USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00443R000200360004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret-
Intelligence 25X1
USSR Monthly Review
SOV UR 84-008X
August 1984
583
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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
regarding the articles are welcome.
Secret
SOV UR 84-008X
August 1984
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Secret
The Soviet Political
Scene After Two
Successions
Contents
Perspective: Leadership Prospects Under Chernenko
ue the domestic and foreign policies associated with Andropov.
The accession of Konstantin Chernenko to the top .party and state
posts following the death of Yuriy Andropov last February gave
strong impetus to the trend toward greater collectivity in Soviet
decisionmaking that has been evident since Brezhnev's last years. As
Chernenko has concentrated on ideological issues, power has de-
volved somewhat to his senior subordinates in the Secretariat-
notably to his second in command and heir apparent, Mikhail
Gorbachev-as well as to Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and
Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. This power-sharing arrange-
ment, in which no individual leader is able to dominate the
decisionmaking process, has resulted in a strong tendency to contin-
supporters.
When Yuriy Andropov died in February 1984, Konstantin Cher-
nenko quickly acquired all the trappings of leadership, but he has
subsequently made little headway in consolidating his power. His
age and infirmity and the prominence of his Politburo colleagues
Dmitriy Ustinov, Andrey Gromyko, and Mikhail Gorbachev under-
mine his political strength. He has had little apparent success in
strengthening his base of support in the party, and the continuation
of Andropov's anticorruption campaign threatens the officials who
traditionally have been the General Secretary's key allies and
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Soviet Economic Reform: Status and Prospects
The Chernenko regime, like its predecessor, is unlikely to break with
the conservative economic model of the Brezhnev years. The modest
Andropov reforms, designed to improve the system of incentives and
performance indicators, probably will be continued because they
promise some economic benefit with minimum disruption to present
lines of authority. New initiatives are possible in the area of
organizational reform, given Chernenko's past position on regional
rights and,a groundswell of support for changes in the ministerial
system, but Premier Tikhonov's support will be crucial.
Cadre Changes Since Brezhnev's Death
Since Brezhnev's death in November 1982, about one-quarter of the
full members of the CPSU Central Committee have been trans-
ferred or retired in the long-delayed process of cadre rejuvenation.
Although the new appointees have been chosen primarily on the
traditional basis of seniority and experience in the, party apparatus,
Andropov broke with this pattern at times to promote managers and
technocrats who had proven themselves in nonparty jobs. As a
champion of the Brezhnev old guard, Chernenko is more reluctant to
replace Brezhnev appointees than Andropov was
Evidence so far suggests
that personnel changes are continuing, although at a slower pace.
US-Soviet Relations: The Soviet View
Calculated to serve both tactical and long-term aims, current Soviet
policy toward the United States combines harsh rhetoric and
inflexibility on resuming the Geneva talks with willingness to move
forward on some bilateral issues of specific interest to the USSR.
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Preparation of the 1986-90 Defense Plan
The Soviet defense planning process appears to be proceeding on
course despite recent leadership changes. The Soviets elaborate
defense policy in a five-year defense plan-part of the state
economic plan-over the course of a highly structured five-year
preparation period. Although roughly a year and a,half remain until
the defense plan is scheduled to receive final approval, major
changes in plan priorities will prove increasingly difficult-though
not impossible-because of the rigidities of the defense planning
process and other factors.
Other Topics The Soviet Economy at Midyear 1984
The Soviet economy continued a moderate recovery for the first six
months of 1984, and Moscow's hard currency position improved.
Taking into account the declining prospects for agricultural produc-
tion, we estimate that GNP growth probably will be in the 2- to 3-
percent range for the year as a whole.
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A Comparison of Soviet and US Gross National Products, 31
1960-83
Soviet forecasts of overtaking the US economy by the 1980s have
not been realized, although some progress has been made. Recently
completed analysis of the annual gross national products of the two
countries shows that the Soviets gained on the growing US economy
between 1960 and 1975 as their output rose from 49 to 58 percent of
the US total. Between 1975 and the late 1970s, however, it dropped
to about 55 percent of the US GNP, and it remained near that level
through 1983.
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Longer Leadtimes: A Symptom of Soviet Problems in Using Western 35
diminishing.
Soviet use of imported Western plant and equipment has fallen far
short of its potential for improving the USSR's overall economic
performance, in large part because the Soviets take so long to
acquire and put to use many of these imports. Average leadtimes for
projects in the civilian economy are much longer in the USSR than
in the West, almost invariably exceed the plan, and show no signs of
Moscow Seeking Improved Relations With Ghana
own, and this will limit their prospects for success in Ghana.
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Over the past five months, Moscow has been trying to improve its
relations with the Rawlings regime in Ghana. The Kremlin may be
interested in additional air and naval access in West Africa and is
probably attempting to lessen the impact of any Western gains
resulting from Accra's search for Western economic assistance. The
Soviets are not likely, however, to extend significant aid of their
Moscow Evaluates Industrial Experiment
Ukrainian Worktime Losses Cutj
Domestic Needs Limit Soviet Fertilizer Exports
Census Age Data Released
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Problems at Reactor Component Plant
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Viewpoint The "War Danger" Thesis in Soviet Policy and Propaganda ~ 5 25X1
The Soviet contention that there is a growing danger of war is
authoritative and is employed in major campaigns directed at
domestic as well as foreign audiences. It may be designed (1) to
provide advance justification for possibly risky actions that the
Soviets intend to take or (2) to serve a comprehensive strategy of
intimidating Western publics and governments, indoctrinating the
Soviet Armed Forces, and persuading Soviet society of the need for
increased discipline and harder work for the public good. Alterna-
tively, the various Soviet campaigns on the danger of war may be no
more than posturing and may reflect the leadership's inability to
devise a coherent strategy to cope with external threats and internal
needs.
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The Soviet Political Scene
After Two Successions
Perspective: Leadership Prospects Under Chernenko
The accession of Konstantin Chernenko to the top party and state posts fol-
lowing the death of Yuriy Andropov last February gave strong impetus to
the trend toward greater collectivity in Soviet decisionmaking that has
been evident since Brezhnev's last years. Chernenko's age, ill health, and
lack of a strong power base make him the weakest leader ever to have occu-
pied the office of General Secretary. As he has concentrated on ideological
issues, power has devolved somewhat to his senior subordinates in the
Secretariat-notably to his second in command and heir apparent, Mikhail
Gorbachev-as well as to the two already powerful members of Andropov's
national security coalition, Foreign Minister (and First Deputy Premier)
Andrey Gromyko and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov. This power-
sharing arrangement, in which no individual leader is able to dominate the
decisionmaking process, has resulted in a strong tendency to continue the
domestic and foreign policies associated with Andropov.
Increased collectivity in leadership and basic continuity in policy tend to
diminish the advantages that attach to the office of General Secretary.
Although he quickly acquired the trappings of power, Chernenko has made
little headway in consolidating his power and in placing his stamp on Soviet
policies (see "Chernenko's Political Progress"). Increasingly, his age, lack
of charisma, and weak leadership have led to a perception among both
Soviet and foreign observers that he is little more than a caretaker.
Although as General Secretary he remains a figure to be reckoned with, he
will soon have to display some initiative-by advancing his power at the ex-
pense of his colleagues or by clearly staking out his own positions in
policy-if he is to avoid the lameduck image of an interim leader.
The one policy area where Chernenko has put forward some feelers-
relations with the United States and arms control-seems to be predomi-
nantly under the influence of Gromyko and Ustinov. This may, in part, ac-
count for the seeming contradictions in Soviet policy toward the United
States. Thus, while Chernenko's accession made it possible for him in early
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SOV UR 84-008X
August 1984
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March to suggest that progress on a number of stalemated issues could
lead to a "breakthrough" in Soviet-US relations, a subsequent hardening
of Moscow's attitude-and in particular its handling of the 29 June
proposal for talks on space weapons-suggests that Gromyko's "hang
tough" approach gained sway. The more experienced Gromyko may have
gained Politburo acceptance of tactics that promised a short-term payoff in
heightened Western anxiety and a long-range advantage in dealing with a
possibly more intransigent US administration after the November elections
(see "US-Soviet Relations: The Soviet View").
In the domestic political arena, Chernenko may be pinning his hopes on
surviving long enough to solidify his claim to leadership at the 27th Party
Congress, expected to be held in early 1986. Of the four main items to be
considered at the congress-the General Secretary's "State of the Union"
address, the adoption of a new party program, approval of the next five-
year plan, and the "election" of a new Central Committee-Chernenko is
likely to have the greatest room for maneuver on the first two. As chairman
of the commission to draft the new party program-the first in 25 years-
he is in a position to make his personal contribution to Soviet policy
through it. Economic policy, on which Chernenko has not yet put forward a
clear-cut strategy, is one area where he could use the new program to
elaborate on the modest reform efforts begun by Andropov; however, he is
more likely to try to make his'mark through organizational restructuring of
management (see "Soviet Economic Reform: Status and Prospects").
By contrast, Chernenko is limited in his ability to make significant changes
in the economic priorities of the 1986-90 plan, particularly those pertaining
to the military. He does not appear to have the clout to alter the plan's ba-
sic directions-assuming he wanted to try-largely because of the built-in
momentum established by presumed prior agreement on the military's
basic needs for the five-year defense plan (see "Preparation of the 1986-90
Defense Plan"). To make such an attempt probably would provoke a
political conflict within the leadership. Also, Chernenko may be compelled
as General Secretary to maintain a certain balance on the issue of
allocations. In any case, preparation of the five-year plan appears to be
proceeding with little evidence of contention within the Politburo over basic
priorities, although there are indications that advocates of increased
defense spending continue to put their'case to the leadership.
Similarly, time and circumstance give Chernenko little opportunity to
enhance his power position through appointments at the Central Commit-
tee' level. Although some cadre changes have occurred since Andropov's
death, the process of replacing regional party officials at local party
conferences was essentially completed by the time Chernenko took over. In
fact, he is unlikely to threaten the tenure of these officials, because he has
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appealed for their political support (see "Cadre Changes Since Brezhnev's
Death"). Furthermore, although he might view ministerial restructuring as
a means to accomplish an improvement in economic management, he is
unlikely to see this as a quick and easy way to broaden his base in the Cen-
tral Committee. Chernenko's greatest sphere of influence in high-level
appointments is among ideological officials-for example, he recently was
able to replace Andropov's appointee as Izvestiya editor in chief-but these
officials constitute a relatively small proportion of the Central Committee.
In sum, Chernenko has not yet demonstrated that he is master of the shi
and he appears to have only limited opportunities to do so.
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there is a strong possibility that the regime
will undergo yet another succession within less than two years. In fact, the
illness or death of any of the senior members of the leadership-Gromyko,
Ustinov, Tikhonov-could precipitate a succession crisis even sooner.
In short, by appointing Chernenko to head the party and state, the
Politburo elders appear to have deferred solution of the generational issue.
Gorbachev, the most logical candidate to represent the younger generation
of party leaders in the next succession, hinted at this in a speech at the
Central Committee plenum that named Chernenko General Secretary, in
which he appealed for party unity. Should Gorbachev succeed Chernenko
any time soon, he would initially face the same constraints of the present
.power-sharing arrangements that Chernenko does. Time is on Gorbachev's
side, however, and he would be far more likely than Chernenko to emerge
as a strong leader capable of bringing about major shifts in Soviet policy.
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Secret
Chernenko's
Political Progress
When Yuriy Andropov died in February 1984, Kon-
stantin Chernenko quickly acquired all the trappings
of leadership, but he has subsequently made little
headway in consolidating his power. His age and
infirmity and the prominence of his Politburo col-
leagues Dmitriy Ustinov, Andrey Gromyko, and Mik-
hail Gorbachev undermine his political strength. He
has had little apparent success in strengthening his
base of support in the party, and the continuation of
Andropov's anticorruption campaign threatens the
officials who traditionally have been the General
Secretary's key allies and supporters. Chernenko may
yet be able to profit from divisions among his rivals
and use the powers of his office to improve his
political standing. Time is his enemy, however, and he
will have to increase his political momentum soon if
he is to halt a growing tendency at home and abroad
to regard him as a figurehead.
Early Success
Almost at once, Chernenko accumulated honors and
titles that had been slow in coming to Brezhnev and
Andropov. Within weeks of his election as party
leader, for example, Soviet media were occasionally
referring to him as head of the Politburo. In late
February, the chief of the Soviet General Staff re-
ferred to him as "Chairman of the Defense Council"
at a reception with foreigners present, and in April
Chernenko became Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, or President.
Chernenko wasted no time in publicly reaffirming the
dominant role of the General Secretary and the party
apparatus that he leads. In his inaugural speech as
General Secretary, he emphasized the importance of
the role of oblast and kray party secretaries. He said
the secretaries, should break free of "duplicating" the
work of those who run the economy and should act as
their political overseers instead. On 25 February,
Pravda reported that at the first regular Politburo
meeting held since Andropov's death, Chernenko "de-
fined the most important directions of Soviet econom-
ic development"-a clear suggestion that he was
setting the leadership's agenda. In March, he ad-
dressed a national conference on the Food Program
attended initially by the entire leadership. On the
second day, only the Central Committee secretaries
attended, signifying that the program's execution was
to be supervised by his subordinates.
By the time of his election as President on 11 April,
Chernenko also had announced plans to revitalize the
Supreme Soviet's role in examining the work of
ministerial organizations. Soviet media have given
increased attention this spring and summer to in-
stances in which Supreme Soviet deputies at the
republic level have addressed questions or complaints
on matters of local interest directly to government
ministers. Party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who
probably expects to inherit Chernenko's offices even-
tually and who is now Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet's Standing Commission on Foreign Affairs, has
been Chernenko's willing assistant in building up this
aspect of the power of the Presidency.
Until his departure for vacation in mid-July, Cher-
nenko also maintained a much more active schedule
of public meetings and activities than did Andropov
or, in his later years, Brezhnev. His apparent purpose
was to reinforce the image of a leader taking charge
of all aspects of the USSR's national and internation-
al concerns.
Problems
Despite his strong early showing, the General Secre-
tary faces several major problems. For one thing, he is
old and sick.
given rise to a widespread assumption that he is an
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interim figure. This could undermine his authority by
inclining officials in the Soviet regime to look beyond
him for solutions to long-term problems.
In addition, Chernenko has had to share the limelight
with powerful senior colleagues. The most prominent
are Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister
Ustinov. This has created the impression that on
matters of national security these two men represent
the Politburo, with Chernenko as their spokesman.
Even Tikhonov, the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, has enjoyed an independent status during
Chernenko's tenure that may undercut the General
Secretary's authority. When Andropov was in charge,
there were logical reasons for believing Tikhonov and
Chernenko to be allies: both represented the Brezhnev
old guard and both probably felt their institutional
constituencies threatened by Andropov's programs.
Now, with Andropov dead, this alliance is apparently
not as strong. Chernenko's announced intention to use
the Supreme Soviet to review and oversee ministerial
operations carries a hint of rivalry with Tikhonov.F
The prominence of the three oldest full Politburo
members-Tikhonov (79), Ustinov (75), and Gromyko
(75)-poses an additional problem for Chernenko by
making him appear to represent an entrenched geron-
tocracy. Many members of the Soviet elite regarded
Chernenko's succession as evidence of an unwilling-
ness by the Politburo "old guard" to make way for
younger leaders.
The increasing prominence of Gorbachev within the
leadership may mitigate such charges. It may, how-
ever, weaken the older leaders' authority because
lower ranking officials will place their long-term
hopes for career advancement on the 53-year-old
Gorbachev. While it is by no means certain that
Gorbachev would succeed Chernenko if the latter died
today-the preponderance of power still lies with the
elders-Gorbachev seems to be moving more and
more into the limelight.
he is widely regarded by Soviet officials as
Chernenko's heir apparent.
There are hints in party publications that the genera-
tion gap within the leadership has already become a
political issue. An April Kommunist article, in the
guise of a historical commentary on Lenin's last
writings, appeared to be warning against elements in
the party who would use a rejuvenation program to
purge party veterans. In contrast, a May editorial in
Sovetskaya Rossiya suggested that older leaders
ought to step down now and let younger ones develop
by being fully responsible for running things. Some
Soviets expect Gorba-
chev to take over in a year or so, before Chernenko
dies, perhaps at the next party congress (expected to
take place in early 1986).
Personnel Appointments
To assert his leadership in the face of these disadvan-
tages, Chernenko needs to strengthen his base of
support. Yet party personnel appointments since he
became General Secretary do not appear to bear his
stamp. Since he took over, Chernenko has removed
one protege of Andropov's-the editor of Izvestiya-
but appointments in the oblast party organizations,
where his political influence should be great, show no
trace of his influence.
Chernenko may be constrained by a leadership com-
mitment to a personnel staffing program that excludes
"favoritism" in principle-it was denounced in a
party editorial in July-and by the role of Gorbachev,
who oversees the party's staffing function in practice.
Chernenko is also not helped politically by the leader-
ship's apparent agreement to continue Andropov's
program of removing corrupt or incompetent execu-
tives and demanding that they be held personally
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responsible for performance in their areas. When
Andropov was in power, entrenched Brezhnev-era
party and ministry personnel probably looked to Cher-
nenko to resist this program and safeguard their
interests. Now, however, Chernenko is probably seen
as unable or unwilling to provide relief.
Although Chernenko is rumored to be attempting to
soften the harsher aspects of Andropov's programs,
publicized actions have taken place that will do little
to reassure those who felt threatened under Andropov.
In March, for example, a deputy minister was ex-
pelled from the party and indicted for corruption, and
in April a minister who had been criticized last year
for unprincipled conduct was replaced. In the same
month, a death sentence was announced for a corrupt
restaurant official in Krasnodar, culminating an in-
vestigation that began when Andropov was General
Secretary and his protege Vorotnikov-now a full
Politburo member-was the local party chief. In June
strong campaigns against corruption, bribery, and
cronyism began in the Uzbek and Latvian Republics,
and in July the press announced the execution of a
former Moscow food store manager who had amassed
a fortune through illegal dealings with the party elite.
Chernenko was earlier rumored to have commuted
the store manager's sentence to imprisonment.
The discipline and anticorruption programs, in short,
have not been altered to help Chernenko's interests or
build support for him in regional party bailiwicks.
Moreover, younger Politburo members such as Gri-
goriy Romanov, who oversees the law enforcement
agencies, and Gorbachev, who oversees personnel
appointments, may benefit from these campaigns to
the extent that new appointees see that their own
political fortunes will be in the hands of these leaders
in the future.
of their rivals.
Chernenko's Prospects
As long as Chernenko holds the office of General
Secretary, he will remain a force to be reckoned with
politically. Where consensus is absent on new issues,
his influence in the Politburo can be decisive. Where
he is seen to defer to his colleagues in their area of
expertise, he may be able to avoid responsibility for
policy failures and perhaps even use them against his
adversaries. Younger contenders for the top party post
such as Romanov or Gorbachev may even be willing
to conspire with Chernenko to undermine the position
Despite the assets of his office, however, Chernenko
has yet to advance his power at the expense of his
Politburo colleagues. He is currently not strong
enough to force other leaders out of office and can
hardly count on surviving them. (Ustinov, Gromyko,
and Tikhonov are older, but apparently healthier,
than Chernenko.) Many of his longtime allies in the
party apparatus are approaching the end of their
careers. Time, therefore, is his enemy, and he will
have to increase his momentum soon if he is to avoid
being seen as an interim leader presiding over a
collective body of assertive individuals.
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Status and Prospects
The Chernenko regime seems unlikely to undertake
major reforms that would represent a break with the
conservative economic model of the Brezhnev years.
Andropov's modest efforts to improve the system of
incentives and performance indicators probably will
be continued because they offer some hope of econom-
ic benefit with minimum disruptions to present lines
of authority. Organizational changes that shift some
economic decision making from the ministries to the
regions are possible, given Chernenko's past position
on this issue and an apparent consensus on the need
for changes in the ministerial system. Success in this
area will depend greatly on the support of Premier
Tikhonov and other members of the ministerial old
guard who fear that organizational change will seri-
ously weaken their political influence.
The Andropov Record
The baseline for evaluating the status of economic
reform under Chernenko is the record established by
the Andropov regime. During his brief tenure, Andro-
pov spoke frequently of the need for a "fundamental
restructuring" of the Soviet economy's system of
organization and management. He called for improve-
ments in three specific areas-economic organization,
planning, and the system of incentives and perform-
ance indicators. New initiatives that can be attributed
to Andropov, however, were targeted largely at the
third area (see inset). They shared common themes: a
strong commitment to central planning and control
over the key economic decisions such as pricing and
new investment, a continuing effort to find the right
combination of enterprise performance indicators, and
a hard line on personal accountability-wages and
bonuses were to be tied more closely to results.
Because many of the "new" features were actually
retreads of earlier decrees, they were a tacit admission
that past reforms had been only partially implement-
The Five-Ministry Industrial Experiment (begun I
January 1984). Seeks to raise productivity and speed
the introduction of new scientific and technical
achievements by reducing the number of enterprise
success indicators and making fulfillment of sales
contracts the main one; expanding the operational
decisionmaking ability of the enterprise, particularly
in the investment and wage areas; and linking earn-
ings more directly to performance.
The Experiment in Consumer Services (begun 1 July
1984). Seeks to raise the material interest of consum-
er service enterprises in serving the public by refining
the incentive system along the lines of the five-
ministry experiment.
Increased Use of Small Labor Units. Seeks to raise
productivity by making the wages and bonuses of
small labor units in both industry and agriculture
more dependent upon 'final results. " Uses contracts
to specify the obligations of both management and
production unit in operational decisions in return for
assuming increased responsibility for results.' These
initiatives had the potential for discernible improve-
ments in planning and management but could not
correct the basic systemic distortions that prevent
Soviet planners and managers from making economi-
cally efficient decisions.
This emphasis reflected Andropov's general drive for increased
discipline and responsibility throughout the economy, which was
probably his major contribution to improving economic growth, at
least in the short run.
The major difference between Andropov's approach
to reform and that of the later Brezhnev years was a
willingness to give somewhat more freedom to the
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Andropov was reluctant to try more radical reforms
because of his innate conservatism-indicated by his
public statements-but also because formidable ob-
stacles block any regime's efforts at economic reform.
These include a stodgy ministerial bureaucracy, a
traditional preference for gradual change, conflicting
prescriptions for reform, a rigidly conservative ideolo-
gy, and a fear that economic reform might bring
demands for liberalization in the political and social
arenas. Additional obstacles could be directly linked
to Andropov's own leadership-his weak provincial
power base
and,
ultimately, his poor health, which was a serious
handicap to implementing new policies in any area.
The Chernenko Regime's Approach to Reform
The Chernenko regime must contend with the same
endemic obstacles to reform faced by Andropov plus a
few more. First, Chernenko has had even less experi-
ence than Andropov and little apparent interest in
economic matters. During most of the Brezhnev years
he was occupied with the administrative details of
running the Central Committee's General Depart-
ment, and later he acquired the ideology portfolio.
Second, the increased influence of other senior leaders
in the Chernenko regime poses a problem. Premier
Tikhonov and other members of the old guard would
hardly sanction a major restructuring that might
diminish their power. These factors, combined with
Chernenko's position as the guardian of ideological
orthodoxy, are sufficient to rule out more radical
reforms of the Hungarian type, which frees the
enterprise from centrally administered targets and
allows it to pursue profits based on market-deter-
mined prices and costs.
Chernenko has not yet put forward a clear-cut eco-
nomic strategy nor has he taken any new initiatives in
the area of economic reform. He and other senior
leaders, however, apparently support Andropov's ef-
fort to seek modest improvements in the system of
incentives and performance indicators. In his maiden
speech as General Secretary, Chernenko repeated
Andropov's call for action in this area. His emphasis
on taking risks and not waiting for the results of
experiments has made him appear as eager as
Andropov to get on with the job. He endorsed the
Andropovian themes of expanding enterprise rights,
specifically the five-ministry experiment, and of using
incentives more effectively. The entire leadership,
including Tikhonov, uniformly endorsed these themes
in their Supreme Soviet election speeches soon after
Andropov's death. Also, senior party secretary Mik-
hail Gorbachev has been instrumental in organizing
support for the collective contract method-a scheme
to improve incentives in agriculture.
New initiatives seem most likely in the area of
organizational reform. In the past Chernenko has
argued that the economy is overbureaucratized and
that ministerial controls are too strong at the regional
level. In a solid endorsement of the rayon agro-
industrial associations (RAPOs),Z he said in May 1982
that they were necessary to end the ministerial disar-
ray "which had previously been eroding the economic
mechanism." Gorbachev has also supported this ef-
fort.
Some moves to reduce the bloated bureaucracy may
have been under way at the time of Andropov's death.
According to dissident historian Roy Medvedev, An-
dropov had proposed that the swollen ranks of party
and governmental administrators be reduced by 20
percent.
Structural changes in the ministerial system are also
being discussed. In a late February speech to his
election district, party secretary Grigoriy Romanov
acknowledged that changes in "the structure of minis-
tries and departments" were being studied by the
Central Committee. The recent Soviet press has been
filled with articles advocating organizational reform.
One of the most comprehensive was by Dzherman
Gvishiani, a deputy chairman of the State Committee
for Science and Technology. He lent his authority to
various proposals for improvements in the ministerial
system, including the creation of new territorial-or-
gans for such sectors as construction and transporta-
tion, special organs to manage priority programs, and
the possible formation of superministries. A 27 May
1 RAPOs were created in 1982 by the Brezhnev Food Program to
strengthen management at the local level. The intention was to give
them broad authority over all agriculture-related enterprises in the
district, regardless of departmental subordination
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decree on ways to improve the construction industry
indicated that in the future more emphasis will be
placed on the territorial (as opposed to ministerial)
management of construction, although it left unspeci-
fied how this would work.
Premier Tikhonov's support will be crucial to the
success of reforms in this area. Chernenko and his
allies must convince Tikhonov and his minions that
changes in the ministerial system are aimed mainly at
improving efficiency and not at reducing their powers.
The formation of superministries, for example, would
partially shift some of the day-to-day operational
decisionmaking to regional authorities.
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Cadre Changes Since
Brezhnev's Death
Since Brezhnev's death, the Soviets have begun the
long-delayed process of cadre rejuvenation. About
one-quarter of the full members of the Central Com-
mittee have been retired or transferred so far, more
than at any time in the last 20 years. Although
vacancies have been filled primarily by their deputies,
Andropov broke with this pattern at times to promote
experienced managers and technocrats who had
proved themselves in nonparty jobs. As a champion of
the Brezhnev old guard, General Secretary Cher-
nenko is more reluctant to replace Brezhnev appoin-
tees than Andropov was, and the turnover in the
Central Committee has been minimal since Andro-
pov's death. Nonetheless, the campaign to root out
venal and incompetent officials at the lower level is
continuing
Both Andropov and Chernenko came to power with
an obvious interest in using their control of personnel
assignments to increase their political power and
make the party and state bureaucracies more respon-
sive to their policies. Andropov, however, went to
unusual lengths to publicize his commitment to clean-
ing house, even expelling two Brezhnev cronies from
the Central Committee. As this cadre renewal cam-
paign progressed, Chernenko, Andropov's major rival
within the Politburo
became a rallying point for those officials who felt
threatened by Andropov's policies. Since becoming
General Secretary, Chernenko has continued to foster
his image as a defender of party veterans. For the
moment, however, he has not ended the anticorruption
campaign nor replaced Andropov proteges who still
time, Andropov gave party secretary Mikhail Gorba-
chev the responsibility for overall supervision of per-
sonnel matters, thereby replacing Chernenko, who
had exercised this function under Brezhnev. Andropov
also presided over the replacement of seven of the 24
Central Committee department heads. The retirees
were all in their seventies; the average age of their
replacements was 57.
Andropov's tenure also witnessed the most extensive
changes in the Secretariat since the early Brezhnev
era. Ligachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and Grigoriy Roma-
nov all were appointed party secretaries-thus pack-
ing the body with officials beholden to Andropov. F_
Ryzhkov's and, to a lesser extent, Romanov's appoint-
ment to the Secretariat reflected Andropov's preoccu-
pation with improving Soviet economic performance
as well as his efforts to consolidate his power. Ryzh-
kov, a man with little background in party affairs, had
formerly served as director of the huge Ural machine-
building complex and then as the first deputy chair-
man of Gosplan responsible for heavy industry. He
was tapped by Andropov to head a new department of
the Central Committee with responsibilities for eco-
nomic planning and reform. Romanov, who had been
a full Politburo member for seven years at the time of
his promotion to the Secretariat, had the necessary
party credentials, but, as party boss in Leningrad, he
had also developed a reputation for innovative eco-
nomic management. Since becoming a Central Com-
mittee secretary, he has been responsible for supervis-
ing civilian machine building and possibly defense
industries and the police and security organs as well.
play a role in personnel appointments.
The Central Party Apparatus
Andropov focused his initial efforts at personnel re-
newal on the central party apparatus. In April 1983
he brought in Yegor Ligachev, the oblast first secre-
tary in Tomsk, to replace Brezhenv's personnel chief,
Ivan Kapitonov, as head of the Central Committee's
Organizational Party Work Department, which is
responsible for personnel policy. At about the same
Chernenko has made no important changes in the
central party apparatus (see table 1). Less than a
month after Andropov's death, he met with Central
Committee officials in an apparent effort to reassure
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Table 1
Key Changes in the Central Committee Under Andropov and Chernenko
Total Promotions
Changes
Table includes promotions of six candidate members to full mem-
bers under Andropov. In cases when officials (like Ligachev,
Vorotnikov, and Solomentsev) were promoted twice, the table
counts each promotion separately. Central Committee members in
the media and national security area have not been included.
them that he valued their contribution and intended
no shakeup.
Regional Party Leaders
Andropov was especially successful in rejuvenating
the top levels of the regional party apparatus. The
death of two republic party leaders-Belorussian First
Secretary Tikhon Kiselev and Uzbek party boss
Sharaf Rashidov-created vacancies that he was able
to fill with his own appointees. So did the transfer of
Azerbaijani First Secretary Geydar Aliyev and Len-
ingrad First Secretary Romanov to new assignments
in Moscow. But most of the changes in, the regional
party apparatus were at the oblast level and occurred
during the party election campaign that was held
from August 1983 to January 1984.
Demotions Transfers Deaths or
Retirements
mayor of Leningrad.
The promotions of Nikolay Slyunkov in Belorussia
and Lev Zaykov in Leningrad underscored Androp-
ov's preference for competent economic managers and
his willingness to disregard the lack of extensive
background in party work. In contrast to both Brezh=
nev and Chernenko, Andropov had minimal experi-
ence in regional party work, and this probably shaped
his view that such a background was not a prerequi-
site for higher office. Slyunkov's party experience, for
instance, had been limited to a two-year stint as head
of the Minsk Oblast Party Committee. He had spent
most of his career in industry-as manager of the
Minsk Tractor Plant and as Gosplan's overseer of the
machine-building sector. Lev Zaykov also lacked ex-
perience in the party-apparatus, having spent his
career in economic management positions and as
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Table 2
Changes Among Key RSFSR Regional First Secretaries
During Party Elections, 1965-83
Promotions 4 0 1
Retirements 0 0 0
Information for the number of changes (demotions and promotions)
for 1965-81 comes from FBIS Trends, 29 December 1983, p. 7.
At the oblast level, about 20 percent of the party first
secretaries were replaced during Andropov's short
tenure. This was the greatest number since Brezhnev's
first year in office and was in marked contrast to the
policy of cadre stability pursued through the 1970s
(see table 2). The spate of retirements suggests that
Andropov's call in an August 1982 speech for senior
party officials to step down gracefully was being
answered. Half of the new appointees came from
within the oblast, usually from the ranks of the second
secretaries or chairmen of the Soviet executive com-
mittee; the other half were posted from outside,
suggesting some leadership dissatisfaction with the
performance of local party officials.
Since the end of the election campaign, the pace of
turnover has slowed as would be expected. One kray
first secretary was recently transferred to a diplomatic
post in Eastern Europe, an Andropov protege replaced
an oblast first secretary in Karelia, and a third
regional secretary retired in July. Only one republic
party boss has been replaced during Chernenko's
tenure. In April, Avgust Voss, who had headed the
Latvian party organization for 18 years, was replaced
by Boris Pugo, 47, who had directed the Latvian
KGB. Latvian press reports indicate that Pugo has
been busy removing local officials accused of corrup-
tion. This suggests that Andropov's approach to per-
sonnel policy still has strong support within the
leadership.
The Economic Ministries
At the time of Brezhnev's death, many of the 60 or so
economic ministers and state committee chairmen
represented on the Central Committee had held their
posts at least since the ministries were reestablished in
1965. Two-thirds were in their late sixties or seven-
ties. Since November 1982 there have been 22 person-
nel changes affecting important economic officials
represented on the Central Committee. Those who
retired were nearly all in their seventies (with an
average of 15 years' tenure in their posts), while the
average age of their replacements was just over 55.F_
The transport, construction, and machine-building
sectors, which had records of poor performance, were
especially affected by the personnel changes. Shortly
after Brezhnev's death, Aliyev was brought into the
Council of Ministers to supervise transportation. Soon
after, the Railway Minister was sacked and replaced
by his deputy. In July 1983, Ignatiy Novikov, a
deputy premier and chairman of the State Committee
for Construction since its creation, was forced out of
office in disgrace after a major construction scandal,
Gosplan's first deputy
retired.
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In the machine-building sector four ministers were
retired-two under Andropov and two under Cher-
nenko. The new machine-building officials appointed
by Andropov had backgrounds in the defense sector.
Sergey Afanasyev was transferred from a ministry
responsible for missile development to head the Minis-
try of Heavy Transport and Machine Building; Yuriy
Maslyukov, who moved into the Gosplan slot oversee-
ing machine building after Slyunkov's transfer, was
formerly a deputy minister of the Defense Industry.
These moves suggest that a decision was made under
Andropov to tap the talents of experienced managers
from the defense sector to help improve performance
in the rest of the economy. Of the two appointed
under Chernenko, Lev Vasilyev, 58, is an' experienced
factory manager.who once headed the Kama truck
complex, but the other, Yuriy Solov'yev, is a former
engineer and Leningrad party official with ties to
party secretary Romanov.
The National Security Apparatus
Under both Andropov and Chernenko, there have
been few high-level personnel changes in the Minis-
tries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. This stability
may reflect the leadership's satisfaction with the per-
formance of these ministries or the greater political
influence that Foreign Minister Gromyko and De-
fense Minister Ustinov have reportedly enjoyed since
Brezhnev's death.
In the Foreign Ministry, Gromyko's promotion in
March 1983 to First Deputy Premier, while retaining
his post of Foreign Minister, symbolized his increased
prominence. The earlier appointment of two new
deputy ministers-Mikhail Kapitsa (for Asian affairs)
and Viktor Komplektov (for US-Soviet relations)-
may have been instigated by Andropov. Both officials
were promoted
The only top-level change in the Ministry of Defense
was the promotion, under Chernenko, of Army Gen.
Vladimir Govorov, commander in chief of the Far
Eastern Troops, to deputy defense minister. Under
Andropov, however, a series of top officers, including
First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Sergey
Akhromeyev and Ground Forces Commander in
Chief Vasiliy Petrov, were promoted to Marshal of
the Soviet Union. At the June 1983 plenum,
Akhromeyev and Deputy Defense Minister Vitaliy
Shabanov were also promoted from candidate to full
membership in the Central Committee.
Largely as a result of Andropov's crackdown on
official corruption, the law enforcement agencies-
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB-have
undergone more high-level changes in personnel than
the Defense or Foreign Ministries. In a political move
directed against one of Brezhnev's closest clients,
Andropov sacked Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolay
Shchelokov, who had largely ignored the corruption
among senior political officials, and replaced him with
Vitaliy Fedorchuk, who had succeeded Andropov in
May 1982 as KGB chief. Simultaneously, Andropov's
former first deputy, Viktor Chebrikov, was promoted
to succeed Fedorchuk as head of the KGB. Last
December, shortly before Andropov's death, Chebri-
kov was again promoted, this time to candidate
member of the Politburo.
Prospects
Evidence so far suggests that personnel changes are
continuing under Chernenko, although at a slower
pace than under Andropov. Indeed, because of the
advanced age of many Brezhnev-era appointees, it is
inevitable that cadre renewal will proceed as older
party officials die or retire. ~
The continued influence of former Andropov allies
Gorbachev and Ligachev over personnel policy also
suggests that we will continue to see younger and
more managerially oriented officials assuming posts
in the Council of Ministers and party apparatus.
Some of the other younger members of the Politburo,
including Romanov, also can be expected to press the
cases of their proteges for higher office. The challenge
for Chernenko will be to reassure his supporters that
the pace of personnel change, which they found
threatening under Andropov, has been slowed, and at
the same time to strengthen his. power base by
installing more of his clients in key positions. His
consolidation of power may well hinge on his ability to
accomplish these two somewhat conflicting goals.
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US-Soviet Relations:
The Soviet View
Soviet policy toward the United States presents seem-
ing contradictions that probably reflect Moscow's
attempt simultaneously to serve both tactical and
long-term aims. Moscow's harsh rhetoric, inflexibility
on resuming the Geneva talks, and withdrawal from
the summer Olympics appear aimed at influencing
the administration's policies by provoking criticism
from domestic opponents and US allies anxious over
US-Soviet tensions. At the same time, Moscow's
proposal to hold talks on limiting space weapons and
willingness to move forward on some bilateral issues
suggest that the Soviet leadership wants to maintain a
working relationship in areas of specific interest to the
USSR, including measures aimed at preventing
crises.
Spring Freeze
During the final weeks of Andropov's life and the
early weeks of Chernenko's tenure as General Secre-
tary, there were signs that the Soviets were interested
in exploring the possibility of progress on security
issues other than the stalemated START and INF
talks. This trend was most evident in Chernenko's
election speech of 2 March. He claimed that progress
on a series of issues-he cited the unratified nuclear
test ban treaties, demilitarization of outer space, and
chemical warfare-could lead to a "breakthrough" in
relations. Along with other efforts at the time to probe
the US position on security issues, this speech may
have reflected a belief by some Soviets, perhaps
Chernenko particularly, that the administration
would prove more responsive to Moscow's overtures
on the eve of a US election campaign. On the other
hand, it may simply have been a perceived obligatory
move by a new leader
By mid-March there was an abrupt hardening of
Moscow's attitude toward Washington. This became
apparent in the chilly reception accorded a group of
senior US arms control experts and in public leader-
ship statements, including some by Chernenko and
Defense Minister Ustinov. Of particular significance,
in April the Soviets introduced last-minute technical
issues into bilateral talks on upgrading crisis commu-
nications that appeared aimed at delaying agreement.
They also insisted, over US objections, that the
format for any agreement be an exchange of notes
rather than a more formal document signed at the
ministerial level
President Reagan's visit to China at the end of April
evoked strong Soviet criticism. TASS on 3 May
accused the President of trying to give the talks with
the Chinese "a provocative anti-Soviet orientation,"
and it called the visit "fresh. confirmation" of US
unwillingness to seek agreement with the USSR on
disarmament issues. Five days later, the Soviets an-
nounced their pullout from the Olympics.
The Soviets also disparaged President Reagan's pub-
lic assertions of his willingness to advance the bilater-
al dialogue. Soviet commentators dismissed his offer
on 4 June to discuss a reaffirmation of the nonuse of
force, a point the Soviets had stressed at the Confer-
ence on Disarmament in Europe, as only a-"sem-
blance" of willingness to talk. They criticized the
President for making talks on this issue conditional on
Soviet consideration of Western confidence-building
proposals, which Moscow characterized as "legalized
espionage," and for not agreeing to discuss "no first
use" of nuclear weapons as well. To emphasize that
relations were stalemated, the Soviets publicly denied
that significant discussions were taking place
The Soviets waited several days before making a
direct response to the President's statement at a news
conference on 14 June that he would be willing. to
hold a summit meeting without prior agreement on an
agenda. They then reiterated their standard position
that they favor a summit in principle, but that it must
be well prepared. They claimed that the President's
remarks revealed no changes in the US position and
therefore could not be considered a serious offer. F_
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The Soviets also indicated their attitude in more
militant ways:
? Attempts to tamper with Western access to Berlin
began in February.
? Military exercises of unprecedented scope, which
stressed the USSR's ability to retaliate in case of a
preemptive US attack, were held in the USSR in
April.
? Areas in East Germany denied to Western military
liaison missions were extended in May.
? Harassment of US journalists and American offi-
cials in the USSR increased in May.
The increased Soviet harshness toward the United
States was accompanied by a general tightening of
Soviet policies both at home and abroad. Repression
of dissidents intensified, highlighted by the handling
of Andrey Sakharov and Elena Bonner. The Soviets
also appeared to be demanding-with little sign of
success-greater East European conformity with their
foreign and security policies.
Calculations Behind the Freeze
The hardening Soviet attitude may in part have
reflected disappointment by some within the Soviet
leadership, possibly including Chernenko, that elec-
toral or other considerations did not prompt a more
concessionary US response to the hints conveyed in
Chernenko's March speech and elsewhere.
The hardening line may also have reflected in part the
role of Foreign Minister Gromyko, whose influence
over foreign policy showed some signs of having
grown following Chernenko's succession:
? Senior Foreign Ministry officials, in conversations
with Western diplomats in May, took the unusual
step of denying the authoritativeness of statements
by Director Georgiy Arbatov and other members of
the Institute for the USA and Canada on the
possibility of resuming the Geneva talks.
? Gromyko appeared in full control of foreign policy
issues during West German Foreign Minister
Genscher's talks in Moscow in May.
More generally, the freeze the Soviets imposed on
relations beginning in March appeared to reflect a
judgment that the most effective means of influencing
US policy would be to portray the bilateral relation-
ship in the worst possible light, thereby provoking ever
sharper criticism of the administration's policies by
domestic opponents and US allies. The Soviets may
have calculated that the administration would be
particularly sensitive to such criticism as the election
campaign got under way and therefore more inclined
to consider altering some of its negotiating approaches
in hopes of reengaging Moscow in an arms control
dialogue.
The Soviets may have entertained hopes that this
approach might hurt the President's reelection pros-
pects. Even if-as seems more likely-they estimated
they could not significantly affect the US election
campaign, they may have thought they could sustain
domestic and allied pressures on the administration
and thereby constrain the policies of a second-term
Reagan administration. While the Soviets have made
no secret of their preference for a change in adminis-
tration, a number of them have stated privately that
they expect the President to be reelected, and they
have publicly adopted the posture that it is immaterial
to them who occupies the White House, claiming they
are prepared to do business with either US political
party.
Partial Thaw
Since late May a number of developments have
suggested that the Soviets have determined that it is
in their interest to maintain cooperation in some areas
and to conclude agreements on selected issues even if
this helps the administration politically
Several of these developments have been in areas
where the Soviets appear to believe they have signifi-
cant security interests at stake. Even during the
coldest period in bilateral relations, the Soviets main-
tained a generally businesslike attitude at the Stand-
ing Consultative Commission in Geneva, which con-
siders compliance with the SALT accords. Both
delegations agreed that the atmosphere of the round
that ended in May was better than that of last fall,
and the two sides agreed fairly quickly to meet for the
next session in October. The Soviets also took a
businesslike approach to the discussions in Moscow in
late May to review the operation of the Incidents at
Sea agreement. In early July the Soviets accepted US
proposals to deal with the remaining technical aspects
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Secret
of upgrading crisis communications and agreed to an
exchange of notes between the acting, Secretary of
State and the Soviet charge d'affaires in Washington
to ratify the agreement. The exchange took place on
17 July
The most notable manifestation of the priority Mos-
cow accords its security concerns was its proposal of
29 June to begin talks in September on limiting
weapons in space, an offer that contrasted sharply
with its continuing refusal to resume negotiations on
limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear
weapons. The Soviets could not have been certain that
the United States would accept their offer, and they
presumably calculated that a US rejection would
yield them political benefits in the form of propagan-
da gains and the administration's increased vulnera-
bility to charges that it was not serious about arms
control. Nonetheless, they clearly were aware that. if
the administration accepted the offer, even on a
conditional basis, it could deflect much of the criti-
cism it had been receiving on the latter count and
claim that its management of East-West relations was
producing positive results. The Soviets must therefore
have calculated that the possibility their offer would
help the administration politically was outweighed by
the urgency of attempting to limit US development of
antisatellite weapons and the US Strategic Defense
Initiative
On some economic, political, and security issues, the
Soviets apparently concluded that they had special
interests that outweighed the considerations that had
prompted them to impose the freeze on relations. On
27 June, barely a day before the 10-year bilateral
agreement on economic, industrial, and technical
cooperation was to expire, they agreed to extend it for
another 10 years. They dropped earlier demands that
had included recertification of Aeroflot flights to the
United States and a reduction in restrictions on Soviet
merchant ships putting in at US ports. By the end of
June, the Soviets were also displaying willingness to
make progress in resolving lower-level consular issues,
and on 5 July Gromyko agreed to a US proposal to
begin talks on a new cultural exchange agreement.
Reasons for the Thaw
It is clear that the Soviets had specific reasons for
deciding to proceed in each of the areas cited above,
the most compelling reasons presumably being those
that bore upon security issues. Nonetheless, the num- 25X1
ber of areas in which the Soviets have appeared
willing to allow progress since the end of May con-
trasts strikingly with the general freeze they had 25X1
imposed on relations during the preceding two
months. This contrast suggests a conscious decision to
revise the earlier policy
To the extent that the freeze had been intended to
increase political pressures on the administration in
an election year, the policy would have been subject to
continuing review in light of the ongoing Soviet 25X1
assessment of the US campaign. If it appeared in
Moscow that the President's prospects were improv-
ing, voices almost certainly would have been raised for
moving ahead on issues where Soviet interests were
clearly apparent, rather than continuing to block
progress at the risk of having to deal with a strength-
ened-and from the Soviet viewpoint possibly more
intransigent-US administration after the election.
Some Soviets might have argued further that it was in
Moscow's interests at least to preserve the foundation
for working relations with the administration by
concluding agreements where mutual interests were
at stake even while more contentious issues remained
deadlocked.
Prospects
Whatever the reason for the partial thaw in Soviet
policy, it almost certainly represents an adjustment of
course, rather than a change in the long-term Soviet
view of bilateral relations. In fact, the Soviets appear
to be undecided on several key questions affecting the
outlook for relations. Despite more frequent assertions
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in recent weeks that they expect President Reagan to
be reelected-assertions probably intended at least in
part to give credibility to their proposal, for space
weapons talks-it is highly unlikely that they would
feel confident enough of their ability to forecast the
election outcome to base firm policy decisions on it.
Moreover, the Soviets appear undecided as to how
much better off they would be if the elections resulted
in a change of administration. Soviet media have
criticized the Democratic Party platform for not
departing substantially from the policies of the ad-
ministration in regard to the conduct of US-Soviet
relations.
More generally, Soviet observers appear divided as to
whether US willingness in recent years to challenge
the Soviets more forcefully represents a temporary,
limited phase in US policy or a long-term trend that
will require a substantial reallocation of resources and
a general revision of policy toward Washington.
Given these uncertainties, the Soviets seem unlikely to
undertake any aggressively hostile ventures in rela-
tions with the United States. They could not be sure
that such a move would not boomerang, rallying
support to the President and increasing US determi-
nation to strengthen preparedness to counter such
challenges in the future. Moreover, if the move in-
volved any military risk it could turn into a serious
embarrassment to the Soviets. They might, however,
consider challenging US interests in other ways some-
time before the US election. For example, delivery of
aircraft that could help the Sandinista regime signifi-
cantly in its battle against the contras could be
undertaken in the hope of putting the administration
in the politically embarrassing position of having
either to acquiesce in the move or take action that
could result in its being labeled trigger-happy.
Soviet policy toward the United States for at least the
next several months is likely to remain a mixture of
the following:
? Intransigence on some issues, probably including
any formal resumption of START and INF.
? Bleak though not necessarily alarmist portrayals of
the state of relations, coupled with hints that these
could improve dramatically if the United States
were to display a willingness to make concessions.
? Willingness to make progress in selected areas of
bilateral relations where the USSR believes contin-
ued stalling would be against its own interests.
The proposed talks on limiting space weaponry proba-
bly will remain in the latter category. On this issue,
Soviet security concerns appear to be the driving
force. In START and INF, by contrast, political
tactics remain paramount, and for now the Soviets
perceive their interests to be served by continued
stalling. So long as NATO INF deployments continue
and the Soviets perceive political opportunities to
disrupt or delay deployments, they are unlikely to
agree to a near-term resumption of the Geneva talks
or to any public linkage of START and INF with
space weapons talks. For the Soviets to agree to
resume negotiations on INF while deployments con-
tinue would be to concede a near-total political defeat
on the INF issue and forgo whatever leverage they
think they have on the anti-INF movement in West-
ern Europe. At a minimum, any Soviet move to
resume formal negotiations on nuclear weapons issues
is likely to be postponed until after the US elections.
Eventually, Soviet interest in limiting US strategic
systems and INF deployments almost certainly will
prove compelling, and the Soviets then will seek a
means of resuming negotiations.
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Secret
Preparation of the
1986-90 Defense Plan
The Soviet defense planning process appears to be
proceeding on course despite recent leadership
changes. The Soviets elaborate defense policy in a
five-year defense plan-part of the state economic
plan-over the course of a highly structured five-year
preparation period. For the 1986-90 defense plan, the
planning cycle began in 1981 and basic guidelines for
defense policy and corresponding requirements were
probably established by early 1983. Roughly a year
and a half remain until the plan is scheduled to
receive final approval. Although some adjustment in
defense procurement plans may be necessary to recon-
cile competing demands on the machinery sector,
major changes in plan priorities will prove increasing-
ly difficult-though not impossible-because of the
rigidities of the defense planning process and other
factors.
The Defense Planning Process
The Five-Year Defense Plan for the Development of
the Armed Forces (FYDP) constitutes the complete
military subset of the Soviet five-year state economic
plan. The FYDP specifies such major tasks as weap-
ons research and development (R&D) programs,
weapons and material procurement, rates and levels of
deployment, changes in force structure, military train-
ing plans, operational requirements, and military
construction.
The Soviets are currently in the fourth ear of the
planning cycle for the 1986-90 FYDP ~J
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Indications That 1986-90 Planning is Proceeding on
Schedule
Pravda reported at the Supreme Soviet Presidium
session on 18 June that "The questions posed in the
findings of the chamber planning and budget com-
missions and speeches by USSR Supreme Soviet
deputies are reflected in the draft Basic Guidelines
for the USSR's Economic and Social Development
in 1986-90, which is being elaborated, and in
targeted comprehensive programs."
In a 14 July interview in Pravda, a deputy chairman
of Gosplan stated that major decisions on the scope
of the consumer program were being finalized.
1986-90 plan guide-
were being defined.
lines for major industrial projects and foreign trade
evidence does not preclude the possibility of dispute
over important investment decisions or even conten-
tion over the FYDP, it leads us to conclude that major
defense policy guidelines have been established, be-
cause these decisions normally precede drafting of the
five-year economic plan. It is unlikely that finalization
of civilian planning guidelines (including resource
commitments) would proceed across a broad front if
basic defense policy decisions remain to be made.
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Although we have no conclusive evidence of past
changes made in defense planning or delays in the
approval of the previous FYDPs, unexpected domestic
and international influences seem to have at least
delayed and perhaps prompted changes to past five-
year state economic plans. For example:
a The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) was delayed by 25X1
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Delays in the Planning Process?
Recent evidence indicates that basic resource alloca-
tion decisions have been made for elements of the
civilian sector and several major industrial projects
for the next five-year period (see inset). Although this
Final approval of the 12th five-year economic plan
(1986-90) could still be delayed. Any change or delay
in the plan might have an impact on defense planning.
The effect would depend on the magnitude of the
change, the economic sectors affected, and when in
the planning cycle the delays occurred. Conversely,
despite the lack of conclusive evidence of any changes
made to defense plans late in a planning cycle,
problems in the FYDP itself could cause delays in the
12th Five-Year Economic Plan. In sum, then, we still
do not know to what extent defense plans can be
revised toward the end of the planning cycle.
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Systemic Hindrances to Changes in Defense
Guidelines
The defense planning process itself, with its estab-
lished system of approvals, acts as a hindrance to
making major changes late in the plan preparation
period. The military's practice of preparing its plan
and receiving leadership approval early in the process
is designed to protect its priority claims to resources
throughout the economy. Within the next several
months, Gosplan will be translating economic policy
decisions made by the leadership into control figures
that reflect aggregate resource allocations among
sectors of the economy. Its calculations will be based
on the party's policy guidance, which is conditioned
by the preapproved list of military requirements.
Because the Soviet military is deeply involved directly
or indirectly with almost every other ministry, sub-
stantial adjustments to major weapon development
and production programs-most of which involve
hundreds of participants-probably would require
modification to resource commitments throughout the
economy. Therefore, any major changes in the FYDP
would be likely to delay completion and approval of
the next five-year plan.
Much of the FYDP is predetermined by ongoing
weapons programs that form the basis of the new
plan. The programs begin with a Central Committee
and/or Council of Ministers decree, which details the
responsible development organizations, program
schedules, and products to be delivered and tested.
These programs, many spanning more than one five-
year plan, build momentum into the FYDP and
commit resources such as labor, facilities, and other
capital equipment.
This momentum is reinforced by the planning prac-
tices within Gosplan.
Gosplan frequently bases its planning cal-
culations on past performance, a practice called
"planning from the achieved level."
most planners
come from similar backgrounds and share the same
general perceptions of priorities. They also realize
that overly ambitious projections probably would not
only disrupt the planning process, but reflect negative-
ly on the planners themselves. Finally, the iterative
process of departmental negotiations within Gosplan
encourages only incremental changes. The net result
of these practices is the perpetuation of previously
established priorities.
The need to plan for the military development of the
Warsaw Pact as a whole also limits major changes in
Soviet plans in the late stages of plan preparation.
Over the last decade the Soviets have moved success-
fully to increase defense and defense-industrial inte-
gration in the Pact. The Pact has its own five-year
defense plan, which fulfills the same function as the
Soviet FYDP, although as a multinational plan it also
specifies assignments for defense-industrial coopera-
tion and inter-Pact purchases. (There is no equivalent
five-year economic plan on the multinational level as
yet, the Soviets are
pressing their allies to integrate further individual
national plans.) Major changes in the Soviet five-year
plan would also disrupt planning for the Warsaw Pact
as a whole, a situation the Soviets would be anxious to
avoid.
Finally, the Soviets incorporate room in the plan to
accommodate unforeseen developments. Flexibility is
provided by means of annual plans (elaborations of
five-year plans on a year-by-year basis) and reserves
to accommodate unforeseen weapon programs or oth-
er resource requirements after the plan has been
finalized. Thus, projects not foreseen during a plan
drafting stage can be started in the middle of a five-
year plan, especially since early stages of weapon
programs are usually not resource intensive. This
flexibility frequently eliminates the need to make.
adjustments after a draft defense plan is approved.
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Other Topics
The Soviet Economy
at Midyear 1984
The Soviet economy continued a moderate recovery in Table 1 Percent change
the first six months of 1984. The industrial sector, in USSR: Growth in Industrial Production
particular, appears to be sustaining the better
performance of last year, when growth in output
picked up after several sluggish years. The railroads
also are continuing to do a better job of moving
1982 1983 First First
freight-bottlenecks and freight car shortages have Half Half
become less frequent. Taking into account the declin- 1983 1984
ing prospects for agricultural production, we estimate Industry 2.3 3.4 3.7 3.5
that GNP growth probably will be in the 2-to-3- Machinery 3.8 3.5 4.1 4.1
percent range for the year. F__~ Industrial materials 1.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 25X1
Industry-On a Par With 1983
Soviet industrial production in first half 1984 was 3.5
percent above the year-earlier level, according to our
calculations. The industrial sector's record during the
past year and a half represents an improvement over
recent years-industrial output grew 2.5 percent a
year on average during 1979-82-but is still well
below the pace of the early 1970s.
Oil (including 0.6 0.6 1.3 -0.1
gas condensate) 25X1
Gas 7.7 7.1 7.3 8.7
Industrial Materials. The production of industrial
materials grew at about the same rate as in first half
1983, although performance fell off in several key
branches. Output of ferrous metals and construction
materials, for instance, increased at a rate below that
of first half 1983 because of shortages of critical raw
materials and skilled labor as well as inadequate
investment. However, most branches of the chemical
industry, nonferrous metals industries, and the wood
and paper industry equaled or bettered last year's
performances
In the energy sector, results were mixed. Oil output
was down slightly in the first six months because of
Synthetic resins and -0.8 8.9 7.0 11.0
plastics
Wood, pulp, and paper 0.4 3.0 3.4 4.0
products
Construction materials 0 3.1 3.4 2.8
Consumer nondurables 1.3 3.3 3.7 2.2
Soft goods -0.5 0.9 0.8 1.0 25X1
Processed foods 2.8 5.2 6.0 3.2
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Table 2
USSR: Production of Major Fuels
1983
First
Half
First
Half
1984
1983
1984
Plan
Projected
inadequate inventories of good-quality oilfield equip-
ment, shortages of well-maintenance crews and other
skilled labor, bad weather early in the year, and
delays in the massive program to add pumps to West
Siberian oil wells. The production goal for 1984 now
is beyond reach, and Moscow will do well to match
1983's output. Coal production was also down some-
what in the first half, and the modest 1-percent
growth planned for 1984 is probably also unattain-
able; output could fall below last year's level of 716
million tons.
On a more positive note, gas and electric power
production both advanced at rapid rates. With first-
half gas output above plan, this year's goal should be
easily surpassed. Production of electricity increased
by a healthy 5.5 percent compared with first half
1983-well above the 3.5-percent rate of increase
planned for the year. The major reason for the
improvement has been the ample fuel supplies avail-
able this year because of a mild winter and the
conversion from oil to gas at a number of power
plants.
Machinery. Machinery output increased by about 4
percent in the first six months of 1984, above the
average for industry as a whole but considerably
lower than the 7-percent rate planned for 1981-85.
Machine building is a pivotal sector, producing mili-
tary hardware as well as consumer durables and
machinery for investment. Reduced availability of
rolled steel products and inadequate investment in the
machinery industries, however, have held back growth
in this sector during the 1981-85 Plan.
Consumer Goods. Growth in the production of nondu-
rable consumer goods slowed in the first six months of
1984. The dropoff was especially apparent in proc-
essed foods such as butter, vegetable oil, and canned
foods. Production of other nondurables increased at
about the same low rate as last year.
Transportation
Total freight turnover totaled 3.8 trillion ton-kilome-
ters during the first half of this year-up over 3
percent compared with first half 1983, and slightly
ahead of plan. The road and river transport sectors,
however, did not do well, and the decline in highway
traffic is the only one in the last 10 years. Transport
of natural gas, on the other hand, advanced rapidly as
new pipelines were commissioned. Five of the six gas
pipelines planned for construction during 1981-85
have now been completed.
Much of the responsibility for the dropoff in industrial
performance in recent years can be traced to the
railroads, which bear the major share of the transpor-
tation burden in the USSR. This sector now appears
to be in the process of righting itself. Rail freight
traffic increased by about 2 percent during the first
half-less than last year's 4-percent growth but still a
solid showing in view of the major problems in this
sector since the late 1970s. Although plans for ship-
ping some commodities-such as coal and lumber-
were not met, the problems appear to be local and not
a signal of widespread disruptions in the rail network.
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Table 3
USSR: Growth of Freight Turnover
Percent
1981 1982 1983
First Half
1984
Table 4 Percent
USSR: Growth of Capital Investment
1981 1982 1983 1984 Plan
1981-85
First Plan
Half
a State capital investment.
b Average annual rate of growth.
Investment and. Employment
State capital investment, which typically accounts for
about seven-eighths of total capital investment, rose 2
percent in the first six months of this'year--one- third
the rate at which it increased during first half 1983. It
is too early to tell whether this reflects a conscious
effort to slow the growth of investment. Earlier during
the current five-year planning period a decision ap-
parently was made to step up the growth of invest-
ment, and it has been rising at an average annual rate
of about 4 percent, more than double the rate called
for in the 1981-85 Plan.
Growth in employment continued to slow during
January-June 1984, reflecting demographic trends.
Total employment rose less than 1 percent and the
increase in industrial employment was even smaller.
Using last year's trends as a guide, we assess that the
biggest gains probably occurred in the service
sectors-particularly education and health-and in
state agriculture.
Consumer Well-Being
Data for the first six months of 1984 do not indicate
any shifts in the Kremlin's policies in the area of
consumer welfare:
? Support for the Brezhnev Food Program has contin-
ued. Over one-third of state capital investment was
allocated to the agro-industrial complex during Jan-
uary-June 1984, roughly the share called for in the
1981-85 Plan.
? Rationing of selected food items is continuing. The
system of special distribution of foodstuffs through
the workplace (which originated in the 1970s and is
considerably more extensive than the traditional
special stores for selected elites) is still in use.
Meanwhile, increased supplies of some foodstuffs and
many nonfood items in the first six months of this
year have reduced the imbalance between consumer
purchasing power and the availability of consumer
goods. Meat output is at record levels as meat produc-
tion on state and collective farms-which account for
about two-thirds of the total-rose 8 percent. Produc-
tion of clothing, textiles, and knitwear also increased.
Reductions in retail prices of selected consumer goods
early in the year may have boosted consumer spend-
ing as growth in retail trade turnover tripled during
first half 1984. Still, imbalances in consumer markets
continue, mainly because of the inability of the
planners to get enterprises to produce the right assort-
ment of goods and services, the failure to adjust
relative retail prices, and the lack of effective quality
? The increase in the average monthly pay of wage
and salary workers was in line with the 2.7-percent
annual rate called for in the 1981-85 Plan.
control.
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Table 5
USSR: Selected Indicators of Consumer Welfare
1981 1982 1983 First First
Half Half
1983 1984a
Percent increase in 2.1 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.4
average monthly
wages of workers and
employees
gas pipeline. Imports of agricultural commodities
from Argentina, Australia, and Canada also were
down, while purchases from the United States re-
mained at about the level of first quarter 1983. The
decline in exports was mainly the result of a reduction
in military sales to less developed countries. The
Kremlin offset a more-than-10-percent fall in oil
prices by boosting the volume of its oil exports to the
The hard currency surplus helped the Soviets boost
Percent increase in 4.1 0 2.8 1.6 5.1 their assets in Western banks during first quarter
retail trade turnover b 1984 by about $1.8 billion; liabilities increased by
a Compared with first half 1983.
b Although the Soviet series reflects some disguised inflation, the
difference in growth rates between 1982 and first half 1984 is
substantial.
approximately $1.3 billion. We estimate that Mos-
cow's total net hard currency debt was about $10.5
billion at the end of the quarter.
Reasons for the Better Performance
We believe that much of the recent economic im-
provement is the result of earlier policy decisions:
Foreign Trade
Moscow finally appears to be making progress in
implementing its foreign trade policy for 1981-85,
which calls for an increasing share of trade to be
conducted with Communist countries. Trade turnover
with the Communist Bloc rose 11 percent in first
quarter 1984 compared with the year-earlier period-
slightly above the 10-percent increase called for in
this year's trade plan-and the Communist share of
total Soviet trade rose from 56 to 60 percent. As in
1983, a sharp increase in purchases of East European
machinery and equipment probably accounted for the
bulk of the growth in imports from the Communist
countries. The trend in machinery deliveries is gener-
ally consistent with the statements Soviet leaders have
made about the need to rely less on Western goods
and technology. These statements reflect the Soviet
reaction to Western trade restrictions and a long-
Some major personnel and management changes
were made. Last year's replacement of the Minister
of Railroads and the special responsibility given
Politburo member Geydar Aliyev to oversee the rail
system, for example, appear to have streamlined rail
operations and improved discipline and morale.
? The decision to raise capital investment above
planned levels was also important, because planners
have been able to direct badly needed investment
resources to troubled areas.
? The cumulative effect of what we estimate as little
or no growth in military procurement during 1976-
82 relieved pressure in the machinery sector and
made it possible to support a larger investment
program.
standing desire to conserve hard currency.
Hard currency exports and imports both declined in
the first quarter. However, because exports dropped
much less than imports, Moscow recorded a $700
million trade surplus as opposed to a $500 million
deficit in the year-earlier period. Imports from Italy,
Japan, and West Germany fell sharply mainly be-
cause of lower purchases of machinery and equipment
and reduced imports of large-diameter pipe for the
nearly completed Siberia-to-Western Europe natural
Particularly encouraging to the regime is the apparent
accelerated growth in labor productivity in the face of
tighter labor supplies. Andropov apparently succeeded
in his efforts to boost productivity through his disci-
pline and anticorruption campaigns. Chernenko, in
turn, has continued if not intensified these programs.
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Nevertheless, the positive effect of these efforts prob-
ably would not have occurred if food supplies and the
availability of other consumer goods had not im-
proved.
Another important factor in the recovery has been the
attack on various bottlenecks in the economy. Prob-
lems in the transportation, power, and metals sectors
all have eased. One of the reasons for the more
comfortable position has been better weather. Rela-
tively benign winters the last two years, for instance,
have helped to ease rail freight snarls. Hydroelectric
power production also has improved because of higher
water levels resulting from more typical rainfall in
Siberia.
The new regime appears to have had little impact on
economic performance in the first half of the year.
Chernenko took power well after the 1984 Plan had
been approved and put into effect, and he has largely
adopted the tactics and programs of his predecessor.
Few new initiatives have been put forth, although
Chernenko has advocated an increased role for local
governments in overseeing the economy and has called
for trimming the size of the bureaucracy and for
educational reforms. Such programs, in effect for only
a short time, will have minimum impact on the
economy this year.
Outlook
We estimate that Soviet GNP will increase by 2 to 3
percent this year. For GNP growth to be at the high
end of the range, both the industrial and livestock
sectors will have to maintain their recent perform-
ances. Livestock production in turn will depend on
Moscow's willingness to spend hard currency on grain
imports needed to cover any deficits caused by lower
domestic production. The outlook for the hard curren-
cy trade balance will depend mainly on how oil prices
hold up and on how much grain Moscow imports.
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A Comparison of Soviet and-
US Gross National Products,
1960-83
The CPSU is setting a great task-to achieve in the
next 20 years a standard of living higher than that of
any capitalist country.... In 20 years, the USSR will
have almost twice the present industrial output of the
entire nonsocialist world.... By accomplishing its
basic economic task, the Soviet Union will win a
world-historic victory in the peaceful competition
with the United States.
General Secretary Khrushchev
1961
Khrushchev's forecasts have not been realized, al-
though the Soviets have made some progress. Recent-
ly completed analysis of the annual gross national
products of the two countries shows that the Soviets
gained on the growing US economy between 1960 and
1975 as their output rose from 49 to 58 percent of the
US total.' Between 1975 and the late 1970s, however,
it dropped to about 55 percent of the US GNP, and it
remained near that level through 1983 (figure 1).
The Soviet Union gained on the United States from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s because average
annual Soviet growth rates during the Eighth and
Ninth Five-Year Plans (FYPs) were higher than
average American rates during the same periods.
Soviet growth, however, had been slowing since at
least the mid-1960s, and the relationship, between the
two economies began to shift in America's favor in the
10th FYP (1976-80) as the decline in Soviet growth
rates continued while US growth accelerated.
Although the Soviet Union gained ground relative to
the United States over the 20-year period as a whole,
the absolute size of the gap between the two econo-
mies in goods and services produced annually in-
creased, whether measured in rubles or dollars. The
US recessions of 1970, 1974-75, 1980, and 1982
caused the gap to lessen in those years, but the trend
has been upward, and the gap widened noticeably
after 1976. Between 1961 and 1983, US GNP grew
300 billion dollars or 285 billion rubles more than
Soviet GNP.
Figure 1
Soviet GNP as a Percentage of US GNP,
1960-838
l l l l l l l
J i l l J i l l I I I I I 1111
0 1960 65 70 75 80 83
a Measured by calculating the geometric mean of the
percentages expressed in 1970 rubles and 1976 dollars.
b Preliminary.
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Trends in GNP Components'
The largest shifts in the uses of GNP between the two
countries in the 1975-83 period were in defense and
investment. Average annual Soviet growth rates in
these areas were markedly-lower in the 10th FYP
than in earlier plan period's and were lower than 75X1
corresponding average American rates. ~~ 25X1
Defense. The absolute level of the Soviet defense
effort has remained substantially above that of the
United States since the early 1970s. Real decreases in
US defense spending occurred between 1969 and
1976 as the United States disengaged from the Viet-
nam conflict, while consistent growth pushed total
3 The estimates in this paper were prepared with data ending in
1981. Preliminary estimates for 1982 and 1983 were prepared using
rough aggregate indexes. These could not be applied with confi-
dence at the component level, but an update now under way will
extend the component comparisons to 1982 and l983.F--]
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Figure 2
Soviet Defense.as a Percentage of
US Defense, 1960-818
Figure 3
Soviet Investment as a Percentage of
US Investment, 1960-81a
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1960 65 70 75 80 81
a CIA defense comparisons have traditionally been
made in dollars or rubles. This figure presents the
geometric mean of the two comparisons for consistency
0 1960 65 70 75 80 81
a Geometric mean of the dollar and ruble comparisons.
Soviet defense costs to a level over 40 percent higher
than that of the United States by the mid-1970s. The
annual rate of Soviet defense growth slowed after
1976, and the defense cost gap remained at the 40-
percent level until 1981, when accelerating US de-
fense costs cut the Soviet lead to around 35 percent
(figure 2).
Defense was also the area of the greatest difference in
GNP composition between the. two economies. The
United States halved the share of GNP going to
defense following the Vietnam war-from 10 percent
in the early 1960s to 5 percent in the early 1970s. The
Soviets, on the other hand, had a fairly steady defense
burden estimated at 10 to 14 percent of GNP over the
1960-81 period.'
'These burden estimates use a US definition of defense. They could
also be calculated using a Soviet definition, which we believe would
include more activities (primarily civil defense and civil space
activities that in the United States would be funded by NASA).
The US defense burden remains nearly the same whether a US or
Soviet definition of defense is used because the costs of US civil
defense and civil space activities are small relative to the defense
budget. The Soviet defense burden would increase by I to 2
Investment. Total Soviet investment has grown almost
twice as fast as the US rate since 1960, averaging 6
percent annually compared with about 3 percent for
the United States. The absolute level of Soviet invest-
ment stayed around three-fifths of the US level
through the mid-1960s, rose to four-fifths by the early
1970s, and exceeded US investment in 1975, 1976,
and 1981 by a small margin (figure 3). Even so, the
growth rate of Soviet investment has been declining
since the early 1960s, and markedly lower growth
rates during the 10th FYP were a major factor behind
the United States' ability to widen the GNP gap.
Soviet gains in comparative levels of investment were
most pronounced in the area of construction. Soviet
construction rose from about 60 percent of the US
level in 1960 to 120 percent by the early 1980s. The
percentage points if a Soviet definition were used.
1In all cases, however, the only
appropriate burden calculation is that in which both defense and
GNP are measured in the currency of the given country.
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value of the machinery and equipment component
also increased relative to that of the United States
over the entire period but stayed below the US figure.
Underlying these trends is the general tendency in the
United States to devote a larger proportion of invest-
ment resources to reequipping older facilities and to
incorporate more extensive mechanical and electronic.
equipment into new facilities.
Since 1960 the USSR has devoted a greater share of
its economic resources to investment than has the
United States. Soviet investment steadily increased
from a low of 21 percent of Soviet GNP in the early
1960s to a high of 30 percent by 1981, while US
investment fluctuated between 17 and 20 percent of
US GNP over the 1960-81 period. Soviet investment
for machinery and equipment (including comparably
estimated capital repair) steadily increased from 5
percent of Soviet GNP in 1960 to 13 percent by 1981,
while Soviet construction plus comparable capital
repair remained between 16 and 18 percent of GNP.
In the United States, machinery increased from 5 to
only 9 percent of GNP in those years, while construc-
tion's share steadily decreased from 13 to 9 percent.
Consumption. The Soviets have gained slightly on the
United States in total consumption costs since 1960.
Soviet consumption over the period rose from a low of
37 percent of US consumption in the mid-1960s to a
high of 42 percent in 1981 (figure 4).
Within the consumption category, Soviet health ex-
penditures showed the most dramatic change by
steadily dropping from 67 percent of US health
expenditures in 1960 to 38 percent by 1981. This was
a consequence of US health costs rising much more
rapidly than those in the Soviet Union. Education
costs in the Soviet Union began the period at or above
the US level, dropped to 86 percent as US expendi-
tures accelerated in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
but returned to an approximately equal level by 1981.
In the other consumption categories of food, soft
goods, durables, and household services, the Soviets
showed small but consistent relative gains.
The Soviet Union is unusual among developing coun-
tries in that its economy has not become increasingly
service oriented. Its household service sector remained
Figure 4
Soviet Consumption as a Percentage of
US Consumption, 1960-818
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1 I I I 1 1 I
0 1960 65 70 75 80 81
relatively steady at 19 to 21 percent of Soviet GNP
between 1960 and 1981, while the US household
service sector increased from 33 to 39 percent of US
GNP by 1975 before falling slightly to 37 percent by
1981. In both countries, the share of GNP devoted to
durables increased, soft goods consumption remained
about the same, and the share going to food de-
creased. Food consumption as a share of GNP
dropped by as much as 7 percentage points in the
Soviet Union and by 4 percentage points in the United
States over the period.
Relative standards of living are usually measured in
terms of consumption per capita. The Soviet consumer
was less well off compared with his American coun-
terpart when consumption is measured on a per capita
basis than is indicated by the aggregate consumption
comparison. This is because the Soviet population was
15 to 20 percent larger than the American population
over the 1960-81 period. The trends over time of the
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per capita and aggregate consumption comparisons
are essentially the same, however, because the popula-
tions of both countries grew at the same average
rate-about 1 percent a year. Soviet per capita con-
sumption rose slightly over the 1960-81 period, from
31 percent of US per capita consumption in 1960 to
36 percent in 1981. As in the aggregate consumption
comparison, Soviet health expenditures showed the
most change, dropping from 57 percent of US per
capita health expenditures in 1960 to.33 percent in
1981. The other categories of education, food, soft
goods, durables, and household services showed slight
overall relative gains for the Soviets.
Implications of the Comparisons
Quite obviously, the Soviet Union did not achieve
Khrushchev's goal of outperforming the American
economy by 1981. It was, however, slowly gaining
ground until the mid-1970s. Why did it fail to
continue catching up during this period, and what are
the implications of this failure for future economic
competition?
Soviet GNP growth has been on a downward trend
since the late 1960s, but this trend worsened in the
late 1970s for a number of reasons. Some were
beyond the Soviets' control, such as bad weather,
unfavorable international economic conditions, and a
decline in the growth rate of the working population.
Others included aging of the capital stock-which
required increasingly larger investments to keep it
productive-and mounting shortages of key raw ma-
terials and energy sources. Still others were the results
of planning decisions, particularly the decision imple-
mented in 1976 to switch from an "extensive" invest-
ment policy that expanded production through large
increases in capital and labor to an "intensive" policy
of growth achieved by more efficient use of resources.
Bad investment decisions also led to insufficient re-
sources being devoted to transportation, which created
shortages of rolling stock and massive bottlenecks.
Finally, some of the causes of the downturn in growth
rates may be endemic to the Soviet system of central
planning. The planning process, with its emphasis on
meeting production quotas, seems to have stifled
innovation and creativity, which are vital to improving
productivity. Lack of wage incentives and limited
availability of consumer goods have also been drags
If the US economy continues to perform as well as it
has over the last year, the gap between the US and the
Soviet economies is likely to widen considerably in the
next decade. Opinion is certainly not unanimous on
whether the United States can sustain this growth,
but the consensus of estimates developed by leading
private forecasting groups shows average annual
growth rates of 3 percent or more through the mid-to-
late 1980s.4 Soviet growth, on the other hand, is
projected by the CIA to be below this rate for the rest
of the decade. If these projections prove accurate,
Soviet GNP in 1990 will be back down to less than
half the US figure. There is little reason to expect
Soviet growth to exceed that of the United States on
average during the rest of the decade. At best, Soviet
GNP in 1990 is unlikely to be more than the 55
percent of US GNP estimated for 1983, and it
probably will be less.
Based on 1983-90 projections of average annual growth rates of
3.1 percent by Wharton Econometric Forecasting and 3.3 percent
by Data Resources. Chase Econometrics predicts 3.7-percent aver-
age annual growth between 1983 and 1985, and Evans Economics
on productivity growth.
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Longer Leadtimes:
A Symptom of Soviet Problems
in Using Western Technology
Soviet use of imported Western plant and equipment
has fallen far short of its potential for improving the
USSR's overall economic performance, in large part
because the Soviets take so long to acquire and put to
use many of these imports. Average leadtimes for
projects in the civilian economy are much longer in
the USSR than in the West, almost invariably exceed
the plan, and show no signs of diminishing.'
Such imports have significantly benefited specific
sectors. They contributed much, for example, to the
substantial enlargement of the natural gas pipeline
network and the major advances of defense industries.
But the Soviets hoped that Western technology also
would stimulate productivity-not only in the individ-
ual plants where the imports were used, but also
generally, through diffusion. This has not happened.
Individual Soviet end users probably can save time by
importing a product embodying new technology rath-
er than waiting for its development in the USSR. But
diffusion-the widespread use of a new technology
throughout the economy-may be faster with indige-
nous development. This is primarily because the Sovi-
ets seldom begin the research and development need-
ed for embodying imported technology in
Soviet-produced equipment until the import has been
operated in a "prototype factory." From initial ex-
pression of interest to factory operation generally
takes two to seven years.
The USSR is trying to speed up the assimilation of
new technology in the civilian economy through vari-
ous reorganizations and special bonuses. Results con-
tinue to be disappointing, however, to judge by the
chronic complaints of officials. We believe the pros-
pect for improvements will remain dim, barring a
major overhaul of the system of incentives for
modernization
Background
Despite its high degree of self-sufficiency, the Soviet
Union has traditionally imported Western technology
to help ease bottlenecks, raise efficiency, and modern-
ize its economy. Imports of Western plant and equip-
ment expanded rapidly in the 1970s, as Moscow
increased its emphasis on these goals in response to
increasingly severe material shortages and expected
manpower shortages.
' The defense and energy sectors are important exceptions to this
general rule. Their shorter leadtimes usually reflect official actions
to override the obstacles built into the system. These actions include
(1) allowing the end user more direct participation in import
negotiations, (2) promptly authorizing payment in hard currency,
The Import Process
The process of legal acquisition and use of Western
plant and equipment for the civilian economy can be
divided into six stages:
o Discovery of Western plant or equipment (initiation
of interest).
c Request for funds.
c Negotiations between a Soviet foreign trade organi-
zation (FTO) and Western suppliers.
e Delivery, installation, and first use.
Assimilation of the import by the original end user.
Diffusion of the embodied technology to relevant
uses throughout the economy.
A variety of factors-some unique to imported tech-
nology and some affecting domestic technology as
well-prolong the leadtimes within each stage:
Divided Responsibility. The lack of a single body to
coordinate all stages of the acquisition and absorp-
tion process fosters redundancy, prolongs negotia-
tions, and slows down the assimilation of new
technology.
o Administrative Barriers. Official reluctance to per-
mit personal contacts-with foreign suppliers isolates
production managers from important Western
sources of information about the equipment, often
leading to improper installation and prolonging the
period of adjustment.
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Leadtimes in the Chemical Industry,
Soviet and Western
Western firms.
Hanson's chemical industry study of 31 projects-has
From contract inquiry through 1.5 0.8 indicated that leadtime performance has not improved
negotiations over the past 20 years, despite Soviet industry's
Total 6.7 3.1 to 3.8
Soviet indigenous development c
Research, development, testing,
evaluation, and achievement of
normal capacity operation
a Leadtimes are from Soviet Absorption of Western Technology: A
Survey of West European Experience, by Malcolm Hill and Philip
Hanson, Stanford Research Institute, December 1978 (a survey of
31 projects).
b Initiation of production is an earlier stage than the attainment of
normal capacity operation, the stage cited in our source for Soviet
indigenous development in the chemical industry.
c Leadtimes are from V. S. Sominskiy (survey of 132 projects);
referred to in Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations,
by Philip Hanson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1981,
p. 79.
increasing familiarity with Western firms.
For the Soviets, the West's speedier assimilation rates
may be less important than whether they themselves
can assimilate an imported technology more quickly
than one developed at home. As the table shows, if the
technology is not available domestically, importing
saves time. However, if equipment embodying the
technology is already available in the USSR, assimi-
lation is presumably speedier through its use, rather
than through imports. But even in this case, Soviet
enterprises sometimes prefer Western suppliers be-
cause they are supposed to be more reliable. In fact,
however, this reliability can be offset by delivery
delays after shipments have reached Soviet soil.
Moreover, even if importing speeds up assimilation by
? Accounting Practices. Because the Soviet economic
system levies a very small interest charge on capital
assets (both domestic and imported), no one feels
obliged to get imported equipment into production
quickly.
? Incentives. By emphasizing quantitative output, the
Soviet incentive system breeds resistance to techno-
logical change.
The delays caused by these factors are indicated by- a
study of the Soviet chemical industry by Philip Han-
son of the University of Birmingham, England. It
shows that the time that elapses between stages 2 and
5 (initial inquiries about import contracts and opera-
tion of the purchased plant and equipment) is roughly
two to three times as long as in the West (see table). A
study of the machine tool industry shows the time
between contract inquiry and first production is more
than twice that required by Western firms. In two of
the six stages of the process (negotiation and installa-
tion/first use), Soviet firms take three times as long as
Furthermore, the Soviets evidently are not improving
with experience. A statistical test-based on survey
In the USSR In the West data from Western businessmen collected in Philip
one end user, it is not clear that it accelerates
diffusion throughout the economy. Diffusion usually
requires that a new technology be embodied in Soviet-
produced equipment-a time-consuming process that
usually demands considerable research and develop-
ment and often does not even begin until assimilation
of imported plant and equipment is well under way or
even complete, a process taking two to seven years.
Additionally, there is evidence that the Soviets some-
times -perhaps frequently-fail in their attempts to
accomplish diffusion (stage 6).
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was lying unprotected.
Soviet Attempts To Accelerate the Process
Leadtime problems persist even though the Soviets
seem to assign a higher priority to assimilating West-
ern equipment than to installing domestic equipment.
In September 1979 a decree established a basic bonus
of 3 percent of the total value of construction and
installation work for completing a project on time and
provided a 25-percent increase to this bonus for
projects using large amounts of imported equipment.
In October 1983 a separate resolution was issued
ordering ministries to ensure that imported equipment
is put into service and brought up to capacity opera-
tion within the warranty period.
At least three Western studies have shown that in the
Soviet chemical industry a high level of imports,
continued over a long period of time, has tended to
perpetuate dependence rather than end it. One, a CIA
study, shows that despite a need for specialized
equipment (which the chemical industry has been
importing for the past 20 years), the machine-building
industry has made only limited progress in its produc-
tion. This prolonged dependence ensures a continued
lag of Soviet technology behind that of the West. Both
Western and Soviet observers have noted that, even if
a new technology reaches stage 6 in the Soviet Union,
the process often has taken so long that the diffused
technology is obsolete.
production elsewhere in the ministry.
The Soviets themselves seem dissatisfied with their
leadtimes. The chemical industry's handling of im-
ports was derided in an August 1981 Pravda cartoon
showing ,a plant buried under crates of machine tools.
The accompanying narrative stated that the Novopo-
lotsk Production Association "Polimer" had not made
any use of imported equipment valued at 674,000
rubles. The article also noted that in 1969 the
Usolskiy "Khimprom" Association had received im-
ported equipment worth 650,000 rubles that had
never been installed and had, in fact, deteriorated
beyond repair while in storage. In 1979 Soviet au-
thorities checked 45 petrochemical complexes and
found 24 at which equipment awaiting installation
The Soviets have attempted to speed up the introduc-
tion and diffusion of new technology-both imported
and domestic-through the use of scientific-produc-
tion associations (NPOs) that bring research, develop-
ment, and production responsibilities together under
one roof. They claim that the NPOs, which currently
number more than 250, have reduced leadtimes by 50
to 65 percent. They probably are referring, however,
to the time between the research and development
(R&D).phase and first use in the NPO plant, not
between R&D and economy-wide use. Moreover,
NPOs are often assigned normal production quotas by
their industrial ministry bosses, in addition to their
experimental work toward speeding up innovation.
Sometimes they have even been ordered to cease
experimental work altogether to make up for losses of
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Outlook
The slow pace at which imported Western technology
is generally assimilated and diffused in the USSR
sharply limits its contribution to the modernization of
the Soviet economy as a whole. Even in some high-
priority civilian areas-such as imported gas-lift
equipment used to maintain or increase oil well flow
rates-the protracted delays in acquiring' and install-
ing the equipment have reduced the effectiveness of
its use.'
Soviet planners will continue to recommend imports
of Western technology and equipment to alleviate
bottlenecks and modernize domestic industries as the
pinch on the USSR's labor, capital, and natural
resources tightens and the leading edge of Western
technology continues to advance. Nevertheless, Mos-
cow will find it increasingly difficult to catch up with
the general level of technology in advanced Western
countries by relying on imports of Western plant and
equipment. This is partly because some imports em-
body technology that is not state of the art and are
bought simply to improve the average quality of the
USSR's own plant and equipment. Even if the Soviets
choose the most up-to-date technology, imports stand
little chance of eliminating the Soviet lag behind the
West, because:
? Widespread application of such imports will proba-
bly be rare.
? If effective application ever occurs, it is likely to
take many years.
? Soviet engineers, having not gone through the de-
signing experience that underlies the imported
equipment, will be ill prepared to carry the embod-
ied technology to a still more advanced level.
' In 1978 the Soviets contracted with a French firm (Technip) to
install gas-lift equipment in 1,800 wells at Samotlor-their largest
oilfield. Similar equipment was purchased for 600 wells at the
Federovo field. Completion of these projects was scheduled for 1985
but has been delayed for one or two years. If installed on schedule,
this equipment could have provided some 200,000 to 300,000
barrels per day of oil output beyond that otherwise expected from
these fields. Because of the delay, however, the window of opportu-
nity for the most effective use of this equipment may have been
missed because the water cut (the amount of water mixed with the
oil) at Samotlor and Federovo is now higher than optimal for
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Secret
Moscow Seeking Improved
Relations With Ghana
Over the past five months, Moscow has been trying to
improve its relations with the Rawlings regime in
Ghana. The Kremlin may be interested in additional
air and naval access in West Africa and is probably
attempting to lessen the impact of any Western gains
resulting from Accra's search for Western economic
assistance. The Soviets are not likely, however, to
extend significant aid of their own, and this will limit
their prospects for success in Ghana.
Soviet-Ghanaian relations on the eve of Flight Lt.
Jerry Rawlings's December 1981 coup were cool. At
the time, the Soviets had little more than a formal
diplomatic presence in Accra. Bilateral trade was
minimal and military ties nonexistent, despite the fact
that the Soviets had been major benefactors of Ghana
under Kwame Nkrumah in the early 1960s.
The Soviets initially regarded the return of Rawlings,
who was then espousing radical positions, quite posi-
tively, putting a leftist cast on the coup and proclaim-
ing it a setback for the West.' However, they were not
accommodating when Rawlings looked to them for
economic aid. In fact, the only Soviet contribution
appears to have been a donation of medical supplies.
Libya and Cuba emerged as the primary non-Western
suppliers of military and economic assistance to
Ghana.
From late 1981 through early 1984, Moscow's policy
toward Ghana focused on low-cost efforts to build
Soviet influence there. Suspicion of the mercurial
Rawlings, the likelihood of continued instability, and
previous bad experiences in Ghana limited Moscow's
willingness to commit its resources or prestige. The
USSR did promise to help revitalize a number of
economic projects begun under Nkrumah in the
1960s, but disagreement on aid terms prevented con-
clusion of any contracts. In addition, the Soviets
attempted to influence Ghanaian public opinion by
' During Rawlings's first stint as Ghana's leader-from June to
September of 1979-Moscow's relations with Accra were shaky,
but the Soviet media did give his regime favorable play after it gave
placing anti-Western stories in the local press and
providing scholarships to Ghanaian students.
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unwillingness to provide the kind of economic assist-
ance it needed. In late 1983, the Rawlings regime
began moderating its radical rhetoric and turned to
the West for economic help. This shift may have
prompted the Soviets to reassess their approach to
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On 13 March, the Kremlin named Vyacheslav Seme-
nov as its new Ambassador to Ghana and initiated a
series of advances to the Rawlings government. In
subsequent weeks:
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? Bulgarian Prime Minister Filipov visited Accra,
? A July Izvestiya article characterized Rawlings
supporters as "progressively minded" and praised
the regime's attacks on corruption. Rawlings him-
self was said to be pursuing policies similar to those
of Soviet favorite Nkrumah.
The Soviets may be paying special attention to Ghana
as a potential site of West African air and naval
access in the event relations with Guinea deteriorate
in the wake of Sekou Toure's death. Access to
Guinean air facilities provides important support for
Soviet resupply flights to Angola. In any case, Mos-
cow seems to believe that it can keep Ghana from
moving too far toward the West by providing small
amounts of economic aid and boosting support for
leftists such as Tsikata.
To date, the results of the Soviet campaign have been
minimal, largely because Rawlings wants to avoid
alienating Western aid donors and is thus wary of
expanding a relationship certain to raise Western
concerns. At present, Western countries provide virtu-
ally all of Ghana's outside assistance.
Outlook
The Soviets will probably continue to lobby Accra in
hopes that the unpredictable Rawlings will adopt a
more radical posture, perhaps out of frustration over
possible Western refusals to grant him the amount of
economic assistance he seeks. They will also try to
cultivate leftist members of the regime to improve
their ability to exploit future developments. Moscow
might be inclined to intensify its diplomatic efforts
and increase its economic aid to Accra if it believed
that its air and naval access to Guinea might be
threatened. More likely, however, the Soviets will try
to build their influence slowly and avoid major politi-
cal and economic commitment in a potentially unsta-
ble environment.
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The leadership has preordained that the experiment will be a success and a model
for Soviet industry. The industries involved have been given priority in such areas
as the acquisition of resources. Consequently, the results will reveal little about the
actual potential for applying these measures throughout the economy as long as re-
sources are in short supply.
riefs
Moscow Evaluates Izvestiya recently published the first detailed high-level Soviet statement on the
Industrial Experiment= progress of an "economic experiment," begun this January, that gives five
industrial ministries more autonomy in using investment and wage funds. Accord-
ing to a leading planning official, each of the ministries has improved its
performance in meeting delivery contracts, the key success indicator under the
experiment. Results are less encouraging for enterprise planning of investment
spending, but the official commented that factories have not Fad enough time to
plan such expenditures. He said that the Soviets are preparing to broaden the
experiment widely in 1985 and beyond.==
Ukrainian Work The amount of work time lost in Ukrainian industry and construction in 1983 was
Time Losses Cute 25 percent less than in 1982, according to a recent press article by the Ukraine's
party chief, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy. The article gives further evidence that an
increase in hours worked may have played an important role in the spurt in Soviet
economic growth last year. Growth in Ukrainian industrial production rose,
paralleling the rise for the USSR as a whole. We do not have a figure for work
time lost, but there is no doubt that it is sizable. Therefore, a 25-percent reduction
would substantially raise time on the job.
Whether the reduction of absenteeism has continued in 1984 is not known.
Reporting from the US Embassy in Moscow and emigres has indicated that the
discipline campaign-which also featured police raids on public establishments to
bring AWOL workers back to their jobs-was already petering out by the end of
1983. However, the high rates of growth in labor productivity observed in 1983
have been maintained in the first half of 1984.
Domestic Needs urea fertilizer exports will be limited
Limit Soviet in 1984 because of domestic requirements. In late 1983 the USSR contracted. to
Fertilizer Exports (c) sell a US firm up to 360,000 tons of urea annually for three years. The firm was
guaranteed two semiannual shipments of 120,000 tons each with options to
purchase an additional 60,000 tons during each- half year.
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rate of only 2 percent.
The emphasis on the Food Program apparently has reversed the historical trend of
shortchanging domestic fertilizer deliveries in favor of exports. In 1983, sales for
domestic farm use rose to nearly 23 million tons of fertilizer nutrients, up 14
percent over 1982; shipments to farms during 1976-82 grew at an average annual
Census Age A recent Soviet journal article on rural labor provides data that enable us to
Data Released F_7 determine the size and sex composition of the working-age population' in urban
and rural areas of the USSR. This information fills one of the large gaps in
reporting on the 1979 census. As shown in the table, the total rural population de-
creased by 6.5 percent from 1970 to 1979, but the rural working-age population in-
creased by 3.4 percent. In this period, both the urban population as a whole and its
working-age component rose by more than 20 percent.
Problems at Reactor
Component Plant F_
Total population
241,720
262,436
Urban
135,992
163,586
Of working age
81,364
103,204
Rural
105,729
98,850
The article also notes the regional variation in the growth of the rural working-age
population, with Central Asia and Azerbaijan showing the greatest gains and the
RSFSR, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic republics registering declines. The
number of rural males and females of working age had equalized because the
share of males in rural areas increased between 1970 and 1979. Roughly 65
percent of all rural workers work in agriculture.
unlikely to meet its production goal for next year.
' Males 16 through 59 and females 16 through 54. F__~
the main production building has founda-
tion problems and that major repairs are probably necessary. The plant is
scheduled to produce the major components for six reactors by the end of next year
and to be the principal producer of these components by the end of the decade. The
time needed to bring the plant into full production cannot be determined, but it is
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Viewpoint
The "War Danger" Thesis
in Soviet Policy
and Propaganda
Soviet statements on the growing danger of war have
received increasing attention in the West and have
been depicted largely as responses to US INF deploy-
ments. The "war danger" thesis, however, antedates
the Reagan administration. Its promulgation and
subsequent amplification by some Soviet leaders may
be designed (1) to provide advance justification for
large and possibly risky actions that the Soviets intend
to take or (2) to serve a comprehensive strategy of
intimidating Western publics and governments, indoc-
trinating the Soviet Armed Forces, and persuading
Soviet society of the need for increased discipline and
harder work for the public good. Alternatively, the
various Soviet campaigns on the danger of war may
be no more than posturing and may reflect the
leadership's inability to devise a coherent strategy to
cope with external threats and internal needs.
Origins
The thesis of the increased danger of war originated
in a resolution adopted by the Central Committee at a
plenary meeting on 23 June 1980. Earlier, the author-
itative Soviet position had been that the danger of war
had been pushed back. This thesis survived wide
fluctuations in US-Soviet relations during the 1970s.
Although these ups and downs were reflected in
Soviet assessments of the international situation, the
basic line throughout the decade was that relations
were governed by detente (which had to be strength-
ened and made irreversible).'
This "optimistic" line failed to survive the sharp
worsening of US-Soviet relations in the year following
the 1979 Vienna summit:
.O There was a confrontation over the Soviet brigade in
Cuba.
c Congress failed to ratify SALT II.
o Iran's taking of American hostages created a risk of
a confrontation between the USSR and the United
States in this area.
e The USSR invaded Afghanistan, and the United
States adopted strong measures in reprisal.
c The USSR expressed strong concern about increas-
ing US reliance on "the China card."
o NATO decided to deploy new US nuclear missiles
in Europe to counter the heightened Soviet interme-
diate-range nuclear threat to NATO.
On 23 June 1980, the Central Committee resolution
entitled "On the International Situation and the
Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union" made the follow-
ing formal pronouncement:
In the present situation, when the adventuristic
actions of the United States and its accomplices
have increased the danger of war, the plenary
session instructs the Politburo of the Central
Committee to steadfastly continue the course of
the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses.
' There were variations on this theme. That the danger of war
remained had been particularly emphasized by military figures,
while political leaders often added that war could be eliminated
from the life of man.
25X1
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At the same time, the plenary session believes
that the intrigues of imperialism and other
enemies of peace require constant vigilance and
the all-round strengthening of the defense capa-
bility of our state, in order to thwart imperial-
ism's plans for achieving military superiority
and establishing a world diktat.... (Emphasis
added.) 2
In addition to US "adventuristic actions," the Central
Committee called attention to two other sources of the
increased war danger: NATO's adoption of a course
"aimed at disrupting the current military equilibri-
um" and US-Chinese rapprochement "on an anti-
Soviet basis." The Soviets later stopped citing US-
Chinese rapprochement as a source of the war danger,
but said that US "aggressive" actions and the NATO
"military buildup" were feeding on each other.
The principal Soviet concern evidently was NATO's
military buildup. According to Foreign Minister An-
drey Gromyko, "the root cause" of the worsened
international situation was a shift in NATO's military
policy following the Vienna summit. While the hard-
ening of the Carter administration's policy toward the
USSR doubtless played a role, the decisive factor in
the Soviet shift on the war danger evidently was
NATO's plans for strengthening its military forces,
particularly plans for new INF deployments, which
Gromyko criticized elsewhere in this speech.'
Consequences
The new tenet on the increased danger of war evident-
ly was meant not to serve a specific, limited objective,
but rather to reorient thinking about world affairs and
Soviet foreign policy. Consequently, its implications
for security policy were not spelled out, but remained
to be developed in accordance with the evolving
international situation. On the level of propaganda,
the resolution provided authoritative guidance on the
worsened international situation to Soviet institutions
(including the massive propaganda apparatus), Com-
munist Party members, Soviet society, and foreign
movements subject to Soviet influence.
2 Pravda, 24 June 1980.
Speech to the plenary meeting of the 35th session of the United
Nations General Assembly, 23 September 1980.
The resolution nevertheless had certain immediate
consequences. Domestic advocates of controversial
policies had to take account of the new line on the war
danger. It provided the military with powerful ammu-
nition. It placed others, such as advocates of increased
resources for consumption or civilian investment, on
the defensive. The new tenet also provided the basis
for a campaign to alert the Soviet people to the
seriousness of the worsening international situation,
although it did not lead to calls for popular sacrifice.
Finally, it fostered a campaign to heighten West
European fears of international tensions in the after-
math of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, portray-
ing these tensions as a consequence of US policies.
Variations on the Theme
While the top political leadership was agreed on the
need to make a public reassessment of the internation-
al situation, the leaders evidently lacked a consensus
on its policy implications. Brezhnev in particular
seemed reluctant to abandon the policies he had
fostered in the 1970s. His adoption of the war danger
tenet opened him to pressures for change in Soviet
security policy, but he appeared to resist them. One
possible implication that could be drawn from the war
danger thesis was the need for caution in areas of
possible confrontation with the United States. Pono-
marev, the party official who most frequently dis-
cussed the war danger, did on occasion link it to
Soviet "restraint."
Yuriy Andropov, at least in his capacity as KGB
head, probably welcomed the war danger thesis inas-
much as it could be used to justify raising the barriers
between Soviet citizens and foreigners. (Indeed, such
barriers have been raised gradually, including the
abolition of direct long-distance calls between the
USSR and foreign countries.) Andropov, both then
and later, seemed animated by a sense of urgency in
treating the war danger: "Every week, every day lost
for attainment of agreement increases the nuclear
danger."' He took the lead in questioning the motives
of the Reagan administration and its capacity to
control events. After leaving the KGB to enter the
? Krasnaya zvezda, 4 May 1983.
Pravda, 25 June 1982.
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Central Committee Secretariat, Andropov subscribed
to the most extreme Soviet assessment yet of the war
danger: "Actions of US imperialism place the world
on the brink of nuclear conflict, which represents a
threat to all mankind."5 This view was explicitly
contradicted in the Soviet press by high Soviet leaders
both before and after Andropov subscribed to it,
suggesting that it was a contentious issue.6 Defense
Minister Dmitriy Ustinov later supported Andropov's
position, asserting that the "insane actions" of the
imperialists had "brought the world to the brink of
universal nuclear catastrophe."' Like Andropov, Us-
tinov stressed the deliberate character of the imperial-
ist circles' preparations "to unleash a new world
war."8
In mid-1983 there was a crescendo of warnings about
the increasing war danger, including varying formula-
tions by virtually the entire Politburo. Chernenko
seemed less preoccupied with the urgency of the
danger than a group that included Andropov, Ustinov,
and Gromyko. It was as though the Soviet leaders
manipulated a metaphorical clock like the one the
Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences has employed: some
periodically advanced the minute hand, while others
resisted these advances. In the aftermath of the
campaign of warnings, Ustinov complained that
"leaders of the NATO bloc have in no way reacted"
to the warnings-the INF deployment had gone
forward. As a result, according to Gromyko in his
election speech, "the danger of war has increased
substantially."' The Soviet atomic clock had once
more inched forward toward midnight.
Foreign and Domestic Reactions
There clearly has been a shift in recent years in mass
attitudes toward the war danger and, to a lesser
degree, in the attitudes of governmental leaders.
What Soviet propaganda has contributed to this shift
must be conjectural, but it was probably considerable.
' The head of the Soviet Government, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov,
had earlier denied "that the world has been closer to the brink of a
worldwide conflagration in the past two years." (Izvestiya, 3 June
1983.) Andropov's contention was subsequently contradicted by
Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the Central Committee's
International Department.
'Pravda, 9 May 1983.
Krasnaya zvezda, September 1983.
Izvestiya, 28 February 1984.
Still, it may be questioned whether this propaganda
campaign will have the effect on Western policy that
the Soviet leaders intend unless it is supplemented by
strong and perhaps risky actions needed to elevate
substantially existing fears.
The extensive domestic Soviet propaganda on the war
danger probably has strongly influenced popular atti-
tudes. This conjecture is supported by a Radio Free
Europe-Radio Liberty survey of 3,000 Soviet travel-
ers to the West, which showed that more than half (56
percent) believed the danger of nuclear war had
increased over the past few years. (Roughly one-
quarter denied such an increase; the remainder had no
opinion.) The proportion of the sample that believed
the danger of nuclear war had increased rose in the
last four months of 1983, when the Soviet campaign
reached a peak.10
It seems doubtful, as noted above, that the war danger
thesis was intended to induce popular acceptance of
austerity and long work hours, since the war with
which the Soviet people have been threatened is a
catastrophic nuclear war-hardly an inducement to
massive self-sacrifice. The domestic campaign may,
however, have served some diffuse purpose in counter-
ing indiscipline and in tightening the slack that has
become pervasive not only in Soviet society but in the
regime's institutions as well." But one wonders wheth-
er depicting the world as being on the brink of nuclear
catastrophe is the best way to get Soviet people to
work harder. Acknowledging that the international
situation has worsened surely makes sense for this
purpose, but why say that nuclear catastrophe is
drawing closer? Is this sensible propaganda? If not, is
it reasonable to infer that it is simply propaganda?
" This purpose may perhaps be inferred from the report of a
Politburo session which, after observing that Andropov's statement
(on 28 September 1983) showed Soviet determination "to keep the
world from slipping into nuclear war," stated: "Party, trade union,
and Young Communist League organizational and mass political
work with employees must be closely tied to the solution of concrete
economic and political tasks and to the improvement of discipline
and organization in all sectors, and it must actively promote
mobilization of the working people to successfully fulfill their plans
and socialist pledges and to further strengthen the Soviet Union's
economic and defensive might." (Pravda, 8 October 1983.)
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The same questions can be raised about propaganda
on the war danger directed to the Soviet armed forces.
Presumably it does not emphasize the catastrophic
consequences of nuclear war. But Soviet soldiers,
since they live in the Soviet Union, are inevitably
exposed to the thesis that the world is moving toward
nuclear catastrophe. (What they are told on these
subjects might reasonably be a subject for extensive
research.)
Implications of Differing Statements
To what extent does Soviet commentary on the war
danger reflect the leadership's true beliefs, rather
than propaganda designed to influence the beliefs and
actions of others? The formal and authoritative char-
acter of the Central Committee's initial pronounce-
ment argues that it marked an important shift in the
Soviet assessment of the international situation, at the
very least a judgment that it had become more
dangerous than the leadership had thought previous-
ly-probably a judgment that war itself, in one form
or another, had become more likely. Subsequent
amplification of the theme, particularly the earliest
assertions in 1982 that the world was sliding toward
nuclear war or was already on its brink, probably
reflected different judgments about the international
situation and about policies to deal with it. Those who
pushed forward the new tenet and its subsequent
elaboration intended to set a new direction for Soviet
foreign policy, while those who were reluctant to
adopt it tried to hold Soviet foreign policy closer to its
previous course. The disagreement pertained not sim-
ply to the costs and benefits of proposed propaganda
campaigns on the war danger, but also to substantive
questions, such as where the world was headed inde-
pendently of Soviet policies designed to change its
course. The fact that General Secretary Konstantin
Chernenko did not mention the war danger in the
round of leadership election speeches earlier this year
while Gromyko did reflects differences not only about
what Soviet propaganda should be, but also about
what Soviet policy should be.
The most reasonable explanation for Soviet propaga-
tion of the theory of the increasing danger of war, and
of its progressive formulations that have even placed
the world on the brink of nuclear catastrophe, is
simple if taken by itself; yet it.is not necessarily the
correct explanation. Soviet propaganda on the in-
creasing danger of war most readily makes sense if
the Soviet leaders are providing justification in ad-
vance for large and possibly risky actions that they
intend to take-actions that they would claim are
necessary to avert the terrible future that mankind
would otherwise face. (Indeed, the Soviet leaders
provide assurances, along with their warnings, that
the nuclear catastrophe can be averted.) According to
this explanation, the Soviet leaders may see a long-
term danger of war stemming from a worsening of
their relative economic, and later military, position
and a near-term danger stemming from their planned
actions to avert this long-term danger. Their reasons
for providing implicit warning to the West of their
contemplated actions are: the need to prepare Soviet
institutions and Soviet society for the planned actions,
the need to provide a retrospective justification for
what they subsequently will have done, and the wish
to intimidate Western nations and to pressure their
governments to make concessions in negotiations that
may yet obviate the need for aggressive Soviet actions.
The actions contemplated need not be military attacks
or even threats to use military force, but they might.
involve some risk of provoking military hostilities.
They would be designed to produce marked improve-
ments in the Soviet strategic position, which otherwise
might be expected to worsen in the years and decades
ahead.
What most argues against this explanation is our
doubts that this superannuated and seemingly weak
leadership has the will and long-term perspective
necessary to plan and execute such a strategy. Still, it
would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility that the
Soviet leaders are preparing moves to alter the strate-
gic balance.
A second explanation that might be given for the
progressive Soviet warnings of the danger of war is
that they are part of a complicated design to influence
in diverse ways several distinct audiences:
? Western publics are meant to be frightened by the
declaratory Soviet assessment of the war danger.
? Western governments are to be made apprehensive
of forthcoming Soviet actions that would indeed
increase the war danger, hence inclined to appease
the Soviet Union.
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Soviet soldiers are to be indoctrinated in the war
danger so that they will train more effectively to
wage successful war.
The Soviet public is to be made apprehensive that
Western governments harbor plans to unleash war,
so that the people will increase their support of the
government in its demands on society and make
sacrifices on behalf of the public good.
The first two efforts raise few serious problems for the
Soviets, but the third is more problematic, and the
fourth, as noted previously, poses serious problems.
What good can come of telling the Soviet people that
war has drawn closer, will have catastrophic conse-
quences, and will leave no victors? Moreover., the
Soviet people are not being heavily indoctrinated to
make sacrifices in the struggle to avert war or to wage
it successfully. The Soviet people apparently have
become more fearful of war, but it is not clear that the
consequences are what the leaders would want.
A third explanation offers itself. The various Soviet
campaigns on the war danger are not elements in a
comprehensive strategy, but separate strands spun by
a divided leadership that has lost its internal coher-
ence, hence its capacity to devise a coherent strategy.
Consequently, each of the respective propaganda
campaigns on the war danger aimed at the West, at
the Soviet Armed Forces, and at the Soviet people, is
contrived without concern about the others. The
Soviet people are told of the war danger so that they
will become more disciplined and more supportive of
and dependent on the government, but they are not
asked to make sacrifices because they no longer
respond to such appeals. On the contrary, they need to
be promised more consumer goods so that they will
not goldbrick even more than they do now. They hear
about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, a
discordant theme, since this is the line employed to
reassure the West that the USSR is content with
parity and the Soviet leaders can no longer prevent
the Soviet people from hearing what they tell the
West. The Soviet Armed Forces are told that war
with the West is possible, perhaps even likely, since
propaganda about the catastrophic consequences of
nuclear war that is directed at the West has inadver-
tently reached Soviet servicemen and persuaded them
that world war will never happen again. According to
this third explanation, the war danger thesis serves
several distinct aims but does not reflect the leaders'
real beliefs, expectations, or intentions; it is simply a
multipurpose tool of a divided leadership that muddles
along without really knowing what it all adds up to.
This explanation has a certain plausibility in light of
our assessment of the poor quality of Soviet leadership
in recent years, but we should not embrace it too
readily.. The war danger thesis involves serious costs
and risks; it would be lightly adopted.and exploited
only by a leadership that was close to bankruptcy.
Once the war danger has been propagated, it cannot
be readily abandoned domestically without encourag-
ing the Soviet people to relax-which is hardly what
the Soviet leaders want these days.
Where does this examination of alternative explana-
tions leave us? This problem clearly requires more
reflection and analysis than it has yet received. No
one of us would have predicted five years ago that the
Soviet leaders would now be telling the Soviet people
and the. Soviet Armed Forces that the world is close to
the brink of a nuclear war that would have cata-
strophic consequences for humanity. We ought to stop
and ask ourselves why what we did not anticipate has
come about, and try harder to understand what it all
means.
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