INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
GI IPI 85-004
November 1985
Copy L A 5
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence Cnmments
suggestions are welcome
no
25X11
Secret
GI IPI 85-004
November 1985
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v
Summary:
Levels of Concern
vii
Part 1.
Developments and Trends
1
Part 2.
Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest
33
33
Panama 41
Part 3. Indicators of Political Instability
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This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of
significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The
quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 August to 31 October,
examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy
changes. Although there are instances where the paper provides short-term
warnings of coups or collapse, it is primarily designed to address the
potential for instability during the next two years through the consistent
application of 85 indicators. Those countries for which indicators have
changed significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated
in detail in the text.
The quarterly includes three parts:
? Part 1 includes an overview of developments during the quarter, a chart
summarizing the status of key indicators, a brief narrative assessment of
each country, and country-specific tables tracing political and economic
changes during the past two years. We assess 30 countries that we have
identified as particularly salient to US interests because they are
strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or
allies, geographically close to the United States, or especially influential
in the Third World.
? Part 2 presents a more detailed assessment of select countries in which
there have been developments of interest. Included in each assessment
are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the
scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative
scenarios.
? Part 3 provides a reference list of the 85 indicators.
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Secret
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
Summary: Among the 30 countries covered, we are most concerned about the short-
Levels of Concern term prospects for Sudan, where the situation has failed to stabilize
following the ouster of President Nimeiri last April. The risk of a coup by
radical officers is high. Analysts also see a substantial chance for
instability over the short term for the Philippines, because of Marcos's
health and his regime's ineffectiveness against the growing Communist
guerrilla threat; Iran, where popular unrest and factionalism within the
regime are growing; and, in Guatemala, where a financial crisis is likely to
make the transition to civilian rule precarious.
Looking ahead over the next two years, we envision significant prospects
for regime-threatening instability in:
? El Salvador, where the rebels remain a potent force, and economic
problems are breeding political difficulties for the Duarte government.
? Honduras, because political infighting will complicate the functioning of
the next elected government.
? Panama, where the increasingly unpopular Defense Forces have made a
mockery of the purported return to democracy.
? Peru, because of the desperate economic circumstances and the guerrilla
threat.
? Chile, where anti-Pinochet sentiment is solidifying.
? Iraq, where the war is beginning to dishearten the public.
? Nigeria, because economic conditions are likely to revive levels of
discontent that drove past regimes from office.
? South Korea, where opposition to President Chun is becoming more
vigorous.
We believe that several countries on our list are under stress but are not at
present producing levels of instability that threaten the government. For
example, despite the violence in South Africa, the ruling white minority
remains relatively unaffected and secure. Also, Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico are under severe economic strain, but we expect these governments
to remain intact. Spain and Greece continue to register as the most stable
among the countries we have examined.
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Part 1. Developments and Trends
The six categories of indicators used in the following
charts are drawn from the 85 indicators presented in
Part 3. The social change/conflict indicators examine
developments such as labor or religious unrest that
could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability
to rule effectively. The economicfactors link various
dimensions of economic performance to potential in-
stability. Opposition activities assess whether the
opposition can mobilize effective antiregime activity
or carry out acts that undermine public security. The
military attitudes/activities category addresses the
military's degree of dissatisfaction with regime poli-
cies, involvement in coup plotting, and behavior rele-
vant to the political process. The external factors
category looks at foreign influences that could affect
internal stability. Finally, the regime capabilities/
actions category focuses on what the government is
doing that could lessen popular support, otherwise
undermine its authority, and affect its ability to
govern efficiently.
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Status of Key Indicators
Developments in
Third Quarter, 1985
Legend
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
? Concern has increased since last quarter
Concern has decreased since last quarter
g
aq
C4
o
R
Va
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C
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o
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w^ w y
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~ C
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0 0
3
~~ o
'eo
~.~. .C
c m E
Latin America Mexico
0 ?
0
0
0
El Salvador
? a
?
a
Guatemala
a
?
A
Honduras
0
coo a
Panama
?
0
?
0
0
a
V a
Colombia
0
0
?
Venezuela
0
0
0
0
0
?
Peru
?
?
Brazil
0
0
0
0
O
Argentina
0
0
0
Chile
Europe Spain
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Greece
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Turkey
0
0
0
Near East and South Asia Morocco
0
0
0
0
Egypt
0
0
0
0
Sudan
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Saudi Arabia
0
0
0
0
0
0
Iraq
?
0
0
a
G ?
Iran
V
?
V
Pakistan
0
0
0 A
?
0
a
India
?
0
0
0
0
Africa Nigeria
?
?
?
a
?
?
?
Somalia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
a
Kenya
0
0
0
0
Zaire
0
South Africa
0
0
East Asia Philippines
0
a
V
Indonesia
0
0
0
0
0
0
South Korea
a
0
V a
307066 10,85
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Mexico:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Legend
however, have prompted more leniency from foreign lenders.
Opposition efforts to capitalize on the government's uncoordinated
response to the September earthquakes have so far garnered only
modest gains. The economic situation continues to erode support for
the current administration-though less so for the well-entrenched
political system. While the government still plans to meet its
financial commitments, many Mexicans are opposed to meeting
foreign debt responsibilities at the cost of a falling standard of
living. Quake damage and international sympathy over the tragedy,
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
O Not of concern G Substantial concern
Low concern 0 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
1984
1985
IV
I II III IV
1 11 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
_ - -
0
0 I 0 0 0
0 0 ' 0
!
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
? ? ? 0
? ?
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
Capital flight
L
1
0 ?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
_
-
Food/energy shortages
-
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
Public support
Military attitudes /activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
Discontent over government action/policies
O 0 0 0
0
0 0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0 0 0 O
0
0 O
External factors External support for government
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
O O
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security
capabilities 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 '
Political disunity/loss of confidence O 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0
307067 lags
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El Salvador:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Legend
labor sectors.
President Duarte is under increasing pressure to be tougher with the
insurgents following stepped up guerrilla activity, and we expect him
to adopt military recommendations for new counterinsurgency
initiatives. The armed forces' capture of rebel leaders and other
successes are hurting the guerrillas, who may respond with further
political abductions to bargain for prisoner exchanges. The govern-
ment's failure to halt inflation and stimulate economic growth is
likely to lead to political dissent, especially from the business and
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
O Not of concern 4 Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I 11 III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
4
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
? ?
?
*
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
r
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
o
?
?
Inflation
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
~
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Z
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
ors External support for government
External fact
External support for opposition
o
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
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Guatemala:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
and high public dissatisfaction over the rising cost of living.
The presidential and congressional elections set for this month and
possible runoff on 8 December appear on track despite efforts by
right and left extremists to derail the return to civilian government.
The military regime's erratic stopgap approach to the economic slide
means the new administration-to be inaugurated in January- will
inherit daunting economic problems. The new president, moreover,
will face a politically fragmented legislature, a skeptical military,
Prospects for major regime or policy change
rr During next six months
V During next six months to two years
O Not of concern V Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I 11 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0 0
0
0
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 0
0
0
0 O
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
-
0
O
O O
O
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
O
O
O
O
O
O
?
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
1
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0 0
0 0
O
0
O
O
O
0
O
O~
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
O
0
0
Regime actions /capabilities Repression/brutality ?
Security capabilities O O O O O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy ?
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Honduras:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
government to be inaugurated in January.
We see a better-than-even chance that the military will fulfill its
promise of honest elections on 24 November. Maneuvering by
politicians, including outgoing President Suazo, to block the process
is, however, likely to intensify in coming weeks, jeopardizing the
first regular electoral transition in decades. Political infighting and
worsening economic conditions bode ill for the stability of the
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
Q During next six months to two pars
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
C)
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
(D
0
O
C
C
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
O
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
:)
C)
C
Inflation
0
0
O
0
C
'7
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
C)
O
Public support
O
0
0
0
0
.)
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
C
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
'.
c)
C
Discontent over government action/policies
4
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
C
External factors External support for government
c)
C'
O
C)
_.
O
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
C_?
C
O
C
C
Security capabilities
G
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
O
U
0
0
17
307070 lass
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Panama a:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
unrest mounts.
The forced resignation of President Barletta in late September
underscores the central role of the Defense Forces in politics. New
President Delvalle is unlikely to complete Barletta's term because he
does not enjoy the confidence of Defense Chief Noriega. Noriega
himself may be vulnerable to plotting within the military if public
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
W Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II Ill
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
0 0 0
0
0
O O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 0 0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0 0 0--
0 0 0
O O 0
0 0 0
'-0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 0
0 ~ 0
0 0
0 0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
Public support
0
0
0'
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0 0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0 0
O O
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0 0
0 0
0
_
0
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
O
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
0 0 0
New category
0
0-
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0+
30707i 10-85
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Colombia:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
as well as from the rebels.
Mounting guerrilla violence has all but killed prospects for a
government-insurgent negotiated settlement. The M-19, the most
active insurgent movement, is pushing for unity with other groups,
and the military-already hampered by materiel shortages-will be
increasingly strained if the guerrillas agree to joint operations. Both
Colombian and US officials are under threat from narcotraffickers
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two dears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
r
F
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
r
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
O
0
0
0
0
o
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Secret
Venezuela:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Labor, a key political element, is growing impatient with the slow
rate of economic recovery. But, despite the persistent recession,
President Lusinchi enjoys substantial support for his austerity and
debt-rescheduling programs, and he remains personally popular.
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern G Substantial concern
Low concern 0 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0 0
0
O
0 0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 0 0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
O
f
O
O O
0
t
O
0
0
O
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
O
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
0
0
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
O
0
1 0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
O
O
n
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
n
O 0
C'
0
0
rJ
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
0
O
0 0
0 0
C'
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
O
O
IO
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality O O 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence O O O 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Peru :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
whose support he needs to revitalize Peru's stagnant economy.
on the debt issue, will give him problems with creditor nations,
President Garcia faces an uphill battle against Peru's many prob-
lems, but his bold moves to curb official corruption and drug
trafficking have solidified his enormous popularity. His cashiering of
officers accused of human rights abuses even won grudging approval
from the far-left opposition. The armed forces, while currently
chastened and weakened by internal divisions, remain a potential
threat to the government. Garcia's foreign policy, notably his stance
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two )ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
O
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
O
O
?
O
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
?
?
i
?
O
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
a
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
t1
i
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
O
O
?
O
?
O
O
Public support
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
O
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
?
?
O
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
O
?
0
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
O
?
?
O
O
307074 10,85
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 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Secret
Brazil:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
relations with international creditors.
More assertive leadership has boosted President Sarney's standing
in the polls to new levels. His shakeup of Brasilia's economic team is
ending policy drift, improving prospects for economic recovery, and
strengthening domestic confidence in the government. His moves,
however, are likely to aggravate already high inflation and to strain
Prospects for major regime or policy change
O During next six months
During next six months to two )ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
0
0
Inflation
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
C)
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
O DT
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0 1
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
L O
O
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0
Loss of legitimacy O
307075 1085
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Argentina:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
but this will not affect stability.
President Alfonsin's popularity is at a record high, and the opposi-
tion Peronists have been unable to reverse their political decline. If
Alfonsin follows through with needed budget and public-sector
industry cutbacks, however, he will meet vigorous opposition from
organized labor, which is already adopting a more confrontational
attitude. In late October, Alfonsin declared a state of siege to
combat discontent within the military and related terrorist incidents,
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two )ears
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
yr Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
?
0
0
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
O
O
O
O
O
0
0
O
_
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
O
0
0
Regime actions /capabilities Repression /brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0
Security capabilities 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Chile a:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
of active insurgency.
The national accord for a return to democracy promulgated by
leading moderate political parties in late August is attracting broad
support and generating a shift in the political balance. Criticism of
President Pinochet's hard line is mounting. If he continues to be
inflexible, senior military officers may try to bypass him and deal
directly with the opposition in negotiating an orderly transition to
democracy. Meanwhile, the Communists are moving toward a state
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
wv Substantial concern
- Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
0 0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
!
0
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
0
0
0
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
O
O
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
-
-
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
O
0
p
0
0
O
0
O
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity loss of confidence
O O
Loss of legitimacy
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Spain:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Prime Minister Gonzalez continues publicly to stand by his commit-
ment to hold a referendum on NATO membership by next spring
despite broad opposition in opinion polls to his pro-Alliance stance.
Leftists and trade unionists remain dissatisfied with high unemploy-
ment and Gonzalez's conservative economic policies, but the Prime
Minister is still more popular than his principal political opponents.
Indicators Legend
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
jw Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
F,
0
-
0
-
O
-
0
-
0
-
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
307078 1085
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Greece :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
relations with Western allies.
Defections from the conservative New Democracy Party, the key
opposition group, have made Prime Minister Papandreou's position
all the more secure. The worsening economy is likely to force the
government to take some austerity measures, but labor-especially
the large Communist unions-will offer strenuous resistance. The
bleak economic outlook will also encourage Papandreou to improve
Prospects for major regime or policy change
O During next six months
O During next six months to two )ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II 111 IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Inflation
_
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests /dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
O
Discontent over government action/policies
0
O
O
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
O
External factors External support for government
0
O.
O
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
O
0
O
0
0
O
O
307079 1x95
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Secret
Turkey:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
government's standing.
Although his health is precarious, Prime Minister Ozal remains
secure despite continuing economic difficulties and the nascent
coalescence of opposition parties on the left in preparation for
parliamentary byelections next summer. External factors are poten-
tially troublesome-tensions with Greece, public concern over Bul-
garian abuse of its Turkish minority, and Kurdish terrorist activity
in the southeastern border areas. The outcome of economic and
defense negotiations, with the United States also could affect the
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Morocco:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
the burgeoning mass of unemployed.
A new IMF loan and debt rescheduling have significantly relieved
Rabat's economic situation. Additional austerity measures will be
needed to keep the economic program on track, and further
deterioration of living standards may provoke labor unrest. The lean
budget mandated by the economic reform package will block King
Hassan's efforts to modernize the military and to provide jobs for
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two dears
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
S
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
0
0
0
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
P
1
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
-6-
O-
1
O
0
Inflation
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
0 0
0 1
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0~
0
External factors External support for government
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
307091 1a85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Egypt ?:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
with such groups.
The hijacking and follow-on US interception of the Egyptian plane
carrying the terrorists have created difficulties for President Mu-
barak, who will probably continue to criticize the United States to
divert attention from his role in the crisis. These events and a serious
economic crunch in the months ahead may spur Muslim fundamen-
talists to foment unrest, but Mubarak is prepared to deal harshly
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two fears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
r Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
O
O
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Q
O
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
0
?
Food/energy shortages
O
0
O
0
O
0
O
O
Inflation
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
Discontent over government action /policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
O
O
O
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
O
O
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0
Security capabilities O 0 0 0 0 0 O O
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3o7m2 1085
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Sudan:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
rampant and risk of a radical takeover is high.
The government could fall before elections to be held in April. The
beleaguered Transitional Military Council is steadily losing its grip
on power. The growing rebellion in the south is polarizing major
interest groups, creating disputes within the government, and under-
cutting military support for the ruling coalition. Coup plotting runs
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
0 Not of concern w Substantial concern
Low concern 40 Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
IV
1984
I 11 111 IV
1985
1 11 III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
g
10
?
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0 0
Economic factors General deterioration
i
#0 Ms
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
p
!
t
Food/energy shortages
?
S
Inflation
O
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
?
?
YN
40
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
?
ab
Ili
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
Public support
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
?
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities A S -
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0
Loss of legitimacy i
307083 10,85
,l Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Saudi Arabia:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
the Eastern Province.
Saudi Arabia's departure from strict adherence to OPEC's pricing
structure to increase revenues heightens the risk of a further fall in
oil prices and the consequent political fallout. The Saudis are
concerned about possible spillover of the Iran-Iraq war-they fear
Iran will retaliate against them for Iraq's attacks on Khark Island.
Also, the war could stir Shia sympathy for Iran and create unrest in
Prospects for major regime or policy change
O During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
O Substantial concern
40 Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
O
0
0
O
0_
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
O
Insurgent armed attacks
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
O
O
O
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
O
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
307084 1085
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Iraq:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Legend
unless a big drop in oil prices occurs.
War weariness is beginning to take a toll on the home front, where
we detect a dip in public morale despite military successes such as
the damage inflicted on Iran's major oil facility. The Army is
holding its own on the ground, and has contained the Kurdish revolt
as well. Baghdad has begun pumping oil through its new pipeline to
Saudi Arabia, and its financial position will remain manageable
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
J During next six months to two years
O Not of concern G Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I 11 1 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
?
0 0
! 0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign
unds -
?
1~
f
-
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
O
0
O
0
_
-
O
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
i
O
0
Inflation
O
O
-O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
0
0
?
?
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0 0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0 0
0
0
0
0
O
Discontent over government action/policies
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
--
0
- --
0
--d
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
?
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality 0 0 0 0 0 ? ?
Security capabilities O 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O
Loss of legitimacy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
307085 1085
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 I I I
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Iran:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Repeated Iraqi attacks on Khark Island are exacerbating Tehran's
economic problems and adding to popular unrest. The reelection of
President Khamenei to another four-year term was uneventful, but
his retention of Prime Minister Musavi, a radical, spells increasing
contention among regime factions already jockeying for primacy in
a post-Khomeini era. The Ayatollah still appears to be guiding
policy through trusted aides, although he is less often seen in public.
Indicators Legend
Prospects for major regime or policy change
w During next six months
w During next six months to two dears
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
0
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
?
?
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
O
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
307086 1085
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 11
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Secret
Pakistan:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Zia if he fails to install a civilian government soon.
In recent months the Zia regime weathered a foreign exchange
crisis, an outbreak of sectarian unrest, and stepped up attempts by
Afghanistan to stir trouble among the border tribes. Concern about
a rise in opposition activity prompted Islamabad to place leading
politician Benazir Bhutto under house arrest and make preemptive
moves against other opposition figures. Military dissatisfaction with
martial law apparently increased, portending a loss of support for
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
0 Not of concern rr Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
IV
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I II 111
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
ds
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
0
C C)
Economic factors General deterioration
0 O
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
0
0
O
0
O
0
Capital flight
T
0
t 0
O
C
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price cont
S
O
0
C)
O
; .
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
O
C)
O
Inflation
O
r
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
0
0
O
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
C)
0
0
C
Terrorism and sabotage
1j
r')
0
0
(_
C
Insurgent armed attacks
C
0
O
0
0
0
0
Public support
O
0
0
C)
C
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
1 O
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
C
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0 O
O
O
O
0
o
External support for opposition
0
t
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality 0 0 0 0 O
Security capabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 0, 0
Loss of legitimacy O 0 0 0 0 0
307087 10,85
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
India:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Prime Minister Gandhi's activist policies to settle regional issues as
well as to improve relations with neighboring countries are paying
off, but differences with Pakistan over nuclear policy and cross-
border skirmishes underscore the potential for conflict. Elections in
Punjab yielded a moderate state government, but Sikh radicals still
pose a serious security problem. The threat of violence against
Gandhi, other officials, and Indian facilities abroad remains high.
Indicators Legend
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two )ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
0
0
0
O
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
O
O
O
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
O
0
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
0
O
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
O
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
o
O
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
O
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality 0 0 0 O 0
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence 0 0 0 0 O
Loss of legitimacy 0 O 0 0 0
307088 10-85
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Secret
Nigeria:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
President Babangida has begun to solidify his position following
August's bloodless military coup. Nevertheless, he faces widespread
opposition to the IMF agreement he seeks to keep the economy
afloat and a possible further decline in oil prices. Military backing
for economic reform will be critical over the next few months and is
not yet assured. The country faces years of painful austerity likely to
provoke the same level of discontent that drove previous regimes
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
? During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
+W Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
1 11 111 i
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
? ?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
? ?
?
?
!
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
? ? ?
*
?
?
~sI
Food/energy shortages
?
?
,~,
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
*
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
?
4
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
tb
External factors External support for government
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
4
Y
307089 1085
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 I I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Secret
Somalia:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
grow.
President Siad's position is not immediately threatened because his
opponents are divided, and he retains the loyalty of key military
elements. Nevertheless, Siad is making little progress against grow-
ing political and economic problems. Dissident raids continue
despite Libya's withdrawal of support, and Mogadishu's ties to
Tripoli have yet to produce sizable economic benefits. Military
dissatisfaction with the level of Western assistance continues to
Prospects for major regime or policy change
0 During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
r Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
O
0
O
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
C)
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
O
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
External factors External support for government
q 0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
307090 1685
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Kenya:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
provide a discouraging long-range outlook.
President Moi remains firmly in charge, but a few politicians are
trying to form a viable group to oppose him, and some Army officers
are unhappy with government corruption and politicization of the
military. Kenya's ethnic rivalries and the growing impact of its 4.2-
percent annual population growth-the highest in the world-
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two )ears
Indicators
Legend
O
Not of concern
0 Substantial concern
Low concern
, Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
C;
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
C)
V
Food/energy shortages
;
Inflation
C)
)
C~
C
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
r
0
(D
C)
0
O
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
0
O
C)
Terrorism and sabotage
C,,
O
O
O
0
O
U
O
Insurgent armed attacks
C)
O
O
O
C ,
Public support
C)
O
O
O
C
C)
O
Military attitudes /activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
_)
O
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
C)
O
O
O
Discontent over government action /policies
O
O
O
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
C
C)
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
0
External support for opposition
)
O
~)
O
O
j
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
0
U
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
0
O
(C
')
O
O
O
Security capabilities
0
C)
0
,
0
C`
O
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
O
C:1
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
O
G
0
U
O
O
307081 10,85
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Zaire:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
in power.
President Mobutu's political supremacy remains unchallenged de-
spite economic problems and externally aided subversion. Rebels are
still active in the east, and we believe Libyan-trained dissidents were
perpetrators of the attempted sabotage of an oil pipeline near
Kinshasa in October. An upsurge in rebel and terrorist incidents
may occur during November, when Mobutu celebrates his 20th year
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two ,ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
10 Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
Food/energy shortages
0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
Public support
Military attitudes /activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Secret
South Africa 8:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Violence continues to spread and has recently spilled into white
business and residential areas. Economic woes and over a year of
unrest in nonwhite townships have sharpened racial tension but do
not appear to have shaken white resolve to retain control. We expect
President Botha to continue his policy of slow-paced reforms, even
though the violence has increased black militancy and reduced the
likelihood that the overnment's reform strategy will defuse black
unrest.
a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
0 Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
y Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
?
?
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
O
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
O
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
O
O
O
O
-0
-0
Terrorism and sabotage
O
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
O
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
Security capabilities
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
307093 10,85
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000300480003-2
Secret
Philippines:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
President Marcos appears to have abandoned his proposal for early
presidential elections, deciding the political risks were too great. The
next crisis point in the steadily deteriorating situation-unless
Marcos's health declines again-will likely stem from General Ver's
acquittal in the Aquino trial. Strong domestic and foreign criticism
will develop if, as we expect, Ver is reinstated as Armed Forces
Chief of Staff. Such a move will also heighten tensions between
senior Ver loyalists and younger officers in the reform movement.
Indicators Legend
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Q Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
0
0
_0
O
O
0
0
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
0
0
0
?
0
Food/energy shortages
0
_O
0
Inflation
?
?
?
?
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
O
0
O
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
_
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
F
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
307094 10,85
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Secret
Indonesia:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
ment policies.
Despite the rash of terrorist incidents earlier this year, President
Soeharto remains in control with the full support of the military.
Trials of prominent dissidents have raised no significant public
outcry against the regime. The country's slipping economic fortunes
could, however, crystalize latent popular discontent with govern-
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
tar Substantial concern
Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Inflation
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
External support for opposition
O
0
0
0
O
0
0
O
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
O
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
307095 IG85
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Secret
South Korea:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
crisis makes him suddenly more vulnerable.
Aggressive New Korea Democratic Party tactics to force the Chun
government to discuss constitutional reforms may deadlock the
current parliamentary session and set the stage for an extraparlia-
mentary struggle next spring. An all-out test of strength, possibly
involving the military, could be precipitated even sooner, however, if
Chun tries to end student unrest by forcing stringent "campus
stabilization" measures through the legislature or a major domestic
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
rr During next six months to two }ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
V Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II III
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
0
0
0
,
0
?
O
?
0 0
?
Economic factors General deterioration
0
O
0
O
O
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
O
0
0 0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
_0
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
0
O
O
O
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0-
0-
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
?
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
O
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
0
O
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
307096 1085
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Part 2. Countries in Which There
Have Been Developments of Interest
year of unrest and thousands have been arrested
since July, when Pretoria declared a state of emer-
gency in 36 magisterial districts in Transvaal and
eastern Cape provinces; meantime, the violence in
black townships has intensified-nonwhite deaths
have averaged 3.5 per day since July, more than
twice that during the first half of the year-and has
spread to the Durban and western Cape areas.
? In an unprecedented level of attacks on black
collaborators, mobs have murdered at least 20 black
councilors and police and attacked over 600 of their
homes; in late September, several isolated incidents
of black-white violence occurred, including a clash
between black demonstrators and white passersby in
downtown Johannesburg.
? Black activists have won support for boycotts of
white-owned businesses, particularly in economical-
ly depressed Cape Province, and the economy has
lost more working hours to strikes by blacks than in
any previous year.
? The African National Congress (ANC) has played
little role to date in the current township violence,
but the bombings in September of businesses in
Durban may presage a new wave of terrorism. F_
? On 12 September the government declared a four-
month moratorium on foreign debt repayment, as
South Africa's financial crisis has undermined any
near-term prospects for substantial growth.
Despite the likely continuance of black unrest and
international attention to events in South Africa, we
believe that the highly nationalistic minority white
2? 0 meters
0 200 Miles
Transvaal
PRETORIA
.
MBABAN
Orange Free
State/~( Natal
MASERU jL m??*ti? !
Africa -
Cape Province i
Indian
community, largely unaffected by the violence, re-
mains determined to retain control and confident that
it will do so. It recognizes that the limited state of
emergency is far from a maximum security response,
and most whites would approve a resort to a full-scale
crackdown if necessary, an increasing possibility if the
recent incidents of violence against whites mark an
emerging trend in social unrest.
At the same time, a majority of whites appear to
agree with Botha's "adapt or die" philosophy-that
some concession to black powersharing must be made,
but freely and not in response to international pres-
sure or black violence. We expect Botha to pursue his
own gradual reform agenda at his own pace with such
moves as easing restrictions on the movement of
blacks and experimenting with political formulations
that expand black rights while retaining white control.
These reform measures, however, are unlikely to
defuse black unrest as the violence over the past year
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appears to have increased black militancy and intimi-
dated moderate blacks who might have been receptive
to government-announced reforms.
Although security forces might achieve some sem-
blance of order in black townships during the next
year, we see little prospect for any lengthy cooling of
the unrest. The climate of protest is almost sure to
prevail, shaped by high unemployment, poor living
conditions, police excesses, lack of educational oppor-
tunity, and the intensifying frustration over black
exclusion from the multiracial government-which
includes Coloreds and Indians-that was established
last year. The deep economic recession will likely be
prolonged, given investor concerns over sanctions and
debt difficulties. This will mean further hardship for
the fast-growing black population.
The ANC appears to have been playing a catchup role
in the unrest, but recently the group has taken steps
toward a more radical position in an effort to shake
white resolve and shore up its image. Acting President
Tambo, abandoning a long-held position, said the
ANC would not be as-careful to guard against white
civilian casualties during its attacks. Despite this and
other tough talk, the group is evidently not yet ready
to risk a campaign of antiwhite terrorism, and ANC
operations have not reflected a new direction.
We do not believe that the sustained unrest over the
past year has brought South Africa to the verge of
revolution. Movement toward black unity or growing
fissures in the white community would propel South
Africa in this direction, however. At present, we
foresee no weakening of white resolve or loss of
confidence within the regime over the next two years.
Divisions in the black community and effective gov-
ernment security promise to leave the rights move-
ment with no leader or vehicle to channel its dissent.
We expect a continuation of sporadic, spontaneous
violence that serves to compound black organizational
disarray. Growing black militancy-underscored by
the unprecedented attacks on collaborators and the
collapse of Pretoria's black town council system de-
signed to compensate urban blacks for their exclusion
from Parliament-is centered among the young, leav-
ing them alienated from community leaders and
parents whose acceptance of the system they deplore.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Sporadic Violence Continues,
But the Government Retains Control and Continues
Its Program of Limited Racial Reform
? Sporadic violence continues, and security forces
maintain a high profile in black townships; white
areas remain largely unaffected.
? The government continues with plans to reform
influx control laws, end forced removals, and extend
property rights to blacks.
? The government makes further vague references to
black participation at the highest government level
but puts forward no concrete proposals acceptable to
black activists.
? Black leaders refuse to meet with government offi-
cials, for fear of being labeled collaborators.
? The government stabilizes the rand and gradually
restores international confidence in its economy.
? Black unions focus on economic issues and are
harassed by the government when they stray into
political topics.
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Secret
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Security forces are unable to reduce the level of
violence, and it spills over into white areas.
? Attacks against collaborators increase, and the gov-
ernment is unable to recruit black police.
? A brutal security incident or the assassination of a
key black leader unites the black community and
sparks an unprecedented wave of violence that
erodes white resolve.
? President Botha dies or resigns and is succeeded by
a rightwing conservative who abandons the reform
program.
? Black moderates such as Chief Buthelezi abandon
hope for a negotiated settlement and support vio-
lence against the government.
? Black unions succeed in effecting a series of general
strikes.
? The government proves unable to stem the outflow
of capital or to reach accommodation with its
creditors.
? Whites become increasingly critical of the govern-
ment and its failure to contain violence or manage
the affairs of state.
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Secret
? The Pinochet regime is facing growing pressure to
speed up the transition to civilian rule.
? The national accord for a return to democracy,
promulgated by the head of the Catholic Church
and 11 leading parties in late August, has attracted
wide support.
? Pinochet ordered early retirement for several mili-
tary leaders who have criticized his policies and his
intransigence toward the moderate opposition.
? A spreading scandal over death squad activities has
eroded morale in the police, aggravated bickering
among the security services, and provoked public
outrage.
The Pinochet regime, beset with increasing internal
divisions, faces the most serious opposition challenge
in years-a challenge that could, over the next year or
so, seriously erode the President's power. The moder-
ate opposition's flexible proposals-seen even by some
within the military as reasonable-have developed a
momentum that we judge will be extremely difficult
to stop if he remains intransigent.
The still-fragile unity of the national accord spon-
sors-threatened by regime efforts to divide and
discredit them-will probably be shored up by the
endorsement it is winning from all sectors. Since late
August, a broad spectrum of parties, numerous pro-
fessional associations and interest groups, most of the
media, and a growing list of key public figures-
including many former regime officials-have spoken
for the accord. A recently launched petition-signing
campaign directed at the general public is contribut-
ing to the perception that Pinochet is becoming
isolated as support for him dwindles. While promoters
of the accord say that most of their points are nego-
tiable, they insist on concrete liberalization measures
soon, such as allowing parties to function and reinstat-
South Atlantic
Ocean
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
(admi, :Ue.ed by U.H.
blabbed by Aryenla)
ing civil liberties. Cardinal Fresno, head of the Catho-
lic Church, has told the US Embassy he will press the
government to accept him as a mediator.
Pinochet would be under only minor threat from this
activity, except that his major constituency, the mili-
tary, is being swayed by it. The US Embassy reports
growing sentiment in the armed forces to return to the
barracks. This mood was underscored in early Octo-
ber when the air force member of the junta publicly
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Secret
Prospective Scenario: Pinochet Bows to Pressure and
Agrees To Negotiate a Return to Civilian Rule
? The sponsors of the national accord remain united
and show flexibility regarding their proposals.
? Cardinal Fresno in early 1986 approaches Pinochet
and other key officials, offering to act as mediator
for talks with the opposition.
? Some senior officers praise Fresno and the accord
and say the military should consider withdrawing
from government.
? Officers meet privately with Pinochet to urge his
flexibility.
? Moderate opposition groups refrain from collaborat-
ing with the Communists in protest actions, but civil
disobedience becomes more common.
welcomed the accord. Other signs of restiveness with-
in the military are surfacing. An unprecedented num-
ber of field grade officers are said to be requesting
early retirement to disassociate themselves from the
regime and any civilian reprisals from a future civil-
ian administration. Others are negotiating with oppo-
sition leaders for later employment in return for
pressing now for a return to democracy. The spread-
ing death squad scandal provides yet another divisive
undercurrent.
How these forces finally play out will depend on
Pinochet himself. To date, he has shown no flexibility
toward the moderate opposition's proposal for a nego-
tiated transition. In typical fashion, he has responded
to critics within the military by forcing resignations
and demanding unswerving loyalty. At the same time,
however, he is exhibiting concern that he may lose the
initiative. He gives frequent press interviews to defend
his policies and has ordered a survey of military
attitudes toward the accord. These moves and his
history of moderating when urged to do so by senior
officers lead us to believe Pinochet will eventually
agree to negotiating a speeded up transition. Should
he continue to stonewall-insisting on no political
change until 1989-we believe senior officers will try
to bypass him and deal directly with the opposition in
discussions brokered by the Cardinal.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Pinochet persists in refusing to accept discussions on
the accord or any changes in the 1980 Constitution.
? Junta members and senior officers clash with Pino-
chet and discontent spreads in the military.
? Moderate political leaders, still promoting an ac-
cord, are openly attacking Pinochet by mid-1986.
? Student and labor agitation intensifies, as does
spontaneous violence in slums, sparking frequent
clashes with security forces.
? Communist-instigated demonstrations draw wider
support and some collaboration from moderate
groups.
? The armed forces rally to Pinochet's call for support
against growing agitation, but officers remain dis-
gruntled with the President's harsh stance.
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Secret
Egypt
as The US interception of the Egyptian plane carrying
hijackers in October has given rise to antiregime
protests and has surprised and embarrassed Presi-
dent Mubarak.
? Mubarak has dealt firmly but cautiously with Is-
lamic fundamentalists and has managed thus far to
thwart their challenges to his regime. He may come
under more pressure, however, because of the US
interception.
? A new government headed by a professional econo-
mist was appointed in September to grapple with
the deteriorating economic situation.
as The balance-of-payments position is expected to
erode sharply this year, and the IMF is predicting
large deficits through the rest of this decade.F
We believe the deteriorating economic situation poses
a major threat to long-term stability, but we antici-
pate no serious challenge to Mubarak over the next
year or more. We judge the uproar over the hijacking
affair will diminish soon. Nevertheless, another spec-
tacular event, such as a new Israeli attack on an Arab
target, soon would heighten further anti-Israeli and
-US sentiments and could lead to widespread violence,
fomented by leftists and Islamic fundamentalists.
Such violence could threaten Mubarak's rule, or force
him to make drastic policy changes.
In general, Mubarak's program of measured political
liberalization has wide support, and we expect no
interruption to his rule over the medium term, barring
assassination. If this were to occur, the largely apoliti-
cal military would take the lead in approving a
successor and ensuring a smooth transition.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Mediterranean Sea
To divert attention from his role in the hijacking
crisis, Mubarak will probably continue to take anti-
US positions for a while. There is some chance this
will backfire if the public comes to believe the Presi-
dent does not command respect in Washington. The
US Embassy says Egyptians from all walks of life
share Mubarak's sense of humiliation, but we believe
Cairo has too much invested in the United States to
let the matter get out of hand; the affair, however,
may leave Mubarak temporarily weakened.F
Mubarak has a good record domestically. His "safety-
valve" democratization to ease the sectarian strife of
Sadat's era has given Egypt the liveliest political
environment in its modern history, complete with
active parties, an independent judiciary, and a spirited
opposition press. Mubarak contends with a vocal
opposition-the New Wafd-in parliament as a result
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of last May's elections, but his own National Demo-
cratic Party holds an overwhelming majority. By
giving the opposition a role, nevertheless, the Presi-
dent spreads the blame for unpopular policy decisions.
The degenerating economy may be the issue around
which his disparate opposition might unite. The sud-
den appointment of a new government headed by an
economist shows that Mubarak feels acutely vulnera-
ble as Egypt experiences declining revenues from its
major hard currency earners-expatriate worker re-
mittances, oil sales, tourism, and Suez Canal tolls.
The expulsion of several thousand expatriate workers
from Libya further poses the potentially destabilizing
problem of reabsorbing them into the domestic work
force. Moreover, extensive food subsidies that the
public has come to regard as a right add considerably
to an already bloated budget.
Effective solutions entail political choices that the
government is reluctant to make. Mubarak insists on
introducing austerity measures gradually to forestall a
replay of the 1977 bread riots. His greatest concern is
that he will be forced to take politically suicidal steps
when he can no longer rely on the largess of the
United States and other creditors to shore up Egypt's
weak financial position.
Official concerns about the economy are intensified
by fears of Islamic resurgence. Religious figures'
demands for application of Koranic law (Sharia) have
had wide press play and have become a hot topic in
intellectual circles. The depth of public support for
Sharia is difficult to gauge, but attendance at
mosques is up, alcohol consumption is down, and more
women are wearing the veil.
Mubarak believes the fundamentalist problem is man-
ageable-he has effectively cracked down on the
extremist minority-and views economic progress as
the key to controlling the Islamic militants. His big
worry is that the economic decline will motivate the
hard-pressed population to embrace fundamentalism
as a weapon against the state. Given the extremists'
political and philosophic disunity, however, the likeli-
hood of their dominance is remote.
largess.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Mubarak Remains in Power
and Continues To Win Popular Support
? Mubarak's denunciations of US actions dampen
public criticism of his relations with the United
States.
? Mubarak makes some progress against economic
problems but refuses to impose severe price
increases.
? Islamic extremists gain additional support, but gov-
ernment security forces are able to control the
movement.
? The military remains loyal and in the background.
? Relative press freedom and opposition activities
provide a safety valve for popular discontent, but
Mubarak retains a tight grip on the direction of
policy.
eration against the ruling party.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Mubarak's support begins to erode seriously in the
wake of the hijacking affair, providing a crystalizing
element for Islamic fundamentalists.
? Antiregime sentiment or Islamic fundamentalism
takes root in the military.
? A drastic curtailment of food subsidies sparks wide-
spread rioting.
? Islamic extremists capitalize on discontent to chal-
lenge the regime and provoke a strenuous govern-
ment crackdown.
? Opposition parties find grounds for sustained coop-
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? During almost a year in office, President Barletta
was unable to build a national consensus for auster-
ity measures, and the World Bank's decision in
August to withhold a $60 million loan threatened to
unravel Panama's financial rescue program.
? Defense Chief Noriega, believing Barletta did not
protect the military from calls for an independent
investigation of the murder of a longtime critic of
Noriega, pressured the President to resign in late
September, and First Vice President Delvalle as-
sumed office.
? The murder scandal fanned antimilitary sentiment,
but opposition groups were unable to seriously chal-
lenge Noriega.
? On assuming the presidency, Delvalle immediately
backed away from his predecessor's austerity pack-
age and promised to enact more expansionary poli-
? In October, the military began intimidating journal-
ists, warning them not to criticize the Defense
Forces or comment further on the murder case.
Recent developments in Panama made transparent
the thin veneer of democratic government. The ouster
of President Barletta-the third president to be re-
moved in five years, but the first "elected" one-is
less a sign of political instability than it is a confirma-
tion of the central political role of the Defense Forces.
More serious signals of developing instability are the
worsening economic situation, public disgust with the
military's arrogance, and divisions within the Defense
Forces. But given Panama's low level of politicization,
the dearth of attractive political leaders, and the
Costa
Rica
0 50 190 Kllometer?
0 50 100 Miles
entrenchment of the military elite, matters would
probably have to become significantly worse before a
discernable threat to political stability appeared. 25X1
25X1
President Delvalle will serve as another figurehead-
and probably not for long. He is in ill health, lacks the
military's confidence, and has no political base-his 25X1
party holds two of 67 seats in the legislature. He is
likely to be pushed aside within months. Meanwhile,
little progress will be made in addressing the country's
long festering financial crisis because of public resis-
tance to austerity and the military's unwillingness to
bear the backlash of unpopular legislation. Delvalle's
abandonment of Barletta's adjustment program leaves
few prospects for funding from international or com-
mercial banks. By year's end, the crunch will probably
require further cuts in imports and result in lagging
production, growing unemployment, higher inflation,
and falling standards of living.
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Defense Chief Noriega gesturing to 1st Vice
President Eric Arturo "Tuturo" Delvalle: "It's
your turn, Tuturo!"
Political fallout from the murder of Hugo Spadafora,
former vice minister of health and longtime critic of
Noriega, following his detention by Defense Forces
personnel in September has heightened tensions. The
opposition, however, has been unable to transform
widespread antimilitary sentiment into a challenge to
Noriega. Attempts to organize protests have been
ineffectual, largely because Noriega made clear that
the military would retaliate. Most of the parties and
interest groups have been co-opted by Noriega by one
means or another. Exceptions are octogenarian Pana-
menista Party leader and three-time former President
Arias and Church leader Archbishop McGrath, both
of whom support a commission of inquiry and who are
potentially powerful allies. Arias's advanced age and
McGrath's measured approach, however, have al-
lowed Noriega thus far to ignore both.
Within the Defense Forces, however, the Spadafora
affair has caused discontent because the scandal has
damaged military prestige. If the scandal drags on, or
if another political crisis occurs, some elements within
the Defense Forces may use the occasion to conspire
against Noriega.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Delvalle Provides No Leader-
ship; Noriega Retains Power; the Economic Situation
Deteriorates; Delvalle Is Ousted and an Interim
Government Is Installed
? Delvalle makes no effort to enact austerity
measures.
? External funding continues to dry up.
? Protests remain at a manageable level and the
Spadafora case fades in the media.
? Noriega solidifies his position by promoting friends
and retiring or reassigning potential rivals.
? Speculation abounds on possible replacement for
Delvalle.
? Noriega begins to criticize Delvalle's lack of leader-
ship or suggests that new elections be held.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Strikes and demonstrations proliferate, resulting in
clashes with the military.
? Arias and McGrath jointly condemn military
actions.
? Noriega is persuaded that austerity measures can no
longer be postponed.
? Delvalle announces a partial debt repudiation.
? Rumors of coup plotting surface within the Defense
Forces.
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Part 3. Indicators of
Political Instability
The following indicators were used in our examination
of each of the countries treated in this publication.
While these factors-especially if taken individual-
ly-may not be predictive of instability for any single,
given country, they have been associated with political
instability in the past. We will continue refining these
indicators to make them more specific to each country
and more predictive.
Social Change/Conflict Indicators
Demonstrations and Riots
1. Are demonstrations/ riots increasing in frequency,
scale, and scope?
2. Is the government taking a more permissive view of
the demonstrations/riots? If so, does this account in
part for the increase? Or is it having a calming effect?
3. Are government repression and opposition violence
escalating?
4. Is the violence in demonstrations/riots indiscrimi-
nate? Is it being directed against the government, a
scapegoat minority or religious community, or other
group?
5. Are demonstrations starting to assume a general
antiregime tone, or do they focus on one specific issue,
a minority group, or a particular region?
6. Does a demonstration attract a larger crowd than
originally predicted? Does a demonstration called by
one opposition group attract the genuine-not manip-
ulated-support of other groups not previously in-
volved, such as labor groups in support of student
marchers, and so forth?
7. Are the media:
? Becoming more critical of the government or sup-
portive of the demonstrators/rioters?
? Ignoring government guidance in their reporting of
the incidents?
8. Are there indications that elements of the political
elite or the security forces are beginning to sympa-
thize with the demonstrators/rioters?
9. Is the government making concessions to the de-
monstrators/rioters for the first time? If so, are these
having a calming effect, or are they seen as a sign of
weakness?
10. Are the demonstrators/rioters disrupting any
area of the economy? If so, does the concerned sector
blame the government or the demonstrators/rioters?
Are the disruptions affecting the government's ability
to provide goods and services, patronage, and so
forth?
Strikes and Other Job Actions
11. Are strikes, slowdowns, sit-ins, and so forth,
increasing in number, frequency, and location?
12. Do the strikers have political objectives apart
from economic motivations? If so, are these directed
against the government?
13. Are labor groups that oppose the government
forging links with nonlabor opposition groups?
14. Are the strikes and other job actions drawing
increasing support from the general public?
15. Is the government starting to meet the workers'
demands despite sound economic reasons that it not
do so? If so, have the concessions persuaded workers
to return to work?
16. Are the strikes, and so forth, starting to hurt the
economy?
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Maintenance of National Unity
17. Do increasingly large numbers of the public tend
to sympathize with the demonstrators/rioters?
18. Is effective government control over some areas
outside the capital being eroded? Are local officials
increasingly unwilling or unable to implement direc-
tives or to perform services, such as tax collection, for
the central government?
19. Is the government starting to carry out policies
that change the political or social status of any group;
for example, is it increasing religious intolerance,
suppressing the use of a minority language or culture,
and so forth? If so, are the policies compelling those
affected to oppose the government in any way?
20. Is the middle or merchant class starting to with-
draw its support for the government?
21. Are religious leaders increasingly critical of the
state of the nation? If so:
? Are religious figures becoming active in antigovern-
ment activities?
? Is the general public beginning to support these
activities and agree with the criticisms?
Economic Indicators
22. Is the government losing its ability to generate
revenues? If so, is it finding difficulty in providing
public services or maintaining popular subsidies?
23. Is the government increasingly turning to money
creation to finance its operations?
24. Is the general public blaming the government for
the deteriorating economy?
25. Are sudden price rises or drops in food or energy
supplies likely or increasing?
26. Is the international economic situation starting to
depress the local economy? If so:
? Is only one sector affected, or is the populace
hurting across the board?
? Do popular perceptions tend to blame pernicious
international forces or countries?
27. Have remittances from expatriates assumed an
important place in the economy?
28. Is the government's ability to obtain foreign aid
and investment starting to decline?
29. Does the economy include a traditional sector,
such as subsistence agriculture and barter, that re-
mains isolated from the modern economic sector and
that could provide a safety valve in times of crisis? If
so, is this being eroded by overpopulation, landless-
ness, crop specialization, and so forth?
30. Do the country's reserves or the free market
exchange rate reflect capital flight? If so, is the
capital flight the result of economic reasons, such as
lack of return on investments, or because of political
fears?
31. Is the government unlikely to meet its debt
service repayment obligations? If so, are the govern-
ment's creditors willing to reschedule all or part of the
debt?
32. Is the government starting to implement its own
or IMF-imposed austerity measures? If so, can it
withstand pressures from opposing domestic interests?
33. Are the government's economic policies benefit-
ing only a small segment of the population, such as
the elite and associated groups?
34. Conversely, are attempts to redress inequality
through taxation, land reform, anticorruption drives,
or other economic measures alienating important
elements of the elite, such as the military or clergy?
Opposition Group Indicators
35. Are opposition groups coalescing against the gov-
ernment? Are they increasingly able to mobilize large
numbers of people for antiregime activities?
36. If opposition groups are organized along class,
ethnic, religious, or regional lines, are these factional
forces and their attraction growing?
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37. Is any opposition group representing itself as the
embodiment of the national identity?
38. Is a polarization of forces taking place, that is, are
centrists and moderates increasingly compelled to
choose among radical positions?
39. Is separatism a growing issue?
40. Is there an opposition leader whose charisma is
increasingly recognized even by those who oppose
him?
41. Are opposition parties increasingly claiming that
the violent overthrow of the government is the only
way to bring about change?
42. Are the intellectuals becoming alienated from the
system? If so, does this lend strength to the
opposition?
Terrorism and Sabotage
43. Are incidents increasing in frequency and inten-
sity? If so, what has been the rate of increase in:
? The number of incidents?
? The number of cities or provinces in which incidents
occur?
44. Are the terrorists or saboteurs being indiscrimi-
nate or selective in their targets? If selective, who are
the targets-government supporters, the opposition,
perceived traitors to one or another side, or others?
45. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to deter any part
of the general public from supporting the
government?
46. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to hurt the
economy? If so:
? Is production declining in key areas such as energy?
? Is the government's ability to provide goods, ser-
vices, and patronage being reduced?
Military Attitudes/Activities Indicators
47. Are there any signs of antiregime or coup
plotting?
48. Are there indications that elements in the mili-
tary and security services, particularly senior person-
nel, are becoming discontented over government ac-
tions or policies?
49. Are the corporate interests or dignity of the
military being assaulted or threatened?
50. Are there elements in the military that are dis-
contented over career loss, pay, or other benefits?
51. Are there signs of a split within or between
military or police leaders?
52. Are the military or security services becoming
less disciplined; are desertions and acts of disobedi-
ence, and so forth, increasing?
53. Are the security services being reorganized fre-
quently or to an extent that affects their efficiency
and morale?
54. Are expenditures for the military and security
services a strain on the budget?
55. Is the government trying to upgrade the efficien-
cy and morale of the military and police through such
measures as:
? Better recruitment, pay, leave, and promotion
policies?
? Increased training in dealing with civil
disobedience?
? Better equipment?
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56. Are foreign influence and aid being viewed nega-
tively by the public and by influential power groups?
If so, is this starting to hurt the regime?
57. Is the opposition receiving increased aid from
radical foreign sources? Is the increased aid improv-
ing the recipients' capabilities, or is it evoking nega-
tive responses from any groups, indicating that they
feel their interests are threatened?
58. Are neighboring countries or other external influ-
ences beginning to affect sectarian or regional groups
in a way that is eroding loyalty to the government?
59. Is the government under threat of incursions or
subversion by foreign elements?
60. Are other countries starting to pose a military
threat? If so, does this enable the government to
"wrap itself in the flag" and rally support it might
otherwise have lost?
61. Is the public's mind being taken off deteriorating
domestic conditions by the government's overseas
adventures? Or, is the government's meddling abroad
unpopular at home?
62. Is an influx of foreign refugees creating
problems?
Regime Capabilities and Actions Indicators
Repression of the Opposition
63. Does the general public increasingly see the gov-
ernment as more responsible than opposition groups
for perpetrating domestic violence?
64. Is the government increasing the use of repression
to counter opposition activities? Is there more torture,
imprisonment without trial, banning of political par-
ties, press censorship, or school and university
closings?
65. Are the regular police having difficulty putting
down demonstrations or riots? If so, is the government
increasingly using paramilitary police units, hired
thugs, or military forces?
66. Are government officials talking about the possi-
bility of declaring martial law or perpetuating it?
67. If the government uses massive force, does this
disrupt opposition groups and make them less effec-
tive? What is its effect on the general public: is it seen
as a necessary sign of firmness, or is it seen as brutal
and repressive?
68. Are there indications that the public sees the
government as inconsistent: for example, does the
average citizen complain that he has "no way of
knowing what he can do to stay out of trouble"?
Government Leadership and the Ruling Elite
69. Is conflict breaking out or increasing among
groups that make up the ruling elite or between the
ruling and supporting elite?
70. Are there indications that government leaders are
doubting their major policies or their ability to rule?
71. Are there indications that the ruler may be
considering stepping down because of age, ill health, a
shift in public opinion, personal tragedy, and so forth?
If so, is the political elite gearing up for an obvious
succession crisis?
72. Is the ruler's style changing in such a way that
lessens his ability to rule? Is he increasingly isolated
in the "palace," becoming erratic, or losing his party's
loyalty?
73. Is a weak coalition government leading to legisla-
tive paralysis?
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74. Has the ruler shown that he is prepared to use the
security forces to suppress demonstrations, riots,
strikes, and so forth? If so, is he prepared to take
extremely tough measures before the situation gets
out of hand?
75. Is the government introducing reforms? If so, is it
doing so under pressure or on its own initiative, and is
prepared to enforce them?
76. Are media criticism of and jokes about the ruler
and the government becoming more direct and open?
Government Bureaucracy
77. Is the bureaucracy becoming less loyal to the
government leadership because of divergent political
views, distaste for the government's policies, and so
forth?
78. Is effectiveness being eroded because the leader-
ship is firing competent officials as scapegoats?
79. Has the government shown ineptitude in coping
with natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods,
crop failures, and so forth?
The Education System
80. Is the education system turning out too many
graduates relative to employment opportunities?
81. Are students becoming restive because of govern-
ment repression or because of restrictive policies in
the educational area?
82. Are fundamentalists or other religious groups
starting to set up schools in opposition to the public
school system, or is enrollment increasing at such
schools in existence?
The Business Sector
83. Is the business sector starting to be hurt by
specific government policies? If so, are losses suffi-
ciently serious to make businessmen increasingly criti-
cal of these policies?
84. Are conditions in the country generally deterio-
rating to such an extent that the business sector is
expressing doubt about the government's ability to
rule?
85. Is a substantial segment of the business sector
starting to support the opposition? If so, is this
support political, financial, or both?
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