ACTION PLAN ON BOLAND-ZABLOCKI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00M00244R000500120002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MEMO

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21
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
October 17, 1983
NOTE FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INT
FROM: CONSTPIT E MENGES
Attached is the State Department's
Action Plan on Boland-Zablocki. The
first two pages are a good summary.
My apologies for the fact that the
attachments do not have tabs, but my
copy does not have them either.
Enclosed is one copy for you and
and one for Clair George.
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111111/11lc- 1)??icsiiItlf-111
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S
UNCLASSIFIED
(SECRET Attachments)
TO: The Deputy Secretary
Wa.shington. 20510
FROM: H - Alvin Paul Drischler, Actin
ARA - James Michel, Acting
SUBJECT: Action Plan on Boland-Zablocki
STAT
During the past two weeks we have:
- Personally called on most of the 44 House Members
identified as key swing votes in our analysis of the July 28
voting to brief them in depth on our Central American policy
STAT
- Met twice with Ken Robinson and Repubican staffers of
the House Intelligence to concert our tactics and strategy;
- Conducted in-depth substantive briefings on the Hill
for the 42 members of the Coleman Republican Task Force on
Foreign Policy and for Republican Members of the Foreign
Affairs and Intelligence Committees, as well as a number of the
Republicans on our target list;
- Met with Representative Dan Mica to plan a similar
effort on the Democratic side, to begin with a briefing for all
the target Democrats on Monday, October 17; and
- Drafted various alternative amendments Robinson can
offer, obtained inter-agency, White House and NSC clearance,
and passed the amendments to Robinson.
Thus far, Department officials sharing in this effort have
personally spoken with 27 of the 44 Members on our key target
list. The initial results show a slight shift in our favor
since the July vote, and a large number of undecided. Of seven
Republicans contacted who voted against us in July, three
report they are still leaning against (Boehlert, NY; Jeffords,
VT; and McKernan, ME); three are now leaning for us (Coughlin,
PA; Horton, NY; and Zschau, CA); and one is undecided
(Schneider, RI). Of eight Democrats contacted, who were "soft
E)
DC' C
3
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UNCLASSIFIED
(SECRET Attachments)
-2-
opponents"-in July (showing a mixed voting pattern but against
us on the final vote), four now claim they are undecided, and
four are leaning against.
We have asked all officers making these calls to complete
them by Tuesday, October 18. In addition, these initial calls
indicate that higher level follow-ups would be useful or
necessary in a number of cases. We are planning to hold an IG
Working Group meeting on Monday afternoon to decide in detail
which follow ups are needed and at what level. We expect to
have specific recommendations for participation by the White
House, the Secretary, and you on Tuesday morning, October 18.
In addition, we have scheduled meetings early next week
with several of our key Democratic supporters (Representatives
Fascell and Mica). Mica is inviting all 25 Democrats on our
target list to a full briefing by representatives of ARA and
the NSC. Jim Michel held a dry run of this briefing with Mica
on Thursday. An impressive Nicaraguan defector will meet with
the Members of the House Intelligence next week. We have also
asked the Secretary or you to meet with the Members of the
House Republican Task Force on Foreign Policy for a final
high-level meeting with our supporters a day or two before the
votP_is expected to take place.
Attachments:
Tab 1 - A copy of the Three Possible Amendments to
Section 108 of H.R. 2968, fully cleared,
provided to Mr. Robinson.
Tab 2 - Information on our Central America Policy
provided to all key Target Members and
Supporters.
Tab 3 - The Text of Draft Letter from the Secretary to
all Members of the House.
Tab 4 - The Package of Instructions and Briefing
Materials provide to all Department Officials
making the Calls on the Target Members,.
including the Target List and Assigned Contacts.
Drafted:H:GdeSantilla :jvm
10/14/83:x2 28
ARA t70
UNCLASSIFIED
(SEL-ET Attacnments)
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STAT
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consideration of H.R. 2968, the intelligence authorization act
for FY 19E4.
At Tab 1 are three possible amendments to section 108 of
H.R. 2968 to be introduced by Mr. Robinson. They are:
--an amendment to strike section 108;
--two versions of an amendment incorporating "strict
reciprocity", i.e., the funds will not be cut off until the
Nicaraguans stop supporting anti-government forces
elsewhere in Central America as determined by a
Presidential certification;
--an amendment, patterned after one introduced by Mr. Mica,
providing that section 108 shall take effect only when (1)
Nicaragua has stopped its support for anti-government
forces, (2) it has entered into a reciprocal and verifiable
agreement with other governments of the region on the basis
of the Contadora."21 points", and (3) the cessation of
Nicaragua's support for anti-government forces and the
entry into force of the agreement has been verified by the
011
OAS 64 the President.
This last amendment should attract support from members who
previously voted for the Boland-Zablocki proposal (H.R. 2760)
because, since passage of H.R. 2760, the nations of the region
adopted a Document of Objectives (the 21 points") calling for a
verifiable agreement on cessation of support for
anti-government forces.
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ter- PSC reire.,3
Tab 3 provides suggested language for a motion to recommit.
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Amendment to H.R. 2968
Offered by Mr. Robinson
i
On page 5, strike out line 20 and all that follcws through
line 3 on page 6.
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Amendment to H.R. 2968
Offered by Mr. Robinson
On page 5, line 22, immediately after "Sec. 108., insert
-"(a)."
On page 6, between lines 3 and 41 insert the following:
(Version 1)
(b) The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not
take effect if the President certifies and reports to the
Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in
the House and the Select Committee on Intelligence in the
Senate that the Government of National Reconstruction of
Nicaragua is continuing to provide support, including the
furnishing of arms, personnel, training, command and control
facilities and logistical support, to military and or
paramilitary operations by anti-government forces in any
country in Central America or the Caribbean.
(Version 2)
(b) The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not
take effect until the President certifies and reports to the
Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in
the House and the Select Committee on Intelligence in the
Senate that the Government of National Reconstruction of
Nicaragua has ceased providing support, including the
furnishing of arms, personnel, training, command and control
facilities and logistical support, to military and or
paramilitary operations by anti-government forces in any
country in Central America or the Caribbean.
(Differences between versions 1 and 2 are underlined]
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An.endment to H.R. 2968
Offered by Mr. Robinson
On page 5, line 22, immediately after "sec. 108., insert
On page 6, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
(b) the prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall take
effect when
(1) the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua
has ceased its activities (including the furnishing of
arms, personnel, training, command and control facilities
and logistical support) in support of military or
paramilitary operations by anti-government forces in any
country in Central America or the Caribbean;
(2) a reciprocal and verifiable agreement has entered into
force among Government of National Reconstruction of
Nicaragua and the other governments of the region on the
basis of thekDocument of Objectives adopted on September
10, 1983, by the governments of Columbia, Mexico, Panama,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua; and
(3) the cessation of such activities, and the entry into
force of the agreement, has been verified by the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States, or by the
President of the United States in a report to the Congress.
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BRIEFING PACKAGE ON NICARAGUA-RELATED LEGISLATION
Attached is material on Nicaragua designed for use with
(and, as appropriate, by) congressmen and staffers. Items
include:
?Mm .11M.
Overview and talking points on importance of
Nicaraguan resistance movement to goal of peaceful
settlement in Central America.
7- History of US efforts to negotiate with Sandinistas.
m?r4=11.
Importance of Nicaraguan resistance to US policy goals.
International law.
Policy implications of curbs on covert action.
Fears of expanded US role.
Refutation of charges US supports Somocistas.
Other pressures Sandinistas face.
Socialist International letter urging Sandinistas to
fulfill their promises.
Accomplishments of anti-Sandinista guerrillas.
Newspaper articles.
Attachments:
As stated.
Doc #5638N
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Tne Nicaraguan nesisanue novement
and the Search for Peace in Central America
The achievement of a negotiated settlement to the current
Central American conflicts is a key US policy objective in the
region. There are now signs of movement toward this goal. A
critical element in this improved climate has been signs of a
changed attitude by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
This development has been fostered by the armed resistance
movement now active in Nicaragua--a movement that poses a
threat to vital Sandinista interests and impairs their capacity
to spread revolution. At this critical juncture, however, the
President is threatened with a loss of authorization to help
the Nicaraguan resistance forces. If this happens, the
movement toward a negotiated settlement stands to suffer a
severe setback as the Sandinistas revert to their former
intransigence.
The removal of this incentive for negotiation of a peaceful
settlement would invite continued, and even increased
Nicaraguan support for insurgency and terrorism in neigHporing
countries. It would also make it easier for the Sandinistas.
with Cuban and Soviet assistance, to pursue the destabilization
of governments friendly to the U.S. by providing a continued
sanctuary within Nicaragua for subversives from other Central
American countries.
Reducing the prospects for successful negotiations and
diminishing the impediments to Nicaraguan support for
neighboring insurgencies would undermine U.S. foreign policy
objectives and important security interests in Central America.
The attached point paper spells out in greater detail the
relationship between US security interests and hope for a
negotiated settlement on the one hand, and the pressure being
brought to bear by the Nicaraguan resistance movement on the
other.
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Nicaraguan support for subversion and terrorism in
neighboring countries is a fact. This support is
carried out under the active direction of Cuba and the
Soviet Union.
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MP 'MID
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The abundant and well-documented evidence for this is
overwhelming. There can be few objective observers,
in this country or abroad, who are unconvinced of
Sandinista support for external subversion.
The Democratic controlled House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence has consistently confirmed
Nicaraguan and Cuban support for Central American
guerrilla groups (see for example the Committee staff
report of September 22, 1982 and the Committee report
of May 13, 1983).
Defectors from Nicaragua (Miguel Bolanos) and from the
Salvadoran guerrillas (Alejandro Montenegro), as well
as from Honduran terrorist groups, have confirmed the
Sandinista role. (See Bolanos' interview in the June
19, 1983 Washington Post.)
US human and technical intelligence means have
provided additional detail and confirmation.
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the continuing turmoil and instability in Central
America, undermining basic U.S. security interests and
foreign policy objectives.
Central America's stability and development can best
be realized through democracy, reform, human freedom
and equitably distributed economic growth.
As opposed to these goals, the leftist guerrillas now
operating in the region represent forces of political
repression, a one-party state, militarization, and
close ties to the Soviet Bloc.
41=
History shows it is difficult to defeat a guerrilla
movement with a geographically proximate sanctuary,
command and control center and source of resupply.
Nicaragua serves these purposes for the Salvadoran
guerrillas.
As long as this situation continues, the U.S. faces an
open-ended cycle of violence and turmoil throughout
Central America, the potential for a flood of
refugees, and a direct threat to U.S. national
security resulting from increased Soviet/Cuban
military and political presence in the region.
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neighboring countries, it must realize that it
support for .terrorism and subversion gives
rise to countervailing pressures that threaten the
Sandinistas' own national interests. ?
Since early in their rule, the Sandinistas have
demonstrated that they share with the USSR and Cuba a
deep ideological commitment to spread Marxist
revolution.
41?11?
?M11.
Financial, military, and political support from the
Soviet Bloc, radical Arabs, and others have given the
Sandinistas immunity from conventional
diplomatic/economic pressures as they subvert their
neighbors.
The history of US bilateral aid is illustrative: we
gave the Sandinistas $118 million in direct assistance
before cutting off aid due to Sandinista support for
Salvadoran insurgency. This had no deterrent effect.
Similarly, we offered to restore aid if the
Sandinistas stopped exporting subversion. This, too,
failed to sway them.
Over the past several months, however, the Sandinistas
have had to face, for the first time, a threat to
their internal control in the form of an armed
resistance movement opposed to Sandinista external and
internal policies. The pressure generated by this ?
movement offers the best hope yet of shaking the
Sandinistas from their single-minded support for
region-wide revolution and bringing them to the
negotiating table.
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OMB Wm,
The pressure that has been generated has begun to
produce signs of a possible agreement between
Nicaragua and its neighbors. Removal of pressure
would undercut the negotiating process and thereby
diminish prospects for democratic reforms and
stability in the region.
On July 19, Sandinista Junta Coordinator Ortega
announced a six-point peace plan which, though flawed,
included for the first time Nicaragua's acceptance of
multilateral negotiations as well as an end to arms
trafficking and training in support of subversive
movements; an end to arms supplies to both sides in El
Salvador (admission that guerrillas receive outside
arms); withdrawal of foreign military bases and end to
joint military exercises.
A few days later, Cuban Premier Castro admitted the
presence of Cuban security advisers in Nicaragua;
implied that under certain circumstances he would be
willing to withdraw advisers and end arms shipments to
Nicaragua; recognized the multilateral nature of
Central American problems and the need for concessions
from all sides; and said Cuba would support elections
with guarantees in El Salvador.
Most significantly, the Contadora process -- which the
US strongly backs -- has resulted in a September
agreement among participating parties (the Contadora
Four: Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela; plus Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua)
on a 21-point Document of Objectives to serve as a
framework for regional peace. According to Colombian
President Betancur, the document has been ratified by
all Central American governments.
Ambassador Stone has held two meetings with the
Salvadoran left, and representatives of the Salvadoran
left have met twice with the Government of El
Salvador's Peace Commission.
These initial moves toward a possible peaceful
settlement, following a long period of intransigence
by the Sandinistas and their Cuban mentors, must be
attributed to the pressures being felt from the
determined resistance of neighboring countries to
Nicaraguan-sponsored subversion, the demonstrated
capacity of the United States to assist these
threatened nations and, most significant, to the
pressures being brought on the Sandinistas by the
Nicaraguan resistance movement.
It is only the resistance movement that poses a direct
threat to Sandinista domination of Nicaragua. This
movement is therefore the strong incentive for the
negotiation of a political settlement in Central
America. Denying the President authority to assist
this movement risks undercutting this hopeful trend
toward Nicaraguan willingness to negotiate.
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HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY ON TALKING TO THE NICARAGUANS
The United States has been the target of repeated charges,
levelled by the Sandinista regime that it is uninterested in
dialogue. In fact, the United Stated has been willing to
discuss issues of mutual concern with the Sandinistas since
before they came to power in July 1979. We have manifested
this willingness to talk with concrete action. The record of
our unrequited overtures demonstrates beyond any doubt the
falsity of Sandinista charges that the U.S. lacks interest in
discussions. It proves, in fact, that it is the Sandinistas
who have stymied all attempts at meaningful consultation.
The United States, the Central American democracies, and
other members of the hemispheric community have made repeated
attempts to engage Nicaragua in a dialogue that would address
the concerns of every country in the region, including
Nicaragua's stated major concerns, guaranteed security for its
borders and the creation of conditions which would permit the
Sandinistas to abide by the commitment to democratic pluralism
they made to their people and the international community at
their accession to power.
The following are bilateral and multilateral approaches to
Nicaragua in which the United States has participated:
41M. MED
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in 1978, the United States participated in a
three-nation mission of 'friendship and
reconciliation under OAS auspices in an effort to
find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Nicaragua.
after the fall of Somoza in 1979, the United States
for nearly two years used economic assistance and
diplomatic support to encourage the Sandinistas to
respect their commitments to political pluralism, free
elections, a mixed economy, and a non-aligned foreign
policy;
in August 1981, after Nicaragua had secretly but
massively supported guerrilla warfare in El Salvador,
the United States presented a five point peace
proposal to the Sandinistas;
in April 1982, the United States presented the
Sandinistas an eight point proposal to solve regional
problems;
in October 1982, the United States, along with seven
other regional democracies, signed the San Jose
Declaration;
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today, the United States is encouraging the
multilateral efforts of the Contadora group as it has
since they started in January 1983.
Equally clear and consistent has been the response of the
Government of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have:
ONO MED
increased their armed forces from 14,000 to 70,000;
received 2,000 Cuban military advisers, as well as
smaller numbers of Soviet and Eastern European bloc
security personnel;
.reneged on their promises of early elections,
repressed moderate opposition groups, and initiated
the establishment of a state aligned with and modeling
itself after the Soviet Union;
in conjunction with Cuba, provided active military
support to guerrilla groups in El Salvador;
All of these actions were taken or begun during the
regime's first 18 months, despite the U.S. policy to achieve an
accommodation with the new government. The only -ones who
pushed Nicaragua into the arms of Cuba and the USSR were the
Sandinista leaders themselves.
In addition, the Sandinistas:
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rejected our August 1981 proposal;
failed to give a substantive reply to our April 1982
proposal;
refused to consider the October 1982 San Jose
Declaration as a basis for further discussions;
refused for many months to give serious attention to
their neighbors' proposals in the Contadora process.
This is a history of Nicaraguan intransigence -- an
illustration of the clear intent of the Sandinistas to push
aside efforts at negotiated peace while pursuing
single-mindedly their goal of region-wide revolution.
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Importance of Nicaraguan Resistance to U.S. Policy Goals
U.S. objectives in Central America are peace and stability,
avoidance of communist or other hostile regimes, and internal
systems characterized by healthy economies, democratic
institutions, and observance of human rights and freedoms.
These objectives are shared by the overwhelming majority of
nations in the region.
The Administration's policy toward Central America consists
of four elements directed specifically at those goals. These
elements are: support for democracy, reform, and human
freedom; support for economic development; support for dialogue
and negotiation; and provision of the security shield necessary
for the other three elements to prosper.
The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, on the other hand,
represents virtually the diametrical opposite of the goals
shared by the US and friendly nations of the region.
The Sandinistas have:
Purposefully undermined peace and stability by
providing material and logistical support to insurgent
and terrorist groups in neighboring states while
building up the most powerful conventional military
machine Central America has ever seen.
Rejected, until very recently, repeated attempts by
the US and their neighbors to engage them in
meaningful negotiations. Even now, the Sandinistas'
grudging acceptance of some of the generally
recognized principles of negotiated settlement is far
from clear proof they have changed their ways.
Instituted a repressive internal system featuring
one-party rule, tight media controls and other curbs
on political and civil rights, while aligning
themselves closely to the USSR and Cuba.
Proved willing to sacrifice their own citizens'
economic well-being in favor of a huge military
build-up, while at the same time abetting the
destruction of the Salvadoran economy through their
support for the Salvadoran guerrillas.
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In their four years of rule in Nicaragua, marked by the
policies outlined above, the Sandinistas have proved beyond
dispute that they are a force for destabilization abroad and
repression at home. Until they stop subverting their
neighbors, there can be no peace in Central America and, hence,
no realization of US policy goals. Moreover, the Sandinistas
have proven impervious to all attempts to get them to modify
their behavior through persuasion, diplomatic pressure or
economic assistance. Only since they have come under direct
attack from the armed Nicaraguan resistance movement has there
been any evidence of a willingness to consider change. This
evidence, however, is too tenuous to give grounds for
optimism. The pressure of the resistance forces must continue
if there is to be meaningful change in Sandinista policies.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW
Every State has the right under internaional law to
defend itself against attempts by another State to
assist insurgent groups in its territory, and
furthermore has the right to seek and receive support
from friendly countries in doing so.
The right of individual and collective self-defense is
specifically recognized by the U.N. Charter and the
Rio Treaty. Each American state has a duty under the
Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter to assist other
American States in defending themselves against
aggression.
- -
This principle of international law clearly applies to
what is happening in Central America. The governments
of Cuba and Nicaragua have been engaging in a serious
and sustained effort to overthrow the government of El
Salvador through the direction, support and
infiltration of arms to insurgents in that country.
Much of this infiltration has violated the territory
and sovereignty of Honduras as well. All of this
clearly amounts to an armed attack under international
law.
El Salvador and Honduras have a clear right to defend
themselves against this armed attack, and the United
States has a clear right to assist them in collective
self-defense.
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Pears of Expanded U.S. Role
There are concerns that armed opposition activities in
Nicaragua will lead that country to strike at neighbors blamed
for harboring these elements thus touching off a general war
leading to US involvement. While the risk of a wider conflict
in this volatile region cannot be dismissed, the above scenario
is not the only -- or even likeliest -- means by which this
could occur. It must be remembered that Nicaragua, long before
it encountered armed resistance, was bent on a course of
aggression and destabilization against its neighbors, including
long-time democracy Costa Rica. This activity on the part of
the Sandinistas is the proximate cause of turning Central
America into the sphere of tension and conflict that it is
today. Thus, if left unchecked, Sandinista policies could
sooner or later create a situation in which the US faced the
choice of either allowing the Sandinistas and their
Soviet/Cuban mentors a free hand, or intervening to stop them
by force.
Repeated conventional efforts to get the Sandinistas to
stop interfering with their neighbors have been ineffective.
Four years of Sandinista rule have demonstrated clearly that
their pursuit of region-wide revolution will not be curbed by
diplomatic or economic leverage. Proposals for physically
interrupting Sandinista support for insurgency carry serious
risks. The House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, in its May 13, 1983 report on H.R. 2760,
recommended U.S. assistance to friendly Central American
countries for the purpose of enabling them to prevent
infiltration of arms from Nicaragua or Cuba. The same report
pointed out, however, that much of this effort could involve
use of US military personnel.
The Nicaraguan opposition movement offers a middle ground
-- a realistic prospect for modifying Sandinista behavior short
of direct US intervention. (The effects the opposition is
having are spelled out elsewhere in this package.)
If the opposition -- through lack of external support or
otherwise -- ceased to be a factor, it can be taken for granted
that the Sandinistas would be encouraged in their aggressive
designs. Once again Central America would be on a course
leading to a US choice of direct intervention or unacceptable
strategic losses.
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IS THE U.S. SUPPORTING A RETURN OF SOMOCISMO?
There are three Nicaraguan opposition groups: the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the Democratic Revolutionary
Alliance (ARDE), and the MISURA Revolutionary Front (Miskito,
Sumo, and Rama indians). All three of these groups have grown
in response to Sandinista abuses. They are not creatures of
- Somocismo or of the U.S.
Critics have charged that the FDN is a 'Somocista* group,
and that the U.S. seeks to replace the GRN with a Somoza-style
government. Although the FDN includes some officers and
enlisted men from the Somoza-era National Guard, its National
Directorate includes only one Guard officer - Enrique Bermudez
- whom even,the GRN admits was not implicated in any illegal
activity. The other Directorate members are people who had
opposed Somoza and who had worked for his removal from power.
Several had worked with the Sandinistas before the latter began
to betray their original promises to Nicaragua.
While all FDN officers are former Guard officers, some of
the non-commissioned officers and the vast majority of the FDN
enlisted men have no National Guard background. It is
noteworthy that at least seventy former Guardsmen are in the
Sandinista army; the first Sandinista Minister of Defense also
was a former Guard officer.
Furthermore, the FDN has called for the establishment of
democratic institutions in Nicaragua. In January 1983, it
proposed the revocation of the state of emergency, the .
separation of the public administration from partisan political
activities, and the convocation of internationally-supervised
elections in Nicaragua by September 1983.
The claim that, first, the FDN is Somocista, and second,
that it has no real support in Nicaragua, is heard more outside
Nicaragua than inside. For example, in March 1983, two U.S.
reporters travelled with FDN guerrillas in Nicaragua. Their
reports attested to the level of their support in the
countryside, in the same areas that once supported Sandino.
The U.S. does not seek a Somocista-style government in
Nicaragua. The U.S. gave ample support to the mediation
efforts in 1978 and 1979 to remove Somoza from power. The U.S.
gave economic and diplomatic support to the new government that
took power, which promised to respect democracy and to follow a
non-aligned foreign policy. We hope that our use of pressure
will result in a government more willing to respect the rights
of its neighbors and its citizens.
doc.5178N
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OTHER PRESSURES THE SANDINISTAS FACE
-- The U.S. is not alone in applying pressure - be it
military, economic, or diplomatic - to bear on the
Sandinistas. Other countries are concerned about Sandinista
support for subversion and attacks on pluralism. These
countries have taken steps that complement our policy.
-- The Contadora countries - Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and
Venezuela - pressured Nicaragua for months to accept the
principle of multilateral negotiations. They then worked on
Nicaragua to accept a statement of objectives (the twenty-one
points). They will now pressure Nicaragua to accept a final
agreement, including meaningful verification measures.
-- In July, four Socialist International (SI) leaders sent
a letter to the Sandinistas criticizing their record on
elections and democracy. The letter underscored SI and Western
European concern about the Marxist orientation of the
Sandinistas. Because the Sandinistas had considered the SI to
be a firm supporter, the letter caused great concern in the
_Nicaraguan government.
-- In a similar vein, donations and other foreign
assistance from Western Europe and third world countries has
fallen short of Sandinista expectations. West Germany has
announced that it will not fund new assistance programs for
Nicaragua. Other donors are also concerned about the tacit
support such assistance implies for Sandinistas' policies.
-- Even Mexico, which has been the Contadora country most
friendly toward Nicaragua, recently imposed stricter repayment
terms on Nicaraguan oil imports. Under the previous terms,
Mexican oil subsidies had reached about t120 million in 1982.
This move by Mexico, along with our recent reduction in the
U.S. sugar quota for Nicaragua, will add to the government's
economic difficulties.
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Informal Translation of Socialist International Leadership
Letter to Nicaraguan Leaders
Esteemed friends:
July 19 will be the fourth anniversary of the fall of the
Somoza dictatorship and the triumph of the Nicaraguan
Revolution.
That day was greeted by all social democratic men and
women as the end of a nightmare of suffering, human rights
violations and wars endured by that small, great country
that is Nicaragua. It is a page of history which will be
recorded always as a positive event in itself and charged
with profound transcencrence for Latin America.
Likewise, from a hope and a historic ambition that
belonged legitimately to the Nicaraguan people it was
considered (also) as .the patrimony of all Latin Americans
who love liberty, peace and the independence of their
people in the face of whatever form of dictatorship, of
oppression and of internal or external dependence.
That was what was called and continues to be called the
original goals of the revolution, based fundamentally in
democratic pluralism, the existence of a mixed economy and
an international policy of non-alignment.
We ally ourselves fully with this original goal of the
revolution, we launch campaigns in all directions and we
will continue to have firm confidence that this is the
best for Nicaragua, for Latin America and for the world.
Four years later we reaffirm our support for the
Revolution in Nicaragua and in order not to fall into any
of the temptations that we denounce of intervention in the
internal affairs of your country, which to us seems
illegitimate regardless of where it comes from, this
letter only contains our concern over the worsening of the
situation in the Central American region and in Nicaragua,
and our profound conviction that the fulfillment of the
original goal will contribute decisively to peace -- which
is once again absent in Nicaragua and more threatened than
ever in the region -- and to the happiness of your people.
We consider ourselves friends of the Nicaraguan
revolution. Friends sometimes less appreciated for not
being dependent upon any external purpose of our own
conscience for men who believe in Democratic Socialism, in
the self-determination of peoples, in freedom and in
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peace. Considering ourselves such, and not wanting to
play anyone else's game, we privately write you and
believe our duty--in this difficult moment--to risk asking
yoy_ that, in fulfillment of the original project you
decide upon, on the fourth anniversary of the Revolution,
the proclamation of the Political Parties Law, the
Electoral Law, the ruling that guarantees freedom of
speech, and the summons for free elections next year, 1984.
Facing the already unsustainable crises of growing
confusion and tension, a bold initiative like the one we
are fraternally asking you for, would rescue international
public opinion, strengthen the actions of the liberal
sector of the United States, particularly the decisions of
the Congress of that country to stop all kind of military
actions, direct or indirect against Nicaragua. Moreover,
it is necessary for the Nicaraguan Revolution to receive
again international cooperation and solidarity. As we
have aleady pointed out, it would do no more than develop
the project that the triumphant Nicaraguan peoples'
Revolution offered to your people and to the world.
Within this climate, the efforts of the Contadora Group
could achieve the full channeling toward the solutions
that Latin America hopes for. ?
Whatever happens, we will always condemn and will oppose
the use of force, and consequently, we will defend the the
right of the Nicaraguans, and the right of all people, to
live in peace.
Willy Brandt
, Felipe Gonzalez
Carlos Andres Perez
Daniel Oduber
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ANTI-SANDINISTA GUERRILLAS
-- 'Popular Support: The tnree major anti-Sandinista
tiroups have about 11,000 armed members, while the Sandinistas
have about 70,000 in the Nicaraguan army, reserves, and
militia. Despite their inferior numbers, the guerrillas have
been able to grow and to penetrate deep in
government-controlled territory, relying upon popular support
in some areas, and upon tacit acceptance in others.
-- Arms Flow to El Salvador: In September, the guerrillas
attacked an arms transshipment point in Estero de Padre Ramos.
Nicaragua (reported in the September 21 issue of the Washington
Post). Salvadoran guerrillas continue to receive arms as well
as other assistance from Nicaragua, but some Salvadoran
guerrillas have asserted that FDN actions have delayed or
cancelled some arms shipments.
-- Attacks on Economic Targets: In September, FDN
commandos successfully disabled the Puerto Sandino offshore
tanker-pipeline hookup. Later that month, ARDE forces
successfully attacked and destroyed power transmission towers.
-- Nicaragua's New Diplomatic Stance: In July, the
Sandinistas announced for the first time that they would accept
multilateral discussions with their nieghbors in the Contadora
Group. In September, they accepted the Contadora twenty-one
points. These positive developments were the product of a
series of military, diplomatic, and economic pressures applied
on the Sandinistas. The anti-Sandinista guerrilla movements
are an essential part of this process.
'Nicaraguan Opposition: Similarly, the Sandinistas have
reacted to these pressures by relaxing some restrictions on the
legal opposition groups. An opposition political party and a
trade union were allowed to hold public conventions, and the
government has largely refrained from attacking the private
sector. We believe this to be a tactical shift for the
Sandinistas, but it reflects the concern that the
anti-Sandinistas have generated within the government.
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