IMPACT OF SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00658R000100020002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Impact of Soviet
Naval Presence in
Third World Countries
T..~ Cis ., ct
Top a
SOV 83-10006JX
January 1983
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Directorate of Top Secret
intelligence
n",
Impact of Soviet
Naval Presence in
Third World Countries
This paper was prepared b}{
Comments and queries are welcome and may e
addressed to the Chief, Theater Forces Division,
SOVAJ
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council.
Top Secret
.SOV R3-10006./X
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Impact of Soviet
Naval Presence in
Third World Countries
ties to a minimum and they are identifiable only as a potential tool.
Key Judgments Naval calls and contacts are often among the first tools used to demon-
Information available strate Soviet interest in a country and frequently continue to be among the
as of I July 1982 most visible. Nonetheless, the Navy is but one-often a minor one-of a
was used in this report.
number of political, military, commercial, and other instruments that
Moscow uses in building its relationship with a Third World state. In some
cases, it is difficult to isolate the naval relationship from an extensive
military training and aid program or from a variety of other state-to-state
ties. In others, the wariness of the Third World state has kept Soviet naval
Despite serious setbacks-such as their expulsion from naval facilities in 25X1
Somalia and Egypt-the Soviets have had some success in transforming
their naval presence abroad into influence with Third World host states.
Many of the factors that determine whether naval presence is effective in
securing improved access or political concessions are beyond Moscow's
control. The Soviets, however, remain committed to building naval ties
throughout the Third World. They seem to view the establishment of naval
influence as a long-term process of grasping opportunities and to accept the
uncertainties of naval presence as a tool of foreign policy. 25X1
Throughout the past decade, as their overseas naval operations have
expanded, the Soviets have consistently probed for new or improved access
to regional naval facilities. Currently a small number of Third World ports
provide significant support to Soviet ships. Soviet naval reconnaissance
aircraft deploy regularly to five nations-two of which are Communist
states-outside the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets' concern about appearing
neocolonialist and their suspicions about the durability of foreign basing
agreements restrict the intensity of their search for naval access. Nonethe-
less, they are willing to nurture marginal naval relationships in the hope
that the political or military situation will shift to their advantage and
result in concrete naval privileges.
In seeking access to facilities in the Third World, the Soviets hope both to
secure support for the operations of their naval ships and aircraft and to
improve their image and influence with local governments. Because of the
way in which the Soviet Navy operates its ships in distant areas, however,
access to foreign port facilities represents an important convenience, rather
than a necessity that drives Soviet policy. Soviet naval reconnaissance
aircraft, on the other hand, require access to airfields in the Third World if
they are to operate in regions distant from the USSR
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Soviet naval relations with seven Third World states are presented in the
appendix. The activities described and the responses by the host govern-
ments are similar to those observed elsewhere in the Third World. Given
comparable opportunities in the future, Soviet tactics may resemble those
described in the case studies and also may reflect that Moscow has learned
from its past experiences. Soviet naval ties with each of the seven nations
studied-and with other Third World states-have some unique aspects.
Nonetheless, a number of common threads emerge that define how the
Soviets establish and use naval presence and highlight those elements of
the Soviet-host state relationship that condition the success of Soviet naval
policy:
? The Soviets take the long view with respect to the use of naval facilities.
They do not press so hard for access that they endanger broader political
objectives and generally relent if their requests for access appear to
threaten their relationship with the host government.
? The most important single determinant of the nature, extent, and effect
of Soviet naval presence is the overall political orientation of the Third
World country. Where the ground has been prepared by internal and
regional developments that create or reinforce a perception of need for
Soviet military, technical, and economic assistance, the Navy can be
successfully used as a foreign policy tool.
? A large and active Soviet naval presence can limit the options available to
the host state by highlighting its ties to Moscow, which may undercut its
relations with more moderate neighboring states. Both Moscow and the
host government retain some flexibility, however, and their naval ties are
unlikely to cause either to alter the fundamental thrust of their regional
policies.
? The Soviets try to use offers of naval equipment and technical services to
reinforce their presence and to create a self-perpetuating dependence.
Such dependence may result directly in naval concessions. Reliance on
Soviet naval aid often outlives the initial gratitude for such assistance,
however, as was the case in Guinea.
? The Soviets have been able to use their Navy in regime support activities
that capitalize on the insecurity or paranoia that so often typifies Third
World regimes.
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? A major limit on the long-term potential for extensive foreign naval
involvement is the extreme sensitivity of Third World countries concern-
ing their nonaligned status and image.
? Soviet naval presence tends to be low key by Western standards: facilities
are generally small, austere, and easily moved in an emergency; and
contact between Soviet naval personnel and local populations is
restricted.
? Most Third World countries are concerned about the security threat
posed by a Soviet presence.
? For most Third World governments the economic benefits of a Soviet
naval presence do not appear to be large enough to influence decisively
their policies.
Moscow's low-key approach to the acquisition and use of foreign facilities
could change in coming years. If the pace of Soviet naval activity in distant
areas increases to the extent that the burden on the afloat logistic system is
excessive, the Soviets probably would be'more insistent in their requests for
naval access. Where an individual country develops new vulnerabilities,
Moscow might apply more pressure for access than in the past. Barring
such changes, however, the Soviets are likely to continue to view the search
for overseas facilities as a long-term process of cautious probing.
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Soviet Naval Operations in Distant Areas and Requirements for 4
Access to Local Facilities
Themes Common to Soviet Naval Relations With Third 6
World States
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1. Soviet Naval Deployments Outside Home Waters, 1976-81 5
2. Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces 7
3. Cape Verde Islands
5. Soviet Naval Presence in West African Waters
6. Ship-days in Conakry as a Percent of Days Spent in West 24
African Waters
8. Seychelles
9. Singapore
3. Naval Ship Visits to the Seychelles
4. Soviet Ship Visits to Singapore
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Impact of Soviet
Naval Presence in
Third World Countries
As the Soviet Navy has expanded its area of opera-
tions, Western nations have been increasingly con-
cerned about Soviet efforts to use naval forces to build
influence in the Third World and have focused on
Soviet access in Third World states as a measure of
Soviet success. This paper examines the interaction
between Soviet naval presence and the policies and
orientation of local governments. It looks at Soviet
goals and the elements that constitute naval presence,
discusses the requirements for naval access that result
from the Soviet Navy's operating philosophy, and on
the basis of case studies of seven countries makes
general observations about Moscow's use of naval
forces in the Third World.
The Soviet Navy attempts to influence an individual
state through ship visits, the setting up of shore
establishments, and military assistance. Soviet naval
presence may also affect the state indirectly even
when its ships and personnel are not physically within
the boundaries of the state. General perceptions of
Soviet naval strength vis-a-vis Western or regional
navies can have a real impact on the policies of small
states. This paper deals with the first aspect of Soviet
naval presence-Moscow's efforts to use the Navy
directly to improve its position in Third World coun-
tries, to influence events in the local country, or to
obtain access to local facilities that will support its
naval activities.
substantial facilities on its territory. A second-
Guinea-appears to be moving away from the USSR
and has gradually reduced the Soviet Navy's access to
its facilities. Two-Cape Verde and Seychelles-are
frequently rumored to be moving closer to the Soviets
and to be prepared to provide bases or facilities for
Soviet ships and aircraft. Three-Mauritius, Singa-
pore, and Tunisia-have been basically Western ori-
ented but have allowed Soviet port calls or repair of
Soviet naval ships.
There are many additional Third World states with
which the USSR has attempted to establish a naval
relationship. Although they are not included as indi-
vidual case studies, we have looked at the history of
Soviet naval relations with these states and do not find
any inconsistencies with our overall judgments. On
the contrary, it appears that additional case studies
that might be undertaken in the future would reaffirm
rather than contradict our general conclusions. Even
the Soviet naval relationships with Cuba and Viet-
nam-which were excluded from the case studies
because their Communist governments are so closely
aligned with the USSR as to be part of the Soviet
"Bloc"-exhibit many of the commonalities discussed
in the overview.
Some Soviet experiences with a state other than those
discussed in the case studies seemed particularly apt
to our observations. When we have drawn on the
evidence of such experiences, we have tried to limit
our references to situations whose basic facts are
widely known, such as the Soviet expulsion from
Egypt or Somalia.
The observations drawn from the case studies appear
to be valid for other Third World states even though
the paper does not present the entire range of Soviet
naval activities worldwide. The nations used as case
studies were chosen because they have a wide variety
of political and ideological orientations and are geo-
graphically disparate. One-South Yemen-is closely
associated with the USSR and permits the use of
We have tried to restrict our judgments to naval
matters. Naval calls and contacts are often among the
first tools used to demonstrate Soviet interest in a
country and often continue to be among the most
visible. Nevertheless, the Navy is but one-often a
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minor one-of a number of political, military, com-
mercial, and other instruments that Moscow uses in
building its relationship with a Third World state. In
the case of South Yemen, for example, it is difficult to
isolate the naval relationship from an extensive mili-
tary training and aid program and from a host of
other state-to-state ties.
The case studies focus on the activities and impact of
Soviet naval ships and those merchant ships that
provide support to naval forces. Data on ship-days and
port visits reflect the activity of naval combatants,
auxiliaries, and hydrographic research and space sup-
port ships subordinate to the Navy but not those
attached to Soviet civilian scientific agencies. The
case studies also address the activities of Soviet naval
personnel, both those aboard the ships and those who
make up shore establishments.
The case studies refer to some issues that are relevant
to the overall Soviet maritime presence in a country
but are not purely naval. Local attitudes toward the
Soviet Navy are often colored by experiences or
perceptions that involve the USSR's civilian ships or
Moscow's constant search for access for its merchant
or fishing fleets. Local resentment of these efforts or
the belief that all Soviet ships are "spy ships" often
spills over and becomes part of the local reaction to
Soviet naval presence.
Background
Naval Presence Defined
Goals of Naval Presence. The Soviets continue to
devote resources to establishing a naval presence in
many Third World states despite their uneven record
in using naval presence to influence Third World
governments and the comparatively small number of
states that provide logistic services to the Navy. On
balance, they appear more interested in the long-term
goal of building political influence than in the naval
facilities themselves-partially because of their limit-
ed operational dependence on shore-based support as
discussed below. Such an approach accords well with
the opportunism of their overall policy in the Third
World. Moreover, Moscow's continued commitment
to maintaining its naval presence in the Third World
suggests that the Soviets are realistic about the
pitfalls of using naval influence in an unstable envi-
ronment and have not been disillusioned by the
setbacks they have suffered.
The objectives of naval presence fall into three areas:
? In the broadest terms-and beyond the scope of this
study-Moscow seeks to use the Navy to enhance
its prestige and contribute to its image as a super-
power with a right to a voice in regional or interna-
tional security questions. Such prestige provides a
"reservoir of credibility" that can make the applica-
tion of force unnecessary in some circumstances or
can foreclose on an opponent's ability to respond
with force. The role of this objective in Soviet
thinking was evident in the expansion of the Indian
Ocean Squadron during 1980 or the reinforcement
of the Mediterranean Squadron during the crisis in
Lebanon. In addition, Moscow hopes that its Navy
will undercut the political impact of the presence of
Western naval forces and that individual states can
be encouraged to deny access to Western ships and
aircraft.
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? On a practical level, the Soviets seek access to naval
facilities that will support the routine deployment of
ships and aircraft to the region. Although Soviet
requirements for such support are minimal (see
below), in peacetime access to local facilities can
ease the logistics burden of overseas deployments.
Soviet use of Alexandria during the early 1970s, for
example, contributed to Moscow's ability to sustain
the Mediterranean Squadron, particularly the sub-
marines that would otherwise have had to return to
the Northern Fleet for upkeep periods. Following
their expulsion from Alexandria, the Soviets re-
duced their force level in the region and gradually
increased the proportion of fleet support ships serv-
ing with the squadron.'
? An additional operational benefit of overseas facil-
ities is the increased availability of naval forces for
contingency responses. Ships deployed to the Medi-
terranean and serviced there can more rapidly rein-
force the token patrol off West Africa, for example,
than can ships required to transit from the Northern
Fleet. The same applies to ships transiting to the
southwest Indian Ocean islands from the Arabian
Sea rather than from distant Pacific Fleet bases.
? In individual states, the Soviets hope that their
naval presence will contribute to a close and conge-
nial relationship with the local government that will
permit Moscow to influence its foreign policy in
directions favorable to the USSR or to affect inter-
nal developments. In the case of an unstable regime,
Moscow may hope to shore up an individual lead-
er-with little commitment or resources-and se- ,
cure his gratitude. In other cases, they may hope
that the presence of even a small Soviet force will
impress the local government with Soviet capabili-
ties to protect or harm. In addition, the Soviet Navy
is probably expected to build professional ties with
the local military, developing a lobby within the host
government and nurturing loyalty in officers who
might be helpful in the future. Finally, Soviet open
literature emphasizes the role of the Soviet sailor as
' Current Soviet access for submarine upkeep in Syria partially
replaced the facilities in Egypt, but the Mediterranean Squadron
remains at a lower level than in the early 1970s. We believe that the
current level represents what the Soviets consider the optimum
an ambassador of good will, and Moscow may retain
expectations that the Navy will enhance the popular
image of the USSR.
Although these objectives are mutually reinforcing,
they are not interdependent. Nor do the Soviets
appear to believe that each can be achieved to the
fullest measure in every situation. Rather, they ap-
pear willing to advance more quickly in some areas
than others or even to recognize that an individual
goal may be temporarily inappropriate. The lack of
emphasis on popular good will in Aden in recent
years, for example, reflects Moscow's realistic reas-
sessment of its chances for success. In most cases, the
Soviets seem to recognize that the value of naval
presence lies in its long-term potential, not just in its
immediate short-term benefits.
Elements of Naval Presence. The term "naval pres-
ence" covers more ground than Soviet use of local
naval facilities. It incorporates efforts by the Soviets
to use their Navy to cement relations with the host
state, as well as pressure to expand Soviet naval
privileges. It also includes the operational and symbol-
ic value of having highly visible military forces far
from the shores of the USSR.
Naval presence has generally involved at least occa-
sional port visits. These have been either official
friendly calls involving government ceremonies or
public relations events, or unpublicized operational
calls for crew rest or replenishment. If a closer
relationship has evolved, it normally has included
several of the following characteristics:
? Frequent, overlapping port calls so that Soviet ships
are continuously present.
? Freedom for Soviet ships from normal entry require-
ments or priority for Soviet ships.
? Reserved access to berths or permission to station
logistics ships in port.
? Workspace, housing, and recreational facilities
ashore for Soviet personnel who direct the move-
ment of Soviet ships in port and coordinate mainte-
nance periods.
? Storage ashore for parts or fuel.
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? Use of naval-related facilities such as airfields,
communications stations, drydocks, or other repair
facilities.
? Periodic or continuous deployment of naval recon-
naissance aircraft to a local airfield.
? Soviet control of access to Soviet-used facilities. P
Offers of naval equipment and training of personnel
or technicians nearly always have accompanied the
establishment of a naval presence. Soviet naval auxil-
iaries frequently have been deployed to help Third
World nations maintain or operate their Soviet-built
naval vessels, and Soviet combatants have conducted
joint exercises with those of host navies. In addition,
the Soviets occasionally have offered to improve or
construct naval or air facilities for the host state-
probably hoping to have access to the upgraded
facilities.
In some cases, Soviet naval ties with an individual
state may remain at the minimal level of infrequent
port calls for a number of years if neither side feels
compelled to develop the relationship further. Moscow
may view its deployments to the region coupled with
such occasional calls as sufficient to provide an option
for the future. Soviet calls to Benin, Togo, or Nigeria
combined with the small West African patrol might
fall into this category.
Although Soviet naval presence in most cases has
resulted from the accumulation of privileges and
reliance on Soviet naval assistance, in others it has
been a sudden outgrowth of operational military
support to a Third World country. The Soviets estab-
lished a naval presence in Guinean waters, for exam-
ple, apparently at the request of President Sekou
Toure following a Portuguese-sponsored raid in 1970.
In some cases, the Soviet presence has not been naval
but maritime. Moscow has negotiated fishing agree-
ments or offered to develop fishing ports for nations
that have not granted the Soviet Navy any conces-
sions. These maritime relationships are potentially
valuable in the overall relationship with a Third
World state and are sometimes viewed by the host
government or the West as beneficial to the Soviet
Navy. Such contacts, however, have little operational
relevance for the Navy and are difficult to use to
create or reinforce naval ties. The fisheries drydock
that the Soviets have placed in Mozambique, for
example, is neither available to the Navy nor large
enough to service the naval ships that normally serve
in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, as several of the case
studies illustrate, resentment over Soviet fishing prac-
tices can undercut naval initiatives, and wariness
about ultimate Soviet intentions can interfere even
with efforts to conclude fisheries agreements. Similar-
ly, Soviet failure to deliver on promises of port
development, as in the case of Cape Verde, can create
animosity between Moscow and the potential aid
recipient.
Soviet Naval Operations in Distant Areas
and Requirements for Access to Local Facilities
The way in which the Soviet Navy functions in distant
areas minimizes the requirement for access to facili-
ties ashore. The Soviet Navy relies primarily on afloat
logistic support for warships operating overseas, using
naval auxiliaries-tankers, cargo ships, tenders, and
repair ships-or merchant ships under naval contract.
The Soviets deploy proportionately far more auxilia-
ries outside home waters than do Western navies and
frequently have a ratio of 2:1 between auxiliaries and
warships (see figure 1). They rarely purchase fuel
from foreign countries, even in the Middle East,
preferring to conserve hard currency by transporting
fuel from distant Soviet ports. Their maintenance of
warships overseas is minimal compared with that of
other navies and is performed by the Soviets' own
repair ships.
Nonetheless, the Navy's operational flexibility can
benefit from the simplicity of performing logistic
support in friendly ports, from having a convenient
stopover for crew rest or rotation and mail call, and
from having a local source of fresh water and perish-
able provisions. Where they have free and regular
access, they often station a tender or repair ship for
limited maintenance, an oiler, or other types of service
craft. By performing pretransit and posttransit upkeep
or middeployment maintenance at such facilities, the
Soviets can extend the deployment period of individ-
ual units. Pacific Fleet submarines serviced at Ethio-
pia's Dahlak Island, for example, can remain on
station longer before returning to their home fleet.
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Figure 1
Soviet Naval Deployments Outside
Home Waters, 1976-81
Hydrographic and space
event support ships
0 Auxiliaries
M Surface combatants
General purpose
submarines
Amphibious ships SSBNs
Mine warfare ships
^
^
^
Where they have no access to port facilities, the
Soviets often use sheltered anchorages in international
waters as logistic centers. They may install a mooring
buoy, station auxiliaries there, and bring in other
naval ships for replenishment and upkeep. The Soviets
have established a number of such anchorages-in the
Indian Ocean, for example, at Socotra Island, and in
the Mediterranean, in the Gulfs of Sollum and Hama-
met. (Figure 2 shows the anchorages and port and air
facilities currently used by the Soviet Navy.) On
occasion, Soviet ships use anchorages in preference to
local facilities. For example, despite their extensive
access in South Yemen, the Soviets sometimes refuel
or repair ships prior to entering Aden, possibly be-
cause they are sensitive about having such operations
observed.
In part, the Soviet Navy can function with the
combination of afloat support and limited shore-based
support because its activity level is lower than that of
Western navies. In general, Soviet ships are under
way only about one-third of the time they are de-
ployed, thus conserving fuel and limiting wear and
tear. The limited access to overseas ports enjoyed by
the Soviets may contribute to the minimal routine
activity level of their ships but is not the decisive
factor. For example, shortly after their expulsion from
Berbera in 1977, the Soviets sharply increased their
naval presence in the Indian Ocean and undertook the
sealift to Ethiopia. Similarly, although they have
never fully replaced the facilities lost in Egypt, the
Soviets have reinforced the Mediterranean Squadron
several times since 1976 and have sustained a higher-
than-normal tempo of operations for the duration of a
regional crisis.
On balance, then, access to local naval facilities has
been an important convenience but-in most places-
not a necessity that drives Soviet policy. Moscow's
efforts to secure or preserve access do not extend to
altering the fundamental thrust of Soviet foreign
policy or to preventing the Soviets from taking actions
that diverge from the interests of the host nation.
Other aspects of naval presence create different re-
quirements. Naval aircraft need landing rights and
some technical support to conduct overseas deploy-
ments. The Soviets seem to restrict themselves to a
minimum of local facilities, however, and to station
only reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare air-
craft abroad.' Their deployments to Syria and Libya
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in the last two years demonstrate their ability to
operate with only temporary logistic support.
Themes Common to Soviet Naval Relations
With Third World States
The common themes that emerge from our analysis of
the case studies and our assessment of other countries
with which the Soviets have a naval relationship will
not startle readers familiar with naval matters. The
case studies confirm some of the Intelligence Commu-
nity's intuitive judgments about the factors that con-
dition the success or failure of Soviet efforts to build
and use naval presence and how Third World nations
may view the Soviet Navy.
Congruent Interests. The most important single deter-
minant of the nature, extent, and effect of Soviet
naval presence is the overall political orientation of
the Third World country. When the ground has been
prepared by internal and regional developments that
make the state ideologically compatible with the
Soviets and that create or reinforce a perception of
need for Soviet military, technical, and economic
assistance, the Navy can be extensively and success-
fully used as a foreign policy tool. Ideological purity is
not a necessary ingredient; the anticolonial experience
of most Third World countries and Soviet political
support for the struggle against Western domination
have provided a sufficient basis for association with
the USSR.
The most extensive and durable naval relationships
among the seven cases are those established in Guinea
and South Yemen. Both were logical associates for
the USSR in their respective regions because of their
anti-Western revolutions, their left-leaning govern-
ments, and because their insecurity or ambitions gave
them a strong interest in Soviet assistance. Similar
calculations have been evident in Soviet naval ties
with Libya, Syria, and Ethiopia-cases in which
his fears of Western reaction
Soviet naval initiatives have capitalized on both anti-
Western sentiments and regional tensions. In Libya,
for example, a longstanding arms supply role that
included naval equipment has widened to a wary
acceptance of the presence of Soviet warships and
aircraft largely because of Qadhafi's ambitions and
Initially, the Soviets may even find opportunities for
access dictated by the political orientation of non-
aligned states. These governments may grant the
Soviets some naval access to balance their Western
ties and reinforce their nonaligned image. Tunisia, for
example, views the extent of access that it permits the
USSR as a counterweight to the wide range of ties
between Tunis and the West. At various times, Singa-
pore, Cape Verde, and Mauritius have made the same
evaluation. Obviously, access based on such calcula-
tions by nonaligned states is less secure than that
granted by states with greater affinity for the USSR.
Nonetheless, it permits the Soviets to maintain a
limited naval presence that may expand if circum-
stances permit.
A natural corollary of the political or ideological
affinity that normally exists between Moscow and a
host state is that naval presence is most effective in
encouraging policies favored by the Soviets when the
interests of the smaller state are similarly inclined.
Guinea and South Yemen have cooperated with the
Soviets and have provided facilities to support Soviet
undertakings because of their own ideological orienta-
tion, regional alliances, or political interests. South
Yemen, for example, had already begun to provide
assistance to Ethiopia before the USSR initiated its
sealift to Asmara. The case studies offer no example
in which the Soviets successfully exploited their naval
presence to pressure countries to adopt policies not to
their liking. Nor does a naval relationship with
Moscow appear decisive in preventing a nation from
taking an anti-Soviet stand as Singapore did on the
issue of Afghanistan.
Where Soviet leaders have developed a sophisticated
understanding of the dynamics in a region-as they
seem to have in the Indian Ocean island states, for
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Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces
633427 1-83
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Atlantic Ocean
France
Mediterranean-.
7 General purpose subrrinse
9 Surface combatants
1 Mine warfare
23 Auxiliaries
3-4 Research ships
n
Spain
Swltz.
Austria
Rijeica
Narlas i. Taranto . #Alb.
ape sm ;
ii - alai .
Mediterranean Sea
Hungary
Romanha
Bulgaria
Black Sea
Pacific Ocean
l 8 SSBNs
10 General purpose submarines
2 Surface combatants
1 Mine warfare ship
8-9 Auxiliaries
8 Research ships
West Africa
1 General purpose submarine
11-2 Surface combatants
/ 1 Mine warfare ship or amphibious ship
3 Auxiliaries
1 Research ship
Atlantic Ocean
-
tig
,- ( *Mtoscow
'*PORT LOUIS
Mauritius
~4 Support/repair facility
- Port of call
Naval communications station
Anchorage
Airfield
Note: Tabulations show average daily deployment of Soviet naval forces in 1982.
Arctic Ocean
Chagos
vIOTORIA, ' Archipelago
Seychelles 'YDiegO Garcia
oetivy I. (fortune Bank)
Indian Ocean
acalaf \
a" r
?Cargados Carajos Shoals
Soviet Union
a Nang
Vietnam
y Hann
t1 Lanka 1 Kompon om 8
coLoMBo)
Indian Ocean
2-3 General purpose submarines
2-3 Major surface combatants
1 Mine warfare ship or patrol craft
1-2 Amphibious ships
15 Auxiliaries
4 Research ships
4 SSBNs
(6,General purpose submarines
3 Suface combatants
1 Mine warfare ship-or amphibious ship
14 Auxiliaries
5-8 Research ships
Pacific Ocean
Pacific
:
are not necessarilyutrtatoe
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example-naval policy can contribute to the success
of the overall policy. Where such an understanding is
lacking, however, or where Moscow has been inept
and blundering-as in its early efforts to bring Ethio-
pia, Somalia, and South Yemen together-naval in-
centives cannot overcome the basic weaknesses of
Soviet policy
Soviet Calculation of Benefits. The Soviets appear to
take the long view with respect to the use of naval
facilities, viewing such access as only a small aspect of
their foreign policy. They do not press so hard for
facilities that they endanger broader political objec-
tives. Their willingness to depend heavily upon float-
ing logistic support is, in strictly military terms, a
weakness; politically, it probably is an advantage. F_
In some circumstances-for instance in the Indian
Ocean island states where their need for logistic
support is limited and their opportunities are uncer-
tain-their policies show a willingness to forgo or
limit their own use of facilities in the interests of
denying or limiting US access and of increasing their
political influence in the region. Their broad support
for the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept favored
by many regional states reflects this policy, as have a
variety of initiatives by the late Premier Brezhnev and
other Soviet officials for talks that would limit Great
Power forces and facilities in the Indian Ocean region.
The Soviets quietly complied with a major change in
Seychelles policy designed to restrict calls by ships of
all non-Indian Ocean navies. In fact, once Victoria
had decided to alter its policy, Moscow may have
played a behind-the-scenes role in formulating the
terms of the new regulations, which effectively pro-
hibit visits by US Navy ships. Although the new rules
also limit Soviet port calls, Moscow probably would
not be sorry to see other regional states, such as
Mauritius, take a similar approach.
The Soviets are constantly probing for access to port
and air facilities throughout the Third World, and
they have developed a wide range of enticements to
tempt target governments. Under the right circum-
stances-where they believe that a client is deeply in
debt to the USSR, both financially and politically-
Soviet importuning may approach a level that could
be described as "pressure." The Soviets have
"pressed" Guinea with limited success. In general,
however, they stop well short of the "demands" they
are so often reported to have made. Moreover, when
asked to leave or to limit their naval presence-as in
Egypt, Somalia, Guinea, or Singapore-the Soviets
do so promptly and with relatively little fuss
Limitations of Options. Soviet naval presence can 25X1
influence the flexibility of both the host state and the
USSR. Extensive use of its facilities by a Great Power
implies a lack of independence that can limit the
choices available to the host government. The clearest
example is South Yemen, whose support for Soviet
military deliveries to Ethiopia-an undertaking in
which the Soviet Navy and its access to South
Yemeni facilities played an important role-probably
was the final blow to Aden's developing rapproche- 25X1
ment with Saudi Arabia. Although none of the case
studies demonstrates a similar restraint on Soviet
options, it is possible to envision a situation in which a
strong Soviet interest in maintaining or expanding
access could involve Moscow in limited compromises
with the host state.
Limitation of the policies of either partner is revers-
ible, however, as was demonstrated by the Somali
invasion of Ethiopia in 1977, the subsequent Soviet
decision to support Ethiopia over Somalia, and the
resulting expulsion of the Soviets from Somali facili-
ties. Extensive military assistance or an expensive
investment in naval facilities will not force Moscow to
accept policies of the host state that run counter to
Soviet interests nor compel the local government to
abide by Soviet dictates.
In contrast, the Navy can provide considerable flexi-
bility to the Soviets in dealing with several states in
the same region. Access to facilities in one state does
not rule out overtures for additional access in a
competing state. For example, the Soviets have man- 25X1
aged to secure some access to port facilities in North
Yemen while maintaining their substantial naval
presence in South Yemen.
Naval Assistance. The Soviets seek to secure self-
perpetuating forms of access. They offer naval equip-
ment to bind the client state to the USSR by a
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continuing need for spare parts and repair services. A
continuing Soviet naval presence is frequently re-
quired to operate and maintain the equipment, and
much of the training of Third World personnel is
conducted in the Soviet Union.
Where countries have accepted Soviet naval equip-
ment or assistance with building and improving port
and air facilities, the Soviets often have been able to
capitalize-at least for some period of time-on the
access provided. Some of the host states have navies
made up almost entirely of Soviet-built combatants,
such as South Yemen, Syria, and Ethiopia. The
Soviets also provide naval craft for paramilitary du-
ties such as fisheries patrol to states like Cape Verde
and the Seychelles. Extensive access to facilities in
Guinea and South Yemen almost certainly grew in
part out of Soviet largesse, and some officers of the
client navies must feel not only dependence but also
loyalty. Joint exercises such as those conducted with
Syria or South Yemen in recent years also may
reinforce professional ties between the two navies. F
Despite these benefits of Soviet naval presence, many
host countries come to resent their visitors over time.
The case study on Guinea provides a good example.
Soviet ties to Guinea have suffered from the "what
have you done for me lately?" syndrome; gratitude for
past assistance is quickly dispersed in a sea of com-
plaints about quality, promptness, and unmet require-
Regime Support. The Soviet Navy is well suited to
capitalize on the insecurity that often typifies Third
World regimes. In Guinea, the Soviet Navy actually
provided security services, patrolling nearby waters
against raiders from outside the country and, on at
least one occasion, capturing a group of dissidents and
returning them to Guinean forces. Similarly, Soviet
combatants have been sent to the Seychelles on
several occasions, reportedly in response to requests
from President Rene, who feared externally supported
coups. Regime insecurity undoubtedly also plays a
large part in cementing the close relationship between
the USSR and South Yemen, whose Marxist-oriented
leadership is weakened by endemic factional bickering
and perceives threats from neighboring moderate
states supported by the United States. Even the
Tunisians apparently hoped that naval concessions
granted to Moscow might lessen the threat they
perceive from Libya.
Instability or fear provides the potential for new or
expanded access in other states as well. In mid-1981,
for example, heightened tensions between Syria and
Lebanon led Damascus to permit Soviet aircraft to
operate briefly from Syrian airfields-the first time
that Soviet naval aircraft had deployed to land bases
in the region since 1972. In cases like Madagascar or
Mozambique, Western observers frequently point to
the lack of regime stability as a possible avenue by
which the Soviets may eventually secure naval privi-
leges.
Soviet naval presence is unlikely to play a decisive role
in the survival of a regime or in its protection from
outside threats. In the Seychelles, for example, the
presence of Tanzanian troops probably has been more
important than that of Soviet warships. For other
countries, such as Syria, the Soviet ships dispatched
during a crisis represented less of a commitment than
the regime would have liked. Nonetheless, where local
forces are small and poorly equipped, even a small
force belonging to a major power may seem awesome
and the regime may perceive it as having made a real
contribution. In the case of Guinea, increased access
to important facilities was a direct result of Soviet
support to the regime. The gratitude of the leadership
may not result in wider Soviet access-as it has not in
the Seychelles-but may increase Moscow's political
capital with the leadership and be useful for future
negotiation.'
Inhibitions of the Nonaligned. Ultimately, the ex-
treme sensitivity of Third World countries concerning
their nonaligned status appears to limit the potential
' A Soviet port visit in the fall of 1981-reportedly at Rene's
request-may have been another example of the use of the Soviet
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for extensive foreign naval involvement, not only by
the Soviets but by any major outside power. These
countries do not want to be labeled "bases" or
"clients" of either Great Power. (The level at which
such concerns arise varies, of course, depending in
large part on the overall political orientation of the
Third World state.
In most of the case studies, the host countries eventu-
ally came to view Soviet naval presence-either actu-
al or potential-as inconsistent with their independ-
ence or nonalignment. Guinea, Tunisia, and
Singapore acted to limit Soviet access to their facili-
ties. One of the factors prompting Rene's decision in
1979 to limit calls to Victoria by all foreign naval
ships was the adverse publicity that Soviet involve-
ment in the Seychelles received in the West-publici-
ty that could undercut the tourist trade, which is a
major source of revenue.
Similarly, when Cape Verde officials were considering
Soviet offers that included establishing a limited
Soviet naval presence, they registered concern over
the effect of such a presence on the country's image.
This concern played a significant role in Cape Verde's
eventual decision to accept assistance, instead, from
France and Portugal. Even South Yemen, where there
is no evidence of any effort to cut back Soviet naval
activities, has taken pains to declare repeatedly that it
is not a Soviet "base" and has turned aside Soviet
requests for expanded access to facilities.
Of the states studied, Mauritius under the Ramgoo-
lam government displayed the least embarrassment
over occasional Soviet port visits and services to the
ships that called, probably because the President was
confident that the most important Western nations
viewed his government as essentially pro-Western. He
may also have seen Soviet visits as a way to reinforce
his nonaligned status by balancing the far more
extensive use of Mauritian facilities by the navies of
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
The argument that Mauritian facilities were available
to the navies of any friendly state may also have been
useful against the government's domestic political
opponents.
Escalation of specific regional tensions may encourage
a nation to reevaluate the balance between its need for
a show of Soviet support and its desire to preserve its
image of independence. Such thinking probably
prompted Syria's cooperaton with the USSR in a
naval exercise in the summer of 1981, Libya's decision
to expand its naval ties with Moscow, and the expand-
ed presence of Soviet ships in and near Tartus this
past summer.
Domestic political fears may at times outweigh con-
cerns about a nation's nonaligned status. The
Seychelles' President Rene, for example, may alter his
policies on naval visits to secure a firmer Soviet
commitment to protect his regime. Even then,
however, most Third World leaders probably will
clothe a minimum of concessions in the verbiage of
nonalignment.
Naval Interaction With Local Populations. Soviet
naval presence tends to be low key by Western
standards:
? Facilities are generally kept relatively small and
austere; many services are provided by Soviet auxil-
iary ships or floating drydocks rather than by local
concerns and shore facilities.
? Contact between naval personnel and local popula-
tions is limited.
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? Shore leave is restricted; small groups of sailors go
ashore accompanied by petty officers to sightsee and
make a few small purchases. Naval advisers and
technicians stationed in the host country are segre-
gated from the local community to the extent
possible and frequently play down their military
status.
This policy has both benefits and costs. On the one
hand, by keeping fixed facilities to a minimum, we
believe that the USSR tries to avoid embarrassing the
host country's political leadership with a large, visible
foreign military establishment. (Further, the floating
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support facilities can be easily removed if circum-
stances warrant.) On the other hand, the Soviet naval
presence is of only limited value in creating good
relations with the local population. Soviet exclusivity
is often resented by the local population, which has
little reason to value the benefits of the USSR's naval
presence and many reasons to dislike the lifestyle of
Soviet personnel stationed ashore.
For the most part, the Soviet Navy does not capitalize
effectively on the public relations aspects of port
visits; the Soviets probably are too security conscious
to do so. In spite of frequent Soviet references to the
sailor as an ambassador of goodwill, the Soviets
probably are more interested in influencing political
elites than the population of the countries they visit.
As a result, Soviet ships are seldom open to the public,
and when they are, access to most parts of the ships is
prohibited.
Soviet sailors have little money to spend and, while
their empty pockets and close supervision may protect
them from some of the worst errors of Western navy
men, local shopkeepers value their visits accordingly.
The contrast between the regimented Soviets and the
free-spending and freewheeling Westerners is noted
wherever both visit; in relatively free societies such as
Singapore, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, it seems
generally to redound to the credit of the West. Even in
an austere and authoritarian society such as Guinea,
US diplomatic officials have reported that US ship
visits were a welcome change from those of the
Soviets. By restricting contacts between Soviet naval
personnel and local populations, however, the Soviets
do avoid situations that might offend the citizens of
poor countries with different cultural and ethical
standards.
Fears of the Host Government. Most Third World
countries are concerned about the security threat
posed by a Soviet presence.1
Soviets are generally watched
career d attempts are made to control their
activities. Incidents such as Singapore's expulsion of a
Soviet shipyard official in early 1982 on espionage
charges serve to reinforce such fears. In two cases-
Guinea and Mauritius-there was real concern that
the Soviet naval presence might in some way aid
opposition elements. Conakry feared that the Guinean
military was being subverted by the Soviet presence
and acted to expel Soviet advisers, probably with the
acquiesence of the Guinean Navy. In Mauritius,
security concerns focused on rumors of Soviet naval
involvement in financing the ma' r ooi)ositipn to
Ramgoolam's government.
Economic Incentives. The economic incentives associ-
ated with Soviet naval presence are of mixed value to
both Moscow and the host state. Soviet military
assistance-both grants or concessional sales of naval
equipment and assistance with modernization or con-
struction of port and air facilities-can provide a
direct and significant economic benefit to Third
World countries. In most cases, there is no real
alternative to Soviet assistance; the countries receive
naval vessels, weapons, training, and facilities they
could not otherwise afford. The role of arms supplier,
even if not immediately associated with naval privi-
leges-as it was not in Libya and has not been in
Madagascar-is an option for the future. Neverthe-
less-as the Guinean and Somali cases illustrate-the
economic benefits, and even continued dependence for
spare parts and repair assistance, do not seem to be
sufficient to guarantee the Soviets continued access
over the long term.
Soviet port visits, whether continuous or intermittent,
do not appear to generate enough income to make
them a major factor in the local economy. In countries
such as Guinea and South Yemen, where many Soviet
ships call and some stay for long periods of time, the
Soviets apparently do not pay full commercial fees for
use of pier space and other facilities-a factor that
tends to create hostility rather than good feeling. In
these two countries, most repairs to Soviet ships are
accomplished by Soviet technicians working out of
naval auxiliaries, so little economic benefit-or tech-
nical spillover-results. In other countries, the Soviets
insist that all work inside their ships be done by their
own workmen-with somewhat the same result. A
facility like Ethiopia's Dahlak Island-which is cur-
rently the major support center for the Indian Ocean
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Squadron-is operated by the Soviets themselves and
provides almost no input to Ethiopia's economy.
Moreover, Moscow's consistent refusal to help nations
like India or Algeria develop an indigenous repair
capability for their Soviet-built units-which would
be of economic benefit-is a source of friction.
I-F
Although the provision of repair and overhaul services
may generate more economically significant benefits,
these do not seem sufficient to decisively influence
policies of interest to the Soviets. Tunisian officials
maintain that their decision to allow the overhaul of
Soviet naval ships in the Menzel Bourguiba shipyard
at Bizerte was based wholly on the economic benefits
and that the Soviet business remains "vital" to the
continued existence of the naval shipyard. Tunisia,
however, decided in 1979 not to allow the repair of
any more Soviet submarines. Singapore, too, wel-
comed Soviet naval use of its underutilized repair
facilities but has now temporarily refused further
access to its dockyards for Soviet naval ships. In both
cases, these actions were taken for larger political
purposes, and there is no evidence that the economic
losses involved were a key issue in the decisions. F_
If the USSR continues to expand its naval deploy-
ments to distant areas, it may change its attitude
regarding the acquisition and use of foreign facilities.
On the whole, however, we expect that the Soviets will
continue to be circumspect in their search for foreign
facilities and unwilling to pay a high political cost to
obtain or to keep them.
On the basis of the patterns shown in the case studies,
it is unlikely that the Soviets will establish large-scale
support facilities in any Third World state in the near
future. They will continue to develop those already in
existence, but not as "bases" as the US Navy under-
stands the term. They will continue their naval calls
and aircraft deployments to Libya so long as Qadhafi
permits. They are unlikely, however, to concentrate
much of their Mediterranean Squadron logistics in
Libya because of Qadhafi's wariness and their own
uncertainty concerning his intentions. Moscow will
probably cooperate with the new government in
Mauritius to exclude Western navies from Port Louis
and to intensify its campaign against the US base on
Diego Garcia. The Soviets will take any concessions
they can trade for their support of President Rene in
the Seychelles. They might divert some of the repair
work of the Indian Ocean Squadron to Diego Suarez
(Madagascar) in the unlikely event that they can gain
access there and may use Sri Lanka to compensate for
the restricted access to Singapore's shipyards. The
Soviets' effort to maintain a naval presence in both
North and South Yemen may be set back if tensions
between the two increase. Moscow may increase its
efforts to return naval reconnaissance aircraft to
Conakry and probably will continue to show the flag
intermittently at other West African ports. Through-
out the Third World, however, we believe that efforts
by the Soviets to use their naval presence will
continue to be undercut by Moscow's own predisposi-
tions against formal bases and by the sensitivities of
potential hosts.
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Appendix
Summary
The USSR has made little headway in securing a
naval presence in Cape Verde. Moscow has many ties
with Praia-including a continuing role as Cape
Verde's chief arms supplier-but has not yet been
able to parlay them into naval or air access. The
Soviet Navy has made only two port calls to Cape
Verde, both in 1979, and future visits are likely to be
very limited-in part because of the continuing defi-
ciencies of the major ports.
Moscow has tried to play on Cape Verde's maritime
interests to get a foot in the door. An American
Embassy evaluation notes that the Soviets have of-
fered to help with port improvement in return for the
use of naval facilities. According to the American
Charge, they have tried to negotiate a fisheries agree-
ment with Praia and have proposed cooperative air
patrols of Cape Verde's extensive fishing zones.
Soviet initiatives have been unsuccessful primarily
because of President Pereira's firm commitment to
nonalignment. Pereira has supported revolutionary
groups in Africa, such as the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and did permit
Cuban troops en route to Angola to use Cape Verde's
airfield-much to the dismay of the West. But he has
also taken steps to signal that Cape Verde is not in the
Soviet camp, such as requesting French and Portu-
guese help with maritime air patrols. Although
Pereira must contend with a domestic pro-Soviet
faction, so long as he is in power, Cape Verde is likely
to continue its balancing act and reject the establish-
ment of a Soviet naval presence.
coast of West Africa (see figure 3). They are on the
primary sea lanes between Europe and the Persian
Gulf-Indian Ocean area and are well situated to
support ASW operations and maritime reconnais-
sance covering the approaches to the Mediterranean.
Access to Cape Verde's port and air facilities also
would place Soviet resources nearer to US operating
areas in the central Atlantic.
Background: Relations Between
Cape Verde and the USSR
At first glance, Cape Verde would appear to be an
ideal target for Soviet penetration, and some Western
observers have repeatedly raised alarms concerning
this threat. The country is severely underdeveloped
because of an almost total lack of natural resources
and the devastating effects of an 11-year drought.
Cape Verde has ties to the USSR that date to the
early 1960s when the Soviets first became involved in
the joint independence struggle of Cape Verde and
Guinea-Bissau. Throughout the war for independence,
the Soviet Union was the primary source of military
and political support and still supplies arms to Cape
Verde. Cape Verde also developed ties to the Soviet-
backed independence groups in Africa, particularly
the MPLA. During the Angolan civil war, Cape
Verde served as a stopover point for Cuban soldiers
airlifted to Africa, and military-related flights be-
tween Cuba and Angola continue to stop in Cape
Verde.
Relations between the Soviet Union and Cape Verde,
however, have not developed wholly to Soviet satisfac-
tion. A number of factors have worked against Soviet
expectations:
? Cape Verde's economy has been almost totally
dependent on Western economic aid and remit-
tances from the large emigre communities in the
West.
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For both the USSR and the West, Cape Verde's
major attraction is its location. The 10 islands that
form the republic cover a 300-km horseshoe off the
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Figure 3
Cape Verde
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? The heritage of colonial status has conditioned Cape
Verde against accepting a new overlord, either
through arms dependence or political alliance.
? The ruling party in Cape Verde, the PAIGC (Marx-
ist African Party for the Independence of Guinea
and Cape Verde),6 has been less doctrinaire in power
than its revolutionary rhetoric has indicated. Since
independence, Cape Verde has specifically rejected
the "Marxist-Leninist path of development."
? US Embassy cables evaluating a communique to
President Carter and President Pereira's remarks
during private conversations state that Cape Verde
has become increasingly concerned about the appar-
ent permanence of Cuban forces in Africa. Such
concern has not led to disruption of Cuban-Cape
Verde relations but has caused incidents demon-
strating Cape Verde's dissatisfaction with the
Cuban role, such as delaying the accreditation of
the Cuban Ambassador to Praia (September 1979).
We believe these factors have reinforced President
Pereira's commitment to nonalignment. Pereira ap-
pears well aware of the danger of close ties with the
USSR-both in terms of potential domination and
alienation of Western economic donors-and he is
unlikely to permit Cape Verde to veer from the
nonaligned path as long as he continues to control the
PAIGC.
There has been a pro-Soviet element in Cape Verde's
internal politics, but it has insufficient strength to
force any change in Cape Verde's foreign policy.
According to cables from the US Embassy, a faction
of the party leadership-which at one time included
former Minister of Defense Silviano da Luz-has
argued for a redirection of Cape Verde's foreign
policy to include closer ties to the Soviet Bloc.
Although the faction included members of the defense
and security establishments, its influence has been
limited by the high prestige of President Pereira. For
his part, da Luz-now the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs-seems to have shifted to a more pragmatic line
on the issue of balancing Cape Verde's sources of
military assistance.
Naval Facilities
Cape Verde's main port is Porto Grande on Mindelo.
Although the port has ample protected anchorage, it
has very little berthing space for deep-draft vessels.
The port facilities, built in 1959, show the effects of
neglect, including the lack of modern cargo-handling
equipment. Even bunkering trade has fallen off be-
cause of the competition of other West African ports,
down to 90,000 tons annually from 700,000 tons in
the 1950s. Numerous underwater obstructions ham-
per the port's use for commercial purposes. Mindelo's
most significant drawback is the virtual absence of
fresh water. Among improvement projects under way
is a USAID desalinization plant; however, the lack of
natural fresh water will limit the provision of supply
to ships calling at Mindelo, at least until the plant is
completed.
The harbor at Praia on Sao Tiago currently is being
developed to handle oceangoing traffic. Included in
the renovations are structural repairs of the new pier
and the installation of cargo-handling equipment.
When the upgrading is complete, Praia will comple-
ment Mindelo. There are also minor ports on five of
the other islands, but they are in serious disrepair and
capable only of serving local needs.
For maritime reconnaissance, Cape Verde has only
Amilcar Cabral Airport on Sal. This jet runway was
built in 1969 to service commercial aircraft flying 25X1
between South Africa and Europe or the United
States. The airport can handle jumbo jets and there-
fore would be sufficient for both long- and short-
range maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Amilcar
Cabral Airport gained international recognition dur-
ing 1975-76 when thousands of Cubans were flown
through Cape Verde to support the civil war in
Angola. Cape Verde, aware of Western concern about
the flights, justified the heavy Cuban traffic in terms
of a 1976 civil transport agreement with Cuba. Presi-
dent Pereira maintained the fiction that the Cuban
passengers were civilians because Cape Verde was
firmly committed to the MPLA and because Cape
Verde needed the revenue from Cuba's air traffic.
Amilcar Cabral Airport continues to serve the civilian
air routes to Africa at a level of about 50 flights per 25X1
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week, and Pereira tries to keep the landing rights
question clear of political issues (such as movement of
Cuban personnel to and from Africa or flights to
South Africa).
Maritime Relations Between
Cape Verde and the USSR
The USSR does not have a naval presence in Cape
Verde. The naval relations between the two countries
consist of a series of Soviet overtures to secure naval
access or to tie naval affairs to other aspects of the
political dialogue.
Port Calls. Port calls have become part of Soviet
initiatives to Praia only recently. The first combatant
visit took place in August 1979 and was followed by a
second in November. No warships have visited since
then. Showing the flag in Cape Verde is unlikely to be
a consistent part of Soviet naval operations because of
Praia's current inability to support major naval visits.
Completion of port improvements could lead to an
increase in Soviet port calls.
Naval Aid. The USSR has donated as much naval
equipment as Cape Verde can absorb. In 1978 Cape
Verde was given a P-6 torpedo boat and a 45-foot
patrol boat (Kometta class). The larger craft was
attached to the fledgling Navy, rather than to the
merchant marine as the Soviets had expected.
the vessel apparently is confined to port
because of engine and fuel problems. In March 1979,
the Soviets gave Cape Verde the first of three prom-
ised Shershen-class torpedo boats. These gave Cape
Verde's Navy a limited capability to patrol its
200-mile territorial zone. The Shershen boats provid-
ed the USSR with a limited future link through the
provision of fuel oil and training of crews in the
USSR. None of these naval transfers has been signifi-
cant enough to provide positive naval entree for the
USSR. Cape Verde's inability to absorb more sophis-
ticated units probably will prevent successful use of
naval transfers as a source of influence for some time
to come
zone. The Soviets have tried to exploit this weakness
by offering Cape Verde three aircraft and pilot
training. The US Embassy in Praia reported that
President Pereira was not satisfied with the terms of
the offer and turned to the West for assistance. As
reported by the US defense attache in Dakar, he
requested that France include Cape Verde in the
patrols made by its Dakar-based aircraft. After a
year's delay, France undertook to perform the patrols
as requested. For its part, Portugal agreed to station
two patrol aircraft on Sal Island. Rejection of the
Soviet offer and subsequent request for French and
Portuguese assistance is in line with Pereira's efforts
to reaffirm Cape Verde's nonaligned status.
Fishing Agreement. Through its claim of a 200-mile
territorial sea, Cape Verde controls a substantial
fishing zone. Although Cape Verde is not capable of
fully exploiting its fisheries, the government envisions
expansion of the fisheries sector as a major part of
economic development. Fishing now accounts for half
of domestic exports, and Cape Verde does not want to
surrender its right to future catches.
The USSR has proposed a fisheries agreement on a
number of occasions. In August 1979, the fisheries
prosposal was tied to an offer of military equipment
and training but was refused. Most recently, in May
1980 a Soviet negotiator spent two weeks in Praia and
again left emptyhanded. This particular visit was
colored by the port call of a Soviet fish factory ship,
which contrary to Soviet intentions, may have raised
the specter of depletion of Cape Verde's fishing
grounds. As long as the USSR continues to press for
an unreasonable portion of Cape Verde's catch, it is
unlikely that the Soviets will secure naval presence via
a fisheries agreement.
Port Development Aid. The USSR has not provided
economic assistance to Cape Verde but has focused on
military assistance as the most fruitful field. In
August 1979 the Soviets offered to finance the devel-
opment of four ports on the lesser islands, but work
has yet to begin. The proposed improvements included
construction of quays for use by the fishing fleet. It
Maritime Patrol Assistance. Maritime patrol is a
serious issue for Cape Verde. Neither her Navy nor
Air Force is capable of patrolling the extensive fishing
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i op 3ecre[
seems likely that this first Soviet promise of economic
assistance was intended to support Soviet pressure for
a fisheries agreement.
Formal Naval Access. In addition to efforts to build
maritime ties, the Soviets have openly requested base
rights. In November 1978, Soviet concern over future
access to Guinea prompted a move to secure alternate
facilities in Cape Verde. The Soviet request was
denied with high-level statements that Cape Verde
would not permit any foreign bases on its territory.
The Soviet bid for naval access was renewed in
August 1979 in conjunction with the port improve-
ment agreement and again in December 1979 in
connection with an offer to build a new port at Sao
Vicente. Neither of these requests was accepted, and
we believe Pereira remains firmly committed to the
denial of foreign bases as part of nonalignment.
Refusal to yield to Soviet pressure in these cases has
not marked a turn away from the USSR, however.
Rather, it is part of a pattern of adherence to
nonalignment, a pattern not always pleasing to the
West. In mid-1978, for example, Pereira decided to
establish a military structure independent of Guinea-
Bissau. Capitalizing on her arms supply role, the
USSR increased her advisers in Cape Verde from 25
to 60 over a period of several months and made a
series of arms deliveries. These developments coincid-
ed with the flow of Cuban troops to Angola via Cape
Verde. Western nations were concerned about the
apparent increase in Soviet influence as well as about
the danger that the flow of arms would undercut
economic development proposals and precipitate inter-
nal instability. Given expressions of Western concern,
as well as increasing uneasiness about the Cuban
presence in Africa, Pereira attempted to placate the
West without losing the benefits of Soviet arms aid.
Pereira moved to strengthen his internal power base
and made the decision to request French and Portu-
guese maritime assistance. Similarly, Pereira appar-
ently hesitated to take a planned trip to Moscow
because of his disapproval of Soviet activities in
Afghanistan.
relationship with the USSR.
Naval Prospects
The Soviets are unlikely to be able to secure a naval
presence in Cape Verde. None of Pereira's decisions
have been part of a break with the USSR or a shift to
the West. Following the coup in Guinea-Bissau in
November 1980-which disrupted Cape Verde's close
ties with its mainland partner-Pereira did indicate
his desire to improve relations with the West, but such
moves will not be at the expense of continued ties with
the USSR or Soviet Bloc nations. Cape Verde's ties
with Cuba will continue, both through the nonaligned
movement and through Cuban aid projects, such as
the upgrading of Amilcar Cabral Airport. Relations
with Warsaw Pact states will be pursued through
Cape Verde's East Berlin Embassy. The Soviets will
continue to use any available leverage to press for
naval access. President Pereira has shown, however,
that he is wary of Soviet designs and is capable of
controlling the domestic forces that push for a wider
Summary
In Guinea, the Soviet Navy played a direct role in
forging close ties and building Soviet influence. The
Soviet Navy has maintained a permanent ship pres-
ence in Guinea since 1970, and from 1973 to 1977
Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft operated from
Conakry airfield, flying surveillance missions against
US ships transiting the North Atlantic. The Soviets
have provided substantial assistance to the Guinean
Navy, including ships and technical assistance for
training and maintenance.
Nevertheless, the Soviet naval presence has often been
an irritant in the relationship between the two coun-
tries, adding to other, more important pressures-
such as the ineffectiveness of Soviet economic and
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technical aid-rather than alleviating them. President
Sekou Toure welcomed the Soviet naval presence in
Guinea when he felt insecure domestically and ten-
sions were high between Guinea and several of its
West African neighbors. As the tensions and insecuri-
ty faded during the mid-1970s, the Soviet presence
increasingly was viewed as a burden rather than a
resource.
In 1977 Toure canceled Soviet access for TU-95
Bear D reconnaissance aircraft; in late 1978 most
Soviet military advisers were sent home; and in early
1979 new restrictions were imposed on the movements
of Soviet ships in Conakry harbor. Throughout the
decade, the Guineans resisted Soviet offers to build
for them a well-developed naval base, a portion of
which would be dedicated to Soviet use.
It is not clear to what extent these limitations on
Soviet access have contributed to the decline in Soviet
naval deployments to the region and in the number
and length of Soviet ship visits to Conakry. It may be
that the drop in deployments has resulted from a
decline in Soviet interest in the region, as Soviet
attention was focused on conflicts elsewhere in the
world during 1979 and 1980. On the other hand, it is
possible that the Soviets' inability to maintain unim-
peded access to the port and airfield at Conakry and
to develop more substantial support facilities in
Guinea has frustrated what might have been larger
Soviet plans for the region
Recurrent domestic unrest in the past two years may
bring about a tightening of the frayed Soviet connec-
tion and a resurgence in the Soviet naval presence.
The regime is not unified behind the policy of distanc-
ing Guinea from the USSR. On balance, however,
Toure and many among his leadership now appear to
view the Soviets as a major part of their problems-
particularly the economic situation-and have ceased
to see Soviet assistance as the potential solution. F_
Background: The Relationship Between
Guinea and the USSR
From the time Guinea became independent from
France in 1958, the USSR had focused attention and
large amounts of military and developmental assist-
ance on Sekou Toure's revolutionary government, and
the Soviets came to view Guinea as one of the most
"progressive" states in Africa. Yet the relationship
between the two was characterized by considerable
friction, resulting from Toure's prickly independence
and Soviet clumsiness. By 1970 two Soviet Ambassa-
dors had been expelled for meddling in internal
politics, and tensions had mounted over the cancella-
tion by Guinea of a substantial Soviet agricultural
project and Soviet violations of its fishing agreement
In November 1970, following two raids by comman-
dos from neighboring Portuguese Guinea-then a
Portuguese colony-Soviet naval ships deployed to
Guinea in response to an appeal from President
Toure. The abortive Portuguese-sponsored raid
heightened Toure's sense of vulnerability to internal
and external forces, and over the next few years the
USSR was able to play on that vulnerability. The
Soviet Navy established a patrol in West African
waters, centered in Conakry, and the USSR reestab-
lished its position as the preeminent foreign influence
in the government of Guinea.
Naval Facilities
Conakry is the only port in Guinea capable of han-
dling international commercial traffic or major naval
ships (see figure 4). Berths are available for about
three large oceangoing ships and five smaller ones,
and there is a large sheltered anchorage with depths
of 11 to 15 meters. Parts of the harbor are shallow
and subject to silting. Perishable provisions and water
are available, but there are no bunkering facilities.
Soviet ships normally moor at a quay in Conakry that
belongs to the Soviet bauxite mining concern. They
also anchor in the roadstead (an offshore area with
good holding ground and some protection from the
sea) outside Conakry harbor, partly to avoid the
crowding of the commercial port facilities and possi-
bly because they are less visible there. The ships
frequently anchor in the sheltered waters off Tamara
Island and the Kassa Islands.
The Soviets have used the workshops of the joint
bauxite concern for making minor repairs, fabricating
some spare parts, and storing essential spares. Addi-
tional spares and other supplies have been shipped in
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Figure 4
Guinea
Guinea
31
Atlantic FREETOW k
Ocean
0 100
from the USSR and stored in the Conakry area.
Limited repairs can be performed by the Soviet
mechanics assigned as advisers to the Guinean Navy,
but more complicated work requires a special visit by
a repair ship, thus involving lengthy delays.
the
Soviets as early as 1971 made one of their repeated
offers to build a new naval base on Tamara Island,'
which lies about 13 kilometers west of Conakry. The
proposals evidently included the construction of two
facilities, one for the use of the Guinean Navy and the
other for Soviet use.
' Development of Tamara Island into a naval base would involve
extensive dredging, because the waters there are too shallow to
accommodate large ships. The facilities currently on Tamara Island
Conakry notes that Toure has consistently opposed
such an arrangement on the grounds that an exclusive
Soviet base would encroach upon Guinean sovereignty
and compromise its nonaligned posture.)
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Soviet Use of Guinean Facilities
Early Deployments. Soviet naval visits to Guinea
began in 1969; two groups consisting of destroyers
and submarines made formal "show the flag" calls
during that year, and three space event support ships
called during 1970 in the months before the comman-
do attacks
During the next year-until September 1971-there
were additional deployments to the area. Most of
these ships called in Conakry during their tours of
duty, but these deployments differed from later ones.
The ships spent far more time at sea, evidently
patrolling the waters off Bissau, the capital of then
Portuguese Guinea. Port calls were brief and unpubli-
cized. When in Conakry, the ships were docked
unobtrusively. Replenishment often took place at sea.
By September the Soviets evidently had decided that
requirements-and opportunities-in the area called
for a more permanent, visible presence. The "West
African Patrol" was established as a continuous activ-
ity, and its character changed. After September 1971,
the ships that were sent to the Gulf of Guinea were
mostly inactive, visiting Conakry and other littoral
ports for long periods of time, neither patrolling nor
exercising, and operating only while moving from one
port to another. In Conakry, the ships became more
visible; one combatant often was docked in clear sight
of the Presidential Palace. An amphibious ship, with
naval infantry personnel and vehicles aboard, became
a regular part of the contingent. From this time on,
data provided by the Naval Ocean Surveillance Infor-
mation Center on West African deployments indicate
that virtually all of the ships sent to West Africa were
detailed directly from their fleets for several months'
duty.
It is our judgment that the reasons for these changes
were twofold. Toure's security fears had begun to
focus increasingly on internal as opposed to external
threats, and a visible Soviet presence in port was
relevant to those concerns. In addition, continual ad
hoc deployments to the area must have imposed
operational hardships on the Soviet Navy, diverting
ships from patrol duties in the Strait of Gibraltar and
drawing down forces in the Mediterranean. Routine
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Table 1
Soviet Naval Ship Visits to Guinea
Overall Ship-days
in West African
Waters
Ships Arriving
in Conakry
Combatants/
Auxiliaries/
Research Ships
Ship-Days in
Conakry
Average Duration
of Stay (days)
Number of ships
Staying more
Than 20 days
57
8
NA
339
13
4
535
10
4
1973
839
37
19/17/1
358
12
1974
1,354
32
9/18/5
880
26
1975
987
27
10/17/0
573
23
1976
1,785
50
21/27/2
1,058
22
1977
3,595
67
23/35/9
1,375
23
1978
4,110
76
21/35/20
1,414
15
1979
3,049
49
19/26/4
913
19
1980
2,693
40
16/22/2
685
17
1981
1,596
33
14/16/3
319
10
programing of ships for duties in West African waters
probably seemed increasingly sensible to Soviet Navy
planners.
Formal Naval Access. In spite of extensive Soviet
assistance to Guinea and use of its facilities, the two
countries have not concluded a Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation. In late 1971, following the estab-
lishment of a permanent presence in and near Cona-
kry, a high-ranking Soviet military delegation visited
Guinea to request the use of Guinean facilities and to
negotiate a formal agreement establishing Soviet
rights. President Sekou Toure is reported publicly to
have rejected the Soviet request sharply, lecturing the
visiting delegation on his country's independence and
the meaning of nonalignment.
indicated to the US Charge that they were satisfied
with the "de facto" rights they enjoyed-virtually
unlimited access to Conakry for Soviet naval ships.
A Maturing Naval Presence. Table 1 and figures 5
and 6 portray Soviet naval presence in West African
waters and in Conakry from 1970-80, and show how
that presence changed over the decade. From 1972
through 1976, Soviet ships deployed to West Africa
spent a large portion of their time in Conakry har-
bor-more than 50 percent in all but one year and
almost 60 percent during 1975 and 1976. By 1974
some Soviet ships were staying in Conakry for many
months at a time, and an amphibious ship and one or
more oilers were present almost continuously.
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Top Secret
Figure 5
Soviet Naval Presence in West African Waters
West Africa
Conakry
Figure 6
Ship-days in Conakry as a Percent of Days
Spent in West African Waters
Q West Africa
17-71 Conakry
to the Soviets. All of these ships, including a Kresta II
cruiser and a J-class diesel-powered guided-missile
submarine, were replenished in Conakry. From this
time on, a guided-missile destroyer became a regular
feature of the Conakry contingent, and there were
seldom fewer than three or four Soviet ships present.
In January 1976, during the airlift and sealift of
materiel to the Soviet-backed faction in the Angolan
civil war, the Soviet Navy augmented its naval forces
in the region-probably to protect Soviet and Cuban
shipping and demonstrate support for the MPLA,
and, possibly, to discourage Western military involve-
ment. Clearly, Soviet access to Guinea made these
deployments easier and may even have been essential
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Soviet deployments to West African waters more than
doubled in 1977 and 1978 over previous levels, and
the numbers of ships visiting Conakry remained high,
but Conakry lost its unique role in the support of
West African operations. The percentage of time that
ships on patrol in West African waters spent in
Conakry dropped back steadily during 1977-80. Still,
Conakry remained the regional home port for most
Soviet combatants sent to West Africa.
There probably were at least two reasons for this
change. Most important, access to Luanda, Angola
provided an alternative port for regular calls, reducing
the need for Conakry and shifting the center of
gravity for the West African patrol. A second factor
was the deterioration of Soviet-Guinean relations to
the point that ship visits caused friction between the
two governments.
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In June 1977, after assuring US officials for a year
that he would refuse the Soviets further access to
Guinean airfields for TU-95 flights, President Toure
finally did so. Formal statements to the US Embassy
in Conakry indicate that Toure was concerned about
the attention the flights received and the threat they
represented to his nonaligned image. Soviet use of
Guinean facilities for military missions aimed at US
forces also raised the prospect of Guinean involvement
in a US-Soviet conflict. In addition, Toure may have
hoped that he would receive some economic or mili-
tary assistance from the United States and other
Western countries if access for the reconnaissance
flights was ended.
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The Impact of the Soviet Naval Presence
Advantages for Conakry. The Soviet Navy has per-
formed a number of functions useful to Guinea.
Beginning with the Portugese-sponsored raids in
1970, Soviet ships repeatedly came to Guinea at
Toure's request, at times abruptly altering scheduled
movements to respond to his needs. In January 1973,
following the assassination in Guinea of Amilcar
Cabral,' a Soviet destroyer left the harbor to pursue
' The leader of the PAIGC-the Front for the Liberation of
(Portuguese) Guinea and Cape Verde-who was then resident in
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Government.
some of the dissidents associated with the attack,
captured them, and turned them over to the Guinea
ized" for service in West African waters.
The USSR has provided at low cost most of the ships
that make up the Guinea Navy, including, in recent
years, three old Shershen-class torpedo boats, a modi-
fied submarine chaser, and a T-43 patrol combatant.
The delivery of the T-43 was eagerly awaited, and the
ship was formally presented to Guinea in a July 1979
ceremony by a high-level Soviet delegation, with most
of the Guinean leadership present. The ship was said
to have been reconditioned and "completely tropical-
genuine friendship and gratitude. I 25X1
doubt this hospitality has represented feelings of
Guinean students to sea for several days of training.
In September 1980 the new Soviet naval hospital ship,
Ob, visited Conakry for 12 days, offering medical 25X1
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military and political elite. During the 1970s, numer-
ous parties were given to commemorate the departure
of various naval ships or groups of personnel, and no
But What Have You Done for Me Lately? Neverthe-
less, occasions for mutual irritation have also arisen
with frequency; on balance, resentment seems to have
outweighed gratitude in Guinean attitudes toward the
Soviet presence.
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Opportunities to visit Soviet ships while in port have
been infrequent, but tours have occasionally been
given to groups of Guineans.
since 1978 the scientific research vessel
Mikhail Lomonosov has repeatedly taken groups of
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Guinean Efforts To Restrict the Soviet Presence.
Eventually, Guinea's growing reputation as a Soviet
base of operations and a loyal client clearly bothered
Sekou Toure and many of his associates. An intimate
relationship between Guinea and the USSR was
reinvigorated in the early 1970s during a period when
Guinea was threatened-or seemed to be-by inter-
nal and external forces. During the Angolan civil war
in 1975-76, Guinean and Soviet objectives in the
region coincided, and Toure probably was quite will-
ing to have the Soviets use Guinean facilities for
operations in support of those objectives. As the
tensions between Guinea and its neighbors lessened,
however, Toure's dependence upon the Soviets dimin-
ished, and Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa be-
came a matter of concern rather than reassurance.
ence increasingly was regarded by the government of
Guinea not as a resource but as a burden accepted
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because of the substantial Soviet military and civilian
assistance. Guinean officials began to chafe under
that presence.
First to go, in 1977, were the Soviet naval reconnais-
sance aircraft. By mid-1978, there were rumors in the
international diplomatic community that Toure had
asked that the Soviet ships stationed in Conakry be
withdrawn, although there is no evidence to confirm
or deny that such a request was ever made. In late
1978, however, the Guinean Government did ask the
Soviet Union to withdraw most of its military and
civilian advisers. The Cuban advisory presence was
concurrently reduced. Following the exodus in No-
vember 1978, probably no more than about two dozen
the reasons for
the expulsion of the Soviets were many: grievances
over the bauxite venture, fishing agreements, and
other commercial arrangements played a significant
role, as did high-level concern with the danger of
subversion of the Guinean military. Most important,
however, was Guinean frustration with a highly ineffi-
cient foreign expert presence-particularly significant
ordered that new instructions be promulgated to
tighten control over the Soviet naval presence. The
Soviets were to submit a written request to the
Ministry of External Affairs 48 hours in advance of
any ship arrival. Guinean officials were to supervise
the movements of Soviet ships closely and to assign
Soviet port calls to Conakry have declined, but the
restrictions may be only part of the reason for the
presence of fewer ships
in the area of economic development.
The Soviets seemed capable only of
providing military assistance-and even that was
perceived as less effective than the military equipment
and training that could be obtained from Western
countries
ability of Soviet equipment and the lack of spare parts
continued to be voiced, and professional ties between
the two navies appeared to be quite limited.
At the time the advisers were sent home, there were
reports that Guinea would terminate the Soviet naval
ship presence by the end of the year, but no discern-
ible changes in that presence followed.
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there was considerable difficulty in renegotiating the
fishing agreement in early 1981, partly (according to
US Embassy assessments) because of public com-
plaints about Soviet overfishing.
It is difficult to assess the impact that Toure's efforts
to restrict Soviet access had on Soviet naval presence
in Conakry. No publicity was ever given to the new
policies, and there was no sharp or immediate drop in
the number of Soviet ships visiting Guinea. The
decline in the use of Conakry as opposed to other
West African ports-such as Luanda-predates this
period by more than a year (see figure 5). But the
numbers of Soviet ships visiting Conakry and the
average length of their stay continued to decline after
the events of late 1978 and early 1979. Overall Soviet
deployments to West African waters dropped off
sharply in 1979, 1980, and 1981, a fact which proba-
bly reflects at least a temporary decline in the Soviet
Union's emphasis on the area, particularly in view of
crises and conflicts elsewhere in the world.
The difficulties with Guinea may, however, have
affected the Soviet Navy's ability or willingness to use
Guinean facilities as much as it would have liked and
therefore to maintain as many ships in the region as it
would have preferred. The continued search for facili-
ties in the northern part of West Africa-especially in
Cape Verde-certainly argues for continued Soviet
interest in access to facilities that would augment or
replace those in Guinea. Facilities in Luanda, because
they are so far south, are not a satisfactory replace-
ment. It is at least possible, therefore, that the Soviets'
difficulties in securing free access to the airfield and a
well-developed naval support facility at Conakry have
frustrated what were larger plans for the West Afri-
can area.
Evaluating the Role of the Navy
in the Soviet-Guinean Relationship
Given the extensive ties between the USSR and
Guinea, it is difficult to isolate the role played by the
Soviet Navy in cementing relations with Guinea and
influencing its domestic and foreign policy direction.
On balance, however, the Soviet naval involvement in
Guinea appears to have been an important element in
the equation, both when relations were on the upswing
and when they began to deteriorate
For a number of years-from 1970 through about
1976-the Soviet Navy was successful in promoting
Guinean dependence on the USSR as well as a
general identity of views on many questions. Toure
seems to have relied upon the Soviet ships in Conakry
to discourage opposition from inside or outside the
country and to deal with such acts if necessary. By
selling Guinea old ships and craft, the Soviets created
a continuing need for spare parts, training, and repair
services. Extensive Soviet technical and managerial
assistance to both civilian and military agencies-
including the Navy-built a dependence on the Sovi-
ets throughout the Guinean bureaucracy. Finally,
during the Angolan civil war, the Soviets and Guin-
eans cooperated to support the faction they both
favored, with Guinea providing valuable facilities for
Soviet ships and aircraft participating in the support
operation.
Nevertheless, Guinea's dependence was insufficient,
once the two countries' interests diverged, to ensure
the continuation of all of the USSR's privileges. At
some point during the mid-1970s, as Toure's security
concerns lessened, the considerable Soviet naval pres-
ence in Guinea became an irritant in the relationship.
Moreover, Guineans began to chafe under their de-
pendence on Moscow, particularly because Soviet
economic, technical, and military assistance appeared
less effective than what Guinea's neighbors were
receiving from Western countries.
A recurrence of domestic unrest could bring about a
tightening of the frayed Soviet connection and a
resurgence in Soviet naval presence. The regime is not
unified behind the policy of distancing Guinea from
the USSR. On balance, however, Toure and many of
his followers now appear to view the Soviets as a
major part of their problems-particularly the eco-
nomic situation-rather than the potential solution to
them
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Summary
Soviet naval deployments to Mauritius have been
relatively ineffective thus far in improving govern-
ment-to-government relations between Mauritius and
the USSR. However, with the departure of the pro-
Western Ramgoolam government following the vic-
tory of the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) in
the June 1982 elections, it is likely that the USSR's
overall influence in Mauritius will increase. Soviet
naval presence-and naval-related policies on Diego
Garcia and the Indian Ocean zone of peace
(IOZP)10-will have played a small part in building a
strong position for the USSR with the new govern-
ment.
The Ramgoolam government tolerated occasional So-
viet port calls to maintain its nonaligned image and to
bring in needed foreign exchange, but the substantive
benefits of the program to the USSR were limited to
the support its ships received. Indeed, some naval
activities, most notably the Soviet Navy's suspected
role in providing financial support to the chief opposi-
tion party, were a constant source of friction between
the governments. The new government has not yet
taken any position on the question of Soviet naval
access. The MMM is officially opposed to the pres-
ence of foreign navies in the Indian Ocean and,
despite its ties to Moscow, may act to ban calls by
foreign warships. Moscow probably will accept such a
policy-as it did in the Seychelles-because of its
concern for limiting Western naval access and its
desire to maintain good relations with the new govern-
ment
Background: Relations Between
Mauritius and the USSR
Soviet relations with the pro-Western Mauritian Gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Sir Seewoosagun Ram-
goolam were correct, although not extensive or uni-
formly amicable. State-to-state contacts revolved for
10 The IOZP is a proposal for regional demilitarization introduced
by Indian Ocean littoral states in the early 1970s. The concept has
been supported by many Third World states in the United Nations
and other international forums, but it has been something of a
a decade around Soviet aid in developing a Mauritian
fishing and fish-processing industry in return for
limited supply and servicing of Soviet naval and
merchant ships. Nevertheless, the USSR devoted
considerable attention to this small island state. The
Navy was a major instrument of Soviet diplomacy in
Mauritius; its success was limited, but it may share
credit for an improvement in the Soviet position now
that the MMM has come to power. Soviet policy on
the naval-related issues of the US facility on Diego
Garcia and the Indian Ocean zone of peace, which
was used to put pressure on the Ramgoolam govern-
ment, probably will reinforce Soviet ties to the
MMM
Before Mauritian independence from Great Britain,
Soviet contacts with Mauritians were limited to covert
financial support for leftwing labor leaders, occasional 25X1
scholarships for study in the USSR, and occasional
visits to Port Louis by Soviet merchant ships and
space-associated naval auxiliaries. Mauritius was
granted independence in March 1968, but almost a
year passed before the USSR established diplomatic
ties with the new state. Despite the lack of trade or 25X1
consular interest, however, the Soviet Union's Embas-
sy staff soon was second in size only to Great
Britain's.
During the first year of formal relations, the Soviets
undertook a vigorous program of diplomatic initia-
tives. According to a State Department cable Ram-
goolam told US officials that in March 1969 they
approached the Mauritian Government, unsuccessful-
ly, concerning landing rights for space support air-
craft and permission to operate a space tracking
station in Mauritius. In April of the same year, a
Soviet combatant visited for the first time. An agree- 25X1
ment was reached in August 1969 under which the
USSR would help establish a Mauritian fishing in-
dustry in exchange for Mauritian servicing of Soviet
trawlers and research ships at Port Louis, and in
September a cultural accord was signed.
The results of these initiatives, which we view as
having been largely disappointing to both sides, estab-
lished the pattern of relations throughout the next
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decade. Repeated requests by the Soviets for space
tracking facilities and military landing rights have
repeatedly been denied. (The former government of
Mauritius occasionally allowed US patrol aircraft to
use Plaisance Airfield.) The Mauritians have also
refused to grant the USSR permission to develop
bunkering or other facilities at the largely dormant
Grand Port, across the island from Port Louis. Occa-
sional rumors that the former government might
grant the Soviets a base on the island probably
resulted from irritation with the way in which the
United States and Britain have handled the develop-
ment of Diego Garcia or may have been an effort to
proposals. Moscow was aware that its ties to the
MMM could backfire-possibly damaging the
MMM's popularity
The victory of Berenger's party in the
June 1982 election almost guarantees that relations
with Mauritius will improve, possibly providing the
basis for an increase in the Soviet naval presence
extract greater US and British support.
The Soviet-Mauritian fishing agreement, which has
been a source of friction between the two states, was
not renewed in 1979. Prior to 1979, dissatisfaction led
the Mauritians to limit the scope of the agreement,
whose renewal was often delayed by acrimonious
domestic debate. During the early 1970s, the Mauri-
tians reportedly considered the equipment provided by
the Soviets as overpriced and obsolete, and Soviet
technical assistance was characterized by a govern-
ment official as "unrealistic and uneconomic." Ac-
cording to a US Embassy cable, in 1974 a Mauritian
official noted that the Soviets were using the fisheries
agreement for intelligence gathering, and in 1978 the
Fisheries Minister publicly threatened to press for the
closing of the Soviet Embassy if Soviet trawlers
continued to overexploit Mauritian waters. Although
unable to negotiate new fishing licenses, in April 1982
the Soviet Ministry of Fish Industry signed a contract
with a newly formed Mauritian company to provide
logistic support to fishing ships calling in Mauritius.
Unofficial Soviet activities in Mauritius constituted
an important source of tension with the Ramgoolam
leadership, but they may be the basis for successful
relations with the current government. Soviet finan-
cial support to the MMM angered the Labor Party
enough to contribute to the rejection of Soviet aid
Naval Facilities
The major port in Mauritius, Port Louis, is among the
best in the western Indian Ocean (see figure 7). It
contains one of the largest ship repair facilities in the
region. Nevertheless, Port Louis is congested and can
offer only limited bunkering and repair services to
large naval vessels. The Port Louis harbor is deep
enough for all but the deepest draft Soviet vessels and
is sheltered except during the hurricane season from
December to April. There are two deepwater quays,
one of which is dedicated to discharging and loading
fertilizer, while the other is available to naval ships.
Port Louis contains one berth for large ships, 10 for
medium-size ships, and five for small ships. Water
and marine diesel oil are available on a commercial
basis. For ship repair, there is one drydock that can
accommodate ships of up to 107 meters in length,
with a 15.5-meter beam and a 3.6-meter draft-too
small for cruisers or destroyers. Moreover, the Mauri-
tians insist that all repairs be done by Mauritian
labor-a requirement that might well discourage any
Soviet naval use of the drydock, because the Soviets
prefer to handle all interior work themselves.
Grand Port, on the southeastern shore of Mauritius,
was used by the United States and Britain during
World War II but has fallen into disuse. It contains
some oil storage installations and could conceivably be
developed as a deepwater anchorage. While the UK-
Mauritian defense treaty was in force, Great Britain
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had to approve any development of Grand Port. Since
the expiration of the treaty in March 1976, the
government of Mauritius has continued to refuse
Soviet initiatives to establish naval facilities there.
Plans for commercial development of Grand Port
make it unlikely the harbor would be used for military
purposes.
Plaisance Airport, 48 km from Port Louis, is an
international airfield with a 2,600-meter runway.
Aeroflot aircraft have used Plaisance to transport
Soviet fishing crews, but no Soviet military aircraft
have landed there.
Soviet Use of Mauritian Facilities
Several Soviet naval ships have called at Mauritius
every year since the country became independent in
1968 (see table 2). Visits normally last about a week,
and the ships usually take on water and provisions but
not fuel. Naval hydrographic ships and space event
support ships have made up a sizable proportion of the
visiting ships, but once or twice a year Soviet combat-
ants have made formal port calls, often in conjunction
with Mauritian Independence Day celebrations. A
typical visiting task force numbers two to four ships,
including a cruiser or destroyer. Combatant visits rose
sharply in 1979, when the Kiev-class VTOL carrier
Minsk and elements of its task force called twice at
Mauritius while operating in the Indian Ocean en
route to their home port in the Pacific. The Minsk was
accompanied during these visits by a Kara-class cruis-
er and the Ivan Rogov, a new amphibious assault ship.
The 17 calls by Soviet naval ships during 1979 placed
Port Louis third among Indian Ocean ports, after
Dahlak Island (Ethiopia) and Aden (South Yemen).
The 1979 level of visits clearly was an anomaly,
however, standing out from the lower level of visits
during 1977-78 and 1980-81.
Mauritian permission for official port calls has tended
to reflect the overall state of relations with the USSR
and-at times-Mauritian pique over Soviet actions.
In 1980, for example, the Soviets requested permis-
sion for their standard official port call in connection
Table 2
Soviet Naval Visits to Mauritius
Number of Ships
Ship-Days Spent
in Mauritius
1968
8
1969
15
89
1970
23
137
1971
12
52
1972
26
154
1973
12
85
1974
15
84
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Impact of Soviet Naval Presence
Building Domestic Influence. There are no Soviet
naval personnel stationed in Mauritius. Soviet crews
of several hundred men are present during port calls,
but they are allowed only limited shore leave. Conse-
quently, Mauritian contact with Soviet naval person-
nel is slight.
The Soviet Navy missed an opportunity to have an
impact in Mauritius when the island was hit by
Cyclone Gervaise in February 1975. The Soviet task
force arrived at Mauritius eight days later than US
and French ships, whose crews had already completed
most of the necessary repairs by the time the Soviets
appeared. Soviet sailors did manage to repair some
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electrical and communications lines, roads, and water
pipes, and they contributed 32 liters of blood. The
Soviet ships had apparently been dispatched to Mau-
ritius to counterbalance Western relief efforts, but the'
tardiness and niggardliness of Soviet aid was resented
by Mauritian officials and criticized even by the
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Mauritian leftist paper Le Populaire.
When Soviet naval ships arrive at Port Louis, the
commanding officers fulfill routine protocol duties,
such as visiting leading members of the Mauritian
Government, laying wreaths at national monuments,
and hosting receptions aboard ship for leading offi-
cials and the Mauritian-USSR Friendship Society.
Press conferences have been given, and ship musicians
have performed on Mauritian television. Soviet sailors
on shore leave are usually kept in small groups
accompanied by a petty officer and must return to the
ship before nightfall. Their supply of local currency is
limited; consequently, according to US Embassy per-
sonnel, the arrival of a Soviet ship arouses less interest
among the local population than that of a Western
one because the sailors spend less money than their
Western counterparts.
Soviet warships are occasionally opened for tours, and
a few Mauritian officials and businessmen sometimes
go aboard. typically,
however, security is tight and the ships are off limits
to the Mauritian public.
Influencing Domestic Politics. Visiting Soviet ships
typically take $5,000 to $10,000 in Mauritian curren-
cy for provisions and somewhat less for crews to spend
ashore. Mauritian officials have expressed doubts at
times about how much of the money actually is spent
by the Soviet crews-especially when the Soviets
draw much larger amounts of currency-and accord-
ing to a US Embassy report, there have been several
reports of Soviet naval involvement in the covert
disbursement of funds to the MMM before the party
came to power. In 1976 Prime Minister Ramgoolam
told US officials that the Soviet naval ships had
drawn much more in local currency than they had
Cooperative Policies on Regional Issues: Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace and Diego Garcia. A primary
Soviet objective in the Indian Ocean is to limit or
deny Western naval access. To this end, the Soviets
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have enthusiastically endorsed the concept of an
Indian Ocean zone of peace (IOZP)-possibly because
they recognize that it is unlikely to be established.
They have consistently supported the efforts of Indian
Ocean states to discuss the issue in international
forums. As a corollary of this support, the Soviets
constantly raise the issue of the US presence on Diego
Garcia
Ramgoolam's policy with regard to the IOZP was
complicated. He endorsed the concept in principle
but, according to a State Department cable, he indi-
cated to former Secretary of State Muskie that he
remained uneasy about the military consequences of
limiting Western naval forces in the region. His
government did not play a leading role on the issue,
but the MMM was very active in its support of the
IOZP and has strong ties to the leaders of the
Seychelles and Madagascar, both of which are com-
mitted to the IOZP.
Diego Garcia remains a potent issue in Mauritian
politics. The island was administered by the British
during the colonial period. In 1965 the then self-
governing colony of Mauritius (led by Ramgoolam)
ceded the island to the British for $7.2 million in
development aid. The United Kingdom subsequently
created the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)
from a number of Indian Ocean islands to provide
sites for joint UK-US military facilities-chief among
them, Diego Garcia
The terms under which the island was transferred are
controversial. Ramgoolam claims that he ceded Diego
Garcia in exchange for a promise of quicker independ-
ence for Mauritius and that London misled him
concerning its plans for the island. The British deny
this and maintain that their subsequent payment of
some $1.6 million to the government of Mauritius to
resettle about 1,200 indigenous residents of Diego
Garcia and $3 million to the residents themselves
fully discharges British responsibility in the transfer.
Nevertheless, in a later agreement, the British agreed
to provide almost $8 million to the residents
The Ramgoolam government privately expressed sat-
isfaction to the US Secretary of State with the US
military presence on Diego Garcia and with the
presence of US naval forces in the region, but it felt
compelled by the MMM to raise the issue energetical-
ly in public. Although Ramgoolam also called for the
return of Diego Garcia, he mainly focused on ways in
which Britain and the United States might defuse the
issue-by hiring Mauritians for construction projects
on the island or by paying rent to Mauritius.
Opposition to US use of Diego Garcia and the return
of the island to Mauritian sovereignty are crucial
planks in the MMM's foreign policy. The new govern-
ment may have to moderate its stand, however, to
incorporate efforts to obtain employment for Mauri-
tians on Diego Garcia. MMM rhetoric may remain
hostile, but a compromise similar to that practiced by
Ramgoolam may be adopted now that the MMM is in
power
Naval Prospects
The MMM probably will join the Seychelles and
Madagascar in even more strident criticism of the US
naval base. An MMM government, however, may not
lead to the expansion of Moscow's naval presence in
Mauritius. Even under the MMM, Mauritius is un-
likely to exclude only Western ships from its ports.
The government will probably adopt a formula that
restricts visits by all non-Indian Ocean ships similar
to that used by Rene in the Seychelles. Under such a
policy, French ships might still be able to call because
France's ownership of the island of Reunion gives it
the status of an Indian Ocean nation. Western navies
may be affected by the ban more noticeably than the
USSR. The Soviet Navy will suffer too, but the new
government may incorporate loopholes advantageous
to the USSR. Even without such concessions, Moscow
is unlikely to oppose the new government's policy.
Elimination or restriction of Western naval access and
the overall tenor of relations with Mauritius are
probably more important to Moscow than the right to
Summary
Soviet efforts in Seychelles reflect a sophisticated,
long-term approach, and the Soviets have been flexi-
ble in using their Navy to pursue influence with the
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Socialist government of President Albert Rene. Soviet
ships have been sent to Victoria on several occa-
sions-reportedly at the President's request-when
Rene believed his government was endangered." At
the end of 1981, Soviet ships responded to a merce-
nary coup attempt and remained in Victoria harbor
until a measure of domestic order had been restored.
Moscow also dispatched two warships to Victoria in
May 1982-one month prior to independence celebra-
tions that (according to an American Embassy cable)
Rene feared might become violent-and kept the
ships in the area of Seychelles for several weeks. The
pattern of Soviet port calls and rumored Soviet re-
quests for access to naval and air facilities have led
Western nations to fear that Rene would permit an
increased Soviet naval presence in return for contin-
ued support of his regime.
In late 1979 the government of Seychelles instituted a
new policy limiting visits by ships from countries
outside the Indian Ocean,
Ws a result, there was a
sharp drop in Soviet calls during 1980. It is possible
that the Soviets played a role in the development of
the new policy on naval visits, which seems to some
observers to affect Western naval operations more
seriously than it does those of the Soviet Navy. Unlike
the USSR, the United States refuses to declare
whether its ships are carrying nuclear weapons and
therefore cannot schedule port calls to Victoria. Even
if the Soviets did not help to shape the new regula-
tions, however, their willingness to quietly forgo most
naval access probably has done more for their long-
term prospects for influence in Seychelles than would
frequent naval visits. Moreover, they have positioned
themselves on the side of President Rene's key foreign
policy goal-the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace-
thereby demonstrating sympathy with Rene's non-
aligned approach and solidifying a working relation-
ship with his government.
Thus far, it can be argued that President Rene has
used the Soviet Navy to his own advantage without
giving much in return. On several occasions, Soviet
ship visits have lent his regime the appearance of
support against domestic enemies. He also has used
the Soviet naval presence as leverage in bargaining for
Western economic assistance. Moreover, although the
Soviets may have limited their naval visits willingly,
the fact is that they currently lack any significant
access to Victoria's convenient facilities. In contrast,
Seychelles has extended the lease of the US Air Force
space tracking station.
Soviet patience concerning access in the Seychelles is
not immutable. Despite their forbearance, the Soviets
remain interested in access and are building ties with
official and nonofficial Seychellois that could provide
the basis for future initiatives. Eventually, Rene's
paranoia may bring success to such initiatives. In that
event, Rene probably will insist that any concessions 25X1
to the Soviets meet at least the letter of the Seychel-
les's policy-that port calls be limited to ships de-
clared to be nonnuclear or to emergencies. Rene may
opt to permit some form of Soviet naval presence 25X1
comparable to that of the US tracking station on the 25X1
grounds of maintaining a balance but probably will
stop short of any basing agreement. The importance
of Western tourism to the economy of Seychelles will
continue to weigh heavily against an extensive Soviet
presence.
Background: Relations Between
Seychelles and the USSR
Seychelles, which comprises over 90 small islands in
the west-central Indian Ocean, received independence
from the United Kingdom in 1976 (see figure 8). Since
1977, when Socialist President Albert Rene seized
power from a more Western-oriented leader, the
Soviets have shown considerable interest in Sey-
chelles. Seychelles response to Soviet overtures has
been ambivalent: on the one hand, many Seychelles
leaders feel an affinity with the USSR-a socialist,
revolutionary government that shares with them a
common approach to many international problems
and a general antipathy toward Western countries.
For example, the Minister of Education and Informa-
tion has publicly extolled the inspiration provided by
Lenin, and Foreign Minister Hodoul has defended the
" We are not certain Rene actually requested Soviet ship visits on
these occasions, but circumstantial evidence suggests he did (see
discussions on pp 41-42).
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Figure 8
Seychelles
AFRICAN IS. Mahe I.
Eagle I
AMIRANTE Ile Des inches
ISLES POIVRE IS Platte 1
Mane Louise I
Alphonse I Bipuner I Coetivy I..
Sarni Franeoes I
Seychelles
ALDABRA Providence I
ISLANDS Saint Pierre I
COSMOL EDO Ced I
GROUP
Astove I FAROUHAR
GROUP
GLOR/OSO ISLANDS
(France)
Aride Island
Island ,7? r-\Felecite t
Cousin.. ( U v
VCD Mare
Anne
~_- ~ Curieuse I. O cEast Sister
West Sister
Silhouette I.
f
Victoria,
Conception L" 'US;4F satellite\
tracking stations
Therese I.
Matnelle
Island
Sainte Anne Island
Cerf Island
Seychelles International Airport
Mahe Island
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to US Embassy offi-
cials. On the other hand, both the public and private
statements of many officials indicate that they believe
strongly in their nonaligned posture, and Seychelles
retains important ties with the West. France, especial-
ly, remains an important source of economic assis-
tance and has a degree of influence that counters that
of the USSR.
As in many Third World countries, the Soviets have
worked hard to promote a fisheries agreement that
would assure them privileged access to Seychelles's
waters and facilities for Soviet trawlers 25X1
Soviet fisher- 25X1
men have irritated the Seychellois by repeated viola-
tions of the regulations, and local officials have
evidenced concern to the US Charge over the scope of 25X1
Soviet fishing operations and intentions.
surveillance radar to Seychelles.
Visits by the Soviet ships operating in the Indian
Ocean have provided an important point of contact
between Rene and the USSR, but a number of other
tools also have been employed. The Soviets have
actively promoted a program of military assistance to
Seychelles. Equipment delivered to Rene's modest
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has included mili-
tary trucks, armored personnel carriers, artillery
pieces, machineguns, and small arms and ammuni-
tion." In 1979,
Rene refused a Soviet offer to provide equipment-a
maritime surveillance aircraft, patrol boats, and a
mobile radar unit-because of Soviet insistence that
SPLA operators be trained in the USSR. Neverthe-
less, according to a US Embassy cable, early in 1980
the radar was accepted along with a six-month train-
ing course in the Soviet Union for eight SPLA
soldiers. There also are Soviet instructors in Sey-
chelles working on radars to be installed on Soviet-
built naval patrol boats, the first of which arrived in
October 1981. The Soviets also have provided coastal
US Embassy evaluations note that the Soviets have
assiduously cultivated left-leaning cabinet members-
many of whom have considerable influence on domes-
tic and foreign policies. Moscow also has energetically
pursued exchanges with Seychelles in the cultural,
educational, labor, and scientific areas
Educational exchange pro-
grams have, however, been hampered by the general
reluctance of Seychelles university students to study
in the USSR.
Seychelles has signed fisheries research, merchant
shipping, and civil aviation agreements, it refused in
early 1980 to allow special access for the Soviet
fishing fleet, ending two years of negotiations.
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According to the US Charge, although some of 25X1
Rene's key ministers favor increased ties with the
Soviets-especially in the military field-Rene pre-
fers, to the extent possible, to rely for military assist-
ance on Third World countries. Tanzanian and Mala-
gasy troops have been deployed to Seychelles during
periods of tension, and some 200 Tanzanians have
remained there to assist the small Seychelles defense
force. Libya has supplied two light aircraft for mari-
time reconnaissance and has funded an upgrading of
the Army's communications capability. The Sey-
chelles also has pursued close relations with and
obtained assistance from Cuba and North Korea, 25X1
both of which are associated with Rene through the
nonaligned movement.
Naval Facilities
Port and air facilities currently available in Seychelles
are of only limited value for military use. The island's
principal harbor and only developed port is at Vic-
toria, the capital city. Two piers can accommodate a
total of three ships, one of which could be of cruiser
size. There is a good anchorage, with a depth of 20
meters, outside the harbor. Pier space, however, is at a
premium; commercial traffic is heavy enough that
pierside berths are normally reserved for refueling.
Fuel storage capacity is limited, and repair facilities
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and equipment can handle only vessels of small craft
size. Seychelles International Airfield, which is used
by major international airlines, has the runway length
and aviation fuel storage area to accommodate Boeing
747s. US maritime patrol aircraft landed there about
once every three months until 1979, and French
maritime aircraft have used the field on several
occasions since the coup.
The potential exists, of course, for development of
facilities on some of the outlying islands. A small
airfield with a gravel-surfaced, 825-meter airstrip is
on Praslin Island, the second largest of Seychelles.
The Soviet Navy occasionally uses two anchorages
near Coetivy Island, some 160 nm to the southeast of
Mahe. From time to time there are reports of Soviet
or Cuban "activities" on Coetivy Island, but we have
never been able to confirm any of these reports. In
June 1980, US and British diplomats toured the
island at the government's invitation, to satisfy them-
selves that there was no Soviet presence. The British
planned during the mid-1960s to develop a major air
staging complex with a 3,600-meter runway at Alda-
bra Islands, about 600 nm southwest of Mahe. The
plan fell victim to British defense budget cuts and
protests by environmentalist groups concerned with
damage to Aldabra's ecosystem, but a similar project
on another unpopulated atoll could not be ruled out.
For the Soviet Navy, the importance of facilities in
Seychelles-either existing or potential ones-is lim-
ited. Access to any friendly port for replenishment,
crew rest, and minor ship repair is welcome to a Navy
operating far from its home base. Apart from other
considerations, Seychelles's inviting climate, with
temperatures far cooler than those in the Gulf of
Aden and Red Sea, and its position outside the Indian
Ocean's cyclone belt make it an attractive destination
for ships of all the major nations operating there.
However, the islands are at least three to four days'
steaming time from the northwest Indian Ocean,
where the Soviet Union's chief interests lie and where
most of the potential naval action would take place.
As a result, it is doubtful that the Soviets would use
Seychelles for more than a modest number of ship
Access to an airfield in the Southwest Indian Ocean
for naval reconnaissance aircraft, however, would add
significantly to Soviet naval capabilities. If IL-38
antisubmarine warfare aircraft operating out of Aden
could land in Seychelles, they could cover wider
operating areas or extend their on-station time in the
central Indian Ocean. If they could stage out of
Seychelles and return there, they could cover some
areas not currently open to Soviet aerial reconnais-
sance-most importantly, the US naval base at Diego
Garcia and the transit lanes to and from it.
Soviet Use of Seychelles Facilities
Soviet ships have made only a few visits each year to
Seychelles since the country became independent in
1976. Until 1979, ships from the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom called regularly,
with French ships the most frequent visitors (see
table 3). Soviet ships typically take on fresh food and
water in Victoria, but they do not refuel there.
Initial Port Calls To Build Domestic Influence. The
first Soviet naval port call to Seychelles after indepen-
dence was made in November 1977 (following by
several months the coup that brought Rene to power),
when an Alligator-class landing ship visited Port
Victoria for seven days. Vice Admiral Nikolay Yasa-
kov, then Commander of the Indian Ocean Squadron,
was aboard for the visit, which was part of a weeklong
celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik
visits each year.
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Table 3
Naval Ship Visits to the Seychelles
USSR
United
States
France
United
Kingdom
1977
1
7
20
0
1978
3
5
21
3
1979
9
12
14
6
Soviet Ambassador to the Seychelles was there at the
same time.) Seychelles officials, when queried by
Western diplomats, vigorously denied reports that
Rene had requested the visit, but the US Charge
observed that they were embarrassed by the reports
and, in any case, probably did not know the true story.
An additional Soviet combatant-a Kotlin-class de-
stroyer-lingered in the waters nearby throughout the
Kresta visit.
Several other ships, including a Kara cruiser from the
Minsk task force, called at Victoria from May to
September 1979. The tone of these visits was anything
but festive-for example, on one occasion word spread
quickly in Victoria of the guards aboard the Kara who
met nonofficial visitors, such as ship chandlers, hold-
ing automatic weapons. In November 1979, again
commemorating Soviet or Seychelles holidays, a pro-
gram that appeared to represent a concerted Soviet
effort to woo the young country.
During 1978 three naval ships called at Victoria. In
January a Ropucha-class landing ship conducted a
low-key 10-day port visit. A Don-class submarine
tender called for five days in connection with May
Day celebrations. In June a Kashin-class guided-
missile destroyer with Vice Admiral Yasakov aboard
was sent in honor of the first anniversary of Rene's
accession to power.
Influencing Domestic Politics. The pattern and the
apparent purpose for Soviet calls to Victoria changed
in 1979. On 10 April the Kresta-I cruiser Vladivostok
arrived for an 11-day stay. The visit differed from
previous ones; no advance notice was given to port
authorities, nor was the British Government informed
as required by the independence agreement. Only one
small official function was held in connection with
this port call, and the ship remained outside the
harbor at a buoy. According to a US Embassy report,
the visit may have been requested by President Rene
to provide support at a time when he believed his
government was threatened by a coup. (French war-
ships had played a similar role in the past.) The Soviet
visit may have been arranged in Madagascar by the
Seychelles Foreign Minister when he was there to
request Malagasy assistance." (By coincidence the
" At about the same time, over 200 Malagasy troops were sent to
Seychelles at Rene's request. On 16 April, two Malagasy warships
also arrived for combined air and sea maneuvers with the Sey-
" Rene-like other Indian Ocean leaders-was greatly alarmed by
the mercenary-led coup of May 1978 that toppled the left-leaning
government of the neighboring Comoros and replaced it with a
Western-oriented government. Rene, who came to power via a
coup, is acutely aware of how effective a small force can be in
fearing a mercenary invasion," Rene called in 400 25X1
Tanzanian troops and arrested some 120 Seychellois,
imposed a curfew, and nearly broke relations with
France (which he suspected of covertly supporting a
coup against him). At this point, another Soviet
cruiser, the Marshal Voroshilov, arrived suddenly on
24 November for a 17-day visit-a stay of unusual
length and one that appeared at times to be openend-
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Once again, the US Charge was informed by the
Seychelles Defense Minister that rumors to the effect
that the cruiser visit had been requested by the
government were unfounded; the Minister maintained
that the visit was a routine port call for "crew rest and
ship repair." Nevertheless, the circumstances of the
visit and its length argued against such an interpreta-
tion. The ship was tied up to a buoy in the middle of
the harbor throughout its stay; there were no signs of
repair under way, and liberty parties were fewer than
normal. The US Charge was told by Defense Minister
Berlouis that the Kresta was ready to depart Victoria
before it actually did so, and on one occasion, it raised
anchor, circled the.island, and returned to the buoy. It
is possible that a ship malfunction explains the sud-
den, extended visit and the aborted departure, but
Western observers in Seychelles tended to discount
this explanation.
During this period, there was a great deal of concern
among Western countries that the USSR was making
serious inroads with Seychelles-both in gaining ac-
cess to naval facilities and in the broader sense of
influence with a left-leaning local government. The
increasing (albeit low) level of Soviet ship visits to
Victoria, and especially the two cruiser visits, were
seen as a clear sign of such a trend. Rene's public and
private remarks suggest that Western expressions of
concern and adverse publicity about the Soviet in-
volvement in Seychelles contributed to his decision in
late 1979 to change its policy-as discussed earlier-
on port calls at Victoria. Prior to the coup attempt last
November, there were reports that Rene was willing
to make exceptions for Soviet ships-that is, consider
some Soviet calls "emergencies" and try to limit
publicity concerning such visits-whenever he felt his
regime was threatened. Rene also has called on
French warships for assistance since the coup attempt,
but formally the limitation of port calls remains in
effect.
Formal Naval Access
Revision of Seychelles Policy on Naval Visits (1979).
Opposition to foreign basing in the Indian Ocean has
been a keystone of Rene's foreign policy. His govern-
ment has ardently supported the establishment of an
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (preferring a multilateral
effort to a bilateral agreement between the two great
powers). It is among the leaders of regional opposition
to the United States' use of Diego Garcia as a
military support facility
Rene does permit the US Air Force to operate a
satellite tracking station in the mountains of Mahe
Island, and in 1981 he agreed to extend the lease until
1990. Rene's comments to the US Ambassador indi-
cate that he regards the station as an embarrassment,
and he insisted on a substantial increase in the annual
rent (from about $600,000 to $2.5 million) before he
would renew the lease. The government has contended
that the station has no military role and would be
loath to lose the substantial revenue that the station
provides. Nonetheless, Rene has said that he would
close the station if he found that it was being used for
military purposes.
Seychelles officials, including Rene, have repeatedly
denied any intention of allowing the Soviets to estab-
lish "bases" in Seychelles. Rene has stated publicly
that the Soviets have never requested such bases,
although according to the US Charge some of Rene's
subordinates have privately recounted several in-
stances of pressure for "basing" rights. Rene and
others among his top leadership seem to be genuinely
disturbed by the notion that allowing port visits and
providing even minimal ship support encourages the
great powers by making their deployment of naval
forces to the area easier.
Although some attempt is made at evenhandedness,
the public statements of Seychelles officials and gov-
ernment-controlled media imply that the United
States, because of its presence on Diego Garcia, is the
chief culprit in the buildup of foreign naval forces in
the Indian Ocean. Seychelles policies on foreign use of
its facilities, moreover, changed in 1979 in ways that
have affected the US Navy more than the Soviet
Navy.
As early as 1978 Rene indicated that he was consider-
ing "banning" the use of Seychelles facilities by
countries that "substantially" increased their forces in
the Indian Ocean. Standing permission for quarterly
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US maritime reconnaissance flights to land in the
Seychelles was quietly withdrawn in November 1979,
and soon after, the government promulgated a new set
of restrictions on visits, some of which appeared to be
directed particularly at the United States. These
included:
? A limit on visits by ships and aircraft of non-Indian
Ocean states (six a year for ships and eight a year
for aircraft).
? A ban on landing privileges for planes coming from
or going to Diego Garcia.
? A ban on all vessels that are nuclear powered or that
carry nuclear weapons.
The new regulations do not apply to research ships.
Countries seeking permission for ship visits are re-
quired to state whether a ship is nuclear powered and
if it carries nuclear arms. The first question poses no
problem for the United States, but the United States
refuses as a matter of policy to confirm or deny the
presence of nuclear arms on its ships. Seychelles
officials, including Rene, have suggested some face-
saving formulations that might allow US port calls,
but the United States has not been willing to accept
such measures. As a result, no US vessels called in
Victoria during 1980 or 1981.
According to the US Charge and other Western
observers, the policy appears to have been initiated by
Foreign Minister Jacques Hodoul, who is intensely
anti-United States and anti-West. Most other Sey-
chelles officials seem not to have been aware of the
impact the new policy would have. Many Western
diplomats believe that the policy was intended to end
US ship visits while allowing visits by the Soviets, who
seem to be willing to file the required declarations."
These observers suspect that Hodoul was coached by
the Soviets in formulating new regulations for ship
visits. It may also be, however, that Hodoul turned for
advice to India, which has a similar policy against
visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warships
and which exerts considerable influence on some
Seychelles officials.
13 Soviet ships have called in other states requiring such declara-
tions; we do not know whether they have ever lied concerning the
The new policy has caused internal dissatisfaction, as
well as charges in the Western press that Seychelles is
sliding into the Soviet camp. The Hotel Owners
Association petitioned Rene in August 1980 for a
resumption of US naval visits, but the government has
thus far reiterated its willingness to live with the loss
of revenues (as much as $150,000 per visit for West-
ern ships). The tourist industry is the Seychelles's
most important source of hard currency and foreign
exchange, however, and the country's appeal to West
Europeans must remain an important factor in the
government's calculations."
All of the external powers operating in the Indian
Ocean, including the USSR, have been affected by
the new policy. Like the United States, Britain has
refused to submit the required declarations and has
forcefully protested the new policy to the Seychelles
Government. The French apparently requested, and
were granted, a visit for an oiler in August without
filing a declaration. Nevertheless, French ship visits
for 1980 were far below those for previous years. F_
Soviet Access Under the New Policy. Fewer Soviet
ships visited Seychelles after the introduction of the
new regulations. Late in 1981, however, the Soviet
Navy probably was called on to again perform the
role of regime support. At the end of September 1981,
a Soviet warship and an oiler called at Victoria for
four days. It was the first visit by a Soviet warship
since April 1980.
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A month later,
a group of South African mercenaries attempted to
overthrow Rene. A French ship arrived in Victoria on
27 November, possibly to support Rene, but apparent- 25X1
ly Rene felt that the presence of Soviet ships would
16 In 1980 Seychelles imported goods worth $79 million and export-
ed only about $5 million worth of goods. If it were not for some $45
million in earnings from tourism and $3 million in funds transferred
from abroad, the country's current account deficit would have been
$74 million, rather than $27 million. In addition, Western economic
aid during 1980-the most recent year for which data are avail-
able-totaled about $18 million, while economic assistance from
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have a greater impact than the single French frigate.
Two Soviet warships left their operating area in the
northwest Indian Ocean and made a rapid transit to
Victoria, arriving on 29 November. After their stay in
Victoria, the ships made several calls at other ports in
the region and returned to Seychelles at the end of
December. In addition, the Soviets sent an Alligator
landing ship to Victoria for the first two weeks of
December.
It is unclear whether this effort in late 1981 by the
Soviets to use their Navy to gain influence by support-
ing Rene's regime has altered the relationship be-
tween the two states. Even prior to the coup attempt,
there were rumors that Rene was moving away from
his stand on nonalignment. Such rumors were based
on the delivery of Seychelles's first Soviet naval craft
in October and on reports that Rene had permitted
Soviet experts to survey for a communications site on
Mahe. In the wake of the the South African coup
attempt in 1981, such speculation has continued.F_
(Rene
visited Paris in early 1982, and military aid talks may
eventually result in formalizing the French patrols of
Seychelles' coastal waters that have been carried out
since November 1981, more French port calls, and
improved logistic support for French ships at Victoria.
The French may also get involved in other aspects of
upgrading coastal defenses and plan to send a small
team of experts to Seychelles. It seems that Rene,
despite his strong fears, would prefer to avoid sole
dependence on the USSR.
Naval Prospects. The Soviets remain interested in
naval access in the southwestern Indian Ocean despite
their statements to the contrary. Soviet naval ships
continue to call sporadically in Mauritius and Mo-
zambique, and the Soviets continue to press Madagas-
car for some form of naval access. Nonetheless, the
primary Soviet goals seem to be to limit or deny naval
access to Western navies and to build long-term
relationships with current or future governments in
the region. To secure these ends, Moscow appears
willing to forgo access for its own Navy and to
cooperate with Rene's restriction of ship visits. It
seems likely that Rene will continue to provide a
means to circumvent the restriction when he feels
sufficiently threatened but will do so without granting
major naval concessions to the USSR.
Summary
From the late 1960s until 1980, Soviet naval ships
called regularly at Singapore en route to and from the
Indian Ocean. From 1972 to 1980, Soviet auxiliaries
were repaired in Singapore's dockyards. Although not
critical to Soviet Pacific Fleet operations, this access
represented a significant improvement to its logistic
support. The government of Singapore has seen these
services as a strictly commercial arrangement, with
both economic and political benefits that did not
compromise its basically pro-Western orientation.
However, following the Vietnamese invasion of Kam-
puchea with Soviet support and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, we believe that Singapore's leaders
reached the conclusion that repairing Soviet naval
ships sent an inaccurate message to the Soviets and
the world. In early 1980 Singapore refused further
access for repair of Soviet naval ships and denied
landing rights to aircraft other than scheduled Aero-
Background: The Relationship Between
Singapore and the USSR
The government of Singapore has been wary of the
Soviets since the island became independent in 1965.
The relationship between the two countries has wors-
ened since early 1979, when Vietnam invaded Kam-
puchea with the USSR's support. Singapore repeated-
ly has expressed its opposition to Soviet policy in
Southeast Asia and in Afghanistan. The pro-Western
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and anti-Communist orientation of the government is
reflected in its continued membership in the British
Commonwealth and in ASEAN, an association of
non-Communist Southeast Asian states." Its defense
forces exercise regularly with those of the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and
the United States.
Although Singapore regards itself primarily as a
Southeast Asian, rather than an Indian Ocean, coun-
try, it has an interest in the overall balance of power
in the Indian Ocean and clearly favors a Western
presence there. Singapore's maritime security forces
carefully monitor Soviet naval traffic to and from the
Indian Ocean and regularly exchange information on
this traffic with Western attaches. It does not appear
to be overly concerned, however, with the fluctuations
of Soviet naval force levels in the Indian Ocean.
Singapore has kept its distance from regional propos-
als for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, and a report
by the Quadrinational Intelligence Group noted that
the government has rejected Soviet efforts to link the
zone of peace concept with Asian collective security
proposals
Despite Singapore's pro-West orientation, it has es-
tablished a businesslike trade relationship with the
USSR, an important element of which has been the
servicing and repair of Soviet ships. More than 1,000
Soviet ships-most of them merchant vessels-called
there in 1979, the peak year to date (see table 4). The
USSR has been the largest customer at Keppel
shipyard, accounting for about 10 percent of the ships
repaired there. The value of overhauls to Soviet ships
probably exceeded $20 million during 1980, account-
ing for about 10 percent of the total earnings of
Singapore's shipyards. A joint-venture company,
SINSOV, oversees the services to Soviet ships calling
at Singapore and acts as agent for all Soviet shipping
companies, and SUDOIMPORT, the Soviet ship-
repair agent in Singapore, arranges for repairs to both
merchant and naval ships.
The two countries also have a fishing agreement that
permits bunkering by and repair of Soviet fishing
boats in Singapore yards and the processing of the
Table 4
Soviet Ship Visits to Singapore
Year of Entry a
Naval and Naval-Associated
Merchant Ships
Total Soviet
Visits,
Including
Replenishment
Repair/ Total
Overhaul
Merchant
Ships b
Total (1969-81)
184
76
260
8,000+
1969
10
10
480
1970
16
16
500
1971
16
16
Unknown
1972
16
3
19
Unknown
1973
23
10
33
510
1974
17
14
31
600
1975
10
14
24
680
1976
11
6
17
800
1977
21
12
33
770
1978
16
9
25
840
1979
17
6
23
1,010
1980
6
2
8
980
1981
5
5
890
Data for 1967 and 1968 are not available.
b Overall figures have been rounded to the nearest 10. Figures for
merchant ships vary and are not available for some years. Those for
1974-76 have been estimated, based on monthly averages. Those for
1981 are estimated for the last half year.
regional Soviet fish catch in Singapore. A joint-
venture company, MARISSCO, was established in
1975 to oversee these activities.
Naval Facilities
Singapore, located at the eastern entry to the Strait of
Malacca, is the second-busiest port in the world and
the most important stop on the shipping lanes between
Europe and East Asia. It has an excellent harbor, one
of the world's largest oil refinery complexes, and
extensive shipyard facilities. Fresh water and produce
are abundant
The two primary shipyards are the Keppel Shipyard,
located on the south side of the island adjacent to the
Strait of Malacca, and the Sembawang Shipyard
complex, on the isolated north side of Singapore
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Figure 9
Singapore
Island (see figure 9). Each year some 3,800 merchant
ships use the commercial facilities at Keppel, which
are controlled by the Singapore Port Authority. Most
of the Soviet ships repaired in Singapore are handled
in Keppel's six large graving docks.
The Sembawang complex was a major UK naval base
until 1971. Sembawang has berths for seven visiting
ships, two graving docks, four floating docks, and
eight repair berths. Most of the port-including the
shipyard-is now controlled by the Singapore Port
Authority, but the UK Ministry of Defense continues
to control access to two berths used by Western
navies. The Singapore Government has been con-
scious of Western sensitivity about this area, and for
the most part, has attempted to keep Soviet ships
away.
There also are three large graving docks and a
floating drydock at Jurong, on the southwestern side
of the island. Two of Singapore's drydocks have a
capacity of 400,000 deadweight tons (dwt), and two
others can handle 300,000 dwt.
The excellence of the facilities is complemented by a
good supply of highly skilled workmen. Singapore's
shipyards export a variety of small but high-quality
naval vessels. Major ship overhauls and conversions,
rebuilding of engines, and installation and repair of
sophisticated equipment have been performed on So-
viet merchant, fishing, and civilian research ships.
Singapore shipyard labor costs undercut those in
other technologically capable countries by as much as
50 percent
Singapore has four major airfields. Singapore Inter-
national Airport is a first-class facility served by a
number of international airlines. This airport and
Tengah Airbase-a former RAF facility-have
2,740-meter runways, but Tengah is the only airfield
on the island with a reinforced runway capable of
accommodating heavy jet aircraft. Two other air-
fields-Seletar and Changi-are used by the Singa-
pore forces but have asphalt runways of less than
2,000 meters.
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Soviet Use of Singapore's Facilities
Initial Port Calls and Repair Agreements. Soviet
merchant ships have called at Singapore for decades,
but the US Embassy in Singapore notes that Soviet
naval research ships apparently began visiting there in
about 1967. Visits by naval auxiliaries and naval-
associated merchant ships followed as an increasing
number of Soviet ships transited the Malacca Straits
to and from the Indian Ocean.
During 1969 the Soviets initiated requests to the
government of Singapore for permission to increase
the number of naval ships visiting Singapore, to have
their ships repaired in local dockyards, and to create a
new entity to oversee bunkering for Soviet ships.
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew aroused considerable
concern among Western governments when he indi-
cated confidentially to his Anglo Saxon allies that he
was considering favorably the Soviet proposal, al-
though he promised to restrict Soviet ships from the
UK naval base at Sembawang. He evidently feared
that some of Singapore's extensive shipyard facilities
would lie unused after the British departure. More-
over, Soviet visits would tend to buttress Singapore's
image as a nonaligned nation.
Following the visit of a Soviet delegation to the
Keppel Shipyard in April 1971, an agreement was
reached that provided for Soviet port calls and repairs
to Soviet merchant ships. The agreement did not
authorize the creation of a separate Soviet entity for
bunkering, nor did it permit access to Sembawang.
Provisioning and repair were to take place in one of
the facilities on the southern coast of the island, and
ship visits required permission and a 10-day notice.
Singapore officials assured Western representatives
that they would control tightly the stay and move-
ments of Soviet personnel ashore during port calls and
overhauls. The first Soviet merchant ship was re-
paired in July 1971, and the overhaul of naval
auxiliaries commenced in May 1972.
Although Singapore never specifically undertook to
deny access to Soviet combatants, there appears to
have been an unwritten agreement concerning the
distinction between combatants and auxiliaries. Only
one Soviet combatant-a Kotlin-class destroyer-has
During the 1970s a fairly predictable pattern for
Soviet naval port calls and overhauls was established.
Annual calls for replenishment ranged from 10 to 23,
visited Singapore.
Top Secret
It stayed only briefly before continu-
ing on to Vladivostok after operating for six months in
the Indian Ocean. A few months later, permission was
requested and granted for the visit of another destroy-
er and a minesweeper, but the visit never took place.
Repair of Soviet merchant ships, however, expanded
throughout the 1970s. In 1974 Soviet and East Euro-
pean merchant ships berthed at a pier near the
ANZUK-controlled portion of Sembawang for the
first time. Early in 1975 Singapore rejected a Soviet
request to have a naval oiler repaired at Sembawang.
The managing director of Sembawang told the US
Naval attache that the decision had been motivated
primarily by pique at the Soviet effort to misrepresent
the ship as a merchantman. The same official made it
clear that the shipyard intended to solicit further
Soviet ship repair business, and later that year, it
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became clear that Singapore was considering opening
the overhaul facilities at Sembawang to Soviet mer-
chant ships. Singapore claimed that Soviet ships
probably would be given access to Malaysian facilities
scheduled to open just across the Johore Strait. This
would invalidate the old arguments about denying
them access to Johore and, incidentally, risk the loss
of ship repair business to Malaysia. Singapore assured
Western officials that Soviet naval ships would con-
tinue to be denied access to Sembawang and that they
would control the access of Soviet merchant ships to
minimize the risk to security. In May 1976
Sembawang Shipyard authorities signed a contract 25X1
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the number varying with the level of Soviet deploy-
ments to the Indian Ocean. Overhauls of naval ships
varied from three to 14 with no clear pattern evident,
although the high levels in 1974 and 1975 probably
reflected increased needs for ship repairs stemming
from the mine-clearing and salvage operations in
Bangladesh during 1973 and 1974. Except for the
incident involving the Soviet Kotlin-class destroyer in
1971, the Soviet-Singapore agreement worked
smoothly. The Soviets consistently requested permis-
sion for visits in advance, and no naval ships were
repaired at Sembawang. Interestingly, the govern-
ment managed to keep the Soviet naval repair ar-
rangements so low key that an article in Singapore's
leading daily newspaper in November 1978 discussed
the multimillion dollar business as though it had just
begun
Singapore apparently has had reason to be concerned
with security, however. In one case the US defense
attache reported that the sonar dome and external
components were removed from a Western commer-
cial survey ship anchored next to a Soviet civilian
scientific research ship in Singapore. The Soviet ship
departed port prior to the discovery of the theft. In
early 1982 Singapore expelled a Soviet shipyard
official for espionage activities. The incident coincid-
ed with similar cases in Indonesia and Malaysia and
may have been prosecuted to embarrass the USSR
rather than because the agent was a real security
threat.
Restriction of Soviet Use of Facilities (1980). Singa-
pore was one of a very few nations in the world to take
an action specifically targeted against Soviet military
capabilities as a response to Soviet actions in Afghani-
stan and Southeast Asia. Following the invasion of
Kampuchea by Vietnam in late 1978, the government
of Singapore expressed mounting alarm over the
strength and aggressiveness of Vietnam and Soviet
support of the invasion. Most members of ASEAN
denied Soviet requests for port calls, and the organiza-
tion discussed measures to respond to the situation.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979
heightened their concern. In late 1979 Singapore
rejected a Soviet request for landing permission for an
Aeroflot aircraft carrying a change of crew for a
merchant vessel, and in early 1980, for the first time
in some years, permission was denied for six Soviet
naval ships-an oiler and five research vessels-to
call for provisions. Singapore officials appeared suspi-
cious that the ships had missions other than for
"scientific research."
In March 1980 the government officially banned
repairs to Soviet naval auxiliaries. A senior official,
citing past visits by Soviet naval ships, stated that his
government "certainly would not consider that form
of assistance, not now." An exception was made for
repairs to two naval oilers, because contracts had been
concluded months earlier. The ban also extended to
overflight, landing, and refueling rights for Soviet
aircraft, other than regularly scheduled commercial
flights. Although officially the new policy did not ban
brief visits by naval auxiliaries, the Singapore Gov-
ernment seems to have limited sharply the number of
Visits and repairs of nonnaval ships were not affected
by the ban; thus, the economic impact on Singapore
has been limited. From January to June 1981, only 20
Soviet ships were repaired in Singapore in contrast to
35 during the same period in 1980. The number of
merchant ship visits was down somewhat in 1980, and
declined about 6 percent between 1980 and 1981.
Overall trade with the USSR has remained higher
than in past years, however, thus cushioning the
economy from the loss of Soviet naval repair con-
tracts.
Impact of Soviet Naval Presence
Singapore's Value as a Port of Call. Port calls at
Singapore clearly have been attractive to the Soviet
Navy. Singapore lies at about the midpoint between
Vladivostok and the Gulf of Aden area, which is the
focus of Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean. It is an
appealing location for crew rest, provisions, and minor
repairs. Nevertheless, alternatives exist. Soviet ships
transiting to and from the Indian Ocean increasingly
put in at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, which is about
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two days' steaming time from Singapore. A smaller
number of calls is made in Sri Lanka, four or five
days' transit from Singapore.
Two-thirds of the Soviet naval ships visiting Singa-
pore stay for only a few days. They take on food and
water, and some crews have had shore leave. Naval
auxiliaries rarely have purchased fuel in Singapore,
though Soviet merchant ships often have.F_
naval-associated merchant ships have used Singapore
in connection with deployments to the Indian Ocean.
(Until 1980
approximately two-thirds of the naval oilers and cargo
ships-including arms carriers-operating in the In-
dian Ocean stopped at Singapore en route to or from
station. Smaller proportions of other types of auxilia-
ries-such as hydrographic research ships-and
Singapore's Value as a Repair Facility. Prior to
March 1980, the Soviet Navy used Singapore's facili-
ties for scheduled overhauls and for deployment-
related repairs. Soviet naval ships overhauled in Sin-
gapore normally were scraped and painted. Engines
were completely broken down, with small parts and
fittings cleaned and machined or replaced; propellers,
pumps, refrigeration equipment, and other major sys-
tems were cleaned, lubricated, tested, and repaired.
This level of repair, which corresponds roughly to
what the Soviets call "medium repair," is performed
on some classes of combatants at intervals of five to
six years. Some ships, possibly because of higher
activity levels, require such repairs more frequently,
and a number of the naval auxiliaries were repaired in
Singapore two or three times at intervals of one to
three years."
Twenty-five ships entered Singapore for repairs in
connection with an Indian Ocean deployment-19
returning from duty there, three en route, and three in
the middle of a deployment. From 1972 to 1974,
almost all of these deployment-related visits lasted
less than three weeks, which would permit only
"Twenty-four ships were repaired in Singapore more than once
between 1972 and 1980-11 twice, 12 three times, and one four
relatively minor repairs." After 1974 the pattern
changed, and most of the ships in for deployment-
related overhauls stayed for periods of four to 12
weeks. The change could have been indicative of
improved planning, which made possible the more
efficient use of Singapore facilities in connection with
normal Indian Ocean deployments. This explanation,
however, confronts the puzzling fact that the Soviets
have on several occasions brought a ship home from
an Indian Ocean deployment, sent it down to Singa-
pore for overhaul, brought it back to Vladivostok, and
then deployed it once again to the Indian Ocean.
Occurrences such as this question the efficiency of the
process by which the Soviet Navy plans for operations
and repair cycles.
It appears that access to Singapore's shipyards repre-
sented an important asset to Soviet planners and
probably alleviated some of the demands on Soviet
shipyards. The seriousness of a long-term loss to the
Soviet Navy of Singapore's repair facilities is difficult
to estimate. Pacific Fleet naval repair facilities are
extremely congested. Those yards that repair mer-
chant ships are busy, although less congested than the
naval repair yards, and some naval auxiliaries can be
sent to these civilian facilities for overhaul. An aver-
age of nine naval ships were repaired each year in
Singapore's docks between 1972 and 1980. These
represent only a small portion of the Pacific Fleet's
more than 200 auxiliaries, but if auxiliaries are
overhauled at intervals of two to five years, the nine
represent a large proportion of the ships needing
overhaul in any one year. Moreover, the ships sent to
Singapore for repair were among the most active in
the Pacific Fleet-they were repeatedly selected to
support distant-area deployments. Certain kinds of
"The only exceptions involved two heavy-lift buoy tenders that
spent 13 to 17 weeks in Singapore dockyards following lengthy
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sensitive work probably cannot be performed in Sin-
gapore's yards. On the other hand, the Singapore
labor force may be more efficient in some respects
than its Soviet counterpart, and the overall repair
process could actually be more cost efficient than if
done in Soviet yards.
Naval Prospects
The government's efforts over the past decade to
circumscribe Soviet naval access probably have been
dictated in part by Singapore's sensitivity to the
feelings of Western governments, and so long as its
chief economic, political, and military interests lie
with the West, it probably will go on limiting careful-
ly its relationship with the Soviet Union. The role of
the Soviet Navy in the overall relationship between
Singapore and the USSR has been small, and the
effect of the Soviet naval presence has been corre-
spondingly minimal.
Access to Singapore's shipyards has been more impor-
tant to the Soviet Navy than to Singapore. Although
repairs and services to Soviet naval ships represent a
financial gain to Singapore, that business has never
been large enough to decisively influence the coun-
try's policy. The value of all Soviet ships serviced or
repaired in Singapore is, of course, much larger than
that of the naval business. Loss of the merchant trade
undoubtedly would be felt by the country's economy.
During first-half 1982, Moscow apparently began to
look to Sri Lanka as a potential site of naval repairs,
but thus far Sri Lanka cannot match the convenience
or proficiency of Singapore's yards. The Soviets have
few realistic alternatives to Singapore. There was no
evidence of concern by Singaporean officials that
their decision to ban repairs to Soviet naval ships
would result in the loss of Soviet merchant business or
any other retaliatory measure. Singapore's Western
orientation probably precludes a significant alteration
in this picture for as long as the current leadership is
in place.
Summary
The Navy has been an integral part of Soviet efforts
to maintain or expand influence in South Yemen. The
first Soviet port call took place in 1968-six months
Top Secret
after South Yemen's independence from Great Brit-
ain-and Soviet ships visited Aden regularly through-
out the 1970s. Following the loss of access to naval
facilities in Somalia in 1977, Soviet ships made more
frequent visits to Aden, where they could secure fresh
water, perform minor repairs, and provide for crew
rest. In addition, Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft
based at Aden's International Airport monitor West-
ern naval activity in the Indian Ocean.
The USSR has provided the bulk of South Yemen's
naval equipment, including missile patrol boats and a
large modern landing ship. The transfers have created
a continuing tie through the provision of spare parts
and maintenance. The Soviets also train Yemeni
personnel to operate and maintain the ships and have
conducted at least one joint naval exercise with South
Yemen. Although we cannot measure the impact of
the small number of naval advisers in South Yemen-
as distinct from other Soviet personnel-Moscow
probably considers their presence one source of con-
tinuing leverage..
As a Marxist-oriented state, South Yemen is ideologi-
cally and pragmatically inclined to pursue policies
that serve Soviet as well as South Yemen's interests.
Politically estranged from its moderate Arab neigh-
bors, South Yemen relies on Soviet arms and advisers
to defend its borders. Aden also looks to Moscow for
protection against what it regards as increased US
threats from Washington's expanding military rela-
tionship with several regional states.
For Moscow, a central objective is to limit Aden's
options to pursue independent regional policies, par-
ticularly with respect to issues such as improving
economic relations with the West, support for regional
insurgencies, and the potential rapprochement with
moderate Persian Gulf states. Aside from the opera-
tional benefits accruing from access to Aden, the
Soviet naval presence facilitates those policies that
Moscow endorses and limits Aden's freedom of action
elsewhere. The sealift to Ethiopia in 1977-78, for
example, which made extensive use of South Yemen's
ports, expanded on a commitment that Aden had
already made to Ethiopia. At the same time, however,
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Moscow probably was not displeased that the in-
creased cooperation between the USSR and South
Yemen evident in the sealift probably disrupted
Aden's improving relations with Saudi Arabia. F-
Naval presence has had a marginal impact on the
Soviets' ability to influence South Yemen's internal
policies. There have been several leadership changes
in South Yemen since 1968. The Soviets have been
concerned about internal stability on each occasion.
In June 1978 they apparently used their naval pres-
ence to bolster the new regime, but they did not take
similar action when the current leadership took con-
trol in April 1980. Soviet naval presence is neither
highly visible nor formalized and therefore is not an
embarrassment to the South Yemeni Government as
it was in Guinea, although there is popular hostility
toward the Soviets who live in Aden, including naval
personnel. The current regime is unlikely to sever its
ties with the USSR, but we do not believe it will
expand the naval access already granted.
Although Aden is not essential to the operations of the
Indian Ocean Squadron, the Soviets have sought a
formal agreement on naval access since 1974. They
apparently placed heavy pressure on South Yemen's
leadership several times, but the Yemenis resisted on
each occasion, citing the taint of neocolonialism. F_
Since the loss of Berbera, the Soviets seem to favor
the development of a number of small logistic centers
for the Indian Ocean Squadron-which is exactly
what they have in Aden even without a written
agreement-rather than one all-encompassing facili-
ty. As a result, interest in wider access to facilities in
Aden will continue but will not be the driving force
behind Soviet policy in the region. To protect their
future options, the Soviets probably will continue to
push for a formal access agreement but not with such
determination that they endanger the broader range
of ties with South Yemen
Background: Relations Between
South Yemen and the USSR
For more than a decade, the Soviet Union has main-
tained a commitment to the Marxist regime in South
Yemen.20 Initial ties with the Aden regime were an
outgrowth of the marginal Soviet support given to
leftist groups involved in South Yemen's four-year
(1963-67) war of independence. Moscow promptly
recognized South Yemen's independence from Great
Britain, but because of a prior Soviet commitment to
North Yemen and the uncertainty of a continuing
power struggle in Aden, the Soviets initially limited
their ties with Aden. After 1969 Soviet disenchant-
ment with the increasingly pro-Western policies of
North Yemen and the apparent internal stabilization
in the South permitted the conclusion of an aid
package that included military advisers and equip-
ment, the training of South Yemeni pilots, and a
fisheries agreement. In 1970 the state was reconstitut-
ed as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
under a Marxist-oriented regime. A pattern of in-
creasingly large aid agreements testified to Moscow's
desire to bind the radical republic to its policies.
The Soviet-Yemeni relationship has not been uni-
formly harmonious. Soviet efforts to influence Aden's
foreign policy have been complicated by internal and
external factors including:
? Instability resulting from political, tribal, and reli-
gious rivalries that are beyond Moscow's control.
? Competition between the USSR and China for
regional influence.
? Contradictions arising from continued Soviet ties to
the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen).
? Changes in the tenor of Soviet-Saudi relations that
in turn affect the regional role that Moscow sees for
Aden.
? South Yemen's search for economic assistance from
moderate Persian Gulf states and the West.
In spite of the inconsistencies created by these factors,
South Yemen remains militarily and symbolically
valuable to the USSR. Aden has the potential to
control access to both the Red Sea and the Horn of
Africa. With a government structure modeled on the
10 Names in the Yemens can be confusing. North Yemen, officially
called the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), also goes by the name of
its capital, Sanaa. South Yemen, officially the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY), is frequently called Aden, after its
capital and the name it had as part of the British Empire.
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USSR, it also stands as an outpost of Soviet ideology
in the region. As a result, Moscow has invested
heavily in securing a naval presence in South Yemen
and in efforts to use its naval presence to enhance
regional political aims
Naval Facilities
The harbor at Aden is one of the finest in the Indian
Ocean (see figure 10). It is well sheltered by mountain
ranges, and navigation is not restricted by obstacles or
tidal change. Although Aden has not fully recovered
economically from the effects of the closure of the
Suez Canal, it is an active bunkering port capable of
mooring 30 ships and bunkering 13. Both cargo-
handling and repair facilities have limited use, howev-
er, because they are outmoded and not maintained
properly. Aden's chief advantage is that fresh water is
available year round at fees lower than elsewhere in
the area. In a region where temperatures range from
the high 20s to mid-30s Centigrade in summer, the
availability of water outweighs the scarcity of other
provisions.
Two other areas of naval interest in South Yemen are
Perim Island and the anchorages off Socotra Island.
For many years, Perim's facilities consisted of deterio-
rating British-built piers and support buildings. Minor
improvements were made in the early 1970s, and
some new construction began by January 1980. A 40-
meter floating pontoon pier of the type used by the
Soviet Pacific Fleet was fitted to new earthworks.
With the new pier, Perim can handle any Yemeni
ships as well as Soviet ships that patrol the Bab al
Mandeb Strait. At the same time, Perim's defenses
were upgraded. Soviet ships occasionally call there
and bring provisions to the Yemeni garrison.
Socotra is an inhospitable island with no proper port
facilities. There are 10 semiprotected anchorages off
the north and west coasts that are used as the
monsoons permit. The Soviets do not require Aden's
consent to use the Socotra anchorages, which are in
Top' Secret
Soviet Use of South Yemen's Facilities
The Soviets have called at Aden regularly since 1968,
but they make surprisingly little use of the shore
facilities. Soviet ships do not use the repair facilities of
the National Dockyard Company, nor did the Soviets
use the drydock they towed there from Berbera in
1977.21 Minor repairs are carried out by Soviet sup-
port ships, some specifically deployed to the Indian
Ocean to operate with an individual unit. The Soviets
have used Aden's bunkering facilities on rare occa-
sions, but Soviet warships tend to be refueled by their
own support ships often outside the harbor prior to
entry. Currently, the USSR maintains a small yard
oiler in Aden. Access to Aden enables Soviet ships to
take on fresh water and provides opportunities for
crew rest. It also is the port call for mail, and relief
crews may be flown into Aden.
2' The floating drydock that was in Berbera was towed to Aden in
November 1977. It remained there unused until April 1978, when it
was moved to Dahlak Island in the Red Sea where it has been used
for repair of Soviet and Ethiopian surface combatants and Soviet
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Figure 10
South Yemen
Saudi Arabia
Oman
North
*SANAA
Yemen
Al ludayda
Aseb.
Ethiopia
/Yemen-
At Riyan
Al Mukelle
. nchor~~,~~.
Salah al Din *ADEN
R +Khormaksor International Airport
Djibouti *oJlBDUlI
-Barbera S
Socotra
(South Yrmen)
omaIia
0 150
Kilometers
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
Soviet submarines also have expanded their use of
Aden. An F-class torpedo attack submarine and a
J-class cruise missile submarine visited in 1978. In
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Table 5
Soviet Naval Visits to South Yemen
Number of
Visits
Average Stay
(Days)
Combatant/
Auxiliary/
Hydro
Total days
in Port
Aden
Soviet Ship-Days
in the Indian
Ocean
Time in Port
as Percent of Indian
Ocean ship-days
1968
5
3.2
8/4/4
16
1,850
0.86
1969
19
5
27/47/21
95
4,152
2.29
1970
13
6.6
23/48/15
86
4,189
2.05
1971
30
5.7
67/105/
172
3,973
4.33
1972
19
4.3
22/53/6
81
8,854
0.91
1973
18
5.3
58/34/3
95
8,895
1.07
1974
45
7.7
235/83/27
345
10,501
3.29
1975
35
13.9
251/226/10
487
7,168
6.79
1976
28
7.8
108/86/24
218
7,335
2.97
1977
35
7.6
80/181/5
266
6,712
3.96
1978
72
13.7
464/519/6
989
8,443
11.71
1979
42
17.3
148/557/20
725
7,595
9.55
1980
83
10.2
390/429/27
846
11,816
7.16
1981
75
8.1
318/278/10
606
10,712
5.66
1979 an E-II-class nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarine was identified in Aden. The US defense
attache in Oman reported that this particular visit
may have taken place without Yemeni permission in a
Soviet effort to establish the precedent of a nuclear
presence. In the spring of 1980, the first V-class
nuclear-powered attack submarine called at Aden,
and other submarines serving with the Indian Ocean
Squadron used Aden regularly throw hout the year,
spending about 175 days in the port.
Yemen to grant wider access to Aden, it is doubtful
that Moscow would be interested in establishing a
Berbera-style support facility in Aden:
The port would require six months of extensive work
to meet Soviet standards.
? Aden is commercially too crowded to permit seclud-
ed repair and maintenance activities.
? The stability of the political arrangements that
would accompany such a Soviet investment would
be uncertain at best.
? The development of other facilities in the region,
such as Dahlak Island, may indicate the Soviets'
preference for several small logistic sites rather than
Aden's location at the mouth of the Bab al Mandeb
Strait and its utility for reprovisioning (particularly
water) and crew rest make it a convenient stopping
point for ships of the Indian Ocean Squadron. In the
aftermath of the Soviet expulsion from Somalia, there
was considerable speculation that Aden would replace
Berbera as a Soviet logistic center. Although the
USSR reportedly (see below) has pressured South
one large naval complex.
In addition to port facilities, South Yemen provides a
staging point for naval reconnaissance flights. Aden
International Airfield (Khormaksar) is one of four
hard-surfaced fields in South Yemen. Expansion of
facilities at Khormaksar began in 1978 and is nearing
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completion. Although the Soviets may not have exclu-
sive access to the expanded facilities, they have staged
IL-38 May aircraft to Aden International since No-
ompletion of the runway extension at Aden
International could allow the use of heavier aircraft,
such as the TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft,
thus permitting the Soviets to cover a larger portion of
the Indian Ocean, including the area around the US
facility at Diego Garcia. Another possibility for Soviet
naval air deployments would be the use of other
airfields in South Yemen that are under construction
(Al Anad) or being improved (Ar Riyan).
Formal Naval Access. Aden has made no formal
agreement granting Soviet access to South Yemen's
naval facilities, but there was speculation about the
extent of Soviet naval base rights throughout the
1970s. Even when the USSR had its facilities in
Berbera, the Soviets were interested in formalizing
their access to Aden as an alternative.
We believe that during his visit in May 1978
Admiral Gorshkov may have tried to capitalize on the
access to Aden that had been permitted during the
Soviet sealift to Ethiopia.
The most recent development on the question of base
rights was the signing of a military cooperation
agreement in February 1980. We do not know the
complete terms of the agreement, but South Yemen's
vehement denial that the Soviets had naval base rights
in Aden suggests that naval rights may have been
discussed in connection with the treaty.
Given their experience in Somalia, it is unlikely that
the Soviets are interested in a Berbera-style installa-
tion in Aden. Rather, consistent Soviet pressure for a
naval treaty argues that Moscow would be interested
in formalizing the priority that Soviet ships enjoy in
Aden and in securing the right to establish additional
facilities at a future time. The significance of the
patterns of pressure and resistance is that neither the
Soviet naval presence in South Yemen nor the exten-
sive range of other ties between the two states has
been sufficient to convince Aden to alter the negative
position taken in 1974.
Impact of Soviet Naval Presence
Building Domestic Influence. The role of the Navy in
establishing friendly local relations has changed since
the initial port calls in the late 1960s. Soviet naval
visits no longer focus on public relations and creating
popular good will.
The first Soviet port call in Aden took place in June
1968. A Sverdlov cruiser and a Kashin guided-missile
destroyer made a four-day stopover. During the visit,
formal contacts were carried out on high diplomatic
levels. Public relations focused on a soccer match and
band concert that were popular with the local people.
The public events received wide press coverage, and
the Soviet parties sent ashore created a favorable
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impression. Overall, this visit and others during the
next few years fit the image of the Soviet Navy as an
ambassador of good will, a role cited by Admiral
Gorshkov as one of the Soviet Navy's peacetime
missions in the Third World.
The Minsk task group's call in June 1979 contrasted
with the tone of the early port visits. This seven-day
visit focused on military capability rather than on
public relations. By concentrating on demonstrating
military power, the Soviets shifted away from their
own concept of port visits as a means of securing good
will to the "imperialist" use of naval demonstration to
threaten enemies or pressure allies. It may be that in
June 1979, countering the US presence in the Indian
Ocean was more important to the Soviets than defer-
ring to local sentiment. It may also be that by 1979
the Soviets had recognized that their naval presence
had not created positive local relations.
The tone of the Minsk visit may
indicate Soviet recognition that its hold on Aden will
not be furthered by the friendship born of goodwill
visits but is completely dependent on Aden's desire for
Soviet military assistance.
Subsequent port calls have included limited activities
designed to woo the local population. The two war-
ships that visited in the summer of 1981, for example,
were open to the public briefly, and Soviet seamen did
present a concert ashore. However, the primary events
relating to the visit were on the official level, such as
the Defense Ministers reception aboard the ships. The
emphasis of such calls, then, is to impress the govern-
ment and local elites rather than to win friends among
the populace.
Influencing Domestic Politics. The clearest use of the
Soviet Navy in an effort to influence domestic politics
took place in June 1978. In the aftermath of a coup,
the Soviets sent a naval force to show the flag in
Aden. The presence of Admiral Yasakov, Indian
Ocean Squadron commander, demonstrated the im-
portance of the visit. In a novel procedure, Yasakov
called a press conference during which he praised
Aden's economic and political policies. The message
apparently was that Moscow strongly supported the
new regime, which had ousted a leadership bent on
improving relations with China at Moscow's expense.
We believe that the naval visit reinforced the confi-
dence of the pro-Soviet faction making up the new
regime and helped intimidate its opponents.
There have been other cases of alleged Soviet naval
intervention in South Yemen's domestic politics, such
as reports of Soviet and Cuban naval and air sorties to
prevent a rebellion on Perim Island. In none of the
rumored cases-nor in the case of Yasakov's visit-
would naval intervention alone have been decisive.
Influence With the Local Military Establishment.
The Yemeni Navy is composed largely of Soviet
transfers, including Osa-II-missile attack boats and a
Ropucha landing ship. The Ropucha is the first ship
of this class transferred since construction began five
years ago. These transfers serve both political and
naval ends. By upgrading Yemeni naval capabilities,
the Soviets increase South Yemen's ability to comple-
ment Soviet naval ventures such as patrol of the Bab.
al Mandeb. By providing conspicuously newer units,
such as the Ropucha, which have a political impact
beyond their military capability, we believe the Sovi-
ets hope to enhance Yemeni commitment to Soviet
policies.
Soviet naval advisers probably comprise about 10
percent of the 1,000 Soviet military advisers in South
Yemen and are extensively involved with the Yemeni
Navy. The pattern of more frequent and more sophis-
ticated naval transfers that has developed since 1977
increases South Yemen's dependence on Soviet advis-
ers, and the rapidity with which some of these units
have deployed suggests a high level of Soviet partici-
pation in their preparation.
Further, if the Soviet
practice of only partially training military personnel
in Moscow and completing their education in their
own country extends to the Navy, Soviet naval in-
structors must be present in Aden on a continuing
basis. Naval assistance also extends into the port
authority at Aden where the civilian harbor master
and pilots are Soviets.
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Continued Soviet commitment of resources to naval
training and aid suggests at least some satisfaction
with professional ties between the two navies and the
Soviet belief that the process of dependency will
ensure South Yemen's continued political support._
Aden's Contribution to Operations of the Indian
Ocean Squadron. South Yemen plays an important
but not essential role in ongoing Soviet naval opera-
tions in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. In conjunc-
tion with the South Yemeni Navy, the USSR main-
tains a patrol of the Bab al Mandeb Strait
The USSR would be able to keep its ships in the
Indian Ocean even without the access to Aden. Ob-
taining water elsewhere would complicate squadron
operations but would not be an insurmountable prob-
lem. Now that some repair and replenishment facili-
ties are available at Dahlak Island to complement the
normal Soviet use of afloat logistic support, Aden may
be even less essential to daily squadron operations.
For example, of the approximately 7,600 Soviet ship-
days spent in the Indian Ocean in 1979, only 725 were
spent in Aden.
Cooperative Policies on Regional Issues. Logistic aid
to Ethiopia during the Ogaden conflict was a clear
example of the use of a naval presence to support a
regional initiative.'
Yemen.
By using Aden to transfer cargo to landing ships, the
Soviets avoided the congestion of Ethiopia's ports and
unloaded supplies directly on shore. Even using con-
servative estimates, the sealift was a significant con-
tribution to Ethiopia's operations. Because Soviet
support for Ethiopia represented a major test of Soviet
policy in the Red Sea area, this case demonstrated the
logistic and political value of naval presence in South
A similar but less well-known example of using naval
presence to reinforce regional policy is the reported
Soviet sealift of troops and equipment from Aden to
support the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman (1973). Infor-
mation about this venture is sparse, but it may have
been an important precursor of the Ethiopian sealift.
Influencing the Political Options of the Host State.
The Ethiopian sealift is also an example of the
interaction between naval presence and client foreign
policy decisions. In 1975 the Saudis offered generous
financial aid to South Yemen in return for the
moderation of Aden's attempts to subvert regional
states. Two years later, the Saudis also offered to
finance arms purchases in the West. Although the
Soviets responded negatively to these developments,
the developing rapprochement was not halted. Aden's
continuing involvement with regional dissident groups
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prompted the Saudis to reassess their policy by Octo-
ber 1977, but South Yemen's subsequent willingness
to cooperate in the Ethiopian sealift marked the final
turning point. By December 1977 the Saudis had
halted their development aid and had cut their crude
oil deliveries to South Yemen. Further, the Arab
League sanctions applied in mid-1978 undoubtedly
took account of the revived threat that Aden's cooper-
Political discord continues in Aden, but none of the
possible resolutions would appear to significantly
threaten Aden's military ties with the USSR in the
near term, and Soviet naval presence is likely to
continue to be a valuable tool of influence.
ation in the sealift posed.
Naval access accorded the Soviets in connection with
supplying Ethiopia clearly played a role in ending the
Saudi-South Yemen rapprochement. This limitation
of host state options may be, in the long run, a most
significant function of Soviet naval presence. In addi-
tion, an internal chain of events was set in motion that
contributed to the Yemeni coup of June 1978. As a
result, the Ethiopian sealift is an instance in which
Soviet naval presence had a major impact on both the
foreign and domestic policies of a Third World state.
Summary
Apart from its initial success in gaining access to the
shipyard at Menzel Bourguiba, the Soviet Navy
seems to have made little headway in Tunisia. The
Tunisians have derived fewer benefits from their
agreement to repair Soviet ships at Menzel Bourguiba
than they had hoped. Partly as a result, they have not
been willing to negotiate additional contracts.or to_
allow the Soviets to establish a foothold ashore by
Following the Ethiopia-Somalia crisis, South Yemen
moved closer to the USSR. Increased Soviet use of
port and air facilities was paralleled by South Ye-
men's sponsorship of pro-Soviet initiatives, such as
proposing alliances between the USSR and the Arab
states that oppose the Camp David accords and/or
making quiet approaches to restore relations with
Somalia. At the same time, instances of Yemeni
resistance to Soviet policy-such as disagreements
that surrounded the 1979 Friendship Treaty or South
Yemen's hostility to Moscow's ties with North Ye-
men-argue that South Yemen remains more than a
Soviet satellite. Areas of bargaining power still exist,
notably with respect to the formal terms of naval
access.
Naval Prospects
In April 1980 President Ismail-long a Soviet favor-
ite-was ousted. The Soviets had been aware of the
frictions within the Adeni leadership but were not
overtly hostile to Ismail's successor, Prime Minister
al-Hasani. Al-Hasani visited Moscow shortly after
assuming power in April to publicly assuage Soviet
concerns over South Yemen's reliability and to reaf-
firm his loyalty. He also postponed a scheduled visit to
providing naval technicians or advisers.
Granting the Soviets naval access in Tunisia has had
very little effect on Tunisia's relations with neighbor-
ing states. Contrary to Tunis's hopes, the Soviets have
not moderated Libyan hostility toward Tunisia, which
continues to view Qadhafi as its chief adversary.
Despite these drawbacks, the Tunisians probably will
continue to permit Soviet ships to use the yards at
Menzel Bourguiba, especially because Western na-
tions appear unwilling to compensate for any econom-
ic losses that would result from excluding the Soviets.
However, so long as Tunisia remains suspicious of
Soviet activities in Africa and other Third World
areas, Moscow is unlikely to secure additional access
to Tunisian facilities.
Background: Relations Between Tunisia and the USSR
Although formally nonaligned, the Tunisians have
acted as a moderating influence among the Arab
nations by pursuing policies comparatively sympathet-
ic to Western, and particularly American, interests.
Since its independence in 1956, Tunisia's relations
Saudi Arabia
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with the USSR have been correct, but suspicion of
Soviet intentions and activities in Africa have prevent-
ed the development of close political ties. Relations
between the two countries have improved somewhat in
recent years, and the Soviet Navy's use of Tunisian
repair facilities at Menzel Bourguiba shipyard has
been an important aspect of those relations.
Tunisia's motives for providing repair facilities to the
Soviets-and seeking improved relations generally-
are both economic and political. The Tunisian
Government has repeatedly justified Soviet use of the
shipyard facilities in economic terms. Soviet economic
credits-although modest-are a welcome supple-
ment to assistance from traditional aid donors. In
addition, however, the naval visits serve as a reminder
to the West that Tunisia should not be taken for
granted. The government has used Western concern
about its Soviet ship repair business to press Western
countries to use Tunisian shipyards for their own
ships-thereby replacing the Soviet trade. Further,
good.relations with Moscow and Soviet naval visits to
Tunisian ports reinforce Tunisia's credentials as a
nonaligned state, balancing in part its far more
extensive contacts with the West. Finally, Tunisian
leaders apparently hoped that the Soviets would re-
strain Libyan activities as the price of more cordial
relations and access to Tunisian ports. Following a
Libyan-sponsored raid in early 1980, Tunisia's Prime
Minister indicated to the Commander of the US Sixth
Fleet that he was concerned about the connection
between Libyan military maneuvers and Soviet naval
ship activities. Tunisia probably would feel more
secure with an explicit Western guarantee, such as the
presence of Sixth Fleet ships. In the absence of such a
Western guarantee, however
reports there been some discord within the
Tunisian leadership over aspects of this policy, with
the Ministry of Defense taking a harder line toward
Soviet visits than other elements of the government.
On balance, the leadership seems to believe that the
benefits outweigh the possible dangers. F_
The US military attache
Tunisia's relations with the USSR, therefore, repre-
sent a delicate balancing act. The Tunisians endeavor
to maintain a harmonious relationship with the Sovi-
ets and to extract from that relationship all the
benefits they can. As a Tunisian Government official
noted they are wary, however, of placing themselves
in a position where they could be pressured by the
Soviets, and they demonstrate a keen concern for the
views of Western countries whose continued support
is, in the end, vital.
Although the USSR's policies toward Tunisia are part
of its worldwide efforts to increase Soviet influence
with Third World governments, Moscow's principal
interest in Tunisia almost certainly is in retaining and
improving access to its port facilities. Heightened
Soviet efforts to secure or expand naval access in
Tunisia during the late 1970s probably were directly
related to the deterioration of the relationship be-
tween the USSR and Egypt and the expulsion of the
Soviet Navy from Egyptian facilities in 1976.
The Soviets have offered modest levels of economic
and military assistance to Tunisia. In 1976 the Soviets
agreed to provide $56 million in credits for economic
and development purposes-more than half of all the
economic assistance provided by the USSR to Tunisia
Naval Facilities
Tunisia has four good ports on the Mediterranean
Sea: Safaqis, Susah, Tunis, and the former French
naval complex at Bizerte (see figure 11). Bizerte is of
particular interest to the Soviets; it contains the
Menzel Bourguiba shipyard, run by Socomena.Z^ This
shipyard could partially replace the facilities the
Soviets lost in Egypt. It has four drydocks-two could
accommodate F-class submarines, and the largest
could handle a Moskva-class helicopter cruiser. The
facility has cranes capable of handling repair jobs on
"The Societe Tunisienne de Construction et de Reparations Me-
canique et Navale. Both "Socomena" and "Menzel Bourguiba" are
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Figure 11
Tunisia
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large pieces of equipment, and a complex of work-
shops including a machine shop and foundry. Al-
though the shipyard is antiquated by Western stand-
ards, is in poor repair, and is underutilized, it is as
good as or better than the yards available to the
Soviets elsewhere in the Mediterranean.25 Tunisian
workmen are not skilled enough to perform sophisti-
cated repairs, but the yards can handle normal
overhaul of medium-size combatants and diesel sub-
marines.
The Tunisian Government would like to obtain fi-
nancing to improve and modernize the Menzel
Bourguiba shipyard. Tunisia has discussed the project
with the French, the British, and the Japanese, but
the Soviets seem the most likely to be interested
Table 6
Soviet Naval Visits to Tunisia
Total
Tunis
Bizerte
Menzel
Bourguiba
Safaqis
Susah
1974
6
4
2
0
0
1975
8
7
1
0
0
1976
17
4
8
0
5
1977
17
3
6
8
0
1978
18
0
4
14
_
0
1979
21
0
8
13
0
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1980
20
0
9
11
0
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1981
20
0
5
15
0
enough to provide funding.
Soviet Use of Tunisian Facilities
Soviet Calls to Tunisian Ports. Although a few Soviet
hydrographic research ships entered Tunisian ports
from 1968-71, the pattern of naval port calls began ir.
1974, when a Soviet destroyer paid an official visit to
Tunis. The Soviets apparently would have liked to
have given the visit high visibility, but the Tunisians
did not cooperate. The usual ceremonies were ob-
served-official courtesy calls were exchanged and
there was a soccer game between the Tunisian Navy
team and Soviet seamen-but Tunisian press cover-
age was modest. A Soviet request for a parade
through downtown Tunis was denied on the grounds
that there was insufficient time for preparations.
Table 6 shows Soviet use of Tunisian ports from 1974
through 1981. All of the visits to Tunis and some of
those to Safaqis and Susah were to obtain provisions
and crew rest. Visits to these ports have generally
averaged four to five days. Visits to Menzel Bourgui-
ba since 1977 have almost all been for repair or
overhaul and have averaged 29 days.
After their initial success in gaining access to Tuni-
sian ports for occasional visits, the Soviets mounted a
low-key but energetic diplomatic offensive to increase
" By contrast, there are no drydocks at Tartus, Syria-the other
Mediterranean port at which the Soviets make frequent and regular
repairs-and access to Yugoslav shipyards is limited. A small
number of ships can also be repaired each year at Annaba, Algeria,
but Algerian facilities are far less satisfactory than those in
that access and to use it more effectively to build
influence with the Tunisian Government. Following a
well-publicized call in August 1975 by a cruiser and a
destroyer, a Tunisian official expressed confidentially
to US personnel his dismay and that of other senior
officials concerning the Soviet tactics. During that
call, souvenir buttons were distributed by Soviet crew
members in downtown Tunis, and the Soviet admiral
commanding the task group held a press conference in
which he welcomed a forthcoming trip by Tunisian
President Bourguiba to Moscow.
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taking advantage of a courtesy call to press the
Tunisian Defense Minister on the substantive issue of
increasing Soviet port calls in Tunisia and by issuing
an invitation to a deputy defense minister to visit the
USSR-an invitation which the official accepted
without clearing. The Defense Ministry evidently
believed that the Soviets were exploiting weaknesses
in the Tunisian bureaucracy to gain privileges they
would not have received through normal channels.
initiatives should receive high-level review.
Soviet Access to Menzel Bourguiba. In April 1977
Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira signed an
agreement during a visit to Moscow to provide for the
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routine repair and overhaul of Soviet naval ships in
Menzel Bourguiba shipyard.
For a time, the Tunisian Government maintained that
no agreement for routine repairs had been signed and
that the Soviet naval ships that could be seen in
Menzel Bourguiba were there for "emergency" re-
pairs.
Tunisian officials recognized that the fiction could not
be indefinitely maintained and indicated that the
Menzel Bourguiba yards were open to ships of all
nations on an equal basis. They have repeatedly
solicited US business for the shipyard, probably to
balance the Soviet visits rather than to displace
them.26
The Tunisians go to considerable lengths to ensure
that the Soviet visits to Menzel Bourguiba are classi-
fied as commercial and to treat all commercial users
of the shipyard equally. No official protocol activities
36 The United States has agreed to send three ships per year into
Menzel Bourguiba for repairs, but these repairs average only about
are.
are allowed in connection with the repair visits:
arrangements are made through the shipyard rather
than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign national
flags are not to be flown aboard the visiting ships, no
salutes are to be initiated or returned as they pass
Tunisian warships, and no formal calls are to be
exchanged with Tunisian military officials. When the
USS Hoist was repaired in Menzel Bourguiba in June
1979, these rules were strictly enforced, with one
exception-when US Navy officials explained that
they could not comply with a requirement that the
Tunisian flag, rather than the US flag, be flown,
shipyard officials accepted their position without fur-
ther comment. Later, however, the Soviets com-
plained that they had been required to fly the Tuni-
sian flag when the US ship was not. In one other area,
treatment of the two differs significantly: US sailors
are not restricted when ashore, but the Soviet sailors
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Tunisia has replied to Western protests by claiming
that the arrangement with the-S
economic-to provide jobs for unemployed shipyard
workers in the Bizerte area and to bring in much-
needed foreign exchange. According to Tunisian offi-
cials, Tunisian leaders clearly are aware of the impli-
cations of a routine Soviet naval presence in their
country, but they seem confident of their ability to
limit both the Soviet presence and its effects. Al-
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Western observers have questioned whether there is
any real economic benefit from the Soviet ship repair
business, but it probably is nearly as significant as the
Tunisians claim. Soviet use of Menzel Bourguiba has
never reached the level reportedly agreed on in 1977;
almost 50 Soviet naval ships (mainly auxiliaries) have
been repaired there since 1977. The US Embassy has
estimated that Socomena employs no more than about
150 Tunisians to repair each Soviet ship; nevertheless,
unemployment is a key economic problem in Tunisia,
and the loss of even a few jobs is politically signifi-
cant. The overall value of the repair to Soviet naval
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ships is estimated at about $1.5 million per year in
hard currency-a significant portion of Socomena's
total $4.5 million earnings and an important element
in Tunisia's balance of payments
Restrictions of Soviet Use of Repair Facilities (1979).
Western objections to the agreement focused heavily
on Tunisian repairs to Soviet submarines. Soviet
surface vessels can readily transit the Turkish Straits
to be repaired in the Black Sea, but the terms of the
Montreux Convention severely limit submarine tran-
sits of the Straits. Consequently, virtually all Soviet
submarines operating in the Mediterranean come
from the Northern Fleet and must return to Northern
Fleet shipyards for overhaul. Arrangements have been
made-for--some submarine repairs in littoral states:
two F-class submarines per year undergo five-month
upkeep periods in Yugoslav drydocks, and Soviet
submarines go into Tartus, Syria, on a monthly basis
for limited overhaul. A small number of submarines
also have been repaired in Algeria by Soviet techni-
cians aboard an accompanying repair ship. All. of
these arrangements together, however, do not replace
the flexibility the Soviets lost when they were denied
further access to Egyptian facilities. NATO govern-
ments feared that routine access to Tunisian ship-
yards for submarine repair would permit the Soviets
to keep additional submarines in the Mediterranean
on a regular basis, as they did before their expulsion
from Egypt
in response to Western representations
or as a result of irritation over efforts by the Soviets to
increase their access-the Tunisian Government de-
cided to ban repairs to submarines of all foreign
powers. The move clearly was aimed at the Soviets; no
other power had had its submarines repaired in
Tunisian shipyards.
Nevertheless, the new policy was evenhanded in its
formulation, reflecting Tunisia's continuing effort to
balance its commitments to East and West. For a
Tunisian Government has clarified its policy, which
evidently prohibits only repairs to submarines. F_
time, US diplomats had the impression that the new
policy banned Soviet submarine visits to Tunisian
ports. No Soviet submarine called from late 1978 to
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he Soviets too have pressed repeatedly for a
reversal of this policy, offering a contract worth as
much as $5 million annually-more than Socomena's
estimated annual earnings-on condition that repairs
to submarines be allowed. The Tunisians apparently
have resisted such blandishments thus far, although
they readily use them to solicit more business-or,
perhaps, economic or military aid-from Western
governments
Apart from the issue of submarines, we believe that
access to Socomena is important to the Soviets. The
Soviet shipyards devoted to repair are overcrowded,
and the Soviets welcome opportunities to have even a
limited number of ships overhauled in foreign yards.
Socomena offers an efficient alternative to Tartus.
For example, in spring 1978, a Natya-class mine-
sweeper had repeatedly been sent to Tartus for re-
pairs, remaining there for periods of up to two weeks.
Finally, the ship was towed to Tunisia, where it was
repaired in nine days and returned to duty. In another
case, a small yard oiler that is permanently stationed
in the harbor at Tartus was towed to Tunisia for
repairs lasting 35 days, although the distance to
Bizerte is no less than that to a Black Sea port.
Moreover, although officials have sometimes turned
down Soviet requests for visits at inconvenient times
or on short notice, Tunisia generally seems willing to
Building Domestic Influence. Soviet ties with the
local population are limited. There appear to be no
Soviet naval personnel permanently stationed in Tuni-
sia, although a Turkish diplomat stated that the
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Soviets have tried to obtain permission to station some
technicians there. Contact between the local popula-
tion and Soviet personnel is therefore minimal. Soviet
sailors have unrestricted access to the small town of
Menzel Bourguiba but cannot travel outside of it
without specific, by-name permission from the Tuni-
sian authorities. Crews of ships calling elsewhere are
restricted in their movements and by the language
barrier. Formal tours of Soviet naval ships are occa-
sionally allowed, but access is strictly limited.
Although Tunisian laborers do work on Soviet ships,
major interior work is carried out by Soviet personnel,
and parts that require repair are removed and serviced
in Tunisian workshops. Soviet sailors normally remain
below decks and do not socialize with their Tunisian
counterparts.
Naval Prospects
Despite Tunisian willingness to repair the ships of the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, Tunisian officials
follow Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean
with a wary interest, especially those activities near
the Tunisian coast. For example, in February 1981,
the Tunisian military consulted with the US defense
attache about the number of Soviet ships that ap-
peared to be anchoring off the Tunisian island of
Kerkenah.
The continued ties between the USSR and Libya are
a prime source of Tunisian suspicions about the Soviet
Navy and will probably prevent any expanded Soviet
naval access. Tunisia looks to the West to protect it
from any spinoffs of the Soviet-Libyan rapproche-
ment. In January 1980, for example, during a period
of extreme tensions in relations with Libya, Prime
Minister Nouira told the US Ambassador of his
concern over Soviet "maneuvers" in the Gulf of
Hammamet, where the Mediterranean Squadron has
one of its major anchorages. He believed that the
maneuvers were somehow connected with Libyan
maneuvers on the Tunisian border a few days before.
A week later, on 26 January, following a Libyan-
sponsored coup attempt by Tunisian exiles who at-
tacked the western town of Qassah, three French
combatants-a cruiser and two frigates-were sent to
patrol in the Gulfs of Hammamet and Gabes. Report-
edly one of the ships anchored in a harbor near Tunis.
There has been no public Tunisian reaction to the
initiation of Soviet port calls and aircraft deployments
to Libya in 1981. The Tunisians are almost certainly
concerned about Soviet calls to Tripoli but probably
will wait to see if Moscow's naval ties with Libya
embolden or restrain Qadhafi before they take any
action. Tunisia might restrict Soviet calls to Soco-
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mena as a warning-no com
for repairs as of December 1981-but as yet has not
communicated any change in policy.
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