INSTRUCTIONS FOR SPECIAL ENVOY TO PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001300140024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 12, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIC #02227-84
10 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Portrait of Soviet POWs/Deserters in Afghanistan
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
1. Attached is a particularly extensive and vivid interview done by
Radio Liberty with a Soviet deserter in Afghan hands. He describes
conditions faced by Soviet troops and their attitudes toward the war.
Particularly of note (page 7) is the belief, or wish to believe, that there
is a "free Russian" unit fighting with the Mujaheddin somewhere in
Afghanistan.
2. FYI: The "special section" or "specials" to which the soldier
refers on pages 11-14 are the KGB organs (osobiye otdeli.sponsible for
cc: NIO/NESA
DDO/C/NE Division
CL BY SIGNER
RVW 10 APR 90
DECL OADR
National Intelligence Council
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
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radio liberty research
RL 121/84 March 19, 1984
A SOVIET SOLDIER OPTS OUT IN AFGHANISTAN*
Note: The following is a translation of one of
a series of interviews conducted. by a Radio Liberty
correspondent with former Soviet servicemen who served
in Afghanistan. The original interview was broad-
cast by Radio Liberty on February 27 and 28, 1984.
Announcer: Radio Liberty correspondent Fatima Salkazanova has
returned from the city of Peshawar in Pakistan on the border with
Afghanistan. She spent almost three weeks in Peshawar. During
her assignment she interviewed six former Soviet servicemen.
Five of them crossed over voluntarily to the side of the Afghan
insurgents. The sixth was taken prisoner. You will now hear
Fatima Salkazanova's interview with Vladislav Naumov.
Salkazanova: Vladislav Naumov answered all my. questions in
great detail. The interview naturally began with questions about
himself: who he is,-where he studied, and what kind of educaion
did he manage to get before being drafted into the army.
Naumov: My name is Vladislav Naumov. I was born in the city of
Volgograd, the former Stalingrad. I am twenty-one years old. I
grew up and went to school in Volgograd. After secondary school,
which I completed in 1979, I enrolled at the Astrakhan Marine
College, from which I graduated with a navigator-engineer's
certificate and with an assignment to the Volga-Gorky Shipping
Company. From there I was drafted into the army on October 1,
1982. Although my qualifications were related directly to the
navy, I ended up serving in Afghanistan.
Salkazanova: Many Soviet soldiers whom I. have met in the border
region between Pakistan and Afghanistan had received no training
before being sent to Afghanistan. Vladislav Naumov was lucky; he
had received basic military training.
Naumov: A lot of attention is paid to military training in the
Soviet Union. In all secondary schools, vocational-technical
schools, and technical institutes, Soviet young people are given
military instruction in accordance with the Communist claim that
the enemy never sleeps." It is a first priority of Soviet
education that schools, technical institutes, and universities
should graduate fanatical Communists. Those who do well in this
respect--that is, those who mature under the influence of
7h is mawriul nun picp,uz'd hir ihr II n/ Ilhr SIull u/ Radio /-t ec LWV/1('IRU,hu I.ihrri .
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March 19, 1984
Communist slogans--are encouraged and move ahead successfully in
.their subsequent jobs. In the final analysis, however, the
preliminary military training does not provide any practical
military skills because young people are not at all interested in
war. Today's Soviet young people have their own more important
problems to face at every step in their lives. The preliminary
military-training is, I think,. regarded more as ideological
training than as military practice.
Salkazanova: I asked Vladislav Naumov what he had known about
Afghanistan before being drafted into the army and what he had
known about the war in that country before he arrived there.
Naumov: I would like to answer this question by citing one
example. In 1981,'I met a chap in the "Ostrava" restaurant in
Volgograd. He was very drunk and, as a result, was not in
control of himslef. In his rage, he burst out with imprecations
against Soviet officers. Sitting on the steps of the restaurant
building, he told me that Russian lads, eighteen to twenty years
old, were dying in Afghanistan, and that the whole war was a
senseless waste of time. He had a lot of bad things to say about
the insurgents too, but he did not spare the Soviet government as
the cause of-all this madness. I learned from this conversation
that the life of our soldiers in Afghanistan was no picnic, and
later I found out at first hand that the whole burden of the war
falls on the enlisted men, who are fobbed off with medals and
decorations--as if this could substitute for the deaths of their
comrades and innocent Afghan people.. As regards the press, the
first article I read was in Komsomol'skaya pravda. That
article immediately provoked debates about the tasks of our
soldiers in Afghanistan. The press, of course, writes very
little about Afghanistan. Even now, with the war at its height
and the situation of our lads becoming more and more difficult
with every day that passes, the Soviet people think that things
are returning to normal in Afghanistan and that our contingent is
serving under the same conditions as it would in one of the
people's democracies. People learn virtually nothing about the
unjust war from newspapers and magazines. The Soviet people have
become so indifferent to the international situation that they
are not in the least interested in what is going on in the world.
Young people, for instance, do not read newspapers, because they
are uninteresting. The ground for this cold indifference is
prepared by the propaganda of red stars, slogans, and posters
hanging everywhere. As a result, the war is only known to those
people who have been directly affected by the Afghan problem--the
soldiers themselves and the mothers who are the recipients of the
white zinc coffins.
Salkazanova:.Please tell us how you were drafted into the army,
how and from whom you learned that you were being sent to
Afghanistan, and what kind of punishment would have awaited you
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if you had refused to participate in this war. In answer to my
question, Vladislav Naumov replied:
Naumov: After I received the summons from the military regis-
tration office--which I had to sign for on the doorstep so that I
could not delay reporting for duty--I was called in to the draft
office for a talk, together with my relatives. At the draft
office, those of us who were draftees were told that we would be
doing our service at the front. In other words, they gave us to
understand that we would be sent to Afghanistan but, at the same
time, avoided any direct mention of the war. The conditions at
the recruiting center were terrible. The so-called medical
commission rubber-stamped the words "fit for travel" without any
checkups or questions. Finally, towards evening,. the whole crowd
of draftees was loaded to the gills. There was a great commotion
at the recruiting center, with much cursing and fist fights. In
order to cope with this wild behavior, the people in charge of
the recruiting center had to call in mounted police. The
draftees then realized that the police constituted no great
obstacle to them and pelted them with empty bottles and curses.
Towards nightfall, everyone collapsed exhausted, and at this
point we were collected without resistance and taken to buses
that drove us to the railroad station, where a train had been
readied beforehand.
I learr--:d' about..: going abroad only after being told the
number of my.travel orders. All those who received orders with
the number 280 were being sent abroad, to the people's
democracies or to' the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Later
the officers often tried to scare us by mentioning Afghanistan.
The soldiers who accompanied our troop train kept on telling us:
"Hang yourselves." We did not know who had made the decisions
about us, but I can definitely say that my name was one of the
first on the list at the recruiting center. I think that they
had been watching me even before I was drafted, that an eye had
been kept on me ever since school. At school I had practiced
shooting and immediately gained a third-class rating. I also
practiced karate, so I was already becoming what our warriors
wanted me to be.
At Termez we built models of Afghan villages. Before every
combat exercise, Major Makarov would constantly repeat: "Look in
the direction of the village; there are the 'dushmans.'* For-
ward! Kill them! They kill completely innocent people." And
then the truly punitive operations would start. To begin with,
we were armed to the teeth; some even rolled up the sleeves of
their camouflage cloaks. Then we would attach the bayonets and
*This is the Persian word for enemy. It is what is used in
the Soviet press to refer to Afghan freedom fighters.
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silencers to our sharpshooter rifles and join the line. Under
the cover of the infantry's combat vehicles we would raze the
village to the ground. Then, working under the scorching sun, we
would rebuild the model, all over again. We had training during
the nights also. Without a sound we would capture house after
house, fortress after fortress, we had bayonets and silencers
attached to. our rifles, and we learned to use them pretty skill-
fully. The major often repeated Suvorov's words: "The bullet is
a fool, the bayonet--a stalwart. Hit with the bayonet and try to
turn it around in the body." At Termez, they did not hide from
us that we were being trained for Afghanistan. On the contrary,
during these exercises we used combat arms--the same as we had in
Afghanistan. Before the oath I could still have avoided service
in Afghanistan, but after having been sworn in, I would have
risked prison or a disciplinary battalion. The soldiers believe
that it is better to spend a year in prison or a camp than serve
one month in the disciplinary battalion. One can draw the conclu-
sion from this just what a disciplinary battalion is like.
Salkazanova: While sending soldiers to war, the Soviet mili-
tary chiefs don't even consider it necessary to tell them where
they are being sent. Listen to the story of the young Soviet
serviceman Vladislav Naumov's flight to Afghanistan.
Naumov: From the city of Ashkhabad, I was shipped to Afghan-
istan aboard a plane. Although everyone knew where we were being
taken to, Captain Knyaev, who was accompanying, us repeatedly
talked of Poland _for some reason. Knowing a little of what was
going on in Poland,-none of us had practically any doubt about
our actual destination, but there was no firm opinion about it.
The pilot would come out and say: "We're flying over the Alps.'
He was joking, but there was nothing improbable about this. Then
he said: "We're flying over Poland," and, finally, when we were
nearing the end of our flight, he came out of the pilot's cabin
and informed us that we had landed in Warsaw. Only later did we
learn that we were in Kabul, and this was because we met a group
of soldiers, decorated with medals and orders, who were being
discharged. There were several wounded among them.
Salkazanova: Former Soviet soldier Vladislav Naumov is telling
us about his service in Afghanistan, about relations between
veterans and rookies, between soldiers. and officers.
Naumov: In Afghanistan, I was sent to serve in the city of
Jalalabad and was assigned to the large 66th Brigade. Jalalabad
is considered to be a. hot spot--there is hardly any difference
between Jalalabad and Kandahar. The soldiers used to recite this
verse: "If you want a bullet in your butt, then take a trip to
Jalalabad." The first thing that we faced in Jalalabad was the
freedom of action on the part of the insurgents. For Soviet
soldiers the territory in Afghanistan is too limited. Only 18
March 19, 1984
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percent of the territory is under occupation. On May Day, the
insurgents opened mortar fire. Shells fell next to the tents
occupied by soldiers. There were dead and wounded. The number
of dead and wounded was concealed from us. It is very difficult
to estimate the number of casualties in Afghanistan, as in
Jalalabad alone two or three and maybe even more persona are
killed every week. The estimate provided by Western experts--
twenty to twenty-five thousand--is just a fraction of the
casualties. What can Western theoreticians say without leaving
their offices? I would better advise them to set up an
organization for rescuing the servicemen and providing material
aid. This would be more effective.
The question of relations among soldiers--between the so-
called old men and the young ones--is the principal scourge as
far as "the limited contingent" is concerned. In this connec-
tion, one may accord the first place to nationality relations
between officers and men. Commanding officers often take
advantage of this to maintain order and discipline. One officer,
for example, told me that he prefers to staff his company with
Georgians. Here it may be noted that soldiers are recruited into
companies so as to form national majorities and in order of their
being drafted. For example, the company's commanding officer
would take only Russians first, but second time around he would
take young Turkmen soldiers. And here national tensions would
begin. Finally, the first Russian recruits are discharged and the
Turkmen, who by this time had been trained by slaps from the
Russians, become "old men," and the commanding officer then
gets a new complement consisting exclusively of Russian soldiers
this time. And a new round of humiliations begins. From this,
one can draw the conclusion that officers are interested in
maintaining such a state of affairs, they are the real .
instigators of antagonisms, and this is why there is no unity
among soldiers and why they cannot present their suggestions and
complaints en masse, as a body. In the Soviet army, soldiers
prefer to be each for himself and not one for all. As far as the
officers are concerned, the soldiers simply hate them; only in
exceptional cases are they respected or appreciated.
Salkazanova: It is being said that Soviet soldiers are the
neediest soldiers in the world and that the system of "self-
supply" is very popular in the Soviet army--even in Afghanistan.
Is this true?
Naumov: Yes, soldiers try in any possible way to procure what
is necessary. Mainly it is watches, jeans, and various trinkets
that fill the Afghan shops to overflow. Many buy mummyo,* ciga-
*This is a kind of dried mushroom that is reputed to be a
remedy for a number of illnesses.
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rettes, drugs, vodka, "Diplomat" briefcases. Where do the
soldiers get Afghan currency? During punitive expeditions, they
engage not only in extermination but also in plunder. A country-
man of mine--an officer who had been on a first-name basis with
me--used to tell me that his soldiers had a lot of money. They
plunder, but I do not put a stop to them." The second method--
the most popular one--consists of selling things. I have already
mentioned that everything is for sale by everybody. The command-
ing officer of a tank battalion took a whole fortune home with.
him. He used to deal in diesel oil. To judge by everything,
the system of "self-supply" does not apply here. It is rather a
system of plundering, profiteering and fraud.
Salkazanova: Former Soviet serviceman Vladislav Naumov, who
has defected to the side of the Afghan resistance fighters, is
telling us about the morale of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan and
the way they spend their free time.
Naumov: In the evenings we usually congregated around our com-
bat vehicle; played the guitar and sang songs about our home, our
town; exchanged memories about the girls we loved, our relatives,
and our friends. We also sang about Afghanistan. Here, for
example, I will recite one quatrain:
I'm going away, said the young lad through tears,
I'm going away, but I'll be back in two years.
The soldier's gone, not having seen the first spring.
He returned in a soldier's coffin made of zinc.
In a general sense, the songs that are sung now by soldiers
in Afghanistan resemble each other: they tell of fallen friends,
of tough battles; of the living conditions encountered in
Afghanistan. What can one add to this? The officers, of
course, confiscate song books and notebooks, which are so
cherished by the soldiers, but-even the officers sing these songs
secretly, away from the soldiers.' I know of one junior officer
who has made a point of collecting songs about Afghanistan. I
often shared guard duty with him and involuntarily I heard all
the songs that he had been able to collect. It is the same songs
as sung by soldiers. All that I have told you is just a small
fraction--i.e., only an aspect--of the life of the Soviet
contingent DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan).
The mood of the Soviet soldier? The first thing that
strikes one is total indifference. This indifference can be no-
ticed in combat, in one's treatment of military technology. Of
course, the soldiers are unhappy with the war and with Afghan-
istan on the whole. I believe that if this continues much longer,
the results will be very costly for those who have cooked up this
mess. It seems to me that the soldiers need only some officer
leaders to turn their arms in the other direction. It is now
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time to pay attention to Afghanistan. What is needed is only a
beginning and then, I think, the soldiers themselves will start
joining the insurgents. Of course, this depends not only on the
soldiers but on the officers as well. And, first and foremost,
this depends on the West. One should counter propaganda. It is
the Communist regime's only base. This is its root. And if you
cut the roots, something unprecedented may happen. Thus one
could liberate not only the Afghan people but Russia itself.
There are rumors circulating among soldiers about a free Russian
unit in Afghanistan. Vadim Plotnikov, for example, left his de-
tachment in order to find this unit. Maybe it does not exist,
but the soldiers want it to be. Many claim to have seen it.
According to rumors, this unit was formed by soldiers from our
Jalalabad brigade.
Salkazanova: D~j the Soviet soldiers believe that they are
fighLing in Afghanistan against former mercenaries?
Naumov: The myth about mercenaries has been shattered, as the
saying goes. The soldiers know that at present there are no for-
eign forces in Afghanistan, with the exception of the Soviet
ones. The officers allege that Afghanistan is swarmed with for-
eign forces. During one operation, the officer cried to us:
"Look, the mercenaries!" I looked through my rifle's telescopic
sight. People in uniform were moving in my direction, and their
actions bore no resemblance to those of ordinary insurgents. One
could see that the soldiers had completed military training.
Several other snipers--friends of mine--were sitting next to me.
The junior officer asked us to be more attentive and to hit the
bull's eye, as they say. I fired a shot, and a so-called mercen-
ary fell to the ground. When we reached the body, we saw that it
was an Afghan in a liberation uniform. The officer, who had
alleged that this was a mercenary, fell silent.
Salkazanova: And what do the Soviet soldiers tell about their
combat 'deeds," about their "heroic" actions in Afghanistan?
Naumov: Those soldiers who have been in combat talk about
their adventures mainly to young and inexperienced troops. One
will not hear such talk among themselves--i.e., among the
veterans. Of course, some soldiers want to avenge the death of
their comrades by striking at the insurgents, but let's not hurry
with conclusions. For they also know whose fault it really is,
but one can understand them. And as for deeds...What kind of
deeds are possible in this war? Maybe just that we tried to
rescue each other's life. But in combat one has no choice. They
shoot at you, and you shoot back, in order to survive.
Salkazanova: Everyone knows what punitive operations are all
about. These are the operations undertaken by the Soviet army
in reprisal for every operation undertaken by the Mujahiden, the
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Afghan resistance fighters. It is not the Mujahiden who fall
victims to these reprisals, though, but the peaceful inhabitants
of the neighboring villages--children, women, and old men who
take no part in combat. I asked Vladielav Naumov what he knew
about these punitive operations.
Naumov: I have already talked alittle about punitive opo-a-
tions, and therefore I am not going to dwell on this question. I
am ashamed of my past. I don't talk about it to anyone; I think,
you understand why. Let's skip over this question, Fatima, if at
all possible. The only thing I can say to you is that I am
Guilty of this. Still, I would like to recount a small episode
related to this topic.
In May, 1983, I arrived at the post guarding a certain sec-
tion of the Kabul-Jalalabad road. Not having yet familiarized
myself with the post, I was doing repair work on two combat vehi-.
cles. These two tanks had been knocked out during one of the
punitive expeditions. The damages were slight, and I quickly
finished the job in one day. I still had the evening and the
morning to myself. During the night I had to do guard duty like
everyone else. I took a bath, changed, and waited for supper.
There was still plenty of time until supper and I was loitering
about the post. All of.a sudden I heard crude cursing from
beyond the crossing. The cursing was so loud that everybody
around stopped working and looked at the mound where two soldiers
were chasing a man whose hands were tied. The man's face was
swollen, there were fresh scratches, his mouth was bleeding.
Having brought the man to the tanks, they forced the Afghan
prisoner to his knees. "Well, what shall we do with him?" There
came two junior officers. They were very drunk, and it seemed
that they were supporting each other in order not to fall down.
The tall soldier reported to the drunken officer about the
prisoner. The officer looked at the Afghan and, smiling
crookedly, said: "This beast is unworthy of prison. As
soldiers, we must shoot him." ."No," mumbled the second officer,
"such a bitch must be hung in the sun with his head down so that
he can slowly realize who he decided to fight against." "Hey,
you rotten soul! What's happening here?" asked a lieutenant who
had just arrived on the scene. "We have caught a ghost," quickly
rapped out the words of the tall soldier. The Afghan was
squatting on his knees and was wiping blood from his face with
his tied hands. "Well, we'll square the accounts with you
yet.. .Shoot him!" commanded the officer. The same two soldiers
lifted the man and dragged him to the combat vehicle. "Bring an
automatic rifle," commanded the lieutenant. The Afghan realized
what was happening and started saying something in his own
language. No one listened to him. Everybody stood around and
watched, waiting to see what came next. "Automatic rifles are
under lock," reported the tall one. "All right, we'll manage
withouta bullet. C'mon, boys, let's lift him closer to the
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gun." The officer climbed into the turret. The soldiers hung
the Afghan on the gun barrel by wrapping his tied hands around
it. "Load!"--came the order. The gun's bolt clicked... "Move
aside!"--hollered the officer. "Disperse!" The order again:
"Fire!" The gun roared. A cloud of smoke and dust hung over the
combat vehicle. There was silence. When the smoke died away,
there was no one hanging on the gun barrel. The shell had blown
away the man's whole body. We all dispersed. There was a dog
running around us that was obviously mad with hunger. It was
growling and whining. I went to the mess hall in the hope of
getting some food soon. My hope came true and, having filled
half of my mess kit with porridge, if you can call it that, I
trudged along to get some tea and stood in line waiting. While
waiting, I ate half my porridge. Next to me there stood a
bespectacled sergeant. And suddenly this sergeant cried: "Hey,
hey, go away, you dirty beast!" I didn't quite get what
happened. There in front of me stood the dog with a chunk of
meat in its teeth. I looked closer and saw that it had brought
the head of the man that had been shot. Just a glance at this
hand was enough to make me choke on my food. In rage I threw my
mess kit aside and went away, but the others continued eating as
if nothing had happened.
Salkazanova: Is it true that there are many drug addicts among
the Soviet soldiers? Is it true that more Soviet soldiers are
dying from disease.than from the bullets of the Afghan insur-
gents?
Naumov: Little notice is paid to breaches of army discipline
in the Fortieth Army. For beating a young soldier half to death
a regular may only be cautioned by an officer. Drugs? Nobody
can deal with them because a great deal of drugs are being used.
There are these tablets. For the most part they smoke hashish
and cocaine. There are also those who shoot. There are not many
of them, of course, but there are some. The soldiers get hold of
drugs by means of sale and exchange. They sell literally every-
thing possible: fat, butter,' canned goods, soap, hardware, and
arms and ammunition.
One could talk forever about the living conditions of the
Soviet soldier in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. I will
not touch on all the problems; I .am writing a book about this. I
would like to'read some excerpts:from my drafts.
"In July it was terribly hot. The thermometer crept over 60
degrees. We took refuge from this hell either in.the river or in
a smoking area where a camouflage net had been spread out. We
quickly became weak and dried out in the heat. At that time the
sick bays were not -in a position to accept people with heat
stroke. I know of nine cases of heat stroke that proved fatal.
How many soldiers altogether have died in Afghanistan not from
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bullets but from disease and the negligence of their commanders?
More than half, I am sure. The diagnoses were: first, heat
stroke--every one of us had that: vomiting, severe giddine:3s,
high temperature, stomach pains, all the symptoms of dysentery;
the doctors took heat stroke for dysentery and packed the sick
off to the infectious section. Second, pneumonia--it's not con-
sidered a disease in Afghanistan. To this day I have no idea
whether it is an infectious disease or not. I lay in the infec-
tious section with pneumonia. They discharged me on the fourth
day when my temperature fell. The doctor I ended up with in re-
ception could not even establish a diagnosis. 'All the symptoms
of typhus,' he said. 'My lung hurts,' I corrected him. He
listened to me and wrote pneumonia in my case history.
"On one operation we sat in the mountains for seven hours
without water in 65-degree heat under the open sky. Sat, or
rather stood, because it was impossible to sit, in the proper
sense of the word, on the rock. It was red-hot like a stove. but
our commander, of course, had water and food, and they provided
him with shelter from the heat with a shroud tent. I repeat,
we sat there seven hours, and then a signal came: 'Operation
canceled, all back to base.' Down below there was a small
mountain rivulet. The soldiers went leaping down from the moun-
tains to the water. We avidly drank our fill of, water, and the
sweat poured off us. Our clothing got soaked and then dried out
and became white from the crystals of salt that dried on it. Some
jumped straight into the water with their clothes on in order to
wash off the sweat and dirt. They either had a cardiac arrest or
brain hemorrhage from the abrupt fall in temperature. Many lost
consciousness.'-Those who had not gone into the water grabbed
them and dragged them out just so they would survive. Another
diagnosis is no less.dangerous and serious. That is Botkin's
disease, jaundice, or hepatitis in Latin. In Afghanistan almost
everybody caught hepatitis--some two or three times. A person
who has contracted hepatitis remains a cripple for life. This
disease is highly infectious. It is enough for one to catch it,
and you have a whole epidemic that is impossible to stop. The
doctors are faced with the problem of what to do. Two or three
wounded, and during an operation maybe ten or fifteen, but the
rest, even in the surgical section, are down with hepatitis. Some
soldiers have whole bunches of diseases. Andrei Gulkov, for
instance, had a broken rib, jaundice, and malaria. You have
typhus and jaundice, dysentery and pneumonia, and so on. In some
areas of Afghanistan oriental boils are rampant. The bites of
Leishmanian midges leave deep sores, and there are lice all year
round. Lice are the scourge of the Soviet army.". Well, perhaps
that's enough of excerpts.
Salkazanova: Do the Soviet soldiers know about the fate of
defectors?
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RL 121/84 -11- March 19, 1984
Naumov: Many talk about defectors and think that the insur-
gents take revenge on them right away. Officers often cited ex-
amples of such actions by the partisans. So those who defect are
those in quite a hopeless situation. To me it was all the same
whether they killed me or not. The soldiers know nothing of pris-
oners of war. Can there really be prisoners? They kill them
all. This is also the influence of political studies. So it is
very difficult to get taken prisoner in battle. What question
can there be? Some soldiers leave the last bullet for them-
selves.
Salkazanova: I asked Vladislav Naumov to describe what methods
and what weapons the Soviet forces use to fight the soldiers of
the Afghan liberation movement.
Naumov: Many people are talking about scorched earth tactics
all over the word. This war is very much like the war against
the Basmachi--only technology is employed, of course, in all its
applications. The main weapon, obviously, is the air force. Mi-8
and -24 helicopters operate very effectively. The BM-23 rocket
launchers, code-named "Grad," are used. The rocket warheads are
filled with napalm. Napalm is widely used in Afghanistan. The
artillery shells are for the most part all fragmentation mortar
shells. Aerial cluster bombs are also used. Thirty or fifty
small charges--ten-kilogram bombs--separate from one bomb, and
these destroy one square kilometer of terrain. An operation
begins with an artillery and "Grad" rocket barrage, then the
helicopters are used; they bomb one specific area. Behind
them, under cover of armored vehicles, come the infantry and
assault troops that carry out the bloody reprisals in Afghan
villages.
Salkazanova: When, how, and why;did you get the desire to go
over to the side of the Afghan insurgents, and how did you real-
ize this desire?
Naumov: On one occasion an Afghan came to me and asked if I
couldn't steal some ammuntion and arms for him. I refused, but I
thought that he could still be of use to me, so I didn't report
him. Then all this story with the food started. The partisans
cut the road that linked us with Kabul. There began to be inter-
ruptions in the supply of foodstuffs. In the dining hall they
gave us porridge teeming with insects and a revolting puree made
of rotten maggoty'potatoes. I suggested to the lads that we
refuse to eat it. That day nobody did eat it. Then I was called.
to the special section. An officer threatened me. I had
developed a downright hatred of our commanders. They ate decent
food, they and their toadies. I helped the Afghans with arms and
ammunition. Of course, I never took money from them for it,.
but then the KGB discovered me all the same. I couldn't stand
the nervous strain and ran. They caught me after three days.
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March 19, 1984
Already by then I had firmly resolved to escape when any suitable
chance offered itself. They caught me and put me in the brigade
prison. There I was severly beaten and made a monkey of. 1
spent a month in solitary, in a cell two meters by one. The
specials wanted to finish me off. In all this time I ate two
loaves of black bread and drank sixty mugs of water. After that
diet I lost nearly forty kilograms. In the cell it was dark.
During the day it was very hot and stuffy from the evaporation-of
water heavily charged with chlorine that they continually poured
over me. Outside it was terribly hot, and the water evaporated
on one's eyes and the chlorine bit into one's eyes. My whole
body itched from the lice, and my hands were permanently tied.
Stuck in all this filth, enduring the nightmare of night attacks,
seeing what the officers ate and what they fed us with, the fear
of death, the disgust at the orders we were given, at the mur-
ders, at the bombing of villages--how, after all that, could one
believe that the USSR is the finest, the most just, the greatest
country in the world.
I was born in Russia and escaped from it. I simply could not
take all this horror. I had a little longer to sit in that cell
and then my path would lead to Kabul, to the central army prison.
Finally, one fine day, the door was thrown open and an escort
ordered "Out! I went out. I was taken through a long corridor
to the street. At the gates "Stood a GAZ-24. "Get in!" ordered a
lieutenant. I got in. Two soldiers sat down on the sides. The
car started. The lieutenant asked me, "Have you any complaints?"
"No," I replied. I was sitting on the back seat and sweat
poured off me in streams. The car stopped at the special
section. "Out!" I got out and they took me to an office. There
was nobody in the office. I sat there alone. There was water
standing on the table. I had a great desire to drink, an
overpowering desire to drink. A major opened the door. He came
in and sat down opposite me behind a large writing desk. The
major began the conversation. gently and calmly; he even pretended
that he sympathized with me. "Come on now, let's introduce
ourselves. I'm Major Miroshnik, an investigator of the special
section." "Vladislav Naumov." "Fine, now we know each other.
Think carefully and try. to remember everything that the man you
passed the arms to asked you about." I suddenly had the bright
idea that I need not hurry because I had Kabul waiting for me. I
said that he had asked me some details but I had told him
nothing. I realized that the major was a chekist, that he was
not in the least interested in the arms; he did not ask me even
once how many and what I had passed on. The major adopted a very
restrained and tactical stance. "So, Vladislav, you must help us;
we must catch your friend. You see, this matter is rather more
complicated than you think. This man may have been recruited by
the Pakistani or some other intelligence service. We must
catch him." "Yes, I understand." "So you must meet with him,
understand? You definitely must meet with him, but there's the
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RL 121/84 -13-
March 19, 1.984
:question how. I don't have time now but tomorrow we will try to
think something up." They drove me back again to the prison.
With these conversations I had missed dinner and supper, the
whole day I had had nothing to eat. I asked the escort for some
bread, my ration. In reply I got one in the liver. "Had
enough?" "Yes, thanks." The following day the car came at the
same time. They took me to the same place, into the same office.
The major met me with a smile. "Come over to me!" He chatted
to me, as to a friend or someone even closer. I sat down on the
chair. The major moved his desk closer to me, spread out a
newspaper and brought out from somewhere a can of stew and a
piece of white bread, an onion, and salt. I set about opening
the can, and the major came to help me. "Eat up, eat up, and
when you have had a bit to eat, lie down and sleep, rest, we have
much to do today." I had something to eat, wrapped up the remains
in the newspaper, lay down on a big couch, and fell asleep there.
I was roused by the major, who had a hunting knife in his hands.
"This is for you. Take it with you whatever happens. After
all, he may not come alone and he may be armed. If you notice he
has a weapon, don't be afraid, stick it in boldly, but not to
kill. I need him." The major's eyes flashed with the excitement
of a hunter. "Now, don't hesitate. If you. catch him, I'll put
a word for you. After all, he's guilty too, and why should you
take all the responsibility alone?" Miroshnik took me for a
child, he thought I would sell out Akhmat to get a lesser term
for myself. But in this case it was the gallows. We reached the
dareguards
unnecessarycmovement.j saw
make anythen
place. Mandsdidknotposted
all this
Announcer: This is Radio Liberty. You are listening to an
interview with former Soviet serviceman Vladislav Naumov, who in
the fall of last year went over to the side of the Afghan insur-
gents. We continue the broadcast.
Naumov: I had prepared my flight carefully. In the cell I had
the minutes, the
thought out every detail, counted the steps,
seconds. For safety's sake I had decided to postpone my flight
until evening. It got dark quickly and that would help me.
Miroshnik's car pulled up, I was brought out of the cell, and we
set off. The major ordered the car to stop a hundred meters st from
the place. I got out of the car and went over to my former
sat down on the turret, and waited for darkness. Beside me,
leaning on the machine gun, sat a friend of mine, from the same
part of the country, a fine chap. I am very fond of him. He
brought me a can of water anyoa ne of let youaknowat,Ahr
while nobody is here. Yone
Vladya, what is to become of you! If you can, run! The lads
won't shoot at you. My advice to you," he repeated, "is r un'at
Run, you'll be alive, and there you'll see." My heart ached
togetherewe had than
o the
battle, bosom
the idea
had partng from
each other Andrei, in from
once w we had covvee
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RL 121/84 -14-
March 19, 1984
lice, were face to face with death, shared our joys and sorrow.
For another hour we sat there and chatted, and then Miroshnik
came up to us. Andrei had been dragged into my case, and I knew
that, if I were to get away, I would be saving both myself,. and
him, and another comrade. Miroshnik came up: "Right, off you
go, don't dally. And you keep a good watch and, if there's any-
thing, cut off the road with the machine gun. If he runs, mow
him down." When the major uttered these words, I had already
moved a little way away from the tank, but the major spoke espe-
cially loudly so that I could hear what was in store for me. I
went on. I moved further and further. And then there came
Miroshnik's savage roar: "What are you looking at, you brutes,
fire, fire, get on with it!" But the machine gun remained
silent. Behind me, at three times my height, tracer bullets flew
over my head; my friends were seeing me off. What became of
Andrei, I do not know. But Miroshnik was put away. For how
long? But is that important? Subsequently, when I was already
in safety, the KGB offered the commander of the detachment to
which I went over a large sum of money, but that man was very
fond of me and quite simply answered the KGB: "Even if you
promise me all of Moscow, I will not hand back people to be tor-
tured."
In that man's family, I got to know his brother, a fine,
bold and courageous man. He endured the purges of Amin and
Taraki, and Karmal, of course, locked him up in prison, where
they tortured him with the electric shock treatment. He began to
lose his sight from these tortures. The KGB was involved in
that, of course, too.
Salkazanova: And how is the war in Afghanistan affecting the
minds of Soviet young people?
Naumov: Of course, this war does not have such a strong influ-
ence. I mean on all Soviet young people. As regards those who
have fought in Afghanistan, they are for some reason regarded as
the silent ones. Among those of his own age, among his friends,
such a one does, of course, enjoy some authority, but when it
comes to talking about the war, he doesn't. As a rule, these
people sign an undertaking not to talk. In general, of course,
the Soviet army does influence the minds of young people. After
the army, a person becomes shy because he has fallen two or three
years behind people of his own age. As a rule, in the army young
people lose their identity, which is, of course, advantageous for
our political leadership. If someone gets to thinking, let him
think, but he does not dare to voice his thoughts. because he
knows from the example of the army how deeply he can get in the
mire. I think that the Soviet'army is the epicenter of the
destruction of a man's character. And I am not going to conceal
the fact that very few young people after the army continue their
studies in secondary technical or higher institutions. The army,
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RL 121/84 -15-
March 19, 1984
as a rule, destroys a man--that is, the Man in him--with its
slavish, overwhelming toil. In a company, for example, there are
120 men of various ages. The sergeant, who is the direct com-
mander for the private, is eighteen or nineteen. The one who i_=
given the orders is twenty-seven. These luckless ones, who end
up in the army after going to an institute, endure humiliation
not only from'the sergeants but also from the regulars. Of
course, at twenty-six or twenty-seven, it is already difficult to
break a person's character, but I have seen some who have run to
wash the socks of the regulars., And such a man has a wife and
child at home.
Salkazanova: According to reports from the Soviet Union, very
many Soviet draftees voluntarily write applications to be sent to
the war in Afghanistan. How do you explain this?
Naumov: Yes, many do write to'be sent to Afghanistan. How can
I explain it to you? In my view, they are people who have abso-
lutely no idea of what Afghanistan is about. Such people are, as
a rule, the victims of romantic ideas about glory. I can tell
them that war is no game of summer lightning. There is very
little romantic about it. In the final analysis there are times
when glory and romantics have to be paid for with one's life. To
judge from such applications, one can say that Soviet citizens
.know very little about the..unjust war in Afghanistan.
Salkazanova: Have you heard that Nikolai Ryzhkov and Aleksandr
Voronov, who.also went over to the side of the insurgents in Af-
ghanistan, are now living in America? Vladislav Naumov replied:
Naumov: Yes, we read in the newspaper Russkaya mysl, which
we receive regularly, that Resistance International carried out
this very complicated and very useful operation. I think that a
little more attention needs to be paid to such things. Of
course, this is a major and very useful work. We are, after all,
Russians, and we must take a direct part in liberating our home-
land. Just by the fact that we are living witnesses of the war
the USSR is waging in Afghanistan, we have annoyed our political
leadership. What would we like to advise or wish Nikolai and
Shura? Of course, one cannot, just because one is far away from
the homeland, avert one's eyes from the tragedy. One must do
whatever possible to oppose the war, even if this may incur
savage reprisals. It is your duty to us. Take courage, friends,
and do not forget that you are not alone; there's us too, defect-
ors and prisoners; we are many, we are of different nationali-
ties, of different faiths, but we are in captivity, while you are
in freedom. So act!
Salkazanova: And, finally, the last question that I put to
Vladislav Naumov, a former Soviet serviceman who last fall went
over to the side of the fighters of the Afghan liberation move-
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RL 121/84 -16- Ma ,ch,: 19, 1984
ment. What would you like to broadcast to your relatives in..the
Soviet Union and what would you like to say to young Soviet';;;-;
draftees?
Naumov: We would like to address ourselves to those people who':
know us well. Don't worry about us, there is no need to be over'
you. It may happen that we have to die or go away to a distant
foreign country. Don't think badly of us. As long as we live,
we are with you body and soul. My dear young friends,, if you
have to come to Afghanistan, don't forget one thing--that is is
impossible to make war on an entire people. These are not my
words, they are the words of a soldier prisoner of war. I am not
calling on you to go over to the side of the insurgents or to go
the the Free World. The only thing I do beg of you is to refuse
sons have fallen or are missing in the mountains of a foreign
land. I am not going to try to reassure you: raise your heads,
say your say, tell as much as you can about the unjust war, say
just that your children died in Afghanistan.
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 STATE
DOD
CIA
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MESSAGE NO. ~~
FROM R O B B KI14MITT
(NAME)
TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO:
CHARLES HILL
REMARKS: NR.'90353
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOVIET PRISONERS, IN,LAFt3HANISTAN" (s) "
Sul.., . - COL. JOHN H. STANFORD,, ISEPT-IROOM =NO: ` ' XTEN N .
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Soviet Deserters and POWs in Afghanistan
FROM: Fritz Ermarth
NI0/USSR-EE
7E62 - HQS.
DDI
2.
S.a
MAR
Executive Registry
DDCI 3 1 M
FORM
1-79
CSC.
NI0/USSR-EE
R 1984
S 1 MAR 1984
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01983-84
28 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council 1
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth (~
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT: Soviet Deserters and POWs in Afghanistan
1. For several weeks we have been attempting to follow the interagency
discussion of a proposal to exfiltrate Soviet deserters currently in the
hands of the Afghan Mujahedin. We are concerned that insufficient attention
has been given to the potential these deserters offer for combating Soviet
strategic aims and operations in Afghanistan. We wish in this memo to
address this potential and other issues that involve an assessment of Soviet
views and reactions.
Objectives
2. We believe that the fundamental policy issue concerns the
desirability and feasibility of a sustained effort to help Soviet soldiers
defect from the war. A one-shot ex i tration of the present Soviet captives
may or may not be worth doing on humanitarian grounds alone. But it should
be assessed and conducted as a step, disguised as necessary, toward a
longer-term program. It should be used as a test of feasibility and to
shape the political and operational environment for such a program.
3. Why should such a program be considered? The main reason is that,
as things are now proceeding, the Soviets may yet win a strategic victory in
Afghanistan. We could make troop desertion into a factor that helps deny
them that victory.
CL BY SIGNER
RYW 28 MAR 90
DECL OADR
SECRET)
!.
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4. There is no question that the valor of the Mujahedin fighters and
the weapons support they are getting from the US and some others through the
Paks are giving the Soviets a hard time. However, although it is not
literally documentable, the Soviet strategy is evidently a long-term one of
wearing down the armed resistance through constant military operations, slow
efforts to build an Afghan army and civil infrastructure, and, above all,
their own irrefutable and unmovable military presence. They propose merely
to outlast the will of the majority of Afghans to resist in serious
organized fashion. There is some evidence that they wish through
infiltration and local compromises to cultivate relations with some
Mujahedin elements on which a Quisling peace might eventually be based.
5. There is at least an even chance that this formula will eventually
lead to a kind of local victory for the Soviets, a relatively pacified
country, under predominately Soviet control, facing low-grade banditry at
home and an exiled opposition.
6. Even if one does not accept this prognosis, however, one must
consider another kind of victory, of far wider geopolitical significance,
that the Soviets are winning just by continuing the war. Day in and day
out, the Soviets are demonstrating that they are politically capable of
conducting a large-scale, protracted, and operationally messy war in the
Third World where geography, logistics, and the tolerance of the rest of the
world permit them to insert their forces. The United States finds it
politically difficult to fight such a war, notwithstanding that our
world-wide security commitments and the difficulty of assuring quick
victories imply a readiness to do so. The message the Soviets want to
convey is when they become engaged militarily, they stick it out.
7. Like other military aspects of their superpower image, the Soviets
have not been successful yet in turning this staying power to concrete
political advantage. It has contributed, however, to the queasiness of the
Paks. It must weigh on the thinking of US friends in the Arab world. And
it would almost certainly be a factor in resolving any US-Soviet test of
strength and resolve over the Persian Gulf region. Precisely because no
party would want such a test to escalate immediately to an all-out war, it
would tend to become a protracted affair of ambiguous lines and operational
endurance. The side expected to stick it out will have far more leverage
than the side expected to leave the firing line as soon as possible.
8. This line of reasoning suggests that if there are means which can
be prudently employed to make the Afghan war politically and operationally
more burdensome to the Soviets, to make it a more severe challenge to their
staying power, the US ought to try to use them. The existance of a reliable
path of desertion for Soviet soldiers and its steady employment by some
numbers of them, even if the percentage is small compared with total
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committed manpower, would significantly add to Soviet political and
operational burdens. It would constrain their military operations even
further than now, when they are already under pressure to adopt more fluid
small unit tactics, in part-for fear of losing prisoners and deserters. It
would certainly produce a small but eloquent body of Soviet voices against
the war outside, and probably encourage those against it inside the USSR.
It would pose the kind of challenge to the Soviet command system and style
the response to which usually exaccerbates rather than relieves the
problem. Perhaps most important, it would help to discredit the Soviet top
military command in the eyes of the political leadership and amplify
resentments within the military command structure already reported to exist.
9. If a sustainable exfiltration operation could be created, it might
produce on the order of several hundred deserters-defectors a year, and
perhaps more. We cannot judge this precisely before the fact. What we know
about human conditions and morale in the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan
and elsewhere suggests that fear and practical obstacles more than loyalty
and patriotism prevent a much higher rate of desertion. Moreover, this
would be a dynamic situation in which new conditions would create new
motives and calculations on the part of Soviet troops.
10. No case can reasonably be made that the anticipated level of
desertions alone would drive the Soviets-out of the war. But in combination
with other factors it could heighten Soviet interest in genuine compromise
and withdrawal. Equally important, it could add to Soviet military and
political inhibitions about committing Soviet forces in the future to
large-scale, protracted, and operationally messy wars in third areas, the
opportunity and capability for which are certain to grow in the years ahead
unless Soviet foreign policy does an unexpected about face.
Considerations
11. We are not equipped to evaluate authoritatively the many
operational issues that must clearly be resolved if a sustained Soviet
deserter program is to be initiated. We also appreciate that the
feasibility of such a program turns crucially on such issues. We believe,
however, that we can usefully address a number of the problems and
objections that we have heard in discussion of this matter.
Soviet Presure on Pakistan
12. Some fear that a deserter program, certainly a sustained one, will
stimulate the Soviets to put much greater pressure on the Paks than they
have heretofore, that the Paks will have to accommodate, and that will be
the end of our entire effort to support the Mujahedin., as well as other
operations we may have going there. As troublesome as heightened desertions
would be to the Soviets, it is not clear why this development should provoke
them to pressure the Paks in ways they have thusfar been unwilling to employ
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despite the fact that they know US arms are getting to the Mujahedin through
the Paks. There are clearly important inhibitions operating on the Soviets
in their conduct of this conflict. These inhibitions will not go away
simply because the desertion rate and its political costs may rise. In
fact, the political message of Soviet deserters to the outside world may add
to those inhibitions.
13. The Soviet retaliation to deserter exfiltration most frequently
mentioned is bombing of the border camps from which the Mujahedin operate.
From a Soviet point of view, however, this might not prove very effective in
intimidating the Paks, and it would be expected to lead to increased US
military assistance to Pakistan and possibly to a US military presence there.
14. Certainly there is a risk of Soviet escalation. There is to any
new step that makes life harder for them. Refusal in principle to take such
risks and to counter them appropriately is equivalent to saying our actions
toward the war in Afghanistan can only be ones the Soviets can tolerate.
This would underscore the strategic credibility of Soviet staying power in
any such ambiguous conflict, while further undermining our own.
US-Soviet Relations
15. The US has taken the diplomatic position that we do not wish the
Afghan war to be seen by the world as a purely US-Soviet or East-West
conflict. It is a war by the USSR against a poor Islamic people on their
border and a challenge to the immediately adjacent region. Further, some
have argued that we want neither the war nor the specific problem of
deserters and POWs to become an explicit issue in US-Soviet relations,
especially when the Administration is trying to improve them.
16. There is a confusion of appearances and realities here. The Afghan
war is an issue in US-Soviet relations, although it is also more than that
and we wish it to be seen as such by others particularly in the Islamic
world. The Soviets, however, see the war as an East-West contest and
contend it would be over in a trice were it not one. Their propaganda daily
denounces US assistance to the Mujahedin. Yet they have not to our
knowledge made an explicit political issue of that aid in our bilateral
dealings except when we have pressed them to withdraw.
17. Again we see interesting inhibitions operating on Soviet policy.
It is highly likely that Soviet reluctance to press the issue of US
assistance to the Mujahedin stems from their fear that this would advertise
their political vulnerability on the war, discredit their position in it,
and give the US bargaining leverage. The same inhibition would probably
operate with regard to exfiltration of Soviet deserters. They will denounce
it propagandistically, e.g., charge that the US is abetting the "kidnapping"
of Soviet soldiers. But they will be reluctant to make it an explicit issue
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SECRET)
because this implies a willingness to bargain. For this reason, we should
actually hope that the Soviets would make desertion and other aspects of the
Afghan war issues in US-Soviet relations. For our part, we still insist
that Soviet behavior toward the Third World is an issue in US-Soviet
relations. For years we have insisted that it is, and at the diplomatic
level the Soviets have brushed this aside.
18. Some have the concern that a US sponsored exfiltration effort would
tend to block the warming in US-Soviet bilateral relations hoped for by the
Administration, whether or not the Soviets chose to discuss it explicitly.
This might be the case, although a contrary argument can be made. One must
be clear, however, as to the mentality of the prospective Soviet partner to
improved US-Soviet relations.
19. At issue is not, as some contend, whether we can bring the Soviets
to perceive and "trust" our good will. Were this the case, there would be
an argument for avoiding combative US actions while seeking to improve
relations. The Soviets see the current US administration as deliberately
hostile to Soviet purposes and competitive with Soviet power. They are
certain that they don't like it much. They are less certain as to how
enduring this challenge will prove to be and how best to blunt it. They
have seen that deep-freeze diplomacy as tried in the last months of Andropov
does't work very well. They are now groping for more flexible tactics, to
exploit the political pressures of an election year. The aim is the same,
to use the political implications of US-Soviet relations to blunt US
anti-Soviet policies without material concessions or changes of behavior on
their part.
20. For the United States to foreswear an initiative in the larger
US-Soviet competition because of damage to the appearance of the bilateral
relationship effectively concedes them this aim. In the short or long term,
the historical record indicates that the Soviets themselves contribute to
good US-Soviet relations when they believe they are dealing with a
determined US competitor. Escalation of US bombing of North Vietnam did not
scuttle the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit. On the contrary, the Nixon
administration's image of toughness contributed to the Soviet interest in a
Summit.
21. In any case, the slim tangible results from anything we can do in
the immediate future to exfiltrate Soviet captives from Afghanistan are
likely to leave this a marginal issue for the rest of the year. It could
exert a more significant, and contructive, influence later.
The Number and Quality of Soviet Captives
22. The small number of genuine deserters in Afghan hands now are of
low rank and meager education. Some are drug addicts and criminals (i.e.,
who shot their officers). Quite apart from the moral snobbery of ignoring
them for these reasons (one might note that normal behavior for Soviet
officers would bring criminal prosecution in the US), first-hand testimony
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indicates that dissatisfaction with the war itself has been a major cause of
desertions, is widespread among troops who have not deserted, and has led to
suicides, self-mutilation, and generally bad morale. In any event, the case
for a sustained exfiltration effort does not turn on the quality of the
current captive Soviets. Precisely because the Afghan war -- past Mujahedin
practices, geography, and the absence of a concerted US-Pak exfiltration
effort -- has not afforded a reliable path of desertion up till now, those
who have deserted are of "marginal character" related to the majority of
Soviet personnel. Only the desperate or supremely ignorant, by and large,
have tried it. If reliable paths to desertion were created for Soviet
troops who managed to get beyond range of KGB guns, there can be little
doubt that a much larger and "better" population of Soviet soldiers would
take it. It simply cannot be determined beforehand how much larger or
better. It is worth recalling, however, that Soviet troops continued to
desert to German forces by the thousands in World War II even after it
became clear that the Germans were not liberators. Sometimes all that is
wanted is a way out of the war. Soviet officers and politicians with a
sense of Russian history know what it can mean when such a path appears.
POWs vice Deserters
23. Some have made much of the fact that a majority of the Soviet
troops in Mujahedin hands are probably POWs, not defectors or deserters.
While a case might be made for helping the latter, the USG cannot be in the
business of exfiltrating POWs, supposedly. Why this should be the case is
not entirely clear, especially if their survival is at issue. In any event,
once a Soviet trooper is in Afghan hands it necessarily becomes very unclear
just what he is. And it-cannot become clear again until he is in a
congenial situation where he can exercise genuine free choice, a
consideration that presumably remains of some relevance to the policies of
the United States. If we get into this, we shall inevitably be dealing with
POWs who have to be established as such and repatriated by a procedure and
over a time period to be determined.
24. Where the POW-deserter confusion looks like a tactical
inconvenience -- and it is probably no more than that -- it should be
regarded as a strategic asset. What it means is that a Soviet soldier can
desert from the war without having forever to turn his back on his homeland
if he doesn't wish to. This factor will tend to increase the number of
desertions, if anything. Nor should it be judged a defeat if some
exfiltrants choose to return to the Soviet Union after a suitable interval.
Their net impact on Soviet'society is most unlikely to be congenial to the
system.
25. The real problem with POWs is the attitude of the Mujahedin.
Unable to barter them for their own men in Soviet hands, the Mujahedin would
rather kill those Soviets they regard as POWs than have them return to the
USSR eventually. From their point of view the only reason to safeguard and
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exfiltrate any Soviets is as part of a sustained effort to create a human
hemorage in the Soviet army. After being persuaded to refrain from
executing them, the Mujahedin are reportedly disappointed that so little has
been done with their captives.
Informing Soviet Troops
26. Some have contended that it will be difficult to convey to the bulk
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan that they have the opportunity to desert;
they do not have personal radios. In fact, this should not be too
difficult. Should a substantial number of the present captives be
exfiltrated, simply broadcasting the news to the Soviet Union will assure
that Soviet troops learn something new is occurring. Graffitti, leaflets,
and posters can amplify the message.
Intelligence Value
27. It is claimed by some that the intelligence value of the present
population_..o.f Soviets in Mujahedin hands would be next to nil.
Notwithstanding low rank and small numbers, one suspects that even they
could give us information of use in planning future exfiltration efforts.
Presumably the intelligence value of a larger number of "higher qality"
deserters is less arguable.
- ~~,nt
Frig W. Ermarth George Kolt
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23 March 1984
NOTE FOR: Counselor Edward J. Deywinski
Room 7250
Department of State
SUBJECT : Interagency Task Force on
Soviet Captives from
Afghanistan
REF : State Memorandum of 21 March
1984, Subject as above
In response to the request contained
in reference, CIA provides the attached
comments on the draft paper concerning
Soviet captives in Afghanistan.
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
via LDX)
1
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DCI
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DDCI
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SA/DCI/IA
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ALL W/ ATTACHMENT
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
URGENT
T{}: U SC - liz. Robert Kiaimitt 840867
DOD ? Col. John) Stanford 8408673.
CIA Mr. ThomaI Cormack 8408674
SUBJECT: Inter-Agency To; k Force op Soviet
Captives from Aghanistan
At the March 20 task force abating it was agreed that a
draft of recommendations to the t4SC would ;fie prepared and
quickly circulated to members, he draft s attached. Please
have action officers phone Coynselor Derwipski's office ,
(632-6864/5; secur-e: 5241) with your cleaFances, suggested
changes, etc.
Char,` on >8 l i
xacutifre Secretary
Attachment:
As stated.,
Raslk~ngt , D,G_- 20520
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SEtj...-
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE XNT -AOZ CY-TASK FORCE
ON SOVIET CAPTIVES F OM AFGHANTSTAN
McFar lane' s ebruary 24 mil O. -an inter-
ouse to Mr
'
.
h r esp
I
agency task force (State, NSC, DoD,,and CIA) chaired by Counselor
Derwinski was established and has met three times. The group
recommends that an enhanced effort to extiltrate Soviets from
Afghanistan and move them to the West have the following primaryy,
objectives; (1) humanitarian -- to save lives of Mujahidin-held
Soviets; (2) political/military - to increase the cost to Moscow
of its Afghan occupation-by stimilasting defections and selectively
exploiting defectors for public diplomacy, PS?YWAR, or other
purposes: and (3) intelligence. The group recommends a non-covert
strategy, one which would both extricate Sov4,ets now held by
Mujahidin and establish a mechanism for a lodger-term, defection-
inducing and exfiltration effort. The strat(~,gy--on which the
group is focussed, outlined below,iwould rely heavily on the
efforts of a cooperative private refugee resettlement organiza-
tion. Depending on Pakistani Govagnment viet1rs, or on operational
requirements not now ascertainableE the group might consider
other, including covert, altern4tives.
Given the threat of execution which may face Mujahidin-held
Soviets, and because any enhanced exfiltration effort will depend
critically on Pakistani cooperation, the task force recommends
sending a team to Islamabad as noon as possible. The team's
mission would be essentially exploratory: to determine the extent
of GOP willingness to cooperate; to gain a ;setter feel -- from.Pak
intelligence -- for the numbers and profiles, of Soviets held; and
to hear GOP views and present our'views on Mltrategy. Any under-
standings reached with the GOP rogld be ad referendum. The team
would be headed by Ambassador at Large WaTt rs-and would include
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Stilwell and an NSC
ar 1 or State Department staff-level officia) .
More specifically, the teatp should be aythorized to discus*
with GOP officials the objectivesjof an enhanced exfiltration
effort noted above and, as appropriate, to puggest for GOP
rcnsideration the following general strategy:
Non-Covert, Immediate and Lon-Term Effort to Exfiltrate
and Move to the West ov a ves o er than rows
A cooperative private refugee resettlement organization
seta up asap in Pakistan a small operation to work solely on
Western resettlement of former Soviet captives. (The interna-
tional Rescue Committee is prepared to participate. The U.S.
Refugee Program could fund projected IRC activities.)
- IRC immediately establishes working contacts among
Mujahidin groups, advising Mujahidin of its interest in facilitat-
inq Western resettlement of Soviet captive*, and encouraging
Mujahidin to turn in Soviet captives to IRS. For the latter
purpose, reception points are established, as necessary.(
OCR
ET --
DECLASSI Y ONs OAPR
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-- IRC seeks understanding a td working relationships withi' ICRC
and-UI+CR, whereby Soviets determined-to bR.POWs are handled by
ICRC under terms of the existing'multi-party agreement. and IRC,
working.where possible through URHCR, assupes responsibility f,or
resettling Soviet non-POWs in Western countries. (Several Western
governments are willing to consider accepting former Soviet sol-
diers from Afghanistan for resettlement on a case-by-case basis.)
DoD recommends that the team also be authorized to present the
option below. State believes strongly that this covert option
should not be discussed in any detail given that key problems with
the approach remain unresolved. However,.State believes General
Walters should be authorized at his discretion to raise the general
issue of a covert approach to exfiltratior;) of-,Soviet captives.
Covert, Shorter-Term, Rxfiltration.anc Westward Movement .
-- USG or GOP officials tncciurage Muj hidin groups to bring in
Soviet captives to designated rocaption point(s), from which-USG
officials move Soviets to GOP-provided,stpcret screening and
holding facility, close to reception point (s) -and to secure,
preferably military airfield,
-- Soviets deemed to be POWs are screened out, for holding and
eventual turnover -- possibly via'IRC -- to ICRC for handling
under existing agreement. Al other Soviets are flown out via
secret U.S. military flight(s) to CONUS or, if feasible,. to!U.S.
military installation out of ariea. while-other-Western Govevnments
are discreetly approached re relsettling some of the Sovietsm
Potential Problems. Whilethe task force believes it is of
little utlity to dof ne a detained strategy prior to the proposed
talks in Islamabad, some member's think certain serious problems
will confront us regardless pf the stratsjgy chosen,. for example:
Compensation. CIA believes Mujahidin would typically
expect compensation -- forithe costl)1 effort to bring in
Soviet captives or for other reasons, The task force is split
on whether the U.S. shouldipay compensation in any but
exceptional, intelligence-related capes,-and has not
identified either possible sources o compensation or
non-covert channels for it(t conveyanpe:--
Difficult Cases.. We 4ght have to-admit into the U.S. all
Soviets not p area le as P s with the 1CRC or resettla{ble in
other Western countries. $one official reports indicate many
Soviets now held are drug-addicted, have serious psychological
problems. or would likely request immediate repatriation.
Private sources strongly dispute this characterization,
CIA's position is ........ ('Agency lar)guage if- depi red )
The task force recomwends1a decision as soon as possib~s on
sending the team to Islamabad and-on~i~~ proposed-autfiottti-:
SECRET
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~' ~~` S`A --=OEPAf~ITME NT. pR? ----- -. _ - .i1 lH
MESSAGE NO --- .
?IASSIFtCATIONSECRET/SENSITIVE
C'ati 1 l -
SAS
f ROM
/OtFice, rams/
"MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
~~ ::~>~?x~~c C"1ptives from Afghanistan
DELIVER TC:
ROBERT KIMMITT
COL JOHN STANFORD
No.
25X1
CLEARANCE INFORMATION f
DER
'
--ri - +s ayinqi co Zoijlow _v j a cm.ui er_,_ -
SIS Office r, ,,
22540
IONios $Ymbol) (Exl ent;on1
_ __ (Roan.n~rr~+~eN
Hill to NSC, DOD, CI4_4
. Inter-Agency Taek::.?Force
REQUE~
Q_- -COMMENT Q
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United States Department of State
I 'ashington, B. C. 20520
SECRET/SENSITIVE
URGENT
March 21, 1984
NSC -
Mr.
Robert
Kimmitt
8408672
DOD -
Col.
John
Stanford
8408673
CIA -
Mr.
Thomas
Cormack
8408674
SUBJECT: Inter-Agency Task Force on Soviet
Captives from Afghanistan
At the March 20 task force meeting it was agreed that a
draft of recommendations to the NSC would be prepared and
quickly circulated to members. The draft is attached. Please
have action officers phone Counselor Derwinski's office
(632-8864/5; secure: 5241) with your clearances, suggested
changes, etc.
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 21, 1984
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE
ON SOVIET CAPTIVES FROM AFGHANISTAN
In response to Mr. McFarlane's February 24 memo, an inter-
agency task force (State, NSC, DoD, and CIA) chaired by Counselor
Derwinski was established and has met three times. The group
recommends that an enhanced effort to exfiltrate Soviets from
Afghanistan and move them to the West have the following primary
objectives:- (1) humanitarian -- to save lives of Mujahidin-held
Soviets; (2) political/military -- to increase the cost to Moscow
of its Afghan occupation-by stimulating defections and selectively
exploiting defectors for public diplomacy, PSYWAR, or other
purposes; and (3) intelligence. The group recommends a non-covert
strategy, one which would both extricate Soviets now held by
Mujahidin and establish a mechanism for a longer-term, defection-
inducing and exfiltration effort. The strategy on which the
group is focussed, outlined below, would rely heavily on the
efforts of a cooperative private refugee resettlement organiza-
tion. Depending on Pakistani Government views, or-on operational
requirements not now ascertainable, the group might consider
other, including covert, alternatives.
Given the threat of execution which may face Mujahidin-held
Soviets, and because any enhanced exfiltration effort will depend
critically on Pakistani cooperation, the task force recommends
sending a team to Islamabad as soon as possible. The team's
mission would be essentially exploratory: to determine the extent
of GOP willingness to cooperate; to gain a better feel -- from Pak
intelligence -- for the numbers and profiles of Soviets held; and
to hear GOP views and present our views on strategy. Any under-
standings reached with the GOP would be ad referendum. The team
would be headed by Ambassador at Large Walters and would include
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Stilwell and an NSC
and/or State Department staff-level official.
More specifically, the team should be authorized to discuss
with GOP officials the objectives of an enhanced exfiltration
effort noted above and, as appropriate, to suggest for GOP
consideration the following general strategy:
Non-Covert, Immediate and Long-Term Effort to Exfiltrate
and Move to the West Soviet Captives other than POWs
-- A cooperative private refugee resettlement organization
sets up asap in Pakistan a small operation to work solely on
Western resettlement of former Soviet captives. (The Interna-
tional Rescue Committee is prepared to participate. The U.S.
Refugee Program could fund projected IRC activities.)
-- IRC immediately establishes working contacts among
Mujahidin groups, advising Mujahidin of its interest in facilitat-
ing Western resettlement of Soviet captives, and encouraging
Mujahidin to turn in Soviet captives to IRC. For the latter
purpose, reception points are established, as necessary.
SECRET
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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-- IRC seeks understanding and working relationships with'ICRC
and UNHCR, whereby Soviets determined to be POWs are handled by
ICRC under terms of the existing multi-party agreement, and IRC,
working where possible through UNHCR, assumes responsibility for
resettling Soviet non-POWs in Western countries. (Several Western
governments are willing to consider accepting former Soviet sol-
diers from Afghanistan for resettlement on a case-by-case basis.)
DoD recommends that the team also be authorized to present the
option below. State believes strongly that this'covert option
should not be discussed in any detail given that key problems with
the approach remain unresolved. However, State believes General
Walters should be authorized at his discretion to raise the general
issue of a covert approach to exfiltration of Soviet captives.
Covert, Shorter-Term, Exfiltration and Westward Movement
-- USG or GOP officials encourage Mujahidin groups to bring in
Soviet captives to designated reception point(s), from which USGJ
officials move Soviets to GOP-provided, secret screening and
holding facility, close to reception point(s) and to secure,
preferably military airfield.
-- Soviets deemed to be POWs are screened out, for holding and
eventual turnover -- possibly via IRC -- to ICRC for handling
under existing agreement. All other Soviets are flown out via
secret U.S. military flight(s) to CONUS or, if feasible,,to U.S.
military installation out of area, while other Western Governments
are discreetly approached re resettling some of the Soviets.
Potential Problems. While the task force believes it is of
little utlity to define a detailed strategy prior to the proposed
talks in Islamabad, some members think certain serious problems
will confront us regardless of the strategy chosen, for example:
Compensation. CIA believes Mujahidin would typically
expect compensation -- for the costly effort to bring in
Soviet captives or for other reasons. The task force is split
on whether the U.S. should pay compensation in any but
exceptional, intelligence-related cases, and has not
identified either possible sources of compensation or
non-covert channels for its conveyance.
Difficult Cases. We might have to admit into the U.S. all
Soviets not placeable as POWs with the ICRC or resettlable in
other Western countries. Some official reports indicate many
Soviets now held are drug-addicted, have serious psychological
problems, or would likely request immediate repatriation.
Private sources strongly dispute this characterization.
CIA's position is ........ (Agency language if desired)
The task force recommends a decision as soon as possible on
sending the team to Islamabad and on its proposed authority.
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EXECUTIVE S.'M~FTARIAT.
ROUTING SLIP,:'
TO:
6 DDA-s ;:.:
Ii W.7, DDO;~,--,,i :.
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Chm%NIC':
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2 1'
SUSPENSE'
DATE
- xecu rve ecre ary
(10 Date
R A1.17
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United States Department of Mate
Washington. D. C. 20520
SECRET/SENSITIVE
URGENT
March 17, 1984
NSC -
Mr.
Robert Kimmitt
8408211
DOD -
Col
John Stanford
8408212
CIA -
8408213
SUBJECT: Inter-Agency Task Force on Soviet
Captives from Afghanistan
Attached is a memorandum for the members of the
subject task force prepared in preparation for the
possible meeting on Tuesday,.March 20.
Charles Hi
Executive Sect tary
SECRET! SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
r
U,
Aft. 69 4?I037+/i
D sy-4c s I
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r-. r.R=,.?e _ "DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NODIS
March 17, 1984
TO: NSC - Mr. Raymond
SUBJECT: Inter-Agency Task 'orce.on.Soviet Captives
from Afghanistan
At our March 9. meeting there was a consensus to send a team
to Islamabad as soon as possible. With NSC concurrence, we had
Deane Hinton inform the Paks that a team would be out soon. We
now.have to decide on instructions, on what the team will be
authorized to discuss or propose.
Thus far we've considered strategy only in general terms.
We seem to agree that:
-- We should get word quickly to the Mujahidin not to kill
their Soviet captives, that we're working on the problem.'
-- The best strategy would be one enabling us to get out
the 'Soviets now held while setting in place a mechanism for a
longer-term, defection-inducing and exfiltration effort.'
-- We should work as. much as possible through a private
organization such as the IRC, but,?if the Paks balk at this type
of more open process, we should consider covert alternatives,
perhaps involving a secret U.S. military airlift.
I think we also agree that detailed planning can only be
done in close consultation with the Paks -- if they're willing
to cooperate. That said, however, the team we send out must be
able, if not to present comprehensive strategy options, at least
to answer some of the many obvious questions the Paks might ask
about how we envision the process working, what we and others
may be willing to do,-,etc.
I'm circulating the attached, uncleared discussion paper to
stimulate thinking about how the process might work, and about
how the team might be authorized to respond to predictable Pak
questions. I'd like to have a meeting on Tuesday, March 20, to
consider the approach outlined in the discussion paper, and to
try to reach agreement on instructions for the team. We will be
in touch with your office to arrange a mutually acceptable time.
State Distribution Desired:
P - Ms. Raphel
NEA - Mr. Schaffer
EUR - Mr. Palmer
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S?tRET/SENSITIVE
NODIS March 17, 1984
ENHANCED EFFORT TO EXFILTRATE SOVIET- CAPTIVES
FROM 1FGHA2 ISTAN AND MOVE THEM TO THE WEST
Znf~ormal Discussion Paper
OBJECTIVES
- Save lives of 'Soviet captives. Humanitarian; also
affords us defensible posture in event of serious mishap/public
disclosure. Caveats .if we decided on selective exfiltration
effort, taking only Soviets of interest to us, and if Mujahidin
executed' those we -did not take and this became known, our,
humanitarian stance would be compromi.sed.
:Anti-Soviet. Propaganda. Flow of Soviet captives to the
West would embarrass Moscow, even if number of Soviets were
small, few were publicly -:exploitable, and some wished to be
repatriated. Caveat.: If U.S, were stuck with large number cf
Soviet undesirables theavy drug-users, mental defectives, etc.)
could be negative PR.forus. Moreover, captives we agreed to
repatriate might be exploited by the Soviets to embarrass us.
--- Increase Military Cost to Soviets. Longer-term goal.
Zven modestly successful :defection-.inducing and exfiltration
effort could hinder Soviet operational effectiveness.
Assume eventual Soviet knowledge of our effort and Pak compli-
city. But Soviets are already increasing pressure on Zia. Zia
will judge.for.himself likely Soviet reaction to our effort and
what he can tolerate. .Caveat: Zia may want quid pro quo from
U.S. on security assistance for Pak cooperation.
--:Safeguard Other U.S. Objectives re Afghanistan. Exfil-
tration program could undermine UN-led-negotiations (next round
in early April), ....butthere is='no indication these negotiations
will bear . fruit . Cam eat : Most Soviets exfiltrated may end up
.in U.S., undermining our rebuttal of Soviet contention that
U.S. is orchestrating the insurgent effort.
- . Key unknowns include: GOP. attitude; ICRC attitude
(important on POW and "undesirables." issues -- see below);
usable U.S. human, material, and financial resources -- in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere. -
Locating. Soviets. Two basic options. One entails U.S.
officials/operatives traveling to wherever Soviets were thought
to beheld and seeking there to take control of them. Assume
we do not now have in the area, and could not feasibly erplace,,-,.
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sufficient personnel for this task --given uncertainties about
where: Soviets are held; need for multiple guards of Soviets
during movement, difficulty of journeys from most Mujahidin
camps, likelihood of complicating current U.S. operations, pos-
sibility of direct U.S.. or Pak involvement in'hostilities, etc.
Preferred option is to encourage Mujahidin to "bring in"
Soviet captives. . Word would be gotten to Mujahidin through Pak
and/or'.U.S. channels.' There.would be reception points near the
border (and in Pakistan, for Soviets now on Pak territory). 25X1
Compensation. In most cases Mujahidin would expect compen-
sation -- for costly effort to transport Soviets, Possible
of Soviets' services, etc. F_ U
I Where
Mujahidin groups expected "per Soviet" compensation, we'd have 25X1
to take, and give compensation for., all Soviets brought in.
(Refusal to compensate in such cases could increase chances Of
that Mujahidin group's killing Soviet captives in future.)
Could be impossible to hold the line on some groups 25X1
progressively upping compensation demands. And we might not
want to stimulate Mujahidin's bringing in defectors now engaged
in fighting 'Soviet forces.
Compensation might include boots, clothing, equipment, arms
ammunition.
Direct USG involvement/control. Compensating Mujahidin for
turning over Soviets might be handled separately from the actual
turnover process. Might be possible get organization such as
IRC to take Soviets directly from Mujahidin in a process coordi-
nated by U.S. officials/operatives. Negotiating and coordinat-
ing payment of compensation, however, and initial screening of.
Soviets at point of turnover, should be effectively under USG
control. To minimize direct USG involvement in deference to
private organization (IRC) sensitivities, most Soviets might
quickly (where extended screening or debriefing was unnecessary)
be "released" to the latter, or to theICRC (see below).
The POW Question. Our effort might be challenged as incon-
sistent with the existing agreement on channeling Soviet PAWS
to Switzerland through the ICRC and/or with Geneva Conventions
on the treatment of POWs. Some might claim that all Mujahidin-
held Soviets are, by international legal definition, POWs. Naik
says the GOP has a clear policy on Soviet POWs: to use the ICRC
mechanism. He casts the problem.in terms of the need for a GOP
policy on Soviet "defectors". The ICRC's approach to Soviet
captives has not been categorical -- it has declined to take
Soviets whom it has determined are not POWs.
Our (if necessary, public) position would be that all
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Soviets held by Mujahidlin are not, ipso facto, POWs and that a
case-by-case determination was possible only when they had been
turned over to (publicly "sought aid ::from") the IRC.
It would be important to seek, through or in coordination
with the IRC, an understanding with the ICRC so that the latter
did not publicly challenge 'us or the IRC on the POW question,
e.g., ,insisting that individuals whom we saw as (exploitable)
defectors were POWs who had to be dealt with under the terms of
the existing agreement. The 'Paks might take their lead on any
difficult POW question from the ICRC. In any case where the-
ICRC and/or the Paks insisted -a Soviet be handled. through. the
ICRC-mechanism, we would probably have to concede.
Re the Geneva Conventions, and possible assertions that we
had violated them, our (if necessary, public) position would be
that we had saved Soviet captives from near certain execution
and treated them in a manner ensuring at least as much consider-
ation for their.weil'abeing as required by Geneva Conventions.
We might permit voluntary' repatriation (e.g., after a two-year
period) and access to the Soviets at any time by the Red Cross.
Screening. Reports indicate that-many Soviets the Mujahidin
sight turn over ar:e undesirables ("human wrecks", says the ICRC
head in Pakistan) . The i:,ni`ta a;l, U.S.-controlled screening,
formally--under IRC ausp:ic,es, might divide Soviets as follows:
(A) persons who appear good candidates for resettlement
in.a Western country,-and of intelligence, PSYWAR, or PR.
value, or.,otherwise of special interest to the U.S.;
-- (B) persons who appear good candidates for resettlement
in a Western country, but not of intelligence, PSYWAR, or
PR value, or otherwise of.special interest to the U.S.;
(C) all others.
"Westward Movement" . We might try get the ICRC to accept
responsibility for category (C) persons, for processing either
as POWs (to Switzerland) or.for basic humanitarian relief. We
would hold that persons in categories (A) and (B) were,not POWs
but defectors. The IRC might channel category (B) persons
through the UNHCR for resettlement in Western countries other
than the U.S. -The IRC would channel persons in category (A)
through the UNHCR for expeditious INS consideration for
admission to the U.S. as refugees.
We might have to accept into the U.S. persons in category
(C) for whom. the ICRC,, or some other relief organization, would
not assume responsibility, as well as persons in category (B)
who could. not be resettled in another Western country.
.Leo Cherneinforms us that the IRC-Executive Committee
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(without knowing de'tails) Is "unanimously" inclined to assist
in an resettlement effort for Soviet "refugees" from
Afghanistan, assuming acceptable arrangements, including
funding, could be work.ed out. The IRC could place a small.
.number of experienced personnel In Pakistan on short notice.
U.S. Refugee Program A(RP) 'funds could be made available quickly
to cover the costs of a small IRC operation.
Alternate Screening and Westward Movement Option -- if the-
GOP refused permission for the longer-range, mostly non-covert,
screening and westward movement system described above. (Re
"Locating Soviets" and "Compensation'", same as above.) We _ _.
would ask the GOP t-.o;provide a secret screening and holding
facility, close. to the tunover, ppointand to a secure, preferably
military airfield. "Depending on the rate at which Mujahidin
groups brought in. Soviets, and on how long the secrecy of the'
operation could be maintained, Soviets chosen for movement to
the West (categories A and' B above) would be flown out" via one.,
two, or a series of .-secret U.S. military flights. The flights
might be direct to CONUS or:, if we intended to try to get other
Western governments t-o. accept some Soviets, to a U.S. military
installation abroad, where 'further screenings/debriefings. could
take place while discreet approaches were made to the other
Western governments.
"Among the serious problems this alternative poses are:
-- The fate of, the majority of Soviets turned in whom we
were not interested.. Soviets "selected-out" and remaining in
Pakistan could threaten the secrecy of a continuing covert
operation. They could not 'be confined' indefinitely. The GOP
Would not want them to remain in Pakistan. Their having
"surfaced" as the result of a covert. operation, private relief
agencies would likely refuse to care for them. Their lives
could be -endangered if the the Soviet Mission got hold of them..
-- The fate of many of the Soviets if we flew them all out..
What would we do 'with the undesirables, the so-called "human
wrecks", who could; not be resettled permanently in the U.S.,
whom the Europeans wouldn't take, and whom even the Soviets
might. refuse to accept even if we offered them at some point?
-- The PR disaster which would result from.a serious
technical mishap, e.g., a plane crash.
--..:The difficulty of securing another government's permis-
sion, ifnecessary, to land covert flights carrying Soviet mili-
tarypersonnel at a U.S.:installation on their territory.
---The legal impediments to admitting groups of
"unfiltered" Soviets directly into the U.S., (need for
immigration law-related waivers by the Attorney General, etc..)
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Executive Secretariat SENSITIVE
The attached document may be seen only by the addressee
and, if not expressly precluded from doing so, by those of-
ficials under his authority whom he considers should have a
clear-cut "need to know."
The document is not to be reproduced, given any additional
distribution or discussed with others in the Department of
State, or in other Departments, Agencies, or Bureaus without
the express prior approval of the Executive Secretary.
Addressees outside the Department of State should handle
the document in accordance with the above instructions on
SENSITIVE.
When this document is no longer needed, the recipient is
responsible for seeing that it is destroyed and for mailing a
record of destruction to Mr. Elijah Kelly,.S/S-I, Room 7241,
New State.
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretariat SENSITIVE
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washinb4on. D. C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Soviet POWs in Afghanistan
While I am sure the US can be helpful in resettling Soviet defectors
from Afghanistan, we do have to be careful not to expose the Pakistanis
as an obvious conduit for such a move. If we do, we are confident it
will bring greater Soviet heat upon Zia.
We urge that we not deal with or handle the Soviet POWs. I fear
there will be great international indignation if the US is involved in
moving Soviet POWs since any POW ought to be handled according to
international agreements. Since the POWs may be the product of an
insurgency, the US has no right to play a role. The Pakistanis have an
overt arrangement with the Soviets that they will turn over any and all
Soviet military prisoners to the International Red Cross for handling.
While urging that we do not deal with the POWs at all, we also wish
to point out the defectors may not be the model citizens that-any nation
would like to have. Given the caliber of the Soviet soldier; we do not
anticipate any great propaganda leverage coming from the defectors.
cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Distribution:
Orig - Adse.
1 - Each cc
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
(~j) - ER
1 - NI0/USSR - 28 Feb 84
1 - SA/IA/DCI 29 Feb 84 All per ES
1 -DDO 1, - Comptroller 29 Feb 84
DDCI:JNMCMAHON:cls (27 Feb 84)
!,SECRET CL BY Signer
DECL OADR C - 3251
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ffi SYSTEM II
90221.. Exec{utivG
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET-/SENSITIVE WASHINGTON 84- 1037~_...._..J
February 24, 1984
JLEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE.-
Following discussions with Secretary Shultz and Secretary
Weinberger, the Department of State is requested to take the
lead in developing an action plan for the immediate
exfiltration of Soviet POWs and defectors from Afghanistan.
This will require careful initial coordination with the
Pakistanis before the feasibility of this plan can be assured.
State should coordinate the approach to the Pakistanis with
Defense and CIA. (S)
The action plan should review carefully a range of possible
ways in which the Soviet soldiers can be moved from Pakistan
to resettlement points in the West. This could include a. DOD =
emergency airlift. Consideration, however, should also be
given to the Pakistanis providing a`transitional safehaven for
the Soviets while. arrangements are made for exfiltration from
Pakistan in-small more discrete numbers to a variety of points
in the West. The time sensitivity of this operation is
critical as we are responding to reports that Afghan resis-
tance fighters may begin executing their Soviet prisoners in..
the next few weeks.. (S)
I would like to meet to review the foreign policy and
operational considerations prior to presentation of the plan
to the President. (S)
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