LETTER TO WARREN A. TREST FROM B. DEFELICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00181R000200450008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 25, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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16 April 1965
OCI No. 0285/65
Copy No. `; ri t
WEEKLY SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RETURN TO RECORDS CENT
II DIATEZY AFTER USS, .
JOB ,. `j BO=
SECRET
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CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 15 April 1965)
and Moscow all responded negatively to
VIETNAM
Hanoi, Peiping, ' speech, although Soviet of-
fcicials nt ad Johnson' s
acknowledged 7 Privately that the speech was "at
f
least an advance." While China has rebuffed all over-
tures for negotiations, the North Vietnamese premier in
a speech last week seemed to be suggesting some flexibil-
ity on Hanoi's part. The DRV meanwhile is exhorting
its people to mobilize themselves to meet the "newdsit-
uation and tasks." In South Vietnam,
the presence of elements of a regular NorthiViet amese
division has mounted. Viet Cong
slightly last week, particularly in the northern provinces.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
for only 5 percent
o
The death last wee
reduced party central committee membership to 1 ,
from 194 in 1958. No members have been addnd,tsomee
50
of the survivors are Ill or out of favor,
are increasingly susceptible to diseases of age.
COMMUNIST WORLD'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH AFRICA
s 1958 when the Communist countrie their
Since ble
economic aid program in Africa, they made a cre more than
me t biThe?USSR anddChinaits m m_
ie dtaary assistance. Although the Communists now account
military Africa's total trade their share
THE BERLIN SITUATION Berlin Since last week's harassment of rthreattto Allied athe ccess
Bast Germans have avoided any new ands designed to imp
cess but continue to issue propag with on West Berliners that hheavilyeon Communistegood will.
the outside world depend 8
EAST-WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION taking advantage
Both East and West European colitical~independ
E ence in
of tee trend re greater ways to expand trade through
Eastern Europe, , toward
new cooperative economic arrangements. 9
BULGARIA IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH BALKAN NEIGHBORS ian-
Since last July, when a general settlement of Bulgarari n
Greek problems was negotiated, Sofia has been promot
both political and cultural contacts with its neighbors. 10
THE DWINDLING CHINESE k1 politburoBmember KO Ching-shidh
is growing.
16 Apr 65
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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O
ASIA AFRICA Page
SUKARNO'S POLICY EDGING CLOSER TO COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES 11
He has warned the army that Indonesiats enemies are the
neocolonialists rather than the Communists, and has fur-
ther discouraged domestic anti-Communist activities.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS
The Communists are making a major effort to keep open
supply arteries, while a new series of low-level polit-
ical talks is scheduled to start next week.
PAKISTANIS FOREIGN POLICY UNDER AYUB AND BHUTTO
Pakistan's fears of India continue to dominate its for-
eign policy. In an effort to gain support against New
Delhi, Pakistani President Ayub and Foreign Minister
Bhutto have set an increasingly independent course in
international affairs. Ayub probably views his official
visit to Washington on 26 and 27 April as an opportunity
to balance his cultivation of Communists and neutralists.
SENANAYAKE GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN CEYLON
The coalition apparently faces no early threat, but its
composition reflects conflicting communal and economic
interests and will be a source of continuing difficulty.
KENYA'S PRESIDENT HEADING FOR SHOWDOWN WITH PRO-COMMUNISTS 14
The breach between Kenyatta and pro-Communist Vice Pres-
ident Oginga Odinga has been widening for several months,
and the President now seems convinced he must act.
NOTES ON CONGO AND SUDAN
The Congolese Government's military position continues
to improve throughout the country, and elections are
proceeding without violence. Sudan's transitional re-
gime has set 21 April as the date for elections to in-
stall a permanent government.
EUROPE
US INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE
The Gaullist hue and cry about a so-called invasion of
Western Europe by American capital seems to bo leading
Europeans generally to look for some way of dealing with
the issue through united action. Accordingly, Common
Market institutions will probably be called on to play
a leading role in finding a solution. In most of Western
Europe, sentiment in favor of US investmert still more
than outweighs opposing attitudes and, except in France,
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16 Apr 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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EUROPE (continued) Page
FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN SPACE PROGRAM 16
The French have withdrawn a proposal that the European
Launcher Development Organization scrap its original
program in favor of a more advanced effort, but they
may still deal ELDO a mortal blow by deciding henceforth
to concentrate on developing their own launcher.
REORGANIZATION OF SPAIN'S STUDENT ORGANIZATION 16
A 7 April decree reorganizing the Spanish University
Syndicate has brought a lull in student agitation by
removing the immediate irritant stemming from regime
appointment of syndicate officials, but is qualified
enough to preserve the status quo effectively.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SPLIT IN BRITISH GUTANA'S GOVERNMENT NARROWLY AVERTED 17
A quarrel between Premier Burnham and Finance Minister
D'Aguiar, who head the two parties in the government
coalition, threatened to bring down the government until
a compromise was reached. The long-run outlook is for
more such confrontations.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF FORTHCOMING OAS CONFERENCE 18
Included on the agenda is an examination of the opera-
tions and the future of inter-American economic and
social organisms, including the Alliance for Progress.
Set for Rio de Janerio on 20 May, the conference will
be the first meeting since 1954 of the Organization of
American States' highest organ, the general conference.
VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ARREST SUBVERSIVES OF RIGHT AND LEFT 19
The Venezuelan Government is exploiting, both domesti-
cally and abroad, the interception of clandestine funds
destined for the Communist Party as well as the arrest
of a newspaper publisher accused of plotting, with ac-
complices of both right and left, to overthrow President
Leoni.
EXTREMIST EFFORTS AGAINST PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT
The escalation of a minor strike by provincial sugar
workers into demonstrations and a general strike in the
capital seems to have been the work of a combination of
extremists subject to influences from a number of sources,
including Cuba and Communist China. The incident seems
also to be furthering the athbitions of lawyer-politician
Carlos Zuniga to organize a leftist-labor coalition.
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Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow
all responded negatively to Presi-
dent Johnson's 7 April speech. Mos-
cow's characterization of the
speech as a "maneuver" was the
mildest propaganda reaction; Hanoi
and Peiping called it "hypocrisy"
and a "swindle." In private con-
versations Soviet officials took
a slightly less negative line,
acknowledging that the speech was
"at least an advance."
Navy F4B Phantom jet fighters, en-
gaged in an offshore high-altitude
patrol prior to the strike on 9
April, were attacked by four Chi-
nese Communist MIG fighters some
35 miles southwest of Hainan Is-
land. One MIG was shot down, prob-
ably by an air-to-air missile. One
Navy fighter failed to return.
DRV Political Developments
Within South Vietnam, evi-
dence indicating the presence of
elements of a regular North Viet-
namese division has mounted. Viet
Cong activity picked up slightly
last week, particularly in the
northernmost portion of the coun-
try. In the North, the Hanoi re-
gime exhorted its people to mobilize
themselves to meet the "new situa-
tion and tasks" which have arisen.
Both US and South Vietnamese
aircraft continued their bombing
and armed reconnaissance over North
Vietnam during the past week.
Strikes were conducted on five
days. Five bridges were virtually
destroyed, and several radar sites
which had been struck on 31 March
were further damaged. Results of
the armed route reconnaissance
were generally limited, possibly
as a result of Hanoi's directive
that all vehicles travel at night
or with an aircraft lookout if day-
time travel is essential.
The week was also marked by
the first engagement of US air-
craft by Chinese Communist fighters.
Hanoi continued its efforts
to mobilize its political, economic,
and military apparatus to meet the
"new situation and tasks" which re-
gime leaders say have arisen as a
result of the continuation of US
military pressure. This was the
main trend evident at the semian-
nual session of the National Assem-
bly held from 8 to 10 April.
Deputies at the session were
ordered to spread the word that
the government is determined to
rally the populace to the defense
of the DRV, to the exertion of
greater economic effort, and to the
"active support" of the insurgency
in South Vietnam. The assembly
delegated to its standing committee--
the normal hub'of its operations--
a number of "new powers necessary to
make state operations suit" the
new situation. This move was prob-
ably intended to further party con-
trol over government operations.
The assembly also put the stamp
of legality on recent regime moves
to strengthen the armed forces,
voting to amend military laws to
increase the "fighting power" of
the military.
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Continued regime concern with
sustaining popular morale under
the strain of the air strikes was
evident at the assembly session.
Considerable stress was put on the
unity of the government with the
party and its policies. Repeated
attention was given to phrases
manifesting determination to con-
tinue to fight US "imperialism"
to tae end and to support the war
effort in the South despite US
military pressure on the DRV. Ho
Chi Minh claimed in his speech
that although the session met in a
tense atmosphere, it was filled
with "high spirits and the utmost
confidence."
Aside from the trend in Hanoi
propaganda, evidence of the effect
of the air strikes during March
and April on public morale is still
sparse,
in Hanoi report a -fairly
re axed atmosphere" in early April,
although they see a suggestion of
greater "anxiety" in official
statements and press comment. A
fundamental conviction of a US col-
lapse and a favorable outcome of
the struggle is still reflected on
all sides, according to this re-
port. Another report on morale
was recieved
last month. The gloomy and
d one of his contacts among
officials strengthened
his ear er impression that the US
air strikes were "seriously" af-
fecting morale.
however, suggest that
strikes the people have been
little affected.
also indicate that regime propa-
ganda has been effective in
convincing the populace that
heavy losses have been dealt to
the attacking aircraft.
Hanoi's propaganda on the
President's 7 April speech la-
belled ita "deception," and said
that the President's proposal for
unconditional talks was "hypoc-
risy." Although,. DRV leaders
have made it clear that military
attacks on the DRV must cease
before negotiations can be even
considered, they have not di-
rectly addressed themselves to
the subject of starting talks,
and still continue to speak
mainly in terms of an over-all
settlement of the "Vietnam ques-
tion."
In this vein, party chief
Ho Chi Minh last week put the 25X1
routine Hanoi demands for US 25X1
withdrawal from South Vietnam
and the settlement of the Viet-
nam question by the Vietnamese
people themselves in the context
of preconditions which must be
"carried out" before any inter-
national conference can be called.
Premier Pham Van Dong spelled out
essentially the same conditions
in a speech to the National As- 25X1
sembly. However, he put them in 25X1
terms of a "basis" which must be 25X1
"recognized" before a Geneva-type
conference could be held. Dong's 25X1
use of the word "recognized" may
have been designed to imply
greater flexibility on the part
of the DRV. In either case, the
basic demands on the US do not 25X1
appear to have changed. Hanoi I
seems to be saying that any in- 25X1
ternational talks on Vietnam will
be merely for the purpose of put-
ting the stamp of approval on a 25X1
Communist victory in South Vietnam.
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Peiping is continuing its
hard line on Vietnam and has
rebuffed all overtures for ne-
gotiations. President Johnson's
7 April proposal for uncondi-
tional talks was dismissed in
the 11 April People's Daily as
a "big swindlea. "hoax"
requiring the unconditional sur-
render of the South Vietnamese
"people" to the "US imperial-
ists. "
China has not formally
replied to the nonaligned na-
tions" appeal but has made clear
its lack of enthusiasm.
In the meantime Peiping
has rebuffed efforts by the
British and UN Secretary General
Thant to explore the possibility
of a negotiated settlement. The
Chinese formally rejected Lon-
don's proposal for a visit by
Patrick Gordon-Walker as "incon-
venient and unwelcome."
Peiping has charged that
the 9 April engagement between
US and Chinese planes near Hainan
Island was a "deliberate mili-
tary provocation against China"
on the part of the US. Chinese
newspapers have subsequently
published photographs portraying
what is claimed to be the wreck-
age of a US air-to-air guided
missile and an auxiliary fuel
tank allegedly dropped by US
aircraft while overflying Hainan
Island on 9 April. Except for
the almost pro forma warning
that the US must bear responsi-
bility for the "serious conse-
quences " of this action, how-
ever, the Chinese have made no
threats of retaliation.
Although there has been no
official Soviet reaction to
either the nonaligned nations'
appeal or President Johnson's
7 April address, Soviet propa-
ganda has stressed that there
has been no change in US policy
and that the US is actually ad-
vancing preconditions for ne-
gotiations. Pravda characterized
the President's speech as a
"maneuver" to placate public
opinion and US allies and reit-
erated that negotiations are
impossible as long as the US
air strikes continue. The
Soviet press also ridiculed the
proposal for an economic develop-
ment plan in Southeast Asia.
In private conversations,
however, Soviet Foreign Minis-
try officials acknowledged that
the President's speech "was at
least an advance.' In a talk
with Ambassador Kohler on 8
April, Deputy Premier Polyansky
denied'that the USSR had re-
jected negotiations out of-hand
and asserted that Moscow favors
peaceful negotiation of all in-
ternational disputes,. including
Vietnam. The Soviet leaders'
desire to hold the door open
to some form of eventual talks
without breaking openly with
Hanoi was also reflected in
their proposal on 8 April for
an immediate international con-
ference on Cambodia. Hanoi
and Peiping had already publicly
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endorsed the mbboddian appeal
of 15 March.
a conference on Cam-
bodia would provide an oppor-
tunity to discuss Vietnam and
possibly Laos.
Meanwhile, the Soviets con-
tinue to assert that military
equipment now is on the way to
North Vietnam. They told Pakis-
tani President Ayub last week
that transit difficulties with
China have been resolved and
implied that Soviet military
personnel are being sent to
North Vietnam. A Soviet diplo-
mat told a US Em-
bassy on 9 April that
if the US continues its present
actions in Vietnam, Soviet "so-
called volunteers" would almost
certainly be dispatched to North
Vietnam. He claimed that the
Chinese had acknowledged the
need for Soviet assistance to
Hanoi and were no longer imped-
ing shipments of arms and rock-
ets. The Soviet diplomat warned
several times that although the
USSR understands the problems
facing the US, Moscow can "no
longer stand by and watch your
aggression against a socialist
state."
Military Developments
in the South
Evidence that elements of
a regular North Vietnamese di-
vision are in northern South
Vietnam is increasing. A report
16 Apr 65
confirm information
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25X1
that the 101st Regiment 25X1
of the 325th Division infiltrated
into Kontum Province in February
of this year. 25X1
the regiment is supposed to 7 X1
take over the provincial capi-
tal during the rainy season.
Viet Cong activity picked
up slightly last week, even
though combat results generally
favored the government forces.
Communists appear to be inten-
sifying their operations in the
northernmost part of South Viet-
nam, while possibly positioning
to step up activity in the cen-
tral highland and southern prov-
inces.
During the past week, the
Viet Cong launched coordinated
mortar attacks on three targets,
including an American advisory
compound, near the capital of
Quang Tri Province, which bor-
ders North Vietnam. At the
southern border of Quang Tri
Province, a government armored
column sustained heavy casual-
ties when it was attacked by an
estimated two Viet Cong bat-
talions.on 13 April.
Recent captured documents
indicate that sizable Viet Cong
units are concentrating in a
guerrilla "war zone" about 50
miles north of Saigon, where
they would be in a position to
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launch actions against Bien Hoa,
Tan Son Nhut, or Ben Cat air-
fields. A new Viet Cong regi-
ment, forming in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince to the west, is believed by
US military authorities to be
approaching operational readi-
ness.
New fighting, largely at
government initiative, was re-
ported during the week around
Ban Me Thuot, the capital of
Darlac Province in the central
highlands, while along the cen-
tral coast, South Vietnamese
marines in Binh Dinh Province
continued to fight off probes
by a probable Viet Cong battalion
in the area.
There have been some indica-
tions that several recent govern-
ment military successes, coupled
with intensified air strikes,
may have disrupted some Viet
Cong military timetables. The
Viet Cong nevertheless retain
the capability of accelerating
the pace of their attacks well
beyond the reduced levels of re-
cent weeks.
Political Developments
in soufFT a nam
Last week's naval mutiny in
Saigon, which led to the replace-
ment pending military inquiry
of naval commander Admiral
Cang, has raised military con-
cern over a possible precedent
for junior officers to take
matters into their own hands.
In addition, the suspension
of Cang and Saigon area com-
mander General Dong~
Catholic fears o fa Buddhist-
inspired military purge. Cang
is Catholic, and Dong had re-
acted firmly to Buddhist street
agitation against the former
Huong government.
Premier Quat, who regards
General Dong as a troublemaker,
now hopes to carry out a major
command reorganization to bring
the military under tighter
civilian control. His plans,
which would leave only one
Catholic officer in a top com-
mand post, risk a serious
Catholic reaction if not even-
tual opposition of the military
in general. Although it is
possible that the views of the
Buddhist heirarchy have influ-
enced Quat's thinking, the
Buddhist clergy continues to
refrain from open political ac-
tivity except for the further
promotion of anti-Communist
themes among their followers.
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The Communist World
THE BERLIN SITUATION
Since last week's harass-
ment of traffic to Berlin, the
East Germans have avoided any
new threat to Allied access.
For the moment, the regime
seems intent only on impressing
on West Berliners that their
freedom and commerce with the
outside world depend to a large
extent on Communist good will
and that the GDR will not toler-
ate so tangible a demonstration
of West German interest in the
city as the Bundestag meeting
of 7 April. At a press confer-
ence in East Berlin on 12 April,
officials of the regime-domi-
nated National Front warned that
there would be an immediate re-
sponse if the West German Bund-
esrat were now to meet in West
Berlin or if the city were the
setting for any political ac-
tivity of a "provocative" na-
ture.
Although regime spokesmen
were careful at first not to
link last week's Soviet-German
military exercises or the harass-
ment of access to the Bundestag
meeting, since 9 April they
have boasted that events "have
made it clear who makes the de-
cisions on our autobahns and
roads." In this vein, the of-
ficial East German news agency
rejected out of hand Mayor
Brandt's proposal for interna-
tional control of the access
routes, describing it as "out-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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dated and unrealistic" and "an
attempt to interfere in the
GDR's internal affairs."
In an editorial published
on the first day of the Easter-
tide pass visits, Neues Deutsch-
land disclosed that est-
l rs who cross over to see
relatives during the current
pass agreement will encounter
heavy propaganda directed against
West Berlin - West German po-
litical ties. The party paper
echoed earlier warnings by the
regime that the Bundestag ses-
sion will have "serious conse-
quences" for renegotiation of
the pass agreement, which it
suggested may be postponed from
June until after the West Ger-
man elections in September. This
suggests that the East Germans
hope to exact from the West Ber-
lin Senat as the price for re-
negotiating the agreement a
pledge not to play host to West
German political meetings or
permit any expansion of the
Federal Republic's presence in
West Berlin. Pankow probably
judges that its chances of get-
ting such a commitment this fall
will be far greater than they
would be during an election cam-
paign in which Mayor Brandt and
other West Berlin leaders of the
Social Democratic Party (SPD)
are to play so prominent a
role.
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West Berliners and West Ger-
mans seem to feel that having
the Bundestag meet in West Ber-
lin was worth the inconvenience
and harassment and that it rein-
forced the city's ties with the
Federal Republic and underlined
the hope for eventual reunifica-
tion. Bundestag President Ger-
stenmaier has taken the position
that the Communists will resign
themselves to such parliamentary
sessions if they are held often
enough, perhaps twice a year.
There has been some public
criticism of the failure of the
Erhard government and the Allies
to react more vigorously to Com-
munist encroachments on access.
The chairman of the Berlin
branch of the SPD complained
that the United States should
have put a stop to the Commu-
nist "antics," and West German
Vice Chancellor Mende, leader
of the Free Democratic Party,
found the Allied response inade-
quate.
Mayor Brandt, who has ex-
pressed satisfaction with reac-
tion of the Allies, has voiced
some concern over the psycholog-
ical effects which the harassment
may have on Berlin's economic
life. He fears that West Ger-
man investors will re-examine
the advisability of committing
funds to the city's expansion
in view of the renewed demon-
stration of the vulnerability
of its land routes to the West.
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The Communist Worl
EAST-WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Both East and West Euro-
pean countries are seeking ways
to expand trade through new
cooperative economic arrange-
ments. The most sweeping of
these--the recently publicized
proposal by the West German
Krupp combine to couple its
capital and technical and
managerial skills with Polish
labor and raw materials--will
probably be modified in the
course of current negotiations.
The proposal, however, suggests
the growing complexity and
range of the many current ef-
forts at cooperation.
Programs already in opera-
tion, however, include not only
licensing and subcontracting
arrangements (see inset) but
also joint construction proj-
ects., Current proposals add
joint management of enterprises
to be built in East Europe.
SOME EXAMPLES OF
EAST-WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Poland-Belaium-Sweden: Economic cooperation pacts calling
for joint production of equipment for third countries, exchange
of technical know-how, joint industrial training, and consulta-
tion among industrial experts.
Poland-Rumania-Hungary-West Germany: Proposed West Ger-
man investment of capital and managerial skill in bloc indus-
trial enterprises.
Programs Already in Operation
Czechoslovakia-UK: Semifinished British textiles finished in
Czechoslovakia and re-exported.
Hungary-Finland: Jointly owned agency to market Hungarian
electrical goods in Finland.
Yu o lovia-Italy: Production under Italian license of Fiat auto-
(esmob I in Yugoslavia for sale in Eastern Europe.
HHuurngaUUK: Jointly produced tractors, using British engines
and Hungarian bodies. 6M13 s
These moves toward in-
creased economic cooperation are
taking advantage of the trend
toward greater political inde-
pendence in Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, East European
countries are dismayed at the
lack of progress in intrabloc
cooperation, and are thus look-
ing to the West for ways to
further their technological ad-
vance.
Nearly all the recent in-
novations stimulate East Euro-
pean hard-currency earnings,
through new exports. Moreover,
the market for goods produced
under Western license is en-
hanced by the established rep-
utations and marketing know-how
of the Western firms involved.
In addition, production-sharing
pacts, under which the Western
supplier of a factory takes a
portion of its production as
repayment on his investment, en-
able Eastern European countries
to acquire technology and ad-
vanced equipment without adding
substantially to their already
considerable medium and long-
term indebtedness to the West.
A group of Belgian business-
men has just visited Poland to
discuss new joint efforts. West
Europeans looking for new export
markets see in Eastern Europe a
significantly rising demand for
their output of heavy industrial
machinery, and many believe that
East Europe's limited ability to
generate new exports for West- 25X1
ern markets can be improved.
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BULGARIA IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH BALKAN NEIGHBORS
Bulgaria last July nego-
tiated a general settlement of
its problems with Greece, and
since then has been promoting
political contacts with its
other Balkan neighbors. This
campaign to break out of its
heretofore isolated position is
making some progress. In the
long run, these new contacts
are more likely to work changes
in Bulgaria than in the states
with which it is dealing. Con-
tinuing contact with the inde-
pendent Communist states of Ru-
mania and Yugoslavia and the in-
flux of ideas from Greece and
Turkey may eventually encourage
Sofia. to loosen its ties with
Moscow
In late January Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Popovic visited
Sofia for three days. While
not enthusiastic about his visit,
he was "satisfied," according
to Yugoslav officials in Sofia.
The visit was symbolically im-
portant and was closely followed
by a number of agreements, such
as the abolition of visa require-
ments between the two countries.
In a recent demarche to
Turkey, the Bulgarians proposed
an early meeting to seek agree-
ment on specified major outstand-
ing problems.
On a lower political level,
Sofia's "mayor" visited Athens
in mid-January and extended an
invitation to the mayor of Athens
to visit Sofia this May. The
mayors of the port cities of
Varna and Piraeus will exchange
visits in the near future.
Bulgarian efforts to pro-
mote Balkan rapprochement have
been particularly active in
the cultural sphere. Sofia is
trying to establish a league
of Balkan writers. Plans have
been made to hold an annual
noncompetitive Balkan Film
Festival. Artists from other
Balkan countries are being
invited to the opening of Bul-
garia's Jubilee National Art
Exhibition. Recently a con-
ference of Balkan, Adriatic,
and Cypriot students was held
in Sofia.
Proceedings of the Balkan
Committees for Peace and Under-
standing, which are scheduled
to meet in Athens in early May,
may well provide an indication
of the success of the Bulgarian
campaign. Past meetings have
foundered when Bulgaria and
Rumania have called for a Bal-
kan summit conference which
Greece and Yugoslavia have in-
sisted must be preceded by
bilateral resolutions of out-
standing problems. This con-
dition appears now to be largely
accomplished or on the way to
accomplishment except in the
case of Albania--whose attend-
ance of past meetings has been
blocked by Greece and Yugosla-
via.
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The dwindling ranks of
Communist China's top leader-
ship suffered another loss
with the death on 9 April of
politburo member Ko Ching-
shih. Full and alternate mem-
bers of the party central com-
mittee now number only 181,
down from the full strength of
194 reached in 1958 when ad-
ditions were last made. Of
the 181 surviving, 16 are known
to be out of favor and 33 oth-
ers have not made public ap-
pearances in six months or
more, probably in most cases
because of poor health.
The leaders of Communist
China are men in their sixties
and seventies. They are in-
creasingly susceptible to
diseases of age and increas-
ingly dominated by narrow, in-
flexible views. These charac-
teristics make them more prone
to unreasonable behavior, while
tending to sap their effective-
ness in managing the party and
government apparatus.
Suspicious of almost every-
one outside their own shrinking
circles, Chinese leaders have
been insisting on an ever
tighter hold over the levers of
power.
NCNA has been put under
the rigid control of the party
central committee, which now
makes all assignments, even
down to interpreters. There
is reason to believe that a
similar situation exists else-
where in the government, al-
though perhaps to a lesser ex-
tent in domestic agencies than
in NCNA, whose employees are
exposed to foreign influences.
Leadership distrust ex-
tends down into the lower ranks
of the party. Last winter the
central committee ordered a mas-
sive campaign to eradicate cor-
ruption at this level. A secret
party document declared that
this was a "shameful and serious
problem," brought about by a
lack of revolutionary spirit.
There have been several reports
in recent months that Mao Tse-
tung has been personally railing
against the "ideological bank-
ruptcy" of rank-and-file party
members and low-level government
officials. Although the regime
often speaks of the need to pro-
mote younger men, Mao's profound
distrust of them has been a bar
to any delegation of real power.
Moreover, the prospect for
change in the near future is slim.
Replacements for Mao and his in-
ner circle of immediate lieuten-
ants would presumably be drawn 25X1
from the present shrinking central 25X1
committee, which is exclusively
composed of old-guard revolution-
aries--men who seem to be just as
dogmatic and hostile to the US as
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Asia-Africi
SUKARNO'S POLICY EDGING CLOSER TO COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
In two recent speeches to
army and government leaders
President Sukarno has defined
Indonesian policy in a way that
comes close to meeting Communist
Party objectives. Party chair-
man Aidit recently commented
privately that he viewed Indo-
nesia "in a very favorable revo-
lutionary situation."
At a seminar of top army
leaders last week, Sukarno in-
structed the essentially anti-
Communist army to redirect its
strategic planning and political
orientation. He reminded the
officers that Indonesia's enemies
are not Communist China and the
Soviet Union but the "neocoloni-
alists," including the US.
During the same seminar,
army commander Jani stressed
the need to integrate the peo-
ple into the "fighting front."
This suggests increasing empha-
sis on the program recently in-
augurated to arm workers and
peasants, whom the Communists
have already partially organized.
In Sumatra, where the program
has started, the Communists
have it well penetrated.
In a speech on 11 April to
the Consultative Assembly, made
up of top politicians, Sukarno
announced that the "national
democratic" stage of the Indo-
nesian revolution was almost
complete and that the country
had already entered the stage
of "Indonesian socialism." In
effect he told the non-Commu-
nist parties to halt their anti-
Communist activities and com-
plained of hypocrites lacking
in the spirit of true "Nasakom"
--a word Sukarno coined to de-
scribe his goal of harmony among
nationalist, Moslem, and Commu-
nist elements.
Two days later Sukarno an-
nounced a purge of the leader-
ship of a pressure group called
the "Generation of 45" led by
Third Deputy Prime Minister
Chairul Saleh, who has been under
strong attack by Indonesian Com-
munists. Sukarno accused the
organization, among other things,
of competing with political par-
ties and of opposing "Nasakom."
Sukarno allowed Saleh to remain
on the group's executive board,
but added to it both Aidit and
Jani, and directed it to create
"a new policy and ideology."
Communists have abided with
Sukarno's ban on all demonstra-
tions until after the 18-26
April celebration of the Bandung
Afro-Asian conference. They
are reportedly planning a new
round of anti-American protests
immediately following the confer-
ence, however.
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The Communists are making
a major effort to keep open
supply arteries in widely sep-
arated areas of Laos, while a
new series of low-level talks
among the three main political
factions are slated to get un-
der way next week.
The Communists' military
efforts include the rapid clear-
ing of chokepoints near the Mu
Gia Pass and farther south on
Route 23, the apparent building
of bypasses for bombed-out road
sections, and the construction
of new antiaircraft artillery
sites protecting the pass. They
seem to be succeeding; a 40-
truck convoy was identified
moving through the pass on 10
April.
In the northeast, North
Vietnam appears to be supply-
ing advanced Communist posi-
tions by air. Planes described
as IL-14 transports were spotted
last week dropping supplies to
Communist positions in the hills
north of Ban Ban. Hanoi has
14 to 18 of these planes. These
flights may constitute a one-
time response to a particular
tactical situation, or presage
more systematic aerial resupply
efforts. Laotian harassment
of key transportation points,
coupled with the impending
rainy season, are likely to
make overland transportation
increasingly difficult.
On the ground, Communist
forces are continuing to exert
pressure against government
units in the Na Khang area north
of Ban Ban, and against pockets
of guerrillas to the north-
west in Phong Saly and Luang
Prabang provinces. In the south,
a build-up along Route 9 from
Dong Hene to Pha Lane has been
reported.
The political talks prepar-
atory to a meeting of the fac-
tional leaders are now sched-
uled to start on 19 April follow-
ing Pathet Lao chief Souphannou-
vong's agreement to Vientiane
as a site. He had previously
insisted on Paris. Chances for
any meaningful accord remain
dim, however.. Premier Souvanna,
with conservative backing,prob-
ably will continue to insist
that North Vietnamese troops
withdraw and that the Interna-
tional Control Commission be
guaranteed freedom of movement
before any cease-fire. Souphan-
nouvong, for his part, is cer-
tain to oppose any proposals
which would jeopardize Communist
control of "liberated areas,"
especially key infiltration
routes leading to South Vietnam.
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Ceylonese Prime Minister
Dudley Senanayake has pulled
together a widely diversified
"national government" which com-
mands 90-95 votes in the 157-
seat lower house. He should
have no difficulty in winning
its first vote of confidence--
probably to be taken next week.
The divergent attitudes of his
present supporters will erode
his support eventually, however,
unless long-standing antagonisms
can be held in check.
Senanayake now depends for
much of his parliamentary
strength on Ceylon's Tamil-
speaking Hindu minority. At
the same time, he is trying to
cultivate ultranationalists
among the Sinhalese Buddhist
majority, represented in the
cabinet by the leftist minister
of industries and fisheries,
Philip Gunawardena. Senanayake's
program attempts to balance con-
flicting communal interests by
assuring that Tamil religious
and employment rights will be
respected, while pledging "to
restore Buddhism to its right-
ful place" and instituting four
new monthly Buddhist holidays.
A critical rise in communal
tensions, however, would force
delicate decisions between con-
flicting interests.
The government is also do-
ing a balancing act in dealing
with the sagging economy. To
stimulate growth, it promises
to support private enterprise
while maintaining undertakings
already nationalized. The bus-
iness community is concerned,
however, over the key position
given Gunawardena, one of the
island's leading Marxists. His
appointment may hold the sup-
port of some leftist elements,
however, and his strength in
the labor movement--particularly
among port workers--may prove
useful in dealing with labor
unrest.
As a further stimulant for
the economy, the government
hopes to turn to the West for
private investment and foreign
aid, although British and Ameri-
can assistance will be delayed
until compensation is made for
oil company properties expropri-
ated three years ago. The new
government's foreign policy
statements uphold Ceylon's tra-
ditional nonalignment, but there
is definitely a friendlier at-
titude toward the West. This
was shown by the favorable re-
action to President Johnson's
speech on Vietnam and by Ceylon's
earlier attempt to moderate the
nonaligned nations', appeal on
the Vietnam crisis.
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KENYA'S PRESIDENT HEADING FOR SHOWDOWN WITH PRO-COMMUNISTS
Kenya's President Kenyatta,
who tries to remain above fac-
tional and tribal disputes with-
in his government, has begun to
demonstrate increasing concern
about subversive elements and
a willingness to take firmer ac-
tion against them. As a result,
he now appears to be heading
for a showdown with the pro-Com-
munist followers of Vice Presi-
dent Oginga Odinga.
Kenyatta has been reluc-
tant to act against Oginga, his
former ally, for fear of precipi-
tating a tribal struggle, but
the breach between the two has
been steadily widening for six
months. Since late March Ken-
yatta has been tacitly encour-
aging the efforts of a coali-
tion of moderate ministers rep-
resenting various tribes, in-
cluding Oginga's Luo, to under-
cut the vice president's power
and influence. The resounding
defeat on 2 April of two Oginga-
backed candidates in a parlia-
mentary election is said to have
impressed Kenyatta with the ex-
tent of opposition to Oginga.
The February assassination
of P. G. Pinto, the pro-Commu-
nist mastermind and paymaster
of the Oginga group, and the re-
cent initiative of the moderate
coalition has thrown Oginga on
the defensive and left his forces
in some disarray. His strength
has proven less than was gen-
erally believed, and two of his
allies in the cabinet appear ready
to jump on Kenyatta's bandwagon.
His staunchest cabinet cohort,
the information minister, has
reportedly antagonized Kenyatta
and may lose his portfolio.
There have been repeated
reports that Oginga and his ex-
tremist cohorts are planning a
coup, perhaps this month. Such
an effort seems unlikely, how-
ever, except as a desperate last
stand.
In a 10 April speech, Ken-
yatta for the first time openly
attacked an Oginga lieutenant,
a Kikuyu who has been agitating
against the government among
Kenyatta's own Kikuyu tribe. Ken-
yatta is incensed by this and
may well encourage the man's
arrest. Other ministers allied
to Kenyatta have been stumping
the country calling for "gen-
uine" nonalignment--that is,
not slanted toward the Commu-
nists--and an end to "foreign
subversion."
Following a debate in par-
liament in early April on an
alleged plot to overthrow the
government with smuggled Com-
munist arms, the Kenyan Army
seized several arms caches, in-
cluding 500 submachine guns and
500 pistols, delivered by a
Czech plane last fall, found
in the basement of Oginga's of-
fice. Oginga was briefly de-
tained for questioning on 14
April
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O
Congo: The government's
military position is still im-
proving throughout the country.
The mopping-up operation in the
northeast continues; patrols
are capturing transportation
centers and rebel resistance is
light. Remaining isolated pock-
ets of rebels give no indica-
tion of organizing counterat-
tacks.
In the eastern Congo, how-
ever, rebels in the Fizi area
again threaten Albertville, the
capital of Nord-Katanga, report-
edly having encircled army gar-
risons on the major road along
Lake Tanganyika leading into
Sudan: The transitional
coalition government has con-
firmed that parliamentary elec-
tions are to take place in the
six northern provinces on 21
April. In the Negroid south,
where the rebels remain active,
the elections will be postponed
indefinitely until civil order
is restored and some agreement
is reached on relationships with
the central government.
According to the present
schedule, a permanent govern-
ment is to be installed in
Khartoum by 7 June. The gen-
erally conservative Umma Party--
the political arm of the Ansar
politico-religious brotherhood--
will probably win enough seats
to control the government with
the continued support of the
urban National Union Party and
the ultraconservative Muslim
that province. Other insurgent
groups continue to harass Uvira,
to the north.
The parliamentary and pro-
vincial elections are proceed-
ing without violence but with
reports of widespread irregu-
larities; final results, how-
ever, are unlikely to be over-
turned by the courts. Voting
is closely following tribal
lines, with support going to
established leaders. As ex-
pected, Premier Tshombd has
received considerable backing
from the Katanga provinces.
Brotherhood. The Communists
hope to establish a working
minority in the parliament by
winning a large share of the
special seats reserved for uni-
versity graduates.
The leftist People's Dem-
ocratic Party is still actively
working for a postponement of
the elections and has declared
that it will boycott the polls
on 21 April.
Egyptian efforts to lure
the National Unionists away
from their coalition with the
Umma have apparently failed.
Traditional rivalries between
these two groups, however, make
prospects for any lasting co-
alition remote at best j
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Europe
The French Government last
week withdrew a proposal that
the European Launcher Develop-
ment Organization (ELDO) scrap
its original program in favor
of a more advanced effort.
Paris' action was apparently
prompted by opposition from the
aerospace industries in France
and other ELDO countries as well
as by a more sober appraisal of
the costs involved.
Last January, the French
criticized the original launcher
--ELDO-A--as too costly and as
inadequate in lifting capabil-
ity. They asked ELDO to con-
centrate on the ELDO-B, a more
powerful follow-on launcher
still on the drawing board.
ELDO-B, they argued, could put
heavy communications satellites
into the desired high orbit and
thus permit Europeans to com-
pete with the US in this profit-
able field.
The reform of the Spanish
University Syndicate (SEU)
spelled out in an official de-
cree promulgated on 7 April has
brought a lull in student agita-
tion. The reorganization has
removed the immediate irritant
stemming from government appoint-
ment of top SEU officials, but
it is unlikely to permit the
kind of freedom the students ex-
Although clearly advanta-
geous to ELDO in the long term,
the French proposal encountered
general opposition, apparently
because it would disrupt the
existing allocation of effort
among national industries and
would require even larger out-
lays of funds than does ELDO-A.
Its withdrawal at a 7-9 April
ELDO council meeting in Paris
was followed by a vote to con-
tinue construction of ELDO-A.
ELDO's continued existence
may still be in jeopardy, how-
ever. Although the French are
calling for greater European
cooperation in scientific re-
search and development, they
may now concentrate on develop-
ing a reliable satellite launcher
for their own national program.
This might deal ELDO a mortal 25X1
blow.
pect. Indeed, some students
have already complained about
the lack of any student role in
drafting the regulations imple-
menting the decree.
The government clearly in-
tends to continue exercising
strict control over the student
organization. The decree it-
self specifies that the SEU must
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Europe
function according to the "funda-
mental principles" of Spain's
political and social life and
that political activity outside
the student organization will
be considered incompatible with
university activities. Also
the regime will appoint a com-
missioner, armed with extensive
administrative powers, to pro-
vide "liaison" between the stu-
dents and the state.
The decree on the SEU
--like an earlier draft press
law and a proposed law of As-
sociations--is an example of
the regime's tendency to offer
proposals which seem to be
concessions but which contain
qualifications that effectively
preserve the status quo
Western Hemisphere
A tax policy quarrel be-
tween British Guiana's Premier
Burnham and Minister of Finance
D'Aguiar, which began in early
April, flared up in larger
dimensions last week end. Be-
fore a compromise agreement was
finally hammered out, D'Aguiar
was on the verge of resigning.
Since he heads the minority
party in the government coali-
tion, his withdrawal might have
brought down the government.
The controversy was re-
kindled through a misunderstand-
ing on the part of one or both
men. In essence, it involved
the degree to which Burnham was
committed to endorse a D'Aguiar
proposal to reduce or eliminate
several taxes to stimulate
greater private investments in
the colony.
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16 Apr 6.5
It seems clear that compe-
tition for power and influence
lay at the heart of the clash
over taxes and that this rivalry
led to the near showdown.
D'Aguiar, who has made a number
of concessions to Burham on
other matters, evidently felt
obliged to take a firm stand on
taxes or be completely over-
shadowed.
25X1
25X1
Now that Burnham and
D'Aguiar have successfully
weathered the first serious
test of their partnership, the
air probably has been cleared
and the coalition at least tem-
porarily strengthened. In the
long run, however, the outlook
is for more such confrontations.
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Western Hemisphere
The Extraordinary Inter-
American Conference scheduled
to open in Rio de Janeiro on
20'May will be the first meet-
ing since 1954 of the Organiza-
tion of American States' high-
est organ, the general confer-
ence. This meeting was called
primarily to consider means to
strengthen the inter-American
system through organizational
changes.
Included on the agenda is
an examination of the operations
and the future of inter-Ameri-
can economic and social organ-
isms, including the Alliance
for Progress. Brazil, along
with Chile, seems to favor a
new international agreement
",institutionalizing" multilat-
eral hemispheric economic co-
operation. This idea derives
in part from a 1960 effort to
link economic development with
hemispheric security in order
to obtain more US aid, although
subsequent developments have
obviated the justification for
such an agreement. The Brazil-
ians apparently contemplate
ending the unilateral nature of
the Alliance by persuading some
of the more advanced countries
to share the aid burden.
Advocates of mandatory eco-
nomic cooperation would like to
have OAS economic activities
consolidated under a new coun-
cil, with the present OAS coun-
cil retaining only a political
role. The new body would be
located in Latin America. Chile,
moreover, contemplates a possi-
ble third council devoted to
culture and education.
Chilean Foreign Minister
Valdes has not only demanded
the institutionalization of eco-
nomic relationships but favors
a more enduring US economic com-
mitment to Latin America than
the Alliance stipulates. For
Chile, this is also related to
the fundamental thrust of the
Frei administration's foreign
policy--the economic integration
of Latin America implicitly under
the leadership of Frei's Chris-
tian Democratic Party.
President Frei recently
wrote four prominent Latin Amer-
ican international economists
asking their cooperation in the
development of continental eco-
nomic integration. In response,
they drafted a study on the crea-
tion of a common market which
possibly would include Cuba. This
insensitivity to US policy would
reflect the tendency of the
Christian Democrats and economic
technicians to assign economic
considerations priority over the
political in working out their
ideas for hemisphere development.
Frei's initiative, however, drew
a countersuggestion from Argen-
tine President Illia, whose gov-
ernment recommends accomplishing
integration through the nine-
member Latin American Free Trade
Association.
These currents will probably
merge at the forthcoming OAS meet-
ing where a formula on closer
economic cooperation may be ham-
mered out. Whether the form
which increased Latin American
economic unity and cooperation
takes will help or harm US inter-
ests remains to be seen
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Western Hemisphere
VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ARREST SUBVERSIVES OF RIGHT AND LEFT
The Venezuelan Government
is exploiting, both domestically
and abroad, the interception of
clandestine funds destined for
the Communist Party (PCV) as
well as the arrest of a news-
paper publisher accused of plot-
ting,with accomplices of both
right and left, to overthrow
President Leoni.
Extensive news coverage
has been given to the arrest of
three Communist couriers on 26
March who had in their posses-
sion $330,000 allegedly for de-
livery to the PCV. Interior
Minister Gonzalo Barrios, in a
news conference on 10 April,
publicly displayed the money
and asserted that the funds came
by way of the Communist Party of
Italy (PCI). The PCI has em-
phatically denied this, but Vene-
zuelan officials are sticking
to their charge.
16 Apr 65
Some international aspects
of the smuggling case have been
touched on in public by the for-
eign minister of Colombia. He
claimed that the Venezuelan in-
cident "coincided with decisions
made during the recent meeting
of Communist parties in Moscow."
He also charged that one objec-
tive of these decisions was to
facilitate the overthrow of both
the Colombian and Venezuelan
governments.
Capriles' group
rightist plotters. Interior
Minister Barrios, in his press
conference, left the clear im-
pression that the Communist
couriers were somehow linked to
On 9 April Venezuelan
authorities arrested publisher
Miguel Capriles, together with
more than 50 of his supporters.
Capriles, whose papers have been
vehemently attacking the govern-
ment, is charged with organizing
and leading an insurrectionist
movement. Among the prisoners
are Communists, retired military
officers, and several well-known
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Western Hemisphere
Panamanian extremists have
stepped up their drive to create
a climate favorable to revolu-
tionary action. Their latest
effort has been the escalation
of a minor strike of provincial
sugar workers into a long march
on Panama City, where they pro-
moted mass rallies on behalf
of the marchers as well as a
fairly effective general strike
in the capital.
The exploitation of the
provincial strike seems to
have been part of a concerted
drive by a combination of ex-
tremist elements to stir pop-
ular dissatisfaction with the
government and the oligarchy.
Among the most active agitators
are members of the newly organ-
ized Panamanian Revolutionary
Union (URP). The URP is backed
by a number of "hard-line" rev-
olutionaries who are in contact
with Havana and Peiping. Also
actively involved are Moscow-
oriented leaders of the regular
Panamanian Communist Party and
followers of ex-President
Arnulfo Arias.
Another aspect of the pres-
ent situation is the prospect
that Carlos Ivan Zuniga, an in-
fluential lawyer-politician who
has made a political career out
of his profession as labor ad-
viser, may be able to organize
a leftist-labor coalition.
Zuniga is generally recognized
as the most effective member of
the National Assembly, where
his highly articulate perform-
ance in that body has won him
wide popularity among the lower
classes as well as growing po-
litical influence.
Zuniga, who already con-
trols the banana workers' union
--Panama's largest--encouraged
the sugar workers in their cur-
rent strike and has become their
legal adviser. He has negotiated
on their behalf with President
Robles, who personally signed
the agreement. In addition to
the probability that he won some
benefits for the strikers, Zuni-
ga's new position with their
union will bring his influence
into Panama's economically de-
pressed central provinces where
the Communists have been partic
active
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16 Apr 65
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 25X1
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(Information as of noon EDT, 14 October 1965)
VIETNAM
Although there was a relative decline in large-scale
military engagements in South Vietnam last week, the
number of Viet Cong incidents reached the highest level
in over a year amid indications that the Communists may
be planning to step up their terrorist activity. The
Communists are also nearing completion of considerable
construction and improvement work on roads in southern
Laos which will extend their infiltration routes into
South Vietnam. The number of confirmed surface-to-air
missile sites in North Vietnamreached 29 last, week, but
it is estimated that the DRV has only enough equipment
for six to ten of these. Hanoi has intensified its
propaganda alleging US air strikes against civil targets.
Page
The Communist World
UNANNOUNCED HIGH-LEVEL PARTY MEETING IN COMMUNIST CHINA 4
Recent regime pronouncements suggest that the leaders
are frustrated by a wide range of foreign and domestic
problems, and an important unannounced conference has
apparently been under way since at least 27 September
to discuss and act on them.
WARSAW PACT EXERCISE IMMINENT IN EAST GERMANY
Preparations for the announced Warsaw Pact exercise
are virtually complete. Military activity in south-
western East Germany is expected to accelerate in the
next few days as Soviet, East German, Polish, and
Czech forces deploy for the event.
ANOTHER SOVIET LUNAR PROBE FAILS
The increasing frequency of Soviet lunar probes sug-
gests that the USSR is anxious to show some results
from a program which has suffered badly in comparison
with US lunar explorations.
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PAGE i WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Oct 65
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ACCRA TO HOST AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING
Most of the 36 countries belonging to the Organization
of African Unity will send high-level representatives,
although some heads of state will not attend. African
problems will be of primary concern, but some touchy
East-West issues may also come up.
TSHOMBE OUSTED IN THE CONGO 15
President Kasavubu's dismissal of Premier Tshombe al-
most certainly presages a period of political turmoil
and possibly violence. Moreover, Leopoldville still
faces a long campaign to re-establish its authority
in large rebel-infested areas, although mercenary forces
captured the last major rebel stronghold last week.
Europe
SCANDINAVIA AND NATO
Swedish Prime Minister Erlander's recent cautious al-
lusion to the possibility of a Scandinavian defense
pact raises the question of whether Norway and Denmark
will continue their NATO membership after 1969 when
they may opt to withdraw. Opinion in those two coun-
tries will be affected as always by Soviet moves but
also by how French NATO policy develops and by their
latent fear of Germany as Bonn seeks a greater nuclear
role in NATO.
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to complete roads in southern
Laos started in mid-1964. When
the dry season arrives in a few
weeks they will have more than
150 miles of roads flanking the
South Vietnamese border to a
point 90 miles south of the de-
militarized zone (DMZ)--some 55
miles farther than a year ago.
The general plan appears to
be to extend Laotian route 92--
which parallels the South Viet-
namese border at an average dis-
tance of about 25 miles--to the
vicinity of Ban Phone and to open
branches from route 92 toward the
border both with new construction
and by upgrading existing trails.
As of the end of September, the
branches
consist of one from
Ban Phone completed to the bor-
der, a second from Muong Nong com-
SOUTHERN LAOS: Roads Built or Improved Snrrr Mid-1964
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pleted to within five miles of
the border. A third road start-
ing from Ban Bac, in an early
stage of construction, may also
lead to the South Vietnamese bor-
der.
Development of route 92 and
its branches is almost certain to
be stepped up when the dry season
arrives. This will probably in-
clude the provision of more off-
road support facilities and bridg-
ing and the further extension of
route 92 from the latitude of
Saravane to Ban Phone, a gap
crossed in 1964 by using large
canoes on the Se Kong River..
More SAM Sites in the DRV
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The total number of confirmed
surface-to-air missile sites in
North Vietnam reached 29 this
week with the confirmation of
seven new sites. Despite this in-
crease it is estimated that at
present there is only enough SAM
equipment in the DRV to equip six
to ten sites. The largest number
of operational sites--those
equipped with missiles and ready
to fire--noted at any one time was
five on 8 October. Many of the
newly confirmed sites are in
groups of two or three within a
few miles of one another, prob-
ably to make the most effective
use of the available equipment.
namese have taken over SAM opera-
tions after only three months'
training instead of the nine to
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?
to twelve months normally re-
quired.
Alleged Bombing of Civil Targets
Hanoi's propaganda charges
denouncing alleged US bombing
and strafing of civil targets in
the DRV have recently been in-
tensified. Part of the DRV cam-
paign involved a guided tour of
the damaged areas for a group
of journalists from Japan, In-
donesia, and the UAR. Initial
reports from the newsmen de-
scribe urban centers in the south-
ern DRV as "virtually flattened,"
and claim "indescribable damage
to civilian establishment" in-
cluding over 40,000 dead from
the raids. After a spate of new
charges over damage to hospitals
and other medical facilities,
Hanoi on 12 October released a
detailed list of 124 "educa-
tional institutions" it claims
were hit by US planes.
Beyond the general inten-
tion of arousing additional free
world sentiment against the air
raids it is not clear exactly
what has sparked the heightened
DRV propaganda charges. Hanoi
may hope to provide some spe-
cific detail-and background
music for leftist and Communist
spokesmen at a series of upcom-
ing free world student protest
demonstrations over US policy in
Vietnam. In its declaration on
the alleged bombing of schools,
Hanoi called on "educational cir-
cles in all countries" to launch
a "powerful movement of protests."
DRV Assembly Postponed
Indicative of the problems
caused in the DRV by the bombing
is Hanoi's decision to "postpone"
the upcoming fall session of its
national assembly. The postpone-
ment will allow state organs and
cadres to concentrate on resist-
ing US "aggression," according to
Hanoi. The move probably also
reflects anticipation of diffi-
culties in transporting delegates
to Hanoi and a reluctance to con-
centrate many key cadres in one
large assembly.
Hungarian Mission to DRV
A high-level Hungarian dele-
gation led by politburo member
Jeno Fock arrived in Hanoi on 7
October. The delegation, which
included both economic and mili-
tary specialists, met with party
First Secretary Le Duan and DRV
economic and military officials
on 10 October. Hanoi described
the talks only as an "exchange of
views on problems of common in-
terests."
The full purpose of the
visit is not clear. North Viet-
nam relies on Hungary for some
telecommunications and electronic
equipment and may be seeking ad-
ditional assistance of this type,
probably for military purposes.
It is likely, however, that the
subject of a settlement of the
war will also be discussed, with
the Hungarians probably urging a
policy of moderation.
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Lon
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ny
Viet.
rag.
3
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tly
is-
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Nest
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absent from their own areas in
early October, when they normally
preside over local National Day
celebrations. This strongly sug-
gests that the activity in Peking
was unscheduled and possibly ur-
gent.
Any meeting at this time
may have been triggered by for-
eign policy problems, such as re-
cent developments in Vietnam,
China's role in the Kashmir
crisis, and difficulties in ex-
tending Chinese influence in Af-
rica and Latin America. Foreign
Minister Chen Yi's truculent and
wide-ranging press conference on
29 September suggests that a de-
cision had already been reached
by then to take a generally harder
line in foreign policy.
The enlarged group meets
so seldom that, once together,
it would undoubtedly also con-
sider domestic affairs, includ-
ing personnel appointments. No
change in domestic policies is
evident yet, but the stress on
domestic problems evident in Na-
tional Day editorials and
speeches suggests that new ap-
proaches are being considered.
Although these contained the
usual claims that the situation
at home and abroad was "excel-
lent," the regime in fact ap-
pears to be disappointed by its
mediocre achievements and
frustrated over the intractabil-
ity of its long-term problems.
In the keynote National Day
address, politburo member Peng
Chen claimed that agricultural
production had increased over
1964, but he warned that "quite
a few areas had suffered seri-
ous natural disasters," an ad-
mission probably designed to
condition the populace to ex-
pect some belt tightening next
spring. Other information on
grain crop conditions indicates
no increase over the mediocre
1964 level.
The absence of a strong
popular commitment to regime
policies also continues to worry
Peking. Chen Yi admitted there
were "revisionists" in China but
claimed they represent no threat.
The National Day editorial in
the party journal Red Flag--re-
flecting a long-stan ing Fear
of top leaders that China, like
the USSR, might some day back-
slide--was devoted entirely to
the problem of inculcating peo-
ple with Maoist beliefs through
"socialist education" campaigns.
Both Chen Yi in his press
conference and Premier Chou En-
lai in a National Day speech
alluded to the third five-year
plan, which is to start in 1966,
but neither gave details and
both stressed that it would
take decades--30-to 50 years ac-
cording to Chen--to build a
strong China
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Preparations for the an-
nounced Warsaw Pact exercise
are now virtually complete.
Military activity in southwest-
ern East Germany is expected to
accelerate during the next few
days as Soviet, East German,
Polish, and Czech forces deploy
for the event.
military activity--which may in-
volve the actual participation
of elements of as many as ten
divisions--will be denied to
Allied liaison personnel. A
large area in southern East Ger-.
many has been closed to them from
9 through 27 October..
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The theme of the exercise.,
will probably be the blunting
of a NATO attack into East Ger-
many followed by a counteroffen-
sive through the Fulda Gap to
West Germany. Simulated tacti-
cal and strategic nuclear blows
r
Observation of the major
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are expected to play a major
role.
Propaganda to date, plus
'Aarsaw Pact commander Marshal
Grechko's statement that the
exercise will be the "largest
ever," suggests that the Soviets
intend to use the exercise as a
demonstration of bloc preparedness
to counter "the West German threat
to peace.'
ANOTHER SOVIET LUNAR PROBE FAILS
The increasing frequency of
Soviet lunar probes suggests that
the USSR is feeling a sense of
urgency to show some results
from this program. Luna 7,
launched on 4 October, was the
most recent probe and was in-
tended to make a soft landing.
Its retrorocket system apparently
malfunctioned, however, and the
vehicle crashed on the moon on
7 October.
A TASS announcement released
some 13 hours after the impact
stated that the probe's operation
was generally successful. While
Luna 7 must be charged off as
the latest failure in a notably
unsuccessful program, it un-
doubtedly did produce some data
which will be useful in further
efforts to perfect a soft-land-
ing system.
So far this year the Soviets
have announced three lunar probe
launchings, none of which has
been wholly successful. They
now appear to be stepping up
their program to develop a soft-
landing technique, possibly in
an attempt to obtain lunar sur-
face data for an eventual manned
lunar landing. In addition,
Moscow certainly feels the need
to show some results from a pro-
gram which has suffered badly
in comparison with US lunar ex-
ploration
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Asia-Africa
INDONES IA
The army continues to keep
Sukarno and the Indonesian Com-
munist Party (PKI) on the defen-
sive, but still appears reluctant
to defy the President by a major
crackdown on the party.
The army is proceeding with
its investigation of the 30 Sep-
tember coup and will try to build
a case against the individuals
responsible. The investigations
permit the arrest and interroga-
tion of relatively large numbers
of leftist suspects and are within
the terms of Sukarno's orders.
Instead of taking direct action
against the PKI and its affiliates,
the army is relying on anti-Commu-
nist civilian organizations. These
groups have been active chiefly
in destroying buildings used by
the party and its front groups.
There seems to have been rela-
tively little-personal violence.
The army is said to be con-
cerned about the smuggling of
Chinese arms into Indonesia dis-
guised as nonmilitary cargo and
to have asked the navy to inves-
tigate.
Sukarno returned to Djakarta
from his palace at Bogor on 10
October. Although he has taken
relatively little action since
then, his presence in the capital
strengthens his position by dis-
counting reports that he is ill
or in protective custody.
S
In accordance with army
wishes, Sukarno has appointed
Maj. Gen. Suharto commander of
the army. Suharto led the army's
counteraction against the 30 Sep-
tember coup. He replaces Maj.
Gen. Yani, who was murdered on 1
October.
Sukarno also has told air force
chief Marshal Dani--who was deeply
involved in the 30 September plot
--that public and army pressures
require his resignation from the
cabinet. Dani appeared at Bogor
on 6 October and, apparently fear-
ing army action against himself,
has stayed close to Sukarno ever
since.
The PKI's central committee
had made no pronouncements since
its statement on 5 October claim-
ing that it was not implicated
in the coup attempt. Chairman
Aidit's whereabouts remains un-
known, although the army still
believes he is in central Java.
Indications are mounting
that Sukarno and the party are
willing to make Aidit the major
scapegoat of the affair and that
they will try to form a "new"
Communist party. Several Dja-
karta newspapers have printed
stories to the effect that there
are two kinds of Communists:
"extreme Communists," who are
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un-Indonesian and who serve for-
eign interests, and "decent Com-
munists," who could take a right-
ful place in Sukarno's national-
ist-religious-Communist concept
of government.
Moscow has treated events
in Indonesia with caution. The
Soviet press has reported and de-
plored the moves against the PKI
but has stopped short of attempt-
ing to assess the situation,
routinely indicting alleged "im-
perialist intrigue." In scattered
private comments with Western
representatives, however, Soviet
officials have implicated pro-
Chinese elements in the PKI. Mos-
cow probably views the situation
in Indonesia as an advantageous
one which reinforces the Soviet
argument that Peking's advocacy
of violent revolutionary tactics
can lead to disaster for many
Communist parties in Asia and
INDIA-PAKISTAN
There has been little change
in the basic military-deplomatic
confrontation between India and
Pakistan. Cease-fire violations
remain at a relatively low level.
UN Secretary General Thant told
members of the Security Council
last week end that the situation
on the cease-fire line had im-
proved, but he saw considerable
room for further improvement.
Neither side has made any move
to pull its troops back from for-
ward positions.
Punjab, believes senior m ary
commanders on both sides are sin-
cere in their assurances to him
that they will honor the cease-
fire. He feels his most pressing
problem is to bring about the dis-
engagement of forward elements,
but he is hampered in effecting
this, as well as in verifying re-
ported cease-fire violations, by
limite tions and logis-
tics. hopes to take up
the withdrawal issue with the
chiefs of staffs of the opposing
armies.
General Musa, the Pakistani
Army commander, has already indi-
cated, however, that Pakistan has
no intention of withdrawing its
troops from Kashmir until real
progress has been made in moving
the Kashmir issue toward a perma-
nent solution.
Unrest has plagued Srinagar,
the chief city of Indian-held
Kashmir, in the past week. A
number of people were killed in
riots last week end, and several
more were killed or wounded in a
subsequent incident on 11 Octo-
ber. The Indian press reported
on 12 October that Srinagar
schools had been closed for three
days. The rioting has resulted
in a nighttime curfew and the ar-
rest of several opposition polit-
ical leaders. Indian authorities
can be expected to react quickly
and harshly to further disorders.
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PAGE 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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I
clusion that the UN was unable
to preserve the cease-fire, and
that accordingly Pakistan may
have to fall back on its own re-
sources, taking a number of ac-
tions "which together may lead
to escalation." Ambassador Mc-
Conaughy has noticed a number of
signs that the Pakistanis may make
important decisions around 15-16
October. He believes it prudent
to anticipate a stiffer Pakistani
response to cease-fire violations.
It is likely, however, that again
the Pakistani warning is primarily
intended to stimulate Western ac-
tion on the Kashmir problem.
-a f o u r the Azad
(Free) ashmir "battalions" in-
filtrated into Indian-held Kash-
mir in August have returned to
the Pakistani side of the cease-
fire line. However, some in-
filtrators probably remain on
the Indian side in any event.
There has been little prog-
ress toward a substantive discus-
sion of the Kashmir issue in the
UN, despite Pakistani prodding.
Foreign Minister Bhutto now is
in New York for a further explora-
tion of this question. The idea
of a four-power commission to
assist U Thant on this issue
appears to be fading, largely
as a result of Soviet and French
objections. Thant still favors
this approach to the problem,
however.
Pakistani Foreign Secretary
Ahmed has told Ambassador Mc-
Conaughy that his country antic-
ipated little effective action
within the UN on this issue, add-
ing that Pakistan was again con-
sidering the Soviet offer of its
"good offices" in an effort to
resolve the problem. Pakistani
officials, probably hoping to
stir the US and UK into more im-
mediate action, have recently
raised this possibility with a
number of diplomats.
Ahmed also suggested that
Pakistan was coming to the con-
India continues to claim
that Kashmir is not a subject for
discussion at all. In a recent
magazine interview Prime Minister
Shastri asserted that Pakistani
"aggression" was encouraged by
the fact that "some of the big
powers" not only condoned crime
but wanted to make aggression
pay. He reportedly was "particu-
larly distressed" at the British.
There are continuing indi-
cations that India's efforts to
cope with its critical food sup-
ply problem have been unsuccess-
ful. Residents of Calcutta are
finding that food-grain rations
set during the hostilities are
inadequate, and recourse to the
black market is increasingly com-
mon. Nevertheless, the state
government plans temporarily to
cut rations even more until addi-
tional food-grain can be obtained
from other states
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Oct 65
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PRO-WEST JUSTICE ]PARTY WINS TURKISH,.ELECTI0NS7
The solid popular majority
won by the conservative Justice
Party (JP) in the 10 October par-
liamentary elections clears the
way for restoration of strong
government in Turkey after four
years of weak coalitions. Unof-
ficial returns give the JP an
estimated 60 percent of the popu-
lar vote and about 250 of the
450 seats in the National Assem-
bly. Its leader, Suleyman Demi-
rel, will almost certainly be the
new prime minister.
The Republican Peoples'
Party (RPP), led by the venerable
Ismet Inonu, suffered a serious
defeat. It received less than
30 percent of the vote, but will
remain the major opposition with
130-140 assembly seats. The re-
maining 60-70 seats will be split
among the four minor parties,
with the leftist Turkish Labor
Party (TLP) winning about 10
seats, assuring it a parliamen-
tary sounding board for its
strong anti-American attacks.
The extreme rightist Republican
Peasant Nation Party (RPNP),
headed by retired Colonel Turkes,
former member of the revolutionary
Committee of National Union, made
a poor showing at the polls but
party leaders hope to attract
support from "friends" in the
assembly.
The JP victory should favor
US interests in Turkey and main-
tain Turkey's Western orienta-
tion. The party leadership is
basically pro-American and real-
izes the importance of sound,
moderate, effective government.
The JP favors flexible, rather
than rigid economic planning,
is oriented toward private en-
terprise rather than state owner-
ship, and while trying to main-
tain good relations with the
USSR, will probably try to slow
down the current Soviet economic
offensive in Turkey.
The new government will re-
main firm in its strong support
and direction of the Turkish
community on Cyprus. At the
same time it will be in a better
position to accept compromise if
indeed compromise becomes possi-
ble. Like its predecessors, it
will look to the United States
and the UK, rather than the United
Nations, for the ultimate reso-
lution of this sticky problem.
The new government will face
many knotty problems, not the
least of which will be the limited
number of JP leaders with top
government experience. There
will be continuing pressure from
both the left--the TLP--and the
right--the RPNP--as well as per-
sistent badgering from the RPP.
The new government probably
will also encounter intermittent
criticism from elements within
the military who either fear po-
litical revenge for the revolution
of 1960 or who want a stronger
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military voice in the affairs of
government. Unless the new govern-
ment reverts to the dictatorial
tendencies of the prerevolutionary
regime, however, or threatens to
undermine the position of the
BRITISH-RHODESIAN TALKS FAIL
Last week's talks in London
between Prime Ministers Wilson
and Smith on the question of
Rhodesian independence ended in
failure. Smith and his cabinet
remain uncompromising and are
likely to decide soon to make a
unilateral declaration of independ-
ence (UDI), although the announce-
ment may be delayed for several
months.
The UN General Assembly
passed a resolution this week
calling on the UK to take all
steps necessary to halt UDI.
However, international pressures
are unlikely to do more than tem-
military, or neglects the country'
social and economic development,
the military can be expected to
porarily delay Rhodesian independ-
ence.
Most of Rhodesia's white
electorate is reported anxious
for an early decision, but some
are having second thoughts about
the wisdom of UDI. Business and
industrial leaders, who last year
declared that UDI would have dis-
astrous economic consequences for
Rhodesia, have reaffirmed their 25X6
opposition to rash action and
apparently are considering ways
of putting pressure on Smith.
Leading newspapers are encouraging
Smith to consider carefully and
to consult public opinion before
reaching his decision.
Nevertheless, Smith announced
on his return from London that
further negotiations were out of
the question, and that Rhodesia
would probably have its independ-
ence by Christmas. He is now so
firmly committed to immediate
action that he will probably have
to declare UDI before too many
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ACCRA TO HOST AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING
African heads of state and gov-
ernment will convene in the capital
of Ghana from 21 to 27 October for
the second time since they estab-
lished the Organization of African
Unity at Addis Ababa in 1963. Most
of the 36 member countries are ex-
pected to be represented at the
meeting, although not by the top
leader in some cases.
The dispute between radical
Ghana and the conservative French-
speaking states, which has threat-
ened to split the OAU, appears to
have been deferred for the sake of
preserving African unity. The argu-
ment revolved around Ghanaian Presi-
dent Nkrumah's active support of
subversive elements from independent
African countries. This was dis-
cussed at an emergency OAU foreign
ministers' conference in June, which
confirmed the Accra site for the
summit in exchange for Ghana's guar-
antee to expel undesirable political
refugees. Nkrumah has made token
compliance, but no one believes he
has given up subversion, and some
of the conservatives may still re-
fuse to attend.
Although the OAU conference
will be concerned primarily with
African problems, some touchy East-
West issues may also come up. Mod-
erates, who put Vietnam on the sum-
mit agenda, successfully blocked
preliminary efforts by radical mem-
bers to present a one-sided version
of the conflict, and the moderates'
bid to ensure a mild African posi-
tion on Vietnam may well succeed.
The question of Chinese Communist
admission to the UN, on the other
hand, would, if it arises, be sup-
ported by some moderates as well
as by the radicals.
Of the specifically African
issues on the agenda, the most ur-
gent will be the working out of
responses to a possible unilateral
declaration of independence by Rho-
desia as well as an OAU stand on
recent Congo developments. Pre-
vious strong resolutions on the
Portuguese African territories, on
South Africa's racial policies and
on its mandate over South West Af-
rica,are likely to be reiterated.
There are numerous indica-
tions that a disguised form of
Nkrumah's old dream of a continen-
tal union government will be given
considerable attention at the sum-
mit.
Diallo Telli, the OAU's am-
bitious secretary general, may
push to make the OAU the
voice for all aspects of African
affairs. In close collaboration
with Nkrumah and the radicals,
Diallo has apparently written a
subtle resolution to this effect
for Ghana to present to the summit.
A somewhat different push to-
ward centralization will come from
Ethiopia, which wants to house the
OAU's many commissions in Addis
Ababa. Ethiopia may also propose
holding all future summit meetings
there to avoid repetition of the
recent disagreement over the Accra
site.
Previous efforts to establish
union government have met with no
success. Many African leaders
have been troubled by recent dis-
plays of disunity, however, and
may be more receptive than formerl
to such suggestions
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TSHOMBE OUSTED IN THE CONGO
Congolese President Kasa-
vubu's dismissal of Premier
Tshombd on 13 October almost
certainly presages a period of
political turmoil in Leopoldville.
In essence the conflict be-
tween the two men is a struggle
for the presidency, the locus of
ultimate political power in the
Congo. Presidential elections
are due in six months, and the
intervening period is likely to
be marked by vigorous and some-
times violent politicking through-
out the.country.
Kasavubu apparently is
working with Interior Minister
Nendaka to cut away Tshombd's
power. Evariste Kimba, whom
Kasavubu named to form a new
government, is a fairly able
politician but lacks a national
political base of his own. He
will be heavily dependent on
Kasavubu's support, on Nendaka's
anti-Tshombd parliamentary alli-
ance, and probably on the goon
squad Nendaka is assembling in
Leopoldville.
Tshombd seems likely to re-
main in Leopoldville for.the.
present and to use his consider-
able parliamentary strength to
block attempts by Kimba and
others to form a government.
Under such circumstances Kimba
faces an uphill struggle in his
efforts to get parliamentary ap-
proval. Given the volatile na-
ture of Congolese politics, how-
ever, his outlook is far from
hopeless.
On the rebel front, the
capture of Fizi cuts off the
last insurgent area with chan-
nels for large-scale supply of
outside aid. Rebel resistance
to Colonel Hoare's.mercenaries
suddenly faded away, but there
apparently are still many insur-
gents in the mountains west of
Fizi.
The Leopoldville government
still faces a long campaign'to
re-establish its authority in
large sections which remain
rebel infested. In many cases
these are areas where rebel ac-
tivity, local rivalries, and
banditry are intermixed, where
the populations are frequently
antipathetic to the government,
and where the terrain provides
a base for antigovernment activ-
ities.
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Europe
SCANDINAVIA AND NATO
Sweden apparently has not
completely dismissed the pos-
sibility of reviving its 1948
proposal for a Scandinavian de-
fense pact. In a recent public
discussion, Prime Minister Er-
lander noted that "pressure from
both East and West" had prevented
such an alliance in 1948 and sub-
sequently led Norway and Denmark
to join NATO. He suggested that
this question might again become
topical in 1969 when the NATO
members may exercise their op-
tion to withdraw from the alli-
ance.
Erlander's-cautious allu-
sion to this question comes at
a time when the moderate group
he represents is being challenged
by the younger more radical wing
of his Social Democratic Party.
Pressure from this faction, which
believes that Swedish nonalign-
ment must give way to a more pos-
itive foreign policy, has al-
ready led the government to
speak out on such controversial
questions as the US role in
Vietnam and disengagement in
Central Europe. In the future
Stockholm may feel compelled to
involve itself more actively
with sensitive issues closer to
home--i.e., Northern Europe and
its position between the Western
and Communist worlds.
The success which this radi-
cal group can hope for in pursu-
ing its objectives will not be
determined in Sweden alone, but
will depend to a large degree on
Norwegian and Danish opinion as
it is affected by developments
outside Scandinavia--particu-
larly in Moscow. In recent
years a major objective of So-
viet policy in Northern Europe
has been to weaken the NATO com-
mitments of Norway and Denmark
from NATO. Moscow's sabre-rat-
tling actions, however, only
served to convince most Norwe-
gians and Danes that they could
enjoy no measure of security
outside an alliance with the US
and Britain.
This attitude might change
rapidly if there were a prolonged
detente between the USSR and the
West, if De Gaulle were to with-
draw France from meaningful par-
ticipation in the alliance, and
if Bonn's pursuit of a greater
role in its nuclear activities
revives latent fears of West
Germany. Under such conditions,
public opinion might look beyond
NATO for other solutions to the
problem of national security.
Both Oslo and Copenhagen already
are under domestic pressure to
hold referendums before commit-
ting their governments to con-
tinued membership in NATO.
If Norway and Denmark were
to contemplate withdrawing from
NATO, all three Scandinavian
countries would have to recon-
sider the basic question of
whether their combined population
and resources would be adequate
to organize and maintain a de-
fense credible enough to deter
aggression.
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As preparations for the
Dominican Republic's expected
elections get under way, anti-
Americanism is likely to grow,
both as an excuse for the coun-
try's problems and as an easy
way to popularity.
0
Garcia Godoy will not be able to
deal effectively with extreme
leftist attempts to infiltrate
government departments and take
over various institutions. He
has insisted that he could not
do so until the rebel zone was
disbanded.
The autonomous Confedera-
tion of Christian Trade Unions,
for instance, reportedly plans
to join the campaign against the
presence of foreign troops--not
because it doubts the Inter-Amer-
ican Peace Force is necessary to
stability in the republic, but
because it feels it must do so
to keep tts membership. The pro-
visional government is urging the
IAPF to hold on to its unpopular
public-order duties rather than
turn them over to the Dominican
police, while at the same time
the government-controlled radio
station is attacking the IAPF
for doing so.
Important progress was made
on extending government control
over the rebel zone in Santo
Domingo when, on 13 October, rebel
military troops started moving
to an IAPF camp outside the
zone. This makes easier the work
of government police, who began
occupying the zone earlier in
the week. It also raises the
question as to whether President
The leaders of the two main
political parties--Juan Bosch
of the Liberal Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party (PRD) and Joaquin
Balaguer of the conservative Re-
formist Party--both are repre-
senting themselves to the US
Embassy as moderates. Balaguer
apparently is using his influence
with the military leadership to
urge patience with Garcia Godoy
in his problems with the left.
Bosch claims to be shocked by
the extend of Communist penetra-
tion of his party. The PRD lead-
ership plans to enlist the aid
of a labor expert from Venezuela
to regain control from the Com-
munists of its own labor organi-
zation, and Boscn has put out
vague feelers to the US Embassy
about cooperation with US offi-
cials and Balaguer on "anti-
Communist" strategy in the com-
ing months. Bosch is, however,
so embittered about the US inter-
vention that more and more of his
supporters say his judgment on
all issues is clouded.
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The country remains bitterly
divided, with its basic problems
far from solution. The longer
it takes Garcia Godoy to put the
rebels under firm government
control the more difficult his
job will be, and the more frus-
trated and desperate right-wing
"vigilante" groups are likely to
grow
ECUADOR'S MILITARY JUNTA REMAINS UNCHALLENGED
Ecuador's military junta
went unchallenged during the 9
October celebration of the 145th
anniversary of Guayaquil's inde-
pendence from Spain, an occasion
when the boisterous regionalism
of that coastal city has often
found expression in antigovern-
ment demonstrations. Although
opportunists were prepared to
exploit disturbances, the national
police were ready and politicians
proved unable to concert action.
Despite this failure, the
political parties remain deter-
mined to press the regime to
accelerate or otherwise alter its
plan for return to constitutional
rule by September 1966. Basically
distrusted by the people, poli-
ticians have shown no ability
to arouse support since their
maximum effort of July. The
junta has played upon traditional
religious attitudes by announc-
ing that it will consider sub-
sidizing parochial schools, a
ploy designed to divide the anti-
clerical Liberals and Socialists
from the Conservatives and hinder
formation of an effective anti-
junta ad hoc coalition.
Only repercussions of a
sharply declining economy or
exacerbation of the perennial
boundary problem with Peru now
appear able to threaten the gov-
ernment's resolve to maintain
the pace of its present transi-
tion plan.
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REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
President Castello Branco
is attempting to ease the ten-
sions caused by heated reactions
of political and military leaders
to results of Brazil's 3 October
gubernatorial elections. The
government's present difficulties
stem from the strong showing made
by several candidates of the So-
cial Democratic Party (PSD) who
are linked to opposii.ion forces.
Many senior army officers have
blamed Castello Branco for the
outcome, charging that subver-
sive and corrupt politicians will
now have access to influential
positions, particularly in the
politically important states of
Guanabara and Minas Gerais.
Partly as a result of pres-
sure from the military, the ad-
ministration is planning to pre-
sent several proposals to Con-
gress designed to increase the
federal government's authority,
especially over security matters,
at both the national and state
levels. Among the measures re-
portedly to be considered will
be one tightening control over
the activities of the several
hundred persons whose political
rights have been removed, in-
cluding ex-presidents Kubitschek
and Quadros.
Governor Carlos Lacerda, a
pres-
presidentialctp
ent has
ent governor of Guanabara,
added to the administration's
troubles by increasing his severe
attacks on Castello Branco. In
several public statements during
the past week, Lacerda accused
the President of betraying the
March 1964 revolution and fail-
ing to provide effective leader-
ship. Lacerda's renewed outbursts
reflect his anger at the loss to
his personal prestige caused by
his personal candidate's defeat
in the Guanabara gubernatorial
race. Lacerda has announced that
he may withdraw as a candidate
for the presidency until his
party, the National Democratic
Union (UDN), has considered
whether or not it wants to con-
tinue with his nomination.
Castello Branco, with the
cooperation of War Minister Costa
e Silva, seems to have succeeded,
at least for the moment, in re-
assuring the armed forces that
the regime intends to remain firm
against subversion and corruption.
At the same time he has pledged
to uphold the election results.
Political conditions will
remain unsettled, however, as
the various power elements vie
for advantage. The government
will have to reappraise its re-
lations both with the UDN, which
now generally supports Castello
Branco, and with the restrengthened
Social Democrats.
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United Nations
FRANCE TRIES TO CURB UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S POWERS
France has seized upon the
Kashmir crisis to revive issues
regarding the future development
of the United Nations. The main
objective as in the past is to
assure the maintenance of great-
power predominance through the
Security Council. The result will
be to curb the role and influ-
ence of the secretary general and
his staff, particularly in peace-
keeping operations.
The French delegation has
been vigorously maintaining that
the Security Council should have
complete authority over all de-
tails of Secretary General Thant's
actions with regard to financing
and staffing the UN observer
groups in Kashmir. The resolu-
tion the French have proposed for
Security Council approval would
set budgetary limits, approve
measures taken so far, and au-
thorize the secretary general to
recruit more personnel to a cer-
tain limit.
The French have always main-
tained that the Security Council
must approve financing as well as
the initiation of peacekeeping op-
erations. They have said they in-
tend to produce a definitive
change in the practice previously
followed by the Security Council
and seem unconcerned by Western
warnings that such a change would
enable the USSR to impose spe-
cific requirements for these
operations, such as troika com-
position of forces.
The French attitude also
reflects De Gaulle's distaste
for any multilateral encroach-
ment on national sovereignty.
According to members of the
French delegation, it was
France's experience with the
"usurpation of power" by the
EEC Commission that has influ-
enced its present determination
to check similar usurpation by
the UN Secretariat.
The controversy recalls
the split over the Congo opera-
tion which led to'the financial
crisis of the past year. Both
the Soviet Union and France then
maintained that the secretary
general had gone beyond his au-
thority in the Congo. They now
are arguing the same for Kashmir.
The Soviets are probably
happy to have France taking the
lead in trying to limit the
power of the secretary general.,
Soviet delegate Morozov has pro-
fessed "dismay" that Thant has
gone beyond his mandate and com-
plained that the council in its
resolutions of 20 and 27 Septem-
ber did not give him "carte
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OCI No. 0318/65
Copy No.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
10
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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IMMEDIATELY 15E
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(Information as of noon EST, 2 December 1965)
VIETNAM
Communist-initiated incidents in South Vietnam reached
a record high last week, sustaining the accelerated
pace of the past few weeks. A number of unusual devel-
opments suggest that additional deployments of regular
North Vietnamese Army units may be under way. Asian
Communist propaganda capitalized heavily on last week's
protest demonstrations in the US against policy in Viet-
nam. Hanoi appears to be seeking new bloc commitments
of economic assistance to counter the effects of US
bombings.
Page
The Communist World
SOVIET POLITICS AND THE INDUSTRIAL REORGANIZATION 4
Political intrigue continues in the USSR. Last Septem-
ber's political compromises affecting the economy appar-
ently did not stabilize the political situation and par-
ticularly did not settle the question of where the di-
viding line lies between party and government authority
--and, by extension, between that of Brezhnev and Kosygin.
MOSCOW'S CALIBRATED RESPONSE TO CHINESE POLEMICAL ATTACK 6
Pravda recently responded forcefully to the latest Chi-
nese anti-Soviet tirade in an effort to discredit and
isolate Peking. Moscow, however, will probably continue
to avoid the tit-for-tat acrimony reminiscent of the
Khrushchev era.
COMMUNIST CHINA PUTS POLITICAL PRESSURE ON SCIENTISTS 7
Peking's demand for more political subservience from
physicists and other natural scientists could ultimately
have an impact comparable to Lysenkoism, which hampered
science in the USSR for many years.
PEKING OUTBURST AT BOURGUIBA REFLECTS HARDER POLICY LINE 8
The Chinese Communists are annoyed by the Tunisian Pres-
ident's recent outspoken criticism of China's leaders,
and probably also resent Tunisia's abstention this year
on the UN Chinese representation vote.
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Asia-Africa
INDONESIAN ARMY PRESSES ANTI-COMMUNIST DRIVE 8
Communist Party branches are being dissolved piecemeal
and rank and file party members slaughtered in some
areas. The army frequently ignores Sukarno's moderat-
ing orders.
MORE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY AID FOR CAMBODIA 9
Peking has agreed to increase its military aid commit-
ments,while the Soviet military assistance program in
Cambodia is at a standstill, probably due to Moscow's
vexation with Phnom Penh's pro-Chinese attitude.
SCATTERED FIGHTING CONTINUES IN LAOS 10
The Communists have lost some positions near 'ihakhek
in central Laos and northwest of Luang Prabang, but
are exerting pressure in other areas.
ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES, AND PALESTINE "LIBERATION" ACTIVITIES
The Arab states have differing policies toward the or-
ganizations dedicated to the "liberation" of Palestine.
Jordan, the haven for most of the Palestine Arab refu-
gees, keeps a damper on both their political and terror-
ist activities because it is the Arab state most suscep-
tible to Israeli reprisals and is vulnerable to Nasirite
subversion among the Palestinians. Syria, far less ex-
posed to Israeli retaliation, encourages the Palestinian
refugee raids into Israel. Egypt is cautious in support-
ing the Arab-Palestine cause because a wrong move could,
with little warning, provoke the worst Arab-Israeli con- 25X1
CONGO QUIET AFTER MOBUTU TAKE-OVER
Congolese politics seem headed for a period of relative
calm following the coup on 25 November, but difficul-
ties may arise from civilian and military political
jockeying.
DAHOMEY REGIME OVERTURNED
When a political stalemate seemed threatened, the army
ousted the country's two top officials and installed a
provisional regime.
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BRITISH POLICY ON RHODESIA TOUGHENING
London is imposing stricter economic sanctions, sending
air force units to Zambia, and threatening to use force
to protect the Kariba dam. Inside Rhodesia, only iso-
ated incidents of violence have occurred.
Europe
FRANCE LAUNCHES ITS FIRST SATELLITE
France's space goals are not yet defined and are still
limited by a launch vehicle capable of only light pay-
loads. One early objective may be to orbit communica-
tions satellites, for which a larger booster is planned.
FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER PRESSURE TO LIBERALIZE
The party congress next month may produce a fight that
could cost the Communists votes in next year's national
elections.
Western Hemisphere
PEARSON FORMING NEW CANADIAN CABINET
The Canadian prime minister may be too optimistic in
feeling he is in a stronger position now than before
the election. He may have problems, in any case, bal-
ancing the various power blocs in the cabinet he expects
to announce after 16 December.
BRITISH GUIANA TO BECOME INDEPENDENT NEXT MAY
Premier Burnham and his coalition partner seem to have
reached substantial agreement on constitutional provi-
sions, and chances appear to be declining that opposi-
tion leader Cheddi Jagan will rouse his followers to
effective violence against the Burnham government.
RESULTS OF THE OAS CONFERENCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO
The foreign ministers approved resolutions calling for
study of political and economic measures to amend the
OAS charter and strengthen the inter-American system.
GENERAL STRIKE FAILS IN PANAMA
Determined action by President Marco Robles prevented
Communist and opposition elements from exploiting a 72-
hour general strike which began on 23 November.
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DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S POSITION GROWING STRONGER
Despite agitation and plotting by politicians on the
left and right, Garcia Godoy's position appears stronger
than at any time since he took office in September.
importance Moscow attaches to good relations with Cuba.
The Castro delegation probably concentrated on military
and political subjects during its lengthy stay in the USSR.
SIGNIFICANCE OF RAUL CASTRO'S VISIT TO USSR
The deference accorded the younger Castro reflects the
FRICTION AMONG BRAZIL'S LEADERS
A serious rift seems to be developing between President
Castello Branco and War Minister Costa e Silva, who has
long been a mediating influence between the President and
his critics among the military hard-liners.
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Communist-initiated inci-
dents in South Vietnam last week
reached a record high, sustain-
ing the accelerated pace of Viet
Cong activity during the past
few weeks. One of the most
damaging large-scale actions of
the war occurred on 27 November,
when a Viet Cong force of at
least regimental strength
launched a dawn attack on the
Vietnamese 7th Regiment in Binh
Duong Province. Although the
7th had beaten off an attack in
the same area five days before,
enemy forces this time achieved
complete surprise, overran two
battalions, and inflicted 600-
700 casualties in four hours
of severe fighting. Allied rein-
forcements searching the area
afterward failed to make contact
with the enemy force. The Viet
Cong also attacked several gov-
ernment outposts and positions
in the coastal provinces of I
and II Corps.
Incidents of terrorism,
also at record levels last week,
were concentrated in government-
controlled areas in the delta
region and near Saigon where
seven hamlet chiefs and one dis-
trict official have been killed
in the past three months.
confirmed two new Viet Cong
regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province
and list a probable additional
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enemy regiment near Saigon.
Confirmed enemy regiments in
South Vietnam now amber 18, in-
cluding seven North Vietnamese
regiments. Confirmed enemy
strength now totals 68,000 main
force troops. In addition there
are some 39,000 political cadres,
17,000 combat support troops,
and over 100,000 guerrillas.
Intelligence gathered dur-
ing the fighting around Plei Me
has led to a re-evaluation of
the role of the PAVN 325th Di-
vision. All three organic regi-
ments of this unit were accepted
as being in South Vietnam as of
early 1965. The garrison head-
quarters of this unit, how-
ever, apparently remained at
Dong Hoi in North Vietnam serv-
ing as a base where composite
units are formed, trained, and
then infiltrated to the South.
Best
that in the past year the -325th
has rebuilt at least three ad-
ditional regiments and infiltrated
at least one of them into the
South.
A possible reflection that
new and heavier infiltration is
planned or is under way are the
attempts the Communists are
making to camouflage the newly
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