POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE MAGHREB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000300080004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Political and Economic
Trends in the Maghreb
NESA 84-10066
March 1984
Copy 419
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n / LPc Directorate of Secret
L (l IN ? Intelligence 25X1
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Political and Economic
Trends in the Maghreb
Division, NESA,
This paper was prepared by the Maghreb Branch
of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli
Secret
NESA 84-10066
March 1984
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Political and Economic
Trends in the Maghreb
Introduction The five countries of the Maghreb-Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and
Information available Mauritania-are a diverse group, with governments ranging from Libya's
as q/'1 March 1984 and Algeria's very different revolutionary regimes through Mauritania's
was used in this report.
military leadership and Tunisia's president for life to Morocco's monarchy.
Not surprisingly, cooperation among these heterogeneous countries has
been sporadic and often superficial. The region is currently witnessing a
prolonged conflict over Western Sahara that pits the Polisario Front and its
Algerian backers against Morocco. Libyan leader Qadhafi mounted a raid
against Tunisia in 1980 designed to topple the Bourguiba government and
periodically dabbles in subversive schemes aimed at every one of Libya's
neighbors, even its supposed friend, Algeria. Yet for all the conflict and
mutual suspicion, the most notable trend among Maghreb countries today
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is a movement toward greater cooperation.
The initiative for this movement-the "greater Maghreb" plan-came
primarily from Algerian President Bendjedid, who has sought over the past
year to normalize relations with his Maghreb neighbors, particularly
Morocco. We believe the first and foremost objective of Bendjedid's
initiative was to improve the chances of a political settlement of the
Saharan conflict by achieving rapprochement with Morocco and improving
economic interchange between Morocco and Algeria. In our opinion,
Bendjedid wanted to assert influence with Tunisia in order to forestall
possible turmoil when Bourguiba leaves the scene. Bendjedid probably
believed that reasonably close relations with Libya's Qadhafi would help
contain Libyan troublemaking. He also saw Maghreb cooperation as a
means of precluding superpower intervention in the area-a goal to which
Algeria remains deeply committed. In our view, the other North African
leaders have been receptive to the "greater Maghreb" idea, primarily for
their own political and economic reasons but also because each sees in the
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plan the possibilities of greater internal stability. The "greater Maghreb"
idea does not include any utopian vision of political unification. 25X1
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Algeria's posture is probably the key to the success or failure of Maghreb
cooperation, although Libya may be able to play a spoiler role. If Algeria's
current orientation endures, as seems likely, cooperation can proceed
among the others with or without Libya's participation. Indeed, just such a
scenario appeared to be developing at the end of 1983. Contacts among
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were multiplying, and Libya's isolation
pushed Qadhafi to try to jump aboard with gestures of friendship toward
each of his neighbors. If Algeria's commitment to cooperation wanes and it
iii Secret
NESA 84-10066
March 1984
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Guinea
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Senegal
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Morocco
Upper
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Algeria
ALGIERS TUN
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Boundary representation is -"?
not necessarily authoritative. I
Central African
Republic
shifts back to a radical stance in Arab and regional politics, the Maghreb
will be polarized, with Tunisia an easy target for the subversive efforts of
its more powerful neighbors and Morocco again at odds with Algeria and
Libya.
Over the past year, Qadhafi has made a deliberate effort to break out of his
isolation from Arab circles in general, and from the Maghreb community
in particular. He succeeded in maneuvering an invitation to visit Morocco
at the end of June, which led to a rapprochement between Libya and
Morocco, public Libyan statements disavowing an independent Saharan
state and continued aid to the Polisario, and real or promised economic
benefits for Morocco. Qadhafi's visit to Tunisia in August was similarly
successful. Qadhafi promised that he would no longer train Tunisian
dissidents in his terrorist camps or use his territory as a springboard for
subversive operations against Tunisia. His reception in Mauritania in July
was cool, but his visit to Algeria the same month, while not a major
breakthrough, eased the strained relations between Algiers and Tripoli.
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On balance, in our judgment, Qadhafi's involvement in the developing
"greater Maghreb" movement may ultimately do more harm than good.
Both Morocco and Tunisia would welcome a respite from Qadhafi's
chronic subversive efforts, but neither can trust him. Libya's presence puts
pressure on Algeria to monitor and control his behavior-a formidable
task-and regularly tests Algeria's commitment to a more responsible,
moderate position on the highly polarized Arab political spectrum.
Regional Problems. The Western Sahara war is the most obvious divisive
factor among the Maghreb countries. Nearly a decade after the start of the
war over the future of Western Sahara, the military situation is stalemat-
ed, with efforts on the diplomatic front showing little progress. Morocco's
construction of a berm, a defensive perimeter that encloses the population
centers of Western Sahara and southern Morocco, has been decisive in
diminishing the Polisario's military impact. Through the adoption of this
defensive strategy, Morocco has perpetuated the stalemate but has reduced
the human and financial costs of the war. The Polisario has long
acknowledged that it cannot drive Morocco's forces from the region, but it
renewed its attacks in the summer of 1983-after 18 months of relative in-
activity-in an effort to force Morocco to enter direct negotiations.
Despite a more regular dialogue between Morocco and Algeria over the
Saharan dispute, a settlement in the near term seems unlikely. The war is
expensive for Morocco, but King Hassan has staked so much national and
personal prestige on the issue that he has left himself little room to
maneuver. Algeria, the Polisario Front's chief supporter, is more amenable
to a political settlement but still insists on direct Moroccan-Polisario
negotiations. King Hassan has refused to give the guerrillas this kind of
recognition and has been unwilling to take substantial risks in negotiations
sponsored by the Organization of African Unity.
ghreb politics.
All parties have agreed to the principle of a referendum on the sovereignty
of Western Sahara. For such a referendum to succeed, however, it must
ratify an arrangement previously agreed to by Morocco and the Polisario.
As long as the stalemate does not become too costly to Morocco, the
conflict over Western Sahara is likely to continue as a divisive issue in Ma-
For all its efforts to mend fences with its Maghreb neighbors, Libya
remains a promoter of regional instability. The threat is partly due to past,
and very likely continuing, Libyan efforts to overthrow Maghreb regimes.
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These include sponsorship of the raid against Qafsah, Tunisia in January
1980; the training of thousands of Tunisian dissidents and some Moroccans
in Libyan camps; support for Muslim fundamentalists hostile to the
Bourguiba regime; attempts to organize
subversive activity within Morocco; backing of an abortive coup against
President Haidalla of Mauritania in January 1983; even contacts with the
former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella in an effort to support his
return to power. These efforts, although unsuccessful, are not negligible;
the Qafsah raid, in particular, was a traumatic experience for the
Bourguiba government.
Direct Libyan subversion, however, is probably less a threat than Qadhafi's
willingness to use Libya's sizable oil revenues and conspicuously oversized
arsenal to support such activity. Qadhafi's neighbors, in our opinion, tend
to attribute to him more ability and determination than his amateurish
efforts at subversion so far would suggest. Maghreb leaders, we believe,
formulate policies with one eye out for their effect on Tripoli. By keeping
his neighbors constantly off balance, Qadhafi multiplies the impact of his
actions.
Economic Problems. Libya's economic difficulties are marginal compared
with the problems facing most of its neighbors. Revenue fell sharply in
1981 and 1982 as a result of the soft oil market, forcing the country to
adopt an austerity program emphasizing import controls, some lowering of
salaries and subsidies, and a hold on development projects. Given the
country's rich oil resources and small population, however, its current
difficulties are probably temporary.
Tunisia, a modest oil producer, does not enjoy Libya's wealth but has
experienced remarkable economic growth and high per capita income. Net
oil exports are declining, however, and, barring new finds, Tunisia will
continue as a net oil exporter only through the 1980s. The country also
faces serious unemployment and underemployment, perhaps 12 percent of
the work force in each category-partly as a result of the narrowing of tra-
ditional outlets for Tunisian labor in France and Libya.
Algeria, also a major oil-producer, has failed to match Libya's prosperity
primarily because of its much larger population. The country's emphasis on
rapid heavy industrial development in the 1970s was a failure; the
agricultural sector is stagnant; and unemployment, especially among the
young, is likely to become a political problem. Algeria's economic malaise
is in part responsible for President Bendjedid's more flexible approach to
the country's economic and social problems-a tack born out of a
conviction that the rigid socialist precepts of the past have failed.
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Morocco's economic pressures are severe. It, too, has a rapidly increasing
population-without Algeria's oil resources. The market for its primary
natural resource, phosphate, collapsed in 1976, and a severe drought hit the
country in 1981. Unemployment is escalating, and inflation is undermining
wages. Defense expenditures-most of them related to the Saharan war-
absorb some 40 percent of the nation's operating budget. Saudi Arabia
largely defrayed the cost of the war until recently, but the country suffers
indirectly as its energy and resources are deflected from more fundamental
concerns.
Mauritania, whose chief resources are fishing grounds and iron deposits, is
a poor country in a constant state of financial crisis. Mining is the
country's exclusive foreign exchange earner, but the international iron ore
market has been stagnant since 1978. The country's chief producing mine
will be exhausted by the end of the decade, and new mines that are to be
opened have a smaller iron content and are likely to prove uneconomic until
the market for iron strengthens.
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Although greater economic and political cooperation among the Maghreb
countries would not solve many of their most pressing economic and social
problems, the stability that might flow from a more cooperative approach
would create a far better environment for tackling them and would
certainly make the region more attractive to foreign investors-especially
Arabs.
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Regional Balance of Power and Military Issues. The principal military
issue in the Maghreb is Qadhafi's capability and intent to use Libya's large
arsenal of sophisticated weaponry. That arsenal, together with Qadhafi's
adventurist policies, has been a source of great unease to the other
Maghreb states. Concerns about Libyan behavior and the potential that
the military balance of power may tip in Libya's favor have significantly
affected their military planning.
The rapid growth of the Libyan arms inventory has increased Tripoli's
ability to sponsor subversion and military operations against its North
African neighbors. Modern artillery and armor, as well as Soviet-made.
tactical surface-to-surface missiles, give the Libyan Army a strike capabili-
ty it did not have 10 years ago. Ground and air transport is now available
to move much of this offensive equipment quickly. Meanwhile, the Libyan
Navy has blossomed into the largest in the Maghreb, doubling its size in
the last five years. Thirty guided missile boats and six submarines operate
from Libyan ports, more than the combined inventories of the rest of the
Maghreb states. Libya's air inventory has grown to the point where its
primary airfields are crowded with modern jet fighters, trainers, and
transport aircraft. Finally, all of Libya's cities and major military installa-
tions are protected by surface-to-air missile systems.
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The rapid growth of Libya's arms inventory has far outstripped the
military's capabilities. No branch of its armed forces can optimally employ
all of the weapons systems available to it. Manning, training, and
maintenance deficiencies combine to mitigate Libya's threat to its Ma-
ghreb neighbors.
Although the strategic planning of Morocco and Algeria continues to be
concerned primarily with the threat they pose to each other, each has had
to devote increasing attention to Libya in recent years. Rabat's approach to
the military campaign in Western Sahara has been affected by Libya's
support for the Polisario. some of the
Polisario's best equipment, such as their SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, has
come from Libya and helped the guerrillas achieve some military surprises
Concerned with the balance between its forces and those of Libya, Algeria
is slowly and methodically building up its ground, naval, air, and air
defense capabilities and recently has begun diversifying its purchases to
include US and other Western equipment. Algeria's Army-larger than
Libya's and similarly equipped with modern Soviet weaponry-is probably
the more capable. Its ships and aircraft, however, are outnumbered by
those of Libya. Algiers must be concerned about the continued remarkable
growth of Libya's military forces. Out of a basic distrust of Qadhafi,
Algiers will try to prevent the balance from tipping in Libya's favor.
Of the Maghreb states, Tunisia is the most concerned about the Libyan
threat. The Qafsah raid in 1980, despite its failure, clearly demonstrated
the danger of Libyan-backed subversion in Tunisia. Moreover, reports of
the presence of large numbers of Tunisian dissidents in Libyan training
camps continue to reach the Bourguiba government, despite the recent
warming in relations between the two countries. In response, Tunisia is
attempting to develop a mobile rapid reaction force to quash Qafsah-like
subversion before it spreads. At the same time, Tunis plans to build up its
conventional military forces to a point where they might serve as a
deterrent to a Libyan invasion. Tunisia's serious financial difficulties will
inhibit this program. With US financial assistance, however, Tunis has
contracted for US-built jets and tanks.
Regional Outlook. The divergence among the five Maghreb regimes with
respect to their types of government and their orientation toward Arab and
international problems guarantees continued strains. The Saharan dispute
is likely to drag on. Qadhafi's injection of Libya into the Maghreb unity
movement could contribute to the reemergence of divisions among the
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other participants, endangering the trend toward cooperation. For all of
these reasons, the "greater Maghreb" concept-like the ideal of Arab
unity-will be the object of continuing lipservice but probably will produce
only limited results of questionable durability.
unity among the rest of the Maghreb states than to jeopardize it.
Even so, periods of increased friction among Maghreb states are likely to
be succeeded by renewed moves toward cooperation. The area, for all its
differences, is a natural unit, isolated to a degree from the tensions of the
Arab-Israeli conflict and engrossed in its own concerns. Qadhafi's occa-
sional moves toward closer ties with his neighbors last for unpredictable
periods of time but invariably give way to estrangement because of
Qadhafi's compulsion to meddle and subvert. Libya's position is something
of an anomaly; its isolation from its neighbors is more likely to promote
Regardless of the current state of Libya's relations with its neighbors, 25X1
Libyan subversion will continue-though it may be muted when Qadhafi is
attempting to play the role of Arab peacemaker. Qadhafi does not balk at
following a two-track policy, wooing a country with talk of peace and
brotherhood while at the same time training that country's dissidents in his
camps. Qadhafi's demonstrated willingness to use any method-from
bribery through subversion to coup attempts and outright military inter-
vention-to accomplish his ends means that his neighbors will live in
permanent fear of his actions. His current stance, while appearing to
deemphasize subversive efforts, gives him a forum for posturing in the
Maghreb and broader Arab circles.F____1 25X1
but not necessarily a force for destabilization.
Unhappiness with the Qadhafi regime on the part of the Libyan population
as a whole, and the military in particular, means that his abrupt departure
from the scene cannot be ruled out. Should that happen, the effects on both
Libya and the region would be profound. Any Libyan successor would
probably be weaker and lack a free hand in running the country for the
first several years-forcing him to court the widest possible popular
support, though purges within the military and other influential groups
could occur. Qadhafi's controversial economic, social, and political experi-
ments would probably disappear. A successor regime would be likely to
retain Qadhafi's close relationship with the Soviet Union-if only to
guarantee continued delivery of military spare parts-but would move to
reduce tensions with the United States. It would work to reintegrate Libya
into Arab councils. Most important, a successor, even one not necessarily
more conservative than Qadhafi, would undoubtedly lack Qadhafi's com-
pulsion to export his "Green Book" philosophy throughout Africa and the
Middle East. Libya would continue to be a significant factor in the region
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The Maghreb Centered on Algiers, Algeria
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Regional Balance of Power and Military Issues vii
Foreign Policy and the King 4
The Military and the FLN 12
Development Strategy 22
L Qadhafi and His Revolution 25
Spreading the Revolution 27
Economic Development 29
Outlook 30
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Statistical Appendix 39
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Political and Economic
Trends in the Maghreb
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Among the North African countries, Morocco's histo-
ry has the greatest continuity. The dynasty of King
Hassan can be traced back to the 17th century, and
the monarchy itself has existed with only brief inter-
ruptions since the ninth century. This continuity has a
powerful influence on contemporary Moroccans, the
majority of whom have strong allegiances to their
King as the nation's religious and political leader and
have been relatively undemanding with regard to
major economic and political reforms. In the wake of
two attempted military coups in the early 1970s, King
Hassan has ruled much more attentively, demonstrat-
ing both skill and ruthlessness in dealing with poten-
tial opposition and competing interest groups. His
relatively secure position at home has allowed the
King to play an active role in Middle East politics
where he has been a voice for moderation and a
reliable friend of the United States. Although most of
the Moroccans seem satisfied with King Hassan's
rule, he is likely to face great problems over the next
several years as a result of a deteriorating economy,
high expectations among a burgeoning, youthful pop-
ulation, and a costly and seemingly unwinnable war in
Western Sahara.'
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Morocco's "Democratic Experiment"
Shortly after independence from the protectorate of
France and Spain in 1956, King Mohammed V-
Hassan's father-began what has become known as
the country's "democratic experiment." From a series
of constitutions-the most recent promulgated in
1972-the structure of a constitutional monarchy has
evolved complete with a parliament, political parties,
and local governments elected by universal suffrage.
In fact, the King's powers remain all embracing, and
what constitutional restraints there are have been
periodically abridged by the King's imposition of
emergency powers.
The Moroccan parliament sits for a six-year term and
is composed of a single chamber, two-thirds of which
is elected by direct, universal suffrage. The other
third of the membership is selected by local councils
and trade, artisan, and labor organizations. Local
governments are elected and hold considerable power
in the conduct of day-to-day activities affecting the
average citizen. Provincial governors are appointed by
the King.
The King's authority and his manipulation of Moroc-
co's political system have prevented the formation of
political institutions with enough power and credibil-
ity to restrict Hassan's ability to make all major
decisions. The small Socialist Union of Popular
Forces, Morocco's only credible opposition party, in
recent years has had its activities severely restricted.
The token pro-Soviet Communist party-Party for
Progress and Socialism-is fairly tame but has a
significant following among youth and intellectual
circles
Predominance of the Monarchy
King Hassan II-who is 54 years old-is the epitome
of a traditional Moroccan monarch. He is a highly
self-confident and paternalistic leader who believes he
is uniquely qualified to determine what is best for his
country. Hassan feels a strong commitment to perpet-
uate the Moroccan monarchy-the oldest reigning
dynasty in the Arab world-and any challenge to his
leadership intensifies his determination to succeed in
carrying out his inherited role.
The King's style of rule is based on the adroit
manipulation of competing interest groups through
divide-and-rule tactics. Hassan's considerable skills in
political manipulation have enabled him to maintain
the upper hand. Nevertheless, faced with complex
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barrier (berm)
Area of Polisario
base camps
Phosphate mine
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