INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
; Directorate of -Secret
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
Gl IN 86-00/
Februar 1986
Copy 6 3 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Directorate of Secret
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome and may be directed to
Secret
61 lPl Nh-ool
Fchruari P) SO
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Preface
Summary: Levels of Concern
vii
Part 1. Developments and Trends
Part 2. Countries With Developments of Special Interest
I
33
The Philippines: Election and Beyond
33
Iraq: Mounting Difficulties Undercut Military and Civilian Mo
rale
37
Guatemala: Moderate Leftist President Cerezo Seekin Cons
sus
39
Peru: President Garcia's Honeymoon Fading
41
Part 3. Indicators of Political Instability
45
iii Secret
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of
significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The
quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 November through 31
January, examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or
policy changes. The paper assesses our levels of concern regarding the
potential for instability in the short term and over the next two years
through the consistent application of 24 indicators.
The quarterly includes an overview of developments during the quarter,
and the following three parts:
? Part I includes a brief narrative assessment of each country, and
country-specific tables tracing significant political and economic changes
during the past two years. The 30 countries we assess have been
identified as particularly salient to US interests because they are
strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or
allies, geographically close to the United States, or especially influential
in the Third World.
? Part 2 presents a more detailed analysis of select countries in which there
have been developments of special interest. Included in each assessment
are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the
scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative
scenarios.
? Part 3 provides a reference list of 85 questions keyed to the 24 indicators.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Status of Key Indicators
Developments in
Fourth Quarter, 1985,
and Prospects
Legend Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
? Concern has increased since last quarter
? Concern has decreased since last quarter
I
u
v
L C y
n i
O
O
O
y
O
>
>
Y ~:
y
E = v 3
..
..
~ O
Y
6. .n G C
U
t
L
-
~
O
'
'=
L
C o
.
J
O
. 0.
~ X
yU 0.
Y
0
C
O
vl
Latin America
Mexico
A
LI Salvador
Guatemala
?
Honduras
Panama
.
I
Colombia
Venezuela
? ! ?
Peru
Brazil
?
j
Argentina
Chile
Europe
Spain
Greece
Iurkev
Near 1 ist and South Asia
Morocco
Egypt
Sudan
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
t
f
,
A
A
A
Iran
Pakistan
4
India
? I
-
?
lfr i e?t
Nigeria
A
Somalia
Kcnva
7aire
}
South Africa
Pau Asia
Philippines
Indonesia
A
}
t
South Korea
A
307922 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
Summary: This quarter, concern has been raised to high levels for the short-term
Levels of Concern stability of Nigeria, Iraq, and South Korea. We continue to have serious or
substantial concern that regime or major policy change could occur during
the next six months in Sudan, Iran, or the Philippines:
? Nigerian President Babangida's brief honeymoon period following last
August's military coup ended with the arrest in December of more than
50 officers charged with coup plotting.
? The Iraqi regime-already hampered by serious morale problems stem-
ming from its five-year-old war with Iran-must cope with the renewed
threat of an Iranian invasion, a spreading Kurdish insurgency, and
declining oil prices.
? In South Korea, we are concerned that President Chun may take steps
ensuring his continued rule beyond 1988 that would unify a broad-based
opposition and trigger widespread protests.
? Elections scheduled for late April in Sudan may be postponed or a new
interim military regime formed if political differences spark major civil
disorder.
? Khomeini's uncertain health and factional rivalries continue to provide
an unsettled political climate in Iran.
? We are concerned that in the Philippines a blatantly fraudulent election
or a move by Marcos to call off elections would spur widespread unrest.
Regime-threatening instability over the next two years is of substantial
concern in several Central and South American countries. The govern-
ments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama must forge an
internal consensus on democratic rule in highly factionalized societies.
Peruvian President Garcia faces long-term economic problems and
strained relations with the security forces. Chilean President Pinochet is
likely to lose the support of the military junta if he refuses to move toward
an accelerated transition to civilian rule and if terrorist incidents and
public unrest escalate. In Kenya, grumbling by the military over pay,
appointments, and ethnic discrimination in recruiting have led us to raise
our concern slightly about short-term prospects for regime change.
The prospect for a continued decline in oil prices poses a difficult political 25X1
challenge for Mexico's de la Madrid. Spending to garner votes in
gubernatorial elections later this year will likely aggravate difficulties with
creditors and the International Monetary Fund over meeting economic
performance targets. We are concerned that a dramatic fall in oil revenues
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
would spur an abrupt shift in Mexican economic and debt policies. In
Venezuela, party elections have consolidated support for President Lusin-
chi and his wing of the majority party, and, as a result, we believe the out-
look for regime stability has improved. We also have lowered our concern
about the longer term prospects for instability in India because of Prime
Minister Gandhi's leadership and conciliatory initiatives that have reduced
incidents of religious discontent and terrorism, although he is still a high-
risk target for assassination.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
25X1
Part 1. Developments and Trends
The six categories of indicators used in the following
charts are drawn from the 85 questions presented in
Part 3. The social chang%onflict indicators examine
developments such as labor or religious unrest that
could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability
to rule effectively. The economicfactors link various
dimensions of economic performance to potential in-
stability. Opposition activities assess whether the
opposition can mobilize effective antiregime activity
or carry out acts that undermine public security. The
military attitude/activities category addresses the mi-
litary's degree of dissatisfaction with regime policies,
involvement in coup plotting, and behavior relevant to
the political process. The externalfactors category
looks at foreign influences that could affect internal
stability. Finally, the regime capabilities/actions cate-
gory focuses on what the government is doing that
could lessen popular support, otherwise undermine its
authority, and affect its ability to govern efficiently.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Mexico:
Selected Instability Indicators
The ongoing deterioration of the economy poses the most difficult
political challenge to the government. The President is expected to
increase spending in states with elections later this year. Public
tolerance for austerity is waning and some military officers are
grumbling The soft
oil market is likely to require that a greater share of public
spending be funded internally, which could pose problems with the
IMF and foreign creditors.
Legend
During next six months
During next six months to two dears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
Capital flight
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
O
0
0
0
O
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 O
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy - O O
307923 1.86
,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
El Salvador:
Selected Instability Indicators
President Duarte's relations with the military have been strained by
his handling of the negotiations to win the release of his daughter,
his perceived failure to discipline corrupt officials, and his indecisive
moves in connection with a church-sponsored Christmas truce. The
High Command, however, remains loyal and does not appear
inclined to challenge the government directly. In the coming months
Duarte probably will be preoccupied with managing leftist agitation
in the labor sector prompted by the implementation of his belt-
tightening economic stabilization package.
During next six months
iii During next six months to two years
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
r.
04
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
aim
~~
-
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
113
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
rt
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?i'r
4r
t;
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
o;,,
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality ? ? wr
Security capabilities ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
307924 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Guatemala":
Selected Instability Indicators
President Vinicio Cerezo is still buoyed by his decisive election
victory in December, but he faces difficult economic and political
challenges-including lack of public support for his austerity mea-
sures, demands from organized labor for higher wages and benefits,
and the prospect of continued political violence initiated by extrem-
ists on the right and left. Opposition to reform from business and the
military also could undermine his electoral mandate.
Legend
During next six months
Gi During next six months to two )ears
0 Not of concern Q Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I II 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0 0 O O
0 0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0 0 0 0
0 0
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
i
Capital flight
?
t ?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0 0
0
0
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
0 0
O
O
O
?
?
Inflation
0
0
O
O
O
O
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
O
O
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
O
O
0
0
0
0
0 0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0
0 0
0
0
O
04-
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0 0
_
0
0 0
0
Discontent over government action/ policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
0
0
0 0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
0
O
O
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
?
307925 1-86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Honduras:
Selected Instability Indicators
Newly inaugurated President Azcona will probably have a short
political honeymoon. He is struggling with how much support to
provide anti-Sandinista insurgents, as well as how to handle dead-
locked border talks with El Salvador and revive the stalled economy.
Although Azcona appears to enjoy good relations with the military
high command, some senior officers still oppose him and most likely
will try to undermine his authority. Residual political infighting
from last year's campaign also is likely to deprive him of much-
needed cooperation from the new Congress.
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
v Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
307926 1-86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Panama:
Selected Instability Indicators
The Delvalle regime's failure to develop a coherent economic policy
may portend a new financial-and political-crisis in 1986. Defense
Chief Noriega, the most likely leader of any maneuver against the
President, does not appear to be scheming actively, and he recently
installed military officers loyal to him in some important positions in
the government and the ruling party. Even so, if the current,
widespread perception in Panama-that Delvalle has no economic
policy and lacks basic competence-persists, regime prospects may
Legend
During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
0
0 0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0 0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
0
0
O
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0 0
0
0
0
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O i 0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
O 0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition t
o
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0
307927 1.86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Colombia:
Selected Instability Indicators
Guerrilla violence is likely to intensify as the presidential election
scheduled for May approaches. Only one guerrilla group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, still adheres to the cease-
fire negotiated by President Betancur in 1984, and some of its
members have cla$hed with Army patrols. Betancur probably will
authorize expanded operations against M-19 guerrillas and some
smaller groups, but the military will be hard pressed if the larger,
well-organized Revolutionary Armed Forces breaks the truce.
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1984
I 11 III IV
1985
1 II 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0 0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
DePreasedaccess to foreign funds Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
O
O O
Food/energy shortages
0
O 4
O
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0 0
:.
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0 0 0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
O 0 0
New category
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
307928 1.86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Venezuela:
Selected Instability Indicators
President Lusinchi's austere economic adjustment program contin-
ues to draw broad public support. The measures have restored
balance to Venezuela's external accounts but failed to revive the
domestic economy. A severe drop in oil prices would assure an
eighth year of economic stagnation. This scenario would probably
disturb the otherwise quiet political scene, but not threaten Lusin-
chi, who most likely can manage the political fallout from a softer
oil market. Party elections last quarter consolidated support for
Lusinchi and his party wing.
0 During next six months
0 During next six months to two years
Legend 0 Not of concern Q Substantial concern
Low concern 10 Serious concern
4 Moderate concern
1984
1985
I II III IV
1
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Economic factors
General
e
t
to foreign funds
D
ecreased
access
0 * 0
0 0
0 { 0
Capital flight
0
0
0 O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
#f
h$
0 1 *
0
0 0
Food/energy shortages
O
O
0 0
0
0
0 0
Inflation
?
ek
0
0 1
0 01
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0I
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0 01
0
O
Terrorism and sabotage
0 0
i 0
?
?
0
Insurgent armed attacks--
oO O
0
0
O
Public support
0 10 O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0 0 0
0
0
1 0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O 0-00
O 0{
0 O
Discontent over government action/policies
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0 O - O 0
0 10
0
0
External factors External support for government
0 0 0 O
O 0
External support for opposition
O-1.010 0
O ' 0
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
00
O
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0 O
O
t
O
0 {
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0 0
0
0
0 0
Loss of legitimacy
O 0 O
O
0J 0
,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Peru" :
Selected Instability Indicators
President Garcia's popularity remains his best protection from
opposition challenges. His solitary decisionmaking style, however,
has antagonized the political left and some members of his Cabinet.
Nationalistic economic policies, while popular, have not boosted
economic recovery. Garcia also faces growing internal security
problems and his reformist policies, anticorruption campaign, and
failure to formulate a clear counterinsurgency strategy continue to
strain relations with Peru's security forces.
a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.
During next six months
rd During next six months to two years
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
r Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II 111 IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
?
1
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
0
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0
0
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
External factors External support for government
O
O O
O
O
0
External support for opposition
O
O
0
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
307930 196
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Brazil:
Selected Instability Indicators
President Sarney has emerged with a broader base of support
following the nationwide municipal elections last fall. The leftwing
parties have made gains, however, and they plan to press for early
direct presidential elections. The area where Sarney could most
readily trip up-giving his adversaries ammunition-is the econo-
my; inflation may heat up in the coming months as a result of
current stimulative policies. Nonetheless, Sarney probably stands a
better-than-even chance of fending off these potential problems and
remaining in office through 1988.
Legend
O During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern tw~ Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0 0
0 O
O O
0 O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
O O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
?
?
O O
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
0
Terrorism and sabotage
o
O
O
O
O
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
O
O
O
O
O
O
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes /activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0 0
10
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits -
o
o O O
o
-o
O
O 1
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0 0 0 0
O O O
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
O O O
O O O
New category
0
o
0
o
0
0
O
0
0
O
0
0
O
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0 O
0
0
0
O
O
0
Security capabilities
EA
o
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
307931 1.86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Argentina:
Selected Instability Indicators
President Alfonsin has scored a string of successes in recent months,
strengthening his political standing and aggravating disarray in the
Peronist opposition. His party made a good showing in the fall
congressional elections; he has reduced tensions in the military; and
his austerity measures continue to limit inflation. Alfonsin could
become vulnerable on the economic front, however, because he
appears reluctant to implement structural reforms-such as the role
of inefficient government enterprises-necessary for long-term eco-
nomic growth.
Legend
During next six months
During next six months to two years
0 Not of concern Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
I
II
III
IV
I
II
111
IV
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
O
0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors
General deterioration
--
--
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
r
0
0
0
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
o
fO
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
_
0
O
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
O
0
0
0
0
0
0 1
0
Public support
O
+O
O
TO
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0 +
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
External support for government
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
O
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
0
O
i O
0
0
0
0(
0
Security capabilities
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
i 0
0
1 0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
O
O
0 0
0
0
0
0
307932 1-86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Chile:
Selected Instability Indicators
Bombings by far leftists have escalated in recent months, and the
Communists and their allies now are targeting US Embassy person-
nel. Such activities are not at a regime-threatening level, but they
are sure to test the security forces-whose morale has suffered as a
result of scandals over death squad activities. Meanwhile, moderate
opposition groups have failed to persuade the government to agree to
an accelerated transition to civilian rule. And some in the military
junta have told President Pinochet they will not support his remain-
ing in office after his term expires in 1989.
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Legend
0 Not of concern Q Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
I II III IV
I II 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Q QI Q
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
? ?
?
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0 O 0
0
0
0 0
Food/energy shortages
0
O 0 0
0
0
0 0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
? ?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
? ?
Insurgent armed attacks
0 10
0
0
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0 0 0 0
0 0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
0
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0 O 0 1 0
0 0
0
O
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New category
O
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
307933 186
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Spain:
Selected Instability Indicators
The referendum on NATO membership, tentatively scheduled for
March, will charge the political atmosphere and probably spark
demonstrations throughout the country in opposition to NATO. We
believe Prime Minister Gonzalez will weather the storm, even if
voters reject his pro-NATO stance. High unemployment remains a
serious problem and probably will increase as Gonzalez pursues his
restructuring program and as Spain's membership in the EC forces
it to compete with more efficient producers.
O During next six months
O During next six months to two dears
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
-
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 i
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
0 0
Capital flight
0
0
0
O
O
O
0
O
----- Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
O
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages
O
O
O
-
a
O
O
Inflation
0
0
0
07
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
O
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
O
Public support
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
O
0
0
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
a
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence O 0
Loss of legitimacy 0
307934 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Greece:
Selected Instability Indicators
The downturn in the economy has forced the government of Prime
Minister Papandreou to adopt a series of austerity measures-
including real wage cuts, import restrictions, and a devaluation of
the drachma. These measures have drawn criticism from labor
unions, provoked strikes, and led to some dissension within the
governing Socialist ranks. Nonetheless, with the opposition divided
and Papandreou still in firm control of his party, there is no major
threat to domestic stability.
Legend
0 During next six months
0 During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
1 11 III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0 0
0
O
0
O
' O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
O
+
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
O
O
0
0
O
0
Food/energy shortages
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
o
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Public support
0
0
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Discont
ent over government action/policies
0
O O
O
t
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O 0
0
O
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
O O
o
o
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
o
O
O
Regime actions /capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 O O O
Security capabilities o
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3W935 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Turkey:
Selected Instability Indicators
Prime Minister Ozal faces no near-term threat to his standing, even
though he appears to be losing support to opposition groups on the
right and left due to economic problems.
Foreign relations issues involving Greece,
Bulgaria, Syria, and Kurdish terrorists also hold potential for
reducing public support for the government.
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Legend
0 Not of concern V Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
-
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
}
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
Public support
0 1
0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 I
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0-
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
' 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
External support for opposition
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
307936 1-86
25X6
2bAb
25X6
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Morocco:
Selected Instability Indicators
Morocco will continue to face financial difficulties over the next
several months. Rabat missed IMF performance targets and pay-
ments due creditors last quarter. It is also experiencing shortfalls in
its key phosphates and agricultural exports. Additional retrench-
ment may spark campus and labor unrest early in 1986 as Moroc-
co's volatile youth return to campus and labor contracts are
renegotiated. Morocco's increasingly active Islamic extremists also
may attempt to exploit the situation, but the regime's security forces
appear capable of containing such mischief.
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
-
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Ca ital flight
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
O
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
0
0
O
O
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
_
O
0
0
__
O
__
__
0
O
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
O
O j 0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
O
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
u=
r>
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
O'
0
0
0
O
0
O
307937 1.86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Egypt:
Selected Instability Indicators
Cairo's decision to attack the hijacked Egyptair plane in Malta with
commandos has been viewed by many international observers as a
necessary step, but the high loss of life-60 killed-has added to
Mubarak's growing reputation among Egyptians for incompetence.
If he is faced with a similar crisis in the near future, public
discontent could erupt into civil unrest. Mubarak will attempt to
implement needed austerity measures cautiously to avoid a repeat of
the 1977 bread riots. He is prepared to deal harshly with Muslim
fundamentalists and other potential agitators.
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Legend
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0 0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
?
?
Food/energy shortages
0
0
O
O
O
O
O
O
Inflation
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
O
O
O
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
o
O
O O
O
O
O
O
External factors External support for government
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
307938 l-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Sudan:
Selected Instability Indicators
Khartoum's interim military regime has formalized a schedule for
elections and the turnover to civilian rule by late April, despite the
lack of preparedness on all sides. We believe there is an even chance
that elections will be postponed or a new interim regime formed if
tensions build and clashes between political parties disrupt cam-
paigning. Meanwhile, a costly defeat by the southern rebels-who
are receiving more support from Ethiopia-or civil unrest over
economic grievances could provide a pretext for disaffected officers
to mount a coup.
Legend
iO During next six months
k3 During next six months to two dears
O Not of concern v Substantial concern
Low concern tf/ Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
I II III
IV
I
If
III
IV
Social change conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
ih
(6
4&
60
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
sri
60
0 {
Economic factors
General deterioration
N
(Ol
fi
~Y
Decreased access to foreign funds
tlr
s~
j 11t
Capital flight
ii
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
Yiy
~jl
Inflation
s
b~
p
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
"t
?
?
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
r
0
(r
j
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
0
External factors
External support for government
1V
External support for opposition
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions /capabilities
Repression/brutality
A
Security capabilities
I
0
~1
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
0
to
a
Loss of legitimacy
307939 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Saudi Arabia:
Selected Instability Indicators
The Saudi Government remains firmly in control, although reduced
government spending is affecting the lifestyles of many Saudis.
Popular criticism of the royal family-especially the King-is
increasing. Riyadh is concerned about regional tensions precipitated
by recent terrorist attacks and Israeli retaliation, and spillover of the
Iran-Iraq war remains a threat. Oil revenues remain depressed, and
OPEC's decision to defend a greater market share will probably
keep oil prices sharply lower this year.
Legend
0 During next six months
During next six months to two wars
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I 11 III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
s
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
0
O
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
i
fif
0
0
0
O
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
g_
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
0
0
O
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
_
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
o
O
O
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
O
0
O
O
0
0
O
External factors External support for government
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
a
c
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality 0 0 0 0 0 ff,. -
Security capabilities 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O!
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 O
307940 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Iraq':
Selected Instability Indicators
The regime in Iraq has been unable to end its five-year-old war
against Iran, and the morale of its Army is depressed. A stubborn
Kurdish insurgency in Iraq's northern provinces is spreading, and on
the southern front Iran continues preparations for a major offensive.
Sharply lower oil prices will seriously hurt the Iraqi economy and
prompt requests for additional Saudi and Kuwaiti aid.
a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.
Legend
w During next six months
y` During next six months to two years
0 Not of concern Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
? ?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
o
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0 0 0 O
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
O
O
O
O
0
0
0
O 1
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
O
-0
O
-0---
0
Terrorism and sabotage
?
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
?
?
?
Public support
0
0
O
0
0
0
Military attitudes /activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
(D-0
0 0
0
0
O
0
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0 0
O O
0 0
O 0
0
O
O
O
O
0
-
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
?
?
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
?
?
?
?
Regime actions /capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
Security capabilities
O
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Loss of legitimacy
o I
O
o
o
0
0
0
30794i 1.86
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Iran:
Selected Instability Indicators
Khomeini's I war weariness, continuing economic
difficulties, and factional rivalries pose formidable challenges for
Iran. The regime, nevertheless, is maintaining its oil exports from
Khark Island despite frequent Iraqi attacks, and Khomeini recently
has intervened to maintain a balance of power between radicals and
conservatives on key issues. Harsh repression of antiwar demonstra-
tors appears temporarily to have stifled overt expressions of dissent.
Legend
4 During next six months
to During next six months to two }ears
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
0
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
O
O
0
0
01
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
0
O
O
0
O
O
0
0
External support for opposition
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
O
0
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
O
0
307942 1-86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 l
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Pakistan:
Selected Instability Indicators
President Zia's lifting of martial law on 30 December appears to
have strengthened the stability of the Pakistani Government, at least
for the near term. The new civilian system faces major problems
early in its tenure, however, including increased political activity by
newly legal opposition parties who are pressing Zia to resign his
command of the Army. Meanwhile, the government has mounted
paramilitary operations aimed at tightening its control in tribal
areas along the border with Afghanistan.
During next six months
During next six months to two )ears
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
ro Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
? 0
J
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0 0
0
0
-d
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0 0 0
-0
-0
O
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
_
Inflation
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
O
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality 0 0 0 0 0 O
Security capabilities O 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 4000 O O 0 0 O{ 0
oss of legitmacy O 0 0 0 0 0
307943 i-86
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
India:
Selected Instability Indicators
Prospects for stability in India have been strengthened in recent
months as religious discontent and terrorism have diminished. Prime
Minister Gandhi's conciliatory initiatives to halt conflict in Assam
and Punjab led to generally peaceful special elections in both states
that were won by opposition parties. Stability in these troubled
regions will heavily depend on the new leaders' abilities to contain
recurrent violence growing out of successionist, sectarian, and ethnic
issues.
Legend
During next six months
During next six months to two )ears
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
0 0
0
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
O O
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
O o-
-o-
- O
O
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
O
O
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages
0
O
O
O
O
O
Inflation
O
0
O
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
O
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
O
O
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
Discontent over government action/Policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
O
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
O
O
O
0
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
Regime actions /capabilities Repression /brutality
-4
O
O
O
O
O
O
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
O
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
o
O
O
O
O
0
307944 1-86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Nigeria:
Selected Instability Indicators
More than 50 officers were arrested and
charged with coup-plotting in December. Babangida's popularity is
declining in the wake of pay cuts and the exclusion of northerners
from the government. Public opinion recently forced him to reject an
IMF accord-many Nigerians oppose the austerity required by the
accord. Even so, debts and low oil prices make politically risky
cutbacks a certainty.
Legend
0 During next six months
During next six months to two wars
0 Not of concern Q Substantial concern
Low concern 9 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
I I II III
IV
I
II
III
IV
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
11 s -
0
40
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors
General deterioration
? ? ?
40
0
0
?
~
Decreased access to foreign funds
40
Capital flight
~.
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
Food/energy shortages
0
}
Inflation
0 ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
O O
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O O O
O
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
O O O
O
O
O
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks _
O O O
O
0
0
0
0
Public support
0 0
O
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0 O 10
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
j
? -
0
0 }
?
Discontent over government action/policies
0-01-0
-0
?
__
?
0
+ ?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ? TO
?
?
?
S !
External factors
External support for government
0 0 O
1
O
0
1
O
0
0
External support for opposition
-
O O~ O
O
O
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions /capabilities
Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
?.
,,
Political disunity/loss of confidence
i
--
0
?
?
S
S
Loss of legitimacy
S .
?
S
S
307945 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Somalia:
Selected Instability Indicators
President Siad continues in his 16th year in power to shrewdly
manipulate tribal rivalries and retain the loyalty of key military and
police units. Although criticism from senior government and party
officials over the level of Western-particularly US-assistance is
growing, Siad is keeping close tabs on his adversaries and is in no
immediate danger. Nevertheless, he faces complex economic and
political problems that-if not addressed-could unite his opponents
and threaten his regime
Legend
O During next six months
During next six months to two wars
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III i IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
-
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
1
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
Food/energy shortages
O
O
O
0
0
0
O
Inflation
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
O
O
0
O
0
0
O
Insurgent armed attacks
Y^`
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
0
0
0
O
O
External support for opposition
'
"
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
O
0
O
O
O
O
O
O
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Kenya:
Selected Instability Indicators
Grumbling by the military over pay and appointments appears to
have increased. The Kikuyu-Kenya's largest ethnic group-feels
shortchanged by skewed Army recruiting quotas and the cancella-
tion of a major papermill project in Kikuyuland. Additionally, more
visible government corruption has marginally reduced public confi-
dence in President Moi's government. In general, however, the level
of disaffection probably remains manageable
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
0
0
O
O
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0{
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
-
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
-0
-
-0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
b
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
o
-0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
O
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
0 it
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
0 0 0
0 O
New category
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security capabilities 0 0 O O O O O 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy o O O O O O 0 0
307947 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Zaire:
Selected Instability Indicators
President Mobutu remains in firm control, although he continues to
face daunting economic problems. Dissident activity in the east has
declined in recent months, and a number of rebels have surrendered
under Mobutu's amnesty program because of lack of supplies and
poor morale. No incidents occurred during celebrations marking
Mobutu's 20th year in power in November, but
Legend
the potential for Libyan-sponsored
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Not of concern Q Substantial concern
Low concern 0 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I II 111 IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/ planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
307948 1.86
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
South Africa:
Selected Instability Indicators
The limited reforms announced recently by President Botha will be
insufficient to satisfy militant blacks and moderate current unrest.
Antiapartheid violence and demonstrations will continue, and black
schools may face a year of disruption as student leaders push for
boycotts to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Soweto riots.
Despite continued efforts to resolve the foreign debt crisis, we
believe Pretoria will experience increasing economic isolation. Nev-
ertheless, the determination of whites to retain power remains
strong.
Legend
During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern Q Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1984
1985
1 II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0 0
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
General deterioration
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0 0
0
0
0
?
1?
--
Capital flight
0 0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0 0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
o T
o
O
_
I
-- j
O
O
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
! O
O
Insurgent armed attacks
0 0
O
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0 0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0 O
O
O
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0 O
O
O
0
O
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
External support for government
0 O
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression /brutality
O j
0
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O O
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3079,49 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Philippines':
Selected Instability Indicators
When President Marcos announced his plan last November for an
early presidential election, he indicated the measure was intended to
move the country toward a new consensus and stability. There
appears to be at least an equal risk, however, that the 7 February
balloting and its aftermath could have the opposite effect. If Marcos
is widely seen as blatantly rigging the election, the result could be
escalating unrest over the next several months-and a boost to the
Communist New People's Army insurgent movement.
a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.
J During next six months
Q During next six months to two dears
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
G, Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
0
O
O
0
Inflation
?
?
?
?
0
O
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
O
0
0
0
9-
0-
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
O
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
do
o:
O~
0
O
O
O
0
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
307950 1-86
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Indonesia:
Selected Instability Indicators
Recent fires at several government-related facilities suggest a
renewal of the antiregime arson campaign conducted in early 1985.
The latest targets include four broadcasting stations, the Depart-
ment of Religion, and a factory owned by President Soeharto's
family. Stiff sentences for prominent dissidents in recent trials
underscore the government's resolve-and ability-to contain po-
tential opposition. Declining export revenues, however, continue to
frustrate Jakarta's efforts to deal with already serious unemploy-
Legend
O During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
ws Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1984
I
II
III IV
1985
I
II
III IV
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
0
I 0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
i
u
Economic factors
General deterioration
0
0
0
0
0
to
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
0
O
! O
O
--O
O
rO
O
O
n
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
O
0
O
T
O
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
O
_
O
_
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0-
o-
0
0
0
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
O
0
0
O
O
O
Insurgent armed attacks
o
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
0
O T
O
O
0
0
0
External factors
External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
O
LO
0
O
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
b
0
o
O
0 1
0
O
0
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0 0
0 O
307951 186
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
South Korea:
Selected Instability Indicators
Concern for stability has been heightened by reports that President
Chun is having second thoughts about stepping down in 1988 and
may use student violence or other opposition activities as an excuse
to crack down this spring. Some insiders in Seoul believe Chun may
disband the Assembly and use new elections to install a more
malleable parliamentary opposition-a move that could trigger
widespread protests. Factionalism has set back opposition plans for a
petition campaign in favor of direct presidential elections, but the
government remains worried.
Legend
i& During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
G) Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1984
I 11 III IV
1985
I II III IV
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
O
0
O
O
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
.0
0
0 0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
0
0
0
0
0-
-Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes /activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
O
0
0
O
O
0
0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
0
- O
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
b
O
O
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
307952 186
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Part 2. Countries With
Developments of Special Interest
The Philippines:
Election and Beyond
? President Marcos's announcement last November of
an early presidential election changed the country's
political agenda. In December, his party pushed
legislation through the National Assembly moving
the election schedule up to 7 February from June
1987. Marcos was then nominated by the ruling
party, and a widely respected assemblyman, Arturo
Tolentino, was chosen as his running mate.
? The opposition united in December behind Corazon
Aquino and Salvador Laurel in a last-ditch effort to
form what many observers believed would be the
most likely ticket to defeat Marocs.
worrisome picture for Marcos. Surveys taken over
the past several months indicate that unless Marcos
cheats, he will win by a slim margin at best. Several
polls have shown him trailing, and one put Aquino
comfortably ahead.
? During the campaign, Aquino has consistently
drawn large and enthusiastic crowds nationwide. By
contrast, Marcos has drawn meager crowds and has
campaigned on a limited schedule because of health
problems.
? Marcos's political machine, however, has outspent
the opposition by perhaps 30 times, and he retains
control of the country's political levers, making him
the favorite to win.
Marcos's call for an early election last November
initially focused attention away from the country's
seriously depressed economy and rapidly growing
Communist insurgency. The announcement almost
certainly was designed to reduce US pressure for
Projected Election Winner by Region
broad economic, political, and military reform. His
domestic calculations probably were based largely on
the results of polls taken last summer that indicated
he would easily win an early election. Marcos doubt-
less believed that the opposition-which had been
badly fragmented-would fail to agree on a single
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
A blatantly fraudulent election victory for Marcos
almost certainly would cost him the political capital
he has gained with his foreign and domestic critics
since calling for an early ballot. Moreover, the percep-
tion of massive cheating could spur widespread-and
possibly violent-protests among the Philippine elec-
torate. Aquino has publicly threatened to call for
demonstrations if she believes she has been cheated,
and Marcos could be forced to turn to the military to
restore public order. Moderates probably would be-
come disillusioned with the political process, and some
might shift their support increasingly to Communist
Party front organizations. The Communist Party
would have a better chance of tapping popular disaf-
fection, stemming from what they proclaim to be a
US-backed Marcos victory, and could parlay it into
recruitment gains for the insurgency.
In the less likely event that Marcos wins a relatively
clean election by Philippine standards, we expect
antigovernment protests to be less serious-at least
initially. Citing his electoral mandate, we judge that
Marcos will be even more resistant to pressure from
foreign and domestic critics for broad reform. In our
view, he probably would emerge from such a victory
more beholden to rightwing allies such as industrialist
Eduardo Cojuangco-a circumstance that will make
it more difficult for him to initiate reforms since they
would adversely affect the interests of his loyalists.
With the election behind them, the opposition proba-
bly would fractionalize into its preelection status
making a united effort less likely in local elections
later this year.
Given the large number of undecided voters in recent
polls and the lack of precedent for such an electoral
contest, Marcos could miscalculate his opponent's
voting appeal and be confronted with a surprise
Aquino victory. If this happens, we believe Marcos
would be tempted to declare the election invalid, using
his control of the election commission and the Su-
preme Court to effect such a move. This undoubtedly
would spark widespread unrest. An Aquino victory
also would increase the chances that Marcos's sup-
porters in the military-who reportedly are concerned
about Aquino's alleged ties to the Communists-
might attempt a coup.
1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Should Aquino be permitted to assume power, she
would face a daunting list of pressing national prob-
lems and formidable obstacles to consolidating her
power. Aquino would have to move quickly to cut
deals with leaders in the still divided opposition as
well as with key people in Marcos's party and the
military. She also would have to decide how to
manage those Marcos supporters with whom she
cannot cut a deal. Moreover, if she proceeds to put
Marcos and his close associates on trial-as she has
threatened-the military almost certainly would in-
tervene.
We see a small chance that an Aquino administration
would have a stabilizing impact on the political
climate. The Communist Party, for example, would
face a dilemma. So far, Communist strategy-con-
centrating on political organization while mounting
enough military operations to discredit the govern-
ment-has been based on the assumption Marcos
would continue to rule at least through the previously
scheduled 1987 election. With Aquino at the helm,
these calculations may change. If she begins imple-
menting reforms that undercut the party's mass base
or mounts an effective counterinsurgency program,
party leaders would have to decide whether to make a
deal with Aquino-in hopes of gaining a foothold in
the government-or to mount massive military opera-
tions aimed at destabilizing her fledgling administra-
There is also the possibility of an Aquino defeat but
victory for her running mate, Salvador Laurel. A
recent survey shows Laurel leading Tolentino by 4
percentage points, and,
some ruling party officials would favor this develop-
ment. In view of Marcos's
weeks of the campaign, Laurel's victory could pave
the way for a less contentious succession should
Marcos become incapacitated in the next several
weeks. Laurel's family has had close ties to Marcos
over the years, and, in our judgment, the ruling elite
may perceive Laurel as someone who would accom-
modate their interests.
Prospective Scenario: Marcos wins a fraudulent elec-
tion; most opposition leaders see real prospects for
reform blocked; and the insurgency gains strength
? Marcos's machine turns out the vote on election
day, securing 60 percent or more of the vote.
? Charges of fraud emerge in selected regions; the
National Citizens' Movement for Free Election
documents incidents of fraud.
? Certification of election results takes longer than
one week.
? Antigovernment demonstrations are broad-based,
involving the military in some clashes.
? The influence of Marcos's rightwing cronies be-
comes increasingly apparent, and a shakeup of his
party and the military weed out those perceived as
wavering in loyalty to Marcos.
? Moderates flirt with Coummunist front groups, and
the insurgency gains more recruits.
Alternative Scenario: The elections are conducted in
a relatively fair manner; the victor shows a greater
willingness to compromise; radical left loses its
appeal
? Election observers note the relative fairness of the
election.
? Both government and opposition leaders dampen
their political rhetoric and reiterate their commit-
ment to the democratic process.
? Aquino, if the victor, placates Marcos's supporters
with a conciliatory program and agrees not to
pursue past abuses.
? Marcos, if the victor, appoints a few opposition
members to government positions and retires Gener-
al Ver.
? The Communist Party solicits external advice on
how to increase its popular appeal.
25X6
25X6
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 ,I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Iraq: Mounting Difficulties
Undercut Military and
Civilian Morale
? Iraq has been unable to devise a successful strategy
for forcing an end to its five-year-old war with Iran,
and morale-both at home and on the battlefield-
is brittle.
? The Iraqis have attacked, but not destroyed, Khark
Island-Iran's major oil exporting facility-and
Tehran has succeeded in restoring oil exports to
near normal levels. Another major Iranian offensive
is in preparation and could come at any time.F
? The Saddam regime has failed to contain a growing
insurgency in the north, which is supported by Iran,
and there is mounting evidence that the two princi-
pal Kurdish-inhabited area guerrilla groups have
entered into an alliance.
? Iraq faces financial difficulties that will be aggra-
vated by a sustained reduction in oil prices.F_
The Iranian-imposed war of attrition is putting in-
creasing stress on Iraqi society and institutions. Iran's
military pressure forces Baghdad to maintain a con-
stant state of alert, which is seriously testing the
morale of its frontline troops. At the same time,
morale on the homefront has become steadily more
depressed, as the Iraqi public confronts the prospect
of a seemingly endless war.
As part of its war of attrition, Iran is supporting
Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. Early last year, the
Iraqi Army attempted to crush the insurgency with a
major offensive. The Army struck at selected civilian
targets in an effort to end grassroots support for the
guerrillas, but these harsh tactics backfired and in-
stead caused the rebellion to spread.
Heavy snow currently blankets the Kurdish-inhabited
area, curtailing rebel activity temporarily. The fight-
ers almost certainly will resume operations in the
spring, and this will force Baghdad to put its own
forces in the field again. Meanwhile, Embassy report-
ing indicates that the two major guerrilla groups-the
Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan-have ended their longstanding feud and
have begun to coordinate their operations. The two
groups have a total of about 8,000 combatants.
On the southern front the Iranians-who outnumber
the Iraqis and many of whom remain motivated by
revolutionary zeal-continue to threaten a major in-
vasion. The Iraqis doubtless will fight hard-and be
willing to pay the price in casualties required to
defend their own territory-but they are reluctant to
risk the heavy losses needed to attempt a knockout
offensive blow.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Iraq increased attacks on vital Iranian targets last
summer, including Khark Island, in an effort to force
Tehran to the negotiating table. Baghdad held back
from completely destroying Khark, however, fearing
this would strengthen Iran's resolve and hasten its
search for other means of exporting its oil. The
Khomeini regime is developing alternative export
routes in any event, and has made sufficient repairs to
damaged installations on Khark Island to restore its
shipments to preattack levels.
Iraq has maintained living standards by borrowing
heavily on the promise of its own increased oil export
capacity. In October, it opened a new pipeline through
Saudi Arabia, and more pipelines are planned by the
end of 1987. The likelihood of a steep drop in oil
prices, however, has clouded Baghdad's economic
prospects. If oil prices remain below $24 per barrel,
Iraq will find it difficult to meet its debt payments or
secure additional loans. It may be forced to make
politically risky cuts in domestic spending.
Saddam and other leaders in Baghdad face a deepen-
ing dilemma. They fear that Iraqi morale would not
support an all-out military effort; we agree that Iraqi
forces and society would balk at taking such large-
scale losses. Allowing the war to drag on, however,
will increase civilian and military dissatisfaction with
the regime's management of the war and could spur
calls for a change in strategy. This, in turn, would
shake the regime's confidence. We do not believe a
collapse of will in Iraq is imminent, but time does not
appear to be on the Iraqis' side.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Iraq continues its cautious
policy of trying to force Iran to the table with
measured military pressure on its economic lifelines
? Iraq continues high-altitude attacks on Khark Is-
land but inflicts only limited damage.
? Iraq builds up its land defenses along its border with
Iran, but does not pursue an offensive strategy.
? Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz continues to
lobby with foreign governments for a cutoff of arms
to Iran and the imposition of economic sanctions on
Tehran.
? Iraq continues to call on the United States and the
Soviet Union to force Iran to talk peace.
Alternative Scenario: The Iraqis decide to move more
boldly to force a decision in the war
? Prominent members of the regime visit friendly
Arab capitals and warn that continued Iranian
intransigence requires drastic action to end the war.
? Hardliners in the Iraqi regime, such as First Deputy
Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, speak out on
foreign policy, while moderates like Foreign
Minister Aziz keep a low profile.
? Iraq intensifies attacks on oil facilities at Khark
Island and moves larger concentrations of ground
forces up to the front.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Guatemala: Moderate Leftist
President Cerezo
Seeking Consensus
? Christian Democratic President Vinicio Cerezo,
who won a decisive victory in the 8 December runoff
election, has been striving hard to reassure key
business and military leaders about his moderate
credentials. Cerezo-seen by many of these leaders
as a leftist-defeated centrist Jorge Carpio by a 2-
to-1 margin. Cerezo's party also won 51 seats in the
new 100-member Congress.
insurgent disturbances were reported. International
observers noted that the ballotin was free of fraud
and military interference.
? Cerezo has emphasized the need to forge a consen-
sus on such potentially contentious issues as eco-
nomic reform and the military's counterinsurgency
campaign. Nevertheless, he has not outlined an
economic program and is relying on large infusions
of foreign aid from Western and Latin American
governments to forestall further economic decline.
? In a preinauguration visit to Washington, Cerezo
pressed for economic assistance but stated that he
opposes US military action in Central America. He
also publicly indicated he supports Contadora and
announced plans to pursue a policy of "active
neutrality" in the region.
Cerezo must contend with serious economic problems
and political challenges early in his administration. If
mismanaged, these tests could quickly erode his im-
pressive electoral mandate. Cerezo's most formidable
potential opposition comes from distrustful military
officers and Guatemala's economic elite, many of
whom regard him as a threat to their interests. At the
same time, he faces challenges from extremist groups
on both the left and the right. As a result, we believe
commitment to improve human rights.
25X1
25X1
Cerezo has limited maneuverability in tackling the
country's severe economic problems, asserting civilian 25X1
control over the military, and following through on his
Cerezo publicly has pledged to implement a compre-
hensive economic stabilization package, including ex-
change rate unification, but he studiously has avoided
indicating specific measures. His predecessor's at-
tempts to institute badly needed economic reforms
met strong opposition from the business community, 25X1
ultimately forcing retraction. Cerezo failed to build
support for austerity before taking office and, in our
judgment, he will face similar difficulties in winning
private-sector support for government intervention in
the largely free-enterprise economy. The release of
much-needed assistance by international lenders and
donors is likely to require a commitment to economic
reform.
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Cerezo also must wrestle with demands from orga-
nized labor and teachers who have threatened to
renew strikes if he does not modify government policy
on price controls and wage increases. Although we
believe there is only a modest prospect of widespread
civil unrest during the first six months of Cerezo's
term, we judge it will increase significantly if these
demands are not met at least partially. Domestic
discontent-as seen in last September's demonstra-
tions over consumer price increases-could intensify
quickly and lead to greater polarization. So far, the
insurgents are taking a wait-and-see attitude toward
the new government; a faltering Cerezo, however,
could provide impetus to increased activity.
Although the military upheld its commitment to
oversee the transition to civilian rule, Cerezo has
recognized publicly that the armed forces remain the
ultimate political power. We believe he will hold out
the prospect of renewed US military aid under his
regime in order to win greater support from the
Army. Cerezo also appears sensitive to military con-
cerns that he not interfere with the counterinsurgency
program, open direct talks with the guerrillas, nor
punish military officers for human rights abuses.
Observers-both at home and abroad-will be watch-
ing closely to see if Cerezo makes promised improve-
ments in human rights. In our judgment, he will move
forward cautiously in responding to demands that he
account for missing persons and punish those in the
security forces responsible for past abuses. There are
indications that rightwing extremists may be prepared
to launch a campaign of terror designed to embarrass
the government and create an atmosphere of fear.
Thus, Cerezo has announced plans to disband the
unpopular Directorate of Technical Investigations and
reorganize the National Police, but he is unlikely to
tamper with the military security police forces.
Cerezo is likely to attempt to craft what he sees as a
more "balanced" regional policy. We believe any
attempt to increase Guatemala's involvement in the
region, however-including his proposal to create a
Central American Parliament-will be tempered by
his recognition of the military's continued opposition
to an activist regional role and the need to maintain
good relations with Mexico. In our judgment, Cerezo
probably will try to use his moderate leftist image to
court better relations with Mexico and other Central
American neighbors, including Nicaragua and Cuba,
without endangering prospects for increased US and
international economic support.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Cerezo pursues a moderately
reformist path
? Cerezo, recognizing the limits of his political power,
pushes for moderate economic stabilization mea-
sures and avoids direct interference in military
affairs.
? International donors provide increased assistance
and debt relief.
? Cerezo ensures that the government's human rights
performance improves by ending the worst abuses,
but Guatemalan society continues to be character-
ized by violence.
? Rightwing political cohesion continues to dissipate
and extremists fail to win military support for a
coup.
? Labor strikes and demonstrations occur sporadical-
ly, but at manageable levels; the government is not
required to use force to contain them.
Alternative Scenario: Cerezo adopts an aggressive
reform program
? Cerezo presses for sweeping economic reform legis-
lation, despite strong private-sector opposition.
? Foreign assistance fails to materialize and a deepen-
ing economic crisis sparks labor and civil unrest.
? Increased guerrilla activity and rightwing violence
produce the perception within the military that the
government is losing control.
? Cerezo moves quickly and with a heavy hand to
control the military; coup plotting increases.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Peru: President Garcia's
Honeymoon Fading
? President Garcia's unprecedented popularity with
the Peruvian public continues to provide his best
protection from opposition challenges.
? The honeymoon period for Garcia's presidency,
nonetheless, has begun to fade; his relations with the
security services have been strained by his reformist
policies, anticorruption campaign, and his failure to
formulate a clear counterinsurgency strategy.
? These problems come at a time when Garcia faces
growing pressure from the middle class to address
security concerns, especially to protect Lima from
increasing terrorist attacks.
? Garcia's one-man decisionmaking style and unpre-
dictable actions also have antagonized Communist-
dominated trade unions, the political left, and even
some members of his own government and party.
? The government's nationalistic economic policies,
while popular, have done little to boost economic
recovery. Lima's hardline stance on debt, combined
with the recent takeover of a US oil company, will
further discourage badly needed foreign investment.
President Garcia's crackdown on human rights viola-
tions and his lack of attention to military needs in
particular have rankled the Peruvian armed forces.
Last fall, he dismissed three top military commanders
following revelations of a massacre in Ayacucho in
which 69 villagers were killed. He has undertaken a
large-scale cleanup of corruption in the police forces,
which play a key antiterrorist role, by dismissing
hundreds of officers. His determination to cut defense
expenditures also has strained civil-military relations.
Senior military officials have criticized Garcia for
making declarations on disarmament and austerity
South
Pacific
Ocean
Boundary representation is 0 200 Kilometers
not necessarily authoritative.
The new President's personal popularity has discour-
aged active coup plotting, but the security services
may be resisting Garcia passively. For example, the
Army is reportedly putting counterinsurgency efforts
on hold until the government provides clearer policy
directives. This wait-and-see attitude, combined with
police demoralization resulting from the anticorrup-
tion purge, could hamper government efforts to stem
subversion.
The five-year-old Sendero Luminoso insurgency,
meanwhile, has shifted from a predominantly rural to
an increasingly urban movement. In 1985, terrorist
without first consulting them.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
incidents dropped by 60 percent in the traditional
highland battleground of Ayacucho and jumped by a
similar percentage in Lima. Last November, the anti-
US Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, follow-
ing a temporary truce with the government, resumed
its terrorist campaign in Lima. Its primary targets
have included ruling party offices, banks, and govern-
ment buildings, as well as US official and commercial
interests.
Both Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru now ap-
pear intent upon challenging the new government by
demonstrating their ability to strike selectively at
targets in the capital. While they cannot overthrow
the Garcia government, they are trying to undermine
its authority, provoke acts of military and police
repression, and aggravate tensions already present in
civil-military relations. There is no persuasive evi-
dence of cooperation between the two insurgent
groups nor of clear external links.
Organized labor is also adopting more aggressive
tactics, even though efforts by the Communist-domi-
nated unions to mount strikes and demonstrations
against the government so far have attracted only
lukewarm rank-and-file support. In December the two
most radical unions-closely linked to the extreme-
left parties in the Marxist United Left coalition-
vowed to launch a spring offensive against the govern-
ment if their demands were not met. The govern-
ment's budget constraints probably will not permit
Garcia to grant large enough wage hikes to avert
strikes and demonstrations this spring. A successful
strike by Peru's government workers could hinder
public services and embarrass the President, but a
crippling general strike in the near term is unlikely.
by labor and the far-left opposition.
Garcia is having unexpected difficulty managing his
own party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alli-
ance. He has aroused harsh criticism from fellow
party members for bypassing the legislative branch,
failing to consult on important policy matters, and not
putting enough party professionals in key positions.
Continuing rancor within the ruling party could weak-
en Garcia's political base and incite greater activism
Finally, Peru's debilitated economy continues to pose
the potential for prompting social unrest. Lima needs
foreign aid and investment to spur development, but
Garcia's decision limiting debt repayment to 10 per-
cent of annual exports has jeopardized relations with
Western governments, foreign commercial creditors,
and global financial institutions. Only Italian and
Swiss banks have renewed trade credits since Peruvi-
an loans were further downgraded by the United
States last October, according to the US Embassy.
Peru's takeover of a US oil firm in late December-
which may activate US legislation invoking punitive
measures if there is no prompt and adequate recom-
pense-imperils future bilateral economic and com-
mercial ties. Foreign investment probably will remain
elusive even if Peru makes fair compensation. In
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
addition, although the government's imposition of
price and exchange controls has slowed inflation and
capital flight, Garcia probably will face growing
popular demand in 1986 for improved living stan-
dards. His crackdown on a burgeoning illegal narcot-
ics industry will affect peasant livelihoods, unless he
can increase substantially funds for land reform and
crop substitution programs.
Prospective Scenario: Garcia's popularity declines
and governmental authority deteriorates under in-
creasing domestic and international pressures
? Public opinion polls show a decrease in Garcia's
popularity.
? Calls for strike action by Communist-dominated
unions are supported by the rank and file, and the
opposition parties become increasingly strident in
their criticism of Garcia's performance.
? Rumors of military coup plotting start to circulate
in the capital.
? Relations between Peru and the United States
become increasingly strained, and the flow of aid
and trade is adversely affected.
? Peru's credit lines and sources of foreign capital
continue to shrink.
? Insurgent groups escalate terrorist attacks.
Alternative Scenario: Garcia's popularity remains
fairly high and his administration regains positive
momentum with achievements in political, economic,
and military areas
? Public opinion polls continue to show high ratings
for Garcia.
? Labor leaders call for strikes, but the workers
hesitate and the United Left coalition remains
immobilized by internal divisions.
? The military grumbles about damage to its prestige
but abstains from coup plotting because of Garcia's
standing with the public.
? Relations with the United States are uninterrupted
by any cutoffs of assistance and trade, and a
political dialogue is continued.
? Garcia's efforts to revive the economy and his
assurances that Peru will eventually pay its debts
mollify the international banking community.
? Terrorism continues to plague Peru, but the insur-
gency is hampered by recruitment difficulties,
chronic shortages of weapons and ammunition, and
security forces countermeasures.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Part 3. Indicators of
Political Instability
The following indicators were used in our examination
of each of the countries treated in this publication.
While these factors-especially if taken individual-
ly-may not be predictive of instability for any single,
given country, they have been associated with political
instability in the past. We will continue refining these
indicators to make them more specific to each country
and more predictive.
8. Are there indications that elements of the political
elite or the security forces are beginning to sympa-
thize with the demonstrators/rioters?
9. Is the government making concessions to the de-
monstrators/rioters for the first time? If so, are these
having a calming effect, or are they seen as a sign of
weakness?
Social Change/
Conflict Indicators
Demonstrations and Riots
1. Are demonstrations/riots increasing in frequency,
scale, and scope?
2. Is the government taking a more permissive view of
the demonstrations/riots? If so, does this account in
part for the increase? Or is it having a calming effect?
3. Are government repression and opposition violence
escalating?
4. Is the violence in demonstrations/ riots indiscrimi-
nate? Is it being directed against the government, a
scapegoat minority or religious community, or other
group?
5. Are demonstrations starting to assume a general
antiregime tone, or do they focus on one specific issue,
a minority group, or a particular region?
6. Does a demonstration attract a larger crowd than
originally predicted? Does a demonstration called by
one opposition group attract the genuine-not manip-
ulated-support of other groups not previously in-
volved, such as labor groups in support of student
marchers, and so forth?
10. Are the demonstrators/ rioters disrupting any
area of the economy? If so, does the concerned sector
blame the government or the demonstrators/rioters?
Are the disruptions affecting the government's ability
to provide goods and services, patronage, and so
forth?
Strikes and Other Job Action
11. Are strikes, slowdowns, sit-ins, and so forth,
increasing in number, frequency, and location?
12. Do the strikers have political objectives apart
from economic motivations? If so, are these directed
against the government?
13. Are labor groups that oppose the government
forging links with nonlabor opposition groups?
14. Are the strikes and other job actions drawing
increasing support from the general public?
15. Is the government starting to meet the workers'
demands despite sound economic reasons that it not
do so? If so, have the concessions persuaded workers
to return to work?
16. Are the strikes, and so forth, starting to hurt the
economy?
7. Are the media:
? Becoming more critical of the government or sup-
portive of the demonstrators/rioters?
? Ignoring government guidance in their reporting of
the incidents?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Maintenance of National Unity
17. Do increasingly large numbers of the public tend
to sympathize with the demonstrators/rioters?
18. Is effective government control over some areas
outside the capital being eroded? Are local officials
increasingly unwilling or unable to implement direc-
tives from or to perform services, such as tax collec-
tion, for the central government?
19. Is the government starting to carry out policies
that change the political or social status of any group;
for example, is it increasing religious intolerance,
suppressing the use of a minority language or culture,
and so forth? If so, are the policies compelling those
affected to oppose the government in any way?
20. Is the middle or merchant class starting to with-
draw its support for the government?
21. Are religious leaders increasingly critical of the
state of the nation? If so:
? Are religious figures becoming active in antigovern-
ment activities?
? Is the general public beginning to support these
activities and agree with the criticisms?
Economic Stability
Indicators
22. Is the government losing its ability to generate
revenues? If so, is it finding difficulty in providing
public services or maintaining popular subsidies?
23. Is the government increasingly turning to money
creation to finance its operations?
24. Is the general public blaming the government for
the deteriorating economy?
25. Are sudden price rises or drops in food or energy
supplies likely or increasing?
26. Is the international economic situation starting to
depress the local economy? If so:
? Is only one sector affected, or is the populace
hurting across the board?
? Do popular perceptions tend to blame pernicious
international forces or countries?
27. Have remittances from expatriots assumed an
important place in the economy?
28. Is the government's ability to obtain foreign aid
and investment starting to decline?
29. Does the economy include a traditional sector,
such as subsistence agriculture and barter, that re-
mains isolated from the modern economic sector and
that could provide a safety valve in times of crisis? If
so, is this being eroded by overpopulation, landless-
ness, crop specialization, and so forth?
30. Do the country's reserves or the free market
exchange rate reflect capital flight? If so, is the
capital flight the result of economic reasons, such as
lack of return on investments, or because of political
fears?
31. Is the government unlikely to meet its debt
service repayment obligations? If so, are the govern-
ment's creditors willing to reschedule all or part of the
debt?
32. Is the government starting to implement its own
or IMF-imposed austerity measures? If so, can it
withstand pressures from opposing domestic interests?
33. Are the government's economic policies benefit-
ing only a small segment of the population, such as
the elite and associated groups?
34. Conversely, are attempts to redress inequality
through taxation, land reform, anticorruption drives,
or other economic measures alienating important
elements of the elite, such as the military or clergy?
Opposition Groups
Indicators
35. Are opposition groups coalescing against the gov-
ernment? Are they increasingly able to mobilize large
numbers of people for antiregime activities?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
36. If opposition groups are organized along class,
ethnic, religious, or regional lines, are these factional
forces and their attraction growing?
37. Is any opposition group representing itself as the
embodiment of the national identity?
38. Is a polarization of forces taking place, that is, are
centrists and moderates increasingly compelled to
choose among radical positions?
39. Is separatism a growing issue?
40. Is there an opposition leader whose charisma is
increasingly recognized even by those who oppose
him?
41. Are opposition parties increasingly claiming that
the violent overthrow of the government is the only
way to bring about change?
42. Are the intellectuals becoming alienated from the
system? If so, does this lend strength to the
opposition?
Terrorism and Sabotage
43. Are incidents increasing in frequency and intensi-
ty? If so, what has been the rate of increase in:
? The number of incidents?
? The number of cities or provinces in which incidents
occur?
44. Are the terrorists or saboteurs being indiscrimi-
nate or selective in their targets? If selective, who are
the targets-government supporters, the opposition,
perceived traitors to one or another side, or others?
45. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to deter any part
of the general public from supporting the
government?
46. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to hurt the
economy? If so:
? Is production declining in key areas such as energy?
? Is the government's ability to provide goods, ser-
vices, and patronage being reduced?
Military Attitudes/
Activities Indicators
47. Are there any signs of antiregime or coup
plotting?
48. Are there indications that elements in the mili-
tary and security services, particularly senior person-
nel, are becoming discontented over government ac-
tions or policies?
49. Are the corporate interests or dignity of the
military being assaulted or threatened?
50. Are there elements in the military that are dis-
contented over career loss, pay, or other benefits?
51. Are there signs of a split within or between
military or police leaders?
52. Are the military or security services becoming
less disciplined; are desertions and acts of disobedi-
ence, and so forth, increasing?
53. Are the security services being reorganized fre-
quently or to an extent that affects their efficiency
and morale?
54. Are expenditures for the military and security
services a strain on the budget?
55. Is the government trying to upgrade the efficien-
cy and morale of the military and police through such
measures as:
? Better recruitment, pay, leave, and promotion
policies?
? Increased training in dealing with civil
disobedience?
? Better equipment?
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
External Factors
Indicators
56. Are foreign influence and aid being viewed nega-
tively by the public and by influential power groups?
If so, is this starting to hurt the regime?
57. Is the opposition receiving increased aid from
radical foreign sources? Is the increased aid improv-
ing the recipients' capabilities, or is it evoking nega-
tive responses from any groups, indicating that they
feel their interests are threatened?
58. Are neighboring countries or other external influ-
ences beginning to affect sectarian or regional groups
in a way that is eroding loyalty to the government?
59. Is the government under threat of incursions or
subversion by foreign elements?
60. Are other countries starting to pose a military
threat? If so, does this enable the government to
"wrap itself in the flag" and rally support it might
otherwise have lost?
61. Is the public's mind being taken off deteriorating
domestic conditions by the government's overseas
adventures? Or, is the government's meddling abroad
unpopular at home?
62. Is an influx of foreign refugees creating
problems?
Regime Capabilities and
Actions Indicators
Repression of the Opposition
63. Does the general public increasingly see the gov-
ernment as more responsible than opposition groups
for perpetrating domestic violence?
64. Is the government increasing the use of repression
to counter opposition activities? Is there more torture,
imprisonment without trial, banning of political par-
ties, press censorship, or school and university
closings?
65. Are the regular police having difficulty putting
down demonstrations or riots? If so, is the government
increasingly using paramilitary police units, hired
thugs, or military forces?
66. Are government officials talking about the possi-
bility of declaring martial law or perpetuating it?
67. If the government uses massive force, does this
disrupt opposition groups and make them less effec-
tive? What is its effect on the general public: is it seen
as a necessary sign of firmness, or is it seen as brutal
and repressive?
68. Are there indications that the public sees the
government as inconsistent: for example, does the
average citizen complain that he has "no way of
knowing what he can or cannot do to stay out of
trouble?"
Government Leadership and the Ruling Elite
69. Is conflict breaking out or increasing among
groups that make up the ruling elite or between the
ruling and supporting elites?
70. Are there indications that government leaders are
doubting their major policies or their ability to rule?
71. Are there any indications that the ruler may be
considering stepping down because of age, ill health, a
shift in public opinion, personal tragedy, and so forth?
If so, is the political elite gearing up for an obvious
succession crisis?
72. Is the ruler's style changing in such a way that
lessens his ability to rule? Is he increasingly isolated
in the "palace," becoming erratic, or losing his party's
loyalty?
73. Is a weak coalition government leading to legisla-
tive paralysis?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
74. Has the ruler shown that he is prepared to use the
security forces to suppress demonstrations, riots,
strikes, and so forth? If so, is he prepared to take
extremely tough measures before the situation gets
out of hand?
75. Is the government introducing reforms? If so, is it
doing so under pressure or at its own initiative, and is
it prepared to enforce them?
76. Are media criticism of and jokes about the ruler
and the government becoming more direct and open?
Government Bureaucracy
77. Is the bureaucracy becoming less loyal to the
government leadership because of divergent political
views, distaste for the government's policies, and so
forth?
78. Is effectiveness being eroded because the leader-
ship is firing competent officials as scapegoats?
79. Has the government shown ineptitude in coping
with natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods,
crop failures, and so forth?
The Education System
80. Is the education system turning out too many
graduates in relation to employment opportunities?
81. Are students becoming restive because of govern-
ment repression or because of restrictive policies in
the educational area?
82. Are fundamentalists or other religious groups
starting to set up schools in opposition to the public
school system, or is enrollment increasing at such
schools already in existence?
The Business Sector
83. Is the business sector starting to be hurt by
specific government policies? If so, are losses suffi-
ciently serious to make businessmen increasingly criti-
cal of these policies?
84. Are conditions in the country generally deterio-
rating to such an extent that the business sector is
expressing doubt about the government's ability to
rule?
85. Is a substantial segment of the business sector
starting to support the opposition? If so, is this
support political, financial, or both?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300490003-1