MISCELLANEOUS TARIFF, TRADE AND CUSTOMS MATTERS
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April 10, 1984
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84192
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J
t p-NGJ#SSIONAL IECORD r- SENATE April 10, 2984
. I certainly welcome the first aspect
of the . unanimous-consent agreement,
but . I ' would like to find out or get
some assurance from the majority -
leader that we would not be precluded
from discussing or debating or even at
least some form of action on Central
America for what may very well be a
period of time which includes the next
2 or 3 weeks, given wbat has happened
over the period of the past days. I am
wondering if the leader will address
that particular concern.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I will be
happy to. I discussed this matter with
the distinguished Senator. from Massa-
chusetts and the minority leader just
before I made the request, so I antici-
pated his query to me. I thank him for
letting me know in advance his con-
cern.
Mr. President, first, let me say that I
have no desire to hogtie the Senate
and prevent it from addressing the
question of the Senator if, when we
return from the Easter recce, it ap-
pears there are circumstances that
warrant that. Indeed, I would insist
that the Senate have that opportuni-
ty. What I would propose, Mr. Presi-
dent, and what I would assure the Sen-
ator from Massachusetts of, is this:
When we return, if there are new de-
velopments in Central America or de-
velopments which come to our atten-
tion after our return that appear to be
of such a nature that they require
urgent attention of the Senate, I will
consult with the distinguished chair-
man of the Intelligence Committee,
Senator GOLDWAT*, With- the Senator
from Massachusetts acad with the mi-
nority leader. If there a~e'ats to that
group that there Is a m1 urgent
importance that ' we giauid` address,
notwithstanding we have not finished
the boat bill, I assure the Senator
from Massachusetts I will find a way
to do that perhaps by moving off this
bill temporarily and on to another bill
that would carry our deliberations in
that respect.
I give my assurance to the Senator
that I am willing to do that. I do not
make that assurance as an idle ges-
ture, but rather in good faith because
I understand and I appreciate his con-
cern for locking out Senate lonsidera-
tion of any other matter in the future
if circumstances warrant.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the
majority leader's word has been his
bond. That kind of assurance from the
majority leader would certainly, I
think, respond to my concerns. I
cannot speak for other Members of
the Senate who debated this issue at
very great length and with very
considerable concern. But I think that
the assurance which has just been
given by the majority leader to the
Members of this body, and I would
think that means something to the
Members of the body because 1400'-
need to seek additional appropriati m
from Congress.
Thus, despite Mr. Regan's claims to
the contrary, U.S. taxpayer funds will
be utilised to help Argentina. He
should have been more honest about
this. So, too, I question why the pack-
age needed to be so complex. Perhaps
Mr. Regan thought this would confuse
the fact that in the final analysis the
United States is helping to take the
banks off the hook-at least in the
short run. If this is necessary in the
short run to give Argentina breathing
space-so be it. However, ultimately
the banks and debtor countries such
as Argentina are going to have to work
out a longer term solution to the prob-
lems. The banks will have to own up to
the fact that they have been too
greedy in their excessive charges on
loans to these countries, and the coun-
tries will have to concede that they
have attempted to 'live beyond their
means. Once these things occur, then I
believe a workable agreement can be
developed between the parties in-
volved and the U.S. taxpayer will not
be called upon time and time again to
come to the rescue.
Mr. President, -I yield back the re-
mainder' of my time and suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING -OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL
OF THE CHAIR
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, A is so ordered.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, as indi-
cated earlier, -there is a briefing to be
conducted under the auspices of the
Intelligence Committee in 8-407 for all
Senators at 3:30 p.m. In order to make
sure that every Senator has an oppor-
tunity to attend, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Senate now stand in
recess subject to the call of the Chair.
There being no objection, the
Senate, at 3:31 p.m., recessed subject
to the call of the Chair.
The Senate reassembled at 6:30 p.m.,
when called to order by the Presiding
Officer (Mr. ABDNOR).
MISCELLANEOUS TARIFF, TRADE
AND CUSTOMS MATTERS
FEDERAL BOAT SAFETY ACT AMENDMENT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President. If I
could have the attention of Senators,
it is now 6:30 in the evening. First, I
must apologize to all Members for
delay in the regular proceedings of the
Senate, but I think it was worthwhile.
I hope so. .
It will come as no surprise to Mem-
bers to know that there is a great deal
of controversy swirling about the Ken-
d merit and the salaitu-
at en ln. cen to sav ;moth-
f the. comp cations we will en-
c titer when we fiat get down to
the business at hand,-which is the tax
bill as an amendment to the boat bill.
Mr. President, I hav a unanimous
consent request that I would like to
pose which I hope will cut the time
and let us proceed, not only with the
disposition of the Kennedy, amend-
ment and both its divisions, but also
permit us to get on with the business
at hand, which I know the Senator
from Kansas and the Senator from
Louisiana are very anxious to do.
I have described this to the minority
leader and the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts, and I have dis-
cussed it, of course, with Members on
this side. Let me put the request at
this time.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREE ENT
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the order of yesterday pro-
viding 30 minutes of debate and the
recognition of the majority leader for
the purpose of making a tabling
motion or motions be vitiated.
I further ask unanimous consent
that no tabling motion be in order
against division 1 of the Kennedy
amendment.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
dent, that a vote occur up or down on
the Kennedy amendment immediate-
ly.
I ask unanimous consent that after
the vote on the first division of the
Kennedy amendment that the second
division be withdrawn.
I further ask unanimous consent
that no other Central America amend-
ment be in order to this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, first of all I
want to express my appreciation both
to the majority leader and the minor-
ity leader for hopefully getting us to a
point where we will be able to vote up
or down on the merits of this particu-
lar amendment, which is the amend-
ment dealing with the mining in Nica-
ragua.
I would like to address my inquiry to
the majority leader with regard to the
latter part of his unanimous-consent
request. That is with regards to pro-
hibiting further amendments to this
legislation on the subject of Central
America.
I have no other amendments at this
time. I would hope that the Senate
would have an opportunity to act on
the fundamental bill at hand. Realisti-
cally, I think it is probably unlikely
that we will complete this legislation
this week, because we get into the situ-
ation of the Easter recess. Then we
will come back and be on this measure
again. We have seen over a period of
really recent days where there have
been developments in Central America
which need the attention of this body
in addressing those issues and those
questions.
this matter of Central America is of
great'concern not only to Members on
our own side, but Membe$w the side]..
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April 10, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
of the majority leader, I. would say
that that would resolve my own partic-
ular concerns. I cannot speak for
others.
With understanding, I wonder if it
would be appropriate for me to inquire
how the majority leader would expect
to vote on this particular amendment?
Mr. BAKER. After the agreement is
entered into, I will vote for the amend-
ment.
Mr. KENNEDY. I would appreciate
an early decision. I thank the majority
leader and the minority leader for
their cooperation.
Mr. BYRID. Mr. President, I person-
ally have no objection to this agree-
ment. The chief author of the amend-
ment has indicated that the agree-
ment is all right with him. I have no
problem with it. I would, however,
have to run our hotline on the request
before I could finally agree to it.
The majority leader has indicated
that his side had a meeting and has in-
dicated the outcome of that meeting. I
have not had a chance to run this pro-
posal by any Members on our side of
the aisle. I owe them that obligation. I
would suggest that the majority leader
put in a quorum call and give us, say, 5
minutes to run the hotline. Once we
have done that, I will be back to him
and report to him.
Mr. BAKER. I will be happy to do
that.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object and I shall not
object, just to be sure that there is
nothing misunderstood, it is that there
would be a vote on the first half of the
Kennedy amendment and that the
second half will be withdrawn.
Mr. BAKER. That is correct.
Mr. HELMS. And that there will be
no further amendments in order relat-
ing to Central America on this bill.
Mr. BAKER. That is correct.
Mr. HELMS. And the Senator be-
lieves that in a short while, there will
be a vote?
Mr. BAKER. Yes, Mr. President, I
do believe that.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we
should begin with a general caveat
that it does not advance the U.S. na-
tional interest at any time to talk
about specific covert actions, even if
they are successful. There are those
who may have the opinion that covert
actions in and of themselves are
unwise. I do not take that position. I
feel that the President of the United
States has the constitutional authori-
ty to conduct our foreign policy. The
use of covert actions is a classic tool of
foreign policy. When we elect a Presi-
dent, we elect him to use his judgment
in the employment of that tool.
We should also begin with the gener-
al assumption that the United States
should not, as a general rule, accept
the juriedlct fen of the World Court in
matters of our national security. The
sovereignty of the United States
should remain paramount In our con-
siderations.
Mr. President, if we surrender juris-
diction to the World Court in some-
thing that the President judges will
impact on our national security, then
we would be surrendering our sover-
eignty. It is all very nice to speak of
the "rule of law"; but the rule of law is
an ideal that is seldom met in a world
of conflicting cultures, traditions, and
ideologies. We must not put our own
paramount national interests in jeop-
ardy by submitting to the Judgment of.
an international court. In the long
run, the most fundamental right of a
nation is the right to protect its secu-
rity.
All this having been said, we should
also take a look at the substance of
the controversy. If the covert actions
which the press says have been taken
have actually been taken, then I could
easily understand the considerations
which might have led the President to
make the judgment to implement
them. The country of Nicaragua has
become a vast storehouse for arms
threatening the national security of
the region, including our own security.
It has become the Libya of the Carib-
bean, a forward base for the logistics
of supplying revolutionary movements
in the Western Hemisphere.
The prime providers of those arms
are the Soviet Union and Cuba. Those
arms are a present danger to Costa
Rica and Honduras. They are the
proximate danger to the free elections
in El Salvador. The Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs recently
heard testimony from Dr. Fred Ikle,
the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. Dr. Ikle said:.
A year ago, I reported to this Committee
that in 1981 the Soviets had delivered 63,000
tons of arms to Cuba, the highest yearly
total since 1962. Today I must report to you
that the Soviet deliveries have increased
further, to 68,000 tons in 1982-about one
billion dollars worth of military assistance.
Mr. President, those deliveries to
Cuba indicate the growing presence of
Soviet military arms in the region. We
also know that those arms are being
shipped from Cuba to Nicaragua, as
well as directly from other Soviet bloc
ports on Soviet vessels. Nicaragua has
admitted to having increased the
number of military and security forces
to 138,000. This includes 39 percent of
all the males over 18.
According to a Sandinista official,
the first training class of 30 pilots-
part of about 70 Nicaraguans training
in Bulgaria-was due to complete its-
training in December 1983. Mean-
while, improvements have continued
on existing landing strips in Nicaragua
to allow them to accommodate modern
jet aircraft. There are presently 36
new military bases and garrisons in
Nicaragua now under construction or
completed.
Appeoxlmately 50 Soviet tanks have
been Introduced into Nicaragua,
enough to form a second battalion.
Nlaaiagua has received about 1,000
East Germ trucks, 100 antiaircraft
guns, and three brigades of Soviet ar-
S 4193
tiilery that can achieve ranges over 27
kilometers. Nicaragua has also ob-
tained additional assault helicopters
and transport aircraft to improve their
mobility.
Mr. President, this and similar
equipment is coming directly from
Soviet bloc ports to Nicaraguan ports.
It seems to me to be an entirely pru-
dent and responsible action to take ap-
propriate steps to stop such ship-
ments. Such considerations could well
have led to a decision to mine the
ports receiving the military equip-
ment.
Those who object to such policies
should be prepared to take responsibil-
ity for the alternative-the collapse of
neighboring countries into Marx
Leninist hands. Nicaraguan freedom
fighters have irresistible reasons for
doing everything in their power to see
that their country does not fall irre-
versibly into the hands of a totalitar-
ian power which considers Castro,
Stalin, Lenin, and Marx as a suitable
successor to the imperfect political
tradition and the ardently Christian
culture of Nicaragua.
We owe at least the same to our
allies in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador. Whoever is dropping mines
into the waters around Nicaraguan
ports, wherever they are from, are
working for the best interests of the
Nicaraguan people, and of all the
people of the region. Whatever role, if
any, may have been played by U.S. of-
ficials should not blind us to the fun-
damental truth. What we should do is
applaud.
We should not and must not do any-
thing which will concede anything of
our national sovereignty to any inter-
national body, or to any group of Jour-
nalists, or to "international opinion."
or to the "international community,"
whatever that is. A policy which ap-
peals to the rule of law to destroy the
basis for a rule of law-that is to say,
the fundamental freedoms of people
everywhere-can have no part in our
thinking. We cannot stand idly by and
wait until the military buildup be-
comes irresistible.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President,
may I simply make a brief statement
for the information of the Senate with
respect to the second section of the
amendment of the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts? It holds that "The United
States shall immediately withdraw the
modification submitted on April 6,
1984, to the Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice over the
United States with respect to disputes
with any Central American state or
arising out of or related to events in
Central America."
May I inform the Senate, as I am
sure many learned Members know,
that the United States does not have
the right under our original agree-
ment with the Court to make the pro-
posal which the Secretray of State did
make on Friday to the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations. The ratifi-
i .Qt ; i C"'2
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
cation, which the Senate agreed to,
stated by President Truman, indicated
the four areas in which we would
submit to jurisdiction, then concluded:
Provided further, That this declaration
shall remain in force for a" period of five
years and thereafter until the expiration of
six months after notice may be given to ter-
minate this declaration.
Mr. President, by our own previous
agreement, we do not have the right
simply to declare that we will no
longer accept that jurisdiction. As a
matter of fact, in the report of the
Committee on Foreign Relations pre-
sented to this body on August 2, 1946,
it was specifically noted:
The provision for 6 months' notice of ter-
mination after the 5-year period has the
effect of a renunciation of any intention to
withdraw our obligation in the face of a
threatened legal proceeding.
Mr. President, how it could come to
pass that the Department of State
would not know what were the agree-
ments which the United States has
made, what the commitments are that
it has made. and what is the legislative
history explicit of those agreements is
a matter of wonder to this Senator in
all events.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that I may have printed in the
RECORD at this point the declaration of
the United States accepting the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the court with
respect to other nations who did the
same with respect to certain specific
subjects, and also the report of the
Committee on Foreign Relations
which provides the specific legislative
history behind the provision that re-
quires 6 months' notice before any
such exclusion can take place.
There being no. objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECbRD, as follows:
DECLARATION
I. Harry S. Truman, President of the
United States of America, declare on behalf
of the United States of America, under Arti-
cle 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, and in accord-
ance with the Resolution of 2 August 1946
of the Senate of the United States of Amer-
ica (two-thirds of the Senators present con-
curring therein), that the United States of
America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation
to any other State accepting the same obli-
gation, the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereaf-
ter arising concerning-
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if es-
tablished, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of an internation-
al obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not
apply to-
(a) disputes the solution of which the par-
ties shall entrust to other tribunals by
virtue of agreements already in existence or
which may be concluded in the future; or
(b) disputes with regard to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the United States of America as de-
termined by the United States of America;
or
(c) disputes arising under a multilateral
treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty af-
fected by the decision are also parties to the
case before the Court, or (2) the United
States.of America specially agrees to juris-
diction; and
Provided further, that this declaration
shall remain in.force for a period of five
years and thereafter until the expiration of
six months after notice may be given to ter-
minate this declaration.
Done at Washington this fourteenth day
of August 1946.
(Signed) HARRY S. TRUMAN.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to
whom was referred the resolution (S. Res.
196) providing that the Senate advise and
consent to the deposit by the President of
the United States with the Secretary Gener-
al of the United Nations of a declaration
under paragraph 2 of article 36 of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice
recognizing as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement. In relation to
any other State accepting the same obliga-
tion, the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in certain categories of
legal disputes hereafter arising, hereby
report the same to the Senate, with an
amendment with the recommendation that
the resolution do pass as amended.
A. TEXT OF RESOLUTION
Following is the text of the resolution, as
amended by the committee:
"Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein), That the
Senate advise and consent to the deposit by
the President of the United States with the
Secretary General of the United Nations of
a declaration under paragraph 2 of article
36 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice recognizing as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in re-
lation to any other state accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in all legal disputes
hereafter arising concerning-
"a. the intepretation of a treaty;
"b. any question of international law;
"c. the existence of any fact which, if es-
tablished, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
"d. the nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of an internation-
al obligation.
Provided, That such declaration should not
apply to-
"a. disputes the solution of which the par-
ties shall entrust to other tribunals by
virtue of agreements already in existence or
which may be concluded in the future; or
"b. disputes with regard to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the United States.
provided further, That such declaration
should remain in force for a period of 5
years and thereafter until the expiration of
6 months after notice may be given to termi-
nate the declaration."
B. HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
On November 28, 1945, Mr. MORss submit-
ted Senate Resolution 196 for himself, Mr.
TAFT, Mr. GREEN, Mr. FULBRIGHT.. Mr.
SMITH, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. AIxEN, Mr. BALL,
Mr. CORDON, Mr. WILEY, Mr. ToBrz, Mr.
MAGNUSON, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Caroli-
na, Mr. MYERS, and Mr. MCMAHON. The res-
olution was referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations. On June 12. 1946, Chair-
man CONNALLY appointed a subcommittee
consisting of Senator THOMAS (Utah). as
chairman, Senator HATCH and Senator
AUSTIN to hear witnesses on the resolution
April 10, 1984
and to recommend any amendments that
might seem appropriate.
The subcommittee held hearings on July
11, 12, and 15, with Senator Morse, Dean
Acheson (Acting Secretary of State), and
Charles Fahy (legal adviser of the Depart-
ment of State) appearing and a number of
other witnesses testifying on behalf of im-
portant private organizations. Outstanding
jurists and international lawyers also sub-
mitted statements for the record. Witnesses
appeared or statements were submitted
from the following organizations:
American Bar Association.
American Society of International Law.
American Association of University
Women.
General Federation of Women's Clubs.
Young Women's Christian Association.
Americans United for World Government.
Friends Committee on National Legisla-
tion.
National League of Women Voters.
Federal Bar Association.
Women's Action Committee for Lasting
Peace.
Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
in America.
Catholic Association for International
Peace.
Pennsylvania Bar Association.
National Council of Jewish Women.
National Education Association.
C. OVERWHELMING PUBLIC SUPPORT
The subcommittee was impressed by the
fact that all the witnesses who appeared
were enthusiastically in favor of the accept-
ance on the part of the United States of the
jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice with respect to legal disputes. The
general feeling seemed to be that such a
step taken now by the United States would
be the natural and logical sequel to our
entry into the United Nations. Twelve
months' consideration since the signing of
the Charter has strengthened the convic-
tion that this action would immediately in-
crease faith in the efficacy of the United
Nations to promote order and peace.
This relative unanimity of American
public opinion was demonstrated on Decem-
ber 18, 1945, when the house of delegates of
the American Bar Association, without a
dissenting vote, passed a resolution urging
the President and the Senate to take appro-
priate action at the earliest practicable time
to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
court. The American Society of Internation-
al Law, on April 27, 1946, likewise adopted a
favorable resolution by a unanimous vote.
Many other national organizations, with
large memberships, including the American
Association of University Women, the Gen-
eral Federation of Women's Clubs, the Fed-
eral Bar Association, the Inter-American
Bar Association, the Federal Council of
Churches, the National League of Women
Voters, the American Veterans Committee,
the National Education Association, the Na-
tional Council of Catholic Women, and the
American Association for the United Na-
tions, have similarly endorsed the proposal.
D. FAVORABLE ACTION BY FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
On July 17 and 24 the subcommittee re-
ported its findings to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. After a discussion of
the legal and constitutional issues involved
(see secs. 0 and J below) the conrlnittee re-
ported the resolution to the Senate for fa-
vorable action. The vote, which was taken
on July 24, was unanimous.
E. PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION
The immediate purpose of the resolution
is to authorize the President to file with the
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April; 10, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Secretary General of the United Nations a
declaration accepting the compulsory .juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice
over certain categories of legal disputes aris-
ing between the United States and any
other nation which has accepted the same
obligation. The United States would acquire
the right and duty to sue or be sued in re-
spect to such other States and would give
the Court the power to decide whether the
case properly falls within the terms of the
agreement.
The ultimate purpose of the resolution is
to lead to general world-wide acceptance of
the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice in legal cases. The accomplish-
ment of this result would, in a substantial
sense, place international relations on a
legal basis, in contrast to the present situa-
tion, in which states may be their own judge
of the law.
The United States has now become a
member of the Court, but membership in
Itself means comparatively little. It is true
that States can agree to submit specified
cases to the Court, but they have always
been able to settle their disputes by arbitra-
tion, assuming they could agree to do so. So
long as individual members can refuse to be
haled into the Court a regime of law in the
international community will never be real-
ized. The most important attribute of this
or any other court is to hear and decide
cases. For this function it must have juris-
diction of the parties and the subject
matter.
F. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
The undertaking of this obligation by
members of the.United Nations is a logical
fulfillment of obligations already expressed
in the Charter. The preamble expresses the
determination of the peoples of the United
Nations-
"To estalish conditions under which Jus-
tice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained," and to this
end "to insure, by the acceptance of princi-
ples and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest."
Among the purposes of the United Na-
tions set forth In article 1 is-
"To bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settle-
ment of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace."
One of the principles of the Organization
as set forth in article 2 is that-
"All members shall settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and secu-
rity, and justice, are not endangered."
Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Charter
provides that the Security Council should
"take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the
parties to the International Court of Justice
in accordance with the provisions of the
statute of the Court."
In addition, by virtue of the general right
of states to bring disputes before the Secu-
rity Council, any state is liable to have its
political disputes brought before the Coun-
cil without Its consent and to be subject to
such moral obligation as attaches to a rec-
ommendation of the Council (arts, 38 and 37
of the charter). It In incongruous that such
rights and obligations should exist with re-
spect to political disputes but that there
should be no similar obligation for the mem-
bers of the United Nations to submit their
legal disputes to adjudication.
0. JURISDICTION CONFERRED, DEFINED, AND
LIMITED
The scope of the jurisdiction to -be con-
ferred pursuant to this resolution is careful-
ly defined and limited.
There is, in the first place, a general limi-
tation of jurisdiction to legal disputes. The
resolution, like article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Court statute, states this limitation in
general terms and proceeds to define the
four categories of disputes thus included.
These are:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if estab-
lished, would constitute a breach of an in-
ternational obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of an Internation-
al obligation.
A second major limitation on the Jurisdic-
tions conferred arises from the condition on
autocracy. This is again specified in the res-
olution in the language of the statute, the
pertinent phrase being as follows: "recogniz-
ing ? ? ? in relation to any other state ac-
cepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice."
Jurisdiction is thus conferred only, as
among states filing declarations. In addi-
tion, the similar phrase in the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice was interperted by the Court as mean-
ing that any limitation imposed by a state in
its grant of jurisdiction thereby also became
available to any other state with which it
might become involved in proceedings, even
though the second state had not specifically
imposed the limitation. Thus, for example,
if the United States limited its grant of Ju-
risdiction to cases "hereafter arising," this
country would be unable to institute pro-
ceedings regarding earlier disputes, even
though the defendant state might not have
interposed this reservation.
A third limitation specified in the resolu-
tion is that the United States should bind
Itself only as to disputes arising in the
future. The United States may not, there-
fore, be confronted with old controversies as
a result of filing the proposed declaration.
A fourth limitation provides that the pro-
posed action shall not impede the parties to
a dispute from entrusting its solution to
some other tribunal if they so agree. The
same provision is found in the Charter of
the United Nations, article 95.
The fifth limitation is that the proposed
declaration shall not apply to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jursidic-
tion of the United States. A provision simi-
lar, in principle is found in article 2, para-
graph 7, of the Charter, providing that
nothing in the Charter shall authorize the
organization to intervene in essentially do-
mestic matters. The committee feels that
the principle is also implicit in the nature of
international law, which, under article 38,
paragraph 1, of the statute, it Is the duty of
the Court to apply. International law is, by
definition, the body of rights and duties
governing states in their relations with each
other and does not, therefore, concern itself
with matters of domestic jurisdiction. The
question of what is properly a matter of in-
ternational law Is, in case of dispute, appro-
priate for decision by the Court Itself, since,
if it were left to the decision of each individ-
ual state, it would be possible to withhold
any case from adjudication on the plea that
it Is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. It Is
plainly the intention of the statute that
such questions should be decided by the
Court, since article 36, paragraph 6, pro-
vides:
"In the event of a dispute as to whether
the court has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court."
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It was also brought to the attention of the
subcommittee that a number of states, in
filing declarations under the statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice,
interposed reservations similar to that of
the resolution under consideration, but in
no case did they reserve to themselves the
right of decision. The committee therefore
decided that a reservation of the right of de-
cision as to what are matters essentially
within domestic jurisdiction would tend to
defeat the purposes which it is hoped to
achieve by means of the proposed declara-
tion as well as the purpose of article 36,
paragraphs 2 and 6, of the statute of the
Court.
The resolution provides that the declara-
tion should remain in force for a period of 5
years and thereafter until 6 months follow-
ing notice of termination. The declaration
might, therefore, remain in force indefinite-
ly. The provision for 6 months' notice of ter-
mination after the 5-year period has the
effect of a renunciation of any. intention to
withdraw our obligation In the face of a
threatened legal proceeding.
Hon. John Foster Dulles, adviser to the
State Department in relation to the Dum-
barton Oaks proposals and adviser to the
United States delegation to the United Na-
tions Conference on International Organiza-
tion, which drafted the Charter and the
statute of the Court, filed a memorandum
with the subcommittee favoring agreement
by the United States to submit to impartial
adjudication Its legal controversies. He
pointed out that failure to take that step
would be interpreted as an election on our
part to rely on power rather than on reason.
Mr. Dulles advocated that the United
States ought now to make the declaration
submitting this country to the jurisdiction
of the Court according to article 36(2) of the
Court statute. He suggested, however, clari-
fication of certain matters in the declara-
tion to wit:
"1. Advisory opinions: The compulsory ju-
risdiction should presumably be limited to
disputes which are actual cases between
states as distinct from disputes in which ad-
visory opinions may be sought."
On this point the committee view is that
the jurisdiction to be accepted pursuant to
Senate Resolution 196 is coextensive with
the jurisdiction defined in article 36(2) of
the Statute of the Court, which is limited to
legal disputes as distinct from the broader
category of cases referred to elsewhere in
the statute.
With respect to Mr. Dulles' suggestion,
Hon. Charles Fahy, legal adviser of the
State Department, made the following
reply:
"The declaration under article 36 (2)
would grant jurisdiction in 'all legal dis-
putes,' as therein described. But the juris-
diction of the court (art. 36 (1)) extends to
'cases which the parties refer to it' and 'all
matters especially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or the trea-
ties and conventions in force.' Thus the
Court's possible jurisdiction is broader than
the jurisdiction conferred by a declaration
under article 36 (2). The provisions of arti-
cle 36 (2) are limited to'legal disputes.' This
compulsory jurisdiction clearly excludes
cases which are not legal disputes, such as a
case to be decided ex acquo et bono under
article 38 (2) if the parties separately so
agree. Such agreement, of course, would be
over and above any jurisdiction accepted by
the proposed declaration under article 36
(2). The only jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to advisory opinions (art. 65) is as to
a legal question on request of whatever
body may be authorized to make such a re-
quest under the Charter. It Is entirely apart
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from the compulsory jurisdiction which a
state grants by its declaration under article
36 (2). No provision in the declaration would
seem necessary to make it clear that the
declaration under article 36 (2) Is indeed
limited to the jurisdiction covered by that
article.
"2. Reciprocity: Jurisdiction should be
complusory only when all of the other par-
ties to the dispute, have previously accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
The committee considered that article 59
of the Court statute removed all cause for
doubt by providing:
"The decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in re-
spect of that particular case.
If the United States would perfer to deny
jurisdiction without special agreement in
disputes among several states, some of
which have not declared to be bound, article
36 (3) permits it to make its declaration con-
ditional as to the reciprocity of several or
certain states.
Mr. Dulles' objection might possibly be
provided for by another subsection in the
first proviso of the resolution, on page 2,
after line 14, reading:
"c. Disputes arising under a multilateral
treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty af-
fected by the decision are alsQ parties to the
case before the Court, or (2) the United
States specially agrees to Jurisdiction.
"3. International law: If the basic law of
the case is not found in an existing treaty or
convention, to which the United States is a
party, there should be a prior agreement as
to what are the applicable principles of in-
ternational law.
The committee considered both the policy
and the parliamentary problems this sug.
gestion raises and decided to leave Senate
Resolution 196 unchanged as to this point,
for the following reasons:
Article 92 provides:
"The International Court of Justice shall
be the principal Judicial organ of the United
Nations. It shall function in accordance
with the annexed statute, which is based
upon the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and forms an-inte-
gral part of the present Charter."
The Charter cannot be amended by a
mere declaration of some of the states par-
ties to, the present statute. What a state
may do is limited by article 36 (3):
"The declarations referred to above may
be made unconditionally or on condition of
reciprocity on the part of several or certain
states, or for a certain time."
This does not permit a state to condition
submission upon different principles of In-
ternattonal law then those which article 38
commands to be used, thus:
"1. The Court, whose function is to decide
in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
"a. International conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
"b. international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law;
"c. the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations;
"d. subject to the provisions of article 59,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the var-
ious nations, as subsidiary means for the de-
termination of rules of law.
"2. This provision shall not prejudice the
power of 'the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto."
To accomplish substantial alteration of
the applicable principles of the Internation-
al law would requireconsent of jibe ether
parties to the Charter. The purpose of this
declaration is to avoid the procedural neoes-
sity of "Special agreement" and to recognize
Jurisdiction ipso facto over the specified
subject matter and parties.
Hon. Charles Fahy, legal adviser of the
State Department, in a memorandum pre-
pared for the committee, replied to Mr.
Dulles' suggestion as follows:
"3. Mr. Dulles suggests there should be
prior agreement as to what are the applica-
ble principles of international law if the
basic law of the case is not found in an
existing treaty of convention. He feels that
to permit jurisdiction of legal disputes
concerning "any question of international
law" Is too vague at this time.
"It is most inadvisable to accept this view.
It would seriously impede the progress of
the Court in the accomplishment of its pur-
pose. The procedure followed in the case of
the Alabama arbitration, referred to as an
instance where previous agreement on the
applicable law was had, was long before the
establishment of the Court. The Charter of
the United Nations and the present statute
of the Court are designed to enlist sufficient
confidence In judicial determinations by the
Court to enable it to become a useful organ
in the settlement of legal disputes. To re-
quire now an agreement, in advance of. sub-
mission to the Court, on the applicable- prin-
ciples of international law would take from
the Court one of the principal purposes of
its creation. The United States should not
insist on such .a requirement. Whatever risk
to the United States is involved in entrust-
ing cases to the Court for its determination
of the applicable basis of decision under in-
ternational law is outweighed by the tre-
mendous advance which would be made by
our acceptance of such risk in the develop-
ment of judicial processes in the world
order."
Other points referred to the committee by
Mr. Dulles for clarification related to the
problem of domestic jurisdiction, the possi-
bility of resorting to other tribunals, and
the desirability of establishing a time limit
for any declaration the United States might
make.
As has been indicated above, domestic ju-
risdiction is safeguarded by.article 1 (1) of
the Charter of the United Nations, limiting
the purposes of the United Nations to inter-
national disputes or situations, by article 2
(7) excluding domestic jurisdiction. The
committee accepted article 36 (8) of the
statute as covering this point.
"In the event of a dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court."
-The right to submit disputes to other tri-
bunals is reserved in Senate resolution 196,
page 2, line & This reservation is permitted
by article 95 of the Charter.
With respect to a possible time limitation,
Senate Resolution 196 provides for 5 years'
duration, plus time of 6 months following
notice of termination of the declaration. A
further discussion of these points will be
found in the first part of section (0) above.
H. COMPULSORY JURISIIICTIOH PRIOR TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
The first important step in the direction
of compulsory jurisdiction was taken by the
Advisory Committee of Jurists appointed by
the League of Nations in 1920 to prepare
the Statute of the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice. This committee, which
included among its members the Honorable
Eithu Root, former member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of
War, and Secretary of State, recommended
a draft providing for general compulsory ju-
risdiction over specified categories of legal
disputes. It was proposed that this should
be binding upon all parties to the 'statute.
This provision proved unsooeptabie to some
of the larger powers when it was presented
April 10,1984
to the League Council and Assembly, and
there was substituted for it a'provision very
similar to article 36, paragraph 2, of the
present statute, enabling such states as de-
sired to do so to agree among themselves to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court as to
the enumerated categories of legal disputes.
Under this provision some 44 states, in-
cluding 3 of the 5 states now permanent
members of the Security Council (Great
Britain, France, and China), at one time or
another deposited declarations accepting
this jurisdiction.
Proceedings were invoked in 11 cases
under these declarations two of which pro-
ceeded to final determination. One of these
was the Eastern Greenland case, involving
conflicting claims to territory by Norway
and Denmark. Upon the rendering of the
decision of the Court, Norway withdrew the
decrees affecting the territory which had
precipitated the dispute. The second case
which went to decision involved a claim by .
the Netherlands against Belgium for alleged
wrongful diversions of water from the
Meuse River. The other nine cases were ter-
minated on procedural points or were with-
drawn.
1. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION UNDER THE
UNITED NATIONS
The negotiations leading to the conclusion
of the statute of the new International
Court of Justice saw a renewal of the effort
to obtain general compulsory jurisdiction. It
is indicated in the Report of the 1945 Com-
mittee of Jurists, which met in Washington
to formulate proposals relating to the Judi-
cial organ of the proposed world organiza-
tion, that a majority of the Committee was
in favor of compulsory jurisdiction. At San
Francisco the discussion was renewed, and
again a very substantial body of opinion was
shown in favor of general compulsory juris-
diction. Due to the opposition of some states
and the doubtful position of others, it was
felt, however, that such a provision might
endanger acceptance of the Charter, of
which the statute was to be an integral part.
This was the position of the United States
delegation. It was, therefore, agreed to
retain the optional provision in a form Simi,
lar to that employed in the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice.
This is the present article 36, paragraph 2 of
the statute, pursuant to which the action
envisioned by present resolution would be
taken. .
The San Francisco Conference added an
additional paragraph to article 36 of the
statute, according to which declarations ac-
cepting the jurisdiction of the old Court,
and remaining in force, are deemed to
remain in force as among the parties to the
present statute for such period as they still
have to run. Nineteen declarations are cur-
rently in force under this provision.
A further indication of the sentiment pre-
vailing among United Nations delegations at
San Francisco was the adoption by the Con-
ference of a recommendation to the mem-
bers of the Organisation-"that as soon as
possible they make declarations recognizing
the obligatory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice according to the pro-
visions of article 36 of the statute."
J. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES INVOLVED
During the discussion which took place in
the subcommittee three important constitu-
tional Issues were raised. These Issues were:
(1) Can the proposed action be taken by the
treaty-making process or is a joint resolu-
tion of the two Houses preferable; (2) is it
proper procedure, to obtain the advice and
consent of the Senate prior to the deposit of
the declaration by the President; and (3)
would the deposit of the declaration by the
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April 10, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
President establish treaty relations between
the United States and the United Nations or
between the United States and the various
members of the United Nations who have
deposited similar declarations.
With respect to the first issue, a declara-
tion of this kind is no doubt unique so far as
the United States is concerned. No one how-
ever, can doubt the power of this Govern-
ment to make such a declaration. The ques-
tion is one of procedure. During the debates
on the United Nations Charter the problem
was discussed at some length on the floor of
the Senate, and it was generally agreed that
the President could not deposit the declara-
tion without congressional action of some
kind granting him the authority to do so.
To clarify the issue Senator VANDENBEa6 re-
quested an opinion of Mr. Green Hackworth
then legal adviser of the Department of
State. The pertinent paragraph of this opin-
ion. Which Senator VANDENBERO read on the
floor of the Senate on July 28, 1945, follows:
"If the Executive should initiate action
to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court under the optional clause contained
in article 36 of the statute, such procedure
as might be authorized by the Congress
would be-followed, and if no specific proce-
dure were prescribed by statute, the propos
ai would be submitted to the Senate with re-
quest for its advice and consent to the filing
of the necessary declaration with the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations."
Since that time both the President and
the Secretary of State have indicated that,
in their opinion, either the procedure out-
lined the Senate Resolution 196 (calling for
a two-thirds vote of the Senate) or that out-
lined in House Joint Resolution 291 (calling
foY a simple majority vote of the two
Houses) would furnish a satisfactory legal
basis for acceptance by the United States of
the compulsory jurisdiction clause.
Inasmuch as the declaration would involve
important new obligations for the United
States, the committee was of the opinion
that it should be approved by the treaty
process, with two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring. The force and effect of
the declaration is that of a treaty, binding
the United States with respect to those
States which have or which may in the
future deposit similiar declarations. More-
over, under our constitutional system the
peaceful settlement of disputes through ar-
bitration or judicial settlement has always
been considered a proper subject for the use
of the treaty procedure. While the declara-
tion can hardly be considered a treaty in the
strict sense of that term, the nature of the
obligations assumed by the contracting par-
ties are such that no action less solemn or
less formal than that required for treaties
should be contemplated.
With respect to the second issue the
answer may be found in the Constitution
itself, Article 2, section 2, provides that the
President shall have "power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur." It is evident that
the advice and consent of the Senate is
equally effective whether given before,
during, or after the conclusion of the treaty.
In fact, President Washington approached
the Senate for its advice and consent prior
to the negotiation of treaties, and this prac-
tice was followed on occasion by other Presi-
dents. While the practice of prior consulta-
tions with the Senate fell into disuse after
1816, a recent precedent may be found in
the convention of 1927, extending the Gen-
eral Claims Commission, United States and
Mexico of 1923. The treaty was signed on
August 16, 1927, pursuant to a Senate reso-
lution of February 17,'1927. A similiar ex-
ample is the convention of. 1929. again ex-
tending the life of the Commission. The
convention was signed on August 17, 1929,
purusuant to the Senate resolution of May
25, 1929.
With regard to the third issue, the pro-
posed declaration would not constitute, in
any sense, an agreement between the
United States and the United Nations. It is
rather a unilateral declaration having the
force and effect of a treaty as between the
United States and each of the other states
which accept the same obligations. It is
merely an extension of the general principle
that any two states may agree to submit
cases to arbitration or judicial settlement.
The so-called optional clause would permit a
large number of states to take such action
with respect to the four categories of legal
cases enumerated.
As to whether the United States can enter
into a treaty with the United Nations, the
question is not here at issue. In any event, it
is clear that the United States can conclude
agreements with the United Nations, inas-
much as the United Nations Participation
Act authorized the President to take such
action in conformity with the pledge of the
United States to make armed forces availa-
ble to the Security Council under article 43
of the Charter. Moreover, there appears to
be nothing In the Constitution Which for-
bids the conclusion of a treaty between the
United States and an international organi-
zation.
If it follows that the legal capacity of the
United Nations is all that is required to
enable the United States and the United Na-
tions to enter into treaty relationships, arti-
cle 104 of the Charter would seem to estab-
lish that authority. Article 104 reads:
"The Organization shall enjoy in the ter-
ritory of each of its members such legal ca-
pacity as may be necessary for the exercise
of its functions and the fulfillment of its
per.,,
X. DESIRABILITY OP SPEEDY ACTION
Most of the witnesses appearing before
the subcommittee expressed the hope that
the Senate would act speedily in order to
demonstrate once more the conviction of
the people of the United States that peace
will be possible only if law and justice are
firmly embedded in the foundations of the
United Nations. To be sure, the extension of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice will not usher the
world automatically into an era of peace; it
is only one important step in man's long and
painful march toward a warless world. The
acceptance by the United States of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction clause, however, would
constitute & step of great psychological and
moral significance. It would help develop a
spirit of trust and confidence, particularly
on the part of the small states, toward the
United States And it would give impetus to
the principle of the peaceful settlement of
disputes as the judges of the new Court
begin their work at the Peace Palace in The
Hague.
On July 28, 1945, the Senate ratified the
United Nations Charter by the overwhelm-
ing vote of 89 to 2. Since that time the
people of the United States, the Senate, the
House of Representatives, the President;
and the Secretary of State have repeatedly
asserted the conviction that the foreign
policy of the United States must be cen-
tered about the activities and the organs of
the United Nations. The International
Court of Justice is one of the principal
organs of the United Nations. It would seem
entirely consistent with our often pro-
nounced policy for the Senate to take
speedy action in order to ensure our full co-
operation with the work of. the Court at the
earliest practicable date.
54197
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
in its report to the Senate on the United Na-
tions Charter, expressed the following view:
"Unless we are prepared to take all steps
which are necessary to effectuate our mem-
bership in the United Nations, we would be
merely deceiving the hopes of the United
States and of humanity in ratifying the
Charter."
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, 2
weeks ago, I expressed the opinion
that the debate we were about to have
would be the most important debate
we would have this session. Today, we
are about to take a vote that could be
the most significant vote of this
decade.
This vote is significant because it in-
volves the lives of innocent people.
Today, we will vote to save innocent
lives, or we will vote to take innocent
lives.
With this vote, we will also deter-
mine whether the United States of
America, under the direction of Presi-
dent Reagan, will continue its march
toward war in Central America. With
this vote, we will decide whether U.S.
funds should continue to be used for-
and whether U.S. personnel should
continue to be involved in-the indis-
criminate mining of territorial waters
in Nicaragua.
On March 29, Just as our debate
about Central America was beginning,
we learned that U.S: personnel were
being used on reconnaissance missions
over El Salvador to assist the Salva-
doran Army in combat with the guer-
rillas. And last Friday, after our
debate had ended, we learned that
U.S. personnel were being used to
mine the harbors and territorial
waters of Nicaragua. That same day,
the Secretary of State quietly with- -
drew this Nation from the Jurisdiction
of the World Court with respect to dis-
putes with Central American nations.
But we did not know about that then,
and we did not learn about that until
yesterday.
President Reagan is moving us
toward war. He has moved U.S. citi-
zens up to the edge of combat, and he
has involved U.S. citizens in the hostil-
ities.
Last week, we debated whether the
United States should continue to pro-
vide military assistance to the Contras
in Nicaragua. Last week, on the floor
of the Senate, we debated whether
such assistance was in violation of in-
ternatJonal law. We were repeatedly
assured that the Contras were not en-
gaged in efforts to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua. We were re-
peatedly told that the Contras were
not conducting a war to destroy the
economic infrastructure of Nicaragua.
If that were true, many Senators said,
we would not be voting to support the
Contras. And even the President of the
United States got into the debate. He
sent a letter in which he assured us
that the United States did "not seek to
destabilize or overthrow the govern-
ment of Nicaragua; nor to impose or
compel any particular form of govern-
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ment there." But 2 days later, the
United States of America withdrew
from jurisdiction of the World Court.
The question before the Senate is a
fundamental one: Will we take any re-
sponsibility at all-or will we abdicate
completely to the executive branch?
Will we condone terrorism and sabo-
tage? Will we let the Reagan adminis-
tration pursue a policy of sneaking
war Into Central America?
'We have turned our backs on diplo-
macy.
We have turned our backs on inter-
national law.
Will the Senate watch passively as
this administration sovietizes Ameri-
can foreign policy-as it adopts the
standard that the end Justifies the
means-as it avoids our constitutional
process and misleads the Congress?
The truth Is confessed only when
the administration is caught in the
act. Such con es a is not the kind of
consultation which the Congress de-
serves or should demand. Such sur-
prises are not the basis for bipartisan-
ship.
Often in this debate, r have raised
the questiop. of our obligation to histo-
ry. I raise it again How will the Sena-
tors here explain someday that Ameri-
can sons are dying in an unwinnable
war in Central America because we
lacked courage to take a stand-or be-
cause we followed a political calculus
which held that the administration
should be- permitted to twist slowly in
the political wind? For what is being
strangled rapidly now is the hope for a
peaceful settlement.
The administration said we had no
combat role in EI. Salvador. On March
29, we learned this was untrue-and
that our forces were engaged in
combat reconnaissance in that coun-
try.
The administration said that we
were not seeking to destabilize the
Government of Nicaragua; we only
sought to interdict arms and supplies
for the rebels in El Salvador. Now we
have learned that this is untrue-that
we have mined a port far from any
point of arms shipments to EI Salva-
dor-and that our mines may blow up
the ships of our NATO allies.
We know the evasions, the rational-
izations, the fabrications, for we have
heard them from this administration
until they have become as tattered as
they are tartrue. We have no excuse
for continued inaction. -
Let us end escalation by surptse in
Central America.
Let us at long lest exercise the
power we were elected to use-and let
us my to this aelminlstration, "Enough
is enough. You shall no longer move
toward war before trying for peace."
? Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
there has been a good deal of discus-
sion in the press recently about re-
marks I allegedly made on the floor of
the Senate lest Wednesday night,
April 5, 1984.
An article in the Wall Street Journal
on the following day stated:
During Senate debate this week, the Intel-
ligence Committee Chairman, Barry Gold-
water, (R., Ariz.) surprised other Senators
by openly referring to a document or paper
indicating that the administration had di-
rectly authorized the mining. Mr. Gold-
water's remarks were dropped from the pub-
lished record made available yesterday, and
while an aide to the Senator dismissed the
matter, two other sources indicated that
such a paper or staff memo did exist.
As well, an article in the New York
Times this Monday stated:.
Senator Barry Goldwater, the chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, inad-
vertently referred to the covert operation in
floor debate. A Senator said Mr. Goldwater,
an Arizona Republican, later had his re-
marks deleted from the Congressional
Record.
There may have been other refer-
ences to this matter as well.
Mr. President, in almost 30 years
service in the U.S. Senate I have never
had my remarks deleted from the
Raoono. Bowever, what we were con-
fronted with last week was a rather
unusual situation-ia fact, it was a
unique situation which I haze never
encountered before.
When the Senate Select Committee
on Inee was established is the
spring of 1976, Senate Resolution 400
gave the committee iurbdietton and
authority to consider all legislation
and other matters relating to authori-
zations for appropriations for the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. Section 501
of the National Security Act of 1947,
which was enacted as part of the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for fiscal
year 1981, imposes an obligation upon
the Director of Central Intelligence
and the - heads of all departments,
agencies, and other entities of the
United States involved in intelligence
activities to keep the Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Repre-
sentatives fully and currently in-
formed of all intelligence activities
which are the responsibility of, are en-
gaged In by, or are carried out for or
on behalf of any department, agency,
or entity of the United States, Includ-
ing any significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity.
Section 662 of the Foreign Assist-
ance Ad of 1961, as amended by the
Intelligence Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1981, requires that each op-
eration conducted by or on behalf of
the Central Intelligence Agency in a
foreign country, other than activities
intend solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence, shall be eosiaidesed a sig-
nificant anticipated intelligence activi-
ty for the purpose of section 501 of
the National Security Act of 2947.
Mr. President, I am providing this
background to make it clear to my col-
leagues that if the CIA was engaged in
the mining of selected harbors in Nica-
ragua, this fact would of necessity
have been briefed to me and to my
committee or committee staff ahead of
time. I say it would have been briefed
of necessity, Mr. President, because
April 10, 1984
this is the law. Now we may all debate
whether this is a good law or a bad law
or an indifferent law, but it is the law.
Now, last Wednesday night, during
open debate on the floor of the
Senate, a member of my committee
came to me to ask if I had seen a docu-
ment which indicated that the Presi-
dent ordered the mining of selected
harbors in Nicaragua. I responded to
him by saying that I had seen no such
document and that I could not believe
the President could have approved
such a program since our committee
had not been so briefed. Nor had I re-
ceived any such briefing. After a few
minutes' hrrestigaticn, I learned that
the document my member had re-
ferred to was simply an informal
memorandueu from a staff member to
a Senator. It had been hastily pulled
together in reapoeeae to a couple of
questions m the mining, and bad no
official standing as far as I was con-
cerned. Although I comveyed these
findings to my colleagues an the floor,
I felt the matter deserved further in-
quiry, and say remarks were struck
until such a tune: as further clarifica-
tion could be obtained.
Mr. President, this afternoon, CIA
Director Casey appeared before my
committee in closed session to brief us
on this issue. I learned to my deep
regret that the President did approve
this mining program, and that he ap-
proved it almost 2 months ago. Fur-
thermore, I learned that in spite of
the legal requirement that the intelli-
gence family keep the members of our
committee fully and currently in-
formed on this sort of matter, we had
not been so informed. By contrast, the
House Permanent Select- Committee
on Intelligence had been fully briefed
on this matter several weeks ago.
Now I have written Director Casey
that this is no way to run a railroad. I
am forced to apologize to the members
of my committee because I did not
know the facts on this case, and .I
apologize to all Members of the Senate
for the same reason.
Mr. President, I have always felt
strongly about the issue of leaks and
of protecting the legitimate secrets of
our Nation. So I will not comment fur-
ther on this matter for the public
record. However, I am prepared to pro-
vide any Member of the Senate with
further details on this matter in pri-
vate if they so desire. As well, Mem-
bers of the Senate may wish to visit
the -offices of the Select Committee on
Intelligence to review documents and
transcripts on this matter, as well as
to talk to our cleared staff. I consider
this a matter of great Importance, not
Just to the members of our committee,
but to the Senate as a whole. And I am
prepared to share whatever informa-
tion we do have at this time. ?
MINING OP NICAit6 7AN PORTS
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am
voting in support of this amendment
because I`am concerned that the re-
ported CIA Involvement in the mining
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of Nicaraguan ports is part of a broad-
er U.S. covert effort that effectively
supports the overthrow of the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua in violation of the
Congress legislative statement of 1982.
Last week I supported an amendment
to delete $21 million for the covert war
against Nicaragua.
While the official purpose of U.S.
covert aid to Nicaraguan Contras is
the interdiction of the flow of arms
from Nicaragua to El Salvador, the ex-
press goal of the Contras is the over-
throw of the Sandinista government.
While it may be argued that the
mining of Nicaraguan ports will help
to interdict the flow of arms between
Nicaragua and El Salvador, the effect
of the mining goes beyond this limited
goal. Mines are blind to the cargo and
flag of the vessels that trigger them,
damaging commercial vessels as easily
as those transporting Soviet and
Cuban armaments. I am concerned
that our actions in and around Nicara-
gua have dangerous repercussions
beyond our stated goals, and that-our
present involvement is contrary to the
stated intent of Congress. The Con-
gress has not declared war against
Nicaragua, yet the mining of another
nation's harbors, like support for a
group whose expressed objective is the
overthrow of a government with
which we have full diplomatic rela-
tions, may be interpreted as an act of
war.
If it is the will of American people to
wage, either directly or indirectly, a
war against the Government of Nica-
ragua, let Congress debate and so de-
clare its intent. If it is not the intent
of the United States to overthrow the
Government of Nicaragua, let us not
engage in support of activities that
may be interpreted as acts of war.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to
state my strong support for Senator
KENmmy's amendment-and to voice
my strong opposition to administra-
tion policy. American participation in
the mining of Nicaragua's harbors is
more than a mere contravention of in-
ternational law. It constitutes a policy
that is strategically wrong, politically
stupid, and morally outrageous. It is a
policy that comes dangerously close to
being an act of war-and I say it is
time for Congress to bring it to a halt.
Let there be no mistake about what
is at issue today. We are not talking
about whether the United States
should be involved in Central Ainer-
ica-or about whether we should pro-
vide financial assistance to democratic
elements in that region. I have long
voiced my support for economic and
military help to the governments of El
Salvador and other central American
countries-and so have a majority of
my Senate colleagues. I have long
voiced my concern over Nicaragua's
seeming desire to export revolution in
that region-and as have a majority of
my Senate colleagues. Like you, I be-
lieve the United States has an obliga?
tion to encourage the voices of moder-
ation and democracy in Central Amer-
ica-and to discourage the forces of
tyranny and dictatorship.
But those goals are not at issue
today. What is at issue is the Reagan
administra'tion's cavalier attitude
toward basic principles of internation-
al law. What is at issue is the adminis-
tration's continuing love affair with
gunboat diplomacy and the politics of
force. And what is at issue is the ad-
ministration's blatant disregard for
Congress role in the making of U.S.
foreign policy.
Apparently, Mr. Reagan thinks that
when it comes to the use of military
force, the job of Congress is to keep its
eyes closed, its checkbook open, and
its mouth shut. He seems to think that
it is all right to violate international
law and to spit in the eyes of our
allies. and he apparently expects Con-
gress to dutifully go along and do only
what we are told.
Well, I say enough is enough. I say
the time has come for us to stand up
and serve, notice on this administra-
tion; to serve notice that we are not
content to be silent partners in a mis-
guided policy that ignores our national
interests and betrays our national
principles. Let us serve notice that
when American lives are at stake, Con-
gress can no longer be expected to
first look the other way-and then to
rally round this administration's fail-
ures.
By directing the CIA to participate
in the mining of Nicaragua's harbors,
the Reagan administration has embar-
rassed the Congress and the country.
It has put us in the ridiculous position
of laying mines that our Western Eu-
ropean allies may help to remove. It
has put us in the preposterous posi-
tion of attempting to topple at worst
or bully at best a government we rec-
ognize and with whom we have diplo-
matic relations. And it puts us in the
hypocritical position of opposing state-
sponsored terrorism when it is direct-
ed against.our friends-and of condon-
ing and even conducting it when it is
directed against our real. or imagined
enemies.
Finally, Mr. President, let me say
that I am deeply concerned about
what this latest action by the adminis-
tration may signal about its future for-
eign policy intentions. I need not
remind you that the mining operation
was carried out without the knowledge
of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
I need not remind you that virtually
our entire foreign policy in Central
America-from the use of training
funds to build military infrastructure
in Honduras to the not-so-secret war
in Nicaragua to the mining of that
country's harbors-has been conduct-
ed outside the normal policymaking
framework of this Nation. And I am
sure I need not remind you that just
this past weekend, unidentified White
House advisers were darkly warning
about the probable use of U.S. combat
troops in Central America-although
not until 1085 and not until this year's
election has safely passed.
S 4199
Mr. President, I believe there is. a
pattern here-and I believe we must
show the administration that we find
it to be completely unacceptable.
Again, I am not calling for a retreat
from our responsibilities in Central
America. Nor am I suggesting. that
there are no circumstances under
which the use of force in that region
would be acceptable. But I am suggest-
ing that no U.S. foreign policy-in
that region or any other-can be suc-
cessful unless it has the support of
Congress and the American people. I
am suggesting that it is time we call a
halt to the administration's high-
handed attitude and underhanded tac-
tics. And I am suggesting that it is
time Congress asserted its rightful
place in the making of American for-
eign policy-and stopped the wrongful
mining of Nicaraguan harbors. I ask
my colleagues to give this amendment
their wholehearted and enthusiastic
support.
IUMNG IfICMAGUAN HARLORI
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
the disclosure of the mining of Nicara-
guan harbors by the CIA has raised
the most serious questions about U.S
policy and the effectiveness of the in-
telligence oversight process. It is very
disturbing that the Select Committee
on Intelligence was not fully and prop-
erly informed of this matter, which
was so clearly and directly relevant to
our consideration of the recent supple-
mental appropriations bill to provide
additional funds for CIA operations in
Nicaragua.
Had I been aware of the mining ac-
tivities, I would have voted against any
funds for that purpose. That knowl-
edge would also have given cause for
me to reconsider my support of the
supplemental appropriation for the
entire operation.
The records of the Select Committee
have been reviewed, and we have
found only one reference to mining ac-
tivities. It did not convey the nature,
extent, or seriousness of what has
been going on.
It is very important for all of us to
understand why the mining of Nicara-
guan harbors is so objectionable. The
fundamental problem is that it is in-
discriminate, rather than directed
against specific targets. I could sup-
port action to interdict a particular
vessel known to be carrying arms to
Nicaragua that could reasonably be
expected to go to guerrillas in El Sal-
vador. That action could be justified
as necessary to protect El Salvador
from outside military intervention.
However, the mining operations that
have been carried out are far differ-
ent. They pose a danger to ships from
entirely innocent countries, carrying
nonmilitary cargo. Our closest allies,
such as Britain and France, have had
their ships and the lives of their citi-
zens placed in jeopardy. Moreover, in-
nocent fishing boats manned entirely
by civilians earning their livelihood
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It makes no 'difference if the mines an example of just that kind of dilem-
are constructed so as not to sink the ma.
ships. They still do damage to proper- - As my colleagues in the Senate
ty and endanger human lives. know, I earnestly hope for a bipartisan
Over the past year I have tried to consensus on foreign policy. To me,
work with my colleagues on the Select politics ideally should stop at the
Committee to insure that the adminis- water's edge. Each of the 535 Members
tration's operations against Nicaragua of Congress cannot be Secretary of
would be subject to the closest possi- State or Commander in Chief. If Con-
ble oversight scrutiny and review. Un- gress secondguesses every decision by
fortunately, the oversight process has a President, we will send an uncertain
not worked in this case to keep the signal to the rest of the world.
committee fully and currently in- Others around the world have come
formed of all significant anticipated to wonder about the ability of the
intelligence activities, as contemplated President to speak for the United
by the congressional oversight provi- States. Even our allies publically ques-
sions enacted in 1980. tion our ability to live up to our com-
We need to learn from this experi- mitments. Our frequent changes of di-
ence. The risk of the type of paramili- rection have left our credibility in
tary operations undertaken against doubt. Our family fights have been
Nicaragua appears to be that they in- watched by the entire world.
evitably get out of control. The Select To be perfectly honest, neither the
Committee has attempted, in a biparti- President nor the Congress, Demo-
san way, to prevent this from happen- crate nor Republicans, can be very
ing. We will continue to do all that we proud of the record of the last decade
can to insure that the administration's when it comes to healing the wounds
use of the CIA's sensitive capabilities of the sixties and building a spirit of
is held accountable through congres- bipartisanship in foreign policy. The
sional oversight to the principles and President was not fair in blaming Con-
interests of the American people. gress for the failure of the administra-
? Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I am tion's policy in Lebanon. It was a
convinced that the vast majority of flawed policy in the beginning. Inject-
the American people could be de- ing a small number of American
scribed as political moderates. They troops into a long, bitter, aeligious war
tend to distrust both the extremism of among several factions would not have
the right and of the left. They do not succeeded even if Congress had voted
want government to be so active that unanimously to support it.
it stifles individual initiative but they On the other hand, there were those
do not want it to be so inactive that it in Congress who were too quick to
fails either to protect equal opportuni- criticize the President when he took
ty of all citizens or to provide for decisive and appropriate action to use
those who are unable to help them- our power to protect our interests in
selves. Grenada. The objective was limited
In foreign policy they are not naive and the chances for success were ex-
isolationists who would concede our cellent.
vital interests in the world to our ad- Some have used the Vietnam experi-
versaries. Neither are they reckless in- ence to argue for complete isolation-
terventionists who would squander our ism. They seem prepared to ,criticize
power carelessly in situations. which any possible use of American power,
we cannot win or which needlessly en- under any circumstances or in any
danger the lives of our young people. part of the world. Such a policy would
Our country has been well served by render the United States impotent in
the commonsense and sound moderate the eyes of the world. It would encour-
judgment of our people. It has gener- age our adversaries to test us and
ally been reflected in the ability of our would increase the risk of conflicts.
political leaders to form a consensus As I said earlier, I believe that the
around which most Americans could vast majority of'the American people
rally both in terms of domestic and reject this naive isolationsim which is
foreign policy. in short a policy of international capit-
For moderates, however, these are ulation.
difficult and frustrating times. The I cannot believe that the American
process for picking our national lead- people want us to simply give up Cen-
ers seems to favor those who tend to tral America and allow regional insta-
the polar positions instead of those bility in our own backyard to move
closer to the reasonable mainstream of ever closer to our 1,800-mile frontier
the total population. with Mexico.
Our sense of community has been On the other hand, if we reject isola-
fragmenting. More energy is spent in tionism, we must not embrace reckless
appealing to narrow single-interest interventionism.
groups than in uniting all Americans I have tried to follow a moderate bi-
for the common good. Too much time partisan course. Last week, I voted
is spent in scoring partisan political consistently against amendments
points than in forming nonpartisan co- which I felt would 'unduly tie the
alitions to solve problems. hands of the President in responding
The moderate majority is often left to emergencies in Central. America. I
to select the lesser of evils among ex- voted against amendments which I felt
_treme choices. The current situation is would set unwise precedents- altering
the President's constitutional powers
as Commander in Chief.
I Voted to support administration ef-
forts in El Salvador to help the people
there help themselves. As an observer
to recent elections in that country, I
am convinced that they were basically
fair and honest. I have no doubt that
the vast majority of the people there
want the ballot and not the bullet to
determine their future. Their demo-
cratic process deserves our encourage-
ment and support.
While the outcome is far from cer-
tain, it would appear that there is at
least a chance that El Salvador may be
winnable. To me, the administration
seems correct in wanting to give our
best effort to attempt to stabilize the
situation there.
In Nicaragua, the situation is less
clear. The legacy of the past dictato-
rial government has clearly created
some significant support for the cur-
rent government. While it has been a
close question in my mind, I voted to
continue our efforts in Nicaragua
aimed at stopping the flow of arms to
hostile forces in other nations.
I have clearly done my best to build
bipartisan support for a reasonable
policy in Central America. We must
test every aspect of that policy by
weighing the moral issues involved
and by carefully balancing the risks of
the policy against the chance for suc-
cess. To me it is clearly moral and in
our interest to attempt to support the
democratic process in El Salvador.
. It is at least possible to argue that it
is proper for us to interdict by practi-
cal means the flow of aggressive arms
from Nicaragua.
The indiscriminate mining of Nicara-
guan harbors in my opinion, however,
clearly fails the test. It is subject to
attack on moral grounds. It clearly
runs grave risks because of the danger
it can cause to ships of many nations,
some of whom are allied to us. It could
cause a major international confronta-
tion if it resulted in loss of life of for-
eign nationals. While this tactic runs
grave risks, they are certainly not bal-
anced by any significant gain which is
achievable by using it.
I deeply regret that this action has
been taken. By resorting to careless
use of our resources, the administra-
tion has at least in the short run only
strengthened the position of those
who would criticize what I believe are
legitimate uses of our power in other
areas in Central America.
My conscience and best judgment
lead me to support the pending sense
of the Senate amendment which con-
demns the mining of Nicaraguan har-
bors.
In reaching this decision, it should
be clear that I do not embrace any
policy of retreat or isolationism in
Central America. Perhaps this current
state of events will make it absolutely
clear to both Congress and the Presi-
dent that we should urgently get on
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with the task of developing a biparti-
san policy.
Let us hope that America's moderate
majority will make itself heard. It is
time for both Congress and the Presi-
dent to call a moratorium on the esca-
lating rhetoric. We must forget past
differences and sit down together. I
hope that the President and congres-
sional leaders of both parties will sit
down together and in candor and good
faith resolve their differences. Volun-
tarily agreeing to accept the congres-
sional view that the mining of the
harbor should be stopped would be a
good first step on the part of the
President. It he should take that step,
let us hope that Congress would also
be prepared to respond, positively.*
U.S. INVOLVEMENT OF NICARAGUAN TERRITORIAL
wATERS
Mr. JEPSEN. Mr. President, last
week, the Senate voted on several as-
pect, of military aid to Central Amer-
ica in the context of the urgent sup-
plemental appropriations bill. Among
the areas that were extensively de-
bated, was the question of so-called
covert aid to the Contras in Nicaragua.
As the record shows, I have supported
funding the amounts requested by the
administration for these activities.
However, my support has been con-
tingent on several principles involved
with our aid to those groups within
Nicaragua who are fighting to push
Nicaragua back toward the path of a
democratic and free society.
These principles included:
That the main goal of the funding
was the interdiction of military sup-
plies flowing from Nicaragua to the
guerrillas in El Salvador.
That the aid be used to help only
Nicaraguan nationals in their struggle
against the Sandinista government.
That the aid not compromise the
commitment of the United States to
bringing about the rule of law in inter-
national relations.
Over the weekend, I began to read
stories in the press of much more
direct U.S. involvement in the contra
operations that may, in my view,
jeopardize everything that we have
been attempting to accomplish there. I
speak specifically of the reports of
direct CIA involvement in the efforts
to mine the territorial waters off Nica-
ragua.
When I read such reports, I am in-
creasingly skeptical of the ability of
some policymakers in the administra-
tion to develop successful strategies to
deal with the growing number of chal-
lenges to the United States in the
world.
Now I number myself in that group
who want to put maximum pressure
on the Sandinistas to fulfill the prom-
ises that they made to the OAS and to
stop shipping military arms and am-
munition to the guerrillas in El Salva-
dor. Cuban and Nicaraguan interfer-
ence ? in the internal affairs of the
duly-elected Government in El Salva-
dor is the major stumbling block to
peaceful resolution of the many con-
flicts in that country. Seen in the light
of what we are trying to do in Central
America, this most recent operation
off of?Nicaragua is plain dumb.
If viewed strictly in the light of
narrow logistical and operational con-
siderations, mining the coastal waters
off Nicaragua may seem attractive as
one way to put additional pressure on
the Sandinistas. But if political and
social factors are taken into, considera-
tion, the plan should have been reject-
ed. To consider that political and
social concerns would be bypassed by
keeping such a large-scale operation
"covert" shows an ignorance of history
and an inordinate dose of wishful
thinking.
If there is any relationship between
reality and what I have been reading
in the press, and I will be first to
admit that the relationship is not
always there, the U.S. involvement in
the mining of Nicaraguan coastal
waters violates many of the basic prin-
ciples on which "covert operations"
have been supported in Congress.
The best way to view the mining op-
eration is to set up a balance sheet of
costs and benefits. The benefits that
the Contra mining could be expected
to accrue are the following:
Mining the waters of Nicaragua
would seriously damage the ability of
Nicaragua to export her recently bar,
vested commodities that are virtually
the sole resource of foreign exchange.
The result of this could be to stop the
arms shipments to El Salvador and to
fulfill the promises they made to the
OAS.
Slowing the importation of oil could
have the long-term effect of hamper-
ing the Sandinistas ability to carry out
military operations against the Con-
tras.
It appears that mining is being con-
ducted in such a way as to stop short
of sinking large ships, but merely
serves as a deterrent to ships heading
for Nicaraguan ports.
Against these so-called plusses a con-
siderably greater number of minuses
can be set.
Because of the sophisticated nature
of the operation, U.S. citizens and non-
Nicaraguan nationals hired by the CIA
appear to be directly involved. This is
an essential change in our role in Nica-
ragua.
Our open society and the size of the
operation has virtually guaranteed a
leak to the press.
Participation in the act of mining
the territorial waters of another coun-
try is considered an "act of war" in the
international community.
Damaging third party shipping
raises serious questions about the U.S.
commitment to freedom of the seas.
Once again the star of the Sandinis-
tas is rising in Western Europe as
world sympathy is aroused by our ac-
tions. There are now even discussions
among our allies about helping to
clear the mines from Nicaraguan
waters.
S 4201
This latest action has given the
Nicaraguans the very limited amount
of credibility they needed to bring- a
case against the United States to the
World Court, the same body that we
appealed to to obtain the release of
American hostages in Teheran.
As a result, we have had to formally
declare that we will no longer accept
the jurisdiciton of the World Court in
matters involving the United States.
We have given the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment an open opportunity to blame
the United States for an economic fail-
ure that is in reality the fault of mis-
management by the Sandinistas.
The long-term effects of our involve-
ment in the mining of Nicaraguan
waters will be hard to predict, but we
should terminate a policy which has
and will continue to undermine our
credibility in the international arena.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, this is a most painful of occa-
sions. For at least 5 years, many of us
have been trying to help our executive
branch forge a workable policy on
Central America. Our progress has
been difficult and slow. Now, in the
last few years, we may be witnessing
the unraveling of what little policy
there was.
Faced with this crisis-and for once
there is a crisis-the Senate has a re-
sponsibility. Our role must be to
rescue American policy. from its own
excesses. We must not be the wrecking
crew, but the salvage team.
The mining of Nicaraguan harbors
illustrates the complexity of any activ-
ist foreign policy. It is one thing to
decide on the broad outlines of such a
policy-the one will engage in covert
action in Nicaragua, for example, or
that one will attempt to interdict arms
flows into El Salvador. It is quite an-
other thing, however, to implement
that decision successfully.
I can understand why the executive
branch would want to mine Nicara-
guan harbors. Despite the doubts of
my colleague, the senior Senator from
Massachusetts, one might well feel
that mining harbors was one way to
stem the flow of arms from Cuba to
Nicaragua, and from there into El Sal-
vador. One might also hope that eco-
nomic pressure on the Nicaraguan
Government would lead that govern-
ment to consider making its peace
with its neighbors, with the United
States, and especially with its own
people, so many of whom fought for
Nicaragua in 1979 and are now fight-
ing for the Contras.
Presidents and executive branches
seem less inclined to consider the
downside of their policies. In their
quest for activist solutions, they are
hardly eager to ponder whether a
tactic will actually do more harm than
good.
The difficulty of combining a covert
action policy with reasonable tactics
has been present from the very start.
When we first heard about this pro-
gram, many of us wondered whether
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S 4202 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April 10,'1984
covert action would-either by design
or by accident-become an effort to
overthrow the Government of Nicara-
gua. That risk was inherent in a policy
of -support for the Contras, as my able
colleague, the senior Senator from
Maine, so eloquently explained last
night.
As a result of these concerns, the
Boland amendment was passed in
1982. Over the ensuing-months, many
people became convinced that the
overthrow of the Sandinistas was,
indeed, our policy.
I did not, and do not, share that con-
cern. We on the Intelligence Commit-
tee have had many briefings on the
covert action program. We have sent
staff members to get more material.
And both Members and staff have
made trips to the region. On the basis
of all that material, I am convinced
that the executive branch-and, in
particular, the CIA-are faithfully
obeying the Boland amendment.
I am also convinced, Mr. President,
that the policies and actions of the
Government of Nicaragua fully war-
rant a strong response. As I noted last
week, even Democratic and left-of-
center elements in Central America
fear the aggressive policies of Nicara-
gua. They see the Sandinistas not as
reformers, or even as revolutionaries,
but rather as the prime supporters of
terrorist and guerrilla violence in the
region.
We must stand up to Nicaragua, and
our objectives are surely honorable:
An end to Sandinista support for for-
eign terrorism and guerrillas; a slicing
down of Nicaragua's frightening mili-
tary buildup; a fond farewell to Soviet
and Cuban advisers in Central Amer-
ica; and a return to the pluralist
system that the Sandinistas originally
promised to the people of Nicaragua.
What is less certain, in this complex
enterprise, is whether the implementa-
tion of our covert action policy has
been rational or effective. Last year,
we were faced with reports of Contras
slitting the throats of teachers and
other civilians, and the Contras
seemed more concerned with showing
the press what the Nicaraguan moun-
tains were like than with undertaking
actions that would rally local support
or interdict arms flows.
So last year the Intelligence Com-
mittee told the President to rethink
this program and to draft a new, more
coherent finding that would set forth
objectives and approaches to achieving
those objectives. This was done last
fall, and I think it was done well. The
last year has seen less Contra grand-
standing, apparently less reliance
upon former Somocistas, and even'
some operations against targets that
seem to be part of the Nicaraguan sup-
port chain for guerrillas in El Salva-
dor.
On two points, however, I am sorely'
disappointed. One is the continuing
gap between policies to pressure Nica-
ragua and policies to resolve the con-
flict. The other. is the most recent evo-
lution in our policy.
The gap between activist policies to
pressure a country and efforts to
settle disputes is an old one. What is
sad is how little we learn from the
past. For example, surely history
teaches us that the chances for real
negotiation are often fleeting, and
that such chances are not to be dis-
missed. But what happened when the
United States invaded Grenada? There
was an initial period in which Fidel
Castro, rightly frightened by this suc-
cessful U.S. activism, counseled cau-
tion to his proteges in Nicaragua. The
Sandinistas, in turn, showed true con-
cern over U.S. intentions and gave
hints of flexibility.
Did we take advantage of that brief
opening? Perhaps I blinked, Mr. Presi-
dent, and did not see it. What I did see
was a policy that kept up the pressure
with military maneuvers and construc-
tion in Honduras, but did not combine
that pressure with active efforts to de-
termine what sort of accommodation
the Sandinistas might be willing to
make with their neighbors, with us, or
with their own people.
Now it is harder. Now Nicaragua is
moving toward elections-not truly
free elections, but close enough to fool
much of the world; not elections that
give their people a real chance to
reject Marxism-Leninism, but timed
just before our own elections so that
we will be too preoccupied to deal ef-
fectively with this challenge.
Now we are in the amazing fix of
having some Contra groups offering to
lay down their arms if a truly free
election ? could be guaranteed, even
though there are important other ob-
jectives to be gained as well. Now we
have the most respected Members of
the Democratic opposition to the San-
dinistas refusing to participate in the
elections, even though most of the
world is likely to view those elections
as valid. Now we see the Democratic
forces in Nicaragua weak and divided,
even though the daily flow' of Nicara-
guans into neighboring lands and
Contra camps suggests that the people
of Nicaragua might well reject their
current masters in a free election.
And what do we see in the mining of
Nicaraguan harbors? Does anybody be-
lieve, Mr. President, that the executive
branch gave a thought to allied reac-
tion when British and Dutch ships
were struck by mines? Does anybody
believe that the executive branch con-
sidered, before it went ahead, that
Nicaragua might go to the U.N. Secu-
rity Council and the World Court to
gain a propaganda victory? Is there
any sign that the executive branch
ever considers how its own credibility
with Congress is damaged when it does
something like this and does not even
tell the committee that is defending
its policy on the floor of the Senate?
Most importantly, Mr. President,
one wonders whether Presidents and
their aides appreciate how each inept
exercise of power, of which this is cer-
tainly one, erodes their credibility
with the American people. This is not
the first executive branch to squander
that precious coin. But when, one won-
ders, when will they learn?
It was Thomas Jefferson who re-
quired us all to observe "a decent re-
spect to the opinions of mankind."
Now that was not a call for inaction.
Rather, it was a call for coherent
policy, cogently presented. But as the
senior Senator from New York might
well have said in our colloquy last
week, a confusing newspaper interview
will not measure up to the Declaration
of Independence. And the Kissinger
report, which is the closest thing we
have to a coherent statement of Cen-
tral America policy, is all but ignored
by policymakers who mistakenly see
activism as only a short-term thing.
Mr. President,, I have given condi-
tional support for the provision of
funds for the Nicaragua covert action
program, despite my misgivings. Be-
cause I see good reasons to keep some
pressure on the Government of Nica-
ragua to change its policies, I voted
with the executive branch to defeat
four amendments on Nicaragua last
week, as well as one on Honduras and
eight on El Salvador. But it makes no
sense to support a self-defeating tactic,
and that is what the mining of Nicara-
guan harbors has become.
Our unseemly flight from World
Court jurisdiction is just one sign, but
perhaps the most telling sign, that the
mining tactic is a colossal loser. We all
know that other countries break inter-
national norms. Nicaragua's indiffer-
ence to the norm of leaving one's
neighbors alone is the reason that we
began this covert action in the first
place. But international law exists to
put limits on our behavior, even when
we are inconflict with others, in order
to preserve certain standards that
benefit us all.
And we, Mr. President, are the ones
who almost always benefit from inter-
national law. The World Court is not a
pack of guerrillas, or even a conclave
of liberation theologists. It is the
guardian of international standards
and tradition. It stands, very largely,
for what we believe in. So when the
United States runs away from the
court, we run away from those who
would hold us to our own standards of
conduct.
Such policy is foolishness, Mr. Presi-
dent, short-sighted foolishness. It
gives the appearance of arrogance,
even though I suspect that it is much
more the product of haste and des-
peration. And the great pity is that it
is unnecessary, a feckless aberration to
shore up an unwise tactic that serves a
policy that-ironically-is still worth
saving.
What shall ' we do in such a situa-
tion? What shall we save, and how?
First, Mr. President, let us clearly
state that this is not the fault of the
CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency
has been the faithful servant of our
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COQ,4 GRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
policymakers. The CIA has imple-
mented its covert action very careful-
ly, with due attention to the Boland
amendment even before it was passed.
They may make mistakes from time to
time; they may have yet to learn how
to keep the Intelligence Committee up
to date on what is happening. But the
CIA is not responsible for policy-
makers who will not coordinate covert
action with other elements of policy.
The CIA is not the agency that is sup-
posed to seize the gpportunities that
overt or covert actions provide, to seek
a resolution of conflict. If we can bring
about a more rational policy, the CIA
will serve that policy as well.
Second, Mr. President, and here I
speak to my colleagues who join me in
concern over the mining issue, let us
not jettison a whole policy just be-
cause one aspect is ill-conceived. If we
end the mining-and I think that we
would be well advised to do just that-
there will still be extremely troubling
arms flows into Nicaragua and El Sal-
vador. If we end the covert action-
and I think it would be wrong to do
that at this time-there will still be
Sandinista interference in its neigh-
bors' affairs, while Nicaragua will still
lack the freedoms that the Sandinistas
promised nearly 5 years ago.
Let us tell the executive branch that
Congress would end this self-defeating
tactic of mining harbors, especially
when the mines affect our friends as
much as our foes, threatening civilian
cargoes as much as military ones. Let
us tell the executive branch that Con-
gress would not run from World Court
jurisdiction, like some criminal jump-
ing bail. Let us encourage the execu-
tive branch, instead, to make the best
case we can in both the ? World Court
and the court of world opinion, for
there is quite a case to be made that
Nicaragua's support for guerrillas and
terrorists warrants countermeasures.
Finally, Mr. President, let us call
upon the President and the executive
branch-loudly, if necessary-to get
our Central America policy in order.
Let us call for a true coordination of
means and objectives, for a policy that
will recognize the need for flexibility
in implementation and will not merely
push forward, willy-nilly, when the
possible adverse consequences of our
facts are so great. This President has
shown great sophistication on so many
issues, from social security to working
out budget compromises, that I am
sure he can bring that same skill to
our Central America policy. I truly
look forward to that great day.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the
simple and plainly visible truth about
our covert assistance to the Nicara-
guan Contras is that the chief use to
which it is being put-an attempt to
overthrow the Government of Nicara-
gua-violates U.S. and international
law. That is a clear and undisputable
fact, evident to anyone who looks at
the record.
What the Reagan administration is
doing in Nicaragua is discrediting the
United States in the eyes of all those
who we ask to believe in respect for
the law.
It is undermining our efforts to call
the attention of the world and of our
own people to the fact of international
terrorism, and to condemn and combat
it.
In short, our covert assistance to the
Contras is destroying our credibility.
It is not difficult to see why.
This program, as it is being operat-
ed, violates article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations, a multilateral
treaty ratified by the Senate. This
treaty prohibits the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity
or independence of any state.
It also violates article 15 of the
Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, of which we and Nicaragua
are members. That treaty was also
ratified by this body. Article 15 bans
direct or indirect intervention in the
internal affairs of any member state.
As established by our Constitution,
all treaties made under the authority
of the United States are the law of our
land. A violation of such a treaty-
such as the U.N. and OAS charters-is
a violation of U.S. law. Our Govern-
ment has violated both of those trea-
ties and has broken our own law.
Moreover, in 1982 Congress enacted
a law prohibiting the use of funds by
the Central Intelligence Agency or the
Department of Defense "to furnish
military equipment, military training,
or advice, or other support for military
activities to any group or individual
not part of a country's armed forces,
for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of Nicaragua or provok-
ing a military exchange between Nica-
ragua and Honduras."
That is the law of this country. Yet
we are providing arms and money,
training and guidance to the Nicara-
guan Contras whose publicly professed
goal is to overthrow the Government
of Nicaragua.
In the past few weeks President
Reagan has made such ambigious and
conflicting statements on our objec-
tives in Nicaragua that the majority
leader last week was impelled, under
the obvious pressure of then-pending
votes on this matter, to get the Presi-
dent's views in writing.
Despite this last-minute attempt at
clarification, what is and remains clear
is that the administration's actions in
Nicaragua violate American law.
The direct participation of the CIA,
in mining several harbors of Nicara-
gua, publicly disclosed late last week,
aggrevates the situation and makes
the U.S. action even more plainly il-
legal. Mining a harbor is an act of war
and a violation of international law.
Let us not forget that Iran, in recent
months, has threatened to shut off
the Persian Gulf by mining the Straits
of Hormuz and its approaches. Repeat-
edly, President Reagan has expressed
his view that such action by Iran in-
volving these international waters
would violate international law and
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could be considered an act of war.
Moreover, the President has empha-
sized that he would not rule out the
use of U Z. military force to respond to
such an eventuality.
How can the United States have this
policy with respect to Iran's threats
while we act in a similar way by
mining Nicaragua's waters?
To make an already bad situation
even worse, the administration now
says that it will ignore the World
Court's jurisdiction over matters re-
ferred to it involving U.S. actions in
the region.
Although it may be technically legal
for the United States not to accept
World Court jurisdiction in matters in-
volving Central America, such an
action-taken in response to informa-
tion that Nicaragua is about to bring
charges against the United States-
makes a mockery of the rule of law.
However, there is a constraint
against the administration's action re-
garding World Court jurisdiction, a
constraint it has violated. In August
1946, the United States accepted com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In a
report to the 79th Congress, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions unanimously said:
The resolution provides that the declara-
tion should remain in force for a period of
five years and thereafter until six months
following notice of termination. The decla-
ration might, therefore, remain in force in-
definitely.
The report then continued-and this
is the key sentence:
The provision for six months' notice of
termination after the five-year period has
the effect of a renunciation of any intention
to withdraw our obligation in the face of a
threatened legal proceeding.
It is clear from this report that in
accepting the World Court's jurisdic-
tion, we relinquished any right to
withdraw our acceptance as a result of
the bringing of a particular legal pro-
ceeding against us-as licaragua said
it will do on the harbor mining issue.
The administration's announced inten-
tion where the Court is concerned
thus directly disregards and trans-
gresses a fundamental commitment
embodied in the Senate's ratification
resolution and in our acceptance of
the Court's authority.
All of this amounts to cynicism
beyond any we have seen to date by
our Government in its actions and
statements in Central America.
What are we to make of this flouting
of law, of the intent of the Congress,
of the will of the people of this coun-
try, and of common sense?
What are we to believe when our
Government, stung by the death of
hundreds of U.S. marines in the
Middle East at the hands of terrorists,
nonetheless continues its support of
terrorists engaged in killing, in indus-
trial and economic sabotage, and in
the mining of the ports. In Nicaragua?
Have we become a nation to whom the
ends justify any and all. means?
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'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA'JTE April a 1984
Mr. President, there are many who,
faced with the facts and with the con-
tradictions between the words and the
deeds of our Government in Central
America, are now coming forward to
question, to criticize and to doubt. I
call on them to demonstrate that
there is no disparity between their
own words and deeds. The answer to
the questions I have asked here today,
in other words, lies in a vote to sup-
port their amendment to stop the
unwise, , unnecessary, and illegal
mining of Nicaraguan ports.
Mr. DENTON. Mr. President, I fully
understand the concern that many of
my colleagues have about the issue
that has been raised by the Senator
from Massachusetts. At the same time,
however, I am grievously disturbed by
the tendency of many of my col-
leagues to rush to Judgment on this
issue, as on many other contentious
issues of foreign and defense policy.
One thing that life teaches, both per-
sonal life and public life, is that deci-
sions made hastily and in heat are bad
decisions more often than not.
I have spoken on this floor on many
occasions about the evils that ensue
when we try to conduct our foreign
policy with 536 Secretaries of State,
when one is sufficient to the chal-
lenge. It is all the more the case be-
cause that one is probably better in-
formed and advised about the details
of our foreign relations than are all
the 535 others taken together.
We forget, in our debates in this
body, that we derive our position from
a constitutional system that has
served our country well for nearly 200
years. It is a system that gives the
Senate of the United States a particu-
lar position of power, Mr. President,
but also one of responsibility, Mr.
President, of responsibility.
The Senate has power and responsi-
bility to oversee the conduct of foreign
affairs, to provide advice and consent,
but the Constitution confers upon the
President the- authority and the re-
sponsibility to conduct the foreign re-
lations of our country. Indeed it man-
dates that he do so. We in the Senate
tread upon dangerous, dangerous
ground when we interfere with the au-
thority and the responsibility of the
President. When we decide to do, and
it should be rarely, it should be cooly,
after careful study, consideration, and
examination of all the information
that we can obtain.
The amendment before us has none
of the hallmarks of such a process. It
can do nothing other than to serve as
an outlet for emotion and to send a
message. Unfortunately, it would send
a message to the wrong people.
I hope that we have the good sense,
Mr. President, to realize that the mes-
sage will be conveyed primarily to
those who seek to exploit our division
and our distress, that it will cheer our
enemies and dishearten our friends,
that it will confuse and dismay the
American people, that it will promote
no good but that it will precipitate
L
great harm. For that reason alone, al-
though there are other reasons, we
should defeat it.
Mr. President, I understand the seri-
ousness of the issue. I, am willing, if
that is the will of the body, to engage
In factfinding, in analysis, in debate,
and in legislation about our policy in
Central America. If we are to do that,
however, let us do it properly, guided
not by our emotions or by the partisan
attractions of an election year but by
our responsibilities as Senators and as
elected leaders of our country. I urge
my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle, colleagues whom I know are
thoughtful, serious, and ' responsible
Senators, to lay aside-the temptation
to vent emotion, and to defeat the
amendment before us.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am
deeply worried about our country's ac-
tions and policies regarding Nicaragua.
The reports, that we are responsible
for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors
and territorial waters cause me deep
concern. These actions are shortsight-
ed and ultimately self-defeating.
We have responsibilities in Central
America. We have a responsibility to
help those countries that desire and
request our help. We have a responsi-
bility to aid El Salvador to achieve sta-
bility and conduct meaningful free
elections. But, our reported actions
toward Nicaragua are not a -fulfillment
of our responsibility, but rather an ab-
rogation of that responsibility.
Our responsibility as a nation and as
a member of the world community is
to adhere to the rule , of law. Partici-
pating in. the mining of the waters of a
nation with which we are not at war is
not adhering to the rule of law.
Our Nation can no longer hide
behind the fiction that we are simply
funding- people who may have a differ-
ent ultimate goal than we do. We can
no longer hide behind the fiction that
we are not actively responsible for ac-
tions that are judged by many to be an
act tantamount to war.
Our responsibility is to meet the le-
gitimate needs of our friends in the
region. Mining the harbors and terri-
torial waters of a nation with which
we have full diplomatic relations is not
the legitimate way to do it. Indeed, it
is ultimately counterproductive.
Such actions confirm the worst fears
of our friends in the region and in the
rest of the world. Not only do they vio-
late our best traditions and aspira-
tions, they Ignore history.
This heavy-handed behavior will not
help us achieve our goal of a stable
region free of Soviet influence. It will
only gradually reduce our own influ-
ence. We should step up to our respon-
sibility and adopt this amendment.
UNDERMINING UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN
FRIENDSHIP
? Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, the
failure of the United States to notify
Mexico, Venezuela, `Colombia, and
other Central and South American
countries that we were providing the
mines and assisting in laying them in
Nicaraguan harbors will especially
hurt our relations with our friends
and trading partners of this hemi-
sphere. There should be a special re-
sponsibility to them stemming from
the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Treaty,
and the Organization of American
States. This action of participating in
mining harbors in a country where
their ships might be damaged is an-
other blow to common neighborliness
that has brought 'U.S. policies toward
Latin American countries in ill repute
as a callous disregard of their vital in-
terests.
The stated policy of the Contadora
groups-Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
and Panama-has been to dissuade the
United States from military action in
Central America. Other Latin Ameri-
can countries have quietly expressed
similar views. This comes at a time
when most Latin American countries
are hard pressed economically and are
attempting to work out conditions for
loans through the International Mon-
etary Fund and private banks, many
of which are American. It takes cour-
age for them to voice objections to ad-
ministration policies.
To have ships from their country
damaged by the mines the United
States made and assisted in laying in
Nicaraguan harbors Is adding insult to
injury. This is a serious act of war. In
my Judgement it is wrong.
Not to notify friends and allies is a
serious blunder admitted even by
many who approve the action.
Whatever else can be said-and
there is a great deal more that will be
said-the sum and substance of the
blunder is that the administration
cannot defend its action. Unless the
President wants to ask for a declara-
tion of war, the best thing he can do
now is to order the CIA to hire the re-
moval of each and everyone of the
mines.
The President can give the order to
the CIA overtly or covertly. The
friends we have in this hemisphere
will be relieved.*
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. BAKER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader is recognized.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the mi-
nority leader needs time to conduct
his clearing process. In order to do
that, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
the PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, It is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
minority leader.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, our
people have been contacted. We find
no objection.
i
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection?
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, as the ma-
jority leader stated, the second provi-
sion dealing with court jurisdiction, as
a result of this proposal, will be vitiat-
ed. I just wanted to mention that al-
though that is the effect of the major-
ity leader's amendment, and I under-
stand that and will accede to it, I also
want to indicate that, after the roll-
call, I intend to send to the desk a res-
olution (S.J. Res. 271) incorporating
that provision and ask for it just as ap-
propriate reference. It will not be in-
corporated in this legislation, but I
just want to indicate that we want to
have an opportunity to vote on that
issue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Without objection, it
is so ordered.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank
the Chair. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will
the majority leader defer to permit
the Chair to place the pending busi-
ness before the Senate?
Mr. BAKER. Yes, Mr. President.
MISCELLANEOUS TARIFF TRADE
AND CUSTOMS MATTERS
FEDERAL BOAT SAFETY ACT AMBIODMENT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will state the pending business. '
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
A bill (H.R. 2163) toy amend the Federal
Boat Safety Act and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration
of the bill.
AMENDMENT NO. 2905, AS MODIFIED-.
DIVISION I
At the appropriate place in the Dole
amendment, add the following new section:
"Sze. . It is the sense of the Congress
that-
"(2) No funds heretofore or hereafter ap-
propriated in any Act of Congress shall be
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. CocH-
RAN) and the Senator from Maryland
(Mr. MATHIAS) are necessarily. absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Mary-
land (Mr. MATHIAS), would vote "yea".
Mr. CRANSTON: I announce that
the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN)
and the Senator from Colorado (Mr.
HART) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER .(Mr.
JEPSEN). Are there any other Senators
in the Chamber who wish to vote?-
The result was announced-yeas 84,
nays 12, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 59 Leg.]
YEAS--s4
Abdnor
darn
Moynihan
Andrews
Glenn
Murkowaki
Armstrong
Gorton
Nickles
Baker
Grassley
Nunn
Baucus
Hatfield
Packwood
Biden
Hawkins
Pell
Bingaman
Heflin
Percy
Boren
Heins
Pressler
Boschwitz
Hollings
Proxmire
Bradley
Huddleston
Pryor
Bumpers
Humphrey
Quayle
Burdick
Inouye
Randolph
Byrd
Jepeen
Riegle
Chafee
Johnston
Roth
Chiles
Kessebsum
Rudman
Cohen
Kasten
Sarbanea
Cranston
Kennedy
Sesser .
D'Amato
Lautenberg
Simpson
Danforth
Laxalt
Specter
DeConcini
Leahy
Stafford
Dixon
Levin
Stennis
Dodd
Lugar
Stevens
Domenici
Mataunaga
Trible
Durenberger
Mattingly
Tsongaa
Eagleton
McClure
Warner
Evans
Melcher
Weicker
Exon
Metzenbaum
Wilson
Ford
Mitchell
Zorinsky
NAYS-12
Denton
Hatch
Symms
Dole
Hecht
Thurmond
East
Helms
Tower
Goldwater
Long
Wallop
NOT VOTING-4
Bentsen
Hart
Cochran
Mathias
obligated or expended for the purpose of So divison I of Mr. KENNEDY's
planning, directing, executing, or supporting amendment (No. 2905), as modified,
the mining of the ports or territorial waters was .gi'ee l to
of Nicaragua. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I
the yeas and nays on the first division
of the Kennedy amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, before
we vote, let me ask this question:
Under the order previously entered,
the only question pending is the first
division. The second division, by the
order, has been withdrawn. Is that cor-
rect?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct.
Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the first di-
vision of the amendment of the Sena-
tor from Massachusetts. The yeas and
nays have been ordered. The clerk will
call the roll.
move to reconsider the vote by which
the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to
lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
SENATE SCHEDULE
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have
had several inquiries from my side,
from my colleagues, Senators who
wish to know what the program will be
for the remainder of today, for tomor-
row, and the remainder of the week.
So I ask the majority leader if he is
in a position to enlighten us.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank
the minority leader.
Mr. President, the chairman of the
Finance Committee is here, and as
strange as it may seem, we are now
back on the tax bill.
If the minority leader will yield for
that purpose, I inquire of the chair-
S 4205
man of the Finance Committee how
long he plans to work tonight and
what he sees in prospect for the future
consideration of this measure.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I so yield.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I do not
see much purpose in going beyond
midnight tonight. We can put in a full
day tomorrow, Thursday, and Friday.
I say this in all seriousness I said it
at the Republican policy luncheon. I
think a lot of the amendments that
Members may have we might be able
to work out.
So unless they just wish to have a
surprise party, if they will let us know
what they have in mind, we will be
glad.to take a look at them.
There are not that many amend-
ments. I know there will be some.
The Democrats may have a substi-
tute or a package. We may have one
on this side.
But beyond that, I know the distin-
guished Senator from Ohio (Mr. Mrrz-
ENBAUM) has a number of amend-
ments.
But I really wish to work awhile to-
night and see if we cannot dispose of a
lot of them and obviously make some
pretty good time. We may not have to
go beyond midnight.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank
the chairman of the committee.
If the minority leader will continue
to yield to me, I guess what that
means is we are going to be here
awhile tonight and tomorrow on this
bill as well.
Let me state my objective.
The leadership on this side wishes to
finish the amendment which is the tax
bill before we go out for the Easter
recess, and in all fairness I doubt we
can, get any further than that and
maybe cannot get that far.
But I have asked for the House of
Representatives to send us an adjourn-
ment resolution that will permit the
adjournment of the Senate from
either Thursday or Friday, depending
on when we finish our work, and the
objective is to try to finish the tax bill
portion of the boat bill before we go
out.
In answer to the minority leader, I
expect us to be late tonight. The
chairman of the finance Committee
said a full day tomorrow. I do not
quite know what that means tomorrow
evening. But if I were to guess, I would
anticipate past the dinner hour. And
then we will see where we go from
there.
Mr. BYRD. Could the majority
leader reveal anything concerning his
plans, if he has plans, with respect to
Thursday?
Mr. BAKER. Yes, Mr. President.
Mr. BYRD. I have inquiries particu-
larly that go to that date.
Mr. BAKER. Yes, Mr. President. I
understand that, and I know some
Senators on both sides of the aisle are
anxious to be a part of the official del-
egation to attend the funeral services
of our former colleague, Senator
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