SOURCE EVALUATION BOARD FOR CIVIL SPACE REMOTE SENSING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T02051R000200410001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1983
• Content Type: MISC

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?--~URCE EVALUATION BOARD FOR
CIVIL SPACE REMOTE SENSING
$:00 AM, July 11,1983
NBOC-1, Room 303
0800
1.
Update on current events (including
nagging on Financial Disclosure
Statements)
R. Kammer
0830
2.
Review of revised RFP Outline
E. Neil
.. "'
090A
3.
Discuss expanded business sections
of RFP
N. Scodari
1000
B R E A K
1015
4.
Review of issue status
R. Kammer
1200
L U N C H
1330
5.
Review TAC drafts
E. Neil
1600
6.
Other Business
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DRAFT
1.2.5 Restrictions on Government Use of Data ~ /?~~ 'j
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In any contract that may result from this RFP, the U.S. Government will require
access to space derived remote sensing data as described in Part_ of these
specifications. The Government will also be conducting independent research and
development using external remote sensing data obtained either by experimental sensors
flown on the commercial sataellites or separate R8~D missions; as well as foreign R&D or
operational data obtained through foreign research investigations. The present
procedures and methods for the obtaining land use of foreign remote sensed data for
R8~D purposes are described below.
1.2.6 Global Data Access for R&D
The established practices associated with the U.S. "open skies" data policy of public
non-discriminatory dissemination have served us well in promoting a climate of
legitimacy and acceptance for U.S. worldwide data acquisition from space. They have
preserved U.S. freedom of action in this area, have benefitted U.S. commercial
participation in growing market and have helped retard development of foreign
competitive trusts that would pose a challenge to U.S. leadership in remote sensing.
The ability to engage in global research has been fostered by the U.S. open data
policy. RB~D programs have not been subject to geographical limitations. They hove thus
enjoyed uncontested access to data of areas of the world judged to be of prime scientific
interest in reaching an understanding of global phenomena despite often restrictive
practices placed on foreign scientific research by bureaucratic factions in a number of
countries. Efforts to impose restrictive limitations have thus far been thwarted and the
U.S. view has prevailed in the deliberations of the United Nations Outer Space
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The U.S. Government conducts a wide variety of space-based experiments to
evaluate the ability of remote sensing techniques for basic and applied studies of the
Earth. Experimental sensors placed on orbiting spacecraft can be used to collect remote
sensing data in may different parts of the world. Wide dissemination of this data within
the global research community is essential to fully evaluate its utility. Past experience
with sensors such as the Shuttle Imaging Radar-A has shown benefits from research
conducted by both domestic and foreign investigators. Limitations on the availability of
such data would restrict the scope and extent of research, which, in turn, would reduce
the Government's overall return on its investment in specific orbital experiments.
As indicated above, the U.S. Government achieves a significant "multiple effect"
on the return on its research investment by permitting experimental data to be widely
disseminated. Restrictions on the flow of R&D data into the reasearch community would
reduce or diminish the overall R&D achievements of specific flight projects. The flow of
such data into the worldwide research community plays an important role in expanding
current awareness of the utility of space techniques.
1.2.7 R&D Requirement for Foreign Remote Sensing Data
A number of foreign nations/agencies (France, Japan, European Space Agency,
Canada, India, Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil) are currentlyu developing or plan to
develop either remote sensing missions. Research scientists have already mode plans to
obtain data from the German-developed Modular Optoelectronic Multispectral Scanner
(MOMS) instrument scheduled for a June 1983 Shuttle experimental flight and the
Microwave Remote Sensing Experiment (MRSE) instrument scheduled for flight on
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Spacelab I in September 1983. We anticipate future research requirements for access to
European Space Agency ERS-I data (in particular ERS-I SAR data) in the 1988
timeframe, Japanese MOS-I data in the 1986 timeframe, and Canadian RADARSAT dat
in the the early 1990s. Although we have not yet identified specific research
requirements for French SPOT data, it is likely that scientists will have access to this
data in the same manner as wi II other U.S. users -through purchase of the data. In the
other above-cited instances, it is likely that we will obtain foreign satellite data for
experimental purposes through cooperative agreement in exchange for U.S. data, in
support of U.S. investigators, or in return for U.S. ground truth support.
The U.S. may explore the possibility of direct readout of foreign remote sensing
satellite data by U.S. ground stations for experiment purposes. Such arrangements could
be patterned after similar arrangements whereby U.S, experimental satellite data was
acquired by direct readout at foreign ground stations on the basis of negotiated
agreements.
1.2:8 Foreign Participation in U.S. RB~D Programs
R&D efforts benefit from the participation of foreign scientists and investigators.
A number of foreign scientists and counterpart foreign agency personnel have
demonstrated expertise in the area of earth seiences. Their own research often
complements that of their U.S. peers. In the earth sciences area, foreign
scientists/investigators have participated/continue to participate in the Landsat I, 2 and
4 investigations, Shuttle Imaging Radar-A and -B investigations, and are associated with
the Skylab, Nimbus-7, Magsat and Heat Capacity Mapping missions. Foreign involvement
can be anticipated in virtually all of the future remote sensing programs; in particular
foreign ground truth support and participation of foreign investigators will be crucial in
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the development of an integrated NASA Global Habitability program.
Foreign scientists and foreign counterpart agencies have command of resources
which are often of value in the context of cooperative programs. Foreign instruments
have been contributed in the case of the TIROS and follow-on meteorological satellite
series (UK instruments, French data collection system) as well as the Nimbus series of
satellites (UK instruments). A currently envisioned cooperative activity is the joint
flight of NASA's Shuttle Imaging Radar-C with the German Remote Sensing Experiment
(initially flown on Spacelab I) in the 1986 timeframe. Another example is the back-up
tape recorder support at Landsat foreign ground receiving stations (operated at foreign
agency expense) enabling attainment of U.S. Government data requirements not other
wise attainable lin the pre-TDRSS era.
As foreign counterpart agencies develop their own earth science missions, we can
expect reciprocity in receiving access to foreign-acquired data and participation by U.S.
scientists and investigators on foreign mission science teams.
1.2.9 International Considerations
Like domestic investigators, foreign investigators associated with R&D efforts
receive the data they need at no cost. In addition to bringing demonstrated expertise to
the investigation and engaging in activities of specific interest, foreign investigators can
provide valuable ground truth support and often resources of great potential value to the
R&D program. At the same time, allowing foreign investigators to participate in R&D
programs have required and will continue to rquire an exhange of U.S. remote sensing
data (experimental land/or operational) in return for ground truth support or eventually
for data from foreign satellite missions.
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1.3.0 Dissemination of R&D Results
It is Government policy to report the results of sponsored research activities in an
expeditious fashion. Meetings of sponsored investigators are considered to be open
forums for scientific debate and discussion, and any interested investigators may
attend. Publication and presentation of research results shall not be affected by
commercialization.
All research results are considered to be public property and they reside within the
public domain. The commercial operator may have a vested interest in remaining
abreast of current sponsored research. However, the commercial operator can not be
provided with early or proprietary access to research results.
1.3.1 Proposal Requirements
The proposal shall address in this part the understanding of the needs and purpose
of remote sensing data for R&D and the approach to provision of operatioral data for
research. Of particular interest is the proposed approach to:
A. Restrictions on duplication rights, if any, for purposes of RS~D use of data;
B. Restrictions , if any on the use of foreign data for R&D purposes; and
C. The methods proposed to maintain organization of RB~D results for
purposes of system or product improvements for commercial use.
FIRST DRAFT:ENei I:LYV:7/ 1 I /83:443-3925
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DRAFT
3.0 PROPOSED FOREIGN REMOTE SENSING SYSTEMS
3.1 Foreign Land Remote Sensing Systems
Two space systems planned by other nations are the French, SPOT (Systeme
Probatoire d'Observation de la Terre), and the Japanese MERES (Mineral, Energy and
Resources Exploration Satellite) systems. These systems are scheduled to start operating
in the mid-to-late 1980's. Table II compares the capabilities of the Landsat-I, -2, -3, -D,
the SPOT, and the MERES systems.
Both of these foreign systems have some characteristics (spectra bands and
spatial resolution, for example) that are comparable to the Landsat-D System. However,
one of the differences is that both the French and Japanese have pointable capabilities
(using rotating mirrors) that will increase the frequency of observation of any point
globally. The SPOT system, with one satellite would cross over a point every 26 datys,
and the pointing instrument could observe a point every fifth day. In addition,
stereoscopic capability would also be available on the French and Japanese systems.
SPOT wi II have direct readout to foreign ground stations, and two on-board recorders (22
minutes each). Both the SPOT and MERES Systems will use push-button (solid state)
scanning technology rather than the mechanical scanners now in use by the United
States. Each line of the image is formed by a linear array of detectors located in the
instrument focal plane, the scanning of the line being performed electronically. The
successive lines of the image are produced as the satellite moves forward along its
orbital track. The advantages of this type of sensor is the exposure time for each ground
point is automatically maximized, and the mechanical simplicity of the instrument
ensures image of excellent geometric quality.
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A market for SPOT data is ecpected to be found among those involved in oil
and mineral exploration, topographic and land use mapping, crop and environmental
monitoring, coastal zone studies and general research activities. SPOT Image, the
privately-owned company that will market SPOT, plans to establish agreements with
ground stations, giving the stations exclusive rights to market Spot within their own
countries. The payment fees to these stations are structured so as to a essentially
proportional to the amount of data received by them. SPOT Image has tentatively priced
their product (high density tape) at about $1,000 per scene. A SPOT scene is
approximately one-forth the area of a TM scene (currently prices at $2,800) and has
three spectral bands, as compared to the TM's seven.
3.2 Foreign Meterological Satellite Systems
3.2.1 Geostationary Satellites
There are several operation or planned geostationary satellites operated
by foreign countries. These are summarized in the Table below:
GEOSTATIONARY SATELLITES
Name Operator Location (Longitude)
METEOSAT EUMETSAT and the 0?
European Space Agency
GMS Japan
INSAT India
GOMS (Planned) USSR
135?E
72?E
74?E
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All provide Visible IR Imagery, WEFAX (except India) and DSC.
Coordination among the operators of the international geostationary weather
satellites is accomplished by an ad-hoc group called Coordination of Geostationary
Meteorological Satellites (CGMS). The WMO serves as an advisor to the CGMS.
3.2.2 Meteosat
The European Space Agency operates METEOSAT, which has a subpoint
of b?E. This position gives Meteosat an areal coverage from the South Atlantic to
Greenland and from Saudi Arabia to Brazil. This satellite offers visible, infrared, and
moiture channel data. Limited amounts of METEOSAT data, also in WEFAX format, are
available to GOES-TAP customers.
The spacecraft is a spinning satellite with its spin axis parallel to the
earth's axis. Spin rate is 100 rpm.
Sensors and services
a. Viewing sensor - 3-channel, high resolution radiometer operating
in three spectral bands.
I) Visible band (0.4-I.I micrometers), resolution 2.5 km,
5,000 lines/image.
2) Infrared band (10.5-12.5 micrometers), resolution 5.0 km,
2,500 lines/image.
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Data are stored in an on-board computer during the earth viewing portion of a spin
(I /20 of a revolution). During the remaining 19/20 of the spin the data are transmitted
to the ground at a transmission speed of 166 kbs. Images are acquired on a half hourly
schedule.
b. Data Collection System -Operates both an international and a
regional DCS. The international system operates on the platform reply frequency 402-
402.1 MHz, divided into 33 3 kHz wide reply channels, and currently accepts only self-
timed platforms. An interrogation frequency is available at 468.875 MHz, but is not
presently in use. The regional system operates on the platform reply frequency 402.1 to
402.2 MHz, divided into 29 3 kHz wide channels (four channels are reserved). Allthree
platform types -self-timed, interrogated and alert -can be accommodated. The
interrogation frequency is 468.925 MHz.
c. Direct BroadcQSt -Two types of direct data dissemination are
provided, ahigh-resolution image broadcast and a weather facsimile (WEFAX)
broadcast. The high resolution broadcast is at 1694.5 MHz. These images are broadcast
in digital form aid may include one or more spectral bands. No panoramic distortion
corrections is made. Three area coverages are provided: (I) whole disk, (2) SEuropean
area, and (3) the Americas, north of 20?S. (This latter is a rebroadcast of GOES data.)
data are repeated no less frequently than three hourly intervals. Delays from original
image receipt to picture transmission are one to two hours.
The WEFAX broadcasts are made at both 1691 and 1694.5 MHz, and
are analogue transmissions. For these transmissions the full disk is divided into
designated sectors. The successive transmission of all sectors will provide full disk
coverage. Each transmission contains data from just sone spectral band. Repetition
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rates for the WEFAX sectors vary from one to three hours, with delays after original
data receipt being generally 30 minutes. In addition to METEOSAT and GOES imagery,
cloud top height analyses and selected weather charts are transmitted in WEFAX format.
Centralized Processing
At present five operational products and one experimental product are produced
routinely using an automated computer-based system. Of the operational products, three
are prepared twice a day at 00 and 12 UT. These are cloud motion vectors (winds), sea
surface temperature, and upper tropospheric humidity, expressed as relative humidty.
These three products are disseminated in the SATOB code on the GTS. The two other
operational products are cloud analysis and cloud-top height maps, which are produced
four times per day, at 00, 06, 12, and 18 UT. The cloud analyses are also distributed on
the GTS in SATOB code, while the cloud-top height maps are disseminated via the
satellite in the WEFAX format. The experimental product, radiation balance data, is
being evaluated and is not now disseminated.*
*Additional information on the METEOSAT system and services is available in WMO-No.
41 I, Chapter I.
Japan operates GMS, which has a satellite subpoint at 135?E. This
position gives GMS an areal coverage from the South Pacific to Siberia, and from Hawaii
to India. Limited amounts of GMS ore available to GOES-TAP customers. GMS data are
transmitted in WEFAX format. The spacecraft is at an altitude
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of 35,800 km and has a spin rate of 100 rpm.
Sensors and Services
a. Viewing Sensor -The Visible and Infared Spin Scan Radiometer
(VISSR), a high resolution scanner operating in two spectral bands.
10,000 lines/image.
2,500 lines/image.
I) Visible bond (0.5-0.75 micrometers) resolution 1.25 km,
2) Infrared band (I 0.5-12.5 micrometers) resolution 5 km,
Data are transmitted to the ground station during the
scanning portion of each spin at a rate of 14M bits/s.
b. Space Environment Monitor. Measures flux of solar protons,
alpha particles, and electrons. Used to monitor solar activity and space environment.
c. Data Collection System. Operates both an international and
regional DCS. The international DCS is the same as for METEOSAT. The regional DCS
operates on the platform reply frequency 402.1 to 402.4 MHz, divided into 3 kHz wide
reply channels. The interrogation frequency is 468.924 MHz. Both self-timed and
interrogated platforms can be accommodated.
d. Direct Broadcast. Two types of direct data dissemination are
provided, a high resolution image transmission (HR-FAX) and a WEFAX-type
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transmission (LR-FAX). HR-FAX is an analogue signal and is transmitted at 1687.1 MHz
with a recorder drum speed of 400 rpm. Two formats are provided, a full disk image with
no panoramic distortion correction and a Mercator mapped image, covering the area
from 35?N-35?S and from 90?E-170?W. Full disk IR images are transmitted every three
hours beginning at 00 UT. The SIR Mercator images are transmittted every six hours
beginning at 02 UT. Full disk visible images are transmitted at 0130, 0400, and 0730
UT. Delays after VISSR operation range from five minutes for the IR full disk to slightly
over two hours for the IR Mercator.
The LR FAX transmissions, which are fully compatible with
WEFAX ,consist of eight sectors which which provide full disk coverage. There is no
panoramic distortion correction. The set of eight LR-FAX sectors are transmitted every
three hours starting at 0021 UT with a time delay of 21 minutes after completion of
VISSR imaging. (Note: For both HR-FAX and LR-FAX, the transmissions expected at I S
UT are delayed one hour to 16 UT because of the lack of a VISSR image near local
midnight during eclipse periods.)
Centralized Processing
Japan produces cloud motion vectors (winds) using an automated computer based
system. These winds are disseminated on the GTS in the SATOP code form.*
Additional information on the gms system and services is available in WMO-No. 41 I,
Chapter II.
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3.2.4 INSAT
Proposed, two geostationary satellites (INSAT-I, A, and B) located at
74?E and 94?E longitude, respectively, to be operated by India. These are combined
communications/meteorological satellites and are three axis stabilized.
Sensors and Services
a. Viewing sensor - A Very High Resolution Radiometer operating
in the visible (0.55-0.75 micrometers) and the infrared (10.5-12.5 micrometers), with
resolutions of 2.75 km and I I km, respectively. Full frame images are available every 30
minutes. Will be used for continuous monitoring. Products expected include synoptic
weather observations, sea-surface and cloud-top temperatures and water-body, andsnow
mapping.
b. Data Collection System - A 200 kH bandwidth data channel in
the 402.75 MHz (earth to satellite) band for relaying meteorological, oceanographic, and
hydrologic data from unattended land- or ocean-based data collection and transmission
platforms.
There is no WEFAX or direct broadcast. The meteorological data
is multiplexed with the communications links. Initially only Indian stations may receive
the data.
3.2.5 GOMS
Russia has proposed, one geostationary satellite (GOMS) located at approximately
70?E. The satellite is planned to be three axis stabilized.
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Sensors and Services
a. Viewing sensors
I.) Television-type scanning equipment in the visible band of
the spectrum with a resolution of 2-4 km.
2.) Infrared scanning equipment in the infrared atmospheric
window (8-12 micrometers) with a resolution about 12 km. Images will be taken every 30
minutes and transmitted to the Primary Data Utilization Stations (PDUS) in Moscow,
Novosibirsh and Khabarosh.
Data Collection System
Planned to be compatible with the DCS as recommended by the CGMS.
WEFAX
Two WEFAX channels are proposed. The first will be an international channel with
transmissions orginated from the principal PDUS in Moscow. This channel will be
operative for 20 minutes out of each half hour. The visible image will be transmitted in
nine sectors, the infrared image as a single sector. Two of the 20-minute intervals will
be required for transmission of the ten sectors. Images will be transmitted two hours
after observation. Initial plans call for four image transmissions per day, with the other
WEFAX periods being used for the transmission of standard meteorological charts. The
second WEFAX channel will be a regional channel and input will be from all three
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PDUS'. This channel will operate continously. Its primary purpose is for the exchange of
meteorological charts between the Hydrometeorological Centre and the regional centres,
and for support of the Hydrometeorological Service.
3.3 Polar Meteorological Satellites
3.3.1 METEOR
At this time polar-orbiting meteorological satellites are being operated
by'two countries, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. The Soviet satellites are of the METEOR
Spacecraft
The current spacecraft in the Soviet polar-orbiting meteorological program is the
METEOR-2 improved operational meteorological satellite. Prior to the introduction of
the METEOR-2, the METEOR satellite was used, with 25 of these satellites being
launched. With the introduction of METEOR-2 the earlier satellite was discontinued.
METEOR-2 will continue as the basic operational meteorological satellite through 1985.
The decision on possible changes at that time has not yet been made.
Two or three satellites are normally in operation at the same time. These
spacecraft fly in a near polar orbit at a height of 900 km. The orbit has an inclination of
81? to the equator and the spacecraft completes one revolution about the earth every
102 minutes. The particular orbit flown was chosen to provide for the collection of data
twice per day, at times approximating the meteorological synoptic hours (0300 and 1500
Moscow time).
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Sensors
METEOR-2 carries five sensors, as follows:
a. A scanning telephotometer. This instrument acquires data in
the visible band of the spectrum from 0.5-0.7 micrometers. The width of the viewed
swath is 2,600 km, the resolution of the data is 2 km. This instrument provides the input
to the automatic picture transmission (APT) direct broadcast service.
b. Television-type scanning equipment. Acquires data in the
visible band of the spectrum from 0.5-0.7 micrometers. The width of the viewed swath is
2,200 km; the resolution of the data is I km.
c. Infrared scanning radiometer. Acquires data in and near the
infrared "window" in the spectrum, operating from 8-12 micrometers. The width of the
viewed swath is 2,600 km, the resolution of the data is 8 km.
d. An eight-channel infrared scanning radiometer. Acquires data
in the frequencies I I.I, 13.33, 13.70, 14.24, 14.43, 14.75, 15.02, 18.07 micrometers. the
width of the viwed swath is 1,000 km, the angular resolution 2?. This instrument
provides information on the vertical distribution of temperature. It is not carried on all
METEOR-2 satellites.
e. A penetrating radiation radiometer. This instrument acquires
data on the fluxes of penetrating radiation in space near to the earth.
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Data processing
The data available from these sensors provide the capability, through analysis, to
determine a number of parameters:
o Global distribution of clouds
o Global distribution of snow and ice cover
. o Global radiation temperature of the underlying surface
o Height of cloud tops globally
The foregoing are produced operationally twice perday, at times approximately the
meteorological synoptic hours. In addition, the system provides the capability to obtain
operationally regional data on cloud distribution through the data provided by the
automatic picture fransmission system.
Experimentally, world-wide data are obtained which can be used to calculate the
vertical distribution of temperature. Finally, data are obtained which indicate the
strength and frequency of the fluxes of penetrating radiation in space near the earth.
*Additional information on the polar-orbiting satellites of the U.S.S.R. is contained in
WMO-No. 41 I, Section III, pages I-81.
The proposer shall state the proposer's understanding and awareness of the current
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and planned foreign satellite systems, either Landsat or meteorological, or both as
appropriate and address proposed mechanisms, procedures and plans for incorporating
such foreign data into his system. The proposal shall clearly state the role, if any of the
U.S. Federal government in the proposed procedures; any limitations proposed on the use
of such foreign data by agencies of the U.S. Government, universities, private
organizations or other enetities of the U.S.
The proposal shall also state what procedures if any might be developed or
incorporated in colloboration with such foreign sensing systems together with the
benefits such action(s) would accrue to the U.S.
Based on the proposer's knowledge of these foreign sensing systems, the proposal
shall indicate the methods and plans to maintain and foster current U.S. leadership in
remote sensing and/or atmospheric measurements, as appropriate.
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1.2.5 Restrictions on Government Use of Data ~/?/~~'~
~~~ ~_~
In any contract that may result from this RFP, the U.S. Government will require
access to space derived remote sensing data as described in Part_ of these
specifications. The Government will also be conducting independent research and
development using external remote sensing data obtained either by experimental sensors
flown on the commercial sataellites or separate R8~D missions; as well as foreign R&D or
operational data obtained through foreign research investigations. The present
procedures and methods for the obtaining land use of foreign remote sensed data for
RS~D purposes are described below.
1.2.6 Global Data Access for R&D
The established practices associated with the U.S. "open skies" data policy of public
non-discriminatory dissemination have served us well in promoting a climate of
legitimacy and acceptance for U.S. worldwide data acquisition from space. They have
preserved U.S. freedom of action in this area, have benefitted U.S. commercial
participation in growing market and have helped retard development of foreign
competitive trusts that would pose a challenge to U.S. leadership in remote sensing.
The ability to engage in global research has been fostered by the U.S. open data
policy. R&D programs have not been subject to geographical limitations. They have thus
enjoyed uncontested access to data of areas of the world judged to be of prime scientific
interest in reaching an understanding of global phenomena despite often restrictive
practices placed on foreign scientific research by bureaucratic factions in a number of
countries. Efforts to impose restrictive limitations have thus far been thwarted and the
U.S. view has prevailed in the deliberations of the United Nations Outer Space
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The U.S. Government conducts a wide variety of space-based experiments to
evaluate the ability of remote sensing techniques for basic and applied studies of the
Earth. Experimental sensors placed on orbiting spacecraft can be used to collect remote
sensing data in may different parts of the world. Wide dissemination of this data within
the global research community is essential to fully evaluate its utility. Past experience
with sensors such as the Shuttle Imaging Radar-A has shown benefits from research
conducted by both domestic and foreign investigators. Limitations on the availability of
such data would restrict the scope and extent of research, which, in turn, would reduce
the Government's overall return on its investment in specific orbital experiments.
As indicated above, the U.S. Government achieves a significant "multiple effect"
on the return on its research investment by permitting experimental data to be widely
disseminated. Restrictions on the flow of RB~D data into the reasearch community would
reduce or diminish the overall R&D achievements of specific flight projects. The flow of
such data into the worldwide research community plays an important role in expanding
current awareness of the utility of space techniques.
1.2.7 R&D Requirement for Foreign Remote Sensing Data
A number of foreign nations/agencies (France, Japan, European Space Agency,
Canada, India, Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil) are currentlyu developing or plan to
develop either remote sensing missions. Research scientists have already made plans to
obtain data from the German-developed Modular Optoelectronic Multispectral Scanner
(MOMS) instrument scheduled for a June 1983 Shuttle experimental flight and the
Microwave Remote Sensing Experiment (MRSE) instrument scheduled for flight on
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Spacelab I in September 1983. We anticipate future research requirements for access to
European Space Agency ERS-I data (in particular ERS-I SAR data) in the 1988
timeframe, Japanese MOS-I data in the 1986 timeframe, and Canadian RADARSAT dat
in the the early 1990s. Although we have not yet identified specific research
requirements for French SPOT data, it is likely that scientists will have access to this
data in the same manner as wi II other U.S. users -- through purchase of the data. In the
other above-cited instances, it is likely that we will obtain foreign satellite data for
experimental purposes through cooperative agreement in exchange for U.S. data, in
support of U.S. investigators, or in return for U.S. ground truth support.
The U.S. may explore the possibility of direct readout of foreign remote sensing
satellite data by U.S. ground stations for experiment purposes. Such arrangements could
be patterned after similar arrangements whereby U.S. experimental satellite data was
acquired by direct readout at foreign ground stations on the basis of negotiated
agreements.
1.2:8 Foreign Participation in U.S. R8~D Programs
R&D efforts benefit from the participation of foreign scientists and investigators.
A number of foreign scientists and counterpart foreign agency personnel have
demonstrated expertise in the area of earth seiences. Their own research often
complements that of their U.S. peers. In the earth sciences area, foreign
scientists/investigators have participated/continue to participate in the Landsat I, 2 and
4 investigations, Shuttle Imaging Radar-A and -B investigations, and are associated with
the Skylab, Nimbus-7, Magsat and Heat Capacity Mapping missions. Foreign involvement
can be anticipated in virtually all of the future remote sensing programs; in particular
foreign ground truth support and participation of foreign investigators will be crucial in
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the development of an integrated NASA Global Habitability program.
Foreign scientists and foreign counterpart agencies have command of resources
which are often of value in the context of cooperative programs. Foreign instruments
have been contributed in the case of the TIROS and follow-on meteorological satellite
series (UK instruments, French data collection system) as well as the Nimbus series of
satellites (UK instruments). A currently envisioned cooperative activity is the joint
flight of NASA's Shuttle Imaging Radar-C with the German Remote Sensing Experiment
(initially flown on Spacelab I) in the 1986 timeframe. Another example is the back-up
tape recorder support at Landsat foreign ground receiving stations (operated at foreign
agency expense) enabling attainment of U.S. Government data requirements not other
wise attainable lin the pre-TDRSS era.
As foreign counterpart agencies develop their own earth science missions, we can
expect reciprocity in receiving access to foreign-acquired data and participation by U.S.
scientists and investigators on foreign mission science teams.
1.2.9 International Considerations
Like domestic investigators, foreign investigators associated with R&D efforts
receive the data they need at no cost. In addition to bringing demonstrated expertise to
the investigation and engaging in activities of specific interest, foreign investigators can
provide valuable ground truth support and often resources of great potential value to the
RB~D program. At the same time, allowing foreign investigators to participate in RB~D
programs have required and will continue to rquire an exhange of U.S. remote sensing
data (experimental land/or operational) in return for ground truth support or eventually
for data from foreign satellite missions.
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1.3.0 Dissemination of RB~D Results
It is Government policy to report the results of sponsored research activities in an
expeditious fashion. Meetings of sponsored investigators are considered to be open
forums for scientific debate and discussion, and any interested investigators may
attend. Publication and presentation of research results shall not be affected by
commercialization.
All research results are considered to be public property and they reside within the
public domain. The commercial operator may have a vested interest in remaining
abreast of current sponsored research. However, the commercial operator can not be
provided with early or proprietary access to research results.
1.3.1 Proposal Requirements
The proposal shall address in this part the understanding of the needs and purpose
of remote sensing data for R&D and the approach to provision of operatioral data for
research. Of particular interest is the proposed approach to:
A. Restrictions on duplication rights, if any, for purposes of R&D use of data;
B. Restrictions , if any on the use of foreign data for RB~D purposes; and
C. The methods proposed to maintain organization of R&D results for
purposes of system or product improvements for commercial use.
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MEETING AGENDA
SOURCE EVALUATION BOARD FOR
CIVIL SPACE REMOTE SENSING
8:00 AM, July 5, 1983
NBOC ~~1, Room 303
0800
1.) Briefing on development of business
provisions for RFP
I.. Klingensmith
0830
2.) Review of Issues in work
L. Heacock
- From SEB ~~2
- Others
1130
3.)
International commitments
L. Rose
1200
LUNCH
1330
4.)
July SEB Meeting Schedule
R. Kammer
1400
5.)
Federal Data Collection System
(DCS)
W. Shope
1500
6.)
Liability Issues
J. Levine
1530
7.)
Recapitulation of new actions
R. Kammer
1600
8.)
Any other business _
1700
9.)
Adjourn
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Q
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
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' ~ ~` = ~ Office of the Secretary
sFa ~ '~~~~ Washington, O.C. 20230
S1~7E5 ~
June 30, 1983
Memorandum for: The Source Evaluation Board
From: Joseph Levine~~
Subject: Liability Issues in the RFP
At its July 5 meeting, the SEB will have to decide on the guidance it
wishes to provide to the BAC on how the liability issue should be addressed in
the RFP. Attached for background information and guidance is a copy of the
LAC's final version of the liability issues. It does not differ in any
significant way from the version distributed previously. If you do not have
time to read the entire paper before this item comes up on the agenda, I urge
that you at least become familiar with pages 7 - 10.
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~E~ ~ ^~jS
' Crp4 ~~~ i~ f+c ~~c if w~ w~~~~~w ~^ w~ cur
r-'~?"~ ~ YIY11 CY ~ 1 N 1 C, YCF~AIS 1 MCIV 1 OF VUMMCK4C
sEO ~,J s~''~ Washington, D. C 20230
~+rES ~ ~
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Joseph M. Levine
Chief, General Law Division
M. Timothy Conner
Staff Attorney
Liability Issues Regarding Transfer of
LANDSAT and Weather Satellites to Private
Sector
The current U.S. program in civil space remote sensing consists
of a single operational land satellite (LANDSAT) and four
operational weather satellites (GOES and TIROS-N) in orbit. The
Administration has proposed the transfer of these satellites to
the private sector and has established a Source Evaluation Board
to evaluate the proposal. This study is in response to your
request for an examination of the liability issues involved in
the transfer.
In discussing the matter, this memo will touch on the following
questions:
(1) What is the current liability status of the satellite
programs?
(2) If a transfer is effected, what liability does the
private entity incur if persons or property are injured by
one of the satellites?
(3) What liability, if any, does the private entity incur
in its provision of, or failure to provide, data upon which
weather forecasts or similar predictions are based?
(4) What liability, if any, does the United States retain
concerning the events outlined in questions two and three?
(5) Should the liability issues be addressed in the RFP?
It should be kept in mind that these liability issues and
situations are really ones of first impression, since, even
though space vehicles and their fragments have been falling back
to earth since Sputnik was launched, no serious injury has been
reported.
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1. What is the Current Liability Status of the NOAA
Satellite Programs
There are two hypothetical situations here. The first involves
damage or injury to a foreign (non-U.S.) national or foreign
property. The second is if the victim is a U.S, national. The
satellites of course are government owned at present.
International Liability of the U.S. Government
In the first scenario, there are four international conventions
which would apply to the existing NOAA satellites. These are
the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, March 29, 1972 [1973] 24 U.S.T. 2389,
T.I.A.S. 7762 (hereinafter cited as Liability Convention); the
treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (hereinafter referred to as the Outer Space
Treaty), October 10, 1967 [1967], 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347,
610 N.N.T.S. 205; the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, April 22, 1968 [1968] 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.R.S.
6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (hereinafter cited as The Rescue
Agreement).
The Liability Convention
Article II of the Liability Convention states: "A launching
state shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight." The reference to "its" space object in
Article II-is not entirely clear. Does this mean only a space
object of the launching state, meaning the government itself, or
a space object owned by a some private entity of that country,
or both? Under Article I the term,"launching State" includes:
(1) A state which launches or procures the launching of a space
object; or (2) A state from whose territory or facility a space
object is launched. It would seem that this language indicates
a desire to make the launching state, or in our case the U.S.
Government, absolutely liable to foreign governments,
businesses, and individuals for personal and property damage
caused by space objects under the control of the U.S. Government
or one of its nationals.
Article II makes it clear that there are three elements which
must be proved before recovery can be had. First, there must be
damage; second, there must be a space object; and third, the
damage must be caused "by" the space object. Proof of
negligence is not required since the launching state is
absolutely liable-irrespective of any fault on its part-for
damage caused on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight. However, as to the unlikely event that a satellite
were to hit another object in space, a negligence standard
would apply.
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The Outer Space Treaty
This Treaty provides in Article VI that states which are parties
to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space. Article VII goes further by
stating that each state which launches or procures the launching
of a space object, and a state from whose territory or facility
an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to
another state or its natural or juridicial persons on the earth,
in the air, or in space.
It is doubtful that the Outer Space Treaty could be regarded as
imposing more liability than the Liability Convention. This
becomes quite apparent from the fact that the Treaty does not
mention absolute liability which is incorporated in the
Liability Convention with respect to damage on earth or to
aircraft in flight. Also, the three essential elements, namely
that there must be damage, that is must be done by a space
object and that there must be proximate causation are equally
important under the Outer Space Treaty. In addition, the
Liability Convention, unlike the Outer Space Treaty, refers to
principles of justice and equity in determining the compensation
which the launching state is liable to pay for damage in order
to provide such reparation as will restore the person on whose
behalf the claim is presented to the condition that would have
existed if the damage had not occurred.
The Rescue Agreement
Another convention which may be considered is the Rescue and
Return Agreement. Under the provisions of this agreement there
are two situations in which expenses associated with the
recovery and return of space objects would have to be borne by
the launching authority: first, if that authority requested the
recovery of its space object and second, if the launching
authority requested the return of its space object. If either
or both of these conditions are met, the launching authority is
required to pay the expenses associated with the recovery and
return.
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The provisions of the Outer Space Treaty concerning liability
are covered in more general terms than those of the Liability
Convention, which came later, and appear to be an elaboration of
the principle of liability enunciated in the Outer Space Treaty
much the same as the Rescue and Return Agreement is, to a great
extent, an elaboration of the principles incorporated in the
Outer Space Treaty concerning the rescue and return of
astronauts and the return of space objects.
Domestic Liability of the U.S. Government
Since the Liability Convention excludes its coverage from
situations where the damage is caused by a launching state to
one of its nationals, an injured American national would have to
look for other remedies to pursue a claim against the U.S.
Government for harm caused by one of its space objects.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. ? 1346 (b) et seq?,
the government has given its consent to be sued for ..money
damages... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee... while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred." The words of the
statute "negligent or wrongful act" have been interpreted to
mean that liability will be imposed only upon the theory that
the employees of the government have failed to exercise ordinary
care or have engaged in some other conduct constituting mis-
feasance or malfeasance. See Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 197 Liability,
however, is not u y coextensive with that of a private
individual, for these are a variety of types of claims that are
expressly excluded from its coverage. 28 U.S.C. ? 2680. Of
interest to the present discussion are the so-called "dis-
cretionary function" exception, 28 U.S.C. ? 2680 (a) and the
misrepresentation exception, 26 U.S.C. ? 2680(h).
The discretionary function exception provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
title shall not apply to -- (a) Any claim based upon an act
or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid or based
upon the exercise of performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function of duty on the part of
the federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(Emphasis added)
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There is a substantial body of case law interpreting the
discretionary function exception. See, Dalehite v.
United States, supra.; Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61 (1955); Rayonier, Inc. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1957); Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.
1956). T e traditional inquiry for determining if the dis-
cretionary function exception applies is an analysis of whether
the particular act of a government agent is one involving the
formulation of government policy or whether the act in question
occurs in implementing a policy at an "operational" level. The
judicial interpretations of this distinction provide no clear
standards for determination of the applicability of the dis-
cretionary function exception. Rather, the judicial construc-
tions of 28 U.S.C. ~ 2680 (a) have tended to examine all relevant
factors in an assessment of whether the act in question was at a
policy making level which Congress intended to place beyond
judicial review or at the functionary or operational level which
was intended to be reviewable. See, Downs v. United States, 522
F.2d at 997; and Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 765-68
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
Therefore, a potential plaintiff injured by falling debris from
a NOAA satellite will have a difficult enough time establishing
negligence, but even if he did, he would then have the very
difficult hurdle of discretionary function to overcome. The act
of placing a satellite in space would appear to be covered by
the exception and even though it is known that someday some part
of it may fall back to earth, I believe the exception would
still apply unless some gross misfeasance or nonfeasance were
shown. However, this issue has never been litigated in this
context and a court could reject the discretionary function
argument.
In the area of weather forecasting, the discretionary function
exception as well as the misrepresentation exception have
consistently been held to bar suits alleging negligence in the
formulation of such forecasts. In Bartie v. United States, 216
F.Supp. (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd 326 F.2 754 5t Cir. 96 ,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964), the plaintiff sued the
Weather Bureau as a result of the death of his wife and children
which occurred during a hurricane. Plaintiff's claim was based
on the negligence of the Weather Bureau in failing to give
adequate warning of the intensity of the impending hurricane.
The Court in a well reasoned opinion held such allegations
constituted allegations of negligent misrepresentation and as
such are barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Similarly the
Eighth Circuit also concluded that the misrepresentation
exception of 28 U.S.C. ~ 2680 (h) was applicable where there were
allegations that the National Weather Service negligently
disseminated information in regard to the rising flood stage of
a Kansas river immediately prior to a flood. National
Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 2 8t Cir.
1954 cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954). In National
Manufacturing Co., supra, the Court went on to say t at, not
only is the misrepresentation exception a bar to suit where the
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allegations are one of dissemination of data and information,
but also includes allegations involving negligence in failing to
-inform or warn that a flood is cominct.
In Bartie, sera, the court in not only finding the
misrepresenation exception as being applicable, stated that the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
was equally controlling. The Court stated that considering the
background and the knowledge and the continual evaluation which
is made in the analysis of meteorological data that, "these
evaluations involved the exercise of judgment and discretion."
Bartie, supra at 14. Further as to allegations of improper
pred cici tion and dissemination of forecast information subjective
judgment is necessarily employed in decisions that are made, and
the means and methods of obtaining observation data require
continual exercise of judgment and discretion. Bartie, supra at
19. Recently in the case of Williams v. United States, 504
F.Supp. 746, 750 (E.D. Mo. 1980 the court in rejecting
plaintiff's claims of negligent prediction, stated that the "the
forecasts or omissions of forecast is a discretionary function
excepted from the Federal Tort Claims Act."
It has never been alleged to my knowledge that the basis of an
improper forecast was either faulty data or the lack of data
from a satellite, so the likelihood of such a claim remains
remote. The reason we have never seen such a case is probably
because of the acknowledged reliability of satellite data and
the fact that much more goes into formulating a weather forecast
than satellite information.
We are currently litigating a case in Boston (Brown, et al. v.
U.S.), which should go to trial later this year involving
alleged negligent weather forecasting as a result of faulty and
incomplete data from a NOAA weather buoy, and the result could
be analgous to the satellite situation.
Most of the U.S. activity involving space objects involves NASA.
While NASA is certainly covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act,
they also have special authority to consider claims where the
injuries or damage have arisen from the ..conduct of the
Administration's (NASA's) function...". 42 U.S.C. ~ 2473.
There is no requirement that the claimant allege or show
negligence or other wrongful conduct. Nor does the claimant
have to show that the direct cause of the damage resulted from
acts or omissions of Federal employees. It need only be shown
that the damage was the proximate result of the activities of
the agency's space or related programs. The only limitation to
the statutary authority is that it is limited to a maximum of
$25,000.00 per claim. Claims for more than this, if not
considered under the FICA, could be submitted to Congress for
its consideration.
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The Secretary of Commerce and NOAA have a similar statutory
claims authority found at 33 U.S.C. 853 for acts for which the
agency "is found to be responsible", but this is presently
limited to only $500.00 and therefore has little significance to
the present situation. An attempt to increase this amount to
$2,500.00 has been on-going for about four or five years but
never seems to make it all the way through Congress.
2. If a Transfer is Effected, What Liability Does the Private
Entity Incur if Persons or Property Are Injured By One of
the Satellites?
Presumably this would encompass situations where a satellite or
part of it fell to earth and caused some injury or damage, or
perhaps by going out of its orbit damages another space object.
The Liability Convention does not address itself to the
accountability of private corporations to persons injured by
fallen space objects owned by them. This is a serious omission
in light of the fact that the Outer Space Treaty places
responsibility upon parties to the treaty (which includes the
U.S.) for space activities whether the acting entity is
governmental or nongovernmental. Arguably, a claimant could
attempt to impose the responsibility of the Outer Space Treaty
through the medium of the Liability Convention upon the
launching state, or United States in our case. The private
entity itself would also be liable, but not under one of the
treaties. Liability could be predicated on a general theory of
negligence, although a better theory to proceed upon would be
strict or absolute liability. Space activities would seem to be
the type of high-risk activities upon which a foundation for the
imposition of absolute liability could be grounded. Thus it would
appear the private entity would have liability exposure in this area
as an owner of the satellites. In addition, the U.S, could
require a contractor to indemnify the U.S, for damage under the
Liability Convention.
3. What Liability, if Any, Does the Private Entity Incur in
Its Provision of, or Failure to Provide Data Upon Which
Weather Forecasts or Similar Predictions Are Based?
The private entity would presumably assume responsibility for
the accuracy and contents of its products and would accordingly
be liable in tort for negligence in the promulgation of this
data. It is anticipated that the private entity would want to
join to the lawsuit any recipient of the meteorological data
which issued a negligent forecast such as a private weather
concern or the National Weather Service.
The private business would of course not have the protection of
the discretionary function and misrepresentation exceptions to
the Federal Tort Claims Act so its exposure in this area would
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be greater than that of the U.S. However, liability seems
remote at present because the satellite data has never, to date,
been the cause of a negligent weather forecast or the lack of
some severe storm warning that I am aware of. This could of
course change if weather forecasting techniques become more
dependent on satellite information, especially in the area of
hurricane and severe storm monitoring. In addition to weather
information, however, any type of data interruption could
potentially be a source of liability for the private entity.
4. What Liability, if Any, Does the United States Retain
Concerning the Events Outlined in Questions Two and Three?
It seems likely that if, after a transfer was effected, one of
the satellites caused damage or injury to someone, the
United States with its "deep pocket" would be made a party to
the claim or litigation.
If the injury or damage occurred to a foreign state or its
property, or a foreign business or national, the U.S. Government
would continue to remain absolutely liable under the Liability
Convention and most likely under the Outer Space Treaty.
As to injury or damage to U.S. nationals or companies, the U.S.
would still presumably be brought into the case even after the
transfer for any number of reasons and liability, while
unlikely, would remain a possibility.
As for weather forecasting by the United States, we will remain
in the same basic legal position vis a vis the user of our
forecasts, whether they be private concerns or the public, as
before such a transfer. We still would have a duty to use
reasonable care given the state of the art in our forecasting.
Of course, if the reason our forecast, or lack of a forecast,
was found to be actionable was because of negligence by the
private satellite owner, we would have an indemnity or
contribution action against the private entity.
In addition, if the Space Shuttle or other NASA equipment were
to be used to launch a new satellite or service one of the
currently orbiting NOAA satellites, and the Shuttle and/or its
contained payloads were to cause damage to a third person, under
traditional U.S, tort law all of the users and NASA would have
potential liability to the injured third person, based on
concepts either of negligence or strict liability. Actual
liability, or course, would depend on proof of a causal
relationship between the damage or injury and the acts or
failures to act of a user. Insurance and indemnification
requirements as to use of NASA facilities and space vehicles
would be worked out between the private entity and NASA.
Using the NASA situation as a model, it would appear to be in
the best interest of the government to require the private
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entity to enter into an indemnification agreement with the U.S.
and to procure liability insurance. Under NASA's current
policies, commercial users are required to obtain third-party
liability insurance (or self-insure for third-party liability)
and that insurance (or self-insurance) must protect the
United States from potential tort liability resulting from
injury to third parties. Such policies are written by Lloyds of
London and are normally required to cover up to $500 million in
liability.
Presumably our private entity would obtain insurance covering
its own interests anyway. The issue is whether or not we should
require them to name the United States as an insured and whether
we would require an indemnification agreement as part of the
transfer package. I believe it would be essential for the U.S.
to require such an indemnification of the Government, especially
for injury or damage for which the United States would become
liable under either the Liability Convention or Outer Space
Treaty, where the U.S. was free from fault itself. Such
indemnification should also cover domestic situations where the
U.S. is held responsible, such as in the forecasting area, but
the actual negligence is attributable to the private entity. In
addition, in order to make this a realistic goal we should
require that the private entity procure a substantial amount of
liability insurance to cover itself and enable it to indemnify
the U.S. where appropriate.
It should also be kept in mind that the U.S. would be absolutely
liable in the international arena and potentially liable
domestically for claims above and beyond the insurance coverage
of the private entity, or whatever corporate assets could be
reached.
5. Should the Liability Issues Be Addressed in the RFP?
In line with the previous discussion, I believe these issues
should be dealt with in the RFP. Any entity wishing to purchase
and assume responsibility for the NOAA satellites should be
required to purchase substantial liability insurance and sign an
indemnification agreement with the United States.
Assuming the insurance required to be in the $500 million range,
this still leaves open the possibility, although remote, of
liability exceeding this amount and a decision will have to be
made as to whether the U.S. will require indemnity above this
figure or whether the U.S. will become, in effect, an insurer of
the private entity's activities over a certain sum.
In summary, at present the United States is absolutely liable to
the international community for damage caused by one of the NOAA
satellites under the Liability Convention and Outer Space
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Treaty. As to U.S. nationals and companies, there is potential
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act depending on the
circumstances of the incident.
If a transfer is effected to a private concern, the U.S. will
still remain absolutely liable under the Liability Convention to
foreign nationals or entities. As to U.S. nationals, the U.S.
may or may not retain liability depending on the nature of the
claim and the actual circumstances of the case, i.e., weather
forecasting, as a seller of an inherently dangerous product,
etc. Of course, the private entity which assumes control of the
satellites will be potentially liable under theories of
negligence or strict liability. Foreign nationals would
presumably submit claims against the U.S. under the Liability
Convention since they wouldn't even have to prove negligence,
giving rise to an indemnity action by the U.S. against the
private entity. Potential indemnity actions also would exist
against the private entity for domestic claims as well.
As a result, it would seem prudent that the private concern be
required to prove liability insurance to cover any damages or to
indemnify the United States if appropriate. Lastly, there is
the issue of what to do about liability over and above the
limits of the insurance coverage, which would fall against the
United States in most cases whether the U.S. was negligent or
not.
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SEB 31 May - 1 June Meeting Issues
First Draft of a Solution for Issue N (31 May - 1 June ):
"How shall the national interest be protected in the event of failure
(financial) of the private operator?"
1. Lien/mortgage on private operators critical (minimum needed for
operating satellite system) capital facilities and equipment for a specified
number of years, e.g. ten.
a. This should prevent sale or disposal of essential operating
capabilities the government would need to resume control of operations.
b. This could be arranged under delayed ownership transfer through
time payment vs. up-front payment for government owned resources. Arrangements
could be specified in other legal agreements.
c. If private sector does not want and does not buy government
equipment and facilities, then minimum operating equipments should be maintained
by the government in "mothball storage" or in operational use for other
requirements.
2. Occupation or reoccupation plan prepared by NOAA and private company(s)
before the fact of financial failure to be reviewed bi-annually. The plan
would transfer to NOAA control of those essential operating facilities necessary
to insure continued flow of data to government agencies.
a. This should include DOC funding (cash) plans (salaries, consumables)
in addition to assumption of control and ownership of mortgaged assets.
b. This plan could be separate or a part of the plan for assumption
of command and control for other national emergencies. Such a plan could
be similar to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (DRAF) program for using commercial
airlines' planes and pilots to augment military airlift.
3. Backup capabilities and plans should be prepared by NOAA in event
the private operator ends up without minimum essential facilities or satellites
for the government to operate.
a. The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) can provide
data as backup for civil polar orbitors. However, NOAA must maintain a
capability to process this data on short notice, e.g., within 90 days.
b. A space DMSP satellite may be required in hot storage (in-the-
can) for short notice launch, e.g., within 120 days.
c. There is no U.S. Government system to backup GOES. A government
owned in-th-can GOES for short notice launch, e.g. within 120 days, is the
most likely solution.
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d. A government owned in-the-can GOES could be launched by the
private company at specified times in the program and replaced with a more
recently built satellite to prevent obsolesence of in-the-can satellites.
Government in-the-can requirements could simply be part of the manufacturer
to launch pipeline.
e. There is no U.S. Government system to backup Landsat. Some
backup capability similar to that described above for GOES would be optimum.
However, current government Landsat uses do not require an in-the-can short
notice launch capability.
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-- ~--.- - -- - Q 4 ~-
A Business Strategy Should Address:
o Define what the products on services of the business in terms
of what they do.
o Designate what markets will be served now and for the future
designed to serve.
o Designate the channels through which the markets will be
reached.
o Designate the means by which the business will be financed
- safety of capital (sources and level of growth)
- income return (stockholders and creditors)
- source of funds consistent with marketing growth
o Designate the size and kind of organization .which will be the
medium of achievement of the strategy.
Criteria for Evaluation of a Business Strategy
1. Is the strategy identifiable and has it been made clear?
- Is there an analysis of opportunity?
- Is there a determination of corporate strengths and
weaknesses?
- Is the strategy purely the reflection of an individual
or is it currently being demonstrated by present
corporate practice?
s~v,~e.{~~e- 2. Does the strategy exploit fully domestic and international
-~.p ~- business environmental opportunity?
- Demonstration of gathering of environmental information
- Demonstration of a balance between projected growth
and corporate resources.
- Demonstration of the relationship between
organizational development and market opportunity.
- Recognition of the effect of market share to
competitive vulnerability.
3. Is the strategy consistent with corporate competence and
resoures, both present and projected?
- Availability of additional financial and
managerial resources along a practicable time scale.
- Can productive capacity be increased fast enough
to counter moves of other large competitors.
4. Are the major provisions of the strategy and the programs
of which it is comprised internally consistent?
- Coherence, compatibility and synergy.
5. Is the chosen level of risk feasible in economic and
personal terms (top executive)?
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- The riskiness of any future plan should be
compatible the economic resources of the
organization and the temperament of the key
management.
6. Is the strategy appropriate and consistent with the personal
values and aspirations of the key managers?
- conflict between the personal preferences,
aspirations, and goals of the key members are a sign
of mediocre performance or failure.
7. Is the strategy appropriate to the desired level of
contribution to the society or pressures from society?
8. Does the strategy constitute a clear stimulus to
organizational effort and commitment?
- Generally, the bolder the choice of goals and the wider
the range of burden is spread, the more successfully
they will appeal to the capable membership of the
organization.
9. Are there demonstrated early indications of the
responsiveness of markets and market segments to the
strategy?
- Show me some proof!
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U U
FINANCIAL CONDITION SPECIFICATIONS FOR
COMMERCIALIZATION OF LANDSATS AND METSATS
(BAC Draft of June 28,1983)
One of the key issues that the final contract for
commercialization must address is the maintenance of some
assurance that the government will not have to unexpectedly get
back into the MET/LAND SATELLITE business because of commercial
failure of the successful bidder (post commercialization). This
risk for the government may be minimized by regulating/
controlling factors dealing with the capitalization of the
successful bidder.
BACKGROUND
The capitalization of a corporation refers to the value of
the (source of) funds which is usually invested in plant and/or
equipment whose productive services will be utilized over a
considerable length of time, usually many years. The usual
sources of these funds to the corporation are depreciation
allowances, retained profits, equity financing, and debt
financing. The mix of these sources of funds can be explained by
the characteristics of the type of business as well as the
differences in management attitudes and policies concerning risk.
In addition to the capitalized or fixed assets of the
corporation, management must finance the current assets. These
current assets (i.e., cash, marketable securities, spare parts,
and inventories) are necessary to cover the annual or recurring
costs of the firm for the near term, usually less than one year
time frame. Examples are salaries, and contract maintenance
charges.
The total of these assets may be financed in various ways.
In some cases the owners will have all the capitalization in the
form of equity with the exception of relatively small amounts
owed on current liabilities (i.e., outstanding invoices to 0&M
contractor, accrued salaries, and withholding taxes). Total
assets may be financed almost entirely by reinvested profits or
by the issuance of additional shares of capital stock. This
(would indicate that management wants the company to be self-
sufficient and) frees the company from the restrictions and
controls that might be imposed by outside creditors. This also
provides more security in the event of business reversals. In
contrast, other companies have large amounts of debt in the
capitalization structure (high debt/equity ratio). This allows
management to obtain some of the benefits from debt financing
(e.g., leverage) and may indicate the management feels confident
that the risks (e.g., - fixed interest payments) are not too
great in relation to the advantages that can be derived.
As I previously stated the capitalization of a company can
be explained by the peculiarities of the industry in which the
company operates. Plant and equipment assets may be relatively
large in amount on the balance sheet of a manufacturer of heavy
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equipment; whereas, in an industry that does not depend so much
upon machinery and equipment in its manufacturing operations, the
investment in current assets may be large when compared with
plant assets.
The nature of the product itself has an influence. An
automobile dealer will have large outstanding notes to the
manufacturer among his current liabilities, large amounts in
inventories, and receivables from finance companies who extend
credit to his customers. On the other hand, a retailer who deals
in products having a low unit value will likely make the bulk of
his sales on a cash basis and will have little or nothing in the
way of customer accounts receivables.
A public utility has an asset and equity structure that is
markedly different form that of a competitive commercial
concern. A telephone company, gas company, etc., enjoy a
monopolistic position, subject to regulation in the public
interest. Because of the stability of demand and profits, they
can operate safely with a greater proportion of debt. In
summary, the composition of the assets and the equities of any
company will be set to some extent by the nature of the industry,
the peculiarities of the product lines or services, and by
customer trade practices. Within this framework, however, it is
possible for the management to plan and control the asset and
equity structure of the company.
At this point it can be seen that there are various options
available to management in planning the financial structure of
the firm. The issues to be dealt with for each bidder concerning
their structure are:
1. Liquidity
2. Leverage
3. Lease or Purchase the fixed or capital assets?
4. Dividend Policy
Issue 1. Liquidity
Liquidity is the net of current assets minus current
liabilities. This is also referred to as Net Working Capital.
By increasing current assets and converting them to cash and
marketable securities, the (conservative) management gains
certain advantages over its less liquid competitors:
a) The company will be in a better position to face
emergencies or business reverses.
b) With liquidity there is independence. Less reliance
will be placed upon outside sources of credit.
c) When attractive business opportunities arise, funds are
available.
d) Purchases can be made in large economic lot sizes.
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e) All discounts can be taken with ease.
Excessive liquidity, however, is undesirable. A management
that accumulated cash or securities beyond the reasonable needs
of the business can be criticized because the return on these
assets is less than the return on the company's fixed investment,
otherwise the company should not have made the investment to
begin with.
Conclusion
Liquidity will be of significant importance to the
evaluation of the bidders because of the long lead times, and
large front end loadings involved with spacecraft and launch
services procurements. The form of this specification may be as
general as the maintenacne of a specified current ratio (current
Assets divided by Current Liabilities), or very specific in terms
of a specified cash or ready cash value (marketable securities)
on hand. The ratio or amounts required because of the possible
variations in types of businesses of the bidders cannot be
specified in the RFP, but should be part of the final
negotiations.
Issue 2. Leverage
Capital acquisitions can be financed in various ways.
Capital resources may be obtained directly by the owners through
the sale of capital stock or may be obtined indirectly by the
owners through the reinvestment of prof its_that have been
retained (not paid out in dividends). Capital may also be
furnished by outsiders either in the form of short-term credit or
long-term debt. Ordinarily, a business will employ resources
that have been furnished by both owners equity and outsiders
debt; and a balance will be maintained between debt and the
owners equity.
Seemingly, debt is undesirable because it imposed an
obligation, and it would appear that management would avoid debt
financing wherever possible. But this is not necessarily true.
Management will sometimes try to increase the rate of return on
the owners' equity by using resources furnished by outsiders. If
borrrowed assets can be put to work to earn a return in excess of
the interest cost, the owners will benefit. Suppose that
$1,000,000 can be borrowed at 10% and put to work to earn 20%.
The owners receive a $100,000 return without any investment on
their part.
Conclusion
Because the successful bidder may enjoy a monopolistic
positon it would be conceivable that the debt/equity ratios could
exceed 100% (e.g., Long Term Debt - $100M, owners equity - $50M;
Debt/Equity Ratio=2). High debt/equity ratios have long been
exhibited by public utiity, telephone companies, etc., that have
enjoyed monopolistic positions. Commercial lenders and bond
holders assume that because of stability of demand and profits,
they can operate safely with a greater proportion of debt.
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However, high debt/equity ratios carry with them potential
penalties to liquidity in the form of fixed interest payments
which must be met, otherwise they total amount of the debt may be
due on demand precipitating bankruptcy. Therefore, a maximum
limitation of debt/equity ratio should be specified in the
contract.
Issue 3. Lease or Purchase the Capital Assets
Various long-lived assets such as buildings, equipment, and
satellites will be needed for the satellite business. These
types of assets are usually purchased by funds obtained by
.borrowing, and/or funds obtained from the sale of stock, or by
renting under a long-term lease agreement from the satellite or
equipment manufacturer.
When property is purchased, the cost of the property is
recorded in the accounting records. If debt has been incurred to
finance property acquisition, the amount of the debt will be
rcorded as a liability.
Under most circumstances, a rented property is not recorded
as an asset, and no liability is recorded for future rental
payments. The rentals are charged to operations in the fiscal
periods to which they apply.
The decision between lease versus buy rests on perceived
advantage by management in the following two areas:
1) Reduction of business risk.
2) Income tax advantage.
1) Reduction of business risk. A lease may be preferred because
it involves less risk than ownership. The property owner is to
an extent a speculator. He hopes that he can purchase the
property at~favorable prices and with proper handling it can be
traded or sold at a later date for no less than the unrecovered
cost. Property may become obsolete. Equipment may become
outmoded. When new models come out, the owner may not be able to
replace without loss. The renter may avoid these risks. Under
many lease agreements, the renter will receive up-to-date models
of equipemnt when they. become available.
2) Income tax advantage. If property is owned, there may be a
loss of purchasing power when the cost of replacement is taken
into account. The full amount of a rent payment can be deducted
in the computation of income taxes; whereas, when property is
owned, only the original cost of the property can be deducted
over the years as depreciation. With high inflation the company
may not recover the original purchasing power invested (through
depreciation).
It will cost more to rent property than to own it. The
lessor is well aware of the risks of ownership and will set the
rental fee accordingly. Additionally, it is very doutful that
any of the hardware manufacturers would sign a lease agreement
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without a large up-front commitment in the form of funded
liability. The successful bidder would become in effect a
middleman with no obvious advantages to the Federal Government
who may be majority user. Should the satellite equipment last
longer than the lease, the lessor may become a competitor to the
successful bidder. If this becomes the case, what may happen to
any long term data purchase guarantees between the successful
bidder and the U.S. Government? The contract Should specify
ownership of the satellite system, by the successful bidder.
Issue 4. Dividend Policy
In planning equities, management may follow the policy of
reinvesting a large portion of the earnings in the business. In
fact, reinvested earnings play an important part in plans for
business growth. In general, a mature company that is growing at
a moderate rate will be more likely to pay out a large percentage
of its earnings as cash dividends. In contrast, a rapidly
growing new company will need its cash to finance its growth. In
lieu of paying out a cash dividend, a rapidly growing company has
the option of declaring stock splits or stock dividends. These
have proven to be attractive alternatives for rewarding the stock
owners.
Conclusion
If the U.S. Government has provided a substantial investment
either in terms of turnover of assets and/or a guaranteed long
term data purchase agreement, then a review/concurrence provision
for changes to dividend policy should be included in the
contract.
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05 :CIA-RDP05T02051 8000200410001-3
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP05T02051 8000200410001-3
June 23, 1983
To.
From ;
Subject:
,~
r.~, ~,
_ ~;
OES/SAT ~ Lisle Rose (SEB Member
Source Evaluation Board Paper on International Specifi-
cations for Commercialization of the LAfJDSATS and
METSATS
Enclosed for your review and approval/disa~provaljrevision is
the Source Evaluation Board (SEB) paper on international specifica-
tions for Commercialization of the LANDSATS and METSATS. This paper
is submitted to you in conformity with the decision reached at the
last I~.-COESS meeting that the SEB would prepare such a paper for
State's-review, and for subsequent submission to the IB-CQESS as an
agreed interagency position on the international aspects of LANDSAT/
METSAT commercialization.
Since this is an agreed SEB paper, drafted in consensus by
representatives from State, DOD, Commerce. NASA and DCI, it is re-
commended that .you approve thepaper end that it be forwarded to the
IB-LOESS at its next meeting on July 15.
OES SAT:LARose lar
/ /
~~~.y~
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 ~ __
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~~~
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 _1. .._
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INTERNATIONAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR CQMMERCIALIZATION OF-
THE LANDSATS AND METSATS
(SEB Draft of June 23,1983 )
The President has directed that the civil land remote
sensing and weather satellite systems be transferred to the
private sector in conformity with existing international
obligations, national security requirements and foreign policy
considerations. This paper sets forth the international
obligations and foreign policy concerns of the U.S. Government.
It defines the areas where the Department of State must play a
key role. However, the precise institutional mechanisms to
regulate/supervise the activities of private operators} remain
to be determined. For the purpose of effective ,analysis of the
international specifications for commercialization, the weather
satellite (METSAT) systems and programs and those of the land
remote sensing satellites (LANDSAT) are divided into the follow-
ing components: satellites, sensors, and data derivation/dis-
semination. The analysis is based upon interagency input. through
the Source Evaluation Board (SEB), previous Department of State
foreign policy specifications, Department of Defense documenta-
tion on national security concerns, and the NOAA "tutorial"
conducted by Dr. John McElroy entitled "International Sharing of
Satellite Data."
I. METSAT System
A. Satellites:
1. A private operator of the U.S. civil geosynchron-
ous and or
/ polar-orbiting weather satellites shall operate these
satellites as determined by contract. However, such operator/
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owner shall act under constraints set forth by international
treaty obligations entered into by the U.S. The United Nations
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space (October 10, 1967) stipulates
(Article VI) that "States Parties to the Treaty shall bear inter-
national responsibility for national activities in outer space.. .
whether such activities are carried out by Government agencies
or by non-governmental entities". To implement existing inter-
national obligations, which include the UN Outer Space Treaty
of 1967 and related conventions on liability and on registration,
(for a complete listing see Tab 2) the U.S. Government (Department
of State and other Federal agencies) must have adequate authority
and opportunity for review and approval of:
(a) the compliance by private owner(s)/operator(s)
of space programs/systems with overall U.S. space policies and
international treaty obligations;
(b) the relations of the private. owner(s)/~
operator(s) with foreign governments, agencies and persons,
and international bodies.
2. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, the U.S.
Government .(Department of State and other Federal agencies)
shall
(a) require that the private owner(s)/operator(s)
provide notification of foreign business negotiations so that the
Department of State can advise the owner/operator of relevant
foreign policy concerns and provide such assistance as the
Department of State deems appropriate;
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(b) review and approve/disapprove the decision of
the private owner(s)/operator(s) on matters and issues involving
foreign policy and international obligations, including those
set forth in .the international conventions on liability and on
registration of vehicles in space.
3. Private operators of civil METSATS must conform _
their systems configuration and operation to national security.
4. A private operator of the civil geosynchronous weather
satellites:(GOES) will also have to provide the U.S. Government
with information regarding intended relations with the Japanese
and European operators of international geosynchronous weather
satellites. At present, the U.S., Japanese and European systems
are bound together organizationally and operationally in the
following important ways:
(a) an ad hoc but vigorous coordinating mechanism
exists. The primary purpose of the CGMS (Coordination of Geo-
stationary Meteorological Satellites) is to maximize technical
and systems coordination. Such cooperation by U.S. Government
agencies will continue under a private geostationary METSAT
operation;
(b) at present, the U.S. receives data on a con-
tinuous no-cost basis data from the European METEOSAT positioned
at the equator over western Africa and from the Japanese GMS sat-
ellite over New Guinea. This data supports NWS, DOD and interna-
tional maritime and aviation activities by the U.S.;
(c) in case of failure of any geostationary weather
satellite, U.S., European and/or Japanese satellites could be
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 1 ... _ _ ____ _ _
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repositioned to maintain maximum global coverage;
(d) U.S. GEOSATS, the European METEOSAT, and the
Japanese GMS share a common WEFAX transmission frequency which
provides near-global access to WEFAX services which are vitally
important to U.S. commercial shipping, military operations and
weather forecasting. _
Whatever relations are developed between a U.S. private owner/
operator and current or future foreign geostationary METSAT opera-
tors will be subject to appropriate supervision/oversight by the
Department of State and other Federal agencies as necessary and
appropriate.
B. Sensors
A number of foreign sensors are deployed on U,S. civil
polar orbiting weather satellites. Their configuration and
recommended disposition are as follows:
1. ARGOS/SSU (AMSU). Under a Memorandum of Understand-
ing with NOAA, France currently provides an operational data
collection and relay platform ("ARGOS") on our polar METSATs
at no cost to the U. S. ARGOS collects and relays environmental
data from buoys, balloons and platforms located anywhere on the
earth' s surface, and is the only system capable of locating
moving platforms. The UK provides an operational Stratospheric
Sounding Unit (SSU) under a 1974 Memorandum of Understanding
with NOAA extended in 1982. The SSU is a primary component of
the TIROS Operation Vertical Sounder (TONS) and serves to reduce
NOAA systems costs. The British Meteorological Office has
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proposed to upgrade their contribution in future years by
replacing the SSU with a part of an operational Advanced
Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU).
Therefore, a private owner has the option to use or
replace the above foreign instrument payloads on the polar
orbiters as he wishes, but with the stipulation that the U.S.
government (Department of State and other Federal agencies)
must have the authority and opportunity to review and approve/
disapprove any change in existing or future relationships with
suppliers of foreign instrument payloads.
2. Search and Rescue. France and Canada provide the
search and rescue instrument packages and the U.S. provides the
satellite (polar METSAT) for the system which, together with a
complementary Soviet space-and-ground component forms the COSPAS/?~
SARSAT international Search and Rescue Satellite Assisted Tracking
program. Ground stations in support of this program are in
existence or are under construction in the U.S., Canada, France,
the Soviet Union and Norway. Since its inception in September,
1982, this international experimental program has been credited
with saving over forty lives worldwide. In the U.S., and
elsewhere, search and rescue have traditionally been government
responsibilities, and the SARSAT program is a part of a much
broader effort conducted as a mission responsibility by the
Coast Guard, Air Force and other Federal agencies.
The U.S. is committed to maintaining the SARSAT program.
If bidders indicate that they will maintain SARSAT with French
and Canadian instruments, the U.S. Government (State and other
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Federal agencies) must have the opportunity and authority to
supervise the necessary negotiations between the private operator
and the foreign entities. If a private bidder indicates a desire
to maintain SARSAT with U.S. or other foreign search and rescue
instrumentation, the U.S. Government (State and other Federal
agencies) may be called upon to provide foreign policy assistance,
guidance and direction.
C. Data
1. In order to encourage and promote private commercial
operation of all or a portion of the METSAT system and programs,
the U.S. Government is willing to grant (the) potential private
owner(s)/operator(s)/vendor(s) exclusive ownership of all data
produced by the civil meteorological satellite(s) under (his)
their management after having met all contractual obligations to
the U.S. Government (the international aspects of which are set
forth in paragraph 2 a-c below). That is, the operator may after
appropriate consultations with responsible Federal agencies enter
into any international business relationships with the data from
his satellite(s) that are outside the scope of U.S. Government
requirements set forth below.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 above,
weather data derived from the geostationary/polar METSATS is
of direct, immediate and often critical use to numerous U.S.
Government agencies in pursuit or fulfillment of a variety of
international mission responsibilities. Chief_ among the U.S.
international obligations is continued commitment to the world-
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wide flow of weather data through the WMO World Weather
Watch and other international arrangements, under present
terms and conditions of participation. Therefore, the
following stipulations should be clearly set forth to all
potential bidders for private ownership/lease/operation of
the polar and/or geostationary METSATS:
(a) WMO-World Weather Watch: The private owner(s)/
operator(s)/vendor(s) of all or a portion of civil METSATS
will be obligated to provide the same volume and quality of
satellite-derived data for t#~e World Meteorological Organiza-
tion (WMO) World Weather Watch as is provided by the same
METSAT system currently under U.S. Government ownership and
operation. In .order not to disrupt existing national security
and domestic weather forecast benefits derived from the free,
no-cost exchange of global weather data through the WMO,
private operator(s) must be prepared to sell the volume and
quality of data from their satellites required by the WMO to
the U.S. Government under commercial terms and conditions
deemed reasonable by the Government for transmittal by the
U.S. Government to the international user community through
the WMO network;
(b) Direct Readout: private owner(s)/operator(s) of
civil polar and/or geostationary METSATs will be obligated
to provide the same volume and quality of satellite-derived
or communicated data to individual foreign ground stations
through direct readout (i.e. WEFAX, DSB, VISSR, APT, KRPT,
etc.) as is currently provided by the METSAT system currently
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 1. __
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under U.S. Government ownership and operation. The U.S. Govern-
ment will be assessed appropriate charges by the private owner(s)/
operators under commercial terms and conditions which the U.S.
Government deems reasonable for maintaining the flow of
direct readout data to all stations worldwide.
(c) International Research/Data Application: AID,
NASA, NOAA, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and other
U.S. Government science, technical and foreign assistance
agencies are employing METSAT derived data in a wide variety of
ways and programs ranging from the Global Atmospheric Research
Program (GARP) to a number of foreign disaster early warning and
monitoring programs such as the Tsunami Early Warning System,
the Agroclimatic Monitoring and Reporting System for early
warning of potential world food shortages, the Global`Seismic
Network utilizing satellite telemetry links through the GOES
satellites for early warning of pending volcanic and seismic
disturbances, and the Severe Storm Surge and Wind Threat
probability warning system for the Caribbean, Indian Ocean,
and western Pacific. In view of the importance of U.S. civil
METSAT data to the U.S. Government's international research
programs, its international scientific and technical exchange
programs and interests, and our developing interest in foreign
disaster early warning and monitoring, the following stipulation
should also be clearly set forth to all potential METSAT bidders:
(i) private METSAT operator(s) must provide on.
commercial terms and conditions that the U.S. Government deems
reasonable an adequate volume and quality of data from their
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__
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METSATS (polar and/or geostationary) to support U.S. Government
participation in international research programs and all other
cooperative international activities utilizing civil meteorological
satellite data (Tab 3 [to be supplied]) ;
I I . LAN DSAT Sys tem -
A? Satellites
1. A private operator of the U.S. civil Land remote
sensing satellite(s) shall operate the satellite(s) as determined
by contract. However, such operator/owner shall act under con-
straints set forth by international treaty obligation entered into
by the U.S. The United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space. .(October 10, 1967) stipulates (Article VI) that "States
Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space. .whether such activities
are carried out by Government agencies or by non-governmental
entities." To implement existing international obligations, which
include the UN Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and related conventions
on liability and on registration, the U.S. Government (Department
of State and other Federal agencies) must have adequate authority
and opportunity for supervision of:
(a) the compliance by private owner(s)/operator(s) of
space programs/sys'tems with overall U.S. space policies and
international treaty obligations;
(b) the relations of the private owner(s)/operator(s) with
foreign governments, agencies and persons, and international bodies.
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 _:.I 1. ___ _ _ _
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2. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, the U.S.
Government (Department of State and other Federal agencies)
shal 1:
(a) require that the private owner(s)/operator(s) pro-
vide nofitication of foreign business negotiations so that the
Department of State can advise the owner(s)/operator(s) of
relevant foreign policy concerns and provide such assistance
as the Department of State deems appropriate;
(b) review and approve/disapprove the decision of the
private owner(s)/operator(s) on matters and issues involving
foreign policy and international obligations, including those
set forth in the international conventions on liability and on
registration of Vehicles sent into space.
B. Sensors
No foreign sensor systems are deployed on the U.S.
Landsat satellite(s).
C. Data
1. In order to encourage and promote private commercial
operation of the LANDSAT system and programs, the U.S. Government
is willing to grant (the) potential private owner(s)/operator(s)/
vendor(s) the following:
(a) exclusive ownership of all data produced and cir-
culated by the land remote sensing satellite(s) under (his)
their management; acknowledging the copyrightable character of
this data and the right of (the) owner(s)/operator(s)/vendor(s)
to protect his (their) copyright interests;
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(b) exclusive right to dispose/distribute data inter-
nationally from land remote sensing satellite(s) under his
(their) management, including the right to enter into data/
pricing/finance systems contracts of his (their) own determina-
tion with any foreign ground station operators (this shall in-
clude the right to negotiate with foreign Landsat ground station
operators limits of liability, definitions of terms under which
contracts shall cease, procedures for the settlement of disputes,
and other miscellaneous provisions);
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of 1(a) and 1(b) above,
(the) private owner(s)/operator(s)/vendor(s):
(a) should seek to conform their programs as closely as
is commercially possible to traditional U.S. practices of pro-
viding civil land remote sensing satellite data to international
users on an equal, non-discriminatory basis;
(b) will consult with the Secretary of State (and other
Federal agency heads as the ,Secretary may direct) to obtain con-
currence that policies and practices remain in conformity with
international obligations, and foreign policy objectives;
(c) will provide an adequate volume and quality of data to
Federal users on commercial terms and conditions deemed .reasonable
by the U.S. Government to support U.S. Government participation in
international-research programs and other cooperative international
activities utilizing civil LANDSAT data. In this connection, it
should be emphasized to potential bidders that numerous Federal agen-
cies including NOAA, NASA, USGS, and especially AID have employed
LANDSAT data extensively and successfully over the past decade in
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a variety of space technology assistance programs worldwide. Such
assistance programs include, but are not confined to, training,
population census, mapping, agricultural crop assessment and fore-
casting, mineral resource evaluations, etc. (The civil LAN DSAT pro-
grams of just one Federal agency - AID - are set forth at Tab 1.)
3. Over the past decade, the U.S. has actively encouraged
the participation of foreign entities in the civil LAN DSAT
program; participation has taken the form of a~dozen ground data
receiving/processing/transmission stations (seven of which are
currently fully active) located in both developing and allied
countries. As a condition of participation in the U.S. civil
LAN DSAT programs, foreign data distributors have had to conform
to U.S. Government policies that emphasize data exchange on a
low-cost, open, non-discriminatory basis. Any private operator
of the civil LAN DSAT system will obviously have to make a deter-
mination about the disposition of the existing foreign LAN DSAT
stations. He should be guided by the following considerations:
(a) retention of foreign LANDSAT ground stations
and U.S. Government data exchange/distribution policies is not
a condition of private ownership/operation of the civil LAN DSAT
program;
(b) a private operator must, however, obtain the
concurrence of the U.S. Government (Secretaries of State and
Commerce) before terminating or initiating relations with an
existing or prospective foreign LAN DSAT ground station operator.
,,, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP05T02051 8000200410001-3