OUTLOOK FOR THE PALESTINIANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00T02041R000100120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

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Natfional ~~tellige~ace Es~im~te
NIE 36.1 '-84"
i5 Augus;,1984
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N I E 36.11-84
OUTLOOK FOR THE
PALESTINIANS
Information available as of 3 August 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate,
which was approved by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board on 9 August 1984.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... v
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
Arafat's Leadership ....................................................................... 5
PLO Factions ................................................................................ 6
Fatah Split ............................................................................. 7
Democratic Alliance ............................................................. 8
The Balance of Power .................................................................. 9
Prospect for a Split ....................................................................... 9
Relations With Arab States .......................................................... 9
Syria ....................................................................................... 9
Jordan .................................................................................... 10
Other Moderate Arab States ................................................ 10
Egvpt's Role .......................................................................... 11
Other Arab States .................................................................. 11
The Soviet Union .......................................................................... 11
PLO Support in the West Bank and Gaza .................................. 12
The Palestinian Diaspora ............................................................. 12
The Terrorist Threat .................................................................... 14
Cessions Learned Last Year ................................................. 14
State-Supported Terrorism ................................................... 15
Implications for the United States ............................................... 15
The Palestinians .................................................................... 15
The Arab States ..................................................................... 15
Outlook .......................................................................................... 17
Alternative Outcomes ........................................:.......................... 18
Egypt ..................................................................................... 18
Syria ....................................................................................... 18
III
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate assesses the status of the Palestinian issue in Middle
East affairs two years after the Israeli invasion that forced the
evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut. It
examines the effects on the PLO of its dispersal and the rebellion within
the moderate Fatah faction of Yasir Arafat, with emphasis on the
implications for Arafat's leadership of the PLO, the relative balance of
power between the radical and moderate PLO camps, and how
developments in the PLO have affected its relations with the Arab
states.
The paper assesses the likely impact of the Palestinian issue on
regional problems over the next year or so-and, whenever possible, we
have tried to proiect judgments over a longer period. The paper
examines the attitudes of the PLO and the diaspora Palestinians toward
the Middle East peace process, and the likely strategies they will adopt
to achieve their objectives. It discusses the prospects for any credible
Palestinian leadership to emerge in the West Bank and Gaza as an
alternative to the PLO. It also assesses the likelihood of increased
terrorism by the Palestinians and their sympathizers.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Arab states are unlikely over the next two to three years at
least to cooperate with the United States in negotiating a solution to the
Palestinian issue. This conclusion is based on our judgment that:
- PLO leader Arafat will have neither the mandate nor the will
to permit King Hussein of Jordan to negotiate on behalf of the
Palestinians.
- Without PLO approval, moderate Arab states are unlikely to
endorse negotiations by Hussein. His room for maneuver on the
Palestinian issue will remain severely circumscribed, and he
will not act unilaterally.
- Only if Washington wrings significant concessions from Israel
would Hussein accept the United States as an honest broker in
the peace process.
- Even the new Israeli Government will not offer sufficient
concessions to make negotiations an acceptable option for the
PLO.
- No credible West Bank leadership will emerge capable of
entering negotiations on its own or in cooperation with Hussein.
- Syria will be able to block any agreement it does not approve,
and will move to halt any incipient negotiations that seem on
the verge of approving Jordanian talks with Israel.
The Palestinian issue will remain a potent force in Middle East
politics for the indefinite future. The Arab and Palestinian commitment
to Palestinian statehood has not diminished in the 35 years of Israel's
existence, and is not likely to do so now.
Although other regional conflicts may periodically divert Arab
attention, the issue nonetheless will continue to be a source of divisive-
ness between the United States and the Arabs. Arafat's diminished
influence over the PLO has increased the Arabs' fear that the Palestin-
ian issue could destabilize the region, creating threats to their own
security. If this occurs, moderate leaders would feel they have no choice
but to distance themselves from the United States.
PLO and Palestinian attitudes toward the United States are likely
to harden over the next year if there is no progress toward solution of
the Palestinian problem. Even Palestinian moderates will point to US
refusal to support Palestinian self-determination, or to recognize the
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PLO, as the basic reason for the impasse. They will see continued Israeli
settlement activity as proof Washington could not in any event be relied
on to get Israel to compromise on its narrow definition of Palestinian
autonomy.
The internal situation in the PLO remains unsettled, although
Arafat appears to have overcome challenges to his position. Neverthe-
less, the de facto veto power of the radicals who oppose negotiations
with Israel has been enhanced.
Despite internal dissension, the PLO is likely to avoid a formal split
over the next year; it cannot, however, legitimately claim to be a
relatively united representative of the Palestinians. If it avoids fragmen-
tation, its symbolic appeal to the Palestinians and the terrorist potential
of its component groups will allow it to play at least a spoiler role indef fi-
nitely. If it does disintegrate, new and probably more radical organiza-
tions will replace it as instruments of Palestinian nationalism.
Under Arafat's leadership, the PLO over the last decade has
pursued a strategy based on diplomatic tactics and aimed at acquiring
some territory f or a Palestinian state. Increasing numbers of Palestinians
have come to believe that this strategy is doomed to failure and that old
approaches may never bring about a Palestinian state. Over time, the
PLO's relevance may decline as increasing numbers of ~ Palestinians
adopt more sweeping ideological approaches such as Islamic f undamen-
talism or Marxism, or abandon politics altogether. ,
As hopes for gains through negotiation dwindle, there will be a
return to militancy in the Palestinian movement and an attempt to
refurbish the PLO's revolutionary credentials. This implies:
- Rejection of a negotiated settlement.
- Abandonment of any land-for-peace concept.
- Renewed emphasis on armed struggle, largely in the form of
unconventional operations against Israeli targets.
A radicalization of the Palestinian movement may force Arafat to
end~his ban on terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. The
Palestinians' loss of an independent base in Lebanon, however, means
that Palestinian groups will be increasingly influenced by host nations'
policies, which could limit their freedom to conduct either international
terrorism or terrorism in Israel and the occupied territories. Such
terrorist efforts, however, are likely to increase through use of PLO
assets in Israel and the occupied territories.
The Palestinians' 17-year experience of Israeli control makes it
unlikely that they would consider autonomy under Israeli sovereignty as
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a solution to their political future, but the pace of de facto accommoda-
tions between many West Bank Palestinians and the Israeli military
government will expand.
On balance, we believe the odds are against a credible West Bank
and Gaza leadership joining Hussein in support of negotiations and
sustaining its support in the absence of Israeli willingness to grant
ultimate Palestinian self-determination.
There is only a slim chance that the dissension within the PLO or
the failure of Arafat and Hussein to reach an agreement will lead to an
independent West Bank initiative.
Not all Palestinian goals are congruent with the national interests of
all Arab states. Syria supports militant PLO groups only to facilitate its
own regional goals. Syria is willing to wait years, even decades, for the
conditions conducive to a settlement on its terms to arise. A change of
regimes in Syria is unlikely to alter Syria's refusal to support a solution
to the Palestinian issue except as part of a broader Arab-Israeli
settlement that includes the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian
control.
The moderate Arab states are concerned over the continuing lack
of progress toward a settlement of the Palestinian problem. The
moderates will use their influence to keep US-Jordanian relations from
deteriorating further and to keep alive the Arafat-Hussein dialogue, in
the hope that f orward movement in the peace process will resume after
the US elections.
Although the Arab moderates will express initial willingness to
explore any new Israeli offers, they are unwilling to compromise on the
issues of Palestinian self-determination and the need for a role for the
PLO in any Palestinian political entity. Egyptian support would be
essential in the unlikely event the moderate Arabs and Arafat ever
decided, despite Syrian opposition, to support negotiations with Israel or
to reach a comprehensive agreement with Israel.
The prospects are remote that the moderate Arab states over the
next several years will back an alternative to the PLO unless it clearly
loses the support of the Palestinian people.
As the stalemate over the Palestinian issue continues, Israel will
move toward incorporation of the West Bank. Israel is unlikely to do
anything that will support a moderate wing of the PLO against the
radicals; Israel prefers a radical PLO, which obviates any need for
compromise.
A Labor government would adopt a more flexible approach than
Likud to solving the Palestinian issue. Labor's policy of turning over the
heavily populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan probably
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would raise some initial interest in Jordan and Egypt, but would not
serve as a basis for a final settlement. A resumption of talks would
present opportunities for conciliatory moves by all participants, but we
believe that even a Labor government is unlikely to come forward with
compromises that would sustain moderate Arab hopes f or an acceptable
negotiated solution.
The festering of the Palestinian issue and Soviet support for the
PLO provide Moscow with major opportunities to increase its influence
in the Arab world. The USSR still views Arafat as the most viable PLO
leader, but, if forced to choose between him and Syria, Moscow will opt
for the latter.
The Soviets will continue to pursue a political solution to the
Palestinian issue that would achieve their regional goals. This will keep
them at odds with PLO radicals that f avor armed struggle and terrorism
as the chief means of dealing with Israel. Moscow probably will offer
Arafat increased military and diplomatic support if he overcomes the
challenges to his leadership and his position as PLO Chairman seems
secure. If radicals opposed to a political solution gain control of the
PLO, Moscow will try to rely on the Marxist Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-a radical group that seeks Soviet inclusion in
negotiations-to urge a return to the pursuit of diplomacy.
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DISCUSSION
Arafat's Leadership
1. Yasir Arafat's personal prestige and authority
declined dramatically in the year following the dis-
persal of the Palestine Liberation Organization from
Beirut. (See chronology, table 1.) He had emerged
from the 1982 defeat with enhanced international
prestige, increased authority within the PLO, and
more influence with Arab leaders. But by the end of
1983 he had been expelled from Damascus, his most
loyal deputies in his moderate Fatah faction had
repudiated his tentative approval for Jordanian King
Hussein to enter Middle East peace talks, a significant
portion of Fatah was in revolt against his leadership,
Table 1
Recent PLO Chronology
Israel invades Lebanon to destroy infra-
structure of Palestine Liberation
Organization.
Yasir Arafat: Apolitical-Psychological Perspective
Yasir Arafat'g number-one priority is maintaining his
leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Sensitive to the complex political differences among
Palestinians, Arafat has a finely honed consensual deci-
sionmaking style, which has helped him to retain
leadership of the PLO for 15 years. Throughout his
career he has acquired and exploited power by shrewd-
ly playing off factions in order to avoid splitting the
movement. At the same time, his unwillingness to risk
losing his across-the-board support has inhibited Arafat
from taking more decisive actions. In general, we
believe this pattern is likely to persist.
While Arafat's talents as a consensus decisionmaker
have kept him on top of Fatah and the PLO, we believe
his style has impeded any strong direction for the
organizations. Arafat can make only short-range tactical
decisions that can be readily reversed if circumstances
change; we believe that his primary objective is to keep
his options open. Arafat's toleration for diversity under
the umbrella of the PLO has so far proved to be one of
the chief stumblingblocks to any Fatah/PLO-sponsored
peace initiatives-including granting to King Hussein of
Jordan a clear mandate to negotiate on behalf of the
Palestinians. Thus, paradoxically, Arafat's consensus
leadership provides an organizational constraint that
weakens his ability to negotiate: he has consistently
demonstrated an unwillingness to act boldly or get too
far out in front on key issues. His insistence on keeping
all Palestinians under the Palestinian umbrella implicit-
ly gives the radical elements in the PLO and Fatah a
veto over any effort to achieve a negotiated settlement.
Syrian-backed PLO dissidents in Lebanon
revolt against Yasir Arafat's leadership.
PLO leftists remain loyal but tilt toward
dissidents.
Dissidents force Arafat loyalists to evacuate
Tripoli, Lebanon. Arafat meets Egyptian
President Mubarak in Cairo.
Arafat and leftist PLO factions in the
Democratic Alliance sign Aden accord
allowing him to remain as PLO Chairman
but with reduced personal authority. PLO
dissidents remain unreconciled.
and he was again forced to flee a Lebanese city under
the guns of a superior military force.
2. The prospects that a Palestinian consensus in
favor of a political solution can remain a strong force
in Middle East politics are linked to Arafat's political
fortunes. None of the other moderate PLO leaders
come close to wielding the authority and prestige
necessary to maintain the commitment to diplomacy
in the face of radical Palestinian opposition and a
relatively uncompromising Israeli stand.
3. Arafat (see inset) remains widely popular among
Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestin-
ian diaspora. His support, however, now depends more
on his role as the symbol of an independent Palestinian
resistance movement than on any belief in his ability
to advance Palestinian political objectives.
4. Arafat's prestige as a symbol of Palestinian resist-
ance to the Israeli attack on Beirut did not last long as
the PLO once again became subordinate to the general
interests of the Arab states. The Arab heads of state
who had deferred to him at their summit meeting in
Fez in September 1982-after his departure from
Beirut-remained largely passive as Syria and its PLO
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dissident allies progessively reduced the area under
Arafat's control in Lebanon and then attacked his last
positions near Tripoli. Arab leaders only belatedly
applied strong pressure on Syria to observe acease-fire
and allow Arafat to leave.
5. Arafat's meeting with Egyptian President Mu-
barak, his prominent role at the Islamic Conference in
December 1983, and the Arab states' willingness to let
him take the lead in determining the next Arab move
in the peace process demonstrate his continuing influ-
ence in Middle East politics.
6. Arafat now controls 6,000 to 8,000 fighters,
comprising those who evacuated Tripoli and those
who remained abroad after the 1982 evacuation from
Beirut. He also commands some underground assets in
Lebanon, and his loyalists dominate the PLO diplo-
Table 2
Groups Within the Palestine Liberation Organization
matic corps and other PLO departments. Arafat main-
tains his headquarters in Tunis.
7. Arafat's opponents include PLO dissident forces
that fought against him in Tripoli in 1983. These
number 2,600 to 3,000 fighters. Leftist PLO forces
who remained neutral in the fighting between Arafat
and the dissidents total 3,000 to 4,000. Both PLO
radical camps-the dissidents and the leftists-have
headquarters in Damascus.
PLO Factions
8. There are three broad groupings within the PLO
(see table 2):
- Pro-Arafat elements consolidated in the Fatah
mainstream.
Group
Leader
Politics
Size of Militia
Pro-Arafat
Fatah loyalists
Yasir Arafat
Palestinian nationalism; main goal is to secure
Palestinian political demands; largely non-
ideological
6,000-8,000
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
Abd al-Rahim Ahm
ad
Controlled by Iraq.
300-500
Democratic Alliance (neutral) a
Popular Front for the Libera-
lion of Palestine (PFLP)
George Habbash
Revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist movement com-
milted to elimination of conservative monarchical
Arab regimes as well as Israel. Uses support for
Arafat as PLO leader to press him for more
radical policies.
1,500-2,000
Democratic Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine (DFLP)
Nayif Hawatmah
Marxist-Leninist; most "ideological" group; gener-
ally supports Arafat and mainline PLO policy.
1,200-1,500
Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (FLP)
Taalat Yaqub
Militant opposition to Israel.
300-500
National Alliance (anti-Arafat)
Fatah rebels
Political: Nimr Mu
Salih (Abu Salih) a
Abu Kuwayk Qadr
Military: Said Mur
Musa)
hammad
nd Sami
i
agha (Abu
Reject negotiated solution with Israel.
2,000-2,200
Popular Front for the Libera-
lion of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC)
Ahmad Jibril
Lacks clearly defined political ideology; empha-
sizes military struggle; follows anti-Israel policy.
800-1,100
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Samir Ghawshah
Militant advocate of armed struggle to eliminate
Israel.
200-300
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-Anti-Arafat elements forming the National Alli-
ance, whose aim is to remove Arafat as PLO
Chairman, drop pursuit of the political option,
and commit the PLO to "armed struggle" against
Israel. This alliance includes the Fatah dissidents;
the Popular -Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine-General Command (PFLP-GC); the Popu-
lar Struggle Front (PSF); and al-Saiga.
- Neutral elements forming the Democratic Alli-
ance, which seeks to preserve PLO unity, but
with constraints on Arafat's personal authority.
This alliance comprises the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); the
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP); and
the Palestine Communist Party (not a PLO
member).
Fatah Split
9. The split in Fatah between the rebels and the
loyalists is likely to prove permanent. The rebels'
initial call for reforms, with Arafat remaining as Fatah
and PLO leader, gave way to demands for his removal
as it became apparent he would avoid compromise.
The Fatah rebels' demands for political and adminis-
trative reforms constituted a resection of Arafat's
relatively moderate policies of the past decade and a
rebuke of his personal leadership. (See insets.)
Evolution of PLO Policy
Official policy of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, as stated in resolutions of the Palestine National
Council, has undergone significant shifts since the
Council first met in 1964. PLO moderates claim the
resolutions have in effect modified the more hardline
provisions of the PLO Charter and are a better guide to
PLO intentions than the Charter. The Charter, adopted
in 1964, contains uncompromising "maximalist" de-
mands calling for the "total liberation of Palestine,"
which would obviously require the elimination of Israel.
A basic split in the ranks of the PLO on the issues of
its participation in Middle East negotiations and its
terms for a settlement occurred at the PNC session in
1974. The Council, against bitter opposition from the
radical camp, adopted a resolution known as the Phased
Political Program. The resolution reiected negotiations
on the basis of UN Resolution 242 but called for the
establishment of a "combatant national authority" on
any land from which Israel withdraws-an acceptance
in principle of the idea of a negotiated solution to the
Palestinian issue and the creation of a Palestinian state
in the West Bank and Gaza.
The program left vague the exact Palestinian terms
for a settlement. It also stipulated that the Palestinians
intended to continue the effort to eliminate aJewish-
dominated state.
The next PNC meeting in 1977 took some additional
steps in support of negotiations. The 1974 declaration
regarding a national authority was modified. The new
wording asserted the Palestinians' right "to establish
their independent national state on their own land"-
dropping the word "combatant" and substituting the
word "state" for "authority." The declaration also
stated the PLO's right to participate in any interna-
tional conference bearing on the Palestinian issue.
These resolutions were victories for Arafat, but the
radicals forced him to drop a proposed resolution
calling for coordination between Jordan and the PLO.
The 1979 PNC predictably denounced the Camp
David accords. The Council reiterated resection of UN
Resolution 242 but softened some of the hardline
language from the 1977 declaration. It deleted one
phrase stating that the PLO reiects all dealings on the
basis of Resolution 242 and another calling for recovery
of Palestinian national rights "without reconciliation or
recognition." The more moderate language was de-
signed to show the PLO's alleged willingness to consider
reasonable compromise. Arafat in 1979 also won quali-
fied Council approval for a PLO dialogue with Jordan.
At the 1981 Council session, Arafat and his followers,
over radical and Syrian opposition, narrowly succeeded
in securing the passage of resolutions giving limited
approval for PLO contacts with the European Commu-
nity and endorsing the continuation of the Jordanian-
PLO ioint committee established in 1979 to oversee the
distribution of Arab funds to the West Bank.
The 1983 PNC resolution affirmed a "special rela-
tionship" between the Jordanians and the Palestinians
and approved the concept of an eventual confederation
between Jordan and an independent Palestinian state.
The resolution said the PLO "refused to accept" the US
September 1982 initiative as a basis for a Middle East
solution, but did not explicitly reiect it. Arafat and the
moderates interpreted this language as leaving open the
possibility of PLO cooperation with the plan if the
perceived defects were modified. The radicals insisted
the resolution's practical effect was to foreclose any
PLO connection with the initiative.
Despite the moderate words and implied willingness
to negotiate found in some provisions of PNC resolu-
tions, the Council's declarations inevitably state the
PLO's intention to intensify the armed struggle within
the: occupied territories. Another standard clause is a
reintegration of the PLO's basic demands fora settle-
ment of the Palestinian issue: the right to "return" (to
Palestine), to self-determination, and to the establish-
ment of an independent national state.
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Since 1964, when both the PLO and the Palestine .
National Council (PNC) were formed, there has been
purposeful ambiguity about their relationship. Both
were formed by the May 1964 "National Congress of
Palestinians" in Jerusalem. The congress published two
documents, the Palestine National Charter and the
Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
There is no evidence that the congress proclaimed the
actual formation of the PLO. Ahmed Shugairy, who
was elected head of the interim assembly, later made an
announcement to this effect, but it is not clear that he
was authorized to do so by the assembly. The PNC is
the successor of that interim assembly.
Article 21 of the constitution specifically states that
half of the members of the national assembly will be
"elected directly by the Palestinian people" and that
the other half will be "elected from the commands of
the Organization." ("Organization" is used throughout
the constitution to mean PLO.) This clearly indicates
that the framers viewed the assembly as distinct from
the PLO, which would provide only half of its mem-
bers. This view was reinforced when Arafat's "feda-
yeen" groups demanded half of the seats in the PNC
after taking over the PLO. Article 22, in apparent
contradiction to Article 21, names the assembly as "the
supreme authority of the PLO." It can be argued that
this simply gives the PNC legislative authority over the
PLO, but the contrary argument-that the assembly is
"of the PLO"-is more easily supported by the lan-
guage of Article 22.
In practice, the PNC has always maintained at least
cosmetic separation from the PLO. It is clear that most
members of the PNC try to maintain separation
between themselves and active PLO organizations.
Many consciously remain independent of the PLO so
they can live in or travel to and from the United States
and Israeli-occupied territories. Only about 30 percent
of PNC members now represent the PLO's constituent
organizations; the other 70 percent claim to represent
various other Palestinian clubs, unions, organizations,
and municipalities.
The PLO, as the largest constituent party in the PNC,
most often gets its way in matters of policy, and, since
the 1969 fedayeen takeover of the PLO, Arafat has
been able to manipulate the PNC on most important
issues. Arafat is not always sure that the PNC will ratify
his actions or policies, however. The delays in. conven-
ing the PNC since Arafat's expulsion from Tripoli,
Lebanon, in December 1983, have been caused by the
attempts by Arafat and his PLO rivals to woo nominally
independent PNC members to their respective sides.
10. The rebels demanded:
- An end to Arafat's dialogue with Jordan and a
resection of all compromise plans for settling the
issue, including the US initiative and the propos-
als adopted by Arab leaders at the Fez summit in
1982.
- Arafat's adherence to the principle of collective
leadership and acceptance of more accountabil-
ity for the dispersal of PLO funds.
- A purge of Fatah officers considered corrupt and
incompetent.
11. The attack on Arafat in Tripoli proved a costly
political blunder for the rebels. The PLO and Palestin-
ian view of them as Syrian puppets hardened, and the
rebels' influence declined sharply. Rebel leaders as of
mid-1984 no longer seemed to pose a threat of replac-
ing Arafat as Fatah or PLO leader, but the ideas they
espoused seem to have gained greater credibility in the
PLO.
Democratic Alliance
12. The two principal groups in the Democratic
Alliance, the PFLP and the DFLP, have gained status
in the PLO since the evacuation from Beirut in 1982.
Their influence has always been second only to Fatah
because of their size and the prestige of their leaders.
Nayif Hawatmah of the DFLP and George Habbash
of the PFLP are the only important PLO leaders other
than Arafat to maintain reputations as independent
representatives of the Palestinians. The Fatah rebellion
and the splits within other gtJerrilla groups have left
the PFLP and the DFLP as the' two most internally
unified groups in the PLO. .
13. The PFLP and the DFLP maintain strong ties
to the Soviet Union, and the DFLP's relations are
particularly close. The PFLP's relations with Moscow
were cool until the late 1970s. The Soviets were
reluctant to become too closely identified with an
organization that had a reputation for supporting
international terrorism and rejected negotiations as a
means for coming to terms with Israel. The PFLP's
suspension of international terrorism in the mid-1970s
permitted improved relations, but Moscow continues
to differ with Habbash's resection of a negotiated
settlement.
14. Hawatmah and Habbash since the Fatah rebel-
lion have tried to 'strike a balance between often
conflicting objectives:
- They sympathize with rebel demands for collec-
tive rule and militant policies but have opposed
Arafat's removal or armed revolt as a means to
force him to adopt reforms.
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- They want close ties with Syria but to retain a
capacity for independent decisionmaking.
15. Habbash's and Hawatmah's political positions
will continue to be crucial in determining Arafat's
strength within the PLO and therefore his options in
the peace process. The movement of either or both
into a permanent alliance with the dissidents would
jeopardize Arafat's claim to be the leader of the PLO,
even if he maintained a majority in the Palestine
National Council and the PLO Executive Committee.
This, however, seems less likely after the Democratic
Alliance and Arafat's Fatah wing agreed to limitations
on Arafat's leadership at a series of meetings in Algiers
and Aden in mid-1984.
16. Arafat's effort to keep Habbash and Hawatmah
on his side will require him to adhere to the Aden
agreements and to PNC resolutions that rule out
surrendering the demand for Palestinian self-determi-
nation or giving Jordan authority to represent the
Palestinians in negotiations. Habbash and Hawatmah
will argue against any form of PLO-Jordanian cooper-
ation, although they probably would grudgingly ac-
cept limited joint action if it were approved by the
Fatah Central Council and by the Arab states.
Council, the Palestine Central Council, and the PLO
Executive Committee. They also fill PLO diplomatic
positions, direct PLO departments and economic en-
terprises, and control the PLO treasury. Furthermore,
he retains swell-developed infrastructure both in the
occupied territories and abroad that will permit him to
resume guerrilla and terrorist activity if necessary to
preserve his leadership position.
21. The increase in early 1984 of terrorist incidents
inside Israel and the occupied territories seemed to
confirm that armed struggle against Israel retains
significant appeal in PLO circles.
Prospect for a Split
22. The odds favor the PLO's avoiding a formal
split over the next year, but it is unlikely to regain the
degree of unity it possessed before the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon. Even without a formal split, the dissidents
who seek a military solution are unlikely to accept
Arafat's leadership again.
23. So far, neither side has been willing to formalize
the split. This standoff could continue for some time,
as both sides see value in preventing the PLO's
disintegration.
The Balance of Power
17. The veto power of radicals that oppose negotia-
tions with Israel has been enhanced. Opinion within
the PLO on Middle East issues favors the radicals'
emphasis on armed struggle and a rejection of compro-
mise solutions, including the US initiative and the Fez
proposals, as the preferred means of advancing Pales-
tinian political demands. All factions seek to preserve
their positions through the retention of armed power.
18. The radicals enjoy the psychological advantage
of having their forces concentrated in states that
border on Israel-Lebanon and Syria-while Arafat's
fighters are distant from the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict. This puts the burden of proof on Arafat to
demonstrate that he is capable of waging armed
struggle against Israel while also pursuing the political
option.
19. The radicals are in a position to benefit from a
stalemate in the Middle East peace process. Their
policies assume that an agreement with Israel is unob-
tainable, and they are prepared for a protracted
struggle to eliminate the Israeli state. Arafat, on the
other hand, must show in the next year or so that his
diplomacy can achieve favorable results or risk more
defections to the radical camp.
20. Arafat still has considerable assets. His support-
ers comprise a majority on the Palestine National
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Relations With Arab States
Syria
24. Syria's consistent objective has been to prevent the
PLO-and particularly Arafat-from acting indepen-
dently of Damascus in the Middle East peace process.
Syrian President Assad wants, at a minimum, to keep the
PLO responsive enough to Syrian direction to enable him
to use the Palestinian issue as a bargaining chip in any
negotiations with Israel on a general Middle East settle-
ment. Apliant PLO also gives him additional leverage in
his relations with the Arab states, lending weight to his
claim to represent Palestinian interests and to his implied
threat to use PLO surrogates to conduct terrorism against
moderate Arab rivals.
25. Syria's own national interests are not identical
with those of the Palestinians, however, and they will
continue to take precedence over strictly Palestinian
goals. Syria will not support a settlement of the
Palestinian issue that is not a part of a broader
settlement that includes:
- The return of all the Golan Heights to Syrian
control.
- Major Syrian influence over any Palestinian
entity.
- Suitable arrangements for the future of the Pales-
tinians living in the diaspora.
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26. The Fatah rebellion gave Assad an opening to
go beyond merely restricting Arafat's freedom of
maneuver. He saw an opportunity to destroy Arafat's
preeminence and bring the PLO under Syrian control.
Assad did not instigate the rebellion, but he assured its
survival by supporting the rebels with money and
arms and encouraging other Syrian-controlled PLO
groups-Saiga, the PFLP-GC, and the PSF-to side
with the rebels. The PFLP and DFLP-the only
important PLO groups other than the Fatah loyalists
that have resisted becoming Syrian surrogates-are
basically pro-Syrian.
27. Syria's most important gain is the weakening of
Arafat. His loss of support among the more militant
PLO groups and his diminished influence over the
PFLP and DFLP enhance Syria's ability to pressure
these groups.
28. The Syrians prefer a united PLO, with leader-
ship passing to pro-Syrian factions. Short of an assur-
an~e its surrogates would get Arab League endorse-
ment, Syria would probably not take steps to establish
a rival Palestinian organization except in the unlikely
event Arafat seeks and obtains maiority support in the
PLO for Jordan to enter peace talks on behalf of the
Palestinians.
Jordan
29. The effort by Arafat and King Hussein to revive
their agreement on entering talks is likely to founder
on the same obstacles that prevented them from
consummating an agreement in April 1983. Fatah and
PLO pressures against a bold move by Arafat to
support negotiations, in fact, are greater now than they
were last year. The Fatah loyalists and other PLO
members who continue to support his leadership have
demanded, as the price for their support, Arafat's
strict adherence to the principle of collective leader-
ship. The result is to restrict Arafat's room for maneu-
ver with Hussein.
30. Arafat has been noncommittal in recent months
on the terms of a possible agreement with Hussein. In
his dialogue, he is likely to make demands consistent
with the Fez proposals, which Israel will find unac-
ceptable. He will refuse to surrender the PLO's sole
right to represent the Palestinians, demand an end to
Israeli settlement activity, and insist on ultimate crea-
tion of an independent Palestinian state as part of any
comprehensive agreement.
31. Arafat will probably probe in his private talks
with Hussein for formulas compatible with the Fez
proposals and the US initiative. The proposed Egyp-
tian-French UN resolution, which incorporates Resolu-
tions 242 and 338, and calls for Palestinian self-
determination, will also receive attention. Much of this
discussion will be cosmetic, designed to cultivate an
image of reasonableness with Jordan and the United
States.
32. PLO radicals and the Syrians will prevent an
Arafat-Hussein agreement. They will use terror and
the threat of terror to intimidate Arafat's Arab and
Palestinian supporters, and they will bid for Palestin-
ian support by arguing that Arafat is pursuing the
same policies that in the past have failed to win US
and Israeli reciprocation. Syria's strong showing in
Lebanon gives it added leverage to keep the moder-
ates on the defensive. Arafat will be able to withstand
this challenge only if he demonstrates that the politi-
cal option can achieve results favorable to the
Palestinians.
33. Hussein, for his part, will not enter negotiations
without PLO approval because other Arab states-
particularly Saudi Arabia-would not then support
such a move. The Arab moderates, furthermore, are
not ready to pay the price of antagonizing Syria and
ieopardizing the Arab consensus.
34. Only if Washington wrings significant conces-
sions from Israel would Hussein accept the United
States as an honest broker in the peace process.
Hussein is concerned that the Arabs' military inferior-
ity against Israel will translate into a weak negotiating
position unless the United States is committed to
seeing that a solution acceptable to all the parties to
negotiations is reached. Hussein will have reservations
about the US commitment unless Israel is persuaded to
accept a freeze on settlement activity in the West
Bank.
35. Hussein's decision in early January to reconvene
the Jordanian Parliament after a 10-year hiatus was
designed in part to give him a possible alternative
mechanism for asserting his claim to represent the
Palestinians if his talks with Arafat fail. The Parlia-
ment will remain a potentially valuable mechanism
for supporting long-range Jordanian interests in con-
trolling the West Bank.
Other Moderate Arab States
36. The moderate Arab states oppose Syrian domi-
nation of the PLO, but their lack of a unified response,
reluctance to impose concrete sanctions on Damascus,
and fear of terrorist retaliation have limited their
ability to blunt Syrian efforts to undermine Arafat and
gain control of the organization.
37. The moderate Arabs- have depended on Arafat
to control the PLO radicals and prevent terrorism.
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Many moderate leaders like those in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the UAE would nonetheless continue to
support a PLO dominated by the radicals in the hope
of ameliorating hostility toward them even if this
meant dealing with some previously unacceptable
PLO leaders.
38. The moderate states' strategy is to preserve at
all costs at least the appearance of forward motion and
to prevent the devastating confrontation that a total
collapse of the peace process would imply. They
believe progress in talks between Arafat and Hussein is
necessary to keep up the diplomatic momentum and
to demonstrate to the United States that the Arabs are
capable of acting positively in support of a political
course toward a resolution of the Palestinian problem.
39. The moderate states would probably favor any
arrangement Arafat could get the Fatah leadership to
approve. This would be unlikely to provide Hussein
with a clear mandate to enter Middle East peace talks,
but the moderate states are unlikely to press Arafat for
greater concessions. They would probably prefer that
he accept an ambiguous outcome and engage in
prolonged talks rather than reach an immediate agree-
ment that would risk his remaining support in Fatah
and thus jeopardize his chances of remaining as PLO
Chairman.
Egypt's Role
40. Arafat's rapprochement with Egypt and Cairo's
improved relations with Arab states following its read-
mission into the Islamic Conference are new elements
in the Palestinian picture. Egypt's political rehabilita-
tion, is still some way off, but some Arab moderates
believe moves in that direction bolster Arab efforts to
foster Arafat-Jordanian cooperation. Egyptian support
would be essential in the unlikely event the moderate
Arabs and Arafat ever decided, despite Syrian opposi-
tion, to support negotiations with Israel or to reach a
comprehensive agreement with Israel.
41. After his meeting with Mubarak the criticism
Arafat received from Fatah and other PLO leaders
who support him as PLO Chairman demonstrates that
he cannot count on Egyptian support to alter Palestin-
ian opinion regarding the terms of an agreement with
Hussein. Any evidence that Egypt was encouraging
Arafat to act in defiance of his Fatah colleagues would
undermine his support in Fatah and the rest of the
PLO.
Other Arab States
42. Libya. Libya is the only Arab state besides
Syria to support the PLO dissidents against Arafat.
Libyan leader Qadhafi provided them with money
and arms to fight the loyalists in Lebanon. Qadhafi's
strongest relations are with the dissidents, especially
the PFLP-GC, but he also has ties to other radical
groups. Libya is a major source of funds for the DFLP
and PFLP as well as the PFLP-GC.
43. Despite Libyan financial support, the PLO
radical groups are likely to continue to take their
political cues primarily from Syria. The PFLP-GC and
the smaller radical groups are comfortable with their
Libyan connection, but the other groups seem to want
to keep some distance from Qadhafi.
44. Iraq. Iraq in recent years has established close
ties to Arafat, primarily because of their shared enmi-
ty toward Syria. The Arab Liberation Front, an Iraqi
puppet organization, is the only non-Fatah guerrilla
group to have remained totally loyal to Arafat. Iraq
probably would support tacitly an agreement between
Arafat and Hussein providing for Jordanian participa-
tion in peace talks but might adopt a cautious public
stand while awaiting the reaction of Fatah and the
PLO.
45. Iraq has accepted some Fatah loyalists from
other Arab countries, and Baghdad in the long term
could become a major base for Arafat. Iraq may see
PLO moderates as potential tools to use in isolating
and weakening Syria but is unlikely to consider such a
move until the war with Iran is ended.
The Soviet Union
46. Soviet treatment of Arafat since his departure
from Lebanon indicates that Moscow-while keeping
its distance-still views him as the preferred PLO
leader. Soviet officials periodically have made positive
comments about him. Soviet officials have emphasized
throughout the PLO's internal crisis that Arafat re-
mains an international symbol of Palestinian unity.
47. Moscow traditionally has fashioned its policy on
Palestinian issues to accord with Arab sentiments. The
Soviets will keep their options open until Arafat's
position in the PLO becomes clearer, and they will
avoid pro-Arafat actions that might antagonize Syria.
48. The Soviet preference for Arafat stems from
broad popular support, international recognition, and
his position as the single best person to speak for the
Palestinians as a whole, in contrast to most of the PLO
radicals who emphasize armed struggle. The Soviets
apparently also calculate that Arafat is more likely to
keep the PLO independent of Syria.
49. While Arafat is secure as PLO leader, Moscow
probably will offer pledges of greater military and
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diplomatic support to assuage his irritation at the lack
of Soviet support during his fight with the Syrian-
backed dissidents. Moscow's relations with Arafat have
never been harmonious, however, and distrust of his
intentions will persist.
50. The Soviets have avoided direct contact with
the Fatah rebels. Although Moscow sympathizes with
some of the rebels' demands-especially rejection of
the US peace plan-it apparently views Abu Musa and
Abu Salih as little more than Syrian puppets.
51. The Soviets are backing efforts to reunite the
PLO and reconcile Arafat and Assad. They probably
hope that the leftists of the Democratic Alliance can
emerge ,from the intensive negotiations with Arafat's
branch of Fatah as a major factor in PLO decision-
making. Moscow undoubtedly would be especially
pleased if the reports about the Palestinian Communist
Party's admittance into the PLO are true. The Soviets
will attempt to use the DFLP and the PCP to urge
Arafat's PLO adversaries to pursue a political solution
to the Palestinian problem and to limit their emphasis
on terrorism and military confrontation with Israel.
PLO Support in the West Bank and Gaza
52. Arafat's support in the West Bank and Gaza
increased substantially in recent months as the Pales-
tinians rallied behind him as the symbol of an inde-
pendent Palestinian movement in the face of efforts
by Syria to gain control of the organization through its
PLO surrogates.
53. The political leadership of the West Bank and
Gaza broadly agrees with what we believe is the
mainstream PLO goal of establishing a Palestinian
state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem and
eventually recognizing Israel. These leaders are pre-
pared to be more flexible in their choice of tactics
because their primary concern is to end the Israeli
occupation as soon as possible. For this reason, political
moderates have supported the US initiative as a sound
basis for negotiations. They were disappointed when
Arafat last year failed to reach an agreement with
Hussein to support talks tacitly linked to the US
initiative. Most West Bankers and Gazans are pre-
pared to accept strong links to Jordan as an interim
settlement, but they have not abandoned the creation
of a Palestinian state as the final objective.
54. There is only a slim chance that the dissension
within the PLO or the failure of Arafat and Hussein to
reach an agreement will lead to an independent West
Bank initiative. West Bank and Gaza :eaders would be
more inclined to act with Hussein independently of
the PLO if the Labor party came to power in Israel
and committed the government to the party's proposal
providing for the transfer of the heavily populated
areas of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan.
55. On balance, we believe the odds are against a
credible West Bank and Gaza leadership joining Hus-
sein in support of negotiations and sustaining its
support in the absence of Israeli willingness to grant
ultimate Palestinian self-determination.
56: Stalemate in diplomatic efforts to end the Israeli
occupation is likely to increase the attractiveness to
younger West Bankers and Gazans of radical alterna-
tives for confronting the Israelis, but the pace of the de
facto accommodations between many West Bank Pal-
estinians and the Israeli military government will
expand. Support for PLO radicals is likely to increase,
but Israeli security measures that so far have restricted
PLO political agitation or terrorism in the occupied
territories (see inset) probably will continue to keep the
radicals in check.
57. Another alternative for the West Bankers, and
one that is likely to gain increased support, is to turn to
Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic organizations over
the past few years have increased their membership,
especially among students, and adherence to funda-
mentalist religious practices has also increased. The
fundamentalists have occasionally engaged in violent
incidents against PLO leftist rivals and Israeli authori-
ties but have not shown the fanaticism associated with
Iranian-style Shia fundamentalist movements. This
may change, but even if violence is avoided the almost
certain consequence of a resurgent Islamic fundamen-
talism would be increased West Bank opposition to the
concept of a negotiated settlement with Israel.
58. The Israelis are confident for now that their
security measures will allow them to blunt a funda-
mentalist challenge as they have prevented PLO
terrorism from posing a serious threat. The Israelis are
also likely to play the fundamentalists against the
PLO, and the tactic is likely to have some success in
getting them to fight each other.
59. A confrontation between Palestinians and the
Jewish extremists, or between the extremists and Israe-
li security forces in which Palestinians become in-
volved, is possible over the next year. Acts of violence
by extremists among the Jewish settlers could trigger
disruptions. Major outbreaks of violence would in-
flame West Bank opinion against any accommodation
with Israel.
The Palestinian Diaspora
60. Arafat and his moderate PLO wing continue to
enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of
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Israeli Positions on the Occupied Territories
In Israel there is broad agreement among nearly all
political parties and within the public as a whole on the
maior tenets of Israeli policy toward the occupied
territories:
There will be no return to the borders before
June 1967. Israelis across the political spectrum
generally believe that the pre-1967 borders are
inadequate to protect Israel's vital security needs.
There are, however, significant variations within
the consensus.
-Israel will neither negotiate with nor recognize
the PLO. The vast maiority of Israelis oppose
negotiations with the PLO even if it were willing
to modify its charter to recognize Israel and
renounce terrorism. Their concern is that this
would lead inevitably to the creation of a hostile
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Even
the minor elements within Israel that might have
favored a dialogue with the PLO will find it much
more difficult to make their case after the recent
divisions within the organization.
- Israel will retain political sovereignty over a
united Jerusalem. There is virtually universal
support for the retention of political sovereignty
over a united city. All Jewish Israelis have a deep
attachment to Jerusalem because of its place in
their religious tradition and in Jewish history. An
overwhelming percentage of Israelis reject any
sharing of sovereignty over the city with the
Arabs. Neither of the maior political blocs within
Israel-Likud and Labor-would be likely to of-
fer more than expanded municipal decentraliza-
tion designed to give greater autonomy to the
Arab population and to preserve Arab control over
Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites.
The Likud bloc aims ultimately to incorporate the
West Bank into pre-1967 Israel, but it does not, in
practice, seek the formal annexation of the territory.
Prime Minister Shamir and many of his colleagues
believe that the West Bank-the heartland of the
Biblical Land of Israel-must never again be lost. They
Palestinians in the diaspora. (See map, figure 1.) His
fight with Syrian-backed PLO dissidents sharpened
the diaspora's view of Arafat as the chief symbol of
Palestinian independence, reversing a decline in his
prestige. The initial sympathy in the diaspora for the
rebels faded as their subordination to Syria became
more evident.
61. The support of the dispersed and divided Pales-
tinians in the diaspora, however, provides Arafat with
little practical power. In making decisions regarding
also regard continued Israeli control as vital to assure
the security of Israel's densely populated coastal plain.
Nevertheless, they recognize that formal annexation of
the West Bank would endanger Israel's status as a
predominantly Jewish state and would inevitably entail
a severe deterioration in US-Israeli relations-which
they would go to great lengths to avoid. We believe
many in Likud realize that formal annexation is an
impracticality.
Shamir and his Likud colleagues insist that the Camp
David accords, reached in 1978, represent the only
acceptable negotiating framework because they provide
Israel the best chance to retain control over the West
Bank. By their interpretation, the Camp David agree-
ments provide for no more than severely circumscribed
Palestinian self-rule, while leaving Israel in control of
all sovereignty-related matters, including land and
water resources, settlement activity, and security.
The Labor Party maintains a more flexible approach
to solving the Palestinian problem than Likud. Labor is
no less insistent on de lure recognition of Israel's right to
exist, guarantees for Israel's security, and continued
control over a unified Jerusalem, but it has long favored
a West Bank/Gaza territorial compromise with Jordan.
The Labor Party regards the Camp David agree-
ments as an interim stage in negotiations to reach a final
peace with Jordan based on a territorial partition. Those
areas returned to Jordan would be demilitarized and
would become part of a "Jordanian-Palestinian" state.
Israel would retain most of the Jordan Valley, the
Etzion settlement bloc south of Bethlehem, greater
Jerusalem, and the southern Gaza Strip. Jewish settle-
ment activity would continue in those areas, but most
party leaders probably would be prepared to abandon
settlements in areas retroceded to Jordan.
Labor's negotiating flexibility-if it returns to
power-would depend, in large part, on the strength of
its parliamentary base. If it had to gain the support of
members of Israel's religious parties-many of whom
oppose the return of any portion of the Biblical Land of
Israel-to form a coalition, Labor's negotiating flexibil-
ity would be severely constrained.
the peace process, he must be most attentive to the
Fatah Central Committee and the PLO Executive
Committee, .which must of necessity make decisions
without direct reference to the opinion of the millions
of Palestinians in the diaspora. The expatriate Palestin-
ians also give Arafat no leverage with which to counter
Syrian influence.
62. The Palestinians in the diaspora are likely, for
at least the next several years, to continue to support
the PLO as their sole institutional representative. Few
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Palestinians support the PLO's military and political
program without reservations, and they differ among
themselves on its specific policies. They are likely,
however, to transfer their loyalties to an alternative
organization only if the PLO falls under the domina-
tion of a single Arab state or a new organization is
formed and over time proves that it is better able to
further Palestinian political aspirations.
63. Most Palestinian expatriates, especially those
that reside in the Gulf states, support a negotiated
solution to the question of their future. They accept
Israel as a reality and are prepared to recognize it as
part of a comprehensive settlement. Many-probably
a majority-see little value in the concept of "armed
struggle" as an adiunct of political action. Some
moderates who advocate an ultimate political solution,
however, believe the PLO must maintain some mili-
tary capability to provide a greater margin of political
credibility.
64. Both the Palestinians and their Arab hosts reject
the assimilation of the Palestinians into the local
societies as a solution to the problem, short of the
establishment of a homeland. Most Palestinians are
unwilling to surrender their identity as a separate
Figure 1
Palestinian Population e
400,000-1,800,000
120,000-350,000
50,000-120,000
Cf under 30,000
e Does not include PLO troops
0 500 Kilometers
~ Unclassified
702961 (547686) 8-84
people. The emotional and symbolic appeal of a return
to, or a political link to, an entity in Palestine is still
strong.
65. The Arab states, with the exception of Jordan,
have offered citizenship to only a few Palestinians
since the first refugees began arriving 35 years ago,
and there is virtually no chance the Arab governments
will change this policy or even accept the Palestinians
as permanent residents.
66. Over the past year, a number of observers have
predicted that Arafat may have no recourse if his
political initiatives fail but to return to international
terrorism as a means of breaking the Middle East
deadlock. Although the terrorist option is available to
the PLO leaders, experience over the past decade
suggests that most of them will be cautious about
moving in that direction. PLO leaders, including the
radicals, have maintained the ban on international
terrorism adopted in 1974, despite the setbacks to their
cause and the lack of progress toward a solution to the
Palestinian issue.
Jordan
Israel d ,000,000
1,800,Od
Egypt
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Pers,pr~ti
~: r.,,u Behre' R
Qatar a~ 1,500 cpupr
23,000-26,000-~ omen
Unit Arab
P.D.R.Y~
(South
Yemen)
100
Indian
Ocean
eountlary rapreaentat,on ie
not necesaa.dy emnornaiwe
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67. The PLO's ability to act autonomously has been
severely circumscribed since the Israeli incursion into
Beirut. PLO fighters, including the putative terrorists,
are now answerable to their Arab hosts. We judge that
most terrorism by Palestinians, in the near future at
least, is likely to result more from the desires of their
patron states than from their own initiative.
State-Supported Terrorism
68. The dispersal of the Palestinians that began in
1982 and the present de facto split within the PLO has
resulted in the increased influence of radical states like
Syria and Libya over the radical elements in the PLO.
Syria, for example, has traditionally used both Saiga
and the PFLP-GC to maintain a voice in the PLO.
Since the Palestinian withdrawal from Beirut and the
Fatah rebellion, Syrian influence over other elements
has grown as well.
69. Syria has increased its terrorist capabilities by
promoting collaboration between radical PLO groups,
such as the PFLP-GC, Saiga, and Black June, anon-
PLO extremist group. We believe that Black June's
late 1983 terrorist campaign against Jordanian inter-
ests, which BJO leader Abu Nidal asserted was carried
out because of Amman's refusal to release imprisoned
BJO members, also serves Assad's desire to discourage
Jordan from playing a role in any Palestinian
settlement.
70. The PLO radicals are accepting financial and
material aid from Libya, but Libya has failed in its
attempt over the past year to get them to form an
independent, anti-Arafat bloc. Among the probable
reasons for this are the relatively low opinion the
Palestinians have of the mercurial and unreliable
Qadhafi, and the fact that, unlike Syria, Libya does
not control territory from which the Palestinians can
operate against Israel.
71. Iraq, preoccupied with its war with Iran, appar-
ently provided very little support last year for Pales-
tinian terrorist groups. President Saddam Husayn last
year expelled the BJO from Iraq and circumscribed
the activities of the 15 May terrorists, another non-
PLO Palestinian group, primarily to ensure the contin-
uation of the military and financial support that Iraq
receives from Western and moderate Arab sources.
Implications for the United States
The Palestinians
72. Arafat will eventually have to placate his con-
stituency by adopting a more strident anti-US and
anti-Israeli rhetoric, although he will probably not
immediately abandon the hope that the United States
will play a role in the peace process beneficial to the
Palestinians. Within nine months to a year, if the
stalemate continues, pressure from frustrated Fatah
loyalists and from Palestinian radicals will probably
force him to adjust his policies toward the hardline
anti-US position favored by PLO radicals.
73. Palestinian radicals over the next year will step
up their assertion that the failure of the United States
to take firm action to support its own initiative by
reining in Israeli settlement activity (see map, figure 2)
vindicates their militantly anti-US stand. With the
possible exception of DFLP leader Hawatmah, the
radicals are unlikely to soften their opposition to the
United States even if negotiations begin on terms
acceptable to Arafat and the PLO moderates.
The Arab States
74. The moderate Arab states do not expect prog-
ress on the Palestinian issue. Their minimum require-
ment over the next year will be for the United States
to demonstrate that it is genuinely interested in bro-
kering an equitable settlement between the Israelis
and the Palestinians that does not rule out the possibili-
ty of eventual Palestinian self-determination. The
moderates' main standard for judging US willingness
to play this role will continue to be whether Washing-
ton is able to convince Israel to freeze settlement
activity.
75. The Arabs' emphasis on this issue will probably
increase over the next year. In the absence of peace
talks, the Arabs will probably consider a US-secured
halt in settlements as essential to prove that the West
Bank and Gaza still provide the basis for a political
solution to the Palestinian issue and are not falling
irreversibly under Israeli control. If the Arabs decide
to support the start of negotiations, they will assert that
their demonstration of support for the peace process,
at the risk of provoking Syrian and radical PLO
retaliation, requires at a minimum that Israel recipro-
cate with a freeze.
76. A continuing stalemate in the peace process will
in time cause the Palestinian issue to become more of a
source of friction between the United States and the
moderate Arab states. The moderates must balance
their desire for US aid in support of their short-term
security interests against their belief that the Palestin-
ian issue, if left unresolved, poses the most serious
long-term threat to their stability. Persian Gulf Arab
leaders for now give priority to cooperation with the
United States against the Iranian and Soviet threats to
the region.
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77. The weakening of Arafat's moderate wing,
however, increases the likelihood that PLO radicals
will gain strength. The failure of, Arafat's diplomacy
over the next year to advance Palestinian political
interests will encourage Palestinian expatriates in the
moderate states to support the radicals. These develop-
ments would bring closer to reality the moderate
governments' fear that they will eventually face a
radicalized Palestinian movement backed by Syria and
Libya. These trends, if left unchecked, will force the
moderate states increasingly to distance themselves
from the United States.
78. Shifts in moderate Arab policies away from US
goals are likely to be evolutionary, but there are
developments that could force moderate leaders to
react strongly against the United States. These include:
- Moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem.
- Another massacre of Palestinian civilians in
Lebanon.
- Violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians
in the West Bank that resulted in large Palestin-
ian casualties. -
- Jewish extremist attacks on Muslim holy places in
Jerusalem.
- Israel's formal incorporation of the West Bank.
Outlook
79. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the dispersal of
the PLO from its independent bases there, and the
PLO dissidents' move against Arafat have ensured that
the Palestinian issue must in the future be handled in a
way different from that of the past four decades.
Arafat's dominant position in the PLO has been dealt
a heavy blow, and his survival depends more than ever
on his scoring a political breakthrough that provides
convincing evidence to the Palestinians that he can
achieve Palestinian self-determination through
diplomacy.
80. Despite the fissures within the PLO and its
declining influence, Palestinian nationalism will re-
main akey force in the Middle East. The Palestinian
and Arab commitment to Palestinian self-determina-
tion will not diminish for the indefinite future. The
Palestinians and the Arabs reject the assimilation of
the Palestinians into their host countries as a solution
to the problem.
81. The Palestinian issue will therefore continue to
be a key factor preventing a comprehensive Middle
East settlement and a source of friction between the
United States and Israel and the Arabs. The issue's
potential for contributing to instability in the region
and intensifying serious splits between the United
States and the Arabs is likely to increase as more
Palestinians conclude that their chances of acquiring a
political entity in the West Bank and Gaza are rapidly
receding.
82. Palestinian radicals and Islamic fundamentalists
reject Arafat's concept of a negotiated settlement
based on the creation of a Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza and opt instead for along-term
strategy that envisions solving the Palestinian problem
by eliminating the Jewish state. The radicals as well as
the fundamentalists believe that an Arab world united
in militant opposition to Israel, demographic changes
that favor the Palestinians, and perhaps a weakening
of Israeli resolve offer the possibility of bringing about
the demise of the Jewish-dominated state.
83. A total reconciliation between the Fatah loyal-
ists and Syria is unlikely, at least as long as Arafat and
Assad remain in power. The willingness of some
loyalists to accept Syrian positions will increase if the
peace process stalemates and the reversion to the
militant tactics favored by Syria becomes more attrac-
tive, even to Fatah moderates. In the unlikely event
Arafat is removed from power while progress on the
political front is stalled, his successor probably will
actively promote reconciliation with Syria.
84. The National Alliance groups are likely to
remain for some time under Syrian domination. The
perception of them as Syrian puppets diminishes their
chances of gaining broad-based support in the Pales-
tinian community and leaves them dependent on
Damascus for survival. If Palestinians come to believe
that a political solution is unobtainable, militant poli-
cies and grudging cooperation with Syria will become
more acceptable, and the dissidents are likely to
recover at least some of their influence.
85. Syria will block any agreement reached by the
PLO for solving the Palestinian issue that does not
have Syrian approval.. Despite the bitter differences
between Syria and Arafat, however, Syria still publicly
supports Palestinian self-determination, and this fact
limits the Fatah loyalists' willingness to act contrary to
Syria's wishes in the peace process.
86. The PLO's internal strife, increased susceptibil-
ity to Syrian domination, and apparent inability to
advance Palestinian political objectives has reduced its
effectiveness as an independent force in Middle East
politics, and its decline is likely to continue. Its radical
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and moderate wings may avoid an open split, but they
will continue to expend much of their energy in
internal squabbling, preventing the organization from
exercising the degree of cohesion necessary to deal
with the Arab regimes as an equal. The PLO's symbol-
ic role as the independent voice of the Palestinians and
Arafat's personal popularity and international stature
will prevent the organization's sudden demise.
87. While the PLO's ability to exercise independent
influence is declining, its capacity to play a spoiler role
in the Middle East remains strong. As long as the PLO
is recognized by the Palestinians and the Arab states as
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, it
will maintain a veto power over moves in the peace
process. Whatever the PLO's strength as a political
force, the terrorist capabilities of its component groups
and their capabilities to cause trouble for Arab re-
gimes, independently or as agents of their Arab
patrons, will ensure its survival as a factor in the
Middle East equation for some time.
88. Regardless of the PLO's fate, some organized
expression of the Palestinians' desire for self-determi-
nation will exist for the indefinite future. If the PLO
fades, another institution-or institutions-will re-
place it; but will be unlikely to achieve the same broad
Palestinian support.
89. One alternative would be a realignment of the
factions that make up the PLO. There are many
potential permutations, but the realignment would
probably shake down into a division between groups
that favor or oppose holding open the political option
for solving the Palestinian issue.
90. The decline and probable eventual eclipse of
the moderate Palestinian center represented by Ara-
fat, together with the Palestinians' refusal to compro-
mise on their demands for self-determination, will
leave the Palestinians susceptible to the appeal of
extremist movements. Leftist and Marxist PLO groups
provide one alternative, but their link with non-
Islamic ideologies and the perception of them as little
more than puppets of Arab states will limit their mass
appeal. Support for Islamic fundamentalism will also
increase.
Egypt
91. President Mubarak is likely to l;a willing to play
a more activist role in Middle East politics as he
becomes more confident about his domestic position.
Egypt's reacceptance into the Arab mainstream would
reinforce his inclination.
92. The combination of a Labor Party in power in
Israel and Egypt playing a more active role on the side
of the Arab moderates would increase the opportuni-
ties for breaking the stalemate in the peace process.
Egypt would try to make a positive response to a
Labor government committed to offering concessions
on the status of the West Bank and Gaza, possibly
including a resumption of autonomy talks. Cairo
believes, however, that direct Jordanian and Palestin-
ian participation is crucial to such talks. If Jordan
agreed to participate, Arafat and the PLO moderates
would be hard pressed to withhold their approval.
Syria
93. A change of regimes in Syria over the next year
or so would at best present only an outside chance for
a breakthrough in the peace process and would more
likely diminish the prospects for progress. If during
this time, the ailing President Assad died or was
incapacitated, ' he probably would be replaced by
another Alawite-dominated regime, one likely to be
weaker than his and less adept at maintaining the
balance between the minority Alawites and manority
Sunni Muslims.
94. The next Syrian regime is almost certain to
interpret Syria's regional interests in terms similar to
Assad's, and it would also be preoccupied with keeping
itself in power. It would be even less likely than Assad
to make significant concessions to begin negotiations
with Israel. In a worst case scenario, Assad's death
would lead to armed conflict in Syria ruling out any
Syrian initiatives in foreign policy for some time.
95. A Syria preoccupied with an internal power
struggle would potentially leave the Palestinians and
moderate Arab states freer to pursue their own inter-
ests. This development probably would only marginal-
ly change their approach to the peace process. The
Arabs-especially Jordan-might be less inhibited
about talking with the Israelis, but they probably
would still refrain from reaching an agreement that
Syria opposed. They would assume that Syria would
eventually put its domestic house in order, reassert its
influence in Middle East politics, and seek retribution
against any Arabs or Palestinians perceived as having
sold out Syrian interests. Moreover, even an unstable
regime in Damascus might be capable of using intimi-
dation tactics, including terrorism or a military show
of force.
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96. Arafat is unlikely to interpret any change of reconciliation with Damascus, and he is more likely
regimes in Syria as offering him a freer hand to follow to cultivate his relations with the new regime-
a more moderate policy or to be more conciliatory whatever its character-than to move more boldly
about an agreement with Syria. He is almost certain to toward closer relations with Jordan and the moder-
see the demise of Assad as improving his chances of a ate Arab states.
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