SRI LANKA: THE GROWING INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Directorate of
Sri Lanka:
The Growing Insurgency
NESA 86-10036
September 1986
Copy 396
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Sri Lanka:
The Growing Insurgency
This paper was prepared by
25X1
25X1
South Asian Analysis, with a contribution byl
25X1
Office of Leadership Analysis.
25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 86-10036
September 1986
2.X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Sri Lanka:
The Growing Insurgency
Key Judgments Sri Lanka faces the most serious threat to its security and stability since it
Information available gained independence in 1948. The three-year-old Tamil insurgency has
as of 2 September 1986 made deep inroads into most of the north and much of the east where Tam-
was used in this report.
ils predominate. Some areas are now administered by the insurgents. The
fighting has weakened the country's once vibrant economy and polarized
Sri Lanka's Sinhalese and Tamil communities.
The security situation in Sri Lanka is likely to worsen over the next year or
so. Tamil insurgent attacks will encourage Sri Lankan President Jayewar-
dene to intensify his efforts to cast the communal conflict as a battle
between democracy and Marxism in a bid to win greater US support.
The major Tamil insurgent groups probably will increase their attacks
against Sinhalese civilians, economic installations, and foreign nationals to
foment instability and force government concessions on Tamil autonomy.
They are also likely to step up their operations against government security
forces and military installations. The insurgents already control the most
densely populated areas in the north and operate freely throughout the
east. The insurgents will not establish full control in the east any time soon,
but a slow erosion of the government's control there is likely.
The deteriorating security situation-including lawlessness, high civilian
casualties, and widespread economic disruption-will make the Sri Lankan
Government increasingly eager for US military aid. A US decision to
provide military aid to Colombo's counterinsurgency, however, might
provoke Tamil attacks against US personnel and facilities in Sri Lanka.
The insurgents are probably capable of attacking US installations in
Europe and the Middle East and soon may target other foreign govern-
ments providing economic or military assistance to Colombo.
US military support to the government would seriously strain Indo-US
relations. New Delhi has heavily invested its prestige in attempts to broker
a settlement and would regard US support for Colombo as an attempt to
obstruct these efforts and increase US influence in South Asia
India is slowly losing its ability to manipulate the situation. Because many
of the 50 million Tamils in South India hold New Delhi accountable for the
plight of Sri Lanka's Tamil minority, New Delhi has provided arms and
sanctuary to Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents since 1983. But the largest
Secret
NESA 86-10036
September 1986
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
insurgent groups are acquiring arms and training elsewhere and moving
their base camps to Tamil areas of Sri Lanka. Moreover, the Sri Lankan
Government is looking for ways to reduce India's support to the insurgents.
Marxist influence is growing among the leadership of the insurgent
movement, and continued fighting will allow Tamil and Sinhalese Marxists
to expand their influence. Leaders of the largest insurgent groups espouse
Marxism and anti-Americanism in their propaganda and have links to
Despite the Marxist influence among the major
insurgent groups, the Soviet Union has been-and probably will continue
to be-circumspect in dealing with the Sri Lankan problem for fear of
endangering its far greater equities in India.
The most hardline group-the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE)-is capable of fighting government troops without Indian support
and probably would continue operations even if other groups agreed to a
negotiated settlement. LTTE has developed a disciplined fighting force of
about 3,000 members and may be training some of its cadres in Nicaragua
and Cuba.
Personal animosities between insurgent leaders and sharp divisions over
goals and tactics will continue to limit insurgent gains. The leaders of the
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE)-the largest
insurgent group-and LTTE have a blood feud that will prevent coordinat-
ed military operations during the leaders' lifetimes. PLOTE favors building
broad popular support in preparation for an islandwide Marxist revolution,
while LTTE is committed to continued attacks against Sinhalese civilians
and government security forces to establish an independent Tamil state.
There is a growing likelihood that PLOTE and LTTE will wage a bloody
battle for supremacy of the insurgent movement. Their rivalry is likely to
spur additional attacks against the government and Sinhalese civilians as
both groups seek to prove themselves the preeminent representatives of
Tamil interests.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Security forces are unlikely to make significant headway against the
guerrillas unless the government makes major improvements in individual
and small-unit training. Undisciplined Sinhalese militias have attacked
Tamil civilians, adding new recruits to the insurgency, and are not likely to
come under full government control any time soon.
The deteriorating security situation and India's eroding leverage are
increasing the pressure on Jayewardene and New Delhi to find a negotiat-
ed solution to the insurgency. President Jayewardene's latest proposals for
creating provincial councils throughout Sri Lanka are unlikely to meet
LTTE's demands, however, and India will be unable to force the major in-
surgent groups into an agreement. Even if a settlement is reached with
Tamil moderates, Sri Lanka will remain divided between hostile Sinhalese
and Tamil communities, and hardliners will continue to fight on. A
settlement, in our view, also could open the way for a Marxist-oriented
provincial government in Tamil areas and to a continued Marxist threat to
the central government from PLOTE.
Continued terrorist attacks in Sinhalese areas will probably stir increased
domestic criticism of Jayewardene from the politically important Buddhist
clergy, the Sinhalese opposition, and some members of the military.
Sinhalese frustration with Tamil terrorist attacks could spark another
round of widespread anti-Tamil rioting and lead to a further deterioration
of civil order throughout Sri Lanka. Under these circumstances, a military
coup or the assassination of Jayewardene by Sinhalese hardliners will
become more likely.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Key Judgments
The Insurgent Groups
Size, Organization, and Goals
1
Capabilities and Strategy
6
Funding
8
Arms and Training
9
Ideology
10
Lack of Civilian Support
11
The Government's Counterinsurgency
12
Goals and Strategy
12
Barriers to a Military Solution
15
Inadequate Training, Leadership, and Discipline
17
Organizational Deficiencies
19
Intelligence Problems
19
Losing Hearts and Minds
20
Indian Equities
21
Prospects for a Settlement
22
Implications for the United States
25
Appendix
Increasing Indian Military Capabilities Toward Sri Lanka
29
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Figure 1
Ethnic Groups and Religions
Sinhalese
Ceylon Tamil
Indian Tamil
0 Ceylon Moor
ISLAM Religion
Figures shown are
percentages of the
total population of
Sri Lanka.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Sri Lanka:
The Growing Insurgency
Sri Lanka faces the most serious threat to its stability
and territorial integrity since it gained independence
in 1948. Tamil separatism has grown since the late
1970s from a series of sporadic terrorist attacks into
an organized insurgency. The fighting has weakened
the country's once vibrant economy and polarized Sri
Lanka's Sinhalese and Tamil communities. Govern-
ment proposals of limited autonomy to Tamils have
been too little and too late, and security forces are
incapable of defeating the insurgents. Deep splits
among the insurgent groups have made reaching a
political consensus for negotiations with the govern-
ment difficult and have hindered their ability to
capitalize on the government's weaknesses.
Ethnic rivalry is at the heart of the conflict. Sri
Lankan Tamils believe-with some justification-
that they are victims of political and economic dis-
crimination at the hands of the Sinhalese. Tamils
allege that, since the late 1950s, Sinhalese-dominated
governments have denied Tamils fair access to Sri
Lanka's national universities, have blocked adequate
funding for development in Tamil areas, and have
discriminated against the use of the Tamil language.
Sinhalese voters and their governments have been
unwilling to respond with concessions to Tamils.
According to academic studies, the 11 million Sinha-
lese believe they must defend their religion, language,
and culture not only against encroachment by Sri
Lanka's 2 million indigenous Tamils but also from 50
million Tamils in nearby South India, traditionally
viewed as potential invaders. The resulting estrange-
ment of the two communities has left Sri Lanka
deeply divided.
The Insurgent Groups
Size, Organization, and Goals
since 1976 Tamil separatism
has grown from a scattered handful of bank robbers
25X1
and terrorists to an organized, armed, full-time insur-
enc of 10,000 members. ?ryl
nearly 7,000 insurgents-including poorly 25X1
trained young recruits-are operating in Sri Lanka.
The insurgents also maintain an extensive support
structure in southern India, where we estimate anoth-
er 3 000 insurgents are based.
an additional 11,000 Tamil expatriates based 25X1
in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and
North America provide funds to major insurgent
groups, and some of them traffic in drugs to support
insurgent operations.
The insurgents are divided into five major groups: the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Peo-
ple's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
(TELO), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation
Front (EPRLF), and the Eelam Revolutionary Orga-
nization of Students (EROS).'
each of these groups maintains between four
and 15 base camps in South India.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Diplomatic reporting indicates LTTE has shifted
most of its personnel in South India to Sri Lanka.
these groups also main-
tain headquarters in the southern Indian city of
Madras and additional training camps in Sri Lanka's 25X1
Northern and Eastern Provinces. At least seven minor
groups-some divided into separate factions-also
maintain base camps in South India but are not active
in antigovernment attacks. 25X1
All the major insurgent groups are united in their
demand for an independent Tamil state comprising
Northern and Eastern Provinces, the area where 70
percent of Sri Lanka's Tamils live, but they differ
over the best tactics to achieve this goal.
' Eelam means nation in Tamil and is the name insurgents give to
their proposed independent state-the traditional Tamil-inhabited
areas comprising Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka.F
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
The majority Sinhalese are Buddhists of Indo-Aryan
descent and have coexisted on Sri Lanka with Hindu
Tamils of South Indian descent since the fourth
century B.C. According to a prominent historian, the
rise of militantly Hindu kingdoms in South India
during the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. prompted
Tamils in Sri Lanka to develop their own ethnic
identity and to separate themselves from the Sinha-
lese. Ethnic divisions were reinforced during a series
of invasions by these South Indian kingdoms and
reconquests by Sinhalese rulers. During the 13th
century, Sri Lankan Tamils established their own
kingdom in the north and set the stage for 600 years
of volatile coexistence with numerous Sinhalese king-
doms and Portuguese and Dutch colonizers.
British rule in Sri Lanka, which began in 1796, led to
an easing of Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry, according to
academic research, as Britain treated both ethnic
groups as equals, relying on both to staff the colonial
administration and plantation economy. Beginning in
the late 1920s, Britain orchestrated a series of consti-
tutional reforms leading to independence in 1948-
including the granting of universal suffrage in 1931,
which revived Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry. Faced with an
enfranchised majority Sinhalese electorate, Sri Lan-
kan Tamils quickly began agitating for protection of
their rights. The Sinhalese, for their part, viewed the
large number of successful Tamils in the colonial
administration and plantation economy as dispropor-
tionately high and a threat to Sinhalese interests. F_
Ethnic nationalism intensified in the general election
of 1956. During his successful campaign, S. W. R. D.
Bandaranaike-leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party-appealed to Sinhalese nationalism. Instead of
advocating multiracial democracy and secular rule,
he attempted to redefine Sri Lanka as an essentially
Sinhalese Buddhist state and advocated broad
changes including the establishment of Sinhalese as
the only official language. Although his rhetoric was
not fully realized in policy, he built a coalition of
Buddhist clergy, rural school teachers, and physi-
cians whose members still hold hardline views in
rural Sinhalese areas.
We believe the failure of successive Sinhalese govern-
ments between the late 1950s and late 1970s to
address increasing Tamil demands discredited mod-
erate Tamil politicians and helped encourage the
growth of an incipient insurgency. The US Embassy
in Colombo reports Sri Lankan President Jayewar-
dene gave assurances to the leaders of the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF)-the main Tamil
political party-that he would address Tamil griev-
ances on government education, development, and
language policies and grant Tamil areas local auton-
omy in return for their support during the 1977
general election. Jayewardene won the election with
Tamil backing but failed to fulfill his promises. As a
result, Tamil moderates were discredited, and Tamil
insurgents gradually eclipsed TULF as advocates of
Tamil rights.
By 1983 Tamil extremists had established base
camps in South India and had begun guerrilla war-
fare training. The insurgency's focal point was in the
Jaffna peninsula, and an attack there against a
government troop convoy in July 1983 killed 13
soldiers and sparked anti-Tamil rioting throughout
Sri Lanka-including in Colombo-resulting in more
than 400 fatalities, mostly Tamils. The rioting
marked a watershed, polarizing the two communities
and marking the expansion of the major insurgent
groups. By late 1984 the government had lost control
of the Jaffna peninsula to the insurgents and had
begun to organize a major counterinsurgency.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Indian journalists have gained occasional
access to insurgent base camps in Tamil Nadu to interview leaders of the main groups, but few journalists
have reported on the extensive network of field commanders in Sri Lanka.
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabakaran
Prabakaran, about 31, is a loner with an authoritarian leadership style; he
approves all LTTE's major decisions. He has called a separate Tamil state the
only solution to Sri Lanka's communal violence. Prabakaran claimed to be
planning operations in the Colombo area before the recent spate of violence in the
capital. He has feuded with TELO and EPRLF but has said that he is willing to
support EROS should that group agree to merge with LTTE. He has a high
school education.
PLOTE Leader Uma Maheswaran
Since escaping from prison in April 1983, Maheswaran has tried to gain power
over the Sri Lankan insurgent movement,
at least one state representative in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Maheswaran
claims to be mobilizing an armed struggle against the Sri Lankan Government led
by the working classes, according to press reports. He attended the 13th congress
of the Communist Party of India in March. According to press reports,
Maheswaran was trained by the PLO in Lebanon in 1978.
LTTE-about 3,000 strong-is the oldest and most
active insurgent group and includes the most hardline
Tamil nationalists. Since 1974, LTTE leader Velupil-
lai Prabakaran has sought to portray his group as the
guardian of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka. F_____1
LTTE is
determined to win favor among Tamil civilians by
abstaining from robberies and attacks against eco-
nomic installations serving Tamils. LTTE operates
throughout Sri Lanka but is primarily a northern-
based insurgent group. It considers groups like
EPRLF and TELO operating in the east to be less
committed to Tamil independence and prone to indis-
cipline and robbery of Tamil civilians. LTTE's hard-
line Tamil nationalism suggests it will be the group
least likely to acquiesce to a negotiated settlement.
Since spring 1986 LTTE has moved to exert its
dominance over the guerrilla movement by repelling a
major government offensive and suppressing the
third-strongest group, TELO, which LTTE regarded
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Insurgent Leaders (continued)
TELO
TELO leader Sri Sabaratnam was killed during the internecine fighting last May
between TELO and LTTE. Some of the remaining TELO insurgents have since al-
EPRLF General Secretary K. Padmanabha
Padmanabha claims his goal is to organize a classless society. Sri Lanka's
National Security Minister has said that the EPRLF leadership has Marxist
leanings and has been trained in Lebanon, according to press reporting.
EROS Leader V. Balakumar
V. Balakumar is also the spokesman for the insurgents' loosely knit umbrella
organization, the Eelam National Liberation Front. As such, he often serves as a
liaison between Indian and Tamil Nadu state politicians and militant leaders.
Balakumar has rejected alliance with the most powerful of the insurgent factions,
LTTE.
as undisciplined and a rival, by assassinating TELO's collaborated, but Prabakaran then allegedly mur-
leader and attacking TELO camps in Sri Lanka. dered a female Tamil activist close to Maheswaran,
LTTE has also begun In
attacking PLOTE camps and personnel. Press reports
indicate LTTE has begun attacks against EPRLF and
may soon dominate this group as well.
PLOTE-about 4,000 strong-is the largest insur-
gent group and LTTE's archrival. Until 1980,
PLOTE's leader, Uma Maheswaran, and Prabakaran
our judgment, the hatred between the two leaders
because of this event makes cooperation between their
groups nearly impossible.
~PLOTE also opposes LTTE's hit-and-run
attacks against government security forces. Instead,
25X1
25X1
225X1
25X1
i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
PLOTE is pursuing a classic Marxist guerrilla strate-
gy of husbanding its resources to gain ascendancy
over other dissident groups and building broad popu-
lar support in preparation for an islandwide revolu-
tion. We believe PLOTE's willingness to enlist women
and persons from all castes and to refrain from
attacks against civilians has given it a broader base
among Tamils than LTTE has.
The remaining three major insurgent groups are all
active in operations against government military and
economic targets but are not as large and do not have
as many international contacts as LTTE and PLOTE.
These groups are loosely organized in an umbrella
organization-the Eelam National Liberation Front.
TELO, a hardcore nationalist group, is in disarray
following a series of battles with LTTE last May but
probably retains a membership of 1,000. EPRLF and
EROS each has less than a thousand fighters, is more
Marxist, targets economic installations, and operates
principally in the east. EROS specializes in terrorist
attacks against economic installations and claimed
responsibility for the bombing of a joint Sri Lankan-
Japanese cement factory last spring in Eastern Prov-
ince.
The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)-Sri
Lanka's banned Tamil political party-is the princi-
pal representative of moderate Tamils, including a
majority of Tamil civilians. It does not share the
insurgents' radical goals and ideology. Although
TULF has publicly called for a separate Tamil state,
the party remains the only moderate Tamil group
willing to consider government offers of limited au-
tonomy. According to the US Embassy in Colombo,
leaders of TULF want to establish a federal system
including a single semiautonomous Tamil province
and Tamil participation in the Parliament. TULF
probably calculates it must defer to India.
Capabilities and Strategy
The insurgents, in our view, are gaining in their war
against government forces. They have established
military and administrative control of the Jaffna
peninsula and operate freely throughout Northern
and Eastern Provinces-the area they consider the
traditional Tamil homeland and future independent
state. Government forces are restricted mainly to
their garrisons in the north and rarely venture out for
fear of ambush.
the insurgents supply their forces in both
provinces by sea, easily move units without detection,
and maintain an intelligence network superior to the
government's. They have also established base camps
around Batticaloa and Trincomalee-two major ur-
ban areas of Eastern Province-as well as terrorist
cells in Sinhalese tea-growing areas in the center of
the island and in Colombo.' In May they fought off a
major government offensive aimed at opening roads in
the northern third of the island.
Much of the insurgents' arms and equipment is old or
secondhand, but press reports indicate their weapons
are of good quality and have been kept serviceable.
Small arms range from handguns and World War
II-vintage Japanese rifles to AK-47s and M-16s.
2 Approximately I million Tamils brought by the British to Sri
Lanka from South India as laborers in the 19th century now work
EPRLF and EROS have recruited from among
these Indian Tamils but have failed to provide them training. The
low caste of the tea workers, their integration with the national
economy, and their more recent arrival in Sri Lanka will probably
prevent widespread collaboration with the insurgent groups.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
L~.) A I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Figure 5. Tamil insurgents equipped with AK-47
assault rifle and rocket propelled grenade
of clearing roads leading to the south, resupplying
northern-based troops, or killing many guerrillas.
Insurgent strategy appears to be shifting toward
attacks against Sinhalese civilians and economic in-
stallations. According to press reports, the insurgents
destroyed a Sri Lankan airliner-killing 16 people-
the telegraph office in Colombo, a cement factory, an
oil depot, a bottling plant, and a passenger train
during a six-week period last spring. The attacks
suggest the insurgents will meet government offen-
sives in Tamil areas with strikes designed to maximize
Sinhalese civilian casualties. In our view, the insur-
gents will continue these operations to provoke Sinha-
lese reprisals against Tamil civilians, deter foreign
tourists, and force greater government concessions on
autonomy. The insurgents probably calculate reprisals
will discredit the government and win greater interna-
tional support for an independent Tamil state.
To facilitate their attacks in the Sinhalese heartland,
the insurgents are developing contacts with radical
Sinhalese Marxists.
links exist between all major insurgent
groups and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-
a banned Sinhalese Marxist group responsible for an
25X1
25X1
25X1
7FX1
25X1
In our judgment, the insurgents' relatively unsophisti-
cated arsenal is adequate for their present level of
operations. Over the last six months, the most com-
mon tactics employed against government forces have
been handgrenade or unmanned landmine ambushes.
The insurgents mainly operate in small units-five to
15 men for ambushes-and engagements with the Sri
Lankan military are usually confined to brief fire-
fights. Press eports indicate
that the insurgents can withstand concerted govern-
ment assaults and are capable of organizing upward
of 100 men for larger actions. During the government
offensive in May, the insurgents avoided pitched
battles with government forces but pinned down
Army columns with small arms, mortars, and land-
mines. Government units eventually retreated to their
garrisons without having accomplished their mission
We believe JVP's Marxist revolutionary goals
are closely shared by PLOTE and could form the
basis for a long-term alliance.
Resources
Funding. Narcotics trafficking is a major source of
the insurgents' funds.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Figure 6. Wreckage of Air
Lanka plane at Colombo air-
port following an explosion on
board on 3 May 1986: shift
toward urban terrorism.F
One kilo-
25X1
25X1
gram of heroin sold in Sri Lanka will yield a profit of
$2,500-enough money, we estimate, to maintain a
moderate-size training camp for a month. We believe
Tamil expatriates who are sympathetic to the separat-
ist movement have provided the network to support
the insurgents' profitable drug trade.
The insurgents also prey upon Tamil civilians. Press
reports indicate thefts of personal property from
Tamil civilians-particularly jewelry-and repeated
robberies of government-run banks in the north and
east have provided additional revenue for the major
insurgent groups. The press reports the insurgents also
have begun collecting sales taxes in Jaffna to
strengthen their war chest.
Arms and Training. The insurgents need outside
support to keep pace with the government's expanding
counterinsurgency.
important Indian aid is the granting of sanctuary in
Tamil Nadu for insurgent training and smuggling
operations. According to the US Consulate in Ma-
dras, each main insurgent group enjoys close ties to
ministers in the Tamil Nadu state government in
southern India.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Ideology
The leadership of the major insurgent groups shares
an anti-imperialist ideology and commitment to so-
cialism. Propaganda publications of LTTE use
colonialism."
Marxist-Leninist definitions of class struggle, imperi-
alist exploitation, and socialist revolution to justify the
need for armed resistance to the Sri Lankan Govern-
ment. PLOTE defines itself as an anti-imperialist,
anti-US organization, according to its propaganda
tracts, and press reports indicate EPRLF is commit-
ted to revolutionary resistance to "US-backed neo-
Many of the insurgent leaders share a common
revolutionary objective. LTTE, PLOTE, EPRLF, and
EROS want to establish a socialist Tamil state to
motivate "progressive forces within the Sinhalese
masses" to overthrow the "reactionary" government
in Colombo. The insurgency's small number of propa-
gandists is using radiobroadcasts, newspapers, and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
books in a crude international propaganda effort to
link Tamil insurgent goals to other revolutionary
movements. Press reports indicate some insurgents
have met with representatives of the South-West
Africa People's Organization and the African Nation-
al Congress.
The Marxist-Leninist ideology and revolutionary
goals of the insurgent leadership have won few adher-
ents among the bulk of Tamil guerrillas. I
the majority of the rank and file are
apolitical. As a result, the main insurgent groups have
relied principally on slogans of Tamil nationalism to
fill their ranks.
Vulnerabilities
Factionalism. In our judgment, factionalism is the
most important weakness hampering the insurgents'
ability to mount a more effective campaign against
the government. Rivalries among leaders and a lack of
consensus on strategy have prevented the insurgents
from forming an effective alliance.
The insurgents' lack of a unified command, in our
view, has resulted in competition between groups for
control of Tamil territory, such as the battle between
TELO and LTTE for control of the Jaffna peninsula
earlier this year. Press reports indicate the main
insurgent groups do not coordinate military opera-
tions. rival groups fre-
quently accuse each other of committing attacks that
are unpopular with Tamil civilians.
We believe that LTTE and PLOTE are on a collision
course. This could be good news for the government if
the two largest insurgent groups seriously weaken
themselves in internecine warfare, but a struggle
between the groups holds considerable perils for the
government's ability to maintain control. As LTTE
and PLOTE wage their struggle for supremacy, each
group is likely to increase attacks to demonstrate its
preeminence as a defender of Tamil interests. Since
PLOTE is not active militarily against government
forces, this could lead to a significant upsurge in
insurgent attacks. Moreover, should one of the two
groups emerge clearly on top, the government would
face a relatively united insurgency.
Lack of Civilian Support. The insurgents' lack of
civilian support, in our view, is their second major
weakness. Insurgent propaganda and public state-
ments by insurgent leaders indicate the main groups
also regard this as a major shortcoming.
the insurgents operating in the
Jaffna peninsula regularly extort funds from civilians
to maintain operations. an
increase in young recruits and a decline in discipline
among groups operating in Eastern Province have
encouraged a proliferation of armed criminal gangs.
The insurgents have plundered Tamil economic as-
sets, destroyed bridges, and severed major rail and
road links to economic centers in the south. As a
result, the civilian population in contested areas-
including 40,000 refugees-has grown weary of and
in some cases hostile to the insurgents, according to
press reports.
The insurgents' exploitation of Tamil civilians will
limit their long-term ability to establish control of
Tamil areas, in our judgment.
living conditions in Eastern Province are
abysmal, but the government's civil administration
continues to function. Even though Tamil civilians are
subject to frequent reprisals by the security forces, the
insurgents have failed to capitalize on the govern-
ment's conduct to win greater Tamil civilian support.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
We believe that unless the insurgents can destroy the
government's presence in the east, establish their own
civil administration, dispense economic aid, and pro-
tect Tamil civilians from attacks by undisciplined
government security forces, the Tamil civilian popula-
tion is likely to provide only passive support to the
insurgents.
The insurgents also lack support among Sri Lanka's
1 million Tamil-speaking Muslims, who account for
34 percent of the population in Eastern Province and
are distinct from Sinhalese and Tamils.
the Muslims want to preserve their
strong electoral position and they oppose both the
creation of an independent Tamil state and moderate
Tamil demands for a merger of Northern and Eastern
believe that, without Muslim support, the insurgents
will remain incapable of establishing control of East-
ern Province and could face armed Muslim o osi-
tion.
The Government's Counterinsurgency
Goals and Strategy
Both public and private statements by government
officials characterize Colombo's counterinsurgency
goals as preserving the unitary state, reestablishing
internal stability, and deterring Indian military inter-
vention. A major unstated goal of the government is
to maintain Sinhalese dominance over the Tamils.
Sri Lankan President Jayewardene is attempting a
dual policy of negotiations and military operations in
pursuit of these goals. Military operations have failed
to halt insurgent territorial consolidation or terrorist
attacks, however, while government offers of Tamil
autonomy have so far fallen short of insurgent de-
mands. Unable to implement either a political or a
military solution, Jayewardene has blamed Sri Lan-
ka's problems largely on India and has attempted to
cast the conflict as a fight against Marxist-oriented
international terrorism.
In our judgment, the government's counterinsurgency
strategy is uncoordinated and poorly thought out. We
believe that Colombo has favored a military buildup
at the expense of political and economic concessions to
the Tamils.
the main features of the government's program
? Intensifying ground operations aimed at denying
insurgent consolidation in Eastern Province and
regaining control over the north.
? A 100-percent leap in military spending, to $520
million, and a 38-percent jump in the number of
military personnel, to about 36,000, over the past
year. Most of the money has been spent on arms and
equipment.
? Reconfiguring the national security bureaucracy to
promote more efficient military operations. Govern-
ment actions include naming a Minister of National
Security and forming the Joint Operations Com-
mand and the National Intelligence Bureau.
? Holding out promises of political concessions to
Tamil dissident groups.
? Garnering domestic support in contested areas and
gaining international support for the counter-
insurgency.
? Resettling Sinhalese villagers in Tamil regions to
reduce Tamil dominance in parts of the east and
north.
So far, Colombo's pursuit of a military solution has
produced only a bloody stalemate
government operations are restricted
mainly to road patrols and retaliation, often against
civilians, for terrorist bombings and landmine, mor-
tar, and hit-and-run attacks by the insurgents.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Junius Richard (J. R.) Jayewardene,
President
Jayewardene has spent much of his presidency wrestling with escalating Tamil
violence and has often appeared ambivalent about how to control the insurgen-
cy-at times approaching the bargaining table and at others supporting a military
solution. He has also been alternately supportive of and antagonistic toward
Indian mediation of the communal conflict. Jayewardene, who regards himself as
South Asia's elder statesman and a political moderate, probably believes he must
appear to search for a negotiated solution to the insurgency.
Lalith Athulathmudali,
Minister of National Security
Athulathmudali is one of Jayewardene's closest military advisers and one of Sri
Lanka's most staunchly promilitary Cabinet officials, according to US Embassy
officials. He almost certainly played a seminal role in planning Sri Lanka's
military offensive in May 1986 against the insurgents. Athulathmudali's public
statements indicate he would never support either an independent Tamil state or a
single, semiautonomous Tamil province. He told US diplomats last December he
believed the Army had superiority over the insurgents but added that "disaffected
Tamils have to be reintegrated as Sri Lankans."
Ranasinghe Premadasa,
Prime Minister
The noncontroversial Premadasa, 62, serves primarily in a ceremonial capacity
with little role in policymaking. Nevertheless, under the Constitution he would
succeed President Jayewardene in the event of an emergency. He is on record as
favoring a political solution to the insurgency, but he does not support the
creation of a single, semiautonomous Tamil province. Premadasa has been deputy
leader of the ruling United National Party since 1977.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Senior Government Leaders (continued)
Army Chief of Staff before his retirement.
Lt. Gen. Cyril Ranatunge,
Commanding Officer, Joint Operations Command
In 1985 Ranatunge, 55, came out of a two-year retirement to command the
government's counterinsurgency forces. Ranatunge said last April that he had no
alternative but to order flushing-out operations. He is credited with procuring
helicopter and seaborne support for embattled police and Army outposts. A
former Sandhurst cadet who is respected throughout the armed forces, he earned
a ruthless reputation in suppressing a Marxist uprising in 1971. Ranatunge was
R. J. G. (Ronnie) de Mel,
Minister of Finance and Planning
US Embassy officials say de Mel, 61-one of the Cabinet's most effective
members plays an important role in financial decision making but is not heavily
involved in political or military decisions. For his part, the Minister has told US
officials privately that he has little faith in Sri Lanka's armed forces. Usually
careful not to criticize the United States, de Mel said last April that India's
proximity to his country made "other powers" unwilling to aid Sri Lanka.
Sirimavo Bandaranaike
As the dominant figure of Sri Lanka's main opposition political party, the Sri
Lanka Freedom Party, former Prime Minister (1960-65, 1970-77) Bandaranaike,
70, insists that the government consult her party about potential compromises
with Tamil leaders. Bandaranaike, whose constituents include Sinhalese chauvin-
ists, has publicly taken a hard anti-Tamil line since her political rights were
restored last winter. Parliament had revoked her rights in 1980 after charging her
with abuse of office during the state of emergency she imposed from 1971 to 1977.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Expansion of the Security Forces
Colombo has added to the confusion among the
security forces regarding their roles and missions by
forming several new paramilitary organizations. The
Army is currently augmented by the Special Task
Force (STF), raised as an elite counterinsurgency
unit; the Home Guard, an official paramilitary force;
the police; and the National Auxiliary Force (NAF).
The NAF is only now forming and is probably not
even at cadre strength for its proposed complement of
10,000. The government last year also proposed
creating a National Armed Reserve, although serious
problems in training and equipment probably will
delay its formation.
The expansion of the security forces is shown in the
following tabulation:
similarly failed to win much ground. The security
forces maintain a higher profile in Eastern Province,
Press reports of the Navy's firing on
and seizing fishing boats and other craft in the Palk
Strait are increasing as the government tries to
interdict the flow of insurgents and materiel between
India and Sri Lanka, but
the Navy has failed to enforce
Barriers to a Military Solution
In our judgment, the government will not be able to
Army
23,500 (active)
STF
3,500
12,000 (Volunteer
Force) (about one-
third on active duty)
8,000 (reserve)
Home Guard
15,000
Navy
4,700 (active)
Police
21,500
500 (reserve)
4,000 (active)
1,000 (reserve)
The security forces' growing arsenal gives them great-
er firepower and the ability to inflict more casualties,
but they are still unsuccessful in conducting effective
operations against the insurgents.
the government's sweep of Jaffna penin-
sula in mid-May 1986 ground to an early halt after an
advancing column from the south was unsuccessful in
clearing landmines and overcoming insurgent resis-
effect a military solution to the insurgency any time
soon because of the security forces' ineffectiveness. A
successful counterinsurgency generally requires ag-
gressively led, well-trained, mobile forces supported
by a flexible logistic network and timely, accurate
intelligence. In our assessment, the Sri Lankan mili-
tary is poorly trained, undisciplined, has mediocre
leadership, and suffers from poor procurement prac-
tices.
Poor Procurement Practices. Although the govern-
ment has concentrated its efforts on acquiring arms
and equipment, its procurement program is unfocused
and riddled with corrupt spending practices.
tance north of Elephant Pass. The Army also failed to As a result, the military is armed with a hodgepodge
expand its small strongholds in Jaffna's harbor, air- arsenal that not only complicates its primitive logistic
field, and old fort during the same operation, and its system but also contains weapons only marginally
presence on the peninsula remains restricted to these useful for fighting a guerrilla war. The Army is
enclaves, resupplied by air and sea. Smaller offensive
operations in the north launched since May have
9 X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Figure 8
Government Security Forces
Government security forces:'
A Army .L Navy
+ Air Force Special police
task force
Province boundary
--.---+- Railroad
Road
a
The security forces' major permanent bases are
located. Units stationed at and deployed from
these bases vary.
0 50 Kilometers
i I I11T
0 50 Miles
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
buying antiaircraft guns and antitank weapons that
have little if any utility in fighting Tamil insurgents.
The Air Force has been buying light attack aircraft,
which need landing strips and are difficult to deploy
and support in the field and whose performance has
been disappointing,
The government's steps to correct its arms-buying
problems have been slow and, in our judgment,
incomplete. Colombo only recently has begun acquir-
ing armed helicopters that can operate out of unpre-
pared forward areas, loiter over target, and give more
accurate gunfire than fixed-wing aircraft.
ever, that only a complete overhaul of the arms
procurement process will root out its endemic corrup-
tion and inefficiency and that such a move is unlikely
as long as senior officials share in the graft.
Inadequate Training, Leadership, and Discipline.
Military training has received less emphasis than
arms acquisitions. US defense attache reporting indi-
cates the Sri Lankans are incapable of teaching their
military personnel much beyond basic training and a
few technical skills.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Sri Lankan military personnel attend courses abroad, Embassy reporting, the junior officer corps is com-
but only the Pakistani programs appear to provide posed largely of young Sinhalese with hardline views
training applicable to a counterinsurgency mission toward the communal conflict and is among those
and Home Guardsmen
in basic infantry courses last year.
groups pressing hardest for a military solution. The
rank and file are mostly Sinhalese peasants who often
see the conflict in ethnic rather than political terms.
As a result, units are often poorly led and prone to
draw little distinction between insurgents and Tamil
civilians, leading to attacks on civilians and a further
hardening of Tamil attitudes toward the government.
although
The lack of training is compounded by poor leadership
and Sinhalese bias, leading to a lack of discipline. The
military suffers from the entrenchment of Sinhalese
senior officers chosen more for their political reliabil-
ity than for their military expertise. According to US
the STF shows greater discipline and professionalism
than other security units, it is among the worst
perpetrators of violence against Tamil civilians. The
STF appears to be the backbone of the government's
operations in Eastern Province, carrying out more
intensive patroling and being mentioned more often
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Sri Lanka receives some arms and security training
assistance from Israel and offers the Israelis better
relations and a diplomatic presence in Colombo in
return. Israel opened an Interests Section in the US
Embassy in Colombo in May 1984, its first official
representation in the country since the SLFP govern-
ment closed the Israeli Embassy in 1971. A security
assistance group was attached to the Interests Section
when it opened, but it has remained small. In July
1985 Jayewardene publicly characterized Israeli se-
curity assistance as providing advice on counterinsur-
gency methods to some police investigative staff.
The Sri Lankan Navy has already
received two of as many as six patrol boats purchased
from Israel.
Despite Colombo's need for more security assistance,
the relationship with Israel will not expand signifi-
cantly, in our judgment, because of pressure on
Jayewardene from his political opponents and Sri
Lanka's Muslim community. The major opposition
party has already criticized the government over its
warming relations with Israel and has announced
publicly that, when it returns to power,it will close
the Israeli Interests Section.
prominent Sri Lankan Muslims-whose sup-
port Colombo needs to maintain its position in East-
ern Province-are concerned that the government is
becoming increasingly pro-Israeli. We believe
Jayewardene is sensitive to this opposition and will
limit contact to arms buying and the present low-level
security assistance. US Embassy sources report Is-
raeli diplomats repeatedly asked Colombo during the
past two years to request more security assistance,
but the Sri Lankans made no response.
KMS training and the close supervision it receives
from the National Security Ministry. Even so, US
Embassy sources assert the STF is behind most of the
violence against Tamil civilians in Eastern Province.
These sources report a common STF tactic when fired
upon while on patrol is to enter the nearest village and
burn it to the ground.
Organizational Deficiencies. Colombo, in our view,
has failed to mold an efficient, high-level organization
for waging counterinsurgency. The creation in 1984 of
the new post of Minister of National Security has
succeeded mainly in introducing into the Cabinet
another voice in the cacophony of advice on the
communal conflict and has not produced an effective
focus for strategic planning and direction of the
National Security Council exists at the Cabinet level
to make informed, high-level decisions on the counter-
insurgency, but deci-
sions are still made almost solely by Jayewardene and
whichever official he chooses to listen to.
The Joint Operations Command (JOC), created in
1985 to provide centralized coordination for security
force operations, is experiencing problems in filling
that role.
Intelligence Problems. Although the National Intelli-
gence Bureau has improved its ability since its estab-
lishment in 1984 to collect raw intelligence and report
on the insurgency, the reactive nature of government
military operations suggests that the intelligence is
not reaching the right security units in time or that
they are not capitalizing on it.
in press l accounts of counterinsurgency
operations in the east. We believe the STF's superior
combat performance relative to the Army is due to its
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Losing Hearts and Minds
The political dimensions of Colombo's counterinsur-
gency strategy, in our view, have proved inept so far.
The government holds out promises of political con-
cessions, but only on conditions it knows the Tamils
are unlikely to accept-renunciation of violence and
the union of Northern and Eastern Provinces. As a
result, Colombo has been unable to reach an agree-
ment, even with the more moderate TULF. Mean-
while, the insurgents do not trust the security forces
and will not lay down their arms.
The government is unwilling to make additional polit-
ical concessions, in our judgment, because of pressure
from Sinhalese hardliners.
Prime Minister Premadasa and National
Security Minister Athulathmudali oppose significant
concessions and have strong ties within Parliament
and the security forces, respectively. We believe Pre-
madasa and Athulathmudali hope to use the commu-
nal issue to advance their own political fortunes at the
expense of the present government. Although US
Embassy and press reporting indicates President
Jayewardene and Finance Minister de Mel both favor
political accommodation with the Tamils, even these
concessions would fall short of insurgent demands.
The major opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP), is the political heart of Sinhalese
chauvinism. The US Embassy in Colombo reports
SLFP leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike is determined to
exploit the communal issue for partisan gain. Even if
Jayewardene's government can agree on significant
concessions to the Tamils, the SLFP is likely to press
for a national referendum on a settlement. Press
reports indicate Bandaranaike is making a major
political comeback, especially among the rural Sinha-
lese electorate. We believe Jayewardene will have to
work hard to blunt her appeal to the Sinhalese
electorate and that he may order Prime Minister
Premadasa-popular among rural Sinhalese-to ap-
pease concerns over the settlement talks.
Unless Jayewardene includes the SLFP fully in the
negotiations, we believe he will be unable to establish
a Sinhalese consensus on concessions to the Tamils. If
the SLFP succeeds in imposing its views on conces-
sions, the resulting government offer is unlikely to be
acceptable to the Tamils. Moreover, future SLFP
governments may regard a settlement reached under
Jayewardene and ratified only in Parliament as non-
binding.
Colombo's efforts to develop civilian support for the
counterinsurgency have been stillborn.
was designed to beef up Colombo's assistance to those
areas suffering the war's ravages and to associate the
military with more positive efforts in behalf of the
local populace. The Cabinet was split in its assessment
of the proposal, the first move by the government
toward a "hearts-and-minds" approach to the insur-
gency, and it was not accepted
Colombo began trying last year to resettle Sinhalese
villages from the south to the north and east to dilute
the Tamils' numerical superiority in these areas. So
far, the Sinhalese settlers have only been introduced
into previously uninhabited areas or areas with an
already strong Sinhalese presence. We believe that
resettlement will have to be greatly expanded to
further Colombo's effort to exert Sinhalese domi-
nance throughout the island, but this will prove
unfeasible given insurgent opposition. The insurgents
have begun targeting Sinhalese villages on the edges
of Tamil areas, probably to frighten off settlers and to
respond to attacks on Tamil civilians by security
The government continues to try to garner support
from outside powers by mounting a propaganda effort
to portray the communal conflict as both a fight
against terrorism and a struggle between a democrat-
ic government and a Marxist insurrection. So far, this
argument has not proved convincing. We believe
Pakistani and Chinese arms sales to Colombo reflect
25X1
2 A11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
more a desire by India's rivals to challenge New
Delhi's regional preeminence than Colombo's diplo-
matic success.
strains as they compete for jobs. The state govern-
ment is threatened by the burden of these refugees
and by opposition efforts to portray it as insufficiently
25X1
L0A]
India, the power most affected by the insurgency, has
long been concerned that instability in Sri Lanka
could threaten its security interests by involving out-
side powers, provoking a flow of refugees to South
India, creating internal pressure on New Delhi to take
action, and raising sympathetic unrest among India's
many minority communities-especially its 50 million
Tamils. We believe that New Delhi would not inter-
vene militarily in Sri Lanka unless it judged that the
communal situation had deteriorated enough to
threaten Indian interests and nonmilitary efforts to
end the violence had failed.'
India's foremost interest in the Sri Lankan conflict is
to demonstrate its dominance by managing the crisis
without third-country interference. In our judgment,
Colombo's search for international support for its
counterinsurgency efforts directly challenges New
Delhi. Colombo receives most of its military aid from
India's rivals, Pakistan and China. The Indians have
publicly criticized Jayewardene for seeking Common-
wealth involvement in a settlement and are wary of
increased US military support, according to the US
Embassy in New Delhi. The strengthening ties of the
insurgents to international arms markets and radical
groups also raise the possibility of the involvement of
others whom India regards as troublemakers.
New Delhi seeks to preserve the government of India's
southern state of Tamil Nadu, which rules in coalition
with Gandhi's Congress Party. Press reporting indi-
cates the state government feels increasingly threat-
ened by the Sri Lankan conflict and is pressing New
Delhi to find a solution. Press reports indicate that
over 130,000 Tamils have fled Sri Lanka and settled
among their ethnic "cousins" in Tamil Nadu, causing
' In 1971, New Delhi accepted an invitation from Colombo to send
forces to help restore order in the wake of a political insurrection by
Sinhalese radicals attempting to overthrow the government. Four
Indian frigates, six helicopters, and about 3,000 troops were
sympathetic to the Sri Lankan Tamils' plight
India.
Because New Delhi wants to hold the line against
separatist movements in South Asia, the Indians, in
our judgment, will not tolerate the creation of a Tamil
state in Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi has stated publicly
that he does not consider a separate Tamil state
viable. India, a mosaic of many ethnic, religious, and
linguistic communities, is already faced with active
separatist movements in Punjab and the northeast
and, we believe, views Sri Lanka's communal conflict
as a threatening example, especially to its own Tam-
ils. In our judgment, the likelihood of Tamil separat-
ism spreading to India is slim because Indian Tamils
do not feel sufficiently discriminated against in their
own country and Tamil nationalism is not strong in
Indian efforts under Rajiv Gandhi to end the Sri
Lankan conflict have focused mainly on gaining lever-
age over both the government and th'b insurgents to
bring about a negotiated settlement. US Embassy
reporting indicates Gandhi has put considerable per-
sonal prestige on the line in pursuing a conciliatory
strategy, playing on Jayewardene's vanity as peace-
maker while trying to isolate him from international
support for anything but the Indian-brokered peace
process.
Gandhi has continued his mother's policy of trying to
control the insurgents by covertly supplying them
arms and
allowing them sanctuary in Tamil Nadu for training
and for smuggling operations.
New Delhi tends to favor TELO, EROS, and
EPRLF-the less radical major insurgent groups-
while continuing to maintain ties to all the groups. We
believe that the more New Delhi attempts to exercise
its leverage by manipulating its support, the less
control it will wield as the insurgency continues to
grow and the various groups forge ties elsewhere to
buy arms and to free themselves from Indian domina-
tion. In our view, New Delhi would prefer not to be
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
involved in arming and training the insurgents be-
cause of the difficulty of keeping this support secret
and the embarrassment caused by Colombo's charges
that India supports in Sri Lanka what it accuses
Pakistan of doing in Punjab-fomenting separatism
and aiding terrorism.
In our view, Gandhi's frustration at Colombo's intran-
sigence in pursuing a military solution and his support
to the insurgents indicate that India may be turning
from brokerage and more toward advocacy of the
Tamils' rights and political aspirations short of inde-
pendence as the conflict grows.
We believe the Soviets are reluctant to put their more
important security interests in India at risk by directly
supplying weapons and training to Tamil insurgent
groups. The Soviet Union, in our view, wants to
appear supportive of New Delhi's leadership on the
issue. The Soviet Ambassador to Colombo in spring
1986 publicly denied accusations of support to the
insurgents.
In our judgment, the Soviet Union has played only a
minor role in the Tamil insurgency,
The capture of an insurgent arms ship-
ment delivered by sea to Eastern Province in spring
1986 is the clearest indication of possible Soviet
support to the insurgents. According to the US Em-
bassy in Colombo, the cache included Czechoslovak
9-mm pistols and was discovered three days after a
Soviet cargo ship and smaller vessels were sighted
offshore with no stated purpose.
the Soviet Embassy in Colombo
helped the Tamil United Liberation Front to establish
Soviet, Cuban, and East German friendship societies
in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, beginning in 1977. The
Soviets also have printed Tamil-language propaganda
for TULF in the past.
We believe that strengthened insurgent ties to Cuba
and Nicaragua would give the Soviets an indirect
means to influence the insurgent movement without
risking India's ire, although the Soviets would be
certain to keep even this indirect support low key.
Guerrilla links to Sinhalese Marxists and possible
training in Nicaragua and Cuba could lead to a
further infusion of Marxist ideology into the Tamil
insurgency.
Although chances for a negotiated settlement between
the government and Tamil moderates during the next
year are fair to good, no settlement with the most
hardline nationalist groups is likely, and, as a result,
the fighting will continue. The devolution of central
government powers to provincial governments
throughout Sri Lanka is at the heart of current
negotiations between the moderate TULF and the
government. The US Embassy in Colombo reports the
talks have made some progress. TULF and the gov-
ernment agree in general terms on which powers
25X1
25X1
25X1
2~DAI
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Colombo will retain and which it will devolve to
provincial governments. The question of how much
control provincial governments will have over local
police forces and allocations of newly irrigated lands
are still unresolved.
The most intractable problem, in our view, is finding a
compromise that would satisfy TULF's demand for a
single Tamil province and Colombo's insistence on no
formal linkage between Northern and Eastern Prov-
inces. Compromise formulas calling for informal link-
age have been suggested by New Delhi, but TULF
appears reluctant to risk settling for less than one
Tamil province, particularly after insurgents assassi-
nated two moderate TULF politicians earlier this
year.
Any settlement, in our view, will have to reckon with
the hardline nationalism of LTTE. Since the moder-
ate TULF does not control any insurgent group and
its party leadership is weak and divided, its negotia-
tions with the government are hostage to a veto by the
main insurgent groups. We doubt the government and
TULF can reach any agreement satisfactory to LTTE
and other hardline groups. As a result, TULF will
remain heavily dependent on New Delhi and Colombo
to implement a settlement and clamp down on LTTE.
Unless New Delhi can reassert control over LTTE,
Tamil moderates are likely to remain weak and in the
shadow of LTTE.
PLOTE is also likely to try to take advantage of any
negotiated settlement. PLOTE's refusal to prey upon
Tamil civilians and its abstention from hit-and-run
attacks, in our view, have increased its popular sup-
port and reputation as a disciplined insurgent group.
PLOTE may be
willing to accept a negotiated settlement to consoli-
date its political power in a future Tamil provincial
government. We believe PLOTE's popular support,
relative strength, and international network would
give it substantial political standing in Tamil areas of
Sri Lanka and allow it to establish a base for pursuing
its revolutionary goal of an islandwide Marxist state if
a settlement is reached. The influence of PLOTE and
other Marxist Tamil groups on a future provincial
government will probably create long-term tensions
with Colombo and Sinhalese border areas.
Civilian attitudes toward a settlement are unclear.
Press reports indicate many Sinhalese, Tamils, and
Muslims in contested areas are exhausted and eager
for a settlement. Reporting from the US Embassy in
Colombo suggests many Tamil civilians, however, still
rely on the insurgents-despite their conduct-for
protection against Sinhalese local militias and govern-
ment security forces and would be hesitant to give up
this protection. The insurgent shift toward attacks 25X1
against Sinhalese civilians, in our view, could also
make Sinhalese-especially members of the Sri Lan-
ka Freedom Party-reluctant to reach a settlement.
Jayewardene will seek parliamentary ratification of
any settlement, but he will not allow a general
referendum, He prob- 25X1
ably calculates the Sri Lanka Freedom Party would
use a referendum for its own partisan gain, encourag-
ing Sinhalese voters to reject the settlement and
calling for early general elections.
The fighting is likely to get worse over the coming
year, but neither the insurgents nor the government is
likely to make enough military gains to establish full
control of Eastern Province. We believe rivalries
among the insurgents will continue to keep them from
achieving enough military and political 'unity to reach
their goal of an independent Tamil state. The insur-
gents, however, will receive increased Tamil civilian
support if government-backed local militias continue
their random attacks. Government forces will remain
beleaguered by leadership, training, and discipline
problems. As a result, we doubt they will be able to
capitalize on insurgent weaknesses and will have to
struggle merely to maintain a stalemate with insur-
gent forces.
We expect the insurgents will resort more frequently
to terrorist attacks against Sinhalese civilians and
economic targets throughout Sri Lanka. Continued
insurgent success against these targets probably will
weaken the government's support among Sinhalese
and could provoke destabilizing communal rioting
between Sinhalese and Tamils.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Economic Impact of the Insurgency
The economic cost of the insurgency to the Sri
Lankan Government is mounting. During the last
year alone, defense expenditures jumped from $230
million to $520 million and are now the second-
largest item in the budget. Spending on rural develop-
ment projects, public-sector industries, and social
welfare programs has been reduced. The fighting has
disrupted rail and road links, damaged rice produc-
tion, and threatens Sri Lanka's tea exports-provid-
ing approximately 30 percent of foreign exchange
earnings. The US Embassy in Colombo reports the
shift in insurgent attacks to economic and civilian
targets last spring has dealt a serious blow to Sri
Lanka's tourist industry. Fishing, a major part of the
economy in the north, has fallen off sharply. Products
supplied from Jaffna to the rest of the country-fish,
salt, and cement-are in short supply throughout Sri
Lanka because of the decline in economic activity in
the north. Press reports indicate Sri Lanka imported
$67 million worth of rice-440,000 tons in 1985 and
1986, in part to bolster national stocks and alleviate
shortages caused by fighting in Eastern Province.
Press reports indicate Finance Minister Ronnie de
Mel is increasingly vocal in his calls for a political
settlement, and diplomatic reporting indicates de Mel
is urging President Jayewardene to reach a settle-
ment with the Tamils soon. If the insurgents continue
attacks in Colombo, where 90 percent of foreign
investment is based, the government, in our view, will
have difficulty attracting new investment and could
lose those investors already operating in Sri Lanka.
Meanwhile, we expect the government to face an
increased threat to its control of Eastern Province.
The insurgents will continue targeting government
post offices, police stations, and local courts for
attacks as well as individual government administra-
tors for assassination in order to undermine Colom-
bo's authority in Tamil areas. Tamil civilians there
are unlikely to provide strong support for the govern-
ment unless it can provide sustained material bene-
fits-including law and order, food, shelter, and
access to markets in the south for agricultural prod-
ucts. Under these circumstances, continued fighting
probably would lead to growing civil disorder in
Northern and Eastern Provinces. A direct confronta-
tion between PLOTE and LTTE will also intensify
fighting and civilian casualties. The government is
unlikely to attempt to reestablish control of Jaffna by
military force but will fight to maintain its military
presence in the north.
Colombo's military buildup probably will lead to
bloodier conflict as the insurgents seek to match
Colombo's growing arsenal by acquiring more sophis-
ticated weapons themselves. The government's deci-
sion to begin aerial bombardment against suspected
insurgent strongholds may have prompted New Delhi
to provide some insurgent groups with SA-7 missiles.
Even if New Delhi is reluctant to continue providing
increasingly sophisticated weaponry to the insurgents,
we believe the insurgents have sufficient access to the
international arms market and other foreign backers
to preserve at least a stalemate against an expanding
counterinsurgency.
Unable to achieve a military solution, Jayewardene, in
our view, will remain committed to negotiations with
some Tamil groups. Jayewardene is likely to continue
responding to Indian pressure by engaging Tamil
moderates and Sinhalese opposition parties in negotia-
tions, but we doubt he will risk the support of his
Sinhalese constituency by granting the Tamils a
unified Northern and Eastern Province-in effect
Eelam-especially if LTTE continues its attacks in
Colombo and other Sinhalese areas. According to the
US Embassy in Colombo, Jayewardene may unilater-
ally devolve powers to provincial governments this
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
fall. Even if a settlement is reached, LTTE is likely to
disrupt an accord by continuing operations and tar-
geting moderate Tamils seeking to join any future
provincial government.
The deteriorating security situation has so far not
fueled significant Sinhalese opposition to the govern-
ment. We have no information suggesting Sinhalese
hardliners-including members of the Buddhist cler-
gy or members of the opposition-are plotting against
the government. Widespread terrorist attacks against
Sinhalese, however, and a deterioration in civil order
would encourage many of these groups to oppose the
government through public demonstrations, strikes,
and parliamentary opposition. A military coup is
unlikely even if Jayewardene's counterinsurgency
continues to falter, but he could face assassination
from Sinhalese hardliners fearful of a sellout to the
Tamils.
Prime Minister Gandhi will seek to balance India's
regional objective of maintaining stability and pre-
venting the establishment of an independent Tamil
state with domestic concerns in Tamil Nadu. If
Gandhi believes increased Soviet or other Communist
country support is reaching the insurgents, he will
probably raise the issue with Moscow. Meanwhile,
New Delhi will try to prevent the insurgents' outside
links from growing too strong by supplying them with
weapons and training. Despite its dominance in the
region, India will remain incapable of imposing a
settlement on the most hardline Tamil groups.
The fighting will put increased pressure on Colombo
and New Delhi to find a negotiated solution to the
insurgency. Jayewardene's recent willingness to offer
new concessions to Tamil moderates suggests he and
his United National Party recognize that an exclu-
sively military solution will not work. We believe New
Delhi is eager to isolate LTTE by forcing the smaller
insurgent groups to accept a settlement. New Delhi
may have to resort increasingly to crackdowns by its
internal security forces to reassert control over Tamil
insurgent strongholds in South India and to put
additional pressure on the Tamils to negotiate.
Even in the event of a negotiated settlement accept-
able to some insurgent groups, Sri Lanka faces the
prospect of prolonged internal instability. Unless the
government shares more political power with Tamils
in the central government and increases economic aid,
employment, and educational opportunities for Tam-
ils, we believe Sri Lanka will remain divided between
two hostile ethnic communities. Moreover, Colombo's
willingness to cede control over local law and order to
Tamils would make it even more vulnerable to attacks
from LTTE and other radical groups likely to use the
north and east as havens for continued operations.
Implications for the United States
In our view, a deteriorating security situation will
make Colombo increasingly eager for US military
support. Sri Lankan President Jayewardene will con-
tinue his efforts to brand Tamil insurgents as terror-
ists to legitimize government military operations and
to win US and other international support. Insurgent
use of terrorism against Sinhalese civilians and for-
eign nationals will help Colombo make its case,
particularly if the insurgents attack overseas Sri
Lankan missions. Moreover, we believe Marxist influ-
ence is likely to grow among the insurgent groups over
the coming months, adding grist to Jayewardene's
claims of a Marxist threat.
Sri Lanka probably will continue requesting US arms
and training support. ' The US Embassy in Colombo
reports Jayewardene has asked this year for AH-1
helicopter gunships as well as devices to protect the
helicopters in the Sri Lankan Air Force from surface-
to-air missiles. He probably also will request more
training openings for Sri Lankan personnel at US
military schools, especially those teaching counterin-
surgency and aircraft maintenance courses. If re-
buffed, he probably will scale down his arms requests
eventually to small arms and ammunition but will
keep pressing for more access to US military schools.
According to the US Embassy in Colombo, US military assistance
to Sri Lanka is limited to a small training program for Sri Lankan
officers-$144,000 is budgeted in FY 1986 for approximately 15
officers. There also was $855,000 in commercial exports of small
9 X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
We see two possible alternative scenarios. In the more
likely scenario, the Sri Lankan military's increased
training and experience in counterinsurgency would
eventually yield significant gains against insurgent
strongholds and stem the rate of terrorist attacks in
Colombo. Under these circumstances, President
Jayewardene would be more likely to offer conces-
sions on Tamil autonomy-including greater provin-
cial control of police forces and land settlement
policies-and negotiate a settlement with some Tamil
groups.
If New Delhi believes a negotiated settlement between
the government and the moderate TULF is attain-
able, it would try to force those groups it influences
most-TELO, EPRLF, and EROS-to sign on. New
Delhi could quickly disband camps in Tamil Nadu
and deny arms, funds, and training to all insurgent
groups operating on Indian soil.
An Indian crackdown would not be sufficient to
contain LTTE. We believe LTTE could reestablish
its operational headquarters and training camps on
the Jaffna peninsula within several weeks and would
absorb members from other groups. The crackdown
would probably force LTTE to seek additional fund-
ingfrom narcotics trafficking as well as possible
increased training from the PLO, Cuba, and Nicara-
gua.
In the second scenario, LTTE could use its assets
among radical Sinhalese Marxists and its own disci-
plined ranks to terrorize Sinhalese urban centers,
target foreign facilities and personnel, and cripple
transportation links and economic installations-
including tea estates. The deterioration of civil order
in Sinhalese areas and severe damage to the Sri
Lankan economy could spark a military coup led by
junior officers close to the Sinhalese opposition or a
Sinhalese assassination of Jayewardene
Widespread LTTE attacks in Eastern Province could
bring Sri Lanka's 1 million Muslims directly into
conflict with Tamil civilians, accelerating the col-
lapse of civil order. Moreover, communal violence
could force even more refugees into Tamil Nadu,
putting intense pressure on Indian Prime Minister
Gandhi to deploy troops to restore order. Some
insurgent groups-most likely LTTE and PLOTE-
could seize upon the chaos to declare unilaterally an
independent Tamil state, a move that might provoke
Indian military intervention.
We believe an Indian military intervention could
cripple Sri Lanka's prospects for maintaining a
multiparty democracy. An Indian troop presence in
Sri Lanka would underscore the weakness of the
Colombo government and most likely force a post-
ponement of the general election scheduled for 1989,
deterring foreign investment and making Sri Lanka
militarily, politically, and economically dependent on
US military support to Colombo's counterinsurgency
would probably provoke Tamil insurgent threats and
possibly attacks against US facilities and personnel in
Sri Lanka. A new Voice of America relay station,
staffed by US personnel, and US Navy port calls are
potential targets for the insurgents. The insurgents
have publicly threatened multinational corporations
operating in Sri Lanka and did attack a joint Sri
Lankan-Japanese cement factory last spring. They
kidnaped a British journalist in January 1986 suspect-
ed of gathering intelligence for Colombo and in 1984
kidnaped an American couple under contract with the
Although the
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
insurgents lack the capability to launch widespread
attacks against Colombo's military suppliers overseas,
the insurgents' international network of drug smug-
glers in Europe and the Middle East, their proven
terrorist capabilities with high explosives, and their
offices in West Germany, Britain, Switzerland, Cana-
da, and Bahrain give them the infrastructure to put
US personnel and facilities outside Sri Lanka at risk.
US military aid, in our view, would seriously compli-
cate US relations with India. New Delhi's longstand-
ing opposition to the US military presence in the
Indian Ocean has made it anxious about US policy
toward Sri Lanka. Faced with prospects for continued
fighting, New Delhi-under pressure from the Indian
Parliament-is likely to resort increasingly to the
excuse of foreign intervention to shield it from a
failure of its peace initiatives in Sri Lanka. The
failure of New Delhi's bid to broker a negotiated
settlement has already fueled Indian accusations of
Pakistani, Israeli, and British interference in Sri
Lanka. Moreover, India could move to offset US aid
to Colombo by increasing its assistance to the Tamils.
As a result, Washington and New Delhi could find
themselves on opposite sides of the conflict.
President Jayewardene may unilaterally impose a
settlement by granting provincial councils to Tamil
areas with the support of some moderates and the
smaller insurgent groups. This situation is likely to
pose particular difficulties for the United States since
Jayewardene could claim he had reached a settlement
by making concessions and that US military aid was
necessary to make a settlement stick. The likelihood
of a threat from hardliners in LTTE would make
Jayewardene especially eager to establish an expand-
ed military relationship with the United States.
If the security forces can contain LTTE after a
settlement, Jayewardene will probably turn his atten-
tion to PLOTE. Widespread political organizing and
the resumption of guerrilla warfare by PLOTE would
make Jayewardene eager to win US support for
combating Marxism.
In the event of a negotiated settlement, we believe
Colombo would seek increased US economic aid. To
make a settlement viable, Colombo would need to
assimilate Tamils into a revived economy, provide
emergency economic assistance to displaced civilians,
and begin costly reconstruction of roads, bridges, and
rail links destroyed in the fighting. The government
would also have to continue its high security expendi-
tures to contain insurgents who refuse to accept a
settlement and to maintain order in Northern and
Eastern Provinces. New Delhi would probably wel-
come such US aid.
Regardless of whether a negotiated settlement is
reached, Sri Lanka is likely to face growing interna-
tional criticism for human rights violations. Colombo
will have difficulty disbanding local Sinhalese mili-
tias-often involved in attacks against Tamil civilians
and now accustomed to wielding authority at the local
level in Eastern Province. The Sri Lankan Parliament
would probably lift the declared state of emergency if
a settlement is reached but may be slower to repeal
the Prevention of Terrorism Act-the government's
principal instrument for detention of suspected Tamil
insurgents. In response, Tamil expatriate lobbyists are
likely to continue seeking Western-especially US-
pressure on Colombo, citing human rights violations.
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Appendix
Increasing Indian Military
Capabilities Toward Sri Lanka
Buildup of Military Capabilities
India is rapidly expanding the forces it could use to
intervene in Sri Lanka. Although New Delhi claims
that these forces are being developed to defend its
offshore territories, we believe it would consider using
them offensively in Sri Lanka if the government
collapsed or the insurgents established an independent
Tamil state.
The Navy has nine recently acquired Polnocny-class
mechanized landing ships and seven utility landing
craft stationed with its amphibious squadron at Visha-
kapatnam on the east coast. With sufficient naval
escort, logistic support, and civilian shipping, the
squadron could transport one and possibly two fully
equipped infantry brigades-about 2,500 to 5,000
men-with artillery and light armor to Sri Lanka.
the Navy
considers its amphibious abilities to be very good and
used modified merchant ships as troop transports-a
lesson learned from British naval operations in the
Falklands war-during an exercise in the Andaman
Islands in March 1985.
The Indian Army's 54th Infantry Division, stationed
in the south, has long experience in amphibious
operations, and its 91st Brigade is often deployed in
annual exercises with the Navy. US defense attaches
report the Army is proposing the creation of a stand-
ing marine force, patterned after the US Marine
Corps, of which we believe the 54th Division would
form the nucleus.
India is also improving its ability to deploy airborne
forces, which would play a key role in an intervention
in Sri Lanka. The Air Force's growing transport fleet,
centering on six IL-76 heavy transports, 60 AN-32
medium transports, and 66 MI-8 helicopters, could
deploy to Sri Lanka all of the 4,600-man 50th
Parachute Brigade, the only Army unit trained in
either airborne or heliborne operations. The para-
troopers probably would try to seize an airfield so that
reinforcements could be brought in by air. US defense
attache sources report the Army and Air Force
practiced such an operation late last year at Trivan-
drum, with the assault force receiving offshore fire
support from Navy warships. Trivandrum closely
resembles Colombo in topography-a city on a west
coast with its airport situated by the shore.
New Delhi is establishing new bases in the south from
which it could launch an operation against Sri Lanka.
The Army has created a local command at Madurai 25X1
with six infantry battalions, a likely second-echelon
force for a Sri Lankan intervention. The Navy and
Air Force have established subcommands at Tuticorin
and Trivandrum, respectively. Although no more than
token forces have been committed to these subcom-
mands, they are well situated to coordinate naval and
air units against Sri Lanka.
How an Indian intervention in Sri Lanka would
proceed depends on the circumstances under which
forces would be introduced. In our view, an Indian
intervention would most likely come, as in 1971,
following a request from Colombo for help in restor-
ing internal order. The possibility exists, however,
that New Delhi would intervene without an invitation
if it believed the situation had deteriorated enough to
threaten Indian interests. We believe the Indians, if
uninvited, would try to take Colombo and other
important centers and defeat any resistance. Alterna-
tively, they may confine their intervention to Eastern
Province, where most of the fighting between the
government and the insurgents is taking place, to halt
the violence and hold territory perhaps important
enough to both sides to force them back into negotia-
tions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
We believe the 36,000-man Sri Lankan military
would offer only token resistance to an Indian inter-
vention. We calculate that an Indian landing force of
about 8,000 amphibious and airborne troops-much
better trained, led, and supported than the Sri Lankan
forces-could be reinforced by about 15,000 infantry
within a week and would soon overrun the major cities
and most important facilities on the island. In the
ensuing months, more of the over 1-million-strong
Indian Army could be deployed to Sri Lanka.
In our judgment, the most serious opposition to a
prolonged Indian intervention would come from Tam-
il, and possibly Sinhalese, insurgents. We believe
some of the more than a dozen Tamil insurgent
groups, with far better knowledge of local terrain and
with a sympathetic populace among which to operate,
would soon direct attacks against an occupying Indian
force. Sri Lankan Tamils engaged in training and
smuggling activities in southern India also could carry
out guerrilla operations within India itself, threaten-
ing the rear area of the Indian force occupying Sri
Lanka. Colombo's forces probably would become the
core of a Sinhalese resistance movement against an
Indian occupation
We believe Indian forces would be ill prepared to
contend with the insurgency currently being waged in
Sri Lanka. The Indian Army has gained some coun-
terinsurgency experience in operations against tribal
separatists in India's northeastern states. In Sri Lan-
ka, however, it would be a foreign presence not long
tolerated by an armed, organized enemy-Sinhalese
or Tamil. Indian conventional forces trying to hold
territory and maintain a peace would be a welcome
change for Colombo's military. If New Delhi contin-
ued to oppose a separate Tamil state, we believe
Tamil insurgents would resist the Indians as they now
do the Sinhalese. In our view, if Indian intervention
were not soon followed by a settlement between
Colombo and the insurgents, violence would again
flare between the island's communities, but this time
with Indian forces caught in the middle.
Secret 30
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP88T00096R000300340001-2