INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FY 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 May 1986
Thank you for your assistance and cooperation in the
recent count of classification decisions. This was the
first of the two samplings scheduled for FY 86. The second
sampling will be taken in September. An analysis of'the
two samplings will be the basis for the Agency's annual
report to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO).
Attached is a copy of the ISOO FY 85 Annual Report
to the President. The statistics we collected last year
concerning classification are compiled in this report.
STAT
STAT
IRMD
1236 Ames
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Information
Security
Oversight
Office
Annual
Report
to the
President
FY 1985
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April 11, 1986
Dear Mr. Garfinkel:
Thank you for your 1985 Annual Report on the
status of the system we have established under
Executive Order 12356 to protect national security
information. I am pleased to note that the system
continues to work well.
Your report noted the current efforts to improve
the information security program which the National
Security Council has since approved in principle.
Your interagency committee is to be commended for
these efforts. These initiatives, in conjunction
with other security and counterintelligence
initiatives, should assist in further strengthening
the information security program.
Please accept my thanks for the outstanding work
of your organization and the other dedicated
personnel throughout the government who are
working so hard on behalf of protecting our
national security.
Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director
Information Security Oversight
Office
18th and F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405
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Information Security Oversight Office
Washington, DC 20405
March 24, 1986
I am pleased to submit the Information Security Oversight
Office's (ISOO) 1985 Annual Report to the President.
Since you issued Executive Order 12356, "National Security
Information," in 1982, the ISOO has regularly reported that the
information security system established under it has functioned
very well. That success continues.
Nevertheless, you have also recognized the need for ongoing
efforts to improve the security classification program, seeking
better protection for national security information without
excessive classification. In 1985, the ISOO commenced an
interagency effort to seek even further improvement in the
information security program. The ISOO is now working to
implement the proposed initiatives that resulted. These are
discussed in greater detail in the Report.
Your support of the information security system has been
constant and remains vital to its continued success. As we seek
further improvement, we proceed with the knowledge of your
continued interest.
Respectfully,
Steven Garfinkel
Director
The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
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Table of Contents
Letter to the President ......................... 1
Agency Acronyms or Abbreviations ........... 4
Summary of FY 1985 Program Activity ........ 5
The Information Security Program FY 1985 ... 6
Program Reviews and Inspections ....... 6
Statistical Reporting ...................... 7
Original Classification Authorities ....... 8
Original Classification .................... 9
Derivative Classification .................. 12
Total Classification Activity .............. 13
Mandatory Review for
Declassification ........................14
Systematic Declassification Review ..... 16
Agency Self-Inspections .................. 18
Exhibits
1. Original Classifiers,
FY 1971-FY 1985 ....................... 8
2. Number of Original Classifiers ........... 9
3. Comparison of Original
Classification Activity .................. 9
4. Original Classification Decisions ......... 10
5. Original Classification Decisions by
Agency, FY 1982-FY 1985 ..............11
6. Original Classification Decisions
Scheduled for Automatic
Declassification ........................ 11
7. Original Classification/
Declassification Assignments ......... 12
8. Comparison of Derivative
Classification Activity ..................12
9. Derivative Classification Decisions
by Agency, FY 1982-FY 1985 ..........13
10. Comparison of Combined
Classification Activity .................. 13
11. Mandatory Review Requests
Received ............................... 14
12. Mandatory Review Workload,
FY 1983-FY 1985 .......................14
Improving the Information Security System ... 19
Appendix A: DoD Sampling Systems .........24
B: Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement .... 27
C: Highlights of ISOO
Symposium ...................28
D: ISOO Inspections: FY 1983-
FY 1985 ........................ 30
13.
14.
19.
20.
Mandatory Review Actions ............... 15
FY 1985 Mandatory Review Actions
by Agency .............................. 15
Mandatory Review Appeals
Workload, FY 1983-FY 1985............ 16
Pages Reviewed for
Declassification ........................ 16
Percentage of Reviewed Pages
Declassified ............................ 17
FY 1985 Systematic Review Actions
by Agency ............................. 17
Agency Self-Inspections ................. 18
Infractions ................................ 18
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Agency Acronyms or
Abbreviations Used in
this Report
ACDA
Arms Control and Disarmament
NARA
National Archives and Records
Agency
Administration
AID
Agency for International
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space
Development
Administration
AIR FORCE
Department of the Air Force
NAVY
Department of the Navy
ARMY
Department of the Army
NLRB
National Labor Relations Board
BIB
Board for International
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Broadcasting
NSA
National Security Agency
CEA
Council of Economic Advisers
NSC
National Security Council
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
NSF
National Science Foundation
COMMERCE Department of Commerce
OA, EOP
Office of Administration,
DARPA
Defense Advanced Research
Executive Office of the President
Projects Agency
OJCS
Organization of the Joint Chiefs
DCA
Defense Communications
of Staff
Agency
OMB
Office of Management and Budget
DCAA
Defense Contract Audit Agency
OMSN
Office for Micronesian Status
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
Negotiations
DIS
Defense Investigative Service
OPIC
Overseas Private Investment
DLA
Defense Logistics Agency
Corporation
DMA
Defense Mapping Agency
OPM
Office of Personnel Management
DNA
Defense Nuclear Agency
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
DoD
Department of Defense
OSTP
Office of Science and Technology
DoE
Department of Energy
Policy
DoT
Department of Transportation
OVP
Office of the Vice President
ED
Department of Education
PC
Peace Corps
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
PFIAB
President's Foreign Intelligence
EXIMBANK
Export-Import Bank
Advisory Board
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
PIOB
President's Intelligence Oversight
FCA
Farm Credit Administration
Board
FCC
Federal Communications
SBA
Small Business Administration
Commission
SEC
Securities and Exchange
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management
Commission
Agency
SSS
Selective Service System
FHLBB
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
STATE
Department of State
FMC
Federal Maritime Commission
TREASURY
Department of the Treasury
FRS
Federal Reserve System
TVA
Tennessee Valley Authority
GSA
General Services Administration
USDA
Department of Agriculture
HHS
Department of Health and
USIA
United States Information Agency
Human Services
USPS
United States Postal Service
HUD
Department of Housing and
USTR
Office of the United States Trade
Urban Development
Representative
ICC
Interstate Commerce
VA
Veterans Administration
Commission
ISOO
Information Security Oversight
Office
INTERIOR
Department of the Interior
ITC
International Trade Commission
JUSTICE
Department of Justice
LABOR
Department of Labor
MMC
Marine Mammal Commission
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Summary of FY 1985
Program Activity
Inspections
The FY 1985 Report to the President is the third
to examine the information security program
under E.O. 12356. The following data highlight
ISOO's findings:
? The number of original classification
authorities rose slightly to 7,014.
? Original classification decisions decreased
to a record low level of 830,641.
? By classification level, 3.9% of original
classification decisions were "Top Secret,"
35.6% were "Secret," and 60.5% were
"Confidential."
? Under E.O. 12356, originally classified
information has been marked for automatic
declassification 34% of the time, in contrast
to the estimated 10% rate under E.O. 12065.
? Derivative classification decisions rose 15%
over FY '84, to 21,492,254.
? The total of all classification actions,
22,322,895, was a 14% increase over FY '84.
? Agencies received 4,037 new mandatory
review requests.
? Agencies processed 3,621 cases, 18% fewer
than in FY '84, but declassified in full
265,197 pages, 101,632 more than in FY '84,
and declassified in part 47,920 additional
pages.
? Agencies received 282 new mandatory
review appeals.
? Agencies acted on 522 appeals, 23% more
than in FY '84, and declassified additional
information in whole or in part in 87% of the
cases.
? Under the systematic review program,
agencies declassified 8,107,047 pages of
historically valuable records, 2.4 million
pages fewer than in FY '84.
? Agencies conducted 28,319 self-inspections,
a slight increase over FY '84.
? Agencies reported 15,154 infractions, 21 %
fewer than in FY '84.
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Information Security
Oversight Office
The Information Security
Program - FY 1985
Under Executive Order 12356, the Information
Security Oversight Office (ISOO) is responsible
for monitoring the information security
programs of those executive branch activities
that generate or handle national security
information. Originally established by Executive
Order 12065, ISOO continues to be the primary
oversight organization in the system prescribed
by President Reagan's Order of April 2, 1982. In
this role, ISOO oversees the information security
programs of approximately 65 departments,
independent agencies and offices of the
executive branch. E.O.12356 also requires the
Director of ISOO to report annually to the
President about the ongoing implementation of
the Order's provisions. This Report summarizes
Government-wide performance during FY 1985,
the system's third year.
ISOO is located administratively in the
General Services Administration but receives its
policy direction from the National Security
Council. The Administrator of General Services
appoints the ISOO Director upon approval of the
President. The ISOO Director appoints the staff,
which numbers between 13-15 persons. For
FY 1985, ISOO's budget was $660,000.
ISOO fulfills its assigned responsibilities
under E.O.12356 in a variety of ways. First, it
develops and issues implementing directives
and instructions regarding the Order. Second,
ISOO conducts on-site inspections or program
reviews of agencies that generate or handle
national security information. During FY 1985,
ISOO also monitored agency implementation of
the signing by all cleared employees of the
Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement,
Standard Form 189, prescribed by National
Security Decision Directive 84 (NSDD 84),
as a condition of access to classified
information. Appendix B, p. 27, reports on the
status of implementation of this requirement by
each agency. Third, ISOO gathers, analyzes and
reports statistical data on agencies' programs.
Fourth, it evaluates, develops or disseminates
security education materials and programs.
During FY 1985, ISOO held a symposium
entitled "National Security Information: Different
Perspectives," at which time Government and
contractor employees, scholars and journalists
heard varying views on the topic from a panel of
experts assembled from the public and private
sectors. Appendix C, p. 28, contains quotes
highlighting the meeting. Fifth, ISOO receives
and takes action on suggestions, complaints,
disputes and appeals from persons inside or
outside the Government on any aspect of the
administration of the Order. In this area, ISOO
serves as the final appellate authority for the
mandatory declassification review of
presidential materials. Sixth, it conducts special
studies on identified or potential problem areas
and on programs to improve the system. During
FY 1985, the ISOO Director chaired an
interagency effort to develop initiatives to
improve the Government-wide information
security system in five perceived problem areas:
overclassification or unnecessary classification;
the overdistribution of classified information;
classification management; revitalization of the
"need-to-know" principle; and unauthorized
disclosures. These initiatives are discussed in
greater detail in the narrative section, p. 19.
Seventh, ISOO maintains continuous liaison
with monitored agencies on all matters relating
to the information security system. This Report
is based upon program reviews and inspections
conducted by the ISOO staff and the
compilation and analysis of statistical data
regarding each agency's program activity.
Program Reviews and Inspections
ISOO's program analysts serve as liaison to
specific agencies to facilitate coordination and
to provide for continuity of oversight operations.
The analysts must stay abreast of relevant
activities within each agency's information
security program; coordinate with assigned
agency counterparts on a continuing basis; and
conduct formal inspections of the agency's
program in accordance with a planned annual
inspection schedule, which includes visits to
selected field activities as well as offices in the
Washington metropolitan area. ISOO also
undertakes compliance reviews of selected
contractor facilities as part of its inspection
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program. Appendix D to this Report p. 30, lists
those activities that ISOO has inspected during
the period FY 1983-1985.
These on-site surveys encompass all aspects
of the information security program, including
classification, declassification, safeguarding,
security education, and administration. The
inspections always include detailed interviews
with agency security personnel, classifiers, and
handlers of national security information. To the
extent possible, ISOO analysts review a
sampling of classified information in the
agency's inventory to examine the propriety of
classification, the existence of necessary
security markings and declassification
instructions, and compliance with safeguarding
procedures. ISOO analysts also monitor security
training programs to determine if the agencies
adequately inform personnel about classifying,
declassifying, marking and safeguarding
national security information. When weaknesses
in an agency's program are identified, ISOO
analysts recommend corrections, either on-the-
spot or as part of a formal inspection report.
Critical reports require immediate remedial
attention by the agency prior to a follow-up
inspection by ISOO. These inspections are a
necessary means of identifying and resolving
problem areas. They provide specific indicators
of agency compliance or noncompliance with
E.O. 12356 that are not apparent simply from
the analysis of statistical data.
Statistical Reporting
To gather relevant statistical data regarding
each agency's information security program,
ISOO developed the Standard Form 311, which
requires each agency to report annually the
following information:
1. The number of original classification
authorities;
2. the number of declassification
authorities;
3. the number of original classification
decisions, including the classification
level of those decisions and the duration
of classification;
4. the number of derivative classification
decisions by classification level;
5. the number of requests received for
mandatory review for declassification and
agency actions in response to these
requests in terms of cases, documents,
and pages;
6. the number of pages of national security
information reviewed during the year
under systematic declassification
procedures and the number declassified;
7. the number of formal self-inspections
conducted by the agency; and
8. the number of security infractions
detected by the agency within its own
program.
The statistics reflected in this Report cover the
period October 1, 1984, through September 30,
1985. Some of the larger agency programs,
including CIA and DoD, calculate their
classification actions on the basis of sampling
systems approved by ISOO. For FY 1985, DoD
utilized two sampling methods in reporting its
statistics to ISOO. The first is based on
electronic message traffic only, and has been in
use since ISOO began collecting these
statistics. The second, which was begun this
year, includes a wider range of document types,
including memoranda and reports. For FY 1985,
ISOO is using the data provided by the
message traffic system in the body of the
Report to allow for more accurate comparisons
with previous years. In future reports ISOO
intends to use the statistics provided by the
new sampling method, because it is likely to
produce more reliable figures. Appendix A, p. 24,
describes the two sampling systems in greater
detail, and contains the statistics reported by
DoD using the new method.
7
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Original Classification Authorities
Up Slightly (Exhibits 1 and 2)
Original classification authorities are those
individuals specifically authorized in the first
instance to classify information in the interest
of national security. These classifiers are
designated in writing, either by the President or
by other officials, primarily agency heads,
named by the President. Limiting the number of
original classifiers to the minimum necessary
for efficient management is one way to control
the volume of overall classification activity.
ISOO encourages agencies to conduct regular
surveys to ensure that the number of original
authorities is in line with operational
requirements.
ORIGINAL CLASSIFIERS Exhibit 1
1971 - 1985
E.O. 10501 E.O. 11652 E.O. 12065 E.O. 12356
1971 1972 1976 1982 1983 1984 1985
13,976
E 7,056 7,010 6,987'
Totals Reported in FY 1984 ISOO Report Changed to Reflect Addition of
87 Secret Classifiers in DoD Not Previously Reported to ISOO
8
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The number of executive branch employees
authorized to classify originally has decreased
significantly since 1972, when the figure was
59,316. In FY 1985, there were 7,014 individuals
with original classification authority. This is
slightly higher than the revised total of 6,987
reported in FY 1984, and approximates the 7,010
original classifiers registered in FY 1983.
Responsibility for the higher figure during
FY 1985, rests with three agencies that reported
substantial increases. They are FEMA, up 13
(+325%), Treasury, up 26 (+30%) and State, up
136 (+8%). These numbers more than offset
decreases at CIA, DoD and OSTP. The number
of "Top Secret" authorities rose at the greatest
rate (+3%), although "Confidential" authorities
also increased by 1 %. "Secret" authorities
declined by 1%. During FY 1986, ISOO will
press each agency that accounted for this
year's increase, and others, to make a
concerted effort to reduce the number of
original classifiers, especially at the "Top
Secret" level. ISOO is convinced that some
designations of original classification authority
continue to be based solely on the purported
prestige that attaches to it. This is unacceptable
because the only valid justification is the need
of the official to exercise such authority in the
performance of his or her employment
responsibilities.
Original Classification Declines
to Record Low Level
(Exhibits 3 through 7)
An original classification decision is an initial
determination by an authorized official that
information requires protection from
unauthorized disclosure in the interest of
national security. The determination is
accompanied by the placement of required
classification markings on the medium that
contains the information. The number of original
classification decisions is probably the most
important statistic reported by ISOO each year
because of its wide ranging impact on all
aspects of the information security program.
In FY 1985, the number of original
classification decisions decreased by 51,302
(-5.8%) to 830,641. This figure represents the
lowest number of original actions reported since
ISOO began collecting such statistics in
FY 1979. The total is 21 % lower than the
1,055,152 decisions reported in FY 1982, the last
year under the previous Executive order.
NUMBER OF COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL CLASSIFIERS Exhibit 2 CLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY
"Top Secret" Authorities:
(1
559)
,
"Secret" Authorities:
(4
293)
,
"Confidential" Authorities:
(1
161)
,
Total:
(7,014)
= 500 Authorities
Exhibit 3
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Despite the positive overall figure for FY 1985,
ISOO notes that the number of original "Top
Secret" actions increased substantially during
the year. They rose by 12,016 (60.1 %). "Secret"
actions increased by 34,539 (13.2%). These
numbers were offset by a dramatic decrease of
97,857 (-16.3%) in "Confidential" decisions.
ISOO is concerned that a trend may be
developing for agencies to classify at
increasingly higher levels, and will be watching
carefully to ensure that any continued
movement in such a direction is justified.
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION
DECISIONS
"TOP
SECRET"
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION
Exhibit 4 DECISIONS
TOTAL
ORIGINAL
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Four agencies classify originally more than 99%
of the actions within the executive branch. Of
these, DoD reported an increase of 39,577 (11 %)
and Justice a rise of 6,341 (10%). The CIA and
State reported decreases of 32% and 5%,
respectively. The decline of 84,500 actions by
the CIA was the primary factor for the lower
total figure in original classification decisions. A
comparison of original classification decisions
by agency for the period FY 1982-1985 shows a
dramatic decrease by the CIA from a high figure
of 413,521 reported in FY 1982, to this year's
total of 181,688. Similarly, the numbers for
Justice demonstrate a marked decline in
original classification activity from FY 1982-
FY 1985. The figures for State remained
relatively constant during the period. The only
major classifier to register increases each year
is DoD, which reported 291,831 original
decisions in FY 1982, and 385,496 in FY 1985, a
32% increase.
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION
DECISIONS BY AGENCY
1982-1985
In Thousands
During FY 1985, 35% of the decisions specified
a particular date or event for automatic
declassification. This is 3% greater than the
figure reported in FY 1984. The average of 34%
under the current Executive order continues to
be considerably better than the estimated 10%
under the predecessor system.
The DoD's automatic declassification rate
remained an impressive 71 % during FY 1985.
However, at several other agencies the rate
declined sharply from the percentages reported
in FY 1984. They were the CIA (5% in FY 1984,
to 1 % in FY 1985), DoE (15% to 7%), State
(12% to 8%), and Treasury (16% to 9%).
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS
SCHEDULED FOR AUTOMATIC
Exhibit 5 DECLASSIFICATION
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During the course of its on-site inspections,
ISOO analysts examine documents to
determine the propriety of the classification and
the proper use of markings. Frequently, analysts
review items that could contain a specific date
or event as the declassification instruction but
instead bear the indefinite designation,
"Originating Agency's Determination Required."
Examples of documents that should contain a
specific date or event as the declassification
instruction are memoranda relating to itineraries
abroad by U.S. officials or to this country by
foreign dignitaries. This is an area in which
further improvements are achievable. ISOO will
continue to press agencies to use a date or
event whenever possible.
Derivative Classification Continues to Rise
(Exhibits 8 and 9)
Derivative classification is the act of
incorporating, paraphrasing, restating or
generating in new form classified source
information. Information may be derivatively
classified in two ways: (a) through the use of a
source document, usually correspondence or
publications generated by an original
classification authority; or (b) through the use of
a classification guide. Only executive branch or
Government contractor employees with the
appropriate security clearance who are required
by their work to restate classified source
information may classify derivatively.
In FY 1985, executive branch agencies made
21,492,254 derivative classification decisions, a
14.8% increase over FY 1984. Of the total,
510,179 (2%) were classified at the "Top Secret"
level, 6,539,860 (31 %) at the "Secret" level, and
14,442,215 (67%) at the "Confidential" level.
These figures represent an increase at each
level, with the number of "Secret" actions rising
the greatest at 18%. "Top Secret" and
"Confidential" decisions increased 11 % and
13%, respectively.
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION! COMPARISON OF DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFICATION ASSIGNMENTS Exhibit 7 CLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY
1985
Agency % Assigned Date
% OADR (Must be
%
or Event for
Declassification
Reviewed Before
Declassification)
"TS"
DoD
71%
29%
1%
18%
81%
CIA
1%
99%
14%
75%
11%
State
8?i?
92%
0.1%
20.9%
79%
Justice
0.4%
99.6%
4%
70%
26%
Treasury
9%
91%
0%
5%
95%
All Others
21%
79%
2%
25%
73%
Totals
35%
65%
4%
36%
60%
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Combined Classification
Activity Increases (Exhibit 10)
An examination of the data from FY 1982
through FY 1985 indicates that DoD and CIA
account for nearly all of the derivative
classification decisions. The figures for DoD
show annual increases during the period from a
low of 13,738,420 in FY 1982, to a high of
18,090,961 in FY 1985. The increase from
FY 1984-1985, was 11 % or an additional
1,826,923 derivative classification actions. The
CIA had experienced declines in each year from
FY 1982-1984. However, in FY 1985 it registered
a 42% increase in the number of derivative
classification decisions. Two agencies reporting
substantial percentage decreases in FY 1985,
were FEMA (-57%) and Justice (-13%).
Given the wide disparity in figures reported by
DoD and CIA for FY-1985, ISOO is concerned
that the sampling systems currently in use may
not result in the most accurate numbers. Both
agencies project the totals based on samples
taken over a single one week period. It is likely
that in one year the week selected may be
relatively quiet while, in another, it may be
unusually active. To overcome this potential
problem, ISOO is recommending that the DoD
and CIA develop systems that sample
classification activity during more than a single
one week period.
DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION
DECISIONS BY AGENCY Exhibit 9
1982-1985
In Millions
2.7 2.4 32
2.3
1982
1983
1984
1985
17 16
06 06
All Others
During FY 1985, the combined number of
original and derivative classification decisions
was 22,322,895. This was an increase of
2,715,159 (14%) over FY 1984. The primary
reasons for the rise were the substantial
increases reported by DoD in both original and
derivative actions and the 42% increase
registered by the CIA in derivative decisions. As
in the past, ISOO worked with the agencies
whose original or derivative classification
decisions accounted for the significant
increases to help determine the causes. Among
the reasons, several agencies cited greater
counterintelligence efforts, particularly in the
area of combating international terrorism. As
discussed in the section on derivative
classification, p. 12, ISOO suspects that the
difference is partly the result of sampling that
concentrates on one week of the year. In
FY 1986, ISOO will devote additional energy to
the review of documents during its on-site
surveys to ascertain the appropriateness of
classification. ISOO will also be seeking greater
involvement by the agencies themselves to
undertake similar spot checks to determine the
propriety of classification decisions.
The percentage of all decisions classified at
the "Top Secret" level remained at 2% for the
second straight year. However, there was a shift
of one percent from "Confidential" to "Secret."
The former now comprise 67% of the total, the
latter 31 %
COMPARISON OF COMBINED
CLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY Exhibit 10
FY Total Actions % "TS" % "S" % "C"
1981 17,374,102
1982 17,504,611
1983 18,005,151
1984 19,607,736
1985 22,322,895
5%
3%
3%
2%
2%
29% 66%
31% 66%
30% 67%
30% 68%
31% 67%
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Mandatory Review Continues to Produce
Impressive Results (Exhibits 11 through 15)
Under E.O. 12356, the mandatory review process
allows agencies or citizens to require an agency
to review particular national security information
for purposes of seeking its declassification.
Such requests must be in writing and must
describe the information with enough detail to
permit the agency to retrieve it with a
reasonable amount of effort. Mandatory review
is a process popular with researchers as a less
contentious alternative to Freedom of
Information Act requests.
The number of mandatory review requests
received in FY 1985, declined by 613 to 4,037.
Despite the decrease, this figure represents the
fourth highest number of new cases received
since the program was instituted in FY 1972.
When the 1,523 cases carried forward from
FY 1984, are added to the new cases received,
agencies had a total caseload of 5,560 during
FY 1985. They acted on a total of 3,621 cases,
18% fewer than in FY 1984.
MANDATORY
REVIEW REQUESTS RECEIVED Exhibit 11
2,246
4,192
Since FY 1983, ISOO has collected data on
agency actions in response to mandatory review
requests in terms of cases, documents and
pages. A comparison of the figures for each
category for the three years indicates that the
numbers for FY 1985, are considerably better
than those for FY 1983, but not quite as good
as those reported in FY 1984. The 3,621 cases
acted on in FY 1985, comprised 84,767
documents totaling 329,945 pages. The number
of pages acted on was only 4% less than the
record number reported for FY 1984.
MANDATORY REVIEW WORKLOAD
CASES/DOCUMENTS/PAGES Exhibit 12
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Of the 3,621 cases completed in FY 1985, 1,866
(52%) were granted in full, 1,344 (37%) were
granted in part, and 411 (11%) were denied in
full. The percentage of cases denied in full
marked the first time in three years that the
figure exceeded 10%.
Of the 84,767 documents acted on in FY 1985,
79,693 (94%) were granted in full, 3,180 (4%)
were granted in part, and 1,894 (2%) were
denied in full. The number of documents
declassified in full increased by an impressive
54,789 (220%) over the FY 1984 figure. Similarly,
the number of pages released in full rose 62%
from 163,565 in FY 1984, to 265,197 in FY 1985.
This was 80% of the pages reviewed during the
last fiscal year. Of the remaining pages, 47,920
(15%) were released in part and 16,828 (5%)
were denied in full. During FY 1985, 313,117
pages were either declassified in full or in part,
slightly below the combined figure of 325,530
for FY 1984. Nevertheless, the percentage of
pages released in full rose to 80% in FY 1985,
as compared to 47% in FY 1984. Much of the
credit for the improvement rests with DoD,
which increased the number of pages released
in full from 140,505 in FY 1984, to 207,329 in
FY 1985.
MANDATORY REVIEW
ACTIONS
E.O. 12356 also gives requesters the right to
appeal mandatory review denials to officials of
the denying agencies, or, with respect to
classified presidential materials, to the ISOO
Director. During FY 1985, agencies received 282
new appeals in addition to the 782 carried over
from the previous year. Of these 1,064 pending
cases, the agencies closed 522 in FY 1985. This
represented a notable 23% improvement over
FY 1984. Justice was the agency primarily
responsible for the improved figure.
FY 1985 MANDATORY REVIEW
Exhibit 13 ACTIONS BY AGENCY Exhibit 14
Agency
Total Cases
Acted On
% Granted
in Full
% Granted
in Part
% Denied
in Full
State
867
43%
44%
13%
DoD
770
62%
28%
10%
NSC
677
39%
57%
4%
Justice
442
88%
4%
8%
NARA
434
41%
39%
20%
CIA
281
28%
48%
24%
All Others
150
75%
21%
4%
Totals
3,621
52%
37%
11%
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Systematic Review Results Disappointing
(Exhibits 16 through 18)
Of the 522 appeals completed, 193 (37%) were
granted in full, 262 (50%) were granted in part,
and 67 (13%) were denied in full. These appeals
totaled 10,669 documents and 56,332 pages,
increases of 80% and 113%, respectively, over
the figures reported for FY 1984. Of the
documents reviewed on appeal during FY 1985,
5,473 (51%) were released in full, 5,036 (47%)
were released in part, and only 160 (2%) were
denied in full. Of the 56,332 pages reviewed,
28,938 (51%) were declassified in full, 26,750
(47%) were declassified in part, and 644 (2%)
remained fully classified. During FY 1985, the
numbers of documents and pages released in
full or in part showed substantial gains over the
comparable figures for the previous year.
Documents rose from 5,723 in FY 1984, to
10,509 in FY 1985, while pages released in full
or in part increased from 24,791 to 55,688. Once
again it was Justice that accounted for the
significant improvement in the figures.
APPEALS WORKLOAD
"Systematic review for declassification" is the
program, first introduced in 1972, in which
classified, permanently valuable (archival)
records are reviewed for purposes of
declassification after the records reach a
specific age. Under E.O. 12356, NARA is
required to conduct a systematic review of its
classified holdings as they become 30 years
old, except for certain intelligence or cryptologic
file series which are to be reviewed as they
become 50 years old. While other agencies are
not required to conduct a systematic review
program, they are encouraged to do so if
resources are available.
In recent years, the product of the systematic
review program has declined as a result of two
factors. First, the records that are now being
reviewed are not generally susceptible to the
bulk declassification methods that were
frequently adequate in declassifying World War II
era records. Second, the resources available
for systematic review have continued to
dwindle. From FY 1980 to FY 1983, with the
World War II era records almost entirely
declassified, the number of pages reviewed
under systematic declassification declined
precipitously to 12.4 million. Following a call for
increased attention by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, in
FY 1984, the number increased to 12.8 million
pages.
PAGES REVIEWED FOR
CASES/DOCUMENTS/PAGES Exhibit 15 DECLASSIFICATION Exhibit 16
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Last year's Report expressed the hope that the
slight increase registered in FY 1984, was a sign
that the program was on the mend. However,
the numbers reported for FY 1985, were the
lowest since the program was initiated. During
the year, agencies reviewed 10.4 million pages,
down approximately 2.4 million (18%) from
FY 1984. Of the pages reviewed, 78% were
declassified. Although this is lower than the
86% declassification rate reported last year, it is
still substantially higher than the 63%
registered in FY 1983.
While NARA reviewed 9% more pages in
FY 1985 than in FY 1984, this increase was
offset by the 29% decline reported by DoD. In
FY 1985, DoD reviewed 2.8 million fewer pages
under the systematic program than in the
previous year. Despite this decline, it is
important to note that DoD still reviewed more
than 6.8 million pages and declassified just over
5 million pages. Under the Executive order, DoD
is not required to conduct any systematic
review program. Its voluntary efforts in this area
continue to deserve special recognition, and
ISOO is hopeful that, at a minimum, DoD will be
able to maintain the current program.
PERCENTAGE OF REVIEWED
PAGES DECLASSIFIED Exhibit 17
Ultimately, the success of the systematic
dec!assification review program rests with
NARA. It is the only agency that is required to
conduct such a program. A small amount of
progress has been made to implement the
recommendations of a special task force
established by the Archivist of the United States
in 1984. There has been some increase in the
resources devoted to NARA's systematic review
program. Most of NARA's systematic review
activity during FY 1985, resulted from a contract
between NARA and State to review State's
central files through 1955. NARA has signed a
similar agreement with AID and has tentatively
reached a new agreement with State to review
certain of its records through 1959. In spite of
these efforts, the 3,141,949 pages reported for
FY 1985, is well below the 5 million pages
recommended by the Archivist's task force and
the 10 million pages that ISOO believes NARA
must review annually to ensure a viable
systematic declassification program.
FY 1985 SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
ACTIONS BY AGENCY
Exhibit 18
Pages
Pages
%
Reviewed
Declassified
Declassified
DoD
6,803,568
5,074,439
75%
NARA
3,141,949
2,808,035
89%
AID
352,576
166,062
47%
State
59,345
50,670
85%
Justice
20,767
3,243
16%
DoT
20,000
500
3%
All Others
43,810
4,128
9%
Totals
10,442,015
8,107,047
78?i?
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Agency Self-Inspections Increase Marginally
(Exhibits 19 and 20)
While the Executive order authorizes the
Director of ISOO to conduct on-site inspections
of those agencies that generate or handle
classified information, it places primary
responsibility for internal oversight on the
agency heads themselves. The Order requires
that agency heads establish and maintain "an
active oversight and security education
program." Agencies report to ISOO the number
of self-inspections that they undertake each
year. They also report the number and type of
infractions found during the year. Infractions are
minor violations of the Order, the implementing
ISOO Directive or agency regulations. These
statistics do not include the more serious
security violations that agencies must report to
ISOO as they occur.
For FY 1985, agencies reported that they had
conducted 28,319 self-inspections. This was a
disappointing 2% increase over FY 1984. Those
agencies showing significant decreases
included CIA (-14%), DoT (-35%), State (-65%),
and Treasury (-53%). Agencies reporting major
increases were DoD (+2%), NSC (+93%), and
NASA (+46%).
AGENCY
SELF-INSPECTIONS
ISOO is concerned not only with the quantity of
self-inspections the agencies undertook in
FY 1985, but also with their quality. This
concern arises from the fact that during the
self-inspections conducted in FY 1985, agencies
found 4,003 fewer infractions than in FY 1984.
The total of 15,154 reported for this fiscal year is
21 % lower than the figure for the previous year.
The average number of infractions discovered
per inspection fell 22% from FY 1984, to
FY 1985, to .54. This is far fewer than the
number found during ISOO's regular program
reviews, and calls into question the
thoroughness of the self-inspections the
agencies are conducting. ISOO is particularly
concerned that agencies increase their review of
classified holdings to ascertain the
appropriateness of classification and the
correctness of security markings.
Exhibit 19 INFRACTIONS Exhibit 20
Total
FY 82
Total
FY 83
Total
FY 84
Total
FY 85
% Change
84-85
Unauthorized Access
475
620
483
440
- 9%
Mismarking
11,499
10,849
7,503
6,642
- 12%
Unauthorized
Transmission
1,197
1,294
1,773
1,688
- 5%
Improper Storage
4,222
3,844
7,363
5,089
- 31%
Unauthorized
Reproduction
207
249
190
143
- 25%
Overclassification
290
220
302
164
- 46%
Underclassification
365
317
351
265
- 25%
Classification w/o
Authority
392
238
597
109
-82%
Improper Destruction
665
581
475
322
- 32%
Other
967
132
120
292
+ 143%
Totals
20,279
18,344
19,157
15,154
- 21%
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Improving the
Information Security System
When the Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) issued its last Annual Report in April
1985, it was, fittingly, recapping the recent past
in order to anticipate the future. Little did ISOO
realize, however, how quickly several of its
pronouncements would occupy some of 1985's
most spectacular news stories. Less than a
month later, the FBI's arrest of John Walker
commenced the so-called "Year of the Spy,"
and highlighted the subject of national security
information like never before.
In its Report, ISOO expressed ongoing
concern about several program weaknesses:
The excess of security clearances; the apparent
erosion in the "need-to-know" principle; the
overdistribution of classified information among
and within agencies and offices; and the
continuing problem of overclassification, that is,
the classification of information whose
sensitivity doesn't merit this extraordinary
protection. Within weeks of the issuance of the
ISOO Report, daily news accounts of the Walker
investigation exposed these subjects to the
public in a way that ISOO and the rest of the
security apparatus within Government could
never accomplish.
To be sure, many news accounts grossly
exaggerated the link between instances of
espionage and perceived weaknesses in the
personnel and information security systems. For
example, it became almost commonplace for
commentators to blame the espionage, in part
at least, on the vast numbers of individuals
holding security clearances and on the
classification of too much information. In each
new case, however, the facts belied the logic of
these assertions. While far too many people
hold unneeded security clearances, all of the
accused who held clearances occupied
positions that clearly required them. And while
the problem of overclassification persists, it is
farfetched to establish a direct link between
overclassification and espionage. The
information at issue in the recent spy cases
obviously warranted classification. The actual or
intended procurers of the information certainly
placed great value upon it, and the Government,
in hearing after hearing, has justified the
classification of the information to the
satisfaction of the judges and juries.
An Opportunity
To the Government's security apparatus,
however, the Walker case and its cousins
presented something far more important than a
challenge -- they presented an opportunity. Upon
the release of its FY 1984 Report to the
President, ISOO noted little interest within the
executive branch to embark upon a program to
improve an information security system that
ISOO itself pronounced in generally good
shape. It was the publicity over the Walker affair
that created a hospitable environment in which
to attack the problems that continued to nag
the system.
ISOO welcomed the opportunity. In July 1985,
the National Security Council endorsed ISOO's
request to commence an interagency review of
the information security system, focusing on
five program areas that both the NSC and ISOO
perceived as most in need of attention. These
were overclassification, or unnecessary
classification; the overdistribution of classified
information; classification management;
revitalization of the "need-to-know" principle;
and unauthorized disclosures. That same month
the ISOO Director chaired a meeting of
representatives of those agencies most heavily
involved in the security classification program,
including the Departments of State, Treasury,
Justice, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Forcc and
Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. That meeting produced
five task forces, each consisting of at least one
civilian and one defense agency, responsible for
recommending initiatives pertinent to one of the
five problem areas. By the end of October, the
interagency group had reached a consensus on
thirteen separate initiatives that the ISOO
Director transmitted to the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
During testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in November
1985, the ISOO Director invited the Committee's
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input on the proposed initiatives. Subsequently,
the NSC concurred in ISOO's recommendation
to invite the input of other interested
committees of Congress as well. To date, the
NSC and ISOO have received four
congressional responses, including a
comprehensive package from the SSCI. Each of
these responses has endorsed the initiatives
wholeheartedly. As this is being written, ISOO is
anticipating the NSC's imminent approval to
begin those actions necessary to implement the
initiatives.
The Initiatives
The thirteen initiatives will not alter the basic
structure of the current information security
system. Each of the agencies participating in
their formulation agreed that the structure of the
system established by President Reagan in
1982, is fundamentally sound and, for the most
part, working quite well. Rather, the initiatives
strive for increased knowledge and increased
accountability among the many people who are
entrusted with making the system work as it
should. Although they are few in number and
quite modest in potential cost, ISOO firmly
believes that they will spark the improvement of
the information security system.
1. Overclassification
The placement of overclassification as the first
problem area was intentional. Although the
problem of overclassification is not nearly as
severe as the popular media portrays it to be, it
is a continuing nuisance that eats away at the
credibility of the entire system. Critics proclaim
that overclassification is the mechanism the
bureaucracy uses to hide its mistakes, to shield
it from embarrassment, and to cover up its
misdeeds. In ISOO's experience, the principal
causes of overclassification are far less
intriguing. Very few classification decisions are
the tools of a cover-up, albeit even one casts a
lingering shadow.
Instead, ISOO believes that just about every
instance of initial overclassification results from
one or more of the following reasons. First,
overcaution. Many classifiers believe, and with
some reason, that it is better to err on the side
of protection than on the side of disclosure.
Second, rote classification. It is almost always
easier to do things the way they've been done
before. Independent thought takes time and
effort. Third, status or prestige classification.
Some misguided individuals believe that it
elevates their stature to elevate the protection
of their product. For status classifiers,
"Confidential" is never high enough, and
"Secret" is merely tolerable. Fourth, and related
to status classification, exclusionary
classification. This occurs when an official
decides that the classification of his product
will establish a more exclusive environment, free
from routine oversight. Fifth, incorrect,
inadequate or nonexistent classification
guidance. Poor guidance results in inaccurate
derivative classification actions and,
quantitatively, is probably the most significant
cause of overclassification. And sixth, the lack
of portion markings in documents used as
sources for derivative classification. If the entire
text of a document is classified, even though
some portions need not be, documents derived
from those portions will be needlessly classified.
There are primarily three initiatives that will
attack the problem of overclassification,
although others will certainly impact upon it.
First, ISOO will issue a directive that
establishes minimum requirements for
mandatory training of original and derivative
classifiers, including those who either issue or
use classification guides. Too often these
officials are receiving little or no training about
the classification system and process, and
because of their positions, the agency
employees who are supposed to provide this
training are reluctant to require it. By mandating
training, this directive will provide those
responsible with the ammunition they need to
enforce adequate familiarity with the
information security system. The directive will
also require that agencies keep records of the
training that each of these officials receives.
Second, ISOO will issue a directive on agency
self-inspections that establishes minimum
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criteria for internal oversight. This directive will
include the requirement that agencies
periodically and routinely examine a sample of
their classified product to ensure the validity of
classification and the existence of appropriate
markings. Most current agency self-inspections
concentrate almost exclusively on physical
security arrangements and largely ignore the
information being protected.
Third, ISOO will ask the President to amend
Executive Order 12356, "National Security
Information," to require employees to report
instances of improper classification. Currently,
the system strongly encourages, but does not
require employees to report classification
actions that they believe to be incorrect. In
practice, this rarely occurs. If amended, the
Order will also require agencies to establish
effective procedures for employees to challenge
improper classification free from the fear of
retribution. This fear is believed to be a primary
reason that employees and contractors are not
challenging classification decisions today. To
be sure, this initiative may result in many
unfounded complaints. This seems to be a
reasonable price to pay for improving the quality
of classification decisions.
II. Overdistribution
The overdistribution of classified information
has become a very serious problem in recent
years. The widespread availability of copiers and
the proliferation of automated information
processing systems has multiplied the
wholesale distribution of classified information.
Increased distribution results in increased
security costs and increased vulnerabilities.
With much more classified information around,
it becomes far more difficult to enforce the
requirement that no one, even with a security
clearance, may have access to classified
information without a job related need to see it.
To attack the problem of overdistribution,
therefore, is also to help restore the "need-to-
know" principle.
Three initiatives confront the problem of
overdistribution. First, ISOO will ask the
President to issue a statement to the heads of
agencies that addresses, among other problem
areas, the overdistribution of classified
information. A presidential statement will
highlight overdistribution as a serious threat to
security, not just an administrative burden.
Second, ISOO will amend its current
Government-wide directive to require agencies
to review, at least annually, the automatic or
routine distribution of all classified information.
Distributors will be required to update automatic
distribution lists and to verify the continuing
"need-to-know" of recipients. This initiative
should remedy the too frequent situation in
which a onetime bona fide recipient is placed
on an automatic distribution list and continues
to receive the unneeded classified product of
the distributor.
Third, ISOO will also amend its current
directive to encourage originators of classified
information to widen controls on its
reproduction, unless there are countervailing
reasons to permit uncontrolled reproduction.
Currently, "Top Secret" information may not be
reproduced without the permission of the
originator. Although originators may place
similar controls on the reproduction of "Secret"
and "Confidential" information, they rarely do
so. With copiers available in just about every
office, copies of classified documents
proliferate. This initative should increase both
control and accountability, and reduce the
overdistribution of national security information.
III. Classification Management
ISOO has termed the third problem area
"classification management." Although
classification management is not a new term by
any means, here it refers broadly to the
management of classified information by
classifiers, security specialists, and others
whose work has a significant impact upon its
creation and handling. The initiatives on
classification management will clearly impact
as well on each of the other problem areas.
First, ISOO will seek the amendment of E.O.
12356 to identify the management of classified
information as an area requiring agency head
attention. Specifically, this initiative would
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require that the responsibilities for managing
classified information be included as critical
elements in the performance rating systems of
civilian and military personnel who are original
classifiers, security managers, or who are
otherwise significantly involved in managing
classified information. Perhaps more than any
other, this initiative will confirm that personal
accountability is the most effective means of
improving the operation of the information
security system.
Second, ISOO will ask that the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs call
upon the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management to review and revise the security
specialist position series, to include proper
recognition for the special skills necessary for
the management of classified information. In
many respects security specialists occupy the
lowest rung of the professional ladder. They
receive little respect, low salaries, and few
opportunities for advancement. All too often the
best people leave the security field as quickly
as they can. The Government must improve the
professional standing of security specialists, so
that it can attract and retain competent,
motivated people in these critical jobs.
Third, ISOO will ask that the President direct
the Secretary of Defense to study the feasibility
of expanding the Defense Security Institute to
provide basic training for all executive branch
security personnel. Security education plays a
fundamental role in assuring the effectiveness
of the information security program. Today,
however, basic security training is not always
available to those who need it. The Defense
Security Institute offers an existing school with
excellent instructors in the necessary security
disciplines. The demand for its courses far
exceeds its current capacities. To increase the
Institute's course offerings and enrollment, the
Secretary of Defense should have the option of
seeking reimbursement from the agencies
whose employees and contractors would
benefit from its expansion.
IV. "Need-to-Know"
The criteria for access to classified information
have long been the security clearance plus the
"need-to-know". With the proliferation of
clearances, reliance upon "need-to-know"
becomes even more critical. Instead, there is
the clear perception of widespread indifference
to this principle. The obvious security threat is
not the only unfortunate consequence of the
relaxed enforcement of the "need-to-know"
principle. Another is the increasing use by
agencies of special access programs to help
protect classified information. These programs
have all too often substituted for the absence of
enforced "need-to-know".
The initiatives to attack the overdistribution of
classified information should also serve to
revitalize the "need-to-know" principle. In
addition, ISOO seeks two other initiatives. First,
ISOO will ask that the President issue a
statement to agency heads that stresses the
importance of revitalizing the "need-to-know"
principle. To avoid duplication, this would be
part of the presidential statement proposed to
address other problem areas as well.
Second, ISOO will seek the amendment of
E.O. 12356 to require agency heads to ensure
effective internal oversight of special access
programs, including periodic reconfirmation of
their continued need. Special access programs
may be established by some agency heads for
particularly sensitive information upon a
determination that normal management and
safeguarding procedures do not control access
sufficiently. At present, too many special access
programs actually receive less security oversight
than normal programs. In addition, a number of
these programs are probably unnecessary. This
initiative aims for both improved security and
increased scrutiny of these costly programs.
V. Unauthorized Disclosures
Unauthorized disclosures is a subject that the
executive branch has explored repeatedly in
recent years. There are many ongoing and
pending actions to deal with this very serious
problem. To complement these actions are two
additional initiatives. First, ISOO will coordinate
with the Security Committee of the Intelligence
Community in seeking the development of
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educational materials, both unclassified and
classified, that address the damage caused by
unauthorized disclosures. ISOO is particularly
interested in the development of effective,
unclassified materials, although it recognizes
that the production of these is far more difficult
without the aid of classified examples.
Second, ISOO will ask that the President call
upon the Attorney General to review and revise
existing guidelines on the investigation of
unauthorized disclosures. Revised guidelines
would cover both internal agency investigations
and external investigations by the Department
of Justice and the FBI. Currently, investigations
of unauthorized disclosures rarely lead to
successful prosecutions or even administrative
sanctions. Revised investigative guidelines may
improve upon this record.
Conclusion:
The Unceasing Need for
Improvement
Some months ago the Director of ISOO hosted
a meeting with an official of an allied
democracy. That official had requested the
meeting in order to learn more about the
American information security system. In
describing his government's slow but
methodical pace toward greater freedom of
information, he cited the American system of
access as an ideal, even if flawed, to which all
democracies should strive.
That conversation illustrated, perhaps as well
as any, the constant irony of the American
information security system. Even as other
democracies are attempting to cope with the
rudiments of open government, officials of the
United States Government are struggling to
improve the system that protects only a very
small portion of the tremendous amount of
information it produces every day, so that less,
not more information, will remain hidden.
From ISOO's experience, just about every
person entrusted with protecting that
information wouldn't want it any other way.
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Appendix A -
DoD Sampling Systems
For most of the agencies that ISOO monitors,
the statistics reported each year are based on
an actual count of items in each category. From
the beginning of ISOO's data collection efforts,
however, it was known that such an item-by-
item tabulation of classification actions by the
agencies with the largest programs was not
possible. This was particularly true in the case
of DoD, with its large number of components
and the enormous volume of its classification
activity. Therefore, ISOO agreed that DoD could
devise a system to sample the number of its
classification decisions, and then project the
total for a given fiscal year. ISOO's approval for
use of a sampling system, however, did not
include the other categories that agencies must
report annually, and DoD's data on
classification authorities, declassification
actions, self-inspections and infractions are
based on actual counts.
The original sampling system developed by
DoD, and in use since ISOO began collecting
program activity statistics, was based entirely
on electronically transmitted message traffic. At
the time, it was believed to be the only feasible
means for DoD to sample its classification
activity. Initially, the sample was derived
exclusively from the Defense Communications
Agency Switch Network Automatic Profile
System. Subsequently, NSA also began
sampling its message traffic because of its
significant involvement in the classification
process. Although ISOO approved the message
traffic system, ISOO and DoD were never
completely satisfied that it was producing the
most accurate statistics, because it was
believed that message traffic skewed certain
statistics about classification, including the raw
numbers. Nevertheless, ISOO recognized that
the consistent application of this system
successfully identified the trends in DoD's
classification activity.
Recently, ISOO and DoD agreed to develop a
revised sampling system that would produce
more reliable data. As a result, in FY 1985, DoD
devised a new method. It requires all DoD
components to sample classification actions
over a one week period. The numbers obtained
are then multiplied by 52. While the figures
reported under the revised system are not based
entirely on an item-by-item tabulation of original
and derivative classification actions, ISOO is
convinced that the results are more accurate
than those registered under the previous
system. First, the sample is not grounded
exclusively on message traffic data. The new
system includes other document types,
including memoranda and reports. Second, the
statistics provided are based on data supplied
from a greater number of DoD components,
including all of the major activities of the
military departments, the DIA and NSA.
For FY 1985, DoD used both systems, and
reported the results separately. Although ISOO
intends to use the data compiled under the new
sampling system in future Reports to the
President, it did not do so with this Report
without first explaining the reasons why the
revised method is likely to produce more
reliable numbers. For this reason, the main body
of the Report reflects the statistics provided by
the electronic message traffic system. Use of
the revised method at this time would not allow
for an accurate analysis of the trends because
there are no prior data available for comparative
purposes.
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A comparison of the data furnished by the
two systems indicates that there are substantial
differences. First, the volume of original
classification using the new method is
considerably higher. Under the previous system,
DoD reported 385,496 original decisions. Under
the new, the figure is 702,208. Of these, 22% of
the original actions were assigned a date or
event for declassificaton, as compared to a
71 % rate under the old method. By
classification level, the number of "Top Secret"
original decisions was 9,327 higher under the
new system, while "Secret" and "Confidential"
actions were 283,547 and 23,838 greater,
respectively.
A second difference is that the amount of
derivative classification activity is markedly less
under the revised sampling system. DoD
reported 18,090,961 derivative decisions using
the message traffic system, and 10,571,652
utilizing the new method, 42% fewer. There are
also significant differences regarding the
classification level percentages, except with
respect to "Top Secret" actions, which
represent 2% of the total under both systems.
Using the revised method, "Secret" actions
account for 38% of the total, while
"Confidential" decisions comprise 60%. Under
the old system, the figures were 21 % and 77%,
respectively.
DoD ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION Exhibit A DoD DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION Exhibit B
Actions Assigned Date or Event for Declassification
Actions Requiring Review by Originator (OADR)
702,208
Old Sampling
System
New Sampling
System
Old Sampling
System
S Classification
C Classification
New Sampling
System
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Due to significantly fewer derivative decisions,
and despite a greater number of original
actions, the combined classification reported
under the new sampling system is 7,202,597
less than under the old method. Overall
classification level percentages also vary
considerably, indicating a tendency to classify a
greater amount of information at the "Secret"
level. Under the new system, 39% of the
combined actions are "Secret," while 59% are
"Confidential." This is in contrast to the
21%/77% ratio when the old method is utilized.
DoD COMBINED CLASSIFICATION Exhibit C
TS Classification
S Classification
C Classification
New Sampling
System
Old Sampling
System
Although ISOO believes that DoD's new system
will provide more accurate statistics, it also
believes that the system should be refined
further. Current instructions require that DoD
components undertake the sampling over a
single one week period. ISOO is concerned that
relying exclusively on such a limited time period
may result in skewed numbers. For example,
during one year the week selected might be
unusually slow in terms of the volume of
classified information generated. Thus, the
numbers reported will be too low. On the other
hand, the week selected the following year
might be crisis-ridden and result in
unrealistically high figures. To avoid this
possibility, ISOO has recommended to DoD and
CIA that each agency conduct the sampling of
its classification activity on more than one
occasion during the year, and then report an
average of the data.
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Appendix B -
Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement
Paragraph 1(a) of National Security Decision Directive 84, "Safeguard-
ing National Security Information," of March 11, 1983, directed ISOO to
issue a standardized nondisclosure agreement to be executed as a
condition of access to classified information. In September 1983, ISOO
issued the Standard Form 189, "Classified Information Nondisclosure
Agreement," and directed agencies to work toward complete implemen-
tation as quickly as possible. The chart below provides an agency by
agency breakdown of progress to date.
Implementation
for New Full
No Employees and/or Agency-wide Implementation
Apparent Planning Reinvestigations Implementation In Some Full
Agency Implementation Implementation Only In Progress Components Implementation
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Appendix C
National Security Information:
Different Perspectives
An audience of 750 from Government, the
media and industry heard six noted authorities
address their own particular ideas about
classified information. The speakers included:
R. Scott Armstrong - Author and former reporter
for The Washington Post. Current Executive
Director, National Security Archive.
Samuel Gammon - Former Ambassador and
current Executive Director of the American
Historical Association.
Guenter Lewy - Author and Professor of Political
Science at the University of Massachusetts.
Mark H. Lynch - Litigator with the American Civil
Liberties Union, National Security Project.
Edward F. Sayle - Former Curator of the Central
Intelligence Agency's Historical Collection and
current editor of Periscope Magazine.
Richard K. Willard - Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, Department of Justice.
The following quotes reflect some of the
divergent opinions expressed by the speakers.
They are intended as highlights, not
comprehensive statements. Arrangements can
be made with ISOO for copies of the complete
transcript or videotape, or selected excerpts of
either.
Scott Armstrong on the source of leaks
The vast majority of the information that makes its
way to the newspaper... comes from multiple
sources, from multiple interviews, from career
bureaucrats. It comes from those people who
themselves would not initiate a story or a leak but
who will, when faced with a significant disclosure
coming out of the room just down the hall from
the Oval Office, will correct the information, will
put it into context, will say, "That's really not quite
right. It really happened this way."
A symposium sponsored by the
Information Security
Oversight Office
December 5 1984
Department of Interior Auditorium
Guenter Lewy on rationalizing unauthorized
disclosures
What honestly may appear to the military as
information that should be withheld for reasons of
security may as honestly appear to the media as
information that the American people have a right
to know.... The fact that both the media and
military act honestly is entirely irrelevant. The
question is, "Who should have [the] final
?"
say...
Samuel Gammon on declassification
Historians are not just working on the decline and
fall of the Roman Empire or the administration of
George Washington .... The woods are full of
scholars who are toiling away on the Nixon and
Ford administration[s] and there are plenty of them
already working on Carter, and I daresay some
getting started on the [Reagan] administration. So,
actually, we want it yesterday, as far as
declassification is concerned.
Richard Willard on overclassification
Overclassification can be just as much a danger to
an effective information security program as can
inadequate classification or inadequate protection.
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Mark Lynch on secrecy and public debate
[T]he Manhattan Project and the decision to drop
the bomb on Hiroshima... [were] so closely held
that the options of not dropping the bomb or
dropping a demonstration bomb were never
seriously considered.
Scott Armstrong on the law
I can say as a matter of practice that I don't steal
and I don't accept stolen property....
The act of dubious legality [is] showing me the
information.
Guenter Lewy on journalistic ethics
[T]here's no justification for the view that a citizen
who... comes into possession of [a] secret and
who knows that it is a secret, should be free
to... harm the nation by passing on the secret as
he pleases. Journalists too are citizens. They
should have the same obligations as anyone else.
Mark Lynch on the scope of Freedom of
Information costs
I'm willing to wager that the propaganda public
relations efforts of the Department of Defense
alone are far greater than the amount of money
spent on Freedom of Information processing. The
Singing Sergeants, the airplanes that do loop-de-
loops at parades and that sort of thing, I'm sure
represent a far greater expenditure of funds than
FOIA requests.
Edward Sayle on secrecy in American history
Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris...
looked at the intelligence and they reached an
agreement which they committed to paper. "We
agree... that it is our indispensable duty to keep
it a secret even from Congress. We find by fatal
experience the Congress consists of too many
members to keep secrets." And they only had 13
colonies.
Richard Willard on preventing a double standard
We need to make it clear that rules on information
security apply throughout the administration from
the very top to the very bottom. We need to make
it clear that people are going to be held to a high
level of trust regardless of their position in the
administration.
Mark Lynch on the perils of compartmentation
[I]f... compartmentation is increased, you may cut
down on leaks, but you're also likely to get an
increase of ill-conceived operations being put into
effect because enough... disinterested people
within the policy making arms of the Government
won't have an opportunity to render a second, third
or fourth opinion.
Samuel Gammon on "intelligence sources and
methods"
It is widely rumored, though as far as I know never
confirmed, that in 1961, the CIA ran a urinalysis on
Khrushchev in Vienna during the summit meeting.
A brilliant piece of intelligence work. Possibly what
one might call an unauthorized leak.
Edward Sayle on secrecy in American history
When ... Tom Paine was determined to have
made an unauthorized disclosure of very sensitive
diplomatic information, he was dismissed from his
job as Secretary to the Foreign Affairs Committee,
and stigmatized publicly by a resolution of the
Congress. Now that's handling a security violation .
... Do you think we have the same will today?
Scott Armstrong on the source of leaks
The President doesn't have to look very far from
his keester to find most of the sources of serious
disclosure in this administration.
Richard Willard on misguided disclosures
[T]here are a lot of people in the administration
who don't know the difference between an
authorized and an unauthorized disclosure. There
are probably a lot of political appointees who may
think that they're helping out the President, and
they really aren't because this President does not
believe that every political appointee has the
authority to declassify information whenever he
thinks it will help with the bureaucratic game.
Samuel Gammon on recovering disclosed
information
To the best of my knowledge, even the State
Department medics, good as they are, are not
competent to perform prefrontal lobotomies on
people [who] have learned things. So once its
gone, it's gone....
Edward Sayle on the effect of leaks
[U]nless steps are taken to stop this escalating
pattern of leaks and to move against those
Government employees who are responsible, be it
either appointees or careerists, I fear that [a]
filtration process may eventually settle in at all
levels of this Government, denying our nation's
leaders the details essential... for policy level
decision making ....
Guenter Lewy on anti-leak legislation
The harm which irresponsible press conduct can
do in revealing national security information in
some cases will indeed be irreparable.... I do not
think it is realistic to rely exclusively on the good
will of reporters and editors.... I favor legislation
that will give national security information the
same protection now available to next year's
soybean crop estimate.
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Appendix D
ISOO Inspections
FY 1983 - 1985
Agency for International Development
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Office of Caribbean Affairs
Bureau for Africa,
Office of East Africa Affairs
Bureau for Asia
Office of Security
Office of the Special Assistant to the
Deputy Administrator
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Office of Administration
Communications Section
General Advisory Commission on Arms Control
Bureau of Multilateral Affairs
Bureau of Strategic Programs
Strategic Affairs Division
Bureau of Nuclear Weapons and Control,
International Nuclear Affairs Division
Board for International Broadcasting
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
Directorate of Administration
Directorate of Science and Technology
Directorate of Operations
Other Major Activities
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Strategic Technology Office
Tactical Technology Office
Defense Science Office
Directed Energy Office
Information Processing Techniques Office
Administrative Services Office
Defense Communications Agency
Headquarters
Joint Data Systems Support Center, Pentagon
Command and Control Systems Organization,
Arlington Hall Station
Defense Communications Engineering Center,
Reston, VA
Joint Data Systems Support Center, Reston, VA
Defense Contract Audit Agency
Security Branch
Defense Industry
American Telephone and Telegraph
Technologies, Inc., Burlington, NC
American Telephone and Telegraph
Technologies, Inc., McLeansville, NC
ITT Electro-Optical Products Division,
Roanoke, VA
Reynolds Metals Company, Richmond, VA
Science Applications International
Corporation, Huntsville, AL
Research Triangle Institute, Research
Triangle Park, NC
CAS Incorporated, Huntsville, AL
Teledyne Brown Engineering, Huntsville, AL
SCI Systems, Inc., Huntsville, AL
BDM International, Inc., Huntsville, AL
Defense Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Security and Counterintelligence
Defense Intelligence College
Directorate for Estimates
Directorate for Scientific and Technical
Intelligence
Directorate for Intelligence and External Affairs
Directorate for Communications
Directorate for Foreign Intelligence
Directorate for JCS Support
Directorate for Research
Directorate of Technical Services and Support
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Defense Investigative Service
Headquarters
Capital Region, Alexandria, VA
Defense Logistics Agency
Headquarters
Defense Technical Information Center
Defense Fuel Supply Center
Defense Mapping Agency
Headquarters, Office of Security
Office of Distribution Services
Hydrographic/Topographic Center
Special Security Office
Defense Nuclear Agency
Intelligence and Security Directorate
Counterintelligence Detachment
Classification Management Division
Security and Operations Division
Radiation Directorate
Shock Physics Directorate
Office of the Inspector General
Office of the Deputy Director for Science
and Technology
Nuclear Assessment Directorate
Technical Information Directorate
Department of Agriculture
Employee Management and Training Staff
(Security)
Foreign Agriculture Service
Office of Management Services
Trade Policy, Planning and Analysis
Division
Western Europe and Inter-American
Division
Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe Division
Communications and Records Cables
Division
Office of Emergency Planning
Department of the Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Systems
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development
and Acquisition
Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources
1947 Headquarters Support Group - Air Staff
Air Force Systems Command, Andrews AFB
Electronics Systems Division,
Hanscom AFB
Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-
Patterson AFB
Foreign Technology Division, Wright-
Patterson AFB
Air Force Logistic Command Headquarters,
Wright-Patterson AFB
Space Command, Denver, CO
North American Aerospace Defense
Command, Denver, CO
Office of Special Investigations, Bolling AFB
Air Force Intelligence Service
Air Force Academy
Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB
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Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Military District of Washington
Criminal Investigation Command
Comptroller of the Army
Logistical Command
Military Traffic Management Command
Office of The Adjutant General
National Guard Bureau
Intelligence and Security Command
Corps of Engineers
Materiel Development and Readiness Command
Missile Intelligence Agency, Huntsville, AL
Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command,
Huntsville, AL
U.S. Army Missile Command, Huntsville, AL
Communications - Electronics Command,
Ft. Monmouth, NJ
U.S. Army Natick Research and Development
Command, Natick, MA
Army Materials and Mechanics Research
Center, Watertown, MA
White Sands Missile Range, Las Cruces, NM
Inspector General
Army Electronics Research and Development
Command
Judge Advocate General
U.S. Army Information Systems Command,
Ft. Huachuca, AZ
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School,
Ft. Huachuca, AZ
Department of Commerce
Headquarters' Office of Security
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration
International Trade Administration
Bureau of the Census
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
Patent and Trademark Office
Department of Education
Office of the Secretary
Office of the Under Secretary
Office of Inspector General
Office of Postsecondary Education
Office of Vocational and Adult Education
Office of Planning, Budget, and Evaluation
Department of Energy
Energy Information Administration
Office of Classification
Office of Computer Services and
Telecommunications Management
Office of General Counsel
Office of International Security Affairs
Office of Management and Administration
Office of Safeguards and Security
Department of Health and Human Services
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health
Office of the Secretary
Food and Drug Administration
National Institutes of Health
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Immediate Office of the Secretary
Assistant for International Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Administration
Inspector General
Department of the Interior
Headquarters' Office of Security
U.S. Geological Survey
Bureau of Mines
Office of the Secretary
Office of the Solicitor
Office of Environmental Project Review
Office of the Assistant Secretary - Water
and Science
Office of Information Resources Management
Assistant Secretary - Land and Minerals
Management
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Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Drug Enforcement Administration
El Paso Intelligence Center
Bureau of Prisons
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
Main Justice
Antitrust Division
Civil Division
Criminal Division
Justice Management Division
Tax Division
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
Office of Information and Privacy
Department of Labor
Office of Emergency Preparedness Planning
(Information Security)
Bureau of International Labor Affairs
Bureau of Labor Management Relations and
Corporate Programs
Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Naval War College, Newport, RI
Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, RI
Naval Underwater Systems Center,
New London, CN
Naval Intelligence Support Center
Naval Research Laboratory
Joint Cruise Missile Project Office
Office of Command Control
U.S. Atlantic Fleet Headquarters, Norfolk, VA
Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, Norfolk, VA
Headquarters Fleet Marine Force Atlantic,
Norfolk, VA
Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, Norfolk, VA
Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific,
San Diego, CA
Space Command and Control Directorate
Navy Ocean Systems Command, San Diego, CA
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA
Department of State
Classification/Declassification Center
Information Systems Office
Information Systems Security Staff
Office of Security
Domestic Operations
Education and Training Staff
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Office of the Executive Director
Office of Economic Analysis
Office of Analysis for Inter-American
Republics
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Japan
United States Mission to the United Nations,
New York, NY
Office of Administrative Affairs
Reference Section
Political Section
Economic and Social Section
Communications Section
Security
Resources Management
Bureau of European Affairs
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Office of Central American Affairs
Office of Caribbean Affairs
Bureau of Politico - Military Affairs
Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy
U.S. Embassy, Ottawa, Canada
Office of the Deputy Chief of Mission
Personnel Section
Political Section
Economic Section
Administrative Counsellor
Department of Transportation
Office of the Secretary
Federal Aviation Administration
United States Coast Guard: Headquarters;
Miami; New Orleans;
El Paso Intelligence Center, El Paso, TX;
National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System, Miami, FL
Maritime Administration
Federal Highway Administration
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Department of the Treasury
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Customs Service
Internal Revenue Service
U.S. Secret Service
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Bureau of Engraving and Printing
Bureau of Public Debt
Bureau of Government Financial Operations
Comptroller of the Currency
Bureau of the Mint
Environmental Protection Agency
Facilities and Support Services Branch
Personnel Security Division
Office of the Associate Administrator for
International Activities
Executive Office of the President, Office of
Administration
Export-Import Bank
Federal Communications Commission
Office of Science and Technology
Office of Plans and Policy
Mass Media Bureau
Emergency Communications Division
Internal Review and Security Division
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Operations Directorate
Office of Security
Document Control Branch
National Preparedness Programs Directorate
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Bureau of Investigations
Office of Policy Planning and International
Affairs
Federal Reserve System
Office of Security
International Information Center
General Services Administration
Office of Internal Security
Federal Property Resources Service
Information Resources Management Service
International Trade Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
Office of Compliance and Consumer Assistance
Staffing and Employee Relations, Personnel
Office
Marine Mammal Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology
Office of Space Science and Applications
Office of Space Flight
Office of Space Tracking and Data Systems
Goddard Space Flight Center
John F. Kennedy Space Center, Kennedy Space
Center, FL
National Archives and Records Administration
Administrative Services Division
Records Declassification Division
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX
Nixon Presidential Materials Project
National Labor Relations Board
National Science Foundation
National Security Agency
National Security Council
National Transportation Safety Board
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of International Programs
Office of the Deputy Executive Director for
Operations
Standardization and Special Projects Branch
Division of Security
Information Security Branch
Facilities Personnel Security Branch
Systems Security Branch
Policy and Operational Support Branch
Division of Technical Information and Document
Control
Records Services Branch
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards
Division of Rules and Records
Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Personnel Management
Personnel Security Division
Compliance and Investigations Group
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Executive Secretariat
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
Net Assessment
Defense Guidance Staff
Emergency Planning
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs
General Counsel
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower,
Installations and Logistics
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Inspector General
Defense Security Assistance Agency
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Atomic Energy
Washington Headquarters Services
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence Oversight)
Program Analysis and Evaluation
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Office of the United States Trade Representative
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Office of the Secretary
Office of the Director, Joint Staff
Office of the Chairman
Manpower and Personnel Directorate
Operations Directorate
Logistics Directorate
Plans and Policy Directorate
Support Services Directorate
Joint Analysis Directorate
Command, Control and Communications
Systems Directorate
Joint Planning Staff for Space
Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency
Joint Special Operations Agency
United States Readiness Command, Tampa, FL
United States Central Command, Tampa, FL
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Peace Corps
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
Securities and Exchange Commission
Selective Service System
Small Business Administration
Physical and Personnel Security Branch
United States Information Agency
Office of Security
Physical Security Division
Office of American Republics Affairs
Office of North African, Near Eastern, and
South Asian Affairs
Office of Public Liaison
Office of Administration and Technology
Classified Library
Bureau of Management
Secretariat Staff
Afghan Media Staff
Office of International Visitors
Office of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Communications Center
United States Postal Service
Office of the Chief Postal Inspector
Inspection Service
Veterans Administration
Assistant Inspector General for Policy,
Planning and Resources
Department of Medicine and Surgery
Office of Data Management
36
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/26: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050013-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/26: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050013-0
Information Security
Oversight Office
Washington, D.C. 20405
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/26: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050013-0