ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CASPAR W. WEINBERGER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 296
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 9, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Report of the Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Weinberger
to the Congress
on the
FY 1986 Budget, FY 1987 Authorization Request
and
FY 1986.90 Defense Programs
February 4, 1985
This Report Reflects the FY 1985 Defense Budget
as of January 30, 1985
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
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TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
We are now completing four years of steady progress toward
fulfilling President Reagan's 1980 mandate to strengthen America's
defenses. With the bipartisan support of the Congress and the
American people, we have begun redressing the neglect of the 1970s
and restoring our nation's strength, confidence, and position of
leadership in the world. The FY 1986 Annual Re ort to the Con ress
highlights our progress and detai s t e c a enges t at rema n.
The defense programs and budget recommended herein are based on
our analysis of the threats facing the United States, our allies,
and our interests worldwide. The military capabilities we seek are
intended to counter these threats, to provide a safer deterrent, and
to ensure peace.
Defense spending is unique, being the only part of the total
U.S. budget determined solely by factors external to our nation.
The continued Soviet military buildup, as well as the growing menace
of international terrorism, regional instabilities, and geopolitical
uncertainties around the world, dictate that our nation maintain its
commitment to rebuild its deterrent capability.
We know that a strong America requires a healthy economy and
financial integrity. To that extent, consistent with our global
responsibilities, we have scaled back budget requests significantly
to help reduce the federal deficit. The fact that we have been able
to make these cutbacks and still deliver our basic defense program
is, in part, due to lower inflation rates achieved under the Presi-
dent's economic program, as well as significant savings achieved
through aggressive management reforms.
For FY 1986, DoD is requesting $313.7 billion in budget authority
and $277.5 billion in outlays, both of which are within the concur-
rent budget resolution established by the Congress in September 1984.
The DoD budget request represents a real increase in budget authority
over the current year of about 5.9 percent, an increase both prudent
and essential to maintaining America's readiness.
The defense program presented here is balanced and responsible.
It will allow further short-term improvements in readiness and sus-
tainability, while continuing our long-range modernization program.
It is the result of a rigorous review that seeks to achieve our
national security objectives at the least cost to the taxpayer. Our
program reflects major management improvements that are providing
us more defense for each budget dollar.
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The FY 1986 defense program seeks not only to maintain the pace
of America's strengthening, but also to secure meaningful arms reduc-
tions. America's resolve to remain strong demonstrates to the
Soviets that they have nothing to gain from their relentless buildup.
If, however, we succumb to budgetary pressures and unilaterally
slacken our efforts, not only will our allies lose confidence in our
leadership, but our adversaries will lose their incentive to negoti-
ate reductions.
This year a crucial test of United States resolve is the Peace-
keeper/MX missile. I urge the Congress to renew its support for the
recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces,
as it has done in the past, by voting to release funds for the
deployment of Peacekeeper. The success of the Peacekeeper program
continues to play a key role in convincing the Soviets to continue
the arms reduction dialogue. We cannot jeopardize our arms discus-
sions with naive talk of unilaterally cancelling our only real near-
term means of redressing the imbalance in strategic forces.
To enhance security over the longer term, our defense program
includes continued research toward an effective defense against bal-
listic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) seeks to
strengthen deterrence and to enhance our ability to negotiate reduc-
tions in offensive weapons. It does so by increasing our adversary's
uncertainty that aggression can succeed, thereby devaluing offensive
weapons and making it easier to envision genuine reductions.
By staying the course, America can have the security and reas-
surance of strong defenses. We will progress toward a time, only a
few years from now, when we can maintain adequate security without
substantial increases in defense spending. If we fail in our resolve
now, we simply postpone and worsen the budget sacrifice, while
prolonging our security inadequacies and undermining crucial negoti-
ations on arms reductions.
In staying the course for a stronger defense during the next few
years, we will fulfill our responsibility to those who follow us.
Many of our investments in research and development, including SDI,
will not pay dividends for a number of years. If we neglect to
invest today in strong defenses for the future, we will be blamed by
future leaders and, indeed, by our own children for denying them the
peace with freedom that we inherited from our forefathers.
If our nation is to remain safe, prosperous, and free to pursue
our other important priorities, we cannot slight our security. For
a nation's security is its government's first responsibility. This
Annual Report describes how we intend to continue fulfilling that
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Table of Contents
PART I Peace with Freedom
A. Introduction: Foreign Policy, National Interests,
and the Strengthening of America ................... 13
U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Strength, 13
Achievements and Challenges, 13
B. Threats to U.S National Interests ..................... 15
The Soviet Threat, 15
Other Threats, 22
C. U.S. National Security Objectives and
Defense Strategy ................................... 25
National Security Objectives, 25
U. S. Defense Strategy, 25
Supporting Policies, 28
Regional Objectives and Strategies, 29
D. Conventional Capabilities Required by
U.S. Strategy ....................................... 33
Readiness, 33
Sustainability, 35
Modernization and Force Structure, 36
Special Operations Forces, 41
Reserve Forces, 41
Mission Allocation and force Integration, 42
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCSJ Special Fund, 43
E. Nuclear Policies and Programs ...................... 45
Deterrence: The Policy and the Challenge, 45
The Emergence of Nuclear Imbalance, 48
Nuclear Modernization, 51
The Strategic Defense Initiative, 54
F. Arms Reductions and Related Diplomatic Priorities ... 59
Nuclear Arms Reductions, 59
Related Diplomatic Priorities, 61
Compliance, 62
G. Facing the Challenges of the 1990s ................... 65
PART 11 Defense Resources
A. The Defense Budget ................................ 69
Introduction, 69
Components of the FY 1986 DoD Budget, 71
Price-Level Assumptions, 75
Budget Trends, 75
Defense Spending and Economic Recovery, 77
Conclusion, 78
B. Management Reforms ............................... 81
/ntroduction: The Challenge of Management
Reform, 81
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Reforming the Defense Acquisition Process, 82
Identifying and Curbing Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 90
Other Management Initiatives, 94
The Grace Commission, 95
Conclusion, 96
C. Readiness and Sustainability ........................ 97
/ntroduction, 97
Readiness, 98
Sustainability, 103
Conclusion, 105
D. Manpower .......................................... 107
/ntroduction, 107
The Manpower Program, 107
E. T_he Industrial Base .................................125
/ntroduction, 125
Current Programs, 125
Conclusion, 130
PART /// Defense Programs
A. Land Forces ....................................... 133
/ntroduction, 133
Force Rationale, 133
Program Goals, 133
Force Composition, 134
Force Disposition, 135
FY 1986-90 Program, 135
Force Structure, 135
Readiness, 137
Sustainability, 138
Modernization, 138
Conclusion, 151
B. Naval Forces .......................................153
/ntroduction, 153
Maritime Missions, 153
Composition of U.S. Maritime Forces, 153
Countering the Soviet Threat, 154
Program Goals for Naval Forces, 155
FY 1986-90 Programs, 157
Power Projection forces, 157
Antiair Warfare (AAWJ Programs, 163
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASWJ Program, 167
Support and Mine Warfare Forces, 173
Conclusion, 175
C. Tactical Air Forces ..................................177
/ntroduction, 177
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Program Goals, 177
Force Structure, 177
FY 1986-90 Programs, 179
Combat Readiness and Sustainability, 179
Force Modernization, 181
Electronic Wan`are (EWJ/Command, Contro%
and Communications Countermeasures
(C3CMJ, 187
Antijam, Secure Voice, Data and Identification
Friend or Foe (IFFJ Systems, 188
Target Acquisition, Surveillance, and Warning, 190
Rapid Deployment Force Program, 191
Conclusion, 191
B. Force Projection ....................................193
lntroduction, 193
Strategy and Missions, 193
Contributions of the Various Force Elements, 194
Segments of a Deployment, 195
Force Projection Goals, 195
Current Force Structure, 196
Assistance from Allies, 196
Improvements Since FY 1981, 197
FY 1986-90 Program, 198
Airlift Programs, 198
Sealift Programs, 200
Prepositioning Programs, 202
Access to Foreign Facilities, 203
Command, Contro% and Communications
(C3J Support, 204
Conclusion, 204
E. Nuclear Forces ......................................205
lntroduction, 205
Composition of U. S. Nuclear Forces, 205
FY 1986-90 Programs for Strategic Forces, 206
Strategic Offensive Forces, 206
Strategic Defensive Forces, 213
Strategic Command, Contro% and Communications
(C3), 216
FY 1986-90 Programs for Nonstrategic
Nuclear Forces, 220
Longer Range lNF Missiles, 220
Short-Range Nuclear Forces, 221
lNF Aircraft, 221
Sea-Based Systems, 221
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C3 Systems, 221
Conclusion, 222
F. Coalition Strategy -Regional Security ...............223
lntroduction, 223
Western Europe/North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATOJ, 223
Southwest Asia and the Middle East, 229
East Asia and the Pacific, 237
Western Hemisphere, 240
Africa, 243
G. Mobilization ........................................245
lntroduction, 245
Interagency Mobilization lnitiatives, 245
DoD Mobilization /nitiatives, 246
Conclusion, 253
H. Installations ........................................255
/ntroduction, 255
Better Working and Living Conditions for Our
People - A Key to Improved Readiness, 255
Host Nation Support (HNSJ, 256
/mproving lnstallation Management, 257
Model lnstallation Program, 257
Environmental Leadership, 258
Homes for the Homeless, 258
Conclusion, 258
I. Special Interest Programs ...........................259
Command, Contro% Communications, and
Intelligence, 259
Research and Development (R&DJ, 263
Test and Evaluation (T&EJ, 269
Security Assistance, 271
International Armaments Cooperation, 275
Space Systems Operations, 277
Conventional lnitiatives, 278
Technology Transfer and Export Contro% 279
Deterrence of Chemical Warfare, 281
Special Operations Forces, 285
Military Health Care, 286
Appendices
A.
Budget Tables ......................................
293
B.
Manpower Tables ...................................
297
C.
Force Tables ........................................
301
D.
Glossary of Acronyms ...............................
307
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Part I
Peace with Freedom
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A. INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN POLICY, NATIONAL
INTERESTS, AND THE STRENGTHENING OF AMERICA
1. U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Strength
For more than four decades, free nations and peoples wishing to
be free have looked to the United States for leadership and support.
Time and again, often at great cost and sacrifice, America has
assisted countries struggling to enhance their security, revive their
economies, provide for the basic human needs of their citizens, and
improve their quality of life. In response to the growing inter-
dependence of nations and the binding nature of American interests
-- historically, culturally, and economically -- with those of many
other states, American foreign policy has become increasingly inter-
nationalist.
America's paramount national interests are peace, freedom, and
prosperity for ourselves and for others around the world. We seek
an international order that encourages self-determination, democratic
institutions, economic development, and human rights. Since the
promulgation of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of the
United Nations, the United States has firmly supported organizations
that work for international cooperation. We remain committed to
the principle that constructive dialogue among nations with differing
political systems can promote understanding and peace. We also are
committed to negotiating genuine arms reductions that would establish
a more stable and secure military balance.
But dialogue and diplomacy alone are not sufficient to ensure
peace in a world in which military force can shatter agreements
and assumptions about the intentions of nations. In an increasingly
complex world, the fulfillment of U.S. national interests and the
successful conduct of diplomacy require military strength, particu-
larly in the face of the numerically superior military forces of our
adversaries. As President Reagan has, said:
We know that strength alone is not enough,
but without it there can be no effective diplomacy
and negotiations; no secure democracy and peace.
Conversely, weakness or hopeful passivity are only
self-defeating. They invite the very aggression and
instability that they would seek to avoid.
In essence, military capabilities protect our national interests
and enable the other elements of our national power to function.
Military strength is not an end in itself; rather, it supports
America's peaceful aims and interests.
2. Achievements and Challenges
Since 1981, this Administration has made substantial progress
toward ensuring that our military capabilities are strong enough to
fulfill their critical purpose. Ongoing programs are building:
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-- Better military units whose highly trained and better
educated men and women are serving their nation with renewed
pride and confidence;
-- More ready conventional forces, better able to sustain
themselves in combat;
-- More modern strategic forces and command and control sys-
tems, able to provide a more stable and credible deterrent;
-- Modern, well-equipped ground and tactical air forces with
the technological edge needed to offset the marked numerical
superiority and increasing technological sophistication of
the Soviet armed forces;
-- Maritime forces more capable of protecting our interests
worldwide; and
-- Strategic mobility forces more capable of supporting our
global requirements.
America at mid-decade is strong and proud, a posture befitting
our leadership role in the world. The leadership of President Reagan
and the bipartisan support of the Congress and the American people
have produced military forces that are, by any reasonable measure,
more capable and more ready than they were four years ago.
The task now is to sustain our progress. Although we have
regained some of the ground lost during a decade of neglect, many
important programs are still several years from completion. To
maintain America's strength and leadership, we must continue to
nurture the broad consensus that has supported our policies and
programs to date, so that we will not falter before we reach
our goals.
The challenge of strengthening America's military forces has
benefitted from the close working relationship between the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense, reinforcing one
of the fundamental principles of American defense organization:
informed policy-making by civilian authorities, with the considered
advice of the senior military leadership. We are hopeful that recent
legislated changes in the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff will contribute to the effective performance of JCS advisory
responsibilities. Additional changes in the Chairman's role should
now await a careful evaluation of the implementation and impact of
the new provisions.
The broad rationale for our defense policies and programs is
set forth in the chapters that follow. Our policies and programs
are geared, as they have to be, to the threats menacing our national
interests (Chapter B). They are guided by national security objec-
tives and a defense strategy by which we pursue those objectives
(Chapter C). To support our defense strategy, we need military
capabilities, both conventional (Chapter D) and nuclear (Chapter
E). Arms reductions and related diplomatic priorities (Chapter F)
also can contribute significantly to our national security.
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B. THREATS TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
In recent years, as the threats to American security have become
more diverse, we have had to cope with situations and crises result-
ing from many factors other than direct Soviet aggression -- the
rescue mission in Grenada being just one example. Still, Rrowing
Soviet military capabilities and expansionist policies continue to
pose the most direct and formidable threat to our national interests.
Until common understanding and arms reductions can reduce the Soviet
military threat, we will continue to emphasize programs essential to
deterring Soviet aggression.
1. The Soviet Threat
An ambitious and sustained Soviet program of military investment,
coupled with restraints on our own defense spending during the 1970s,
enabled the USSR to shift critical components of the overall global
military balance in its favor. For example, by 1981 the Soviets had
achieved an advantage in nearly every measure of strategic arms
capability. While continuing to tilt the conventional and nuclear
balance in Europe further in their favor, the Soviets were also
increasing and modernizing their already considerable air and ground
forces in Northeast Asia. The Soviets were also expanding the geo-
graphic reach of their forces, moving steadily closer to achieving a
global power projection capability. The growth of insurgency and
political instability within many Third World nations, the emergence
of a worldwide Soviet military presence increasingly able to exploit
this instability, and the dependence of the United States and its
allies on Third World resources have all contributed to amore
complex military balance.
a. The Nuc%ar Ba/ante
Soviet efforts to achieve military superiority have been par-
ticularly pronounced in the area of strategic nuclear forces. The
United States, in contrast, has made a conscious and consistent
effort for many years to restrict strategic force deployments.
During the 1970s, the Soviets undertook a massive expansion of their
strategic forces that continues to this day. Through major qualita-
tive and quantitative improvements in offensive as well as defensive
systems, they have significantly altered the strategic balance.
(See Chapter I-E for a discussion of the nature and implications
of the Soviet nuclear buildup to the present day.)
As we look to the future, the Soviet nuclear weapons buildup
continues, with a large number of new strategic offensive systems
at or nearing the deployment stage. The Soviets are:
-- Continuing production of the Backfire and modified Bear H
bombers (the latter of which carries the new AS-15 air-
launched cruise missile), while completing development of
yet a third type of bomber aircraft, the Blackjack, which we
expect to be ready for deployment before the end of the
decade;
-- Completing development of several new intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBMs) -- including the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25
-- which we believe will be deployed both in silos and on
mobile launchers over the next few years; and
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-- Constructing two new classes of ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) -- the Delta IV and Typhoon -- and associated
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), along with a
new sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), the SS-N-21.
Further complicating the offensive strategic force balance are
Soviet developments in the area of shorter range and intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF), which include:
-- Construction of nine additional SS-20 bases, coupled with
the continued production of SS-20 missiles and launch
equipment; and
-- Continued deployment of 203mm artillery and of SS-21, SS-23,
and Scaleboard missiles, the latter in forward locations in
Eastern Europe.
Because the overriding purpose of the United States' nuclear
posture is to deter the use of Soviet weapons, the Soviet Union's
own assessment of the nuclear balance is of great importance. Their
assessment, not ours, will determine whether they are deterred. The
Soviet Union appears to give relatively greater weight to such con-
tributors to nuclear warfighting capabilities as active and passive
defenses, and command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C3I) systems (see Chart I.B.1). When these factors are taken into
account, the momentum of Soviet strategic programs over the last 15
years becomes even more pronounced.
Chart I.B.I
Comprehensive Measures of US-USSR
Strategic Balance a
(1970 to 19r~5J
U.S. Soviet
Advantage Even Advantage
Offensive
Forces (701-- [85]-~
Active
Defenses ;1701 [85]--
Passive
Defenses ~ (70) [85]
D3i 170) ~- [85]
l
? Relative balance for rheas apgrepate measures estimated for yeah 1970 and 1986 Ibracketedl.
Arrows indicate the direction the balance is shifting in that year.
As planned and programmed upgrades are made to our strategic
triad, the adverse trends in strategic offensive forces will be
arrested and a more stable balance restored. We have already made
significant progress over the past four years in strategic C3I.
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At the President's initiative, we are beginning an extensive
research and technology program to explore the promise of active
strategic defenses. For the next decade, however, the Soviets are
likely to retain the lead in active and passive strategic defenses.
A comprehensive discussion of the programs to restore the nuclear
balance is provided in Chapter I.E.
b. The Conventions/ Ba/ante
The Soviets have maintained an overall numerical advantage in
most categories of conventional forces throughout the postwar period.
As Chart I.B.2 shows, since the mid-1970s they have widened their
advantage in nearly every force category by producing major weapons
at rates exceeding those of the United States and our NATO allies
combined. The general quality of Soviet weaponry and equipment
has also improved markedly -- often through the purchase or theft of
Western technology. All in all, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact
allies have built a military force far exceeding that required for
the defense of their territory.
Chart 1. B. 2
Production of Selected Weapons for NATO
and Warsaw Pact Forces
(1975 - 19841
Non-Soviet
Vlkrsaw fact
? Soviet Union
Tactical Combat 6
Interceptor Aircraft
Non-U.S. NATO
United States
Field Artillery, Mortars
and Rocket Launchers
Other Armored
Vehicles
Major Surface
Warships
Attack
Submarines
In the critical Western European theater, most measures of the
NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional force balance continue to indicate a
substantial Pact advantage. In ground combat power alone -- a
measure that includes the number and quality of armor, antiarmor,
and fire support weapons -- the ~]arsaw Pact has widened its advantage
across the Central European theater from about 1.9-to-1 in 1970 to
more than 2.2-to-1 in 1984 (see Chart I.B.3).
Traditionally, NATO has relied on its theater air forces to off-
set the Pact's greater combat potential on the ground, and NATO
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continues to enjoy some significant advantages in this area. NATO's
aircrews and support personnel are better trained and more capable
than their Pact counterparts. Its newest front-line aircraft
(F-15s, F-16s, and Tornados) are superior in avionics, weaponry, and
overall performance to the third-generation models (MiG-23 Flogger
and Su-24 Fencer) now being deployed with Soviet and Pact forces.
However, while expanding the Pact's tactical aircraft inventory, the
Soviets have also been modernizing their air forces. Two new Soviet
all-weather counterair fighters with look-down/shoot-down weapon
systems, the Su-27 Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum, are expected to
become operational in Eastern Europe by the late 1980s. And to take
full advantage of the increased range, weapons loads, and better
maneuverability of these new aircraft, the Soviets have begun to
experiment with new tactics that place a greater emphasis on pilot
initiative and independence.
Other factors have eroded confidence in NATO's ability to con-
tinue offsetting the Warsaw Pact's ground superiority. Warsaw
Pact ground forces and air bases are protected by an increasingly
diverse and sophisticated array of air defense systems to neutralize
NATO air superiority. Warsaw Pact short-range missiles and deep-
battle concepts pose growing threats to the survivability of NATO
operating bases and air defenses in a conventional war. And by
streamlining the command structure for their strategic, tactical
air, and air defense forces, the Soviets have improved significantly
their capability to launch simultaneous large-scale offensives in
widely separated theaters.
Chart 1. B. 3
NATO-Warsaw Pact Aggregate Ground Combat Power
in the "Central Region"e
eNATO Central Region Countries: Belgium IBEI, Canada (CAI, Netherlands (NLI, France IFRI, United Kingdom (UKI, United States IUS1,
and West Germany IGEI. Only French forces stationed in the Federal Republic o/ Germany are included in NATO totals. Warsaw Pact
Central Region Countries: East Germany /EGI, Czechoslovakia ICZI, Poland IPU, and Soviet Union /SUI. Warsaw Pact totals do not
include forces stationed in Hungary.
Complicating such assessments of the conventional balance are
a number of factors that do not readily lend themselves to quanti-
tative comparisons. These include the uncertain reliability of the
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Warsaw Pact's East European forces in the event of a conventional
conflict, the quality of military leadership and troops on both
sides, and differences between the opposing forces' military strat-
egies and warfighting tactics. We believe these and other intangi-
bles, together with the dangers of nuclear escalation, continue to
help preclude any Soviet perception that a Warsaw Pact invasion of
Western Europe would produce a rapid victory.
The conventional balance is also affected by Soviet expansion
and modernization of its forces in the eastern military districts
of the USSR, opposite Japan and the People's Republic of China.
That buildup has not been offset significantly by the countries of
that region.
In Southwest Asia, Soviet forces have been modernized more
slowly, but they still pose a significant threat. The Iranian
revolution deprived the West of a militarily capable regional ally
and, together with the Iran-Iraq war, introduced unstable conditions
bhat might tempt Soviet involvement. Indeed, one need look only
at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to understand the Soviets'
willingness to use force in the region. The West's dependence on
Southwest Asia's enormous oil reserves makes the region an inherently
attractive target for Soviet economic and strategic gain. In
response, the creation of the U.S. Central Command has improved
U.S. capabilities and demonstrated our commitment to the security
of the region. The growth and strengthening of Soviet forces and
the tinderbox character of relationships in the area emphasize
again the overriding importance of the Middle East peace initiative
proposed by the President in 1982. We could help reduce tensions
there, and thereby lessen the attractiveness of the region for the
Soviets and help our allies in the process, if we could secure adop-
tion of the principles enunciated by the President. We should work
ceaselessly for the success of his peace initiative.
c. The G/oba/ Reach of Soviet Power
Twenty years ago, the Soviet Union lacked the ability to project
power to regions far from its borders. That picture has now changed
considerably. Growth in the range and payload of Soviet military
transport aircraft (and of civilian aircraft designed to military
specifications) has Riven the USSR the capability to move its forces
or proxies throughout the world. The Soviets continue to develop
their naval basing facilities worldwide, and they have established
a naval air logistics and operations base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.
They have also expanded their access to bases in Syria, Libya,
Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, and Cuba. And they are now building
a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that we believe will substantially
extend the reach of Soviet tactical aviation.
Soviet power projection capabilities and the geographic expan-
sion of Soviet presence are mutually reinforcing. As illustrated in
Chart I.B.4, these activities have provided the Soviets with bases
and ports near the world's major trade routes and energy resources,
threatening U.S. interests as well as those of our friends and
allies. In a major NATO/Warsaw Pact or global conflict, for example,
Soviet forces currently deployed abroad could, at the onset of hos-
tilities, attack Western naval forces and impede the flow of forces
and supplies from the United States to the theater of conflict.
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Chart 1.8.4
Soviet Global Military Reach
y ~ecr~
~-Mejor Soviet eons cNenb
Swwt/East Eurapeen
mINWy etlVSgt
IMajor concanaetional
Latin America (Including Cuba)
4,700
Sub-Sahara Africa
3,600/4,000
Middle East 8 North Africa
8,000
Asia (Including ~etnaml
2,500
Afghanistan
105,000a
Soviet military assistance to Third World countries remains
Moscow's major instrument for gaining access and influence around
the world. Since 1980, as shown in Chart I.B.S, the Soviet Union
has delivered far more major weapons systems to the Third World than
has the United States, which concentrates instead on economic assis-
tance to promote development in these regions.
F.ven the nature of the two countries' military assistance is
different. While the Soviets emphasize major weapon systems, the
United States provides more spares, follow-up support, and technical
and training services. Our program is designed to stimulate greater
self-reliance, while the Soviets seek to foster military dependency.
The Soviets flood recipient countries with more than 20 times the
number of permanent military technicians the United States assigns
abroad to manage our military assistance program.
The Soviets' ambitious military assistance program, coupled with
their strong military forces, allows them to achieve many of their
political objectives through coercion. Soviet displays of military
might often intimidate nations who lack a strong indigenous defense
capability, particularly if they are not members of a strong defen-
sive alliance.
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Threats to U.S. lnteresrs
Chart 1. B. 5
Comparison of Major U.S, and Soviet Equipment
Delivered to >Nte Thi-+d World a
(1980 - Mid-19841
Total
Near East
and
South Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Latin
America
East Asia
and
Pacific
U. S. USSR
U. S. USSR
U. S. USSR
U. S. USSR
U. S. USSR
Tanks/Self-
Propelled Guns
2,896
4,215
2,426
3,160
20
450
28
400
422
205
Field Artillery
Supersonic
2,559
6,410
808
3,530
123
1,800
505
770
1,051
310
Fighter Aircraft
420
1,810
217
1,230
6
290
18
130
129
160
Helicopters
Surface-to-Air
178
773
3
590
0
130
74
70
101
100
Missiles
a As of June 30, 1984.
4,558
8,665
2,896
6,900
2,559
545
420
870
178
350
d. Soviet Doctrine and Goa/s
Soviet warfighting doctrine has consistently exhibited an offen-
sive orientation. Even in the immediate postwar period, when U.S.
nuclear supremacy made offensive operations by the Soviet army very
risky, the Soviets maintained an offensive doctrine that emphasized
surprise, high-tempo armored attacks, massive firepower, and the
rapid exploitation of breakthroughs. Today, their General Staff's
concept of operations represents a continuation of this long-
standing Soviet preference. The growing emphasis on operational
maneuver groups -- highly mobile formations of up to corps size
designed for the rapid seizure of targets in enemy rear areas --
exemplifies this approach. The development of large special opera-
tions forces and strategic air armies tailored for attacks on high-
priority targets deep in Western Europe and the Far East further
illustrates the offensive orientation of Soviet warfighting doctrine.
New and more capable Soviet ships and weapons, and the manner in
which they are being deployed, indicate clearly that the Soviet
fleet is intended ultimately to extend its area of sea-control and
sea-denial operations farther from the Soviet landmass, severing the
sea-lanes linking the ilnited States with its allies. In short,
the Soviet challenge and threat to our interests is global, and thus,
deterrence requires that we have global capabilities to respond.
While Soviet leaders regard military power as their primary
strength, they view the struggle with the West in a multidimensional
context, combining political, economic, social, ideological, propa-
ganda, and military factors into what they characterize as "the cor-
relation of forces." The Soviets believe that the correlation is
shifting in their favor, and through invasion, subversion, covert
activities, the use of proxies, and the threat of intervention, they
work to exacerbate existing instabilities. They also exercise to the
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fullest their power to try to influence public opinion in the open
societies of the West, while they, with no effective public opinion
in their country, are shielded from any similar activities by the
West. Academic experts analyzing Soviet statements and actions
remain divided as to whether the Soviet leaders are motivated pri-
marily by the ideological desire to spread communism (or just pretend
to be as a means of justifying and legitimizing their own authority);
or wish to extend their own power or that of the Russian state; or
merely have an exaggerated sense of insecurity, so that the accumu-
lation of military hardware and the projection of military presence
to neighboring or distant countries zs intended as insurance against
what they perceive to be external threats. This latter theory is
inherently incredible when we note that their military buildup has
been continuous, regardless of whether or not they faced any condi-
tions they could conceivably call a threat.
Regardless of the underlying motivations for the Soviet military
buildup, postwar history demonstrates a Soviet willingness to take
advantage of any perceived weaknesses in the global politico-military
balance. A prudent American defense policy cannot rest on unproven
and scarcely credible theories of relatively benign Soviet motiva-
tions, but must respond to the facts of Soviet policy and behavior
and to our knowledge of what the Soviets are, and what they have
done: their totalitarian character; their concentration of enormous
resources on military purposes, without regard to their overall
economy or the quality of life of their people; and their secrecy
as a closed society. We must acknowledge the continuing major
differences and the long-term competition between our two systems,
and try to direct that competition toward more stable and peaceful
areas.
2. Other Threats
The United States also has interests abroad that can be threat-
ened by nations or groups much less powerful than the Soviet Union.
Terrorism, local warfare disrupting world resource supplies, and
insurgent groups or neighboring nations seeking to overthrow govern-
ments friendly to the United States all pose challenges to our
security. The proliferation of advanced conventional armaments and
of nuclear weapons, coupled with the increasing threat posed by
chemical and biological weapons, portend even more ominous challenges
in the years ahead. In 1984, the military forces of 20 countries
were involved in conflicts in 11 areas of the world. Most of those
areas contain resources essential to many nations, including the
United States. Each area is gripped by instability that has created
new opportunities for exploitation disadvantageous to the West. The
complexity of the interdependent world system offers no easy solutions.
As Chart I.B.6 shows, terrorism has become an unfortunate
fact of international life. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex
in Beirut in September 1984 was the third major terrorist attack
upon U.S. personnel working in Lebanon. The mining of the Red Sea
is an example of a terrorist threat directed against the shipping
of all nations. The United States will continue to seek a more
active defense against terrorist attacks throughout the world.
We are urging individual nations to provide appropriate safeguards
against terrorism in their security plans. At the same time, we
are consolidating key intelligence assets and seeking the help of
other nations in containing the further spread of terrorism.
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Threats to U.S. /nteresrs
Chart I.B. 6
International Terrorist
Incidents
(1968 - 191841
a 100
E
Z 0
1968 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84"
Calendar Years
Low-level threats to our security generally lend themselves to
responses short of direct intervention by American military forces.
But we cannot exclude the possibility of threats to our citizens or
interests, or to those of our friends, that might require the employ-
ment of our military forces. Grenada -- where there was indirect
Soviet involvement -- is a case in point. In such instances, the
flexibility, mobility, and special training of U.S. forces will be
important in meeting whatever threat may arise, just as we were able
to be highly effective in securing our objectives in Grenada.
But our policy remains, first, to try to alleviate the conditions
leading to conflict by fostering political negotiations, extending
economic aid, encouraging free enterprise that brings about economic
improvement, and providing diplomatic support for human rights and
the continued development of democratic institutions. Second, our
security assistance programs remain vital channels through which we
support other countries' efforts to remain free of external domina-
tion and coercion.
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C. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND
DEFENSE STRATEGY
1. National Security Objectives
America's most basic national security objective is to preserve
the United States as a free nation at peace, with its fundamental
institutions and values intact. From this objective flow supporting
objectives for which a defense strategy and military programs must
be formulated. These are to:
-- Safeguard the United States, its allies, and friends from
aggression and coercion;
-- Protect U.S. economic interests worldwide by maintaining
steady access to energy supplies, other critical resources,
and foreign markets;
-- Maintain close and productive relations with our allies and
friends abroad and work closely with them to build and main-
tain regional stability in areas of shared vital interests;
-- Inhibit the expansion of Soviet control and military pres-
ence throughout the world, while increasing the costs of
supporting or using subversive, terrorist, and other aggres-
sive forces, for the Soviet Union or any other nation or
group espousing such tactics;
-- Support the development and preservation of democratic
political institutions in other nations;
- Limit Soviet military advantages by strengthening U.S. and
allied military capabilities, and by preventing the flow of
militarily significant technologies and resources to the
Soviet Union; and
-- Pursue equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements
to create a stable and secure military balance and deter-
rence at lower levels.
2. U.S. Defense Strategy
U.S. defense strategy can be summarized as follows:
-- To deter aggression and coercion against the United States
and its allies, friends, and vital interests.
-- Should deterrence fail, to seek the earliest termination
of conflict on terms favorable to the United States, our
allies, and our national security objectives, while seeking
to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict.
A fundamental premise of U.S. defense strategy is the reactive
posture of our military forces. The United States does not seek
territorial gains from the use of military power. It will use its
military forces only in response to clear threats to its security and
interests. This places a premium upon seeking means to ameliorate
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the causes of conflict before they lead to armed combat. This policy
has important implications both for our strategy (how U.S. forces are
employed) and for our programs (what capabilities we must build into
our forces).
America's defense effort requires a close relationship between
our military strategy and the force structure we select to carry out
that strategy. Our defense strategy must be anchored firmly in our
national security objectives, and our force structure decisions must
stem directly from this strategy if our forces are to be able to
execute their required missions. Strategy and force structure there-
fore must be planned together, taking into account the requirements
of the strategy, the military capabilities that the defense program
is to provide, military doctrine, and the need for priorities that
ensure our defense assets meet our most important needs.
a. Deterrence
Deterrence is the core of U.S. strategy. It seeks to provide
security by convincing a potential aggressor not to commit aggres-
sion. For deterrence to succeed, possible adversaries must be
persuaded that the risks and cost of aggression will exceed the
gains. The military sources of deterrence are:
-- Effective defenses, to confront an adversary with the like-
lihood that his aggression will not succeed;
-- The threat of escalation, to warn an adversary that his
aggression could start hostilities that might not be con-
fined in the manner he envisions; and
-- The threat of retaliation, to raise the prospect that
aggression will trigger attacks on the aggressor's national
interests and cause his losses to exceed any possible gains.
To be credible, these three military sources of deterrence
require that the United States both have, and be perceived by friends
and foes alike as having, the military capability to execute any of
these responses -- effective defense, escalation, or retaliation
-- and the political will to carry them out.
Of the three military sources of deterrence, the most reassuring
is effective defense. A potential aggressor would have little cause
to doubt that a nation would use its military capabilities to try
to repel an attack. Effective defense is also less likely to cause
escalation than are the other two sources of deterrence, and it pro-
vides the means for protecting ourselves should deterrence fail.
These advantages of defensive forces help explain why the NATO
allies have committed themselves to strengthening their conventional
forces. Likewise, because of the limitations and inappropriateness
of nuclear weaponry, America's commitments outside Western Europe
require strong conventional forces for deterring nonnuclear hostil-
ities. The uniquely valuable contribution of defense capabilities
to keeping the peace is also a fundamental justification for the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) this Administration is pursuing
to try to secure a thoroughly reliable defense against incoming
Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles.
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U.S. National Security Objectives
In sum, American and allied forces, using strategic, theater,
and general purpose weapons, are intended to deter aggression by
demonstrating a credible capability to deny Soviet war aims.
b. Defense
Should deterrence fail, U.S. strategy seeks the earliest termi-
nation of conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its
allies, and its national security objectives. "Favorable" means that
if war is forced upon us, we must win -- we cannot allow aggression
to benefit the aggressor. It does not mean more territory or other
elements of power for the United States. In seeking the earliest
termination of conflict, the United States not only would act to
defeat the aggression but also would try to convince the attacker to
halt his advance because his continued aggression would entail grave
risks to his own interests. Still, because of the enormous military
strength of the USSR, the United States cannot prepare only for a
"short war," which would merely tempt an adversary to believe he
could outlast us in combat.
Although U.S. strategy seeks to limit the scope and intensity of
any conflict by containing it to its original location, we must have
the capability to respond should hostilities erupt in two or more
regions simultaneously. The Soviets are fully capable of launching
aggression in more than one region at the same time, and U.S. strategy
must take account of that fact. In seeking to limit the intensity of
a war, our preference would be to end hostilities by employing forces
that do not create or risk escalation. Should our attempts to limit
the scope or intensity of war fail, however, U.S. strategy provides
for the flexible and sufficient application of force to ensure that
no area of vital interest is lost by default. Such a strategy simply
recognizes that the loss of any vital area would be an encouragement
and a springboard for further aggressive acts against us.
America's strategy for defense stresses a reliance on forward-
deployed forces. U.S. interests and commitments and the threats we
face require that we continue our substantial forward deployments in
and around Western Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia. The
proximity of Soviet forces to our allies and overseas interests
imposes severe demands on the timeliness of response, since territory
once lost would be difficult to regain. The purpose of our forward-
deployed forces are, therefore, to:
-- Defend the United States far more effectively than attempting
to rely on a discredited "fortress America" philosophy or
strategy;
-- Deter aggression in a more convincing and effective way than
-- Increase our ability to respond effectively and quickly in
the event of a war and to bring it to a favorable end;
-- Reassure our allies, assist them in resisting intimidation,
and enable them to sustain their full contributions to our
collective security;
-- Discourage regional instabilities and low-intensity aggres-
sion; and
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-- Provide a more stable international environment for construc-
tive diplomacy.
To fulfill these purposes, forward-deployed forces must be ready,
highly capable, and sustainable in combat. Joint and combined
exercises serve to test, train, and improve our capabilities while
bolstering the deterrent value of our forces. We must be capable
of responding quickly to aggression if we are to defeat an attack or
sustain a defensive line until zeinforcements can be brought to bear
or a decision made to employ other tactics.
Our overseas deployments are backed up by forces based here in
the United States, including the Reserve Components, a significant
portion of which must be rapidly deployable. In the event of a con-
flict, all of these reinforcing units would depend on airlift and
sealift to get them to the combat theater in time to be effective.
For these reasons, we will continue to complement our rapid-deploy-
ment capabilities by expanding our stocks of prepositioned materiel
overseas. Furthermore, we will continue to make every effort to
secure host nation support, overflight, landing and bunkering
rights, and access to essential overseas bases and facilities in
advance of potential crises or contingencies.
Should deterrence fail, and war be launched against us, U.S.
military responses would be governed by existing commitments,
general strategic priorities, the specific circumstances at hand,
and the availability of forces. While neither the United States nor
any one nation has, or can afford to have, all the forces required
for simultaneous, effective defense against major aggression in all
areas where the Soviet Union and its allies might launch attacks,
we and our allies together must have forces that are strong and
flexible enough to respond effectively to the most serious threats
to our worldwide interests. That, indeed, is the hallmark of an
effective defense.
3. Supporting Policies
Several policies guide U.S. military strategy and programs, and
support both deterrence and defense.
8. A//%8NC6S
A strong system of alliances and regional cooperation helps the
United States and its allies and friends preserve peace and freedom.
It enables cooperating nations to share their common security burdens
and achieve a division of labor capitalizing on the relative strengths
of each state. Efficient alliance security requires that national
forces be able to fight together effectively in combined operations.
It also requires a coherent program of security assistance and a
sharing of key technologies and of the task of providing arms to the
alliance so that each alliance partner has the means of increasing
its capabilities for the military role it has been assigned.
Because of our alliances, we all are able to achieve a level
of deterrence and defense that otherwise would be unattainable for
any one of us. Furthermore, cooperation in defense matters can
reinforce political cohesion and improve diplomatic and economic
relationships.
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b. Security Assistance
Security assistance consists of U.S. sales or grants of defense
goods or services to allied and friendly nations. It is an indis-
pensable tool of American foreign policy and an essential element
in strengthening our defense posture around the world. Because of
the magnitude, diversity, and complexity of our global security
interests, the United States cannot, and should not, be expected
to safeguard the free world's interests alone. Therefore, it is
in our national security interest to assist allies and friends in
strengthening their defenses against external aggression and internal
conflict. Our security assistance program is the principal instru-
ment for accomplishing this goal. The program also helps us gain
access to bases and overflight rights, improves our power projection
and forward defense capabilities, and enhances our defense industrial
mobilization base at home.
c. Superior Techno%gy and Qua/ity
The United States continues to rely on its superior military
technology to offset the numerically larger forces threatening its
security interests. We and our allies have never advocated a con-
ventional military buildup that matches the Soviet bloc's numbers
soldier for soldier, tank for tank, or aircraft for aircraft.
Instead, we have depended on superior military technology, and on
better readiness, training, leadership, and better educated people
steeped in freedom with all of the inestimable advantages that
brings, to compensate for quantitative disadvantages. Modern tech-
nology makes our systems more effective and more survivable.
Additionally, a strong technological edge can protect us against
scientific breakthroughs by potential adversaries that could
seriously erode the deterrent and defensive capabilities of our own
forces.
To ensure that America's technological advantage over the Soviet
Union is preserved in the decades ahead, DoD is dedicated to promot-
ing a strong national and Western educational, scientific, and indus-
trial base, while guarding against the inappropriate transfer of
technology to the Soviet bloc. Although the West's technological
lead remains sufficient to enable us to maintain a viable military
balance for the present, the technological balance could shift
markedly toward the Soviets if the flow of Western technology to the
East is not arrested.
4. Regional Objectives and Strategies
The United States cannot itself provide all of the manpower and
weapons necessary to deter aggression worldwide. We must therefore
build on and expand the strength of our alliances, linking together
improvements in the U.S. defense posture with renewed efforts to
stimulate allied contributions and, where required, military assis-
tance.
a. Europe
The strength and resilience of the Atlantic Alliance provides
the foundation for the defense of our interests and commitments in
Western Europe. The Atlantic Alliance enjoys enduring support in
all the states party to it, despite all the propaganda efforts the
Soviets have been able to bring to bear on our free public opinion.
The propaganda attacks the Soviet Union directed against the
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deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe did
not diminish public support for the Alliance at all. The deployments
were begun only after we had attempted to negotiate an arms reduction
agreement with the Soviets that would have rendered such deployments
unnecessary.
Since 1967, NATO's strategy has been one of deterrence based on
a capability for defense at all possible levels of conflict. The
strategy calls for forward defense and for flexibility in response.
The United States and its allies seek an effective mix of conventional
and nuclear capabilities, one that would neither force NATO to early
nuclear use from conventional weakness nor preclude such use should
that be forced on the Alliance.
NATO defense policy and military strategy posit a sharing among
the member nations of both the risks and the burdens of deterrence
and defense. We remain committed to doing our part, and we encour-
age, in the most effective way we can, our allies to do theirs.
b. South America, Gentle/America, and the Caribbean
In this area, the primary U.S. objective is to maintain the
security of the North American continent and the contiguous Carib-
bean Basin, and to help create a security environment conducive to
democracy. The proximity of Central America and the Caribbean, and
our close ties of culture, kinship, and trade, make the security of
this area of paramount importance not only to our own territorial
security but also to U.S. interests in other regions.
The Soviet Union's influence and presence in the region have
been growing with the help of its proxy, Cuba. As Cuba and Nicaragua
continue to acquire offensive weapons, the threat to neighboring
states, and accordingly to U.S. interests, increases. Of consider-
able concern is the growing Soviet military influence in Peru and
increasing Soviet presence in the South Atlantic. The Soviet Union
and Cuba have taken advantage of the underlying poverty in the region,
and of the other social, economic, and political problems there, by
supporting insurgency, terrorism, and destabilization efforts.
Our task is to help our neighbors address their underlying prob-
lems, while countering and ultimately reversing Soviet and Cuban
expansion. U.S. policy supports the growth of democratic institu-
tions, economic development, the achievement of regional solutions
to problems through diplomatic negotiation, and the enhancement of
security assistance so that the democratic and democratically in-
clined nations of this area can help themselves to survive. Without
this U.S.-provided shield, there is little hope of achieving the sta-
bility required for the development of democratic institutions. The
strengthening of democracy is essential if these nations are to
improve the protection of human rights and to attract the investment
needed to relieve the endemic poverty there.
c. Midd/e East and Southwest Asia
Since the late 1940s, major objectives for U.S. policy in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia (SWA) have remained virtually
unchanged: to deter Soviet aggression and prevent Soviet gains in
the region; to protect the security of Israel and the territorial
integrity of the other regional states; to ensure unimpeded access
to oil and other valuable raw materials; and to find a lasting solu-
tion to the Arab-Israeli problem. The President's Middle East
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peace initiative of 1982 offers the best hope of achieving this, and
we should pursue it with vigor.
In the past year, we have faced serious challenges to all our
objectives with the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the
escalation in the war between Iran and Iraq, and the Soviets' strong
support for Libya and Syria, which in turn have engaged in aggression
against neighboring states.
By maintaining a strong deterrent posture and the ability to
respond quickly to regional requests for assistance, we have pre-
vented the Soviets and others from exploiting these opportunities,
thereby improving regional confidence in U.S. military power and our
reliability as a security partner. We also have achieved allied
cooperation in contributing to the protection of our shared vital
interests in the area. The recent multinational effort to clear the
Red Sea of mines and the provision of U.S. and French assistance in
response to the Libyan invasion of Chad are examples of such coopera-
tion. In these efforts, more emphasis is being placed on improving
the military capability of friendly states in the region so that they
can defend themselves in local conflicts, without need of intervention
by U.S. forces, and so that they can assist in any broader regional
contingencies. Finally, we are giving greater attention to the grow-
ing threat of terrorism in the region. We are taking steps to ensure
that such threats are detected early, that attacks are deterred, and
that U.S. facilities and personnel are adequately protected.
d. East Asia and the Pacific
America is a Pacific power with vital security and economic
interests in East Asia and the Pacific region. Four states border
the Pacific; a fifth, Hawaii, lies in the center of this vast region;
the U.S. territories of Guam and American Samoa occupy strategic
positions in the western and southern Pacific; and more than 2,000
other Pacific islands are under U.S. administration. More than 30
percent of U.S. trade is conducted with the nations of East Asia,
and five of our eight mutual security treaties link us with East
Asian countries.
Our objectives in the region include the defense of U.S. terri-
tory and the lines of communications that connect us to our Pacific
allies and friends, and the fulfillment of our treaty commitments to
assist our allies. We are encouraged by the progress of our North-
east Asian allies in taking on more of the responsibility for defend-
ing themselves and thereby contributing to the defense of the region.
We continue to urge Japan to develop within this decade the capa-
bilities required to carry out fully its self-defense missions,
including defending its sea-lanes out to a distance of 1,000 miles.
We also continue to encourage and assist the Republic of Korea's
efforts to improve its self-defense capabilities against the North
Korean threat, while U.S. forces help to maintain peace and stability
on the peninsula.
Elsewhere in Asia, we continue our efforts to develop an endur-
ing relationship with the People's Republic of China. We support
Thailand's efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities against
the Vietnamese threat, and we also support the Philippines' inten-
tions to improve its capabilities to combat an increasingly violent
insurgency and to mass its political and economic strengths. Our
bases there are vital to the maintenance of Philippine sovereignty,
and to our military and strategic imperatives.
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In the Pacific, we have secured long-term denial and basing
rights in Micronesia and the Marianas, whose transition to a new
and closer political relationship with the United States awaits
congressional approNal. We look to our ANZUS security partners to
continue their contributions to the security of the South Pacific,
Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean, and to cooperate with us to
maintain the strength of the Western Alliance.
e. AfiiCa
In Africa, our principal objectives are to support the independ-
ence and stability of friendly governments, recognizing that one of
the key elements of stability is a happy, free people fully able to
participate in their government; to preserve free access to mineral
resources essential for meeting defense and industrial needs of the
Western nations; and to deny the Soviet Union and its allies oppor-
tunities to make further inroads in the region.
Since important lines of communications run across or near
Africa, our ability to deploy forces to nearby theaters, such
as Southwest Asia, depends on gaining and maintaining access and
transit rights in Africa. To challenge the forces creating insta-
bility in the continent, we seek -- through a combination of our own
efforts and greater cooperation from both our European allies and
other powers -- to provide timely and appropriate security assis-
tance. That assistance is increasingly focused on measures (e.g.,
logistics, facilities, and management improvements) that will enable
African military establishments to provide for themselves more effec-
tively, and on activities that will contribute to nation-building.
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D. CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES REQUIRED BY U.S.
STRATEGY
Strong conventional forces are essential to deterrence and
defense. In the past four years, we have made great strides in
rebuilding our conventional capabilities. As a result, we can be
much more confident today of our ability to counter, and therefore
deter, threats to our interests around the world. Yet, during the
past year, there have been inaccurate and oftentimes confusing claims
of a reduction in the readiness of U.S. forces. Some of these claims
have been based on highly technical methodologies that measure unit
readiness in terms of narrowly defined criteria (some readiness
ratings declined when we made the criteria more stringent to reflect
the new capabilities needed to meet a growing threat); others draw
on reports using outdated and incomplete data. The belief that
our forces are less ready today than they were four years ago is
dangerous and untrue. Indeed, our commanders in the field have
emphatically declared that their troops are by any measure far more
ready today.
One source of public misunderstanding has been a misinter-
pretation of readiness and its relationship to combat capability.
Although often incorrectly used as a synonym for warfighting capa-
bility, readiness -- the people, training, equipment, and maintenance
needed to-Teep our forces prepared to deploy and fight -- is only one
of four components that, when integrated and maintained in balance,
form the pillars of our total combat capability. The other three
components are sustainabilit -- the inventories of munitions, spare
parts, fuel, an of er items that give our forces "staying power" for
prolonged combat; modernization -- the equipping of our forces with
more capable, technica y superior weaponry and facilities; and force
structure -- the number and composition of air wings, battalions,, and
ss ii~the Armed Forces.
Our objective is to improve the combat capability of our forces
through steady and balanced progress in each of these four pillars.
Furthermore, we are working hard to enhance our ability to conduct
combined operations with allied forces, while striving to achieve
greater interservice cooperation in the development and procurement
of equipment, as well as in joint combat roles and missions.
1. Readiness
Our military forces must be able to reach their full combat
potential under the most demanding conditions. Should deterrence
fail, warning time could be so short that peacetime readiness might
become the key determinant of success. For this reason, one of our
top priorities has been to build and maintain a combat-ready force
-- one that is adequately manned and trained, supplied with modern
equipment in good working order, and supported by excellent facili-
ties.
Over the past four years, the quality of our young men and women
in uniform has improved markedly. Each of the Services continues
to meet its enlistment goals with an increased percentage of better-
educated recruits. As Chart I.D.1 shows, more than 93 percent of
our recruits in FY 1984 were high school graduates, compared with
less than 70 percent in FY 1980. We are also retaining more of our
quality people. The overall reenlistment rate has increased from 55
percent in FY 1980 to 68 percent in FY 1984, while first-term reen-
listments have jumped by 31 percent, as reflected in Chart I.D.2.
Moreover, these important gains have occurred in a revitalized economy.
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This increase in both the educational level and experience of our
forces has produced better leadership, fewer disciplinary problems,
better equipment maintenance, and more effective training (see
Chapter II.D). Collectively, these factors indicate improved readi-
ness.
Chart /. D.1
Recruits with High Schoo/ Dip/omas
(Percentage)
- Army ~ Navy ~' USMC USAF O DoD
Chart /. D.2
First Teim Reen/isbnents
(Percentage of E/igib/eJ
- Army Q Navy a' USMC USAF O DoD
To complement these improvements in our forces, we are providing
our people with additional opportunities for more realistic training.
Our aircrews depend on this training to overcome the Warsaw Pact's
advantage in numbers of aircraft. Air Force tactical aircrews now
get 20 hours of flying time per month (up from 16 hours in FY 1980
and a low of 13 hours in FY 1978), and Navy aircrews get almost
24 hours, more than double that of their Warsaw Pact counterparts.
Our Navy ships are steaming an average of almost 35 days each quarter,
up from 32 days in FY 1980. And the Army has increased its battalion
rotations through the National Training Center at Fort Irwin from 16
in FY 1982 to 24 this year, giving 50 percent more soldiers highly
realistic training. In short, training improvements are helping to
keep our forces more ready and capable.
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Despite the increased use of modern equipment for training, we
have been able to improve the immediate operational availability of
our equipment through increased funding for repair parts and main-
tenance. Since FY 1981, we have raised funding for the daily opera-
tion and maintenance of our forces by almost 25 percent in constant
dollars. At the same time, improvements in spare parts availability
have increased by more than 75 percent the number of tactical combat
sorties that could be flown in Europe. The number of Navy ships
rated "fully" or "substantially" ready has climbed by more than 25
percent since January 1981, while Army and Marine Corps equipment
availability rates have continued to increase.
Thus, we have significantly improved our ability to bring forces
to bear in the critical early phases of a conflict. Readiness, how-
ever, is not a one-time investment. Continued growth in the readi-
ness accounts will be required in order to keep readiness levels
high as the force structure increases and our weaponry is modernized.
Since our military strategy is fundamentally a defensive one, it
is essential that we maintain our forces' readiness at or above that
of any potential aggressor.
2. sustainability
We recognize that our forces, even 'with improved readiness, might
become a "hollow" deterrent if we were unable to sustain them in
combat. We must therefore ensure that they have adequate logistical
support -- munitions, fuel, repair parts, and in some instances,
replacement equipment -- to maintain their combat strength over time.
We have made considerable progress in improving the sustainability
component of our military capability. These gains have been achieved
despite the fact that building stockpiles of war reserve materiel is
a slow, expensive endeavor, and that our job was made all the more
difficult by the extremely austere baseline we inherited from the
FY 1980 budget. The munitions procured during the past three years
will, when delivered, result in a steady growth of war reserve stocks
by 14 percent for the Army, 58 percent for the Navy, 62 percent for
the Air Force, and 24 percent for the Marine Corps. Overall, aggre-
gate funding for the sustainability accounts will have doubled in
real terms between FY 1981 and FY 1986. Additionally, through the
Industrial Preparedness Planning Program, we have increased signifi-
cantly the level of effort devoted to improving the surge and mobi-
lization responsiveness of the industrial base.
In spite of this progress, sustainability is a continuing con-
cern, given the steady improvements in the warfighting capability of
our potential adversaries. In Europe, for example, the combat sus-
tainability of NATO's forces remains inferior to that of the Warsaw
Pact. It is therefore imperative that we continue, along with our
allies, to emphasize increases in sustainability that not only would
bolster the deterrent value of our conventional forces but, if deter-
rence fails, would allow them to survive.
If we continue to build upon the gains made during the past
four years, by the end of the decade we will achieve a much safer
level of conventional weapons sustainability. The increased surge
and industrial mobilization expansion capacity will further enhance
the sustaining power of our forces.
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3. Modernization and Force Structure
Through a balanced approach, we are improving the combat capa-
bility of our forces not only by improving combat readiness and sus-
tainability, but also by modernizing our forces to maintain their
qualitative edge, and by developing a force structure that can meet
potential threats. Our overall objective is to make our conventional
forces more responsive and flexible by improving their striking power
and mobility.
The FY 1986-1990 defense program continues our commitment to
provide capable systems that will enable our forces to counter a
numerically superior and qualitatively improving opponent. The
expansion to a 600-ship Navy and the creation of two new Army light
infantry divisions, a renewed emphasis on Special Operations Forces
(SOF), a gradual expansion of our tactical air forces, and substan-
tially increased investments in airlift and sealift capabilities
are among the force structure goals that we are well on the way to
achieving. We will continue to seek ways to counter Soviet capa-
bilities through flexible and innovative tactics, operational exper-
tise, and improved weapons technology. We will continue to emphasize
force responsiveness and adaptability, improved. surveillance and com-
munications capabilities, and increased range, speed, and flexibility
-- all needed to meet the rapidly changing conditions of the modern
battlefield.
a. Land Forces
The Army, hit especially hard by a decade of limited moderniza-
tion, is well on the road to rebuilding its capability to respond to
aggression over a broad spectrum of conflict, from counterterrorist
operations to full-scale armored and mechanized warfare.
NATO's ground forces in Central Europe face a Warsaw Pact army
of some 90 divisions, including about 60 Soviet divisions stationed
in Eastern Europe or in the western military districts of the Soviet
Union and more than 30 non-Soviet Pact divisions based in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Most of these 90-plus divisions
are either motorized rifle or armored divisions, deploying about
28,000 tanks and 18,000 artillery pieces and heavy mortars. About
two-thirds of the divisions are equipped for rapid, mobile warfare
and are deployed in forward areas, where they are maintained in a
high state of readiness. Each year, these forces continue to improve
in overall quality and sustainability.
To meet the threat in Europe, we are working to improve the
antiarmor capabilities and tactical mobility of our forces, as well
as to provide them with better command, control, and communications
(C3) support. The M1 Abrams tank, the M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
(BFV) equipped with TOW antiarmor missiles, and the AH-64 Apache
attack helicopter carrying Hellfire antiarmor missiles will provide
potent additions to NATO's antiarmor defenses. For example, the M1
demonstrated in recent NATO exercises that it can shoot accurately
on the move, at speeds of up to 45 miles per hour, in day or night.
We have stepped up the pace of our ground force modernization pro-
grams, adding more M1s, BFVs, and AH-64s to the procurement levels
planned by the previous administration.
Obviously, not all conflicts in which our land forces might become
involved would require armored units. Indeed, for many contingencies,
armored units might be inappropriate. The Army is forming two new,
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10,000-man light infantry divisions -- one to be based in Alaska and
the other at Fort Drum, New York. It also plans to convert two
existing infantry divisions to a light configuration, and to acti-
vate a light infantry division in the Reserve Component. Deployable
worldwide up to three times faster than standard infantry divisions,
the new light infantry divisions will add a new dimension of stra-
tegic mobility to our forces, increasing U.S. fast-reaction capa-
bility worldwide. The divisions will be trained and equipped for a
wide range of missions, particularly in areas appropriate for close-
in fighting, thus demonstrating the United States' resolve to prevent
armed hostilities, whether of low-intensity or on a major scale.
Effective use of tactical mobility can help counter a numeri-
cally superior opposing force by permitting personnel and materiel to
be concentrated at places where they can best exploit enemy vulnera-
bilities. Anew generation of highly mobile helicopters and support
vehicles is allowing us to make better use of this tactic. For
example, the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, which proved its worth in
Grenada last year, is a larger, more agile and reliable aircraft than
the UH-1 it replaces.
Also supporting our ground forces are highly capable new weapons
such as the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). In less than a
minute, a single launcher can fire 12 rockets beyond cannon range,
covering an area the size of six football fields with approximately
7,700 grenade-like submunitions effective against both personnel and
lightly armored targets. The MLRS, incidentally, is an excellent
example of U.S.-NATO cooperation in arms development.
Complementing these improvemens in combat systems are upgrades
to the command and control systems that would support our forces in
battle. In the mid- to late 1980s, our commanders will receive light-
weight, jam-resistant C3 equipment that will assist them in managing
their forces on a high-technology battlefield.
b. Maritime Forces
We need strong maritime forces to support our forward defense
strategy, to fulfill the responsibilities associated with our network
of overseas alliances, and to protect the vital sea-lanes linking us
to Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. We rely heavily on
maritime forces to respond to a wide variety of crises, a role to
which their global reach, rapid responsiveness, and integrated combat
power are particularly well suited.
The Soviets have greatly expanded and modernized their naval
capabilities over the past two decades. They now have a genuine
"blue water" navy, capable of projecting power worldwide and oriented
toward undermining U.S. maritime defense capabilities. In response,
and in support of our global maritime responsibilities, we are enlarg-
ing our Navy to 600 ships -- a goal that will be achieved in FY 1989.
By the following year, the deployable force will include 15 aircraft
carriers, 66 amphibious assault ships, and 4 reactivated battleships
fitted with cruise missiles. Modern aircraft carrier battle groups
enable our naval forces to respond rapidly to crises anywhere in the
world and to conduct sustained operations in areas where we do not
have airfields or other major land bases.
To revitalize our amphibious assault capabilities, we are build-
ing new high-speed, air-cushioned landing craft and two new classes
of amphibious ships. By the middle of the next decade, we will have
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expanded our amphibious lift capacity by one-third, allowing assaults
to be launched from points over the horizon, thereby reducing vulner-
ability and increasing the likelihood of surprise. Ship-to-shore
mobility will be enhanced by the powerful CH-53E helicopter, now join-
ing the force in large numbers, and the new JVX tilt-rotor aircraft
under development. Once ashore, our Marines will be provided greater
mobility and firepower by the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), three
battalions of which will have been deployed by the end of FY 1986.
The Soviet submarine fleet, long the world's largest, has
recently undergone significant improvements in lethality and detec-
tion avoidance. For example, the Oscar-class nuclear-powered cruise
missile submarine, introduced in 1981, is about twice as large as
our Los Angeles-class submarines, carries 24 long-range SS-N-19 anti-
ship missiles, and incorporates important qualitative advances in
sound quieting and self-protection. New Mike- and Sierra-class sub-
marines boast similar improvements. And the Soviets continue to
build submarines at a rapid rate, launching a total of seven over the
last year alone.
We are working hard to improve. our ability to locate and combat
enemy submarines. One example is a new attack submarine that we plan
to begin producing near the end of this decade. A key design objec-
tive is to build a quieter boat with better sensors that will enable
it to hunt down and engage enemy forces without itself being detected.
At the same time, we are continuing to construct improved versions
of the Los Angeles-class attack submarine as replacements for older
boats approaching obsolescence; 29 of the 48 Los Angeles-class boats
authorized to date are now operational. In addition, LAMPS heli-
copters, new towed-array sonar systems, and lightweight torpedoes are
upgrading the antisubmarine capabilities of our naval surface and air
forces.
The growing threat to our fleet from the air is no less worrisome
than the submarine threat. The addition of 30 new Backfire bombers
to the Soviet inventory each year raises the threat of antiship mis-
sile attacks over large sectors of the world's oceans. The Soviets
are producing several types of antiship missiles, capable of being
launched from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. These
missiles travel to their targets at high speeds, and follow elusive
flight profiles. Our defenses against them will be improved by the
wide-area surveillance systems now under development and by strength-
ened area air defense systems. Central to those efforts is the
development of tactical over-the-horizon radars that will be able
to detect enemy aircraft hundreds of miles away, thus enabling our
land- and carrier-based interceptors to mount a more effective
defense of our ships at sea. Likewise, the deployment of new CG-47
cruisers and DDG-51 destroyers, both of which incorporate the Aegis
air defense system, will improve our ability to intercept high-speed
cruise missiles and aircraft at extended ranges. Ultimately, we plan
to build a total of 27 Aegis cruisers and 29 DDG-51 destroyers.
c. Tactics/ Air Forces
Well-trained and properly equipped tactical air forces can
quickly destroy targets on land and at sea, as well as provide an
air defense umbrella in support of ground and naval forces worldwide.
Our forces have long been considered superior to the Soviets in air
combat capabilities, but that advantage has been diminishing in the
face of an aggressive modernization of the Soviet air forces. The
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Soviet Union now has more than 5,000 tactical aircraft in its inven-
tory and is continuing to produce aircraft at rates higher than our
own. New generations of Soviet fighters, attack aircraft, and
bombers, complemented by an early warning aircraft similar to our
AWACS, now challenge our air superiority.
To retain our qualitative edge in this area, we must continue
to improve our tactical aircraft inventory. To that end, we are
acquiring systems that will allow for rapid, multiple engagements
beyond visual range, while being highly maneuverable and lethal at
close-in ranges.
The Navy is modernizing its carrier-based force of combat air-
craft. The F-14, our primary fleet air-defense fighter, and the
long-range Phoenix missiles it carries are being upgraded to improve
their ability to cope with the more sophisticated electronic counter-
measures employed by new Soviet bombers and air-to-surface missiles.
By the end of the decade, all of the Navy's fighter and medium-attack
squadrons will be equipped with F-14s and A-6Es, and the F/A-18 will
have replaced almost 80 percent of the A-7E light-attack inventory.
The Air Force is continuing to modernize its F-15 and F-16
forces. Since 1980, it has more than doubled its inventory of F-15s
and F-16s, bringing the combined total to nearly 1,400 aircraft.
These planes, flown by Israeli pilots in Middle Eastern operations,
have repeatedly proved their superb combat capabilities against both
air and ground targets. New, more durable, and easier-to-maintain
engines, scheduled for installation on the aircraft in the early
1990s, will further enhance their combat effectiveness.
Aerial combat in the Middle East and in the South Atlantic also
demonstrated the lethality of U.S. air-to-air missiles. Armed with
new systems such as the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM), our fighters will be more effective in aerial combat, and
our F-16s will, for the first time, be able to engage enemy forces
well beyond visual range.
The Air Force is also upgrading its inventory of ground-attack
systems. Currently in development are a new airborne targeting
system, the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System
for Night (LANTIRN), and new infrared air-to-surface missiles that
will allow F-15Es, F-16s, and A-10s to strike enemy targets whenever
they present themselves. Finally, some squadrons of B-52G aircraft
have been assigned general purpose missions, such as minelaying,
antiship attack, and conventional bombing, supplementing their stra-
tegic duties.
Overall, our inventory of tactical aircraft has grown by the
equivalent of two wings over the past four years. Over the next five
years, we plan to buy 1,284 fighter and attack aircraft for the Air
Force and 954 for the Navy and the Marine Corps. This will allow us
to reach our goal of 14 carrier air wings by FY 1987, and of 40 Air
Force tactical fighter wings by FY 1991.
d. Projection Forces
Our forward-defense strategy dictates that we be able to conduct
concurrent deployments to widely separated areas of the globe. Our
present goal is to achieve the capability to deploy forces to a
remote theater such as Southwest Asia, while maintaining an accept-
able capability to reinforce NATO and key areas of Northeast Asia.
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Further, we must be capable of sustaining our forces once deployed
and of redeploying them in response to changing regional priorities
or conditions. Forces able to meet these combined objectives should
be adequate for virtually any contingencies we might face.
The ability to respond promptly on warning of an attack requires
a heavy reliance on airlift and prepositioning. Although the com-
bat units deployed by air would constitute only a small fraction of
the total force required for a conflict in an area such as Southwest
Asia, they would be essential to preempt the enemy from seizing
critical facilities. The units' early arrival in the theater could
be necessary to slow the advance of an enemy force and to protect
the ports and other facilities that would serve our main forces,
which would deploy by sea. In Europe, U.S. forces deployed entirely
by air and equipped with prepositioned materiel would rapidly boost
NATO's tactical air power, while contributing most of the ground
force reserves needed to stave off a Warsaw Pact breakthrough. We
plan to incorporate allied lift assets into our reinforcement
efforts to the extent possible. Our NATO and Northeast Asian allies
have earmarked a substantial number of ships for the transport of
reinforcements to their regions, but because their airlift capabili-
ties are relatively limited, we would have to provide the bulk of
the airlift capacity needed for a multitheater deployment.
In four years, we have increased our intertheater mobility
capabilities by about 35 percent. Between 1982 and the end of the
decade, we will have added 50 C-5B cargo aircraft and 44 KC-10
tankers to the airlift fleet, and modified 19 commercial aircraft to
carry military cargo in an emergency. The procurement of new C-17
cargo aircraft and of new equipment for unloading ships in austere
ports is especially important to our NATO and Southwest Asian goals.
Chart /.0.3
Progress Tower/
MoW//ty Gaa/s
isso isso
Airlih
Fisca/ Year
~seo isso
Sealift
iseo isso
Propositioning
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Modifications will be completed in FY 1986 on seven of eight fast
sealift support ships, providing an early sealift surge capacity not
previously available, and we will have loaded eight maritime preposi-
tioning ships with equipment and supplies for a brigade-size Marine
Corps force. Overall, by the end of the decade, we will have in-
creased airlift capacity by 80 percent, sealift capacity by 110 per-
cent, and the amount of materiel prepositioned in key locations by
150 percent (see Chart I.D.3). These improvements will allow us to
conduct major concurrent deployments to the most critical theaters
if required.
4. Special Operations Forces
The United States must also be prepared to deter and, if neces-
sary, respond to low-intensity conflict -- including terrorism and
guerrilla insurgencies -- when our national interests are threatened.
Since low-level conflict will likely remain the most immediate threat
to free world security for the rest of this century, specially trained
forces have been established for such operations. To help others
defend themselves, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are heavily engaged
in security assistance efforts. In the last ten years, these forces
have dispatched some 500 U.S. mobile training teams (MTTs) to almost
60 countries worldwide. Such efforts, while low-key and generally
low-cost, provide very large payoffs, strengthening Third World
countries and demonstrating our commitment to peace and stability.
Special operations forces provide us the ability to respond to
a range of crises in a flexible manner. They contribute to our
ability to deter and defeat major conventional attacks through their
capability to disrupt an enemy's rear echelons, and to engage in
unconventional warfare, psychological operations, counterterrorism,
and intelligence missions.
When this Administration took office in 1981, we committed our-
selves to rebuilding a capability that had been nearly lost during
the 1970s. We undertook a revitalization of our Special Operations
Forces, activating a new Army Special Forces Group and a new Navy
SEAL team, as well as strengthening undermanned units. More units,
including another Special Forces Group and an additional SEAL team,
are planned for the coming years, as are new MC-130 Combat Talon
aircraft and naval special warfare craft. SOF missions are being
realigned to enhance the forces' effectiveness and cohesion. Out-
dated equipment is being replaced, and better training and logis-
tical support are being provided to the forces. The completion of
this multiyear effort will require continued congressional support.
5. Reserve Forces
Under the Total Force Policy,. the Reserve Components have assumed
an increasingly important role in our conventional defense strategy.
The creation last year of the position of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs recognizes the critical role that Reserve
Component forces would play in any conventional conflict.
During the past four years, we have upgraded significantly the
combat capabilities of the Reserve Components of all four Services.
We have, for example, improved the equipment, training, and manning
of Army and Marine Corps reserve units. Following the "first to
fight, first to be equipped" policy, early deploying Army National
Guard and reserve units are receiving modern weapons systems before
later-deploying active duty units. In FY 1985, these units are
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scheduled to receive more than 10,000 new items of equipment costing
about $1.4 billion -- including 180 M1 tanks, 64 BFVs, and 8,000
modern support vehicles. New Marine Corps equipment includes KC-130T
tanker aircraft and M198 howitzers. Guard and reserve units are also
benefitting from the more rigorous training afforded by increased
participation in realistic field exercises.
Under the Total Force Policy, the Naval Reserve is continuing
its most ambitious expansion since World War II. The Navy's reserve
structure is being simultaneously enlarged and modernized, to meet
the needs of a 600-ship fleet and to strengthen the contribution of
reserve forces across the entire spectrum of warfare. Overall, the
end strength of drilling reserve units will have grown by 30 percent
by FY 1989, and their equipment inventories will have been substan-
tially upgraded. Naval Reserve pilots are now flying the F-14 and
the F-4S, and are training in the F/A-18. By the end of FY 1985, we
will have transferred 11 modern FF-1052 and FFG-7 frigates to the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF), leading to a total of 26 reserve frigates
by the end of the decade. Based aboard these ships will be the SH-2F
antisubmarine helicopters of the three reserve squadrons now being
formed. We will depend on the NRF to man almost all of our new MCM-1
and MSH-1 mine countermeasures ships, now under construction. In
addition, we are modernizing our 13 reserve squadrons of P-3 maritime
patrol aircraft. By FY 1989, we will have completed upgrades to the
AN/AQA-7 acoustic processor systems aboard the older P-3 "A" and "B"
models now operated by the reserves. As a preliminary step in the
eventual transition of the reserves to the modern P-3C aircraft, we
have established our first Master Augmentation Unit with two P-3C
aircraft. Two more such units are planned in FY 1987-88.
The combat capability of our reserve fighter forces (Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve) has also continued to improve. We have
transferred highly capable F-16 aircraft to reserve unite, and are
replacing early model F-4C/Ds with the more capable "E" version of
the aircraft. And in FY 1986, we will introduce F-15 air superiority
fighters into the reserve inventory.
In addition to deploying more modern systems with our reserve
forces, we are upgrading the combat capabilities of the aircraft.
Enhancements include the equipping of fighters with advanced AIM-9L
air-to-air missiles and with low-smoke engines and improved radar-
warning receivers. The forces are receiving modern air-to-air and
air-to-ground munitions, along with the advanced training needed to
employ these weapons effectively.
Reserve forces also are being modernized through the transfer
of long-range C-141 and C-5 transport aircraft to the Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard. These transfers expand upon the
successful Associate Reserve Program, under which active and reserve
units are collocated. Modernization of shorter range airlift forces
continues as new C-130 aircraft are brought into the air reserve
inventory. This force expansion is in keeping with the objective of
transferring to the reserves those missions that are cost-effective
and do not decrease the combat capability of the Total Force.
6. Mission Allocation and Force Integration
For years critics have argued, with considerable persuasiveness
in some instances, that our basic allocation of missions among the
Services, established in the aftermath of World War II, was not
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properly attuned to the demands of modern warfare. This Adminis-
tration has encouraged the harmonization of military missions and
integration of operations wherever possible, and significant prog-
ress is being made in these vital areas. For example, recent naval
exercises in the Northwest Pacific and Sea of Japan reflected an
unprecedented degree of Air Force support for the Navy in the areas
of aerial refueling, surveillance, and C3I. And the Army and Air
Force chiefs, working closely together, have now crafted a series of
initiatives -- covering planning and procedures, joint studies, oper-
ational doctrines, systems development and procurement, and basic
mission allocations -- that collectively will improve our combat
capabilities and DoD's overall management efficiency. For example,
it was agreed that the Army would assume responsibility for all
ground defense of our air bases beyond their perimeters, with the
Air Force transferring Reserve Component manpower to the Army to aid
in this task if necessary. Of the 31 Army and Air Force initiatives
agreed to, seven have been completed, and the remainder will be under
way by early 1985. We feel this effort merits strong congressional
support, and we will continue to look for other opportunities to
make our various military forces operate more effectively together.
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS) Special Fund
In 1981, this Administration developed the idea of giving our
field commanders direct responsibility for allocating a very small
portion of DoD's budget directly for high-priority operational needs
that could not be met in a timely fashion through the normal budget-
ing process. The JCS Special Fund, as this program is now called,
would be monitored by the JCS, but the CINCs themselves would initi-
ate all requests for its use. We try to decentralize budgeting con-
trol to the lowest practical level, and we strive to enhance the day-
to-day readiness of our current forces. Even though there are
expressed congressional desires, the program has yet to achieve full
congressional backing. We hope that the Congress will appropriate
the S50 million requested to start this effort in FY 1986, and will
consider favorably future requests for larger amounts if our first
year's experience is a success, as we fully anticipate it will be.
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E. NUCLEAR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
1. Deterrence: The Policy and the Challenge
This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the end of World
War II and of the use of atomic weapons to bring that conflict to
a close. During the past four decades, there has been no armed con-
flict between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the first 45 years of the twentieth
century -- in which we witnessed two global conflagrations -- there
has been peace among the major powers during the past 40 years.
These years also represent the longest continuous period of peace
Europe has known since the early nineteenth century. This is no
accident. It is, in large measure, a result of the policy of deter-
rence adopted by the United States and the Western democracies in the
wake of World War II, a policy designed to deter any aggression,
either conventional or nuclear, against ourselves or our allies.
The awesome destructiveness of modern warfare, coupled with the
introduction of nuclear weapons, has made the prevention of major
conflict imperative. U.S. policy is based upon this principle. But
this recognition on our part alone is not sufficient to prevent the
outbreak of war; it is essential that the Soviet leadership under-
stand it as well. As the Scowcroft Commission's first report stated
so succinctly:
Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to
simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror-image of
what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of
beliefs in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their
own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our
will. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what
would deter them from considering aggression, even in
a crisis - not to determine what would deter us.
We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear conflict.
I can think of no clearer or better statement of U.S. policy than
that which President Reagan has made on numerous occasions: "A
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Even a cursory
glance at our nuclear force structure and modernization plans makes
clear that this in fact is our policy: we do not have, nor do we
seek, a first-strike capability; we do not have a "nuclear warfight-
ing" posture; all of our exercises and doctrine are defensive in
nature.
Unfortunately, we face an adversary whose collective leadership
has, through its strategic force deployments and exercises, given
clear indications that it believes that, under certain circumstances,
nuclear wars may be fought and won. The Soviets' development of a
potential first-strike force of SS-18s and SS-19s, their plans to
reload ICBM silos, the refire missiles associated with systems such
as the SS-20, the extensive hardening of key assets, and the amounts
they spend on civil defense are all indicators of such an attitude.
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As a result, it is our task to ensure that the Soviet leadership, in
calculating the risks of aggression, recognizes that because of our
retaliatory capability, there are no circumstances in which it
would benefit them to attack us or our allies at any level.
In the final analysis, effective deterrence requires not only
that we have the capability to respond adequately to any aggression
but also that we be perceived by potential adversaries as having that
capability. If Soviet leaders understand that a nuclear conflict
could lead to the destruction of those military, political, and
economic assets they value most highly, Soviet plans for aggression
lose whatever attractiveness they might otherwise hold, and the risk
of war is diminished. Accordingly, we must have sufficient forces
to make certain that the Soviets understand clearly that we can and
will deny them their objectives at any level of conflict they might
contemplate.
a. F/exib/e Response
By 1961, Soviet nuclear capabilities had grown to the point that
the inflexible U.S. strategy of massive retaliation was no longer
credible. Consequently, the Kennedy Administration formulated a
strategy of flexible response that combined a wide range of conven-
tional and nuclear capabilities to enforce deterrence. Today, some
24 years later, U.S. policy remains one of deterrence through flexi-
ble response. To be sure, as the Soviet threat has evolved, so too
has our strategy of flexible response. Additional response options
and capabilities were built into our nuclear plans and our forces in
order to maintain deterrence in the face of Soviet developments.
Each of the changes under succeeding administrations had been
designed to ensure that the United States possesses the capability
to meet aggression at any level an adversary might contemplate -- and
thus to prevent it.
Unfortunately, many who have chosen to criticize the evolution of
U.S. nuclear strategy seem to measure our current deterrent require-
ments against some threat of days past, thereby wishing away the
reality of emerging imbalances. For example, in 1974, Secretary
Schlesinger's nuclear policy modifications were met with concern and
misunderstanding. Yet his important step, which increased the flexi-
bility with which a President might respond to an attack (and there-
fore our ability to deter one), was denounced by some as a move toward
"nuclear warfighting." The same thing occurred in 1980 to Secretary
Brown. The Reagan Administration has not been spared similar criti-
cism and misrepresentation. The fact remains, however, that deter-
rence through flexible response continues to be our policy and strat-
egy today, and it will remain so throughout the President's second
term. The fact also remains that any discussion of the nuclear strat-
egies needed to deter Soviet attacks always brings forth denuncia-
tions of those who discuss or have to deal with these matters.
In order to ensure deterrence, we need to think about and plan
against possible failures of deterrence. While we cannot predict how
a conflict would escalate should deterrence fail, the credibility of
our deterrent forces increases as we demonstrate flexibility in our
response options and in our forces. That flexibility offers the pos-
sibility of terminating a conflict and reestablishing deterrence at
the lowest level of violence possible, avoiding further destruction.
Although there is no guarantee that we would be successful in creat-
ing such limits, there is every guarantee such limitations would not
be achievable if we do not attempt to create them. Flexible response
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does not, however, imply that we seek to fight a limited nuclear war
or, for that matter, to fight a nuclear war under any conditions. It
does imply our profound belief that, if we have the capability to
present the Soviet leadership with unacceptable consequences at any
level of aggression of which they are capable, then that aggression
will not occur in the first place.
b. Coup/ing: The Conventions/-Nuc%ar Linkage
To enhance deterrence in NATO, we have for many years stationed
nuclear forces in Europe. Many of those delivery systems are "dual-
capable," meaning they can use both conventional and -- with proper
authorization from the President and in consultation with our allies
-- nuclear weapons. These nonstrategic nuclear forces, along with
conventional forces provided by the United States and other NATO
nations, constitute the front line of defense against any Warsaw Pact
aggression. All of our nuclear forces are governed by a single
coherent policy that governs the linkage among our conventional, non-
strategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, the
Soviets must understand that an attack on NATO constitutes an attack
on the United States and risks the engagement of U.S. nuclear forces.
It is important to note that, in addition to providing a range of
nuclear options for deterrence, the adoption of the flexible response
strategy in the 1960s also had as a goal improving NATO's conventional
capabilities so as to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or
cope with a nonnuclear attack. Unfortunately, neither we nor our
allies ever fully met this goal. Thus, with our present effort to
increase our conventional strength, NATO is essentially seeking to
secure a long-established but elusive goal. The greater urgency with
which we have approached this task stems from the fact that, over the
past decade, the Warsaw Pact has strengthened its nonnuclear as well
as its nuclear forces to a far greater extent than has NATO.
The very purpose of our effort to strengthen conventional forces
is to lessen NATO's reliance on the threat to use nuclear weapons to
stop a conventional attack. If it is clear to the Soviets that a
conventional assault cannot produce a victory, either through a quick
campaign or by outlasting NATO in conventional combat, then no
rational Soviet planner would launch such an assault in the first
place. But we cannot allow our security to rest entirely on the
calculations of a Soviet planner as to whether he can successfully
attack and invade NATO Europe with his conventional military power.
As a result, in addition to our conventional modernization and sus-
tainability programs, our nuclear forces remain an important element
in deterring a Soviet attack, especially one supported by nuclear
weapons. If the Soviet leadership is aware that NATO will respond
to an attack with all the means necessary to defend itself and pre-
vent the USSR from achieving its war aims, then deterrence is
strengthened, and the chances of both conventional and nuclear war
are reduced.
c. Deterrence at Sea
The United States also deploys dual-capable weapons systems
aboard a wide variety of ships. In addition to deterring Soviet
first use of similar nuclear weapons at sea, U.S. nuclear antiair
and antisubmarine weapons provide unique capabilities that serve as
a hedge against a massive and catastrophic failure of our conven-
tional systems. Nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft and nuclear
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles have three vital roles:
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contributing to our nuclear reserve force; providing a worldwide
deterrent presence; and deterring attacks on our naval forces by
Soviet nuclear antiship missiles (especially those aboard Backfire
and Badger bombers). U.S. sea-based nuclear forces, along with our
land-based forces, support our policy of confronting the Soviet
leadership with uncertainty and risk should they contemplate a
nuclear war at sea.
2. The Emergence of Nuclear Imbalance
Throughout the 1960s, the United States possessed a strong deter-
rent, and as a result, the nuclear balance between the United States
and the USSR was extremely stable. Our nuclear posture confronted
the Soviet leadership with a retaliatory capability sufficient to
deny any aggressive ambitions it may have harbored. The United
States attempted to maintain this stability by initiating the SALT
talks in November 1969. During the negotiations, the United States
did not add any strategic launchers to its forces. Indeed, it
publicly stated that it was freezing its launcher levels at their
1967 totals and signalled its willingness to see the USSR build up
to parity. In contrast, over the next three years of negotiations,
the USSR added about 500 ICBM launchers and quadrupled the size of
its SLBM force.
The SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms, signed in 1972
after three years of negotiations, froze the number of ICBM launchers
then operational or under construction, while permitting an increase
in SLBM launchers up to an agreed level.l Qualitative aspects of the
arsenals, however, were not addressed. Left unconstrained were the
number of weapons on strategic delivery vehicles,2 the accuracy of
those warheads, and the individual throw-weight of the vehicles.
When SALT I was signed, the USSR had roughly 2,300 strategic weapons.
In 1972, the throw-weight of the entire Soviet ballistic missile
force was about 3 million kilograms, and while we had provided some
degree of hardening to our 1,000 Minuteman silos, the entire Soviet
force could have destroyed only about 200 of the silos.
Negotiations for SALT II began in November 1972 and lasted seven
years, spanning three administrations. By the time an agreement
was signed by former President Carter and the late Secretary General
Brezhnev in June 1979, the Soviet strategic arsenal had more than
doubled to roughly 5,500 strategic weapons, with a ballistic missile
throw-weight of about 4 million kilograms, enabling the force to
destroy promptly about 1,200 hardened targets. Today, the Soviet
arsenal contains over 8,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads.
1 At the date of signing, the United States had 1,054 ICBM launchers
with no additional ones under construction; the USSR had 1,618
launchers either operational or under construction. Under the
terms of the accord, the United States was permitted to increase
its 656 SLBMs to 710 if it retired 54 older ICBM launchers (an
option we did not exercise at the time); the USSR was permitted
to increase from 740 to 950 SLBMs, if it retired older ICBM
launchers -- an option it did exercise.
2 Indeed, in the SALT I ratification hearings, the Nixon Administra-
tion noted that the U.S. lead in warheads, and our ability to in-
crease that lead further through MIRVing, were an adequate offset
to the Soviet superiority in launchers.
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This growth in Soviet capabilities reflects the fact that, during
the 1970s and continuing to this day, the Soviet Union has been
making major qualitative and quantitative improvements in both its
offensive and defensive strategic systems that have significantly
altered the strategic balance. The following chart illustrates the
tremendous magnitude and pace of the Soviet effort.
Cheri /.E.1
Introduction of
S~treteglc Systems
1962
INTRODUCTION SYSTEMS BY YEAR
SOVIET UNION
SALT 1 - 1972 SALT II - 1979
_ 1 _
GOLF III 1 - TYPHOON
DELTA 11 YANKEE II
DELTA III 1
GOLF IV ;
OOIF V
BEAR x
BOMBER
S'4
ALCM
SLCM
1962 1972 1979 1984 1987
~k AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE SS-18 IS INCONCLUSIVE, BUT INDICATES PROBABLE DEPLOYMENT.
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The Soviet buildup encompassed all aspects of their nuclear
capabilities: long-range aviation, the strategic submarine force,
and the land-based missile force. Of greatest concern for strategic
stability, however, was the development and deployment of the SS-18
and SS-19 ICBMs. Since the late 1970x, the USSR has deployed more
than 300 SS-18x, each twice as large as the U.S. Peacekeeper/MX and
capable of carrying ten warheads, and 360 SS-19s, each larger than
the MX and capable of carrying six warheads. It would take only a
fraction of this force of approximately 5,000 highly accurate war-
heads -- itself representing only a portion of the Soviet ICBM force
-- to destroy most of our land-based missile silos. The emergence
of this potential first-strike force occurred fully within the
restrictions of SALT I and those being discussed for SALT II. And,
perhaps most disconcerting, it occurred despite the fact that in the
mid-1970s the United States made a well-publicized choice (of which
the Soviets were well aware) to restrict improvements in the Minute-
man force's yield and accuracy so as not to threaten the Soviet
Union with the creation of a U.S. first-strike capability. That the
Soviets did not follow our example in the 1970s must be considered
by those who would have us undertake other unilateral restraints
today.
In conjunction with their offensive force buildup, the Soviets
increased their active and passive defenses in a clear and determined
attempt to blunt the effects of a possible U.S. retaliation. This
included a modernization of their already large air defense network
-- which is today the most sophisticated in the world -- and the
development of anew ABM network for the Moscow area. It also
included hardening to an unprecedented degree (far above the strength
of our Minuteman silos) their ICBM silos and launch facilities, and
other key C3 and leadership bunkers.
The net result of this combination of Soviet defensive measures
and U.S. restraint in modernizing its offensive nuclear forces was
to allow the Soviet Union a "sanctuary" for its ICBM force and for
the other key assets that were protected by hardening. This, com-
bined with the Soviets' ability to attack our Minuteman force using
only a portion of their ICBMs, significantly eased the problems of
Soviet nuclear planners. They could begin to envision a potential
nuclear confrontation in which they would threaten to destroy a very
large part of our force in a first strike, while retaining overwhelm-
ing nuclear forces to deter any retaliation we could carry out. This
ability to conduct a first strike also threatened to make less credi-
ble the deterrent linkage between our strategic nuclear force and our
forward-deployed conventional and nuclear forces. In addition, the
increasing Soviet emphasis on blunting the effects of U.S. retalia-
tion held open the prospect of undercutting deterrence further,
because the Soviet leadership could come to believe that their
hardening programs would permit them to emerge from a major conflict
with their forces, command and control, and other support systems
damaged, but still functioning.
The Soviet Union also expanded its intermediate-range and battle-
field nuclear forces, including developing an entirely new generation
of nuclear artillery and short-range ballistic missiles. Of gravest
concern was the wholly unjustified creation and subsequent rapid
expansion of the SS-20 missile force. This force, together with
other Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces that can reach Europe
and Asia but not the United States, could give the Soviet Union sig-
nificant coercive leverage, and preclude the Alliance from achieving
its objectives in the event of war.
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The SS-20 buildup occurred even while the Soviets were conducting
a carefully orchestrated propaganda offensive designed to portray the
USSR as a peaceful state facing a growing nuclear threat from NATO.
In fact, NATO's historic 1979 dual-track decision to deploy 572
cruise and Pershing II ballistic missiles (but to cancel or reduce
those deployments if an equitable, verifiable arms reduction agree-
ment was signed) was a studied and measured response to the introduc-
tion and rapid growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities as exemplified
by the SS-20 force. At the time of the NATO decision, the Soviets
already had 140 SS-20 missiles. Over the next four years, years in
which NATO did not deploy a single Pershing II or ground-launched
cruise missile despite strident Soviet propaganda claims that NATO
was increasing the threat to peace in Europe, the number of SS-20s
almost tripled.
3. Nuclear Modernization
Aware of these disquieting developments, one of my first tasks
on assuming office in 1981 was to conduct an evaluation of the state
of our strategic deterrent forces. That review produced two major
conclusions.
First, the concept of a strategic triad provides an indispensable
element of deterrence. The combined effect of having three comple-
mentary legs complicates Soviet attack planning and any efforts to
prevent U.S. retaliation. The existence of the three legs provides,
in addition, an important hedge against the possibility that a single
Soviet technological breakthrough could threaten our overall deterrent
capability. By maintaining a triad of forces, we compel the Soviet
Union to disperse its resources against three components, preventing
if from concentrating its considerable resources on defeating only
one or two U.S. strategic systems. The strengths of each triad leg
not only complement the strengths of the other two but also compensate
for their weaknesses. To deter successfully all types of nuclear
attack, our forces as a whole must possess a number of characteris-
tics and capabilities -- including survivability, prompt response,
endurance, mission flexibility, and sufficient accuracy and warhead
yield -- to retaliate against hardened Soviet military targets. No
single weapon system can incorporate all of these capabilities.
Submarines are less vulnerable but they are difficult to communicate
with at times, and currently their missiles are less accurate.
Bombers are accurate and retrievable, but they are much slower.
ICBMs are easier to command and provide a quicker response, but they
are more vulnerable than submarines. The three systems together can
incorporate all of the elements necessary to deter any type of nuclear
attack. Thus, the key advantage of the triad is that it provides an
important measure of strategic stability.
The second conclusion of my review was that the triad we in-
herited had deficiencies and was becoming obsolete in all three of
its legs. Also, its associated command, control, and communications
systems lacked the survivability and endurance necessary to support
our nuclear policy. The strategic modernization program begun by
the President in October 1981 is designed to address these problems.
A little more than three years later, I am pleased to report on our
progress.
a. The Support Systems
We are taking steps to ensure that our C3 systems are surviv-
able and are able to function throughout any sequence of Soviet
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attacks. We are upgrading our warning networks to ensure that in
the event of attack we would have ample time to respond and that
we would be able to respond at the proper level of force. We are
upgrading our logistics network to ensure that our deterrent forces
remain strong and endurable over extended periods, so that the
Soviets could not hope to gain an advantage by trying to outlast us
in a crisis. All of these qualities are essential to our ability to
implement the flexible response strategy.
b. The Bomber Force
While examining the requirements for deterrence, we recognized
that an effective bomber contribution is best served by a combina-
tion of penetrating aircraft and standoff cruise missiles, which
together could stress Soviet air defenses to the maximum degree.
Our B-52 force has served us well; it has adapted to the up-
graded Soviet defenses over the last 25 years. And it will serve us
for yet a few more years by providing a standoff capability with the
cruise missile while we are procuring 100 B-1B bombers to provide
a continued penetration capability. We also are developing an
advanced technology bomber (ATB), which we expect to begin deploying
in the early 199Os. As the ATB is fielded, some of the older B-52G
models will be retired, and the B-1Bs will assume the role of cruise
missile carrier. This will maintain a mix of cruise missiles and
manned penetrators well into the next century.
The fleet of 31 Poseidon submarines forms the backbone of our
sea-launched ballistic missile force. All of these submarines were
built in the mid-196Os. In the late 197Os, 12 of these submarines
were modified to carry the longer range Trident I (C-4) missile.
Neither the Poseidon missile nor the Trident I missile is capable
of retaliating against hard targets; furthermore, the Poseidon sub-
marines themselves will approach block obsolescence beginning in the
199Os, when they reach their 30-year service anniversaries. In order
to provide for a modern SSBN force in the future, we are continuing
to build Trident submarines at a rate of one per year. Four of these
SSBNs are already operational carrying the Trident I missile, and a
fifth, the USS HENRY JACKSON, will soon begin patrol. To rectify
the inability of existing SLBMs to deal with hardened Soviet targets,
we are developing the Trident II missile. When deployed at the end
of this decade, the Trident II will strengthen our flexible response
deterrent by providing an enduring hard-target capability. For the
near-term, in accordance with the President's strategic modernization
program, we completed development in 1984 of the nuclear Tomahawk
sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and began deploying the system
aboard selected Navy combatants.
d. The /ntercontinenta/ Ba//istic Missi/e Force
The Congress is well aware of the controversy surrounding the
issue of ICBM force modernization. Through the efforts of the Scow-
croft Commission, a genuine bipartisan solution to this formidable
problem was developed in 1983 and was subsequently endorsed by both
the Administration and the Congress. The solution recommended by the
Commission addresses the twin problems of restoring U.S. ICBM hard-
target capability, jeopardized by Soviet hardening programs, and of
ensuring the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force, endangered by
Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 deployments. The solution advanced by the
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panel calls for deploying two different types of missiles in differ-
ent basing modes, which together, will restore the viability of the
ICBM leg of our triad.
The Peacekeeper missile, scheduled for deployment in selected
Minuteman silos in 1986, is the only near-term answer for providing
a prompt capability to hold time-urgent hardened Soviet assets at
risk. It has been debated for eleven and one-half years. During
that time, we have invested over $6 billion in the system. The
Peacekeeper force will have all the positive attributes traditionally
associated with fixed-based ICBMs, such as high effectiveness across
the target spectrum, low operational costs, a near 100 percent readi-
ness level, and highly redundant command, control, and communications
links.
The new, small, single-warhead ICBM is being designed to be
mobile -- and therefore highly survivable and endurable. It will be
deployed in the early 1990s. Together, it and the Peacekeeper will
form the backbone of our land-based missile force in the 1990s and
into the next century. We are also exploring other techniques to
increase the survivability of our silo-based forces through such
methods as super-hardening and deep underground basing, in combina-
tion with active defenses.
The Congress will face a number of decisions early this spring
that are crucial to the Peacekeeper program. The Peacekeeper is an
essential element of the triad. It helps to preserve a strong deter-
rent by offsetting the Soviet hardening program, thus providing a
strong incentive for arms reductions agreements.
e. Nonstrategic Nuc%ar forces
In accordance with its 1979 dual-track decision, NATO began
deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles at the
end of 1983 in the absence of an INF arms control agreement and as a
response to the unprecedented growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities,
particularly the SS-20 force. These deployments continued on schedule
during 1984. In accordance with the Alliance program, deployments
will continue at a gradual and steady pace over the next four years.
Also under way is the implementation of the October 1983 Monte-
bello decision, in which NATO Defense Ministers mandated the with-
drawal of 1,400 nuclear weapons from NATO's stockpile over the next
several years. These reductions are consistent with Alliance policy
that the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile should be at the
lowest level commensurate with our security needs. Steps are also
under way within the Alliance to improve NATO's nonstrategic nuclear
forces in accordance with the Montebello mandate so as to ensure
that the nuclear weapons stockpile retains its capability to deter
aggression, even in the face of increasing Soviet theater nuclear
capabilities.
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4. The Strategic Defense Initiative
What if free people could live secure in the
knowledge that we could intercept and destroy
strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our
own soil or that of our alliesl
President Reagan's historic speech on March 23, 1983, challenged
the notion that we must always remain hostage to enemy ballistic
missiles. Much has happened since then. The FY 1985 DoD budget,
submitted to the Congress a year ago, contained a research program
restructured on the basis of technology and policy analyses conducted
in 1983. This new program focused our efforts on powerful new tech-
nologies that may provide options for an effective defense against
ballistic missiles. In early 1984, I created a new organization
within DoD, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO),
directly responsible to me. Under able leadership and with the
assistance of the Joint Staff, Service staffs, and various elements
of OSD, the SDIO is directing research into the vast array of tech-
nologies applicable to the new weapons, sensors, and data-processing
capabilities required for a task of this magnitude.
As a broad research program, the SDI is not based on any precon-
ceived notions of what an effective defense system would or should
look like. A number of different concepts, based on a range of prom-
ising technologies, are being examined, but no single concept or
technology has yet been identified as the best or most appropriate
one.
The goal, however, is clear and unchangeable:
It is to secure a thoroughly reliable defense against all
incoming Soviet missiles, either intermediate or long-
range, and to destroy, by nonnuclear means, those
missiles before they get near any target.
Effective defenses against ballistic missiles can significantly
enhance deterrence. Such defenses could increase an aggressor's
uncertainties regarding the ability of his weapons to penetrate them
and destroy their intended targets. If the Soviet leaders were ever
to contemplate initiating a nuclear attack, their purpose would be to
destroy U.S. and NATO military forces that would be able to oppose
their aggression. Yet, it would be very difficult for Soviet mili-
tary planners to predict the likely outcome of a nuclear attack in
the face of strategic defensive systems. Defenses that could deny
to Soviet missiles the objectives of an attack, or deny to the
Soviets confidence in the achievement of those objectives, would
discourage them from even considering such an attack, and thus be a
highly effective deterrent.
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Nuclear Policies
Based on our research so far, we cannot now say how soon we will
be in a position to make decisions on defensive options; nor can we
today describe all the forma such defenses could take. Clearly,
Soviet military planners and scientists are confident that strategic
missile defenses will be effective. Their extensive effort to
acquire such defenses provides ample evidence of their conviction,
as does their major effort to stop us from proceeding with our own
defense initiative.
We all recognized from the outset that a complete system, or
combination of systems, of strategic defenses could not be deployed
overnight. There could well be a transitional period when some
defenses would be deployed and operating before others might be
ready.
Some have argued that such a transition would be particularly
dangerous; that it would upset the present deterrent system without
putting an adequate substitute in its place. The opposite is the
case. If properly planned and phased, the capabilities deployed
first would strengthen our existing deterrent. In fact, the initial
capabilities could make a major contribution to the prevention of
nuclear war before a fully effective system is deployed, because they
would create many of the same uncertainties for Soviet planners that
a fully deployed system would engender.
Thus, based on a realistic view of Soviet military planning, the
transition to strategic defense would not be destabilizing. On the
contrary, initial defense capabilities would offer a combination of
benefits. They would contribute to deterrence by denying Soviet
attack goals. Should deterrence ever fail, they would save lives by
reducing the scope of destruction resulting from a deliberate Soviet
attack. And, in the case of an accidental Soviet launch, defenses
would be the only hope for protecting our people. The more effec-
tive the defense, the more effective this protection would be.
Nevertheless, we would not want to let our efforts toward a
transitional defense exhaust our energies or dilute our efforts to
secure a thoroughly reliable, layered defense that would destroy
incoming Soviet missiles at all phases of their flight. Such a sys-
tem would destroy weapons, not people. It would not raise the ques-
tion of whether we were trying to defend missiles or cities. We
would be attempting to destroy Soviet missiles by nonnuclear means
before Soviet missiles could approach any targets in the United
States or the territory of our allies. The choice, therefore, is not
one of defending people or weapons.
a. The Strategic Defense /nitiative and The Defense of A//ies
Because the security of the United States is inextricably linked
to the security of our friends and allies, the SDI program will
not confine itself solely to an exploration of technologies with a
defensive potential against ICBMs and SLBMs. We will also examine,
and at the same time work to achieve, technologies that will be
effective against shorter range ballistic missiles. Indeed, there is
reason to believe it will be at least as easy to destroy lesser range
missiles as to destroy ICBMs. Throughout 1984, we held extensive
discussions with our allies on the SDI effort. Given its potential
contribution to collective security, SDI will be a major topic of
mutual interest, and therefore will continue to be discussed with our
friends and allies over the months and years ahead.
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An effective defense against shorter range ballistic missiles
could have a significant impact on deterring Soviet aggression in
Europe. Soviet doctrine stresses the use of conventionally armed
ballistic missiles to initiate rapid and wide-ranging attacks on
crucial NATO military assets throughout Europe. The purpose of this
tactic is to reduce NATO's ability to resist effectively the initial
thrust of a Soviet conventional attack and to impede NATO's ability
to resupply and reinforce its forces from outside Europe. By reduc-
ing or eliminating the military effectiveness of such ballistic mis-
siles, defensive systems have the potential for enhancing deterrence
not only of nuclear war, but of conventional war as well.
Over the next several years, the United States will continue to
work closely with its allies to enhance security. In the event that
a decision to deploy defensive systems is made, consultation with
our allies will play an important part.
b. Hedge Against Soviet Defensive Techno/ogy Program
Some critics of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative
have the misconception that this increased emphasis on defensive sys-
tems is solely a U.S. initiative, which will alter the strategic bal-
ance. This is not the case. The Soviet Union has always considered
defense to be an important and natural part of its national security
policy. The extensive, advanced Soviet air defense network and the
Soviets' large civil defense program are obvious examples of the
priority they have attached to strategic defenses. In addition, the
Soviets have for many years been working on a number of technologies,
both traditional and advanced, with a potential for effectively,
defending against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union currently is
upgrading the capability of its Moscow ABM defense system -- the
world's only operational ABM system. The Soviets also are engaged
in research and development (RED) on a rapidly deployable ABM system
that raises concerns about their potential ability to abrogate the
ABM treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM defense system within the
next ten years should they so choose.
In addition to these ABM efforts, the Soviet Union is deploying
a new surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and is flight testing
another, the SA-X-12, both of which we believe can intercept some
types of ballistic missiles. These air defenses and their radars
are of concern because of their potential to provide the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact allies some degree of ABM protection -- all within
the bounds prescribed by the ABM treaty.
Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union also has been pursuing a
substantial advanced defensive technologies program -- a program
that has been exploring many of the same technologies of interest
to the United States in the SDI program. In addition to covering a
wide range of advanced technologies, including various laser and
neutral particle beams, the Soviet program is much larger than the
U.S. effort in terms of the amount of resources invested -- plant,
capital, and manpower. These efforts could lead to the testing of
space-based ABM systems in the mid-1990s and to their deployment
after the turn of the century. The President's initiative, there-
fore, is being pursued in part as a prudent response to Soviet R&D
activities in this field and as insurance against unilateral Soviet
efforts to develop and deploy an advanced defensive system. A uni-
lateral Soviet deployment of such advanced technologies, in concert
with the Soviet Union's massive offensive forces and its already
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impressive air and passive defense capabilities, would make this a
far more dangerous world than it is now.
These Soviet programs amply demonstrate that the Soviet Union
does not feel restrained by the ABM treaty's prohibition against a
widespread defense against ballistic missiles. Consistent with the
importance Soviet doctrine places on defense, if the Soviets were to
develop such a system as a result of their intensive research program,
in all probability they would deploy it.
In the near term, the SDI provides a powerful deterrent to a
potential Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty, a prospect made more
worrisome by recent compliance questions -- such as the construction
of a new Soviet radar, which almost certainly is in violation of the
ABM treaty. The SDI research program also makes clear that the
United States takes seriously the Soviet buildup in offensive arms.
In the long term, SDI may provide the means by which .both the
United States and the Soviet Union can safely agree to very deep
reductions and, someday, even the elimination of nuclear arms. We
have sought to engage the Soviet Union in comprehensive discussions
on how to make arms reductions more effective in the near term and
on how to provide a safer future for all mankind.
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F. ARMS REDUCTIONS AND RELATED
DIPLOMATIC PRIORITIES
Our overall national security policy complements military
strength with active diplomacy to maintain the peace and reduce
tensions.
1. Nuclear Arms Reductions
The United States has long exercised restraint in its nuclear
posture. We now have 25 percent fewer nuclear warheads and 75 per-
cent leas nuclear explosive power (measured in megatonnage) than we
had in the 1960s. The reductions in our nuclear arsenal during the
past two decades attest to our commitment to retain the fewest pos-
sible nuclear forces consistent with the requirements of defense and
deterrence.
We are in the process of implementing similar substantial reduc-
tions in NATO's nuclear arsenal, independent of any arms control
agreement. As part of the December 1979 dual-track decision on the
modernization of longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces
(LRINF), NATO decided to withdraw 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe,
an action completed in 1980, and to remove one nuclear warhead for
each of the 572 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles
deployed. After careful study of the Alliance's nuclear needs, the
NATO defense ministers decided in October 1983 to remove an addition-
al 1,400 nuclear weapons from Europe over the next few years. As a
result of those decisions, we will have withdrawn more than five
nuclear warheads for each new LRINF warhead deployed -- even if we
do not succeed in reaching an intermediate-range nuclear force (INF)
arms reduction agreement.
Unfortunately, the Soviet performance has been quite different.
Rather than reducing, or even curbing the growth of its nuclear
arsenal, the Soviet Union has engaged in an unprecedented and relent-
less expansion of its nuclear forces. Disregarding our efforts to
establish a stable balance at lower force levels, the USSR took
advantage of U.S. restraint to try to achieve clear nuclear superi-
ority. As a consequence, the United States has gone as far as it
should with unilateral nuclear arms reductions. Further reductions
must be negotiated bilaterally.
The United States is committed to far-reaching nuclear arms reduc-
tions that are equitable and verifiable and increase international
stability and security. The approach taken by earlier agreements
like SALT I and II, which simply limited, and thereby legitimized,
future growth is not enough; at best, they can only divert us from
the real goal of actual reductions. Furthermore, the record of
Soviet noncompliance with earlier arms control agreements demon-
strates how vital it is that future accords be precisely drafted,
include effective verification provisions, and be complied with by
all parties. In this regard, if arms control is to be an effective
stabilizing force in the future, it is imperative that the Soviet
Union take a more constructive approach to its obligations than it
has in the past.
In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the intermediate-
range nuclear force (INF) negotiations, the United States proposed
deep cuts in nuclear arms, focusing on the systems of greatest con-
cern to each side. In START, we called for a 33 percent decrease'in
the number of warheads deployed on strategic ballistic missiles. In
the INF negotiations, we proposed the elimination -- or at least a
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substantial reduction -- of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Addi-
tionally, in START we have called for limitations on bombers and
other strategic systems. Regrettably, the Soviet Union walked out
of the INF talks in November 1983, and shortly thereafter refused to
agree to a date for the next round of START.
In June 1984, although the USSR had not returned to either START
or the INF talks, it proposed that our two governments meet in Vienna
in September to begin "talks to prevent the militarization of outer
space." The United States promptly accepted the proposal, and at the
same time, made it clear that we considered the most pressing task to
be reductions in offensive nuclear arms. The United States pointed
out that the militarization of space began when the first ballistic
missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons sys-
tems using outer space were first deployed. Faced with a positive
U.S. response to their proposal, the Soviets then demanded that we
institute a moratorium on antisatellite (ASAT) weapons tests before
opening any talks. That precondition represented an unacceptable
attempt to preserve a Soviet weapons monopoly and consequently to
weaken t1.S. deterrence capability. Since the United States is only
now developing an ASAT capability, a testing moratorium would leave
the USSR as the only nation with an operational ASAT weapon.
In his September 1984 speech to the United Nations General
Assembly, President Reagan suggested a bold initiative to break the
impasse in nuclear arms reductions:
We need to extend the arms control process to
build a bigger umbrella under which it can operate -
a road map, if you will, showing where, during the next
40 years or so, these individual efforts can lead. This
can greatly assist step-by-step negotiations and enable
us to avoid having all our hopes or expectations ride on
any single set or series of negotiations. If progress is
temporarily halted at one set of talks, this newly
established framework for arms control could help us
take up the slack at other negotiations.
After discussing the President's proposal, the United States and
the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations on the whole range of
questions concerning nuclear and outer-space arms. Secretary of
State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva in
January 1985 to discuss the agenda and objectives of the negoti-
ations. They agreed that the forthcoming talks would address a com-
plex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic
and intermediate-range. The timing and location of the negotiations
will be arranged through diplomatic channels. We expect that each
delegation will be divided into three groups and will address stra-
tegic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and space and
defensive arms. In that last forum, we plan to discuss both the
means of moving toward a more defense-oriented deterrence, as well
as space-based systems that can attack targets in space.
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There is a clear relationship among all the different types of
arms to be addressed in the negotiations. Since the Strategic
Defense Initiative is only a research program, and while we are
still many years away from any decision on whether to develop and
deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles, nevertheless,
we are prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union the issue of stra-
tegic defense. However, these talks will consider existing Soviet
defenses as well as each side's research programs in this area.
The agreement between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko marks a welcome new beginning. We have a long and
difficult task ahead of us, but if we are patient and persistent, I
have every hope that we can achieve deep reductions in nuclear
weapons along with increased strategic stability, both of which are
in the best interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, our
allies, and indeed, the entire world. In order to achieve that
goal, we must retain the same determination to preserve the military
balance that has encouraged the USSR to return to the negotiating
table. Our firm commitment to nuclear force modernization, to the
continued development of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability, and to
strategic defense is vital to the success of the coming negotiations.
While we seek bilateral nuclear arms reductions with the Soviet
Union, we must also be attentive to the problem of nuclear prolifer-
ation. If the number of nuclear-armed nations were to increase, the
risk of nuclear war would grow. Moreover, the spread of nuclear
weapons raises the possibility of these weapons falling into the
hands of subnational groups. Along with more than 100 other nations,
the United States supports the Non-Proliferation treaty, which recog-
nizes the universal interest in controlling the spread of nuclear
arms. In recent years, the United States and the Soviet Union have
discussed this issue periodically. We have now decided to hold these
consultations on a regular basis.
2. Related Diplomatic Priorities
We also are actively engaged in seeking other important force
reductions. In April 1984, the United States presented a draft
treaty to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament calling for a compre-
hensive and verifiable global ban on the production, stockpiling,
possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. To ensure that
parties to a global ban would not be able to violate it, as has been
the case with the Geneva Protocol forbidding chemical weapons use,
the U.S. draft treaty provides for unique, cooperative verification
measures.
In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, the
United States and its NATO allies are negotiating with the Warsaw Pact
to reduce conventional forces in Central Europe. NATO has called
for reductions to 700,000 ground force personnel and for a combined
total of no more than 900,000 air and ground force personnel on each
side. Progress in the MBFR talks has been stymied primarily because
of the Warsaw Pact's intransigence in agreeing to provide force level
data and permit adequate verification measures. In April 1984, the
West presented a new initiative designed to overcome those obstacles.
It offered Western flexibility on the data question in exchange for
Warsaw Pact flexibility on verification.
In other discussions with the Soviet Union, we are seeking agree-
ments on measures to reduce the risk that conflict could ever break
out as a result of accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.
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While such steps -- known as confidence-building measures -- would
not affect the level or type of military forces, they could help
ensure that those forces are never used inadvertently.
In April 1983, with strong congressional support, I recommended
to the President several improvements in the U.S.-Soviet communica-
tions network that would significantly enhance our ability to resolve
a crisis or avert a misunderstanding. Specifically, I called for
the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the Direct Com-
munications Link (or "hotline"); the establishment of a Joint Mili-
tary Communications Link for the transmission of urgent military-
related information; and the establishment by both the U.S. and
Soviet governments of improved communications with their embassies
in each other's capital.
The President endorsed those proposals, and we began negotiating
with the Soviet Union in August 1983. In July 1984, the two sides
agreed to add a high-speed facsimile capability to the Direct Commun-
ications Link (DCL). This modest but positive step will enable the
U.S. and Soviet heads of government to transmit messages over the
DCL far more rapidly than they can now. For the first time, they
will be able to use the DCL to exchange graphic materials such as
maps and photographs; that kind of information could be invaluable
in helping to resolve an ongoing crisis or military incident.
In his September 1984 United Nations speech, the President sug-
gested several further bilateral measures to enhance U.S.-Soviet
knowledge and understanding. These include regular U.S.-Soviet
Cabinet-level meetings on a variety of issues, sharing of information
on weapons procurement and development plans, exchange of observers
at military exercises, and direct measurement of nuclear test yields.
In January 1984, the United States, its NATO allies, the Warsaw
Pact, and Europe's neutral and nonaligned states opened the 35-nation
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe (CDE). Early in the conference, NATO proposed a set
of measures designed to reduce the risk of conflict by surprise
attack or miscalculation, limit the opportunities to use military
force for political intimidation, and enhance communications among
the signatory states. These measures include: an open exchange
of information on ground and air forces; forecasts and notification
of, and observer invitations to, a range of military activities;
verification through on-site and aerial inspection; and methods for
improved communications.
3. Compliance
As the President stated in his 1984 Report_ to the Congress on
Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control greements, t e concept of
arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to
global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to
agreements comply with them. Unfortunately, the Soviet record of
compliance is not supportive of this objective. In his January 1984
report to the Congress, the President concluded that the Soviet Union
has violated or probably violated several of its major arms control
obligations and political commitments.
Thus the Soviets have used, or supported the use of, chemical
agents and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia in
violation of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Con-
vention. They have violated the Helsinki Final Act requirement of
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advanced notification of certain major military exercises, and the
SALT II limits on encryption of missile test telemetry. Anew
large phased-array radar that they are now building in the central
USSR is almost certainly in violation of the 1972 ABM treaty. The
SS-X-25 missile is probably a second new ICBM type, prohibited by
the SALT II agreement; if it is not, it violates the SALT II pro-
visions regarding the permitted ratio between the weight of an
ICBM reentry vehicle and the missile's total throw-weight. In
addition, it is likely that the Soviets have violated the Threshold
Test Ban treaty limits on the size of underground nuclear teats,
and they probably have deployed SS-16 missiles in violation of
SALT II.
In response to additional requests from the Congress, the Presi-
dent will submit a further report of his findings regarding other
Soviet arms control noncompliance issues. Furthermore, at congres-
sional request, in October 1984, the President submitted both
classified and unclassified versions of an independent review by the
bipartisan General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarma-
ment. Based on a year-long analysis, that report cited numerous
instances of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements over
the past 25 years.
Dialogue with the Soviet Union must encompass our compliance
concerns as well as our arms control objectives. We are continuing
to pursue these issues with the Soviet Union, seeking explanations,
clarification, and corrective actions. In current and future arms
negotiations, just as in our defense policy, we must take into
account the Soviet compliance record as we search for productive
avenues to preserve peace and enhance global stability.
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G. FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1990s
As a capstone to this overview of defense policy, we should look
ahead to the security challenges we likely will face through the end
of our program years (1990) and beyond.
Because America's security and economic well-being will continue
to depend on events and resources abroad, our vital national inter-
ests worldwide will remain at least as extensive as they are today.
Our political,, economic, and financial ties with other nations will
grow as the world becomes more interdependent and more closely
linked by improved international communications and transportation.
Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that the diverse threats
to world peace and U.S. interests abroad will subside. Because of
its unrelenting military investment coupled with an opportunistic
foreign policy, the Soviet Union will remain the most serious threat
facing U.S., allied, and mutual interests. Moscow's current and past
behavior justify no optimistic assumptions about its future inten-
tions. Furthermore, America's interests will also remain threatened
by terrorism, the proliferation of arms, low-intensity conflicts, and
widespread political and economic instabilities.
The constancy of American interests and the threats facing them
suggest that our strategy of deterrence and defense will retain its
validity. For that strategy to continue to preserve the peace,
America must restore and preserve the military balance. While we
have made considerable progress to date, we cannot say that we have
finished the task because the Soviets continue to add to their mili-
tary might, and deterrence is not a static concept. Our nuclear
forces must be strengthened to bolster our deterrence and to provide
incentives for the Soviets to agree to significant mutual arms reduc-
tions. We also need to continue the balanced improvement of our con-
ventional forces, maintaining our progress in readiness and sustain-
ability while persevering in our long-term modernization efforts.
In sum, our future defense efforts should be much like those of
the past four years. And if, as we expect, those efforts continue
to protect our nation, our allies, and our interests, we will have
carried out our primary security responsibility successfully. But
many Americans, with characteristic idealism, legitimately may ask
if the future might hold the happy prospect of even more hope for all
mankind.
There is a brighter message. The most prominent ray of hope is
the promise of strategic defense. President Reagan's Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) is a bold start toward freeing people from
the threat of nuclear weapons. We are pursuing new technologies that
someday may enable us, if we are completely successful, to reduce
substantially, and we should hope ultimately to end, the terror of
offensive nuclear ballistic missiles. If we can attain that goal,
all nations will become more secure and better in every way.
The President's SDI is just one example, although a very special
one, of how the United States and its allies can develop and exploit
new technologies to protect our security and freedom more effectively.
Other innovations can markedly improve our military capabilities in
ways that will enhance our deterrence and defense posture. Advanced
technology is an inherent advantage that the West must continue to
keep and to exploit in order to ensure the security of us all.
America and its allies have not sought to protect themselves by
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matching their adversary's capabilities quantitatively. In the
future, our wisest course will continue to be to seek security
through quality of our forces. The intensive development and
fielding of advanced technology can enable us to do this in the
most achievable and affordable way.
The freedom that we and our allies seek to safeguard fortunately
supports economic systems and open societies in which helpful new
ideas can flourish. Freedom is the West's foundation for peace. But
neither technological advantage nor improved security flow automati-
cally from conditions that support them. We must actively cultivate
and protect our technological edge.
The United States is not caught up with the Soviet Union in some
spiraling competition that can lead only to more arms and greater
budgetary burdens. In fact, from the West's resolve to ensure our
security can flow the incentives for our adversaries to agree to
diminish their stockpile of arms and curb their aggressive behavior.
The Reagan Administration is firmly committed to the achievement of
meaningful, verifiable arms reductions. Unfortunately, we cannot
predict our success at arms agreements because we do not know how
seriously the Soviets will bargain. We do know, as history has
shown, that successful bargaining with the Soviets takes patience
and firmness. We will continue in future years to take every
opportunity to obtain genuine arms reductions. Recent Soviet
actions do give us some cause for hope. We trust we will not again
be disappointed.
Optimism about the future prospects of peace and freedom is rein-
forced by renewed confidence in America's leadership in the world.
Supporting that leadership role, is a broad-based, bipartisan consen-
sus that we must be strong to protect ourselves and our interests;
that realism, not wishful thinking, is the only basis for evaluating
our adversaries; that we must deal with the world as it is, not as
we would like it to be; that uncomfortable facts of modern life, like
nuclear weapons or terrorism, cannot be wished away; and that genuine
arms reductions are achievable if we have patience and determination.
More reassuring and cost-effective security is our nation's hope
and this Department's mandate. This document highlights what we are
doing, and what we need to do, to achieve that end. The key to pro-
gress in all we seek, from correcting our military vulnerabilities
to attaining arms reduction agreements, is the resolve to stay mili-
tarily strong, maintaining the deterrent and defense necessary to
preserve peace and freedom.
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Part 11
Defense Resources
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A. THE DEFENSE BUDGET
1. Introduction
Too often overlooked in any discussion of defense requirements
is the overriding purpose of America's military forces, that is, to
guarantee and maintain peace. It is not really so incongruous that
the weapons and equipment that we plan for and buy each year, while
implements of war, are also guarantors of peace. Without a firm
national resolve reinforced by a strong military force, our adver-
saries would have no incentive to temper their increasingly global
incursions or to negotiate arms reduction. Therefore, America's
military forces assume an important function in international
diplomacy. In fact, the military's role of peacekeeper is equal
in importance to its traditional role of warfighter.
The worldwide presence of our troops in international peacekeep-
ing forces, other deployments, and our ships strategically placed in
the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Caribbean all bear witness to
America's commitment to the pursuit of peace worldwide. As the
Soviets and their allies have projected their military power across
the globe, it has been even more crucial that we establish and main-
tain our own military forces on a global basis. Our naval fleets
provide a mobile and impressive presence underscoring our resolve to
preserve our national interests and those of our allies. Obviously,
this peacekeeping role is dependent upon the existence of a military
force of sufficient capability to defend our interests against mili-
tary threats and foreign aggression. The defense program is designed
to meet our worldwide commitments and still provide for increased
modernization, improved sustainability, and guaranteed readiness.
It reflects security requirements based upon Soviet intentions and
capabilities. It is not precisely the program we would most like
to have if we lived in a world in which we could make our defense
program decisions unilaterally. Unfortunately, we do not live in
such a world, so our defense budget and programs are driven by grow-
ing Soviet worldwide capabilities.
The determination of the level and mix of budget resources neces-
sary to meet our security requirements is a difficult and complex
task. It involves detailed planning, programming, and budgeting
efforts at all levels of the Department of Defense. Fundamental to
the development of our defense objectives is the determination of the
national security requirements of our foreign policy goals and the
threats to those objectives. We must develop a strategy to achieve
those objectives and identify the manpower, logistics, and materiel
requirements to implement that strategy. Finally, we must determine
the total level of resources necessary to fund these requirements and
their most effective allocation. But even then the process does not
stop, for once we receive these resources from the Congress, we must
make sure that they are spent efficiently.
Substantial resources are required to preserve and enhance the
security of our nation. As history clearly reflects, when there is
an extended period of inadequate funding for our national defense,
a deterioration of our military capabilities occurs. The funding
requirements to restore these capabilities then become even larger
and more burdensome. This is exactly the situation we faced in
1981. As Chart II.A.1 shows, DoD budget authority declined during
most of the 1970s. The resultant deterioration in the combat readi-
ness and equipment modernization of our forces, combined with an
unprecedented growth in Soviet military spending during the same
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period, had a detrimental effect on our ability to counter threats
to our security. Therefore, we must invest increasingly greater
levels of resources for defense to rebuild our military strength.
Chart //.A.1
Reps/ Growd~ In DoD Bt~d~et Au>tihorigr
There was strong congressional and public support for the view
that while the nation cannot afford to provide a limitless amount of
resources for national defense, it must provide whatever is needed
to ensure the future security of our economic and political institu-
tions. The Congress became a full partner in this effort and sup-
ported more than 12 percent real growth in defense budgets for both
FY 1981 and FY 1982. From FY 1983 to FY 1985, growth in defense
budgets increased as well, but at a much lower rate. This was due,
in part, to the perceived need by the Congress to trim defense spend-
ing, along with other federal spending, as part of the overall fiscal
constraint necessary to control the federal budget deficit. However,
the slowing pattern of growth reflects an evident weakening of con-
gressional commitment to continued support for the necessary levels
of defense funding.
As a result, there has been a loss of momentum in our efforts to
achieve our national security goals, and there is considerable con-
cern that a continuation of this loss will eventually undermine the
improvements we have made thus far and will indefinitely defer and
make more expensive the achievement of an adequate national security
posture.
The defense improvements that are currently under way are sig-
nificant, and we are accruing many benefits from this substantial
investment in our future security. A heightened state of readiness,
a very high level of morale and combat-effectiveness in our military
personnel, and a firm foundation in our modernization program all
demonstrate the worth of that investment. Our willingness and
ability to support U.S. security interests worldwide have met with
the approval and support of our allies. Faced with this increased
resolve, the Soviets, following a period of aggression in the mid- to
late 1970s, have realized no geopolitical victories in the last four
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years. But, there is the fear that, having accomplished so much, we
may again become complacent and impatient with the continuation of
the long, difficult, and expensive task of regaining our deterrent
capabilities and studying how to obtain and deploy a thoroughly
reliable strategic defense. The Soviets feel they can always outwait
us. In doing so, they hope to prevent "impatient democracies" from
achieving their goals.
We now face a critical point in our rebuilding program. Our
challenge is to sustain the progress we have made to date as we con-
tinue the steady march toward our goals. The programs provided for
in the FY 1986 defense budget are a necessary part of our ability to
meet that challenge.
The FY 1986 defense budget builds upon the foundation laid in
FY 1982-85. It reflects not only our efforts to increase the level
of national security but also ongoing efforts to improve the effi-
ciency of DoD expenditures and program execution. We have sought to
invest our resources wisely, to improve the way we do business, and
to attain more efficient production levels for our industrial base.
A few headlines (generated by our own audits of past years) notwith-
standing, significant progress has been made within DoD in achieving
not only more defense but more defense for the dollar. This budget
represents our continued emphasis upon good management practices.
It reflects known and anticipated benefits from long-term institu-
tional changes designed to address fraud and mismanagement. This
is consistent with our stewardship role in providing adequate levels
of defense through the most efficient use of our nation's resources.
2. Components of the FY 1986 DoD Budget
Teb/e /LA.1
De~prr6r;*sr~t of D~silfsr~ss Baa~st
fS Bi///onsl
Current-Year Dollars
FY 1984
FY 1986
FY 1886
Total Obligational
Authority ROAN
258.2
285.3
314.4
Budget Authority IBAW
258.2
284.7
313.7
Outlays?
220.8
246.3
277.5
FY 1886 Dollars
Total Obligational
Authority (TOAp
279.6
296.7
314.4
Budget Authority IBAW
279.5
296.1
313.7
Outlays
238.3
256.1
277.5
Tote/ Ob/igationa/ Audxxity fTOAI represents the value of the direct defense program for
each fiscal year, regardless of the method of financing.
b Budget Authority /BAl permits the obligation of funds for immediate and future
disbursement and is associated with the year the authority takes effect. Generally the
difference between TOA and BA stems from the application of receipts that offset total
budget authority.
Oudeys represent actual expenditures. less than 62 percent of FY 1986 outlays will resuk
from FY 1986 budget authority; the remainder will come from budget authority provided in
earlier years.
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a. Overview
The President's defense budget, shown in Table II.A.1, proposes
budget authority (BA) of $313.7 billion for FY 1986. This represents
an increase of $29 billion over FY 1985. The tables in Appendix A
provide budget data by appropriation title and by component in cur-
rent and FY 1986 constant dollars.
The distribution of FY 1986 BA by major appropriation title
and FY 1986 outlays by source of spending is shown in Chart II.A.2.
Operating costs, including Military Personnel (MP) and Operations
and Maintenance (0&M) appropriations, represent about 50 percent of
DoD's budget authority. This category includes: payments to mili-
tary and civilian personnel and the accrued retirement cost of the
current military force, allocations for maintenance and repair of
equipment, and for utilities, medical costs, training, petroleum and
lubricants, and spare parts.
Chart //.A.2
FY 1~ Do,D BaaQp~st
(Do//ars in Bi//ionsl
ProcursmeM
3108.8
other
3t 7.7
Milkary
Psreonnel`
373.1
Opsretion end
Maintenance
182.6
Total $313.7
Budget Authority
by Title
`Includse RNired Psy Accrwl Costs
Current
CunsM Ysar Year
Invsetment Opsratlons
_~ _ 578.1
Pay`
3718.8
Total $277.5
Outlays by Source
of Spending
The remainder of the budget contains funds for investment in
research and development (R&D), procurement of weapons systems, and
military construction and family housing. Of particular importance
is the continued development of state-of-the-art, high technology
defense systems.
Outlays in FY 1986 again will go primarily for current year oper-
ations (7.0 percent), pay and pay-related items (42.8 percent), and
prior year investment requirements (38.3 percent). Current year
operations relate to the base structure and support costs. Outlays
from prior year programs represent amounts already on contract and
are largely a function of procurement and RED investments made in
previous years. Only 11.9 percent will be spent on new investment
programs.
The FY 1986 budget again provides for real growth in all cate-
gories of the defense program (Chart II.A.3).
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Chart //.A.3
DOD Bu~dyot S/>~-ss
(Budget Authority in FY f986 Do//arsJ
Tsai iss2
Fiscal Year
b. Personnel
The FY 1986 budget includes $103.3 billion to pay our military
and civilian personnel. This represents an increase of 1.5 percent
in real terms and includes a 1.2 percent growth in Active Component
military strength. These added personnel are needed to operate and
maintain new weapons systems being deployed as part of our moderni-
zation program. Selected Reserve strength will increase by 4.4
percent. This increase will provide further enhancement to our
mobilization readiness and warfighting capability, as the Reserve
Components provide continued depth and balance to the responsiveness
and flexibility of the active force. Civilian strength will increase
by 1.7 percent. It is significant that all of our manpower and per-
personnel-related costs total about 45 percent of our budget that
the comparable figure in the Soviet military budget is between 10
and 15 percent.
c. Operating Costs
The steady upgrading in the operation and support of our forces
to improve readiness and sustainability will continue in FY 1986.
Further improvements in materiel readiness are expected as a result
of the increased procurement of spares and repair parts, equipment
maintenance and modification, and other logistical support. Increased
funding will be provided for base maintenance and repair programs.
The Army and Air Force will increase flying hours in FY 1986.
The Navy will fund a further increase in ship modernization, fleet
outfitting, and aviation depot level repairable parts programs.
These increases will enhance the training of all our military per-
sonnel in tactical operations and in the operation of sophisticated
weapons.
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The FY 1986 budget provides for the continued buildup of major
and secondary item war reserves in Europe and the further upgrading
of existing communications facilities. Increased training and
education of officer and enlisted personnel for initial skill and
skill progression are to be funded, and much needed improvements are
planned for the seriously deteriorating condition. of training and
medical plant property.
d. /nvestment
Critical improvements to the modernization of our conventional
and strategic forces will be funded in FY 1986. Investment funding,
(i.e., procurement, R&D, and military construction) will increase
almost 10 percent in real terms. We are emphasizing ground forces
modernization by continuing the procurement of 840 M1 tanks and 716
Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems for the Army.
Significant progress has been made in our shipbuilding program
in the past three years. The budget provides for a total deployable
battle force of 551 ships. In FY 1986, we will fund 28 ships,
including 5 ballistic missile and attack submarines, 3 cruisers, 3
amphibious ships, 8 mine warfare ships, and 9 support ships.
We will continue to modernize and expand our tactical air forces.
In support of these plans, and to continue the modernization of
existing units, we are requesting funding for 400 additional tactical
aircraft for the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Also,
we will continue development of a wide range of tactical programs in
order to achieve a balanced conventional warfare capability.
This budget continues to implement the President's program to
modernize and upgrade all aspects of our strategic forces against a
threat that has made significant technological progress in recent
years. We plan to continue our commitment to procure several major
strategic programs such as the Peacekeeper missile, B-1B bomber, and
the Trident nuclear submarine.
The FY 1986 budget request for research, development, testing,
and evaluation (RDT&E) reflects real growth of over 20 percent and
is highlighted by continuing investment in defense technologies. Of
particular importance is continuing research on the Strategic Defense
Initiative and developmental work on a small single-warhead intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to ensure the credibility of our
deterrent strength into the 1990x.
The Military Construction Appropriation (MCA) request will con-
tinue the progress we have made in overcoming prior years' inadequate
funding. The modernization of our physical plant and improvements
to working and living conditions for our Service personnel are high
priorities.
Resources are again provided for the key acquisition initiatives.
The budget request includes 6 major multiyear procurements to allow
economical lot buys and the more efficient use of production resources.
Productivity improvement projects for modernization of tools and
equipment for our in-house production operations have been funded.
Resources are budgeted for manufacturing technology programs, which
develop innovative, more productive processes for manufacturing
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defense materiel. While these innovations require large near-term
expenditures, they should achieve significant outyear savings in
major systems costs. They are examples of our commitment to the
long-term efficient use of defense resources.
3. Price-Level Assumptions
The level of funding required to accomplish programs in FY 1986
and beyond is dependent on the course of inflation in the intervening
years. Estimates of the future impact of inflation on the defense
budget are prepared on the basis of guidance furnished by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB). The gross national product (GNP)
deflator is used for all purchases of goods and services except major
weapons systems and fuel. Special weapons systems commodity inflation
estimates have been used since the FY 1983 budget and are based on
analyses of historical trends of defense inflation published by the
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), as part
of the offical GNP statistics. Special estimates are also used for
purchases of fuel due to the potential volatility of fuel prices.
The use of these special deflators is a major factor in ensuring
that DoD's thorough financial management protects the funding integ-
rity of its programs by properly programming for inflation. The
budgets for acquisition programs now are prepared in a manner that
enables the Congress and others to see what the likely, fully funded
costs will be, based on appropriate inflation expectations for several
years in the future. This change puts more realistic cost estimates
up front, where they should be, and is clearly an important component
of improved acquisition management.
One of the most important benefits of the current economic
recovery has been the dramatic decline in the rate of inflation.
Today, prices are increasing in the general economy at a rate less
than one-half that experienced in 1981. Even though price increases
for many defense weapons systems have not declined as sharply during
the last three years, the progress made in fighting inflation has
played a very positive role in our efforts to meet national security
goals with fewer budget dollars. The FY 1986-90 program reflects the
assumption that this favorable trend will continue. However, because
of the unique nature of price changes for many defense commodities,
reductions to the defense budget due to lower inflation trends will
be monitored closely to prevent possible underfunding of programs.
4. Budget Trends
The FY 1986 budget continues the well planned growth in defense
resources begun in FY 1981 in comparison to the continuous no-growth
trend through much of the 1970s when defense spending did not keep
up with the level of inflation (Chart II.A.4).
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Chart //.A.4
DoD Budget Trends
(/n FY 1986 Do//arsJ
~~ ~ ~
R~e~.
~. ~ ~?re.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~..~ bye
~ ; . ,~.
~,
:
Outlays
~~
~.m
To be sure, total federal spending has grown significantly over
the past 20 years. However, this growth was characterized by a
dramatic shift from defense to nondefense spending. The defense
share of federal outlays, which was more than 50 percent in FY 1955,
will be only about 30 percent in FY 1986 (left figure, Chart II.A.S).
Chart //. A.5
DoD Budget and
Totes/ Fedeia/ Outlays
Budget Shares Outlays (FY 1986 SI
% ct Federal ~!u#lsys
10 ~~ ~ ~ i~
+ii ~ ~' ?~ V '~' r ~ '~
0
5o?s so?g 7o?S so s1 az as as e5 es
Fiscal Year
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Fiscal Year
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 i
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The Defense Budget
Even with the continuing buildup, defense spending will account for
less than 33 percent of the federal budget in FY 1990. The trend in
nondefense spending has been exactly the opposite. It comprised less
than 50 percent of total federal outlays in FY 1955, but will repre-
sent more than 70 percent of the budget in FY 1986. These trends are
further highlighted in the right figure of Chart II.A.S. Nondefense
federal payments adjusted for inflation have increased precipitously
since 1970, reflecting a continuous rising trend in payments to indi-
viduals. Conversely, defense spending declined during most of the
1970s and has only experienced sustained growth since 1981. In fact,
in FY 1986 it will be only slightly higher than the 1968 level.
It is also important to note that the recent growth in defense
requirements has not taken a disproportionate share of the nation's
wealth. The defense share of the nation's output of goods and
services (GNP), based on the current estimates for defense outlays
and economic growth, will average only slightly more than 7 percent
over the next five years (left figure, Chart II.A.S). This is well
below the peacetime 1950s and the early 1960x. Should the economy
grow faster than currently forecasted, the defense share of GNP could
be even less. Defense shares of the federal budget and economic
aggregates are shown in Appendix A.
5. Defense Spending and Economic Recovery
It is apparent from available data on the current recovery that
the nation's economy is accommodating the Administration's defense
program and is also achieving sustained growth without creating
employment problems, inflationary pressures, or supply shortages.
The unemployment rate is declining steadily while employment levels
are at all-time highs. Inflation has been more than halved since
1981 and continues at a moderate rate. Industrial capacity utili-
zation continues to expand, and supply bottlenecks are rare and of
short duration. These conditions apply to both defense-related as
well as nondefense industries, and we expect this favorable trend
to continue.
Studies, such as the exhaustive review done by the Department
of Commerce on industrial capacity and the defense buildup, have
shown that industry in general will easily continue to be able to
accommodate our rebuilding program. There may be occasional spot
shortages in certain industries, but they are not widespread and
should not lead to significant labor or material shortages that
could impede either our defense program or our overall economic
growth. Therefore, we believe that our defense program complements
the other aspects of the President's Economic Recovery Program and
will continue to do so in the future.
But, even as we are well into our revitalization program, the
prospect of continuing high deficits increases pressure to lower the
level of resources available to meet our defense commitments. While
no one contends there is any lessening of the military threat we
face, some critics argue that large reductions in defense spending
must be made, not because they are wrong or unnecessary, but simply
to lower future federal deficits. The federal deficit situation is,
of course, a very real concern, but it is quite wrong to conclude
that the defense buildup is the primary cause of that situation.
Other factors, both on the receipt and outlay side, have influenced
the level of deficits far more than the recent upward trend in
defense budgets. For example, the growth in nondefense spending
during the past two decades has dwarfed that of defense spending.
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Also, since we first announced our increased defense program in
FY 1981, there have been significant reductions to planned increases
in defense spending, primarily due to concerns about the deficit.
It is important to understand the economic effect of the budget
because it requires a commitment of the nation's resources. There-
fore, we will continue to evaluate the relationship of defense spend-
ing and the economy and develop our defense plans as economically and
efficiently as possible. The defense budget is neither the primary
tool of economic stabilization policy, nor a jobs program. What's
more, it should not be used solely to stimulate industrial develop-
ment. We must remember that defense spending does indeed produce
both jobs and tax revenues. Cutting the defense budget does not
automatically cut the deficit by the same amount.
The primary responsibility of a defense budget must be to provide
our military forces with the resources necessary to counteract the
threats to our security and to perform their peacetime role as an
instrument of diplomacy and world stability. We cannot afford to
prepare a defense budget that helps meet short-term, economic, non-
defense goals, but does not meet our short- and long-term security
goals. To do so would be ineffective economic policy and would be a
very dangerous way to provide for our national defense.
6. Conclusion
The President's FY 1986 to FY 1990 defense program, shown in
Table II.A.2, continues the commitment to meet our nation's security
goals. This program, which totals S2.0 trillion, is based on a care-
ful evaluation of the threats to our security and provides a balanced
mix of defense resources to implement our strategy for meeting these
threats.
Table /LA.2
FY 1~6 De~p~enbrien-t of Delbinse Buffet
Lor~Ra~n ps For+soasts
fS /n B////onsJ
Total, Current Dollars
313.7
354.0
401.6
438.8
477.7
Total, Constant
(lY 1986) Dollars
313.7
339.4
369.5
388.0
406.7
Percent Change
5.9
8.2
8.8
5.0
4.8
Outlays
Total, Current Dollars
277.5
312.3
348.6
382.3
418.3
Total, Constant
(FY 19861 Dollars
277.5
299.0
319.3
336.1
353.8
Percent Change
8.4
7.7
6.8
5.3
5.3
Composhe PaylPrice
Assumptions for Outlays
100.0
104.5
109.2
113.7
118.2
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Even though we have achieved much success over the last four
years, congressional reductions to requested funding levels have
lengthened the time necessary to complete our rebuilding program,
and this has increased the cost.
However, with sustained congressional and public support, we can
still complete our rebuilding program and achieve the goals we estab-
lished in FY 1981. This will require a renewed commitment on the
part of the Congress to address its share of the stewardship role for
our national defense. If we continue to receive resources that are
less than necessary, we will further delay our modernization program
and increase the risk of returning to unacceptably low levels of
military readiness. This five-year program precludes that from hap-
pening and is designed to meet both the short- and long-term require-
ments as efficiently and effectively as possible. So far as we can
tell now, it is imperative that we follow this course so that we may
continue the progress we have already made toward restoring American
leadership and preserving peace with freedom. If events change and
the Soviet threat significantly and verifiably diminishes, so can our
defense spending plans.
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B. MANAGEMENT REFORMS
1. Introduction: The Challenge of Management Reform
President Reagan took office four years ago with a promise to
cut the fat out of government. He did not make an exception for
the Department of Defense. While he was determined that defense
would have a greater claim on the nation's resources than in the
decade of neglect of the 1970s, it would not have a limitless claim.
To fulfill the President's pledge to restore America's military
strength, we were charged to get more defense from each defense
dollar.
During the 1970s the United States accumulated serious short-
falls in weapons and equipment, and much of what we had was becoming
increasingly obsolete compared to new Soviet hardware. Even when
new systems were acquired, they took too long to develop, cost too
much, and too often failed to meet our requirements. In order to
rebuild our forces as quickly and cost-effectively as possible, and
to ensure that the weapons we procured could perform when and where
they might be needed, we undertook a comprehensive program of manage-
ment reform.
This reform program faced several challenges. One was the sheer
scale of defense acquisition. In FY 1984 alone we entered into con-
tracts with thousands of firms, for a total of $146.2 billion. This
does not include the hundreds of thousands of earlier, ongoing con-
tracts involving hundreds of billions of dollars, which still must
be monitored.
These earlier contracts, indeed, present another challenge.
Many existing contracts were very bad contracts from the government's
viewpoint. For example, contractors were permitted to retain pro-
prietary data rights indefinitely, making it very difficult to
encourage competition, and enabling contractors to charge sometimes
unreasonable prices for vitally needed spare parts.
Likewise, many inherited programs were already over budget and
behind schedule. The first Trident submarine, for example, was 22
months behind schedule when it arrived. We have been working to cor-
rect these problems. The last four Trident submarines, for example,
were delivered to the Navy four to seven weeks early, and the ships
now under construction are on or ahead of schedule. Some other
troubled programs now back on track include the M1 tank engine, the
Tomahawk cruise missile, and the Los Angeles-class submarine.
A final and even more basic challenge to our defense acquisition
reform program is the continuing need to balance competing management
goals.
Our weapons acquisition programs must respond to changes in our
national security interests and the threats to those interests, as
well as to innovations in technology, strategy, and tactics. For
these reasons weapons acquisition must remain flexible; yet it
often takes 15 years for a system to move from the drawing board
to the field. During this time, program stability is the key to
containing cost growth. Good management, then, requires balancing
flexibility and stability.
As a nation with worldwide interests, we must be prepared to meet
a broad spectrum of potential conflicts. Therefore, the acquisition
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process is crowded witn programs, each of which places legitimate
demands upon our limited resources. Too many programs, however,
force managers to make difficult choices between competing priorities.
Sometimes this results in decisions to cancel or stretch-out programs
that, under better budgetary circumstances, should be allowed to con-
tinue undisturbed.
Reducing the time it takes to acquire a weapon system also
involves a variety of managerial dilemmas. Developing several com-
ponents of a system concurrently, for example, can shorten acquisi-
tion time significantly. However, it also heightens program risk
and can add major costs. Entering production too early may lead to
costly and time-consuming changes if tests reveal new problems. On
the other hand, developing system components in strict sequence can
delay by years the time it takes to deploy a new system and may
render it obsolete before it is deployed.
Efforts to shorten acquisition time must also be balanced against
the need for comprehensive planning. Our management reforms emphasize
planning early to ensure that we provide for such critical factors as
logistics support, competition, capital investment, test equipment
funding, warranties, and the use of simplified specifications and
standards. While these will save money, they may increase the time
required for the early phase of program planning. Traditionally,
the early phase of a program is most susceptible to stretch-out.
Other tradeoffs between short-term costs and long-term savings
affect many of our management reforms. Multiyear procurement, eco-
nomic production rates, improved support and readiness, and even
competition generally require higher initial investments to achieve
eventual savings. In FY 1986, for example, we are requesting addi-
tional resources for multiyear programs, with estimated long-term
savings of $1.3 billion. These additional up-front costs, however,
increase the demands on the current budget, already under greater
pressure than the out-years.
These challenges have not discouraged us. We have pressed for-
ward with our acquisition reform efforts, making great progress in a
short period. We have also come to a clearer understanding of the
nature and scope of today's most pressing acquisition problems. Our
commitment to achieve even higher levels of efficiency and effective-
ness through further reforms of the acquisition process and greater
efforts to identify and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse remain
undiminished.
2. Reforming the Defense Acquisition Process
In March 1981, I ordered a sweeping review of the defense acqui-
sition process. Our investigative team was asked to undertake a
forthright analysis of DoD's management weaknesses, to present a plan
to reduce costs and acquisition time, and to increase the stability
and efficiency of defense acquisition. The result was the Defense
Acquisition Improvement Program (DAIP).
The record shows that we have taken major strides toward achiev-
ing our management reform objectives during the past four years. The
nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office has estimated that annual
cost growth on selected major systems has been reduced from 14 percent
in CY 1980 to only 1 percent by the end of FY 1983. Several important
programs (e.g., aircraft carriers and the B-1B bomber) are now on or
ahead of schedule. We have simplified and streamlined the acquisition
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process in accordance with sound management principles. We have
increased competition, improved readiness levels, and met support
requirements. Finally, despite continued problems with program
instability, caused in no small part by budget cutbacks, we have
introduced a number of measures, such as multiyear procurement,
that will improve program stability.
a. Situp/ifying Acquisition Decisionmaking
Our FY 1981 defense acquisition review revealed that our planning
and acquisition process had become overburdened with paperwork and
excessive regulation, leaving senior defense managers with little
time to focus on such major problems as cost control. In response
we have simplified the acquisition process considerably.
By doubling the dollar thresholds that define a major program
(which had been set in FY 1974 and remained unchanged despite almost
100 percent inflation) to $200 million in research and development
and $1 billion in procurement, we have ensured that senior managers
review only the highest priority programs. Programs that formerly
met the threshold definition, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile
and the Rattler antiarmor weapon, have been delegated back to their
respective Services for regular management review.
We have also reduced to two the number of milestone decision
reviews of major systems. What was once the first milestone has now
been incorporated into an annual review of new program proposals con-
ducted by a strengthened and expanded Defense Resources Board. There
it can be examined in the context of our entire defense program and
overall budget constraints. Unless major cost or schedule thresholds
established at Milestone II have been breached, the Milestone III
production decision is retained by the parent Service. This enables
us to give closer scrutiny to major systems.
Special emphasis has also been placed on tailoring program speci-
fications and standards to the minimum essential to meet objectives.
Our goal is to avoid unnecessary costs and delays from specifications
and standards that are not truly essential. Twelve pilot programs,
including the Advanced Tactical Fighter, the LHX light rotorcraft,
and the JVX Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft, have been
selected for application of this tailoring initiative. Already we
have achieved significant savings in applying this initiative to the
Navy's new trainer program, the VTXTS.
b. The Defense Acquisition /mprovement Program (DA/PJ
The DAIP was the product of our initial review of the defense
acquisition process. In April 1981, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
issued 32 management initiatives. A subsequent review of how these
initiatives were being implemented led us to focus on six major
areas: program stability, multiyear procurement, economic produc-
tion rates, realistic budgeting, improved readiness and support, and
greater competition.
(1) Program Stability
Ultimately, improving the affordability of defense programs
depends on achieving greater program stability. Arbitrary changes to
programs cost the taxpayer billions of additional dollars as programs
are redesigned, stretched out, or interrupted to meet near-term
budgetary demands. The Services have instituted important management
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improvements aimed at discouraging and eliminating arbitrary changes
to programs. The Army and Air Force baseline management programs
ensure that only essential changes are introduced into a program.
The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force personally review proposed
changes to their programs. Certain high priority programs are sub-
ject to frequent Secretarial Program Reviews, where proposed changes
must be approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. As
a result of these reviews, for example, we have rejected some expen-
sive engineering modifications proposed for the B-1B bomber.
During the past three years, we have also improved overall afford-
ability and contributed to greater stability by reducing the number of
approved new programs from 15 in FY 1983 to only one new program in
the FY 1986 budget. The Integrated Electronic Warfare System (INEWS)
included in the FY 1986 budget is a high priority Joint Service pro-
gram to develop a self-protection system for the Air Force's Advanced
Tactical Fighter and for the Navy's Advanced Tactical Aircraft. Other
high priority programs approved in recent years include the Navy's
next generation attack submarine and the inner-zone antisubmarine war-
fare helicopter; the Army's Antitactical Missile (ATM) and Multiple-
Launch Rocket System (MLRS); and the Air Force's Advanced Tactical
Fighter (ATF) and space surveillance programs.
Chet //.B.1
DoD A~preved
New Starts
1983
Fisca/ Year
While these and other priority programs have been approved, the
number of programs for which approval has been withheld has gone up
during the past two years. Two of the programs proposed in FY 1985
were not approved. This year, four new program candidates were not
approved. These decisions represent our best judgement about the
appropriate balance between meeting essential security needs and
satisfying budgetary constraints.
We have also sought to cancel and reduce lower priority programs.
We continually review existing acquisition programs to identify any
that give us marginal capabilities at high cost, duplicate other pro-
grams, or involve unacceptable development risks with the potential
for major cost increases.
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Unfortunately, the systematic efforts being made within DoD to
improve program stability have often been offset by the impact of
budgetary constraints and other actions taken by the Congress. For
example, as a result of budget reductions, the FY 1985 amended budget
contained 12 additional program stretch-outs that will raise the
total costs of these programs. Indeed, almost every line item in our
annual budget submission is adjusted on a regular basis by one of the
several congressional committees that review the defense budget.
Congressional understanding of the hidden costs of arbitrary program
changes is required to achieve greater program stability and better
cooperation between DoD and the Congress.
(2) Multiyear Procurement
Multiyear procurement can reduce long-term costs by enabling con-
tractors to purchase materials in more economical lot buys. It also
encourages program stability, another management goal. We have
already saved over $4 billion from multiyear procurement, and we
believe that, with continued congressional cooperation, the potential
exists for far greater savings in this area.
In the FY 1985 budget we proposed 12 multiyear candidates for a
savings of $1.1 billion. Of these, nine programs, for a savings of
$1 billion, were approved. Overall, the Congress has approved 32
programs for multiyear contract starts since FY 1982, including two
F-16 airframe contracts (savings: $256.8 million and $358.3 million,
respectively), the MLRS (savings: $209.1 million), the KC-10 aircraft
(savings: $658 million), and the B-1B bomber (savings: $1,188.2
million). This year's budget contains an additional six programs
(the LHD amphibious assault ship, MK-46 torpedo, P-3C, M1 engine, M1
fire control system, and T-700 engine) for estimated savings of $1 .3
billion over annual procurements of these systems. In the 1986 bud-
get we propose 6 multiyear candidates with a savings of $1.3 billion.
Chart //. B.2
Multiyear
Procurement
Requested
18
~p~ n
y 10
E
LI
1982 1983 1984 1986 1986
Fiscal Year
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(3) Economic Production Rates
Initial progress through this initiative was very gratifying.
In FY 1983 we achieved $2.3 billion in unit cost savings for 18 pro-
grams by producing them at rates that take advantage of economies of
scale. For example, the AIM-9M air-to-air missile unit cost was
reduced from $178,000 in FY 1981 to $83,000 when the procurement
quantity was increased six-fold. Higher production rates also sig-
nificantly reduced costs for the F-16 and F-14A aircraft.
However, since budget restrictions have reduced acquisition
resources more than $100 billion below planned levels for FY 1983-87,
we have been unable to achieve additional comparable economies. Dur-
ing the past two years we have added only $500 million in savings.
Reducing unit costs through more efficient production requires full
budgetary support. In 1986, our plans are to save $100 million by
this method, if the Congress approves.
Another approach to reducing unit costs emphasizes the produci-
bility of a design during the full-scale engineering development
phase. Most of our early operational difficulties stem from failure
to make an efficient transition from development to production. The
unfortunate result has been higher-than-programmed unit production
costs and operational support costs. We have two new DoD directives
governing this transition from development to production, and a
new DoD manual has been drafted that is aimed at assessing -- and
reducing -- a program's production risk.
(4) Realistic Budgeting
One of the problems plaguing defense acquisition in recent years
has been a tendency to understate the ultimate cost of a program.
Sometimes a contractor offers a low bid to win a contract, confident
that as costs rise so will payments from the Department of Defense.
This is one reason we have increased the use of fixed-price con-
tracts. Last year, 82 percent of all military procurement dollars
were under fixed price contracts, up from 75 percent three years ago.
In times of budgetary restriction, moreover, the Services may
choose to rely only on the most optimistic cost forecasts, underesti-
mating the risks of cost growth in a program. For this reason, we
are making greater use of independent cost estimates to achieve more
accurate cost projections. During preparation of the FY 1986 budget,
27 programs were independently reviewed.
(5) Improved Readiness and Integrated Logistics Support
Reducing costs and acquisition time for major systems is a top
management priority. But we must also be careful not to wait until
a system is nearing deployment before we consider what kind of inte-
grated logistics, manpower, and training support it will require --
and how much this support will add to the cost of the system. We
must invest now to improve the reliability of our new systems and
reduce their maintenance burden. All three Services have implemented
programs to review support and readiness requirements in the early
stages of development. Readiness objectives are now being assigned
to all new programs as they enter the acquisition process, and these
objectives are tracked at each milestone review, as well as during
the program budget review. In addition, we have systematically
reviewed the logistics support requirements and funding for 29 of
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our major systems over the past few years, and we have made the
necessary budgetary adjustments to fulfill requirements.
(6) Competition
Probably no reform holds greater promise for reducing costs and
improving quality than enhanced competition. Competition encourages
risk-taking and innovation; at the same time, it offers an incentive
for controlling costs and speeding production. Competition also
helps preserve our defense industrial base and, therefore, our
mobilization capacity.
We have made encouraging progress in expanding competition. For
example, contracts for 19 of 22 ships were competitively awarded in
FY 1984. Savings included $228 million on the Aegis cruiser and
$108 million on the Los Angeles-class submarine. In fact, in FY 1984
we saved enough money through competition and tough bargaining to
finance the entire cost of renovating the battleship USS MISSOURI --
despite earlier criticism that our estimates were too optimistic.
Likewise, competition for a new fighter aircraft engine not only
pushed costs below the initial estimates but also provided DoD with
impressive warranties. The fighter engine contract also provides for
future competition for replacement spare parts.
We are working to identify areas where competition has not yet
been exploited. The Deputy Secretary has asked the Services to look
at all major programs expected to enter full-scale development within
the next two years to identify greater competition opportunities.
The Services have also been asked to identify additional investment
needed to encourage competition -- a recognition that competition,
like so many management reforms, often requires greater up-front
spending. For example, it is sometimes desirable to keep a con-
tractor who has lost an initial development bid involved in a pro-
gram that might later be produced competitively. However, unless
the eventual production quantities are sufficiently large, this
investment in competition may not be recouped in eventual savings.
In addition, the Services and Defense Agencies have appointed
almost 600 competition advocates, individuals who have institutional
interest in identifying potential areas where competition can be
introduced. Among the changes in defense acquisition successfully
proposed by competition advocates are: establishing a second pro-
duction source or accelerating second-sourcing for the Phoenix and
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) programs; opening the engineering
development contract for a major avionics upgrade to the P-3 aircraft
to competition (the first time competition has ever been applied to
the P-3 program); and developing a second production source for the
MARK 21 reentry vehicle for the Peacekeeper program.
c. Spare Parts /nitiatives
Competition is also one of the keys to ending spare parts over-
pricing, another top reform priority of this Administration.
Overpricing of spare parts is not a new problem; studies as far
back as 1961 indicated that this was an area in which defense manage-
ment was ineffective. These problems were exacerbated during years
when replenishment of spare parts was a dangerously low priority.
The increasing age of our systems drove up the cost of spare parts,
as did the increasing technological sophistication of our new pro-
grams. Meanwhile, thousands of suppliers dropped out of the defense
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marketplace -- the number of aerospace suppliers alone dropped from
6,000 in FY 1967 to just over 3,000 in FY 1980. This reduced price
competition and, in some cases, required that parts for aging equip-
ment be redesigned and completely rebuilt. Above a11, the spare
parts purchasing system was fraught with such inefficiencies as small
lot buys, inequitable overhead costs, and over-engineering of parts.
For these reasons, the newly appointed Assistant for Review and
Oversight decided to undertake a major exploratory audit of aircraft
engine spare parts pricing. The problems revealed by this audit led
to a sweeping, Department-wide audit of spare parts pricing involving
over 400 auditors and consuming 18,000 auditor days. Although DoD
has received very little credit for uncovering these problems, our
audits and investigations gave us the information we needed to
institute a full-scale reform of spare parts acquisition practices.
In July 1983, I issued a ten point program for ending spare
parts abuses -- a program that included incentives for employees who
discover cost savings and stern disciplinary action against those
who allow abuses to continue; an aggressive effort to seek voluntary
refunds where mistakes were made and to refuse unjustified price
increases; additional audits and investigations; debarring of contrac-
tors who refuse to meet contracting standards; a strong commitment to
the competition advocate program; and greater attention to spares
problems. Above all, the program emphasized fundamental changes in
acquisition procedures to reform the entire system of spare parts
procurement.
Chart //.B.3
Sp~ar~e Parts S"Mry
You heard about the But did you hear that
5400 Claw Hammer - DoD Identified the Overcharge
and Obtained a Refund from
the Contractor.
5110 Diode - DoD Identified the Overcharge
and Obtained a Refund from
the Contractor.
59,000 Hexagonal Wrench - DoD Identified the Overcharge.
and Refused to Pay.
51,100 Plastic Stool Cap - DoD Identified the Overcharge,
Obtained a Refund, and Gave an
51,100 Award to the Air Force
Sergeant Who Challenged the
Price.
Our efforts are paying off. We have received over $2.1 million
in refunds from over 250 contractors and are seeking more. Three
hundred and seventy DoD personnel have received a total of $200,000
in awards for identifying over-pricing. Each Service has instituted
a new spare parts reform plan. The Army has increased spare parts
competition from 45 percent in FY 1981 to more than 55 percent in
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FY 1984. The Air Force Logistics Command saved more than $60 million
through spare parts competition in FY 1984. The Navy's program to
find alternative spare parts suppliers saved $53 million in FY 1984,
and two-thirds of the items reviewed for possible competition are now
being purchased competitively.
Some of the steps we are taking to reform spare parts contracts
and contracting procedures include:
Assigning additional personnel -- 3,500 in FY 1984 -- to
implement our spare parts reform initiatives;
Requiring contractors to identify the subcontractors from
whom they purchase spare parts. This enables us, in many
cases, to break out spare parts -- that is, to purchase
directly from the subcontractor at a lower rate;
Requiring contractors supplying items that are also sold
commercially to certify to DoD that their prices are as low
or lower than those charged to their "most favored customer;"
-- Performing intensive reviews of parts with an annual buy
requirement of $10,000 or more, to see if we can identify
parts that can be broken out for competition; and, in some
cases, using reverse engineering techniques to develop
competitive data packages;
-- Requiring contracting officer certification for the purchase
of any spare part with a price increase of more than 25 per-
cent in the last 12 months;
Buying
replenishment spare parts in conjunction
with
the
initial
million
production of a system -- a reform that
last year in its initial application;
saved
$188
-- Challenging contractor claims of proprietary rights to data
that prevent competition for spare parts;
-- Promoting the use of standard parts in the development and
production of a weapon system, allowing us to make more cost-
effective quantity buys;
-- Undertaking value engineering analyses to determine which
spare parts are "over-engineered" and could be produced more
simply and inexpensively; and
-- Establishing a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
position to oversee spares management within the entire
Department.
These spare parts initiatives, along with our other major acqui-
sition reforms, are helping us recover our long neglected military
strength at a lower cost and with greater efficiency. We have made
major contributions to improving the overall affordability of defense
programs; we have simplified the acquisition process; and we have
increased management accountability at all levels. We will always
face difficult choices between reducing costs and reducing acquisi-
tion time, between promoting stability and promoting flexibility,
and between undertaking promising development risks and undertaking
more thorough initial planning. Tradeoffs are inevitable; but,
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having established a firm management foundation through our acquisi-
tion reform programs, we are confident in the ability of the acquisi-
tion process to meet our security requirements while achieving the
efficiencies necessary to keep our economy strong.
3. Identifying and Curbing Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
During the past four years, we have witnessed dramatic improve-
ments in our ability to detect and curb waste, fraud, and abuse.
DoD improvements reflect the greater resources (2,000 additional
auditors and investigators) and higher level attention now being
given to these activities.
a. Office of the /nspector Genera/
(1) Audits
In April 1981, I established the position of Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Review and Oversight -- now the Office of
the Inspector General -- to ensure better coordination of DoD's
audits and investigations. Since then, over 68,000 internal audits
have been completed with a potential savings of over $7.9 billion.
Chart II.B.4
/nspector G EHarts to Curb Weste,
Fisur~ ~d Abuse in FY 1964
? Audits of Internal
-Reports Issued
18,532
Management of
-Potential Savings
52,714M
Defense Operations
and Programs
? Investigative Cases
-Cases Closed
15,837
- Cases Referred for
5,546
Prosecution or
Administrative Action
- Convictions
- Fines, Penalties,
Restitutions, and
Recoveries Collected
from Referrals to
548
Justice Department
518,031 M
Military Departments
511,151M
? DCAA Audits
-Reports Issued
61,081
- Net Savings from
Reports Closed
S7,400M
? Army Corps of
-Reports Issued
416
Engineers Con-
tract Audit
-Net Savings from
Reports Closed
520.1 M
? DoD Inspection
Organizations
-Reports
~ u,~ uz
? Follow-up Actions
-Audit Recommendations
63,351
Completed
-Estimated Savings
51,900M
? Defense Hotline
-Calls and Letters
Received
7,820
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A vital element in this success has been aggressive audit follow-
up -- long the Achilles' heel of our audit program. Thus far, 156,410
corrective actions have been completed on 50,939 DoD internal audit
reports, resulting in savings of $3.5 billion over the past three
years. For the same period, 2,350 corrective actions on 1,077 General
Accounting Office (GAO) reports have been taken, resulting in monetary
benefits of $4.6 billion. An additional 3,782 DoD and GAO reports
are being tracked with potential savings of $3.2 billion. The GAO
has praised Do D's increased responsiveness -- and DoD managers now
know that accepted audit recommendations must be implemented.
(2) Investigations
A three-pronged campaign is under way to protect the Department's
resources from unscrupulous individuals and corporations. The major
elements of the campaign are: increased resources to combat criminal
activity, including a new unit specializing in white collar crime;
unproved cooperation with the Department of Justice to increase the
number of prosecutions -- a special DoD/Justice Department Procure-
ment Fraud Unit has been established; and a new program to help DoD
employees prevent and detect criminal activities -- over 10,000 per-
sonnel have participated in the program to date.
During the past year, we placed increased emphasis on procure-
ment fraud involving major DoD contractors and providers of medical
services. For example, investigation of one corporation revealed
mischarging of labor hours from one contract to another. As a result,
the corporation paid $30,000 in fines, $650,000 in damages, and was
barred from recovering $300,000 in legal and defense fees. Another
investigation revealed that a contractor had falsely certified
required testing results of certain microchips purchased by govern-
ment agencies. A plea agreement was made in which the corporation
agreed to pay $247,000 in criminal fines and reimburse $105,000 for
the cost of prosecution, plus $1.4 million in damages and civil
penalties.
Cheri //.8.5
Susper~s~Ons and
Ds~6an?ants
goo
0
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The Department is now conducting a vigorous campaign to suspend
or debar individuals or corporations who abuse the procurement pro-
cess. The Department has made use of this powerful deterrent tool
over 1,000 times since FY 1980, 402 times in FY 1984 alone -- an
increase of 25 percent over the previous year.
During the past three years, the Department's criminal investi-
gative organizations have opened nearly 49,000 cases. About 20,000
of these cases have been referred for prosecution or administrative
action, and over 1,500 convictions have been obtained. More impor-
tantly, the trend is positive -- convictions increased 70 percent in
FY 1983 over the previous year.
To help our employees identify procurement fraud, on June 1,
1984, DoD published Indicators of Fraud in De artment of Defense Pro-
curement. This publication identi ies circumstances in w is raud
is likely to occur, shows how to detect fraud that has already
occurred, and outlines steps to take when fraud is uncovered.
More than 45,000 copies of this publication have been distributed.
In addition, more than 400 of our criminal investigators and auditors
and more than 2,000 procurement personnel have been given procurement
fraud detection training.
(3) Defense Hotline
In June 1981, we established a DoD Hotline to encourage reports
of waste, fraud, and abuse in defense programs. Since then we have
received over 23,000 calls or letters, of which more than 7,500
merited in-depth inquiry. Since May 1982, we have documented $3.5
million in savings from Hotline suggestions. Following are some
examples of important cases handled by the Hotline during the past
three years:
-- In a case developed from a Hotline tip, two employees of a
DoD contractor pleaded guilty to shipping falsely marked and
inferior quality materials and presenting fraudulent invoices.
The materials were used in armor plating for the battleship
USS NEW JERSEY and the space shuttle program. The employees
were sentenced to ten years in prison and five years
probation.
-- When a Hotline complaint reported that asphalt the floors
were being replaced with wood parquet in five senior officers'
quarters, action was taken to cancel the excessive work. A
direct savings of $10,680 was realized and indirect costs of
$17,750 were avoided.
-- Two Hotline-initiated inquiries showed that the Navy Ships
Parts Control Center at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, was
being overcharged for various spare parts. In the first
case, the contractor, while denying intentional over-pricing,
agreed to refund $3,271 to the government. In the second
instance, a one-time savings of $36,544 was realized. Future
purchases will cost about $9,000 less per unit.
-- A Hotline complaint focused attention on a sixfold increase
in the price of a navigational light. After a review, the
contractor refunded more than $30,000 to the government and
reduced other prices awarded under its blanket purchase
agreement. Eventually the blanket purchase agreement was
terminated and contract surveillance increased.
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b. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
DoD's worldwide contract audit activities are conducted by the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) -- a separate agency within DoD
reporting to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). In
FY 1984, the DCAA issued 61,081 audit reports, resulting in net sav-
ings of $7.4 billion. Likewise, in FY 1981-84, the DCAA reported 255
suspected contractor fraud cases. As the chart indicates, the number
of cases per year has increased more than four times from FY 1981 to
FY 1984. The percentage of audit exceptions sustained increased from
55 percent in FY 1981 to 65 percent in FY 1984.
Chart //.B.6
Defonse Contract Au~dit.ggrency
Number of Referrals for /nves6gation
~ss~ iss2 isas ~ssa
Fiscal Year
'Phe following efforts to improve efficiency and reduce costs
will be emphasized this year:
-- Conducting special systems and operations reviews of major
weapon systems contractors and subcontractors;
-- Using special computer software programs to provide direct
auditor access to contractors' computerized accounting
records;
-- Providing new guidelines to help auditors recognize fraudu-
lent pricing practices;
-- Emphasizing the evaluation and review of contractors' compen-
sation costs and salary escalation costs; and
-- Installing new agency-wide information systems that exploit
technological advances in automated equipment and software.
Effective management of DoD's worldwide contract audit operations
has achieved significant reductions in procurement spending as depicted
in Table II.B.1.
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Table 11.8.1
DoD Reduction in Procurement Spending -
12-Month Period Ending June 30
(Dollars in Millionsl
Examples of significant individual contract audit findings
include:
-- Audit of a $480 million fixed-price proposal resulted in a
$58 million savings to the government. A major portion of
the savings was attributable to historical differences
between vendor quotes and actual purchase orders.
- Audit of a change order proposal totaling $68.2 million
resulted in government net savings of $25.5 million.
Savings came primarily from identified duplications of
direct and indirect costs.
-- Examination of a $19 million fixed-price proposal for spare
parts resulted in net savings of approximately $3.5 million.
The audit disclosed that the contractor's proposed material
cost was significantly overstated due to application of
several inappropriate or incorrectly computed add-on factors.
4. Other Management Initiatives
a. /nterna/ Management Contro/ Program
Consistent with the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982, DoD has established the Defense Internal Management Control
Program. The purpose of this initiative is to identify and correct
management weaknesses before they can cause problems and to strengthen
management at every level, in line with our decentralized management
policy.
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Under the Internal Management Control Program, managers through-
out DoD are required to make a formal assessment of their depart-
ment's vulnerability to, and safeguards against, waste, fraud, and
abuse, and then to submit plans for strengthening internal controls.
Identifying and solving internal management problems will now be
part of every manager's performance review.
The Internal Management Control Program has top level support
throughout DoD. It is closely monitored by the Defense Council for
Integrity and Management Improvement, which is chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. During FY 1984 alone, 52,000 managers were
involved in assessing their organizations. Based on these assess-
ments, 29,710 intensive reviews of controls were conducted. Major
areas of material weakness that were identified include management
of foreign military sales; property management; cash and debt manage-
ment; and security, procurement, and accounting system certification.
In FY 1985 we will be working to correct these weaknesses.
b. Reform '88
Reform '88 is a long-range Presidential initiative to improve
administrative management within the Federal Government. Many of
the reforms already discussed in this section, such as improved
internal management controls, increased Inspector General audit
recoveries, and procurement reforms, are consistent with the Reform
'88 initiative.
Similarly, we are already seeing results from our efforts to
reduce administrative systems, improve the collection of debts owed
to the government, and manage revenues and disbursements.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense has established an Administra-
tive Systems Exchange Project to reduce the number of administrative
systems and to increase their commonality. For example, the Defense
Logistics Agency is currently operating a consolidated personnel/
payroll system. Similarly, the Services have initiatives aimed at
consolidating numerous pay and personnel systems into one personnel
system as well as a single payroll system per Service.
In the area of debt collection, we are developing guidance for
employing administrative and salary offsets, increasing the use of
credit bureaus and collection agencies, and helping other federal
agencies in collecting debts. For example, we are helping the
Department of Education collect student loans from DoD employees.
To improve cash management, DoD has made procedural changes
and improvements (e.g., Treasury Financial Communications System,
Direct Deposit/Electronic Fund Transfer, lockboxes, and automated
teller machines) that accounted for about $31.7 million in annual
savings during FY 1984.
5. The Grace Commission
When the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control was
established in June 1982, we viewed it as an opportunity for
identifying additional means of enhancing management efficiency.
Following the release of the Commission's reports, we embarked on
a comprehensive review of all defense-related recommendations.
As a result of this review, the Department is now moving aggres-
sively to implement Grace Commission recommendations. For example,
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we have already made improvements in stock positioning, freight bill
audits, airframe maintenance, and contract travel.
To expedite implementation of other Grace Commission recommen-
dations, we have issued guidance for improving basic acquisition
management activities such as acquisition planning, stability, and
prioritization; multiyear procurement; and economic production
rates. We have issued additional guidance in other areas such as
wholesale depot-level distribution functions, petroleum product
procurement, and improved inventory management.
The savings associated with these improvements have been
incorporated into our budget. DoD will continue its efforts to
ensure that all prudent recommendations are implemented.
6. Conclusion
- During the past four years, we have identified management prob-
lems within DoD and initiated reforms to eliminate these problems.
Of course our job is far from done. We will continue to uncover
problems, even as we continue to evaluate and, when necessary, revise
our management reforms. A comprehensive program to improve acquisi-
tion management, to end spare parts pricing abuses, and to curb
waste, fraud, and abuse is in place -- and, it is working.
Our challenge in the coming years will not be just to solve prob-
lems, but to prevent them. As we develop new weapons systems, we must
plan at the outset for competition, for efficient production, and for
adequate support and readiness. We must write tough contracts and
enforce them strictly. And we must examine our operations to see not
just where waste or fraud is occurring, but where it could occur --
and then see to it that the taxpayers' dollars are not squandered.
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C. READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY
1. Introduction
Over the past four years, we have greatly improved the combat
capabilities of both our active and reserve conventional forces --
an improvement essential to our deterrent and warfighting strategies.
Moreover, we have achieved this increased capability in a balanced
fashion, with improvements in each of the elements of capability:
readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure. While
our modernization programs and force structure initiatives may be
the most visible of our conventional forces' capability improvement
efforts, we have not neglected the equally important readiness and
sustainability elements, as some have contended. We recognize that
our forces, regardless of the technical sophistication of their equip-
ment, offer only illusory deterrent value if perceived as unable to
respond quickly and effectively, or unable to sustain themselves in
combat. We have therefore accorded readiness and sustainability
high priority in our defense resource allocations for the past four
years.
Overall, readiness and sustainability funding has increased from
$50.3 billion in FY 1981 to $80.4 billion in FY 1986, an increase of
50 percent in real terms. Despite our increased investment in modern-
ization during this period, readiness and sustainability have not been
sacrificed, but received essentially a constant share of total defense
funding.
These real increases for readiness and sustainability funding
have allowed us not only to realize significant progress in correct-
ing the deficiencies that existed in these areas four years ago, but
to achieve improved levels of readiness and sustainability with a
larger, considerably more modern force. The result is a conventional
force significantly more effective -- both as a deterrent and in war-
fighting capability. Some have used highly technical indices of
specific aspects of readiness to charge we have gained nothing by our
improvements. The real life practical answer is best given by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who summarized our progress:
By every common sense measure we are far more
ready now than in 1980 .... we have better people, they're
armed with more and better equipment, their training has
improved, and they have better support behind them.
And that makes fora readier force.
We will continue this progress with balanced improvements in each of
the elements of our conventional forces' combat capability.
This chapter discusses several specific areas of our materiel and
unit training readiness and sustainability improvements, assesses our
current posture, and identifies expectations for the future. Our
manpower, installations, and mobilization programs which contribute
to readiness and sustainability are discussed in separate chapters.
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2. Readiness
Our readiness objective is to provide and train personnel, and
equip our forces to a level that will enable them to achieve full
combat potential within tasked response times should a conflict
arise. We evaluate our achieved readiness in four basic areas:
-- E ui ment Fill: The amount of equipment (aircraft, tanks,
truccs, etc. we field relative to our combat requirement;
-- Equipment Condition: The operability of this fielded
equipment;
-- Personnel Fill: The availability of people, with the right
s i s an training for our force structure; and
-- Unit Training: How well our individual units are collec-
tively trained.
These readiness components require various resources that have dif-
ferent procurement lead-times as depicted in Table II.C.1.
It is important to note that relatively few readiness areas can
be improved quickly. Some important readiness areas have lead-times
as long as our modernization programs. This "resources-to-readiness"
lag is much greater than the strategic warning we are likely to get.
For this reason, we continue to give readiness a high funding pri-
ority, in that we will not have time to "get ready" once hostilities
commence. Our achieved readiness in peacetime will largely determine
the effectiveness of our conventional forces in the first days of
combat.
Tab/e //. C.1
Rsaour~e to Re~edM6ss
Lqg-Time
Component
Lead-Time (Years)
Equipment Fill (PA)
2 - 3
Equipment Availability
- Depot Maintenance 10?tMl
~
- Repair Parts IPA, SF-
1 - 3
Unit Training
- Flying/Steaming Hours and
Battalion Training Days (OftM)
1
- Simulators (PA)
2 - 3
Personnel
- Recruiting and Retention (0?tM, MP) 1
PA - Procurement Accounts Investments
08M -Operations and Maintenance Account Expense
SF - Stock Funds Investment
MP -Military Pay
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a. Equipment Fi//
The Army's readiness continues to be affected by shortages of
equipment. After the Vietnam War, the Army needed to modernize its
equipment to counter the most effective equipment being deployed by
the Warsaw Pact. As this essential modernization program grew, so
did its costs. As a result, we have not been able to modernize as
fully as we wished, to procure enough equipment to replace that
wearing out, or to fill all existing shortages. Consequently, with
the exception of the most important combat equipment, equipment fill
still needs additional funding.
This problem has existed for some time, but we have lacked the
data necessary to assess the shortages of specific ancillary equip-
ment. We have initiated an effort to compile and assess these short-
ages in all combat and support units. The results of this study will
allow us to target the necessary resources to this long-standing prob-
lem area.
b. Equipment Condition
The operational availability of our fielded equipment is a func-
tion of our maintenance programs and the availability of repair parts
and other components to keep this equipment in combat-ready condition.
We have made considerable progress in both areas.
(1) Depot Maintenance
Overhaul of ships, aircraft, tanks, missiles, and other major
weapon systems at the depot level is central to the equipment main-
tenance strategy of each Service. We have significantly increased
funding for depot level maintenance in each of the Services since
FY 1981, as Chart II.C.1 illustrates.
Chart II.C.1
Depot Maintenance
Funding
(FY 1980 - 19861
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The budget reflects continued emphasis on improving our depot
maintenance posture by providing adequate funding in support of
depot maintenance requirements. We will continue to emphasize depot
maintenance funding because of its central contribution to equipment
availability and readiness.
(2) Spares and Repair Parts
The effectiveness of both depot and organizational maintenance
programs is dependent on the availability of spares and repair parts.
We require both replenishment spares to replace those consumed during
maintenance and initial spares to support new weapons systems enter-
ing the inventory. While replenishment spares requirements are
driven largely by peacetime activity levels (aircraft flying hours,
for example), initial spares requirements are primarily a function of
our modernization programs.
Chart ll.C.2
Peacetime Replenishment
Spares Funding
(FY 1980 - 19861
80 81 82 83 84 85
Fiscal Year
As shown in Chart II.C.2, we have substantially increased our
annual investment in replenishment spares to support our peacetime
activity levels and improve the operational availability of our ships,
aircraft, and combat vehicles. In addition, we have fully funded the
requirement for initial spares each year to keep support abreast of
new equipment deliveries and to ensure that our newest and most effec-
tive equipment is fully supported. We will invest over $4 billion
in initial repair parts purchased through the Defense Stock Funds
between FY 1983 and FY 1986. As a result, the new weapons systems
procured through our modernization programs are better supported
at delivery than were their predecessors.
(3) Equipment Readiness Results
Our increased attention to equipment maintenance and repair parts
support is largely responsible for the measurable improvement in
equipment readiness. Our primary measures of force-wide equipment
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availability include mission capable (MC) and fully mission capable
(FMC) rates for aircraft and ground forces equipment, and command
operationally ready (COR) rates for ships. These measures each
describe the percent of weapons systems in the inventory that are
Chart ll.C.3
Aircraft Mission Capable Rates
(FV 1980 - 1984)
Army
Navy Ft Marine Corps
1980 1981 1982 198:1 1984
Fiscal Year
Chart II.C.4
Selected Ground Forces Equipment
FMC Rates
(FY 1980 - 1984)
?s:
e. e. e,. e. 8
~~
~~~
so
----
k, A
~Wm ~
~~~~~ ~ $
9
~ ~
~
e~ k~ # ~^~
'
V
J
1??" 1961 1' G 1983 1984
Fiscal Year
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capable of performing at least one primary mission (MC) or all de-
signed missions (FMC). We have experienced positive trends in air-
craft and ground forces equipment availability as illustrated in
Charts II.C.3 and II.C.4. The COR rate for ships, the percent rated
fully or substantially combat-ready, has increased from 54 to 78
percent between FY 1980 and FY 1984.
We expect these trends to continue as our expanded investments
in spares and repair parts are fully delivered. The FY 1986 Force
Readiness Report provides detailed historical and projected MC,
COR rates by specific weapon system and Service.
c. Training Readiness
In addition to possessing adequate inventories of well-maintained
equipment, our forces must be systematically trained and exercised
as teams in order to develop the collective skills required for suc-
cess in wartime missions. The amount and quality of collective unit
training define the training component of force readiness.
The ability to conduct good collective unit training is heavily
dependent on personnel and materiel readiness. The favorable trends
described in the Manpower chapter of this report -- high-quality
enlistees, good retention of noncommissioned officers, improvements
in personnel stability -- allow units to concentrate on perfecting
collective skills. Improved availability of operational equipment
also increases the opportunity for sound collective unit training.
And we have also improved training readiness by increasing the
value of training time -- for example, the development and use of
more effective training ranges. Another important way in which
training is being made significantly more effective is through the
increased development, procurement, and use of simulators and other
training devices. These devices complement and supplement training
on the primary equipment and raise proficiency beyond that which
could be achieved in the past using primary equipment alone.
d. Unit Readiness Measures
The measures of equipment availability and unit training dis-
cussed above are examples of force-level readiness indicators. We
also measure some components of readiness on a unit basis.
Our basic system for reporting readiness at the unit level is the
Unit Status Reporting System (UNITREP). UNITREP is designed, man-
aged, and controlled by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(OJCS). The Services collect and report unit status statistics to
OJCS in accordance with specific Service reporting rules, developed
within broad OJCS guidelines.
The UNITREP system rates units as C-1 (fully ready), C-2 (sub-
stantially ready), C-3 (marginally ready),
C-4
(not ready), or C-5
(not ready for a preplanned reason, such as
a
ship in overhaul).
Furthermore, under UNITREP, units are rated
in
four resource areas
-- two related to materiel and two related
to
people. They are:
-- Equipment Status: Quantities of equipment and supplies on-
hand relative to that required and authorized for the war-
time mission;
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-- Equipment Readiness: The average condition of the equipment
on- an ;
-- Personnel: People on-hand relative to wartime requirements
in terms of numbers, critical skills and grades; and
-- Training: Whether the unit is trained to perform its wartime
missions.
UNITREP assigns a C-rating to each unit in each of these four
resource areas and an overall C-rating that is the lowest of the
area ratings unless modified by the commander's judgement.
UNITREP data, although classified, support many of the trends
mentioned in this section. For example, equipment status trends are
up for Navy and Air Force aircraft; training trends are also improv-
ing. Amore complete discussion of UNITREP, as well as detailed
UNITREP data, is contained in the DoD report, Im rovements in U.S.
Warfi htin Ca abilit FY 1980-84, and its classi ied annex. This
report ocuments t e speci is improvements that have been made in
each of the elements of our combat capability, and substantiates
readiness gains measurable at both the force and unit level.
3. Sustainability
Our Sustainability objective is to ensure logistical support to
our conventional forces from initiation to successful termination of
any hostility. Our requirements for combat-essential materiel dur-
ing a conflict will be several times greater than our normal peace-
time consumption. For this reason, we are striving to build up war
reserve stocks sufficient to support the combat forces until our
industrial base can mobilize to meet our wartime requirements.
Unfortunately, long production lead-times and the large quantities
required make building stockpiles of war reserve munitions and
repair parts a slow, expensive process.
Sustainability, like readiness, cannot be purchased quickly.
Although the sustainability resource areas were allocated some of
the largest real funding increases over the last four years, less
than half of this investment has been produced and delivered. We
have recognized and sought accelerated sustainability funding as a
high priority and we need congressional support for this.
We have continued the progress reported last year toward redres-
sing critical deficiencies in our munitions sustainability. Funding
for the last seven budget years is shown in Chart II.C.S. This graph
demonstrates our resolve to build our munitions inventories to the
point that we would never be forced to escalate to theater nuclear
weapons because our conventional sustainability had been exhausted.
Even with these increases, however, achieving our modest mid-term
objective is slow. The long production lead-time for munitions,
about two years, means that the increased funding in FY 1982 is only
now beginning to be translated into increased combat staying power.
This is one of the best arguments for avoiding the drastic budgetary
erosion we experienced in the 1970s.
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Cheri //. C.5
Munitions Sustainabi/ity
Finding
(FY 1980 - 86J
Procurement of modern munitions supports our sustainability and
modernization programs. When we buy Maverick missiles, for example,
we not only arm a number of sorties, we also increase by an order of
magnitude the potential effectiveness of those sorties. Similarly,
the Copperhead offers an increase in capability that cannot be matched
by any number of the older artillery rounds.
The exact level of our sustainability -- how many days or weeks
that we could fight -- is highly scenario-dependent, and our esti-
mates for specific scenarios are classified. In general terms, we
have not yet attained the levels necessary to constitute a prudent
risk deterrent. Sustaining a conventional war is very expensive. It
will take many years of increased budgets to build our stockpiles to
the required level. However, we think it is worth the expense to
provide the conventional sustainability necessary to reduce the risk
of nuclear escalation.
b. Spares and Repair Parts
Our increased consumption of repair parts to keep aircraft,
ships, and other combat equipment fully operational at the much
higher level at which they will be operated during conflict is
the basis for our war reserve requirement for these items. We have
concentrated on filling the necessary stockpiles of prepositioned
repair parts -- those that would he required first. To accomplish
this, we have increased our funding for war reserve spares and
repair parts in both the procurement accounts and the stock funds
(see Chart II.C.6)
Because of the production lead-times for these items, more than
half of our investment over the last four years has yet to be
delivered. Today, we have only about one-third of our war reserve
prepositioning objective on hand, but we expect that the increased
sustainability funding already approved, as well as that planned,
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Readiness and sustainability
will allow us to achieve more than 80 percent of that objective by
the end of this decade.
Chart //.C.6
War Reserve and
Repalr Parts Ring
(FY 1980 - 861
~`^'"'v
.nd Mwlres Corps
~~~ n~~~
so ei
Fiscal Year
4. Conclusion
Without question, we have made substantial improvements in both
the readiness and sustainability posture of our conventional forces
over the past four years. With regard to readiness, we are confident
that we have achieved the level necessary to deter aggression today
and, if necessary, to react effectively. This improvement is sub-
stantiated by readiness indicators. Our equipment is more operation-
ally available, we have more and better people to operate it, and
they are better trained, individually and collectively. But, we need
more modernization and more expenditures for sustainability.
So we can, and should, do better. We will continue to improve
our equipment availability by eliminating depot maintenance backlogs
for both end-items and components and by fully funding requirements
for both initial and replenishment spares. In addition, we plan to
continue funding for collective unit training at the current level
for the Navy and Air Force, and at an increased level for the Army's
flying hour program.
We have not progressed as quickly in improving the sustainability
of our conventional forces. This is due in part to the longer lead-
times required to procure modern munitions and repair parts, and in
part to the large sustainability deficiencies that existed four years
ago. Our sustainability requirements have also increased both to
support our modernized weapons systems and to meet the larger threat
we must deter and, if necessary, defeat. We will not reach a point
of confidence in our sustainability posture until late in this decade
even with the large real increases in funding we will propose. But
as a result of these investments, each year our conventional sustain-
ability posture improves and reduces the probability of having to use
nuclear alternatives should deterrence fail. This is not an invest-
ment area in which we can afford to be frugal.
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D. MANPOWER
1. Introduction
Almost every aspect of our manpower program has experienced note-
worthy improvements in the last four years. Whereas in FY 1980 there
was genuine concern that the all-volunteer concept might not succeed,
in FY 1984 all Services met their recruiting goals. Retention was
up, the quality of our new recruits exceeded that of the civilian
youth population, and our Selected Reserve Forces increased their
strength by 22 percent to the highest level in history. We remain
committed to protecting our people programs, safeguarding equality
of opportunity for all servicemembers, and ensuring that our man-
power investment continues to pay dividends in improved readiness.
This chapter discusses our military and civilian manpower pro-
grams. More detailed information on these programs is provided in
the Defense Manpower Requirement Report and the Military Manpower
Training Report.
2. The Manpower Program
a. Active Component Military Manpower
This Administration, with the support of the Congress, has built
a strong, quality force that not only provides for the immediate
defense of the nation, but offers the soundest foundation we have
ever had upon which to build to meet our future defense needs.
The growth in capability of our Active Component has permitted
development of a credible, formidable military force that can meet
its commitment of supporting our security program.
The record high quality of our new recruits gives us a solid
foundation from which we can staff our force and draw our future
leaders.
Chart //. D.1
Improvements in
Military Manpower
We Are Exceeding
Recruiting Goals;
:101
101
107
101
14T
100
100
75
75
%
50
50
Re-Enlistments Are
Stable;
a
c
~ 1,200
0
~ 600
~o
E
a
2 0
Total Strengths
is Up;
'Includes Navy, Training and Administration of Reserves (TARS) that are counted as Selected Reservists.
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Existing supervisory and leadership shortfalls are gradually
being eliminated, providing us with a more appropriately graded
force possessing the necessary skills and experience to win on
today's battlefield.
Our success in quality of life programs is reflected in the
improved morale of our force and the decline in disciplinary actions
taken during the past year. We now have a force that is prepared and
able to support our worldwide commitments.
We will examine the four aggregate indicators of personnel readi-
ness: end strength, experience, skills, and stability. These indi-
cators clearly convey the greater capability of today's military per-
sonnel. We now must focus on sustaining our manpower successes of
the past four years, particularly in the support to our people.
(1) Active Component End Strength
From FY 1980 to FY 1984, Active Component end strength increased
by 98,568 personnel, or about 4.8 percent. The Navy and the Air
Force experienced the greatest growth, both in absolute and relative
terms (7.1 percent from FY 1980 to FY 1984). Navy's manpower growth
of about 2 percent per year approximates the increased number of
billets at sea; however, the fleet support requirements have not been
met. Air Force growth supports new and expanded missions and associ-
ated force structure modifications. The manning of Marine units
increased at a rate proportional to the growth in the Marine force
structure, which is essentially the same as that programmed prior
to FY 1983.
Chart //.D.2
Active MN/tery S"tr~ngth a
(End Strengths)
'Excludes Navy Training and Administration
of Reserve ~TARs) that are counted as
~
t
~
0
Selected Reserves.
FY 1980 FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 Growth
Pro- President's (FY 1980-86)
Actual jetted Budget
(a) Active Component Military Manpower
Adequate strength is a fundamental determinant of unit person-
nel readiness. However, over the past two years, the Congress denied
about 60 percent of the growth in Active Component end strength
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requested for FY 1984 and FY 1985. This denial comes at a time when
our force structure must expand to meet the increasing threat. Man-
power requirements and strength levels are not independent of other
modernization programs. As end strength levels are artificially con-
strained, the resultant undermanning of much needed new programs ulti-
mately degrades overall readiness.
We plan to increase the number of active military personnel at
the end of FY 1986 by about 25,600 (about 1.2 percent) over FY 1985
end strength levels (see Chart II.D.2). Concomitantly, we antici-
pate the percentage of minorities will remain relatively stable, and
the overall percentage of women will increase slightly.
(b) Recr
We continue to make every effort to enhance both the attractive-
ness of military service and our competitiveness in the youth labor
market. Our success in recruiting the necessary quality and quantity
of new personnel has continued as all four Services met or exceeded
their accession objectives. Table II.D.1 shows actual enlisted
accessions for FY 1984 and planned recruiting levels through FY 1986.
Tab/e //. D.1
En/ist~ecl Active Duty Aooessions
(Numbers in Thousands)
FY 1984
Number
Percentage
of Objective
FY 1985
Number
FY 1986
Number
Army
142.3
100
139.9
145.1
Navy
82.9
100
85.8
89.1
Marine Corps
42.2
109
39.2
37.6
Air Force
61.1
100
67.0
69.8
Total
328.5
101
331.9
341.6
The young men and women we recruit to meet our objectives are
of an unprecedented high quality. The quality of our enlistees
as measured by educational attainment (high school graduation) and
scores on the enlistment test reflects substantial improvement since
FY 1980. Charts II.D.3 and II.D.4 reflect these increases in quality.
We are confident that we can continue to satisfy our personnel
requirements with volunteers. However, the sustained economic
recovery and the decline in the military age youth population pose
difficult recruiting challenges. There is some evidence of this
decline in quality and quantity of reserve pools of potential
recruits. We must provide a competitive level of pay and benefits
and ensure that the Services have adequate recruiting resources in
order to continue attracting high quality men and women.
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Chart //.D.3
High Schooi Dip/orna Graduates (HSDGJ and
Am~ed Forces Qusii~don rase (aFQT1 Category
Amw~g Nonprior Service fNPSJ Active Duty Accessions
(Percentage of NPS Accessions)
i sso
. Army ~ Navy
Chart //.D.4
Armed Forces Que/f~xcatron Test (AFQTI Cate9aY
Among Nonprior Service (NPSI Active Duty Accessions
(Percentage of NPS Accessions)
issa
USAF O DoD ?Youth
- Army a Navy USMC .USAF a DoD ?Youth
(2) Experience
Experience, another key element of personnel readiness, is a
costly, but necessary, dimension of the force. Experience must,
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therefore, match our needs as closely as possible. Too much experi-
ence can be very costly and can result in promotion and career stag-
nation, while too little experience seriously detracts from our capa-
bility to accomplish our mission. We have had great success in
improving experience levels throughout the force and in eliminating
many of the shortfalls so common four years ago. Our goal now is
to manage the force so as to maintain the proper experience levels
appropriate to our needs and to the career management needs of our
people.
(a) Officer
Since FY 1980, the total officer population has increased nearly
26,000, or over 9 percent, with over 15,900 of this net increase
(62.3 percent) among officers with between four and nine years of
service. Additionally, there has been an increase of minority and
female officers during this same period. Since FY 1980, the number
of minority officers has increased over 25 percent, and the number of
female officers has increased over 33 percent. More junior officers
are choosing to stay in the Service at their initial career decision
point (generally the fourth or fifth year of service). Moreover,
these junior officers today generally have more years in service and
in grade, therein providing better and more experienced leadership at
the unit level.
Retention of officers should remain at an acceptable level. Good
retention has improved the manning in some critical skill areas; how-
ever, experience shortages will remain for some time as a result of
low retention in previous years.
Chart ll.D.5
Experience and Leadership
E5 to E9 4 Years
of Service
End Fiscal Year
We solicit congressional support for our legislative proposal to
establish a new framework for the management of flag and general of-
ficers. This legislation would provide for the necessary oversight,
flexibility, and responsiveness required to administer changing flag
and general officer requirements in support of national security
objectives.
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(b) Enlisted
Sustained retention success has permitted development of a force
with the experience needed to meet the demands for skilled techni-
cians, supervisors, and managers. The average years of service have
increased from 5.55 to 5.93 years, an increase of 6.8 percent.
The long existing noncommissioned officer/petty officer shortfall
has been significantly reduced as a result of our retention successes.
This becomes particularly evident in the growth in average grade of
the enlisted force by 4.2 percent.
Chart //.0.6
Exparfeince of
En/ist~9d FOrce
Enlisted retention is now at an acceptable level in most segments
of the force, although chronic shortages persist in some skills, par-
ticularly in those career fields that are highly marketable in the
private sector and those that involve arduous duties in the military.
Many of the shortages remain in the middle grades and will be allevi-
ated only when people now in the lower grades develop the skill and
experience needed to move upward. Although this will not happen
overnight, interim measures, such as aggressive retraining programs
and better promotion opportunities for shortage skills, are being
implemented.
(3) Skills
The availability of personnel in needed skills at the unit level
directly affects personnel readiness. Recently, there have been some
gains in skill areas where shortages have contributed to degraded
readiness in the past.
(a) Officer
Although we continue to experience shortages in some critical
officer skills, our manning position is improving.
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Our most serious problem is the 18 percent shortage of
nuclear trained submarine and surface officers in the grades
of lieutentant commander to captain. The situation is
getting worse and this may rise to 22 percent by FY 1986,
unless corrective measures work.
Although requirements for pilots continue to grow, we have
reduced the pilot shortage from over 5,000 in FY 1981 to
about 950 in FY 1984. There are some indications that
future retention trends may not be as favorable as those we
have experienced in recent years. External economic con-
siderations, which include factors such as airline hiring
practices, influence retention patterns for highly skilled
pilots.
(b) Enlisted
In addition to increased manning in critical enlisted skills, we
are maintaining high quality personnel in these skills. Four factors
are responsible for the growth and quality we have achieved in these
enlisted skills. First, positive accession and retention trends are
stabilizing the force while improving its overall quality. Second,
our use of enlistment bonuses, education programs, and other monetary
incentives enhances the quality of recruits entering these critical
skills. Enlistment and Selective Reenlistment Bonuses remain the
most cost-effective accession and retention incentives. Third, we
are planning more effective training in areas of greatest need. And
finally, attrition during the first six months of service has dropped
from 15.0 percent in FY 1981 to 11.9 percent in FY 1984. Since people
who now start training are more likely to complete it, our training
resources are used more efficiently.
(c) Training
Training imparts the necessary skills to survive and win on the
battlefield. Toward that end, one of our foremost objectives is to
continue the progress the Services have made in improving more effec-
tive training both for individuals and for military units. The
quality of military training, both of individuals and of operational
units, is generally high, but better management and support can bring
further improvements. To meet this need, we have instituted two man-
agement initiatives designed primarily to capitalize on opportunities
offered by new technology. First, we have established within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with Joint Staff partici-
pation, an OSD Steering Committee on Training and Training Technology.
The purpose of this group is to assure early recognition of training
problems and to take prompt actions to solve them, making full use
of advances in training technology. Second, DoD has established a
Defense Training Data and Analysis Center (TDAC) in Orlando, Florida.
TDAC provides a defense-wide capacity for gathering, organizing, and
analyzing data and information on all aspects of military training.
(4) Stability
Stabilizing personnel assignments contributes to improved readi-
ness because individuals now stay together longer in the same unit
thereby improving that unit's teamwork and mutual confidence. Ad-
ditionally, crew/team proficiency is increased, tactical competency
is improved, the need for repetitive team training is reduced, and
operational efficiency and safety are enhanced.
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During FY 1980-84, unit stability (percent of servicemembers in
the same unit from one year to the next) increased DoD-wide by 1.7
percent to 44.8 percent. Greater stability is a result of lower
attrition, greater retention, and fewer accessions; greater manage-
ment discipline; higher overall personnel quality; and greater job
satisfaction among our servicemembers.
(5) Other Related Factors
Inherent factors supporting these four primary aggregate indi-
cators of personnel readiness -- strength, experience, skills, and
stability -- are DoD's quality of life and compensation programs.
(a) Quality of Life
Quality of life encompasses many individual DoD programs that
contribute to sustaining personnel readiness by recognizing the
importance of the people who make up the Armed Forces and acknow-
ledging their contributions to the defense effort. We have built
on efforts begun early in this Administration to improve existing
programs and have also developed new programs to help compensate
for the demanding aspects of military life.
Our first priority here is to improve the quality of life in
overseas and remote areas, both for single service personnel and,
where accompanied tours are authorized, for families. These initia-
tives include building and remodeling schools for dependent children,
child care facilities, physical fitness centers, family service
centers, chapels, and multipurpose recreational facilities. Also,
we have undertaken management actions to improve the benefits pro-
vided by commissaries and exchanges.
Chan ll. D.7
Quality of Life
Medical Care
Child Care
Legal Assistance
Religious Programs
Assignment Policies
Housing
Recreation Services
Family Services
Education Programs
Commissaries
PostlBase Exchanges
Postal Services
Financial Counseling
We recognize that service people are making career decisions
based on their families' considerations of their quality of life.
It appears that a significant correlation exists among quality of
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life programs, spouse satisfaction, and recruitment and retention
of qualified people on the one hand, and the discipline, morale,
and readiness of our forces on the other. In FY 1984, we created a
Family Policy Coordinating Committee to bring together policymakers
throughout DoD to shape and influence the direction and extent of
family support efforts. In order to target DoD resources more cost-
effectively, we have commissioned a DoD-wide family survey, to poll
approximately 131,000 servicemembers and 75,700 spouses on demo-
graphics, satisfaction with military life, and needs for additional
support. We have expanded our efforts to work with agencies outside
of DoD in support of family programs. Additionally, we have made
great strides in incorporating family issue awareness training into
officer professional school curricula. We are operating 272 family
service centers on DoD installations worldwide. To meet the growing
demand for child care, the Department operates nearly 550 child care
facilities on some 400 military installations worldwide. Family day-
care programs are also being expanded.
In FY 1984, we recognized the contribution that military spouses
make to the defense effort by observing a National Military Spouse
Day on May 25, 1984.
(b) Compensation
Our ability in recent years to compete with the private sector
for the manpower required to meet our national security objectives
is due, in no small part, to the significant improvements that have
been made in our compensation system. There is no question that a
competitive compensation program is vital to our continued success.
The compensation program, both pay and benefits (non-pay), that
we are proposing for FY 1986 is a comprehensive package designed to
improve the overall quality of life for servicemembers. In light of
government-wide efforts to reduce the federal deficit, we are request-
ing only a 3 percent military pay raise, which will start in FY 1985.
Recognizing that this will not match the projected private sector
wage growth, we are asking the Congress to reduce the impact of a
smaller pay raise by approving it one quarter early, thus making it
effective July 1, 1985. In addition to this, we are also requesting
approval for restructuring of the permament change of station (PCS)
reimbursement system. These initiatives, including a request to
increase the maximum weight allowance for household goods from 13,500
pounds to 18,000 pounds and fund four days temporary lodging expenses
not to exceed $110 per day, will allow for a more realistic reimburse-
ment of the costs associated with the PCS moves that we require of our
men and women. That we expect a great deal from our servicemembers is
an understatement. That our men and women in uniform accept the hard-
ships and sacrifices inherent in military service is a testimony to
their willingness to do more than their share to keep our country
strong. That they should have to pay to do this is patently unfair.
A recent Air Force survey revealed that when making a PCS move, the
average servicemember was reimbursed only one dollar for every four
dollars spent out-of-pocket in connection with the move. In addition,
over half of our servicemembers making a PCS move needed to borrow,
including withdrawal from savings, to meet their expenses. We are
committed to ensuring that the costs of a government-directed move
are borne by the government, not inflicted on the individual service-
member.
We are also considering a dental care program for active duty
dependents. This is desirable if the military medical program is to
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continue to compete on favorable terms with private health care plans
and remain an effective recruiting and retention incentive. In
addition, we will be considering legislation to implement certain
recommendations of the Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compen-
sation (QRMC). Included in those recommendations are improvements to
certain special and incentive pays, designed to enhance the recruit-
ing and retention of members in those specialty skills that are still
experiencing shortages. Increases in Servicemen's Group Life insur-
ance and in the death gratuity, along with the initiation of a burial
expense benefit, all of which were recommended by the QRMC, will be
part of the compensation program being considered for FY 1986.
Finally, in the area of compensation, our members must be pro-
tected from reductions in pay resulting from changes in tax policy
if fairness is to be maintained. Current tax treatment of allowances
and other benefits of military service is integral to the Military
Compensation System and should not be changed without corresponding
corrections in the total compensation package.
(6) Summary
It is therefore imperative that continued attention be directed
to recruiting, retention, compensation, and quality of life resource
levels. Sufficient resource levels in each of these areas will allow
us to achieve our goal of providing adequate manpower to operate,
maintain, and support our equipment effectively and efficiently.
Inadequate manpower can only place debilitating stress on our per-
sonnel, with further degradations in readiness and sustainability
capabilities. Finally, history shows that while manpower losses can
occur quite rapidly, it can take a decade to recoup such losses.
b. Reserve Mi/itary Manpower
The Reserve Components are charged with providing trained units
and qualified individuals for active duty in the Armed Forces in time
of war or national emergency. These units and individuals are to be
available on short notice and capable of assuming major contingency
roles as demanding as those in the active force.
This Administration has supported continuous improvements to the
Reserve Components within the Total Force Policy. In July 1981,
President Reagan strengthened the Total Force Policy first enunciated
by the Secretary of Defense in 1970. In August 1982, DoD further
strengthened the Total Force by implementing measures to ensure the
short notice readiness capabilities of the reserve forces. These
policy decisions have been followed by actions to increase manning,
training, and readiness.
The Ready Reserve is comprised of reserve units, individual
reservists assigned to active duty units, and individuals subject to
recall to active duty to augment the active force in time of war or
national emergency. Within the Ready Reserve, the Selected Reserve
consists of those units and individuals designated as so essential
to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other
reserves. The second category of the Ready Reserve is the Individual
Ready Reserve (IRR)/Inactive National Guard (ING), and consists of
those reservists who are not in the Selected Reserve but are subject
to recall on an individual basis to provide initial augmentation of
active or reserve units.
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(1) Selected Reserve Manpower Strength
In FY 1984, the Selected Reserve attained their highest manning
levels in history -- 1,045,828 men and women. The previous high of
1,006,000 was reached in FY 1959 when individuals were allowed to
substitute enlistment in the Ready Reserve for two years of con-
scripted service in the Active Component. Since FY 1980, the Selected
Reserve has grown at four times the rate of the active force and at
the end of FY 1984 stands 22 percent higher than in FY 1980 (see
Table II.D.2).
Increased Selected Reserve manning has resulted from our emphasis
on increasing the readiness of the Reserve Components as a vital part
of our national defense. Strong congressional support has provided
additional full-time recruiters and unit support personnel, while
improving compensation incentives and benefits.
Tab/e //. D.2
Se%t+ad Reserve Manpower
(End Strength in Thousandsl
Army National Guard
367
434
438
450
Army Reserve
207
275
286
301
Naval Reserve
97
121
129
142
Marine Corps Reserve
35
41
42
43
Air National Guard
96
105
108
111
Air Force Reserve
59
70
75
77
Totalb
861
1,046
1,077
1,124
a Numbers include Navy Training and Administration of Reserves (TART.
b Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
(2) Selected Reserve Recruiting
The growth of Selected Reserve manning has necessitated large
increases in recruiting of both nonprior and prior military service
personnel. In spite of an improved economy, the declining size of
the military-age population, and reduced active force separations,
the quantity of enlistees continues to improve (see Table II.D.3.).
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Table //.D.3
Se%ted Reserve En/isbnents
(Nonprior/Prior Service in Thousands)
FY 1980
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
Army National Guard
50147
60150
55144
54144
Army Reserve
26134
33134
37132
39139
Naval Reserves
3125
10122
10130
10128
Marine Corps Reserve
514
915
916
1016
Air National Guard
7110
618
619
519
Air Force Reserve
3110
319
4111
4111
Totals
941128
1221127
1301133
1201137
s Reflects new Sea Air Mariner (SAM) Recruiting program in FY 1984 and after.
b Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding
An important measure of the quality of reserve enlistees is the
proportion that are high school graduates. Another key measure is
their scores on the AFQT. The percentage of high school graduates
rose from 76 percent in FY 1980 to 85 percent in FY 1984 (see Table
II.D.4).
Table //.D.4
Reserve En/isbnents of N/9h Schoo/ Gn~duates
FY 1980
FY 1984
Total Enlistments
222,100
218,400
High School Graduates
168,400
185,000
Percent
75.8
84'7
s Includes equivalency certificate and diploma graduates and students
currently in high school who are expected to graduate.
The Reserve Components attained excellent recruiting and reten-
tion results in a much improved economic environment and in spite of
an accessible youth population declining in size since 1979. The
sustained economic recovery and a further decline in the 18-21 year
old population will provide challenges that will require continued
congressional and public support. With this support, DoD will be
able to continue to attract and retain the required personnel.
In support of this Administration's policy to increase the oppor-
unities for women and minorities, the number of women and minority
personnel in the Reserve Component has continued to increase. The
number of women grew from 68,000 in FY 1980 (9.3 percent) to 102,000
in FY 1984 (9.8 percent). Similarly, minority personnel increased
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Manpower
from 170,000 in FY 1980 (20.0 percent) to 226,000 in FY 1984 (21.6
percent). Additional increases are expected in both categories in
future years.
(3) Full-Time Support (FTS) Personnel
FTS personnel are a key factor in achieving the unprecedented
level of readiness that now exists within the reserve forces. Total
FTS strength for all components has increased from 12.5 percent of
the Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 to 14.2 percent in FY 1984.
All Active Guard and Reserve and Military Technician (MT) personnel
are counted as part of the Selected Reserve. Further increases are
projected as shown in Table II.D.S.
Teb/e //.0.5
~I~Tlme Suplport P~rsor~nel~
(End Strength in Thousands)
Actual
Programmed
FY 1980
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
Army National Guard
32
43
46
56
Army Reserve
17
29
31
34
Naval Reserve
20
23
24
27
Marine Corps Reserve
5
6
6
7
Air National Guard
26
30
32
33
Air Force Reserve
11
13
14
15
Totalb
111
143
153
172
Percent of Selective Reserve
12.9
13.7
14.5
15.2
a Includes Active Guard and Reserve (AGRI, Military Technicians (MT), Active
Component IACI personnel, and Civil Service personnel ICSI.
b Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
The mix of FTS personnel has evolved within each component based
on historical and mission differences. It is DoD's policy that
each Service continue to establish its own mix of FTS personnel that
best suits its unique needs.
Tab/e //.D.iS
Fi~l~rme Support Pi~rsonne/ - By Tree
(FY 1984 End Strength in Thousands)
AGR
MT
AC
CS
Total
Army National Guard
16.7
24.6
1.6
0.2
43.0
Army Reserve
8.8
7.0
6.7
6.1
28.5
Naval Reserve
13.3
-
6.9
3.1
23.3
Marine Corps Reserve
0.8
-
5.0
0.2
6.1
Air National Guard
5.8
21.1
0.7
1.9
29.5
Air Force Reserve
0.5
8.0
0.7
4.3
13.5
DoD Totala
45.9
60.7
21.6
15.7
141.9
a Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
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(4) Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard
The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard
(ING) consist of a pool of individual manpower within the Ready
Reserve, who are not part of the Selected Reserve. They have served
previously in the active forces or Selected Reserve. Many have some
obligated service remaining. IRR/ING individuals would be mobilized
to augment initial demands for military manpower of the active force
and Army National Guard units. This manpower pool shrank from nearly
1.6 million persons in FY 1972 (swollen by draft considerations) to
a low of 342,000 in June 1978, which was well below our mobilization
needs. A number of legislative and policy initiatives increased the
IRR/ING strength to 445,000 in FY 1984 (see Table II.D.7). The new
eight-year military service obligation implemented June 1, 1984,
along with IRR bonuses is expected to provide an additional 150,000
IRR members beginning in FY 1990.
Tab/e //.0.7
/ndividua/ Ready Reserve and /reactive Nadona/ Guard
(End Strength in Thousands)
FY 1980
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1988
Army National Guard (ING)
7
9
10
11
Army Reserve
205
277
271
273
Naval Reserve
97
69
88
99
Marine Corps Reserve
57
48
48
48
Air National Guard (ING)a
-
-
-
Air Force Reserve
47
41
42
41
DoD Totalb
413
445
454
467
a Fewer than 500.
b Numbers may not add to total due to rounding.
c. Civi/ian Manpower
(1) The Role of Civilians
The United States has a long established policy of using civilians
to the maximum extent possible to assist in maintaining our national
security. This policy has a number of advantages. It reduces to a
minimum the number of men and women required on active duty. More-
over, civilians cost less in many functions than uniformed personnel.
Civilians also provide stability and continuity to those functions
that require rotation of uniformed personnel. Marketplace trends in
the coming years may reinforce civilians' cost advantage as a declin-
ing youth population forces DoD to compete harder with the private
sector for prospective recruits.
Civilians participate in all defense activities not potentially
involving combat and account for one-third of all active DoD man-
power. They comprise over half of DoD's personnel in research and
development and base operations support and about 95 percent of all
workers in depots, shipyards, and other logistics activities that
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directly affect the readiness of our forces. Of particular impor-
tance, many civil servants occupy overseas positions which would be
essential to military operations in wartime. The Mobilization
chapter discusses how we would fill these essential positions during
a crisis.
(2) Size of the Civilian Workforce
In FY 1986, DoD plans to employ about 1,107,000 civilians of
whom about 1,020,000 will be hired directly by the United States.
The remainder will be indirect-hires, foreign nationals paid by
their own government for working at U.S. bases in accordance with
Status of Forces Agreements. We reimburse the host country for the
cost of these personnel.
These employment totals are almost 10 percent higher than
FY 1980 levels and reflect the increased defense resources and work-
load. Expansion in our overall defense program over the last four
years has necessitated the additional employees. The increase in
civilian spaces will continue to help DoD reduce depot maintenance
backlogs, manage spare parts better, handle more foreign military
sales, and civilianize former military positions, thus allowing the
military to return to military jobs and increase readiness. In spite
of this growth, civilian manpower costs have declined sharply as a
share of the total DoD budget. In FY 1980, 16 out of every 100 dol-
lars spent by DoD went for civilian related expenses. Five years
later this portion has dropped to 9 out of every 100 dollars.
As a result of congressional action, in FY 1985 we are not oper-
ating under any ceiling on the number of civilians we can hire. All
DoD activities can employ as many civilians as are needed to complete
funded work. We welcome this opportunity to demonstrate that we can
manage all our programs more effectively without end-of-year employ-
ment restrictions. During the two preceding fiscal years, only DoD's
industrially funded activities, such as depots and shipyards, were
exempted by the Congress from ceilings. We benefited from this
exemption in several ways. We gained through:
-- Greater ability to respond to unexpected workload changes;
-- Elimination of the need to drop workers from the rolls
temporarily to avoid exceeding ceilings; and
-- Freedom to devote more emphasis to employee training as well
as contract monitoring.
Just as important, the industrially funded activities did not abuse
their freedom by hiring more civilians than were required to complete
funded work. During FY 1985, DoD will report to the Congress the
results of removal of all hiring ceilings.
(3) Characteristics of Civilian Workers
About 32 percent of DoD's full-time employees with permanent
jobs, excluding indirect hires, are women and 22 percent belong to
a minority group. About two-thirds of our civilians are in General
Schedule (GS) or General Manager (GM) (white collar) positions and
provide engineering, scientific, professional, technical, clerical,
and administrative services. Our blue collar workers -- who are paid
under the Federal Wage System -- repair ships, planes, tanks, and
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other equipment, maintain our installations, and provide most of
the manpower for other logistics and supply operations.
The average grade of our GS/GM employees is about 8.2, up less
than 0.4 in ten years. Four-fifths of this growth was due to a
change in the composition of our workforce, i.e., we hired pro-
portionately fewer in occupations with lower average grades. This
record was achieved during a time when defense technology became
more complex and competition from the private sector for our
scientists and engineers accelerated.
d. Programs to Raise Workforce Productivity
Fiscal responsibility demands that DoD use its workforce as
efficiently as possible. Although the productivity of our civilian
workforce has risen faster than the federal average, we are continu-
ing to work in several ways to raise the productivity of all our
employees, both military and civilian. At the same time, we are
using private employees where they are less expensive than civil
servants and where it is not essential to use uniformed personnel.
The Installations chapter contains further information on our Com-
mercial Activities Program.
We are applying procedures similar to those of the Commercial
Activities Program to those activities exempt from competition with
the private sector. Under the Efficiency Review Program, organi-
zations develop performance work statements that describe the work
to be done and the standards to be met. The organizations then
determine the most efficient means of completing the work statements.
The goal is to minimize the costs for a given function so that man-
power and other resources can be reassigned to other jobs.
DoD has recorded very high returns from investments in labor-
saving equipment. Our major capital purchases, under the Produc-
tivity Investment Fund (PIF) Program, typically pay for themselves
in reduced labor costs in less than two years. For example, the
LOGMARS project uses electronic bar-coding of material to cut the
time required in inventory activity. In another area, computer-
aided design and manufacture projects have raised the output of
our engineers. In FY 1986, we plan to spend $147 million under
the PIF program, which accounts for about 70 percent of DoD's
labor-saving investments, other than industrial fund investments
which come under the Asset Capitalization Program. Chart II.D.8
shows the cumulative costs and savings from PIF projects undertaken
in FY 1981-85.
We also know that employee motivation strongly affects produc-
tivity. We have added new ways in which outstanding civilians can
be recognized and rewarded. We are also experimenting with how DoD
can share with workers the gains from greater than expected produc-
tivity. The Quality Circle Program is designed to give employees
a chance to work with their colleagues and supervisors in improving
the management of their activities. We gain not only from the sug-
gestions of the workers but also from the better morale that results
from their ability to influence how their organizations function.
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Chart ll. D.8
Productivity Investment Funding
FY 7981 - 19189 Investment Costs vs, Savings
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Fiscal Vear
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E. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
1. Introduction
During the past year, significant progress has been made in
strengthening yet another vital aspect of our national defense --
America's industrial base. We have initiated programs over a broad
front to include both the public base and over 30,000 private sector
prime and subcontractors. The President's Economic Recovery Program
establishes the foundation for these initiatives and implements pro-
grams that both meet our peacetime needs and also provide the neces-
sary measures to expand production during a crisis or hostilities.
Private industry is joining us in the areas of surge production
assessment, productivity improvement, and acquisition cost reduction.
The Services have aggressively revitalized their respective Industri-
al Preparedness Programs to help identify critical items and poten-
tial production bottlenecks for surge and mobilization. For the
first time, the Congress has authorized funding to support industrial
surge responsiveness. Further activity in this area ranges from the
Industrial Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP) to our efforts to
encourage more cost-effective contract requirements. They include
increased emphasis on efficient manufacturing facilities and greater
attention to manufacturing plans as part of our acquisition strate-
gies. We are optimistic that industry understands the challenges
ahead. While more remains to be accomplished, we have firmly set
the stage for continued progress.
2. Current Programs
a. /ndustria/ Base Guidance
In addition to establishing the Industrial Base .Program (IBP) as
a DoD mission area, defense industrial base guidance has been clari-
fied, defined, and prioritized. The four basic objectives are:
peacetime production efficiencies, production surge capabilities,
wartime sustainability, and effective industrial preparedness plan-
ning.
Significant milestones have been reached in achieving an indus-
trial base capable of responding more effectively to our critical
defense requirements. The first production surge investment was
funded in FY 1985. It provides accelerated production of the TOW 2
missile in the event of a crisis. The Air Force has identified and
programmed funding for FY 1986 to remedy shortfalls in production
surge capabilities for three critical items (combined effects muni-
tions, traveling wave tubes, and chaff). Under Title III of the
Defense Production Act, the Congress has appropriated funding in the
FY 1985 budget to establish or expand needed manufacturing capacity
for critical materials. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have begun a pro-
gram to identify and to prioritize the most essential warfighting
materiel needs of the commanders in chief of unified and specified
commands. This will provide a common baseline to allocate scarce
resources to improve industrial responsiveness. The Services and
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) now are staffed with qualified
industrial planners to perform the essential reviews and analyses of
our industrial base program. Manufacturing technology and IMIP
investments have gradually increased and are reflected in measures
of improved producibility and productivity. The defense industrial
base guidance will include additional refinements made for the
FY 1987 Defense Guidance.
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b. The Defense Production Act
The Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 (Chart II.E.1) provides
the principal authority for vital readiness programs directed toward
maintaining the national defense industrial base for peacetime,
surge, and national emergency requirements. Over the past 30 years,
we have relied heavily on this authority in order to maintain ongoing
defense contracting and preparedness programs in support of national
security objectives. The B-1B bomber, cruise missile, and Blackhawk
helicopter are three programs for which we have used the priority
rating available under Title I of the DPA in order to maintain pro-
duction schedules and reduce lead-times and costs. DoD has worked
closely with the Department of Commerce in revising their regulations
for implementing Title I and for maintaining the industrial readiness
necessary in time of national emergency. DoD is updating its inter-
nal procedures to incorporate these new Commerce regulations.
Chart //. E.1
Defense Production Act
of 1950
Title I Authorizes Allocation of Resources to Prevent
Disruption of Production
Title III Provides for Expansion of Industrial
Capability to Meet National Security Needs
Title VII Establishes Advisory Committees to Allocate
Production During Wartime
In addition to our dependence on foreign sources for many raw
materials, we are also experiencing a significant decrease in our
domestic capability for processing and manufacturing certain indus-
trial products. Title III of the DPA authorizes a variety of govern-
ment financial incentives encouraging private sector investment to
increase industrial capacity. We are exploring this method of estab-
lishing or expanding needed domestic industrial capability, particu-
larly in areas in which foreign dependence can be damaging to our
national security.
As a necessary part of industrial readiness planning, we are
assessing our capability to exercise production options in a national
emergency. An illustrative example is the conversion to domestic
ilmenite from imported rutile necessary for the production of tita-
nium. We have also analyzed production options necessary to produce
graphite fibers to manufacture composites used in aircraft and mis-
siles, germanium for sensors, gallium arsenide for integrated cir-
cuits, and materials for lasers. Such analyses enable us to assess
the capabilities of the domestic industrial base to respond when
needed.
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c. National Defense Stockpi/e of Strategic and Critical Materia/s
The fundamental purpose of the stockpile, which is managed
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is to ensure a
supply of critical raw materials to support the military, indus-
trial, and civilian needs of the United States during an emergency.
Chart II.E.2 highlights those materials for which we have a high
import dependence.
Chart //.E.2
Imports of Selected Minerals and Metals a
Titanium IRutile)
Columbium
Mica (Sheet)
Manganese
Bauxite
Cobalt
Chromium
Tantalum
Platinum-Group Metals
Fluorspar
Tin
Asbestos
Nickel
Zinc
Cadmium
Tungsten
Selenium
too
a
too
0
t00
99
0
84
The Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board's (EMPB) Working
Group on Industrial Mobilization has undertaken a study to review
the process by which the national stockpile goals are set. This
includes examination of scenarios, assumptions, and econometric
models used to develop stockpile goals. New goals will be calcu-
lated using the results of the study.
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d. Manufacturing Techno/ogy Program
The Manufacturing Technology Program seeks to improve the produc-
tivity and responsiveness of the defense industrial base by investing
in advanced technologies for the production of DoD materiel. This
is an established program contributing to improved industrial produc-
tivity on a broad national basis. One recent accomplishment is a
manufacturing process for producing "crimped" miniature bearings and
shaft assemblies for the turbine alternators used in mortar multi-
option fuzes. This process has resulted in savings of $10.3 million
to date. An additional $13 million savings is projected. Another
accomplishment, the Automated Propeller Optical Measurement System
(APOMS), has resulted in a 53.8 million yearly savings by permitting
inspection of large ship propellers in 8 hours versus 140 hours by
previous methods.
e. /ndustria/ Property Management
Initiatives in this area include:
-- Completion of a technical review of Plant Equipment Packages
(PEPs) that are retained to support mobilization production.
The review revealed that some PEPs could not be responsive
to emergency demands and suggested that PEP policy should be
strengthened. A policy review is ongoing.
-- Improvement of the policies for obtaining and retaining a
general reserve of plant equipment. This inventory system
permits reutilization of equipment during peacetime and iden-
tifies machines that will be used to augment production in an
emergency. The revised policy will ensure that only critical
machines are retained.
-- Automation of the property management system used by the
Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC). Inventory
records can now be accessed via remote terminals.
f. Emergency Preparedness P/arming for Catastrophic Earthquakes
Because of the scientific concern of a catastrophic earthquake
in California, recent government attention has been focused on prep-
arations for minimizing the catastrophic effects of such an event.
A review by an ad hoc committee of the National Security Council
concluded that the "nation's preparations are inadequate to cope
with the damage and casualties for a catastrophic earthquake, and
with the disruptions in communications, social fabric, and govern-
mental structure that may follow." Subsequently, the EMPB was
established by presidential directive, with an Earthquake Working
Group included as part of its composition. The National Plan of
Action for emergency mobilization, developed by the EMPB, assigned
responsibilities to various agencies for development of response
and preparedness plans. To mitigate the potentially severe impact a
catastrophic earthquake could have on our national security posture,
we are developing preparedness plans to address those problems we
expect could occur simultaneously with a catastrophic earthquake.
Specific examples are: allocation of resources and restoration of
utilities and public services essential for the operation of military
installations and critical defense industrial facilities.
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The Industrial Buse
g. Defense Economic /mpact Mode/ing System (DE/MSJ
As part of our continuing effort to provide corporate planners
information on planned defense activities that could affect invest-
ment decisions, we have provided over 4,000 small and large com-
panies, industry associations, and individuals the projections of
future defense requirements. This information is provided through
the DEIMS and is based on the proposed defense budget. It projects
defense spending on commodities and services over the next five
years. We plan to increase the dissemination of this data during
the next year.
h. /ndustria/ Productivity
Just as productivity has become a priority within the private
sector, so too has the achievement of increased productivity and
manufacturing efficiencies become of paramount concern to DoD. It
is a critical element in strengthening our industrial base and in
reducing acquisition costs.
Through the Industrial Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP),
we are continuing to develop and to refine contract incentives
encouraging industry to make productivity enhancing capital invest-
ments. There has been significant activity under IMIP up to the
point of actual implementation of individual contractor capital
investment plans. After this phase, with some notable exceptions,
experience is more limited. However, the IMIP process is an inter-
active one that builds on earlier efforts. Broad implementation
will be a lengthy process, but long-term benefits will result. The
most important lesson learned to date is that the process does work.
Increased capital investment and enhanced productivity can be stimu-
lated through efforts such as IMIP.
Another extremely important effort to improve the acquisition
process deals with promoting more cost-effective definition of
requirements in our weapon systems contracts. This initiative,
authorized by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 11, 1984,
is aimed at fostering more cost-effective application of specifi-
cations, standards, and data requirements. It encourages greater
flexibility in how requirements are imposed -- particularly early
in a program. Moreover, we are stressing progressive definition of
requirements as a weapon moves into development instead of working
from the start with detailed contract requirements that may turn out
to be inappropriate. The Services have identified twelve major pro-
grams for initial application of this concept, including four of the
Services' most important aircraft programs.
Productivity and quality are inseparable issues. Because quality
has such a major impact on decisions about manufacturing processes,
equipment, and supplies (and because quality has become an increas-
ingly significant issue in defense materiel acquisition), DoD is
emphasizing policies and programs directed toward improving product
quality. Moreover, DoD encourages commitment from top management
and promotes increased awareness and attention to quality problems
during the design and manufacturing stages. In addition, DoD is
reexamining its qualification and certification programs to determine
whether quality is sufficiently stressed. Perhaps most important,
we are trying to find new ways to include quality history into our
source selection process.
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Too often in the past, DoD has emphasized the performance char-
acteristics of products it acquires rather than manufacturing effi-
ciency. We have selected our contractors based on their design and
engineering capabilities rather than their manufacturing capabilities.
This is changing. We are now promoting increased attention to pro-
ductivity and quality improvement plans as integral parts of our
acquisition strategy. They are being given more visibility and are
now increasingly important considerations during our source selection
evaluations and major systems reviews.
3. Conclusion
A healthy and responsive industrial base has been and will con-
tinue to be an important element of our national security, not only
to deter war but to fight a war if necessary. A revitalized economy
and efforts by both industry and government have already produced
measurable results. However, much more must be accomplished. We
must continue to improve if we are going to get the most out of our
defense dollars. This means vigilant attention to quality, produc-
tivity, and efficiency, while at the same time maintaining a suffi-
cient reserve to meet any potential crisis. This is an ambitious
agenda that places a major burden on industry. We will continue to
provide every opportunity to create rewards in the acquisition pro-
cess and, in response, industry must continually review manufacturing
operations and aggressively move to replace outdated and inefficient
capital equipment and improve productivity. We must correct defi-
ciencies and reduce inefficiencies to ensure that our defense dollars
buy the most capable forces possible. This, in turn, will enable
both DoD and industry to continue the many positive contributions
they are making to the strengthening of our nation's defense.
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Part 111
Defense Programs
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A. LAND FORCES
1. Introduction
a. Force Rationa/e
The land forces of the iJnited States -- the Army and Marine
Corps -- occupy a central place in our conventional force planning.
As our only combat forces capable of holding or retaking territory,
they are key to our deterrent strength and forward-defense capa-
bilities. In support of their deterrent role, we station Army divi-
sions in Europe and the western Pacific, deploy Marine amphibious
forces at sea, and maintain a reservoir of rapidly deployable forces
-- both Army and Marine -- in the United States.
The various types of contingencies for which we must prepare
require forces of varying sizes and capabilities. For our most
demanding task, a NATO reinforcement, we need forces that are large
enough and heavy enough to defeat the heavily armored, tactically
mobile forces of the Warsaw Pact. Deployments to other regions
could well require lighter forces -- ones that are agile enough to
fight their way across difficult terrain, yet sustainable enough
to maintain their combat strength over time.
These widely varying demands present a dilemma for defense plan-
ners: those forces capable of countering a massive ground invasion
-- heavy armored and mechanized units -- are the most difficult to
deploy rapidly, while lighter forces -- designed to deploy more
rapidly, against increasingly sophisticated threats worldwide -- are
less capable on arrival. We partially solve this dilemma by preposi-
tioning equipment and supplies abroad, near areas where U.S. forces
might be needed.
Substantial portions of the active force structure are organized
and trained primarily for rapid-response and forcible-entry opera-
tions worldwide. Such forces include, in addition to the Marine
divisions, the Army's four planned light infantry divisions, along
with the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault), and a ranger regiment. Once deployed, these forces need
timely reinforcement and logistics support to build up their strength
for prolonged combat. A further consideration, then, in designing
our land forces is providing adequate combat support (e.g., artillery
and combat engineers) and combat service support (e.g., medical care
and maintenance) to sustain them in combat.
b. Program Goa/s
For our land forces to provide the capabilities we need, they
must be:
-- Structured properly;
-- Able to respond quickly;
-- Capable of sustained combat; and
-- Provided with modern weaponry and equipment.
The last point is particularly important. The Army and Marine
Corps were hit hard by the spending cutbacks of the 1970s. As pro-
curement programs were scaled back, inventories of weapons and
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equipment shrank to unacceptably low levels. That this occurred
while the Soviets were engaged in a buildup and modernization of
their ground forces only compounded the problem. Our program seeks
to offset those unfavorable trends and restore the deterrent strength
of our land forces.
c. Force Composition
By FY 1986, the force structure will have expanded to 32 divi-
sions. Of those, 21 divisions (18 Army and 3 Marine) will come from
the active force; the remaining 11 (10 Army and 1 Marine) will be
supplied by the reserves. These divisions, supplemented by separate
nondivisional brigades and regiments, form the cutting edge of our
land forces. They are supported by a wide variety of active and
reserve units and are backed by an extensive training and support
base.
In order to take advantage of the economies represented by the
Reserve Components, the Army's active divisions rely on reserve
forces to achieve their full combat potential. Of the 18 active
Army divisions, five will be "rounded out" by at least one reserve
combat brigade, while four others will use one or more reserve bat-
talions to reach their full strength. Additionally, two of the new
light infantry divisions, the 7th and 25th, will be "rounded up."1
In this way, a total of 29 reserve battalions will be used to flesh
out active divisions. In addition, the Reserve Components provide a
large number of service support units for the active force, many of
which would deploy within 10 days of a mobilization.
Chart ~~LA.1
Projected Conlbiblrition of
Reserve Components
(End FY 19851
Army Infantry, Armored,
& Mechanized Battalions
Marine
Corps
Tactical Support
Units
o z5 so
Reserve Units as Percentage of Total
A roundout unit is one t~iat completes the structure of an active
unit (supplying, for example, the third brigade of a three-
brigade division). A roundup unit, on the other hand, augments
an active unit's structure (furnishing, for example, a fourth
brigade for a three-brigade division).
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But our use of reserve forces extends well beyond "roundout/
roundup" and rapidly deployable support units. Chart III.A.1 shows
just how much.
d. Force Disposition
Chart III.A.2 shows the planned location of the Army's and Marine
Corps' active and reserve divisions at the end of FY 1985. In addi-
tion to the forward deployments shown, two brigades of Army divisions
based in the continental United States (CONUS) are stationed in
Europe, and one Marine brigade is based in Hawaii. The Army also
maintains a separate brigade and two armored cavalry regiments in
Europe, five active and fifteen reserve brigades and regiments in
CONUS (not involved in roundout/roundup), one active brigade in
Panama, an active brigade and two brigade-sized units of reserves
in Alaska, and another brigade-sized reserve unit in Puerto Rico.
Chart III.A.2
Deployment of
U.S. Divisions
O Active
Army
O National Guerd
Division Type
Armor `~
Mechanizeds+r -+c~
Infantry ~~
In}amry
Air ,_
Asse:
Airborne
~? Alaska
~./
~ n Camp Pendleton ~~
n ?~~
O Ft. Drum, N.Y.
~ ~ ~~ ~
Ft. Campbell Bragg, N.C.
Kemucky 82
~_ ~ 1g1 ~~Camp lejeune, N.C.
~~CAV ~~ 5Q1-1 ~. Stewart, GA
~o ~~~-~
n y"~,__ ,. ~_ o
2. FY 1986-90 Programs
a. Force Structure
In FY 1986, we will continue to reorganize and consolidate the
Army's active force structure as more modern weapons systems become
available. Consistent with that strategy, in FY 1985, we began
reorganizing the 9th Infantry Division into a one-of-a-kind, high
technology motorized division (HTMD). That division, based at Fort
Lewis, Washington, is experimenting with many of the combat systems
and techniques that could be used by light forces.
FY 1986 will see further advances in the light force structure,
as we flesh out the new active light divisions being formed this
year. The 7th Infantry Division, based at Fort Ord, California,
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is being restructured as a light division of about 10,000 men. It
will be used to examine ways to enhance the deployability and com-
bat strength of light forces. The tank and mechanized battalions
now with the 7th and 9th Divisions will be retained as part of a
nondivisional brigade that will be available for reinforcing light
divisions in high-threat areas. In FY 1986, we will be activating
the initial increment of the 6th Light Infantry Division; another
light infantry division, the 10th, continues the activation begun in
FY 1985. Both divisions will be assigned reserve roundout brigades.
The 10th will be headquartered at Fort Drum, New York, while the 6th
will be based in Alaska. A fourth active light infantry division
will be created by converting the 25th Division, based in Hawaii.
Table III.A.1 shows the resulting distribution of heavy and
light forces by Service and unit type.
Tab/e ///.A.1
Disbibudon of Heavy and Light Forces
(End FY 19861
Divisions
Heavy
Light
Total
Active Army
10
8
18
Army National Guard
4
6
10
Active Marine Corps
-
3
3
Reserve Marine Corps
-
1
1
Total
14
18
32
Nondivisional Maneuver
BrigadeslRegimentse
Active Army
Army Reserve Components
6
11
4
7
10
18
Total
17
11
28
a These units have not been assigne
d a roundo
utlround
up mission.
Programs for the Special Operations Forces (SOF) focus on improv-
ing their capabilities for operations at the lower end of the con-
flict spectrum (e.g., counterterrorist activities). We are adding a
new ranger battalion in FY 1985, while continuing to fill out the
SOF units activated in FY 1984.
We are also continuing to increase personnel strength in the sup-
port units activated in recent years. All in all, this will require
adding about 900 support spaces in Europe and 700 in CONUS.
In the Reserve Components, the combat force structure will change
slightly when we form the 29th Light Infantry Division by consolidat-
ing existing, smaller units. The heavy divisions are converting to
a modified Division 86 configuration; and the 35th Mechanized Divi-
sion, formed in FY 1984, will be fleshed out by consolidating three
separate brigades. Two additional brigades from the current force
will be designated to round out active divisions, and the tactical
support structure will increase by 6,100 spaces.
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The Army units available to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
will increase in FY 1986 and the years following. When the 9th
Division completes its conversion in FY 1986 to its new HTMD con-
figuration, the readiness of those forces will increase markedly.
The 6,100 tactical support spaces to be added to Reserve Component
units will increase the ability of our land forces to support
USCENTCOM without drawing down on forces needed for Europe. The
major improvements in the units available to the Command will be
readiness related, a result of increased manning, additional modern
equipment, and increased participation in exercises.
The combat readiness of our land forces continues to climb.
Their ranks are filled with first-rate people. We are giving them
tougher and more realistic training, and they are getting more up-
to-date equipment and more ample stocks of supplies.
The quality of enlistees in both the Army and Marine Corps is
higher than ever. In FY 1984, more than 90 percent of the men and
women who enlisted for the first time held high school diplomas.
The readiness of Army Reserve Component units rose from FY 1983 to
FY 1984 with the addition of about 12,700 full-time support person-
nel. These individuals assist in training, logistics, and mobili-
zation planning, and help maintain the modern new equipment entering
the inventory. The effectiveness of Army combat units is being
enhanced by the continued expansion of the New Manning System, under
which company-sized units undergo initial training and then remain
together for a full three years. By the end of FY 1985, we plan to
have formed 97 such units. Unit cohesion and esprit are further
improved by linking battalions under a single regimental flag and
affiliating soldiers with a single regiment throughout their careers.
The FY 1986 program builds upon our progress of the past four
years in improving the scope and quality of training for both active
and reserve units. Under an expanded flying-hour program, Army
aviators can expect to log more than 20 hours flying time per month
by FY 1990. Tank crew proficiency will continue to improve with the
funding of "conduct of fire" trainers and the acquisition of train-
ing devices that make use of advanced video technology. Other Army
initiatives include increased automation at the National Training
Center, the continuation of 28 full battalion rotations through the
Center each year, and additional training sessions for the reserves.
The Marine Corps continues to emphasize training for amphibious
landings and subsequent operations ashore. Ten live-fire, combined-
arms exercises are conducted annually in the high desert at the
Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twenty-Nine Palms, Cali-
fornia. Numerous amphibious exercises and other training programs
routinely conducted both at home and abroad provide additional
opportunities for Marine units to practice their skills.
The readiness of our land forces is also benefitting from the
more reliable, easier-to-maintain equipment entering the inventory.
To keep these items in peak operating condition, the Army has sub-
stantially increased its budget for spare parts and depot repair
work. Funding for peacetime spares will rise substantially from
FY 1985 to FY 1986, while depot repair funding will also grow.
Spending in these areas is of great importance, since it yields
the most cost-effective improvements in materiel readiness.
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c. Sustainabi/ity
The sustainability, or staying power, of our forces is a func-
tion of a number of factors, including the amount of materiel on
hand to replace items lost or consumed in combat, the availability
of trained personnel to replace wartime casualties, the size of the
support forces, and the amount of host nation support available.2
We are building up our inventories of war reserve materiel toward
prudent stockage objectives. Funding for Army and Marine Corps
munitions (for both war reserves and training) will rise from $6.0
billion in FY 1985 to $6.4 billion in FY 1986. We are continuing to
buy and preposition major items of equipment that would be needed
to replace combat losses, and we are expanding our stocks of spare
parts and other secondary items needed to keep that equipment func-
tioning on the battlefield. We intend to reach our stockage objec-
tives for those items by FY 1990.
The sustainability of Army and Marine Corps forces also depends
on the size and quality of the Reserve Components (RC) and on the
surge capacity of the training base. In FY 1986, the Marine Corps
Reserve will increase its combined end strength to 43,900, while
enhancing its combat capability with the introduction of M198 155mm
towed howitzers. The capability of the Army Reserve Components will
be enhanced with the addition of about 10,000 full-time support per-
sonnel, the infusion of more modern equipment into the inventory,
and the provision of more intensive training for reserve units.
In FY 1985, RC units will receive more than 10,000 new pieces of
equipment -- including M1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles --
costing some $1.4 billion.
We also are increasing the sustainability of our land forces by
building up the support structure and by pursuing additional host
nation support agreements.
The FY 1986-90 program continues a major, and long-overdue, mod-
ernization of the land forces. Obsolete systems are being replaced
with up-to-date equipment that will enable our forces to perform
effectively against a numerically superior, and steadily improving,
opponent. Existing systems are being upgraded to enhance their per-
formance on the modern battlefield. Looking ahead to the future,
emerging technologies are being applied to the development of new
generations of weapons that promise even more significant gains in
combat capability.
(1) Close Combat
Our land forces are well on the road to rebuilding their capa-
bility to counter a heavily armored opponent in close combat. The
new weapons and equipment now entering the inventory will boost the
firepower of our antiarmor forces, while providing them greater tac-
tical mobility and better protection from enemy fire.
2 The term "host nation support" refers to the combat support and
combat service support that allied countries have agreed to
provide U.S. forces who may be called upon to fight on their
territory.
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M1 Abrams Tank -- The M1 tank's superior agility, advanced fire
control system, and modern armor will make it an effective and sur-
vivable counter to Soviet armored forces through the 199Os and beyond.
The 60-ton M1 can shoot on the move, delivering highly accurate and
lethal fire in day or night. Its 1,500-horsepower turbine engine and
improved suspension system enable it to travel at speeds of up to 45
miles per hour, reducing its exposure to enemy fire. Since its field-
ing in Europe, the M1 has enabled U.S. Army units to achieve consis-
tently high scores in NATO tank gunnery competitions. The planned
production rate of 70 units per month will allow the Army to reach
its goal of fielding 7,467 Mls by the early 199Os. In late FY 1985,
we plan to begin fielding an improved version of the tank (designated
M1A1) equipped with a 120mm gun. More than half of the M1 force will
eventually carry this larger gun.
Bradle Fi htin Vehicle (BFV) -- The BFV provides mechanized
infantry an armore cava ry orces with tactical mobility equivalent
to that afforded by the M1 tank, while greatly improving their fire-
power. The BFV would accompany the M1 in battle, its TOW antiarmor
missiles providing the punch needed to complement the M1 in knocking
out enemy armored forces. By the end of FY 1985, the Army will have
contracted for nearly 3,000 of these vehicles. By FY 1987, the pro-
duction rate will increase to 75 units per month, allowing the Army
to achieve its acquisition objective of 6,882 BFVs by the early 199Os.
Assault Am hibian Vehicle (LVT7) -- The LVT7 is a lightly
armored ve is e designed to transport Marine forces from ship to
shore in amphibious assaults.3 On the ground, it provides an essen-
tial measure of tactical mobility and protection for infantry units.
By the end of FY 1986, the Corps will have 1,317 of these vehicles
-- all in the improved LVT7A1 configuration. Of that number, 333
will be new vehicles and the remaining 984 rebuilt LVT7s.
Li ht Armored Vehicle (LAV) -- The LAV will increase the ground
mobi ity, surviva i ity, an firepower of Marine Corps infantry
units. The vehicle will be produced in several versions, designed
for use in antiarmor, direct and indirect fire, command and control,
and recovery operations. The basic vehicle will carry a 25mm cannon.
By the end of FY 1985, the Corps will have received 758 LAVs, satis-
fying its initial acquisition objective.
TOW Missile System -- The Army and Marine Corps are continuing
to build Teir inventories of TOW 2 antitank missiles. This weapon,
incorporating an improved warhead and guidance system, will give
their antiarmor forces a means of defeating technologically advanced
armored systems.
3 A lightly armored vehicle protects its occupants from small-
caliber weapons fire and fragments from exploding artillery
projectiles, grenades, and other munitions.
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FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
M1 Tank
Development:
$Millions
58.9
52.8
3.9
12.8
Procurement:
Quantity
840
840
840
840
$Millions
1,827.4
1,882.0
2,285.7
2,337.1
BFV
Development:
$Millions
26.5
14.3
2.2
-
Procurement:
Quantity
600
655
716
900
$Millions
909.0
1,109.0
1,236.2
1,398.1
LVT7
Procurement:
Quantitya
569
248
-
-
$Millions
219.6
107.2
0.2
-
LAV
Development:
$Millions
10.1
11.6
16.8
-
Procurement:
Quantityb
236
292
-
$Millions
171.5
249.7
2.9
0.6
TOW Missile`
Development:
$Millions
4.8
9.9
11.8
6.6
Procurement:
Quantity
20,200
14,355
24,882
21,133
$Millions
215.5
252.8
299.2
288.7
a Includes new and rebuilt vehicles.
bincludes the basic vehicle and variants.
?Includes Army and Marine Corps funding.
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 Approved For Release 2010/10/26 :CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050003-1
(2) Land Forces Aviation
(a) Helicopters
The Army and Marine Corps maintain a versatile fleet of heli-
copters to support their combined-arms teams. The missions of these
aircraft range from detecting and engaging enemy armored formations
to transporting troops and equipment within combat theaters. Many
of the systems now in service are aging and in need of replacement;
others must be upgraded if they are to cope successfully with an
evolving threat. Over the next five years, we will be continuing a
major modernization of the fleet, designed to enhance the firepower
of the attack component, add lift capacity in the assault-support
elements, and improve survivability forcewide.
Attack Helico ters -- The AH-64 Apache will add substantially to
the antiarmor capa i ity of Army divisions. Equipped with the Hell-
fire missile system, the helicopter will be able to operate during
day or night and in all kinds of weather, anywhere in the world. The
Army took delivery of its first eight Apaches in FY 1984.
In FY 1986, the Marine Corps will receive the first of 44 AH-1T
Super Cobra helicopters it is adding to the fleet. These aircraft
will help relieve a serious shortfall in the attack inventory that
has resulted from the reduced pace of modernization in the the 1970s.4
The new aircraft will be powered by improved engines and carry a mix
of Hellfire air-to-surface missiles and Sidewinder air-to-air mis-
siles. The 46 AH-1Ts operated by the Fleet Marine Force also are
slated to receive the new engines; they are now being fitted with
the missile systems.
Assault-Su ort Helico ters -- To improve the tactical mobility
of its orces, t e Army is ie ding new UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
and modifying its existing fleet of CH-47 Chinooks. A larger, more
agile, and less vulnerable aircraft than the UH-1 (Huey) it replaces,
the Blackhawk is able to deliver 50 percent more cargo and troops
over greater distances at higher airspeeds, providing commanders
added flexibility in employing their troops. The superior versa-
tility and survivability of this aircraft were demonstrated during
the rescue operation in Grenada. When deliveries of its external
stores support system begin in January 1986, the Blackhawk will be
able to deploy to virtually any area of the world without having to
stop to refuel. In the medium-lift category, the CH-47D moderni-
zation program will increase that helicopter's lift capacity by
approximately 60 percent, while improving its overall reliability
and maintainability and reducing its vulnerability to enemy fire.
The Marine Corps has two programs under way to modernize its
inventory of assault-support helicopters. It is acquiring additional
heavy-lift capacity by continuing procurement of the three-engine
CH-53E Super Stallion, the free world's largest helicopter. That
aircraft, along with the JVX (discussed in the next section), is key
to the new concept the Corps is developing for launching amphibious
assaults from points beyond the horizon. (A detailed explanation of
that concept is provided in the Naval Forces chapter.)
4 Two of the Marine Corps' three active attack helicopter squadrons
are a total of five aircraft short of their authorized strength.
The third squadron is equipped with Vietnam-era AH-1Js, which
have no antiarmor capability.
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The CH-46E -- the workhorse of the medium-lift fleet -- is under-
going a major upgrade to improve its safety, reliability, and main-
tainability. That program will enable the fleet to remain in service
into the 1990s.
Scout Helicopters -- The OH-58D AHIP will provide the Army with
a more agile and survivable scout helicopter. Its primary mission
will be to find and designate targets for attack helicopters and
artillery units. Equipped with a mast-mounted sight containing
advanced sensors and optical systems and a laser rangefinder/
designator, the helicopter will be able to operate around the clock
and in almost all types of weather. The first OH-58Ds will be fielded
in FY 1986.
(b) Developmental Aircraft
Revolutionary advances in aviation technology are paving the way
for entirely new generations of military aircraft. In one related
development effort, the Navy and Air Force are designing a tilt-rotor
plane that will have the lift and versatility of a helicopter but the
speed, range, and survivability of a fixed-wing plane. Called the
JVX (for Joint Services Advanced Vertical-Lift Aircraft), the air-
craft would be used by the Marine Corps to ferry troops and equip-
ment from ship to shore in an amphibious assault, by the Air Force
for special operations, and by the Navy for search-and-rescue mis-
sions. The schedule calls for full-scale development to begin in
May of this year and for the Marine Corps to take delivery of the
first production model in FY 1991. The Army and Air Force intend to
begin procuring their versions of the aircraft in the early 1990s.
The Army is developing a new family of light rotorcraft (LHX) to
replace its aging fleets of AH-1, OH-58, and OH-6 helicopters, and
to take over for the UH-1 in units not slated to receive UH-60s. The
aircraft will be produced in two versions, one designed for utility
missions and the other for use in the scout or attack role. Initial
deliveries are expected in the early 1990s.
FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
Actual Planned Proposed Proposed for
Funding Funding Funding Authorization
AH-64
Development:
$ Millions 21.4 27.7 17.5 -
Procurement:
Quantity 112 144 144 144
$ Millions 1,360.4 1,418.8 1,376.3 1,318.4
AH-1T
Procurement:
Quantity - 22 22 -
$ Millions 17.8 206.6 218.5 41.6
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FY 1984
FY 198.5
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Hellfirea
Development:
S Millions
4.3
2.9
6.2
6.3
Procurement:
Quantity
4,870
5,780
7,880
7,960
S Millions
235.5
252.7
308.5
303.6
U H-60
Development:
S Millions
15.0
-
-
-
Procurement:
Quantity
84
86
78
78
S Millions
431.5
476.6
486.2
394.5
CH-47D
Procurement:
S Millions
357.9
482.9
396.6
328.7
CH-53E
Procurement:
Quantity
11
8
4
10
S Millionsb
187.8
168.2
101.0
171.2
JVX
Development:
S Millions
86.7
187.5
608.6
493.0
O H-58D
Procurement:
S Millions
199.5
231.1
260.6
307.7
LHX
Development:
S Millions
1.0
72.7
146.3
399.3
alncludes Army and Marine Corps funding.
bincludes the start-up costs for a multiyear procurement contract.
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(3) Air Defense
Our land forces deploy a balanced mix of systems to defend
against aircraft and missile attacks. Shorter-range (or "point
defense") systems, such as Stinger and Chaparral missiles and anti-
aircraft guns, are designed primarily to protect troops and equip-
ment near the front lines (e.g., forward command posts and maneuver
units). Longer-range ("area defenses") systems, such as Patriot and
Improved Hawk missiles, guard larger, more widely dispersed areas of
the battlefield (e.g., corps command and control facilities and air-
fields). These weapons are supported and linked by a network of
radar, command and control, and electronic warfare systems.
(a) Short-Range Systems
Stinger -- The Stinger is a shoulder-fired, infrared-guided
missile that can be carried by a single soldier or marine. It is
designed to defend against low-flying aircraft at relatively short
ranges, and is being purchased jointly by the Army and Marine Corps
to replace the aging Redeye. In FY 1984, an improved version of the
missile, with increased resistance to enemy countermeasures, entered
production. That system, called Stinger-Post, is scheduled for field-
ing in FY 1987.
Chaparral -- A short-range air defense missile deployed with
most active Army divisions, the Chaparral will soon be consolidated
at the corps level. To enable the missile to engage targets at night
and in poor weather, we are fitting it with a forward-looking infra-
red radar (FLIR) sensor. For the future, we are developing an
improved guidance system that will be highly resistant to infrared
countermeasures. With these modifications, the Chaparral will be
able to remain in service through the end of the century.
Short-Range Air Defense Command and Control (SHORAD C2) -- To
take maximum a vantage o t e capa iliti- es o~ erg-~y its~orward-
area air defense systems, the Army is developing a new automated
command and control system for use at the division and corps levels.
Called SHORAD C2, the system will be able to assign priorities among
multiple targets and transmit engagement instructions to Chaparral
and Stinger operators. By improving coordination among air defense
units, the SHORAD C2 system will greatly increase the effectiveness
of the Army's entire air defense network.
(b) Long-Range Systems
Patriot -- The Patriot is the Army's advanced all-altitude air
defense missile. The system's multifunction, phased-array radar
enables several missiles to be directed to their targets simultane-
ously, even under jamming conditions. Astate-of-the-art system, the
Patriot will be highly effective against any enemy aircraft likely to
be encountered through the end of the century. In December 1984, we
began fielding it with our Army units in Europe, where it will form
the backbone of NATO's future air defense system. Several allied
nations are also considering procuring Patriot missiles for their
forces.
Im roved Hawk (I-Hawk) -- The Army and Marine Corps are modern-
izing their inventories o Hawk antiaircraft missiles. The upgraded
version incorporates a new motor and an improved guidance system that
will enable multiple targets to be engaged simultaneously. Other
features being added will enable the system to cope with the projected
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electronic countermeasures threat of the 1990s, while making it easier
to maintain on the battlefield.
FY 1984
FY 198,5
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Stinger/
Stinger-Post
Development:
S Millions
-
5.0
18.6
3.2
Procurement:
Quantity
1,956
3,216
4,239
9,269
5 Millions
182.7
279.0
366.0
711.9
Chaparral
Development:
$ Millions
20.2
17.5
17.7
-
Procurement:
Quantity
-
12
300
1,095
5 Millions
-
32.0
109.0
154.0
SHORAD CZ
Development:
S Millions
34.1
50.4
33.0
57.8
Patriot
Development:
S Millions
78.3
61.1
53.1
38.8
Procurement:
Quantitya
440/12
440/12
585/12
700/12
S Millions
963.5
1,045.8
1,063.9
1,055.2
Improved Hawk
Development:
$ Millions
32.6
18.8
5.2
9.6
Procurement:
Quantity
400
500
550
550
S Millions
97.0
126.1
140.1
156.6
alncludes fire units and missiles.
(4) Artillery Fire Support
To offset the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority and near tech-
nological parity with NATO in ground maneuver forces, we must improve
the ability of our forces to detect advancing enemy formations and
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mass large volumes of accurate, effective firepower against them.
To that end, we are upgrading the target acquisition and fire control
capabilities of our weapons systems, developing new munitions with
improved laser-homing capabilities, and increasing the overall
sustainability of our fire support forces on the modern battlefield.
T~ar~et Ac uisition -- The Army is working on two new systems
that will provi a ong-range targeting support for its missile and
artillery batteries. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (Joint STARS), described in more detail in the Deep Interdic-
tion section, will be able to locate and track moving targets at
extended ranges. The Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), a drone air-
craft, will be used to locate and designate targets for laser-guided
weapons and to provide firing data for artillery units.
Fire Control -- The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(AFATDS a new-generation automated fire control system being devel-
oped by the Army, will increase the efficiency and targeting capacity
of its firing batteries. Entering procurement over the next two years
will be the Army's Battery Computer System (BCS), a small computer
designed to provide firing data for individual guns. The BCS includes
an automated data system that will provide timely and accurate meteor-
ological information to artillery units.
Laser Desi nators -- Laser designators are used to illuminate and
designate targets or laser-guided bombs, artillery munitions (Copper-
head), and missiles (Hellfire). They help provide the "precision" for
precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The FY 1986 budget supports con-
tinued procurement of Ground Laser Locator Designators (GLLDs) for
the Army. The Marine Corp will complete procurement of the Modular
Universal Laser Equipment (MULE) in FY 1985.
Wea ons and Su ort S stems -- The Multiple-Launch Rocket Sys-
tem MLRS is a ig -rate-o - ire weapon being procured for general-
support artillery units. It can be used to supplement cannon artil-
lery fire or to strike targets, such as enemy artillery and air
defense systems, beyond cannon range. A single launcher can fire its
load of 12 rockets in less than a minute, covering an area the size
of six football fields with approximately 7,700 grenade-like submuni-
tions effective against both personnel and lightly armored targets.
The Army began deploying the MLRS in FY 1983 and is using multiyear
procurement authority for its continued production. At the same time,
as part of a multinational program with Germany, France, and Great
Britain, the Army is working on a warhead for the system that could
dispense terminally guided submunitions.
Over the coming years, the Army will continue modernizing its
inventory of 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. Competing budgetary
priorities will, however, force it to terminate production of the
M109A2 155mm howitzer with the FY 1986 order.
Later this year, the Army will take delivery of its first Field
Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles (FAASVs). These highly mobile
tracked vehicles will provide armor protection for ammunition, and
carry equipment to prepare and supply ammunition for howitzers. They
will be assigned to self-propelled artillery units in Europe.
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Ammunition -- The Army and Marine Corps are continuing to build
their inventories of improved conventional munitions, 155mm howitzer-
delivered scatterable mines, and 155mm laser-guided Copperhead artil-
lery projectiles. A large number of these items have been earmarked
for the war reserve stocks.
FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual Planned Proposed
Proposed for
Funding Funding Funding
Authorization
RPV
Development:
S Millions 126.2 95.7 51.1
29.4
Procurement:
S Millions - - 150.7
305.3
AFATDS
Development:
5 Millions 25.1 32.9 35.6
46.2
BCS
Procurement:
Quantitya 146 162 255
66
5 Millions 31.2 32.7 50.0
11.6
GLLD
Procurement:
Quantity 200 208 180
240
S Millions 45.6 56.1 45.1
8.5
MULE
Development:
5 Millions - - -
-
Procurement:
Quantity 134 115 -
-
SMillions 43.3 38.0 -
-
MLRS
Development:
S Millions 3.5 1.9 -
0.6
Procurement:
Quantityb 36,000/76 50,472/44 72,000/44
72,000/ -
$ Millions 545.4 561.9 570.5
461.5
M 109A2
Procurement:
Quantity
120
70 - -
$Millions
87.2
52.4 - -
FAASV
Procurement:
Quantity
120
170
212
190
5 Millions
59.1
78.2
101.5
98.5
alncludes Army and Marine Corps funding.
bincludes rockets and launchers.
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(5) Deep Interdiction
Emerging technologies are providing our land forces with radi-
cally new techniques for defeating armored attacks. Moving targets
deep behind enemy lines will be located and tracked by, long-range
detection systems. Intelligence and fire control information from
multiple sources will be rapidly processed by computers and distrib-
uted to tactical commanders for targeting decisions. Targets will be
attacked by aircraft and missiles delivering a variety of munitions,
including terminally guided submunitions. In this way, our forces
will be able to carry the fight to the enemy and overcome the advan-
tage their opponents hold in numbers of troops and equipment.
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS)
-- This airborne detection system, ein~g developed jointly by tie
Army and the Air Force, will be able to monitor moving targets well
before they reach the main battlefield. Drawing on the information
it provides, our forces will be able to use their weapons systems
to attack targets deep behind enemy lines.
Joint Tactical Fusion Pro ram (JTFP) -- This automated system,
under development by the Army and t e Air Force, will process, ana-
lyze, and distribute intelligence reports gathered from multiple
sources. The information will assist battlefield commanders in
assessing the status and disposition of enemy forces and selected
targets. In the future, we hope to develop a more advanced fusion
system that will be able to provide direct, real-time intelligence.
Standoff Tactical Missile -- This missile will be able to dis-
pense terminally guided submunitions against targets deep behind
enemy lines. Designed to exploit the long-range vision of our new
target acquisition and guidance systems, the missile will enable
attacks to be directed against enemy follow-on forces, air defense
systems, tactical ballistic missile launchers, and command and con-
trol facilities.
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Joint STARSa
Development:
$ Millions
109.0
96.7
304.0
239.3
Standoff
Tactical
Missile
Development:
S Millions
50.2
76.4
154.8
207.0
alncludes Army and Air Force fu
nding.
(6) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
The Army and Marine Corps are continuing to improve the ground
mobility of their forces by upgrading their overage, over-mileage
fleets of tactical wheeled vehicles. As part of that effort, they
will begin fielding the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
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(HMMWV) in FY 1985. This versatile 5/4-ton vehicle will be used
to replace a portion of the jeep inventory and other vehicles in
the 1/4- to 5/4-ton range.
In the 10-ton category, the Army is placing high priority on
procuring the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT). The
truck is being produced in five body styles for use by combat and
combat support units. The Marine Corps is procuring a variant of
the HEMTT, called the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS), for its
combat support forces. The LVS comes with four interchangeable
rear-body units. By integrating the two programs, we have been
able to accelerate the introduction of the Marine Corps' trucks
by more than a year.
Army units
began receiving
their HEMTTs in
FY 1982; the Marine
Corps version
will be
fielded
later this year.
FY 1984
Actual
Funding
FY 1985
Planned
Funding
FY 1986
Proposed
Funding
FY 1987
Proposed for
Authorization
HMMWV
Procurement:
Quantity
8,955
14,751
18,215
15,065
S Millions
216.1
390.1
451.5
396.6
HEMTT
Procurement:
Quantity
1,209
1,194
770
955
S Millions
201.9
214.9
134.8
168.0
LVS
Procurement:
Quantity
148
354
360
444
(7) Tactical Command, Control, and Communications
and Electronic Warfare
In equipping our land forces, we seek to provide them the respon-
siveness and flexibility they need to defeat a numerically superior
opponent. But it is not enough merely to provide our forces with
modern weapons systems; we must also be able to direct their opera-
tions efficiently in the heat of battle. To that end, we are devel-
oping a variety of command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C3I) systems that will enable tactical commanders to locate and
gather information about enemy forces; assist them in analyzing that
information; provide jam-resistant, secure communications links to
firing units; and allow our forces, through the use of electronic
warfare, to disrupt enemy communications and intelligence gathering.
Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) Satellite Communications -- The GMF
will provide re fable, jam-resistant communications support for
battlefield commanders. By using satellite communications to link
headquarters in the field, we provide commanders with a means of
transmitting orders and intelligence information over long distances.
The Army and Marine Corps will procure several hundred GMF terminals
with supporting equipment.
Single-Channel Ground and Airborne System VHF_(SINCGARS-V) --
This program will provide secure, jam-resistant, very igh frequency
(VHF) radios to replace the 20-year-old equipment now in use with
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combat battalions and companies. The Army will begin fielding its
new radios in FY 1986, and the Marine Corps will follow in FY 1987.
Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) -- A digital communications
system, the ADDS will provi a secure, jam-resistant communications
links for command and control, intelligence, air defense, fire sup-
port, electronic warfare, and other computer systems. The FY 1986
budget provides initial procurement funds, working toward a planned
deployment date in FY 1988.
Maneuver Control S stem (MCS) -- This advanced command and con-
trol system will provi~e tactical commanders with information on
the status and disposition of their forces and those of the opponent.
The system will consist of a network of small computers adapted to
military use. A prototype version has been fielded in Europe, where
it is undergoing further development with the direct participation
of the eventual users.
Mobile Subscriber E uippment (MSE) -- This system will provide
an automatic, secure, mo ile telepTone service -- both voice and
data -- for tactical users at the corps and division level. Initial
deliveries will begin in FY 1987.
FY 1984
FY 198.5
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
GMF
Procurement:
S Millions
183.7
210.8
346.9
293.9
SINCGARS-V
Development:
S Millions
10.5
10.8
15.2
8.5
Procurement:
Quantity
1,325
10,600
16,400
17,100
S Millions
50.7
156.5
250.8
321.7
ADDS
Development:
S Millions
22.9
23.0
38.1
15.7
Procurement:
S Millions
-
-
31.8
131.1
MCS
Development:
S Millions
12.4
21.9
8.6
8.7
Procurement:
S Millions
26.3
27.9
72.3
72.5
MSE
Development:
S Millions
0.6
-
-
-
Procurement:
S Millions
-
63.3
335.3
786.3
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Electronic Warfare (EW) -- To increase its ability to disrupt
enemy communications, the Army is procuring additional tactical jam-
ming systems (MLQ-34 and TLQ-17A), hand-emplaced expendable jammers
(EXJAM), and EH-60 Quick Fix helicopters. Tactical intelligence sys-
tems are being modernized through continued production of the Trail-
blazer (TSQ-114A) system, resumed production of the Teampack (MSQ-103)
system, and upgrades to the Quick Look and Improved Guardrail V
systems.
Communications Security (COMSEC) -- The Army is procuring several
typess o~o3ern OMSEC equipment. These systems provide secure
communications links over which commanders can transmit orders and
intelligence information without giving the enemy an opportunity to
eavesdrop.
3. Conclusion
We have made considerable progress over the past four years in
revitalizing the combat strength of the Army and Marine Corps. The
FY 1986-90 program will bring further gains, moving us closer to our
goal of creating:
-- A credible and efficient force, equally capable of peacetime
-- A modern, balanced, and strategically mobile force armed with
advanced weaponry and maintained at a high level of readiness;
an d
-- An active force capable of being rapidly expanded by the
Reserve Components and prepared for sustained combat oper-
ations anywhere that conflict might threaten.
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B. NAVAL FORCES
1. Introduction
a. Maritime Missions
The United States has traditionally maintained a strong Navy to
preserve the freedom of the seas and to support the global commit-
ments associated with its forward defense strategy. In peacetime,
naval forces are routinely deployed overseas as a means of reassur-
ing allies and deterring potential adversaries. In times of crisis,
their inherent mobility permits them to be redeployed to world
trouble spots rapidly without relying heavily on foreign bases or
special transit rights. Deployed to areas of vital interest to the
United States and its overseas allies, naval forces can remain on
station for extended periods, ready to project power ashore should
deterrence fail and the circumstances warrant American military
action. If need be, they can apply power rapidly and flexibly in
support of such key objectives as protecting friendly shipping from
air or sea attacks, depriving enemy forces of access to strategic
ocean areas, and projecting power against enemy targets ashore.
Taken together, these capabilities make our naval forces a power-
ful instrument for peace and stability in an often troubled world.
Their importance to Western security and world peace requires that we
take steps to maintain their strength in future years.
b. Composition of U.S. Maritime Forces
The instruments of our naval power are many and varied. Carrier
battle groups, perhaps the most visible symbol of America's maritime
capability, support our foreign policy through a series of routine
overseas deployments. Should an emerging crisis require action, our
modern multimission aircraft carriers, backed by a mix of surface
combatants, attack submarines, and logistical support ships, can
execute the full range of naval missions. They can project power
against targets on land and at sea. They can establish air defense
umbrellas in the skies above naval task forces. And they can under-
take antisubmarine operations.
Our Iowa-class battleships, now being reactivated and armed with
Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles, provide a potent supplement to
the carrier force. In addition to their long-range missile strike
capabilities, these ships substantially increase our ability to
provide naval gunfire support for amphibious assaults. The first
battleship to be refurbished, the USS NEW JERSEY, rejoined the fleet
in FY 1983 and has already seen extensive service in the western
Pacific, Central America, and the eastern Mediterranean. The second
ship, the USS IOWA, rejoined the fleet last year and has recently
returned from operations off Central America.
Amphibious assault forces provide another highly visible and
flexible means of supporting our national security objectives. These
highly mobile forces give us a means of rapidly deploying Marine units
to distant trouble spots with the equipment to fight their way across
hostile territory, if necessary. In peacetime, amphibious forces are
routinely deployed near regions of interest to us, providing a ready
means to protect the safety and security of American citizens or to
respond to other threats to our vital interests. The recent opera-
tions in Grenada and Lebanon provide clear testimony to the value of
this capability.
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Nuclear-powered attack submarines, though inherently a less
visible component of the force structure, also contribute powerful
warfighting and deterrent capabilities to the fleet. In addition to
their traditional roles in operations against enemy surface ships
and submarines, our attack submarines are now gaining the ability to
strike land targets with highly accurate cruise missiles.
A final, but no less vital, element of the force structure is
the diverse mix of support ships and mine warfare forces that serve
the fleet in peacetime and in war. These units range in type from
replenishment ships, which carry fuel, food, munitions, and other
items that must constantly be resupplied, to repair ships and mine
countermeasures ships and helicopters. These latter forces, which
are designed for mine clearance operations, demonstrated their value
last year, when we dispatched two detachments of mine countermeasures
helicopters to the Red Sea in response to requests for assistance
from the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
c. Countering the Soviet Threat
To maintain naval forces capable of fulfilling the maritime
missions mandated by our forward defense strategy, we must pay close
attention to the threat posed by increasingly powerful Soviet naval
forces. That threat has grown alarmingly in recent years in the wake
of a sustained Soviet military buildup.
Particularly worrisome have been the advances in the Soviet sub-
marine fleet. This massive underseas combat force -- at more than
370 boats, by far the world's largest -- has improved greatly in
quality over the past decade and a half. The 197Os saw the intro-
duction of several new submarine types, including the nuclear-
powered Alfa and Victor III and the diesel-electric Tango. Classes
introduced during the 1980s have yielded substantial additional
improvements across the full range of submarine capabilities. For
example, the 13,000-ton Oscar, armed with 24 SS-N-19 long-range
antiship missiles, has significantly increased the scope and mag-
nitude of the threat to our carrier battle groups and other surface
forces. Still other new classes now being delivered to the fleet,
such as the 9,700-ton Mike and the 7,300-ton Sierra, can be expected
to yield further improvements in Soviet submarine capabilities in
future years. These include increases in size, which provide more
space for weapons, and enhancements in speed and sound quieting,
which make the submarines more difficult to detect and engage.
Our naval forces also face a serious threat from the air. Back-
fire bombers armed with long-range, supersonic AS-4 air-to-surface
missiles are the greatest menace. There are now about 250 Backfires
in the Soviet inventory, more than 100 of which are assigned to Soviet
naval aviation and dedicated to antiship missions. With an unrefueled
combat radius of about 3,000 miles, the Backfire can threaten our
ships over a large portion of the world's ocean area. In addition,
the Bear bomber, with a combat radius of more than 5,000 miles, is
being reconfigured to carry the AS-4 missile. Anew variant of that
aircraft (the Bear H), configured for carrying air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCM), is in production. Moreover, the Soviets are flight
testing an entirely new intercontinental bomber, the Blackjack, which
could be used for maritime strikes.
The Soviets are also building a new generation of surface combat-
ants. In recent years, they have introduced the 28,000-ton Kirov
nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser, the Slava guided missile
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cruiser, and the Udaloy and Sovremennyy guided missile destroyers.
Moreover, they are now building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
that we believe will be large enough to operate high-performance
conventional takeoff and landing aircraft. As a result, the next
decade will see the Soviets gain the ability to conduct air defense
and air-strike operations in regions outside the reach of their
land-based tactical aircraft.
d. Program Goa/s for Nava/ Forces
The defense program for FY 1986-90 carries forward our effort to
build a modern 600-ship Navy, ready for combat and able to sustain
itself in battle. The program is designed to correct remaining
deficiencies in the fleet and to add the forces needed to support our
worldwide commitments and national interests. As a first priority,
we have sought to improve the fleet's day-to-day readiness and combat
sustainability. Much progress has been achieved, particularly in the
recruitment and retention of the high-quality personnel needed to man
a growing and increasingly sophisticated Navy. To sustain that prog-
ress, we must continue to receive the strong support of the Congress
for our readiness and sustainability initiatives. Those programs are
described in detail in the Readiness and sustainability chapter.
We are also moving steadily closer to our goal of an expanded
fleet of 600 deployable battle force ships, including 15 deployable
carriers, 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines, a one-third in-
crease in amphibious lift capacity, and expanded support forces.
As Table III.B.I shows, we expect the fleet to have grown to 555
ships by the end of FY 1986, up from 479 at the end of FY 1980.
Tab/e ///. B.1
Dep/oyaare Batde Foru~es
(End Fisca/ Yearl
Ballistic Missile Submarinese
40
37
38
Strategic Support Ships
8
6
6
Aircraft Carriers (Deployable)
13
13
13
Battleships
0
2
3
Cruisers
26
30
32
Destroyers
81
69
69
Frigates
71
110
112
Nuclear Attack Submarines
74
96
95
Diesel Attack Submarines
5
4
4
Amphibious Ships
66
61
62
Patrol Combatants
3
6
6
Mine Warfare Ships
Mobile Logistics Ships
Support Ships
3
68
21
3
74
31
7
75
33
Total
479
542
555
See Chapter III.E fora discussion of S
SBN retire
ments.
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Between FY 1986 and the end of the decade, the fleet will con-
tinue to grow as new ships authorized in previous years are delivered
to the Navy faster than older vessels are retired from service. By
1989, we expect to reach a force level of slightly more than 600
deployable battle force ships. Contributing to that growth will be
94 ships that have been authorized through FY 1985 but not yet
delivered to the fleet (see Table III.B.2).
Tab/e ///.B.2
Ships Authorized But Not Delivered
Ballistic Missile Submarines 7
Aircraft Carriers 3
Battleships 1
Cruisers 14
Destroyers 1
Frigates 10
Nuclear Attack Submarines 18
Amphibious Ships 6
Mine Warfare Ships 10
Auxiliaries 24
Total 94
As part of the force expansion program, we are upgrading the
Naval Reserve Force (NRF). By the end of FY 1986, we will have
transferred 15 modern frigates of the FFG-7 and FF-1052 classes
from the active fleet to the NRF, leading to an eventual total of
26 reserve frigates. The LAMPS MK I antisubmarine helicopters
deployed with these ships are also being assigned to reserve
squadrons. In addition, the NRF will man 8 of our 14 new MCM-1
mine countermeasures ships and all 17 MSH-1 mine-hunters.
The FY 1986-90 shipbuilding plan, summarized in Table III.B.3
at the end of this chapter, projects a steady rate of ship construc-
tion through the remainder of the decade, with about 21 ships sched-
uled for authorization each year. The plan is designed to sustain
and modernize a 600-ship Navy as large numbers of vessels built dur-
ing the 1960s reach retirement age in the 1990s. Special emphasis
has been placed on the large number of guided missile destroyers and
nuclear-powered attack submarines that will be needed to replace the
many ships of these types scheduled to retire in the early 1990s.
The shipbuilding plan also supports a selective expansion of the
force in areas in which our individual goals have not been achieved,
with particular emphasis on amphibious, mine warfare, and underway
replenishment ships.
We are making every effort to buy these ships in an efficient
and economic manner. Owing to the expanded use of competition and
other improvements in contracting procedures, we have seen an improv-
ing trend in ship delivery schedules, as shown in Chart III.B.1.
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Chars ///.B.1
/mproved Ship Delivery Trends
1982
Calendar Year
At the same time that we are expanding the fleet, we must up-
grade its capabilities if it is to meet the challenges posed by
increasingly sophisticated Soviet forces. The FY 1986-90 program
therefore continues to pursue the four broad objectives we have
set for modernizing and strengthening our general purpose naval
forces:
-- Expanding and improving our power projection forces, includ-
ing aircraft carrier battle groups, amphibious assault ships,
reactivated battleships, and cruise missile forces;
-- Strengthening our ability to secure vital sea-lanes and
defend naval task forces against bomber and missile attacks;
-- Retaining our crucial edge in antisubmarine warfare capa-
bilities in the face of major improvements in the Soviet
submarine force; and
Over the next five years, we will also continue to modernize
our force of ballistic missile submarines, adding new Trident sub-
marines and developing the Trident II (D-5) missile. These programs
are described in the Nuclear Forces chapter.
2. FY 1986-90 Programs
a. Power Projection Forces
We have placed particular emphasis on strengthening our power
projection forces. These forces support our national interests
around the globe in peacetime and during crises, while providing
our commanders the wherewithal to take the battle to the enemy in
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wartime. We are expanding the aircraft carrier force to 15 deploy-
able carriers. The amphibious fleet is undergoing a major upgrade.
We are refurbishing and returning to service our Iowa-class battle-
ships. And we are upgrading the strike capabilities of our surface
combatants, attack submarines, and aircraft by arming them with
Harpoon antiship missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles, many of the
latter in new vertical launch systems.
(1) Aircraft Carrier Forces
Our program to expand the carrier force to 15 deployable carriers
by the end of the decade remains on track. Our thirteenth deployable
carrier, the USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70), joined the fleet in FY 1982.
In early FY 1987, our fourteenth carrier, the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
(CVN-71), launched in 1984, will enter service. At the end of the
decade, when the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72), one of the two carriers
authorized in FY 1983, joins the fleet, we will reach our goal of 15
deployable carriers. In early FY 1992, when the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON
(CVN-73) the other carrier authorized in FY 1983, is delivered, the
Navy will restructure its force of operating and training carriers,
while retaining 15 deployable units. A number of options for main-
taining a carrier training capability are under review. One involves
the removal of the USS CORAL SEA from the deployable force for use as
a training carrier. This option is depicted in the expansion plan
outlined in Chart III.B.2.
Cheri ///. B.2
Moor Mi/eaMaes of die Carrier Exp~nsron PMn
68 Fons.41
W Sentope
81 R.np.r
az lrwep.neenoe
63 KKry Newk
H Conetslletion
86 Enterpri.s
J.n 83-Mry K
Oct 80.Feb B3
89 Nlmit:
88 Ei.mhowsr
70 Vinson
Apr 86AO9 67
71 RoowveN
72 Lincoln
73 Washington
1976 19911 19K 1980 1986 2060 2006 2010 2016 2020
Deployable Cerriar Force Leval 12 13 13 16 16 13 11 7 8 8
Under current plans, the Navy will not need to procure any
more new carriers until the early 1990s. At that time, to sustain
a force of 15 deployable carriers, we should examine a program to
replace the USS MIDWAY, as well as the Forrestal-class carriers
now undergoing renovation.
In the meantime, we must continue to prolong the operating life
of our older carriers. Under the Service Life Extension Program
(SEEP), we are adding 15 years to the original 30-year service lives
of eight existing large-deck carriers. While each must be removed
tlon.l Serviee LHe
Exten.lon .nipr.ra p.rloe.
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from the deployable force during the roughly two-year duration of
its overhaul, we have found the program to be a very economical
alternative to new carrier construction. Work on the first carrier
was completed two years ago, and the second ship, the USS FORRESTAL,
will complete its renovation this summer. Funding for the third
ship, the USS INDEPENDENCE, was authorized in FY 1985. The FY 1986
budget funds long-lead items for the fourth ship, the USS KITTY
HAWK, which is scheduled to begin its overhaul in FY 1987. Due to
the KITTY HAWK's excellent material condition, the projected scope
of its SLEP has been reduced, with a substantial decrease in cost.
The Navy will continue to examine the condition of its other unreno-
vated carriers to see if they, too, might be candidates for shorter,
less expensive SLEPs.
FY 1954 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
Actual Planned Proposed Proposed for
Funding Funding Funding Authorization
Service Life
Extension Program
Modification:
Quantity - 1 - 1
$ Millions 116.0 742.3 156.8 521.9
(2) Amphibious Assault Forces
Our amphibious assault forces are undergoing a revitalization,
reversing a long period of stagnation during the 1970s. Our goal
is to achieve, by 1994, sufficient amphibious lift capacity to
accommodate the assault echelons of a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)
and a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). This will require a one-
third increase over today's capacity. Three ship construction
programs -- the LHD-1, the LSD-41, and the LSD-41 Follow-on --
support this effort.
Beyond the increase in lift capacity, our program seeks to
achieve a capability for launching amphibious assaults from points
over the horizon. This new assault concept is intended to reduce
the vulnerability of amphibious ships and to generate greater uncer-
tainty in the enemy's mind as to the location and timing of an
assault, thereby maximizing its prospects of success. Key programs
supporting this effort include the procurement of new, high-speed
landing craft, air-cushion (LCAC) and CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters,
along with the development of the JVX advanced vertical-lift air-
craft. The latter two programs are discussed in the Land Forces
chapter.
(a) LHD-1
The LHD-1 multipurpose amphibious assault ship program is the
cornerstone of our plan to expand amphibious lift capacity. Similar
in design to the LHA-1 amphibious assault ship, the 40,000-ton LHD-1
will provide space equivalent to that of the LHA-1 for transporting
troops, vehicles, and cargo in an amphibious assault. But with a
capacity to carry three LCACs and large numbers of helicopters, the
ship will significantly enhance our ability to support over-the-
horizon assaults. As a secondary mission, it could serve as a "con-
vertible carrier" for V/STOL aircraft.
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The lead ship in the program, the USS WASP, was authorized in
FY 1984 and will join the fleet in FY 1989. The five-year shipbuild-
ing plan provides for four more LHD-1 purchases, giving us a total
of five of these ships by 1994. In FY 1986, we are requesting the
second ship as part of a multiyear procurement package incorporating
funding for the third and fourth units as well. This will result in
a savings of some $820 million, while significantly accelerating the
ships' deliveries.
Beyond the five ships needed by FY 1994 to support the MAF-
plus-MAB lift goal, we ultimately plan to build a total of 10 or
11 LHD-1s. The additional ships will replace the seven LPH-class
ships scheduled for retirement in the late 1990s.
(b) LSD-41
This year marks the entry into the fleet of the lead ship of the
LSD-41 class, the USS WHIDBEY ISLAND. Six of these dock landing
ships have been authorized through FY 1985, and the FY 1986 budget
seeks funds for two more. This will give us a total of eight LSD-41s
by 1994 -- enough, when combined with other ships in the amphibious
program, to supply the 90 LCAC spots required by the MAF-plus-MAB
objective.
(c) LSD-41 Follow-On
Following completion of the LSD-41 program, we plan to switch
production to a variant design. The follow-on ship (previously
designated "LPDX") will have essentially the same hull and engineer-
ing plant as the LSD-41, but it will trade two of that ship's four
LCAC spots for substantially more cargo space (an area in which we
face particularly severe shortfalls). The five-year shipbuilding
plan includes six LSD-41 follow-on ships. We anticipate construc-
tion of additional units in future years to replace amphibious ships
scheduled for retirement in the latter half of the 1990s.
(d) LPD-4 Service Life Extension
We plan to renovate our 11 1960s-vintage LPD-4 landing platform
dock ships, giving them 10 to 15 additional years of service and post-
poning their retirement well beyond the turn of the century. This
will ease a major block retirement problem facing the amphibious
fleet, while supporting our goal of increasing overall lift capacity.
The five-year program funds seven renovations, the first in FY 1988,
a one-year delay imposed by tightened fiscal constraints.
(e) Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC)
The LCAC program is the key to the new amphibious assault con-
cept we are developing for the future. Designed to carry the combat
and logistical vehicles of a Marine landing force from ship to shore
at speeds in excess of 40 knots, the LCAC will enable our forces to
launch assaults from many miles offshore. To support the landing
requirements of a MAF and a MAB, we plan to buy at least 90 of these
craft. Of the 21 authorized through FY 1985, one has already been
delivered and is undergoing initial operational testing. Further
tests are scheduled for this summer, after the next two craft are
delivered; those tests will be conducted with the LSD-41. We are
now forming an assault-craft unit to man the first six craft, which
will be ready to begin operations with the fleet in the summer of
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1986. The five-year program adds another 60 craft, at a steady rate
of 12 per year.
FY 1984
FY 1913.5
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
LH D-1
Procurement:
Quantity
1
-
1
-
S Millions
1,365.7
39.2
1,507.2
381.7
LS D-41
Procurement:
Quantity
1
2
2
-
S Millions
396.6
522.0
426.5
23.5
LSD-41 Follow-on
Procurement:
Quantity
$ Millions
LPD-0 SLEP
Modernization:
Quantity -
-
-
-
$ Millions -
15.0
-
80.5
LCAC
Procurement:
Quantity 6
9
12
12
S Millions 162.0
251.1
316.2
312.5
(3) Battleship Forces
As part of our program to expand the power projection capabili-
ties of the fleet, we are continuing the reactivation of our Iowa-
class'battleships. Armed with new Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles,
these ships are capable of striking land or sea targets from points
over the horizon. Their original 16-inch guns provide a much needed
boost in naval gunfire support capability. To enhance the guns'
firepower, we are developing new types of 16-inch ammunition, includ-
ing submunition rounds that will be more effective against dispersed
targets and extended-range rounds for covering inland targets. The
first two battleships, the USS NEW JERSEY and the USS IOWA, have
already rejoined the fleet, and the third, the USS MISSOURI, is
undergoing its renovation. We are requesting advance funding in
FY 1986 for the fourth ship, the USS WISCONSIN, whose reactivation
is scheduled for FY 1987.
(4) Cruise Missile Forces
(a) Tomahawk
The Tomahawk cruise missile program represents a major effort to
improve the firepower of our naval units and to distribute offensive
striking power among a larger number of ships. This highly capable
and versatile weapon can be launched from a variety of surface ships
and submarines, and it has the range to reach enemy surface ships and
shore targets beyond the horizon.
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As is often the case with new weapons programs, the Tomahawk
encountered various problems during initial tests. These are now
being corrected, allowing us to move to higher production rates. We
have therefore budgeted funds for 249 missiles in FY 1986, and for
another 330 in FY 1987.
The antiship and nuclear land-attack versions of Tomahawk have
already entered the fleet, and the conventionally armed land-attack
version is undergoing extensive testing prior to its general intro-
duction. At present, Tomahawks are deployed aboard battleships
and a number of submarines, and are being introduced aboard DD-963
destroyers. To maximize the number of weapons that can be carried
on each ship, we are installing the vertical launch system (VLS) on
our new SSN-688 attack submarines, CG-47 cruisers, and DDG-51 de-
stroyers, and are retrofitting the system on some DD-963 destroyers.
The VLS is essentially a cell of launch tubes in which different
types of missiles and rockets can be clustered. In addition to
increasing the number of weapons that can be carried, the system
improves the speed and reliability of launchings.
(b) Harpoon
We are continuing production of the highly successful Harpoon
antiship missile, with funding for 395 missiles requested in FY 1986.
The Harpoon system is deployed on most of our surface combatants and
on many of our attack submarines as well. It can also be launched
from P-3 patrol aircraft and A-6 attack aircraft, and we plan to
incorporate it into the weapon suites of F/A-18 strike-fighters and
S-3 antisubmarine aircraft. During the past year, ten long-range
B-52G bombers were configured to fire the Harpoon, and we intend to
modify 20 more by the middle of this year. This program, which
enhances our capability to conduct antiship strikes worldwide, is
an excellent example of how expanded cooperation among the military
Services can increase our overall defense capabilities.
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Battleship
Reactivations
Quantity
1
-
-
1
S Millions
473.3
12.6
75.2
435.6
Tomahawk
Missiles
Procurement:
Quantity
124
180
249
330
S Millions
341.7
578.5
780.0
929.9
DD-963 VLS
Backfit
Quantity
-
-
3
3
S Millions
-
-
127.4
123.4
Harpoon
Missiles
Procurement:
Quantity
315
439
395
153
S Millions
287.9
356.8
338.6
214.1
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b. Antiair Warfare (AAWJ Programs
Soviet antiship missiles pose a serious and growing threat to
our naval forces and sea lines of communications. These weapons are
being produced in several versions, designed for launch from bombers,
submarines, and surface ships. Because their high speeds and elusive
flight profiles make them very difficult to intercept, the missiles
can best be countered by detecting and engaging the ships or aircraft
carrying them before they reach launch position. Our antisubmarine
warfare programs, discussed in the next section, are designed to
improve our ability to locate and destroy enemy submarines over long
ranges. Likewise, our antiair warfare programs emphasize efforts to
improve our capabilities to intercept enemy bombers in an "outer
defense zone" -- before our forces come within range of their mis-
siles. But because these outer defenses must cover broad ocean areas
that can never be totally sealed off from a determined attacker, we
must also have systems that can knock out incoming missiles them-
selves. Overall, we seek to maximize the effectiveness of our AAW
systems by maintaining a strong, "layered" defense in which attacking
forces are countered in a series of engagements by different types
of defensive systems.
The air defense system employed by our carrier battle groups
illustrates this layered defense approach. "Outer-zone" protection
is provided by an integrated team of airborne early warning air-
craft, fighter-interceptors, and electronic warfare aircraft. These
forces, which are discussed in the Tactical Air Forces chapter, can
detect and intercept approaching bombers before they come within mis-
sile launch range of carrier battle groups and the other ships they
may be protecting. To maximize the effectiveness of these outer-
zone defenses, we are developing counter-targeting tactics and sys-
tems that will force enemy bombers seeking good missile-targeting
solutions to move closer to our forces in order to launch an attack,
thereby increasing the opportunities for our fighter-interceptors to
engage them. "Area" defenses, the second layer of protection, are
provided by long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) installed
aboard antiair warfare ships, such as the CG-47 cruisers and DDG-51
destroyers now under construction. Area SAMs protect not only the
ships on which they are installed but also the neighboring ships in
a naval task force. "Point" defenses, the last layer of protection,
include short-range interceptor missiles, guns, decoys, and elec-
tronic warfare systems. They are designed primarily to protect the
ships that carry them.
Beyond these efforts to maximize the protection afforded to our
naval task forces, we are striving to improve our ability to detect
and engage enemy bombers well before they reach the vicinity of our
maritime forces. The key elements of this emerging capability are
wide-area surveillance systems and land-based tactical air forces
used in a maritime air defense role. Where geographically feasible,
we will use our new long-range monitoring systems and upgraded com-
mand and control network to improve the joint employment of land- and
sea-based fighters and early warning aircraft.
(1) Wide-Area Surveillance and Command and Control
Wide-area surveillance can maximize the effectiveness of outer
zone defenses by providing warning of an attack early enough to
position large numbers of fighters to engage enemy bombers. With
a detection range of several hundred miles, the tactical over-the-
horizon (0TH) radars now being developed will substantially increase
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the amount of warning time available to the force. Deployed in
locations from which they can scan likely bomber approach corridors,
OTH radars will greatly enhance the effectiveness of our maritime
air defenses, both land- and sea-based. The system will also be
"relocatable" to prepared sites, providing an emergency capability
to establish surveillance coverage in areas that are not routinely
monitored.
To provide overall command, control, communications, and intelli-
gence (C3I) support for our uuter-zone air defenses and long-range
antiship missile systems, we have instituted the Naval Command and
Control System/System Engineering and Integration (NCCS/SE&I) pro-
gram (formerly known as ITSS). Essentially a management coordination
effort, this program will provide a means of integrating OTH radars
and other sensor systems with surveillance and information management
systems used by battle forces at sea. To facilitate these enhance-
ments, we are upgrading the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Sys-
tem (OBIS). Together, these programs will be the key elements of our
future command and control and wide-area surveillance system.
(2) AAW Ships
To strengthen the fleet's area defenses, we are continuing con-
struction of two new classes of antiair warfare ships, the CG-47
guided missile cruiser and the DDG-51 guided missile destroyer.
These ships will greatly improve the long-range SAM capabilities of
the fleet. Both feature the Aegis system, which incorporates the
most advanced technologies available for detecting and intercepting
high-speed cruise missiles at sea. The system's powerful phased-
array radar can detect incoming missiles at long ranges, and its
automatic fire-control equipment can track and engage many targets
simultaneously, even under intense jamming conditions. These capa-
bilities will substantially increase the air defense firepower of
our battle groups against coordinated antiship missile saturation
attacks.
(a) CG-47 Cruisers
Of the 16 CG-47 guided missile cruisers authorized through
FY 1985, four will have entered service by the end of this year.
Last year, the lead ship in the program, the USS TICONDEROGA, suc-
cessfully completed an additional series of operational tests after
returning from the Mediterranean Sea, where it was deployed in sup-
port of the multinational peacekeeping effort in Lebanon. The second
ship, the USS YORKTOWN, joined the fleet last summer and is preparing
for its first deployment later this year. The five-year shipbuilding
program funds a total of 11 CG-47s, including three in FY 1986. This
will complete the program at 27 ships, enough to support 15 carrier
battle groups and four surface action groups centered around battle-
ships.
(b) DDG-51 Destroyers
Last year, the Congress authorized the lead ship in the DDG-51
guided missile destroyer program. Like the CG-47, the DDG-51 will
be equipped with the Aegis system, but it will be a smaller (8,300-
ton), less costly ship and, therefore, affordable in larger numbers.
It will carry a full complement of weapons systems for air defense,
antisubmarine operations, and strikes against enemy surface ships
and land targets. Although it will operate primarily with carrier
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battle groups and surface action groups, the ship will also serve
as the principal escort for amphibious task forces and underway
replenishment groups. We plan to buy a total of 17 DDG-51s over
the next five years, two in FY 1987 and five each year thereafter.
The FY 1986 request seeks advance funds for the two purchases
scheduled for FY 1987.
(c) Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization
Until enough CG-47 cruisers and DDG-51 destroyers come on line,
we will need to extend the service lives and upgrade the capabili-
ties of our existing AAW ships. To that end, we are converting
guided missile cruisers and some destroyers to carry the improved
surface-to-air Standard Missile (SM-2). Compared with the older SM-1
missile it replaces, the St1-2 can cover wider areas and has a higher
probability of intercepting incoming missiles. Second-phase improve-
ments to shipboard radars and fire control systems are being imple-
mented under the New Threat Upgrade (NTU) program. This package of
modifications will enhance performance under jamming conditions.
The NTU system has been successfully installed and tested aboard the
guided missile destroyer USS MAHAN and ultimately will be extended to
an additional 31 cruisers and destroyers.
(d) Force Levels
Under current planning factors, the Navy needs 100 AAW cruisers
and destroyers to meet the escort requirements of its carrier battle
groups, battleship surface action groups, amphibious task forces, and
underway replenishment groups. It will have 69 of these ships by the
end of FY 1986. As Chart III.B.3 shows, even with the 28 CG-47s and
Chart /l/.B.3
Shortage of.4AW Ships in the 199Os
Other Guided Missile Destroyers
~ ~~
~;
ea ~ ,:A
.~
Other Cruisers + CG-47s
..-
~~ ~ ?.,
?k
1984 1986 1988
Fiscal Year
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DDG-Sls planned for authorization over the next five years and the
ongoing modernization of existing ships under the NTU program, the
Navy will continue to suffer from a shortage of AAW ships in the
1990s, when large numbers of guided missile cruisers and destroyers
will have to be retired. Easing this shortfall will require con-
tinued construction of DDG-Sls and follow-on AAW ships into the
1990s.
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
OTH Radars
Development:
5 Millions
Procurement:
5 Millions
27.8
-
31.7
-
56.2
-
35.6
8.3
CG-47 Cruisers
Procurement:
Quantity
3
3
3
3
S Millions
2,971.5
3,024.5
2,834.8
2,988.9
DDG-51 Destroyers
Development:
S Millions
123.2
126.5
104.8
88.8
Procurement:
Quantity
-
1
-
2
S Millions
79.0
1,050.0
164.3
2,246.8
Standard Missiles
Development:
S Millions
31.4
40.7
47.2
54.2
Procurement:
Quantity
1,190
1,384
1,316
1,800
S Millions
624.8
764.3
874.1
1,047.2
Phalanx Close-In
Weapon System
Procurement:
Quantity
40
49
39
32
S Millions
136.5
172.4
151.6
134.1
Sea Sparrow
Missiles
Procurement:
Quantity
321
327
380
408
S Millions 66.4 74.1 80.8 86.6
Rolling Airframe
Missile System
Procurement:
Quantity - 30 117 400
S Millions 19.0 20.4 45.1 113.8
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(e) Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)
To improve our area defense capabilities, we are procuring large
numbers of surface-to-air Standard Missiles -- both the SM-1 and SM-2
versions -- for our AAW cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. The five-
year program funds some 11,000 of these missiles, including 1,316 in
FY 1986.
We are also introducing major improvements to the standard system.
A "Block 2" version of the SM-2, now in production, will give our SAM
batteries better intercept capabilities against sophisticated antiship
missiles such as the Soviet AS-4. New warhead fuses, with improved
capabilities against sea-skimming antiship missiles, are in develop-
ment, and the Outer Air Battle Missile program is investigating the
feasibility of intercepting enemy bombers before they can launch
their weapons.
(3) Point Defense Systems
Modernization of the self-defense systems aboard surface ships
will continue in FY 1986 with the procurement and installation of
the Vulcan Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), the MK-23 Target
Acquisition Radar for the NATO Sea Sparrow missile system, and the
AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. The program also continues
production of an improved version of the Sea Sparrow missile, (called
the RIM-7M) and of the five-inch Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) for
retrofit in selected Sea Sparrow installations.
c. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASWJ Program
Countering the Soviet submarine threat requires a layered offen-
sive strategy that both maximizes enemy attrition and affords a high
level of protection for our naval forces. The best means of neutral-
izing enemy submarines is to engage them in forward areas and barriers
-- before they come within range of attacking our forces. For this,
we rely primarily on attack submarines and long-range P-3 patrol air-
craft supported by undersea surveillance systems. Enemy submarines
that escape forward sweeps and penetrate our ASW barriers must con-
tend with a layered defensive screen surrounding our naval task
forces and convoys. Within this layered defense system, long-range
protection is provided by land- and. carrier-based patrol aircraft
and by attack submarines operating in a direct-support role. At
shorter ranges, protection is provided by formations of surface
combatants equipped with passive and active sonar systems and by
torpedo-armed antisubmarine helicopters.
(1) ASW Surveillance Systems
The ability to locate enemy submarines within broad ocean areas
is essential to the task of countering the large Soviet submarine
force. Fixed undersea surveillance systems have long played a key
role in this respect. To improve our submarine surveillance capa-
bilities, the FY 1986-90 program continues funding for two new sys-
tems -- one mobile and the other a rapidly deployable, air-dropped
system -- designed to supplement our fixed sensors.
(a) TAGOS Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor
System (SURTASS)
The Navy took delivery of its first two TAGOS SURTASS ships in
FY 1984, and several others will enter service this year and next.
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The long-range surveillance capabilities of these ships will be use-
ful both for extending coverage to ocean areas not presently monitored
by fixed systems and for providing backup coverage in areas that are
routinely monitored, should our fixed systems be incapacitated. The
Congress has appropriated funds for 14 TAGOS ships through FY 1985.
We are requesting authorization of two more in FY 1986, followed by
two additional units in FY 1987.
(b) Rapidly Depioyable Surveillance System (RDSS)
For the future, we are investigating an entirely new deployable
undersea monitoring system, the RDSS. Designed to be dropped from
patrol aircraft, the RDSS would give our forces a means of rapidly
establishing surveillance coverage in areas of special interest. Its
ability to function for extended periods would make it particularly
well suited for operations in remote areas; in an emergency, it
could also be used to augment other sensors in areas we want to watch
closely. Future plans for RDSS development will be determined later
this year, after we have evaluated ongoing system tests and evolving
strategies for detecting and combating Soviet submarines.
(2) Attack Submarines
Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) remain a key element of
our ASW defense-in-depth strategy and are an integral part of our
forward offensive strategy, especially for antisubmarine operations.
Early in a war, our undersea forces must be capable of moving into
far-forward positions, including waters where Western forces would
lack control of the surface and surrounding airspace and where Soviet
naval forces would be operating in strength. Areas of combat oper-
ations might also include the ice-covered Arctic. Operating under
such conditions would place a premium on stealth and firepower --
areas in which the Soviets are fast encroaching on our long-held
advantage. To maintain our advantage over Soviet capabilities, the
FY 1986-90 program seeks continued improvement in the firepower and
operating effectiveness of our attack submarine forces.
Of the 48 SSN-688s authorized through FY 1985, 29 have been
delivered and are operating in the fleet today. The five-year pro-
gram projects construction of 18 additional units, including four in
FY 1986.
To keep pace with the advances in the Soviet submarine force, we
are making several improvements in the SSN-688 design. New SSN-688s
are being provided additional firepower through the installation of
vertical launch systems, with the first submarine so equipped sched-
uled for delivery later this year. We also are making the SSN-688s
quieter, and giving them a greater capability to operate under the
ice -- which is essential for conducting forward patrols in northern
waters. The submarines are also being given the capability to lay
mines.
Further improvements to the Los Angeles-class are being made in
the area of sensor and computer-processing capabilities. The Sub-
marine Advanced Combat System (SUBACS), which will be installed on
all submarines authorized in FY 1983 and subsequent years, incor-
porates the latest in computer technology, thereby improving relia-
bility and helping to ensure that we maintain our technological edge
in detection and targeting.
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To capitalize on the flexibility of our SSN force, we are
broadening the submarines' missions beyond the ASW duties they have
traditionally been assigned. Last year, we began deploying Tomahawk
cruise missiles on attack submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets, giving them an expanded role in antiship warfare as well as
an entirely new role of projecting power ashore. These missions --
combined with the submarines' traditional ASW duties of battle group
escort, barrier patrol, and forward area operations -- establish the
basis for our force goal of 100 multimission SSNs.
To meet the Soviet submarine threat of the 21st century, we have
started designing a new attack submarine, the SSN-21. A key objec-
tive is to make improvements in sound-quieting in order to preserve
our acoustic advantage over a Soviet submarine force making major
advances in quieting technology. The SSN-21 will also carry twice
the number of weapons as existing classes, in addition to having
more advanced sensor systems and being able to operate under the ice
more effectively. These improvements, which cannot be accommodated
within the SSN-688 hull, are necessary if we are to maintain our
qualitative advantage over the rapidly improving Soviet submarine
force and our ability to operate in forward areas. The SSN-21 will
also provide the necessary flexibility to react to the inevitable
changes that will occur in naval warfare over the next 40 years.
A contract for the ship's design will be awarded this year, with
authorization of the lead unit projected for FY 1989.
In the meantime, we must continue producing improved SSN-688
submarines at relatively high rates in order to provide replacements
for the large numbers of older-model SSN-594s and SSN-637s that will
have to be retired in the 1990s. Chart III.B.4 shows the changing
composition of the nuclear-powered attack submarine force through
the end of the century.
Chart I~I.B.~
Compos/don of Nuid~Si~Powsi~ed Attack
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 ,~ ,....1 4 ~..
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(3) Maritime Patrol Aircraft
P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, when provided information from
broad-area surveillance systems on the general location of Soviet
submarines, offer our most potent area antisubmarine capability.
Fleet exercises have also demonstrated the aircraft's utility as
long-range protection forces for carrier battle groups and other
naval task forces. Several characteristics of the P-3 system con-
tribute to these capabilities. The aircraft's long range and high
endurance enable it to cover large ocean areas. Its large number
of sonobuoys and advanced data-processing systems help pinpoint the
location of enemy submarines. And its large payload of ASW torpedoes
provides the capability to translate submarine detections into sub-
marine kills.
The FY 1986-90 program continues production of the latest model
in the P-3 series, the P-3C. A total of 250 of a planned force of
316 of these aircraft have been authorized through FY 1985. The
five-year program adds 42 more -- all in the Update III configura-
tion -- including nine in FY 1986. To promote program stability and
to achieve cost savings, we are requesting funds to start a multiyear
procurement program for the 33 aircraft scheduled for authorization
during FY 1987-90. Beyond the procurement of new aircraft with
improved performance features, we are retrofitting Update III avi-
onics into earlier versions of the P-3C. For the future, we are
developing an Update IV version of the P-3C with expanded processing
capabilities and a new family of acoustic sensors designed to counter
the quieting trend in the Soviet submarine force.
(4) Surface Ship ASW Systems
(a) Tactical Towed-Array Sonar (TACTAS)
The long-range detection capabilities of TACTAS will substan-
tially enhance the ASW capability of our surface combatants, provid-
ing an essential counter to the increased range of weapons carried
by Soviet submarines. The AN/SQR-18 towed-array sonar system is
being deployed aboard all 46 of the FF-1052 frigates operated by
active and reserve units, and aboard all of the Naval Reserve's
FFG-7 frigates. The AN/SQR-19, a more advanced towed-array sonar
system now in the final stages of development, will be installed
later in the decade on DD-963, DDG-993, and DDG-51 destroyers and
on CG-47 cruisers and active FFG-7 frigates. We are introducing
improvements to both systems to maintain their detection capabili-
ties against Soviet submarines.
(b) Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS)
Fleet deliveries of SH-60B LAMPS MK III antisubmarine helicopters
have begun. The SH-60B, also known as the Seahawk, will allow modern
surface combatants to exploit the opportunities for long-range ASW
engagements offered by our new towed-array sonars. Engagements at
extended ranges are essential if our forces are to destroy enemy sub-
marines before they come close enough to launch salvos of long-range
antiship missiles and torpedoes. LAMPS MK III helicopters will be .
deployed aboard some 100 surface combatants, including DD-963 and
DDG-993 destroyers, CG-47 cruisers, and active FFG-7 frigates. A
total of 90 SH-60Bs have been authorized through FY 1985, and the
five-year program projects construction of 90 more.
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(5) ASW Weapons
We must arm our antisubmarine forces with improved weapons as a
means of countering new generations of Soviet submarines that not
only are faster and quieter, but can dive deeper and are more resis-
tant to hull penetration. To that end, we are continuing to improve
both our heavy and lightweight torpedoes and our long-range ASW
rockets.
(a) MK-48 Torpedoes
Following the completion of a successful test program last year,
we are accelerating production of the ADCAP (advanced capability)
heavyweight torpedo. The five-year program calls for production of
1,890 ADCAP units, including 123 in FY 1986. This submarine-launched
weapon, an upgraded version of the MK-48, can be fired against either
submarines or surface ships. It is designed to counter current and
projected advances in Soviet submarine designs and tactics.
(b) Lightweight Torpedoes
The FY 1986-90 program also continues a major modernization of
our inventory of lightweight ASW torpedoes. These weapons are
designed for launch from surface ships, patrol aircraft, and antisub-
marine helicopters. To provide the near-term improvements needed to
counter new Soviet submarines, we are procuring an upgraded version
of the MK-46, called NEARTIP (Near-Term Improvement Program). For
the longer term, we are developing a much more advanced lightweight
torpedo, the MK-50. That weapon promises significant improvements
over the MK-46 in speed, diving depth, accuracy, and lethality. The
system entered full-scale engineering development in FY 1984, after
a highly successful series of demonstration and validation tests.
It will join the fleet in the late 1980s. Further improvements in
propulsion and destructiveness will be made through a preplanned
product improvement (P3I) program in the early 1990s.
(c) Long-Range ASW Weapons
We are continuing development of two new long-range ASW weapons
that will be able to attack enemy submarines outside effective tor-
pedo range. The first, the ASW Standoff Weapon (ASW SOW), is slated
to replace the aging Submarine Rocket (SUBROC) deployed with the
attack submarine force. The second new system, called the Vertical
Launch ASROC (VLA), will replace the aging Antisubmarine Rocket
(ASROC) system on surface ships equipped with the Vertical Launch
System (VLS). Both of these weapons should reach the fleet within
the next five or six years.
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TAGOS
SURTASS Ships
Procurement:
Quantity
S Millions
RDSS
Development:
S Millions
FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
Actual Planned Proposed Proposed for
Funding Funding Funding Authorization
2 2 2
133.9 121.0 119.0
SSN-688
Procurement:
Quantity 3 4 4 4
S Millions 1,981.2 2,754.6 2,770.3 2,625.0
P-3C Aircraft
Procurement:
Quantity 5 9 9 9
S Millions 303.9 413.1 496.5 488.3
TACTAS
Procurement:
Quantity 12 10 16 19
5 Millions 116.7 112.0 165.4 184.0
SH-60B
Helicopters
Procurement:
Quantity 21 24 18 18
S Millions 527.6 476.7 378.8 354.7
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FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
MK-48 Torpedoes
Procurement:
Quantity
144
108
-
-
SMillions
117.5
91.7
2.4
2.5
MK-48 ADCAP
Torpedoes
Development:
5 Millions
173.2
126.6
63.5
34.9
Procurement:
Quantity
-
44
123
280
$ Millions
21.7
113.7
433.2
671.4
MK-46 Torpedoes
Procurement:
Quantity
1,200
1,565
500
500
S Millions
215.3
231.5
132.8
106.8
MK-50 Torpedoes
Development:
5 Millions
Procurement:
Quantity
$ Millions
ASW Standoff
Weapon
Development:
5 Millions
84
124.1
Vertical Launch
ASROC
Development:
S Millions
Procurement:
Quantity
S Millions
250
71.7
d. Support and Mine Warfaie Forces
The expansion of the fleet has brought with it an increased
requirement for support ships. At the same time, our existing forces
are aging and in need of replacement. To meet these combined demands,
the FY 1986-90 program includes several programs to modernize and
expand the support fleet, with particular emphasis on underway
replenishment ships. It also significantly improves mine counter-
measures capabilities, a mission area that has been severely
neglected in the past.
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(1) Multiproduct Station Ships
The battle group concept of operations requires one multiproduct
station ship (an AOE or an AOR) for each carrier battle group, to
keep it supplied with food, fuel, ammunition, and other provisions.
As we move toward our goal of 15 deployable carrier battle groups,
we will have to add four new multiproduct ships to the 11 now oper-
ated by the fleet. The five-year program funds four ships of the
new AOE-6 class. Fiscal constraints have forced us to delay the
first of these until FY 1987, one year later than we had anticipated
last year.
(2) Fleet Oilers
To keep our multiproduct station ships supplied with fuel, fleet
oilers perform shuttle service between battle groups at sea and for-
ward bases. The TAO-187 program is designed to relieve an existing
shortage of oilers, while providing replacements for the 30-year-old
vessels now operated by the P4ilitary Sealift Command. The Congress
has authorized seven TAO-187s through FY 1985, and we are projecting
continued construction at a steady rate of two per year through the
five-year program. In addition, starting in FY 1988, we will modify
five existing AO-177 oilers to increase their fuel-carrying capacity.
The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest and most capable
inventory of naval mines. These weapons have proven their effective-
ness in many naval campaigns over the years. Our aging, force of mine-
sweeping ships and helicopters is only marginally effective against
this threat. To improve our capabilities in this important area of
naval warfare, we are procuring two new classes of mine countermeas-
ures ships and a new type of minesweeping helicopter.
(a) Mine Countermeasures Ships
The MCM-1 mine countermeasures ship will both improve our mine-
sweeping capabilities and provide our forces with a capability to
hunt and neutralize advanced mines that cannot be countered by sweep-
ing techniques. Nine of these ships have been authorized through
FY 1985, the first of which, the iJSS AVENGF,R, will be delivered
next year. The FY 1986-90 shipbuilding plan funds five additional
units, completing the 14-ship program.
A second new type of mine countermeasures ship, the MSH-1 mine
hunter-sweeper, will augment the MCP4-1 during initial harbor clear-
ance and breakout operations. It will be equipped with advanced
combat systems similar to those on the MCM-1, but it will be smaller
and less expensive. The Congress authorized the lead ship of this
class in FY 1984. We are requesting funds for four additional ships
in FY 1986, with a total of 16 projected over the five-year program-
ming period.
(b) Mine Countermeasures Helicopters
The FY 1986-90 program also funds 33 additional MH-53E mine
countermeasures helicopters, of which 29 will be purchased as part
of a four-year MH/CH-53E multiyear procurement package. (The CH-53E
helicopter is discussed in the Land Forces chapter.) The MH-53E
offers significant improvements over the older RH-53D minesweeping
helicopter in flight endurance and lift capability. ~1e plan to buy
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a total of 44 MH-53Es, enough to form and support an 11-aircraft
combat squadron on each coast. (The additional aircraft are needed
for training and to replace operating losses or units undergoing
maintenance.)
FY 1984 FY 198,5 FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual Planned Proposed
Proposed for
Funding Funding Funding
Authorization
AOE-6 Multi-
product Ship
Procurement:
Quantity - - -
1
$ Millions - - -
756.6
TAO-187 Oilers
Procurement:
Quantity 2 3 2
2
MCM-1 Ships
Procurement:
Quantity 3 4 4 1
S Millions 286.6 356.7 371.1 132.8
MSH-1 Ships
Procurement:
Quantity 1 - 4 4
S Millions 65.0 - 187.6 206.0
MH-53E
Helicopters
Procurement:
Quantity
$ Millions
2 10 4
92.6 217.1 82.6
3. Conclusion
We are now beginning to see the results of our efforts to build
a strong and balanced Navy with modern warfighting capabilities. We
are well on our way to a 600-ship fleet. New, more capable ships
and aircraft are entering the inventory in increasing numbers. The
FY 1986-90 program carries these trends forward, giving us the mari-
time strength needed to reduce the risk of confrontation at sea and
preserve the peace in the decades ahead.
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Table III.B.3
FY 19g&9i0
Shipbuilding Program
FY uses-so
FY
1986
FY
1987
FY
1988
FY
1989
FY
1990
Five-Year
Total
New Construction
TRIDENT (Ballistic Missile Submarine)
1
1
1
1
1
5
SSN-688 (Attack Submarine)
4
4
4
2
4
18
SSN-21 (Attack Submarine)
-
-
-
1
-
1
CG-47 (Guided Missile Cruiser)
3
3
3
2
-
11
DDG-51 (Guided Missile Destroyer)
-
2
5
5
5
17
LHD-1 (Amphibious Assault Ship)
1
-
1
1
1
4
LSD-41 (Landing Dock Ship)
2
-
-
-
-
2
LSD-41 Follow-on (Landing Dock Shipl
-
-
2
2
2
6
MCM-1 (Mine Countermeasures Ship)
4
1
-
-
-
5
MSH-1 (Mine Hunter-Sweeper)
4
4
4
4
-
16
AOE-6 (Multipurpose Stores Ship)
-
1
1
1
1
4
AE-36 (Ammunition Ship)
1
1
1
3
AR (Repair Ship)
-
-
-
-
1
1
TAO-18710i1er)
2
2
2
2
2
10
TAGOS (Surveillance Ship)
2
2
4
Total
Conversions/SLEPs/ Reactivations
CV (Aircraft Carrier) SLEP
?3
-
ZO
1
24
-
22
-
18
1
107
2
BB (Battleship) Reactivation
-
1
-
-
-
1
LPD-4 (Landing Platform Dock Ship) SLEP
1
3
3
7
AO ("Jumbo" Oiler) Conversion
1
2
2
5
AG (Acoustic Research Vessel) Conversion
1
-
1
TAVB (Aviation Support Ship) Conversion
1
-
-
-
-
1
TACS (Crane Ship) Conversion
3
2
2
-
-
7
Total
5
4
4
5
6
24
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C. TACTICAL AIR FORCES
1. Introduction
Our tactical air forces are a vital and integral part of the
forward defense strategy for protecting our national interests.
Rapid response to aggression on a global scale requires a well-
trained and properly equipped tactical air force to project force
in an area of crisis and support our ground and naval components.
a. Program Goa/s
We must ensure that our tactical air forces are capable of
maintaining air superiority and defending and supporting our ground
and naval forces. The Soviets have built an inventory of more than
5,000 fighter and attack aircraft and are continuing to produce tac-
tical aircraft at a rate higher than our own. Although our tactical
air forces have long been considered superior to the Soviets in terms
of combat capabilities, thus outweighing our numerical disadvantage,
we are seeing a new generation of highly capable Soviet aircraft that
could seriously contest our superiority. Countering this growing
threat requires continuous improvements in the combat-effectiveness
of our tactical air forces. We recognized this requirement and
accepted the task four years ago.
Our FY 1986-90 program continues to focus on those four broad
objectives identified four years ago and outlined below:
-- Improving the combat-readiness and sustainability of our
tactical air forces through better training and increased
stocks of weapons, munitions, and spare parts;
-- Plodernizing the Active and Reserve Components with F-14,
F-15, F-16, F/A-18, and AV-8B aircraft as well as with
improved air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons;
-- Enhancing electronic warfare, tactical communications, and
air defense suppression capabilities; and
-- Improving target acquisition, surveillance, and warning
capabilities.
b. Force Structure
Our tactical air forces consist of fighter and attack aircraft,
and a variety of special-purpose aircraft that support them in combat.
Fighter aircraft, armed with air-to-air missiles and guns, main-
tain control of the skies above land and naval forces, protecting
them from air attacks (the "air superiority" mission). Fighter and
attack aircraft, armed with bombs, guns, and guided weapons, are
capable of attacking targets on land or at sea. They can attack
enemy formations in close proximity to friendly forces (the "close
air support" mission) or strike targets well behind enemy lines (the
"interdiction" mission). Table III.C.1 depicts the type of aircraft
generally associated with these missions.
Support aircraft assist fighter and attack forces in carrying
out their combat missions. The missions of these aircraft fall
into the general categories of airborne early warning, command and
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control, tactical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, in-flight
refueling, defense suppression, and special operations.
Table III.C.1
Tactical Fixed Wing Aircraft
F-15(AF1, F-15E1AF1, F-161AF1,
Air Superiority
F-41AF,MC-, F-141N1,
Close Air Support
F-161AF-, F-4 (AF,MC1, A-10(AF1,
A-71N,AF), A-41MC1, AV-81MC1,
Interdiction
A-6(MC1, F/A-181N, MC1
F-1111AF), F-15EIAF), F-41AF,MC1,
F-161AF1, A-7(AF,N-, A-61N,MC1,
eAF = Air Force
F/A-181N,MC1, A-41MC)
N = Navy MC = Marine Corps
The Air Force's fighter force structure consists of 37 wing
equivalents, 25 in the active force and 12 in the Air National Guard
(ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFR). Each wing typically contains
three squadrons of 24 aircraft each. Combat support units, such as
those composed of EF-111 electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, are gener-
ally organized into squadrons of 18 to 24 aircraft. By the end of
FY 1990, we will have the equivalent of 39 tactical fighter wings,
26 active, and 13 ANG and AFR.
In support of our fighter forces, the Active and Air National
Guard Components operate four electronic combat squadrons, fourteen
tactical reconnaissance squadrons, one tactical air command and con-
trol division, two tactical air command and control squadrons, and
nine tactical air support squadrons. By the end of the decade, we
will have modernized several elements of these support forces.
The force also includes seven squadrons of B-52 aircraft that
are assigned general purpose, as well as strategic nuclear delivery
missions. These bombers, together with strategic reconnaissance and
tanker aircraft, provide a highly responsive, long-range force
designed to perform a variety of conventional missions, including
naval minelaying, antiship attack, and conventional bombing.
(2) Navy and Marine Corps Aircraft
Unlike Air Force wings, which generally consist of only one type
of aircraft, Navy and Marine Corps air wings include a mix of air-
craft types. Atypical active Navy carrier air wing consists of nine
squadrons (approximately 86 aircraft): two fighter squadrons; two
light attack squadrons; one medium attack squadron; plus supporting
elements for airborne early warning, antisubmarine and electronic
warfare, reconnaissance, and aerial refueling operations.
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Tab/e ///. C.2
TypiQe/ Composition of Navy and Marine Corps Air Wings
Navy
Marine Corps
Number
Type Aircraft
Number
Type Aircraft
24
F-14
48
F~ (or FIA-18)
24
FIA-18 for A-7)
20
A-6
10
A-6
60
Awl (or AV-8)
4
KAY
6
RFC
4
EA-6
5
EA-6
4
E-2
12
C-130
10
S-3
60
CH-53
6
HS-3
96
CH~6
86
Total
24
AH-1
24
UH-1
15
370
OV-10
Total
An active Marine Corps air wing typically consists of 23 to 25
squadrons (338 to 370 aircraft in all): four fighter/attack squad-
rons; two or three light attack squadrons; one or two medium attack
squadrons; plus supporting elements for electronic warfare, recon-
naissance, aerial refueling, transport, airborne assault, observa-
tion, and tactical air control.
When this Administration took office, the Davy had 12 active car-
rier air wings. Consistent with the planned expansion to a 600-ship
force ultimately centered around 15 deployable carriers, we added a
13th wing in FY 1984 and will add a 14th during FY 1987. We will
maintain three active Marine Corps air wings, two Navy reserve wings,
and one Marine reserve wing throughout the program period.
2. FY 1986-90 Programs
The FY 1986-90 program for our tactical air forces is, with few
exceptions, a continuation of our focus on improving combat readi-
ness and sustainability; force modernization; electronic warfare; and
target acquisition, surveillance, and warning. This program was for-
mulated to address the necessity of maintaining and, where possible,
expanding our superior air combat capabilities in the face of the
Soviet's numerical superiority and advances in aircraft performance.
a. Combat Readiness and Sustainabi/ity
Improving combat readiness and sustainability continues to be one
of our highest priorities. The following paragraphs highlight the
efforts we are making to improve the combat capability of our forces.
Logistics initiatives are covered in detail in the Readiness and Sus-
tainability chapter.
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(1) Combat Readiness
Combat readiness is determined by the amount and type of equip-
ment and supplies on hand, as well as by personnel and training
levels. We recognize that our forces, regardless of the technical
sophistication of their equipment, offer only an illusory deterrent
if perceived as unable to respond quickly and effectively. This
Administration, therefore, has given top priority to improving the
readiness of the forces and the equipment they operate. The
FY 1986-90 program continues progress to date, building up stocks of
spare parts for our aircraft and providing more realistic training
for our aircrews.
(a) Equipment and Supplies
Peacetime operating spare parts are critical to the readiness of
our forces. These items keep our equipment ready for training in
peacetime and support increased levels of activity during the initial
stages of a conflict. 6,1e have substantially increased funding for
the procurement of spare parts during each of the past four years.
Since FY 1982, we have added $25 billion for these items. This
represents an increase of 45 percent in real terms.
(b) Personnel and Training
To realize the full potential of our significant investment in
tactical aircraft, we must have highly trained aircrews. The amount
of flying time we provide our crews is a good measure of their train-
ing and readiness levels. Largely because of their significant
advantage in average flying time per crew member, together with supe-
rior training methods, our tactical aircrews continue to be consid-
ered superior to Warsaw Pact aviators.
In FY 1986, Air Force tactical aircraft pilots will average about
233 flying hours. This represents an increase of about 50 percent
over the FY 1978 low of 156 flying hours, and is nearly double the
time logged by Soviet pilots. Navy tactical aircraft pilots will
average about 300 flying hours in FY 1986, up from 276 hours in
FY 1984. We must sustain these increased levels of training if our
aircrews are to achieve and maintain their full combat potential.
In addition to increasing flying hours, we are continuing to
emphasize realism in training. Experience has shown that aircrews
with high levels of realistic peacetime training have a significant
advantage over less-skilled adversaries in the critical early days of
a conflict. Instrumented air combat maneuvering ranges offer U.S.
and allied aircrews unique and realistic training opportunities.
Joint Service exercises in which active and reserve units from
the Air Force, Navy, and P~larine Corps conduct integrated operations
also increase the combat proficiency of our tactical aircrews. Exam-
ples of this type of training include the RED FLAG exercises held at
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the COPE THUNDER exercises conducted
at Clark Air Force Base, the Philippines; and the combined arms,
live-fire exercises held at the 1`larine Corps Air Station in Yuma,
Arizona. The RED FLAG exercises are conducted north of Las Vegas,
in an area larger than the country of Switzerland. Our aircrews are
training the way they are going to have to fight.
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(2) Force Sustainability
The possibility of extended conflict required accelerated
improvements in our ability to sustain our forces. As a result, we
increased Air Force and Navy funding for war reserve spares and muni-
tions. These efforts have resulted in a significant increase in the
number of days Air Force and Navy squadrons could conduct prolonged
wartime operations.
In addition to sustainability, the five-year program gives force
projection a high priority. We have provided funds to preposition
aircraft support equipment, materiel-handling equipment, and support
vehicles in Europe. Funds have also been provided to increase stor-
age capacity for munitions and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL)
in both regions. The Force Projection and Readiness and Sustainabil-
ity chapters discuss these programs in more detail.
b. Force Modernization
Our modernization program for the tactical air forces is struc-
tured to meet three goals: to increase combat capability, to main-
tain the force at an acceptable average age, and to permit a modest
force expansion.
The FY 1986-90 program calls for continued procurement of modern,
high-performance aircraft as a key method of improving combat capa-
bilities. F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18s equipped with the latest
weapons and employed in their individual areas of designed excel-
lence, provide us with the requisite improvements.
An average age of 10 to 11 years is considered acceptable for Air
Force tactical aircraft. For Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, we pre-
fer an average age of eight to nine years because of the high stress
associated with carrier operations. By FY 1990, the aircraft oper-
ated by active and air reserve squadrons will have been in service
for an average of 9 and 16 years, respectively. The aircraft in
operation with active and reserve Navy/Marine Corps squadrons will
have seen 9 and 14 years of service, respectively.
Over the next five years, we plan to buy 1,284 fighter and attack
aircraft for the Air Force and 893 for the Navy and the Marine Corps.
This procurement plan will allow us to modernize our tactical air
forces and replace attrition losses, while also achieving our goals
of expanding to 14 active carrier air wings by FY 1987 and 40 Air
Force tactical fighter wings by FY 1991.
(1) Air Force Programs
Though our F-15 and F-16 aircraft could perform satisfactorily
in air-to-air combat against Soviet aircraft today, we must pursue a
vigorous modernization program if we are to retain our advantage by
the end of the decade, when the Soviets will have deployed a new
generation fighter aircraft with greatly improved air-to-air combat
capabilities. Therefore, the FY 1986-90 program funds several devel-
opment programs. We will increase the thrust levels of the engines
delivered for the F-15 and F-16 fleet by FY 1990. We are developing
an F-16 variant which will possess improved air-to-air capability.
The Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) will give the
F-16 a night/all-weather, multiple target, radar-missile capability,
and will improve the F-15's capabilities in multiple target engage-
ments beyond visual range. For the future, we are continuing studies
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of Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) concepts which could lead to the
introduction of a new aircraft type in the mid-199Os.
Further details on major elements of the Air Force's moderni-
zation program are provided below:
F-15 (Ea le) -- The F-15 is the Air Force's primary air-
superiority ig ter. Equipped with beyond-visual-range radar mis-
siles, it can engage aircraft deep in enemy airspace from standoff
positions in all types of weather. We plan to complete the F-15C/D
buy with 40 in FY 1986 and then transition to the dual role F-15F.,
procuring 236 F-15Es through 1990 and continuing the buy until
FY 1993. The F-15C/Ds will free earlier model F-15A/Bs for transfer
to reserve force units. The F-15E will significantly improve the
interdiction and airfield attack capability of our tactical forces.
When equipped with Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared
System for Night (LANTIRN), these aircraft will possess the capabil-
ity to operate against ground targets at night and in adverse weather.
F-16 (Fi htin Falcon) -- A multirole fighter, the F-16 is capa-
ble of per orming in bot the air-to-air combat and air-to-ground
attack roles. It complements the F-15 as an air superiority fighter.
We plan to procure 180 F-16s in both FY 1986 and 1987, then increase
the production rate to 216 per year in FY 1988. Most of the F-16s
will replace F-4Es in the active force, freeing those aircraft for
transfer to the ANG, where they will replace early model F-4C/Ds.
We will split the procurement of F-16s in FY 1989 with the intro-
duction of the F-16F. There are a number of promising technologies
applicable to the F-16F in various stages of evaluation which may be
incorporated. Certainly, the F-16XL with its fuselage extension and
cranked-arrow wing for longer range and increased payload is promis-
ing as are improvements evaluated in the Advanced Fighter Technology
Integration (AFTI) program.
Increased Thrust F.n fines -- Introduction of two new Soviet air
superiority fig ters uring the late 198Os, coupled with improvements
to the F-15 and F-16, which subsequently increased the weight of
these aircraft, generated a requirement to increase their engine
thrust levels. At present, we are determining the minimum thrust
levels needed and will define a specific program by early next year.
MC-130H (Combat Talon II) -- A modified C-130 aircraft operated
by the Special Operations Forces, the MC-13OH is equipped with
precision-navigation, terrain-following, and self-protection systems
which enable it to penetrate enemy airspace at night and at low alti-
tudes. Its primary mission is to deliver, resupply, and recover com-
bat personnel and equipment behind enemy lines. By FY 1992, the
inventory will include 35 modified C-13Os.
HH-6OA -- We plan to modernize a portion of the helicopters in
our combat rescue fleet with the introduction of the HH-6OA. This
helicopter will improve our combat rescue capability in unfavorable
weather conditions and at night.
LANTIRN -- Currently under development, LANTIRPI is a pod-mounted
navigation and targeting system designed to enable our F-15E, F-16,
and A-10 aircraft to penetrate enemy air defenses at low altitude
and to find and destroy enemy targets at night and under the weather.
Soviet army doctrine stresses around-the-clock operations in all
types of weather. Therefore, we must be capable of destroying enemy
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concentrations whenever they present themselves, and not allow dark-
ness or the poor weather conditions prevalent in Central Europe to
become their ally.
Ima in Infrared (IIR) Maverick -- An antiarmor, air-to-surface
missi e, t e IIR Maveric is an evolutionary follow-on to the current
TV-guided system. The IIR version uses an imaging infrared seeker
for guidance, expanding its capability in the night-attack role.
Advanced Medium-Ran a Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) -- The APIRAAM
is anew, a weat er, air-to-air missi e being eve oped for use by
both the Air Force and the Navy. Unlike current medium range radar
missiles, which are guided to their targets by the radar systems
aboard the aircraft which launch them, AMRAAPR will have an active
radar seeker, giving it a "launch-and-leave" capability. This means
that the missile will be able to guide itself to its target. An air-
craft carrying several of these missiles will be able to engage mul-
tiple targets on a single intercept, thus reducing its exposure to
enemy air defenses.
AIM-9M (Sidewinder) -- An infrared-guided, air-to-air missile
carried y of Air Force and Navy aircraft, the AIM-9M incorporates
improved background-discrimination and countermeasures capabilities
relative to earlier versions. Other improvements include a reduced-
smoke motor, making it more difficult for an enemy both to see the
missile and to locate the launch aircraft.
Tactical Aircraft Modification -- We modify our aircraft to
enhance t eir com at capa i hies, improve their reliability and
maintainability, correct safety defects, and extend their service
lives. Major elements of the FY 1986-1990 program include: F-111
avionics modernization, improved radar warning receivers, and
AIM-9L/M self-protection capability.
Air Base Survivability (ABS) -- In FY 1984, we began a major pro-
gram to increase t e survivability of the overseas air bases from
which we would operate aircraft during a crisis. The program in
Europe includes improvements to the 22 main operating bases (MOBS)
and 5 standby bases we maintain and to the more than 70 collocated
operating bases (COBS), maintained by European allies, that we would
share with NATO forces during a reinforcement of in-place forces.
Funding for these facilities for U.S. use is provided for both by the
NATO Infrastructure budget and -- where specified in NATO agreements
-- by unilateral U.S. funding. Examples of projects that we must
fund unilaterally under existing agreements are rapid runway repair
equipment, chemical defense measures, and camouflage. D]ATO Infra-
structure covers basic operating facilities, such as main runways,
aircraft shelters, munitions storage ,. etc. The ABS program also
includes air forces with Pacific and SWA commitments.
High priority projects begun with U.S. funds in FY 1985 include
preparation of earthworks around key U.S. facilities at MOBS and
COBs, construction of revetted, dispersed aircraft parking pads
pending the construction of shelters, and procurement of munitions
storage containers. The revetted parking pad program will continue
through the late 198Os, using concrete slabs and other equipment that
can be reused later for runway repair once the more costly permanent
shelters become available. Studies accomplished over the past few
years show that dispersed parking and sheltering for aircraft offer
significant benefits in aircraft survivability against the kinds of
air attack we would expect in a major war.
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Due to a significant increase in infrastructure funding for
FY 1985-90, there are a substantial number of aircraft shelters
planned for contruction at the COBS. Ode also will be exploring the
possibility of cooperative, bilateral airbase improvement projects to
speed the enhancement of airbase survivability, including such con-
cepts as joint procurement of chemical protective systems at COBS.
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
F-15
Development:
S Millions
110.0
189.6
252.1
110.3
Procurement:
Quantity
36
42
48
48
S Millions
1,514.5
2,066.2
2,209.1
2,221.8
F-16
Development:
S Millions
98.6
94.6
94.9
214.1
Procurement:
Quantity
144
150
180
180
S Millions
2,551.7
3,306.5
3,708.7
3,661.7
MC-13OH
Procurement:
Quantity
2
2
1
2
S Millions
73.1
95.4
83.3
120.9
H H-6OA
Procurement:
Quantity
-
-
3
25
S Millions
-
6.1
122.1
340.2
LANTIRN
Development:
S Millions
58.1
98.3
40.8
44.7
Procurement:
S Millions
-
90.0
436.4
786.1
IIR Maverick
Procurement:
Quantity
1,980
2,600
3,695
6,119
S Millions
303.1
381.8
517.6
755.6
AM RAAM
Development:
S Millions
190.7
209.7
101.4
1.1
Procurement:
Quantity
-
-
90
505
S Millions
57.8
73.1
438.4
853.3
AIM-9M
Procurement:
Quantity
1,700
-
800
769
S Millions
104.5
-
43.3
64.1
Tactical Aircraft
Modifications
Procurement:
S Millions
639.9
810.9
812.8
1,553.2
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(2) Navy and Marine Corps Programs
Over the next five years, we plan to buy 1,035 Navy and Marine
Corps tactical aircraft, of which 954 are fighter and attack air-
craft. To facilitate force modernization, 574 F/A-18 strike-fighters
are planned during the program period. Twenty-eight Navy and 12
Marine squadrons will be equipped with the F/A-18 by the early 1990s.
Recognizing the significant advancements in combat-effectiveness
afforded by introduction of the multimission F/A-18 and planned up-
grades to other carrier-based aircraft, our carrier air wings will
also be restructured with a new mix of fighter, attack, and support
aircraft.
Further details on major elements of the Navy's modernization
program are provided below:
F-14 (Tomcat) -- The F-14 is a high performance, all-weather, air
superiority ig ter designed for fleet air defense and is the only
aircraft in the Navy's inventory that can carry the long-range Phoe-
nix air-to-air missile. The F-14 is intended primarily to protect
carrier battle groups against long-range Soviet bomber and cruise
missile attacks. It will continue to provide our carrier task forces
with an organic reconnaissance capability by carrying the Tactical
Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS). To ensure its effectiveness
against new-generation Soviet aircraft, we are modifying both the
existing airframe and engine and will begin procuring an upgraded
model, the F-14D, in FY 1988. The F-14D will incorporate significant
improvements in avionics and radar, as well as new and more powerful
engines. Transition of two naval reserve squadrons to the F-14 com-
menced in FY 1985. We plan to upgrade additional early production
aircraft to complete the transition of four Naval reserve squadrons
from F-4s to F-14s by FY 1988.
F/A-18 (Hornet) -- The F/A-18 strike-fighter, as it replaces
older F-4s an A-7s, gives Navy and Marine aviation new flexibility.
Capable of employment in both the fighter and attack role, the
F/A-18 will be used to modernize a major portion of our tactical
air force. In the future, we anticipate using F/A-18s for tactical
reconnaissance missions. The first F/A-18 aircraft will he assigned
to the naval reserve in FY 1986 to support two reserve squadrons.
Additional naval reserve squadrons are planned to be equipped with
the F/A-18 during the program years.
A-6E (Intruder) -- The A-6E is the only carrier-based aircraft
that can attac and and sea targets at night in all types of
weather. Operated by active Navy and Marine Corps units, the air-
craft is particularly well-suited for war-at-sea, power projection,
and deep interdiction roles. A mainstay of the fleet since 1963, we
will ensure its continued effectiveness in the future threat environ-
ment by modifying it with improved navigation and target recognition
systems as well as procuring an upgraded model in FY 1988. This up-
graded version will incorporate improved avionics, radar, engines,
and survivability features. In addition, we are studying Advanced
Tactical Aircraft (ATA) concepts which could lead to the introduction
of a replacement aircraft in the 1990s.
AV-8B (Harrier) -- A V/STOL attack aircraft, the AV-8B incorpo-
rates signi icant improvements over the earlier "A" model in payload,
performance, and ordnance delivery accuracy. The AV-8B will replace
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older AV-8A/Cs and A-4s, freeing the A-4Ms for transfer to reserve
units. This unique tactical aircraft will provide ground commanders
with responsive close air support by combining the speed and fire-
power of a modern jet attack aircraft with exceptional basing flexi-
bility.
CV-Helico ter -- The 1986-1990 program calls for development
and initia procurement of a CV-helicopter to replace the SH-3.
This gives our inner-zone AStiJ forces new offensive punch by intro-
ducing advanced sensors and weapon capabilities. Eventually, the
CV-helicopter will be used to modernize Navy reserve forces.
AIP1-7M (S arrow) -- The AIM-71`1 is an all-weather, air-to-air mis-
sile esigne or use with both Air Force and Navy aircraft. It
relies on semi-active radar guidance to home on its target. First
procured in FY 1980, the "M" model has greater electronic counter-
measures resistance and look-down/shoot-down capabilities than the
earlier "F" version.
Laser Maverick -- This highly accurate air-to-surface missile is
designed to destroy enemy armor and heavy fortifications from stand-
off ranges. Its sophisticated laser guidance system makes it partic-
ularly suitable for use in the close air support role. The missile
is compatible with all Navy and r1arine Corps attack aircraft.
AIM-54A/C (Phoenix) -- A long-range, air-to-air missile, the
AIM-54A/C is intended primarily for attacks against enemy bombers.
The F-14 aircraft can carry six Phoenix missiles and is capable of
near simultaneous launch against six targets in an all-weather,
jamming environment. First procured in FY 1980, the "C" model has
improved electronic counter-countermeasures features relative to
earlier versions.
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
F-14
Development:
S Millions
40.6
277.1
348.1
252.5
Procurement:
Quantity
24
24
18
18
5 Millions
976.0
964.2
812.4
910.5
F/A-18
Development:
S Millions
19.8
29.9
58.3
92.6
Procurement:
Quantity
84
84
84
102
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FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
A-6E
Development:
S Millions
14.4
69.1
238.0
134.7
Procurement:
Quantity
6
6
6
6
S Millions
232.0
256.7
224.0
390.5
AV-8B
Development:
S Millions
104.1
71.5
72.1
54.1
Procurement:
Quantity
27
32
46
47
S Millions
893.1
870.4
1,076.7
1,137.0
CV-Helicopter
Development:
S Millions
18.4
20.1
12.7
2.8
Procurement:
Quantity
-
-
-
7
S Millions
-
-
30.0
283.8
AIM-7M
Procurement:
Quantity
374
1,344
1,492
1,502
S Millions
86.0
223.6
293.0
290.3
Laser Maverick
Development
S Millions
6.9
2.0
-
-
Procurement:
Quantity
185
600
1,500
1,800
S Millions
36.2
103.0
199.1
222.1
AIM-54A/C
Procurement:
Quantity
265
265
265
420
S Millions
332.8
365.7
393.5
542.8
c. E/ectronic Warfare (EWJ/Command, Contro% and Communications
Countermeasures (C3CMJ
The rapidly expanding Soviet electromagnetic threat has generated
significant changes in equipment and tactics within the U.S. forces.
Recognizing that the proliferation of battlefield electronics is
exceeding our capability to respond to each new system or modifica-
tion, we are assuming an offensive posture to counter the full array
of threat systems and provide for weapon system and avionics protec-
tion. Achieving an offensive posture rests heavily on a sound tech-
nology base, and timely, prudent systems acquisition.
The FY 1986-90 program funds a complementary mix of self-
protection, disruptive, destructive, and support systems to improve
the E6J capability of strategic and tactical forces. These systems
are designed to degrade hostile air defenses; deny the enemy unre-
stricted use of his command, control, and communications systems; and
protect the security of our own communications.
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We are pursuing the following major programs to improve our capa-
bilities in these areas:
EF-111 -- The EF-111 is a standoff jamming platform designed to
suppress enemy long-range detection and acquisition radars. It may
also be employed in the close-in jamming and penetration/escort jam-
ming roles.
EA-6B (Prowler) -- The carrier-based EA-6B is a sophisticated
Nava tactica support aircraft designed to degrade enemy defenses
by jamming their radars and communications systems. Because of the
dynamic nature of electronic warfare, the program funds continued
improvements to the EA-6B to counter new generations of enemy radars
and weapons systems.
COMPASS CALL -- COMPASS CALL is an airborne jamming system
designe to egrade an enemy's command, control, and communications
capability. These EC-130 aircraft are in the field today; however,
we have a number of ongoing programs to improve their capability.
Additional COMPASS CALL aircraft are scheduled to be modified in
the mid-198Os.
High-Speed Antiradiation Missile (HARM) -- HARM is an air-to-
surface missile developed jointly by the Navy and the Air Force. It
is designed to suppress or destroy land- and sea-based air defense
radars. The system was fielded by the Navy in FY 1983 and by the Air
Force in FY 1984.
F-4G Wild Weasel -- The upgraded Air Force defense suppression
F-4G weapon system is employed to destroy surface-to-air missile
(SAP4) systems for all mission aircraft in the target area. F-4Gs
are HARM carriers.
Precision Location Strike S stem (PCBs) -- PLSS is an a11-
weat er stan o ocation stri e system. It will locate enemy
defense emitters in near-real-time and in all weather conditions and
allow attack from standoff ranges by both ground and airborne weapons
systems. Currently under development by the Air Force, the system is
scheduled to become operational in the late 198Os.
Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) -- ASPJ is a joint Navy/
Air Force program whic will provide many of our modern tactical air-
craft with reprogrammable, electronic countermeasures designed to
cope with the projected threat. The ASPJ system has been designed as
an internal system which will not degrade aerodynamic performance.
d. Antijam, Secure. Voice, Data and /dentification Friend or Foe
(/FFJ Systems
Joint Tactical Information Distribution S stem (JTIDS) -- JTIDS
is a secure, jam-resistant, igita ata an voice system designed
for use by all Services. The United Kingdom also plans to purchase
JTIDS equipment for some of its tactical air forces. The system is
now deployed on E-3A (AtiJACS) aircraft in Europe and will be deployed
in U.S. systems later next year. The remaining portions of the
system, which include terminals of various sizes and capabilities,
will be fielded throughout the 198Os and into the 199Os.
The enhanced JTIDS system (EJS) will satisfy our requirement for
a secure, jam-resistant voice radio for our tactical aircraft. As
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a near-term response to the Soviet jamming threat, we are modifying
our tactical UHF radios with the HAVE QUICK system.
The Air Force, with participation by the Army and Navy, is also
developing a combat identification system for use by the Services and
our NATO allies. As suggested above, we are pursuing a program to
integrate voice, data, and identification systems into a common, mod-
ular design.
TRI-TAC -- The Joint Tactical Communications program will pro-
vide modernized switched voice and digital communications required by
our tactical forces. The majority of TRI-TAC subsystems will be in
production in FY 1986, including tropospheric scatter radios, a fam-
ily of digital message and voice switches and terminals, and the
Communications Nodal Control Element which performs automatic techni-
cal control functions. RDT?~E efforts in FY 1986 will include design
of peculiar support equipment for these systems, specifications of
electromagnetic countermeasures capability for the radios, mainte-
nance of equipment at the Joint Test Facility, and the integrating
and fielding of TRI-TAC communications equipment.
Tactical Air Control System Improvements (TACSI) Program --
TACSI will provide significant modernization of our aging and obso-
lete tactical command and control capabilities. The Marine Corps and
the Air Force are developing and acquiring the Tactical Air Opera-
tions Center (TAOC) -- Modular Control Equipment (MCE). TAUC/MCE
will provide the capability to handle a significant increase in
command and control workload, enhance service interoperability, and
reduce life cycle support costs. The Ground Attack Control Center
System will incorporate MCE hardware components with additional soft-
ware programs to provide the TACS with the capability to control air
attacks more rapidly against time-sensitive mobile ground targets.
In addition to MCE developments, the Air Force is pursuing Ultra-Low
Sidelobe Antenna and Antiradiation Missile Decoy Development programs
for the AN/TPS-43E tactical radars. These will improve the radar's
jam-resistance and increase its survivability against antiradiation
missiles.
FY 1984
FY 198,5
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
EA-66
Development:
5 Millions
23.4
35.8
80.2
`~?3
Procurement:
Quantity
8
6
12
12
S Millions
488.3
398.2
501.6
518.1
HARM
Procurement:
Quantity
698
1,559
2,619
3,706
5 Millions
379.2
589.5
752.0
930.8
F-4G Wild Weasel
Procurement:
S Millions
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FY 1984
FY 19&5
FY 1986
FY 7987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
PLSS
Development:
S Millions
72.9
79.1
63.1
27.4
Procurement:
S Millions
8.8
153.1
138.4
72.5
ASPJ
Development:
5 Millions
84.4
65.3
36.2
18.6
Procurement:
S Millions
21.0
263.1
429.0
380.9
JTIDS
Development:
S Millions
TR I-TAC
Development:
S Millions
Procurement:
S Millions
TACSI
Development:
S Millions
e. Target Acquisition, Survei/Nance, and Warning
The ability to locate and identify enemy air, naval, and ground
forces is critical to effective tactical air operations and, there-
fore, to the outcome of the battle. We are pursuing the following
major programs to improve our capabilities in this area:
E-3A Airborne Warnin and Control S stem (AWACS) -- This Air
Force aircra t is equippe wit a ong-range, oo - own radar with
substantial resistance to enemy jamming. Capable of detecting both
air and ground targets, and of managing multiple fighter and attack
sorties, the AWACS provides surveillance, warning, and control capa-
bilities for use in North American air defense, as well as in over-
seas theaters of operations. It is also a valuable supplement to our
naval forces in performing maritime theater operations.
We have decided to complete our procurement of E-3A AWACS air-
craft with the 34 aircraft purchased through FY 1984. While the
additional aircraft previously planned would provide valuable sur-
veillance capabilities, we believe that new wide-area sensors -- such
as over-the-horizon (0TH) radars discussed in the Nuclear Forces and
Naval Forces chapters -- have a higher priority and greater long-term
potential. To keep pace with the evolving threat, we will continue
to upgrade our existing E-3A aircraft.
E-2C (Hawkeye) -- This carrier-based aircraft provides airborne
early warning andcommand and control support for air defense and sea
control missions.
TR-1 -- A derivative of the high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft, the TR-1 is equipped with an array of sensors designed to
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Tactical Air Forces
provide our forces with continuous, all-weather surveillance of
the battle area.
Joint STARS -- The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System being developed by the Air Force and the Army, detects,
tracks, and guides attacks against second echelon enemy armor to
supporr_ the AirLand Battle.
E-3A (Modification)
Development:
S Millions
Procurement:
S Millions
FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
Actual Planned Proposed Proposed for
Funding Funding Funding Authorization
E-2C
Development:
S Millions 50.3 37.4 23.7 35.4
Procurement:
Quantity 6 6 6 6
5 Millions 324.2 357.0 390.3 396.3
TR-1 / U-2
Procurement:
Quantity 6 4 8 2
S Millions 195.6 207.4 363.6 125.4
f. Rapid Deployment Force Piogiam
The inherent deployment flexibility of modern aircraft makes them
a key element of our rapid deployment forces. While virtually all
tactical air forces are considered "rapidly deployable," the Air
Force and Marine Corps have identified several units for commitment
to the Central Command, oriented toward Southwest Asian operations.
A mix of fighter, attack, and support aircraft have undergone special
training to prepare them for this assignment. Recent Air Force and
Marine Corps participation in the BRIGHT STAR '83 exercise offered
an opportunity for in-theater training, as did deployment of two E-3A
surveillance aircraft and eight F-15 fighters from the United States
to Sudan during the Chadian crisis in the fall of 1983. That deploy-
ment revealed some limitations -- such as a lack of aircraft parking
aprons, inadequate airport navigation facilities, and poor fuel stor-
age and distribution, which complex modern aircraft could face when
operating from unprepared sites. As an example, lack of sufficient
parking aprons precludes dispersing the aircraft thereby increasing
their vulnerability to sabotage. Our SWA construction programs are
designed to overcome such limitations by upgrading key facilities
to which we have access.
3. Conclusion
The program to improve our tactical air force combat capabilities
through a consistent, long-term modernization effort continues in
this five-year plan. Through procurement of the most modern and
capable combat aircraft, munitions, and combat support systems and
modification of existing aircraft, we are not only improving our
combat capability and sustainability but also modernizing our force.
Improvements in logistics support and training for our aircrews offer
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further increases in combat effectiveness. Together, the improvement
efforts outlined in the preceding sections will build a flexible and
balanced force, capable of deploying rapidly to distant regions and
of bringing substantial firepower to bear against hostile forces in
the air, on the ground, and at sea.
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D. FORCE PROJECTION
1. Introduction
a. Strategy and Missions
Our investment in the force improvement programs described in
the preceding three chapters would be worth little if we lacked
the means to project military power in support of our national
interests, wherever or whenever they are threatened. A combat
force -- however well trained or equipped it may he -- simply can-
not be effective if it must wait for lift at its home base while
a conflict progresses overseas. Force projection is, therefore,
vital, initially to the deterrence of aggression, but also to the
conduct of a successful forward defense should deterrence fail.
These two principles of U.S. military strategy -- deterrence and
forward defense -- place a premium on rapid deployability. They
require that we have sufficient amounts of airlift and sealift, and
of prepositioned materiel overseas, to maintain a credible deterrent
while minimizing our peacetime presence in allied nations. They
require that we be able to move major combat forces rapidly to endan-
gered areas, and to support them for as long as their presence is
needed. As the scope of our security interests has grown and the
threat of regional conflicts has increased, so, too, has the range of
demands on our projection forces.
Our most serious challenge is posed by the Soviet Union, which,
in conjunction with its Warsaw Pact and North Korean allies, enjoys
a significant advantage of proximity to three critical theaters --
Europe, Southwest Asia (SWA), and Northeast Asia (see Chart III.D.1).
U.S. projection forces are sized to support a strong forward defense
of these vital areas, concurrently if need be. The deployment
demands are met by a combination of military and civilian transpor-
tation systems, augmented by overseas prepositioning and by ships
and aircraft provided by allied nations.
Chart ///. D.1
Soviet Geogrraphic Advant$gre
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b. Contributions of the Various Force E/ements
(1) Airlift
Airlift, our most flexible and rapid force-projection resource,
would play a vital role in virtually any deployment. In regions
such as Southwest Asia, where we maintain only a very limited mili-
tary presence in peacetime, airlift would deliver the initial incre-
ment of combat forces. These forces -- consisting largely of tacti-
cal air, air defense, and light ground units -- would be needed to
secure a lodgment and defend ports and airfields in preparation for
the arrival of much larger follow-on forces. For deployments to
regions such as Western Europe, airlift is the only transportation
mode that can satisfy our immediate reinforcement objectives.
Heavier forces, such as armored and mechanized units, cannot be
transported rapidly by air in the numbers needed for either a Euro-
pean or Southwest Asian conflict. It is simply too expensive to buy
that large an airlift force. Yet we must be able to move such units
quickly, particularly in a NATO reinforcement, given the heavily
armored forces they would face. Large armored and mechanized forces
can be deployed rapidly only by combining airlift with extensive
prepositioning.
(2) Prepositioning
Prepositioning, whether on land or at sea, can sharply reduce
lift requirements in the important early days of a deployment. For
example, by storing the heavy equipment of mechanized divisions in
Europe, we can cut each division's transit time from several weeks to
two or three days, thereby enabling us to meet our early NATO rein-
forcement objectives. Although land-based prepositioning programs do
much to improve early combat capability, their contributions are
limited to the theaters in which materiel has been stored. Preposi-
tioning at sea offers greater flexibility, since ships can be moved
from one region to another as regional priorities or circumstances
change.
(3) Sealift
In most cases, Army and Marine Corps units for which equipment
has not been prepositioned would deploy by sea. Amphibious lift
forces and government-controlled ships maintained in a high state of
readiness would be the first to depart. We would also use ships from
the U.S.-flag fleet, and in a NATO or Korean conflict, we would draw
on a pool of ships committed by allied nations. Commercial ships in
or near a port could be loaded relatively quickly and take part in
the initial deployment. Ships at sea, which could take some time
returning to port, would carry follow-on reinforcements.
Just as we do with airlift, we combine prepositioning with sea-
lift to shorten response times. In this case, cargo-handling equip-
ment and other items needed to unload ships and operate ports are
stored near potential conflict regions so that the first ships to
arrive would have a full support capability awaiting them. Having
these materials on hand would be especially important in deployments
to Third World regions, where port facilities are often austere.
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(4) En Route Basing Support
Access to bases en route to a conflict theater would be important
in any deployment, particularly one involving a large amount of air-
lift. To move large forces quickly, we must maximize the amount of
cargo carried aboard each aircraft. Without access to intermediate
bases for refueling, we would either have to reduce cargo loads in
order to take on more fuel or press an already overburdened aerial-
refueling force into additional service. Although many of the facil-
ities we have received permission to use are adequate for day-to-day
operations, they must often be modified or augmented in peacetime to
make them capable of supporting military operations during a crisis.
c. Segments of a Dep/oyment
For planning purposes, deployments are often characterized as
having two segments: an "intertheater" stage involving the movement
of forces and materiel to or between major geographic regions or
theaters; and an "intratheater" stage comprising subsequent moves
within an operating tTieater. Some aircraft and ships are designed
to operate over a single deployment segment, while others can be
employed effectively over both. Examples of single-segment contrib-
utors include converted SL-7 ships, which, at more than 30 knots,
are best used over long intertheater shipping routes, and the medium-
range C-130 aircraft, the workhorse of the intratheater airlift
fleet. Systems capable of contributing to both deployment segments
include amphibious ships (discussed in detail in the Naval Forces
chapter) and the new, long-range C-17 aircraft, whose ability to
deliver forces and equipment directly to austere forward locations
will make it a valuable complement to both the intertheater and
intratheater fleets.
d. force Projection Goa/s
liven the growing ability of the Soviet-bloc nations to launch
simultaneous offensives in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific
region, our long-term goal is to be able to deploy the forces we
need to these areas concurrently. Because the European and SWA por-
tions of any such deployment would place the heaviest demands on our
projection forces, our objectives for those regions are discussed in
more detail below.
(1) Europe
Rapid reinforcement is central to the U.S. commitment to NATO.
Because the Warsaw Pact maintains a large military force along its
borders with NATO, and the region's extensive road and rail networks
would support a major, rapid enemy buildup, NATO must be prepared to
initiate a large-scale reinforcement of its in-place forces immedi-
ately upon warning of an attack. We are committed to deliver six
Army divisions, 60 tactical fighter squadrons, and one Marine Amphib-
ious Brigade (MAB) -- all with initial support -- to their combat
positions within 10 days. Although further reinforcements would be
needed later, this should enable NATO to prevent a Pact breakthrough
in the early stages of an attack. Because the forces must be in
place before sealift could respond, they would have to be deployed
by air and would draw on equipment that had been stocked for them in
advance.
Once the initial reinforcements had been airlifted to the
theater, sealift would accomplish most of the remainder of a
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deployment. Because government-controlled and U.S.-flag shipping
could fulfill only a portion of the requirement, we would also use
ships obtained from allied civil fleets. Our dependence on allied
shipping would he substantial if we had to deploy forces simulta-
neously to two or more theaters.
(2) Southwest Asia (SWA)
Our deployment objectives for S4dA are much different from those
for NATO. This is partly because a serious Soviet threat to this
theater would take longer to materialize due to the limited road and
rail system and the greater distances to be traveled. Even so, our
forces would have to move more than 12,000 nautical miles by sea and
some 8,000 nautical miles by air -- nearly double the distance to
Europe. At their destination, they would be operating from ports
and airfields that might lack the modern cargo-handling equipment
found at European facilities. But one of our toughest challenges
follows from the fact that, with no combat units forward deployed in
SWA, we would have to deliver an entire fighting force, with all of
its support elements -- and do so very quickly.
Our objective is to be able to deploy a major joint task force
and required support within six weeks of being asked for assistance.
Establishing air defenses would have a high priority in the early
stages of a deployment, as would the protection of ports and air-
fields. Airlift, combined with prepositioning, would deliver the
forces needed to accomplish these tasks. Heavy combat and support
forces would follow on fast sealift, with conventional sealift com-
pleting the deployment. Although these objectives are challenging,
they can be met with the planned improvements to our projection
forces if we have modest support from friendly nations in the region
and if we respond promptly to warning.
e. Current Force Structure
The U.S. military maintains a diverse fleet of aircraft and ships
to serve the transportation needs of its forces. The inventory
includes 304 C-5 and C-141 long-range cargo aircraft (designed pri-
marily to transport materiel to or between theaters of operation) and
26 KC-10 dual-role airlift and aerial-refueling aircraft. Another
518 aircraft of shorter range (C-130s) and some 700 helicopters
(CH-47s, CH-53s, and CH-54s) contribute to the movement of troops and
supplies within theaters. In addition, approximately 90 dry cargo
ships and 30 tankers are maintained under government control. Most
of these ships could be made available for sealift operations within
five to ten days of notification. Approximately 140 additional cargo
ships are in long-term storage and could be readied for use within
one to three months.
These forces would be augmented in a major deployment by aircraft
and ships drawn from the i1.S. civil fleets. The Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) could contribute 226 passenger and 63 cargo aircraft.
The U.S.-flag fleet could supply approximately 202 dry cargo ships
and 120 tankers. Of these, 142 cargo ships and 17 tankers could be
made available by charter or government contract under the Sealift
Readiness program, which operates at no direct cost to DoD.
f. Assistance from A//ies
The NATO nations and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have agreed to
contribute a number of ships and aircraft for a U.S. reinforcement
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of their regions. The European allies have earmarked some 600 ships
for this purpose -- the majority of the sealift capacity needed for
a NATO reinforcement. To augment our airlift forces, they would pro-
vide nearly 40 long-range cargo transports and nearly 40 passenger
aircraft. The ROK likewise has promised to make available a pool of
ships and aircraft for a reinforcement of Northeast Asia. These com-
mitments would speed the arrival of U.S. troops and materiel, and
free some of our aircraft and ships for use elsewhere.
g. Improvements Since FV 1981
While the United States' force projection capabilities were sub-
stantial when this Administration took office, the forces on hand
were insufficient to meet all of the potential deployment demands.
We lacked the ability to move large forces quickly enough to deter,
with reasonable confidence, Soviet aggression in distant regions.
Nor could we have deployed major forces to two or more theaters
simultaneously. Moreover, we lacked the ability to unload the full
range of ships needed to move materiel into less-developed regions.
Since FY 1981, we have made considerable progress in redressing
these deficiencies, adding subtantially to our airlift and sealift
capacity and prepositioning additional large quantities of materiel
abroad.
In January 1982, we announced a major airlift program calling for
the procurement of nearly 100 wide-bodied transport aircraft. In
September 1983, we began a long-proposed program to enhance the capa-
bilities of the CRAF by adding cargo-convertible features to wide-
bodied passenger aircraft in the fleet. Combined with an increase
in spare parts purchases over the past four years, these initiatives
will, by FY 1985, increase our intertheater airlift capacity by
roughly 35 percent and almost double our ability to move outsized
equipment -- which includes major weapons systems for ground forces
-- by air.
Chart III. D.2
Programmed Improvements to
Force Projection Capabilities
(FY 1981 - 19901
~~?~ ~ ,~,
p ~ ,~
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For sealift, the FY 1983 budget began a significant expansion
of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) along with a number of readiness-
related improvements. It also began a program to increase the con-
tribution of the U.S.-flag fleet to the movement of military mate-
riel. (The equipment being purchased under this program will enable
commercial containerships to carry the full range of military cargo.)
Combined with an acceleration of a major sea-based prepositioning
program, these programs will have tripled our sealift capacity by
the end of FY 1985.
Chart III.D.2 summarizes the force projection improvements pro-
grammed through FY 1990.
2. FY 1986-90 Program
The programs we are proposing for the next five years continue
the emphasis this Administration has placed on strengthening U.S.
force projection capabilities. A number of the programs are focused
on improving our ability to move forces to underdeveloped regions.
Completing these programs will bring us considerably closer to our
goal of being able to deploy and sustain major combat forces in two
or more theaters simultaneously.
The planned airlift improvements will help eliminate long-
recognized shortages. The prepositioning of additional materiel
abroad will enhance our rapid-response capabilities worldwide. Espe-
cially noteworthy will be the completion in FY 1986 of the Maritime
Prepositioning Ship (MPS) program, which will give us the capability
to deploy three heavily configured MABs very rapidly to any point
near which these ships are based. The sealift-related improvements
will increase the availability of government-controlled ships early
in a deployment. Furthermore, they will provide fast transport for
an Army division and improve our ability to unload cargo in austere
ports or over the beach.
a. Air/ift Programs
The FY 1986-90 program continues to give high priority to in-
creasing airlift capacity. By the end of the decade, we will have
added 50 C-5Bs and 44 KC-lOs to the intertheater fleet and begun pro-
curing a major new transport aircraft. As these programs move for-
ward, we will continue to improve the performance of existing air-
craft, increasing the cargo contribution of the civil fleet and
extending the service lives of important components of the military
fleet.
(1) Expansion of Airlift Capacity
The C-5B increases our ability to move outsized equipment, such
as tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and helicopters. These items
would have to be substantially dismantled in order to be carried by
any other aircraft in military or civilian use. Upon arrival in
the combat theater, the equipment would have to be reassembled -- a
time-consuming process that would slow the deployment and introduce
risks. This problem would be particularly severe in a NATO rein-
forcement, given the large amount of outsized cargo that would have
to be moved within the first 10 days. Adding to our outsize capa-
bility with additional C-5Bs helps resolve this problem.
The KC-10 adds anew dimension of flexibility to the airlift
force. It can operate as a transport aircraft or a tanker, or as
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both simultaneously. Consequently, we can use it in whichever mode
best serves the needs of a deployment. In a NATO reinforcement, it
could be employed as a transport aircraft for moving bulk and over-
sized cargo. In deployments to other regions, where access to inter-
mediate bases for refueling might be limited, it could be used as a
tanker for refueling C-5s and C-141s, or it could operate in a mixed
role, carrying fuel for fighters and a limited amount of cargo.
Under the CRAF Enhancement program, we are adding "cargo-
convertible" features to 19 wide-bodied passenger aircraft that would
be used for military airlift operations during a national emergency.
The modifications will enable the planes to be converted to carry
military cargo. This cost-effective program will increase the cargo
contribution of the civil fleet by more than 30 percent while avoid-
ing the cost of acquiring and operating additional military trans-
ports of comparable capability.
Although these programs will significantly increase our inter-
theater airlift capacity, they cannot meet our long-term goals.
Consequently, the FY 1986 budget includes a request for funds to
continue full-scale engineering development of the C-17 transport
aircraft, working toward a production start in FY 1988. Though
smaller than the C-5, the C-17 will be able to carry the full range
of military equipment, including all armored vehicles and most other
outsized cargo. Unlike most other intertheater aircraft, however,
it will be able to operate on austere airfields, thereby increasing
the amount of cargo that can be delivered directly to operating
forces. After its intertheater mission is completed, the C-17 could
be used to augment the C-130 fleet in moving troops and materiel
within theaters.
(2) Improvements to Existing Aircraft
Meeting our airlift objectives requires that we improve our
existing forces as well as acquire additional capacity. Over the
next five years, we will complete two major upgrade programs for the
intertheater and intratheater fleets, while expanding our inventories
of spare parts.
(a) Intertheater Airlift
In FY 1987, we will complete a major modification program for
the C-5A fleet. The work entails correcting structural deficiencies
in the planes' wings. Once modified, all 77 aircraft in the fleet
will he able to remain in service well into the 21st century.
We also are continuing to build up our stocks of spare parts for
the C-5A and C-141 fleets. We must buy adequate amounts of these
items in peacetime if the aircraft are to achieve and sustain their
planned surge rates in a crisis.
(b) Intratheater Airlift
Last year we began a program to modify the wings of older-model
C-130 aircraft. The project was undertaken in order to repair cor-
rosion damage and to correct problems caused by stress. The "A"
models will be modified during regularly scheduled depot maintenance
periods through FY 1986; work on the remaining aircraft will be com-
pleted in FY 1989. With these refurbishments, the "A" models of the
C-130 fleet will be able to remain in service into the mid-1990s,
while the later C-13Os will remain operational into the next century.
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FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
C-5
Procurement:
Quantity
4
8
16
21
S Millions
1,358.3
1,652.4
2,380.6
2,212.8
KC-10
Procurement:
Quantity
8
8
12
8
S Millions
786.1
619.9
519.0
124.1
CRAF
Enhancement
Procurement:
Quantity
3
4
5
-
S Millions
95.4
128.9
164.9
-
C-17 Cargo
Aircraft
Development:
5 Millions
25.7
123.3
453.7
624.8
Procurement:
S Millions
-
-
-
244.9
b. Sea/ift Programs
Sealift is vital for projecting and sustaining the full range
of combat and support forces. In a large deployment, it would
deliver most of our forces and cargo, including much of the non-
prepositioned equipment of heavy divisions and support units, as
well as the bulk of our ammunition and supplies.
(1) Fast Sealift
In FY 1981-82, we acquired eight SL-7 container ships. At 30
knots, these are the fastest cargo ships available. To enable them
to carry the full range of military cargo, and to shorten their
loading and unloading time, we are converting the ships to a self-
sustaining, "roll-on/roll-off" configuration. The first four conver-
sions were completed in 1984, and the remaining ships will be opera-
tional by the end of FY 1986. The first two ships were successfully
employed in last year's GALLANT EAGLE and REFORGER exercises. One
of the ships also took part in the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
(JLOTS-II) tests conducted last summer to evaluate cargo-discharge
capabilities in austere environments.
(2) Maritime Prepositioning Ships
The Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) program provides for one
of the most dramatic improvements in rapid force projection. We are
chartering 13 ships that will be loaded with equipment and supplies
for three MABs, each capable of conducting highly mobile mechanized
operations. The ships will be maintained at various locations from
which they would be capable of departing for trouble spots on very
short notice. The troops and residual equipment would be airlifted
to the theater, where they would pick up their combat gear from the
ships. This will make it possible to deploy an operational force to
remote regions much faster than was previously possible. Once
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Force Projection
unloaded, the ships could be used to move equipment and supplies for
other deploying units.
The first MPS task force will be on station in the Atlantic in
early 1985, and the remaining two will be deployed in late FY 1985
and FY 1986. The second task force will be stationed in the S41A
region, while the third will be placed in the Pacific.
(3) Ready Reserve Force
As noted earlier, we have begun a program to expand the Ready
Reserve Force (RRF), a part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet.
Current plans call for the force to grow to 116 ships (100 cargo
ships and 16 tankers) by the early 199Os. This represents an
increase of 39 ships over previously planned levels, necessitated by
a continuing decline in the breakbulk component of the civil fleet.
This important force can be made available for sealift operations
on five to ten days' notice without disrupting routine commerce. In
a major crisis, its ships would provide some of our earliest avail-
able sealift. We also could use the ships for smaller contingencies
not requiring the entire U.S.-flag fleet.
(4) Container Ship Utilization
In their operations to recapture the Falkland Islands, the Brit-
ish found breakbulk ships to be the most useful vessels for deliver-
ing cargo. These ships carry their own cranes and can accommodate
the full range of military cargo. With the switch to containeriza-
tion in the maritime industry, however, breakbulk ships have come
into increasingly short supply. Though the greater use of container-
ships has substantially increased shipping companies' productivity,
it has put into commercial service a ship with limited utility for
military operations. Most of these ships require modern ports with
extensive crane facilities to load and unload cargo. Also, many
items of military equipment are not suitable for containerization.
The Navy has developed two techniques for giving containerships
a breakbulk capability for military missions. One involves using
large platforms, called "flat racks," to build a tier of decks for
carrying cargo. The racks fit into the standard container guides on
these ships and can support all but the heaviest items of military
equipment. In essence, they function as portable decks that are
loaded and unloaded with the cargo they carry. Alternatively, the
ships can be fitted with large containers, called "sea sheds," to
create a cargo hold accessible from the main deck. Installed in
reinforced container guides, these devices can carry the full range
of military cargo. Once fitted, they can remain in a ship indefi-
nitely. We plan to buy enough flat racks and sea sheds to outfit
approximately 40 containerships. A fleet of that size could provide
lift for about one Army division and its supporting elements while
carrying equipment to operate ports.
(5) Sealift Discharge
A deployment to SWA could well require unloading ships in austere
or damaged ports, or in areas lacking port facilities. The Army and
Navy are working together to improve their ability to deliver forces
under these conditions. Key programs supporting that effort include
the procurement of transportable barges for unloading ships unable
to navigate in shallow water; mobile piers; portable facilities for
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unloading petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) from tankers; portable
ramps for removing cargo from roll-on/roll-off ships; and auxiliary
crane ships (TAGS) for unloading non-self-sustaining containerships.
A total of 11 TAGS are scheduled for procurement through FY 1989.
FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
Actual Planned Proposed Proposed for
Funding Funding Funding Authorization
S L-7
Procurement:
Quantity 4
5 Millions 227.0
Ready Reserve
Force
Procurement:
Quantity 24 6 12 4
S Millions 83.0 31.0 203.4 29.1
TAGS
Procurement:
Quantity - 1 3 2
S Millions - 36.0 84.9 68.7
Sealift Support
Equipment, Flat
Racks, and Sea Sheds
Procurement:
$ Millions
c. Prepositioning Programs
Prepositioning expedites the delivery of major combat forces in
crises. By storing military equipment and supplies in or near poten-
tial conflict regions, we reduce lift requirements tremendously and
maximize the rate at which forces can be deployed. Over the next
five years, we will be adding to our stocks of prepositioned equip-
ment in Europe, while completing a major sea-based program that will
enhance our rapid-response capabilities worldwide.
(1) Prepositioning in Europe
Prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe began in the 196Os in
response to U.S. and European concerns that the forces available in
the theater in peacetime were inadequate to meet a mobilized Warsaw
Pact threat. Since that time, the Pact has increased the size and
effectiveness of its forces. As a result, the need for rapid deploy-
ment of heavy, mobile forces is at least as great today as it was
when the prepositioning program was first proposed.
Under the POMCUS (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit
Sets) program, the Army stores heavy items of equipment (e.g.,
trucks, personnel carriers, and tanks) in dehumidified warehouses in
Europe. The equipment is arranged in unit sets, ready to be moved
out of storage to a marshalling area. This means that only the
troops themselves and any remaining equipment (such as helicopters
and electronic gear) would have to be airlifted to the theater at
the outbreak of a crisis. On arriving in Europe, the forces would
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be trucked to the marshalling areas, where they would pick up their
propositioned equipment, assemble into units, and move forward.
We are committed to provide POMCUS equipment for a total of six
U.S.-based Army divisions and supporting units. Four division sets
are already in place, and work on the remaining two is under way.
The host nations for the fifth and sixth sets, Belgium and the
Netherlands, have provided land for the storage facilities, and the
NATO Infrastructure Fund is subsidizing the construction costs. The
first of the new warehouses began receiving equipment last summer,
and we expect the remainder to be ready by September of this year.
With continued congressional support, we plan to move equipment into
the warehouses as they become available.
The Air Force is propositioning equipment in Europe to support
the tactical fighter squadrons it would commit to a NATO reinforce-
ment. The materiel in storage ranges in type from engineering,
ground support, and medical equipment to munitions, spare parts, and
POL.
The Marine Corps has begun a land-based propositioning program in
Norway to support an amphibious brigade. Some equipment is in tempo-
rary storage, while other materiel will be positioned as NATO-funded
permanent storage facilities are completed. The latter construction
programs will begin this year.
(2) SWA Propositioning
Our propositioning efforts in SWA serve three main objectives:
they permit forces to be deployed rapidly to the region; they provide
the materiel needed to unload ships in austere ports; and they pro-
vide supplies and ammunition to cover expected consumption until sea-
lift can meet demands. We are making extensive use of sea-based pro-
positioning in the region because we lack land-based sites and
because it provides flexibility to meet the variety of contingencies
we might encounter in SWA or elsewhere.
Our ship-based propositioning program dates from mid-1980, when
the Near-Term Propositioning Force (NTPF) was created. That force
originally comprised seven ships stationed at Diego Garcia. Five of
the ships carried equipment and supplies for a MAB; the sixth and
seventh carried a medical facility and fuel for the P4arines and other
early deploying forces. Eleven depot ships, carrying materiel for
Army and Air Force units, were added to the force during FY 1981-82.
By the end of CY 1985, we plan to have replaced the five ships con-
taining Marine Corps equipment and supplies with five ships carrying
equipment and supplies for the second MPS task force. We also plan
to retain approximately 12 depot ships loaded with materiel for Army
and Air Force units.
d. Access to Foreign Faci/ities
We have reached formal agreement with several nations, and are
seeking permission from others, to preposition materiel and conduct
routine training exercises during peacetime, and to use regional
facilities during crises. In some cases, it has been necessary to
improve existing facilities. These projects were initially funded
in FY 1980-81, and most will be completed by the end of FY 1987.
By agreement with the United Kingdom, we have enlarged the air-
field at Diego Garcia to increase its capacity to support en route
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refueling. The port facilities have also been upgraded in prepara-
tion for mooring additional MPS and ammunition ships. Facilities at
Lajes Air Base in the Azores are being upgraded, and we are receiving
Portugal's approval to provide for additional fuel storage at the
base. These programs enhance our ability to deploy forces rapidly
in a crisis as well as support routine peacetime operations.
e. Command, Contro% and Communications (C3) Support
Work continues on a number of improvements in the C3 systems
serving the airlift and sealift fleets. Commercial ships that would
carry military cargo in a war are receiving more capable and secure
communications equipment. The high frequency radios aboard long-
range military transport aircraft are being upgraded. Automated
planning and C3 systems, including the Joint Deployment System, are
in development. The latter systems will contain master data files
and computer models for use in formulating contingency plans; in a
crisis, they also would provide up-to-the-minute information to com-
manders making deployment decisions.
3. Conclusion
The proximity of the Soviets and their allies to several regions
of critical importance to us poses enormous challenges for our pro-
jection forces. We have recognized the serious shortfalls in our
capability to deploy forces and have begun a series of programs to
correct them.
The procurement of additional C-5s and KC-1 Os, and of the new
C-17, along with CRAF enhancement, will add significantly to the
capability and flexibility of our airlift forces. Completion of the
MPS program will enable us to deploy a division-sized P4arine force
very rapidly to distant theaters of conflict worldwide. The expan-
sion of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), coupled with continued pur-
chases of equipment to unload ships in austere ports, will enhance
our ability to deliver combat forces and materiel by sea.
The programs we have planned for the next five years will move
us considerably closer to our goal of deploying major combat-ready
forces to critical theaters simultaneously. While further improve-
ments will be necessary, these programs will greatly enhance the
rapid deployability of our forces and, consequently, both their
deterrent and warfighting strength.
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E. NUCLEAR FORCES
1. Introduction
Four years ago, the United States was faced with adverse trends
in its nuclear force posture. The Soviet Union was engaged in a
massive buildup and modernization of its strategic arsenal, adding
new generations of missiles, bombers, and submarines at a rapid rate.
U.S. strategic forces were aging, and there was increasing concern
that command and control systems might not survive a nuclear strike
to direct a retaliation. To halt these unfavorable trends and thus
ensure that a credible deterrent could be maintained, the President
announced a plan in October 1981 to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear
forces and command, control, and communications (C3) systems. Firmly
linked to that plan was a proposal to negotiate substantial reduc-
tions in strategic nuclear forces with the Soviet Union.
The President's strategic modernization plan and the associated
arms reduction proposal are complementary. The prospect of more
modern and capable U.S. forces provides the Soviets with incentives
to negotiate genuine reductions. Also, the deep cuts we seek in the
destructive potential of strategic nuclear arsenals, particularly in
ballistic missiles, should improve the survivability of our forces,
thereby enhan ing stability. Modernization and reductions are
directly link~d through the strategic nuclear weapons build-down
proposed by the President in the START (Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks) negotiations.
In the area of nonstrategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union
was several years into its SS-20 deployment program in 1981, an
unprecedented buildup that has created for them a huge preponderance
of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. To redress that situation,
the Administration resolved to implement NATO's 1979 dual-track
decision to deploy longer range intermediate-range nuclear force
(LRINF) missiles in Europe while simultaneously seeking an arms
treaty to limit, or even obviate the need for, such deployments.
2. Composition of U.S. Nuclear Forces
U.S. nuclear forces can be grouped into four broad categories:
strategic offensive forces; strategic defensive forces; nonstrategic
nuclear forces; and associated command, control, and communications
(C3) systems.
Strategic offensive forces include land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs); submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs); and long-range bombers armed with gravity bombs, short-
range attack missiles (SRAMs), and air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs). Maintaining three diverse types of forces -- collectively
referred to as the "strategic nuclear triad" -- strengthens the capa-
bility and deterrent value of the force by compounding the problems
of a potential enemy and by compensating for possible vulnerabilities
in any one of the three components.
Strategic defensive forces include ground- and space-based sur-
veillance systems and air defense forces. Surveillance systems warn
of ballistic missile and bomber attacks, and identify and track
objects in space. These systems contribute to deterrence by ensur-
ing we would receive timely warning of an attack, thus reducing a
potential aggressor's confidence that a surprise attack could be
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successfully executed. Air defense forces control access to North
American airspace and provide a limited defense against bombers.
Strategic C3 systems help assess attacks; support command func-
tions; and provide communications linking warning sensors, command
centers, and forces. Effective deterrence demands that these systems
be able to function both during and after an attack.
Nonstrategic nuclear forces include intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF), such as intermediate-range missiles and tactical
bombers carrying nuclear weapons; short-range nuclear forces (SNF),
such as artillery projectiles and surface-to-surface missiles; land-
based defensive systems, such as surface-to-air missiles and atomic
demolition munitions; and sea-based systems. These forces enhance
deterrence by providing the capability to respond at the lower end
of the nuclear spectrum, firmly linking our strategic forces to our
conventional capabilities.
3. FY 1986-90 Programs for Strategic Forces
The FY 1986-90 program sustains the modernization plan directed
by the President in 1981. That plan has since been expanded to in-
clude development of a small ICBM and long-term research on poten-
tial defenses against ballistic missiles.
a. Strategic Offensive Forces
(1) The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Force
The inherent responsiveness of land-based missiles and their
ability to put time-urgent, hardened targets at risk make them essen-
tial to effective deterrence. As part of the President's strategic
modernization program, we are improving the ICBM force by building
the Peacekeeper missile and developing a small ICBM. At the same
time, we are maintaining and modernizing the Minuteman force and
retiring the aging force of Titan IIs. Chart III.E.1 shows the pro-
jected composition of the ICBM force through FY 1990.
Chart III.E.1
ICBM Force Modernization
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Peacekeeper's performance in its first six flight tests has been
excellent. In line with recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission,
the missile will be deployed in existing Minuteman silos beginning in
late 1986. The FY 1986 budget request includes funds for continued
research and development (R&D), including several flight tests, and
for production of the Peacekeeper and modifications to the Minuteman
silos.
Initial studies of design and basing concepts for the small
ICBM are well under way. The missile will carry a single warhead
and weigh less than 30,000 pounds, ensuring its compatibility with
a mobile basing system. To keep missile weight down without sacri-
ficing range or payload, we are investigating the use of new, light-
weight, high-strength casing materials for the propulsion system.
To achieve the desired missile accuracy, we are developing a light-
weight version of the advanced inertial reference sphere, the heart
of the Peacekeeper guidance system. We are also pursuing advanced-
technology alternatives such as ring-laser gyroscopes and stellar
inertial updates. Several mobile launcher designs are being evalu-
ated, and initial hardness tests on subscale prototypes have yielded
promising results.
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Peacekeeper
Missile and Basing
Development:
$ Millions
1,962.6
1,699.7
804.1
360.6
Construction:a
$ Millions
31.2
95.7
55.8
60.5
Procurement:
Quantity
21
21b
48
48
S Millions
2,153.6
1,000.Ob
3,180.2
2,798.3
Small ICBM and
Mobile Launcher
Development:
$ Millions 3
28.3
461.5
624.5
TBD
Follow-on Basing
Technology
Development:
S Millions 1
39.0
179.6
152.2
TBD
Minuteman
Modernization
Development:
$ Millions
4.9
4.7
31.2
95.0
Procurement:
S Millions
97.2
118.6
101.7
160.8
aExcludes planning and design, and family housing.
bin March 1985, Congress will vote on the provision of an additional S1.5 billion to procure the 21 missiles.
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We are also continuing work on super-hardened silos. Recent sub-
scale tests suggest that silos can be made many times harder than was
formerly believed possible.
The small ICBM and mobile launcher will enter full-scale develop-
ment in FY 1987. The FY 1986 budget request includes R&D funds for
the missile, a hardened mobile launcher, and hard-silo technologies.
The FY 1986 program continues refurbishment of aging Minuteman
components and test equipment. The program also continues to retire
the obsolete Titan II force. The last of these missiles will be
deactivated and dismantled in FY 1987.
(2) Sea-Based Strategic Nuclear Forces
Sea-based strategic nuclear forces consist of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and the submarines that carry
them (SSBNs). When at sea, they are the most survivable element of
the strategic triad. Our program calls for building one new Trident
SSBN per year to replace the aging Poseidon fleet, and developing
and deploying the Trident II (D-5) missile. Also as part of the
strategic modernization program, we are deploying Tomahawk Sea-
Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) on selected attack submarines and
surface ships.
Sea-based forces now consist largely of Poseidon (C-3) and
Trident I (C-4) missiles deployed on Poseidon submarines (see
Chart III.E.2). These submarines were constructed during the 1960s.
Although regularly scheduled overhauls have kept them in good condi-
tion, they will reach the end of their service lives in the mid- to
late 1990s.
Chart III.E.2
Sea-Based Force Modernization
N
'lr'~tv~rV
i5
Roseidon C-3
i0
Poseidon C-4
0
100~~
PI olerfs
( ~ 4~ B1
~
1 1 1 _ 1 _ i .~ ~ ~..~ _ ~ _
1986 1988 1990 1980 1982 1984 1966 1988 1990
Fiscal Year
The new Trident submarine is more capable and more survivable
than the Poseidon. It is faster, quieter, harder to detect, and
able to spend a greater portion of its time at sea. It carries 24
missiles instead of 16, and because its missile tubes are larger
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than the Poseidon's, it will he able to accommodate the more effec-
tive Trident II (D-5) missile. Twelve Trident submarines have been
authorized through FY 1985, and we are requesting authorization of
a thirteenth in FY 1986. The first five Tridents have been delivered
to the Pdavy, and four are now on patrol. Their performance at sea
has met or exceeded design specifications, particularly in speed and
quietness. The last four submarines were delivered four to seven
weeks early, and follow-on ships are on schedule.
The first eight Tridents will he equipped initially with Tri-
dent I missiles. Trident IIs.will be deployed on the ninth Trident
submarine and all succeeding ships and will he retrofitted into the
first eight. The Trident II will be able to carry a larger payload
and will he more accurate than the Trident I, thus providing the
SSBN force with the capability to put hard targets at risk. The
missile is now in full-scale development, with initial deployment
scheduled for late 1989. The FY 1985 budget included the first
increment of production funding for the missile; the FY 1986 request
again includes both development and production funds.
The FY 1986 request continues the SSBN Security Program, under
which the Navy is examining potential threats to U.S. ballistic mis-
sile submarines and developing countermeasures, if necessary. This
comprehensive research effort is reviewing all current antisubmarine
warfare techniques, as well as possible technological breakthroughs
for the future. The program is designed to ensure that our sea-based
nuclear forces remain highly survivable.
In FY 1984, we began deploying Tomahawk nuclear SLCP1s on a vari-
ety of attack submarines a.nd surface ships. These weapons, which
are effective against a wide range of land targets, give us a cost-
effective means of increasing hard-target capability at sea in the
near term. Because they are distributed among a large number of
ships, nuclear SLCI`4s complicate a potential attacker's planning and
improve the overall survivability of the force.
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Trident Submarine
Development:
S Millions
71.2
32.5
47.2
59.2
Procurement:
Quantity
1
1
1
1
S Millions
2,080.3
1,627.2
1,546.4
1,695.7
Trident 1 Missile
Procurement:
Quantity
52
-
-
-
S Millions
529.0
141.1
66.2
46.8
Trident II Missile
Development:
S Millions
1,473.2
2,049.0
2,165.6
1,719.8
Procurement:
Quantity
-
-
-
27
S Millions
-
162.9
582.0
1,865.5
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(3) The Strategic Bomber Force
Bombers are the most versatile element of the triad. They can
be launched on warning of an attack for survivability but, once en
route to their targets, can still be recalled or redirected. Addi-
tionally, penetrating bombers can assess target damage and retain
weapons for subsequent use if a target has already been destroyed.
Furthermore, they can be reloaded and used for more than one attack.
In addition to their strategic nuclear capabilities, bombers can per-
form conventional missions. Conventionally armed bombers can attack
a wide variety of targets virtually anywhere in the world. In some
remote areas, they can be employed well before other conventional
forces could arrive. In maritime roles, they can perform surveil-
lance missions, attack ships, and lay mines.
At present, the bomber force consists of B-52s and FB-llls. By
the end of the decade, an improving Soviet air defense system will
have seriously limited the B-52's ability to penetrate Soviet air-
space. The ongoing bomber modernization program is designed to ease
that limitation and to maintain the deterrent capabilities of the
force in the 1990s and beyond.
The program has three main elements: the installation of air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on B-52s, the production of B-1B
bombers, and the development of the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB).
A number of B-52s not equipped with ALCMs will be assigned conven-
tional missions. In the 1990s, as the ATB is deployed, we plan to
use FB-llls as tactical aircraft rather than as strategic bombers.
Chart III.E.3 shows the proportion of bombers and bomber weapons
of each type in the force from FY 1980 to FY 1990.
Chan III.E.3
Bomber Force Modernisation
iseo ~sez sea
Fiscal Year
iseo isez sea lees
Fiscal Year
(a) Bomber Modernization
We have deployed ALCMs on 90 B-52Gs and will begin modifying
B-52Hs for cruise missile carriage this year. ALCMs are very
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effective against hard targets, and they compound enemy air defense
problems. Their introduction has prolonged the useful life of
B-52s by allowing these older bombers to launch attacks without
penetrating enemy air defenses.
A follow-on cruise missile, now in development, promises further
gains in capability. This weapon, called the Advanced Cruise Mis-
sile (ACr1), will have a longer range than the ALCM and will incorpo-
rate low-observable technology. The advantages of increased range
are twofold: B-52s will be able to stand off farther from Soviet
defenses and still put distant targets at risk, and the missile
itself will be able to circumnavigate some air defenses. The low-
observable design will enhance the missile's ability to penetrate
highly defended areas. By anticipating evolving Soviet defenses,
the ACM provides a logical and timely update to the bomber force.
Our future strategic bomber force will be composed of B-52
cruise missile carriers and modern penetrating bombers. We believe
that a mixed force of this type is the best way to counter Soviet
air defenses and to ensure that both fixed and movable targets can
be attacked effectively.
The B-1B will be our primary penetrating bomber in the late
1980s and well into the decade of the 1990s. The program is making
excellent progress. The first of 100 production aircraft came off
the assembly line five months early, and the first B-1B flight test
was conducted five months ahead of schedule as well. The FY 1986
request includes funds to procure the last 48 aircraft and continue
flight testing.
As Soviet defenses become more formidable, we will deploy the ATB
to carry out the most challenging penetrating bomber missions and
transfer cruise missiles from B-52s to B-1 Bs. The B-1B will continue
to have a strong strategic penetrating role. Development of the ATB
is proceeding at a vigorous pace toward a planned initial deployment
date in the early 1990s. We expect that the aircraft, which incorpo-
rates low-observable technology, will be capable of penetrating all
existing and projected Soviet air defenses into the next century.
(b) Aerial Tankers
The KC-135 tanker is essential to the effectiveness of the bomber
force. Changes in mission profiles and the added weight and drag
caused by carrying cruise missiles externally have increased the
bombers' in-flight refueling requirements. At the same time, more
aerial refueling capacity is needed for the general purpose forces,
both to support fighter missions and to sustain long-range airlift
operations.
Modernizing KC-135s with current-technology CFM-56 engines and
other system updates -- the KC-135R program -- will increase the
fleet's refueling capability by approximately 50 percent, while
reducing operating and maintenance costs. With this upgrade, the
fleet will be able to remain in service well into the next century.
The FY 1986 request includes funds for support equipment and engines
to modify 43 aircraft.
Since the KC-10 tanker is being purchased primarily to enhance
conventional capabilities, it is discussed in the Force Projection
chapter.
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FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
B-52 Bomber
Development:
$ Millions
68.7
22.2
16.0
10.0
Procurement:
5 Millions
460.7
466.5
463.6
795.7
B-1 Bomber
Development:
S Millions
737.2
465.0
367.4
136.3
Procurement:
Quantity
10
34
48
-
$ Millions
6,124.5
7,630.7
5,624.0
-
Air-Launched
Cruise Missile
Development:
$ Millions
35.9
25.0
14.2
15.1
Procurement:
Quantity
240
-
-
-
SMillions
421.3
79.4
34.4
21.9
KC-135 Mod
Procurement:
$ Millions
548.2
715.1
727.4
1,039.2
Chart III.F.4 shows the changing composition of the strategic
forces during the 19ROs. Ry FY 1990, modernized systems will
constitute almost 25 percent of our operational ballistic missiles
and bombers and about 50 percent of our weapons.
Chart III. E.4
Strategic Forces Modernization
a o
isao i9sz sea ices ~sse ~sso
Fiscal Year
~seo issz issa ~sss lase ~sso
Fiscal Year
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b. Strategic Defensive Forces
Our program reverses the trend of declining capabilities in stra-
tegic defensive forces and C3 systems. It calls for major improve-
ments in air defense radars and interceptor forces. It strengthens
space surveillance capabilities and pursues an operational antisatel-
lite system. Finally, it supports a major research program for
advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.
(1) Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
In March 1983, President Reagan took the first important step
toward a new and better way to deter war, strengthen stability, and
ensure peace by moving away from exclusive dependence on nuclear
retaliation toward greater reliance on defensive systems. To that
end, he directed the establishment of a comprehensive and intensive
research program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), to find
a practical means of effective defense against nuclear-armed bal-
listic missiles. Aimed at destroying all incoming ballistic missiles
that may be used at shorter ranges as well as intercontinental dis-
tances, the program's objective is to develop a thoroughly reliable
nonnuclear defense that would be able to protect our allies as well
as the ilnited States.
SDI is a major departure from ballistic missile defense programs
of the past, which relied on nuclear-tipped missiles to intercept
incoming warheads during their high-speed terminal plunge toward
their targets. SDI is examining advanced-technology concepts that
could lead to a means of intercepting ballistic missiles during, their
boost phase and warheads at all points along their trajectories.
Warheads could be destroyed by nonnuclear means at great distances
from their intended targets.
In the spring of 1984, we established the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization (SDIO) to manage this program. The SDIO
provides central planning for the entire effort and uses centers of
technical and management excellence within the Services, DoD, and
non-DoD agencies for decentralized execution of research efforts.
The program employs simplified management and is developing inno-
vative contracting approaches to accelerate schedules and reduce
costs.
Building on the FY 1985 program, the FY 1986 agenda carries for-
ward research in five key technology areas: directed energy weapons;
kinetic energy weapons; surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill
assessment systems; battle management and command, control, and com-
munications systems; and survivability, lethality, and support tech-
nologies. Many of these ongoing activities are already showing sub-
stantial progress. For example, last June, the Army Homing Overlay
Experiment demonstrated the capability of a'nonnuclear missile to
intercept and destroy an incoming warhead outside the earth's atmos-
phere. Directed energy research devices are already operating at
several laboratories. These include a neutral particle beam device
at Los Alamos, and free electron and chemical laser devices at Los
Alamos, Livermore, and contractor facilities. A low-cost approach
to a ground-based "eximer" laser is also under study. Additionally,
progress is exceeding expectations in many areas, including railgun
technologies as well as sensors and cryogenic refrigeration devices.
Defensive technologies are currently at different stages of
maturity. The FY 1986 request continues research. on rapidly maturing
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technologies and also emphasizes less developed technologies that
hold great promise for more effective systems. The request also
supports smaller, additional research efforts involving innovative
concepts that may offer the potential for very large gains in cost-
effectiveness and an inherent ability to overcome potential Soviet
countermeasures. Each SDI budget request will support research on
technologies at various levels of maturity so as to provide the basis
for a continually improving ballistic missile defense potential.
The SDI demonstrates to our friends and to any potential adver-
saries that America is firmly committed to the President's goal of
a thoroughly reliable defense for the United States and its allies.
Demonstration of our resolve will be as vital as technical progress
on the SDI program to ensure that the Soviet Union realizes that the
best choice for it as well as for us is to move to the enhanced
security and more optimistic future of a deterrent in which defenses
play a central role. As nuclear ballistic missiles increasingly lose
their military value and their capability to destroy our respective
societies, we can move together to eliminate these weapons.
The Strategic Defense Initiative offers the world more hope than
any concept developed since the nuclear era began. We owe it to our-
selves and to the world to pursue it until it is achieved in full.
(2) Air Defense
For many years, ballistic missiles have been the mainstay of
the Soviet strategic arsenal. As a consequence, relatively low
priority was attached to improving our air defense systems. Today,
however, the Soviets are developing a new bomber and are beginning
to deploy long-range cruise missiles. In light of this increased
threat, and to correct deficiencies in our bomber warning systems,
we are deploying new ground-based surveillance radars and modern
interceptors.
(a) Surveillance Systems
To improve atmospheric surveillance of the eastern, western,
and southern approaches to the continental ilnited States, we are
deploying a network of Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (0TH-B) radars.
These radars will be able to identify incoming bombers hundreds of
miles away at any altitude. Funds for the last 60? sector of the
east coast segment of the network were authorized in FY 1985. The
FY 1986 request seeks funds for the first two of the three sectors
to be installed on the west coast.
For surveillance of the northern approaches to the continent, we
plan to install modern microwave radars across northern Alaska and
Canada. The new radars, known as the North Warning System, will
fill gaps in existing coverage, enable us to detect low-flying air-
craft, and be cheaper to maintain than the present system. Procure-
ment of 13 long-range radars for this system will be completed in
FY 1985. Funds requested in FY 1986 will continue development of a
short-range radar, 39 of which will ultimately be deployed between
the long-range radars.
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(b) Interceptor Forces
Fifteen interceptor squadrons maintain a ground alert at sites
around the periphery of the 48 contiguous states. The primary
mission of these aircraft is to intercept and identify unknown
intruders into North American airspace. The aircraft also could
provide a limited defense against bomber attacks.
By FY 1986, four active interceptor squadrons will have been
modernized with F-15 aircraft. Pending congressional approval, the
remaining active squadron, at K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base in Michigan,
will be deactivated. Its air defense responsibilities will be assumed
by the Air National Cuard squadron at Duluth, Minnesota. This will
result in an air defense force composed of four active and eleven Air
National Guard squadrons.
(3) Space Defense
The antisatellite (ASAT) program is central to our efforts to
improve defensive capabilities in space. Our vigorous pursuit of
this capability is motivated by the desire both to deter the Soviets
from using their ASAT weapons, which are already operational, and to
deny them the unrestricted use of space to support operations against
U.S. forces in wartime.
The current U.S. ASAT program consists of a missile launched by
specially equipped F-15 tactical aircraft. The missile, referred
to as the air-launched miniature vehicle (ALP4V), would be targeted
against low-altitude satellites.
Our first test of the ALMV successfully demonstrated the capa-
bility to guide the missile to a point in space. We have recently
tested the missile's sensor and will conduct subsequent tests consis-
tent with congressional direction. The test and evaluation phase of
the ASAT program is scheduled for completion in FY 1987. We are
requesting funds in FY 1986 to continue production of the missile and
to complete work on support facilities at Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia. We must caution that congressionally imposed restrictions
or prohibitions against further tests would adversely affect the
prompt development of this needed capability.
To help defend U.S. space-based systems and to monitor hostile
space weapons and satellites, we are deploying a worldwide network
of five ground-based electro-optical surveillance sensors. These
sensors, which complement existing radars, are designed to detect,
track, and identify objects in deep space. Three of the sensors
are already operational, and a fourth will be completed in FY 1987.
The schedule calls for construction of the remaining site to begin
in FY 1986 and for the entire system to be operational in FY 1988.
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FY 1984
FY 7985
FY 1986
FY 7987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Stategic Defense
Initiative
Development:
5 Millions
50.0
1,397.3
3,722.2
4,908.3
Air Defense
Development:
S Millions
123.7
106.9
108.4
51.0
Procurement:
S Millions
173.8
164.8
245.9
256.9
Space Defense
Development:
S Millions
Procurement:
S Millions
c. Strategic Command, Contro% and Communications (C3J
Strategic C3 systems must be capable of supporting an initial
U.S. retaliation against a nuclear attack; they also are essential
to the effective management of nuclear reserve forces. The
FY 19ft6-90 program will correct most of the deficiencies in stra-
tegic C3 capabilities that were identified at the outset of this
Administration. The program will upgrade and augment existing
capabilities, increase the survivability of C3 systems, protect
them against nuclear effects, and provide redundant communications
and control.
(1) Missile Warning and Attack Assessment Sensors
We maintain satellites and ground-based radars to warn of bal-
listic missile attacks. The satellite would provide the first
indication that an attack was under way, and radars would confirm the
satellite warning data. This information must be both prompt and
accurate. Early warning is essential to the survivability of bombers
and C3 systems on ground alert, and to give the President time to
consider retaliatory options. Accurate information on the size and
scope of an attack would be needed in order to select an appropriate
response and to control escalation. Ongoing programs to modernize
and augment the warning systems now in service will enhance their
ability to provide timely information about an impending attack.
(a) Satellite Early Warning System
Early warning satellites detect ICBP1 and SLBM launches. The
satellites now in operation will soon be replaced by new models with
improved survivability and performance features.
(b) PAVE PAWS
The PAVE PAWS radar system would confirm satellite warning of an
SLBM attack. Two of these phased-array radars are now operating, on
our eastern and western coasts, where they monitor regular Soviet
SSBN operating areas. In 1981, we decided to deploy two additional
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PAVE PAWS radars in Georgia and Texas to expand coverage to the
southeast and southwest of our borders. We are requesting funds
in FY 1986 to continue construction of these two sites, both of
which are scheduled to be activated by FY 1987. The aging FPS-85
and FSS-7 radars in Florida will remain in service until all four
PAVE PAWS radars are operational. The Perimeter Acquisition Radar
Characterization System (PARCS), a phased-array radar in North
Dakota, completes our network of SLBP~[ warning radars and comple-
ments the system used to confirm ICBM attacks.
(c) Ballistic 1`lissile Earl Warnin S stem
(BMF.WS
BPIE4JS radars at sites in Greenland, Alaska, and England would
confirm satellite warning of an ICBM attack. To improve BMEWS'
coverage and performance, we are replacing obsolete radars at two
sites with new phased-array systems similar to PAVE PAWS. In
FY 1986, we will complete the installation of a new radar at Thule,
Greenland, aYid begin a major upgrade of the Fylingdales, England,
site. The radars now in operation at these locations are expensive
to maintain and are inadequate against an evolving threat (e.g.,
they would have difficulty distinguishing large numbers of targets
with small radar cross sections). In addition to its ICBM-related
duties, the new Fylingdales radar will improve warning of missile
attacks against NATO territory and of SI.BM attacks against the
United States, while enhancing surveillance of objects in space.
(d) Nuclear Detonation Detection System (NDS)
The NDS, also known as the Integrated Operational Nuclear Detona-
tion System (IONDS), will enhance our ability to detect and pinpoint
the location of nuclear detonations worldwide. The system is being
installed on the satellites of the Navstar Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS). In a nuclear war, it would help determine which targets
had been destroyed; in peacetime, it will contribute to nuclear test
ban monitoring. The FY 1986 program continues the installation of
the sensors into the host satellites. The entire system will be
operational in the late 198Os.
(2) Command Centers
Should deterrence fail, survivable command centers are needed to
ensure that our retaliatory forces could be employed effectively and
remain responsive to national authority both during and after a nu-
clear attack. To ensure that we could take full advantage of our
most capable command posts during the early stages of an attack, we
are upgrading the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the
Alternate Nt~1CC. The modifications include protecting electronic
equipment against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects,l and install-
ing uninterruptible power systems and more advanced data-processing
equipment. We expect to complete these improvements in FY 1986.
Airborne command centers, which are more likely to survive a
nuclear attack, will benefit from similar improvements. By FY 1986,
all four EP1P-hardened E-4B aircraft serving as National Emergency
1 The surges of current caused by the EP1P effects of a nuclear
detonation could damage many types of electronic equipment that
had not been adequately hardened.
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Airborne Command Posts will be operational, with improved data-
processing equipment aboard. We are also installing additional
communications equipment on the aircraft to provide redundant, jam-
resistant links to forces and surveillance systems.
The EC-135 fleet, which serves the Commander in Chief of the
Strategic Air Command and other nuclear force commanders, also is
being fitted with improved communications gear. Obsolete UHF radios
are being replaced with modern EMP-hardened equipment. The first of
the new radios will be installed in FY 1986, and we plan for the
entire program to be completed in FY 1990.
Communications systems connect warning sensors to command centers,
enable information to be exchanged among command centers, and link
commanders with their forces. Although ensuring that the forces
would receive initial retaliatory orders remains our first priority,
we are also working to provide them with two-way communications
channels.
(a) Satellite Communications Systems
The Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) system, which
became fully operational in FY 1984, provides low-data-rate communi-
cations links to our strategic nuclear forces worldwide. A.FSATCOPI
terminals are widely distributed among the forces and command
centers, and AFSATCOP4 transponders are deployed on several satel-
lites, including those of the Defense Satellite Communication Sys-
tem (DSCS).
The new DSCS III satellites provide high-data-rate communi-
cations, serving strategic forces as well as many other government
users. Missile warning data, for example, would be transmitted from
sensors to command centers via DSCS III. Also, F.-4B command posts
will he able to use the system to transmit messages to nuclear forces.
DSCS III satellites are better protected against nuclear effects than
the DSCS II satellites they replace, and they are more jam-resistant.
The second DSCS III satellite is scheduled to be launched in the near
future, and the full system will be operational a few years later.
The Milstar satellite communications system would ensure effec-
tive, continuous control of strategic forces both during and after a
nuclear attack. These satellites will use extremely high frequency
communications, which are even less susceptible to the effects of
nuclear detonations and jamming than are the frequencies used by
DSCS III. To ensure their continued availability, Milstar satellites
will also incorporate a variety of survivability features. Milstar
terminals will allow two-way communications between commanders and
their forces, thereby increasing force effectiveness. We are
requesting funds in FY 1986 to start construction of the third
satellite and to continue development of the terminals.
(b) Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN)
The GWEN system will consist of a network of EMP-hardened radio
relay stations distributed across the country. The program is pro-
ceeding in two phases. The first phase is designed to increase our
confidence that bombers would receive timely warning of a nuclear
attack. Initial operational testing and evaluation for this phase
will be completed in FY 1986. During the second phase, we will be
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adding substantially more transmitters and receivers, thereby
.increasing the system's survivability and giving us an alternate
link to the ICBP1 force. Funds to begin that portion of the program
are requested in FY 1986. We expect to have the entire system in
place by the end of the decade.
(c) Piniature Receiver Terminal (MRT)
Equipping strategic bombers with miniature terminals for receiv-
ing very low frequency (VLF) communications will improve our ability
to communicate with them in flight during the early stages of a nu-
clear attack. Though slower than transmissions in the higher
frequency bands, VLF communications can be transmitted over much
greater distances than can line-of-sight communications, and they are
much less susceptible to nuclear effects than are existing satellite
communications to bombers. We plan to continue development of the
MRT system with funds requested in FY 1986 and to begin producing
the terminals in FY 1987.
(d) TACAMO E-6A Aircraft
To communicate with its deployed ballistic missile submarines,
the Navy keeps TACAMO radio-relay aircraft continuously airborne
over the Atlantic and the Pacific. In a nuclear war, these aircraft
would ensure that commanders could send messages to SSBNs, even if
ground-based transmitters were destroyed. Over the next several
years, we plan to replace the EC-13Os (modified C-130 transports)
currently flying the TACAMO mission with a new aircraft, the E-6A
(a derivative of the Boeing 707). A faster and longer-range plane
than the EC-130, the E-6A will be able to operate over vast expanses
of the ocean, thus ensuring that SSBNs deployed in remote ocean areas
will receive messages in a timely fashion. In FY 1986, we expect to
complete work on a prototype version of the aircraft. Plans call for
building a fleet of 15 E-6As at a rate sufficient to deploy a Pacific
squadron by FY 1990 and an Atlantic squadron by FY 1992. The aircraft
will be outfitted initially with communications equipment transferred
from EC-13Os. To provide greater protection against electronic jam-
ming and nuclear effects, we plan to replace this equipment with a
modern communications suite early in the next decade. The FY 1986
request supports continued development of the upgraded TACAMO commun-
ications gear.
(e) Extremely l.ow Frequency (ELF) Communications
To upgrade peacetime communications to deployed submarines and
to support the transition to wartime operations, we are constructing
a -dual-site, extremely low frequency (ELF) communications system.
Submerged submarines must now deploy an antenna at or close to the
ocean's surface to receive messages, thus potentially increasing
their susceptibility to detection. This constraint will be allevi-
ated by the use of EI,F communications, which can penetrate sea water
to much greater depths. The two transmitter sites, in Wisconsin and
northern Plichigan, will operate in electrical synchronism, thereby
providing a highly reliable means of maintaining continuous contact
with the submarine force. To achieve an initial operational capa-
bility in FY 1986, we are requesting funds to complete construction
of both sites and to begin installing receivers in submarines.
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FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
FY 1987
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding
Proposed
Funding
Proposed for
Authorization
Stategic
Surveillance
and Warning
Development:
S Millions
Procurement:
139.8
137.9
147.2
156.8
S Millions
617.6
382.4
515.1
874.5
Stategic
Command Centers
Development:
S Millions
Procurement:
$ Millions
130.7
8.4
294.0
59.8
282.7
69.3
279.0
155.5
Strategic
Communications
Development:
5 Millions
801.1
914.0
953.5
1,058.7
Procurement:
S Millions
249.1
54.7
539.3
740.3
4. FY 1986-90 Programs for Nonstrategic
Nuclear Forces
Our highest priority for the nonstrategic nuclear forces con-
tinues to be the implementation of NATO's 1979 dual-track decision
on longer range INF missiles. This step alone, however, will not
provide the diverse set of modern nuclear forces needed to maintain
effective deterrence in Europe and worldwide. Accordingly, we are
also continuing, to modernize our inventories of tactical nuclear
bombs, nuclear artillery, and sea-based missiles. Concurrently,
we are enhancing the safety, security, and survivability of our
nuclear weapons systems. Finally, as with the strategic forces, we
are improving the C3 systems that support our nonstrategic nuclear
forces.
a. Longer Range /NF Missi/es
In accordance with NATO's 1979 decision, we began deliveries of
Pershing II ballistic missiles to the Federal Republic of Germany,
and of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) to the United Kingdom
and Italy, at the end of 1983. Follow-on deployments to those coun-
tries, and GLOM deployments to Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands,
are planned over the next several years. All 464 GLCMs and 108 Per-
shing Its are scheduled to be deployed in Europe by the end of 1988.
The FY 1986 request includes funds to complete Pershing II procure-
ment and to produce additional GLCP9s. LLCM procurement will be com-
pleted in FY 1987.
As we proceed with these deployments, we remain committed to the
arms control track of the 1979 decision. All of the deployments are
subject to modification, cancellation, or reversal if an agreement
with the Soviet Union is achieved. We have repeatedly expressed our
readiness to resume immediately the negotiations broken off by the
Soviets in November 1983. We are pleased that the Soviet iJnion has
now agreed to begin new talks on these weapons in the near future.
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b. Short-Range Nuc/ear Forces
Effective short-range battlefield nuclear systems serve multiple
purposes. Not only do they deter Soviet first use of comparable
systems, they enhance the effectiveness of our conventional defenses.
The latter effect results primarily because the threat of these
weapons would force the Warsaw Pact to disperse its forces and
develop multiple lines of communications, thus blunting the full
potential of their conventional offensive capability.
To ensure that our battlefield nuclear systems remain effective,
we are replacing, our aging stocks of artillery-fired atomic projec-
tiles (AFAPs). A new eight-inch round, the W79, is being produced
as a replacement for the W33. Similarly, a new 155mm AFAP, the W82,
is planned to replace the W48. Each new round offers significant
improvements in range, accuracy, safety, and security. Deployment
of both takes full advantage of NATO's artillery force structure,
thereby increasing the survivability and flexibility of its short-
range nuclear forces. Due to the greater effectiveness of the new
rounds, the older ones can be replaced on less than a one-for-one
basis.
All DoD funds required for the W79 program have already been
appropriated. Consistent with congressional direction, rounds
produced from FY 1985 on will not have an enhanced radiation capa-
bility. The FY 1986 request includes funds for continued develop-
ment of the W82.
c. /NF Aircraft
For nuclear air attack missions, NATO relies on a variety of
dual-capable aircraft. The inventory is currently being modernized
with F-16 and Tornado fighter-bombers. As part of that effort, we
are deploying new tactical bombs with improved capabilities and
enhanced safety and security features.
d. Sea-Based Systems
T'he five-year program sustains a general modernization of our
nonstrategic nuclear forces at sea. Central to that effort is the
development of a nuclear warhead for the SM-2 surface-to-air mis-
sile. LJe anticipate requesting long-lead procurement funds in
FY 1987 to support an initial deployment date in the early to mid-
1990s. We also are developing a nuclear capability for the new
submarine-launched Antisubmarine Llarfare Standoff 4Jeapon and are
considering a nuclear warhead for both the surface ship-launched
Vertical Launch Antisubmarine Rocket and a new air-delivered depth
bomb.
e. G"3 Systems
Two new communications networks are being installed for our non-
strategic nuclear forces in Europe. The networks will provide criti-
cally needed improvements in security, reliability, and performance.
The first, a UHF satellite communications system, will link the head-
quarters of the European Command with its deployed forces. The tele-
type communications terminals are now being fielded, and we expect
the system to be completed in FY 1987. The second new network will
be a high frequency (HF) system. It is designed to provide reliable
and secure communications channels that are highly resistant to elec-
tronic jamming and that could withstand the EMP effects of a nuclear
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blast. We will be testing the terminals for this system in FY 1985,
and plan to begin full-scale production in FY 1986. The entire net-
work will be deployed by the end of FY 1989. A similar HF system is
planned to support nonstrategic nuclear forces assigned to the Pacific
Command.
5. Conclusion
As President Reagan's strategic modernization plan and NATO's
intermediate-range nuclear force modernization plans begin to reach
fruition, we are restoring the capability necessary to maintain a
credible and stable deterrent. Our continuing efforts to implement
these plans remain firmly linked to our goal of genuine and verifi-
able arms reductions. Together, modernization and arms reductions
will ensure a safer and saner world for us and for future generations.
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F. COALITION STRATEGY - REGIONAL SECURITY
1. Introduction
Upon taking office in January 1981, this Administration faced
three trends with urgent implications for international peace and
security:
-- A general, decade-long decline in Western strength that had
gradually eroded the U.S. margin of military safety and that
of our allies.
-- The increasing interdependence of the West and the developing
countries, many of which, because of their fragile economic
conditions, had become targets for Soviet-sponsored destabi-
lization.
-- The emergence of the Soviet ilnion as a global military power,
increasingly willing to use its might to promote violence in
areas of strategic significance to the 47est.
Our response to these challenges recognizes that the United
States cannot itself provide all of the manpower and weapons neces-
sary to deter aggression worldwide. Hence, we have adopted a coali-
tion strategy linking improvements in the U.S. defense posture with
an expanded program of economic and military assistance and renewed
attention to the vitality of America's alliances and security rela-
tionships with other friendly nations. This chapter describes the
U.S. forces, commands, and defense programs contributing to this
coalition strategy.
2. Western Europe/North Atlantic Treaty Organization
~ NATO)
Chart lll. F.1
Western Europe
Mejor funded security
assistance program
b German Damoaetic ~J- i ~/
Republic 1 __ l/ ,
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NATO continues to provide an indispensable framework for main-
taining the peace in this critical geostrategic region. Its coopera-
tive security arrangements have served us and our allies very well.
The strength and resilience of the Alliance have most recently been
demonstrated in its emplacement of intermediate-range nuclear
weapons, after having attempted to reach an arms control agreement
with the Soviets that would have rendered such deployments unneces-
sary.
NATO's strategy is one of deterrence based on a capability for
defense at all possible levels of conflict. That strategy, adopted
in 1967, calls for forward defense and for flexibility in response.
While NATO is maintaining and improving its nuclear capabilities
under approved programs, it is widely agreed that the Alliance needs
to strengthen its conventional defenses. This will help achieve an
effective mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities, which would
neither force NATO to early nuclear use from conventional weakness
nor preclude such use should the Alliance so choose.
a. U.S. Forces for NATO
Under existing arrangements, most forces in Europe -- including
those of the United States -- remain under national command in peace-
time. In an emergency or war, the forces would be integrated into
the NATO command.
IJ.S. forces stationed in Europe include four Army divisions, two
brigades of U.S.-based divisions, and two armored cavalry regiments,
along with 28 Air Force tactical air squadrons.l Those forces would
be heavily augmented in a crisis. Our goal is to be able to field a
total of 10 Army divisions, 88 Air Force squadrons, and one Plarine
Amphibious Brigade within 10 days of a decision to mobilize. To
achieve that capability, additional improvements are needed in U.S.
materiel prepositioning and lift programs, as well as in European
reception and support facilities. Further reinforcements, both
ground and air, would follow as readiness and transport availability
permit.
U.S. naval forces for NATO include the Second Fleet in the
Atlantic and the Sixth Fleet in the Plediterranean. These, too,
would be reinforced in an emergency to the extent permitted by
commitments elsewhere.
This Administration opposes any ceiling on, or reduction in, U.S.
troop strength in Europe. We believe that such limitations unduly
restrict operational commanders' flexibility and may produce an
effect precisely opposite to that which is desired. They could
also tempt our allies to make similar reductions in their force
levels. Furthermore, by delaying needed modernization programs,
cutbacks in U.S. manpower levels in Europe might send a signal of
a weakening of the United States' commitment to NATO, unraveling
the Alliance-wide consensus on conventional force improvements.
Therefore, it is with great reluctance that, at the insistence
of the Congress, we have reduced our planned FY 1986 increase in
European end strength by about 3,500 spaces so as to remain within
the congressionally imposed limit of 326,414 troops. .
1 In addition, the United States maintains a separate brigade in
Berlin that is not committed to NATO.
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b. NATO Nuc%ar P/arming
NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is responsible for coordi-
nating matters involving NATO's nuclear forces. At present, all
members of the Alliance except 'Iceland and France are represented
on the NPG and one of its subsidiaries for special projects, the
High Level Group (HLG).
The HLG prepared the analyses and recommendations that led to
NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy Pershing II missiles and
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). A separate group, the
Special Consultative Group (SCG), set up under the North Atlantic
Council, laid the groundwork for the other half of the two-part
December 1979 decision -- the commitment to seek, through negotia-
tions with the Soviet ilnion, limitations on those missiles. The
HLG also conducted the study of the Alliance's nuclear needs that
led to the October 1983 decision by NATO defense ministers to with-
draw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Europe. That study also identified
a number of areas in which improvements in the Alliance's nuclear
posture would help maintain the future deterrent capabilities of
its nuclear forces. (U.S. initiatives and programs in support of
NATO's modernization and arms control goals are discussed in Part I
and in the Nuclear Forces chapter of this report.)
c. /mproving NATO's Conventions/ Defense Capabi/ity
The continued growth of Soviet and Warsaw Pact nuclear and con-
ventional capabilities has increased NATO's requirements for flexi-
ble and measured responses to aggression, thus placing a heavy burden
on its conventional forces. There is an Alliance-wide consensus that
NATO's conventional defenses need to be upgraded, and a number of
programs have been directed toward that end. Improved facilities
for conventional forces are being planned by the NATO Infrastructure
Committee, operating under its newly adopted six-year financial
ceiling. The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is
working to improve cooperation in the acquisition of weapons, par-
ticularly those involving emerging technologies. The Senior National
Logisticians Conference (SNLC) is examining ways to strengthen
cooperation in the area of logistics, with special emphasis on war
reserve munitions stocks, wartime host nation support, and other
logistical aspects of rapid reinforcement. The NATO Air Defense
Committee (NADC) is developing plans and priorities for improving
air defense systems and procedures, while the Senior Civil Emergency
Planning Committee is looking at ways to improve transportation
services and reception facilities for reinforcements. The NATO
Joint Communications-Electronics Committee (NJCEC) is working to
improve the performance and interoperability of communications net-
works and command and control systems. Under the auspices of the
Military Committee (MC), the Mayor NATO Commanders (MNCs) are working
closely with national _~:E_'~ori~ies to refine the Alliance's conven-
tional force doctrines and tactics. The MNCs test these procedures
during regularly scheduled exercises.
In order to encourage adequate national funding for these improve-
ment efforts, NATO is developing a "conceptual military framework"
against which questions of priority can be addressed. It is also
drawing up a defense resources strategy to guide national efforts
in the mid- and longer term.
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d. NATO Cost-Shared /nfrastructure
Under the NATO Infrastructure program, Alliance members share
the costs of constructing facilities for the use of their forces
in a war. Thirteen NATO nations contribute to the full Infrastruc-
ture program. France joins the common funding for air defense warn-
ing installations, bringing the contributors in this area to fourteen.
(Iceland has no military forces and thus is not involved; Spain does
not participate in the Infrastructure program at this time.) This
burdensharing effort contributes enormously to the effectiveness of
NATO's conventional forces. Over the years, however, the Infrastruc-
ture program has fallen far short of satisfying the burgeoning needs
for modern facilities to support the Alliance's forces and command
network.
That situation should soon begin to change, owing to the sharply
increased six-year ceiling of nearly $8 billion adopted last December.
The additional funding will hasten the deployment of new units and
weapon systems and the provision of facilities needed to support
ground and air reinforcements. These latter programs in particular
will go a long way toward overcoming the shortfalls at the collocated
operating bases from which our reinforcement aircraft would operate.
Over 70 percent of the required airfield improvements will be under-
taken during the next six years, including construction of 60 percent
of the shelters needed to protect our combat aircraft.
The NATO countries benefit economically from the Infrastructure
program in several ways: general economic benefits accrue to host
countries from peacetime maintenance and operations, as well as from
the construction of new installations; all member countries compete
for commercial contracts for construction and related goods and
services; and the user nations benefit from allied contributions to
facilities that their forces will use. While the United States con-
tributes 27.8 percent of total Infrastructure funding, a full 35 to
40 percent of the projects programmed annually are in direct support
of U.S. forces.
The Infrastructure program funds only those facilities needed for
wartime operations. Personnel support facilities and other projects
serving predominantly peacetime needs are funded by each country,
according to its own standards. Were such construction to fall under
common funding, the United States' share of all such projects would
far exceed the amount of U.S. military construction (MILCON) funds
needed just for our European programs. Therefore, we do not favor
such a broadening of NATO Infrastructure coverage.
e. Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNSJ
The European allies would provide a substantial amount of logis-
tical support for U.S. ground and air units in a NATO reinforcement,
particularly during the early stages. These services, furnished
under what are known as "wartime host nation support" agreements,
range from the provision of rail and highway transportation, materiel
handling, and equipment transshipment to the evacuation of casualties
and protection of critical installations and facilities. Civilian
resources would be used to the maximum extent possible in carrying
out these functions. Comprehensive joint logistics plans have been
prepared with the Benelux countries and the United Kingdom, and are
in progress with Norway, Italy, and Turkey. To facilitate the imple-
mentation of these plans, U.S. logistics coordination cells have been
assigned to the military staffs of several countries.
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The WHNS agreement signed with the Federal Republic of Germany
in April 1982 deserves special mention. Besides providing for the
use of various civilian resources by U.S. forces during a crisis
or war, it calls for the activation of a 93,000-man German reserve
force charged solely with supporting U.S. forces. The initial
combat support and combat service support units have already been
formed, and the entire force will be activated by the end of 1989.
f. Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUSJ
The storage of U.S. equipment at POMCUS sites in Europe is criti-
cal to our ability to reinforce NATO promptly in a crisis. This is
the least expensive and, indeed, the only practical way to ensure a
ten-division U.S. force at D-Day. The POMCUS program also provides
a concrete example of allied burdensharing, since most of the facili-
ties are commonly funded under the Infrastructure program.
The Belgians and the Dutch have expended considerable political
capital and materiel resources to provide the land and certain sup-
porting facilities for the POMCUS sites in their countries, which
will house equipment for Division Sets 5 and 6. One of the sites
in the Netherlands was completed in the spring of 1984 and is now
being stocked. Two additional sites in the Netherlands were com-
pleted in the fall of 1984, while the remaining sites there and in
Belgium will be ready for occupancy by mid-1985.
Mindful of congressional restrictions against stocking equipment
for which the active Army has less than 70 percent of its authorized
levels, or the Reserve Components less than 50 percent of their
requirements, U.S. planners are working to ensure that the POMCUS
facilities are filled as soon as inventory levels permit. As the
program reaches completion, intertheater airlift requirements (for
residual equipment) will be significantly reduced, thus increasing
our ability to deploy combat-ready reinforcements.
g. NATO Arms Cooperation
DoD has taken steps to foster allied cooperation in the devel-
opment, production, and procurement of armaments. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense has organized a senior group to oversee efforts
to achieve increased cooperation and to protect NATO technology
against illegal or unauthorized release. The work of this group
on programs involving emerging technologies is especially important.
The NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors is also
taking a direct interest in the progress of the emerging technologies
program. DoD is supporting that effort by continuing to seek multi-
lateral and bilateral agreements with allied nations on such pro-
jects. Increased cooperation in armaments programs has the potential
of permitting more efficient use of national resources if we can
eliminate the obstacles that stand in the way.
h. Security Assistance
Security assistance and arms sales programs with the NATO nations
continue to be essential in bringing the full availability of other-
wise restricted national resources to Western defense. U.S. security
assistance takes four forms: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits,
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grants under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the Inter-
national Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and economic
aid provided via Economic Support Funds (the ESF program).
The FY 1986 request is summarized in Table III.F.1. Again this
year, the major European recipients of U.S. security assistance will
be Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The program also continues
the mutually beneficial arrangements under which our other NATO
allies acquire U.S. defense articles and services on a cash basis
through the FMS program or commercial channels.
Tab/e ///. F.1
Mq%or Funded Programs? FY 1986
(Do//ars in Mi//ions)
Country
FMS
Credits
Map
Grants
International
Military Education
and Training Program
Economic
Support
Funds
Greece
500
-
1.75
-
Portugal
65
70
3.00
80
Spain
400
-
3.00
12
Turkey
555
230
4.00
150
i. Burdensharing
Alliance defense policy and military strategy posit a fair shar-
ing among the member nations of both the risks and burdens of deter-
rence and defense. The success of the Alliance in preserving peace
and freedom for its members over the past 35 years testifies to the
sense of common purpose and interdependence that link the nations
of Western Europe to each other and to North America. Recognizing
that this sense of mutual commitment is by far the most critical
ingredient of security, NATO governments have made a determined
effort to preserve the momentum of their defense programs even in
the face of adverse and discouraging developments. This is not to
minimize the troubling fact that reWi increases in allied defense
spending have run well below ours for the past few years. But
account must be taken of political and economic imperatives in
Europe as well as in this country.
Nevertheless, we believe the record shows that our European
allies are doing more for the common defense, broadly defined, than
they are often given credit for. Last year, the average real growth
in defense spending for the non-U.S. NATO allies combined was approxi-
mately 3 percent. And in December 1984, the allies agreed to strive
to continue to make the necessary resources available and to optimize
the use of resources to improve NATO's conventional defense capability.
We will continue to urge our allies to accept a greater share
of the common defense burden. In doing so, it is essential that the
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Rexionul Securih~
United States continue to make a full contribution to NATO's collec-
tive defense effort.
3. Southwest Asia and the Middle East
Political and military instabilities in Southwest Asia (SWA) and
the Middle East continue to pose complex and dynamic challenges for
U.S. defense planning. In response, President Reagan has steadfastly
reaffirmed our commitment to protect U.S. and free world interests
in the region, especially the pursuit of a lasting Arab-Israeli peace
and continued access to Persian Gulf oil.
Over the past several years, we have improved our military capa-
bilities for the region, primarily by enhancing the readiness and
mobility of existing forces. Our plans, programs, and command struc-
ture for SWA and the Middle East have now begun to mature and provide
us with a broad range of capabilities in those areas. Furthermore,
they continue to be the mainstay of a larger effort to revitalize our.
worldwide rapid-response capabilities.
a. The Region and Potential Conf/icts
Chart III.F.2 depicts the general areas we refer to as South-
west Asia and the Middle East.
Chart III.F.2
Saithwes[ Asia and
the Middle East
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(1) Southwest Asia
It is our policy to support the independence and territorial
integrity of friendly countries in this politically unstable region
and to prevent a further spread or deepening of Soviet influence.
In addition, the free world relies on SWA for one-third of its
oil supply, making the area vital to the economic interests of the
United States and, especially, its allies.
Although SWA is the focus of our rapid deployment planning, we
currently have no agreements to station combat forces permanently
ashore in the area and maintain only a limited sea-based presence
there. Furthermore, political conditions and agreements with
friends and allies near the region, in Europe, and elsewhere along
vital lines of communications influence the availability of transit
facilities needed to support our rapid deployment strategy. As a
result, many of our programs emphasize mobility and access to coun-
tries en route to or near SWA.
Some of these programs have been completed, and many more are
beginning to take effect. They have been very timely, and we have
been able to use our new capabilities to support requests for assis-
tance from several regional nations. For example, during the past
several years, we have deployed AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia, sup-
ported the Sudan in response to threats emanating from Libya, and
assisted Egypt to prepare against potential aggression, again from
Libya. More recently, in response to regional concerns about the
escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, we expanded our security cooperation
with the governments of several Persian Gulf states. Most recently,
in response to a request from the Egyptian government, we partici-
pated in multinational efforts to clear mines from international
shipping lanes in the Red Sea.
Our programs for the region must offer capabilities across a
wide spectrum of potential conflict. In most cases, we would pro-
vide only economic, technical, or security assistance (including
military training and materiel). An overt Soviet invasion or direct
military threat to our vital interests would, of course, pose a more
demanding requirement for a military response that might involve the
use of U.S. forces, together with any available forces of friends and
allies.
(2) The Middle East
Our policy for the Middle East is based upon our goal of achiev-
ing a lasting Arab-Israeli peace. Accordingly, we support the
security and territorial integrity of Israel and other nations in
the Middle East region. As is the case with our SWA programs, which
are focused on improving U.S. rapid deployment capabilities, our
efforts in the Middle East are oriented toward deterring Soviet
aggression by providing security assistance and economic support.
This is especially true for Egypt and Israel, whose military forces
are more than sufficient to provide for their territorial defense.
It is also necessary for the United States to provide direct
military assistance to other countries in the Middle East. During
the recent crisis in Lebanon, for example, and while we still had
hopes that the warring parties would agree to withdraw their troops,
we deployed Marine Corps units as part of the multinational peace-
keeping effort. Further, in order to protect our Marine positions
ashore, the U.S. Navy provided gunfire and tactical air support.
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Regional Security
When the warring countries did not agree to withdaw their troops,
the Multinational Peacekeeping Force was withdrawn.
U.S. troops also participate in peacekeeping operations in the
Sinai as part of another Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
program.
In January 1983, we created the United States Central Command
(USCENTCOP4) with headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
This is our first new geographic unified command in more than 35
years. Its establishment highlights the importance we place on
being able to deter or oppose Soviet aggression in the SWA region.
The Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM (USCINCCENT) is charged with
achieving U.S. national security policy objectives in SWA, including
the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa. His primary responsibilities
are to ensure continued Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to deter
Soviet aggression and preserve regional stability; and to halt, and
if possible reverse, the spread of Soviet influence.
While, in principle, most of our general purpose forces could
be used for rapid-response missions, we have identified a certain
number of units that could readily be allocated to USCENTCOM for
this purpose (see Table III.F.2).
Table Ill. F.2
Combat Forces Initially Available
to USCENTCOM
Army
1 Airborne Division
1 Airmobile/Air Assault Division
1 Mechanized Infantry Division
1 Light Infantry Division
1 Air Cavalry Brigade
Marine Corps
1-1 /3 Marine Amphibious Forcesa
Air Force
7 Tactical Fighter Wingsb
2 Strategic Bomber Squadrons
Navy
3 Carrier Battle Groups
1 Surface Action Group
5 Maritime Patrol Air Squadrons
aA Marine Amphibious Force typically consists of a reinforced Marine division and a Marine aircraft wing
(containing roughly twice as many tactical fighter/attack aircraft as an Air Force tactical fighter wing, as well
as a helicopter unitl.
bincludes support forces. Does not include 3-1 /2 tactical fighter wings available as attrition fillers.
`These bombers would be accompanied by reconnaissance, command and control, and tanker aircraft.
Later in the five-year planning period, as we improve our ability
Lo move forces rapidly and provide adequate support, USCENTCOM's
ground allocations will be gradually expanded. During peacetime,
many of these units are assigned to the U.S. Readiness Command for
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training purposes. Since they represent some of our most mobile and
ready forces, they are available on a priority basis to USCINCCENT
for his SWA mission. They are also available for rapid deployment
missions in other regions.
CINCCENT recently established a small Forward Headquarters Ele-
ment (FHE) afloat with our naval forces in the Persian Gulf. As
local countries increase their interaction with the Command, we
would expect to transfer more functions to the FHE.
c. Southwest Asia Regional Requirements
No matter where outside Europe we might send our rapidly deploy-
able forces, the problems they would face are likely to be quite dif-
ferent from those posed by a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. The forces
might have to operate in distant theaters characterized by an inade-
quate infrastructure (e.g., limited transportation and communications
networks) and a harsh climate or difficult terrain, and where the
United States maintains only a limited peacetime presence. Require-
ments for SWA illustrate the considerations we must incorporate into
programs supporting our rapid deployment strategy.
Today, our peacetime presence in SWA is restricted primarily to
sea-based forces in or near the Persian Gulf. To defend free world
interests there, we must be able to project substantial ground and
land-based tactical air power very rapidly to this distant region
and sustain that power over time. Meeting these objectives will
require:
-- Developing the capability to deploy forces rapidly over
extended air and sea lines of communications and to sustain
the forces in combat;
-- Gaining approval for, and developing, land-based preposition-
ing sites;
-- Obtaining both overflight rights and en route access from
several additional countries;
-- Securing lengthy air and sea lines of communications for
considerable periods of time;
-- Obtaining access to and improving selected airfields and
seaports in the theater;
-- Obtaining additional host nation support from countries en
route to and in SWA;
-- Improving our cargo-handling capabilities to compensate
for the lack of local infrastructure and trained personnel;
and
-- Tailoring support (e.g., water, medical, communications, and
transportation) for unique and austere combat operations.
All of these goals require improved relationships with moderate,
friendly nations of the region.
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d. Key FY 1986-90 Programs
We have made an impressive start toward responding to each of
these challenges. The FY 1986-90 program builds largely on existing
efforts; only a few of the programs are new.
(1) Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (C I)
A secure, survivable C3I network is essential for conducting
military operations in any theater, and it is one of our highest
priorities in SWA. Communications facilities in the region -- unlike
those in other, more developed theaters -- are practically nonexist-
ent, except in a few urban areas. We therefore must acquire commun-
ications equipment that is capable of operating over long distances,
is resistant to jamming, and is easily transportable -- a formidable
and costly task. We are requesting $280 million over the next five
years to procure mobile C3I equipment that will initially be based
in the United States, ready for rapid deployment to the region if
needed.
Over FY 1986-90, our plans call for establishing three major
communications nodes at appropriate locations. In the interim, we
will rely on our Joint Communications Support Element ~JCSE), which
also must support other unified commands, and on the C capability
provided by a Deployable Field Headquarters (DFH) that will be opera-
tional in the next several years.
(2) Access and Improvements to Regional Facilities
We have reached formal agreements with several nations, and are
pursuing negotiations with others, for permission to preposition
materiel and conduct routine training exercises during peacetime,
and to use regional facilities during crises. In some cases, it
has been necessary to improve the existing facilities and infrastruc-
ture. These projects were initially funded in FY 1980-81, and most
will be completed by the end of FY 1987. We will continue to seek
opportunities for further improvements as our access to facilities
in the region increases.
Table III.F.3 shows our funding requirements for military con-
struction projects in countries where we have, or expect to gain,
Tab/e ///. F 3
Mi/ii~ry Co?sbt~ction Fundingr for SWA-Re/ai~ed Faci/ities~
(Do//ars in Mi//ionsl
FY 1981-85
FY 1986-90
Location
Appropriated
Programmed
Kenya
57.9
-
Oman
255.0
-
Somalia
54.0
-
Other
96.0
128.0
Total
462.9
128.0
e Does not in
clude planning an
d design costs.
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access. It is important to emphasize that we are not creating U.S.
bases, per se, in SWA. Rather, we are improving existing facilities
that U.S. forces might use and are arranging for prompt access when
needed and when invited by the host government.
Egypt has offered temporary access to its facilities, including
the strategically located installation at Ras Ban as on the Red Sea,
in the event the United States is invited to come to the defense
of a friendly Arab country. The facility at Ras Banas would require
improvement in order to be suitable for use by U.S. forces. Because
of domestic legal and political considerations, however, the Egyptian
government has declined a II.S. proposal to upgrade the base. The
Egyptians plan to improve the base themselves, but this could be a
protracted undertaking. In the meantime, the Egyptian government
has reaffirmed its willingness to allow us to use other facilities
in an emergency. If such a contingency should arise, we would,
with Egyptian approval, be able to deploy forces near a potential
conflict area in the region sooner than if we had to wait until
we could move directly to the affected country.
Under the provisions of the U.S./Oman Facilities Access Agree-
ment, and with the approval of the Omani government, we are improv-
ing selected facilities in that country for use by the United States
during peacetime or in crises. Many of these improvements are nearly
complete. They include upgraded runways, taxiways, and aprons; sup-
port facilities for personnel and maintenance; and storage facilities.
Omani facilities are important for extending sea control, basing tac-
tical aircraft, and staging ground forces during regional contingen-
cies, as well as for supporting U.S. naval forces.
We also have completed some relatively small but important. con-
struction projects in Kenya and Somalia. Kenya has allowed us to
use its facilities at Mombasa, where we have dredged the harbor and
upgraded the airfield with improved navigation aids, utilities, and
maintenance facilities. This port is useful for maintaining and
refueling our ships, including aircraft carriers, and offers one of
the few locations in the region for crew rest and liberty. Somalia
has allowed us access to its seaport and airfield at Mogadishu, where
we have improved the airfield's pavement and support facilities, and
at Berbera, where we have made similar airfield modifications and
have added POL storage and distribution facilities along with other
improvements to the seaport.
(3) Exercises and Training
Our ability to conduct military operations in SWA or elsewhere is
enhanced through combat exercises in and outside the theater, as well
as through communications and logistics exercises and wargaming. Be-
cause we believe they are essential for operational readiness, as
well as to demonstrate U.S. resolve in SWA, we plan to continue a
wide range of exercises in the region. These programs have been well
received by many SWA nations and, as a result, should enjoy greater
participation in the future.
Our most recent major exercise in SWA was BRIGHT STAR 83, con-
ducted in the fall of 1982. The exercise lasted about 30 days and
involved some 5,500 U.S. troops operating in four countries. In
Egypt, Army and Air Force units conducted field training and air
defense maneuvers with Egyptian forces. In the Sudan, we airdropped
Army Rangers for combined operations with the Sudanese army, and our
234
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Regional Security
Marines practiced amphibious operations. We plan to hold another
BRIGHT STAR exercise in SWA later this year.
Instead of exercising in SWA in FY 1984, we held exercise GALLANT
EAGLE in California and Nevada, where some 50,000 personnel from all
four Services participated in a simulated SWA conflict. Notably,
GALLANT EAGLE marked the first use of our SL-7 fast sealift ships.
(4) Intertheater Mobility
The intertheater lift programs planned for FY 1986-90 will sig-
nificantly improve our ability to deploy forces to distant theaters,
particularly Southwest Asia. Airlift enhancements will almost
double our ability to move forces, primarily air defense and light
Army units, rapidly to this area. The Maritime Prepositioning Ship
(MPS) program will provide our first rapid-response capability for a
division-sized Marine force augmented with armor. An increase in
government-controlled shipping will enable us to move a two-division
corps by sea, one of them on fast sealift. (The Force Projection
chapter provides further details on these and other intertheater
mobility enhancements.)
e. Security Assistance
P1ore than one-half of the $5.65 billion we are requesting for
FMS credits in FY 1986 will go to countries in the SWA/Middle East
region, and all of the guaranteed FMS loan credits extended to
Israel ($1.8 billion) and Egypt ($1.3 billion) will be forgiven.
More than half of the U.S.-provided Economic Support Funds (ESF)
will be applied to enhance our economic and foreign policy objec-
tives in the region. Table III.F.4 summarizes the major security
assistance programs by country and type of assistance.
Tab/e ///. F.4
Moor Funded Programs, FY 19'86
(~ in Mi//ionsl
Country
FMS
Credits
Map
Grants
International
Military Education
and Training Program
Economic
Support
Funds
Egypt
1,300
-
2.00
815
Israel
1,800
-
-
-a
Jordan
95
-
2.00
20
Kenya
-
25
1.80
35
Lebanon
10
-
0.80
10
Morocco
5
45
1.85
22.5
Oman
58.3
-
0.15
20
Pakistan
325
-
1.20
250
Somalia
-
40
1.50
35
Sudan
-
58.5
1.75
120
Tunisia
53
16
1.70
22.5
Yemen Arab Republic
-
6
1.55
-
e Not yet determined.
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The program for Israel will help that country defend itself and
ease the burden of its enormous defense effort. The program for
Egypt continues our support for that nation's long-term military
modernization plan, which includes a transition away from obsoles-
cent Soviet equipment.
The program for Jordan will remedy major deficiencies the Jor-
danian armed forces face in countering the growing, Soviet-supported
Syrian military buildup. The programs for Oman, Somalia, and Kenya
complement our agreements for access to facilities in those countries
and will help their governments cope with threats from neighboring
states. Our substantial program with Pakistan represents the con-
tinuation of a multiyear modernization plan necessitated by the So-
viet invasion of Afghanistan. The program for Morocco supports U.S.
efforts to help that country modernize its armed forces, and the
program for Tunisia will help it resist Libyan-supported threats
to its internal security. These programs are provided on both a
repayable-loan and grant basis.
We also anticipate continuing requests from other countries, such
as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for help in modernizing
their armed forces through direct cash purchases of military equip-
ment and services, including construction.
f. Host Nation Support and Prepositioning
To the extent that host nation support can be provided by regional
nations during a contingency, and that we can preposition materiel in
peacetime, our limited intertheater lift assets could deliver more
combat forces and equipment during the critical early days of a
deployment to SWA. Our negotiations and plans for obtaining such sup-
port must consider the differing strategic priorities and perceptions
of nations in the region; the absence of an indigenous integrated
command structure and common operational concepts; and the long lines
of communications, major geographic barriers, political instabilities,
economic uncertainties, and strong religious and cultural biases that
are prevalent. No nation in SWA is a formal ally of the United
States, and all are wary of perceived superpower insensitivity to
their sovereignty.
These problems, while formidable, are not insurmountable. We
have approached several SWA countries with requests for host nation
and contingency support and for permission to preposition U.S.
materiel. We have achieved some successes in these areas, and we
will continue discussions in the future.
g. Extraregiona/ A//ied Support and Cooperation
Many of our friends and allies have long experience -- and, in
some cases, still maintain a presence -- in SWA. France, for example,
has naval and tactical air facilities in Djibouti that could help keep
the Bab el Mandeb Strait open in a conflict. Similarly, the United
Kingdom has provided military personnel to assist the Sultan of Oman's
armed forces and has made arrangements for our using and improving its
facilities at Diego Garcia. France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and Norway have all participated in multinational peace-
keeping forces in the Middle East. A number of the European allies
have provided en route support to U.S. forces deploying to SWA for
exercises or other missions. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and
France routinely deploy forces to the region. Depending on the situ-
ation, external allied support and cooperation could be very helpful
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to us in a crisis. We and our NATO allies are studying ways for
them to compensate in Europe for any diversion of NATO-oriented U.S.
forces to SWA in the event of simultaneous conflicts in the two
regions.
4. East Asia and the Pacific
East Asia and the Pacific (depicted in Chart III.F.3) have impor-
tant economic and security ties to the United States. More than 30
percent of U.S, trade is conducted with the nations of this region,
and five of our eight mutual security treaties link us with East
Asian or Pacific nations. The commitments derived from these eco-
nomic and security relationships require a strong and visible U.S.
presence to deter the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam from
interfering with the independence and stability of our friends and
allies.
Chart III.F.3
East Asia and
the Pacific
a. Command Structure and Forces
The U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC), with head-
quarters in Hawaii and forces spread across the western Pacific and
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Indian Ocean, has geographic responsibility for over 50 percent of
the earth's surface. Major units available to USCINCPAC are shown
in Table III.F.S.
Table lll. F.5
Forces Available to
USCINCPAC
Army Air Force
1 Infantry Division (Korea) 1 Strategic Bomber Squadron
1 Infantry Division (Hawaii) 10 Tactical Fighter Squadrons
5 Tactical Support Squadrons
Marine Corps
Portions of 1 Marine Division
(Okinawa)
1 Marine Brigade (Hawaii)
1 Marine Division (California)
Navy
6 Carriers with Air Wings
89 Surface Combatants
32 Amphibious Ships
40 Attack Submarines
12 Maritime Patrol Aircraft Squadrons
b. Security Re/ationships
The size of the East Asia and Pacific region and the limited
availability of our own forces require strong cooperation with our
friends and allies in meeting threats posed by potential adversaries.
(1) Japan
Our defense partnership with Japan, based on the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, remains the cornerstone of our defense
policy in East Asia. Long-standing Japanese national policy calls
for that country to acquire and maintain forces adequate for the
defense of its land area and surrounding airspace and sea-lanes, out
to a distance of 1,000 miles. These goals are supported by a strong
U.S. presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
(2) Republic of Korea (ROK)
U.S. and ROK forces face a growing military threat from North
Korea. North Korea could today launch a massive attack with very
little warning. Together with the ROK and our United Nations part-
ners, we must continue to strengthen U.S. and ROK capabilities.
With U.S. assistance, ROK ground and air forces are modernizing and
improving their ability to conduct joint operations. We are also
helping Korea improve its C3I systems, upgrade its petroleum storage
facilities and contingency airfields, and enhance the overall sus-
tainability of its forces. At the same time, we are continuing
efforts to reduce tension and maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.
(3) The Philippines
The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the Military Base Agree-
ment of 1947 are the foundations of our security relationship
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with the Philippines. U.S. military facilities there permit a
continuous air and naval presence in East and Southeast Asia and
support U.S. forces operating in the western Pacific and Indian
Oceans. The proximity of these facilities to the international sea-
lanes connecting the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia
makes them vital to the security of the region. Persistent problems
in the Philippines have spawned a communist-led insurgency to which
the Philippine government has responded with political and economic,
as well as military, measures. U.S. military assistance and training
programs will aid in dealing with the security-related aspects of
the insurgency.
(4) Thailand
Maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of Thai-
land is critical to the stability of Southeast Asia. The presence
of 150,000 to 170,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea poses a direct
threat to Thai security. We will continue to provide Thailand with
military assistance and training to bolster its self-defense capa-
bility, under the auspices of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty (Planila Pact) .
(5) Australia and New Zealand
The ANZUS Treaty links us with two of our oldest allies, Australia
and New Zealand, in defense efforts supporting our mutual interests
throughout the South Pacific.
c. Security Assistance
Again this year, more than half of the proposed FMS credits for
the East Asia and Pacific region support the ROK Force Improvement
Plan ($228 million). Most of the remaining FMS credits will be
divided among the Philippines ($50 million), to help it stem the
growing communist-led insurgency; Thailand ($97.5 million), whose
borders are threatened by the substantial Vietnamese force in
Kampuchea; and Indonesia ($34.7 million), which sits astride vital
sea lines of communications.
Tab/e ///. F.6
Mayor Funded ProBramsy FY 1986
(Do//ars in Mi//ions)
Country
FMS
Credits
Map
Grants
International
Military Education
and Training Program
Economic
Support
Funds
Indonesia
34.7
-
2.80
-
Korea
228.0
-
2.20
-
Malaysia
5.0
-
1.15
-
Philippines
50.0
50
2.25
95
Thailand
97.5
5
2.50
5
d. Regions/ Exercises
U.S. forces conduct major live-fire exercises with the ROK each
year, including TEAM SPIRIT, the largest combined field-training
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exercise in the world. We also participate in annual bilateral and
multinational exercises on a lesser scale with Japan, Thailand, the
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.
5. Western Hemisphere
U.S. security commitments to Latin America are based on our
adherence to the Rio Treaty. (The countries of this region are shown
in Chart III.F.4.) Our policy seeks to defend the continental United
States, and to minimize U.S. military presence and tailor security
assistance to the specific needs of the armed forces of our friends
there.
Chart lll. F.4
Western Hemisphere
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Despite a recognition of the need to broaden U.S. security assis-
tance to help our allies meet the growing Soviet, Cuban, and Nica-
raguan threat, we have been unable to obtain the funding necessary
for more than a superficial improvement. In the face of growing
military buildups in Cuba and Nicaragua, neighboring countries have
been able to do very little because of deteriorating economic condi-
tions.
a. Command Structure and Forces
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH), with
headquarters in Panama, has responsibility for Central and South
America. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT),
headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, has responsibility for the Carib-
bean and the ocean areas surrounding Central and South America.
The United States maintains an Army brigade as well as small Air
Force and Navy contingents in Panama. We also maintain bases in
Puerto Rico and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although we have no bases
in Honduras, an annex to our 1954 agreement with that country pro-
vides for U.S. access to Honduran airfields.
The U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama, which had trained
Latin American officers for 38 years, unfortunately closed its doors
on September 30, 1984, pursuant to provisions of the Panama Canal
Treaty. Because of its major contributions to our security as well
as to the security of our neighbors, the school is continuing to
operate from temporary quarters at Fort Benning, Georgia, until a
suitable permanent facility can be found, probably in this country.
b. Programs
U.S. programs for the Western Hemisphere stress mutual coordi-
nation in responding to regional security needs. For example, the
Memorandum of Understanding on Industrial/Military Cooperation
signed in 1984 with Brazil should advance military cooperation on
arms production and sales. Intelligence sharing allows our friends
to take advantage of U.S. information-gathering assets. Annual con-
ferences of the Service Chiefs of the Americas have also proven very
beneficial over the years.
c. Security Assistance
A more intense exercise program is another way in which the
United States has been able to demonstrate its commitment to regional
allies and to give our forces an opportunity to train together. U.S.
security assistance programs are focused on the training and materiel
support required to enhance the performance of Latin American armed
forces. These programs are designed to respond to critical military
needs, not to promote arms purchases that would increase already-
burdened regional defense budgets.
The U.S. security assistance effort has been focused primarily
on the immediate defense needs of E1 Salvador and Honduras. The
Regional Military Training Center in Honduras has been a convenient
and cost-effective way of training the Salvadoran and Honduran
armed forces to defend their homelands and resist communist-led
insurgencies. U.S. instructors trained more than 6,000 personnel
at the Center last year. Mobile training teams in E1 Salvador and
Honduras are attempting to redress other deficiencies, such as
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medical care and command and control support. Equipment acquisi-
tions have improved mobility and medical evacuation capabilities,
while enhancing communications security.
Tab/e ///.F 7
Major funded Progrem~ fY 1986
(Do//ars in Mi//ionsl
Country
FMS
Credits
Map
Grants
International
Military Education
and Training Program
Economic
Support
Funds
Bolivia
-
6.0
0.30
10
Colombia
20
-
0.95
-
Costa Rica
-
2.5
0.225
150
Dominican Republic
4
6.0
0.80
50
Eastern Caribbean
-
10.0
0.40
35
EI Salvador
-
131.0
1.60
210
Guatemala
10
-
0.30
25
Honduras
-
87.0
1.25
80
Jamaica
-
8.0
0.275
70
Panama
4
14.4
0.65
40
Peru
10
18.35
0.85
45
We will continue to support the security forces of the member
states of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System, as well
as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. To the extent possible, we
will coordinate our efforts with those of allied nations active in
the region, particularly the United Kingdom.
The increasing guerrilla actions in the Andean countries demand
that U.S. security assistance efforts not be overly restricted to
Central America. Reductions in political violence and improve-
ments in civil-military relations may make resumption of security
assistance possible in Guatemala.
d. Regiona/ Exercises
The United States and eight South American countries par-
ticipated in last year's UNITAS exercise, which involved a circum-
navigation of South America. This exercise program, which has been
conducted for 25 years, fosters solidarity, goodwill, and military
professionalism among participating navies.
In 1984, the United States participated in combined exercises
such as AHUAS TARA II and GKENADERO I in Central America and adjacent
waters. In MINUTEMAN I, an engineer training exercise conducted in
Panama, active Army and Army National Guard units joined with Panama
Defense Force personnel in constructing and improving roads on the
western coast of Panama. Such exercises improve our ability to
respond to crises in the region, provide an opportunity to train
with local forces, and -- perhaps most important -- demonstrate the
United States' commitment to allies there.
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6. Africa
In Africa, (see Chart III.F.S) we seek an environment in which
nations can achieve political stability, territorial security, and
economic well-being. These goals are threatened by the continued
expansion of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate influence and adventurism
in the region. The Soviets, in concert with Cuba and Eastern bloc
states, supply large amounts of equipment, materiel, advisory assis-
tance, and training to Libya and the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa.
About 2,500 Cuban military personnel -- many of them combat troops
-- are stationed in Ethiopia. Some 30,000 more Cuban soldiers are
fighting to preserve the Marxist government in Angola from a growing
resistance movement, in part to help ensure continued Soviet access
to military facilities and the continued use of Angola as a base for
supporting Marxist-dominated "liberation movements" in southern
Africa. These circumstances, combined with Libya's continued aggres-
sion against Chad in the past year, have been of major concern.
a. Command Responsibi/ities
Three unified commanders have responsibility for Africa. The
U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), has responsibility for
most of the continent. Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia,
and Kenya are the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, U.S.
Central Command (USCINCCENT); and the four African island states in
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the Indian Ocean are the responsibility of the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC).
b. Security Assistance
The security assistance request for Africa supports ongoing pro-
grams through the provision of training, logistical support, and
spare parts. Most of the assistance will be extended through MAP
grants and economic support funds; few transfers of major weapons
systems are anticipated. The bulk of our FY 1986 funds will be
directed to programs benefiting Liberia, Botswana, Zaire, and Chad.
The assistance to Chad is especially important as that country
attempts to cope with Libyan subversion and aggression. We are con-
tinuing the regional Civic Action Program, under which we help African
armies undertake activities (such as road building) beneficial to
their countries' military and civil sectors, and aid African navies
and coast guards in improving their ability to patrol territorial
waters and enforce fishing regulations.
Tab/e ///. F,8
Major Funded Programs, FY 19M
(Do//ars in Mi//ions)
Country
FMS
Credits
Map
Grants
International
Military Education
and Training Program
Economic
Support
Funds
Botswana
6
4
0.40
8
Cameroon
7
-
0.225
-
Chad
-
6
0.15
10
Gabon
5
-
0.15
-
Guinea
-
5
0.15
-
Liberia
-
13
1.30
45
Niger
-
5
0.275
7
Senegal
-
4
0.50
15
Zaire
-
10.4
1.40
15
Civic Action Program
-
7
-
-
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G. MOBILIZATION
1. Introduction
Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces are brought
to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency, includ-
ing activating all or part of the Reserve Components. The capability
of the United States to mobilize its vast economic, industrial, and
human resources to augment the active force in times of national
emergency is an essential factor in deterring potential enemies and
reassuring our allies. The complexity and magnitude of the entire
process makes peacetime planning essential for the success of mobili-
zation. This chapter addresses the Reagan Administration's emphasis
on mobilization planning and the resultant enhanced military pre-
paredness.
The President has repeatedly emphasized his personal commitment
to mobilization planning and preparedness. In National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) 47, he established a clear policy to
develop programs to provide sufficient manpower and materiel to
mobilize. This guarantee of the nation's ability to mobilize is a
significant factor in deterring potential enemies and in assuring
our allies of our continued support.
2. Interagency Mobilization Initiatives
a. The Emergency Mobi/ization Preparedness Board (EMPB)
In 1981, the President established the EMPB to develop a means
for managing America's mobilization potential. The Board is chaired
by his Assistant for National Security Affairs and includes deputy
cabinet-level representatives from all major Federal Departments and
Agencies having mobilization preparedness responsibilities. The
Board establishes national policy in the mobilization area, develops
and monitors progress on the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness,
and resolves issues that arise in the mobilization planning process.
b. Mi/itary Mobi/ization Working Group (MMWGJ
The MMWG is a chartered working group of the EMPB that focuses
on improving and enhancing the interagency coordination of plans and
procedures for military mobilization and for military support to
civil agencies in emergencies. Among its major accomplishments, the
MMWG has:
Identified and described a range of scenarios for national
mobilization planning;
Determined Do D's initial resources required to support
mobilization;
-- Established, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), a Federal Resource Assessment System for the annual
appraisal of mobilization resource availability;
-- Prepared standby legislation to draft health professionals
into the military, should the number of volunteers to deal
with the crisis be inadequate; and
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-- Evaluated the ability of current systems to support civil
defense, to provide military assistance to civil authorities
as required, and to recommend changes in these systems.
In the coming year, the MMWG will continue to promote interagency
mobilization planning. In that regard, it is now developing an
unclassified mobilization scenario for the use of those Federal
Agencies which need to conduct mobilization support planning but are
unprepared to deal with the classified materials found in the current
plans. Working groups within the MMWG will refine the estimates of
DoD's mobilization resource requirements through use of the Federal
Resource Assessment System. Work will also begin on defining the
resource requirements of the nation and its ability to fulfill them.
Consideration will be given to defining our defense requirements for
critical skills other than health professionals and for determining
if there is a need for standby draft legislation covering such
skills. The MMWG will also develop interagency plans and resource
requirements to support deployment of forces. Finally, we plan to
develop a system which will integrate military support into all non-
mobilization crisis planning.
c. Emergency Communications Working Group (ECWGJ
Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and
Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, consolidates
the responsibility for telecommunications functions that support
national security and emergency preparedness (NSEP). The Executive
Order also established the National Communications System (NCS) and
the NCS Committee of Principals. This major achievement in sorting
out emergency communications roles and responsibilities significantly
reduces duplicative government actions. Twenty-two federal organiza-
tions are now members of the NCS and serve on the Committee of Prin-
cipals. Most taskings in the National Plan have been accomplished.
The NCS has also begun a comprehensive review of those taskings to
ensure that they respond to NSEP telecommunications needs within the
framework of E.O. 12472.
3. DoD Mobilization Initiatives
a. P/arming and Po/icy
Our capability to mobilize is based on the accuracy of our plans
and the availability of potential resources. In peacetime, we design
contingency plans to respond to the various crises that may occur.
This includes planning to ensure that the resources needed will, in
fact, be available. Policy guidance forms the basis for our plans
which are, in turn, evaluated through a series of recurring exer-
cises. As illustrated in Chart III.G.1, mobilization preparedness
is based on the building blocks of policy, plans, and procedures
which in turn derive their support from a number of specific func-
tional areas. The remainder of this chapter will discuss mobili-
zation policy and plans, identifying those areas where notable prog-
ress has been made.
In recent years, policy guidance has been based on the likelihood
of a multitheater war. This clear recognition of the international
situation amplifies previous guidance based on a single theater,
NATO-only conflict. In turn, it has led to an expansion and compli-
cation of mobilization plans and procedures. However, as we learn
from our expanded planning and procedures, we are likewise enhancing
our mobilization preparedness.
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Chart 111. G.1
DoD Mobilization Preparedness
Building Blocks
DoD
Mobilization
Preparedness
Procedures
Military
Manpower
Construction
and
Engineering
Civilian
Manpower
Industrial
Preparedness
Mobilization planning took a step forward in June 1982 with the
publication of the DoD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP). The MMP is
the keystone of our mobilization planning efforts. While the MMP
is intended to provide broad, department-level policy guidance, it
also establishes specific responsibilities and tasks for DoD compo-
nents. An annex was added to identify those critical decisions
which must be made upon mobilization.
Recent exercises identified a need to update the MMP. During
fall 1984, we distributed a revised MMP that includes new roles and
responsibilities corresponding to the DoD reorganization. Also, we
incorporated the findings of a DoD task force to upgrade and define
in more detail responsibilities in the logistics area. In the spring,
we expect to publish a new section to clarify OSD's role in mobili-
zation exercises. This will help train both leadership and staff
support to deal with real crisis problems.
A DoD Crisis Management System (CMS) has been developed to
enhance the ability of the DoD staff to perform its essential
functions more rapidly and effectively in times of major crisis.
This system permits action on a large number of critical issues to:
-- Support the Secretary of Defense and other DoD principals
with the information necessary to permit timely decision-
making;
-- Facilitate resolution of problems at the lowest practical
levels;
-- Focus the major issues for senior decisionmakers; and
-- Provide a single information source for all DoD activities
in responding to the crisis at hand.
The CMS has been tested, evaluated, and refined in each of the
last five major JCS-sponsored command post exercises. In July 1984,
the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a small, per-
manent facility to be the core of DoD's crisis management activities.
DoD has been increasingly active in planning and participating in
mobilization exercises. We have also instituted a remedial projects
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program to identify lessons learned, to assign reponsibilities for
correcting them, and to ensure actions are completed. DoD's in-
creased role in exercises has improved the staff's ability to carry
out its emergency functions.
b. Manpower Sustainabi/ity
Combat sustainability, the staying power of our combat force,
depends on the continued availability of weapons, equipment, secon-
dary items, fuel, and munitions to replace those consumed or de-
stroyed during combat operations, and on the availability of trained
personnel to replace combat casualties. Materiel sustainability is
discussed in the Readiness and sustainability chapter. Manpower
sustainability is achieved through a combination of active military
forces, mobilized Reserve Components, pretrained military manpower
called to duty, newly trained military manpower, and the civilian
manpower required to operate the support base.
Wartime manpower sustainability is measured by comparing demand
with supply in the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). The
WARMAPS military manpower subsystem is slowly expanding to address
such military occupational areas as combat and medical, where we
anticipate replacement problems may occur. We have also established
a WARMAPS civilian manpower subsystem to identify our need for addi-
tional civilian personnel after mobilization. With each update of
the civilian manpower data, we have improved our estimates of our
wartime civilian manning requirements.
c. Mi/itary Manpower /nitiatives
As depicted in Chart III.G.3, WARMAPS data shows a significant
increase in military manpower requirements between FY 1981 and
FY 1986. The increased requirement for military manpower is largely
caused by a change in the projected scenario from a single theater
(NATO) conflict in FY 1981 to a multitheater worldwide conflict in
FY 1986. However, when requirements are compared with supply of
active forces, Selected Reserve, and pretrained individuals, the
size of the shortfall decreases between these years. While the size
of the shortfall in total manpower has decreased, we expect certain
critical skill shortages to exacerbate our shortfalls. However,
these shortfalls generally occur later in a projected scenario than
do equipment and ammunition shortfalls.
We have instituted programs to increase military manpower sus-
tainability now. The results of a variety of initiatives are
beginning to affect both the quantity and quality of the Individual
ReadyReserve (IRR). The IRR has grown steadily from a low of
342,000 in June 1978 to over 445,000 in FY 1984, and is projected
to be more than 467,000 by FY 1986. The Army has initiated refresher
training programs to ensure that the IRR will be an immediately
usable wartime asset. All Services are also intensively managing
the IRR pool to identify those individuals who could occupy critical
mobilization positions and to screen out those individuals who will
not be available for wartime service.
Extension of the military service obligation (MSO) from six to
eight years, along with IRR enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, are
designed to alleviate the manpower sustainability problem. We expect
these bonuses to reduce specific shortages in combat and combat sup-
port skills in the IRR, thereby increasing our near-term manpower
sustainability. Implementation of the eight-year MSO on June 1, 1984
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Chart ~~L G.2
Wartime Mi/nary Manpower Requirements
1886.1
Pretrained
Individuals (+)
Selected
Reserves (+1
Active
Forces 1+)
will begin to eliminate aggregate manpower shortfalls beginning in
FY 1990. These mobilization manpower initiatives are discussed in
greater detail in the Reserve Military Manpower section of the Man-
power chapter.
We are also making progress in establishing plans to assess both
the quantity and quality of manpower required to meet our global re-
quirements. Specific subjects under study include allocation and use
of conscientious objectors, quality distribution of military manpower
among the Services, industrial deferments, and testing of the entire
DoD mobilization manpower acquisition process.
The Army is aware of a potentially significant problem in its
training base surge capacity and is conducting an in-depth evaluation
of the issue. The Army is sizing its training base to provide enough
surge capacity to accept and adequately train nonprior service per-
sonnel as well as retrain prior service personnel into shortage
skills.
In FY 1981, the Navy lacked the medical capability to support a
global conflict. During a global conflict, it would have had to
evacuate the majority of Navy and Marine Corps combat casualties to
the United States with a resultant increase in morbidity and mor-
tality rates. The Navy has initiated several large-scale programs
to improve its operational medical readiness. These programs include
the design, procurement, and staffing of 19 fleet hospitals and two
hospital ships, significantly improving the Navy's capability for
treating both Navy and Marine Corps in-theater combat casualties.
d. Civi/ran Manpower /nitiatives
The requirement for wartime civilian manpower has grown from
1,120,000 in 1981 to 1,187,000 in FY 1984 -- an increase of 67,000.
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This is a result of the addition of the mobilization requirements
of all Defense Agencies to our data base as well as better planning,
better definition, and a more detailed look at our wartime civilian
manpower needs. In the face of this larger and more defined require-
ment, our estimated supply of civilian manpower at the start of mobi-
lization has also increased significantly -- from 682,000 to 863,000.
This has reduced the overall number of new people we would need to
hire in a mobilization from 438,000 to 324,000. However, there is
still great difficulty in hiring this many people in the right occu-
pations and grades and at the right locations.
Recognizing the importance of civilian employees in a national
emergency, we have concentrated our efforts on improving our ability
to hire additional civilians quickly. We will soon provide each DoD
installation information on civilian DoD retirees living within com-
muting distance. During a crisis, our civil service retirees could
provide a ready source of trained manpower.
We have improved our ability to work with the local offices of
the United States Employment Service (USES) upon which we would
depend for much of our mobilization recruiting. With the aid of the
Office of Personnel Management, we now can present recruitment re-
quests listed with the same occupational code used by the USES
offices. A recent mobilization exercise showed that our past inabil-
ity to do this would have greatly limited USES' assistance.
We have also introduced a new policy to preclude the loss of key
civilians in essential overseas positions during a crisis. Although
our civilian employees have an excellent historical record of serving
in hazardous areas during past wars, DoD agreed with the Congress
that we should do everything possible to retain key civilian em-
ployees during emergencies. We plan to issue a similar directive on
contractor personnel in the coming year.
e. Logistics /nitiatives
In the past, a major emphasis of many DoD policies has been the
promotion of peacetime economies and efficiencies. This emphasis
could impact negatively on our ability to meet the anticipated surge
in throughput capacity required during mobilization. As a result,
we have begun to identify those DoD logistics policies and procedures
that would be modified during mobilization. Our objective is to
develop a set of standby actions that can be rapidly and selectively
implemented during mobilization in order to maximize the ability of
available staff and Automatic Data Processing (ADP) resources to
provide wholesale-level logistics support to deployed or deploying
forces.
Exercises PROUD SABER and WINTF.X/CIMEX 83 demonstrated that DoD
responsibilities for materiel management during mobilization were
not clearly delineated. Thus, we created the Mobilization Materiel
Management Task Force (MMMTF) in April 1983 to address deficiencies
in the MMP and CMS. The MMMTF has completed its review, and the MMP
and CMS have been revised. As a result of these efforts, materiel
management and organizational roles in the event of mobilization
are now clear and integrated.
f. /ndustria/ Preparedness /nitiatives
To improve industrial responsiveness to mobilization require-
ments and plans, we have taken steps to focus on our highest
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priority mobilization requirements in accordance with peacetime
affordability concerns. Our priorities for industrial base invest-
ment seek to:
-- Achieve peacetime production efficiencies, while retaining
a warm production base for critical items;
-- Achieve production surge capability for high priority con-
sumables and critical components identified by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Services;
-- Meet wartime sustainability objectives, whenever feasible,
for critical munitions and combat equipment; and
-- Maintain a viable industrial preparedness planning program
to reduce post M-day industrial base response times for
mobilization requirements.
For the first time, funds have been authorized by the Congress to
begin developing in FY 1985 a production surge capability for the
TOW-2 missile. Also for FY 1985 and FY 1986, a total of $100 million
has been authorized to establish or expand domestic capacity and sup-
plies of critical industrial materials. A joint industrial base
study on precision guided munitions (PGM) has commenced and seeks to
permit a more realistic assessment of industrial base capability to
satisfy the combined requirements of all the Services for the PGM
category of materiel. The D-to-P (time between initiation on D-Day
and full production sustainability) concept has been reemphasized to
determine the optimum investment balance between industrial respon-
siveness in wartime and war reserve stocks in peacetime. Other
mobilization preparedness enhancements of industrial planning are
covered in the Industrial Base chapter.
g. Construction and Engineering /nitiatives
We continue to make significant progress in planning for-the
timely acquisition of facilities required during mobilization. The
construction agents have developed concept designs for common facil-
ities that must be constructed. Detailed designs are now under way.
The Services have identified commercial facilities that could be used
to support mobilization. FEMA is coordinating with other federal and
local agencies to ensure that they have not identified the same
facilities for mobilization use. This will provide positive assur-
ance that our facilities acquisition plans are credible.
h. Training /nitiatives
We have recently taken two initiatives to enhance the effective-
ness of Active and Reserve Component mobilization training. Reserve
training is being integrated with Active Component training and
training technology. Additionally, we have formed the Defense Train-
ing Data and Analysis Center (TDAC), an organization whose tasks will
include analysis and evaluation of cost-effective training improve-
ments for Active and Reserve Components.
i. Transportation /nitiatives
DoD transportation initiatives in the mobilization area have
resulted in improved planning and interagency coordination mechanisms
and agreements. The Contingency Response (CORE) Program established
an on-call interagency team of senior officials, augmented by members
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of the commercial transportation industry, to be activated in a con-
tingency. This team will implement procedures which significantly
reduce the reaction time required to muster civil rail, motor, and
air assets to meet DoD mobilization transportation needs.
Our mobilization and deployment plans call for activation and
operation of DoD terminals at commercial water and air ports by
reserve transportation units. Important initiatives to improve the
reaction time and operational performance of these units include:
-- Completion of a series of mobilization workshops and
on-sight briefings for supported and supporting units;
-- Training of reserve units at their actual mobilization
site on a regular basis; and
-- Preparation of detailed battle books providing a guide to
local authorities, contractors, and facilities (to include
maps and photographs) at various ports.
Port readiness is a major planning concern. The complex and
seemingly overlapping roles and missions of federal, state, and local
authorities, compounded by the presence of private business elements
in U.S. ports, have long been a confusing issue. A DoD-initiated
joint interagency memorandum of understanding has just been com-
pleted. For the first time, a single document sets forth jurisdic-
tional responsibilities, provides for timely exchange of information,
and details procedures for the optimum use of personnel and resources
through cooperative effort.
Significant progress is being made in automating logistical func-
tions to support mobilization and deployment of U.S. forces:
- Logistic Applications of Automated Marking and Reading
Symbols (LOGMARS), a system to mark equipment and capture
data in unit movements, was tested successfully in
REFORGER 84. This system accelerates the processing of units
through ports of embarkation, while reducing errors and the
need for hard copy documentation.
- The Crisis Action Management System (CAMS) is being devel-
oped to provide detailed transportation feasibility analysis
for operational alternatives during crisis situations.
- The Transportation Coordination Automated Command and
Control Information System (TC ACCIS) is a joint prototype
development project that will eventually result in auto-
mation of unit deployment planning and execution from unit
level, through the Installation Transportation Office, to
the Transportation Operation Agency.
- The Automated Airload Planning System (AALPS) is a functional
prototype which provides gross airload planning and type-load
capability for units in a significantly reduced time frame.
-- Finally, a new Computerized Deployment Execution System
(CODES) is in the initial stages of development and will
automate the preparation of vessel stow plans, now a slow
manual process.
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These initiatives will enhance our transportation capability to
meet the compressed reaction times anticipated during mobilization
and deployment conditions.
j. Energy /nitatives
During FY 1984, DoD also experienced progress toward its goals of
improved energy preparedness and efficiency.
-- On the preparedness side, the Congress approved a legis-
lative initiative to provide DoD with emergency authority to
waive procurement regulations during petroleum emergencies.
Had this authority been available earlier, it could have
made a major difference in DoD's ability to obtain adequate
fuel supplies in FY 1979 and FY 1980.
-- On the efficiency side, DoD continues its management and
investment programs to improve energy efficiency in both
facilities and operations. On both fronts, DoD has made
significant achievements in energy conservation, in spite
of increased costs. We expect this progress to continue
in the years to come.
Do D's energy efficiency initiatives contribute to preparedness
by reducing the potential impact on DoD operations of energy supply
disruptions. Our future challenges focus on improving preparedness
and efficiency. We will be examining a number of complex prepared-
ness issues, including the need for long-range strategic energy
supplies. We plan to underscore the importance of energy-efficient
design in facilities, equipment, and weapon systems. We will also
continue to work with our allies toward mutual energy security objec-
tives.
k. Other /nitiatives
Mobilization planning and preparedness is an integral part of
efforts in many areas discussed separately in this report. The pro-
gress discussed in the chapters on Readiness and Sustainability, P4an-
power, and Health Affairs, in particular, reflect our enhanced mobi-
lization preparedness. The progress we've made in host nation sup-
port initiatives, as discussed in the Coalition Strategy - Regional
Security chapter, will also contribute to better preparedness. Mobi-
lization planning and preparedness is pervasive throughout all
defense programs since our ultimate mission is to be prepared to
mobilize and defend the nation in time of crisis.
4. Conclusion
Much has been accomplished in the last four years to enhance
mobilization planning and preparedness. This chapter has addressed
some of our key accomplishments. As is apparent from this brief
review, we still have much to do. We will use this firm foundation
as the basis from which to build a complete mobilization management
system and to develop the resource data needed to support such a
system.
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H. INSTALLATIONS
1. Introduction
Installations construction, maintenance, and management consume
almost ten percent of the DoD budget. A program of this magnitude
demands leadership dedicated to innovative management and a concerted
effort at all levels to ensure that we build and maintain the appro-
priate facilities to support our personnel. Specific programs sup-
porting this objective include replacement and modernization of
obsolete facilities; maintenance and repair of existing facilities;
construction of new facilities; improvements to operating efficiency;
host nation programs; management initiatives; and compliance with
environmental, safety, and occupational health standards.
2. Better Working and Living Conditions for Our
People - A Key to Improved Readiness
During the past three years we have made major improvements in
the working and living conditions for our servicemembers, especially
overseas where many of our men and women had been living in pre-
World War II facilities. The key to this progress has been a signif-
icant increase in facilities investment as depicted in Table III.H.1.
Tab/e ///.H.1
Fsc//hy /nvesbnent /mprovements
(Constant FY 1986 Dol/ars in Bi//ions)
FY 1977-80
FY 1981-84
Increase
FY 1985
FY 1986
IPercentl
Repair and Maintenance
New Construction
12.8
17.0
33
4.5
4.4
United States
12.7
15.1
19
4.7
5.8
Overseas
2.5
6.7
168
1.6
2.0
Worldwide
15.2
21.8
43
6.3
7.8
Our investment is paying off. Commanders around the world are
reporting marked improvements in working and living conditions.
Following a recent visit to Germany, the Secretary of the Army
reported, "This Administration's facility improvement program has
had a great impact on morale, efficiency, and readiness." It is,
therefore, imperative that the facilities we put in place not only
support our sustainability initiatives but also provide the flexi-
bility required by our forces to respond to local, theater, or world-
wide challenges. Continued emphasis on facility improvement for the
next few years will result in decades of strengthened national
defense.
Included in our facility investment program are more and better
barracks for enlisted personnel. Anew barracks design, developed
this past year, provides more privacy and more living space for
servicemembers -- particularly those in the middle enlisted grades.
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While considerable progress has been made in improving troop
barracks, much remains to be done. For instance, we still need over
330,000 barracks spaces at a cost of more than $7 billion. Our
construction backlog in maintenance and supply facilities is over
$13 billion.
Moreover, in many areas, our military families still do not have
adequate housing. In response, two new initiatives were approved by
the Congress in FY 1983 and have been instrumental in providing new
housing in considerably less time than had previously been the case.
First, the Congress authorized DoD to encourage private devel-
opers to build housing on or near our bases with the incentive of
long-term leasing or guaranteed occupancy. This authority was
granted for a limited time at only a few locations. Included in our
plans are testing long-term leasing at Eielson Air Force Base and
Fort Wainwright, Alaska; San Diego, California; Fort Polk, Louisiana;
Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Fort Drum, New York; Fort
Hood, Texas; and Norfolk, Virginia. Plans for testing the rental
guarantee program include the following sites: Fort Rucker, Alabama;
Naval Station, Long Beach; Norton Air Force Base, California; Fort
Campbell, Kentucky; Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey; and
Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.
The second initiative provides for the use of American-
manufactured construction material for nearly all new overseas con-
struction. This program has been stagnant for years, blocked by
uncertainty over the duration of our stay and the relative merits of
leasing versus building. Recently, however, we have been successful
in obtaining host country permission to use family housing units that
were manufactured in the United States for our MILCON projects. Two
contracts have been awarded for overseas housing construction: one
in Germany and the other in the Philippines. For FY 1986, we are
requesting over $200 million for overseas family housing construc-
tion.
Moreover, our t~1ILCON budget will continue to focus on those
personnel support facilities -- barracks, gymnasiums, child care
centers, and clinics -- deemed essential to improving the quality of
life for our troops and their families. Quality of life benefits not
only reaffirm the depth of the nation's commitment to its service-
members and their families, they also vitalize the Armed Forces.
3. Host Nation Support (HNS)
Continued stationing of U.S. forces overseas has warranted
increased emphasis on obtaining host nation support in providing
more facilities and more support without straining country-to-
country relations. In this regard, the Japanese government provides
facilities for personnel support to include dormitories, hospitals,
and family housing. Our construction needs are being met much
earlier due to a steady growth in Japan's annual contribution to U.S.
military construction -- $285 million in FY 1984, with an equal
amount expected for FY 1985. Over the last five years, the Republic
of Korea has funded $426 million for operational requirements such
as airfield facilities. In Europe our NATO allies provide real
estate, utilities, and services for our forces and their families.
Additionally, we are continuing to formalize a number of wartime
HNS agreements with NATO countries.
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The commonly funded NATO Infrastructure Program provides many of
our wartime required facilities. All of the NATO allies agreed to
a significant increase in Infrastructure Program funding for the
remainder of the decade. This will allow the construction of more
facilities directly supporting U.S. forces stationed in Europe.
These include facilities for the Patriot missile, storage of preposi-
tioned war reserve materiel including fuel and munitions, and recep-
tion and beddown of our NATO-assigned land and air reinforcements.
We are continuing to press for recoupment of funds used to pre-
finance NATO construction. During FY 1984, we were able to collect
$24 million. This was twice our original estimate. In FY 1985, we
expect to recoup an additional $15 million, which is the full amount
programmed within the current NATO Infrastructure funding cycle. We
are working closely with the NATO military commanders to program the
maximum amount of recoupment during the next six-year NATO funding
period.
4. Improving Installation Management
As the President said in his State of the Union Address,
"Without competition, there can be no champions, no records
broken, no excellence." With this in mind, DoD's goal this year is
to improve installation management through competition. Specific
examples include peer competition and the Defense-wide competition
for a Commander in Chief's Award for Installation Excellence. More-
over, we are particularly proud of our improved management of man-
power and money in compliance with OMB Circular A-76 requiring com-
petition between our in-house workforce and the private sector for
base support services. From FY 1979 to FY 1983, over 900 competi-
tions were conducted. These competitions involved a workforce of
over 32,000 employees. In-house organizations won half of these com-
petitions. Annual savings have reached $350 million. Although we
are still analyzing the FY 1984 results, we know we have generated
considerable savings by competing at least 10,000 positions. Addi-
tionally, during FY 1985 and FY 1986, we plan to compete another
10,000 positions annually.
5. Model Installation Program
I am convinced that, given the opportunity, base-level managers
and workers can and will find more innovative ways to become more
efficient. This fundamental belief led to the Model Installation
Program, one of this year's most important initiatives. The concept
is simple: let the commanders run their bases. Their job is to
strive for excellence and try new methods. In return, model bases
are able to use any savings from their new ideas to improve facili-
ties and services for their people. This grass roots approach is
identifying better ways to operate and is leading to better working
and living conditions for our people while increasing morale and
readiness. For example, readiness improved at the Whiteman Minute-
man Base upon obtaining a waiver of the regulation requiring elec-
tronic equipment to be repaired off base. Since the waiver, which
permitted base personnel to repair electronic equipment was approved,
there hasn't been a single missile out of commission for more than a
day. The participating commanders have expressed great enthusiasm
for this initiative and its potential for getting more Defense for
each dollar.
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6. Environmental Leadership
DoD's environmental challenges have never been greater. We
anticipated and overcame many of the problems we faced over the
years. Last year, we assumed a leadership role in this key area.
We cemented cooperative relations with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), established the Defense Environmental Leadership
Project with a team of experts to overhaul our environmental manage-
ment system, and secured the Environmental Restoration Account with
S150 million appropriated in FY 1984 and S314 million in FY 1985.
In FY 1986, we will continue this commitment by budgeting $342
million for environmental restoration. This unprecedented surge
in management initiatives and resources has finally brought environ-
mental programs into the mainstream of installation management where
they belong, and demonstrates DoD's leadership role in achieving our
national environmental goals.
We spent about $20 million in FY 1984 for environmental activi-
ties at facilities formerly owned by DoD. We plan to spend 543.5
million for this effort in FY 1985. Seventy percent of our instal-
lations are in compliance with hazardous waste management regula-
tions. We are striving to achieve full compliance, with an interim
goal of 90 percent in FY 1985. All of our major air pollution
sources are presently in full regulatory compliance or on an approved
schedule to achieve it. We are reviewing the design, construction,
and operation of our waste treatment facilities to bring, them into
full compliance.
In FY 1984, DoD and EPA signed the Chesapeake Bay Initiative thus
joining with state and local governments in a formal agreement to
protect a significant natural resource. We have followed through on
this program by spending $17 million in FY 1984 on pollution abate-
ment projects in the Chesapeake Bay region.
7. Homes for the Homeless
In response to a Presidential request the Services are working in
partnership with local elected officials and religious and charitable
organizations to provide emergency shelters for the homeless on mili-
tary installations. Space has been offered to hundreds of local
governments for these community-operated shelters. Within two months
of the President's request in 1983, shelters were opened at the Naval
Air Station in Corpus Christi, Texas, and at Kirtland Air Force Base,
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Currently, DoD is working with Alameda
County, California, to open a shelter at Camp Parks Army Base. DoD
was also successful in assisting Philadelphia establish. a shelter in
an Army Reserve Component building. A shelter run by Montgomery
County, Maryland, has opened at the Forest Glen Annex of the Walter
Reed Army Medical Center. Still another shelter has been established
at the Naval Reserve Center in Lawrence, Massachusetts. DoD will
continue to work in partnership with elected officials and religious
and charitable organizations to assist them in opening shelters when-
ever agreements can be reached.
8. Conclusion
6Je have made significant progress in our installations efforts,
but there are always opportunities for improvement. By continuing to
refine our efforts, there are still several ways we can save even
more money and meet the needs of our servicemembers more efficiently.
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I. SPECIAL INTEREST PROGRAMS
1. Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence (C31~
a. /ntroduction
Our command authorities, both military and civilian, require
timely, accurate, and unambiguous information to plan military oper-
ations and to select alternative courses of action. All commanders
and their staffs must then be assured that the decisions and direc-
tion emanating from this information can be clearly and accurately
communicated to the forces and weapons systems under their control.
We refer to this process as command and control and to the systems
that provide this capability as C3I. Typically these systems consist
of an array of sensors, communications links, command and control
support facilities, and information processing and display equip-
ment. Collectively, these systems constitute a significant combat
multiplier.
Our primary goal is to provide C3I systems that maximize the
performance of our weapons systems and the operability of our forces
in terms of survivability, endurability, interoperability, and effec-
tiveness. To accomplish this, we provide management and oversight
through a mission area structure illustrated in Chart III.I.1.
Details on the progress of C31 programs solely supporting the nuclear
forces or the conventional forces, depicted in the upper two boxes,
are provided in the sections of this report that deal with these
topics. This is in keeping with our insistence that resources neces-
sary to provide adequate force management be considered whenever
weapons and force structure improvements are implemented.
The C3I programs and management initiatives described below
emphasize those capabilities needed to support several, or all,
warfare areas and those of special importance to combined, joint,
and coalition warfare tasks. These mission areas are shown on the
lower portion of Chart III.I.1.
Chart ///.1.1
Gam/ M/sslon Area
S''tructrrre
Nuclesr Force Management
? Surveillance and Warning
? Communicatbna Connectivity
? Command and Control Elemamt
Defense-Wide Information
and Communications
? Navigation and Location
Systems
? Common-User
Communications
? Information Systems
? Communications end
ComDUter Security
Conventional Force Management
? Information Collection
? Information Distribution
? Command end Control Elements
Electronic Warfare
? Elechonic Countermeasures
? Elechonic Coumer-
Countermeasures
? Electronic Warfare
Support Systems
Defense Intslllgsnce
? National Foreign
Imelligenca Program
? Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activhies
? Imelligence Oversight
Cs Countermeasures
? C' Protection
? Counter C'
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b. Defense-Wide Communications and /reformation Systems
Defense-wide systems support nuclear as well as conventional
force management. During FY 1984, we emphasized improvements to
defense-wide systems that would enhance their survivability and
endurance during periods of conflict. The five-year program pur-
sues improvements in four broad areas: navigation, communications,
information systems, and computer and communications security.
(1) Navigation and Location
Accurate navigation and position location information is essen-
tial to the timely deployment and management of forces and equipment
both in peacetime and during conflict. Our efforts to improve our
navigational capabilities center around the acquisition of the Navi-
gation Satellite Timing and Ranging (NAVSTAR) Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS). This space-based system will provide our forces with
highly accurate position, velocity, and timing information on a con-
tinuous basis. In FY 1984, we launched two research and development
(R&D) satellites that support tests of the navigation equipment used
in a wide variety of operational platforms, including ships, aircraft,
and vehicles. The project remains on schedule for completion in
1988, when the full 18 satellite network. will be completed, thereby
providing a worldwide three-dimensional capability.
The Defense Communications System (DCS), consisting of both
government and commercial facilities, provides global telecommuni-
cations service to DoD. Our goal is to improve the operability of
DCS during wartime, while reducing peacetime operating costs. Major
accomplishments in pursuit of that goal are discussed below.
(a) Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
In order to improve the jam-resistance of this major satellite
system, additional antijam modems were installed during FY 1984 at
selected key locations. An antijam network among these and addi-
tional locations will be operational in early FY 1985.
(b) Inter-Service/A enc Automated Messa e
Processing Exc ange I-S A AMPE
This program will field approximately 90 I-S/A AMPE systems to
replace a wide variety of the current Service/Agency exchanges and
automatic voice network (AUTOVON) switching centers. Existing sys-
tems do not provide the requisite security to support full DoD opera-
tional requirements. I-S/A AMPE will improve the survivability of
the record message network by increasing the number and dispersal
of switching sites. Proposals for production of this system were
received in FY 1984 with contract awards expected in early FY 1985.
(c) Defense Switched Network (DSN)
The existing AUTOVON and other telephone systems will gradually
be converted into a new system called the Defense Switched Network
(DSN). Our goal is to replace obsolete, manpower intensive tele-
phone systems with more modern, survivable networks. The contract
for the Defense Commercial Telecommunications network for CONUS
connectivity was awarded in FY 1984. Installation of new switches
in Europe as part of the European Telephone System upgrade also began
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in FY 1984. In addition, a request for proposal for the upgrade of
the Oahu Telephone System has been issued, and we expect to begin
this upgrade of voice communications among DoD installations in
Hawaii in FY 1985.
(d) Defense Data Network (DDN)
Expansion of the DDN was accomplished in FY 1984 and will con-
tinue over the next five years. End-to-end encryption devices are
expected to become available during 1985. This will permit integra-
tion of the several classified segments operating at various security
classification levels into a single classified segment, thus provid-
ing, increased capability and responsiveness to information exchange.
(e) Secure Voice System (SVS)
The number of secure voice users will be increased significantly
with the implementation of the Secure Voice Improvement Program
(SNIP). This program shares equipment and facilities with the
Federal Secure Telephone System and will be interoperable with other
DoD and civilian networks. Under the Secure Conferencing Project
(SCP), survivable secure voice and a graphics conferencing capability
will be provided to command centers worldwide.
(3) Worldwide Military Command and Control System
(WWMCCS) Information System
National Command Authorities (NCA) and subordinate command eche-
lons require data processing and display systems, which are an ele-
ment of the WWMCCS, to give them information on the status and loca-
tion of their forces and on the availability of support materiel and
facilities. The WWMCCS Information System (WIS) program includes
near-term enhancements for WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
computers and related facilities. An extensive and evolutionary
modernization of the total system is programmed in two major con-
tracts that were awarded during FY 1984. The NORAD - Cheyenne
Mountain Complex ADP equipment is also being modernized to satisfy
C3I requirements unique to operations in space.
(4) Computer and Communications Security
Computer and communications security programs are designed to
ensure that these assets cannot be disrupted or used by anyone not
properly authorized. The Computer Security Evaluation Center is
currently examining ways to prevent unauthorized use of DoD computer
assets. During FY 1984, we published technical specifications and
criteria to assist our computer users in the evaluation of the
security aspects of their systems. Additionally, we examined ways
to reduce the cost and long. lead-time associated with the acquisition
of communications security (COMSEC) equipment. Streamlined procedures
for managing and acquiring COMSEC equipment were also introduced this
year.
c. E/ectronic Warfare (EWJ
EW includes the use of electromagnetic energy to limit hostile
use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while retaining friendly use
of this resource. We are continuing to emphasize EW by maintaining
a technological advantage in the face of a threat that is growing in
both the quantity of weapons systems available and in the technical
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sophistication of these systems. Acquisition and investment strat-
egies have been developed by the Services and serve as the basis
for meeting the readiness objectives of our commands.
(1) Threat Warning and Self-Protection
Programs in this area provide protection for our combat vehicles,
primarily aircraft and ships, through the use of threat warning and
electronic countermeasures systems. Threat warning systems provide
the information needed to select an appropriate response option such
as avoiding, suppressing, jamming, or destroying the enemy threat.
Two major joint Navy/Air Force programs in this area are the Air-
borne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) for our frontline fighter/attack
aircraft, such as the F/A-18 and the F-16, and the Integrated Elec-
tronic Warfare System (INEWS), which will protect our new design
aircraft into the next century.
(2) Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
Standoff escort jamming complements our self-protection systems
by degrading enemy early warning and ground control intercept sensors.
By denying the enemy use of his sensors, his weapons fire becomes
less effective. The two main support aircraft used for this purpose
are the EA-6B (Navy and Marine Corps) and the EF-111A (Air Force).
Both systems are operational and, with improvements, will maintain
their effectiveness through the 1990s.
d. Command, Contro% and Communications
Countermeasures (C3CM)
C3CM is a strategy that integrates four fundamental approaches:
destruction, disruption, deception, and denial of information to our
adversaries' C3 systems, while protecting friendly C3 systems from
the enemy's C3CM systems. The Services are developing capabilities
such as the Air Force's Compass Call communications jamming aircraft
and the AN/ALQ-149 for the Navy's EA-6B aircraft to support implemen-
tation of C3CM strategies.
e. /nte//igence Programs
DoD intelligence programs obtain military information about
foreign activities and furnish it to national, departmental, and
tactical users. Signals intelligence, imagery, and other technical
collection capabilities allow decisionmakers to respond to near-term
military, diplomatic, and economic developments in foreign countries.
On the operational side, these intelligence capabilities enable
weapons planners and operators to improve warfighting equipment and
adjust battle plans. Our intelligence activities are accounted for
in either the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) or Tac-
tical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). While the
Director of Central Intelligence, under Presidential direction,
provides guidance and develops the overall NFIP, the TIARA program
is developed and managed by the Services and Agencies in response to
operational commanders' intelligence requirements. All TIARA pro-
grams are administered under the cognizance of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).
DoD is pursuing an aggressive policy incorporating interoperable
and survivable intelligence support systems capable of meeting the
needs of the unified and specified commands for joint and combined
operations. This unified and specified command planning perspective
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is being developed by the Defense-Wide Intelligence Plan, which
includes the Intelligence Communications Architecture (INCA) and
the Imagery Acquisition and Management Plan (TAMP). During FY 1984,
we awarded the contract for INCA development and completed Phase I
of IAMP. We also continued to procure TR-1 aircraft for a variety
of sensor needs.
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Over-
sight) is responsible for the independent monitoring of all DoD
intelligence and counterintelligence activities to ensure their
legality and propriety. He inspects DoD intelligence elements world-
wide and monitors inspections of such units by the Inspectors General
(IGs) of the Services and the Defense Agencies. This past year he
conducted 79 inspections of DoD intelligence elements and monitored
55 IG inspections of NSA, DIA, and Service intelligence activities.
He reviewed several inquiries into allegations of questionable
activities to assure that all aspects of the matter had been inves-
tigated and that appropriate corrective measures had been taken. He
serves as the DoD point of contact with the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board and, together with the DoD General Counsel, submits
a quarterly report to the Board that describes DoD intelligence
oversight activities.
f. Conc/usion
We have made substantial progress over the past several years in
modernizing our C3I systems into a more reliable, survivable, and
flexible capability. We have also improved total mission effective-
ness in the C3I area through several management initiatives, includ-
ing the establishment of the Joint Tactical C3 Agency in July 1984,
and extensive use of our consolidated C3 management procedures.
While evolutionary development, acquisition of nondevelopmental
items, and restructuring of long-term programs all contribute to
overcoming C3I shortfalls, only a firm commitment to keep our force
management capability on par with our weapons and force structure
will achieve the desired goals.
2. Research and Development (R&D)
An essential element of our defense is our R&D effort. This
investment ensures that the most militarily effective equipment is
placed in the hands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in
the field. This equipment must be reliable and producible at an
affordable cost.
In the decade 1972 to 1981, our principal adversary, the Soviet
Union, more than doubled its defense-related R&D spending. In
contrast, U.S. defense-related R&D expenditures remained level or
declined until 1981. Even with recent increases, i1. S. investment
in this area is only half of the estimated Soviet investment. R&D
investment is, by its nature, long-term, representing future military
capability. Because of this long-standing disparity in Soviet and
U.S. defense investment, it is essential that we continue to increase
our R&D investments to ensure our ability to deal with any future
threat successfully. Our goal is to ensure that we maintain the
technological edge in deployed military equipment and to exploit
technology so that our forces maintain both a credible deterrent and
warfighting capability.
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The strategic, tactical, chemical, test and evaluation, C3I, and
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) objectives and status are discussed
in detail elsewhere in this report. Therefore, we will describe here
only the cross-cutting mission areas of science and technology,
advanced research projects, and nuclear weapons development.
a. Science and Techno/ogy (S&TJ Program
The Science and Technology (S&T) Program is dedicated to the prep-
aration of tomorrow's forces to deter and, if necessary, engage and
defeat tomorrow's threats. It is imperative that we provide now for
the technological innovations required by future developers to design
and test effective weapons systems for use by our forces in the field.
This investment in the future is necessary if we are to maintain a
strong and effective national security posture and if we are to deter
aggression.
(1 ) Objectives
Elsewhere in this report, we have described the enormous arms
buildup by the Soviets during the 1970s, while U.S. defense spending
declined. During the past four years, however, we have made con-
siderable progress toward both restoring the readiness of our Armed
Forces and investing to modernize aging military equipment. A sub-
stantial part of this investment has been allocated to long-term,
high-quality, technological improvements that will be required in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The qualitative advantage that we
currently enjoy will remain a key factor in maintaining a techno-
logical edge over our principal adversary, whose numerical advantage
presents a formidable threat.
(2) Programs
The S&T program encompasses a wide array of projects ranging
from basic research to technology demonstrations in an operational
environment. The Services manage about 46 percent of the program
with the Defense Agencies administering the remainder (Chart III.I.2).
Chart ///./.2
FY 1985 Science and Technology Program
(Do//ars in Bi//ions)
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The following paragraphs present highlights of Service-specific S&T
programs. Defense Agency programs are discussed in appropriate
sections of this report.
(a) Very-High-Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC)
We have made significant progress toward our goal of increasing
the U.S. lead in integrated circuit technology deployed in weapons
systems by minimizing the time delay between technology development
and deployment. All of the VHSIC 1.25 micrometer contractors have
produced fully functional VHSIC devices, and the first insertion of
VHSIC into an operational system will occur this year. Thirty-seven
weapons systems have been scheduled for VHSIC technology insertion.
In addition, we have begun the development of second generation
VHSIC chips, which will provide another hundred-fold improvement
in processing power. These new chips will greatly increase the
warfighting capability of our weapons systems in the 199Os.
(b) Computers and Software
Many of our military systems are dependent upon computers and
software for their effective operation. Over the past two years, we
have initiated two very important Tri-Service programs to improve
our ability to produce and support operational software for mission-
critical systems. The first of these, the Software Technology for
Adaptable, Reliable Systems (STARS) Program will create a system of
computer-aided techniques and methods for the development and support
of mission-critical software. The objective of this program is to
provide a ten-fold reduction in the cost of software development and
evolution and in the number of latent defects in software systems.
The second program involves the creation of a Software Engineering
Institute, the purpose of which is to overcome the traditional field-
ing lag in maturing new technologies and to accelerate the applica-
tion of new software technology to military systems. The Institute
will combine advanced methods emerging from the private research
community with an integrated computer-aided software development sys-
tem and technology produced by STARS to demonstrate their application
in weapon systems programs.
(c) Medical and Life Science Program
The Medical and Life Science Program has as its objective to
maximize human operator efficiency in any anticipated operational
environment. For example, combat capability can be enhanced by the
development of techniques or equipment that would allow pilots to
fly new, highly maneuverable aircraft while minimizing the effects
of G-forces that might otherwise prevent exploiting the full per-
formance envelope of the aircraft. Combat effectiveness is also
improved by the development of vaccines to prevent diseases that in
the past have removed many troops from combat. Further, equipment
and methods to treat combat casualties by reducing disability or
promoting rapid return to combat permit more efficient utilization
of personnel. These and other aspects of the program contribute
significantly to keeping our forces on the job and performing as
intended.
(d) Training Programs
Training unskilled military personnel to meet the operational
and maintenance requirements of combat equipment is the primary goal
of our education and training technology program. During the coming
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year, DoD will emphasize the development of advanced portable mainte-
nance training equipment to provide both information and training to
personnel. These information and training systems are capable of
rapid adaptation through microprocessors to meet changing user and
operational system needs. A training package adaptable to the M1
tank system, for example, is expected to reduce classroom training
time by 30 percent. We will continue to emphasize state-of-the-art
training systems both to expedite and facilitate the training process
while reducing overall training costs.
(e) Chemical Defense Program
The development of an effective chemical defense capability is
an important aspect of our technology program. Recent developments
have improved our chemical protective posture. Using fundamental
biotechnology principles, a toxin detection and identification dip-
stick has been developed. Also, monoclonal antibodies with greatly
enhanced affinity for the nerve agent Boman have been demonstrated.
Production will continue on a portable contamination monitor, which
will provide U.S. troops with an effective hand-held agent detection
device. These and other developments in detection and decontamina-
tion have improved the overall readiness of our forces by enhancing
their protection and survivability in a contaminated environment.
(f) Basic Research
University research is an important component of the S&T program.
It is a source of new ideas, new techniques, and new knowledge, all
of which are vital in maintaining the technology leverage we cur-
rently enjoy. Over the past four years, the involvement of the
university community in the DoD research program has increased
substantially. University research activity in defense-related
technology areas will provide a sound base for the development of
long-range technology options required to solve future national
security problems. We remain committed to improving the research
capability of the nation's universities. Toward that end, we are
emphasizing increased basic research funding and continued efforts
to improve the instrumentation used in university research.
In addition, we are increasing the interaction between the
university research community and industry through the Independent
Research and Development (IR&D) and the Small Business Innovative
Research (SBIR) programs. These programs, selected and managed
by private industry, stimulate competition by increasing the capa-
bilities as well as the number of companies with expertise in
defense-related areas. A stronger industry/university interaction
will foster a more rapid transition from concept, to research, to
product. Also, under the SBIR program, small businesses supported
by DoD are identifying innovative high-technology concepts for DoD
needs. Funds for SBIR will total one percent of our contractual
R&D budget in FY 1986.
(g) Joint Technology Demonstrator Engine (JTDE)
The JTDE program, a joint Air Force/Navy effort, has recently
demonstrated significant performance improvements in experimental
large fighter engine configurations. These advanced technology con-
figurations provide a foundation for the new Joint Advanced Fighter
Engine (JAFE) for the next generation air superiority fighter. A
major JTDE effort in the next two years will be the completion of
engine life assessment tests to ascertain whether the JAFE can avoid
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the durability problems and performance tradeoffs plaguing previous
fighter engine developments.
The Advanced Materials Technology Base continues to provide
significant contributions to the effectiveness, reliability, and
maintainability of both fielded equipment and weapons systems in
development, while concurrently establishing high-payoff techno-
logical options for new systems. We currently lead the world in
composite materials technology. This contributes substantially to
the attainment of superior performance capabilities of U.S. mili-
tary equipment. In FY 1986, enhanced survivability of aircraft,
missiles, and spacecraft, as well as appropriate components of SDI
will be emphasized through the continued development of metal-matrix
composites.
b. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) continues
to provide corporate research support for DoD. Its research projects
are carefully selected to maintain the U.S. technological lead and
avoid potential adversarial technological surprises. While the
Agency's projects are high-risk, they have high potential payoff in
military utility and are frequently applicable to multi-Service use.
Maturing, technology is often taken into the field for feasibility
demonstration with the Services, which are then in a position to
advance the technology through the development process.
The FY 1986 DARPA budget request reflects a rebuilding of the
technology base and a reconstitution of the technology demonstration
initiatives since the major FY 1985 redirection, which resulted in
the transfer of directed-energy, surveillance, kinetic energy weapons
technology, and support programs to the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO).
DARPA's research programs cover a broad spectrum of technologies;
some of its major efforts are discussed below.
(1) Strategic Computing
The Strategic Computing program is developing a class of super-
intelligent computers for application to advanced defense systems
by the end of the decade. These new machines will be capable of
"vision" for autonomous vehicle navigation, "understanding natural
language" (English), and "speech recognition" for use in a fighter
cockpit and command center. In addition, advanced expert systems
will be developed that can store and manipulate knowledge in any of
these fields to allow machine-reasoning and inferencing. Small-
scale feasibility demonstrations of these concepts have been carried
out in the laboratory, but they need to be engineered for application
to practical defense systems. High performance computers will be
needed to carry out these functions to meet the real-time demands of
field operations. Anew family of computers, 1,000 times faster than
existing equipment, is being pursued using multiprocessor computer
architectures and state-of-the-art VLSI (very large scale integration)
components.
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(2) Advanced Cruise Missile Technology
Development of carbon-carbon composite jet engine turbine com-
ponents has advanced through high-speed spin tests where structural
integrity was validated. Over the next few years, full-scale carbon-
carbon components will be fabricated and installed in high performance
testbed engines for proof of concept testing. These turbines will
be capable of operating at inlet temperatures up to 3,500?F. This
is over twice the capability of current cruise missile engines and
will significantly extend future cruise missile performance.
(3) Submarine Laser Communications (SLC)
Submarine Laser Communications (SLC) will provide real-time com-
munications, using blue-green lasers, to submarines at depths that
increase security for strategic missile submarines while maintain-
ing survivable communications and constant connectivity.
By the end of FY 1987, the DARPA SLC program will have resolved
the remaining technical issues needed for an informed decision
to institute a satellite program. A brassboard transmitter and
submarine-qualified atomic resonance receiver will have been pro-
duced and tested.
c. Nuc%ar Weapons Program
(1) Modernization Program
DoD and DoE share statutory responsibilities, under the pro-
visions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, for managing the U.S.
nuclear weapons program. DoE is structured to support approved
DoD programs to modernize our nuclear forces. The goal of our pro-
gram is to improve military effectiveness, safety, security, surviv-
ability, and endurance in all environments.
The deployment of GLCM and Pershing II nuclear weapon systems
during the past year demonstrates the progress of our nuclear weapons
modernization program. In the near- and mid-term, we will continue
the development and production of previously authorized weapons. We
are emphasizing incorporation of the modern safety and command and
control technology in these weapons.
It is essential that modernization be a continuous process. With
this in mind, we initiated an effort with the military Services, DoE,
and the National Weapons Laboratories to clarify and stimulate our
thinking and understanding of nuclear weapons requirements in the
199Os and beyond. Working groups have been established to address
specific topics and potential future needs. We intend to continue
this type of interchange to ensure a rational, long-term weapons
development program.
While much progress has been made, we must continue to strive
to meet our objective of fielding adequate quantities of effective
systems. Achieving our goals depends on continued congressional
support. We intend to work closely with DoE and the appropriate
congressional committees and their staffs to explain and justify
our nuclear modernization program.
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(2) Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) Programs
DNA conducts DoD's nuclear weapons effects research program.
DNA's most recent activities include responding to the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces, which recommended that this Agency
lead the effort in resolving those uncertainties regarding attain-
able hardness levels of strategic missile silos, shelters, and
mobile systems. In addition, DNA has been given the responsibility
for assuring that nuclear survivability be considered in all new
weapons systems required to operate in a nuclear environment. New
technology and procedures are being developed to assure continued
survivability for strategic and tactical nuclear forces in light of
more accurate and larger-yield Soviet missiles.
DNA will conduct a joint demonstration of the capabilities that
can be achieved by a Strategic Air Command (SAC) command post using
the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) module building block con-
cept of shelters, computers, and communications systems. By the
application of modern technology, DNA will be able to simulate
multiple attack scenarios at all levels of command in both fixed
and mobile centers.
Construction of the major underground nuclear effects tests,
MIDDLE NOTE and MISSION CYBER, will be completed. Both tests will
directly support advanced systems development, as well as some
specific missile system and satellite components.
DNA also provides significant support to the SDI program, with
major projects conducted in the fields of weapons lethality, system
survivability, and infrared backgrounds and measurements in a nuclear
environment. These projects build on fundamental technologies devel-
oped in past DNA programs, which will rapidly produce the data
required by the SDIO through a program of careful test, analysis,
and experimentation.
3. Test and Evaluation (T&E)
The T&E organization within DoD has undergone considerable review
and restructuring within the past year. The Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation was established to be independent
of all research and development activities and to oversee all opera-
tional testing in DoD. At the same time, the Office of the Director,
Defense Test and Evaluation has continued to implement developmental-
related initiatives to enhance and modernize our test capabilities,
continue vital joint Service test efforts, and improve testing capa-
bilities and productivity through international arrangements and
cooperative activities.
a. New Emphasis on Operationa/ Test and Eva/nation
In response to Public Law 98-94, we have established and staffed
a new office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, which
reports directly to the Secretary of Defense on the conduct and
adequacy of operational testing of all major weapons systems in the
Department. Establishment of this office has resulted in more
stringent oversight and emphasis on thorough planning, adequate
funding, proper conduct, and independent evaluation of all test
activities within the Department. The office submitted its first
annual report to the Congress on operational testing and subsequently
augmented it with a supplemental report. Other activities currently
under way include a review of operational test policy, review of
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test plan adequacy for eight major acquisition programs prior to the
initiation of operational testing, and assessment of programs now
being considered for procurement at rates above low-rate initial
production. In addition to oversight of major weapons systems, the
office has assumed management responsibility for two joint operational
tests that will provide valuable insight into the effectiveness of
Joint Service tactics and operational procedures involving chemical
warfare doctrine and joint logistics operations over unprepared
beaches.
b. Enhancing Our Test Capabi/ities
The Tri-Service development program established last year by the
Director, Defense Test and Evaluation to develop threat radar simu-
lators is now developing a data base for use in simulating state-of-
the-art threat air defense systems. An integrated program will con-
solidate scientific and technical intelligence, surrogate testing,
and simulator development. This same program will catalog the
requirement for threat simulators.
A supersonic low-altitude aerial target to replicate
the
high-
speed, low-altitude dash threat of antiship missiles is
being
devel-
oped for deployment by late FY 1989. Also
by FY 1989,
a
new
sub-
scale, subsonic target will replace older,
costlier sy
st
ems a
nd pro-
vide testing for counterair systems. Anew Army helicopter aerial
target needed to test battlefield air defense systems is scheduled
to be fielded by FY 1987.
Modernization of our test facilities and resources is continu-
ing with such programs as the Army's High Energy Laser Systems Test
Facility (HELSTF) and the Air Force's Radar Target Scattering
Advanced Measurement System (RAMS), both of which will reach oper-
ational capability in FY 1985.
c. Joint Test and Eva/nation (JT&EJ Programs
In FY 1986, five ongoing tests managed by the Director, Defense
Test and Evaluation will examine the capability of developmental
and deployed systems to perform their intended mission in a joint
environment. These tests include evaluation of command, control,
and communications countermeasures; identification of friend, foe,
or neutral systems; forward-area air defense capabilities; electro-
optical guided weapon countermeasures and counter-countermeasures;
and live munitions effects on foreign and domestic armor and aircraft.
d. /nternationa/ Test and Eva/nation /nitiatives
Under the provisions of an international agreement with Canada,
the Air Force successfully completed captive carry flights of the
air-launched cruise missile in March 1984, and the Navy conducted
combined operational tests of the AV-8B and F/A-18 in October 1984
along with testing of the Air Force's Low-Altitude Navigation and
Targeting Infrared System (LANTIRN). Operational test flights of
the F/A-18 will be conducted in the spring and summer of this year.
The Canadian-U.S. agreement is affording DoD an inexpensive oppor-
tunity to test weapons systems in realistic battlefield conditions
and geophysical environments replicating those in Europe and Eurasia.
New cooperative agreements are also being formulated with France, the
ilnited Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China to assist them
in the long-term improvement and modernization of their testing
capabilities.
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In the past year, the Foreign Weapons Evaluation program has
selected five more foreign systems for use by the Services. Since
its inception in FY 1980, the program has resulted in 18 items of
equipment being selected for the U.S. inventory with a procurement
value of nearly one billion dollars. By capitalizing on the research
and development efforts of our allies, we have been able to obtain
S20 of procurement value for every test dollar invested compared to a
return of S3.?0 in procurement value for every RDT&E dollar invested
in domestic programs. With its added features of increased inter-
operability and standardization with our allies, this successful
program has established visible milestones along the two-way street
of international cooperation.
4. Security Assistance
a. /ntroduction
Security assistance programs contribute directly to the national
security of the United States by helping friendly and allied countries
defend themselves. Through the sale of equipment and services, some
of which are supported by financial assistance, our programs enable
recipient countries to make better use of their own resources, assist
in fostering greater military self-reliance, and advance the shared
goal of collective security and regional stability around the world.
At the same time, these programs promote closer military working
relationships between U.S. forces and the armed forces of other coun-
tries, help strengthen our alliance relationships, and improve our
power projection and forward defense capabilities through access to
overseas facilities and retention of base rights abroad. They also
enhance our ability to interact with other friendly forces through
improved commonality of equipment and training, thus adding a force
multiplier to U.S. capabilities. In each instance, security assis-
tance has been an essential foreign policy tool for obtaining, or
retaining these defense benefits.
The national security value of the security assistance program,
including the economic portions, clearly exceeds the face value of
its costs. Without the direct and indirect benefits we gain, the
projected demands of the defense budget would be far greater.
b. Programs
By statute, the Secretary of State has responsibility for deter-
mining the direction and extent of security assistance programs.
DoD has primary responsibility for such areas as releasability of
technology and the procurement and supervision of military end-items.
Both Departments work together to develop the annual State Depart-
ment sponsored budget request and to ensure that the overall pro-
gram operates to maximize our collective security interests. DoD
administers the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash sales program,
which is the largest program, the Foreign Military Sales Credit
(1'MSCR) financing program, the grant Military Assistance Program
(MAP), and the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
grant program.
All but the FMS cash program are financed by the IJ.S. government,
and the FMSCR program itself is composed of loans offered at the cur-
rent cost of borrowing by the U.S. Treasury, concessional credits
(as low as 5 percent interest), and foreign credits (i.e., payments
waived) for Israel and Egypt. In addition, Economic Support Funds
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(ESF) are programmed by the State Department for countries with which
we have a security assistance relationship and are generally regarded
as part of security assistance. Administered by the Agency for
International Development (AID), ESF is a form of economic assistance
and may not be used to purchase military goods and services. Chart
III.I.3 summarizes the program levels over the past four years and
the proposed FY 1986 levels.
Chart lll. l.3
Military Assistance:
FY 1983 - 1986
a
h
0 3
m
c 2
.y
_m 1
? Request ($ in Millions) o
1983
Fiscal Year
c. Recent Record
Over the past few years, our security assistance programs have
contributed greatly to the resolution or containment of conflicts
around the world and in the improvement of our relations with a
large number of countries.
We have expanded existing programs with Egypt and Turkey and made
a substantial effort in Central America. Our program with Pakistan
was revived during this time, and we have begun military sales dis-
cussions with the People's Republic of China (PRC), while preserving
our relationship with Taiwan.
These programs also played a key role in the containment or less-
ening of conflicts around the world. Our assistance helped prevent
the outbreak or escalation of conflicts in Morocco, Chad, Somalia,
Yemen, the Persian Gulf, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and in
Thailand and Korea. We are making progress in Central America.
We concluded critical base rights renegotiations in Turkey,
Spain, Portugal, Greece, and the Philippines, where the promise of
security assistance funding greatly facilitated successful agree-
ments. Without these agreements we would be severely constrained
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in any potential conflict scenarios involving NATO, the Middle East,
or the Far East.
Additionally, we have responded quickly to assist countries
facing crises without any significant reduction of our readiness
or major diversions of U.S. military equipment.
Of course, not all conflicts have been resolved or contained,
and not all relations with other countries are as satisfactory as we
would prefer. Funding and legal limitations lessen the flexibility
we would want, but, on balance, we have established the United States
as a reliable partner with more countries than ever before.
d. The FY f986 Request
In FY 1985, the Administration launched, and the Congress
approved, a major new initiative to place the entire security assis-
tance program on-budget, thereby converting the guaranteed loan pro-
gram to all direct loans. As a result, we are now able to provide a
portion of our loans at reduced interest charges to countries that
meet certain economic criteria. We have also obtained increased
grant levels from the Congress. A key objective behind this proposal
was to avoid adding to the debt-servicing burden of many Third World
countries. We are again recommending concessional credits for quali-
fying countries and additional grant levels for those countries with
greater economic needs. However, a significant portion of FMS credits
will still be extended at prevailing near market interest rates.
The MAP request would increase the grant program by S144.25 million.
Many of these funds would go to African and Latin American countries,
which are of increasing strategic importance.
Overall, the security assistance request for FY 1986 totals
$6.67 billion in FMS credits, MAP grants and IMET, a 13 percent
increase over FY 1985 (see Chart III.I.4). Our request continues
Chart ///./.4
FY 1985 - 1986 Military Assistance
Market-Rate Credits Concessional Credits
e Forgiven Credits MAP &IMET
'Includes 5109 M
Guaranty Reserve Fund.
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most country programs at their current levels or provides for
modest increases over last year. The major increase over FY 1985
funding is primarily for Israeli and Egyptian forgiven credits and
a smaller amount of MAP funds for economically hard-pressed countries.
The accompanying security assistance map of the world (see
Chart III.I.S) depicts countries proportionally according to the
size of the proposed FMS/MAP programs for FY 1986. Twenty-seven
countries would receive FMS loans. Of the 27 countries, 2 (Israel
and Egypt) would receive forgiven loans; 15 would receive concessional
credits only; 10 would be offered market rate loans only; and 6
countries would be considered for both concessional and market rate
loans. We are proposing MAP funds for 35 countries, some of which
would also receive FMS credit funds.
Cheri ///./.5
FY 1M8' FMS/MAP Financing Request
Our foreign military training fosters stronger military-to-
military linkages and enables recipient countries to utilize the
defense articles acquired from the United States more effectively.
Most training in the United States involves foreign military and
civilian personnel enrolled in formal courses and orientation tours
where they gain valuable on-the-job experience and are exposed to
U.S. culture and society. The temporary move of the U.S. Army School
of the Americas from Panama to Fort Benning, Georgia, will mean that
most foreign military training for Western Hemispheric nations will
be conducted in the United States, at least for the present time.
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The grant IMET program has been the mainstay of our training pro-
gram, and we are requesting $65.65 million for FY 1986, which is about
1 percent of the total security assistance request. The increased
IMET funds and the reduced training costs for FMS authorized in
FY 1985 should help provide training to foreign students at numbers
approaching those of the mid-1970s. The number of countries partici-
pating in IMET has grown too -- some 90 countries were offered IMET
funds last year, an increase of almost 30 countries over the past
four years.
The Administration is also requesting authorization to increase
the value of the war reserve stocks in Korea (WRSA-Korea) by $360
million and to increase appropriations for the Special Defense
Acquisition Fund (SDAF). We are also requesting an increase of the
capitalization ceiling to $1.5 billion, adding $325 million in
obligational authority, and seeking greater flexibility in managing
the SDAF in FY 1986. The SDAF enables the United States to make
advance procurements in anticipation of foreign sales, thereby
minimizing drawdowns from U.S. forces while protecting U.S. force
readiness. These SDAF funds would come from past foreign military
sales receipts, not from the U.S. taxpayers.
5. International Armaments Cooperation
The goal of our international coordination and technology trans-
fer programs is to develop, field, and support -- through equitable
burdensharing -- the most effective and interoperable conventional
military equipment for our forces and those of our allies and friends.
Our armaments cooperation activities focus on NATO cooperation first
but also involve many other allied and friendly countries with whom
we share security interests.
Last June, DoD transmitted to the Congress a statement defining
recommended improvements to NATO's conventional capabilities. The
continued vitality of the Alliance stems both from its military capa-
bilities and from the cohesion and determination of its members.
The military capabilities comprise a balanced triad of conventional,
nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces, the first objec-
tive of which is to deter an attack by persuading a potential aggres-
sor that his military objectives cannot be attained at an acceptable
risk or cost. This defense policy and military strategy require a
sharing among the allies of both the risks and the burdens of deter-
rence and defense.
Armaments cooperation remains a primary element in increasing the
conventional capabilities of the Alliance. The Alliance can only
achieve its stated objectives if all members recognize that collec-
tive security depends upon military, economic, and industrial
cooperation. We must capitalize on each opportunity to support
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) to make
the most efficient use of limited resources and increase combined
combat capabilities. This requires joint effort and the exchange of
military technologies and goods when in our national interests, and
it requires the denial of militarily critical technologies and goods
to our potential adversaries in order to preserve our own technical
advances.
We are also cooperating with Japan, Israel, the Republic of
Korea, and other allied and friendly nations in fulfilling these
same goals, but in a bilateral, not multilateral, manner. Our focus
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is upon defined forces and missions that meet both our objectives
and theirs.
a. Objectives
Our primary objectives are to develop and maintain a credible,
collective nonnuclear forces capability in areas of potential
coalition operations, as well as an environment that fosters
maximum use of combined technologi cal and industrial capabilities.
b. Current Programs and /nitiatives within NATO
Armaments cooperation is improving both within the NATO Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and its main groups,
as well as through a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements
for specific development and production programs.
The broad infrastructure for cooperation continues to expand as
more industry-to-industry relationships are developed. The Multiple-
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is an example of a U.S. system with
early European involvement. The AV-8B Harrier, on the other hand,
is a European system with U.S. industrial teaming arrangements for
co-production. The three-nation Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) pro-
program and the four-nation terminal guidance warhead for the MLRS
program are cooperative developments involving technology sharing
across national lines.
With congressional support and approval, significant improvements
have been made in NATO's air defense coverage. Innovative agreements
have been signed with Germany and the Netherlands authorizing their
acquisition of the Patriot air defense system. A similar agreement
with Belgium is now being pursued. This will result in enhanced
effectiveness and interoperability of NATO's air defense capabilities.
The NATO initiative to exploit emerging technologies to improve
conventional defense will help focus Alliance resources on improving
conventional capabilities within this decade, e.g. forward defense,
attack of follow-on forces, counterair, C3I, and C~CM. A small
number of programs have been identified for priority action, with
more proposed by both the United States and the Independent European
Program Group (IEPG) nations.
c. Cooperation with Non-NATO A//ies and Other Friend/y Nations
The United States also shares strategic and security concerns
with our non-NATO allies, as well as other friendly nations with whom
we have no alliance agreements. Our objectives with these nations
are to enhance mutual security interests, primarily by assisting them
in developing a self-sufficient defense capability.
We will continue our armaments cooperation activities with
friendly Middle East nations. Cooperation with Israel has provided
the Services with valuable battlefield information from the 1982
Israeli conflict in Lebanon. This exchange of information, as well
as efforts to co-develop new systems, is expected to continue.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, we have signed a defense industrial
cooperation agreement with Pakistan that constitutes a significant
addition to our security assistance to that country.
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Our cooperation with the Republic of Korea constitutes an impor-
tant element in securing that nation's independence and freedom.
Armaments cooperation programs, most notably in tanks, communica-
tions equipment, and missiles, are helping to strengthen their
defense capabilities.
We have achieved considerable progress in establishing balanced
armaments cooperation with. Japan with the signing of notes author-
izing the transfer of Japanese military technology to the United
States. We are moving rapidly to create a mutually beneficial
exchange environment with Japan. The Defense Science Board (DSB)
has conducted an assessment of the potential and means for enhancing
industry-to-industry armaments cooperation. Concurrently, DoD con-
ducted an intensive assessment of two critical technological areas to
determine where increased U.S./Japanese cooperation in these selected
areas would be in our mutual interest. The Defense Policy Advisory
Committee on Trade (DPACT) has prepared an assessment of increased
armaments cooperation from the perspectives of both trade and defense.
These efforts are focused with DoD to ensure that our overall program
of armaments cooperation is balanced and in our national interest.
In the Pacific region, progress continues in assisting the
People's Republic of China to modernize in a manner that does not
threaten our own national security or that of our allies and other
friends throughout the region. Additional cooperative programs with
Australia have been negotiated. We are increasing our cooperation
with countries of Southeast Asia. We are also seeking projects of
mutual interest with Indonesia and Singapore.
Cooperation with friendly countries in Latin America continues
to improve commensurate with the needs and capabilities of the
individual countries. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on mili-
tary industrial cooperation, as well as an Air Force Scientist and
Engineer Exchange Program, have been concluded with Brazil. We are
also assisting USCINCSOUTH to develop a regional cooperative program
for the indigenous production of low technology materiel, and we are
arranging for exploratory discussions with Mexico on establishing
long-term cooperative programs in military technology.
Our efforts with non-NATO allies and other friendly nations
continue to emphasize enhancing mutual national security interests.
Toward that end, we have approved the sale of defense equipment, with
appropriate safeguards concerning technology transfer, to those
nations whose policies are in consonance with the United States and
NATO.
6. Space Systems Operations
United States military systems in space provide vital communica-
tions links, weather information, surveillance and warning, and
navigation support to forces of all Services worldwide. To ensure
that space systems meet the operational wartime requirements of
our forces, a unified command for space will be formed on October 1,
1985. The U.S. Space Command will provide operational command of
space systems to support national security objectives by integrating
space systems into the overall warfighting structure.
Our objectives in space include: implementing a strategy that
provides for a launch system complementary to the space shuttle;
pursuing research concepts that have a high military payoff in terms
of providing a hedge against a potential breakthrough in space
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weapons by any adversary; achieving an antisatellite capability; and
defining and developing the needed surveillance resources to support
our national leadership during military operations.
During the past year, we corrected the Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) problems that almost caused the loss of the first Tracking
and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) launched in 1983. An extensive
test and recertification program has given us confidence that these
problems have been corrected. The recently approved National Space
Strategy specified that DoD develop an alternative launch capa-
bility to complement the shuttle and guarantee access to space.
The Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) Program will
give us that capability by 1988.
Construction of the Vandenberg Shuttle Complex is on schedule.
Reported welding and electrical problems were documented by the Air
Force and contractors prior to their public disclosure. Corrective
measures are well under way. Flight hardware compatability testing
began last November to support the October 1985 launch. However,
NASA's recent problems with the space shuttle's insulating tiles and
development delays related to new lightweight casings for the
shuttle's solid rocket boosters will delay the first launch to not
earlier than late January 1986. We have also begun work on the
Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) to conduct DoD's planning
and operations for the shuttle program and to augment existing satel-
lite command and control capabilities as the volume of assets in
space increases significantly in the late 198Os. We expect to con-
duct initial satellite control operations at this facility in FY 1987
and to conduct initial shuttle planning and operations during the
early 1990s.
We are continuing to expand space-related T&E within DoD to
ensure that we are not technologically surprised by an adversary,
to advance our own capabilities in space, and to improve the sur-
vivability of future space programs.
7. Conventional Initiatives
New technologies are now available to provide our AirLand forces
with radically new techniques for defeating the enemy's follow-on
forces. These technologies include near-real-time airborne acquisi-
tion sensors now being fielded, as well as microprocessing compo-
nents and communications equipment to bring the acquired intelligence
to the executing element on the battlefield. Additionally, we have
made progress in lethal submunitions, guidance systems, and delivery
systems that enable us to take an enemy force under fire well beyond
the range of conventional artillery and close air support. We are
developing systems that will be able to locate and track moving tar-
gets deep behind enemy lines. Intelligence and fire-control informa-
tion from multiple sources will be processed by automated systems and
distributed to tactical commanders for targeting decisions. Targets
will be attacked by aircraft and missiles delivering a variety of
munitions, including terminally guided submunitions. Major programs
emphasizing, extended-range target acquisition and deep attack capa-
bilities include: Joint STARS, Joint Tactical Fusion Program, and
the Standoff Tactical Missile (for description see the Land Forces
chapter).
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8. Technology Transfer and Export Control
a. Objectives
The transfer and control of technology is inseparably related
to international cooperative R&D efforts. Of particular concern to
DoD are those technologies essential to the development and produc-
tion of superior quality weapons systems. In fact, NATO's military
strength has been, and will continue to be, based upon such technol-
ogies. In sheer quantities of military resources, the Warsaw Pact
has NATO outnumbered and outgunned. We must, therefore, balance
this numerical threat in large measure by relying upon qualitatively
superior weapons systems to maintain our collective military strength.
Toward that end, we cooperate with our NATO allies in the exchange
of technology through cooperative research, development, and acqui-
sition of weapons systems. It is our objective that the Alliance
attain, through equitable burdensharing, the necessary military
strength in terms of superior weapons, readiness, sustainability, and
interoperability in order to achieve and maintain a credible military
deterrent and thus preserve peace.
It is clear that, properly managed, the sharing of our modern
weapons technology with our allies is in our own national interest,
but the loss by transfer to the Soviets is cause for grave concern.
Only now can we fully understand the consequences of the technology
transfer that had been occurring during the latter half of the 1970x.
b. Techno/ogy "Ha/f-Life"
Although military technology has a significant value, it also has
a limited life span. While we must provide reasonable precautions
against the transfer of our technology to the Soviet bloc, we must
also resist the temptation to lock away new discoveries for fear of
loss to our adversaries. If we do not apply new discoveries to our
weapons systems in a timely manner, we may find either that the tech-
nology has become obsolete or, worse, it has found its way into Soviet
weapons systems before being incorporated into allied weapons systems.
c. /nitiatives and Achievements
This Administration takes a two-step approach toward the tech-
nology transfer issue. First, we promote sharing of military tech-
nology with our friends and allies. Second, we try to control the
loss of that technology to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact
nations. As part of our effort to raise the visibility and sharpen
the focus of the technology transfer security program within DoD, a
number of initiatives have been undertaken.
The Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) is a basic
building block of our technology program. We have continued to
refine and improve this list to increase its clarity and specificity,
to remove outdated elements of technology and, for the first time,
to provide an unclassified version. Industry has been a major con-
tributor to the MCTL's evolution, both as members of the Technical
Working Groups (TWGs) and in the review of the MCTL by the Multi-
Association Policy Advisory Group (MAPAG).
The MCTL is used to prepare Coordinating Committee (COCOM) pro-
posals and to assist DoD in reviewing technical data provisions for
incorporation in the Export Administration Regulation by the Depart-
ment of Commerce. The list is also used as supplementary information
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in the processing of export license requests for those items that are
under Commodity Control List or Munitions List Control. The MCTL is
used as a reference document in disclosure questions pertaining to
scientific symposia, visitors from Warsaw Pact countries, and
various international agreements involving exchange of technical
data.
The COCOM -- comprising representatives from Japan and the NATO
countries, except Iceland and Spain -- has developed a list of
restricted items to control the transfer of products and technology
to Warsaw Pact nations. DoD has been a major contributor to this
effort, preparing well over a hundred technical proposals to be used
in the COCOM list review. We have also provided a major portion of
the technical support at the negotiating table. Our efforts in this
area have been very successful in as much as COCOM has accepted our
recommendations to provide new coverage in many areas that were
previously uncontrolled and also has agreed to decontrol products of
lesser strategic significance.
Among the most significant of these are several revisions to the
International List (IL) in the area of computers. These have elimi-
nated many obsolete controls while concentrating on areas that have
a high military value.
In order to improve the control of critical technology identified
in the MCTL, DoD has long recognized the need to rewrite the Tech-
nical Data Regulations administered by the Department of Commerce.
While the regulations control direct technology transfers to poten-
tial adversaries, there is considerable potential for diversion
through third countries. While existing regulations are clearly
inadequate to protect our critical technology, we recognize that
more stringent controls would impose an additional burden on U.S.
exporters. We have continued to work closely with the Department
of Commerce to tighten certain technical data transfers to all
destinations, while reducing controls on products. When imple-
mented, these initiatives will lead to tighter controls in critical
technology exports to all destinations but decrease controls in the
export of noncritical technology.
In addition to interacting with industry on specific export
cases, we are also working to improve industry's understanding of
critical technology issues. In this regard, the Defense Policy
Advisory Committee on Trade (DPACT), the Defense Science Board (DSB),
the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA), and the DoD
University Forum provide useful forums for discussing transfer
issues.
The DoD export control and technology transfer program has
enhanced our operating policies and procedures so that export license
applications are now being processed more consistently and expedi-
tiously. While we are aware of the rapidly increasing worldwide
importance of trade in technology, we are also keenly aware of the
crucial need to maintain our technological lead. By, maintaining that
lead, we can offset the sigificantly superior numbers of weapons and
troops available to our potential adversaries.
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9. Deterrence of Chemical Warfare
a. /ntroduction
The Soviet Union maintains a massive chemical and expanding bio-
logical and toxin capability and has repeatedly used or sponsored
the use of such weapons in violation of their treaty obligations.
In addition, chemical weapons have proliferated throughout the world
with potentially grave consequences for us and our allies. In spite
of major improvements in chemical protection, the U.S. and allied
capability to counter the expanding threat continues to decline due
to our failure to reestablish a credible chemical retaliatory capa-
bility.
Although we no longer believe the Soviets intend to use chemical
weapons on a massive scale, the selective use against special targets
cannot be ruled out. Responding to this threat of chemical warfare
has been a particularly difficult issue for our nation to face. The
question we must address is how to ensure these weapons are not used
against either civilians or the men and women of our Armed Forces.
The Congress must face this issue and resolve it.
In accordance with our international treaty obligations, the
United States does not and will not possess biological or toxin
weapons. Moreover, our goal is to eliminate the threat of chemical
warfare by obtaining a global, comprehensive, verifiable ban on the
development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical
weapons. Negotiations to achieve this goal are currently under way
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1984, at the Geneva
Conference, the Vice President presented a draft proposal for the
total prohibition of chemical weapons. The treaty is a bold U.S.
initiative forging new ground in the critical areas of verification
and compliance. In essence, to establish confidence in the treaty,
the United States is offering to open its military, government-owned,
and government-controlled facilities to unrestricted inspection in
the event of a suspected violation, and we are asking other nations
to do the same. We realize that such a verification measure is
unprecedented, but the risks of the status quo or of an unverifiable
treaty are so severe that they far outweigh the risks of allowing
international inspection teams into our sensitive facilities. A ban
remains elusive, however, despite many years of effort and more than
fifteen years of unilateral U.S. restraint in chemical weapons pro-
duction. The continuing decline in U.S. chemical retaliatory capa-
bility does not give the Soviets any incentive to negotiate.
Chemical weapons could exert their greatest impact on the course
of battle when there is an imbalance in chemical capabilities between
the two sides. The Soviet Union possesses a considerable advantage
in chemical warfare capabilities, which could be a decisive factor in
conflict.l Working or fighting in protective gear -- the mask, hood,
special suit, gloves, and boots -- can be so debilitating that the
protective measures themselves can be damaging to military operations.
The problems faced by an individual -- heat, stress, restricted move-
ment, impaired vision, and limited communications -- are compounded
when people must work or fight as a unit. Tasks that are demanding
under normal battlefield circumstances -- repairing runways and
1 For more information on the Soviet threat, see Soviet Militar
Power, 1964 and Continuin Develo ment of Chemica ea ons a a-
i ities in the USSR, Octo er 1983.
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other facilities, rescuing and treating casualties, flying aircraft,
and defending against armored attacks -- become much more difficult
in a chemically contaminated environment. We estimate the overall
loss of combat capability to be 30-60 percent.
The United States and its allies are investing billions of dol-
lars in conventional forces to deter or, if necessary, to turn back
a Soviet conventional attack. The lack of an effective retaliatory
chemical capability, however, could provide the Soviets with a power-
ful incentive to use their chemical weapons to negate U.S. conven-
tional force improvements. 6Jhether they would do so under the threat
of nuclear retaliation is open to conjecture, but, if we do not
restore a credible chemical retaliatory capability, nuclear weapons
might be our only option to deny the Soviets victory. We must
decrease rather than increase our reliance on nuclear weapons to
deter conventional conflicts.
The recent proliferation of chemical weapons, as shown by the
Iran-Iraq war, has added a new dimension to the chemical threat.
Today, more than 15 nations are believed to possess chemical weapons,
and many more are capable of acquiring them. Chemical warfare poses
a threat in many areas of the world where the United States has vital
interests and where the threat of nuclear retaliation to chemical
attack is not credible.
Until we can achieve an effective chemical weapons ban, we must
have the capability to deter others from using chemical weapons
against us or our allies. The United States will never initiate
chemical warfare but, since World War I, has possessed both protec-
tive equipment and a stockpile of chemical weapons as a deterrent;
indeed, the existence of such stocks of weapons is generally credited
with having deterred the use of chemical weapons in World War II.
However, our current aging stocks of chemical weapons, produced in
the 1950s and 1960s, no longer constitute an adequate deterrent.
Our field commanders have identified their minimum chemical munitions
requirements, and the current U.S. stockpile of militarily useful
munitions falls far short of the requirement in types of munitions
and the quantity of agent fill. We do not have the number of artil-
lery projectiles of the appropriate caliber and chemical agent
required for the modern battlefield. Worse, we lack any effective
capability to deliver persistent agents against those critical tar-
gets beyond artillery range. We must modernize to reestablish and
maintain an adequate chemical deterrent. Our proposed program is
designed to do this and no more.
For an effective deterrent, we need not match the size and scope
of either the Soviet chemical weapons or protection capabilities.
In fact, our proposed modernization program would result in a stock-
pile significantly smaller, but safer and more effective, than the
one we now possess. We do, however, require an adequate chemical
defense and a modest, but effective, chemical retaliatory capability.
Most of the funds allocated to this program are devoted to improving
protective capabilities -- suits, detectors, shelters, decontamina-
tion equipment, and antidotes. However, all foreseeable effective
chemical protective equipment and procedures will continue to hamper
individual and unit effectiveness severely. Therefore, improving
our protective posture will not, by itself, provide an adequate
deterrent, since the Soviets and others would enjoy a significant and
perhaps decisive military advantage if they could force us to operate
in protective equipment, while their troops remained relatively
unencumbered. To possess an effective deterrent, we must reestablish
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a retaliatory capability sufficient to assure that the Soviets, too,
would have to operate in a protective posture.
In addition to pursuing a chemical arms ban and reestablishing
a chemical deterrent, our program includes plans for the disposal
of obsolete and unusable stocks of chemical agents and munitions.
b. FY 1986-90 P~ogiams
(1) Chemical Warfare Protection
Our chemical protective program, comprising more than 70 percent
of the FY 1986-90 chemical funding, Chart III.I.6, will continue to
improve the capability of our forces to operate in a chemical warfare
environment and reduce the degradation in effectiveness imposed by
chemical protective equipment and procedures. Our major emphasis
will be to develop and field improved protective equipment and sup-
plies, including medical items. Training, exercises, and doctrine
will remain key components of the chemical protective program.
Chart ///./.6
FY 1986-90 Funding for
Chemical Programs
Considerable progress has been made in chemical protection. We
have increased the instructional time devoted to chemical defense,
the number of trained specialists, the amount of time spent by opera-
tional units in protective gear, and the frequency and extent of
chemical operations in major field exercises. In addition, we have
fielded stocks of protective equipment for our forces. Over the next
five years, we will be acquiring collective protective equipment for
fixed installations and mobile units, more and better decontamination
equipment, significantly improved detection and warning devices, and
improved individual protective equipment. We are also acquiring
medical systems to prevent and treat chemical and conventional
casualties in a combat environment, which might include chemical
contamination.
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(2) Chemical Retaliatory Capability
A chemical retaliatory capability, along with a strong protective
posture, would deny the Soviets any incentive to use their chemical
weapons against us or our allies. Toward that end, our field com-
manders require adequate quantities of nonpersistent artillery pro-
jectiles and deep attack persistent agent weapons to establish a
credible deterrent. However, our current stockpile of useful muni-
tions contains no deep attack persistent agent capability, and most
of the short-range artillery shells contain inappropriate persistent
agent. Although the stockpile may have been adequate in 1969 when
the United States last produced chemical weapons, we have now reached
a point at which the U.S. stockpile of militarily useful chemical
weapons contains only about half the agent required to support our
field commanders' needs. Additionally, the stockpile lacks the
capability to engage targets beyond artillery range.
Chart ///./.7
Chemical Weapons
Stockpiles
1969 1985 Early 1990's
with Modernization
(Could Be Zero with-
out Modernization)
Our proposed program will continue maintenance efforts to pre-
serve the serviceability of the militarily useful chemical munitions
stockpile. However, maintenance cannot halt or reverse internal
deterioration of the chemical agent fill, nor can it provide an
effective deep target capability in the absence of appropriate
weapons, nor ease the logistical burdens associated with the current,
highly toxic chemical munitions. Therefore, modernization of the
stockpile is urgently required; it represents about 20 percent of
our FY 1986-90 program.
(3) Demilitarization
About 10 percent of our chemical program funds will be used to
dispose of chemical munitions. Most of these funds will be used for
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the disposal of those chemical munitions that could pose safety prob-
lems. At the same time, we are proceeding with technology develop-
ment and planning for the disposal of other obsolete or unusable
munitions and, if negotiations are successful, to dispose of the
entire chemical stockpile. Construction of a facility to dispose of
the highly flammable agent BZ at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, was
approved for FY 1984, and a facility at Johnston Island to dispose of
chemical rockets was approved for FY 1985. The planning and approval
process for facilities to dispose of_ obsolete chemical rockets stored
at other locations is under way.
c. Conc/usion
Chemical weapons pose a worldwide threat, and improving our
chemical deterrent capability is vital if we are to eliminate adver-
sarial incentive to use chemical weapons against the men and women
who serve in our Armed Forces. Modernization would provide the
necessary inducement for these nations to join in a comprehensive,
verifiable chemical weapons ban. Both the protective and retaliatory
components of the proposed program are essential. The current imbal-
ance invites the Soviets to use chemical weapons and could give them
a decisive edge in conventional conflict. Our comparative weakness
in this area also invites other nations to acquire chemical weapons
as a cheap alternative to increasing conventional military power.
Failure to modernize both program components will undermine inter-
national efforts to achieve what we and most of the world desire --
a total, verifiable ban on the development, production, and stockpil-
ing of chemical weapons. The Congress must face its responsibilities
squarely and authorize the modernization program we have requested.
10. Special Operations Forces
Revitalizing our Special Operations Forces (SOF) remains a high
priority of this Administration. Over the last four years, we have
made significant progress toward achieving that goal. The high
priority we have assigned to SOF revitalization reflects our recog-
nition that low-level conflict, for which SOF are uniquely suited,
poses the threat we are most likely to encounter through the end of
this century. We must have strong SOF if we are to meet this and
other challenges across the broad spectrum of conflict.
With this in mind, we have activated a new Special Forces (SF)
group and a new SEAL team, which will expand our SOF structure when
fully manned in FY 1988. To reach projected force level require-
ments, activation of another SF group and SEAL team is scheduled by
FY 1990. By fielding 21 new MC-130 Combat Talons by FY 1992, we are
addressing the shortage of long-range SOF aviation capabilities. New
naval special warfare craft are programmed to modernize and expand
the naval special warfare capability. Readiness is being improved
with better training and modern equipment, and we are revising and
updating doctrine and strategy for the employment of SOF. We have
also undertaken a number of management initiatives to ensure that
the revitalization process proceeds in an orderly manner and that we
develop a truly effective joint force. These include improvements
in command and control mechanisms, creation of the Joint Special
Operations Agency within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and enhancements to Service, Commander in Chief, and DoD
staffs. Major exercises now contain SOF participation to raise
staff expertise and operational planning for integrated SOF
operations.
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When completed, the SOF revitalization program will provide us
a force fully capable of supporting U.S. national security interests
worldwide.
11. Military Health Care
Chart ///./.8
DoD Medlar/ Appropriations - FY 19186
a. /ntroduction
The military health care system is dedicated to two purposes:
providing medical support to U.S. combat forces during war, and
providing quality health benefits to active duty and retired members
of the Armed Forces, their dependents, and survivors. To accomplish
this, the FY 1986 budget request for military medical programs is
nearly S10 billion. This includes approximately S3.?. billion for the
Army, $2.5 billion for the Navy, and 52.6 billion for the Air Force.
The CHAMPUS budget is S1.5 billion. About half of the total health
budget is for health care costs, and over 40 percent is for medical
operations and maintenance. The remainder is for military hospital
and clinic construction, medical research and development, and pro-
curement of equipment and supplies.
b. Medics/ Readiness
Being "medically ready" means the ability to treat casualties
and return them to duty as soon as possible; to provide life-saving
care, including surgery, to U.S. casualties in the event of war or
terrorist attack, within the first few hours of injury; and to
evacuate casualties requiring more definitive medical care. Modern,
up-to-date medical equipment and supplies that can be deployed with
our troops, or that can be stored throughout the world so that they
are readily available to our troops wherever they might be stationed
or engaged are essential to medical readiness. Also needed are
specially trained medical forces, a comprehensive medical evacuation
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system, and agreements with other government and civilian hospitals
-- both at home and abroad -- to take care of U.S. casualties in an
emergency, if needed.
From a medical standpoint, our go-to-war capability today and
for the future has improved. This year, the Defense Resources
Board (DRB) directed the accelerated procurement of deployable
medical systems which will, over the next several years, dramatically
increase our ability to provide medical support in war. Moreover,
we have improved the efficiency of these systems by requiring the
procurement of standardized medical units across all three Services.
Another major initiative in medical readiness is our continuing
progress in deploying two hospital ships. These San Clemente-class
tankers will be converted into floating general hospitals with
1,000 beds and 12 operating rooms each. The USNS MERCY is now in
a San Diego shipyard, and the USNS COMFORT is scheduled to arrive
in the next few months for final conversion.
In FY 1984, an extensive review of the Department's overall
medical capabilities, both in Europe and in the Pacific, was
directed. These reviews, the most extensive analyses done so far,
have already led to improvements in our medical command, control,
and communication structures. New agreements have also been con-
cluded with key friendly nations for emergency medical support for
U.S. troops. Efforts to expand these agreements will be a high
priority for improving medical readiness in the year ahead.
The success of the Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System
continues with over 61,000 beds from over 770 civilian hospitals in
48 metropolitan areas committed to DoD in the event of a mobiliza-
tion. Great strides have also been made in cooperative medical
planning between the Veterans' Administration (VA) and DoD for the
treatment of active duty personnel in VA hospitals during wartime.
This assures greater efficiency of both systems in time of war.
Another area of progress, and great need, is in the medical
readiness of our reserve forces. Reserve forces are expected to
provide over 60 percent of the health care personnel to meet medical
support requirements in war. Special training programs designed by
the Office of Health Affairs and joint efforts between Health and
Reserve Affairs will place major emphasis on improving the training
and recruitment of needed Reserve medical personnel in the year
ahead. These efforts are already showing results. Since last year,
about 1,000 additional physicians have been added to the reserve
forces, bringing us within 2,000 of our overall physician goal. A
critical shortage still exists in a number of specialties and among
some nurse specialties. These will receive emphasis in the year
ahead.
c. Management of the Hea/th Care System
DoD is committed to providing high-quality health care to over
eight million eligible beneficiaries through the direct care system
and the CHAMPUS program. Significant progress has been made in the
past four years, and, in the year ahead, we will continue to provide
high-quality health care easily accessible to our beneficiaries.
We will not retreat from our commitment to continue efforts to
control costs within our medical system.
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DoD is taking advantage of every opportunity to keep medical
costs down. The Services have already made progress in avoiding
additional costs under CHAMPiJS by increasing workloads in military
treatment facilities. This year, we have also been working to
limit the costs of CHAMPUS by incorporating the prospective payment
system now in use under Medicare into the CHAMPUS program. Several
projects are being planned to test the feasibility of alternative
financing mechanisms -- Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)
and Preferred Providers Organizations (PPOs) -- to the military
health care system. One major step forward this year will be to
test the feasibility of creating an even more efficient management
system through enrollment of our beneficiaries in programs similar
to HP10s operated by the military treatment facility commanders.
Finally, we are developing a legislative proposal to bring about
cost savings by allowing our military treatment facilities to seek
reimbursement from private insurers when a beneficiary is covered by
another health insurance plan.
d. Qua/ity Assurance
In terms of assuring quality health care, DoD is currently
putting in place reporting and monitoring mechanisms to safeguard
against medical misconduct or malpractice. DoD directives have been
issued in a number of critical areas, including supervision of non-
physician health care providers; review of provider credentials; and
reporting of misconduct, morbidity, and mortality. DoD is now in the
forefront of national efforts to improve confidence in the quality
of the health care system.
A recent audit of six military facilities by DoD's Inspector
General (IG) revealed a number of cases in which DoD directives
and hospital accreditation standards were not being followed. In
response, we are taking steps to improve compliance with these
regulations. The same IG report also pointed out some apparent
deficiencies in emergency room supervision and documentation. To
correct this, DoD sponsored a national conference on emergency
medical care to determine how to improve emergency room operations
in military hospitals.
A DoD directive is now being developed to require licensing of
all military health care providers in a number of health professions,
and we are developing a legislative proposal to guarantee confiden-
tiality to those who identify and report medical misconduct.
e. A/coho/and Drug Abuse Control
In the last four years, we have seen an encouraging and sustained
downturn in drug abuse among our active duty personnel. Much of this
success can be attributed to the Services' aggressive use of urinaly-
sis to identify drug abuse. We now have a drug screening and con-
firmation system in place, which the scientific community agrees is
valid and credible. This program will continue to receive strong
support from DoD in the future, as it is a critical component not
only of military readiness, but also for the personal health and
welfare of our military personnel.
Our goal is to reduce drug abuse by military personnel to zero,
and we have made a commitment to achieve that goal. We must also
take further steps to curb alcohol abuse. Alcohol-related accidents
are still the greatest cause of death among active duty military
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personnel. Our efforts to improve identification and treatment of
alcohol abuse and alcoholism in all ranks of military and civilian
personnel will be intensified in FY 1985.
In this vein, we have recently launched a new health promotion
and preventive medicine effort based on scientific evidence of the
health hazards of smoking, overeating, and excessive use of alcohol.
All of the Services have implemented programs in these areas. We
will work to identify the most effective of these programs and
continue to develop and refine strategies that encourage service-
members to adopt healthful living habits.
f. Fraud and Abuse
Unfortunately, fraud and abuse have been a problem in the health
care system. To eliminate the fraudulent use of military health
care facilities by those who are not eligible for this service, DoD
initiated the Defense Enrollment Eligibility System (DEERS). All
CHAMPiJS claims are now checked with the DEERS system before payment
is made, and all individuals seeking routine medical care at military
treatment facilities have to be enrolled in DEERS. By preventing
the fraudulent use of the military health care system, our efforts
have already saved millions of taxpayer dollars, enabling more
efficient use of our health care resources for those eligibile to
receive care.
g. Conc/usion
In the past year, we have seen improvements in several critical
dimensions of medical readiness and our peacetime health care sys-
tem. However, there is much that remains to be done. Our goal is
to assure our ability to provide medical support in the event of war
and, at the same time, to provide a high level of health care to our
active duty, retired, and dependent personnel. In the past, this
was viewed as an impossible task. Improving medical readiness, it
was said, could only be done by ignoring the peacetime system. And,
in order to maintain the peacetime system, readiness had to suffer.
We reject this premise and feel the accomplishments of the past few
years in both peacetime and wartime capabilities bear us out. We
can strike a better balance without diminishing the level of care
provided to our military families.
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Appendix A
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Table 1
Departr?ent of Defense - B/A by Appropriation
(Do//ars in Mil/ions)
Current Dollars
Military Personnel
25,430
31,014
42,875
45,688
64,866a
68,901a
73,425a
Retired Pay
7,326
11,965
14,986
16,155
Operation Er Maintenance
28,731
46,365
62,466
66,540
70,950
78,219
82,450
Procurement
20,991
35,283
64,462
80,355
86,161
96,807
106,813
Research, Development, Test
fr Evaluation
9,451
13,561
20,060
22,798
26,867
31,464
39,280
Special Foreign Currency Program
3
7
3
4
3
9
2
Military Construction
2,360
2,293
4,916
4,512
4,510
5,517
7,057
Family Housing Et Homeowners
Assistance Program
1,229
1,526
2,203
2,712
2,669
2,894
3,283
Revolving b Management Funds
135
1,336
2,494
1,075
2,774
1,554
1,860
Trust Funds, Receipts, Er Deductions
-146
-727
-714
-365
-650
-636
-659
Proposed Legislation
189
Total -Direct Program IBIAI
Constant FY 1986 Dollars
Military Personnel
95,506 1
50,727
42,621
48,045
213,751 2
50,567
39,474 2
51,803
56,150
70,701a
284,730
72,519a
313,700
73,425a
Retired Pay
13,645
16,127
17,044
17,368
Operation Fr Maintenance
53,005
57,962
68,595
70,927
74,554
79,513
82,450
Procurement
44,402
50,643
79,061
93,211
95,070
101,611
106,813
Research, Development, Test
Fr Evaluation
17,409
18,203
23,356
25,567
29,056
32,717
39,280
Special Foreign Currency Program
5
9
4
4
3
9
2
Military Construction
4,326
2,969
5,756
5,076
4,872
5,724
7,057
Family Housing Et Homeowners
Assistance Program
2,283
2,067
2,489
3,023
2,879
3,010
3,283
Revolving 8 Management Funds
261
1,876
2,945
1,234
3,045
1,649
1,860
Trust Funds, Receipts, 8 Deductions
-272
-979
-807
-397
-680
-641
-659
Proposed Legislation
189
Total- Direct Program IBIAI
185,791
196,922
249,009
267,817
279,501
296,111
313,700
(Note: Totals may not add due to rounding)
a Includes Retired Pay Accrual.
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Table 2
Depsrbnent of Defense - B/A by Component
(Dollars in Mi//ionsl
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Table 3
Federal Budget Trends
Fiscal
Federal Outlays
DoD Outlays
as a ?k of
DoD Outlays
as ?~ of
Non-DoD
Outlays
as % of
Non-DoD
Outlays
as % of
DoD Outlays
as % of
Net Publi~
Year
as % of GNP
Federal Outlays
GNP
Federal Outlays
GNP
Spending
1950
16.1
27.4
4.4
72.6
11.7
18.5
1955
18.0
51.3
9.2
48.7
8.8
35.5
1960
18.5
45.0
8.3
55.0
10.2
30.3
1965
18.0
38.7
7.0
61.3
11.0
25.2
1970
20.2
39.4
8.0
60.6
12.2
25.4
1971
20.4
35.4
7.2
64.6
13.2
22.4
1972
20.4
32.6
6.7
67.4
13.8
20.7
1973
19.6
29.8
5.8
70.2
13.8
19.0
1974
19.5
28.8
5.6
71.2
13.9
18.3
1975
22.5
25.5
5.7
74.5
16.7
16.5
1976
22.7
23.6
5.4
76.4
17.4
15.4
1977
22.0
23.4
5.1
76.6
16.8
15.5
1978
21.9
22.5
4.9
77.5
17.0
15.2
1979
21.4
22.8
4.9
77.2
16.5
15.4
1980
23.0
22.5
5.2
77.5
17.8
15.3
1981
23.5
23.0
5.4
77.0
18.1
15.8
1982
24.5
24.5
6.0
75.5
18.5
16.7
1983
25.1
25.4
6.4
74.6
18.7
17.4
1984
23.8
25.9
6.2
74.1
17.6
17.6
1985
24.8
25.7
6.4
74.3
18.4
17.5
'Federal, state, and local net spending excluding government enterprises (such as the postal service and public utilities) except for
any support these activities receive from tax funds.
Table 4
Defense Shares of Economic Aggregates
DoD as a Percentage
of Public Employment
DoD as a Percentage of
National Labor Force
National Income Accounts
Percentage of Total Purchase
Fiscal
Federal
State 8
Direct Hire
Including
National
Total
State ?t
Year
Federal
Local
(DoD)
Industry
Defenses
Federal
Local
1965
71.3
29.3
5.0
7.8
7.3
9.8
10.3
1966
73.0
30.6
5.6
9.0
7.5
10.0
10.4
1967
74.1
31.5
6.0
10.0
8.6
11.1
10.9
1968
74.0
31.3
6.1
10.0
9.0
11.4
11.4
1969
73.2
30.1
5.9
9.4
8.4
10.8
11.7
1970
72.3
27.7
5.3
8.1
7.8
10.0
12.1
1971
68.3
24.4
4.6
7.0
7.0
9.2
12.6
1972
66.0
21.9
4.0
6.2
6.4
8.9
12.8
1973
65.0
20.7
3.7
5.8
5.8
8.1
12.8
1974
63.8
19.7
3.5
5.5
5.3
7.6
13.0
1975
62.9
18.7
3.4
5.3
5.4
8.0
13.8
1976
62.5
18.1
3.3
5.0
5.2
7.6
13.9
1977
62.5
17.6
3.2
5.0
4.9
7.5
13.1
1978
61.9
17.3
3.1
4.8
4.7
7.2
13.0
1979
61.1
16.8
2.9
4.8
4.6
7.0
12.7
1980
61.3
16.7
2.8
4.7
4.9
7.4
12.9
1981
62.4
17.0
2.8
4.8
5.1
7.6
12.5
1982
63.3
17.5
2.8
4.9
5.7
8.2
12.6
1983
63.5
17.9
2.9
5.2
6.1
8.5
12.7
1984
63.9
17.9
2.8
5.5
6.0
7.9
12.3
1985
64.3
18.0
2.7
5.6
6.2
8.2
12.5
Includes Department of Defense -military, atomic energy defense activities, and other defense-related activities, such as
emergency management and maintenance of strategic stockpiles and the Selective Service System.
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Appendix B
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 Approved For Release 2010/10/26 :CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050003-1
Table 1
Department of Defense
General and Flag Officer Strengths
Table 2
Department of Defense
Officer Strength - In Thousands
,4ch,al
Officer Svengths ?
Foliated to
Officer Ratio
1961
315
6.9
1962
343
7.2
1963
334
7.1
1964
337
7.0
1966
339
6.8
1966
349
7.9
1967
384
7.8
1968
416
7.5
1969
419
7.3
1970
402
6.3
1971
371
6.3
1972
336
5.9
1973
321
6.0
1974
302
6.2
1975
292
6.3
1976
281
6.4
19T0
279
6.5
1977
275
6.5
1978
273
6.5
1979
273
6.4
1960
276
6.3
1981
2ffi
6.3
1982
290
6.2
1983
299
6.1
1984
303
6.0
Programmed
19&5
308
5.9
1986
312
5.9
ncludes all active forces of
ficers on extended active duty.
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 ,.
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Table 3
Military and Civilian Personnel Strength a
(End Fiscal Years - In Thousands)
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
1968 1972 1976 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Active Military
Army 1,570 811 779 777 781 780 780 780 781 781
Navyb 765 588 525 517 529 542 558 565 571 586
Marine Corps 307 198 192 188 191 192 194 196 198 200
Air Force 905 726 585 558 570 583 592 597 602 612
Total 3,547 2,322 2,081 2,040 2,071 2,108 2,123 2,138 2,152 2,178
Reserve Components
(Selected Reserve)
Army National Guard 389 388 362 367 389 408 417 434 438 450
Army Reserve 244 235 195 206 225 257 266 275 286 301
Naval Reserveb 124 124 97 97 98 105 109 121 129 142
Marine Corps Reserve 47 41 30 35 37 40 43 41 42 43
Air National Guard 75 89 91 96 98 101 102 105 108 111
Air Force Reserve 43 48 48 59 62 64 67 70 75 77
Total 922 925 823 861 909 974 1,00.5 1,096 1,077 1,124
Direct Hire Civilian
Army` 462 367 329 312 318 322 332 344 342* 346*
Navy 419 342 311 298 310 308 328 332 328* 330*
Air Force` 331 280 248 231 233 233 238 240 243* 252*
Defense Agencies 75 61 72 75 79 84 82 85 89* 91*
Total 1,287 1,0.50 960 916 940 947 9190 1,000 1,002* 1,020*
a Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
b Navy Training and Administration of Reserves (TARS) personnel are counted in the Selected Reserve from FY 1980 on. Prior to
FY 1980, TAR pesonnel are included in the Active Military.
` These totals include Army and Air National Guard technicians, who were converted from State to Federal employees in FY 1979. The
FY 1968 total has been adjusted to include approximately 3,900 technicians.
'Estimated.
Table 4
U.S. Military Personnel in Foreign Areas a
(End-Year - In Thousands)
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
1968
1972
1976
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Germany
225
210
213
239
244
248
256
254
254
Other Europe
66
62
61
61
65
64
67
70
73
Europe, Afloat
23
Z6
41
25
22
25
33
18
25
South Korea
67
41
39
39
39
38
39
39
41
Japan
79
64
4b
46
46
46
51
49
46
Other Pacrfic
37
25
27
15
15
15
15
15
16
Pacrfic Afloat
(Including
Southeast Asia)
94
51
24
22
15
25
33
34
18
Miscellaneous
Foreign
27
22
8
11
42
39
34
41
38
Total 1,
200
595
460
468
489
502
528
520
511
e Numbers may not add to to
tals due to r
ounding.
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Appendix C
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 Approved For Release 2010/10/26 :CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050003-1
Tab/e 1
Depe~ment of Defranse
Sbategic foroes H/ghlights
Strategic Offense
FY 1976
FY 1980
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
Land-Based ICBMs
Titan
54
52
31
23
9
Minuteman
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
997
Peacekeeper
-
-
-
-
3
Strategic Bombers (PAA1?
B-52D
145
75
-
-
-
B-52GIH
241
241
241
241
241
FB-111
66
60
56
56
56
B-1 B
-
-
-
1
18
Fleet Ballistic Launchers (SLBMs)
Polaris
240
80
-
-
-
Poseidon IC-3 and C~1
416
496
496
496
496
Trident
-
-
120
144
192
Strategic Defense
Interceptors (PAAISquadronsl?
Active
14116
12717
9015
9015
7214
Air National Guard
262115
165110
162110
198111
198111
a PAA -Primary Aircraft Authorized
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Tab/e 2
Deparlb?ent of Defense
Genera/ Purpose Forces Highlights
Land Forces
FY 1976
FY 1980
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
Army Divisions:
Active
16
16
16
17
18
Reserve
8
8
9
9
10
Marine Corps Divisions:
Active
3
3
3
3
3
Reserve
1
1
1
1
1
Tactical Air Forces
(PAAISquadronsla
Air Force AttacklFighter
Active
1608174
1680179
1734177
1758178
1786179
Reserve
758136
792139
852143
864143
876143
Navy AttacklFighter
Active
976165
894160
947163
956163
990165
Reserve
120110
120110
10819
9219
10819
Marine Corps AttacklFighter
Active
422125
422125
409124
417125
430125
Reserve
9618
8417
8818
8818
9418
Naval Forces
Strategic Forces Ships
50
48
41
43
44
Battle Forces Ships
367
384
425
433
439
Support Forces Ships
63
41
45
52
54
Reserve Forces Ships
4
6
12
14
18
Total Deployable Battle Forces
484
479
523
542
555
Reserve Forces Ships
57
44
24
20
21
Auxiliaries and Sealife Forcesb
14
15
32
43
45
Total Other Forces
71
59
56
63
66
a PAA -Primary Aircraft Authorized
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Tab/e 3
Deperbnent of Defense
Airlift and Sea/fft Foes Highlights
FY 1976
FY 1980
FY 1984
FY 1985
FY 1986
Intertheater Airlift (PAAIa
C-5A
70
70
70
70
70
C-5B
-
_
5
C-141
234
234
234
234
234
KC-10A
-
-
25
35
46
Intratheater Airlift (PAAlH
Air Force Active
C-130
234
218
218
216
216
Air Force Reserve and
National Guard
C-130
262
264
302
302
302
C-123
64
64
_
_
_
C-7A
51
48
-
-
-
Active Navy and Marine Corps
Tactical Support
40
45
47
38
38
Reserve Navy and Marine Corps
Tactical Support
33
34
33
34
34
Sealift
Ships, Active
Tankers
12
21
21
26
26
Cargo
19
14
14
14
14
Controlled Fleet Charters:
Tankers
14
14
12
12
12
Cargo
National Defense Reserve Fleetb
21
144
23
164
30
202
40
214
43
220
a PAA -Primary Aircraft Authorized
b Includes commercial dry cargo ships and the Ready Reserve Force
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Appendix D
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 Approved For Release 2010/10/26 :CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050003-1
ACRONYMS
AALP:
AAW:
ABM:
ABS:
AC:
ACM:
ADCAP:
ADDS:
ADP:
ADPA:
AFAP:
AFATDS:
AFQT:
AFR:
AFSATCOM:
AFTI:
AGR:
AHIP:
AID:
AIM:
ALCM:
ALMV:
AMRAAM:
ANG:
ANZUS:
AOE:
APOP4S
ASAT:
ASPJ:
ASROC:
ASW:
ASW/SOW:
ATA:
ATB:
ATF:
ATM:
AUTOVON:
AWACS:
BA:
BCS:
BEA:
BFV:
BMEWS:
C3.
C3CM:
C3I:
CAMS:
CDE:
CELV:
CH:
Automated Airload Planning System
Antiair Warfare
Antiballistic Missile
Air Base Survivability
Active Component
Advanced Cruise Missile
Advanced Capability (torpedo)
Armv Data Distribution System
Automatic Data Processing
American Defense Preparedness Association
Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
Armed Forces Qualification Test
Air Force Reserve
Air Force Satellite Communications
Advanced Fighter Techonology Integration
Active Guard and Reserve
Army Helicopter Improvement Program
Agency for International Development
Air Intercept Missile
Air-Launched Cruise Missile
Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
Air National Guard
Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (treaty)
Multipurpose Stores Ship
Automated Propeller Optical Measurement System
Antisatellite
Airborne Self-Protection Jammer
Antisubmarine Rocket
Antisubmarine Warfare
ASW Standoff Weapon
Advanced Tactical Aircraft
Advanced Technology Bomber
Advanced Tactical Fighter
Antitactical Missile
Automatic Voice Network
Airborne Warning and Control System
Budget Authority
Battery Computer System
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
Command, Control, and Communications
Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
Crisis Action Management System
Conference on Disarmament in Europe
Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle
Cargo Helicopter
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CHAMPUS: Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services
CINC: Commander in Chief
CIWS: Close-In Weapon System
CMS: Crisis Management System
CNAD: Conference of National Armaments Directors
COB: Collocated Operating Base
COCOM: Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CODES: Computerized Deployment Execution System
COMSEC: Communications Security
CONUS: Continental United States
COR: Command Operationally Ready
CORE: Contingency Response Program
CRAF: Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CS: Civil Service
CSOC: Consolidated Space Operations Center
CY: Calendar Year or Current Year
DAIP: Defense Acquisition Improvement Program
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCA: Dual-Capable Aircraft, Defense Communications Agency
DCAA: Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCS: Defense Communications System
DDG: Guided Missile Destroyer
DDN: Defense Data Network
DEERS: Defense Enrollment Eligibility System
DEIMS: Defense Economic Impact Modeling System
DFH: Deployable Field Headquarters
DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency
DIPEC: Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center
DLA: Defense Logistics Agency
DLC: Direct Communications Link
DNA: Defense Nuclear Agency
Do D: Department of Defense
DoE: Department of Energy
DPA: Defense Production Act
DPACT: Defense Policy Advisory Committee on Trade
DRB: Defense Resources Board
DSB: Defense Science Board
DSCS: Defense Satellite Communication System
DSN: Defense Switched Network
ECM: Electronic Countermeasures
ECWG: Emergency Communications Working Group
EJS: Enhanced JTIDS System
ELF: Extremely Low Frequency
EMP: Electromagnetic Pulse
EMPB: Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency
ESF: Economic Support Fund
EW: Electronic Warfare
EXJAM: Expendable Jammer
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FAASV: Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFG: Guided Missile Frigate
FHE: Forward Headquarters Element
FLIR: Forward-Looking Infrared Radar
FMC: Fully Mission Capable
FMS: Foreign Military Sales
FMSCR: Foreign Military Sales Credit (Financing)
FTS: Full-Time Support
FY: Fiscal Year
GAO: Government Accounting Office
GLCM: Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
GLLD: Ground Laser Locator Designator
GM: General Manager
GMF: Ground Mobile Forces
GNP: Gross National Product
GPS: Global Positioning System
GRF: Guaranty Reserve Fund
GS: General Schedule
GWEN: Ground Wave Emergency Network
HARM: High-Speed Antiradiation Missile
HELSTF: High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility
HEMTT: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
HF: High Frequency
HLG: High-Level Group
HMMWV: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HMO: Health Maintenance Organization
HNS: Host Nation Support
HSDG: High School Diploma Graduates
HTMD: High Technology Motorized Division
I-S/A AMPE: Inter-Service Agency Automated Message
Processing Exchange
IAMP: Imagery Acquisition and Management Plan
IBP: Industrial Base Program
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IEPG: Independent European Program Group
IG: Inspector General
IL: International List
IMET: International Military Education and Training
IMIP: Industrial Modernization Incentives Program
INCA: Intelligence Communications Architecture
INEWS: Integrated Electronic Warfare System
INF: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
ING: Inactive National Guard
IONDS: Integrated Operational Nuclear Detonation System
IR&D: Independent Research and Development
IRR: Individual Ready Reserve
IUS: Inertial Upper Stage
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JAFE: Joint Advanced Fighter Engine
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE: Joint Communications Support Element
JLOTS II: Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore II
Joint STARS: Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
JTDF.: Joint Technology Demonstrator Engine
JT&E: Joint Test and Evaluation
JTFP: Joint Tactical Fusion Program
JTIDS: Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JVX: Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft
LAMPS: Light Airborne Multipurpose System
LANTIRN: Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared
System for Night
LAV: Light Armored Vehicle
LCAC: Landing Craft, Air Cushion
LF: Low Frequency
LHX: Light Helicopter Experimental
LOGMARS: Logistic Applications of Automated Marking and
Reading Symbols
LRINF Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
LVS: Logistics Vehicle System
LVT: Assault Amphibian VehiclE~
MAR: Marine Amphibious BrigadE~
MAF: Marine Amphibious Force
MAP: Military Assistance Program
MAPAG: Multi-Association Policy Advisory Group
MBFR: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC: Mission Capable, Military Committee
MC F.: Modular Control Equipment:
MCS: Maneuver Control System
MCTL: Military Critical Technology List
MFO: Multinational Forces and Observers
MiG: Mikoyan-Gurevich (aircrai~t)
MILCON: Military Construction
Milstar: Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System
MIRV: Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MLRS: Multiple-Launch Rocket System
MMMTF: Mobilization Materiel Management Task Force
MMP: Master Mobilization Plan
MMWG: Military Mobilization Working Group
MNC: Major NATO Commander
MOA: Memorandum of Agreement
MOB: Main Operating Base
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
MPS: Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MRT: Miniature Receiver Terminal
MSE: Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MSO: Military Service Obligation
~1T: Military Technician
MTT: Mobile Training Team
MULE: Modular Universal Laser Equipment
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NADC: NATO Air Defense Committee
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Navstar: Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging
NCA: National Command Authorities
NCS: National Communications System
NCCS: Naval Command and Control System
NDS: Nuclear Detonation Detection System
NEARTIP: Near-Term Improvement Program (for MK-46 torpedo)
NFIP: National Foreign Intelligence Program
NJCEC: NATO Joint Communications-Electronic Committee
NMCC: National Military Command Center
NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPG: Nuclear Planning Group
NPS: Nonprior Service
NRF: Naval Reserve Fleet, Naval Reserve Force
NSA: National Security Agency
NSDD: National Security Decision Directive
NSEP: National Security and Emergency Preparedness
NTPF: Near-Term Prepositioning Forces
NTiJ: New Threat iJpgrade
OF~M: Operation and Maintenance
OJCS: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMB: Office of Management and Budget
OS D: Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIS: Ocean Surveillance Information System
0TH: Over-the-Horizon
OTH-B: Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (radar)
P3I: Preplanned Product Improvement
PARCS: Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization
System
PAVE PAWS: Phased-Array Radars
PCS: Permanent Change of Station
PEP: Productivity Engineering and Planning, Plant Equipment
Package
PGM: Precision Guided Munitions
PIF: Productivity Investment Fund
PLSS: Precision Location Strike System
POL: Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POMCUS: Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets
PPO: Preferred Providers Organization
PRC: People's Republic of China
QRMC: Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
R&D: Research and Development
RAM: Rolling Airframe Missile
RAMS: Radar Target Scattering Advanced Measurement System
RC: Reserve Component
RDSS: Rapidly Deployable Surveillance System
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 Approved For Release 2010/10/26 :CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050003-1
RDT& E
ROK:
RPV:
RRF:
RSI:
S&T:
SAC:
SALT:
SAM:
SBIR:
SCG:
SCP:
SDAF:
SDI:
SDIO:
SEAL:
SE&I:
SF:
SHORAD C2:
SINCGARS-V:
SLBM:
SLC:
SLCM:
SLEP:
SM:
SNF:
SNLC:
SOF:
SRAM:
SSBN:
SSGN:
SSN:
STARS:
START:
Su:
SUBACS:
SUBROC:
SURTASS:
SVIP:
SVS:
SWA:
T&E:
TACAPI0
TAGS:
TACSI:
TACTAS:
TAOC:
TARPS:
TC ACCIS:
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Republic of Korea
Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Ready Reserve Force
Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability
Science and Technology
Strategic Air Command
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
Surface-to-Air Missile, Sea Air Mariner
Small Business Innovative Research
Special Consultative Group
Secure Conferencing Project
Special Defense Acquisition Fund
Strategic Defense Initiative
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
Sea-Air-Land
Systems Engineering and Integration
Special Forces
Short-Range Air Defense Command and Control
Single-Channel Ground and Airborne System, VHF
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
Submarine Laser Communications
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
Service Life Extension Program
Standard Missile
Short-Range Nuclear Forces
Senior National Logisticians Conference
Special Operations Forces
Short-Range Attack Missile
Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear-powered
Cruise Missile Submarine, Nuclear-powered
Submarine, Nuclear-powered
Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Systems
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Sukhoy (aircraft)
Submarine Advanced Combat System
Submarine Rocket
Surveillance Towed-Array Sonar System
Secure Voice Improvement Program
Secure Voice System
Southwest Asia
Test and Evaluation
Airborne Strategic Communications System
Auxiliary Crane Ship
Tactical Air Control System Improvements
Tactical Towed-Array Sonar
Tactical Air Operations Center
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System
Transportation Coordination Automated Command
and Control Information System
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 Approved For Release 2010/10/26 :CIA-RDP90B01390R000100050003-1
TDRS:
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
TFW:
Tactical Fighter Wing
TGSM:
Terminally-guided Submunition
TIARA:
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
TOA:
Total Obligational Authority
TOW:
Tube-Launched Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided
(antitank missile)
TRI-TAC:
Joint Tactical Communications Program
TWG:
Technical Working Group
UHF:
Ultrahigh Frequency
UNITREP:
Unit Status and Identify Report
USCENTCOM:
United States Central Command
USCINCCENT:
Commander in Chief, United States Central
Command
USCINCEUR:
United States Commander in Chief, European
Command
USCINCLANT:
Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic
Command
USCINCPAC:
Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Command
USCINCSOUTH:
tJnited States Commander in Chief, Southern
Command
USES:
United States Employment Service
[JSSR:
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VA:
Veterans' Administration
VHF:
Very High Frequency
VHSIC:
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit
VLA:
Vertical Launch ASROC
VLF
Ver
Low Fre
en
:
VLS:
y
qu
cy
Vertical Launch System
VLSI:
Very Large Scale Integration
V/STOL:
Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing
WARMAPS:
Wartime Manpower Planning System
WHNS:
Wartime Host Nation Support
WIS:
WWMCCS Information Systems
WWMCCS:
Worldwide Military Command and Control System
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