LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM RICHARD J. KERR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Q0'
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
X31 JUL
NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
This is an assessment I requested
shortly after the crisis at Chernobyl.
Richard r
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 13 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Possible Use of Forced Labor at
Chernobyl'
1. This is to apprise you of our continuing efforts to
ascertain_ whether the Soviets are using forced labor in cleanup
operations at Cher'. Thus far, the evidence is
4. Three forced labor camps are located within 100
kilometers of the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant. The forced
labor camp at Mozyr' lies about 90 kilometers to the northwest
with access by a hard-surfaced road; a camp to the south near
Kiev is 130 kilometers by road from the power plant. Each of
these camps confines 1,700 to 1,800 prisoners. The camp in the
city of Chernigov, about 90 kilometers by rail from the power
plant, houses 600 to 700 forced laborers. In addition, seven
other forced labor camps are located within 161 kilometers of the
TOP SECRETI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
TOP SECRET
6. have reported Soviet
use of forced labor in the mining, processing and utilization of
radioactive matter:
-- In the 1950s, political prisoners were used in the
extraction of uranium in Kol ma
in the
Wort ern Ura s in t e 196 s reported that prisoners
were bein used in the a uranium there.
that prisoners
under capital sentence were sent to uraniqm mines,
jin
Centra Asia in the mi Os report that prisoners
were used in the extraction of urani imated
that the loss of life was high.
prisoners which y
produced metal mesh for heavy
artillery, and that rumors had circulated about an
increase i ioactivity and cases of terminal
cancer. 7
that his factory had a secret workshop manned b~v
-- A former political prisoner has written
a book that locates 41 camps were prisoners were
used for the extraction and processing of uranium
ore, or for labor in institutions dealing with
wa s
badly contaminated by a nuclear weapons plant--
(report of the Kyshtym disaster in the
ate 1950s--in which a large area in the Urals
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
concluded that prisoners serving long terms did most
of the cleanup at Kyshtym in exchange for pardons and
early eleases (the sort of arrangement
tioned for the work at Cherno
report notes that prisoners used at
Kyshtym were referred to as "death squads" or "death
brigades." (Soviet diplomats have reportedly
referred recce to Chernobyl' as a "zone of
orlyi
25X1
25X1
Our best judgment is that the Soviets have used forced labor
extensively in uranium mining. At least in recent years they
probably have not used forced labor in nuclear weapons production
because of security considerations and because skilled labor is
needed. At Chernobyl', however, unskilled labor is needed for
such tasks as purifying the soil and destroying forests. 25X1
7. -While working in an open area forced laborers require
constant guarding. Usually they are confined in a fenced and
heavily secured work area having guard towers along the
periph prv-simila- to that which surrounds the Chernobyl' reactor 25X1
area.
8. There are indications that the Soviets are keeping
contaminated vehicles within the 30 kilometer evacuation zone and
that vehicles bringing equipment and supplies to the power plant
are transloaded at the border of the 30 kilometer zone to prevent
contamination. These transloading areas would be ideal places to
use forced laborers; they would be located away from the main
area of activity and they would provide a place for forced -
laborers tot manual labor tasks of loading and
unloading.
9. Considering the suitability of unskilled forced labor
for many of the cleanup jobs at Chernobyl', and considering past
Soviet willingness to use forced labor in hazardous work, the use
of forced labor is plausible--but not confirmed.
10
We
ill
i
.
w
cont
nue to monitor f
any indications that forced labor is present in Chernobyl'.
T t__twwu9.Lt7 ac in
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
byl').
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
IUP SECRETI
SUBJECT: Possible Use of Forced Labor at Chernobyl'
SOVA/DJMacEachin~(5 June 1986)
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 EXDIR
4 - EX Reg
5 - DDI (for chrono)
6 - DDI Reg
7-8 - D/SOVA
9-12 - DPD/SI
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 nnruI Ac rrc roncc or ['ornlrr
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
- Invi: LV. I LLnJL IIN I II'I IV
REMOVE FROM DOCUMENTS THANKS...
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
RoUTIND AND TRAN$MmILL AV oM.: a JUN 1896
TO inm oft* syw*K mm mn*w.
Executive Registry
Dow
Wy ~6
$1 Executive Secretar
CT-
-5-r
F< ClsnMiee
ftr
cwww MI.a
Fsr Csu8-
08 o
FOWW PAW
1
Pff vow NO w"m
3es Me
Joe
qIj d n, b C(
Iv~w e. S~u a/
00
Ctn ~wvvnswa. ~tu~-rw-s_)
FROM pwnM, o& symbol. AEWAY/Pert)
-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
Execuii,,e Reels"
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
NOTE TO: Executive Secretary
FROM: Executive Assistant/DDI
SUBJECT: Odom's Request on Chernobyl
The attached memo and article sent to
Lieutenant General Odom last week by Dick Kerr
addresses the points raised in Odom's memo to
the DDCI. I don't believe another response is
necessary. Please let me know if this is
sufficient.
Attachment:
As stated
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
S5ECRET
Central Int igence Agency
29 May 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army
Director, National Security Affairs
Chernobyl Accident
told me that you were interested in the long- 25X1
term impact of Chernobyl, particularly in the economic area. I
have attached an article that we prepared on this subject. In
addition, there is a paper underway on the impact of the accident
on the Soviet nuclear power program (that paper will take at
least another month). We are also working on a short paper that
will try to assess the long-term health effects of the
on working with o
accident This nonce de
ends heavil
p
y
a r
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As stated
SECRET CL BY SIGNER
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
USSR: Economic Impact of
the Chernobyl' Accident
Preliminary analysis of the Chernobyl' nuclear
accident indicates that direct damage to the Soviet
economy will be relatively minor. Although the cost
of the evacuation, decontamination, cleanup, im-
ports of technical equipment and medical supplies,
and some permanent resettlement will be large-
perhaps as much as 25 billion rubles
a 30-km zone around the plant. We estimate the
population of this area to be 150,000 to 180,000,
including the two towns of Pripyat' and Chernobyl'
and the surrounding rural population. It is likely
that many fled on foot-some with their live-
stock-before vehicles arrived. In addition to the
official evacuees, thousands of persons, mostly
women and children, have left Kiev and other cities
outside the 30-km area.
damage to
agriculture, industrial facilities, and the environ-
ment will be limited to a fairly small area. None-
theless, the potential loss of electric power this year
could put a crimp in General Secretary Gorba-
chev's hopes to get the new five-year plan off to a
fast start in 1986.1
Preliminary calculations suggest workers and fire-
men at the reactor site and local residents who were
drawn to the area by the fire-perhaps as many as
200 to 300 persons-received potentially lethal
doses of radiation. As of 21 May, the death toll was
15-13 from radiation and two from the explosion.
Additional deaths among the heavily irradiated
victims are expected in the next several weeks.
Onlookers near the site would have inhaled consid-
erable airborne radioactivity and may be among
the hospitalized victims, who, according to Gorba-
chev, numbered 299 on 14 May. People within 5
kilometers (km) of the site who were exposed to the
initial radioactive plume could have received sub-
stantial doses of radiation. An additional 25,000 to
30,000 persons who were exposed may have re-
ceived enough radiation to show mild symptoms
such as nausea, and these people will be at risk for
future cancers
The accident also forced-aflarge-scale relocation of
many in the area. As of 13 May, Moscow acknowl-
edged that 92,000 persons had been evacuated from
It is difficult to estimate the cost of the evacuation,
but assuming military units were involved, little
incremental cost would accrue to the Soviets. Vol-
unteers are housing many of the evacuees; and, if
existing housing is properly decontaminated, resi-
dents could begin returning within months. The
Soviets reportedly are applying a polymer to the
immediate area that can later be removed, taking
contamination with it. The roofs of buildings are
also being coated to prevent rain from washing
radioactive debris into drainage systems. It is likely
that permanent relocation will be required for some
of the population. Indeed, in some areas, the evacu-
ees are already being put to work.
Impact on Agriculture
The initial plume of radioactivity appears to have
passed over an area covered largely by forests and
swamps. Not more than 15 to 25 percent of the
crop and pasture land in the Chernobyl' region
would have been seriously affected. Soviet data
show that the region accounts for a minuscule share
of total Ukrainian farm output. Damage to farming
regions beyond the immediate area of the accident
is likely to be minimal. Because harmful levels of
contamination are localized, we do not anticipate
substantial, long-term effects on international com-
modity supplies or trade
Secret
DI JEER' 86-02/
23 Mat, 1986
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
Secret
What Happened in Chernobyl'?
Our best estimate of the cause of the accident is
that the reactor power suddenly surged, producing
superheated steam. A reaction between superheat-
ed steam and zirconium-alloy fuel cladding pro-
duced hydrogen gas. The gas built up until it
exploded, damaging the reactor and leading to fuel
melting and afire in the graphite. The destruction
of the reactor hall allowed large quantities of
radioactivity to escape. The explosion reportedly
knocked out the radiation alarm system, and
officials at the site did not learn of the high levels
of radioactivity until hours later. Two and possibly
three persons were killed by the explosion, and at
least 35 people at the site, including some of the
firemen who responded, were exposed to lethal
doses of radiation. Helicopters were used to drop
sand, lead beads, clay, dolomite, and boron into
the burning reactor. The fire was finally extin-
guished on 11-12 May.
The livestock sector may be more seriously disrupt-
ed in the area. Indeed, we have already seen reports
of livestock being slaughtered because of high
radiation levels. Soviet press reports
however, indicate many livestock were evacuated
along with the population. Livestock that ingested
contaminated feed before being evacuated should
survive if quickly switched to clean feed. Except for
milking cows, radioactive isotopes not excreted by
these animals would be localized in organs general-
ly not consumed by humans, such as the thyroid,
and in bones. Some pastureland beyond the evacu-
ated area may have to be taken out of use until
radiation drops to acceptable levels, putting pres-
sure on local supplies of stored feed.
The local dairy industry will be most seriously
affected because cows consuming radioactive feed
concentrate radioiodine-the main contaminant-
in their milk. Cows fed contaminated feed will
produce hazardous milk for several weeks after
switching to clean feed. Soviet dairy authorities will
have to not only monitor the milk but also assure
that cond does not reach black-market
channels.
Local Effects of Radiation on Agriculture
The effects on farming activities near the site are
likely to be varied. Although the affected area
contains very small quantities of grain and sugar-
beets, winter grains planted last fall and sugar-
beets that are just emerging have been exposed to
radioactive particles settling on leaves. Some of
this radiation will be incorporated into the plants.
Lightly contaminated grain may be mixed with
clean grain during milling to dilute any harmful
effects, but any heavily contaminated grain will
have to be collected and disposed of. Sugarbeets
exposed to radiation would tend to concentrate
radioactivity in their roots and will likely have to
be destroyed.
According to US experts, spring grains and vegeta-
bles can be planted in areas of light contamination
because most of these crops-with the exception of
sunflowers-do not absorb radiation through their
roots. Danger to humans, however, could result
from contaminated dust raised by machinery in
fields during planting, subsequent field operations.
and harvesting. Thorough monitoring and decon-
tamination of workers, equipment, and crops in the
areas adjacent to the evacuated zone will be
necessary, slowing field work. Even in those areas
where contamination is light, crops could suffer
some losses if normal spring field operations are
delayed. Workers may be kept from the fields as a
safety precaution or diverted to cleanup opera-
tions. Growing seasons in the USSR are short, and
harvests are frequently disrupted by the early
onset of winter.
The Chernobyl' power plant is located just north of
the Kiev Reservoir, which supplies the bulk of the
drinking water for the Ukraine's capital. Some
radiation was undoubtedly carried to the reservoir
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
by winds and by the two major rivers feeding it-
the Pripyat' and the Dnepr. Fish, particularly
freshwater shellfish, taken from these waters will
also require monitoring for some time. The Soviets
are building a 30-meter concrete wall into the
ground around the complex to contain any contam-
inated runoff or groundwater seepage. Soviet envi-
ronmental authorities, however, maintain that reg-
ular water samples are being taken from the Kiev
Reservoir and that they show levels of radioactivity
Local Industry
An inventory of industrial facilities within the 30-
km zone around the reactor reveals only a small
number of civilian plants, including two concrete
products plants, a machine-tool plant, perhaps 10
food-processing sites three tex t' a
railroad repair yard. several
of these facilities have been shut down-probably
as a result of the evacuation order. How long they
will be affected remains an open question, depend-
ing on the degree of contamination and bow quickly
the Soviets want to resume their operation. Moscow
has already discussed bringing reactor units I and
2 at Chernobyl' back on line as quickly as possible,
but local industry may not have such a high
priority.
In all likelihood, the accident disrupted-at least
temporarily-electricity supplies beyond the 30-km
area. All industries suffer problems in the event of
brownouts or blackouts, but the largest users of
energy-metals processing, cement, food process-
ing, and chemicals-would be hardest hit from
resulting damage to machinery and products in
process. We have no information to date regarding
specific disruptions in electric power supplies to
local industry. In addition to electricity, industrial
facilities depend on water for cooling and process-
ing-. If irradiated water is used in processing, some
end products could be affected, particularly in the
chemical and food sectors.
Electricity Supplies
The shutdown of the four 1,000-megawatt (MW)
reactors at Chernobyl' will probably have a wide
range of effects. During the summer lull in electric-
ity demand, the Soviets will be able to compensate
for most of the power losses associated with Cher-
nobyl' by using other generating capacity more
intensively. Beginning in September, however, the
upsurge in demand for electricity probably will
eliminate most of the painless adjustment mecha-
nisms. Moreover, we have good evidence that two
reactors at Kursk identical to the damaged one at
Chernobyl' may not now be operational. We cannot
be certain whether these other reactors are com-
pletely shut down or are operating at reduced
power levels for safety reasons. Moreover, if they
are in fact shut down, it is unclear that the
Chernobyl' accident was the reason. Moscow, how-
ever, probably would not disrupt the economy
further by shutting down the remaining nine
graphite-moderated, boiling-water reactors
(RBMK) similar to those at Chernobyl' unless the
cause of accident is judged to have stemmed from
basic design faults.
The confirmed shutdowns at Chernobyl' and the
likely shutdowns at Kursk-assuming the latter
reactors remain out of service for the remainder of
the year and the power is not made up from other
plants-would reduce Soviet electricity output in
1986 by about 25 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh),
roughly 1.5 percent of the annual total. The im-
pact, however, is concentrated on two power grids
that would experience losses of about 10 percent.
Power cuts of this magnitude, although unlikely,
could seriously affect key economic activity in the
Ukraine and Moscow regions: We believe the Sovi-
ets will attempt to ease the impact by drawing
electricity from adjoining grids, and possibly from
more distant grids in the Urals and Kazakhstan.
Moscow may also request that Czechoslovakia,.
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland reduce imports of
electricity from the Ukraine-roughly 20 billig6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Secret _
kWh was sent to these countries in 1985. Cutting the Soviets to at least put construction of new
exports to Eastern Europe, however, may not be a RBMK reactors on hold temporarily. The Soviet
politically attractive way to ease the crunch. decision to allow placement of nuclear plants closer
The Soviets could compensate for the loss of elec-
tricity over the next several months if they forgo
maintenance-normally scheduled for the sum-
to populated areas to supply centralized district
heating systems-including one in Kiev-could be
mer-at power plants using fossil fuels and operate
them at full winter capacities. Moscow has already
reported that one generating unit at a thermal
power plant in Kiev, normally held in reserve at this
time of the year, is now operating at full capacity to
partially compensate for the loss of Chernobyl'.
Seven other power plants in the Ukraine-four
hydroelectric and three thermal-are also reported
to be working at full capacity.
Increasing output at conventional plants, however,
is only a stopgap measure. Maintenance must still
be performed, and if it is not finished by winter the
Soviets will be hard pressed to meet the surge in
electricity demand that will take place then. In any
event, domestic supplies of fossil fuels will have to
be supplemented with increases in domestic fuel
production and possibly with imports, such as
additional coal from Poland. The additional fuel
required to offset the loss of the Chernobyl' reac-
tors would amount to perhaps 150,000 barrels per
day oil equivalent and half again as much if the
other two reactors remain shut down. If domestic
fuel oil supplies are used to generate replacement
electricity for these six reactors, at the expense of
exports of oil to the West, hard currency losses
would amount to S 100 million per month at current
prices.
The Chernobyl' disaster is likely to result in some
setback to the USSR's nuclear power program. The
Soviets currently have 28,300 M-W of nuclear
generating capacity, supplying some 11 percent of
their electricity. Moscow's plans call for expansion
of nuclear capacity to 70,000 MW by 1990, boost-
ing the nuclear share of total electricity output to
more than 20 percent. The accident may prompt
t
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
? EXECUTIVE SECREYARIAl'
ROI iI\G tit 11'
Compt
D/OSWR
D/SOVA
IrA-E
ACTION , INFO DATE INITIAL
Remarks To 5: Please provide DDCI background info
and a draft response.
x utive Secretary
29 May 86
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ... This Information has been Authorized for
Release to .. .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
1~>11614 -.0 1
29 May 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE I 'DUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Implications of Chernobyl
During my recent trip to Euro e
I
discovered that they are already working on the
implications of the Chernobyl incident for the
Soviet economy. Perhaps we are doing the same,
but I thought I might raise the issue in the event
that we are not yet addressing it.
it would be
useful to have an idea of methodology for such an
analysis. It is a unique analytical task and will
require an innovative analytical scheme. The
following points strike me as relevant to such a
scheme:
-- consequences for electrical power output;
-- implications for agricultural production;
-- implications of labor displacement;
-- implications for export of Soviet agri-
cultural products;
-- Soviet agricultural export reactions; and,
-- Soviet requirements for western
technology/assistance in repair of other nuclear
power plants.
Two other related studies may also be appropriate.
First, what are the political implications? Both
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
elite factional politics and broader party cadre
issues are apparently significantly affected. The
foreign policy implications are an additional dimen-
sion. Second, there may be some military implica-
tions. Improvements in civil defense, military
district administrative arrangements, and diversion
of military manpower come to mind.
If you would like, we can discuss in further
elaboration.
WILLIAM E. ODOM
Lieutenant General, USA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
S2-
cc-,~~cr
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution- Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ... This Information has been Authorized for
Release to .. .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 16 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ... This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
(1. Vil V3 Y,lVl\. i VV
WASHINGTON TIMES
1 May 1986
Page 1 of 1
STAT
Lllo~
CATASTROPHE AT CHERNOBYLI
u.s. Spy sateffites didn't detect
Soviet reactor meltdown
By Bill Gertz
VA SHINOTON TONS
Multibillion-dollar technical spy
satellite systems of U.S. intelligence
agencies failed to detect a Soviet nu-
clear reactor meltdown that was
only revealed after airborne radio-
active particles triggered an alarm
in Sweden, U.S. officials and intel-
ligence experts said yesterday. .
"Our intelligence allows us to look
at things we already know are inter-
esting;' Stanford University intelli-
gence expert Angelo Codevilla said.
"But anyone who says we have the
world under surveillance is talking
through his hat"
He added that "we have the cap-
ability to focus a camera or an an-
tenna on any given spot in the world
at least once a day" but U.S. intel-
ligence is unable to maintain blanket
coverage of the world.
Electronic intelligence specialist
James Bamford. author of an au-
thoritative book on the National Se-
curity Agency, said U.S. intelligence
could only have been warned that
something had happened in the
Ukraine by monitoring the level of
radio communications in the region
following the accident, which began
last Friday.
Our monitoring and sensing
equipment isn't designed to discover
accidents in nuclear reactors;' Mr.
Bamford said. "Nuclear detection
capabilities are primarily designed
to determine when and where there
is a nuclear explosion."
Reconnaissance satellites can de-
tect nuclear flashes and seismic
monitors can pick up earth vibra-
tions from nuclear blasts, he said,
but only aircraft sensors targeted on
a particular area could have de-
tected the radioactive fallout from
Chernobyl.
"The only way they might have
known is that there would have been
a huge increase in high-level, and
possibly classified, communications
going between various points" Mr.
Bamford said. "That could have
given the intelligence community
some early warning."
Mr. Bamford said the United
States now has only one "Big Bird"
close surveillance photosatellite ca-
pable of spotting an accident such as
the Chernobyl plant, since a second
satellite planned for orbit may have
blown up with a Titan II rocket in
California last week.
Senate Intelligence Committee
member Chic Hecht, Nevada Re-
publican, who was briefed several
times yesterday by U.S. officials on
the disaster, said the first details of
the nuclear fire came from a Swed-
ish nuclear engineer.
"We did not know about it, and we
found out about it from Sweden:' Mr.
Hecht said in an interview
A nuclear engineer first detected
abnormally high levels of radiation
at a nuclear facility in Sweden, evac-
uated plant employees and then or-
dered them back inside the plant
when it was discovered the radiation
had come from outside the country,
he said.
"I did see a [intelligence] photo-
graph of the site" showing that the
roof of the reactor building had been
blown off, Mr. Hecht said. He said it
was -too early" in the ongoing disas-
ter for U.S. officials to determine the
long-range environmental effect of
the radiation exposure on the region.
A State Department Soviet ex-
pert, speaking anonymously, said
the Swedes provided the first clue to
the disaster.
This is not a case of a nuclear
explosion where you would pick up
other kinds of indicators" the offi-
cials said. The Soviets maintain doz-
ens of nuclear reactors spread out in
rural areas, the official said, "but
these are not military targets" for
intelligence collection.
Mr. Codevilla, who served as a
professional staff member of the
Senate Intelligence Committee for
eight years, said "it would have been
a startling surprise if we knew about
it" shortly after the accident oc-
curred because U.S. intelligence
agencies do not maintain "broad
area surveillance programs.'
"In fact, if the wind had been
blowing in the direction that it cus-
tomarily blows, we wouldn't have
know about it" he said. "If the wind
had been blowing eastward, we
might have picked up two weeks
from now a little bit of extra radi-
ation in Alaska
Only rumors about the disaster
would have filtered out of Kiev, the
Ukrainian capital, to other parts of
the world because of the tight Soviet
Controls on information, he said.
U .S. photographic satellites, once
focused on the disaster site, would be
able to provide high-resolution pho-
tographs of the area, he said.
A commercial photograph taken
'itiesday afternoon by an orbiting
satellite owned by the Earth Obser-
vation Satellite Company reveals
smoke coming from the Chernobyl
facility believed to be the result of
the ongoing radiation fire.
Senate Intelligence Committee
spokesman Dave Holliday said yes-
terday that the committee has been
briefed by U.S. intelligence agencies
on Chernobyl but that, "I don't know
that we know a lot more than is in the
public domain right now."
Asked if U.S. intelligence was
taken by surprise by the nuclear cri-
sis, Mr. Holliday said, "We have not
looked into the question of what did
we know and when did we know it.
We may ask that at some point,
but we haven't done it yet;' he said.
CIA spokesman Kathy Pherson
declined to comment on U.S. collec-
tion efforts, saying, "That's some-
thing we can't comment about in any
way, shape or form"
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 New York Tim Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
2 May 86. AFIRE IN REACTOR MAY BE OUi,,-
d_Q
s'A
NEW U.S. PICTURES INDICATD'
SOVIET SAYS FALLOUT /S C(IT
NO FIRM ANSWERS
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
*KW b me Ni, vat 710a
WASHINGTON, May I -The United
States said today that the Soviet Union
might have smothered the fire that
raged for the last five days at a nuclear
reactor In the Ukraine.
In addition, a French communica-
tions satellite. took pictures today that
suggested the fire might have been
-smothered, a report from Sweden said.
The accident at the Chernobyl reac-
tor, 70 miles north of Kiev, spewed
radioactive material into the atmos-
phere that has drifted into many Euro-
pean countries.
Only a day after it predicted that the
severely damaged reactor might con-
tinue to burn for weeks, an American
interagency panel said this afternoon
that the latest Air Force reconnais-
sance photos made it "plausible" that
the Soviet Union had put out the the, as
Moscow contended Wednesday after.
:noon that it had done. But the group
said it lacked definitive evidence to
I make a firm conclusion.
HeBosptes shg6ted at Thant
American officials said special
Soviet civil-defense forces, in helicop-
ters. bad been observed dropping ma-
terial. believed to be wet sand, over the
fire Into the graphite that encased the
nuclear feel tads In the reactor.
The Usk force members also said
they could not confirm speculation that
there was damage to a second reactor
at the Chernobyl plant. They said a pos-
sible "hot spot" close to the burled
reactor was not another zeactor but,
some other industrial building. There
are tear reactors at Chernobyl.
The American interagency panel and
European nations said the air mast
carrying radioactive particles was now
widely dispersed throughout northern
Europe and Polar region and should
begin to move east over the next week. .
There were these developments:
411ve Soviet Government said decon-
tamination teams were cleaning up the
area around Chenrobyl, where It said 2
people were killed and 197 were hospi-
talised. of whom 18 were listed today as
in serious condition. It said the amount
of radiation near the power station had
declined.
American Officials Think
Copters Are Dropping
Wet Sand on Plant
!Moscow turned down an after by
President Reagan to supply assistance.
but it invited Dr. Robert Gale, chair-
man of the International Bone Marrow
Transplant Registry, to fly to the
Soviet Union to provide medical assist-
ance to the victims of the disaster.
Bone-marrow transplant is used to help
victims of severe radiation sickness.
The Russians have also solicited simi-
lar non-governmental assistance In Eu-
rope, while declining direct goverb-
ment offers.
91n a highly unusual move, a Soviet
diplomat appeared before a Home
committee looking Into the affair. The
diplomat said that the consequences of
the accident were not over and that
people both inside and outside the
Soviet Union still faced danger.
The Soviet Government. facing
worldwide criticism for the paucity'
and delay in the information it has
made available, made undertook .a
major effort to persuade other govern-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
New IDrK thee:
2 May 1986
Page o
Reactor Fire May Be' Out, J.S. Photos Show
meets that the situation was noder coo-%
trot and that steps were being taken to
clear ap the area near the reactor. A
violent explosion apparently occurred
at the reactor Iast Saturday, but be.
came known to the outside world only
last Monday.
There continued to be uncertainty
about the number of casualties In.
valved In the blast and the subsequent
fire and radioactive dispersiaL Secre-
tary of State George P. tz, without
Citing exact figures. Mid in Indonesia
that the United States believed the
casualty low exceeded the official
Soviet --by a good measure."
But the American interagency panel
maintained that it still had no firm
numbers to cite in contradiction to
those announced by Moscow.
-A Hoge Problem'
When asked If the Soviet Union now
had the situation under control, a mem-
ber of the American interagency panel
indicated that the problem was far
from over.
"Radiation is no doubt deposited on
: am have bben ei
said. "They have a huge problem iinrere--
gard to cleanup.-
Lm M. Thomas, administrator of the
Environmental ? Protection Agency,
who beads the panel, said, "To us, it is
a major accident. probably and togd-
bly the most major accident at a nu-
clear facility that has occurred-"
"It Is a significant cause for can.
cerq " be said.
Th New Yet Tt
ASKED TO HaP. Dr. Robert
Gale'of the University of Califor-
nia, chairman of the Interna-
tional Bone Marrow Transplant
Registry, has been invited to the
Soviet Union to provide medical
assistance to radiation victims.
neither could I confirm that it's still
If, in fact, it turns out that the fire
has been smothnered, It will somewhat
enhance Soviet credibility. Daily. brief
reports ? from Moscow have been
greeted throughout the week with deep
skepticism. .
ftbnlts Faults Soviet
This morning, speaking with report-
ers in Indonesia, where he Is accompa-
nying President Reagan, Mr. Shultz
castigated the Soviet Union for falling
to -meet Its obligations by providing
.full andpr pt~nformatlon ' to other
m
nations thatmight be contaminated,
from the accident.
?'Lthik by this time we have a much,
fuller picture than the Soviets are
presenting to us." Mr. Shultz Said, "or,
for that matter, to their own people."
He declined to estimate the ngrnber
Of casualties,
ner excee diedto say that the
number ceded
n the total Iuaraunced
by the Russians -'by a good measure "
Much of the concern on Wednesday
was whether another "hot spot" seen
on satellite photos of the Chenrobyl
plant
it thrwas that of the ee. had ex$od adjacent inna wway~
u
slmilarto unit four. it would have led to
more radioactive material being
spewed into the atmosphere.
Mr. Denton said today that'-the data
we have today continue to support the
view that unit three b not involved In
. this event." ' .
State Dept. Cautions sat Travel
ensued as to whether there still was a
fire burning.
Photos taken Wednesday, officials
said, clearly showed white smoke com-
ing from the damaged reactor. The
photos taken today lacked such smoke,
they said, but instead had a kind of
haze over the area, which some ana-
lysts believed might be smoke *and
others said was not.
This new intelligence led to a re-
evaluation of what the. United States
had been saying, one official said. "It
could be that the Soviet Uni 'has-
put It out," an official bald.
Charles. E. Redman. a State Depart-
ment spokesman, said that "concern-
ing the fire,'the best we have is that we
have seen reports that the fire is out.,,
"We, of course, hope that that's.
true," he said, "but We can't eon$rm
that independently as yet. I can't cop-
firm that the fire is. out, so conversely,
. On Wednesday. Mr. Denton, director
of the office of reactor regulation In the
Nuclear Regulatsry Cbmmisslon and a
member of the panel, said the fire In .
the sctor, known as unit
four. was r+eto bum for weeks' un-
less It wasppqqtt am He said then that it
would be difficult to extinguish. ?
This morning. Mt Thomas said on
television that the fire was continuing
to burn. although the amount of radio-
active material emitted would grow
progressively smaller as the fire con-
tinaed.'
But according to several Administra-
tion officials, wfien the cy
panel met with intelligence cials
later this marni g to wamine the lat-
est rec w ianoe photos,. a debate
The interagency panel noted that the
State Department had recomnlendbd
against traveling to the Kiev area, but
had decided not to advise against
travel to-the Soviet Unioq, Scandinavia
and Eastern Europe, the areas hit
hardest by the release of radiation ma-
te rials. ?
But the .department urged caution.
..Americans planning travel to the
Soviet Union and adjacent countries,"
'
the department said, "sbould?earefully
monitor press reports on this rapidly
changing situation to make as fully fn.
formed a decision as possible with rb-
spect to their travel plans. They should
bear in mind that many of these coun-
tries have reported I>lccreased levels of .
radiation In the environment."
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
of 11
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
This Week with David Brinkley
May 4, 1986 11:30 AM
STATION W J L A T V
ABC Network
Washington, DC
Secretary of State Shultz/Reps. Markey and Young
DAVID BRINKLEY: Coming next, the Secretary of
State, George Shultz, from Tokyo in an interview done last night.
And shortly, two Members of Congress, holding differing views on
the virtues and dangers of nuclear power plants. In a moment.
BRINKLEY: Mr.Secretary, in Tokyo, thank you very much
for coming in today, pleased to have you with us.
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ: Thank you.
BRINKLEY: Here with us in Washington is George Will, of
ABC News, and there in Tokyo, as you see, Sam Donaldson, ABC News
White House correspondent.
Mr. Secretary, the President is saying that the
explosion in the Soviet Union was hardly an internal matter,
since the fallout has floated over several countries -- has
demanded more information about it. Has there been any response?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.
BRINKLEY: Do you expect any?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course.
BRINKLEY: All right.
George.
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
STAT
Motenal supplied by Radio N Reports. Inc. may be used for file and reference ournases oruv It may not t a nw,rn,i,., -M .Mn rr .,,,hl -k, .in....,...w,.m.. ,,, e.n.:`...ld
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
GEORGE WILL: Mr. Secretary, you said you would bet the
press corps $10 that there were more than two people killed by
that. Brinkley and I have authorized Sam Donaldson to give you
all the money in his wallet if you can tell us more, and tell us
how you know more about this.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: It may be that at some point in time
there were only two people killed. But we have photographs, we
have other kinds of information coming in from the area. And we
know that the radiation levels and the heat in the vicinity of
the plant, and still are, for that matter, intense.
From the pictures you can see that as they realized what
was happening they must have had on the one hand evacuation of
people, and on the other hand, people who stayed and tried to
cope with what was going on and get control of it.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: And among the reasons why you can see
emergency equipment, like fire engines, and so forth and you can
see that they're still where they were parked.
Now, if you went some place to do an emergency operation
and you decided you had to get away in a hurry, I suppose you
would grab the truck you came in and drive it as fast as you
could go -- but it's still there. So I think there's a certain
amount of inference that comes from that.
WILL: Mr. Secretary, after the Korean airliner was shot
down, the Soviet Union spent five days denying that it happened
and then started lying about it. They seem to have gone into
that same pattern here. What conclusions should the American
people draw, specifically with regard to arms control
negotiations, about dealing with a regime that has this character
as it's shown again this week?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first they haven't denied that
it took place; they could hardly do so because the pictures are
there and the radioactive substance is being measured elsewhere.
They haven't been forthcoming with information.
I think the imnplications are no different than what we
have known all along. We know they're a closed society, and we
know that it's important in any arms control agreement, for
example, to have as good a means of verification as you can get,
and try to build in the consideration of compliance as distinct
from verification.
SAM DONALDSON: Mr. Secretary, aside from the casualty
figure and whether or not it was two or 20, or what numnber, have
we not tried to hype the situation from the standpoint of beating
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
the Soviets over the head? And you've even suggested just now,
once again, that while they may not have lied about it, it was
simply because they had no choice.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: We haven't been trying to beat them
over the head. We have, first of all, expressed sympathy, and
continue to. Second of all, offered to be helful if we could.
And third, said that since the citizens of other countries,
including our own people, who are in the vicinity or in
neighboring countries, have their health endangered, we want to
know what's going on, so that we can take steps to protect our
people. And I don't see that that's -- I think that's what we
should be doing.
DONALDSON: Well, now, the radiation levels reported
from western Europe and from Poland just a few hours ago suggest
that there has really been no threat to humanity, no threat
to health, at least so far. Do you have any information that
contradicts that?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: The radiation levels measured have
been announced, and all sorts of precautions are being taken.
I think when sometehing like this happens, you should
observe and then you should err on the side of safety; and that's
what is being done, and I think it's proper to do.
DONALDSON: You're suggesting that here in Tokyo the
summit leaders may agree on some way to strengthen the reporting
of cross-boundary incidents. What do you have in mind?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the International Atomic Energy
Agency has considered the question of cross-border flows of
radioactive material. And I think that -- and theirs are just
voluntary and there's a loose procedure surrounding it; and
perhaps it would be well to tighten that up and to do more.
DONALDSON: Are you suggesting through that agency, or
international treaties among governments?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that agency is an international
treaty among governments, and it's one of the most extensive in
existence. And I might say it's been broadly very successful.
DONALDSON: Yes, but how do you want it strengthened,
though? I'm not quite clear.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: You might write in and have everyone
agree to certain standards and procedures in the event that there
is an accident.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
4
DONALDSON: What are the chances the Soviets would
agree?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know exactly what, but
that's the general idea.
agree?
DONALDSON: What are the chances the Soviets would
SECRETARY SHULTZ: We shouldn't always judge whether we
should do something by whether or not they'll agree. Maybe they
will agree. They agreed to inspection of power plants.
WILL: Mr. Secretary, you said a moment ago that this
again dramatizes the closed nature of the Soviet society, and
hence, the importanbce of having verifiable agreements with them,
and national technical means of verification of arms control
agreements with them. Given the fact that NASA has now suffered
yet another setback in its attempt to launch a space vehicle, are
we reaching a point where the decline in the execution of its
mission by NASA is jeopardizing our national security,
specifically with regard to the verificatgion of arms control
compliance?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's a problem, but it hasn't
reached that point. And I think that the -- it emphasizes on the
one hand the importance of the space program, and the need to
build redundency into the system.
BRINKLEY: If I may interrupt here briefly. We'll be
back with more questions for Secretary Shultz in a moment.
BRINKLEY: Mr.Secretary, we're back.
We got a report here in our newsroom a short time ago
from Poland, some official, whose name I do not know, saying that
their views was that children and women of childbearing age
should not come to Poland because of the danger from radioactive
fallout. Now, my question is, do you foresee this will cause
problems for the Soviet Union with its client states --
satellite states?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's interesting that Poland has
treated this in a sharply different way than the Soviet Union
has. Poland has kept people informed of all the information
they've had, they have issued warnings about drinking milk;
they've issued the kind of statement or caution that you just
referred to. So I think it's an interesting fact that they've
reacted in a different way.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
DONALDSON: Here at the summit, terrorism, I guess is
supposed to be the big issue. Will it still be, or will this
nuclear accident overshadow it?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, of course, this is an economic
summit, and there are very important eonomic matters to be
discussed, some great opportunities around the world, and a
generally good economic environment, so that's going to be the
centerpiece in this summit. Terrorism, however, is a very
important topic. And we and others certainly intend to talk
about it thoroughly, and I expect that out of it will come some
positive results.
DONALDSON: All right.
Do you expect that there will be a statement, a
political statement, in which terrorism is not only mentioned,
but I assume condemned, and do you expect Libya to be condemned
by name?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: I feel confident there will be a
statement of some kind about terrorism. And at the same time,
my own view --I know the President's view is that it's important
to say these things. But more important is what we do, what do
countries do when they go home and confront possible actions that
can be taken.
DONALDSON: What about Libya and others? Do you expect
Libya to be specifically named in the statement? Do you want it
to be named?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know whether it will be named
in the statement or not. But I think by this time, whether it's
named or not, there's no argument anywhere about Libyan
culpability and terrorism.
WILL: Mr. Secretary, the Italians, who have a large
economic stake in Libya, have now indicated a willingness to go
along with very substantial economic sanctions again Libya. A/
is that enough and B/ are they doing that in an attempt to head
off the Americans from doing something that they disagree with,
that is the use of force again?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Italians have a good record of
fighting terrorism. They've done a good job of it. And in so
far as their relations with Libya are concerned, of course,it's
been very extensive.
But I gather that whereas, let's say a little over a
year ago there were some 18,000 Italians in Libya, now there are
only about 3,000, so they have been decreasing.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
I think steps of this kind that Italy and other
governments are in the process of taking, isolate Libya
diplomatically and economically, and that's good. And it's going
to cause concerns inside Libya, and we have indications that is
continuing to be the case.
WILL: Mr. Secretary, when some people in the American
government began to leak to the press shortly after the raids that
we had hoped to kill Qadaffi in those raids, you said that was
not our aim, but if he had been killed it would have been -- I
believe I've got your words right -- all to the good.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: I didn't say that. You've got my
words wrong.
WILL: Okay, well, I'd like to clarify. Go ahead.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, there was no plan or
effort to go after Qaddafi personally, and at least one
potential target, namely, his tent, was explicitly not targeted.
That statement that you quoted was wrong. As far as I'm
concerned, what I said was that if we had a change of government,
a coup of some kind, so that we could expect that Libyan
behavior would be different, I'd be all for that. And I repeat
that right now.
WILL: Well, that's really what I want to clarify, and I
guess you've answered it, and it is this: the United States not
only was out to get him, but took pains not to -- took some care
not to, to minimize the chance that he himself would be killed.
DONALDSON: But if Qadaffi's government fails, in the
sense that he no longer has the power, is that necessarily a
terrrific thing for us, particularly if those who succeed him
go closer to the Soviet Union?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course it makes a difference what
follows on, and you never know for sure.
On the other hand, I think we have some indications that
a successor government,if one emerges, would be different. For
one thing, a successful government has to face the fact that
Qadaffi now has the Libyan economy and society in a shambles, and
they're going to have to do something about that.
DONALDSON: Mr.Secretary, the other day when the
President suggested that he might order a strike against Syria or
Iran, or any other state that can be shown to have sponsored a
direct terrorist attack, you tried to soften those remarks. At
least that's the interpretation. Are we in fact pulling back
from the idea that we would strike Damascus?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President had some words put in
his mouth by a question, and did not mean to say that we had a
plan for attacking Syria or Iran. And I pointed that out.
However, insofar as the fight against terrorism is
concerned, we have to be ready to use all the available means we
have to fight it. And we have to have present in our toolbag the
possibility of military action. And the fact that we did take
action againsts Libya shows that the tool is in the bag, and it's
important that everybody know it.
DONALDSON: Yes, but you were asked repeatedly why, if we
do this against Libya why we don't do it against Syria.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: When we get ready to do something
we'll do it.
WILL: Mr.Secretary...
DONALDSON: In other words, we might do it against
Syria, against Damascus?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm not going to get involved in
speculation about the use of military force, except to say that
it's a good thing that everybody now sees that there are some
circumstances when the U.S. will act.
I think this fight against terrorism is very important,
and we do have to focus on what it takes to win, and we have
to recognize we can win. And the main things it takes is unity
and purposefulness and a recognition that the answer to the fear
that terrorists try to spread is courage to confront that and
take the actions necessary to stamp it out.
WILL: Mr.Secretary, you've pleased the allies with whom
you're meeting by saying that although we think the SALT II
treaty is fatally flawed, and is being comprehensively violated by
the Soviet Union we will continue to agree to comply with it
almost unilaterally. Why is it not fair for the Soviet
government to conclude that we are so in the thrall of our allies
on arms control that we simply cannot get out of a treaty, even
though they are violating it?
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all, the President
hasn't made any decision that I know of, and what he has done is
put forward some ideas that our allies have heard and have
reflected on, and we've also had some discussion with Members of
Congress and the President is now considering what position he
should take.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Thanks very much for being with us today. It's been a
pleasure to have you with us and hear your views.
SECRETARY SHULTZ: Thank you.
BRINKLEY: Coming next, Representative Edward J. Markey,
Democrat Massachusetts, Chairman of the House Energy
Subcommittee, and Representative Don Young, Republican, Alaska,.
of the House Interior Committee, in a moment.
BRINKLEY: Mr.Markey, Mr.Young, thanks for coming in
today. A pleasure to have you here with us.
Now, after the explosion in the Soviet Union, a number
of environmental and anti-nuclear groups, the Audobon Society,
the Sierra Club, the Concerned Scientists, and so on, said that we
in this country are exposed to the same possibility of the same
danger, and they recommended that our nuclear program be tapered
off and ultimately to disappear. What are your thoughts on that?
Mr. Markey?
REPRESENTATIVE MARKEY: Well, there hasn't been a new
nuclear power plant oredered in the United States since 1978.
That's before Three Mile Island. So to a large extent Wall
Street and Main Street has already rendered its verdict on economic and
safety grounds on this technology.
I think that it the light of Chernobyl those concerns
have been reinforced and I think now there is a tremendously high
burden on the nuclear industry that they're going to have to
overcome in guaranteeing to the public that they can make these
plants safe and economical. And I think in the present climate
that's going to be a very high burden, in fact, for them to meet.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Young?
The need for nbuclear power is still here as it was in
the past, more so in the future. And it's a funny thing when
you mention those that call for the demise of nuclear power are the
same ones that are against gas and oil development, hydropower,
all other sources of energy, and energy is the secret to America's
prosperity and its future growth.
WILL: Mr., Markey, policy has to deal with not just
possibilities but probabilities.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Now, when we were developing new technologies for
bridges, dams, airplanes, cars, trains -- lots and lots of
casualties. Yet in the United States I can't think of any new
technoliogy with a safety record as remarkably good as that of
the domestic nuclear power industry. Wouldn't you admit that?
REP. MARKEY: Well, the problem is that in the minds of
the public it's an inherently dangerous technology. They look at
Three Mile Island and at Chernobyl and they get concerned,
because this is an accident that will be ongoing for 30 years.
There will be thyroid cancers, leukemias, bone marrow cancers,
and so the public is afraid. They're fearful of nuclear
power and nuclear weapons. And the only way in which you can make
them in fact believe that this technology is safe is if you,
rather than undermining the public participation in safety
devices, which is what this Administration has been advancing, is
to, in fact, reverse that and to strengthen public participation
and the concern for safety in these plants.
REP. YOUNG: I can suggest one thing, George, your
comment [?] is the safest energy we have. There's been more
people hurt by dams, more people hurt by mines, every other source
of power that we have, people have been in the long run hurt over
a period of time. But there has been no one, to my knowledge has
died from nuclear power.
We have 115 plants in the United States; they have a
tremendous safety record, they provide us with 15 percent of our
power need today. And we are continuing each time to improve the
plants that we have in place.
And as the gentleman from Massachusetts said, we haven't
ordered any plants in ten years, primarily because of
Congressional action, and primarily because of people like Mr.
Markey that do not want an energy source available to the general
public.
Now, I cannot understand, Ed, when you sit in that
committee with me and talk about no more drilling off shore,
you have never supported any other alternate sources of energy,
and yet you stand there and sit here and say we have to eliminate
nuclear power. Where are we going to get our power? Russia
has the most advanced nuclear program today as far as acquiring
the necessary megawatts that are necessary. We have 170 billion
-- or they have 170 billion megawatts produced today through
nuclear power.
REP. MARKEY: This issue is a straw man issue,the
pro-nuclear/anti-nuclear issue.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
REP.MARKEY: Well, the issue really is whether or not
this industry is willing to restore public confidence to the extent
that they're willing to invest in the technology. That's all it
is. And right now...
REP. YOUNG: How can -- excuse me...
REP. MARKEY: Just let me make my point and then
I'll be more than willing to listen to you. The point is this...
REP. YOUNG: It would be the first time.
REP. MARKEY: ...is that the issue comes down to an
industry which has a mindset that accidents can't happen.
Boiling water, which is potentially so dangerous that the public
wants extra security built into it -- and so here's the point: the
nuclear industry right now is pressing for legislation which reduces
public participation, which puts caps on the amount of liability of
the industry in the event of an accident, which restricts in the
Sunshine Act the right of the public...
REP. YOUNG: That's not true. That's not true...
REP. MARKEY: Excuse me, let me finish.
REP. YOUNG: That's the straw dog right there. That's
not true. You know that Price/Anderson does not do that.
REP. MARKEY: I have a right to finish, please...
REP. YOUNG: Well, finish.
REP. MARKEY: ...to restrict the right of the public and
the press into the secret gatherings of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. And I can guarantee you that that is going to, in
fact, result in just the opposite result of what the nuclear
industry is seeking to achieve.
REP. YOUNG: The fact of the matter, the Price/Andersopn
renewal, which we're working on right now, increases
the liability of the industry. And again, they have never had
the opportunity to have it kicked in as far as the liability to
the general public, and we have lost, we have no harm and
in fact, Three Mile Island has not done what you said it did.
BRINKLEY: Let me ask a question that is of somewhat
long range, but it's curious. Some of us around in the
Eisenhower years when Secretary of Commerce Louis Strauss was
discussing the possibility of nuclear power, saying that it was
going to be so cheap we would not even need meters. What
happened?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
REP. MARKEY: Well, what happened was that...
REP. YOUNG: My turn Ed. My turn, Ed. You had your
time. Let me -- this is a fair -- equal...
BRINKLEY: Well, I want an answer from both of you. Let Mr.
Young go first.
REP. YOUNG: Two things happened. Number one, we had
cheaper sources of power. We had the Mideast oil, we had a
lot of power developed within our own United States. We have not
done that. We have come to a power standstill. We're
not producing the necessary mewgawatts we must have. And along
the road the nuclear program -- as I mentioned, we had 15 plants
-- 15 percent of our power today comes from nuclear plants. We have
come to the point where the public has been misled, and I believe
actually through hysteria, that this is the most dangerous of
all power sources. It's very difficult to get the permits
necessary now to build a nuclear plant. We're trying to unify
we're trying to unify the system today, which was opposed by
the gentleman on my right. And I would suggest, respectfully,
that is where the problem lies. It is a very expensive
proposition now to produce the power.
BRINKLEY: Mr.Markey, I'll give you the last word
before the time runs out.
REP MARKEY: The public was told in the 1950s that it
would be too cheap to meter, that it would be safe and that it
would be economical.
What we've learned over the course of the last 25 years,
from Three Mile Island to Chernobyul, is that accidents can happen
and do happen.
The point is that the public doesn't trust the experts
anymore. And as a result they want more and more guarantees of
public safety devices built into these plants. And with it we've
seen a corresponding rise in price. And nuclear power has, as a
result, become much more competitive with alternative
energy sources which Wall Street decided to invest in.
BRINKLEY: Mr.Markey and Mr.Young, thanks very much.
Glad you came in today. Enjoyed hearing your thoughts.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #02386-86
14 May 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Acting NIO for Economics
Economic Costs of the Chernobyl Incident
1. I believe many analysts are overestimating the economic costs of
the Chernobyl accident to the USSR. Attachments A
imply the costs will be high indeed. think Moscow can contain
the economic costs to well under $10 billion, keeping them within the
limits of a very significant, but hardly catastrophic, natural disaster.
2. According to the analysts in SOYA, loss of grain, livestock, and
farmland will be minimal. As for other costs, it is only possible, of
course, to make order of magnitude estimates at this point.
-- Assuming the permanent relocation of 10,000 families in the area
at $20,000 each, the cost would be $2 billion plus, say, $500
million for temporary relocation of others in a wider, 30
kilometer, area. (We have reports that those relocated are
already being put to work.)
-- The loss of the four reactors amounts to perhaps $4 billion in
capital costs. It is possible, however, that in time reactors
1 and 2 could be returned to service, depending on the levels of
radiation in the immediate area and estimates of cleanup costs
relative to new construction.
-- Cleanup costs, including covering radioactive earth, plus loss
of farmland, livestock, etc., could total another $1 billion or
so assuming the Soviets do not apply strict Western standards to
contamination of meat and dairy products.
25X1
25X1
DECr OADRER / ~_ .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
SECRET
In addition to these capital costs, loss of the four reactors represents
an annual loss of power equal to 100,000 b/d oil worth about $550 million
per year. It is impossible at this point to gauge longer term costs such
as delays in the power program, increased costs to improve reactor
design., etc.
3. In the attached article (Attachment C) Goldman argues that the
accident is a major blow to Gorbachev's effort at economic reform. I
think it is more appropriately viewed as an indication of the lack of
maneuvering room Gorbachev has to meet any single major economic
emergency including major crop failures--let alone back-to-back problems
such as the Chernobyl accident followed by a crop failure. He cannot, I
believe, afford to shut down all reactors of similar design for an
extended period owing to the cost of fossil fueled replacement power.
Similarly, the grid cannot accommodate such losses; the system
experienced periodic brownouts even before the accident.
4. As an aside, I would like to know what the power production
targets were for these four reactors, whether these targets were raised
under Gorbachev, and whether our people think the rate of capacity
utilization allowed time for proper maintenance.
5. SOVA has drafted an article on the economic impact of Chernobyl
on the USSR; EURA is doing an article on the costs to Eastern Europe.
This memorandum was reviewed by SOVA.
A. Chernobyl's Impact on Foreign Trade
C. "A Threat to Soviet Economic Reform," The New York imes
4 May 86
D. "The Worst Effects Will Emerge Slowly," The New York Times,
4 May 86
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Confidential
Attachment A
Chernobyl's Impact on Foreign Trade
There have been a lot of rumors but few hard facts of any direct
impact on foreign trade:
--Should oil be needed as feedstock for power plants to replace
the power lost from Chernobyl then foregone oil earnings are
approximately $550 million for every 100,000 b/d at $15 per
barrel.
--There have been many rumors of increased grain purchases but,
again, few hard facts. Indeed, given current he constraints and
some statements about cutting back imports sharply, especially
for consumer goods, the Soviets may forgo any food imports to
to replace losses, particularly if there not significant.
--There may some minor he outlays to fight the disaster such as
the purchase of West German robots, or the payment to medical
specialists.
--There has been some speculation in the West German press about
farmers bringing a suit against the Soviet Union to recoever
damages--the amount mentioned was $500 million. This may lead
nowhere.
--Western bankers may use this accident as one more reason to
up the price of borrowing by the Soviets. So far they had kept
rates low despite the poor oil market, but this may change their
minds.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MAY 4,
1986
THE GRIM TOLL OF CHERNOBYL
Attachment C
A Thread to Soviet Economic Reform
By MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN
WHILE there obviously is
never a good time for a nu-
clear meltdown, the Cherno-
byl disaster comes at a particularly
awkward moment for the Soviet econ-
omy. it may well abort Mikhail S.
Gorbachev's ambitious effort to turn
the Soviet economy around.
Before Chernobyl, Mr. Gorba-
chev's efforts to discipline and moti-
vate the Soviet work force were
beginning to bear fruit. According to
official Soviet data, in the first three
months of 1966, industrial production
rose 6.7 percent and labor produc-
tivity 6.3 percent over the compara-
ble period in 1965.
Even oil production was increasing
again. Since Mr. Gorbachev made a
personal tour of the west Siberian oil-
fields last year, fired several officials
and criticized many more, production
- which at one point was down by 4
percent on a monthly basis - has re-
.
,
l
bounded to a 2 percent growth rate, long accustomed to brownouts, an)
compared with the same month a loss of capacity hurts.
.year before. Equally impressive, Moreover, the accident will slog
steel production increased by 10 per- the Soviet's nuclear drive, requirini
cent in the first.quarter of 1966, corn- the diversion for electricity genera.
pared with a year earlier, something tion of more natural gas, coal and
not seen for a decade or more. possibly some petroleum that other-
Building on this momentum, Mr. wise could be set aside for hard-cur.
Gorbachev seemed to be preparing to rency exports. Fortunately for Mr.
bring high technology and better Gorbachev, oil production is increas-
services to the Soviet Union so that it ing again, but that increase will not
would be competitive with the United compensate for the fall in world oil
States not only in military strength . prices, all the more so if more energy
but in economic sophistication. Given must be kept for home consumption.
the resistance to previous attempts at The last thing the Soviets need is a
reform, this may have been an un- further crimp in their hard-currency
attainable dream: But to make any earning abilities - Soviet foreign
inroads, Mr. Gorbachev realized be debt will increase by over fib billion
would have to establish his credibility 'this year because of falling oil prices.
as a manager and leader, and he The recent shift in the winds to the
seemed to be doing just that - until south and the east from Chernobyl is
Chernobyl. putting many important Soviet crops
The accident jeopardizes not only in the country's rich black-soil zone at
his credibility, but also the economic risk. Assuming Soviet leaders do the
momentum be has generated. There right thing (which at this point is not
is no way that Mr. Gorbachev could , all that certain), they will destroy
have escaped at least some criticism. some of these crops, which will neces.
for Chernobyl, but the inept, if not un- sitate increased imports. For a nation
conscionable, way the Soviet people that imported $7 billion of grain in
have been kept in the dark about the 1964, any further loss is unwelcome,
potential dangers has turned a bad though by no means devastating.
situation into one with unusually seri- None of these setbacks is insur-
ous and enduring consequences. mountable. The mort important con-
sequence of Chernobyl may be the
dashing of Mr. Gorbachev's hopes for
reforms, innovation and inspired
leadership. ^
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
The first economic casualty, then,
is the sense that the Soviet Union had
finally found itself a leader who would
provide his people utth the openness
and respect they have so long been
denied. As the editors of Sovietskaya
Rossiya, a Moscow newspaper, said
in January, "In the interests of truth
and of speaking openly with people on
all vital questions, our information
must be up-to-date, accurate and
complete." For Mr. Gorbachev,
Chernobyl fails on all three accounts.
The second casualty is the Soviet
energy industry. At a minimum,
Chernobyl's four generating units,
with a total capacity of 4,000 mega-
watts, will be out of commission for
the foreseeable future. Even though
the units account for almost one-half
of the Ukraine's electrical capacity,
nuclear-ge oration provides only 11
percent of the Soviet Union's total
electric energy. So the loss of Cherno
byl is not irreplaceable, particular])
'Dow that the weather is warmer and
the days sunnier
Yet
In a count
r
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
THE NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY, MAY 4, 1986
Attachment D
The Worst Effects Will Emerge Slowly
T HE history of the 20th century is
a confirmation of the wisdom
that the impossible is always
possible. Whether in the destruction
of Challenger or in the meltdown at
Chernobyl, the seeds of disaster were
planted long before the event, and the
repercussions will be felt long after.
What are the likely environmental
and health effects of Chernobyl? For
a few in the immediate vicinity who
were heavily exposed to radiation, it
could mean death within days, weeks
or months, depending on the extent of
exposure. For many others, who were
Herbert L. Abrarns is professor of
radiology and a member-in-residence
,f the Center for International Se-
auity and Arms Control, at Stanford
University.
exposed to leas severe - but still
critical - amounts of radiation, it
could mean a bone-marrow death
that could occur in weeks to months.
Fluid replacement, antibiotics and
stringent sterile precautions may
save many in this group.
At least 14 different isotopes drifted
into Scandinavia, including the ha:-
ardou s radioactive iodine and cesi-
um. As the wind's direction changed,
countries adjacent to the Ukraine -
Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugo-
slavia and Austria - experienced in-
creased levels of radioactivity.
Radioactive iodine is deposited on
the soil and in plants, ingested by
cows and it appears quickly in milk.
Once ingested, it accumulates in the
thyroid gland and may destroy thy-
roid tissue and ultimately produce
thyroid nodules and even cancer.
Cesium is threatening because it con.
tines to produce radiation for dec-
ades after it has been taken up by
human tissues.
What of the area around Cherno-
byl? Land within 5 to 15 miles of the
reactor may be contaminated for
many years and could be uninhabita-
ble. Over days, weeks and months, as
fallout settles to the ground, water,
lakes, rivers and crops may be con-
taminated at distances beyond the
immediate area.
A major concern of the Chernobyl
accident is not only the reservoir that
supplies Kiev - which must have in.
Creased radioactivity - but' the
Dnieper River that flows out of the
reservoir and south to the Black Sea.
Both immediately, and for weeks and
months thereafter, the use of impure
water must be sharply restricted, and
contaminated agricultural products
impounded.
The expense of Three Mile Island -
huge though it was - may pale beside
the Chernobyl disaster. Any estimate
true include the cost of evacuating
and relocating thousands of people;
of medical care for hundreds with
radiation sickness and . possibly
burns; of workdays lost; of a sus-
tained interruption of one-seventh of
all Soviet nuclear power for the
Ukraine and Eastern Europe; the
decontamination of a large area that
may remain "hot" - excessively
radioactive - for months or years;
agricultural products that must be
junked, and property that cannot be
'used. The pressure will be great to
close or redesign those reactors with-
out appropriate containment, and the
cost attached to all new Soviet reac-
tors will rise sharply.
' The human tragedy of the dead, in-
jured and evacuated is clearly the
central concern of the world com-
munity. But the secondary effects of
Chernobyl are inestimable, and none
are more aware of this than those in
the nuclear power industry in this
country and in other lands. ^
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
SUBJECT: Economic Costs of the Chernobyl Incident
ANIO/Econ
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - D/Exec Staff
1 - ER
1 - A/C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/SOVA
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/AL (Einsel)
1 - NIO/Econ Subj file
1 - NIO/Econ Chrono
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88G01116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
DATE: 12 May 36
INDEX: OCA86-1491 & ER 36-1816X
TO: HAMILTON, HPSCI
FROM: CRIES, D/OCA
SUMt1ARV: RESPONSE TO LETTER OF 1 May 86 re the chernobyl NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN
THE SOVIET UNION
FILED: OIRG FILED IN B-406-IR
C-113-IR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
TO:
10
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
d /Y/ to
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 36-8
7A 1 w- RAAV PF I I(ZFf)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #02194-86
1 May 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Acting NIO for Economics
Hard Currency Limitations on the Response
to the Chernobyl Disaster
1. We can expect Gorbachev soon to come under pressure by
neighboring countries to shut down all nuclear reactors similar in design
to the units at Chernobyl. While Gorbachev may have been able to
consider such an option only two years ago when foreign exchange earnings
were much higher, the squeeze of lower oil and gas prices effectively
precludes this option.
Each 1,000 MW reactor replaces the equivalent of 25,000 b/d of
fuel oil worth about $130 million per year at current market
prices.
The loss of the four units at Chernobyl, hence, already costs
the USSR $500 million per year. (Even if power is rationed
rather than replaced by oil-fired capacity, indirect economic
losses would presumably be equally high.)
It would cost the USSR nearly 500 thousand b/d in fuel oil at a
cost of $2.5 billion annually to shut down all reactors of
similar design, causing a drop in oil exports of roughly 40
percent.
2. Looking further ahead, hard currency considerations will also
play a role in decisions relating to food. Should the damage to farmland
prove widespread, the decision on determining levels of contamination
acceptable for distributing food absent an ability to pay for substantial
imports will be a difficult one. EC countries may well offer substantial
"emergency" credits for such supplies given their surpluses in
production. The Soviet bureaucracy, however, might opt to distributing
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
SUBJECT: Hard Currency Limitations on the Response to the
Chernobyl Disaster
A/NIO/Econ
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - DCI
1 - DOCI
1 - D/Exec Staff
-1 - ER
1 - A/C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIO/AL/Einsel
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/Econ Sub File
1 - NIO/Econ Chrono
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3
Iq
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/16: CIA-RDP88GO1116R000700830001-3