LETTER TO WILLIAM WEBSTER FROM ELDON RUDD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000901450021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 12, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Vcutive Secretary
15 Mar 86
STAT
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Report of the
Delegation for Peace
In Central America
June 27 - July 11, 1985
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Cover Photograph
Residents of the town of Perguin in the province of Morazan, El Salvador, and other surrounding towns demonstrated against
the bombings of their homes, schools, health clinics, and other civilians by the Duarte government and the Reagan administration.
The Ei Salvadoreans met with the Peace Delegation in July 1985.
For More Information Contact:
Southern California Coalition for
Peace In Central America
7250 Franklin Ave. #101
Los Angeles, CA. 90046
[phone]
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Contents
Report of the Delegation for Peace
In Central America
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1
The Contadora Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Role in Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
The War in LI Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The War Against iNicar~wua . . . . . . . . I
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2O
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 1
Letter to the American People . . . . . . . . ?7
Throuth Select 1errrhers of
Congress By the I MLN General
Command, Ll Salvador
Interview With Commander . . . . . . . . . . 24
Joaquin Villalohos
Delegation for Peace in . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Central America Members
Delegation for Peace in . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Central America Meetings
and Conversations
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Health Clinic in Perquin, Morazan, El Salvador, destroyed by aerial bombing by the Duarte
Air Force, July 1985.
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The following members of the Delegation for Peace in Central America have
reviewed and signed this report:
? Mr. Aris Anagnos
? Mrs. Carolyn Anagnos
? Ms. Sandra Gladstone
? Dr. Jesus G. Nieto
? Mr. Eli Sandoval
? Ms. Callie Wight
This report was initially prepared and submitted by Margarita S. Studemeister, Latin American specialist
and resource person to the Delegation for Peace in Central America, along with delegates who provided
input in the writing and production of the document.
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Introduction
The Delegation for Peace in Central America visited
Mexico, Honduras, FI Salvador, Nicaragua and Cuba between
June 27 and July 11. 1985. The Delegation was composed
of Hispanic and other civic leaders of Southern California rep-
resenting regional and national organizations concerned about
the increasing military involvement of the United States gov-
ernntent in Central America. Of particular concern to the Dele-
gation was the stagnation of peace initiatives and the strong
emphasis on military solutions to the conflicts in the area.
The Peace Delegation mission consisted of obtaining a gen-
eral assessment of the nature and effects of armed conflicts
and in exploring the willingness of governments and peoples
of Central America to support and implement peaceful solu-
tions. The Peace Delegation arranged a series of meetings,
participated in social events and attended public ceremonies
in Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Cuba. The
Delegation met with many government and opposition leaders,
political parties. religious, peasant, labor, human rights and
media groups in order to gather the widest possible range of
opinions.
The Delegation members investigated several key ques-
tions These were: Has the Contadora process advanced to-
wards the demilitarization of Central America? Do Hondurans
approve the U.S. militarization of their country'? Has the
Duarte government opened up a democratic process for the
political particiaption of previously excluded sectors? Are the
armed opposition forces in EI Salvador sincerely interested in
resuming dialogue with the government of President Duarte?
What are the effects of the war waged by the U.S.-backed
contras against Nicaragua'? Is Cuba promoting conflicts in Cen-
tial America'' Is the cause of the conflict an East-West confron-
tation or are there other causes? Is U.S. policy towards Central
America enhancing the possibility of a peaceful settlement to
the Conflicts?
While traveling in Central America, the Delegation learned
about a series of actions taken by our government that severely
hinder on-going peace initiatives in the region.
For instance,
The House of Representatives approved the Foley-Conte
amendment authorizing the use of U.S. troops if Nicaragua
"acquired advanced jet fighter plans, allowed the introduc-
tion of nuclear weapons, was involved in a hijacking to
which the United States felt it was necessary to respond.
or to counter what was termed 'a clear and present danger
of attack' against the United States or its allies." New
York Times. June 19, 1985). this vote was qualified by
Rep. Ted Weiss tD-NY) as a "dangerous blueprint for
American involvement." The Peace Delegation was re-
minded of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution which
marked President Lyndon B. Johnson's :stepped up involve-
ment in Vietnam.
Also on June 27, the New York Times reported that the
F.B.I. trained a special unit of the Salvadoran police to
investigate human rights abuses, and that the U.S. trained
a special counter-terrorist unit, and commented, "The
moves appear to be part of growing official American in-
volvement in the training and supervision of police forces
[in EI Salvador], despite Congressional restrictions on di-
rect American aid to foreign police units under most cir-
cumstances." In the case of El Salvador, special exceptions
were granted by Congress.
The Peace Delegation was startled to read about Presi-
dent Reagan's intentions to order a U.S. air strike on areas
held by the armed opposition forces in El Salvador (News-
week, July 15. 1985).
On July 8, President Reagan characterized Nicaragua
and Cuba as "terrorist states" (New York Times, July 9,
1085 ).
According to the July II Excelsior, President Duarte
offered to conclude an alliance with Honduras against
Nicaragua. signaling another attempt to prepare conditions
towards the regionalization of the conflict and thus further
reinforcing the Central American sentiment that such an
eventuality is to be expected.
The Peace delegation hopes that this report will help Amer-
ican citizens and po licvnrakers to better understand the Central
American conflict and the United States' rile in the region
and, in this way, contribute to the on-going efforts for peace
in the hemisphere.
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The Contadora Process
"It's Easy To Get In,
Hard To Get nut."
The Contadora process was initiated in January of 1983 by
Mexico, V'iC/uel:r, Colombia and Panama as an efhot to reduce
tensions and to advance peaceful solutions to conflicts in the Central
American region. The history of U.S. military interventions in the
inter it affairs of Latin American countries is one factor that has
led the Contadora nations to take a strong stand against intervention.
Mcsi, o's Foreign Relations Minister, Mr. Bernardo Sepulveda Amor.
explained to the Peace Delegation that Mexico was "extremely con-
Ccrn;d'' over the increased militarization and possible direct interven-
tion by the United States government in Central America. He cm-
phasiicd that peace in the region is in the national security interests
of Mexico, the Central American countries and ultimately the United
State
In Spring of last year, Contadora nations committed over one
hundred technical advisors and diplomats to work on a compromise
draft which the four Contadora countries endorsed on September 7,
1984 The Contadora draft agreement includes measures which would
halt the arms buildup in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, check the
growth of armed forces in the region, end external support to insur-
gent movements in Central America, send foreign military advisers
honic from Honduras. Nicaragua and 1.1 Salvador, control nrilitarv
numcuvcrs, and close down U.S. military bases in Central America.
Morcovcr, for the first tinge, the Contadora draft agreement addressed
the i,suc of national reconciliation.
II he Contadora document needed the approval of the Live Central
American nations. According to President Daniel Ortega of
Nicaragua, the U.S. government had pressed Nicaragua throtwh the
^lani,myllo talks, which began in June 1984, to sunp++rt Contadoa.
To the surprise of the !Reagan Administration, Nicaragua agreed to
sign on Scptcnrher 21 , 1954. the United States g?vcrnnycnt, how-
ever, quickly convinced its Central American allies--1,I Salvador,
Honduras and Costa Rica -to raise technical objections on the issues
of Conuo1 and verification that iffcctcd U S. military activities in
the region. Esen when the Contadora group presented a revised draft
agreement based on these objections, Nicaragua was still the only
county willing to accept. This impasse led the Contadora nations
r'cently to change the discussion to the topic of armament issues
and security affairs, according to President Ortega.
Latin American Proposal for
Peace in Central America
Mr. Salvador Samayoa, member of the Political-Diplomatic Corn-
mission of the Faiahu11(10 Marti Front for National Liberation and
the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FMLN-FDR) the Salvadoran op-
position forces, warned that the implementation of specific measures
contained in the Contadora draft agreement could lead to "political
errors". For example, the absence of specific criteria defining legiti-
mate forces in the internal conflicts of Central American countries
affect the process and perspectives of the national reconciliation meas-
ures.
Fragile Peace Process
Mr. Sepulveda considered that the peace process in Central Airier-
ica is "fragile" at the present tittle. He cited the cumbersome discus-
sion of the Contadora draft agreement, the breakdown of the peace
talks between the Duarte government and the Salvadoran opposition
as well as the U.S. -Nicaragua Manzanillo talks, the financial support
for the contras, the economic embargo against Nicaragua and the
overall militarization of Central America by the Reagan Administra-
tion.
In Cuba, the Peace delegation learned that the govcrnynent of Fidel
Castro supports the Contadora process and considers the peacefully
negotiated settlement of Central American conflict, not only urgent
but the only viable alternative. Moreover, President Castro pointed
out that the enormous external debts plaguing Latin American coun-
tries, which they are unable to pay off, present a new situation which
necessitates a voluntary adjustment by all parties involved in order
to avoid further turmoil and upheaval in Latin America
The Spanish Ambassador to Honduras. Fernando (ionialcz
Camilla, also perceived the Contadora process as an appropriate alter-
native to the military course promoted by the Reagan Administration:
lie identified problems of underdevelopment, the lack of basic free-
doms, century-old social structures and the lack of adequate resources
as elements that demand social change.
Ambassador Gonzalez explained to the Peace Delegation that a
military solution to Central American conflicts not only risks escalat-
ing and regionalizing a war that has an uncertain outcome but also
postpones social change indefinitely at a great cost for humanity.
In reference to the uncertain outcome of a U.S. direct interven-
tioin, Mr. Sepulveda stated: "It's easy to get in, hard to get out.'
Central Americans in general approve of the Contadora process.
According to Dr. Carlos Sosa Cocllo, an Inovation and Unity Party
Congressional candidate in Honduras, the Contadora peace initiative
represents a Latin American proposal to achieve peace in Central
America. He criticized the abstract level of the proposals contained
in the draft agrenicnt and the insufficient leverage which the Contad-
ora nations have to pressure the United States into concrete support
for the draft agreement He believes tint the endorsement of stronger
!!;uums such as West Gcrrany, France, Spain and Japan could rein-
force the initiative xis-a-vLs the United Slab's.
I)r- President Ortega and Mr. Sepulveda, among others,
uiiders, ii .-d that the abstract nature of the Contadora distusions con-
trast ah.+rl,ly with the accelerated militarization of Central AincilLa.
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U.S. hole In Honduras
"The United States Government
Will Supply the Weapons, and
Hondurans Will Provide the Dead."
In 1981 Hondurans elected their first civilian president in a de-
Cade, yet the military seems to continue to hold power in the country.
It has been very receptive to U.S. military assistance and presence
in Honduras. For instance, U.S. military aid to Honduras rose from
S4,0 million in 1980 to S77.5 million in 1984; the U.S. has either
upgraded or built new at least 10 airstrips in Honduras. (..S. observa-
tion planes based at one of these bases, La Palntcrola, fly datlti over
Nicaragua and Id Salvador, while sophisticated radar scans installed
by the United States monitor air and sea traffic throughout Honduras.
F1 Salvador and Nicaragua. The United States government has inves-
ted S32 million in the construction of the Regional ('enter for Military
Training where Honduran, and until recently, Salvadoran, troops re-
ceive instruction. While the actual number of U.S. military personnel
stationed in Honduras fluctuates, over 10,(X() U.S. troops participated
in the recently held Big Pine III joint military exercises. The Hondu-
ran Army has tacitly opened its territory to the 15,(XX) U S.-hacked
contra forces, which launch attacks into Nicaragua with the objective
of destabilizing and overthrowing that duly-elected government.
One week before the Peace delegation arrived in Central America,
it U.S, Army twin rotor CH-47 Chinook helicopter flew twice front
l'.S-built I.a Palmerola air has(- in Honduras into northeastern EI
Salvador to recover downed Salvadoran UH-111 helicopters. Spokes-
men for the Reagan Administration, according to the July 3
Washington Post, said it was "the first time a U.S.-piloted aircraft
has been used in it recovery mission during the five-year Salvadoran
Civil war." The Peace Delegation viewed it videotape footage of this
operation filmed by the FMLN Radio Vencerenurs Communication
System during the Delegation visit to Moraran province in EI Sal-
vador.
the Regional Military Training Center in Puerto Castilla on the Atlan-
tic ('oast. '['his constituted an affront to the majority of Hondurans
who consider F:I Salvador their traditional enemy. Dr. Edgardo Ca-
ceres of the Liberal Democratic Revolutionary Movement, Mr. Fer-
nando Garcia of the Central American Economic Integration Bank
and Dr. Enrique Aguilar Paz of the Inovation and Unity Party agreed
that this situation has deprived Honduras of its national sovereignty
and threatens its national security and interests. The Unitary Federa-
tion of Honduran Workers' leadership blamed President Suazo Cor-
dova's government for subjecting Honduras to the objectives of the
United St,utes government
Hondurans feel that their country could he pulled into it war they
do not want- Mr. Caceres and Mr. Garcia recalled that the Honduran
Army participated in the 1954 overthrow of a progressive and refor-
mist Guatemalan government and in the 1965 intervention of the
Dominican Republic, both ominous precedents that were organized
by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The majority of Hondurans with whom the Peace delegation met
are of the opinion that their country could once again he drawn into
a war as a result of the traditional antagonism with El Salvador over
the century-old border dispute or even more likely, in the context
of the contras' unrestrained activities within Honduras and against
Nicaragua. Mr. Garcia feared that the Reagan Administration could
follow the precedents set in 1954 and 1965 by using the Honduran
Army to fight its war in Central America. In this way U.S. youth
would he spared the bloody participation in yet another military con-
flict. One leader of the Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers ex-
pressed the commonly held fear of so many Hondurans this way:
['he United States government will supply the weapons, and the
Hondurans will provide the dead.''
" ltonduras Is A Military
Occupied Territory."
In Tegucigalpa, the Peace Delegation had the unique opportunity
one evening to meet with representatives of political parties, women's
v muth and human rights organizations, peasant groups and labor
union, and independent Hondurans. The meeting's host explained to
the Delegation that it was the first time that so many individuals
and organizations with differing political perspectives gathered to-
gether to discuss U.S. involvement in their country. They, in turn,
stated that their overwhelming desire for a peaceful solution to proh-
lenms in Central America and their deep concern over increasing U.S.
involvement in Honduras brought them together. ()n these issues,
their positions oppose President Suazo Cordova's collaboration with
the Reagan Administration.
''Honduras is a n';htarily occupied territory'' hegan Dr Juan Al-
ntendarez, former Rector of the National Autonomous University of
ltonduras. Three armies operate in Honduran territory: the U.S.. the
Honduran and the U.S.-financed contra forces Until September
1984. Salvadoran troops-"the soldiers who massacred Hondurans''
in the 1969 war with El Salvador, according to a Unitary Federation
of Honduran Workers' leaderAcre being trained by the U.S. in
Pat_e (0
Hondurans Differ On the
Threat of Nicaragua
Dr. Ramon Villeda of the Honduran Foreign Relations Ministry
heI eves that Nicaragua has an expansionist policy in the region. Dr.
Sosa explained that Nicaragua cannot affort to export revolution The
Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers considered that Nicaragua
is not a threat to Honduras. Mr. German Leitzelar, Congressional
candidate for the Inovation and Unity Party, stated that from a
geopolitical perspective, the Reagan Administration reinforces Hon-
duras militarily in order to prepare it to respond to a U.S. perceived
threat from Nicaragua's "expansionism", but that it is not being pre-
pared to counteract aggression from Honduras' traditional enemy, El
Salvador. Mr. Conrado Napky of the Liberal Unity Front, said that
Honduras enemy is the population explosion in El Salvador which
stimulated F.I Salvador's territorial claims against Honduras. Dr.
Roberto Aviles, from the private enterprise sector, explained that El
Salvador expands by conquering territory, in reference to the 1969
Honduras-El Salvador border war. Mr. Efrain Bu Giron, presidential
candidate for the Bu Giron Movement and President of the Congress,
talked about the contra presence in Honduras which could provoke
it border incident that might spark a Honduras-Nicaragua war.
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U.S. Role In Honduras
"One Less Refugee, One
More Hand."
,Ihc contra forces in Honduras are based in several area,, that
border Nicaragua. These areas coincide geographically with refugee
camps administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and inhabited by Nicaraguans or Miskito Indians from
Nicaragua. Several Peace Delegation members visited one refugee
camp near Danli. The male head of one household explained that
for two years his family had lived in the mountains of Honduras"
and that they would not return to Nicaragua until the current govern-
ment is toppled. Nicaraguan refugees were free to come and go from
the camp, a situation which contrasted sharply with the closed and
fenced-in camps for Salvadoran refugees. According to two Honduran
sources who prefer to remain anonymous, these refugees are the social
base of the nearby contra forces. One of the sources explained that
contra men visit relatives living in the camp and recruit young men
into their ranks under the slogan "One less refugee, one more hand."
Desperate Social Conditions
One after another Hondurans described the stark social conditions
in their country. The Organization of Women for Peace explained
that social and educational programs have been cut to allow for a
larger defense budget which compliments adequately the strategic oh-
ieetives of the United States government in the region. This has inm-
pacted the funding for abandoned children and resulted in the closure
of orphanages. Children roam the streets and even the very young
are being arrested for delinquency. Dr. Almendarcz commented that
prostitution is becoming commonplace, especially around the U.S.
military bases, and is accompanied by sexually transmitted diseases.
Crime has increased dramatically according to Mr. Leitzclar, some
committed by contra forces' members. Eighty-live out of every 100
children and half of all pregnant women arc malnourished, con-
sequently 1 /6th of all children are retarded. Ms. Luisc Druke, Deputy
Representative and Interim Representative of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, explained to the Peace Delegation that
with internation food programs the refugee population receives a com-
plete diet, which contrasts sharply with the level of malnutrition of
the majority of Hondurans. She admitted that this situation creates
resentment among Hondurans. Dr. Ramon Custodio, President of the
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America
declared that 57C% of Hondurans live in extreme poverty. The Hondu-
ran Workers' Confederation estimates that unemployment is at 25%
and combined with underemployment, the figure reaches 50%. One
number of the Foreign Relations Ministry described Honduras as,
"one big refugee camp." Since 1981 there has been an increase in
human rights violations. According to the Unitary Federation of Hon-
duran Workers, about 150 labor leaders have been arrested, tortured,
assassinated or disappeared.
The Peace Delegation was unable to meet with President Suazo
Cordova as he was out of town. The diverse political parties, organi-
zations and individuals that met with the Peace Delegation requested
that their message be taken to the people of the United States and
its government. They urged for a political solution to achieve peace
for the benefit of the people of Central America.
Ramon Valladares, Ex-Supreme Court Justice is intervie.
wed by delegate Aris Anagnos.
Family Cabins at United Nations Refugee Camp at Danli.
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The War In El Salvador
"Constructive Criticism of the
Duarte Government ... Is Inter-
rupted by Government Charges
That They Are FMLN Sympathizers."
After a series of elections amidst civil war in El Salvador, the
Christian Democratic Party and its leader Jose Napoleon Duarte are
in power, having won the presidency in 1984 and a majority in the
As.scnthl~ in 1985.
Duarte had previously won the election in 1972, but the military
prev .'nted him from taking office. At that time, Duarte's running mate
was 1)r. Guillermo Ungo, who is currently the exiled leader of the
government's opposition. Duarte was also part of a civilian-military
Junta government in I980-SI. During this period alone, over 30,(XX)
Salvadorans were killed by government forces
Military Occupation of the
University of El Salvador
The Peace Delegation was able to inspect some of the pillage
and destruction of the University of El Salvador campus carried out
in the June 1980 military occupation and described in A University
survives: A report of a Dutch-University Mission to El Salvador,
June 1984: "During the occupation the 35 buildings of the university
were completely stripped of all furnishings, much of which was sint-
plh vandalized and left lying. ... Not only had all the fittings and
cyuipment in all of the laboratories and workshops been destroyed,
but the furniture was out of the lecture rooms and either smashed
or sold. Window, telephone wiring, electrical wiring and fittings,
even sinks and toilets- everything was either destroyed or missing.
Sonic books were left in the central library. Soldiers had defecated
on them after knocking over all the shelves. These books and those
under them were left alone. Valuable old manuscripts disappeared,
reportedly sold to collectors in the United States. The university's
[)uses still stand, but they are wrecks, stripped of any usable parts."
The University returned to function on its campus about a year
ago. Even though the yearly budget is 47 million colones (the official
exchange rate is 2.50 colones per U.S. dollar), the Rector, Dr. Miguel
Angel Parada, indicated to the Peace Delegation that they are still
15 million colones short of budgetary needs. Dr. Parada added that
even though President Duarte has enthusiastically verbalized the need
fix higher education in his country, there has not been sufficient finan-
cial support given. Dr. Parada explained that the repairs and the pur-
chases of new c,luipment and other supplies have been made through
the adjusted higher tuition costs which the students have supported
and g. - iv given the University.
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The War In El Salvador
President Duarte promised during his presidential campaign last
year to bring peace to the country, curb human rights abuses and
bring criminals to trial, and to favor those sectors of society that
pledged their collaboration with his government.
Duarte's electoral victory has restricted the extreme right to the
control of the Judiciary and to minority status in the Legislative As-
scntbly. Although the extreme right appears to have been weakend
by internal divisions and shifting alliances, it continues to exert sig-
nificant pressure on government decision-making. The military,
strengthened in the course of the war and bolstered by U.S. aid,
is able to limit the executive power of the Presidency in order to
guarantee the maintenance of the political, economic and social status
quo. Duarte's base of support seems to be eroding due to his inability
to deliver on his campaign promises, and his growing alignment with
the Salvadoran military. The University of El Salvador research pro-
ject concluded that the Duarte government has not broadened the
democratic process which would allow for the political participation
of previously excluded groups. Dr. Parada added that to the dismay
of the University, the Duarte government had instead leaned more
dangerously to the right thereby making it exceedingly difficult for
these sectors to have faith in the political process. Dr. Parada also
indicated that any constructive criticism of the Duarte government
by the University or other organizations ". . . is interrupted by gov-
ernment charges that they are FMLN sympathizers. This implicitly
sanctions government repression."
Human Rights Violations
A group of 5(X) northern Morazan residents threatened and forced
to abandon their homes and lands by the Army in mid-June, repor-
tedly traveled to San Salvador at the beginning of July to demand
their right to live peacefully and to press for a halt to the bombings,
captures and harassment by the Army. On July 4, the 5(0 refugees
marched from the Cathedral to the Legislative Assembly to present
their demands. The Peace Delegation learned that on their return to
Morazan, some of these families had been captured by government
security forces and charged with being manipulated by the FMLN
into carrying out the protest.
Although the number of reported human rights abuses has some-
what decreased, the brutality has not changed. The Peace Delegation
visited two Mothers' Committees* which have been persecuted over
the years for their defense of human rights. Their offices in San Sal-
vador were ransacked weeks before the Peace Delegation arrived.
They were astounded at President Reagan's partiality on terrorism
and morality in the killing of four Marines in San Salvador on June
19. "What about the over 62,(XX) Salvadorans killed? What about
the bombing of civilians?" they asked. According to Dr. Parada, one
day before the Peace Delegation visited the University of El Salvador,
four tortured bodies were dumped from a moving vehicle in front
of one of the campus entrances. Some bodies were still moving, their
faces unrecognizable. On July 9, at 6:00 a.m. a Mothers' Committee
member was captured by government security forces in civilian dress
and taken to a vehicle where she found her son, a First Infantry
Brigade soldier, who was also made prisoner. She was told to accom-
pany them for an interrogation. At II:00 a.m on the same day,
her home was ransacked. She was released on July 10. Her son's
whereabouts were still unknown. On July 3, when Peace Delegation
members visited the Legal Aid Office of the Archdiocese of San Sal-
vador. their staff mentioned that the 10 people waiting in the office
were there to report disappearances.
Bombing of Civilians
According to the Mothers' Committees and the Legal Aid Office,
international laws are violated when civilians are accused of being
sympathizers of the FMLN and treated as if they were FMLN person-
nel and therefore, legitimate military targets of the Salvadoran Army.
Furthermore, a new category of human rights violations, the bombing
of civilians, has increased dramatically. The Peace Delegation learned
that villagers of northern Morazan were heavily bombed, before the
Salvadoran Army moved in on June 14. Residents of Pancho
Quemado, Carrizal, Los Patios, EI Mono, Sabanctas and
Nahuaterique were threatened over the next five days with renewed
bombing and accused of being FMLN sympathizers. The Army pro-
ceeded to order the destruction of their crops and food, and forced
the 2.000 residents to abandon their homes and land. The group's
representatives met with the Peace Delegation and pleaded for support
for their demands to live peacefully.
Mothers' Committees for the Political Pnsoners. assassinated and disappeared "Oscar
Arnolfo Romero- and "Marianclla Garcia Villas
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The War In El Salvador
P
Resurgence of Protests,
Demonstrations and Strikes
The overall deteriorating situation in El Salvador has led to the
resurgence of protests, demonstrations and strikes. These activities
arc carried out at great risk. While the Peace Delegation was in EI
Salvador, paid ads from religious, professional and cooperative or-
gani/ations outlined their particular demands and urged for social
change as well as for the continuation of dialogue towards a
negotiated settlement of the war. The Cooperative Associations of
Husbandry and Agricultural Production (ACOPAI). supportive of the
Duarte government in the past, stated in their paid ad:
"I In order to solve the grave problems that the country has,
we have to make all efforts possible to eradicate the internal causes-
the social injustices, the margination and the subjugation that the Sal-
~adoran people have traditionally been victims of-that motivated the
frustration of broad sectors of the population. . . .
"2. It is worthwhile to mention that our government and people
need the international solidarity in the economic and technological
aspects. But this solidarity must be based on the joint effort of all
the people of the governments of the world, on mutual respect and
reciprocal decency and not he based on use of power over the power-
less.
" 3. We call upon the government to continue with the efforts
to achieve it true national dialogue towards peace and we reiterate
our total support to the Church as the mediator in this effort. Only
in this way will we he able to overcome the crisis which we are
suffering." (In La Presna Grafrea. July 8, 1985)
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The War In El Salvador
FMLN ('ommandantes, July 4, 1985, Perquin, Morazan.
Unprecedented Interview
With FMLN Commanders
I'he Peace Delegation, accompanied by members of the interna-
tional pros, had the unprecedented opportunity to interview senior
FMLN commanders in an area of Morazan province under the military
jurisdiction of the FMLN on July 4 and 5. Before and after the trip,
the Peace Delegation attempted unsuccessfully to meet with president
Duarte and the Army. General Blandon, the Salvadoran Armed Forces
Chief of Stafl, proposed a meeting on July 4. that conflicted with
prey iously made anrangenients to visit the armed opposition forces
in Mora/an Province. The purpose of the visit to Morazan, taken
at great risk for the peace Delegation, the press and the FMI.N, was
to assess the willingness of the FMLN to continue dialogue and
negotiations with the Duarte government and to obtain their view
of the general situation in F'.I Salvador,
the Peace Delegation was received by about 800 people marching
with placards and chanting slogans which voiced their demands to
stop the bombing and strafing of their villages, to stop the captures,
harrassment and forced evacuation of villagers by the Salvadoran
Arne . and for clinics, medicines and schools. The people, the peace
Delegation and the press gathered in the town square of Perquin to
participate in a mass offered by Father Miguel Ventura. In his sermon
he told about the abuses that the Morazan residents are subject to
by the Army, and reiterated that the Salvadoran people yearn to live
in peace and justice. He called upon all the "have faith in the midst
of all the trials" and comforted listeners by saying that "God walks
on our side.."
"Father Miguel Ventura told about the abuses that the
Morazan residents are subject to by the Army . . ."
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The War In El Salvador
.m 777-7
Rebel message to Duarte soldiers, Perquin, El Salvador: "Brother Soldier: We do not receive pay.
We do. not play with life for a future for the poor, and not for a miserable salary. You, too, are
poor. Desert!
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The War In El Salvador
i low Can You Be Involved In
A War and Not Expect Casualties?"
The Peace Delegation held a formal interview with Commanders
Jorge Shafik Handal (Salvadoran Communist Party) and Joaquin Vil-
lalohos (People's Revolutionary Anny), of the General Command of
the FMLN, and FMLN Commanders Facundo Guardado (Popular
Liheration Forces), Lucio Rivera (Salvadoran Communist Party), Leo
Cabral (National Resistance), Miguel Mendoza (Central American
Workers Revolutionary Party) and Carlos Argueta and Mercedes del
Carmen Letona (People's Revolutionary Army), some of whom par-
ticipated in the la Palma and Ayagualo peace talks in October and
November 1984. Their analysis contained the tollowing relevant
points:
I . The FMLN forces are increasingly united and follow common
strategy and tactics. Contrary to the opinion that their alliance with
the political arm of the opposition the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (FDR)---is crumbling, the FMLN leaders explained that the na-
ture of the relationship and the heterogeneous composition of the
political coalition allowed for a wide range of opinions.
2. The FMLN is in a process of consolidating their strongholds
over 1/3 of the national territory, explained Commander Joaquin Vil-
lalohos. Their strategy over the next year includes the expansion of
their theater of military operations throughout the country and particu-
larly in the urban areas where the government continues to hold con-
trol. This expansion, he explained, will he achieved by developing
local forces and a support network of sympathizers.
Commandante Shafik with captured U.S. weapon.
3 According to the FMI.N, the Duarte government legitimizes
and cover,, up the U.S. counterinsurgency plans which emphasize
the military buildup and operations against the FMLN and their social
base. Duarte's hold and renewed promises for agrarian reform,
economic development and peace are used to weaken support for
the opposition forces, and so far, have been empty promises,
explained Commander Leo Cabral.
4. Over the last five years the U.S. government has escalated
its involvement and support of the war. Therefore, its military person-
nel stationed in El Salvador faces greater chances of suffering casual-
ties. Commander Shafik Handal illustrated: "The pilot drops bombs
during the day. goes home and takes a good shower and then goes
out to dinner..." lie asked: "How can you he involved in a war
and not expect to suffer casualties?" The FMLN considers U.S. mili-
tary personnel, and specifically the four U.S. Marines killed in San
Salvador on June 19, as legitimate military targets. He explained that
the Reagan Administration will always find pretexts to define the
FMLN as "terrorists". However, if terrorism is defined as "any action
that attacks defenseless civilians", then he concluded, by specifically
mentioning the bombing of civilians, that the Reagan Administration
is responsible for promoting State terrorism in FEl Salvador. The
FMLN commanders agreed that they were determined "to struggle
politically and militarily" against the Duarte government, and "if nec-
essary, although we do not want it, against the intervention of U.S.
troops. We do not want an intervention . . . neither do we fear it."
5. Commander Facundo Cuardado, who had participated in the
peace talks in 1984, reiterated the FMLN's sincere interest in continu-
ing the dialogue in order to create basic conditions towards negotia-
tions first, and then to address the need to overcome the internal
causes of the conflict in EI Salvador. He stated that President Duarte
is interested in achieving the surrender of the FMLN and is promoting
dialogue in order to guarantee the continuation of U.S. assistance
to prop up the deteriorating national crisis According to the FMLN,
the accelerated escalation of the war by the Reagan Administration
and the Duarte government signals their unwillingness to reach a
political settlement of the war. The FMLN explained that their con-
crete proposals of date and place to hold a third meeting had not
been answered by President Duarte.
6. Commander Joaquin Villalobos presented a comprehensive
military analysis to the Peace delegation which focused on the de-
velopment of the FMLN forces strategy over the 1981-85 period.
The number of casualties inflicted to the government forces has been
maintained over the 1983-85 period at about 4(X) per month. Accord-
ing to Commander Villalohos the casualty ratio is 4 Salvadoran sol-
diers to I FMLN combatant.
7. One of the Commanders stated that there are actually 300 U.S.
military advisors in El Salvador. However, the vast majority of these
are disguised as businessmen and civilian experts.
The Peace Delegation saw U.S. weapons and equipment used by
the FMLN forces providing security in Morazan. When Delegation
members asked whether they received arms from Nicaragua, they
laughed and said there was no need because they can even acquire
them by bribing the military, in addition to capturing weapons in
operations against the Salvadoran Army.
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The War In El Salvador
FMLN Guerrillas sing at Mass by Father Miguel Ventura
in Perquin, Morazan.
Civilians in Perquin, Morazan told the American delegation
that The bombing causes terror and leads people to leave
their home." The people pleaded for the Salvadorean Air
Force and President Reagan to stop the bombings.
The FMLN blew up the main bridge over the Torola river
linking Northern Morazan to the rest of El Salvador.
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The War In El Salvador
Civilian Air War Casualties
The Peace Delegation visited the nearby town of San Fernando,
totally destroyed and inhospitable after several bombings and Army
sweeps last year. The Delegation members listened to the testimony
of a woman who lost her granddaughter when a bomb fell on her
home.
Peace Delegation members were appalled by the poverty, squalor
and despondency of the la Cruz refugee camp outside San Salvador.
inhabited by about 2,(XX) refugees. The part-time teachers explained
that learning was hampered by the war psychosis that most children
suffered and by the limited resources derived From budget cuts in
education.
In El Salvador, the official unemployment and underemployment
rate is estimated at 60%. Consumer buying power has diminished
54`4 over the last five years, whereas most salaries have remained
frozen since December 1980. About 50%% of the national budget is
dedicated to the war effort. (Christian Science Monitor, July 1,
1985).
The Peace Delegation visit to El Salvador demonstrated the
urgency of stopping the escalation of the war and of continuing the
dialogue process initiated in October 1984.
Two women who provided testimony to international press
and delegation of bombings of San Fernando by Duarte
Air Force.
Church destroyed by Duarte Air Force 1985, San Fernando in Morazan province.
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The War Against Nicaragua
"Nicaragua Does Not Need An
Intervention From the United
States, the Soviet Union, Cuba,
or Any Other Country, Nicaragua
Alone Can Resolve Its Own Problems."
Cardinal Obando Y Bravo
As early as February 1982, Nicaragua began to address concerns
raised by the Reagan Administration. Under Mexico's auspices,
Nicaragua offered to sign non-aggression pacts with its neighbors to
guarantee a policy of non-alignment, a mixed economy and political
pluralism. Throughout 1982, Nicaragua repeatedly urged the U.S.
to name a negotiating team and to set a date for it meeting. The
Reagan Administration responded that the Contadora regional peace
initiative was the proper forum to discuss these issues, not bilateral
talks. In late 1983, Nicaragua submitted several draft treaty proposals
to the Contadora group. These proposals included mutual non-aggres-
sion pacts among Central American nations, provisions prohibiting
foreign military h.uses and Salvadoran opposition facilities in
Nicaragua, provisions for on-site inspection and penalties in case of
violations, an arms freeze, armed forces limitation, and measures for
implementing "democratic, representative and pluralistic systems" in
the region.
Nicaragua's Concessions
Since No'embcr 1983 Nicaragua began to iniplcmcnt some meas-
ures independently. It sent home Cuban advisers and Salvadoran op-
position leaders, opened up dialogue with the opposition, moved the
elections to an earlier date and relaxed censorship. The Peace Delega-
tion saw an array of slogans painted on the walls of Managua and
Leon by the opposition parties as well as opposition bill hoards dot-
ting the highways. Nicaragua also passed an amnesty program which
has become increasingly popular with the Miskito Indians and accord-
ing to Ms. Druke, Deputy Representative and Interim Representative
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in
Tegucigalpa, to a lesser extent with Nicaraguans in refugee camps
in Honduras. She explained to the Peace Delegation that those who
wish to avail themselves of the amnesty program have to do so con-
fidentially with UNHCR staff, since they are subjected to threats from
refugees who oppose the Nicaraguan government. Another Honduran
source who works in the area where Nicaraguan Miskito Indians are
settled in the Moskitia added that most of them would avail them-
selves of the amnesty and that they are kept misinformed, are abused
and forced into fighting by the contras. One hundred refugees have
returned this year, representing a 10017( increase over last year, ac-
cording to Ms. Druke. There are currently about 6(X)-7(X) who have
expressed their desire to be repatriated. Ms. Druke confirmed that
the Miskito Indians are safe upon their return to Nicaragua.
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega with Delegate Mem-
bers Dr. Armando Navarro, Samuel Maestas, and Dr. Jess
Nieto.
Manzanillo Talks
During the summer of 1984, Nicaragua began bilateral talks with
the Reagan Administration in Manzanillo, Mexico According to Pres-
ident Ortega, the talks were to get Nicaragua to sign the final Contad-
ora treaty, which Nicaragua agreed to do in September 1984. In Janu-
ary 1985 the Reagan Administration broke off the Manzanillo talks.
In February 1985, Nicaragua once again unilaterally implemented par-
ticular components of the Contadora draft agreement by returning
1(X) Cuban advisers to Cuba and freezing military acquisitions. Presi-
dent Ortega reiterated Nicaragua's willingness to resume the Man-
zanillo talks with the U.S., the government support for the Contador
process and Nicaragua's unilateral moratorium on importing new mili-
tary systems.
Despite Nicaragua's efforts, the Reagan Administration has con-
tinued its pressures and accusations, "distorting information" and
making unlikely progress towards peace according to Commander
Omar Cabezas from the Interior Ministry.
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The War Against Nicaragua
The Contra War "Is A War
Imposed on Us."
The Reagan Administration has secured Congressional approval
for financial assistance to the contra forces, whose objective is the
overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, and has imposed an
economic embargo through an executive order. According to
Mexico's Foreign Relations Minister, these measures contribute to
harden political positions and make even more difficult the search
for a peaceful solution in the region.
I'he Peace Delegation witnessed the economic hardships and the
effect that contra attacks and the imminent threat of a U.S. invasion
have on Nicaraguans. The Peace Delegation considers that the main
concern of Nicaraguans is to he able to have peaceful conditions
to promote economic development. They do not want war with neigh-
boring countries, they cannot afford to wage war, they do not have
"expansionist" sentiments as claimed by the Reagan Administration.
The majority of Nicaraguans would agree with Commander Toners
Bork, Interior Minister, that the "contra" war "is a war imposed
on us." Nicaraguans do not recognize the contra forces as part of
the legitimate opposition in their country, stating that their creation
and development has been financed and directed by the Reagan Ad-
iiinistration.
Approximately 15,000 Nicaraguans enthusiastically cele-
brated the 6th anniversary, of the liberation of Leon with
the American delegation.
The contra war has diverted scarce national resources towards
the military effort to isolate contra forces inside Nicaragua and push
them back into Honduras and Costa Rica. President Ortega explained
to the Peace Delegation that the remaining contra forces arc engaged
in terrorist activities such as the July assault and setting afire of a
civilian passenger ship in Bluehelds where four persons died aboard.
President Ortega also told the Peace Delegation that contra forces.
were concentrating in Honduras in order to launch an attack on July
19 the sixth anniversary of the overthrow of the Somoza dictator-
ship into Nueva Segovia and Lelaya provinces.
Nicaraguans are engaged directly and actively in the war effort.
At a rally in Lcon celebrating the sixth anniversary of the liberation
of the city from the Somoza regime, approximately 15,(XX) Nicara-
guans enthusiastically chanted and sang patriotic slogans for national
unity and sovereignty against the contra war and an imminent U.S.
invasion. The Peace Delegation net wounded soldiers and local
troops, including a women's battalion, returning from the war front
in northwestern Nicaragua. The over all morale of the people and
troops was very high.
The Delegation met wounded Nicaraguan soldiers at the
Leon celebration.
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The War Against Nicaragua
A Fast For Peace
I'r lcnt Ortega explained to the Peace Delegation that the
e. oii I ft embargo imposed by the Reagan Administration in May
I985 is III attempt to complement the contra pressure in achieving
oscrthrow of the government. President Ortega assured that it
ss(wld not he achievable since Nicaraguans are united in support of
Ilya Sandinista Front for National Liberation. The Peace Delegation
%cuncssed the determination of the Nicaraguans to defend their na-
ttonal unity and sovereignty. At the same time, they are eager to
search for all legitimate avenues to achieve peace. To implement such
an effort, Father Miguel D'Fscoto requested a leave of absence from
his positron as Foreign Relations Minister in order to began "a fast
for peace and against terrorism"' of the Reagan Administration against
Nicaragua, as a new form of Christian struggle for peace. President
Ortega offered to establish a demilitarized border area with Costa
Rica, and did not preclude a similar agreement with Honduras.
President Ortega indicated to the peace Delegation Nicaragua's
friendly sentiment towards the American people. He stated that
Nicaragua is an open country and invited Americans to visit. Nieara
"uans make a point of separating the Reagan Administration and the
American people. The Peace Delegation read in the July 4 New York
Times that an estimated Ifx),lXx) Americans have visited Nicaragua
since 1979 without incident, according to Nicaragua's Foreign Trade
Minister.
... How To Get Out and
When To Do It."
President Ortega presented two options available to the Reagan
Administration : negotiations or direct intervention. He concluded that
the threat of U.S. invasion is more real now than ever, and recalled
that U_S. filibuster William Walker made himself President of
Nicaragua in the 1850s and that under pretexts U.S. Marines invaded
and occupied Nicaragua on two occasions this century. The problem
for the Reagan Administration, he said, is "not how to come in,
but how to get out and when to do it." As the majority of Central
Americans whom the peace Delegation met, President Ortega em-
phasized that any U.S. direct intervention in Central America would
erase the nation's borders and escalate into a regional conflagration
with very high costs and an unpredictable outcome.
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The War Against Nicaragua
Tomas Borge consoles the young daughter of a Sandinista soldier
killed by the Contras.
Minister of the Interior and only surviving founding member of
Sandinistas, Tomas Borge, (center) in Leon.
President Daniel Ortega and the omni-present image of Augusto Sandino.
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Conclusions
The Peace Delegation presents in this report a discussion
that supports the following findings:
1. The Delegation sounds the alarm about what it per-
ceives as the headlong rush by the Administration into direct
military involvement in Central America. In spite of the dis-
claimers issued by our Government, the constant threats and
inflammatory language used against Nicaragua, the intensive
military buildup in Honduras and El Salvador, and the resump-
tion of aid to the Contras, point in the other direction. The
intensive militarization of Honduras and the effort to militarize
Costa Rica create ample opportunity for a real, accidental or
staged, incident, which would provide the justification for mili-
tary intervention. The human and material costs of such an
eventuality for Americans and Central Americans leads us to
conclude that all possible efforts should be invested to find
a political solution to achieve peace before it is too late. There
is no time to lose. We must prevent a disaster of the magnitude
of the Vietnam War from re-occurring in Central America.
2. The nature of the conflicts in Central America are not
related to the confrontation of Eastern and Western political
ideologies nor to Soviet or Cuban attempts to expand their
influence. They are related to the poverty and misery, underde-
velopment and dependency, century-old stagnant social struc-
tures, unresponsive political systems, and the subjection of the
national sovereignity of Central American countries to the
United States objectives in the hemisphere.
3. There is universal yearning for peace in the area. The
delegation found no support for U.S. military intervention
,from any part of the political spectrum. No amount of repres-
sion or bombing of populations will solve the problems. It
may at best suppress or postpone the day of reckoning. Only
an improvement in the standard of living of the people con-
cerned through economic and not military aid will abate these
conflicts and the turmoil.
4. This situation has led a broad spectrum of people in
EI Salvador and Nicaragua, and in a very incipient form. seg-
ments of the Honduran society, to struggle for the defense
of their national sovereignty and interests. These efforts to in-
stitute responsive economic, social and political policies, far
from threatening the long-term interests of the United States
government and people, are geared to guarantee stability and
peace in the region. However, the situation also demands an
evaluation and change in United States foreign policy towards
Central America.
5. All viewpoints from extreme right to extreme left con-
cur that a U.S. military intervention would immediately re-
gionalize the conflict. Borders would he eliminated and a vast
military field of operations would be created that would extend
from the Mexican border to Panama and in which large U.S.
forces would bog down. Such an intervention would force the
revolutinary movements in Central America to merge in oppos-
ition and engulf countries like Honduras and Costa Rica, which
have not had major internal strife. Salvadorean President
Duarte has already proposed to regionalize the conflict by of-
fering an alliance with Honduras against Nicaragua. The most
likely ultimate result after many U.S. and Central American
lives are lost and enormous suffering and devastation is in-
flicted would be irreparable damage to U.S. Latin American
relations with the eventual consolidation of regimes hostile to
U.S. interests.
6. The Delegation found unanimous opposition to "ter-
rorism." The difficulty is in the definition of terrorism, which
is described differently by various victims of violence. Our
Administration defines terrorism as violent opposition to its
policies. The Mothers of the Disappeared in San Salvador
define terrorism as the actions of the security forces of the
Salvadoran Government and the death squads, which had re-
sulted in the deaths of over 62,0)0 people; the campesinos
in the areas controlled by the FMLN define terrorism as the
daily bombings and strafing of the government planes and
helicopters; the Honduran civilians define terroism as the ar-
rest, torture and disappearance of Honduran labor leaders; the
Nicaraguan civilians define terrorism as the attacks by the Con-
tras, such as the recent destruction of a civilian ferryboat in
the Bluefields area and the tactics described in a manual distri-
buted by the CIA. Since violence breeds violence and ter-
rorism, it is obvious that all violence in the area must cease,
including the violence committed by the forces supported by
the Reagan Administration.
7. The accelerated introduction of U.S. military hardware,
personnel, and infrastructure over the last four years has con-
tributed to the escalation of the levels of confrontation in Cen-
tral America armed conflicts. At the same time U.S. interven-
tion in the region has created an awareness and sensitivity
to national sovereignty in all segments and political forces in
each Central American country visited by the Peace Delega-
tion.
8. The climate for peaceful solutions in Central America
is fragile at best. The pressure for the continuation of dialogue
in El Salvador, the willingness of the Nicaraguan government
to resume the Manzanillo talks, and the overwhelming support
for the Contadora process are hopeful signs. These legitimate
peace initiatives can advance only if the Reagan Administra-
tion abandons its objectives of overthrowing the Nicaraguan
government, militarily defeating the Salvadoran opposition
forces, and militarizing Honduras and Costa Rica.
9. A generally acceptable solution is the one proposed by
the Contadora Countries, which provides for gradual de-escala-
tion of the conflicts and the demiliarization of the area. The
Contadora proposals are particularly appreciated as an effort
by Latin American leaders to solve their own problems and
not as the imposition of a solution from the outside. While
our Government officials supports Contadora negotiations,
only Nicaragua has accepted the proposals. U.S. allies, Hon-
duras, El Salvador and Costa Rica, offer objections which they
would not be likely to ofer without the encouragement of the
Reagan Administration.
10. If our country is to be dragged into a major conflict
in Central America, it should only be done after free and
open debate and the full consent of the American people
and their representatives in Congress. It should not be
done by Government deception, misinformation or secret
activities which violate U.S. and international law. We
should never forget the secret bombing of Cambodia and the
other illegalities committed by the Nixon Administration,
which led to Richard Nixon leaving office tinder the threat
of impeachment.
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Recommendations
Based on these conclusions, the Delegation for Peace in
Central America makes the following recommendations:
1. The Reagan Administration should take concrete steps
to promote and support the Contadora draft agreement, the
dialogue process in El Salvador and the U.S.-Nicaragua Man-
zanillo talks.
'_. The United States government should de-escalate its
military involvement in Central America as a good faith effort
to contribute to a climate towards peace in the region. Specifi-
cally, the United States should conform to the following points
as called for by the Contadora Act of September 7, 1984.
a) Cease the assistance and support of the contra forces
in Central America. (Cuntadora Act, Section 5, 6 & 7).
h) Halt the military assistance to the Duarte government
and press to stop the bombing of civilians in El Salvador.
shifting emphasis to negotiations and national reconcilia-
tion. (Contadora Act, Section 2).
c) Cancel U.S. military exercises and surveillance flights
over Central America. (Contador Act. Sections 2 & 4).
d) Freeze the introduction of military hardware and per-
sonnel in Central America. (Contadora Act, Sections 2
& 4).
c) Begin a process of dismantling the military bases in
Honduras and withdrawing U.S. troops from the region.
(Contadora Act, Section 3).
3. U.S. Congress should strike the conditional amend-
ments attached to the Foley-Conte amendment and support the
original language of the amendment. According to the June
28, 1985 Los Angeles Times, Foley's original amendment pro-
hibited the commitment of U.S. forces except in the event
of a declared war, a hostile attack on the U.S., its embassies
or citizens, or circumstances of mutual defense; as called for
in the so-called Rio Treaty adopted in 1947 by the United
States and most Latin American nations.
The Peace delegation wishes to thank the numerous indi-
viduals, organizations and institutions that provided their
generous hospitality and assistance to make its mission effec-
tive.
(The Delegation intended to include Costa Rica in its itiner-
ary, due to the initiation of U.S. military assistance to this
country that had abolished its Army in 1949, but lack of time
and scheduling difficulties did not make this possible.)
A Nicaraguan youngster stands in front of a sign in the city of Leon which reads, "With one fist, we will
defeat the aggressor," a reflection of widespread fears of a U.S. invasion to topple the Marxist-oriented Sandinista
government.
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Letter To The American People
Note On Letter:
While in Morazan, El Salvador, the U.S. delegation was
asked by the FMLN to deliver its' message for peace to the
American people, the international press, and the U.S. Con-
gress.
This letter was delivered to select members of the U.S.
Congress and U.S. Senate by delegates Aris Anagnos, Caro-
lyn Anagnos, and Dr. Jesus G. Nieto who subsequently pre-
sented the letter to the American and international press at
a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington,
D.C. on July 30, 1985.
July, 1985
Morazan, El Salvador
Dear
Interference by the Administration of President Ronald
Reagan in the internal affairs of El Salvador has already
reached the level of direct intervention in the armed conflict.
The involvement of United States war materiel, military advis-
ers and economic resources in this conflict is approaching the
level of an undeclared war by the Reagan Administration.
This involvement takes concrete forms. For example:
a) Development and coordination of counterinsurgency
plans;
h) "Training of government armed forces both inside and
outside El Salvador;
c) Supplying arms, ammunition, aircraft and artillery;
(1) A large number of military advisers, who already repre-
sent a very high percentage of the army's officer corps and
who have clc facto taken on the tactical and strategic direction
of the Salvadoran Armed Forces:
e) The presence of U.S. advisers in or over areas of con-
flict. For example:
- Major Queen in Operation Roblar 1, Guazapa, June
1 985;
- Colonel James Steel in Operation Torola IV, Mora-
zan, October 1984;
- Proven participation of a U.S. adviser in an operation
of troop transportation by helicoper, in which Comman-
der Nidia Diaz of the FMLN was captured (San Vic-
ente, April 1985):
The recovery of a helicoper downed in combat (Mora-
zan, June 1985). using a "Chinook" U.S. Army
helicoper flown by U.S. military personnel out of their
military base in Palmerola, Honduras.
The growing intervention by the U.S. Administration is
clearly an act of aggression. It has brought all manner of tragic
consequences, not only due to the air war, but also because
of the direct involvement of the U.S. advisers in this war
which has taken the lives of more than 50,000 civilians and
produced more than one million refugees and displaced persons
('/ of the total population). This constitutes a high level of
destruction of the country and its resources.
It is evident that nothing has been capable of stopping the
FMI.N. U.S. intervention in El Salvador has only increased
the suffering of our people and the destruction of our country.
Page 22
In order to maintain this level of intervention, President
Reagan has distorted the truth to Congress and the American
people, promoting a false image of the Duarte government.
- In El Salvador, true agrarian reform does not exist. The
little that was accomplished is now paralyzed and corrupted.
Duarte's agrarian policies have brought about bankruptcy and
indebtedness among rural farmers. Phase 11 of the agrarian
reform was never implemented, and the basic structure of
economic power has remained intact.
- The government is promoting economic policies which
only favor the dominant sectors, thereby subjecting the work-
ing majority of the people to the stifling effects of spiraling
inflation, wage freezes, unemployment and economic chaos.
- There is corruption at all levels. The investment of mil-
lions of U.S. dollars has heightened the contrasts of social
inequality. Corruption among high army officers and gover-
ment officials is uncontrollable. The corruption is similar to
that which existed among the local allies of the United States
during the Vietnam war.
-- The judicial system is inoperative and corrupt. Not one
political crime (murder of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero,
U.S. agrarian reform advisers, etc.), or mass crime (massacres
at El Mozote, Las Hoja. etc.) has been solved. There are hun-
dreds of political prisoners, and thousands of "disappearances"
and political assassinations take place with impunity.
There is systematic repression against grassroots organi-
zations: arrests and assassinations of trade unionists, workers
and students; military blockades of workplaces; terror against
the rural population, and so forth.
- The Duarte government lacks popular support. There are
growing signs of popular discontent (demonstrations, strikes).
- Grassroots sectors and organizations, who supposedly
made up the social base of the Duarte program, stand today
in open opposition to the government. The recent electoral
victory of Duarte's party proves nothing in El Salvador. Col-
onels Sanchez Hernandez and Molina, as well as General
Romero, also reached the presidency by way of supposedly
democratic elections, and yet brought bloodshed and war to
our country.
Furthermore, no election authorizes anyone to bomb and
displace unarmed civilians as Duarte authorizes daily. It is
timely to remember that Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem became president
of South Vietnam without any popular support. and the results
are well-known.
Injustice and popular discontent will persist as long as these
conditions persist, and the war will continue to be fueled by
the very causes which gave rise to it.
With regard to the military situation, it can be proven that
reality stands in stark contrast to the analysis and projections
of the Administration.
In a short time, the war will have spread to the entire
national territory. This runs contrary to the strategic plans of
the U.S. advisers who are attempting to confine the war to
one or two separate areas within El Salvador.
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Letter To The American People
. The number of casualties among the ranks of the eovern-
ment army is growing daily in the course of their patrols and
operations planned by the U.S. advisers. The U.S. Embassy
in El Salvador is well aware that the casualty figures listed
by General Vides Casanova in his monthly report to the Legis-
lative Assembly (July 1985) are manipulated and falsified.
The air war is a crime against the civilian population,
yet ineffective against our military forces.
The FMLN is able to render inoperative any economic
or political program imposed behind the backs of the majority.
Duarte's army is unable to thwart our policy of eroding the
economic, political and military base of the government.
We are prepared to wage a long war of attrition, even
against an eventual intervention by foreign troops.
President Reagan has lied repeatedly in his attempts to
place the issue of U.S. intervention in El Salvador within the
context of an East-West confrontation. This is absurd. An anal-
ysis of El Salvador's geographic situation will demonstrate that
it is impossible to sustain the FMLN from other countries.
The United States has taken control of both oceans (Pacific
and Atlantic): it has military bases and military control of all
land borders. In order to be sustained by foreign logistical
support for the Duarte government, the FMLN would require
such quantities of boats, airplanes and trucks that it would
he impossible to hide them.
Our forces and our resources come from inside the country
they are based on popular support. The origins of the con-
flict lie in the deep and intolerable inequality and social injus-
tice, and the suppression of civil and human rights of the Sal-
adorauu people.
In this context of social injustice, repression and interven-
tion, Jose Napoleon Duarte is trying to use dialogue as a politi-
cal component of the military plan drawn up by the U.S. advis-
ers. and not as a true alternative for it negotiated political solu-
tion to the conflict.
This reasoning attempts to achieve at the negotiating table
the goal which has not been achieved on the battlefield. They
are using dialogue to attempt to force us to surrender, although
they are unable to win the war nor take away our weapons
in combat.
For Duarte, the dialogue process is but an instrument to
achieve bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress in order
to maintain U.S. economic and military aid, thereby prolong-
ing the war in the search for an illusory and impossible military
victory. He expressed this very clearly in his speech to the
t1. S. Chamber of Commerce (.June 1985).
It is within this context that we must understand the present
controversy regarding the continuation of the dialogue process:
the issue is will it take place secretly and in another country,
or publicly inside the country.
The first option signifies that dialogue would he utilized
to win approval of U.S. aid, which would mean the prolonga-
tion and deepening of the war. Secret talks would eliminate
public pressures to carry out the agreements reached, thus af-
lowin;c Duarte to maintain the false image of a negotiator be-
fore cc American people and Congress. If the dialozuc is
conducted openly, commitments and conclusions must be
agreed upon in full sight of the Salvadoran people and interna-
tional public opinion.
Confronted with these alternatiaves, Duarte has interrupted
the dialogue process.
There are clearly two possible courses of action:
a) An end to intervention in El Salvador by the U.S. Ad-
ministration and the initiation of it process leading to a
negotiated political settlement.
b) A continuation of the policy of aggression and interven-
tion against our people and the unleashing of a greater war:
a regionalization of the conflict, dragging the youth of El Sal-
vador, the United States and of other countries into a holocaust
without any true and objective perspective of military victory
for the United States.
You know as well as we do that a war of this type is
not won on the basis of arms superiority, but rather on the
basis of popular support. There is no doubt that intervention
by U.S. troops in our country would deepen the nationalist
character of this war of the entire people in defense of their
live,, and their sovereignty.
In an attempt to justify the U.S. role in El Salvador to
the American people, the Reagan administration has come up
with a supposed third alternative which lacks any true basis:
to obtain our surrender through threats. pressures and more
intervention. This vision is unreal. Our confrontation with in-
tervention strengthens our love for our homeland, as well as
our principles and our nationalism. We will never surrender.
This third alternative will merely serve as an excuse for future
escalations of intervention.
We would like to express to you, members of the Congress
of the United States of America. and to the American people
as a whole, that there are historical and geographic links that
unite us, which can contribute to progress, brotherhood and
mutual cooperation and respect. We would like to maintain
and strengthen these tics, but it must he understood that today
we are exercising our irrevocable right to legitimate self-de-
fense against aggression by the administration of President
Reagan.
We therefore propose that Congress, as a contribution to-
ward peace, take steps and present initiatives which will allow
for an end to the process of intervention in El Salvador. Only
in this way can a just and lasting solution be achieved, one
which will allow us to exercise our right to self-determination
and which will free the American people from another tragic
war.
We are convinced that the U.S. Congress can initiate this
process toward peace with the same authority that it exercises
today in supplying the military aid which maintains, prolongs
and aggravates the war. It is well-known that he who can de-
cide to wage war can decide to make peace.
FMLN GENERAL COMMAND:
Jorge Schafik Handal
Ferman Cienfuegos
Joaquin Villalobos
Roberto Roca
Leonel Gonzade,
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Interview With Commandante Joaquin Villalobos
Summary of Statements Made at a Press Conference Held in Per-
quin, El Salvador by Members of the General Command and the
Political Commission of the FMLN
Present:
Members of the General Command:
Commander Joaquin Villalobos
Commander Jorge Shafick Randall
Members of the Political Commission:
Ico Cabral, National Resistance
Miguel Mendoza, Central American Workers Party
Facundo Guardado, Popular Liberation Forces
ON THE MILITARY SITUATION
Question: Commander Villalohos, there is a great deal of talk
among the Salvadoran army that they are optimisrc regarding a vic-
tory against the FMLN; that you are dispersed, that you are suffering
defeats: that the FMLN is being dismantled. What is the actual situa-
tion of the war?
Answer: First, we are going to try to give a synthesis of the
developments of the war during the last five years, so that we can
arrive at the present situation and explain, in summary, what our
present strategic plan is and what the present plan of the Christian
Democrats is, with the support and advise and direct management
of the present U.S. Administration.
In 1980,the perspectives of a victory were based on the develop-
ment of it mass insurrection and at that time the FMLN had minimal
military force and slid not rely on large qualitative capacity. The mass
movement was confronted by the politic; of the destruction of the
popular base of the FMLN, both in the country and in the cities.
'I'hc first target was in the cities, The press is aware of this process
of extermination of the popular movement in the cities. This happened
during 1979-80.
From 1981-1982 the process of extermination is transferred to
the rural areas, since their position was that the cities had been
pacified. This process left 50,000 people dead, of which most of
them were civilians. Most of' these people were from the general
population, some organized, but a large percentage of civilians, who
were not it belligerent part in the contlict.
As a result of this policy of the extermination of our base, we
were forced to put a great deal of energy into self-defense. During
I~ib1-1982 we called this process the plan of resistance. In an effort
to destroy our forces in order to stop the insurrectional process, the
any- I forces were weakened, they suffered a great deal of casualties.
In his presidential report in 1981 or 1982, Duarte stated that the
armed forces suffered over I(X)0 casualties. At that time I(XX) casu-
alties was an immense loss. The army had no more than I5,(XX)-
17,(X1) troops.
This happened in 1981, it is evident that we were able to defeat
this phase in which they intended to destroy us What this phase
brought was the extermination of large sectors of the civilian popula-
tion with massacres, such as, El Mozote, the Sumpul River where
0(X), 7(X), I,(XX) peasants were killed. During this period we de-
veloped and strengthened our military forces, during the first phase
we resisted and by 1982 our forces begin to consolidate and develop
a counter offensive force.
During this period the military plan of the enemy was
based on keeping hundreds of posts in the areas of conflict,
such as, northern part of Morazan, Chalatenango, Cabanas,
Guazapa, Tres Calles. Jucuran. They kept guard from high
strategic positions and stationary posts with the intent of stop-
ping our process of expansion, although their main objective
was to destroy the FMLN's base of support. Once completing
the extermination of the revoluntionary process, they would
begin the process of democratization. (This is related to the
political aspect of the plan, but we are addressing the military
situation). Their plan to destroy us was defeated. By 1982,
we had taken the offensive and started to destroy their posts
left inside our rearguard. There with the support of the people,
we were able to destroy doyens of posts, one by one, by sec-
tions and companies. This phase lasted from 1982-84 and left
the FMLN with a great deal of territory. This territory included
not only small areas of land, but also the east, northeastern
areas until the I'an-American Highway, leaving the Salvadoran
army to a reduced number of posts. The same occurred in
Chalatenango.
Of course, there were Fronts that only maintained their
position, such as the Cerro de Guazapa, and did not expand.
This was due to a more complicated situation. This front is
adjacent to a vital area of the enemy. When the process of
expansion was initiated in Guazapa, we had initiated the
counter-offensive strategy in Tres Calles, the zone adjacent
to Rio Lempa in the central part of Usulutan. This phase ended
with very favorable results: we caused 15,000 casualties to
the army, we captured 2,0(X) prisoners, we took 5,000 arms
and more than I million cartridges. We also captured important
people like the Vice Minister of Defense. Throughout this
phase,the FMLN carried out uninterrupted offensives, reaching
new areas. These areas were not limited to only the north
or isolated parts of the vital zones, but to more populated
areas. Areas where the population has higher levels of cultural
and political awareness. As such, the FMLN in this period,
entered into a discussion about the most effective approach
in order to advance militarily.
The military advances made by the FMLN forced the army
to make changes in their general plan. In order to slow down
the destruction of their positions, they moved to a second line
and established a plan based on mobile troops in order to avoid
being targets of the FMLN. This is strictly a defensive plan,
that is, the anny was more concerned about their men, than
the political-judicial and economic structures. Obviously as
they moved from their positions, we developed new methods
and areas of operation in the southeastern part of the territory
and were able to reach the Pan-American Highway and the
central zone. We were able to successfully carry out sabotage
actions since the army could no longer defend the area.
So their plan changed from stationary forces maintained
inside the territory to mobile troops which patrolled and carried
out offensive actions, thus avoiding being stationary targets.
Given these changes, we developed a change in the mode of
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Interview With Commandante Joaquin Villalobos
tactical operations --- the bases of which were the following
we believed that if it wasn't for the level of U.S. interven-
tion we would have won the war by now. The army had
around 13,0X) troops and 30 aircraft, now it has around
42,0(X) and about 50 aircraft. We have caused them about
18,(X)0 casualties, that is we have destroyed the army which
they started the war with, we have taken between one-fourth
and one-third of the territory. In zones such as the eastern
part of the country, for example, the municipalities in which
the army defends its political-judicial structures of local power
are only 20 out of 86. This means that the armed forces are
a mobile force which is more concerned with their own secu-
rity than with the security of their political and economic pro-
jects. We could say that their intent is to wage an irregular
war against us.
The difference in the conception of an irregular war for
them is that they have the responsibility with respect to their
economic and political project. They have a lot to protect
whereas, we do not have to protect an economic project as
such, not even the territory. For us the teritory is a theatre
of operations, a front or a rearguard. With the process of inter-
vention, we could not continue with a view of an immediate
definition of the war, an uninterrupted offensive toward reach-
ing the cities. This was an error, we could not adopt such
strategy given the unlimited material resources of the enemy.
Our strategy had to he defined in terms of weakening and
defeating their resistance and the will of the Reagan Adminis-
tration to continue to supply the Salvadoran Army. If we can
defeat this factor, we will win the war.
In that sense, for us the fundamental thing was to develop
a war of attrition which results in some changes in the percep-
tion of the development of the war and have produced this
feeling of success from the armed forces.
In the last phase, the perception of the war, at the publicity
level with respect to the advances made by the FMLN was,
we could say, very strong because we destroyed and took over
posts, took prisoners, etc. Under the conception of a war of
attrition, this year it has become clearer. The war is cumulative
and the problem is who is able to confuse and wearout (wear-
down) the other side.
\\c have developed lines to guarantee a process of creating
the conditions for what we call a counter offensive strategy
geared to defeat the Reagan Administration's willingness to
continue to supply and support the Salvadoran Army. We
adopted several areas -- the human element in the military
aspect is one. Here our fundamental objective is to weardown
the ex. __ng military forces. Each time they carry out an offen-
sive, we launced an offensive designed to weardown and hiced
each one of those units. This was based on tactics that would
ati~~w u,, to cause the maximum casualties with a minimum
of casualties to our units. We have succeeded in these efforts.
Since July of last year, we have maintained a high level of
casualties against the Salvadoran Army and we have signifi-
cantly reduced our losses. The Reagan Administration can send
all the weapons they want, hut they cannot substitute the casu-
alties suffered by the armed forces and cannot solve the morale
problem.
We adopted another area - with the retreat of the armed
forces, they left large areas unattended and vulnerable to politi-
cal-military destablization. The army, as I was saying, is prac-
tically unable to defend the political economic infrastructure
and, therefore, tries to defend it with political arguments. Ev-
erybody knows that in any war, the economy is a military
target. So, we put forward a plan geared to prevent that the
economic aid of which 85% is allocated to counter-insurrgency
plans is not favorably implemented by the Duarte government.
We also adopted the political destabilization of the Duarte
government. The issue of the mayors and its relationship of
the political power to the military power is related to this.
The army has in reality lost military control in approximately
:35`I of the municipalities and local governments within the
country. It is not that we are permanently there, but they no
longer have the control, therefore, the government lost its
judiciary power (based on local judges), lost the civil defense,
the municipal governments, information networks and political
parties. All this disappeared so the question is, on what logic
and on what grounds do they pretend to continue to have politi-
cal power. if they do not have military power?
In addition, the local power is part of the counter-in-
surgency plan put forward by the North Americans. It is a
fundamental component of their plan to create a civil defense
as part of their military plan against us. It is on this basis
that we launched our campaign against the government's local
powers (i.e., the mayors).
We are at war, we are two beligerent forces; what political
rights do they allow us as FMLN in the capital so that we
would allow them political presence where they no longer con-
trol militarily?
The other element is that of expansion, not of transferring
(of leaving our zones to go to another area) that is to take
the war to the entire country. This was a decision made based
on the need to prepare ourselves for a possible intervention.
The administration planned to push its, with the participation
of Honduras, to two areas close to their (Honduras) border.
But we have taken the war to the entire country and to all
the highways. We have kept our strongholds throughout the
zones .of what we call our strategic rearguard.
This process required a readjustment in order to confront
the level of intervention. We had to reorganize our units and
structure in addition to the unification of the military strategy
of the FMLN. This has taken some time. This happened
around September 1983, they did the same thing. They used
this to say that we had lost the war.
With all the change,, we have made, taking into consider-
ation that our objective is not to conquer territory, but rather
to expand and integrate and organize the people and establish
local forces, such as in the eastern part of the territory. The
statements they have made about the sabotage, the effects on
the transportation system, the dismantling of local govem-
mems, the casualties incurred and the operations in the eastern
territory are elements that prove that the FMLN plans are being
effective and that we have the offensive in the military arena.
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Interview With Commandante Joaquin Villalobos
ON THE POLITICAL SOLUTION
Question: Some of our delegation and 2 North Ameri-
can Congressmen met with the Archbishop. One of the Con-
gressmen asked how the negotiations were going. The Ar-
chbishop expressed his opinion, saying that the guerrillas want
a peaceful solution and want negotiations but now they don't
show much interest in these negotiations. Is there any reason
why the Archbishop should have such an opinion'?
Answer: Well, here it depends on the willingness of 2
parties. We say to you quite frankly our willingness is to find
a political solution and, if it is necessary, to enter now in
new conversations. Now in La Palma there were three funda-
mental agreements regarding dialogue: it should take place in
front of the people, inside the country and with the participa-
tion, or rather Allowing the participation of the different popu-
lar sectors. This is spite that we are convinced that the conver-
sations helped Duarte to go to the Congress and different sec-
tors in the U.S. and say "look I'm talking, give the more
money, more planes, more helicopters." We could repeat also
the same argument that he has said, that is it is a tactical
dialogue." But we share the opinion of the people, because
we are a part of. the people, that the majority of the people
want a political solution. In this sense, from our point of view,
we have not diminished our interests to continue with the talks.
However, we don't see a corresponding attitude nor a realistic
attitude from the other party. Naturally, we have said before
that there are interests behind all of this that don't want a
political solution to the conflict and in fact are heightening
the crisis, not only in El Salvador hut in Central America,
by increasing the war and this you know very well.
Question: Comandante, what specifically can be done to
influence the dialogue process between you and Duartc, what
steps can he taken?
answer: Well, inside the country, we consider basic that
the distinct sectors, the social political and economic forces,
permitted to freely express their opinion regarding a politi-
cal solution, regarding dialogue. In this sense we have pre-
sented initiatives and that there he some type of meeting of
all of these groups and forces in order to discuss, that is,
to have an active participation of the different sectors. In re-
gard to the U.S., we could say it is necessary that the sectors
opposed to the intervention speak out in favor of a political
solution.
Question: What are the state of the negotiations at this
moment'!
Answer: We have publically expressed that the govern-
ment of Duarte through concrete actions has basically ruptured
the dialogue. Our 3 proposals which I have referred to have
not received a positive response. Duarte continues to talk in
public about dialogue and that he is for dialogue, that he is
for the humanization of the war but this is no more than
rhetoric for political purposes. demogogic purposes, that don't
relate to a real desire to advance in the process we started.
In the recent days there hasn't been a single contact. For our
part, as I said in the beginning, we have the will to continue
the talks, not only in the general but in the concrete.
OTHER QUESTIONS
Question: The Reagan Administration argues that you are
Marxist-Leninist, that Marxism is cruel. This argument is used
for public propaganda. In other words, Comandante, how
much influence does Fidel Castro have here'?
Answer: Societies, social models, social thoughts influ-
ence everybody, not only us. Even the government has such
influences, so that is not the problem. We are an authentically
independent movement. We make our own decisions based
of course, on a correlation of the world. The problem is that
the present U.S. government does not understand that it has
to take into consideration other ideas, other social models and
other forms of thought in Latin America. They must seriously
consider in this country, where land is the fundamental means
of production, if Duarte's capitalist model is capable of solving
the social problems. That is. if we are not right in presenting
a model of deeper social changes. That is the issue and not
if it will or will not resemble the Soviet, the Nicaraguan or
Fidel Castro's model. Of course, among revolutionaries we
arc in solidarity, but we are totally independent.
Question: How would you describe your ideological posi-
tion'?
Answer: More than ideological, the definition should be
a scientific one. We aim for a solution to the country's social
and economic problems. We believe the country has been liv-
ing in the framework of dependent capitalism which has
exacerbated our country's problems. If this model had been
successful, there would he no war. The fact that there is a
war, sustained by popular roots, shows clearly that this model
is no solution. So we have to find another model.
Some of its believe the final direction will he to a socialist
society, but this is not an immediate issue. We forsee that
a next stage would include a series of political, economic and
social transformation which are not precisely those of a
socialist society, but which go in that direction.
The government of the U.S. is trying to impose on us,
not only a domination, but a system as well. It would have
us accept that all the social-economic problems he solved with-
in a more modern stage in the development of dependent capi-
talism. That in its essence, is the Kissinger Plan.
Question: What would happen if the U.S. got out of Cen-
tral America'?
Answer: First, there would be no more war. In El Sal-
vador, what is first needed to achieve peace, is the end to
U.S. intervention. Without it, the war would have ended a
long time ago, either by military means or through negotia-
tions.
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Interview With Commandante Joaquin Villalobos
The other thing is that the dynamic of Central America's
historical process, would find its own way. This would not
mean a total exit of the U.S. In other words, it does not mean
a void in the presence of the U.S. because the U.S. is here
- in the continent. There exists an economic relationship
which is not only unavoidable but which we don't want to
avoid either. There exists a cultural relationship, etc. The U.S.
out of Central America means an end to its military interven-
tion, its poltiical interference, its imposition of the historical
path of Central America.
U.S. public opinion should think about this. In the coming
years. what is going on in Central America will he happening
throughout Latin America. What is going to happen in the
Southern Cone'? There is already an explosive situation de-
veloping there. In Chile there is an armed struggle - it's
a powder keg and the explosion is going to be much stronger
than here. What formula should prevail in the U.S.? Should
it he allowed that wherever there is a fire, troops and planes
be sent'? If so, in ten years, the U.S. will be fighting all over
Latin America. Does it have the strength? We believe not.
This also has to do with the argument that the Central
American struggles represent a threat to the U.S. Peoples are
forced to arm themselves as a legitimate defense when they
are threatened. If there is not an interventionist threat against
a newly born revolution, against a new process, of course our
people have no interest in arming themselves. When the social-
economic problems are so serious that it is impossible to chan-
nel human and economic resources there is no choice but to
arm oneself.
Neither does anyone have expansionist interests. Our inter-
est is to solve our national problems. We consider the argu-
ment that we represent a threat ridiculous. From no point of
view can our movement, our liberated people, he a threat to
the United States.
FMLN-FDR Commanders Jorge Shafik (left), Joaquin Villalobo (center), and Facundo Guardado
(right).
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Delegation For Peace In Central America Members
DELEGATION FOR PEACE IN
CENTRAL AMERICA MEMBERS
(Listed in alphabetical order)
Mr. Aris Anagnos
Past President of the Southern California American Civil Liberties
Union affiliate. Member of the National Board of Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA). Member of the House of Representa-
tives Speakers' Club. President of Real Estate Dynamics Inc. in
Los Angeles, California.
Mrs. Carolyn Anagnos
Referrec of the California State Bar Court. Member of the Na-
tional Board of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Mem-
ber of the California State Democratic Central Committee.
Ms. Sandra Gladstone
Member of Southern California Americans for Democratic Action.
Former member of the California State Democratic Central Com-
mittee. Former labor union organizer.
Mr. Samuel Maestas Executive director of El Progreso del De-
sierto Family Health Center in Coachela,
California.
Dr. Armando Navarro
President of the Congress of United Communities. Director of
the Institute for Social Justice. Member of the California State
Democratic Central Committee. Professor of Political Science at
Pomona College and at the California State University in North-
ridge.
Dr. Jesus Nieto
President of the Bakersfield chapter of the Congress of United
Communities. Businessman from Bakersfield, California.
Dr. Raul Ruiz.
Director of Chicano Studies Department at the California State
University in Northridge. Co-Chair of the Committee for Commu-
nity Action.
Mr. Eli Sandoval
California State Chairman of the American G.I. Forum.
Ms. Callie Wight
Coordinator of CARINO, a mental health group for Central Amer
can refugees in Los Angeles, California. Ph.D. candidate in Clin-
ical Psychology.
RESOURCE STAFF
Ms. Margarita Studerneister, Central American specialist.
DELEGATION FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA
MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS
In Mexico:
Mi. Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, Foreign Relations Minister
Mr Salvador Samayoa, Political-Diplomatic Commission of the
Farahundo Marti Front for National Liberation and the Demo-
cratic Revolutionary Front (FMLN-FDR)
U.S..Ambassador John Gavin
In Honduras:
Dr. Ramon Villcda and Mr. Leo Valladares, Foreign Relations
. Ministry
!sk Luise Druke, Deputy Representative and Interim Representa-
tive of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)
National Party
Christian Democratic Party
Bu-Giron Movement of the Liberal Party
Liberal Democratic Revolutionary Movement of the Liberal Party
People's Liberal Alliance of the Liberal Party
Inovation and Unity Party
Liberal Unity Front
Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers
Honduran Workers Confederation
Federation of Transportation Labor Unions
National Association of Honduran Peasanta
Honduran Federation of Women's Associations
Organization of Women for Peace
Dr. Ramon Custodio Lopez, President, Commission for the
Defense of Human Rights in Central America
Mr. Ramon Valladares, Supreme Court
People to People
Youth organization representatives and independent Hondurans
Spanish Ambassador Fernando Gonzalez Camino
U.S. Embassy reception
Visit to a refugee camp near Danli under the auspices
of the UNHCR
In El Salvador:
Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas
Legal Aid Office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador
Mothers' Committees for the Political Prisoners, Assassinated and
Disappeared "Oscar Arnulfo Romero" and "Marianella Garcia
Villas"
Dr. Miguel Angel Parada, Rector, Dr. Mauricio Guevara Pacheco,
Vice-Rector, Ms. Ana Gloria Castaneda. Mr. Jesus Marquez
Ochoa, Dean of Agronomy, University of EI Salvador
U.S. Embassy officials
Commanders Jorge Shafik Handal (Salvadoran Communist Party)
and Joaquin Villalobos (People's Revolutionary Army), mem-
bers of the General Command of the Farabundo Marti Front
for National Liberation (FMLN)
Commander Facundo Guardado, Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
Commander Lucio Rivera, Salvadoran Communist Party
(PCS)
Commander Leo Cabral, National Resistence (RN)
Commander Miguel Mendoza, Central American Workers Re-
volutionary Party (PRTC)
Commanders Carlos Argueta and Mercedes del Carmen Letona,
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Residents of northern Morazan province
Visit to Perquin and San Fernando, Morazan province
Visit to La Cruz refugee camp
In Nicaragua:
President Daniel Ortega
Commander Tomas Borge, Interior Minister
Mr. Jose Leon Talavera Salinas, Vice-Minister of Foreign Rela-
tions
Commander Omar Cahezas, Ministry of the Interior
Ms. Nora Astorga, Ministry of Foreign Relations
In Cuba:
President Fidel Castro
Mr. Jose Fernando Alvarea, Vice-President of the Council of
Ministers
Mr. Ramon Castro, Director of the Picadura Valley Plan
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