K.G.B. RUNS COMMERCE UNIT, U.S. SAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000702650005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 127
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 16, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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~ YORK TIMES,- WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1987
kn,~ee+` . ":.
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Once the target companies brtn[ .;;;d
their'equipment to the Soviet Union far. _.
exhibition, the report said, Soviet otM ~
cials put pressure on them to sell It. "A.. ..? _~
former Soviet military attache has rn y~
ported tharWestern businessmen t~"s?
aften been drawn into negotiations or ~
the sale of sensitive equipment:': _~
added. ;;~l ~":".r :~
..,, ~ .
Quotation of the Day d"
- page 2, every day,`'~.~; _ .
in the News Surnmary? - "
The New York 71meS? ~ ~
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A Government
. .1
document says
one-third of the .
officials are spies.
. un~ ornrne~ce n t , _.: ~ a
By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
Speaal to Thc New YorN Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 - A State
Department report, based on classified
Central Intelligence Agency data, as-
serts that the U.S.S.R. Chamber , of
Commerce and Industry is headed by a
KG.B. lieutenant general and is sys-
tematicallyengaged in commercial es-
pionage in the West.
It is the first time the chamber,
which is housed in the former Moscow
stock exchange at?Gfitsa Kaibysheva 6
and represents itself as the. Russian
equivalent of Western chambers of
commerce, has been officially branded
by the United States as a center of in-
dustrialspying.
The document says that of 140 offi-
cials identified with the chamber,
about one-third are known or suspected
intelligence officers, of whom a few are
from the G.P..U., or military intelli-
gence,and the rest from the K.G.B., the
main Soviet intelligence organization,
known by its Russian initials for the
Committee on State Security.
The report did not get much attention
when it was put out for what State De-
partment officials said was "limited"
distribution last August. But it reached
the Soviet Union and, according to
sources here, was believed to have an-
~, gered Soviet officials, including the
Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev.
executive committee or? governing
board of the U.S: U.S.S.R. Trade and
Economic Counciha foivm for impro~?-
ing commercial exchanges between
the two countries.
The chamber "exploits and mis-
leads" Western business and govern-
ment leaders by systematically using
international trade exhibitions and
seminars for collection of economic
data, the report contends.
State Department Document
"Hosting over 200 trade exhibitions
and about 100 Western business delega-
tions annually and inspecting thou-
sands of goods each year give its em-
ployees extraordinary access to im-
ported equipment and uncounted con-
tacts with foreign companies," accord-
ing to the State Departmene document.
Cited as principal collection priori-
ties are robot technology, marine tech-
nology, including that dealing with sub-
marines doing deep sea research,,and
industrial chemicals.
Officials here said the document The chamber was also accused of
might have been on Mr. Gorbachev's "falsifying" end-user documentation
desk during his meeting with Secretary during inspection of Western equip-
of State George P. Shultz last week that ment coming into the Soviet Union, ac-
failed to set a date for a summit meet- cording to the report.
ing For example, when a Western com-
Albert V. Melnikov, Commercial. Pany producing goods for a civilian in-
Counselor at the Soviet Embassy, said, dustry in the Soviet Uniori requests a
"1 have no comment on" the commer- quality control inspection, the chamber
cial espionage allegations. usually prepares a declaration of in-
The report identified the chamber's spection for the equipment.
chairman as Lieut. Gen. Yevgeny P. When Soviet officials wish to hide the
Pitovranov of the K.G.B., who is on the true identify of the Soviet user, the re-
Was It on Gorbachev's Desk?
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y ~ tricks' f ire upsets Soviets
orbachev angered by U.S. report on disinformation
By Terry Atlas
Chicago Tribune
WASHINGTON-At the low
point in his talks last week with
Secretary of State George Shultz, a
suddenly angry Mikhail Gort~achev
pulled from his stack of papers a
month-old. State Department report
on Soviet disinformation and other
"dirty tricks" to influence foreign
public opinion.
The report was "all mazked up; '
Shultz said afterward, and the Sovi-
et leader "seemed to resent the fact
that there were critical comments in
it."
Kathleen Bailey, author of the re-
port, said Monday that she was not
altogether surprised by Gorbachev's
reaction.
"You would anticipate they
:vould be upset atxiue it'-yes; be=?
cause we've exposed what they've
done," she said.
Ironically, Shultz at the time had
not seen the 90-page nepon, which
documents a vanety of Soviet "ac-
tive measures," such as a disinfor-
mation campaign that contends the
A1DS virus is the result of Ameri-
can germ warfare experiments. By
Monday, Shultz had a copy of the
unclassified report.
Bailey, former research director at
the U.S. Information Agency, is
deputy assistant secretary of state
for research, specializing in Soviet
c(forts to influence world public
opinion through deception and lies.
The report was the work of an
inters enc overnment rou that
raves on o icials rom intclh cn
agencies. rom t Statr? snit n,.
ense dcoartments and th t 1 c to
formation Agency.
Partly in response to pressure
from the political right, the State
Department a year ago established,
under Bailey, an Office of Active
Measures Analysis and Response to
monitor such Soviet activities and
to plan U.S. steps to counteract
them.
The study, requested by Congress,
looked at the way the Soviets use
disinformation (deliberately false or
misleading information), forgeries,
front organizations and other covert
measures to advance Soviet foreign
Policy and to damage the U.S. in:
the eyes of the world.
"The Soviets have been pickin
up their activities in this area signif~
icantly;' Bailey said, despite Gor-
bachev's calls for more openness
and better relations with the West.
JcfTrey Richelson, an intelligence
specialist at the Brookings Institu-
tion, said there is no question that
the Kremlin directs such undercover
activities.
If the Soviets are planting false
stories, then "it's certainly legiti-
mate to try to find out about them
and to try to show they're not
true," he said.
The report documents Soviet ef-
forts to spread false stories that, for
instance, the U.S. supplies chemical
weapons to the anticommunist Af-
glean resistance fighters and that-fhe
U.S. has developed an "ethnic .
bomb" that selectively kills
nonwhites.
The report traces the AIDS story,
a disinformation campaign that has
particularly angered American ofl5_
cials. Last month, Shultz com-
plained about it to Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who
reportedly said Moscow would try
to stop spreading the story.
In addition, the report cites the
World Peace Council and its Amer-
ican branch, the U.S. Peace Coun-
cil, as Soviet front organizations
that promote the Kremlin's defense
and disarmament proposals.
The group is said to be directed
by the intcmational department of
the. Soviet Communist Party, which
is headed by Moscow's former am-
bassador to the U.S., Anatoly
Dobrynin.
The report covers what it says are
Kremlin efforts to use Soviet reli-
gious leaders to influence their
counterparts around the world and
damaging forged documents that
seem to be the work of Moscow or
its allies.
The official Soviet news agency
Tass, in a story Sept. 30 about the
report, said cntically: "The authors
of the publication seemed to be
guided by two simple rules: Any
pualic organization opposed ~to
Washington's. o(Iicial directives was
a 'front' for the Russians, while any
The Washington Post
____ _
_
The !dew York Times _
Th
W
_
__ _
e
ashington Times
__ __ __-__
The Wall Strsei .:ournal
_ _____
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today _`
The Chicago Tribune $E - ~, b
Date
Press report. damming to U.S. pres-
tige;;was Soviet disinformation."
Shultz, recounting his conversa-
tion with Gorbachev, said he gave
no ground. to the Soviet leader.
"There was son: of an attitude [by
Gorbachev) of how could anybody
be critical. of the Soviet Union "
Shultz recalled. "And I said really
it's very easy.
"After all, You invaded Afghani_
sue, ~ you shot down that Korean
airliner and then Mr. Gromyko
[then !'Soviet foreign minister] went
to Madrid and said that they'd do it
again;" Shultz said he .told Gor-
bachev. "And then you've been
spreading all this bum dope about
AIDS;! so_youu can see that it's pi~s-
sible to be upset."
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United States Department of State
Intelligence Collection in the
USSR Chamber of Commerce
and Industry
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Intelligence Collection in the
USSR Chamber of Commerce
and Industry
This paper was prepared for the Department of
State for public distribution. It is based on a classified
study initially done by the Directorate of
Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency for US
Government officials.
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Intelligence Collection in the
USSR Chamber of Commerce
and Industry
Key Judgments The USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry plays an important role in
I~t/ormation available the Soviet effort to collect Western economic information of value to Soviet
as oj2 January /987 industry. It carries out that role while acting as a trade promoter and
was used in this report.
facilitator with excellent access to Western firms. Among other things, the
chamber:
? Introduces Western firms to Soviet foreign trade and
industrial organizations.
? Provides foreign trade data to Soviet agencies.
? Carries out official trade functions, including
hosting exhibitions and facilitating patent work.
? Maintains representations in at least 14 countries.
Of the chamber's known staff of 140, about a third are KGB officers. The
chamber also maintains ties to the GRU.
Some of the chamber's trade promotion activities involve exploiting or
misleading Western business and government leaders by:
? Systematically using international trade exhibitions
and seminars for economic collection.
? Falsifying end-user documentation during inspection
of Western equipment coming into the USSR.
The chamber's collection priorities-if it has any-are unknown. However,
since at least the 1960s, it has tried-often successfully-to collect
information on a wide range of Western technology, including:
? Robot technology.
? Marine technology, including that dealing with submarines doing deep-
sea research.
? Industrial chemicals.
The chamber's contribution to the overall Soviet effort to collect informa-
tion on Western technology is difficult to gauge. However, its trade
promotion activities-hosting over 200 trade exhibitions and about 100
Western business delegations annually and inspecting thousands of goods
each year-give its employees extraordinary access to imported equipment
and uncounted contacts with foreign companies, particularly US or US-
afiiliated firms.
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Key Judgments
iii
Setting the Scene
1
Collection Targets
2
Links to Soviet Intelligence
2
Inspection Methods
3
The Inspectors
3
Destination-Defense Industry
4
Trade Exhibition Tactics
5
Targeting Displayed Equipment
5
Collecting Technical Information
5
Reaping Seminar Benefits
5
Access to Commercial Data Bases
5
Acquiring Western Patent Information
9
Soyuzpatent Association
9
Foreign Patent Applications
12
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Figure 1
Structure of USSR Chamber of
Commerce and Industry
? Joint Secretariat Ibr
Arbitration
? Goads Inspection
Administration
? Insurance
Department
0 0 111 117 1 S S I OI1
? Farcign C-xhibits
? Juridical l7etaartment
in the USSR Admini?tration
- Commercial Shipping and
- Foreign 'trade
Mtiritima Lew Section
Arbitr:uion
? Soviet Exhibits
Conunission
Abrostd Administration
? Supplies
Department
- ~Inritimc
Arhitration
Cnnunission
- Iturcau of
Avorrge Adjusters
? lnCormntion and
I?ublications Administration
? ~ranSlatlUnS
Administration
- 'fmnslations
SCrvice
~ laCrSOnnv'1
Adn1lniStrfitlan.
- West Europetn
Ucpaetm::nr' ;
- Prptoeol
Department
Ae~artnient
- American and rtsidn
Coagtries I~ep.tinmen[
Administration
? Marketing
Section
? Sayuzpatent
Association
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Intelligence Collection in the
USSR Chamber of Commerce
and Industry
Setting the Scene
The Soviet program to acquire militarily significant
Western technology is well documented. The effort
consists of two programs that use both legal and
illegal means. The first, managed by the Military-
Industrial Commission of the Presidium of the USSR
Council of Ministers, seeks one-of-a-kind military and
dual-use hardware and blueprints to improve the
technical levels of Soviet weapons and military equip-
ment. The second, run by the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Soviet intelligence services, diverts dual-
use manufacturing and test equipment into the pro-
duction lines of weapons industries.
Along with the organizations that spearhead these
technology-transfer programs, other agencies aid the
process. This publication focuses on how one of the
most important of these agencies-the USSR Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry-creates and uses
opportunities for legally acquiring information of
value to Soviet industry and, in doing so, misleads
Westerners about certain chamber activities.
The chamber collects economic information-in it-
self, alegal activity. It does this while assisting major
Soviet foreign trade actors in exhibiting goods, host-
ing seminars, and translating commercial documents.
It easily gains access to such information because it is
a frequent contact for Western companies doing
business with the Soviets. For example, US business-
men who need information or procedural assistance on
trade matters can contact the chamber's representa-
tive at the New York office of the US-USSR Trade
and Economic Council. When Westerners arrive in
Moscow to sell their products, the chamber introduces
them to the appropriate Soviet foreign trade organiza-
tion or industrial customer. At various stages in the
commercial process, the chamber steps in to encour-
age negotiations and help solve problems between
Soviet industrial clients and their potential Western
suppliers.
According to its charter, the chamber is a public
agency. However, it works closely with-and is prob-
ably secretly subordinate to-the Ministry ojForeign
Trade:
? The chamber's predecessor organizations operated
openly under the People's Commissariat jor (now
the Ministry o,~ Foreign Trade.
? Many chamber employees originally worked in the
Ministry and graduated from its Academy ojFor-
eign Trade.
? Some chamber officials use the services ojthe
Ministry's personnel administration when traveling
abroad, and their visas state that they are Minis-
try-not chamber-employees.
The chamber probably disavows its o,~cial govern-
ment connection in order to cortJorm to the organiza-
tional structures of Western chambers of commerce,
which operate independently of their governments.
Like many Western corporations, the chamber has a
headquarters o,~ce and subsidiary associations,
which are divided into jams and departments. The
chamber even has its own version ojshareholders: in
return jor a membership jee, about 4,500 Soviet
industrial enterprises, scientthc research institutes,
public health and cultural organizations, construc-
tion and transport agencies, andloreign and domestic
trade organizations can draw upon chamber services.
However, some of the chamber's functions involve
deception. In the USSR, it helps inspect Western
equipment, some sold legally to civilian industries but
destined from the first for defense-related
organizations.
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KGB Lt. Gen. (Res.) Yevgeniy Petrovich Pitovranov
has been an o.,~icer in the chamber since 1966. He is
on the Executive Committee (governing board) ojthe
US-USSR Trade and Economic Council.
Pitovranov has studied at the Moscow Electrome-
chanical Institute jor Railway Transport Engineers.
He,loined the Communist Party (CPSUJ in 1938.
From the late 1930s until 1951 he served in the
People's Commissariat ojlnternal AB"airs and
successive intelligence organizations. In 1951 Pitov-
ranov began an 18-month imprisonment during then
General Secretary losil'Stalin's purge ojintelligence
o..~cers who had associated with secret police chief
Lavrentiy Beriya. ~QJ'ter the post-Stalin regime re-
leased him, Pitovranov served as Deputy High Com-
missioner in Berlin (1953-54), KGB resident in the
Embassies in Berlin (1955-58J and Beijing (1959-61 J,
and head ct/' the KGB Training School (1962-64J. He
then attended the CPSU Higher Party School; upon
graduation, he,loined the chamber as a deputy chair-
man. He was promoted to first deputy chairman in
1972. His responsibilities in his.hrst two chamber
posts included supervising international exhibitions
and registering patents and trademarks. Pitovranov,
71, speaks German. He is not believed to speak
English. He and his wife, Yelizaveta Yasil'yevna,
have three grown children.
Collection Targets
The chamber's collection priorities-if it has indeed
set any-are unknown. However, during the past two
decades it has often succeeded in collecting informa-
tion on a wide range of Western equipment. The
following examples are typical:
? A Soviet in the Franco-Soviet Chamber of Com-
merce tried in 1983 to collect technical data on
Western marine technology, including computer
software packages and information on deep-sea
research submarines.
? A chamber official in West Germany attempted
during the late 1960s to obtain data on secret
chemical-processing procedures.
? The chamber sponsors trade fairs to which it rou-
tinely invites Western manufacturers whose prod-
ucts fit Soviet industrial needs. Invitations have
been extended to, among others, a Japanese indus-
trial robot association and a Western producer of
calibration equipment for precision electronics.
? At Expo-70 in Tokyo, chamber personnel solicited
from a Japanese trading firm reports containing
data extracted from a technical paper, information
on Western applications for patents, and informa-
tion on Mitsubishi's technical research funds.
? The chamber routinely requests several copies of
technical publications provided for seminars given
by Western businessmen. In one case, the chamber
seminar coordinator asked a Western electronics
manufacturer to send him all construction, manu-
facturing, and design standards relating to the
product and its specific industrial applications.
Links to Soviet Intelligence
The exact number of chamber employees is unknown.
Of the approximately 140 officials who have been
identified, about a third are known or suspected
intelligence officers, of whom a few are GRU (mili-
tary intelligence) and the rest KGB. Analysis of the
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Gennadiy Fedorovich Solntsev
Chief; Fenno-Soviet Chamber oJCommerce,
Helsinki (since 1984)
Age 65 ... agiliated with the KGB ...1949 graduate
ollnstitute oJForeign Trade ...first secretary in
Embassy economic section in Austria 1956-60 .. .
commercial attache, Soviet trade mission, Canada,
1967-71 ... joined chamber in about 1976 as deputy
chiej'oj'Foreign Exhibitions Department ...deputy
general director of V/O Ekspotsentr during 1977 and
1981-84 ... worked in United States as deputy
chairman of Kama River Purchasing Commission
1978-81 ... low-key, polite, knowledgeable ... de-
scribed as ejlective with US businessmen ... in late
1970s tried to coax US diplomat in Moscow into
sending him technical literature jrom a seminar .. .
speaks good English.
career patterns and activities of the remaining offi-
cials suggests that the actual number of KGB and
GRU officers is higher.
KGB use of chamber cover appears to be quite broad:
? KGB staff officers fill about half of the senior
management slots in the chamber's Moscow appara-
tus and thus are in a position to have considerable
policymaking authority. In most other Soviet ad-
ministrative units, intelligence officers hold lower
level positions and concentrate mainly on intelli-
gence operations.
? Some of these senior managers have had extensive
experience in clandestine operations.
? KGB oflicers are found in almost every chamber
component; in most government agencies, they tend
to congregate in only one or two components that
deal with foreigners (like foreign trade organizations
and foreign relations or protocol departments).
The chamber conducts intelligence operations both at
home and overseas. Overseas, it maintains representa-
tions in several countries. A representation may be
Central Arbitration Laboratory,
Moscow Goods /nspection Administration
part of a Soviet trade delegation to a country or a
separate, bilateral chamber, such as the Italian-Soviet
Chamber of Commerce in Milan, the Franco-Soviet
Chamber in Paris, or the British-Soviet Chamber in
London. In the United States, the chamber is repre-
sented on the US-USSR Trade and Economic Coun-
cil in New York.
Judging by their activities, it appears that the KGB
fills the top slots in these overseas organizations. They
conduct regular chamber work to gain credibility,
establish business contacts, and lay the foundation for
future collection. Firms whose products are of techno-
logical interest to the USSR are contacted for infor-
mation on manufacturing processes and technical
specifications. Soviet foreign trade representatives
may then follow up on these leads with offers to
develop a market for the company's goods in the
Soviet Union or simply with ofTers of cash.
Inspection Methods
The Inspectors. When the USSR purchases some-
thing from a foreign source, the product must be
inspected to ensure that it meets specifications agreed
upon at the time of sale. This is done by quality
control inspectors (also called acceptance engineers),'
' Acceptance engineers can be found in other Soviet organizations,
such as the State Committee for Science and Technology and
industrial enterprises that have economic dealings with the West.
All quality control inspectors operate in the same way.
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InspectionOB"icials
Yuriy Maksimovich Levin
Chamber Inspector, Nissho-Iwai, Japan
Age 47 ... servingfor,fifth time in same post with
this,firm (previous tours have been less than a year)
...known KGB ct,~"iliation ...uses State Committee
for Science and Technology credentials ...has often
contacted Japanese manufacturers to request techni-
cal details on equipment Soviets purportedly interest-
ed in buying ...has played on manufacturers' eager-
ness to make sales to obtain technical specifications
and procedures.
Vladimir Ivanovich Gornostayev
Chid; Goods Inspection Administration
(since about 1968)
Age 73 ... possibly involved in GRU illegals opera-
tions ...director of Soviet industrial and trade
exhibitions in Australia 1961 and in Turkey 1963-65
...described as reserved, rather unsocial, di~cult to
ir~uence, and ambitious but not conniving.
Doctoring the Documents
When a Western firm producing goods for a civilian
industry in the USSR requests a quality control
inspection, the chamber usually prepares a declara-
tion of inspection for the equipment. That document
includes the name of the inspector, the name ojthe
Soviet organization that is the customer, and the
names of two customer representatives. In cases in
which the Soviets wish to hide the true identity of the
Soviet user, o,~cials may doctor the document so
that theloreign supplier may never suspect that he
has sold his product to a closed facility probably
involved in military production.
results. Acceptance engineers routinely initiate con-
tact with firms other than the one to which they are
assigned in order to obtain technical details on equip-
ment that the USSR is supposedly interested in
purchasing. They may also target Western engineers
and scientists for recruitment as agents to pass along
technical information or trade secrets.
Destination-Defense Industry. The Goods Inspec-
tion Administration helps funnel foreign goods ac-
some of whom serve in the Goods Inspection Adminis- quired by the USSR into defense or other classified
tration of the chamber. Among their legitimate re- facilities. It does this in a variety of ways. For
sponsibilities are preparing invoices and other docu- example:
ments that accompany goods, witnessing certificates
of origin, and conducting laboratory tests.
The position of quality control inspector provides an
excellent cover for Soviet intelligence officers trained
in S&T collection methods. These inspectors go
abroad frequently; they can be assigned to a Western
factory for several weeks or for months. Most will be
able to return for several tours if the host country has
no objection. Acceptance engineers are not normally
subject to travel restrictions and surveillance imposed
on diplomatic personnel and thus are able to gather
technical information more easily than can embassy
or consulate officials. Observers of Soviet commercial
personnel abroad note that acceptance engineers
sometimes wander into off-limits areas on the pretext
of inspecting equipment or looking at equipment test
? Its personnel can conceal the identities of Soviet
military or defense end-users from Westerners who
have legally sold equipment to what they thought
were nonstrategic facilities. They can accomplish
this by preparing false certification documents dur-
ing quality control inspections.
? It inspects and forwards imported items that have
arrived in the USSR. There is reason to believe that
half or more of the imported equipment inspected by
the Moscow branch of the chamber ended up in
defense-related facilities. According to the Soviet
press, as of 1982 the chamber had conducted over
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1.6 million inspections of imported goods, and the
volume of services had risen by 250 percent since
1969. These figures suggest that much equipment
that is not export controlled is nevertheless of value
to defense-related organizations.
Trade Exhibition Tactics
One of the chamber's two foreign trade organizations,
V/O Ekspotsentr, organizes international trade fairs
and exhibitions. Ekspotsentr annually handles more
than 200 exhibitions in the USSR and about 25
Soviet expositions abroad. It establishes special
booths~alled commercial centers-for Soviet for-
eign trade and scientific specialists to use as a home
base while they assess advanced technology exhibited
at the fairs. In 1983 a senior expert with the Main
Engineering and Technical Administration (GITU), a
component of the Foreign Trade Ministry, was named
director of an international exhibition center in the
chamber. The presence in the chamber of this official,
as well as of other GITU officials, indicates close
coordination between the two organizations in facili-
tating the assimilation of foreign equipment.
Targeting Displayed Equipment. The chamber clear-
ly views exhibitions as opportunities to gather indus-
trial intelligence. It has been successful in gaining the
participation of Western countries, even those that
belong to the Coordinating Committee (COCOM),
and in persuading them to exhibit sensitive electronic,
instrument-making, engineering, and other equip-
ment. Once the targeted companies bring their equip-
ment to the USSR for exhibition, Soviet officials-
probably including chamber exhibition representa-
tives-pressure them to sell it. A former Soviet
military attache has reported that Western business-
men have often been drawn into negotiations on the
sale of sensitive equipment.
Collecting Technical li~/ormation. At exhibitions
chamber officials collect any industrial information
they can. Several sources have noted the enthusiasm
with which they gather up unclassified handouts on
equipment manufactured in the West. Western visi-
tors to exhibitions in the USSR believe KGB officers
have entered locked display rooms at night to copy
design information from equipment, but this charge
cannot be independently confirmed.
Reaping Seminar Benefits
The other chamber foreign trade organization in-
volved in industrial collection efforts is V/O Sovint-
sentr, which runs the International Trade Center in
Moscow as well as various hotels and office buildings
in the city. Each year Sovintsentr's hotels accommo-
date thousands of guests-including US Government
officials-from Western industrialized countries.
Sovintsentr also sponsors seminars in Moscow for
foreign businessmen who wish to brief Soviet officials
on their products. In 1983 alone, it organized about
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Figure 2
Exhibition Sections
and ndusEry
S!Ftrminforrnreklam'a
.-re
V/O: Ekspotsentir
Adm~nisttr~~
~~~'_P,roviOcs mformuuon and adver4smg services prepares ,' ~ Arranges and holds international exhibitipns in the USSR..
promouorial`~ma c i.tl on~internaUOn~l und&foreign exhibit's =- ~tnd expositions at mternattonal eont,resses. Exhibits.
~hc~Id~n~thcUSS~~`~,~ ~ ~ r x ~ ~ arivnlve;seJer.rl'eoun'trics and;thomos. ;
Fu rri` Tiransc~~po ~ ~~ ~~ , ~ ? Ftrm inovystavka r~
~~ ~ ~~~ ~
~tspnrts and lorwards erh bnion' c,argots assembles and E?Fepares andtholds exhibns fpr ~ sm le country or For-.
Jisn'`ianiles t~hi6us~'s~s"+~~g"~?w~~ ~ ~ ~ iritlrvidual rompaniesaon th?e same theme; supplies lists
~~~{~ ~ ~~ ~ ~} t ~ ` ;~ of services and rcgulfitionil
~tsa~'~i x 1 II
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Marlen Khorenovich Akopov
Director of Soviet Exhibitions
(since about 1976)
Age 46 ... suspected KGB ciliation ...served in
Embassy in Nepal as interpreter during 1961-62 .. .
joined chamber as translator in about 1971.. .
worked in Exhibitions Abroad and Foreign Relations
Administrations ...representative to Board of Inter-
national Expositions in Paris since 1966 ... has often
traveled to United States for negotiations on exhibi-
tions and 1982 World's Fair ...friendly, gregarious,
and able to draw people out ...cultivates relation-
ships with US ogicials who have high-level political
contacts ...described as shrewd and tough .. .
speaks excellent English.
Konstantin Fedorovich Afanas rev
Deputy General Director, V/O Ekspotsentr
(since at least 1981);
Director, Firm Inovystavka, Ekspotsentr
(since at least 1983)
Khachik Gevorkovich Oganesyan
Former Deputy General Director, V/O Ekspotsentr
(1978-84)
Age 72 ... retired in 1984 ... supervised all Soviet
agents in Tehran during 1946-SO as second secretary
and consul ...assigned to Vienna as chief of an
illegals section of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVDJ
1950-53 ... deputy chie,/; MVD Counterintelligence
Section, East Berlin, 1954-59; there he ran illegals
and handled sabotage operations and for most of the
time was attached as adviser to East German Minis-
try of State Security ....first identified in chamber in
1969 as deputy chief of Foreign and.tnternational
Exhibitions Department ...advised US companies
on types of equipment chamber wanted them to
display ...described as cordial and helpful on exhi-
bition administrative details.
Ivan Luk ~anovich Rozhkov
Director, Firm Irsformreklama,
V/O Ekspotsentr (since about 1983)
Age 66 ... KGB colonel ...probably responsiblelor
S&T matters ...served in trade mission in Cologne
as stc'employee during 1957-60 ... was rP/'used visa
for second tour in 1962 because of prior activities and
contacts ...during 1964-68 was just secretary at
trade mission in Vienna ...joined chamber in about
1969 as deputy director of specialized foreign exhib-
its ... speaks.fluent German; good French and
English.
Age 67 ... suspected GRU o.,~icer ...was held army
radio operator and then captain in engineer corps
during World War Il ...foreign trade representative
in Italy 1964-67 ....first secretary in Bolivia from
1970 until he was declared persona non grata in 1972.
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Cottection Service Data Processing Center
V/O Sovintsentr
150 seminars at the Trade Center. Seminar sponsor-
ship constitutes Sovintsentr's largest and one of its
most successful information collection efforts.
At these professional gatherings, Sovintsentr officials
attempt to collect technical intelligence and to moni-
tor the activities of foreign business representatives.
They display literature that suggests that businessmen
who are losing trade because of government restric-
tions on selling high-technology items to the Soviet
Union should lobby against such sanctions. The
chamber informs businessmen before the seminar that
they are not permitted to keep Soviet calling cards,
and it attempts to confiscate all cards they may
already have collected.
Access to Commercial Data Bases
The chamber has a computer center, which contains a
new automated storage and retrieval system operated
by Sovintsentr. The center provides information to the
chamber's members on world market prices, interna-
tional trade and finance, patent and invention specifi-
cations, and stock exchanges. It includes a library, a
microfilm storage area, and an S&T data bank. The
center uses IBM 370/ 148 and PDP 11 /70 computers,
which the United States exported legally to the USSR
in 1978.
V/O Sovintsentr O,~cials
Aleksandr Fedorovich Khlystov
Deputy General Director,
V/O Sovintsentr (since at least 1980)
Age 53 ... administrator oj'International Trade Cen-
ter ...probably KGB colonel ...translator at New
York World s Fair in 1959 ... foreign trade employee
in London 1961 fi5 ... adviser and counselor at
Soviet pavillion at Expo-70 in Tokyo ...deputy
division chiPJ'in chamber in 1974 ... drinks heavily.
Gennadiy Nikolayevich Tapeshko
Director, Firm Interkongress,
V/O Sovintsentr (since April 1985)
Age 46 ... suspected KGB o.~cer ...employee (non-
diplomatic), Office of Commercial Counselor, Em-
bassy, Colombo, 1963-64 ... became Inturist repre-
sentative in Trade Mission, New Delhi, 1968.. .
while driving an automobile in 1972, killed Indian
bicyclist; lacked diplomatic immunity and leJ't India
abruptly ...joined chamber in about 1976, probably
as chiPf'oJprotocol in V/O Ekspotsentr ...served in
Soviet-Belgian Chamber of Commerce, Brussels,
from about 1977 until /981 ... became deputy direc-
tor, Firm Interkongress, in about 1982.
The computer center is part of Akademset, a data-
?transmitting network for Soviet scientific institutes.
The institute appears to control other network mem-
bers' access to the data bases. It is reasonable to
assume that Sovintsentr's computer center supple-
ments its economic collection activities by tapping
into Western online information services through
VNIIPAS. VNIIPAS currently has access to unclas-
sified military-related data.
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Figure 3
Hotel and Seminar Operations
Provides advertising and information Runs four hotels and provides s In their rush to disseminate the Nikolayev article, Soviet
officials at the Novosti bureau in Nicosia, Cyprus, included an
English-language version in an Apri13, 1987, weekly
compilation of articles from the Soviet press. All other articles
included in the weekly were translated into Greek.
17 See also Radio Moscow (January 30 and March 31, 1987);
Radio Peace and Progress (November 29, 1985); TABS
(November 5, 1986; February 16 and March 14,1987); Izuestiya
(January 25 and March 9, 1987); Souyetskaya Rossiya (January
23,1987).
18 For example, Literaturnaya Gazeta IMay 7,1986) warned
specifically against contact with Americans.
is At the April 1985 International Conference on AIDS in
Atlanta, a Soviet study was presented suggesting that Soviet
experts had not detected AIDS in the U.S.S.R.. Dr. Rakhim M.
Khaitov, deputy director of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health
Institute of Immunology in Moscow, in a paper entitled "Search
of AIDS Cases in Secondary Immunodeficiency Patients in the
U.S.S.R.," reported the results of a study in which 500 persons,
suffering from illnesses that could possibly have been AIDS
related, were identified; a subgroup of 10 patients was selected
and studied in more detail using immunologic tests. The findings
were not suggestive of AIDS. (It is unclear whether antibody
testing for the virus was used in Dr. Khaitov's study.) For an
abstract of Dr. Khaitov's paper, see Official Program,
International Conference on AIDS, April 14-17, 1985, Atlanta, p.
36. Five months earlier, Dr. Zhdanov told Radio Moscow
(November 29, 1984) that although no AIDS cases had been
registered in the U.S.S.R., Soviet officials were investigating "all
cases that arouse suspicion."
20 Valentin Pokrovskiy, recently elected president of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences, told the May 6, 1987,
Soviet building industry newspaper Stroitelnaya Gazeta that 30
"foreign students" residing in the U.S.S.R. had been diagnosed as
AIDS carriers. They have been deported from the U.S.S.R.,
according to TABS (June 10, 1987).
21 For more information on the U.S. contribution to
international efforts to combat AIDS, see Confronting AIDS:
Directions /or Public Health, Health Care and Research, Institute
of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences; National Academy
Press, Washington DC, 1986, pp. 274-277.
'2 For a more complete description of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Joint Health Committee session, see KHS News, Public Health
Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Washington, D.C., April 17, 1987.
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Appendix A
A Note on the Patriot
The New Delhi Patriot is apro-Soviet daily with a
circulation of about 35,000. It has long served as a vehicle for
Soviet disinformation. According to Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former
KGB officer who defected to the Westin 1980, the Patriot was set
up by the KGB in 1962 "in order to publish disinformation."'
Official Soviet media frequently cite stories appearing in the
Patriot that the Soviets originally placed in the newspaper,
sometimes as articles, sometimes as paid advertisements, from
which the Patriot derives a substantial share of its revenues.
[n 1983, for example, Patriot published the so-called
Kirkpatrick Plan for the "balkanization" ofIndia (January 25,
26, and 28); the "plan" itself was a forgery. Patriot has promoted
numerous other disinformation themes, including stories
alleging U.S. attempts to assassinate former Indian Prime
:Minister Indira Ghandi and U.S. support for Sikh terrorists.
' Details concerning the origins of the Patriot emerged
during an 8-week trial in London's High Court of a libel suit
brought against The Economist magazine's Foreign Report
newsletter by Greece's most popular daily newspaper, To Ethnos,
which the Foreign Report accused of being a Soviet propaganda
mouthpiece. See The Economist, April 18, 1987, pp. 19-22.
Excerpts from Dzhirkvelov's testimony were published in
Disinformation: Souiet Actiue Measures and Disinformntion
Forecast, Summer 1987.
Appendix B
What We Know About AIDS 1
HIV-I (the AIDS virus) is structurally and genetically.
related to a group of retroviruses, called lentiviruses, that are
found in domestic farm animals, including sheep, goats, and
horses; more recently, they also have been found in monkeys and
cattle. VISNA virus was the first lentivirus discovered (c. 1932)
and isolated. 2 Since that time two other well known
lentiviruses, equine infectious anemia virus and caprine
arthritis encephalitis virus, were discovered and characterized.
These viruses are sometimes euphemistically called "slow
viruses" because of the relatively long delay (2 years or more on
average) in the onset of debilitating symptoms after infection.
Although the diseases caused by each lentivirus species may
differ greatly, some similarities in disease state and biology may
be found le.g., they infect cells of the immune system and cause
encephalopathyl.
The lentiviruses, like other retroviruses (some of which
cause cancer), are RNA s viruses that replicate in the host cell
via a DNA a intermediate. The RNA (or DNA) genome s
contains three major structural genes called gag, pol, and env (or
envelope) and a few smaller but significant coding regions. The
gag gene is situated at the 5 prime (first in order of place) most
end of the genome and codes s for the core proteins of the virus.
The pol gene is situated intermediate to the gag and envelope
genes and codes for the enzyme reverse transcriptase ~ which is
unique to all retroviruses.
The envelope gene is found at the 3 prime most end of the
genome. The envelope gene codes for the exterior protein shell,
which defines the host species that can be infected and helps the
virus bind to its target cell. The envelope gene appears to be the
least conserved of the three major genes mentioned.
Although these lentiviruses, including its human cousin the
AIDS virus (HIV-I1, are genetically related, they have
considerably diverged at the DNA level. That is, they all may
have all come from a common ancestor (probably thousands of
years ago) and, at present, they still show some significant
homology s but have changed enough at the DNA level to enable
one to distinguish them by analyzing their DNA sequences. s
In fact, similar comparisons can distinguish them from the
more distantly related oncogenic (cancer causing) retroviruses.
The DNA sequence for the human oncogenic retrovirus, HTLV-I,
and the lentiviruses (HIV-I and VISNA virus of sheep) genomes
are known. By comparing them it is apparent that HI V-I is more
closely related to VISNA virus than it is to HTLV-I or to any
other oncogenic retrovirus. Moreover, the greatest homology, as
expected, is found in the pol gene. Sequence comparisons of the
envelope genes ofHIV-I and VISNA virus clearly show that even
though common characteristic sequences can be found, the DNA
(and amino acid) sequences are so greatly diverged that they are
readily distinguishable.
It would have been impossible to have recently substituted
all or part of the envelope gene of VISNA virus for that of
HTLV-I in order to make HIV-I and still not be able to identify it.
In addition, the envelope genes of these viruses are so species-
specific in binding that VISNA virus is not capable of infecting
human cells, nor is HIV-I capable of infecting sheep cells.
Furthermore, HIV-I contains an additional coding sequence
overlapping the 3 prime end of its envelope, called the 3 prime
orf, whose function is unknown. The 3 prime orf is not present in
HTLV-I or VISNA virus. This is yet another distinguishing
feature that shows that HIV-I is not a chimeric to of HTLV-I and
VISNA virus.
HTLV-I was first cloned 11 in the United States in early
1983 in the laboratory of Dr. Robert Gallo, National Institutes of
Health, Bethesda. The first sequencing of HTLV-I was reported
in June 1983, in the laboratory of Dr. Motoharu Seki et. al.,
Department of Viral Oncology, Cancer Institute, Kami-
Ikebukuro, Toshima-Ku, Tokyo, Japan. VISNA virus was first
cloned in 1983 by Janice Clements in the laboratory of Dr.
Opendra Narayan at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.
VISNA was sequenced in 1985 in the laboratory of Pierre Sonigo
et al., France.
HIV-I was cloned in the laboratory of Dr. Gallo in 1984.
Another AIDS virus known as LAV was cloned in the laboratory
of Dr. Luc Montangier, also in 1984. These were the first
molecular clonings of the AIDS virus, carried out to understand
its structure as well as to develop vaccines for it. The sequences
of both HIV-I and LAV were reported in January 1985.
These were the first reports on the molecular clonings of
these viruses, and they came nearly two decades after serum
samples, later tested and found to contain antibody to HIV-I,
were taken.
1 The information contained in this Appendix was provided
to the U.S. Department of State by Dr. Matthew Allen Gonda,
Laboratory of Cell and Molecular Structure, Program Resources,
Inc., NCI-Frederick Cancer Research Facility, PO Box B,
Frederick, Maryland 21701. For further information, see
Matthew Allen Gonda, "The Natural History of AIDS," Natural
History, Vol. 95, May 1986, pp. 78-81; Robert C. Gallo, "The First
Human Retrovirus," Scientif c American, December 1986; "The
AIDS Virus," Scientific American, January 1987. Also, see
Confronttng AIDS: Directions for Public Health, Health Care and
Research, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences;
National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1986, for
bibliographies of scientific and medical papers discussing various
aspects of the AIDS virus. The definitive resource for
information on genetic engineering techniques and methodology
is Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory Manual, Thoman Maniatis,
Cold Spring Harbor, New York,1982.
2 Isolate: to separate from another substance so as to obtain
pure or in a free state.
s RNA (ribonucleic acid): any of various nucleic acids that
contain ribose and uracil as structural components and are
associated with the control of cellular chemical activities.
44
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a DNA !deoxyribonucleic acid): any of the various nucleic
acids that are localized especially in cell nuclei and are the
molecular basis of heredity in many organisms.
s Genome: one haploid set of chromosomes with the genes
they contain.
s Code: to specify the genetic code.
~ Reverse transcriptase: the enzyme which makes the
identical DNA copy of the RNA genome after infecting the cell; it
is the coding sequence most conserved (i.e., maintained constant
during a process of chemical change) in the evolution of
retroviruses and upon which evolutionary relationships are
mainly, but not entirely, defined.
s Homology: likeness in structure between parts of different
organisms due to evolutionary differentiation from the same or a
corresponding part of a remote ancestor.
9 Sequence: genetic code; to determine the sequence of
chemical constituents.
io Genetic Chimera: an individual, organ, or part consisting
of tissues of diverse genetic constitution.
ii Clone: an individual grow n from a single somatic cell of
its parent and genetically identical to it; a segment of DNA
representing all or part of the viral genome needed to produce a
virus.
Appendix C
Fort Detrick
Fort Detrick is a military compound that today rents space
to various military and civilian governmental agencies as well as
private research organizations engaged in cancer and defensive
medical research (aimed at developing vaccines for biological
warfare agents). Two independent governmental organizations
situated on the Fort Detrick compound-one military, the other
civilian-are conducting research to find a cure for AIDS. The
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(U.S.AMRIID) is conducting an antiviral drug development
effort that includes the evaluation of ribavirin, a compound with
proven anti-viral effectiveness, for efficacy against the AIDS
virus. U.S.AMR_ID's entire research program is unclassified and
all information is appropriately reported in medical literature.
The National Cancer Institute, Frederick Cancer Research
facility (NCI-FCRF), an internationally recognized institution
for interdisciplinary research on cancer, its causes, biology,
diagnosis, and treatment, also is located there.
Aside from conducting research on countering and
preventing A[DS, NCI-FCRF scientists produce HIV-I, samples
of which are supplied through the Centers for Disease Control
ICDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, to medical experts all around the
world, for research aimed at finding a cure for the virus. In late
1986, at the request of visiting Soviet virologists, the CDC
provided the U.S.S.R. with HIV-I samples for the Soviet AIDS
research program. 1 Production ofHIV-I began at NCI-FCRF in
iviay 1984, shor ly after Dr. Robert Gallo of the National
Institutes of Health discovered the virus.
From 1943 to 1969, Fort Detrick was the U.S. Army's
biological warfare research and development center. However,
no offensive biological warfare research has been conducted at
Fort Detrick since 1969. Then, the facilities formerly used for
biological warfare research were turned over to research on
cancer and research for defenses against biological warfare the
latter emphasizing the search for vaccines against, and antidotes
for, diseases such as chikungunya, anthrax and Rift Valley fever.
The United States is party to two international arms control
agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons. The
Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of chemical and
bacteriological weapons but not the development, production,
possession, or transfer of such weapons. Most major states party
to the protocol, including the United States, have recorded
reservations retaining a right to retaliate in kind if such weapons
are used against them.
The U.S. also is a party to the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention. This Convention bans development, production,
stockpiling, or possession and transfer of biological agents or
toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes" and also
the weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or
toxins. The U.S. is in full compliance with both the 1925 Geneva
Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
1 The Soviet foreign affairs weekly New Times (#25, June
29,1987) acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. Institute of Virology
"borrowed the first AIDS pathogene from abroad" to enable
Soviet experts to study the virus. New Times did not specify the
date, however.
Appendix D
The Soviet Biological Warfare
Program 1
One reason Moscow has promoted the AIDS
disinformation-and in recent months given the false charges an
arms control twist-maybe its attempt to distract international
attention away from its own offensive biological warfare
program, which the United States and others have monitored for
decades.
A number of Soviet installations capable of producing
disease agents and toxins on a large scale and of placing them in
munitions and delivery/dissemination systems have been
identified. These installations were established by the Ministry
of Defense and are under its control. One such facility, in
Sverdlovsk, has had a long history of biological warfare research,
development, and production, with emphasis on the causative
agent of anthrax. In early April 1979, an accidental release from
that facility ofanthrax-causing substances caused many
casualties and very likely a high death rate among exposed
Sverdlovsk citizens. At the time the Soviets admitted only to
some public health problems, which they said were caused by the
illegal sale ofanthrax-contaminated meat. Soviet leaders have
never acknowledged that the Sverdlovsk facility is a biological
warfare facility.
In addition to anthrax, the Soviets are believed to have
developed tularemia, plague, and cholera for biological warfare
purposes, as well as botulinum toxin, enterotoxin, and
mycotoxins.
1 For more information, see Soviet Military Power, 1987,
U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
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Appendix E 1
Appearances of the
Disinformation
Internationally:1983-86
Antigua, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guadeloupe, Guatemala,
Honduras, India, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Mauritania, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain,
Tanzania, U.K., U.S.S.R., Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
1985
Brazil, Dominican Republic, E1 Salvador, Finland, France, India,
Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, U.K., U.S.S.R.
1 The following lists incorporate information that the U.S.
Government has been able to monitor and collect as of July 10,
198?.
Appearances of the Disinformation Internationally:
January-July 1987
Country City
Egypt Cairo
Peru Lima
India Calcutta
Jamaica Kingston
L'.S.S.R. Moscow
Bulgaria Sofia
Yugoslavia Belgrade
Uganda Kampala
Ghana Accra
U .S.S. R. Moscow
India New Delhi
Greece Athens
U.S.S.R. Moscow
Barbados Bridgetown
Argentina Buenos Aires
U.S.S.R. Moscow
U.S.S.R. Moscow
Sudan Khartoum
Bangladesh Dhaka
U.S.S.R. Kiev
Pakistan Lahore
U.S.S.R. Moscow
West Berlin
Costa Rica San Jose
Kuwait Kuwait
Cameroon Douala
U.S.S.R. Moscow
Argentina Buenos Aires
U.S.S.R. Moscow
Albania Tiran
Senegal Dakar
Philippines Manila
Panama Panama City
Brazil Rio de Janero
Belgium Liege
Libya Tripoli
Congo Brazzaville
Grenada Grenada
U.S.S.R. Moscow
U.S.S.R. Moscow
U .S.S.R. Moscow
U.S.S.R. Moscow
Bulgaria Sofia
Malta Valletta
AI-Ahrar
Extra
Aajkaal
Daily Gleaner
Za Rubezhom
Narodna Armiya
Politika Ekspres
Weekly Topic
Ghanaian Times
Souyetskaya Rossiya
Patriot
Rizopastis
Izuestiya
Daily Nation
Diario Popular
New Times
TASS
SUNA News Agency
Daily News
Prauda Ukrainy
Viewpoint
Souyetskaya Rossiya
Tageszeitung
Libertad
Al-Wotan
Le Mont Cameroun
Giteraturnaya Gazeta
La Semarta
Izuestiya
Bashkimi
Le Soleil
Manila Times
Critics
Jornal do Brasil
La Wallonie
Tripoli television
Mweti
Indies Times
Za Rubezhom
Novosti Military Review
TASS
Selskaya Zhizn
Zemedelsko Zname
Ziminijienta
January 5
January 8
January 8
Early January
January 9-15
January l2
January 14, 15
January 14, 21
January l6
January 23
January 23-26
January 25
January 25
January 26
Februaryl
February, #2
February 7
February 7
February 8
February 14
February 17
February 18
February l8
February 20-26
February 20
February 23
February 25
February 25
February 28
March 2
March 10
March 17
March 17
March 18
March 19
March 20
March 23
March 24
March 27
March 30
March 30
March 31
March 31
March
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Appearances of the
Disinformation in Soviet Media:
Pravda
Sotsialisticheskaya
Industriva
June 14, 1986
June 14, 1986
October 1985-June 1987
Kommurzist(Tbilisi)
TASS
September 19, 1986
October 30, 1986
Pravda
October 31
1986
Soviet Print/Wire Service Media
Souyetskaya Rossiya
TASS
,
November 2, 1986
November 13,1986
Literaturnaya Gazeta
October 30, 1985
Novosti
Za Rubezhom
November 19, 1986
January 9-15
1987
Souyetskaya Rossiya
Apri127, 1986
Souyetskaya Rossiya
,
Januar
23
1987
Literaturnaya Gazeta
May 7, 1986
Izvestiya
y
,
January 25
1987
Souyetskaya Rossiya
June 8, 1986
New Times
,
February 2
1987
TASS
June 8, 1986
TASS
,
February 7, 1987
Country
City
Source
Date
Finland
Helsinki
Kansan Uutiset
A
ril 1
Jordan
Amman
Ad-Dustour
p
Apri12
Morocco
Rabat
Al Bayarze
Apri12
Costa Rica
San Jose
Libertad
Apri13-9
Uruguay
Montevideo
LaHora
Apri13
Ghana
Accra
The Mirror
Apri14
Mauritius
Port Louis
Sunday Star
A ri15
p
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
TASS
Apri16
U.S.S.R.
Leningrad
Leningradskaya Pravda
Apri17
Cyprus
Nicosia
Novosti
A
ri18
Burkina
Ouagadougou
Sidwaya
p
Apri18
Pakistan
Peshawar
Frontier Report
A
ri18
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Krasnaya Zuezda
p
A
ril 10
Bolivia
La Paz
Aqui
p
A
ril 11
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Izvestiya
p
April 14
Iraq
Baghdad
Sainik Samachar
April 14
Bulgaria
Sofia
Narodrza Armiya
April 15
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Novosti
April 17
Zimbabwe
Harare
Herald
Apri117
Indonesia
Jakarta
Observer
April 18
Bangladesh
Dhaka
The Tide
April 19
Cuba
Havana
Granma
Apri120
New Zealand
Wellington
NZ Trtburze
Apri122
Cuyana
Georgetown
Chronicle
April 22
Chile
Santiago
Fortin Mapocho
A ri123
p
Philippines
Manila
Manila Journal
April 23
Qatar
Doha
A[ Arab
Apri123
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Moscow News
Apri126
Costa Rica
San Jose
Libertad
May 1-7
Ecuador
Quito
National television
May 8
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Lesnaya Promyshlerznost
May 12
Finland
Helsinki
Kansan Uutiset
May 12
Bolivia
La Paz
Jornada
May 21
Greece
Athens
Athens News Agency
May 22
Bulgaria
Sofia
Orbita
May 23
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Souyetskaya Molodezh
June 3
India
New Delhi
Patriot
June 7
Cuba
Havana
Granma
June 8
U.S.S.R.
Kiev
Rabochaya Gazeta
June 10
U.S.S.R.
Kiev
Radyarzska Ukraina
June 10
U.S.S.R.
Vilnius
Souyetskaya Litua
June 12
Kenya
Nairobi
Sunday Times
June 21
Mexico
Mexico City
Excelsior
June 23
Senegal
Dakar
Le Deuoir
July
Nigeria
Lagos
The Standard
July 2
3
Nicaragua
Managua
E[ Nuevo Diario
,
July 6
Sudan
Khartoum
SUNA
July 10
Peru
Lima
La Voz
July 12
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Pravda Ukrainy
Souyetskaya Rossiya
Literaturnaya Gazeta
Izuestiya
Za R ubezhom
Novosti Military Review
TASS
Selskaya Zhizn
TASS
Leningradskaya Pravda
Krasnaya Zvezda
Izuestiya
Novosti
Moscow News
Lesnaya Promyshfennost
Souyetskaya Molodezh
Rnbochaya Gazeta
Radyanska Ukraina
Souyetskaya Litua
February 14,1987
February 18, 1987
February 25,1987
February 28,1987
March 27-April 2,
1987
March 30,1987
March 30, 1987
March 31, 1987
Apri16,198?
Apri17, 1987
Apri110,1987
April 14, 1987
April 17, 1987
April 26, 1987
May 12, 1987
June 3, 1987
June 10, 1987
June 10, 1987
June 12,1987
Appendix F
U.S. Ambassador Hartman's
Letters to Mr. Aleksandr
Borisovich Chakovskiy, Editor in
Chief, Literaturnaya Gazeta
Radio Moscow World
Service
Radio Moscow Peace and
Progress
Radio Moscow to Turkey
Radio Moscow World
Service
Radio Moscow Peace and
Progress
Radio Moscow Peace and
Progress
Radio Moscow Peace and
Progress
Moscow Television
Radio Moscow to China
Radio Moscow to Italy
Radio Moscow to China
Radio Moscow to China
Moscow Television
Radio Moscow to
Czechoslovakia
Radio Moscow to Southern
Africa
Radio Moscow to Iran
November 29,1985
December 2,1985
December 26,1985
September 22,1986
November 13, 1986
December 13, 1986
December 25,1986
January 16, 1987
January 27, 1987
January 31, 1987
February 28, 1987
Apri12, 1987
April 6, 198?
Apri123, 1987
I am sure that many thoughtful Soviet readers shared my
sense of surprise and revulsion at an article in the October 30
edition of Literaturnaya Cazeta. The article, titled "Panic in the
West or What Is Hidden Behind the Sensation About AIDS,"
included the allegation that the worldwide AIDS epidemic
resulted from U.S. Army research into the human immunity
system. In attempting to buttress this fantastic charge, the
author drew heavily upon an article which allegedly appeared in
the Indian publication, the Patriot. Mr. Zapevalov did not,
however, provide the date or issue number of the Patriot in which
this article allegedly appeared.
In an effort to get to the bottom of what appears to have been
a deliberate deception of your readers, we directly queried the
editor of the Patriot as to whether such an article actually
appeared in his journal. After a check of the Patriot archives, the
editor, Mr. R. K. Misra, has told us that he could not find any
article in his newspaper that made the AIDS allegation. I am
sure that you will agree with me that any serious journal has an
obligation to ensure that whenever material is used from another
source, it is accurately reported and fully cited. It now seems
obvious that Mr. Zapevalov's article does not meet either of these
fundamental criteria of responsible journalism.
Beyond this point of journalistic ethics, it is inconceivable
that anyone who had done serious research into the AIDS
problem could make the irresponsible and totally baseless charge
contained in this article. Even a cursory review of the facts of the
AIDS epidemic would have revealed that this disease has a
complex epidemiological history and worldwide geographical
distribution. Moreover, in the regions of the world hardest hit by
the epidemic-Central Africa, Haiti, the United States, and
Western Europe-different segments of the population appear to
be the most severely affected. Serious medical research on this
disease is going forward in the United States, the Soviet Union
and many other countries. This intense worldwide research
effort has not, however, turned up a single shred of credible
evidence to support an alleged link between the AIDS epidemic
and U.S. military research. I can only conclude that Mr.
Zapevalov's charge was a transparent effort to deceive his
readers and manipulate genuine popular concern about a dread
disease for propaganda purposes.
Unfortunately, the responsibility for this affair does not rest
on Mr. Zapevalov alone. Obviously, a journal of the prominence
of Literaturnaya Gazeta has an obligation to its readers to ensure
that its articles do not deliberately misrepresent the truth. In
this connection, I noted that the new edition of the draft CPSU
Party Program states that "the party and the Soviet state will
cooperate with other countries in tackling global problems"
including "eradication of dangerous diseases." When articles
48
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such as the one in question appear in the Soviet media, careful
readers are entitled to question the seriousness of the Soviet
Union's commitment to international efforts to eliminate dread
diseases such as AIDS.
I request that this communication be published as aletter-
to-the-editor.
population and to abuse a medical tragedy affecting people all
over the world, including in the Soviet Union, for base
propaganda purposes. In light of the protests of Soviet public
figures over Western press coverage of the Chernobyl disaster,
and constant complaints by the same persons about Western
portrayals of Soviet citizens, such behavior on your part seems
strange, to say the least.
I request that this letter be published as a letter?to-the-
editor.
It is with a sense of sorrow and disappointment that I am
again forced to write to you in regard to the bizarre treatment of
the subject of AIDS in your newspaper-this time in a May 7
article, which repeats the absurd claim that AIDS is a chemical
warfare agent developed by the CIA and the Pentagon. These
assertions are as reprehensible as they are false. One would
think that a journal representing itself as intellectual would
make every effort to ensure articles are carefully researched and
scientifically accurate. Yet the anonymous member of your staff
who edited the offensive article in question seems to be ignorant
even of Soviet scientists' views on AIDS. For example,
Academician Viktor M. Zhdanov, known the world over as an
eminent immunologist, stated in the December 7 edition of
Souyetskaya Kultura that evidence indicates the disease
originated in Central Africa, that it may be related to a similar
virus found in monkeys, and that it may have existed for several
hundred or even several thousand years, or may have evolved
from another virus. In the April 1986 issue of Priroda, A. L.
Liozner of the Institute of Immunology, and A. F. Bykovskiy of
the Gamaleya Epidemiology and Microbiology Institute conclude
that there are serious bases for considering that the disease has
existed in Africa for a long time. As I have pointed out to you
before, serious scientific research has found that AIDS affects
different segments of the population indifferent regions of the
world. This research, in which the Soviet Union is taking part,
has never uncovered a single bit of evidence to support the
assertion that U.S. Government agencies are somehow
responsible for creation and dissemination of the disease. I can
only conclude, based on a reading of the many objectionable
articles appearing in your newspaper in the past several months,
that these are nothing more than a blatant and repugnant
attempt to sow hatred and fear of Americans among the Soviet
(NOTE: Ambassador Hartman sent a similar letter June 25,
1986, to Mr. Valentin Vasil'Yevich Chikin, Editor-in-Chief,
Souyetskaya Rossiya, where the AIDS disinformation charges
appeared Apri127 and June 8, 1986.)
Appendix G
Soviet Interference in U.S.
Efforts To Expose the Campaign
The Soviets have interfered with efforts by U.S. Embassy
officials to set the record straight and expose the Soviet
disinformation campaign. For example, Literaturnaya Gazeta on
December 3, 1986, castigated the Brazilian newspaper Estado do
Sao.Paulo, which earlier in the year had run a retraction
following its publication of the AIDS disinformation story.
The Soviets have also interfered in Africa. The
Brazzaville(Congo)dsily Mweti (March 23, 19871 published an
article citing the Segal hypothesis that the AIDS virus was
created at Fort Detrick, Maryland; Mweti subsequently
published a letter from the U.S. Ambassador to the Congo,
protesting the false charges and supplying information exposing
the disinformation effort. Moscow's Novosti news agency then
disseminated a report, dated April 17 and datelined Brazzaville,
criticizing the U.S. Ambassador's letter to Mweti , calling on the
West to put an end to the "anti-African campaign," and repeating
the charges that the virus was created in U.S. military
laboratories.
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Chapter VI
Soviet Disinformation on
Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW)
The United States is party to two existing
international arms control agreements affecting
chemical and biological weapons: the Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol of 1925)
which prohibits the use in war of chemical and
bacteriological weapons; and the 1972 Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC).
The latter bans development, production,
stockpiling, or possession and transfer of biological
agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that
have no justification for prophylactic, protective,
and other peaceful purposes." It also bans the
weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of
agents or toxins.
Despite the fact that the U.S. has strictly
adhered to these agreements, Moscow and its allies
have sought to identify the United States as a
violator of the BWC and to portray the United
States as ruthlessly pursuing offensive chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) research. In part,
the campaign may be designed to distract world
attention from the U.S.S.R.'s CBW activities (see
appendix). This campaign has entailed false
allegations that the U.S. has:
? produced the AIDS virus as a result of
biological warfare experiments;
~ provided the Afghan resistance with CBW;
? cooperated with South Africa and/or Israel
in developing a so-called ethnic weapon; and
? caused outbreaks of deadly diseases
worldwide.
As in other disinformation campaigns, these
charges have appeared in a variety of media
worldwide but especially in Soviet and Soviet bloc
newspapers. In turn, these allegations have been
developed as press placements in several
newspapers in Third World countries where the
Soviets have good access.
Last September, for example, the "unofficial"
Soviet Radio Peace and Progress assailed the
United States for "pushing through its work on the
creation of bacteriological arms ... in violation of
international conventions." In an April 1987 TASS
interview, Veniamin Votyakov, a Soviet member of
International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War, repeated the charge in a plea to
physicians worldwide to "do their utmost for
disrupting the horrifying plans of preparing a
chemical and biological war designed by the U.S.
military."
A major component of the disinformation about
alleged U.S. CBW activities concerns Fort Detrick,
Maryland. 1 For example, Fort Detrick has been
cited by the Soviets and their allies as the
birthplace of AIDS.
Some of the Soviet disinformation themes that
have circulated recently are described below. Two
key points are pertinent to all of them: the Soviet
Union is directly involved in purveying the
disinformation, and its repetition in media
throughout the world lends credibility to the
stories.
Afghanistan
Moscow and Kabul both published CBW
disinformation throughout the past year. The
foremost theme of this disinformation was the
accusation that the U.S. supplied chemical weapons
to the mujahidin. For example, the Soviet daily
newspaper Prauda (December 2, 1986) asserted that
"counter-revolutionary gangs" in Afghanistan were
using chemical grenades marked "Made in the
United States." At a press conference staged by the
Kabul government in September 1986, the Afghans
displayed chemical weapons and training manuals
which they alleged had been manufactured in the
U.S. and captured from the insurgents by the
Afghan Army. To ensure widespread publicity for
this false story, Soviet and Afghan media gave it
extensive coverage on three separate days.
This disinformation theme also has appeared in
non-Soviet press. In mid-October 1986, the Indian
wire service, United News of India (UNI), published
accusations by Soviet General Nikolai Chervov,
chief spokesman of the Defense Ministry, that U.S.
chemical weapons were being used in Afghanistan;
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the UNI item was picked up by India's pro-Soviet as
well as mainstream press.
Appearances in non-leftist press are
particularly important to the viability of a Soviet
disinformation campaign. A conservative daily
newspaper in Helsinki, Uusi Suomi, carried the
chemical warefare disinformation on June 26,1987.
It cited a report from Moscow: "More than 200
American-made chemical mines were found re-
cently at Surobi in Kabul Province, TASS said
Thursday, quoting Afghan Army Colonel Moham-
mad Khashem. The Afghan Chief of Staff ...said
that French, West German and Egyptian-made
chemicals had also been found in Afghanistan."
On June 24, 1986, the Lahore, Pakistan daily
Nawa-I-Wagtcarried aMoscow-datelined item
alleging that the mujahidin were being given
chemical weapons training in Pakistan by
American advisers. The Soviets took this theme
one step further by claiming in a September 28
TASS report that Pakistan-based li .S. instructors
were accompanying the insurgents inside
Afghanistan to provide advice on chemical warfare.
All of the charges are false.
Probably as a response to U.S. allegations of
Soviet violations of chemical and biological
agreements, the U.S.S.R. periodically has published
charges that the U.S. has fabricated evidence of
Soviet use of CBW in Afghanistan. The Soviet and
Afghan presses frequently have run stories alleging
that the U.S. instructs the mujahidin to use their
"American-made" chemical weapons in such a way
as to lay the blame on Soviet and Afghan troops.
For example, the Soviet Defense Ministry daily
Krasnaya Zvezda (September 30, 1986) claimed that
the U .5., in order to obtain evidence of Soviet
complicity in CBW use, ordered the mujahidin to
"send to Peshawar [Pakistan] photographs of the
people, animals, and plants they had poisoned and
samples of water and soil from contaminated
areas."
Korea and Vietnam
In a campaign similar to that of the alleged U.S.
CBW activity in Afghanistan, Moscow and its allies
continue to accuse the li .S. of having waged CBW
during the Korean and Vietnam wars. These
allegations often are cited as "evidence" to support
disinformation about alleged present or future L'.S.
CBW activity. For example, an August 1986 North
Korean press article titled "In Pursuit of Chemical
Warfare" declared: "It is no secret that the U .S.
imperialists committed the heinous bestiality of
massacring our people with biological and chemical
weapons during the Korean War. Even now the
U.S. imperialists are introducing numerous
chemical weapons into South Korea and conducting
military exercises in preparations for chemical
warfare in this area."
In February 1987, prior to the start of joint U.S.-
South Korean military exercises, the North
Koreans charged that the effects of an alleged
epidemic of hemorrhagic fever, which "broke out in
South Korea in 1950 in consequence of the germ
warfare of the U.S. imperialists," still lingered.
In October 1986, while discussing the need for a
chemical weapons ban and assailing U.S. CBW
policy, 2 Soviet media charged that the U.S. Army
during the Vietnam war acquired great experience
in conducting chemical warfare. (Radio Moscow
International Service, October 3, 1986). Shortly
thereafter, the Soviet monthly journal International
Life (October 10) and Pravda (October 27) repeated
old charges of U.S. use of chemical warfare during
the Vietnam war. These charges coincided with the
U.S. release in October of a Pentagon report detail-,~
ing Soviet development of chemical weapons.
Diseases
During the past year, a number of false stories
surfaced in Soviet, bloc, and Third World presses
alleging U.S. responsibility for the outbreak of a
variety of deadly diseases throughout the world.
Some of the accusations were crude and, to a
sophisticated reader, unbelievable. Many were
replays of themes from previous years. For
example:
The U.S.S.R.'s Radio Peace and Progress
alleged on September 22,1986, that
"Pentagon bacteriologists are provoking
epidemics, hemorrhagic fever in Korea,
dengue in Cuba, viral encephalitis in
Nicaragua, and conjunctivitis in E1
Salvador."
The September 17,1986, edition of
Krasnaya Zvezda charged that the
"epidemic of `dengue' fever which affected
thousands of Cubans in 1981 was the result
of a subversive U.S. operation.". Cuban
President Castro first leveled this false
charge in July 1981, and it has since been
replayed by Cuban and Soviet media.
On December 13,1986, Soviet Radio Peace
and Progress asserted that in Lahore,
Pakistan, "American experts conduct
research on developing new types of -
bacteriological weaponry, including those
causing grave mental disorders. Local
residents meanwhile are being used as
guinea pigs by researchers at the Lahore
center, with over 500 residents of Lahore
who suffer from yellow fever, jaundice, and
mental disorders falling victim to criminal
experiments." The same broadcast
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resurfaced false charges that "Lahore has
become the center for breeding particularly
dangerous species of mosquitos to be used
against the population in Afghanistan." A
Soviet commentator, Iona Andronov,
originated the "killer mosquito" story in a
February 1982 article in the Soviet weekly
Literaturnaya Gazeta.
? The Prague Tribunes, in Czech (No 19, 1987)
carried an article titled, "Where the Death
Bacteria Are Being Cultivated." It listed
purported examples of U.S. bacteriological
weapons, including a poisonous mushroom
causing fever outbreaks, particularly
among black people. It accused the U.S.
Army of spreading smallpox at Washington
National Airport in 1964-65, and repeated
old allegations about attacks on Cuba,
including blame for a plague that destroyed
the Cuban sugar crop.
Ethnic Weapon
In 1986-87, the L?.S.S.R. continued its dis-
informationcampaign alleging that the U.S. was
involved in research on a biological weapon
designed to kill individuals of a particular ethnic
group or race. The charges varied, depending on the
intended audience. For example, in Africa, the U.S.
purportedly was working with South Africa to
develop a weapon that kills only blacks; in the
Middle East, it was said to be working with Israel to
make a weapon effective only against Arabs. These
false charges have appeared since at least 1980,
when they appeared in People's World, a U.S.
Communist Party newspaper.
TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow, and Moscow's
Radio Peace and Progress featured the "ethnic
weapon" story repeatedly during the 1980s. A
partial listing of Soviet stories and broadcasts on
this subject follows, to provide a sense of the
continuity and persistence of Soviet endorsement of
these themes:
August 13, 1984: TASS charged that the U.S.
and South Africa were developing "carefully
selected pathogenic viruses which are practically
harmless to whites and mortally dangerous to
Africans, Asians, and `coloreds'." It also alleged
that Israel was involved and that viruses were
being tested "on Africans in prisons of the apartheid
state and on Arab prisoners in Israeli jails."
April 2, 1985: The Soviet daily newspaper
Selskaya Zhizn repeated allegations about South
African and Israeli cooperation on an ethnic
weapon.
July 13, 1985: Radio Moscow domestic service
in Russian characterized the CIA and the Pentagon
as "the initiators of the development of so-called
ethnic weapons."
October 8, 1985: The U.S. Embassy in Ghana
reported that a recent issue of the People's Daily
Graphic had featured an article charging U.S.,
Israeli, and South African research do ethnic
weapons, which it attributed to "Soviet sources."
November 15, 1985: TASS cited "reports in the
press about the development of so-called ethnic
weapons in laboratories in the Republic of South
Africa and the U.S.A."
December 27, 1985: The Soviet newspaper
Krasnaya Zuezda carried a TASS item citing a
report in the Malagasy newspaper Carrelour that
the U.S. and South Africa were secretly working on
an ethnic weapon. The TASS report mentioned a
letter from a Dr. Tyner, director of the division of
neuropsychiatry of Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research, to a Defense Department official. The
letter, a forgery, alleged U.S.-South African
cooperation in drugs to be used in "special
conditions."
January 30, 1986: Moscow's Radio Peace and
Progress in an anonymous report alleged U.S.-
South African research on "ethnic weapons."
February 5,1986: Radio Moscow in Zulu to
southern Africa broadcast a report that "Lately
there has been growing talk in Africa of the
presence of biological weapons in South Africa that
can discriminate on the basis of race. These are
meant to selectively kill the black race and leave
out the white race. Such diabolical weapons are
being researched and manufactured with the aid of
the United States."
February 1986: Novosti cited a Senegalese
newspaper, Teskusaan, alleging U.S. and South
African research on "ethnic weapons." The report
was published with a Novosti byline by the local
writer Garba Inuwa in the February 12 issue of
New Nigerian and the February 10 issue of Nigeria
Voice. It charged "American and South African
scientists are doing joint research on so-called
ethnic weapons designed to kill only blacks."
February 18,1986: Radio Moscow ran atwo-
minute report alleging South African research on
ethnic weapons.
September 27, 1986: An article by an author
who frequently uses Novosti as a source appeared in
the Nigerian newspaper The Voice. He reiterated
charges of Israeli and South African research on
ethnic weapons. At the same time, according to the
U.S. Embassy in Lagos, Novosti was distributing to
:Nigerian newspapers a story titled, "Death at the
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Cellular Level: United States and South Africa
Develop Ethnic Weapons," by N.U. Pogodi.
November 18, 1986: Radio Moscow in English
reported that South Africa had developed selected
biological warfare that could eliminate blacks
without harming whites.
January 10, 1987: TASS reported on an
interview given to the Soviet magazine New Times
by Professor Yuri Rychkov of the General Genetics
Institute, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. The TASS
account gave the impression that Rychkov was very
concerned about alleged plans to create an "ethnic
weapon." But a comparison of the New Times
interview with the TASS account shows that
several times TASS incorrectly portrayed
information contained in questions asked to
Rychkov as comments that Rychkov had made. For
example, TASS said, "He [Professor Rychkov] notes
that the South African army has a unit of biological
warfare which studies the possibility of developing
viruses and other microorganisms affecting only
Africans." But, in the actual interview in New
Times, it was the interviewer who said this, not
Rychkov.
On June 5, 1987, the Director of the U.S.
Information Agency, Charles Wick, protested the
ethnic weapon disinformation in a meeting with
Novosti director Valentin Falin. The meeting was
cut short when Falin asserted that the accusations
were true.
Less than one week later, in an interview
printed in Moscow News, a joint publication of
Novosti press agency and the Soviet friendship
societies, Falin reiterated the Soviet claims, saying,
"It is no secret that the United States has been
working on various `exotic' weapons, including the
so-called ethnic ones. These are biological and
chemical agents with selective action against
people of different races, populating the same areas
yet having different genetic susceptibility or
vulnerability to these agents. Such facts are widely
known, too. Take the report, circulated back in
1974, by Dr. Hammerschlag, an expert of the
National Medical Center in Duarte, California,
which he delivered at the symposium held in Los
Angeles by the American Chemical Society, and the
materials published in the journal Abstracts on
Hygiene (Number 55, 1980)."(sic)
In actuality, Hammerschlag's work refuted
allegations that the U.S. had conducted research on
an "ethnic weapon." Hammerschlag concluded-in
a report, "Chemical Weapons and U.S. Public
Policy," published by the American Chemical
Society-that "we have no `story'; no hard evidence
that ethnic weapons are or even have been under
consideration by the Department of Defense."
Implications
Moscow's CBW disinformation campaign
illustrates two key elements of Soviet strategy:
repetition of even the most unbelievable stories
pays off in the long run, and even if a disinfor-
mation theme has little or no immediate impact on
its target audience, it can be replayed or surfaced at
an opportune time in the future. Indeed, Moscow
seems to have reaped some benefits from this
approach. For example, in mid-Apri11987 an
official Indian armed forces journal, Sainik
Samachar, published a story under the headline,
"The Diabolical Chemical Warfare." This article
repeated the false charges spread by the U.S.S.R.
that AIDS was developed at Fort Detrick, that the
U.S. started a dengue fever epidemic in Cuba, and
that the U.S. experimented with chemical and
biological weapons in Vietnam, Korea, Laos, and
Cambodia.
At a U.S. Department of State-sponsored
seminar on "Disinformation, the Media, and
Foreign Policy" (May 1987), journalists
representing newspapers in Latin America and
Africa discussed the impact of such stories on
readers in their regions. They noted that they
themselves had seen disinformation regarding U.S: .
involvement with biological and chemical weapons
in their regional newspapers. Their consensus was
that most readers-particularly those who are not
well educated or widely traveled-would believe the
stories.
Although no public opinion data are available
to gauge the extent to which CBW-related
disinformation has had an effect, it is apparent that
the U.S.S.R. finds the campaign useful enough to
continue to devote resources to it. Also, the fact
that non-leftist media occasionally repeat the
stories demonstrates the extent to which they are
becoming "acceptable."
Footnotes
1 Fort Detrick is discussed in detail in Chapter V, Appendix
C. From 1943 to 1969, Fort Detrick was the U.S. Army's
biological warfare research and development center. No
offensive biological warfare research has been conducted there
since 1969, when the facilities were turned over to research on
cancer and on defenses against biological warfare.
2 Soviet criticism of U.S. policies focuses, in part, on the U.S.
decision to begin production of binary chemical weapons in 1987.
The U.S. is currently in the process of destroying old, less stable
stockpiles of chemical weapons. The U.S. continues to abide by
the Geneva Protocol, which bans use, not possession, of chemical
weapons. The U.S. has pledged that it will not use chemical
weapons first, but will possess them for deterrence.
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Appendix
Soviet CBW Activities
The Soviet disinformation campaign alleging illegal and
extensive U.S. CBW activities may, in part, be aimed at
diverting attention from massive and, in some instances, illegal
Soviet activity in this area. The U.S.S.R. has "the most extensive
chemical warfare (CW) capability in the world," according to the
1987 U.S. Department of Defense publication Soviet Military
Power. This report says that "The types of chemical agents that
the Soviets could be expected to employ in war ...include the
following:
? "nerve agents Isarin, soman,and a V-series agent);
? "blister agents (mustard, lewiste, and a mixture of the
two );
? "a choking agent (phosgenel; and
? "one other agent not specifically identified that causes
unconsciousness for an hour or more and has been
widely reported as being used in Afghanistan."
Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are parties to the 1972
Bacteriological (Biological)and Toxin Weapons Convention,
which bans the development, production, stockpiling or
possession, and transfer of biological agents or toxins except for
small quantities for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful
purposes, and the means of delivery for biological agents or
toxins. The U.S. is in full compliance with the BWC.
The President's March 10, 1987, report on "Soviet Non-
compliance with Arms Control Agreements" concludes, however,
that "the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological
warfare program and capability in violation of its legal
obligations" under the CBW. The 1987 edition ofSouietMilitary
Power says that "In addition to anthrax, we believe the Soviets
have developed tularemia, plague, and cholera for biological
warfare (BW) purposes, as well as botulinum toxin, enterotoxin,
and mycotoxins." The report details a suspected BW accident in
April 1979 at a Soviet military facility Ithe Microbiology and
Virology Institute) in the city of Sverdlovsk. The U.S.
Government analysis of the incident concludes that:
? While bulk quantities of anthrax spores in dry form
were probably being prepared, a pressurized system
most likely exploded.
? As much as 10 kilograms of dry anthrax spores were
released from the Institute.
? Within two weeks, a significant number of deaths
occurred. Reports surfaced that hundreds of Soviet
citizens died from anthrax inhalation within 7 to 10
days of the outbreak. Other reports stated that in
subsequent weeks, 1,000 or more cases may have
developed.
? Heavy military involvement, military casualties
immediately after the accident, total military control
within two weeks, and rooftop spraying of
decontaminating solutions from aircraft are not
consistent with public health measures for dealing with
anthrax acquired by eating bad meat, which is the
official Soviet explanation for the outbreak of anthrax.
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Chapter VII .
The Soviet Propaganda and Active Measures
Campaign on Afghanistan ~~
The Soviet Union, from the onset of its
intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, has
conducted a broad campaign to undermine inter-
national support for the Afghan resistance (the
mujahidin) and to minimize criticism of the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan. As in Moscow's other
efforts to influence international perceptions of
controversial issues, this Soviet program has
blended diplomacy (particularly in the negotiations
in Geneva), propaganda, and active measures, and
is targeted at a host of foreign opinionmakers and
international organizations.
The active measures and propaganda associated
with the campaign employ multiple themes
designed to influence the opinions and perceptions
of key foreign audiences. Some of these themes are
discussed in this chapter, and examples of the
specific active measures-principally
disinformation-undertaken to exploit them are
provided.
Theme 1: "We Were Invited"
This theme-that the U.S.S.R. entered
Afghanistan at the invitation of the sovereign
Afghan leadership-was initiated immediately
after the Soviet invasion. Although no longer
central to the propaganda campaign, it is still
evident, particularly in Soviet public diplomacy
initiatives in the Third World.
The U.S.S.R. continues to portray the presence
of its military forces in Afghanistan in terms of
legitimate "fraternal assistance" which is limited in
time, scope, and purpose. Ina 1980 interview with
the West German newspaper Die Zeit, Babrak
Karmal, the pro-Soviet Afghan installed to head the
regime in Kabul after the invasion, indicated that
the Soviets came "in response to an official and
legal invitation." Karmal issued his invitation
while he was in the Soviet Union. Two Soviet
publications, The Truth About AFghanistan and
Afghanistan Today, cite Soviet "military
assistance" as valid and in accordance with the
letter and spirit of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of
Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation
(signed in 1978) and Article 51 of the UN Charter,
which provides for collective and individual self-
defense.
After more than seven years of continuous
presence in Afghanistan-now involving a force of
116,000-Moscow still asserts that Soviet forces?
remain only at Kabul's behest. Moscow and Kabul
argue that the decision to withdraw Soviet forces is
a bilateral matter. The Soviets concede that
"arrangements" for the eventual Soviet withdrawal
may be discussed in the Geneva process, but that
the decision ultimately rests with Moscow and
Kabul.
Theme 2: "Outside Interference
Prolongs the Problem"
A related theme intended to justify the Soviet
military presence is alleged external interference
by Pakistan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, France, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia-all at the instigation of the United States.
For example, a June 28,1987, TASS report claimed
that Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) .
army units had seized from the mujahidin large
quantities of French 82mm and 40mm chemical
mines as well as chemical weapons produced in
Egypt and FRG.
Criticism of France, such as the DRA protest of
the French Foreign Minister's "irresponsible and
provocative assertions" in support of the mujahidin,
usually is reserved for domestic Afghan audiences.
France, according to a Kabul radio broadcast on
May 11, 1987, "like other imperialist and .
reactionary countries ... is interested, through a so-
called screen of democracy, in a continuation of war
and bloodshed in the DRA, and in maintaining a
conflict situation." The "external forces of
imperialism" and their "accomplices" are said to
include the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Japan,
F.R.G., U.K., Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia,
according to a February 1986 issue of the Soviet
publication Agitator Tadzhikistana.
Foreign media reports supportive of this
propaganda line are regularly cited by the Soviets
to establish its credibility and legitimacy. For
example, the Soviet dailies Prauda, Izuestiya, and
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Trud in February 1986 cited such an article
appearing in a leftist Egyptian publication, al-
Ahali; the author of the item had visited
Afghanistan at Kabul's invitation and reported the
"truth" about the country-that life was proceeding
normally on the whole, but was hindered by U.S.
and other interference.
Theme 3: `The United States
Does Not Want Peace in
Afghanistan"
Closely related to the "outside interference"
theme is the claim that Washington is unwilling to
entertain any thought of compromise and that U.S.
policy is to fight the Soviets "to the last Afghan."
Further, Moscow wishes to create the perception
that Washington controls Pakistani foreign policy
and will veto any compromise that does not support
U.S. "neo-globalist" aims. DRA Foreign Minister
Wakil, in an interview with Pravda (March 19,
1987), contended that the Geneva talks could have
been concluded if only Pakistan had been flexible,
and asserted that U.S. "anti-Afghan policy"
remained the chief obstacle to success.
Theme 4: "The Mujahidin Are
Bandits"
Moscow's media campaign to portray the
mujahidin as CIA-financed criminals, saboteurs,
and murderers is intended to undermine domestic
and international support for the resistance
movement and portray Soviet forces as a stabilizing
factor in the country. In order to distract attention
from Western reports of Soviet and Afghan
atrocities, Soviet media occasionally claim that the
mujahidin dress in Soviet Army uniforms and stage
massacres which are filmed for Western television
(Izuestiya, January 14, 1986; Prauda, February 15,
1986).
Soviet news stories, often repeated in other
countries' media after being carried by TASS or
Radio Moscow, portray the resistance as anti-
Islamic. During a recent interview with Western
journalists, DRA leader Najibullah cited the
destruction of 25 mosques as evidence of the
counter-revolutionaries' anti-Islamic orientation.
In Afghanistan Today, the resistance is identified
as "fanatics disguised as Islam's defenders" who
murder patriotic clergy and destroy mosques.
The Soviet media often cite stories from the
Press Trust of India (PTI). The U.S. Government
has learned from defectors that many PTI reports
are Soviet-planted disinformation. For example,
Radio Moscow referred to a PTI item (published in
the Indian paper Hagat) which reported that 1,500
U.S. advisers, 300 of whom were said to be CIA
agents, were providing chemical weapons training
to members of the Pakistan-based Afghan
resistance. A story in the Indian evening paper,
News Today (April 10, 1986) claimed that Sikh
terrorists were being trained in the,same CIA-
sponsored camps.
Distorted and fabricated reports also appear in
Pakistani media. Agents of the Kabul government
have infiltrated the refugee camps in Pakistan,
planted bombs throughout Pakistan, and conducted
other terrorist operations. Soviet-sponsored articles
then appear locally, blaming the violence on
refugees in order to generate hostility toward the
refugee population.
Moscow also expends considerable effort to
portray U.S. support for the mujahidin as "state-
sponsored terrorism." The increase in Soviet
military aircraft losses in Afghanistan has
prompted a new wave of bogus accounts of
mujahidin terrorism. The downing of a transport
aircraft was retold in the Hungarian News Agency's
English-language Daily News. Identifying an
Associated Press report (datelined Islamabad) as
the source, the Hungarian daily recounted the
shootdown of a "civilian" airliner. In fact, it was a
Soviet-supplied military transport aircraft on a
military mission.
Theme 5: Najibullah: `~We Are
Not Communists"
In a recent interview with Die Zeit, DRA leader
Najibullah vehemently denied he was a communist
and stated that "Afghanistan is not now, nor has it
ever been communist." He further described
himself as a "son of my Muslim people," although
last year he prided himself on being a "son of Lenin"
upon assuming, in May 1986, the leadership of the
People's Democratic (communist) Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA).
Regime efforts to portray Najibullah as pro-
Islam have been stepped up over the past year. The
regime is now fronted by an acting chief of state,
Haji Mohammed Chamkani, who uses the Mecca
pilgrimage honorific Haji before his name. The
regime media regularly extol the government's
support for Islam, and the leadership attempts
visibly to demonstrate its Islamic credentials. For
example, three leaders-Karmal, Keshtmad, and
Najibullah-participated in Eid-al Adha (Feast of
Sacrifice) in Kabul's central mosque in August
1986. In February 1987, at the inauguration of the
Islamic Studies Research Center at Kabul
University, Najibullah emphasized the role of
"patriotic clergy" in building a "progressive"
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Afghanistan. Additionally, a Ministry of Islamic
Affairs has been formed.
The Kabul regime widely publicizes its
subsidies to religious institutions. It does not
mention that they are paid out of the institutions'
own endowments, which were seized by the state. It
also institutionalizes the "patriotic clergy" and
centrally controls the actions of these influential
opinion-leaders. Entry to the colleges of religious
jurisprudence and Islamic learning is strictly
controlled by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and
Endowment and the Council of Ulema and
Religious Leaders, both controlled by and
responsible to the PDPA.
To prove to the world that it is Islamic, not
communist, the Kabul government is seeking'
reinstatement in the 44-member Organization of
Islamic Countries (OIC). In early July 1987, the
Afghan Foreign Minister invited the Secretary
General of the OIC to talk with Afghan clergy, see
the Islamic Research Center, and discuss Kabul's
participation in the OIC.
A propaganda pamphlet-almost certainly
produced by the U.S.S.R-titled "Islam and
Liberation Struggle" was distributed in Burma in
1986. Its message: Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan was undertaken in defense of Islam
and against reactionary, imperialist-sponsored
Muslim elements. The United States is portrayed
as anti-Islam; readers are warned of danger to.
Islam in Palestine, Jerusalem, and Lebanon, where
"Muslims are being killed with American
weapons."
Moscow is unlikely to allow Islamic institutions
to increase their role in Kabul's political activity
without close controls. The recent law on political
parties is indicative of Moscow's approach. Radio
Kabul (July 4, 1987) reported that the
Revolutionary Council had adopted a law allowing
new. political parties-but only those that would
agree to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union.
This, in.addition to the requirement that the new
parties would have to support a nonaligned
Afghanistan and "the consolidation of the historic
friendship with the Soviet Union" (Washington
Post, July 6, 1987).
The themes cited above are a mixture of
propaganda and outright distortion. Some of the
examples mentioned-such as brochure on Islam,
which is probably Soviet in origin-constitute
active measures. Others are not so clearly .
identifiable as deceptive, but better fall in the
.category of propaganda reflecting Moscow's vision
or version of reality.
Below are examples of major Soviet and DRA
deception activities designed to manipulate public
opinion: All were initiated after General Secretary
Gorbachev came to power.
Deception: The Sham
Withdrawal
The most flagrant attempt to deceive the West
.was the October 1986 sham withdrawal of Soviet
military forces from Afghanistan. This active
measure, which coincided with the annual~UN. ,,
debate and vote on the Soviet occupation, ., .
underscored the U.S.S.R.'s intention not to degxade
the military effectiveness of Soviet forces already
actively engaged.
In his televised speech from Vladivostok on July
28, 1986, Gorbachev announced:
Before the end of 1986, six regiments-one tank regiment,
two motorized rifle regiments, and three antiaircraft
regiments-will be returned from Afghanistan to the
homeland, with their authorized equipment and arms.
These units will return to the areas of permanent
deployment in the Soviet Union and in such a way that all
The withdrawal began with fanfare on October
15 and was completed by the end of the month.
Soviet military spokesmen insisted that the units
withdrawn had been in Afghanistan for years. 'In
fact, this was not the case. The withdrawn units
were as follows:
1. Three air defense regiments,
constituting half of the promised withdrawal
package. This component illustrates the limited
significance of the original Soviet proposal: Such
units play no military role against the mujahidin,' '
who have no air force. ?
2. The only tank regiment in Afghanistan,
stationed at Shindand. This regiment had been .
severely understrength. In an effort to bring it to
full strength for the withdrawal ceremonies, the
U.S.S.R. sent additional tanks into Afghanistan in
September and October. During the withdrawal
ceremonies, Western correspondents noted that the
vehicles paraded as part of this departing regiment
showed few signs of wear and that the Soviet
soldiers associated with the unit claimed never to
have seen any mujahidin. In short, it was a trick.
3. Two motorized rifle regiments, the only
true potentially combat-necessary troops. This
was another trick. These troops were brought into
Afghanistan shortly after the Vladivostok speech
solely to be withdrawn with public fanfare and
.without ever having been used against the
mujahidin. The newly introduced motorized rifle
regiments had markedly different equipment from
that of the regiments they temporarily displaced at
Shindand and Kunduz.~ Specifically, the units
included truck-mounted infantry with towed
artillery, whereas standard equipment for
motorized rifle regiments in Afghanistan includes
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armored personnel carriers and self-propelled
artillery.
After these two truck-mounted regiments were
withdrawn, the motorized rifle regiments
previously stationed at Shindand and Kunduz were
returned to their respective garrisons. In effect, all
motorized rifle regiments that were in Afghanistan
on the day of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech
remained in Afghanistan after the alleged
withdrawal.
The October 1986 withdrawal was not the first
incident in which the Soviets had sought to deceive
the West with staged force reductions. In 1980, for
example, Moscow announced a troop withdrawal
from Afghanistan weeks before the Moscow
Olympics. These troops, some 5,000, were not
suited for the Afghan terrain and counterguerrilla
operations. Even as the unwanted forces were
being withdrawn, new and more useful units were
being introduced.
Deception: The Cease-Fire and
Refugee-Return
Inmid-December 1986, the Soviet leadership
received virtually the entire Afghan leadership for
four days of meetings in Moscow. This was the first
such visit in six years. Several weeks later,
Najibullah announced plans for a unilateral cease-
fire and a proposal for a coalition government.
Within days of this announcement, Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and International
Department chief Dobrynin led the highest ranking
Soviet delegation to Afghanistan since the Soviet
invasion.
In an authoritative TASS report issued at the
close of the visit, Moscow announced that the Soviet
leadership totally approved of Kabul's initiatives.
Shevardnadze added that Gorbachev had personally
dispatched the Soviet delegation as part of the
campaign to generate momentum and to display
Moscow's desire for a peaceful settlement in
Afghanistan. The main points of the "national
reconciliation" 1 as proposed by Najibullah include:
? Implementing acease-fire;
? Refraining from armed struggle and
bloodshed in resolving Afghan questions,
now and in the future;
? Maintaining just representation in the
political structure and economic life of
Afghanistan;
Granting general amnesty and refraining
from prosecution based on past political
activity;
Protecting and consolidating national,
historical, and cultural traditions; and
Respecting and observing the sacred
religion ofIslam. - .
Apparently, the amnesty was used to increase the
number of available fighting men. Many of the
soldiers who deserted the Kabul ranks during June
and July fighting have reported that they were
released from prison and immediately pressed into
the army.
A news report in the Pakistani English-
language daily The Muslim.(January 6,1987)
alleged that three former Afghan officials were in
Kabul the same time as Shevardnadze and
Dobrynin to discuss participation in the proposed,
national reconciliation process. The bogus story
was picked up the following day by All India Radio,
which identified the visitors as former Afghan
Ambassador to India Abdul Rahman Pazhwak,
former Afghan Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed
Yusuf, and former Afghan Minister of Justice and
li N representative Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi.
Tabibi, who in fact resigned his diplomatic post
in protest against the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, publicly denounced the fraudulent
account of the visit and insisted he had "not visited
Kabul or participated in any negotiations with the
communist authorities." Yusuf and Pazhwak also
publicly denied the story. "
This disinformation ploy was carefully timed to
give substance to the sense of seriousness of
Moscow's initiative, to minimize anticipated
criticism of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan at
the then-upcoming Islamic summit in Kuwait, and
to generate a false sense of positive momentum for
the February 1987 round of Geneva negotiations
between Kabul and Islamabad. At the 'regional
level, the purpose was to sow discord among the
mujahidin political parties in Peshawar and to
encourage refugees to return to Afghanistan.
Last May, a Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spokesman reported on the progress of the national
reconciliation effort. He claimed that 1.,300
national reconciliation commissions had already
been established, and 949 villages "peacefully
liberated."
In concert with the cease-fire and national
reconciliation initiatives, Kabul has used deception
to convince international public opinion that
Afghan refugees are eager to return and that, when
given the opportunity of the cease-fire, many are
doing so. Kabul media, for example, claimed on
July 6 and 7,1987, that more than 60,000 refugees
had returned to Afghanistan in response to the
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national reconcil~iatiori campaign:- These claims,,. ~~
however, are highly exaggerated. : ~:=`~- ~..:
In February1987, ~an Afghan tele`visiot~~"crew in
Kabul delayed a scheduled Afghan'airlne~fli~ht to.?.
film a faked. return of Afghan refugees fr>om India.
The "returnees"actually were Kabul citizens .~ ,. .
pretending to be refugees. The film"was~then aired
on German television to lend credibility to and
generate international support for the
reconciliation initiative. To explain the limited
numbers of refugees returning home, Kabul claims
that Pakistan and Iran forcibly block many seeking
to return.
In an appeal to entice refugees to return and to
persuade the mujahidin to lay down their arms,
Kabul also has announced an amnesty for prisoners
and "misled patriots." The Soviet and Afghan
media regularly report the release of thousands of
prisoners. One such prisoner release, on February
7, 1987, was arranged to ensure maximum media
coverage. In addition to three Western journalists,
Soviet and Czechoslovak correspondents were on
hand.
Although the DRA regime has announced that
1,300 prisoners have been released, Western
journalists estimate the numbers to be in the range
of 650-800. The regime implies this is a wide-
rangingamnesty program for "estranged brothers,"
but upon closer examination, the prisoner releases
and amnesty program specifically exclude
mujahidin, who by definition are "professional
murderers, spies, saboteurs," and not entitled to
prisoner-of--war status. The prisoner amnesty .
program in fact applies to only a limited number of
candidates who fall into one or more of the following
categories: 2
? Over 60 years of age;
? Female;
? L'nder 18 at the time of commission of the
crime;
? Incurable illnesses;
? A sentence of five years or less; and
? A sentence of seven years, of which four
have been served.
Deception: Forgeries
The Soviets and the DRA Government have
published forged letters attributed to the
mujahidin. For example, two pamphlets containing
forgeries were published in 1984: "Chemical
Weapons: Who Resorts to Its Use?" and "Armed
Intervention and Other Forms of Interference in the
Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan." Both pamphlets purport to have
been printed in Kabul, but.the latter one, which is
much more,professionally typeset, ~robably~was~ ~ ~ ~'
printed in the.U.S S.R. The forgeries cited in the -~? ';
pamphlets falsely claim that chemical' weapons ''
have been used by the mujahidin. ' ' ` " ' '~?
One forged letter bearing the letterhead of the
Harakat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan
resistance group says: I m sendingto~yot~::..b~he~ ~:.
chemical substances, which had been requested
earlier. -You should hand the chemcaFs'over to the
person, who had been introduced earlier..;,as soon as~ .
possible, to be used according to the previous plan in
envisaged places."
Another forged letter purports to be from Sayed .
Ahmad Gailani, leader of the National Islamic
Front of Afghanistan resistance group. It says:
"The poisoning chemical substances sent to you
must be used very carefully, i.e., the time of usage
during the operation must be chosen carefully not to
harm the mujahidin, and in the case of unproper
[sic] weather conditions, it is better to leave the
place of operation. Afterwards, send all the
poisoned people to Peshawar as soon as possible for
the propaganda purposes."
These letters are fairly crude, in some cases
using incorrect words for common Afghan terms.
For example, in one forgery, the word artiste was
used for "army," which is proper usage in Iran or
Soviet Tajikistan, but not in Afghanistan. In
addition, the same typewriter was used for letters
supposedly written by different resistance groups.
Conclusion
It is difficult to assess the precise impact and
effectiveness of Moscow's deception initiatives in
support of its military campaign in Afghanistan.
Many people throughout the world remain skeptical
of Soviet motives in Afghanistan. The continuing
occupation remains a sore point in the U.S.S.R.'s
dealings with Third World nations, members of its
own bloc, and Western peace groups.
A recent United States Information Agency
survey of the world press found that Third World
media continue to express condemnation of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. West European,
Australian, and Canadian media consider Moscow's
willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan a test of
Soviet sincerity and credibility in other areas,
including arms control. s
It should be noted, however, that despite seven
years of waging a brutal, high-technology war
against a less developed, nonthreatening
neighbor-a war that has drive one quarter of
Afghanistan's population into exile-the U.S.S.R.
at the most recent Nonaligned Conference again
escaped condemnation for its actions. It is safe to
assume that the International Department of the
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Central Committee will continue energetically to
pursue what it must regard as a reasonably
succe$sful active measures campaign on
Afghanistan.
Footnotes
release of prisoners,.an amnesty, and economic assistance for
returning refugees. .
Z'"Text.of Najibullah News Conference of January 18,
1987," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, South Asia,
Volume VIII, January 21,1987. '
s United States Information Agency, Foreign Media
Analysis, "World Press Says If Gorbachev Is Serious About Peace
He Must Withdraw From Afghanistan" (July 8,19871.
1 The plan is virtually identical to the reconciliation
program launched under Babrak Karmal. In 1985, Karmal
promised a government composed of all political groups, the
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.Chapter VIII
Soviet.Relations in Latin America
This chapter is divided into two sections. The
first is a report on the results of a conference on
Soviet activities in Latin America. The conference,
sponsored by the, Department of State on May 7,
1987, brought together nine scholars to discuss the.
entire range of the U.S.S.R.'s interaction in the
region. The report provides a useful context for the
second section,'a discussion of Soviet cultural and
information activities in Latin America. The
second section was not a product of the conference.
Neither section focuses on propaganda or active
measures, but rather on legitimate international
relations. This.chapter is included in this report to
describe-using the example of one region, Latin
America-the backdrop of diplomatic, economic,
and cultural activities against which Soviet
influence activities take place. The interaction ,.
between these legitimate international relations
and the deception activities that constitute active
measures may be subtle. For example, a student
scholarship program for study in the Soviet bloc is
in the first, legitimate category. If that program is
then used to prepare.agents of influence, for
example, it encroaches on the realm of active
measures. Likewise, international radio
broadcasting is an acceptable means of
disseminating information and propaganda; its use
to spread disinformation, however, ties it to active
measures.
The views expressed in the first section of this
chapter are those of the conference participants and
do not necessarily reflect Department of State
positions or policies. The conference participants
were: Cole Blasier, University of Pittsburgh; Juan
del Aguila, Emory University; Robert Evanson,
University of Missouri, Kansas City; David Jordan,
University of Virginia; Bruce McColm, Freedom
House; Eusebio Mujal-Leon, Georgetown
University; William Richardson, Wichita State
University; Jiri Valenta, University of Miami; and
Robert Wesson, The Hoover Institution at Stanford
University.
Section I: Diplomatic and~~~
Economic Interactions
In the past two decades the Soviet Union has
increased its diplomatic, economic, cultural, and
political activities in Latin America. Although the
area remains aloes-level priority for Moscow vis-a-
vis the rest of the Third World, Latin America is
viewed as an arena for competition with the U.B.
Soviet interest in Latin America is due primarily to
the region's political and strategic importance to
the U.S. The priority of Latin America on the
Soviet agenda may change; during.late 1986-early
1987, rumors have circulated of a Latin American
visit this year or next by General Secretary
Gorbachev.
The Soviets follow two approaches to political
relations with Latin America: state-to-state,
involving the pursuit of"normal" diplomatic and
economic ties with non-Marxist governments; and
party-to-party, aimed at developing ties with the ',
region's communist regimes, parties, and leftist
groups. In 1960, the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic
relations with only five countries in the region.
Today, it has relations with 16 Latin American and
Caribbean countries and engages in some economic
activity with nearly all countries in the region.
Communist party relations have been strongest
with Marxist Cuba and Nicaragua where~Soviet
influence has been most significant.
The Soviets have expanded trade relations in
Latin America partly by taking advantage of U.S.
barriers to certain imports. U.S. quotas.are one
reason for recent increased Soviet purchases of ? ?.
sugar from Guyana and Caribbean countries. The
U.S.S.R. now buys from Nicaragua bananas and
other products no longer salable in the United
States. Argentine President Alfonsin has said that
unless the West opens its doors to increased exports,
his country will be forced to trade mope with the
socialist bloc.
Trade relations have served to expand Soviet
presence in Latin America, but have been costly to
the U.S.S.R. The Soviets imported approximately
three times what they have exported to the region.
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As it has in the Middle East and Africa, the
U.S.S.R. has sought to extend influence through the
supply of weapons and military advisers. To date,
military relations have been established only with ;
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru. Most military
assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua is given on a
grant basis. Cuba has received $9 billion in
assistance since 1960. Soviet sales and assistance
to Peru since 1973 are valued at about $1.5 billion.
Peru is currently deeply in debt to the U.S.S.R.
The foundation of Soviet cultural relations with
Latin America is exchange visits and scholarships
for study in the U.S.S.R. The number of
scholarships offered to Central Americans to pursue
post-secondary degree programs increased sixfold
from 1979 to 1983. Corresponding figures for
scholarships provided by the U.S. Government to .
Latin Americans remained relatively low and
constant for the same time period.
Despite its multifaceted presence in Latin
America, the U.5.S.R.'s success in expanding
influence has been limited. U.S. influence remains
strong and widespread. Recently both U.S. and
Soviet interests have been served by the return in
many Latin American countries to constitutional
government and civilian rule.
Soviet Views of Latin America
Throughout the 19th century, Russian
scientists and travelers visited many Latin
American countries. By the 1890s the Russian
Empire had established official and economic .
relations with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and
Uruguay. After the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet
diplomats, trade representatives, and political
advisers were sent to Latin America to extend those
earlier relations, establish a Soviet presence, and
set up local communist parties.
Soviet attention to and relations with Latin
America have fluctuated among countries and over
time. The Mexican Communist Party was founded
in 1919, and in 1924 Mexico became the first
country in the Western Hemisphere to exchange
ambassadors with the U.S.S.R. Disagreements
between the two countries in the Comintern,
however, led to a break in relations in 1930, a major
setback for the Soviets with the Latin American
country they knew best at that time. It was not
until the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941
and the subsequent anti-fascist military alliance of
World War II that relations with Mexico and
several other Latin American countries were
restored. In the postwar period, the Cold War .
strained many of the newly established diplomatic
relationships. However, Mexico, U ruguay, and
Argentina maintained relations with the U.S.S.R.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American
studies began to be emphasized in the U.S.S.R. In
1961, after Castro's success in Cuba, Soviet interest
was whetted, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences
established an Institute on Latin America to train
scholars and to provide guidance to policymakers.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets
concentrated on diplomatic, commercial, and
cultural contacts. They encouraged exchange visits
ranging from ballet troupes to government officials,
setup Soviet reading rooms, and offered
scholarships. The Soviet leadership scaled back
support for revolutionary activities in countries.
where conditions did not appear favorable for
radical change. Attention was directed instead to
improving relations with such "progressive" forces
as Allende's Popular Unity government in Chile:
More recently, the Soviets have been
encouraged by the success of revolutionary forces in
Nicaragua and the ability of the "united fronts" to
bring together in political coalitions communist and
noncommunist radicals in countries as different as
El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay. The Soviet Union
probably perceives a weakening of the inter-
American security system caused by: a decline of
U.S. influence in the region; the
Falklands/Malvinas War; a stronger sense of Latin
American nationalism; and the emergence of such
regional powers as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
The Soviets interpret these events as a shift in the
correlation of forces in their favor.
Soviet approaches to the region have been
evolving over the past two decades. Although they
have viewed most of Latin America as not ripe for
revolutionary change, the Soviets have tried to take
advantage of opportunities as they have arisen. In
addition to state-to-state relationships based on
diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties, the U.S.S.R.
has pursued party-to-party relations. Although the
U.S.S.R. will readily exploit such conditions as
those that led to leftist Sandinista rule in
Nicaragua, the Soviets' relations with the "new
democracies" suggest they recognize there is much
to gain from official state-to-state relations.
State-to-State Relations
The Soviet Union seeks to establish diplomatic,
economic, cultural, and political relations with as
many Latin American nations as possible. Through
these ties, the U.S.S.R. exploits, whenever possible,
deeply rooted Latin American resentment toward
the United States. It plays to Latin American
nationalism by encouraging self-assertiveness on
the world stage, demands for better export prices,
restriction of multinational corporations (MNCs),
nationalization of MNC holdings, and refusal to
repay debt. The Soviets also seek support for their
positions on such broad themes as peace,
disarmament, the militarization of outer space,. debt
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relief, and independence vis-a-vis the U.S. The goal
is weakening of Latin ties with the U.S.
The 16 Latin American and Caribbean
countries that have d;plomatic relations with the..,
U.S.S.R. are Mexico, Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and all of South
America except for Chile and Paraguay. Despite .
these broadscale relations, no Soviet leader has . .
visited the Latin American mainland. It is now
rumored that Gorbachev may soon visit, perhaps in
early 1988.
In October 1986, Raul Alfonsin became the.first
Argentine President to travel to the U.S.S.R. Also
in October, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze traveled to Mexico, the first Latin
American country other than Cuba to be visited by
a Soviet foreign minister. In January 1987,
Shevardnadze met in Moscow with ambassadors
from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina,
Peru, and Uruguay as members of the Contadora
and support groups to express Soviet backing for the
peace effort in Central America. Soon after, Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov
traveled to Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay. A
Brazilian official reported in May, 1987 that
Shevardnadze would pay an official visit to Brazil in
October.
Economic Relations
Trade has been a key factor in extending Soviet
influence. The U.S.S.R. will trade with almost any
country, regardless of politics. For example, in
1964, trade relations with Brazil continued despite
the onset of anticommunist military rule.
After the Cuban revolution, the U.S.S.R. picked
up the slack in Cuban exports created by the loss of
U.S. markets for sugar and other products. Since
that time the number of Soviet trading partners in
the region has increased steadily. For more than 15
years, the U.S.S.R. has traded with 8 of the 12
South American countries, Mexico, Costa Rica, and
Nicaragua. The U.S.S.R.'s top Latin American
trading partners are Cuba, Argentina, and Brazil.
As a result of the 1980 partial grain embargo
imposed upon the U.S.S.R. by the United States, the
Soviets became Argentina's biggest customer in the
early 1980s, purchasing 80 percent of Argentine
grain exports in 1982. Despite subsequent declines,
sales in 1985 still exceeded $1.5 billion. Trade fell
in 1986, leaving the Soviets far down the list of
Argentine trading partners. A recent agreement
between the two commits them to high levels of
trade through 1990.
Soviet imports from Brazil, primarily foodstuffs,
iron ore, and pig iron, rose from $226 million in
1979 to $864 million in 1983. In 1985, the figure
declined to $495 million as a result of a drop in ,
overall Soviet food orders and Soviet disinclination
to import from Brazil given its extreme bilateral
balance-of--trade deficit.
Brazilian imports from the U.S.S.R., primarily ,
oil, amounted to $91 million in 1985. Attracted by
Brazil's large domestic market, the Soviets have
been pressing hard to sell manufactured goods.. In .
November 1985, the U.S.S.R. and.Braiil`signed a ,
$1.5 billion trade agreement designed to triple the
19851evel of trade between the two countries.
In addition to trade, the U.S.S.R: ha's offered ,
technical assistance, for example, to biiild smelters
for the metal industries in Bolivia and'for
construction-especially hydroelectric-projects in
Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. The U.S.S.R.
imports much of its tin from Bolivia and exports
machinery, equipment, and technology. Trade
between the two countries has fluctuated owing to
changes in Soviet tin requirements and
inconsistency in Bolivian production, but Soviet
investment in upgrading Bolivia's mining sector
indicates the relationship will persist. The Soviets
have offered technological assistance in oil and
natural gas, copper smelting, iron and steel heavy
industry, and transportation-areas that could lead
to Soviet sales of machinery and equipment.
The Soviets will also build two textile factories
in Chihuahua, Mexico. In turn, Mexico has
expressed interest in the joint manufacture of
tractors, will send workers to the U.S.S.R. for
training, and will sell steel products, pipes, and oil
drilling equipment for Soviet industry:
Soviet trade with Mexico in the 1970s averaged
about $9 million dollars yearly. This figure rose in
the 1980s to $24 million, still a small amount..,In
1983, the two countries formed a Joint:Commission
for Economic Trade and Coordination.
The Soviet share of Latin American~trade
remains small, totaling around 4 percent; the
United States accounts for 40 percent of the region's
trade.
But although their share of Latin American
trade is small, the Soviets import three times as
much as they export. This is caused by several
factors: the availability of substitute sources for
Latin American imports, an anticommunist
sentiment in many countries, the lack of
complementarity between local economies and the
Soviet economy, and a general Latin American
conviction that Soviet products are inferior.
To balance trade, the Soviets have sent
delegations to expand markets for Soviet products
and for joint development projects that guarantee
use of Soviet equipment. Countertrade agreements
with Argentina and Brazil-with which the Soviet
deficits are largest-now require the trading
partner to purchase a specific amount of Soviet
goods or to include Soviet-manufactured products as
a certain percentage of the partner's total
purchases.
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