INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300470002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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~~
Intelligence 25X1
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
August 1985
GI IPI 85-003
August 1985
Copy 0 6 3 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome
Secret
GI /P/ 85-003
August l 985
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Secret
Preface
Summary: Levels of Concern
Part 1. Developments and Trends
1
Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of
Interest
33
Philippines
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Secret
This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of
significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The
quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 May to 31 July,
examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy
changes. Although there are instances where the paper provides short-term
warnings of coups or collapse, it is primarily designed to address the
potential for instability during the next two years through the consistent
application of 85 indicators. Those countries for which indicators have
changed significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated
in detail in the text.
The quarterly usually includes three parts:
? Part 1 includes an overview of developments during the quarter, a chart
summarizing the status of key indicators, a brief narrative assessment of
each country, and country-specific tables tracing political and economic
changes during the past two years. We assess 30 countries that we have
identified as particularly salient to U~ interests because they are
strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or
allies, geographically close to the United States, or especially influential
in the Third World.
? Part 2 presents a more detailed assessment of select countries in which
there have been developments of interest. Included in each assessment
are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the
scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative
scenarios.
? Part 3, a full list of the 85 indicators, was printed in the May 1985 issue
and other previous editions.
Secret
GI IPI 85-003
August 1985
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Indications of
Political Instabili~
in Key Countries
Summary: Among the 30 countries covered, we have serious concern about the short-
Levels of Concern term political future of two: Nigeria and Sudan. We believe that either or
both of these nations could fall into regime-threatening instability without
further warning. Indeed, we believe that there is a significant possibility
that the current leaders of these two countries could be ousted before our
next issue is published.
Beyond these very immediate threats, our most pressing concerns are
focused on the following nations:
? The Philippines, where a combination of governmental weakness, public
discontent, and Communist insurgency makes the future of the Marcos
regime increasingly problematic.
? El Salvador, where the rebels have turned to urban terrorism.
? Iran, where massive war losses, increasing economic privation, and
perhaps a certain religious weariness are eroding support for the
Khomeini government.
Given the nature of the Iran-Iraq war, we doubt that the eventual loser will
be able to remain in power-and the winner may have serious problems as
well.
We also see serious but less than regime-threatening instability in:
? Guatemala, where the political culture, as well as a variety of economic
and social problems, reduces the odds that the return to civilian rule will
result in lasting political stability.
? Chile, where both public discontent and Communist capabilities are
growing.
? Peru, where newly inaugurated President Garcia confronts economic
crisis and violent insurgency.
Although all of the 21 other countries we examined have significant
problems, we do not believe that these are likely to threaten regime survival
in the short to intermediate term. In particular, well-publicized ethnic
strife in South ,gfrica and India, political strains in Mexico and Panama,
and economic crises in Argentina and Brazil are not portents of regime
change, in our opinion. The Governments of Spain and Greece appear to be
the most secure among the countries studied.
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Part 1. Developments and Trends
The six categories of indicators used in the following
charts are drawn from the 85 indicators presented in
Part 3 of the May book. The social change/cortflict
indicators examine developments such as labor or
religious unrest that could undermine the regime's
legitimacy and ability to rule effectively. The econom-
icfactors link various dimensions of economic perfor-
mance to potential instability. Opposition activities
assess whether the opposition can mobilize effective
antiregime activity or carry out acts that undermine
public security. The military attitudes/activities cate-
gory addresses the military's degree of dissatisfaction
with regime policies, involvement in coup plotting,
and behavior relevant to the political process. The
external factors category looks at foreign influences
that could affect internal stability. Finally, the regime
capabilities/actions category focuses on what the gov-
ernment is doing that could lessen popular support,
otherwise undermine its authority, and affect its
ability to govern efficiently.
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Status of Key Indicators
Dievelopments in
Legend
O
Not of concern
First Quarter, 1985
O
~
?
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
Concern has increased since last quarter
?
Concern has decreased since last quarter
u
c
8
~
~
t
~
N
~
~
U
c
W
::
'?
~
C
~
&
4
O
~
~
w
~
`~ =
~~
~
U
~.~.
~,
K
W
~
~
~7
V ~
~ ."..
~a
~
PC v
`o c 'y
N C
,~' u E
~ ..
~.C. ~. y
C
~ ~,~
O
U .~ 'o
e?JO y
`' ~
O ~ T
u ~ 3
8.E ..
~ ._.
4~. ~. ~
~,pE
pp H
U .~ ...
Lain America Mexico
?
O
O
O
?
?
El Salvador
~
V
Guatemala
O
~
Honduras
O
Panama
O
O
O
O
O
Colombia
O
?
O
Venezuela
O
O
O
O
O
?
Peru
~
~
O
?
?
~'
Brazil
O
O
O
O
O
Argentina
O ?
O
O
Chile
~
Europe Spain
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Greece
O
O?
O?
O
O?
O?
O?
Turkey
O
O
O
Near East and South Asia Morocco
O
O
O
O
Egypt
?
O
O
O
O
Sudan
~
~
~
~
~
~
'~
Saudi Arabia
O?
O
O
O?
O
O?
[raq
?
O
?
O
?
??
Iran
~
~
~
'~'
Pakistan
O
O
O
O
O
India
~
O
O
O
O ?
Africa Nigeria
~
~
O
~
O
~
~
~
Somalia
O
O
G
O
O
O
O
Kenya
O
O
O
O
Zaire
O
?
South Africa
?
O
O
East Asia Philippines
O
fir'
Indonesia
O
O?
O
O
O
O?
South Korea
O
O
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Secret
Mexico:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
election fraud,
nation to maintain political control at every level. Along with the
The ruling party's midterm electoral victories in July-marred by
vote rigging and some violence-indicate the government's determi-
are tarnishing President de la Madrid's image. Continu-
Indicators Legend
have appeared.
ing economic problems~ropping oil prices, high inflation, an
increasingly overvalued peso, and capital flight-are also taking a
political toll. No unusual signs of general popular unrest, however,
ProspeMs jor major regime or polity change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
O Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
p
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
~~
Capital flight
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning _
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
O
Terrorism and sabotage
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
O
O
O
O
O
O
Reports/rumors of coup plottin
O
O
O
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
O
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
O
O
O
U
O
Security capabilities
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
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El Salvador:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
and the process of political normalization remains on track.
The guerrillas' increasing resort to terror tactics, such as the June
assassination of US Marines and others in San Salvador, under-
scores their worsening fortunes in the field and will cost them
further popular support. Rightwing extremists may be tempted to
respond by resuming death squad activity, but so far President
Duarte and the military high command have checked such impulses,
Prospects for major regime or polity change
During next six months
`- During next six months to two dears
~ Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
'd Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
i
?
?
?
- - ___ __
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
i
?
__
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
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Guatemala:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
rebel bases will keep the insurgency contained.
Chief of State Mejia's accommodation of various political and
business-sector concerns has reduced earlier widespread opposition
to government austerity plans and kept the national elections
scheduled for 3 November on track. Mejia is struggling to minimize
the effects of an energy crisis that could prompt renewed protests if
power outages and gasoline shortages become more acute. Guerrilla
harassment will probably continue, but Army operations against
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
~ Serious concern
1983
III ~ IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
U
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
~
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
O
O
O
O
+~
'~
Food/energy shortages _ _
O
O
O
O
O
O
Q
Inflation
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
O
O
O
O
O
O
p
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
O
O '
O
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plottin
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
O
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality O ~
Security capabilities O O O O O O
Political disunity/loss of confidence ~
Loss of legitimacy ~
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Honduras 8:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
contain it.
The military appears committed to ensuring honest elections in
November. Under army pressure, President Suazo probably will
adhere to an agreement with his opponents to end manipulation of
the electoral process. Factionalism within the military remains a
problem, but Armed Forces Chief Lopez will likely be able to
Prospects for major regime or pdicy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
O Not of concern
low concern
Moderate concern
(~ Substantial concern
r Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
O
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages
_
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
_
Inflation
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
O
O
O
Public support
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
Q
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
O I
Reports/rumors of coup plottin
~
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
_
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Security capabilities
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
- - - ----
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
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Panama:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
could engineer without roiling the political waters.
President Barletta's fumbling leadership, sporadic civil unrest, and
Defense Forces Chief Noriega's steady accrual of power threaten
the fragile civilian government, which in any case has served as only
a facade for continuing military control. Barletta's press for eco-
nomic reform has alienated the two most important civil sectors,
labor and business. Broad discontent with his administration may
lead to his resignation or replacement-which Noriega probably
Prospects jot major regime or pdiry change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
~, Substantial concern
~+ Serious concern
1983
III I IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Capital flight
O
O
O
O
O
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
(J
O
O
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Inflation
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
C~
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning _
O
O
O
O
O
O
Terrorism and sabotage
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
O
_
O
O
O
O
Public support
O
' O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
O
O
O
O
O
O
_
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition _
O
G
O
O
O
O
O
_
O
_
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
_
O
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality O C~ O O O O O O
Security capabilities _ O O O O O O_ O O
Political disunity/loss of confidence O O O O O O O
Loss of legitimacy O (J O O O O O O
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Colombia:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
extradition in June of a US citizen wanted on drug charges.
against government and US officials may abate following the
President Betancur's struggle to negotiate an end to four decades of
political violence shows little promise. Clashes between the govern-
ment and guerrilla groups are increasing, and M-19 insurgents have
declared the truce broken. Severe budget cuts are meanwhile
eroding the military's capability. Preemptive government action
defused aCommunist-inspired labor strike in June, but labor unrest
remains a problem. The threat of violence by narcotics traffickers
Prospects jor major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
O Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
rr Substantial concern
'~ Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
O
O
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
----
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
O
O
O
__
Food/energy shortages
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Inflation
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
~ O
O
----- ---- -
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
H O
O
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
_
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
O
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Security capabilities
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
__ _
Loss of legitimacy
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
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Venezuela:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
the next year at least.
Although President Lusinchi has succeeded in placating organized
labor without departing from his austerity program, festering
popular discontent over continuing economic stagnation remains a
source of potential political unrest. Unless oil prices drop precipi-
tously, the government is unlikely to face any major difficulties over
Prospects for major regime or polity change
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
O No[ of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
lyx3
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious. discontent _
O
O
O
O O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
_
~ O
O
O H O
_
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
_
_
O
O
O
Decreased access to foreign funds
-- ---
_
O
O
O
Capital flight
---
--
-
O
O
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
_
_
-
Food/energy shortages
O
O
O
O
O
G
O
O
Inflation
_
O
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
__ __
O
-
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Terrorism and sabotage
- - -
O
O
-
O
O
O
__
O
Insurgent armed attacks _
O I
O
O
O
-
O
O
O
--
O
Public support
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
~~
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Dis
content over overn
nt acg n/ olicies
g_ P
_
~
~
O
O
O
O
O ~
~
O
O
_
O
O
O
O
p
p p
Re orts/rumors of cou loam
O
O
O
O
__
O
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition
O
O
O
O
_
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
New category
O
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality O O O O O O O O
- _ -
Security capabilities _ O O_ O O O O O O
Political disunity/loss of confidence _ _~ O O_ O O O O_
Loss of legitimacy t O O O O O O
305720 7-85
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 . i
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Peru:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
strong public support at least in the short term.
Newly inaugurated President Alan Garcia faces formidable prob-
lems including a worsening economy, massive foreign debt, expand-
ing insurgency, and a burgeoning narcotics industry. We expect the
high level of instability that has plagued Peru over the past three
years to continue unabated under the new administration. Garcia's
landslide victory at the polls, however, probably guarantees him
Prospects jor major regime or pdicy change
During next .six months
~ During next .rix months to two dears
~ Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
~ Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
_
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
?
_
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
-
- - _ _ -
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
_
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plottin
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
O
Q
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality ? ? ? ?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence _ ? ? ? ? ?
Loss of legitimacy ? ? ? ? ? O
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Brazil a:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
over the next year.
President Sarney has won support from much of the public and most
political leaders for his performance thus far. As he grapples with
Brazil's economic and political problems in coming months, Sarney
will probably come under increasing criticism from the left and
labor. Nonetheless, we judge he will retain sufficient support to
govern effectively, and we do not believe the military will intervene
ProspeMS jar major regime or policy change
O During next six months
During next six months to two years
O Nat of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
~ Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1y83
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent _
O! O
O O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
O
O
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
? I ?
? i,
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
Capital flight
--- __- -
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
---
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
_
O
O
Inflation
?
?
?
_
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities _ _
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
__
O
Terrorism and sabotage _ _
O
O
O
O
O
O
_
O
O
Insurgent armed attacks _ ___
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Public support
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
_
~
O
O
O
~ O
O
O '
Discontent over government action/policies
O
O
O
O
O
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
O
O
O
O
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition _
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
O
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Security capabilities
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
_
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
O
305722 7.85
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Argentina:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
apparent.
President Alfonsin's political standing remains high. A recent
agreement with the IMF and an emergency economic program of
wage and price controls, budget cuts, tax hikes, and a new currency
will help slow runaway inflation. Strong public support and military
approval for the program have kept the President's main oppo-
nents-organized labor and the Peronist Party-on the defensive
and unable to actively challenge the economic reforms. Pressure on
the regime is likely to grow, however, as initial enthusiasm wanes
and slippage in wage and price controls becomes increasingly
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate carcern
V Substantial concern
~ Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
~,
O
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
_ ?
C
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Inflation
~
~
~
~
~
~
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
O
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
__ _-
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
-
O
Terrorism and sabotage
O
O
O
O
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
__
Public support
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
I
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
I
__
O
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External factors External support for government
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition
Q
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
O
O
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Security capabilities
_
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
__
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Loss of legitimacy
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
305723 7.85
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Chile:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
strikes to a prolonged military campaign.
President Pinochet lifted the state of siege on 17 June but retained
strictures on political activities and the media. He made no conces-
sions on eventual transition to civilian rule-probably assuring that
polarization will worsen. Moderate political groups, capitalizing on
the somewhat more open climate, are forming a broad opposition
front and planning large-scale protests. The Communists and their
allies meanwhile are preparing to move from harassing terrorist
Prospects for major regime or poJiry change
During next six months
G During next six months to two }ears
Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
~ Serious concern
1983
III I IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
~
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
~
~
~
~
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
- - -
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
~
~
~
~
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
~
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
~
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality ~ ~
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
305724 7$5
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 II
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Secret
Spain:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
by next spring.
Prime Minister Gonzalez's popularity still greatly exceeds that of
his principal political opponents despite leftist and trade union
dissatisfaction with high unemployment and the government's con-
servative economic policies. Opinion polls suggest, however, that his
personal standing might not be enough to swing the public behind
NATO membership in the referendum he has promised on that issue
Prospects for major regime or pdiry change
L ~ During next six months
~) During next six months to two }ears
Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
~ Substantial concern
~ Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
O
O
O
O
~~
O
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
O
O
O
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
O
O
O
G
O
O
O
Capital flight
O
O
G
O
O
O
~-
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
U
C
O
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages _
U
O
O
O
O
O
C
--
Inflation
O
O
O
O
O
G
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
v
O
C
C
O
O
G
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
~~
Terrorism and sabotage
~;
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
O
Public support
O
O
O
O
O
O
v
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
O
O
O
O
O
O
Discontent over government action/policies
O
O
O
O
O
O
Reports/rumors of coup plottin
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External factors External support for government _
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
External support for opposition
G
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
New category
O
U
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
G
O
O
C
O
O
O
G
Security capabilities
G
O
O
O
O
O
G
~~
Political disunity/loss of confidence
O
O
O
O
O
O
C~
Loss of legitimacy
O
O
O
O
O
O
G
~)
305725 7.85
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Greece:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
most significant problems for the government.
Prospects for stability have measurably improved following Prime
Minister Papandreou's decisive victory in the parliamentary elec-
tions on 2 June. The fresh mandate, the absence of former President
Karamanlis, and the ruling Socialists' lack of dependence on
Communist support leave Papandreou relatively unfettered. Grow-
ing unemployment and balance-of-payments difficulties present the
Prospects jor major regime or pdiry change
C During next six months
During next six months to two dears
Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
~ Substantial concern
~ Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I [I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
~
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
~;
Food/energy shortages
C ~
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
C_,
O
C;
\,
Opposition conspiracy/planning
i,,
O
Terrorism and sabotage
_
-
O
-_
-
Insurgent armed attacks
~~
~_;
O
~-~
Public support
~-,
O
,_;
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
O
C
;>
O
~'~~
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
-
C,,
c;~
Discontent over government action/policies
O
~~
Reports/rumors of coup plottin
O
O
O
C ~
' /
External factors External support for government
O
(~
O
O
C
O
~~
External support for opposition
O
U
O
;~
O
O
__
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality _
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
~. i
Security capabilities
O
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
C i
O
Loss of legitimacy
~;
O
O
305726 785
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 i I I I
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Turkey:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Iraq.
Prime Minister Ozal retains military support and appears politically
secure despite continuing economic problems and opposition to a
new law expanding police powers. External factors, however, may
adversely affect the government. Tension with Greece remains high,
as does public indignation over Bulgaria's forced assimilation of its
Turkish minority. Kurdish activity along the border raises the
possibility of Turkish counterinsurgency operations into Iran and
Prospects for major regime or polity change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Not aj concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
~ Substantial concern
r Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
~~
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
,
Food/energy shortages
L
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
J',
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
~
O
~
Public support
O
^
C
O
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
(~
!;
Q
';)
~~~
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
~
C,;
Discontent over government action/policies
;'_)
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
_~
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
i
C
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
~ ~
.J
O
Security capabilities
t ,
J
C
Political disunity/loss of wnfidence
r,,
Loss of legitimacy
~
v
_
305727 7 85
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Secret
Morocco:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
assistance.
We expect some unrest in coming months as consumers are hit by
the effects of a poor cereal harvest and the recent sharp devaluation
of the dirham. Proposed education reforms, moreover, are likely to
provoke more student demonstrations when classes resume. Rabat
will almost surely have difficulty rescheduling nearly $2.5 billion in
debt service obligations due this year. Given the country's weak
financial position and King Hassan's urgent need to replace aging
military equipment, he may turn to Libya or the USSR for
Prospects jor major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two Jears
Nor aj concern
L,ow concern
Moderate concern
G Substantial concern
~ Serious concern
1983
III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I II
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
O
C
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
!,~
Q
~
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
- _-
-
i
Capital flight