RESOURCE BOOK ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001301640013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 10, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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100C
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3637 (10-81)
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STAT
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1 Executive Registry
85.
4284 41'1
CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM
Date: 10/30/85 Number: 175587CA Due By:
Subject:
Resource Book on Nuclear Arms Control Issues
Actiotr ' FYI
ALL CABINET MEMBERS CT 0
Vice President 0 0
State 0 0
Treasury 0 0
Defense 0 0
Justice 0 0
Interior 0 0
Agriculture 0 0
Commerce 0 0
Labor 0 0
HHS 0 0
HUD 0 0
Transportation 0 0
Energy 0 0
Chief of Staff 0 0
Education 0 0
OMB 0 0
CIA 0 0
UN 0 0
USTR 0 0
GSA
EPA
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o 0
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Action FYI
CEA 0 0
CEQ 0 0
OSTP 0
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McFarlane
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Executive Secretary for:
DPC
EPC
REMARKS:
RETURN TO:
Enclosed is a handbook prepared by the National Security Council
containing background information on nuclear arms control issues
and the Strategic Defense Initiative. I am forwarding it to you
for your use prior to the President's meeting with Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev.
tj Alfred H. Kingon 0 Don Clarey
Cabinet Secretary 0 Rick Davis
456-2823 0 Ed Stucky
(Ground Floor, West Wing)
Associate Director
Office of Cabinet Affairs
456-2800 (Room 129,0E0B)
_
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8568
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 30, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
SUBJECT: Resource Book on Nuclear Arms Control Issues
Attached is a handbook of unclassified background information and
talking points on nuclear arms control issues and the Strategic
Defense Initiative which I believe will be useful to you as we
prepare for the President's meeting with Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev.
Robert C.
r
Attachment
Tab A Speakers' Book
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1
I
I
4
Nuclear Arms Control
Speaker's Resource Book
September 1985
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Nuclear Arms Control Speaker's Resource Book - Index
TAB 1 Basic Themes
A. TV Talkers
TAB 2 Qs and As
A. Geneva Negotiations
B. Basic Qs and As
TAB 3 Deterrence
TAB 4
A.
B.
U.S. Defense Programs
Modernization
Defense Budget
TAB 5 Charts - U.S./Soviet Comparisons
TAB 6 Strategic Arms Reductions
TAB 7 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
TAB 8 Defense and Space Negotiations .
TAB 9 The Strategic Defense Initiative
TAB 10 Other Arms Control Issues/Negotiations:
A. Interim Restraints/SALT II
B. CD/Chemical Weapons
C. Confidence-Building Measures/Hotline
D. CDE
E. Nuclear Winter
F. Nuclear Testing
G. Nuclear Free Zones
H. Nuclear Freeze
I. Non-Proliferation
J. Nuclear Stockpile Reductions
K. MBFR
TAB 11 Compliance
TAB 12 Religious and Moral Themes
TAB 13 U.S. - Soviet Relations
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Basic Themes
Overall
The US seeks a serious, constructive dialogue with the Soviet
Union in the Geneva negotiations.
o Our immediate goal is to get agreement on deep and
verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals.
o We also seek to redress the erosion of the ABM Treaty that
has resulted from Soviet actions, and we are expressing our
concerns about Soviet non-compliance with this and other
existing agreements. We are trying to get corrective
action where there are violations.
o Over the longer term -- should the new defensive
technologies being examined in our SDI research program
prove feasible -- we hope to make a transition from the
current situation, in which deterrence rests on the
ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation, to one
in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced and greater
reliance is placed on defenses which threaten no one. We
seek to discuss with the Soviets our ideas about how our
two sides might manage this transition.
o Our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all
nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has long stated this to
be its goal as well. We have no illusions that the two
sides can quickly or easily agree on the steps necessary to
reach this goal, but its importance makes it imperative
that we persist. Were nuclear weapons to be eliminated, we
would have to devote particular attention to how, together
with our Allies, we might counter and diminish the threat
posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both arms
improvements and arms control efforts.
? Our negotiators in Geneva have been given flexibility to
explore various avenues toward agreement. The President
has made it clear that we will do our part to bridge
differences with the Soviets.
o We will continue to take into account the concerns of our
Allies and friends, and to consult closely with them as the
negotiations proceed.
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o We are realistic about our differences with the Soviet
Union. There will be many tough issues to resolve, and the
negotiating process will require patience and persistence.
SDI
o SDI is a research program. The aim of SDI is not to seek
superiority, but to maintain the strategic balance and
thereby assure stable deterrence.
o Research will last for some years. We intend to adhere
strictly to ABM Treaty limitations and will insist that the
Soviets do so as well.
o We do not have any preconceived notions about the defensive
options the research may generate. We will not proceed to
development and deployment unless the research indicates
that defenses meet strict criteria.
? Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to
be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective
at the margin.
o It is too early in our research program to speculate on the
kinds of defensive systems -- whether ground-based or
space-based and with what capabilities -- that might prove
feasible and desirable to develop and deploy.
? The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear -- to
find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before
they can reach any of their potential targets.
o U.S. and allied security remains indivisible. The SDI
program is designed to enhance allied security as well as
U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our
allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied
views are carefully considered.
o If and when our research criteria are met, and following
close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult
and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to
the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such
consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through
a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems.
This commitment should in no way be interpreted as
according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive
deployments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to
initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship
and stability in the Defense and Space Talks underway in
Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future
possible consultations.
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o It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive
technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing
consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly
manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.
? SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring war
and enhancing stability.
o For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and
the prospect Jf nuclear retaliation will remain the key
element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern,
flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces.
o Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons
entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal,
which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally
energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by
conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional
force improvements, and the negotiation of arms reductions
and confidence-building measures.
Strategic Modernization
o Since, for the forseeaole future, offensive nuclear forces
and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key
element of deterrence, we must maintain modern, flexible,
and credible nuclear forces.
o Our modernization program is essential to this objective.
o The US modernization program also provides a crucial
incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for
genuine arms reductions.
START
o Our objective remains an equitable, verifiable agreement on
substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces, in a
manner that would improve stability.
o The President has given US negotiators unprecedented
flexibility with regard to how we reach that goal. We are
less concerned with the method than the outcome.
o In the past, the Soviet Union has proposed ballistic
missile limits that focused on launchers as the primary
unit of limitation. Launcher limits alone, however, nave
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proven ineffective in limiting the growth of strategic
forces. The US, on the other hand, focused on warheads,
deployed missiles and throwweight as the proper units of
limitation. Our negotiators have received guidance that
makes possible the bridging of these differences.
o We are proposing limits on heavy bombers and the number of
ALCMs they carry below the levels set in SALT II.
o We are not trying to dictate the character of the Soviet
force structure. We recognize that there are substantial
differences between our respective forces. We are prepared
to explore with the Soviets trade-offs between areas of US
and Soviet advantage and interest. For example, we would
consider various provisions that would allow a Soviet
advantage in ballistic missile capability in return for a
US advantage in bomber capability.
INF
o Our ultimate objective remains the complete elimination of
all US and Soviet land-based LRINF missile systems.
o As an interim measure, we seek reductions to the lowest
possible equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads. We
will consider any number between zero and 572 LRINF missile
warheads.
o In order to take account of expressed Soviet concerns, we
are also prepared to:
- consider a commitment not to deploy in Europe all of
the LRINF missiles to which we would be entitled under
equal global ceilings;
- apportion reductions to be made in LRINF missiles
between Pershing IIs and GLCMs, in an appropriate
manner; and
- discuss LRINF aircraft limitations.
o We are prepared to explore any number of different
approaches leading to a zero global ceiling.
o We are also willing to consider any serious Soviet proposal
that meets US and Allied security concerns.
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5
Defense and Space
o We are providing the Soviets our assessment of the current
strategic situation, pointing out sources of instability
and the need for our two sides to reduce or eliminate them.
o We are discussing our concern about Soviet actions -- such
as their construction of a large phased-array radar at
Krasnoyarsk -- that are eroding the ABM Treaty. Because of
its associateJ capability, siting, and orientation, the
Krasnoyarsk radar violates the ABM Treaty constraints.
o We are trying to explain to the Soviets our view on tne
relationship between offensive and defensive forces, the
potential contribution of defensive forces to our mutual
security, and how -- if new defensive technologies prove
feasible -- we might manage a stable transition over time
toward increased reliance on defense.
o We will attempt to clarify and will assess carefully any
Soviet proposals for new limitations in the defense and
space area.
? At this time, however, we believe that possibilities for
restraints beyond the significant restrictions already
established by the ABM Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and
other agreements are limited. Foreign Minister Gromyko
agreed with us in Geneva that limits on research would not
be verifiable. It would be premature to consider addi-
tional limits on testing, development, or deployment of
defensive technologies until we can assess tne results of
the research and can better judge the possible contributions
of those technologies to enhancing deterrence and strategic
stability.
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IA
Talking Points for TV
US-Soviet Relations
Key Message: WE SINCERELY WANT MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS
WITH THE SOVIETS, AND BELIEVE WE CAN WORK OUT SOLUTIONS TO
OUR DIFFERENCES. WE WILL KEEP ADDRESSING THE MAJOR PROBLEMS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES, AND TRADE, IN ADDITION TO
ARMS CONTROL. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT PROGRESS WILL COME
EASILY, BUT WE REALIZE THAT SERIOUS DIALOGUE IS A
PREREQUISITE FOR A STABLE RELATIONSHIP SUSTAINABLE OVER THE
LONG TERM.
Additional Points if Time Permits:
- Arms control is an important part of our overall
relationship with the Soviet Union--but it is only one of
many US-Soviet issues.
- Our differences with the Soviet Union are profound, stemming
from fundamentally different values, history, and the amount
of freedom we enjoy.
- We believe we can and must work together to reduce the risk
of war. But the Soviet Union must recognize that cooperation
is a two-way street, and tney must be prepared to address
our concerns as well.
- The new Soviet leader Gorbachev (phonetic: gorbah CHAWF)
has expressed his desire for better relations with the
United States. We hope that sentiment will be translated
into deeds.
- We are prepared to meet the Soviets halfway at the
negotiating table. If they snow similar flexibility and
commitment, the prospects for arms reduction and progress on
other issues will be enhanced.
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Talking Points for TV
Arms Control and Geneva Negotiations
Key Message: OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IN GENEVA IS TO GET
EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS ON DEEP REDUCTIONS IN
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, BUT WE ALSO WANT TO DISCUSS HOW
WE AND THE SOVIETS MIGHT MANAGE A TRANSITION OVER THE LONG
TERM FROM TODAY'S SITUATION, IN WHICH DETERRENCE RESTS ON
THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION, TO ONE IN WHICH GREATER
RELIANCE IS PLACED ON DEFENSES THAT THREATEN NO ONE. (20-25
secs.)
Additional Points if Time Permits:
- The US is seeking a serious,
Soviet Union in Geneva.
constructive dialogue with the
- We are focusing on reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals
because they are the weapons that exist today and are the
source of greatest immediate concern to both sides.
- The President has given our negotiators in Geneva wide
latitude to explore various avenues toward agreements
radically reducing strategic and intermediate-range nuclear
weapons.
- Our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all
nuclear weapons.
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Talking Points for TV
Strategic Modernization
Key Message: WE MUST MAINTAIN MODERN, FLEXIBLE, AND
CREDIBLE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES BECAUSE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE PROSPECT
OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION WILL REMAIN ESSENTIAL TO DETERRENCE.
OUR STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO REDRESS
SEVERAL CRITICAL INEQUALITIES IN THE US-SOVIET STRATEGIC
BALANCE. (20-25 secs.)
Additional Points if Time Permits:
- Critical inequalities have arisen in the strategic balance
due to the combination of the massive Soviet arms buildup
and relative US restraint over the last fifteen years.
- The bulk of US strategic forces are aging and becoming
increasingly vulnerable: all our bombers are over 20 years
old; almost all our submarines are over 15 years old. Most
of our ICBMs are 10 to 20 years old. We must modernize our
forces to maintain a credible and effective deterrent in the
face of Soviet strategic force improvements.
- Our strategic modernization program also provides a crucial
incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva.
- The President's strategic modernization program comprises:
--improvements in command, control, and communications
systems;
--building the B-1B and eventually tne advanced technology
"Stealth" bomber;
--deployment of the Trident submarine and the D-5 missile;
--improving the survivability of the land-based leg of the
Triad, including deployment of 100 MX missiles; and
development of a small single-warhead ICBM; and
--improvements in air defenses and research on strategic
defense technologies.
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Talking Points for TV
SDI
Key Message: SDI IS A RESEARCH PROGRAM THAT IS DESIGNED TO
INVESTIGATE THE FEASIBILITY OF NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES.
IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY. IF DEFENSES
EVENTUALLY PROVE FEASIBLE, WE WANT TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS
TO MANAGE A STABLE TRANSITION TO A WORLD IN WHICH THERE
WOULD BE GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSES. WE ARE TRYING TO
DISCUSS THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA. SDI IS ALSO A
PRUDENT HEDGE AGAINST A MASSIVE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE
EFFORT. (25-30 secs.)
Additional Points if Time Permits:
- Our SDI research is permitted by tne ABM Treaty and fully
consistent with it.
- The Soviets have been conducting similar research for many
years and are ahead of us in certain areas. Tney have the
world's only deployed anti-ballistic missile system and tne
only operational anti-satellite system in existence today.
- The radar the Soviets are building at Krasnoyarsk is in
violation of the ABM Treaty. One of our objectives at tne
Geneva negotiations is to reverse the erosion of the ABM
Treaty and get corrective action where there are Soviet
violations of that and other treaties.
- It will take many years to reach the point where feasibility
of defenses can be determined. We would proceed to develop
and deploy defenses only if tney were survivable and less
costly than the offenses they would offset.
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Qs and As on the Geneva Negotiations
Strategic Arms Reductions
1. What is the difference between the current US position on
strategic arms reductions and the US position in 1983 when
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) broke off?
A: Our objective in START remains to achieve significant,
equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive
forces, in a manner that would improve stability. However,
our negotiators have been given new latitude to explore
various ways to reach this outcome. For example, they are
prepared to explore with the Soviets alternative means of
incorporating trade-offs between areas of US and Soviet
advantage and interest.
2. How deep are the reductions you are now seeking in START?
A: Our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all
nuclear weapons. Our immediate goal in START is to reduce
US and Soviet ballistic missile warheads to roughly 5000 on
each side, and to reduce the numbers of bombers and ALCMs
they carry below the levels set in SALT II. (cf. ACDA
Publication, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, p.
242)
3. If you favor deep reductions in offensive systems, why are
you building more?
A: For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and
the threat of nuclear retaliation will remain the key
element of deterrence. It is therefore essential that we
maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear
forces. Our strategic modernization program will redress
several critical inequalities that have arisen in the
strategic balance due to the combination of the massive
Soviet buildup and relative US restraint over the last
fifteen years.
Moreover, our prospects for success in Geneva will depend
on our determination, and Soviet recognition of that
determination, to maintain an adequate deterrent for
ourselves and our Allies with or without arms control. The
Soviet strategy is to combine tough bargaining at the
negotiating table with a hard-nosed public propaganda
campaign designed to undercut support for US and NATO
positions and force unilateral concessions. Only when they
realize that the propaganda campaign is not working -- that
is, that US will not make unilateral concessions -- will
the Soviets bargain seriously at the negotiating table.
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Inter r elationship of Negotiations
4. The Soviets have said they are willing to agree to reduc-
tions in offensive systems only if an agreement can also be
reached on space arms. What is your view of this
interrelationship?
A: We have always believed that there is an interrelationship
between offensive and defensive arms. In fact, upon
concluding the ABM Treaty in 1972, we made a unilateral
statement emphasizing our view that offense and defense
were intimately related, and that we should have
comprehensive treaties on both.
What the Soviets now appear to be demanding, however, is a
rule under which, even if we were to reach agreement in one
of the three subject areas, it would not be implemented
until agreement was reached in the other areas. We believe
that such a precondition makes no sense. If the US and
Soviet Union can arrive at an agreement in one or more
areas that benefits both sides, then there is no reason why
we should not both begin immediately to derive those
benefits.
5. Faced with a move on the part of the US toward a defensive
strategy, why would the Soviets agree to put limits on
their offensive weapons, since such limits might eventually
confront them with a situation in which they would not be
able to penetrate US defenses?
A: Our SDI program is devoted solely to research. This
research is allowed by existing treaty constraints. The
Soviets have in the past agreed with us that limitation of
research could not be effectively verified. Furtnermore,
the Soviets have been conducting a comparable research
program for years. While both sides continue to conduct
strategic defense research in parallel, we see no reason
for either side to alter its stated support for deep
reductions in offensive weapons.
Many years down the road, when research results are
realized, there will be two possible outcomes. If the
research indicates that defensive technologies are not
feasible, we will continue to rely on the threat of nuclear
retaliation to maintain deterrence. In such an event, it
should be in both sides' interest to base deterrence on a
more stable balance with greatly reduced levels of arms.
If SDI research should indicate that defensive technologies
are feasible -- that is, that they are survivable and
cost-effective at the margin -- then it would be senseless
from an economic standpoint to expand offensive forces.
Additional offensive systems would cost more than the
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defenses necessary to counter them. Moreover, we believe
that we could convince the Soviets that, by joining us in a
mutual transition to a more defense-reliant balance, they
could shift to a deterrent that would oe safer and more
stable.
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
6. What is the difference between the current US position in
INF and the US position in 1983 when the talks broke off?
A Our goals in the INF talks remain the same. We believe the
complete elimination of all US and Soviet land-based LRINF
missile systems remains the optimum outcome. We remain
willing, however, to agree to equal global limits at the
lowest possible levels, as an interim step toward zero.
Our negotiators have been given wide latitude to explore
various ways to achieve our desired result.
Defense and Space Issues
7. President Reagan has said that everything is on the table
in Geneva. Does that mean you are willing to negotiate
limits on SDI?
A: The SDI is a research program. The Soviets have in the
past agreed with us that it would be impossible to verify
compliance with research limitations.
Should our research indicate that it would be desirable to
develop and deploy defensive systems, we intend to consult
with the Soviets pursuant to provisions of the ABM Treaty
and negotiate with them on how we might jointly manage a
transition to greater reliance on defenses.
8. Would the US be willing to accept a ban on deployment of
strategic defenses in return for Soviet agreement to
radical reductions in offensive arms?
A: It is premature to speculate on this deployment issue,
since it will be many years before SDI research results are
realized and decisions on the feasibility and desirability
of actual systems are possible.
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9. Doesn't SDI just further complicate what are already very
complex negotiations?
A: In attempting to achieve effective arms control agreements,
we have always recognized the close relationship of
offensive and defensive arms and the need to have
comprehensive limits on both. In 1972, when we signed the
ABM Treaty, the US made a unilateral statement emphasizing
this interrelationship and specifying the need for parallel
limits on offensive systems. Accordingly, in addressing in
Geneva the full set of issues associated with offensive and
defensive systems, we are merely continuing a process that
has existed for many years.
As for the immediate effect of the SDI research program, it
seems to have been a major factor in getting the Soviets to
resume negotiations. In the long run, we hope that
successful SDI research will reinforce the prospects for
US-Soviet reductions in nuclear weapons and for a shift to
a more stable regime of deterrence.
10. By embarking on SDI, isn't the US just initiating a new
arms race?
A: The Soviets have had an extensive program to explore
similar defensive technologies for years. For example,
they were the first to begin particle beam research and the
first to conduct high-energy laser research. In addition,
they have the only operational ballistic missile defenses
and the only operational ASAT system in existence today.
Their campaign to block the US SDI research program
represents nothing less than an attempt to maintain a
Soviet monopoly in this area of technology, a monopoly
which could seriously upset the essential East-West
military balance.
Further, our SDI research program provides a prudent hedge
against the Soviets' obtaining significant unilateral
advantages in ballistic missile defenses. In the long run,
we hope that it will provide the basis for shifting over
time to a more stable deterrent and ultimately eliminating
nuclear weapons altogether.
11. Wouldn't we be better off by avoiding the "militarization
of space"?
A: Space has long been used for military purposes. Both the
US and the Soviet Union use space for numerous defense-
related activities, including communications, warning, and
verification of arms control agreements.
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Our SDI research program is exploring defensive technolo-
gies -- ground-based as well as space-based -- that would
have the beneficial effect of enhancing deterrence and
strengthening strategic stability while threatening no one.
12. Aren't space-based defenses really offensive in nature, in
that they are capable of being used to attack ground
targets?
A: Defenses based on the technologies we are researching could
not effectively attack ground-based targets from space.
Both particle beams and high-energy lasers would be so
diffused upon passing through the atmosphere that they
would be ineffective against any targets on the ground.
Similarly, kinetic energy weapons would burn up in the
atmosphere, as they have no heat shields.
13. Deterrence has worked well for 40 years. Why should we now
shift to a new strategy based on SDI?
A: Our strategic concept and our desire to investigate the
feasibility of shifting over time to a more defense-reliant
balance is designed to strengthen deterrence. Deterrence
requires that a potential opponent be convinced that the
risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the gains he
might hope to achieve. The popular view of deterrence has
been that it is a matter of posing to an aggressor high
potential costs through the ultimate threat of devastating
nuclear retaliation.
But deterrence can also function effectively if one has the
ability to deny the attacker the gains he might otherwise
have hoped to realize. Our intent, if our research bears
out, is to shift the deterrent balance from one based
primarily on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear
retaliation to one in which nuclear arms are greatly
reduced on both sides and non-nuclear defenses play a
greater and greater role. We believe the latter would
provide a sound basis for a more stable and reliable
strategic relationship.
14. Is there not more deterrence in today's world, in which
both sides are threatened with total destruction, than in a
defense-reliant posture, in which there would be minimal
capacity for destruction?
A: Deterrence is achieved by convincing a potential opponent
that the risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the
gains he might hope to achieve. There are two interrelated
components of deterrence. One involves creating a
situation whereby aggression entails huge risks and costs,
such as we and the Soviets do today by maintaining the
capability for devastating nuclear retaliation. The other
consists of maintaining the capability to deny any
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aggressor the ability to achieve his desired military
gains. Effective defensive systems could do the latter,
and without threatening anyone. New technologies may make
it possible to strengthen deterrence by shifting
increasingly to reliance on such systems. This is what our
SDI research program is designed to find out.
15. Won't a strategy of deterrence based increasingly on
defense require, if not perfect defenses, at least near-
perfect systems and a very high level of confidence in that
high level of effectiveness?
A: Even an imperfect defense could create excessive complica-
tions for an aggressor contemplating a first strike,
thereby strengthening deterrence. In the ultimate phase,
when all nuclear weapons would have been eliminated, we
could reasonably expect a very high level of defense
effectiveness against the sort of nuclear arsenal that
might be clandestinely maintained.
16. If both sides have both offensive and defensive weapons, a
situation might exist that favors the side striking first.
This would be very destabilizing. How do you propose to
avoid such a situation during your transition phase?
A: We would ensure that the transition period -- if defensive
technologies prove feasible and we decide to move in that
direction -- would be effected witnout jeopardizing
stability. We would have to bring about a mix of
survivable offensive and defensive systems that, over time,
would steadily reduce incentives in a crisis for a first
strike. That is why we would seek to make the transition a
jointly managed endeavor with the Soviets, and have offered
now to begin talking with them about the issues that would
have to be addressed.
17. Would you envision the US moving to deploy defensive
systems unilaterally?
A: Should our research indicate that it would be desirable to
develop and deploy defensive systems, we intend to consult
and negotiate with the Soviets pursuant to provisions of
the ABM Treaty on how we might jointly manage a transition
to greater reliance on defenses. We will seek to proceed
in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.
18. If we were to deploy defenses, wouldn't the Soviets oe
willing to spend what it takes to overcome them?
A: We would deploy defenses only if they were cost-effective
at the margin -- that is, if it would cost the Soviets more
to deploy additional offensive systems than it would cost
us to deploy the additional defensive capability required
to counter those systems. There would thus oe a strong
economic incentive against deploying more offensive systems.
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19. Why are we spending large sums to develop and deploy new
ballistic missiles, such as MX and Trident II, while at the
same time pursuing a program to make ballistic missiles
obsolete?
A: For the foreseeable future -- even in the first stages of a
possible transition to a more defense-reliant balance --
offensive nuclear forces and the threat of nuclear retalia-
tion will remain the key element of deterrence. It is
therefore essential that we maintain modern, flexible, and
credible nuclear forces. Our force modernization program
will redress several critical inequalities that have arisen
in the strategic and INF balances, due to the combination
of the massive Soviet buildup and relative US restraint
over the last fifteen years.
20. Does the President stick by his promise to share defensive
technology with the Soviets?
A: In conducting our SDI research program, the US seeks no
unilateral advantage over the Soviet Union. If defensive
technologies prove feasible, we intend to manage jointly
with the Soviets a transition to a more defense-reliant
balance. As part of this endeavor, we would consider
sharing defensive technology. It is too early in the
research effort at this time, however, to know exactly what
could and should be shared.
21. If you develop and deploy SDI, won't you then need a
defense against strategic bombers and cruise missiles?
Then against satchel bombs? Then against chemical and
biological weapons? Won't the arms race always shift to
some other area, and thus isn't the cheapest, most
effective deterrent large nuclear weapons?
A: We cannot create a risk-free world. However, it is
important to deal with the most dangerous threats. If we
can do that, we will greatly reduce the overall level of
risk we face. Ballistic missiles are the most threatening
weapons in the existing military arsenals. If we can find
a way to defend against, and ultimately eliminate, these
missiles, we will take a large step toward a safer
existence. At the same time, however, we will be working
to lessen the threat of other kinds of aggression,
including conventional.
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22. Doesn't SDI decouple the US from its Allies?
A: No. Our commitment to the defense of our allies remains
intact. We will ensure that any defensive system which we
might develop in the future would strengthen the security
of our allies as well as of the United States. We are
examining technologies for defense not just against
ballistic missiles that can reach the US, but also against
the shorter-range ballistic missiles that can strike our
allies. We are consulting closely with our allies and other
nations on the Strategic Defense Initiative and will
continue to do so as the program progresses.
23. How can the Allies participate in SDI research?
A: We have invited those Allies who wish to do so to work out
with us bilateral programs of cooperation in SDI research.
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs)
24. Is the US unwilling to accept any new limits on
anti-satellite weapons?
A: In an arms control sense space is already heavily
regulated, perhaps more so than earth. The Outer Space
Treaty prohibits the placing of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons, in space. The
Limited Test Ban Treaty forbids the testing of nuclear arms
in space. Additionally, all systems -- whether nuclear or
otherwise -- which have a capability to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their warheads at any point in their
trajectory are subject to the ABM Treaty. That agreement
prohibits the deployment of ABM systems in space or on
earth, except for precisely limited, fixed, land-based
systems. Its provisions also cover testing and engineering
development of systems or their major components.
Therefore, the only space activity that remains outside of
such regulation is certain anti-satellite or ASAT systems.
The principal ASAT capabilities not covered by existing
limitations are non-nuclear systems capable of attacking
satellites but incapable of countering ICBM reentry
vehicles. This restricted class of systems includes the
operational Soviet co-orbital ASAT and the aircraft-
launched miniature vehicle now under development by the US.
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Devising effective ASAT limitations is extremely difficult,
and the more comprehensive the limitations, the greater the
difficulties. These difficulties include definition,
verification, and dealing with the targeting and
reconnaissance capabilities of Soviet satellites which
could affect US deterrent forces.
We are prepared to consider any proposal which would be
consistent with our security, and to study carefully any
serious Soviet proposals.
25. Didn't President Reagan authorize an ASAT moratorium in
fall 1984?
A: The President stated that the US would consider what
measures of restraint both sides might take while
negotiations proceed. Since then, we have continued to
study all aspects of possible ASAT limits very carefully,
in order to find militarily significant and verifiable
limits on ASAT capability. We are prepared to study any
Soviet proposals carefully.
Geneva Negotiations - General
26. How are the Geneva negotiations proceeding? How will we
know whether progress is being made?
A: We have agreed with the Soviets to keep details of the
negotiations confidential, based on our belief that
publicizing our exchanges in Geneva would be counter-
productive to serious give-and-take. However, I can say
that during the first round of negotiations the Soviets
proposed nothing new and posed as a precondition for
progress in the strategic arms area the resolution of the
space arms issue -- on their terms. They also back tracked
from previous proposals. In the second round, which
concluded in mid-July, there was little movement, but the
Soviets were marginally less polemical than in the first
round, and, in some areas, they began to respond to our
efforts to engage them in serious dialogue. Thus, as the
negotiations proceed, many tough issues remain to be
resolved, and the process will require patience and
persistence. We are convinced that we have formulated a
sound approach, advanced by an excellent negotiating team,
which could lay the groundwork for equitable and verifiable
agreements that would be in the interest of both sides.
27. Do you have some sort of timetable in mind for getting
agreements?
A: The most important requirement is that we get good
agreements. We are prepared to negotiate as long as is
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necessary for such an outcome. The process will require
patience, persistence, and Allied solidarity.
28. Are you pessimistic or optimistic?
A: Although the issues in Geneva are many and complex, we are
convinced that we have formulated a good approach that
provides a sound basis for mutually beneficial agreements.
We have assembled a delegation comprising three excellent
negotiating teams. Accordingly, despite our realization of
the difficulties ahead, we are hopeful that beneficial
agreements will ultimately be obtained.
29. What are our fallback positions?
A: We are convinced that our current positions would deal with
the issues of the negotiations equitably and effectively.
30. How do you respond to Soviet charges that the US is
reneging on its January commitment to seek to prevent an
arms race in space?
A: The US does indeed seek to prevent an arms race in space.
We will continue to abide by the Outer Space Treaty and
those provisions of other agreements that limit space
weapons. If our SDI research program indicates that
defensive technologies are feasible, we would seek to
jointly manage with the Soviets a transition to a more
defense-reliant balance, including the deployment of any
space-based defenses tnat might prove desirable. Such an
approach would be designed to provide an agreed program for
the introduction of defenses on both sides concurrent witn
an agreed program to reduce destabilizing offensive nuclear
arms. This would be the opposite of an arms race; it would
increase the confidence both sides could have in effective
deterrence and a diminution in the risk of war. We are
even now trying to engage the Soviets in discussions on
these issues.
31. If all nuclear weapons were eliminated, wouldn't
conventional war become more likely?
A: In such a situation, the need for a staple conventional
balance would become even more important than it is today.
We would have to devote particular attention to how,
together with our Allies, we might counter and diminish the
threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both
conventional arms improvements and arms control efforts.
Were we able to move with the Soviets in a jointly managed
transition toward a nuclear-free world, we snould be able
to establish a more cooperative relationship with them in
general -- one in which efforts to establish a conventional
balance at lower levels might be more fruitful.
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32. What is your view of the morality of deterrence based on
mutual assured destruction?
A: Our basic aim is to live in peace with freedom. To
maintain peace it is necessary to deter those who would
wish to gain by war or the threat of war. Deterrence
requires that the potential aggressors be faced with the
prospect of effective resistance and the risk of
unacceptable damage. Deterrence and defense are moral.
Otherwise the prospect of maintaining freedom would be
extinguished. The defender should, however, strive to
deter and defend with the minimum level of violence
consistent with that purpose. If there is no available
alternative other than the threat of nuclear retaliation,
then this is the necessary and moral course. If, through
adequate defenses, one can deny the potential aggressor any
hope of military success and thus deter him from
aggression, that then becomes the preferable and the moral
course.
33. What is your view of Soviet leader Gorbachev's moratorium
proposal?
The proposal outlined by General Secretary Gorbachev in his
interview with Pravda is essentially a repackaging of
previous Soviet freeze proposals, and would not be in the
US interest. Specifically:
It would lock in the advantages the Soviets have
gained in both strategic and intermediate-range
nuclear arms as a result of their deployment of many
modern systems during a period in which the US has
exercised restraint.
It would also directly undercut the prospects for
achieving reductions, instead giving the Soviets
incentives to preserve their advantages by
perpetuating the freeze.
The proposed ban on strategic defense research could
not be verified, as the Soviets have in the past
conceded.
Moreover, SDI research holds open the possibility of
providing the means for a move to a more defense-
reliant relationship, one that would be more stable
and reliable for both sides. Such a possibility
should not be foreclosed.
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The ban on testing and deployment of "space-strike
arms" would perpetuate a situation in which the Soviet
Union has the world's only operational anti-satellite
system. Once a system of this type has reached
operational status, monitoring its deployment is most
difficult.
In sum, this proposal does not appear to provide a useful
basis for progress in the Geneva talks.
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Basic Qs and As
1. Don't we already have enough nuclear weapons? Why do we
need more?
A. The ultimate U.S. long-term objective is the eventual
complete elimination of nuclear weapons. As a step in that
direction, we are negotiating with the Soviet Union in
Geneva for substantial, stabilizing and verifiable
reductions in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear
forces, and we hope the Soviet Union will negotiate
seriously toward this objective.
At the same time, it is important that we maintain an
adequate nuclear deterrent. Many of our current nuclear
weapons are aging and becoming increasingly vulnerable as a
result of the massive Soviet buildup and relative US
restraint during the last fifteen years. Our objective,
embodied in the President's strategic modernization program,
is not to increase the number of weapons, but to replace
aging weapons systems with newer ones that can continue to
deter effectively. If we do not take these steps to
modernize now, the Soviet Union will have little incentive
to negotiate for the the significant reductions we are
proposing in Geneva. (Cf TAB 4 for details of the US
modernization program, and TAB 5 for US-Soviet force
comparisons.)
2. Why won't the U.S. agree to a mutual US-Soviet pledge not to
be the first to use nuclear weapons?
A. We and our NATO partners have stated that we will not be the
first to use any weapons except in response to aggression.
A nuclear no-first-use pledge by itself would be no
guarantee that no nuclear weapons would be used. Moreover,
such a pledge would make war more rather than less likely by
making Europe seem safe for conventional aggression. It
could tempt Moscow to hope that it could take conventional
military action against our European allies at relatively
low cost to itself, or make West European governments more
vulnerable to Soviet political pressure.
3. Isn't this Administration preparing to fight a limited
nuclear war? Doesn't the existence of many small accurate
battlefield nuclear weapons make nuclear war more thinkable?
A. No, we do not seek to fight any type of war. The existence
of tactical nuclear weapons does not make the decision to
use nuclear weapons of any kind any more thinkable or
likely. Such weapons are necessary to ensure that we have
credible and effective forces to be able to respond flexibly
to all levels of Soviet aggression. Only through such a
capability can we maintain a credible deterrent posture.
Given the massive and varied forces we face and the range of
possible Soviet actions, deterrence requires a spectrum of
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capabilities whose use would seem credible to Moscow in
different situations. It would be militarily, politically,
and morally unsound to have only two options -- massive
retaliation or capitulation to Soviet demands.
4. Why is the Administration deploying first strike weapons
like the MX and the Pershing II?
A. We do not have a first strike strategy, and, as a result, we
do not possess, nor will we build in the future, a first
strike capability.
Neither the MX nor the Pershing II are first-strike
threats. Such a capability presupposes a combination of
numerical superiority, speed, accuracy, and range.
The planned force of 100 MX missiles is clearly insufficient
to pose a first strike threat to the 1400 Soviet ICBM silos,
let alone to the additional hundreds -- and perhaps
thousands -- of other key hardened Soviet assets.
Similarly, even with the full deployment of 108 Pershing II
missiles, they are not sufficient for a first-strike attack
against the USSR's intermediate-range, much less its
strategic forces. Moreover, the Pershing II's range is only
1800 km, which puts Moscow, and 80% of Soviet strategic
forces, well outside its range.
In reality, it is the USSR, with over 400 multiple warhead,
highly accurate LRINF missiles and over 600 heavy MIRVed
ICBMS, which is now much closer to a first-strike
capability. U.S. arms reduction proposals and planned force
improvements address the Soviet ability to destroy U.S.
ICBMs in their silos as well as NATO assets.
5. How can the U.S. claim to be for nuclear arms reductions
when we are building and will be deploying thousands of new
weapons? Haven't both sides' nuclear arsenals grown out of
all proportion to defensive needs?
A. We are for mutual and verifiable arms reductions to achieve
balance at the lowest possible level and are committed to
retaining only the minimum number of nuclear weapons
necessary for deterrence. The U.S. nuclear stockpile today
is actually lower than it was in the mid-1960's: we had 1/3
more nuclear weapons in 1967 than we have now, and the total
yield (megatonnage) of our stockpile was 75% greater in the
1960's. Moreover, in 1983, NATO decided to withdraw 1,400
warheads over the next five or six years. Taken together
with the withdrawal of the 1,000 warheads following the 1979
dual-track decision, the total number of warheads removed
from Europe since 1979 will be 2,400, resulting in the
lowest NATO stockpile level in 20 years. In addition, since
one further warhead is being removed from the stockpile for
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each Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
deployed, the NATO stockpile level will not be affected by
deployment of these LRINF weapons.
6. Do you think a nuclear war could be limited or won?
A. As the President said many times, nuclear war cannot De won
and must never be fought. This is why our efforts are
directed at preventing war between the nuclear powers from
occuring. As part of this effort, the U.S. has proposed a
number of initiatives -- including substantial reductions in
the number of strategic and intermediate range nuclear
weapons, decreasing conventional forces in Europe and
reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation
which are designed to enhance strategic stability and
security. But even in a world with far fewer and less
destabilizing nuclear weapons we would still need to be able
to deter potential aggressors.
7. The President said that the Soviets have superiority in
nuclear weapons. Don't experts say there is parity or rough
parity now?
A. At his March 31, 1983 Press Conference, the President said
that the Soviets have a "definite margin of superiority,
enough so there is risk . . ." He was referring to our
concern about:
the vulnerability of our land-based ICBMs;
Soviet superiority in intermediate-range nuclear
missiles;
the Soviet lead in strategic ballistic missile
launchers, warheads and throwweight; and
the momemtum of Soviet nuclear weapons programs.
Although there is some disagreement among experts on the
relative significance of some measures of nuclear
capability, there is no disagreement that in the overall
strategic balance the U.S. has until recently experienced a
long downward trend relative to the Soviet Union since the
mid-1960's. It is thus necessary for the US to continue to
redress the balance to maintain deterrence and provide
incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for
genuine and verifiable arms reductions. This is what our
modernization programs are all about.
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8. If our SLBMs can destroy all Soviet cities in a retaliatory
strike, and our B-52s and bomber weapons still have some
advantage over the Soviets, why do we need a land-based ICBM?
A. It is not our purpose to destroy Soviet cities. Our task is
to prevent nuclear war by deterring Soviet aggression. Over
the years, we have learned that a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and
bombers provides the strongest possible deterrent. Each
system has unique capabilities which makes the whole of the
triad more than the sum of its individual parts. This range
of capabilities represented in the U.S. strategic triad
makes it more difficult for a potential aggressor to cripple
our deterrent forces. Maintaining all three legs of the
triad substantially complicates Soviet strategic planning.
To rely on bombers and SLBMs exclusively would undercut U.S.
force flexibility, and reduce hedges a(pinst failure of one
or more legs of the triad, or the possibility of sudden
Soviet technological breakthroughs. Moreover, to rely
solely on these two legs of the triad would limit U.S.
retaliatory capability against hardened Soviet military
targets since bombers are slow-flying and face heavy Soviet
air defenses, while SLBMs cannot destroy hardened targets
such as missile silos.
9. What is U.S. nuclear targeting policy and how can you
prevent harm to innocent civilians?
A. For moral, political and military reasons, it is not U.S.
policy to target Soviet civilian populations as such.
Rather, our policy is to deter aggression by making it clear
that we have the capability to hold at risk those things the
Soviets value, e.g. Soviet military forces, botn nuclear and
conventional, and its industrial capability to sustain war.
10. Why is the U.S. planning to spend millions on civil defense
when we know that there are no winners in a nuclear war?
How can our civil defense efforts make any difference?
A. We have no illusions: any war -- conventional or nuclear
would take a terrible toll of human life. But, as a
democratic government, we are morally bound to do what we can
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to mitigate the effects of such a conflict, and provide for
some protection during conflict. It is the responsibility
of the government to be prepared for such contingencies,
however remote.
11. How do you perceive the Soviet threat?
A. The Soviet threat to Western security and freedom, and more
generally to international peace, derives from the Soviet
military build-up and Soviet international interventionism.
Over the past 10-15 years, the Soviets have undertaken a
massive build-up of virtually all aspects of their arsenal
-- conventional and nuclear -- that has clearly gone far
beyond any rational definition of what the Soviets might
need for legitimate defensive purposes.
As their build-up has proceeded, the Soviets have
demonstrated an increasing tendency to intervene in other
countries through direct or proxy military force. Their
December 1979 invasion and their continuing occupation of
Afghanistan against the opposition of the overwhelming
majority of that country's people is but one example. Their
constant pressures on Poland from the start of that
country's reform efforts in August 1980, through the tragic
repression of that process in December 1981, is another.
Their massive shipments of arms and their intervention
either directly or through proxies like Cuba in such places
as Angola, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Indochina
and the Caribbean provide further illustration. If we are
to live in a stable and peaceful world we must convince the
Soviets to follow more responsible policies.
12. Isn't the prospect of nuclear war so horrible as to make
irrelevant any national or other differences between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union?
A. We do not believe that the choice is between failing to
defend our interests or risking war. Maintaining a stable
military balance, and trying to resolve our differences
peacefully has worked to prevent major war for forty years,
and we believe it can continue to do so. The record shows
that the Soviets, while quick to take advantage of
opportunities to increase their influence in trouble spots,
are more cautious when faced with states willing and able to
defend themselves and their interests. Our maintenance of
strong deterrent forces is designed to discourage the
Soviets from contemplating any aggression or coercion of the
U.S. and our allies. It is therefore the best way to
prevent the horrors of a nuclear war.
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DETERRENCE: THE POLICY & THE CHALLENGE
Nineteen eighty-five marks the fortieth anniversary of the
end of World War II and the use of atomic weapons to bring that
conflict to a close. During the past four decades, there has
been no armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union, or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the first
45 years of the twentieth century -- in which we witnessed two
global conflagrations -- there has been peace among the major
powers during the past 40 years. These years also represent
the longest continuous period of peace Europe has known since
the early nineteenth century. This is no accident. It is, in
large measure, a 'esult of the policy of deterrence adopted by
the United States and the Western democracies in the wake of
World War II, a policy designed to deter any aggression, either
conventional or nuclear, against ourselves or our allies.
The awesome destructiveness of modern warfare, coupled with
the introduction of nuclear weapons, has made the prevention of
major conflict imperative. US policy is based on this
principle. But this recognition on our part alone is not
sufficient to prevent the outbreak of war; it is essential that
the Soviet leadership understand it as well. As the Scowcroft
Commission's first report stated so succinctly:
Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to
quantification. Still less is it a mirror-image
would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of
the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own
attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It
requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter
them from considering aggression, even in a crisis -- not
to determine what would deter us.
S imple
of what
beliefs in
values and
We are under no illusions about the dangers of nuclear
conflict. I can think of no clearer or better statement of US
policy than that which President Reagan has made on numerous
occasions: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought." Even a cursory glance at our nuclear force structure
and modernization plans makes clear that this in fact is our
policy: we do not have, nor do we seek, a first-strike
capability; we do not have a "nuclear warfighting" posture; all
of our exercises and doctrine are defensive in nature.
Unfortunately, we face an adversary whose collective
leadership has, through its strategic force deployments and
exercises, given clear indications that it believes that, under
certain circumstances, nuclear wars may be fought and won. The
Soviets' development of a potential first-strike force of
SS-18s and SS-19s, their plans to reload ICBM silos, the refire
missiles associated with systems such as the SS-20, the
extensive hardening of key assets, and the amounts they spend
on civil defense are all indicators of such an attitude. As a
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2
result, it is our task to ensure that the Soviet leadership, in
calculating the risks of aggression, recognizes that because of
our retaliatory capability, there are no circumstances in wnicn
it would benefit them to attack us or our allies at any level.
In the final analysis, effective deterrence requires not
only that we have the capability to respond adequately to any
aggression but also that we be perceived by potential
adversaries as having that capability. If Soviet leaders
understand that a nuclear conflict could lead to the
destruction of thos.! military, political and economic assets
they value most highly, Soviet plans for aggression lose
whatever attractiveness they might otherwise hold, and the risk
of war is diminished. Accordingly, we must have sufficient
forces to make certain that the Soviets understand clearly that
we can and will deny them their objectives at any level of
conflict they might contemplate.
Flexible Response
By 1961, Soviet nuclear capabilities had grown to the point
that the inflexible US strategy of massive retaliation was no
longer credible. Consequently, the Kennedy Administration
formulated a strategy of flexible response that combined a wide
range of conventional and nuclear capabilities to enforce
deterrence. Today, some 24 years later, US policy remains one
of deterrence through flexible response. To be sure, as the
Soviet threat has evolved, so too has our strategy of flexible
response. Additional response options and capabilities were
built into our nuclear plans and our forces in order to
maintain deterrence in the face of Soviet developments. Each
of the changes under succeeding administrations had been
designed to ensure that the US possesses the capability to meet
aggression at any level an adversary might contemplate -- and
thus prevent it.
Unfortunately, many who have chosen to criticize the
evolution of US nuclear strategy seem to measure our current
deterrent requirements against some threat of days past,
thereby wishing away the reality of emerging imbalances. For
example, in 1974, Secretary Schlesinger's nuclear policy
modifications were met with concern and misunderstanding. Yet
his important step, which increased the flexibility with which
a President might respond to an attack (and therefore our
ability to deter one) was denounced by some as a move toward
"nuclear warfighting." The same thing occurred in 1980 to
Secretary Brown. The Reagan Administration has not been spared
similar criticism and misrepresentation. The fact remains,
however, that deterrence through flexible response continues to
be our policy and strategy today, and it will remain so
throughout the President's second term. The fact also remains
that any discussion of the nuclear strategies needed to deter
Soviet attacks always brings forth denunciations of those who
discuss or have to deal with these matters.
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3
_
In order to ensure deterrence, we need to think about and
plan against possible failures of deterrence. While we cannot
predict how a conflict would escalate should deterrence fail,
the credibility of our deterrent forces increases as we
demonstrate flexibility in our response (tions and in our
forces. That flexibility offers the possibility of terminating
a conflict and reestablishing deterrence at the lowest level of
violence possible, avoiding further destruction. Although
there is no guarantee that we would be successful in creating
such limits, there is every guarantee such limitations would
not be achievable if we do not attempt to create them.
Flexible response does not, however, imply that we seek to
fight a limited nuclear war or, for that matter, to fight a
nuclear war under any conditions. It does imply our profound
belief that, if we have the capability to present the Soviet
leadership with unacceptable consequences at any level of
aggression of which they are capable, then that aggression will
not occur in the first place.
Coupling: The Conventional-Nuclear Linkage
To enhance deterrence in NATO, we have for many years
stationed nuclear forces in Europe. Many of those delivery
systems are "dual capable," meaning they can use both
conventional and -- with proper authorization from the
President and in consultation with our allies -- nuclear
weapons. These nonstrategic nuclear forces, along with
conventional forces provided by the US and other NATO nations,
constitute the front line of defense against any Warsaw Pact
aggression. All of our nuclear forces are governed by a single
coherent policy that governs the linkage among our
conventional, nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear
forces. Therefore, the Soviets must understand that an attack
on NATO constitutes an attack on the US and risks the
engagement of US nuclear forces.
It is important to note that, in addition to providing a
range of nuclear options for deterrence, the adoption of the
flexible response strategy in the 1960s also had as a goal
improving NATO's conventional capabilities so as to reduce
reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or cope with a nonnuclear
attack. Unfortunately, neither we nor our allies ever fully
met this goal. Thus, with our present effort to increase our
conventional strength, NATO is essentially seeking to secure a
long-established but elusive goal. The greater urgency with
which we have approached this task stems from the fact that,
over the past decade, the Warsaw Pact has strengthened its
nonnuclear as well as its nuclear forces to a far greater
extent than has NATO.
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The very purpose of our effort to strengthen conventional
forces is to lessen NATO's reliance on the threat to use
nuclear weapons to stop a conventional attack. If it is clear
to the Soviets that a conventional assault cannot produce a
victory, either through a quick campaign or by outlasting NATO
in conventional combat, then no rational Soviet planner would
launch such an assault in the first place. But we cannot allow
our security to rest entirely on the calculations of a Soviet
planner as to whether he can successfully attack and invade
NATO Europe with his conventional military power. As a result,
in addition to our conventional modernization and
sustainability programs, our nuclear forces remain an important
element in deterring a Soviet attack, especially one supported
by nuclear weapons. If the Soviet leadership is aware that
NATO will respond to an attack with all the means necessary to
defend itself and prevent the USSR from achieving its war aims,
then deterrence is strengthened, and the chances of both
conventional and nuclear war are reduced.
Deterrence at Sea
The US also deploys dual-capable weapons systems aboard a
wide variety of ships. In addition to deterring Soviet first
use of similar nuclear weapons at sea, US nuclear antiair and
antisubmarine weapons provide unique capabilities that serve as
a hedge against a massive and catastrophic failure of our
conventional systems. Nuclear-capable carrier-based aircraft
and nuclear Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles have three
vital roles: contributing to our nuclear reserve force;
providing a worldwide deterrent presence; and deterring attacks
on our naval forces by Soviet nuclear antiship missiles
(especially those aboard Backfire and Badger bombers). US
sea-based nuclear forces, along with our land-based forces,
support our policy of confronting the Soviet leadership with
uncertainty and risk should they contemplate a nuclear war at
sea.
(The preceding is an excerpt from the Secretary of Defense's
Annual Posture Statement.)
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U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
Soviet Force Expansion
Over the last fifteen years, the Soviet Union has undertaken
an unprecedented expansion and modernization of its
strategic nuclear forces.
Since 1970, the USSR has deployed at least three new
MIRVed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) types
(the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19) (with at least nine
modifications of new or previously existing ICBM types)
and has Jeveloped two new types -- the SS-X-24 and
SS-X-25 in violation of the SALT II agreement. The SS-18
and SS-19 in particular are highly accurate and powerful
missiles with significant hard-target-kill capability.
During the same period, the USSR has also introduced five
new Submrine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) types
(SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23), five
variants of new or existing SLBM types, and six new or
improved Ballistic Missile-Carrying Submarine (SSBN)
types, including the TYPHOON, the world's largest
submarine.
-- The USSR is also producing new long-range BACKFIRE
bombers at a rate of at least 30 a year, and a new
variant of the BEAR bomber designed specifically to carry
cruise missiles. It began deploying long-range
air-launched cruise missiles in 1984.
The increase in Soviet strategic forces continues unabated.
The USSR is flight-testing two new ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and
SS-X-25) and a new SLBM (the SS-NX-23), and has several
other modified or new ICBMs in various stages of development.
Testing of the SS-X-25 violates the SALT II prohibition on a
second new type of ICBM. The USSR is also developing a new
strategic bomber (the BLACKJACK), flight-testin9 new
long-range sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles (the
SS-NX-21 and SSC-X-4), and developing a larger sea-launched
cruise missile (the SS-NX-24). A ground-based variant of
this missile may also be in development.
Moreover, the Soviets have increased the numbers and
capabilities of their air defense systems--the most
extensive and sophisticated in the world--whose purpose is
to prevent bombers from penetrating their airspace, and have
hardened their ICBM silos and other facilities to render a
large portion of our retaliatory capability ineffective
against them.
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2
- The Soviet Union is also upgrading the world's only
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and is actively engaged
in research on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.
In addition, several Soviet actions--including violations
and potential violations of the ABM Treaty--in the aggregate
suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its
national territory.
Deployment of such a defense is prohibited by the ABM Treaty
and could have significant impact on the effectiveness of
U.S. strategic forces.
U.S. Restraint
- In contrast, the United States carried out only a limited
number of force improvements in the 1970s. We MIRVed our
MINUTEMAN III ICBMs, hardened our MINUTEMAN silos, deployed
the Poseidon C-3 SLBM, and began deploying the TRIDENT C-4
SLBM. We also added short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) to
our B-52s to help them penetrate heavy Soviet air defenses.
- During this period, the United States greatly reduced its
number of nuclear weapons. We had one-third more nuclear
weapons in 1967 than we have now. We have not increased the
number of our deployed ICBMs since 1967. Our SSBN fleet
fell from 41 boats to 31 between 1966 and 1981. We built no
B-52s after 1962.
U.S. Strategic Modernization Program
- Those years of Soviet growth and relative U.S. restraint
created serious imbalances in the capability and age of U.S.
and Soviet strategic forces. President Reagan's strategic
force modernization program is designed to correct those
imbalances and thereby to maintain our deterrent, strengthen
stability, and provide incentives for substantial,
equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions.
The President's plan covers five major elements of our
strategic forces:
-- To enhance the survivability of our command and control
network, we are improving our early warning and
communications systems, and continuing development of
more robust C3 systems.
We are deploying air-launched cruise missiles on selected
B-52 bombers to ensure our near-term ability to penetrate
Soviet air defenses. To ensure continued bomber
penetration capability in the future, we have begun
production of the B-1 bomber and are developing an
advanced technology bomber for deployment in the early
1990s.
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3
We have begun deploying new TRIDENT submarines at the
rate of about one a year to replace our aging SSBNs, and
are developing the TRIDENT II SLBM, which will have
better accuracy and a greater payload than its
predecessors. We will begin deploying the TRIDENT II
SLBM at the end of this decade. For the near-term, we
began in 1984 to deploy TOMAHAWK sea-launched cruise
missiles aboard selected Navy combatants.
To improve the effectiveness of our land-based ICBMs, we
plan to deploy a force of 100 PEACEKEEPER (MX) missiles.
We have also begun developing a new small sin7le-warhead
ICBM, as recommended by the Scowcroft commission.
To revitalize our strategic defensive forces, we are
replacing obsolete F-106 interceptors with modern F-15
and F-16 aircraft. We are also deploying modern
early-warning radars on the DEW line and our coastal
approaches--although it is not a part of the Strategic
Modernization Program, under the President's Strategic
Defense Initiative we are researching technologies which
hold promise for developing in the future reliable,
survivable, and cost effective defenses against ballistic
missiles that could protect our allies as well as the
United States. If successful, the results of this effort
would allow us to move from exclusive reliance on the
threat of retaliation for deterrence toward greater
reliance on defensive systems.
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FY 1986 DEFENSE BUDGET
Overview
- The FY 1986 Department of Defense budget calls for spending
authority of $313.7 billion (an increase over 1985 of 29
billion; of which 12 billion or 4.2% is due to inflation,
plus 17 billion, or 5.9% is real growth), and outlays of
$277.5 billion.
- Defense spending declined in real terms during most of the
1970s; it has experienced sustained growth only since 1979.
-- The defense share of federal outlays, which was more than
50 percent in FY 1955 will be less than 30 percent in FY
1986.
The defense share of U.S. Gross National Product (GNP),
based on current estimates for defense outlays and
economic growth, will average only slightly more than
seven percent over the next five years. This is well
below the level of the peacetime years in the 1950s and
1960s.
- Defense outlays in FY 1986 will be primarily for current
year operations (7 percent), pay and pay-related items (43
percent), and proir year investment requirements (38
percent). Only 12 percent will be spent on new investment
programs.
Strategic Forces
- The FY 1986 budget proposal continues to implement the
President's strategic modernization program.
-- It calls for the continued production of PEACEKEEPER (MX)
missiles.
Funds are requested for the continued development of a
small single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) and mobile launcher.
We are also requesting funds for the purchase of the
thirteenth TRIDENT ballistic-missile-carrying submarine
and development and production funding for the TRIDENT II
sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
The budget completes a procurement of 100 B-1B strategic
bombers, and further development ot the Advanced
Technology Bomber.
Funds are also requested to improve our space
surveillance and defensive capabilities, including the
anti-satellite program, and to upgrade and protect the
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2
-- survivability of our command, control, communications,
and intelligence program.
- Coming after long years of U.S. restraint in weapons
programs and an incessant Soviet build-up, the President's
strategic modernization program is essential to maintain the
continued effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent and to
persuade the USSR to negotiate genuine nuclear arms
reductions.
Our MINUTEMIN ICBMs cannot hold at risk Soviet hard
targets and are vulnerable to attack from hundreds of
modern Soviet heavy ICBMs. Our B-52s are increasingly
unable to penetrate Soviet air defenses. Most of our
submarine force faces block obsolescence in the 1990s.
We must therefore modernize all three legs of the
strategic triad at once.
-- Yet our strategic nuclear forces take up less than 15
percent of tne FY 1986 defense budget, only about 4
percent of the federal budget, and about one percent of
GNP.
Strategic Defense Initiative
- The Strategic Defense Inititive research program is
exploring technologies which hold promise for developing
reliable, survivable and cost effective defenses against
ballistic missiles that could protect our allies as well as
the United States.
We hope that the research undertaken in the SDI will
eventually allow us to move from exclusive dependence on the
threat of nuclear retaliation for deterrence toward greater
reliance on defensive systems which threaten no one.
- In FY 1986, the major emphasis of SDI research will be on
directed-energy weapons, surveillance and target acquisition
technologies, and identifying how defensive systems could be
made survivable against a determined attack.
- The budget request also emphasizes less developed
technologies that have high potential for very large gains
in cost-effectiveness and ability to overcome potential
Soviet countermeasures.
- The promise of the SDI--of a world in which the threat of
ballistic missiles has been substantially reduced--is great.
- Yet the FY 1986 budget request for SDI research amounts to
only slightly more than 1 percent of the defense budget, and
about one-third of 1 percent of the overall federal budget.
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CURRENT STRATEGIC BALANCE -
OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
AS OF APRIL 1985
U.S.
30 TITAN II
450 MINUTEMAN II
550 MINUTEMAN ill
1030
304 POSEIDON 1C-31
312 TRIDENT IC-41
616
167 B-52G
96 B-52H
ICBMs
SLBMs
BOMBERS
SOVIETS
520 SS-11
60 SS-13
150 SS-17
308 SS-18
360 SS-19
1398
42 SS-N-5
336 SS-N-6
292 SS-N-8
12 SS-N-17
224 SS-N-18
16 SS-N-20
982
125 BEAR
48 BISON
250 BACKFIRE
263 423
TOTAL DELIVERY VEHICLES
1909 2751
BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS
7700 8800
BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT
4.4 MILLION POUNDS 11.9 MILLION POUNDS
CAPABILITY AGAINST HARDENED TARGETS-USSR HAS 2:1 ADVANTAGE
A FREEZE TODAY WOULD LOCK IN POTENT SOVIET MILITARY ADVANTAGES.
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I 1960 I
BEAR
BISON
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U.O. RIVIJ OV V IC I o nm Icum. ir-vm?K
INTRODUCTION OF SYSTEMS BY YEAR
SOVIET UNION
11111111 SALT I AND ABM TREATY ? I I SALT II ? 1979
I I 1972 I I I
9
4
BACKFIRE
8
A A
1
8
rei
_2]
3
I I 1985 I 1987
111
SS-NX-21
AS-15 1
*ij
HOTEL II
HOTEL III
GOLF II
YANKEE I
ii
A. A I
T
T r T
L L
A I IA n
s IS A
1 LEA F 2
1
A
n
; DELTA I
4
DELTA II
GOLF III
YANKEE II
DELTA III
TYPHOON
UNITED STATES
L.
MK 124
11
. A
ALCM
?I ALLEN
LAFAYETTE
GEORGE WASHI I II I I II I h I I OHIO,
19b, 197: 1979
* AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE SS-16 IS INCONCLUSIVE. BUT INDICATES PROBABLE DEPLOYMENT.
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DELTA IV
SLCM
BLACK JAC
SS-NX-24
B-1E3
kr1'
PEACEKEE
1987
0
(D
0
CD
=h
(D
5
SINCE SALT I, SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED MANY NEW
SYSTEMS AND REPLACED OLDER ONES FAR FASTER
THAN U.S.
CD
0
-o
U.S. U.S.S.R.
8
? 5 NEW TRIDENT SUBMARINES, THE -? SINCE SALT I, MORE THAN 50 SSBNs
(D
FIRST SSBNs BUILT SINCE 1967 DEPLOYED IN 6 NEW OR IMPROVED
CLASSES
(D
cn ? 1 NEW TYPE OF SLBM INTRODUCED ? SINCE SALT 1,4 NEW SLBM TYPES
(D
r.) SINCE SALT 1 ( +8 "MODS) HAVE BEEN INTRO-
0
DUCED AND USED TO REPLACE 1/2
OF OLDER SLBMs; YET ANOTHER
NEW SLBM ABOUT TO BE DEPLOYED
? NO NEW TYPES OF ICBMs DEPLOYED ? 3 NEW ICBMs IN 10 VARIANTS HAVE
-0 SINCE 1970; ONLY MINUTEMAN III REPLACED OVER HALF OF SOVIET
co
MODIFIED ICBMs SINCE SALT I. IN ALL A
0 TOTAL OF 800 NEW ICBMs HAVE
0
BEEN INTRODUCED. TWO NEW ICBMs
0 ARE CURRENTLY BEING TESTED
0
C))
? NEWEST B-52 BOMBER WAS BUILT ? SINCE SALT I, 250 BACKFIRE
OVER 20 YEARS AGO BOMBERS WITH INHERENT INTER-
CONTINENTAL RANGE DEPLOYED.
NEW BEARS STILL BEING PRODUCED.
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COMPARING U.S. AND SOVIET
STRATEGIC ARSENALS
(I)
CD1
U.S. WEAPONS
? ABOUT 20% OF OUR WEAPONS ARE ON ICBMs. OF THESE, 20% ARE ON SYSTEMS
OVER 15 YEARS OLD
? ABOUT 50% ARE ON SUBMARINES; OF THESE, 85% ARE ON SUBMARINES THAT ARE
OVER 15 YEARS OLD
? ABOUT 30% ARE ON BOMBERS; ALL OF THESE AIRCRAFT ARE OVER 20 YEARS OLD
? ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF U.S. WEAPONS ARE ON LAUNCH SYSTEMS OVER 15 YEARS
OLD
?41411111111.1=1
(D
0_
0
0
?.<
(D
0_
151"
SOVIET WEAPONS
? ABOUT 65% OF SOVIET WEAPONS ARE ON ICBMs. OF THESE, ABOUT 50% ARE ON
SYSTEMS WITH AN AGE OF 5 YEARS OR LESS AND OVER 90% ARE ON SYSTEMS
10 YEARS OLD OR LESS
? ABOUT 25% ARE ON SUBMARINES. OF THESE 85% ARE ON SUBMARINES THAT
ARE 10 YEARS OLD OR LESS
? ABOUT 10% ARE ON BOMBERS. OF THESE, ABOUT HALF ARE ON AIRCRAFT WHICH
ARE 5 YEARS OLD OR LESS
? OVER ONE HALF OF TOTAL SOVIET WEAPONS ARE ON LAUNCH SYSTEMS WHICH ARE
5 YEARS OLD OR LESS; ONLY 4% ARE ON SYSTEMS OVER 15 YEARS OLD
THE AGING U.S. ARSENAL MAKES MODIFICATIONS
MANDATORY IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE TO FIELD A CREDIBLE
DETERRENT FORCE. THE NEWER SOVIET ARSENAL ALLOWS
THE SOVIETS THE LUXURY TO FREEZE NOW
NOTE: WEAPONS ARE DEFINED AS WARHEADS ON MISSILES OR BOMBERS. ICBM SYSTEMS ARE DISTINGUISHED WHERE
SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN DIFFF 'T YIELDS AND ACCURACIES.
4
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INVENTORY WARHEADS
BY AGE OF LAUNCH SYSTEMS
1984
U.S.
LEGEND
M ICBM
SLBM
Ej BOMBER
4
U.S. WEAPONS ARE ON OLDER
LAUNCH SYSTEMS
SOVIET
r
/z
AGE IN YEARS 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20
LEGEND
ICBM
SLBM
EI BOMBER
:?-:.-
r
1
SOVIET WEAPONS ARE
ON NEWER LAUNCH SYSTEMS
AGE IN YEARS
7-,
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20
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0
(D
0
CD
(/)
(c)
CD
5
?0
WHY SYSTEM AGE IS IMPORTANT
CD
0
SSBMs/SLBMs ? PROBLEM: ? 31 POSEIDON SSBNs FACE BLOCK OBSOLESCENCE IN MID 1990s
? OLDEST POSEIDON SUBMARINES ARE 20 YEARS OLD AND OLDEST
a POSEIDON MISSILES ARE 14 YEARS OLD
? SURVIVABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS COMPONENT OF OUR
'f,h) DETERRENT MUST BE MAINTAINED AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL
? RESPONSE: ? TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND D-5 MISSILE WILL INCREASE SSBN
cT OPERATING AREAS AND HENCE SURVIVABILITY OF SUBMARINES;
TRIDENT SUBS WILL REPLACE AGING POSEIDON SSBNS
ICBMs ? PROBLEM: ? MINUTEMAN IS AGING, AND INCAPABLE OF HOLDING AT RISK
r71)
SOVIET HARD TARGETS TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE
cn
? TITANS BEING RETIRED
0
? RESPONSE: ? PEACEKEEPER NEEDED TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND ENSURE
CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF ICBM FORCE AND, THEREBY,
-o DETERRENCE
co
? NEW SMALL ICBM NEEDED TO ENHANCE STABILITY
cn
BOMBERS ? PROBLEM: ? B-52s ARE ALL OVER 20 YEARS OLD; HARD TO SUPPORT AND
0 INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO SOVIET DEFENSES
0
c71) NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL B-52s IS DECLINING; OLDER
51) MODELS ARE CLEARLY UNABLE TO PERFORM IN A DETERRENT
ROLE
.7.1) ? RESPONSE: ? ALCM AND ACM NEEDED AS STANDOFF WEAPON TO GUARANTEE
B-52 TARGET Cr"/ERAGE
BIB AND ATE, .EDED TO PENETRATE SOVIET DEFENSES
'Jed peq!ssepeo
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COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF WEAPONS
HOW TODAY'S LRINF IMBALANCE DEVELOPED
AND SOVIET PUBLIC DESCRIPTIONS OF US-USSR FORCE POSTURE
1400i1300
1200
1103
1003
700
800
500
408
200
100
1977
FEB 81
BREZHNEV:
"THERE IS APPROXIMATE
EQUALITY NOW..."
OCT 79
BREZHNEV: A "BALANCE OF
FORCES...HAS TAKEN
SHAPE IN EUROPE"
DEC n
SS-20
DEPLOYMENT
BEGINS
U.S.S.R.
APR 83
TASS "...CURRENTLY
EXISTING PARITY"
AUG 82
USTINOV:
"APPROXIMATE PARITY OF
FORCES...CONTINUES TO
EXIST TODAY..."
OCT 80
USSR NEGOTIATORS:
"A BALANCE NOW EXISTS"
nFr 70
NATO DECISION*
APR 85
GORBACHEV CALLS
FOR MORATORIUM
MAR 85
NEW
NEGOTIATIONS
BEGIN
NOV 83
SOVIETS WALK OUT
OF NEGOTIATIONS
NOV 81
INF NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN
sof" U.S.
fdamstammiaissuitaihaustinsmilmesommilia0)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
*THIS DECISION CALLED FOR LRINF DEPLOYMENTS AT END OF 1983 UNLESS AN ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENT WERE REACHED WHICH MADE THEM UNNECESSARY
1988
4115-4
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1000-
SOVIET SS-20
WARHEADS
NATO GLCM
AND PERSHING II
WARHEADS
TARGET COVERAGE OF
SOVIET SS-20 AND
NATO PERSHING II AND
GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE
MISSILES
1977
0
US USSR
END YEAR
1980 1982
0
1984
US USSR US USSR US USSR *
*AS OF DECEMBER 1984, THE USSR ALSO HAD 148 SS-4 LRINF
MISSILES DEPLOYED
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ct,
CI) cc
. . Z et
4IC u.
111 41
=
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(D
0_
0
0
(D
0_
(D
(T)
CD
(i)
(D
n.)
cn
U-t, P UUF i? u.; I, UU el 6E9001AlLed CII-V10
STATUS OF U.S. WEAPON STOCKPILE OVER TIME
INVENTORY
1.25
1.00
RELATIVE SCALE
1972 = 1.00
2.50
2.00
TOT AL U.S.
TOTAL YIELD
1.50
NUCLEAR
.75
ALL U.S.
WEAPONS
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
1.00
Imam
.50
II
.25
.50
IRON.
1 1 1 1
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
YEAR
MEGATONNAGE
RELATIVE SCALE
1972 = 1.00
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986
YEAR
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NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON
NATO
WARSAW PACT
Fen= I PamI Eon**
Rebdorced by Rod/ly
Daisy.* Fames*
SA AM
Fdy Rsidemod Foam**
TOTAL MILITARY
INCLUDING
NAVAL FORCES
115
DIVISION
EOUNALENTS
192
115
17.779
13AX
1?11?11.M?ir
11231
38.100
19M1
94,SX
12.341
MAIN BATTLE ANTI-TANK GUIDED
TANKS WEAPON LAUNCHERS
Oldie orammad 1Cmys amid ader
N owe aml devil
NOTE: WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS NORMAU.Y CONSIST OF FEWER PERSONNEL
THAN MANY NATO DIVISIONS BUT CONTAIN MORE TANKS AND
ARTILLERY. THEREBY OBTAINING SWIM COMBAT POWER
ARTILLERY/
MORTARS
hies iNmm ad
as.. admen
Redid Lamdmnd
ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS It INFANTRY NEUCOPTERS HELICOPTERS
FIGHTING VEHICLES
OTHER ARMORED
VEHICLES
ATTACK TRANSPORTMIPPORT
*RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES?INCLUDE THOSE U.S. FORCES WHOSE HIUIPTIENT IS STOW
IN EUROPE AND HIGH-READINESS SOVIET FORCES LOCATED IN THE BALTIC. BELORUSSIAN.
CARPATHIAN, ODESSA. KIEV AND NORTH CAUCASUS MILITMY DISTRICTS
**FULLY REINFORCED FORCES?INCLUDE NORTH AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS AND AU
WARSAW PACT FORCES LOCATED WEST OF THE URAL MOUNTAINS
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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS
Background
Between 1969 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet
Union engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).
Although that process yielded some benefits, it failed to meet
the hope of the early 1970s. Specifically, SALT II allowed for
growth in some elements of nuclear arsenals, inequalities with
respect to certain types of weapons systems, and ambiguities in
verification provisions. For these reasons, the U.S., after
extensive interagency review, adopted a new approach to what
were called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). That
approach emphasized achieving significant reductions in the most
important elements of strategic capability, equality of similar
forces, promoting greater stability by reducing the incentives
for a first strike, and ensuring effective verification of any
agreement signed.
U.S. Proposal
In June 1982, the United States and Soviet Union opened
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva. The initial
U.S. proposal called for a two-phased approach including:
reductions in ballistic missile warheads by about
one-third - to 5,000 for each side. No more than
one-half the remaining warheads to be on land-based
systems;
reductions in deployed ballistic missiles of about 50%
- to 850 for each side;
substantial reductions in ballistic missile destructive
capability (throw-weight); and
limitations on heavy bombers and cruise missiles that
could be carried by bombers.
After several rounds of negotiations, the United States
modified its proposal to take account of expressed Soviet
concerns and the recommendations of the President's Special
Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission). In March
1983, the United States dropped its proposal that no more than
1/2 the warheads be on ICBMs. In June 1983, the United States
relaxed its proposal for limits of 850 ballistic missiles, and
made other modifications to its position. These were
incorporated into a draft treaty which the United States
presented to the Soviets in Geneva in July, 1983. In October
1983, after close consultations with the Congress, the United
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-2-
States added to its position the proposal for a mutual,
guaranteed "build-down" of strategic forces. The build-down
proposal was designed to channel modernization of strategic
forces toward more stabilizing systems, and to ensure regular
annual reductions of strategic ballistic missile warheads and
heavy bombers. At the same time, the United States expressed
willingness to explore with the Soviets trade-offs between areas
of U.S. and Soviet advantage.
Soviet Position
In START, the Soviets proposed reductions of 25% in
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1800 for both sides.
They also proposed a combined limit on "nuclear charges"
(missile warheads and bomber weapons), a ban on all ground-and
sea-launched cruise missiles and a ban, later modified to a
limit, on air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of
600 Kilometers.
The U.S. proposal would have substantially reduced or
limited the most important elements of strategic forces in a
stabilizing manner, while permitting necessary modernization and
establishing a basis for future reductions. The Soviet proposal
was designed to allow the Soviets to preserve tneir advantages
in important elements of the strategic balance: it provided for
some reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but
would have permitted growth in the number of ballistic missile
warheads and would not have strengthened strategic stability.
At the end of Round V of START in December 1983, tne Soviet
Union refused to set a date for resumption of talKs, citing "a
change in the strategic situation" due to the beginning of
limited NATO INF missile deployments in Europe.
New Geneva Negotiations
The U.S. position in the new negotiations in Geneva builds
upon the U.S. position of fall 1983, and incorporates new
flexibility. Our objective remains the same: to strengthen
stability through substantial, equitable and verifiable
reductions in offensive nuclear forces, focussing on the most
destabilizing elements, e.g. ballistic missiles, their warheads
and destructive capacity. Specifically, the U.S. approach
features:
reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads;
limits on heavy bombers and ALCMs below SALT II levels;
flexibility to explore trade-offs between areas of U.S.
and Soviet advantage which take into account
differences in each side's force structure.
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Soviet Proposal
During the first round of negotiations (March - April 1985),
the Soviets proposed nothing new, and posed as a precondition
for progress in the strategic arms area the resolution of the
space arms issue -- on their terms. They publicly proposed a
vaguely worded call for a moratorium, and even backtracked from
several of their previous proposals, including with respect to
ALCM limits by calling for a ban on all cruise missiles with a
range over 600 KM. In the second round (May-July), the Soviets
were somewhat less polemical, although they did not offer a
concrete proposal of their own. They surfaced some concepts
which could involve possible reductions in existing strategic
offensive nuclear arsenals. However, tne methods of aggregation
poposed in these concepts seems designed to favor preservation
of the Soviet Union's primary area of advantage, that is,
prompt, hard target kill capability, the most worrisome element
in the current strategic equation. Efforts by tne U.S.
delegation to elicit Soviet answers to our questions about these
concepts, with regard to issues such as numbers, ceilings and
rates of possible reduction were essentially unanswered.
Points to Make
In the strategic offensive arms forum, our goal remains
to achieve a verifiable agreement for deep reductions
in strategic nuclear arsenals in a way that would
enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.
We have gone to the negotiations with new flexibility
in an effort to build upon the work done in the
Strategic Arms Reduction negotiations of 1982-83.
Our proposal focuses on achieving reductions in
ballistic missiles, their warheads and their
destructive capacity. We are also proposing reductions
in heavy bombers and the number of ALCMs they carry
below the levels set in SALT II.
Our negotiators have been given great latitude and
flexibility to find common ground, and to probe for
Soviet flexibility on issues of concern to the United
States. We have also made clear our readiness to
explore trade-offs between U.S. and Soviet areas of
advantage that take into account the differences in
each side's force structure.
We are prepared to consider any serious Soviet proposal that addresses
our concerns about stability and would result in deep and verifiable
reductions.
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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)
Background
History. The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles on
its territory with sufficient range to strike targets in Europe
but not the United States. In the late 1950s and early 1960s,
the USSR deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted against
Europe. Some 575 were in place by mid-1977. In contrast, NATO
in the early 1960s deployed fewer numbers of roughly equivalent
missiles--the Thor and Jupiter--in the United Kingdom, Italy
and Turkey. NATO unilaterally withdrew and retired these
systems in the 1960s, giving the Soviets a virtual monopoly in
this type of missile. The Soviet lead was tolerable when the
imbalance in these intermediate-range systems was offset by
superior US strategic forces, which provided an adequate
deterrent to Soviet aggression or intimidation.
Two critical developments--Soviet achievement of strategic
parity with the US and the deployment of the SS-20--came
together in the 1970s to alter the situation.
The SS-20. The SS-20 deployments which began in 1977, at
the rate of about one a week, represented a qualitative as well
as quantitative change in the European security situation. The
SS-20 is more accurate than the SS-4 and SS-5. It can strike
targets throughout Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and
much of Asia and the Pacific. It is mobile and can be
redeployed quickly to any part of the USSR. Finally, the SS-20
carries three independently targetable warheads, as opposed to
the single warhead of the earlier missiles, and its launchers
are capable of firing two, three or more rounds of missiles.
As of March 1985, the total force of Soviet SS-20s is 414.
NATO "Dual Track" Decision. As the Soviet SS-20 missile
force grew, and with no NATO missiles deployed in Europe which
could reach the USSR, European members of NATO raised the
concern that Moscow might come to believe--however
mistakenly--that US strategic forces could be decoupled from
the defense of Europe and stressed the need for a NATO
response.
This led to intensive alliance-wide consultations,
culminating in the NATO "dual-track" decision of December
1979. One "track" was to redress the imbalance in
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) through deployment in
Western Europe, starting in 1983, of 108 Pershing II ballistic
missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles over the next
five years. Meanwhile, on the other track, the United States
would negotiate with the Soviets to restore an INF balance at
the lowest possible level.
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2
Negotiations. Formal talks with the Soviet Union began in
November 1981, at which time the U.S. proposed to ban or
eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF systems, including the
Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5, and U.S. Pershing II and GLCM.
Even though the Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles throughout the
negotiations, on November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of
the INF talks, protesting votes in the parliaments of Great
Britain, Italy and West Germany that reaffirmed the dual-track
decision and the subsequent arrival of US longer range INF
missiles in Europe. On March 12, 1985, the US and Soviet Union
began a new set of arms control negotiations in Geneva which
include intermediate-range forces.
US Position. The US approach to the INF negotiations is
based on five principles: 1) equality of rights and limits, 2)
an agreement must include US and Soviet systems only, 3)
limitations must be applied on a global scale, with no transfer
of the threat from Europe to Asia, 4) NATO's conventional
defense capability must not be weakened, and 5) any agreement
must be effectively verifiable.
The US Zero-Zero Option Proposal which would eliminate all
U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles, the Interim
Agreement Proposal that would result in equal global limits on
LRINF missile warheads between 0-572, and the President's
September 1983 Initiatives are based on those criteria.
Soviet Approach. The Soviets initially refused to
negotiate, posing the condition that NATO must first renounce
the modernization track. The Soviets then proposed a bilateral
"moratorium" on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces
in Europe that NATO rejected for three reasons: it would have
codified the Soviet advantage in INF; would not have halted
the SS-20 buildup in the eastern USSR, and by preventing NATO's
deployment, a moratorium would have removed any incentive the
Soviets had to negotiate genuine reductions.
Only after Moscow recognized that NATO was determined to
proceed with deployments in the absence of negotiated
limitations, did the Soviets agree to INF negotiations. Moscow
proposed at the outset that "NATO"--by which the Soviets meant
the US, United Kingdom and France--and the USSR each reduce to
300 "medium range" missiles and aircraft in or "intended for
use" in Europe.
The effect of this Soviet proposal--and all the variations
of it that followed--would have been to prevent the deployment
of a single US Pershing II or cruise missile, while allowing
the Soviets to retain a formidable arsenal of SS-20s in Europe
and to continue their buildup of SS-20s in Asia. It also would
have removed from Europe hundreds of US aircraft capable of
carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons, essential to
NATO's conventional deterrent.
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3
In addition, Soviet insistence on compensation for the
independent strategic nuclear forces of Britain and France is
an assertion of the right to match the forces of all other
nuclear states combined and thus to codify nuclear superiority
over each of them. Moreover, British and French nuclear forces
are those nations' strategic deterrents. They are not
available for the defense of other European members of NATO in
the same way as US forces and they are small compared to the
size of the Soviet arsenal.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's April 1985 public
announcement of a unilateral freeze of the number of SS-20s
already in place in Europe still leaves the USSR with an
advantage in longer-range INF missile warheads of more than
eight-to-one. Moreover, it would leave unconstrained the SS-20
force in the Far East, a force which, due to the missile's
range and mobility, is capable of reaching targets in Europe in
addition to threatening US friends and allies in Asia.
Points To Make
o Deployments of the Soviet SS-20--a triple-warhead, highly
accurate, and mobile weapon--changed the nuclear balance in
Europe and presented a new and disturbing nuclear threat to
NATO and our Asian allies and friends.
o The object of Soviet INF missiles is to pose a regional
threat to Europe without directly threatening the US
mainland, thereby trying to sever or "decouple" US and
European strategic interests.
o In the face of this massive Soviet military build-up, NATO
decided to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces
while offering US-Soviet arms control negotiations on INF.
NATO's 1979 "dual track" decision demonstrates that the
Soviets cannot engage in such regional threats without
provoking a unified Alliance response.
o One "track" was to redress the INF imbalance through
deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983, of 108
Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched
cruise missiles. Meanwhile, on the other "track," the US
would negotiate with the Soviets to restore an INF balance
at the lowest possible level.
o Formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981,
at which time the U.S. proposed the complete elimination of
an entire class of longer-range land based INF missile
systems. In November 1983, the Soviets walked out of the
INF talks, protesting the arrival of US longer range INF
missiles in Europe--even though the Soviets deployed SS-20
missiles throughout the negotiations. On March 12, 1985,
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4
the US and Soviet Union began a new set of arms control
negotiations in Geneva which includes intermediate-range
forces.
o The US and NATO would greatly prefer a negotiated solution
to the INF problem. At tne opening of the talks, the US
proposed the elimination of the entire class of US and
Soviet longer-range INF missiles and that remains our
objective. We are also willing, as an interim measure, to
agree to equal 9lopal limits on LRINF missile warheads at
the lowest possible level. Moreover, in order to take
account of expressed Soviet concerns, we have reiterated
several additional initiatives first proposed in September
1983.
o However, in the absence of an equitable and verifiable arms
control agreement obviating the need for deployments, NATO
is determined to proceed with a measured and appropriate
modernization of its own forces.
o Negotiating proposals that allow the USSR to maintain a
virtual monopoly over NATO in such systems cannot be
regarded as serious efforts to address the concerns
underlying NATO's 1979 decision. Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev's April 1985 declared unilateral freeze of the
number of SS-20s already in place, even if implemented,
still leaves the USSR with an advantage in longer-range INF
missile warheads of more than eight-to-one.
o The US is prepared to consider any serious Soviet proposal
and is hopeful that the Soviet Union will address Western
security concerns in a constructive manner in Geneva.
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WALK IN THE WOODS
Q: What is the so-called "walk in the woods"?
A. In July 1982, during the so-called "walk in the woods" US
Ambassador Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart discussed
ideas for an agreement on an informal, exploratory basis.
Although the US had several problems with the proposal as
it stood we were interested in Keeping this informal
channel open. Moscow's reaction, on the other hand, was
completely negative on the proposal itself and on further
use of this informal channel.
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Q:
INF DEPLOYMENT FREEZE?
Is the US willing to accept a freeze on INF deployments,
particularly Pershing II missiles, if the Soviet Union will
consider the idea?
A: The United States has never proposed an INF deployment
freeze. As we have said on numerous occasions, a freeze
would reward the massive Soviet nuclear buildup of recent
years in strategic and intermediate-range weapons systems.
In the case of longer-range INF missiles, a freeze would
preserve an imbalance in favor of the Soviets in the single
most destabilizing weapons system in Europe.
A freeze would also remove incentives for the Soviets to
negotiate at Geneva a meaningful, verifiable agreement to
remove or significantly reduce the threat of SS-20 and
other longer-range INF missiles from Europe and Asia.
Finally, negotiating a mutual and verifiable freeze would
be at least as difficult and time-consuming a task as
negotiating an arms reduction accord which is our objective
in Geneva.
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U.S. Objectives in the Defense and Space Negotiations
-- We want to discuss emerging technologies and how these
could contribute to a more stable framework for deterrence,
although our SDI research program is years away from answers on
whether it will oe technically feasible and economically
worthwhile to move toward greater reliance on defenses.
-- In the meantime, we want to explain to the Soviets our
view of the relationship between offense and defense, the
potential contribution of defense to mutual security, and how we
could work together to ensure a stable transition toward
increased reliance on defense.
-- We want to discuss our concern about Soviet actions
which are eroding the ABM Treaty, and Soviet non-compliance with
this and other agreements. We are pressing for corrective
action where violations exist.
Soviet Programs and Objectives
Tne Soviets have over the past decade spent about as
much on strategic defenses as they have on offensive forces (tar
more than the U.S.) including research into advanced
technologies with ABM applications. The Soviets have and are
improving the world's only deployed ABM system, and have the
world's only operational ASAT system.
-- Soviet construction of a large radar complex in
Krasnoyarsk which violates the ABM Treaty, improvement of its
extensive strategic air defenses -- which have some ABM
potential, and other actions raise concern that they may be
developing a nationwide ABM defense, which is prohibited by the
ABM Treaty.
-- Soviet efforts to stop the U.S. SDI research should De
seen for what they are -- attempts to preserve Soviet advantages.
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Points to Stress on Space Arms Control
Significant limitations on space weapons already exist:
- Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction from space.
Limited Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear weapons tests in
space.
-- ABM Treaty bans development, testing, or deployment ut
space-based ABM systems or components.
International Treatment of Issue:
-- 1978-79 bilateral U.S.-USSR negotiations: Sides were
separated on several issues including verification problems;
negotiations were not resumed after invasion of Afghanistan.
-- Ad Hoc CD Committee to discuss outer space nas now been
formed along lines suggested by tne U.S. and its Allies two
years ago.
Difficult problems in space arms control discussed in tne
President's March 1984 Report:
-- Impossible to verify compliance witn comprehensive ASAT
ban that would ban tests of all methods of countering
satellites; no satisfactory ways found for verification of
aspects of Soviet proposed ASAT limitations (e.g., elimination
of Soviet interceptor).
-- Diverse sources of threats (e.g., certain ABM
interceptors have ASAT capability, ballistic missiles capable of
lofting a nuclear weapon to orbital altitude nave some inherent
ASAT capabilities).
-- Threats posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance
satellites undermine U.S. and Allied conventional and nuclear
deterrence, and Soviets have ASAT interceptor operational tor
over a decade while U.S. interceptor only under development.
U.S. Policy on ASAT arms control:
- U.S. will consider verifiable and equitable space arms
control measures compatible with U.S. security.
U.S. MV system represents a deterrent to the Soviet ASAT
and complements other measures to counter Soviet satellites
designed to provide targeting data on U.S. and Allied forces.
-- U.S. is prepared in the Defense and Space negotiations
to listen to Soviet proposals and to respond with ideas of our
own.
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Special
Report
No. 129
The Strategic
Defense Initiative
June 1985
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
In his speech of March 23, 1983, Presi-
dent Reagan presented his vision of a
future in which nations could live secure
in the knowledge that their national
security did not rest upon the threat of
nuclear retaliation but rather on the
ability to defend against potential at-
tacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) research program is designed to
determine whether and, if so, how ad-
vanced defensive technologies could con-
tribute to the realization of this vision.
The Strategic Context
The U.S. SDI research program is
wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to
research permitted by the ABM Treaty
which the Soviets have been conducting
for many years, and is a prudent hedge
against Soviet breakout from ABM
Treaty limitations through the deploy-
ment of a territorial ballistic missile
defense. These important facts deserve
emphasis. However, the basic intent
behind the Strategic Defense Initiative is
best explained and understood in terms
of the strategic environment we face for
the balance of this century and into the
next.
The Challenges We Face. Our na-
tion and those nations allied with us face
a number of challenges to our security.
Each of these challenges imposes its
own demands and presents its own op-
portunities. Preserving peace and
freedom is, and always will be, our fun-
damental goal. The essential purpose of
our military forces, and our nuclear
forces in particular, is to deter aggres-
sion and coercion based upon the threat
of military aggression. The deterrence
provided by U.S. and allied military
forces has permitted us to enjoy peace
and freedom. However, the nature of
the military threat has changed and will
continue to change in very fundamental
ways in the next decade. Unless we
adapt our response, deterrence will
become much less stable and our suscep-
tibility to coercion will increase
dramatically.
Our Assumptions About Deter-
rence. For the past 20 years, we have
based our assumptions on how deter-
rence can best be assured on the basic
idea that if each side were able to main-
tain the ability to threaten retaliation
against any attack and thereby impose
on an aggressor costs that were clearly
out of balance with any potential gains,
this would suffice to prevent conflict.
Our idea of what our forces had to hold
at risk to deter aggression has changed
over time. Nevertheless, our basic
reliance on nuclear retaliation provided
by offensive nuclear forces, as the essen-
tial means of deterring aggression, has
not changed over this period.
This basic idea?that if each side
maintained roughly equal forces and
equal capability to retaliate against at-
tack, stability and deterrence would be
maintained?also served as the founda-
tion for the U.S. approach to the
strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)
process of the 1970s. At the time that
process began, the United States con-
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eluded that deterrence based on the
capability of offensive retaliatory forces
was not only sensible but necessary,
since we believed at the time that
neither side could develop the
technology for defensive systems which
could effectively deter the other side.
Today, however, the situation is fun-
damentally different. Scientific develop-
ments and several emerging tech-
nologies now do offer the possibility of
defenses that did not exist and could
hardly have been conceived earlier. The
state of the art of defense has now pro-
gressed to the point where it is reason-
able to investigate whether new tech-
nologies can yield options, especially
non-nuclear options, which could permit
us to turn to defense not only to
enhance deterrence but to allow us to
move to a more secure and more stable
long-term basis for deterrence.
Of equal importance, the Soviet
Union has failed to show the type of
restraint, in both strategic offensive and
defensive forces, that was hoped for
when the SALT process began. The
trends in the development of Soviet
strategic offensive and defensive forces,
as well as the growing pattern of Soviet
deception and of noncompliance with ex-
isting agreements, if permitted to con-
tinue unchecked over the long term, will
undermine the essential military balance
and the mutuality of vulnerability on
which deterrence theory has rested.
Soviet Offensive Improvements.
The Soviet Union remains the principal
threat to our security and that of our
allies. As a part of its wide-ranging ef-
fort further to increase its military
capabilities, the Soviet Union's improve-
ment of its ballistic missile force, pro-
viding increased prompt, hard-target kill
capability, has increasingly threatened
the survivability of forces we have
deployed to deter aggression. It has
posed an especially immediate challenge
to our land-based retaliatory forces and
to the leadership structure that com-
mands them. It equally threatens many
critical fixed installations in the United
States and in allied nations that support
the nuclear retaliatory and conventional
forces which provide our collective abili-
ty to deter conflict and aggression.
Improvement of Soviet Active
Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet
Union has continued to pursue strategic
advantage through the development and
improvement of active defenses. These
active defenses provide the Soviet Union
a steadily increasing capability to
counter U.S. retaliatory forces and those
of our allies, especially if our forces
were to be degraded by a Soviet first
strike. Even today, Soviet active de-
fenses are extensive. For example, the
Soviet Union possesses the world's only
currently deployed antiballistic missile
system, deployed to protect Moscow.
The Soviet Union is currently improving
all elements of this system. It also has
the world's only deployed antisatellite
(ASAT) capability. It has an extensive
air defense network, and it is ag-
gressively improving the quality of its
radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-
to-air missiles. It also has a very exten-
sive network of ballistic missile early
warning radars. All of these elements
provide them an area of relative advan-
tage in strategic defense today and, with
logical evolutionary improvement, could
provide the foundation of decisive ad-
vantage in the future.
Improvement in Soviet Passive
Defenses. The Soviet Union is also
spending significant resources on
passive defensive measures aimed at im-
proving the survivability of its own
forces, military command structure, and
national leadership. These efforts range
from providing rail and road mobility for
its latest generation of ICBMs [intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles] to extensive
hardening of various critical installa-
tions.
Soviet Research and Development
on Advanced Defenses. For over two
decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a
wide range of strategic defensive ef-
forts, integrating both active and pas-
sive elements. The resulting trends have
shown steady improvement and expan-
sion of Soviet defensive capability. Fur-
thermore, current patterns of Soviet
research and development, including a
longstanding and intensive research pro-
gram in many of the same basic tech-
nological areas which our SDI program
will address, indicate that these trends
will continue apace for the foreseeable
future. If unanswered, continued Soviet
defensive improvements will further
erode the effectiveness of our own ex-
isting deterrent, based as it is now
almost exclusively on the threat of
nuclear retaliation by offensive forces.
Therefore, this longstanding Soviet pro-
gram of defensive improvements, in
itself, poses a challenge to deterrence
which we must address.
Soviet Noncompliance and
Verification. Finally, the problem of
Soviet noncompliance with arms control
agreements in both the offensive and
defensive areas, including the ABM
Treaty, is a cause of very serious con-
cern. Soviet activity in constructing
either new phased-array radar near
Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia, has
very immediate arid ominous c,rise-
quences. When operational, this radar,
due to its location, will increase the
Soviet Union's capability to deploy d ter
ritorial ballistic missile defense.
Recognizing that such radars would
make such a contribution, the Am]
Treaty expressly banned the const ruc-
tion of such radars at such local ions is
one of the primary mechanisms for en
suring the effectiveness if he treaty.
The Soviet I lnion's activity with respeci
to this radar is in direct viiIitia ift
ABM Treaty.
Against the backdrop of this Soviet
pattern of noncompliance with existing
arms control agreements, the Soviet
Union is also taking other actions which
affect our ability to verify Soviet com-
pliance. Some Soviet actions, like (heir
increased use of encryption during
testing, are directly aimed at degrading
our ability to monitor treaty compliance.
Other Soviet actions, too, contribute ti)
the problems we face in monitoring
Soviet compliance. For example, Soviel
increases in the number of their mobile
ballistic missiles, especially those a rifled
with multiple, independently-target able
reentry vehicles, and other mobile
systems, will make verification less and
less certain. If we fail to respond tb
these trends, we could reach a point in
the foreseeable future where we would
have little confidence in our assessmeni
of the state of the military balance or
imbalance, with all that implies I'm. our
ability to contnil escalatimi during
crises.
Responding to the Challenge
In response to this long-term pattern of
Soviet offensive and defensive im-
provements, the United States is corn?
pelled to take certain actions designci I
both to maintain security and stahilit.v in
the near term and to ensure these condi-
tions in the future. We must act in three
main areas.
Retaliatory Force Modernization.
First, we must modernize our offensive
nuclear retaliatory forces. This is
necessary to reestablish and maintain
the offensive balance in the near term
arid to create the strategic conditions
that will permit us to pursue com-
plementary actions in the areas of arms
reduction negotiations and defensive
research. For our part, in 1981 we em-
barked on our strategic modernization
program aimed at reversing a long
period of decline. This modernization
program was specifically designed to
preserve stable deterrence and, at the
same time, to provide the incentives
necessary to cause the Soviet Union to
2
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join us in negotiating significant reduc-
tions in the nuclear arsenals of both
sides.
In addition to the U.S. strategic
modernization program, NATO is
modernizing its longer range -
intermediate-range nuclear forces
(LRINF). Our British and French allies
also have underway important programs
to improve their own national strategic
nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI
research program does not negate the
necessity of these U.S. and allied pro-
grams. Rather, the SDI research pro-
gram depends upon our collective and
national modernization efforts to main-
tain peace and freedom today as we ex-
plore options for future decision on how
we might enhance security and stability
over the longer term.
New Deterrent Options. However,
over the long run, the trends set in mo-
tion by the pattern of Soviet activity,
and the Soviets persistence in that pat-
tern of activity, suggest that continued
long-term dependence on offensive
forces may not provide a stable basis for
deterrence. In fact, should these trends
be permitted to continue and the Soviet
investment in both offensive and defen-
sive capability proceed unrestrained and
unanswered, the resultant condition
could destroy the theoretical and em-
pirical foundation on which deterrence
has rested for a generation.
Therefore, we must now also take
steps to provide future options for en-
suring deterrence and stability over the
long term, and we must do so in a way
that allows us both to negate the
destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive
forces and to channel longstanding
Soviet propensities for defenses toward
more stabilizing and mutually beneficial
ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is
specifically aimed toward these goals. In
the near term, the SDI program also
responds directly to the ongoing and ex-
tensive Soviet antiballistic missile effort,
including the existing Soviet deploy-
ments permitted under the ABM Treaty.
The SDI research program provides a
necessary and powerful deterrent to any
near-term Soviet decision to expand
rapidly its antiballistic missile capability
beyond that contemplated by the ABM
Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task.
However, the overriding, long-term im-
portance of SDI is that it offers the
possibility of reversing the dangerous
military trends cited above by moving to
a better, more stable basis for deter-
rence and by providing new and compel-
ling incentives to the Soviet Union for
seriously negotiating reductions in ex-
isting offensive nuclear arsenals.
The Soviet Union recognizes the
potential of advanced defense con-
cepts?especially those involving boost,
postboost, and mid-course defenses?to
change the strategic situation. In our in-
vestigation of the potential these
systems offer, we do not seek superiori-
ty or to establish a unilateral advantage.
However, if the promise of SDI tech-
nologies is proven, the destabilizing
Soviet advantage can be redressed. And,
in the process, deterrence will be
strengthened significantly and placed on
a foundation made more stable by reduc-
ing the role of ballistic missile weapons
and by placing greater reliance on
defenses which threaten no one.
Negotiation and Diplomacy. During
the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a
radical reduction in the power of ex-
isting and planned offensive nuclear
arms, as well as the stabilization of the
relationship between nuclear offensive
and defensive arms, whether on earth or
in space. We are even now looking for-
ward to a period of transition to a more
stable world, with greatly reduced levels
of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability
to deter war based upon the increasing
contribution of non-nuclear defenses
against offensive nuclear arms. A world
free of the threat of military aggression
and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate
objective to which we, the Soviet Union,
and all other nations can agree.
To support these goals, we will con-
tinue to pursue vigorously the negotia-
tion of equitable and verifiable agree-
ments leading to significant reductions
of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do
so, we will continue to exercise flexibili-
ty concerning the mechanisms used to
achieve reductions but will judge these
mechanisms on their ability to enhance
the security of the United States and
our allies, to strengthen strategic stabili-
ty, and to reduce the risk of war.
At the same time, the SDI research
program is and will be conducted in full
compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the
research yields positive results, we will
consult with our allies about the poten-
tial next steps. We would then consult
and negotiate, as appropriate, with the
Soviet Union, pursuant to the terms of
the ABM Treaty, which provide for such
consultations, on how deterrence might
be strengthened through the phased in-
troduction of defensive systems into the
force structures of both sides. This com-
mitment does not mean that we would
give the Soviets a veto over the outcome
anymore than the Soviets have a veto
over our current strategic and inter-
mediate-range programs. Our commit-
ment in this regard reflects our recogni-
tion that, if our research yields ap-
propriate results, we should seek to
move forward in a stable way. We have
already begun the process of bilateral
discussion in Geneva needed to lay the
foundation for the stable integration of
, advanced defenses into the forces of
both sides at such time as the state of
the art and other considerations may
make it desieable to do so.
The Soviet Union's View of SDI
As noted above, the U.S.S.R. has long
had a vigorous research, development,
and deployment program in defensive
systems of all kinds. In fact, over the
last two decades the Soviet Union has
invested as much overall in its strategic
defenses as it has in its massive
strategic offensive buildup. As a result.
today it enjoys certain important advan-
tages in the area of active and passive
defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly
attempt to protect this massive, long-
term investment.
Allied Views Concerning SDI
Our allies understand the military con-
text in which the Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative was established and support the
SDI research program. Our common
understanding was reflected in the state-
ment issued following President
_Reagan's meeting with Prime Minister
Thatcher in December. to the effect
that:
First, the U.S. and Western aim
was not to achieve superiority but to
maintain the balance, taking account of
Soviet developments;
Second, that SDI-related deploy-
ment would, in view of treaty obliga-
tions, have to be a matter for negotia-
tions:
Third, the overall aim is to enhance.
and not to undermine, deterrence; and,
Fourth. East-West negotiations
should aim to achieve security with
reduced levels of offensive systems on
both sides.
This common understanding is also
reflected in other statements since
then?for example, the principles sug-
gested recently by the Federal Republic
of Germany that:
? The existing NATO strategy of
flexible response must remain fuil.\ valid
for the alliance as long as there is no
more effective alternative for preventing
war; and,
? The alliance's political and
strategic unity must be safeguarded.
There must be no zones of different
degrees of security in the alliance, and
Europe's security must not he decoupled
from that of North America.
.1
0
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SDI Key Points
Following are a dozen key points that
capture the direction and scope of the
program:
1. The aim of SDI is not to seek
superiority but to maintain the
strategic balance and thereby assure
stable deterrence.
A central theme in Soviet propagan-
da is the charge that SDI is designed to
secure military superiority for the
United States. Put in the proper context
of the strategic challenge that we and
our allies face, our true goals become ob-
vious and clear. Superiority is certainly
not our purpose. Nor is the SDI pro-
gram offensive in nature. The SDI pro-
gram is a research program aimed at
seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and
allied security, using the increased con-
tribution of defenses?defenses that
threaten no one.
2. Research will last for some
years. We intend to adhere strictly to
ABM Treaty limitations and will insist
that the Soviets do so as well.
We are conducting a broad-based
research program in full compliance
with the ABM Treaty and with no deci-
sion made to proceed beyond research.
The SDI research program is a complex
one that must be carried out on a broad
front of technologies. It is not a pro-
gram where all resource considerations
are secondary to a schedule. Instead, it
is a responsible, organized research pro-
gram that is aggressively seeking cost-
effective approaches for defending the
United States and our allies against the
threat of nuclear-armed and conven-
tionally armed ballistic missiles of all
ranges. We expect that the research will
proceed so that initial development deci-
sions could be made in the early 1990s.
3. We do not have any precon-
ceived notions about the defensive op-
tions the research may generate. We
will not proceed to development and
deployment unless the research in-
dicates that defenses meet strict
criteria.
The United States is pursuing the
broadly based SDI research program in
an objective manner. We have no pre-
conceived notions about the outcome of
the research program. We do not an-
ticipate that we will be in a position to
approach any decision to proceed with
development or deployment based on the
results of this research for a number of
years.
We have identified key criteria that
will be applied to the results of this re-
search whenever they become available.
4
Some options which could provide in-
terim capabilities may be available
earlier than others, and prudent plan-
ning demands that we maintain options
against a range of contingencies. How-
ever, the primary thrust of the SDI
research program is not to focus on
generating options for the earliest
development/deployment decision but op-
tions which best meet our identified
criteria.
4. Within the SDI research pro-
gram, we will judge defenses to be
desirable only if they are survivable
and cost effective at the margin.
Two areas of concern expressed
about SDI are that deployment of defen-
sive systems would harm crisis stability
and that it would fuel a runaway pro-
liferation of Soviet offensive arms. We
have identified specific criteria to ad-
dress these fears appropriately and
directly.
Our survivability criterion responds
to the first concern. If a defensive
system were not adequately survivable,
an adversary could very well have an in-
centive in a crisis to strike first at
vulnerable elements of the defense. Ap-
plication of this criterion will ensure that
such a vulnerable system would not be
deployed and, consequently, that the
Soviets would have no incentive or pros-
pect of overwhelming it.
Our cost-effectiveness criterion will
ensure that any deployed defensive
system would create a powerful 'incen-
tive not to respond with additional offen-
sive arms, since those arms would cost
more than the additional defensive
capability needed to defeat them. This is
much more than an economic argument,
although it is couched in economic
terms. We intend to consider, in our
evaluation of options generated by SDI
research, the degree to which certain
types of defensive systems, by their
nature, encourage an adversary to try
simply to overwhelm them with addi-
tional offensive capability while other
systems can discourage such a counter
effort. We seek defensive options which
provide clear disincentives to attempts
to counter them with additional offen-
sive forces.
In addition, we are pressing to
reduce offensive nuclear arms through
the negotiation of equitable and
verifiable agreements. This effort in-
cludes reductions in the number of
warheads on ballistic missiles to equal
levels significantly lower than exist to-
day.
5. It is too early in our research
program to speculate on the kinds of
defensive systems?whether ground-
based or space-based and with what
capabilities?that might prove feasible
and desirable to develop and deploy
Discussion of the various tech-
nologies under study is certainly neeo,..
to give concreteness to the understand-
ing of the research program. However,
speculation about various types of defen-
sive systems that r,ight be deployed is
inappropriate at thit. time. The SDI is a
broad-based research program in-
vestigating many technologies. We cur-
rently see real merit in the potential of
advanced technologies providing for a
layered defense, with the possibility of
negating a ballistic missile at various
points after launch. We feel that the
possibility of a layered defense both
enhances confidence in the overall
system and compounds the problem of a
potential aggressor in trying to defeat
such a defense. However, the paths to
such a defense are numerous.
Along the same lines, some have
asked about the role of nuclear-related
research in the context of our ultimate
goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our
current research program certainly em-
phasizes non-nuclear technologies, we
will continue to explore the promising
concepts which use nuclear energy to
power devices which could destroy
ballistic missiles at great distances. Fil?
ther, it is useful to study these concf
to determine the feasibility and effec
tiveness of similar defensive systems
that an adversary may develop for use
against future U.S. surveillance and
defensive or offensive systems.
6. The purpose of the defensive
options we seek is clear?to find a
means to destroy attacking ballistic
missiles before they can reach any of
their potential targets.
We ultimately seek a future in which
nations can live in peace and freedom,
secure in the knowledge that their na-
tional security does not rest upon the
threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore,
the SDI research program will place its
emphasis on options which provide the
basis for eliminating the general threat
posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal
of our research is not, and cannot be,
simply to protect our retaliatory forces
from attack.
If a future president elects to move
toward a general defense against
ballistic missiles, the technological op-
tions that we explore will certainly also
increase the survivability of our
retaliatory forces. This will require a
stable concept and process to manage
the transition to the future we seek.
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C) ncept and process must he hased tipon
a realistic treatment of not only LS. but
\ Soviet forces and out-year programs.
7. U.S. and allied security remains
indivisible. The SDI program is de-
signed to enhance allied security as
well as U.S. security. We will con-
tinue to work closely with our allies
to ensure that, as our research pro-
gresses, allied views are carefully con-
sidered.
This ilaS IWO] i 1.111111arnental part f.
S. policy since tlw inception of the
Strategic Defense Initiative. We have
made a serious commitment to consult,
and such consultations will precede ahy
steps taken relative to the SDI research
program which limy affect our allies.
8. If and when our research
criteria are met, and following close
consultation with our allies, we intend
to consult and negotiate, as appro-
priate, with the Soviets pursuant to
the terms of the ABM Treaty, which
provide for such consultations, on how
deterrence could be enhanced through
a greater reliance by both sides on
new defensive systems. This commit-
ment should in no way be interpreted as
according the Soviets a veto over possi-
hle future defensive deployments. And,
it) fact, we have already been trying to
out It)' a discussion of the offense-
defense relationship and stability in the
defense and space talks underway in
Geneva to lay the foundation to support
such future possible consultations.
If, at some future time, the United
Strays, in close consultation with its
allies, decides to proceed with deploy-
ment of defensive systems, we intend to
utilize mechanisms for U.S.-Soviet con-
sultations provided for in the ABM
Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and
taking full account of the Soviet Union's
own expansive defensive system re-
search program, \vt) will seek to proceed
iii 1 stable fashion \t'ith the Soviet
'Mon.
9. It is our intention and our hope
that, if new defensive technologies
prove feasible, we (in close and con-
tinuing consultation with our allies)
and the Soviets will jointly manage a
transition to a more defense-reliant
balance.
Soviet propagandists have accused
the United States of reneging- on com-
mitments to prevent an arms race in
space. This is clearly not true. What we
envision is not an arms race; rather, it is
just the opposite?a .jointly managed ap-
proach designed to maintain, at all
tones, control over the mix of (offensive
and defensive systems of hoth sides 1.11(1
therchy increase the confidence of all na-
tions in the effectiveness and stability of
the evolving strategic halance.
10. SDI represents no change in
our commitment to deterring war and
enhancing stability.
Successful SDI research and devel-
opment of defense options would not
lead to abandonment of deterrence but
rather to an enhancement of deterrence
and an evolution in the weapons of
deterrence through the contribution of
defensive systems that threaten no one.
would deter o potential aggressor by
making it clear that we mad deny him
the gains be might otherwise bop, to
achieve rather the n rel y react( i
him with costs largc enongh to ()aweigh
those 90(005.
U.S. policy supports the basic princi-
ple that our existing method of deter-
rence and NATO's existing strategy of
flexible response remain fully valid, and
must be fully supported, as long as there
is no more effective alternative for
preventing war. It is in clear recognition
of this obvious fact that the United
States continues to pursue so vigorously
its own strategic modernization program
and so strongly supports the efforts of
its allies to sustain their own corn-
mitrnents to maintain the forces, both
nuclear and con \ entional, that prr)\
tIday'S deterrclIce.
11. For the foreseeable future, of-
fensive nuclear forces and the pros-
pect of nuclear retaliation will remain
the key element of deterrence. There-
fore, we must maintain modern, flexi-
ble, and credible strategic nuclear
forces.
This poilil yikiiits thy y
roust sinitiltaneoask rise a number ol
tools to achieve our goals today \\ IoU
looking for better ways to iichieve dur
goals over the longer term. It expre.--,'s-
our haste rationale lid- sustaining. IL
1..S. strategic modernizro ii provriiiii
and the rationale lot' thy critic:illy
riecdcd kill program -
toeing- conducted the I.nited kingdom
It id France.
12. Our ultimate goal is to
eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. 111
necessity, this is a very long-term
goal, which requires, as we pursue
our SDI research, equally energetic ef-
forts to diminish the threat posed 1)
conventional arms imbalances, both
through conventional force improve-
ments and the negotiation of arms
reductions and confidence-building
measures.
We fully recognize the contrihution
nuclear weapons make to deterring con
?'entional aggression. We equally
recognize the destructiveness of war io.\
conventional and chemical means, ;11111
the need both to deter such conflict and
to reduce the danger posed loy the threat
of aggression through such means. MI
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, I /.C. ? June 1955
This material is in the public domain and In
he reproduced without permission: citation ot
this source is appreciated.
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SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS OF SDI
?
- New technologies hold open the prospect of defenses that would
be reliable and cost-effective.
-- The overall conceptual approach calls for research into methods
for destruction of attacking ballistic missiles in all of
their flight phases: boost, post-boost, mid-course, and
terminal.
By repeatedly attempting to destroy attacking ballistic missiles
in each of these phases, such a multi-layered system might
provide effective defense capability without requiring
perfection from any one of its layers.
Advances in microelectronics, microcomputers, optics, lasers,
particle-beam devices, and data processing software have
provided the necessary potential technological building blocks.
They may make possible systems--such as advanced optical
and radar sensors, miniature kinetic kill vehicles, and
directed energy weapons--that could enable us to destroy
ballistic missiles in all their phases of flight.
- Some scientists believe that the scientific and technical
basis of the SDI is weak.
Those critics may not be familiar with recent advances in the
relevant technologies. The Fletcher panel and the scientific
review group were originally sicepcical about the prospects
for developing effective defenses against ballistic missiles,
but the members changed their minds after examining the
technological potential in this area.
Judgments at this stage that defenses are not feasible are
reminiscent of mid-1940s arguments about the impossibility
of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Decisions about
the feasibility of effective defenses can be made only after
thorough research. To abandon SDI research because of
prejudgments about its outcome would be completely indefensible
from both a scientific and a policy standpoint.
- We have defined a research program that will allow us to examine
the potential contribution of these technologies to strategic
defense.
-- The initiative is being pursued with discipline and program
stability.
-- The SDI research program is centrally managed and reports
directly to the Secretary of Defense.
-- It uses the expertise and capabilities of the Services,
appropriate Defense Agencies, and other government departments.
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2.
- Our emphasis is on defense against ballistic missiles, which
are the most threatening strategic systems and the most difficult
to defend against.
- The SDI is examining the necessary defensive capability in five
major areas:
Search, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment (SATKA)
Directed energy weapons (DEW)
Kinetic energy weapons (KEW)
System concepts, battle management, and command, control and
communications
-- Survivability and supporting technology
- In the SATKA area, we are conducting research in advanced
boost-phase surveillance and tracking, long-wavelength infra-red
(LWIR) space surveillance and tracking, airborne optical
sensors, and radar and optical imaging concepts.
- In DEW, we are pursuing short- and long-wavelength lasers, neutral
particle beam concepts, and the appropriate pointing and tracking
systems.
- In KEW, we are researching the potential for an advanced non-
nuclear endoatmospheric interceptor missile, a miniature homing
mid-course interceptor missile, a space-based miniature kill-
vehicle system, and advanced hypervelocity launchers. We also
plan to examine a new terminal defense system capability using
a ground-based radar, an airborne optical sensor, and an endo-
atmospheric non-nuclear interceptor.
- We will continue to examine the most appropriate overall system
concepts and architectures, as well as sequential approaches to
their employment. We are also addressing battle management,
command and control approaches, and the supporting data processing
hardware and software development techniques. Special emphasis
is being given to system survivability (especially of potential
space-based components) and to lethality (especially for
directed energy weapons).
- The contribution of the U.S. industrial and scientific communities
will be vital to the SDI.
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ALLIED CONCERNS REGARDING SDI
?
- The U.S. commitment to the defense of its allies is not in
any way changed by the Strategic Defense Initiative.
The US remains committed to the modernization of strategic
and intermediate-range nuclear forces and conventional
forces that will be essential to the maintenance of deter-
rence for the foreseeable future. We will also continue
our current efforts to achieve significant, equitable, and
verifiable nuclear arms reductions.
-- The United States will continue to work closely with its
allies to ensure that, in the event of a future decision to
deploy defensive systems, allied, as well as U.S., security
against aggression would be enhanced.
- The SDI seeks to explore the potential of emerging technologies
to enhance deterrence through defenses that would significantly
reduce the military utility of ballistic missiles. The defensive
capability we are seeking would protect against shorter-range
ballistic missiles that can strike our allies as well as
against intercontinental systems.
- The SDI does not constitute a decision to develop and deploy
defenses against ballistic missiles. Rather, it is a research
program, fully consistent with US committments under the ABM,
Outer Space, and Limited Test Ban Treaties, that is designed to
answer a number of technological questions which must be answered
before the promise of defensive systems can be fully assessed.
Any future decisions concerning whether to proceed to development
and deployment of defensive systems would be made in full con-
sultation with our allies.
- Should a decision be made in the future to develop and deploy an
advanced defense capability, such defenses would complement
U.S. efforts to achieve significant reductions in strategic and
intermediate-range nuclear arms.
-- By greatly reducing the military value of ballistic missiles,
effective defenses would increase the likelihood of negotiated
reductions.
- With any decision in the future to deploy defensive systems, arms
control could play an important role in managing the transition
to a greater reliance on defenses and in enhancing their contribution
to deterrence and stability.
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SOVIET EFFORTS IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE
?
- The Soviet Union has always placed great emphasis on developing
and maintaining an effective defensive capability. Indeed, it
has invested about as much in this area as it has in building
up its powerful offensive arsenal. As a result, the USSR has
an extensive, multifaceted operational defensive network, and
is actively engaged in research and development on both conven-
tional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.
- Soviet passive, or "civil", defense efforts dwarf those of the
United States. For example, the USSR has built an extensive
network of hardened command posts located well away from urban
centers--in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in
Soviet cities--for more than 175,000 civilian government and
party officials.
- For strategic air defense, the USSR has 1200 dedicated interceptor
aircraft, 7000 air defense radars, and 10,000 surface-to-air
missile (SAM) launchers. The United States has fewer than 300
interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense, fewer
than 100 air defense radars, and no SAM launchers.
- Soviet efforts in ballistic missile defense have also been far--
more extensive than those of the United States.
The USSR maintains the world's only operational ABM system
around Moscow. It is currently modernizing and enlarging
that system to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The United States deactivated its ABM system several years
ago.
Several other current Soviet ABM activities raise serious
concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty:
The large phased-array radar which the Soviets are
constructing at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia violates the ABM
Treaty by virtue of its location and orientation.
The Soviet Union may have violated the ABM treaty
by the development of components of a new ABM system,
which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites
requiring relatively little preparation.
The USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing
SAM components in the ABM mode by conducting tests that
have involved SAM air defense radars in ABM-related
activities.
--- The aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related
actions suggest that it may be preparing an ABM defense
of its national territory, which is prohibited.
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In the late 1960s, the USSR initiated a substantial research
program into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic
missiles. That program covers many of the same technologies
involved in the U.S. SDI, including laser and neutral
particle beam technologies. The USSR, however, apparently
has invested much more plant, capital, and manpower than
has the United States in this research.
The Strategic Defense Initiative is a prudent response to the
very extensive Soviet activities in this field. A unilateral
Soviet deployment of effective advanced defenses against
ballistic missiles, combined with the USSR's massive offensive
forces and impressive air and passive defense capabilities,
would seriously undermine the deterrent capability on which
U.S. and allied security depends.
Should it prove possible to develop effective defenses against
ballistic missiles, we would envision parallel U.S. and Soviet
deployments which would enhance mutual security and international
stability.
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SDI Program
FY 85
FY 8u
FY 87
SDIO Program
Appropriation
Request
Estimate
Surveillance,
$546
Million
$1386
Million
$1875
Millon
Acquisition, Tracking
and Kill Assessment
Directed Energy
$376
$ 966
$119u
Technology
Kinetic Energy
$256
$ 860
$1239
Technology
Systems Concepts/
$ 9
$ 243
$ 273
3attle Management
Survivability,
$112
$ 258
$ 317
Lethality, and
Key Technologies
General Management
$ 11
$ 9
$ 10
Support
Total
$1400
Million
$3722
Million
$4910
Million
In FY 1986, the major emphasis of SDI research will De on
directed-energy weapons, surveillance and target acquisition
technologies, and identifying how detensive systems could De made
survivable against a determined attack.
The budget request also emphasizes less developed technologies
that have high potential for very large gains in
cost-effectiveness and ability to overcome potential Soviet
countermeasures.
The FY 1986 widget request for SDI research amounts to only
slightly more than 1 percent of the defense budget, and aDout
one-third of 1 percent of the overall federal Dudget.
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loA
INTERIM RESTRAINT AND COMPLIANCE
I. U.S. has adopted new policy toward observance of SALT
o U.S. will continue to refrain from undercutting
existing strategic arms agreements, to extent Soviets
do the same.
? U.S. will dismantle a Poseidon SSBN in accordance with
agreed procedures when 7th Trident SSBN goes to sea.
o In interest of securing the stable environment and
despite some cases of Soviet noncompliance, President
is prepared to go the "extra mile" in trying to
establish an interim framework of truly mutual
restraint.
o U.S. will review Soviet response and adopt appropriate
and proportionate response, including military measures
to compensate for Soviet noncompliance, to provide for
the national security of the U.S. and its Allies.
? U.S. reserves right to respond to irreversible Soviet
violation of SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting more
than one new type of ICBM. This could include U.S.
deployment of small ICBM.
? Policy is subject to continuous review.
II. U.S. policy based on several considerations
o Remains in the interest of U.S. and Allies to maintain
an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
o Such a framework should be conducive to pursuing
significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, as
well as putting arms control process on more
constructive footing.
o Provides incentives for Soviets to improve compliance
since U.S. will take appropriate military steps to
counter Soviet noncompliance.
o Policy reflects the views of Allies and Congress.
III. Continuance of policy requires positive actions by Soviets
o Must take concrete steps to resolve noncompliance and
reverse or substantially reduce their unparalled
military build-up.
o Must demonstrate in Geneva that tney are actively
pursuing arms reduction agreements.
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Chemical and Biological Weapons
U.S. Objectives
--achieve an effective and verifiable global ban on all
chemical weapons;
--bring an end to the use of chemical, biological and toxin
weapons; and
--maintain a credible and effective CW deterrent/retaliatory
capability until the objective of an effective ban is reached.
Background
--Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits use in war of chemical or
biological weapons.
--Production and possession of biological and toxin weapons are
prohibited by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC). There is at present no similar prohibition on production
and possession of chemical weapons.
--There is overwhelming evidence that the Soviets and their
allies have used toxin and chemical weapons in Soutneast Asia
("Yellow Rain") and Afghanistan, and tnat Iraq nas used chemical
weapons against Iran in the Gulf War. However, evidence or CW
use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan has diminished over the
past two years.
--Our conclusions about "Yellow Rain" are based on the total
body of evidence available. This evidence includes:
(1) eye-witness accounts of attacks by victims and
testimony by medical and relief workers, journalists,
defectors, private U.S. and foreign citizens and government
officials;
(2) data from other samples -- bodily fluids and tissues
analyzed following the autopsy of victims have confirmed the
presence of tricothecene mycotoxins;
(3) direct interviews with attack victims by medical
personnel;
(4) information from sensitive intelligence sources; and
(5) analysis of toxin residues actually found in the area
of attacks.
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--Theories about bee excrement are contradicted by tne wider
body of evidence which has long been available to the public.
-- A suspicious outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in Sverdlovsk, in
1979, suggests that the USSR is also maintaining an offensive
biological warfare program.
--In 1963, we estimated that only 5 countries nad chemical
weapons. Now, we estimate that about 16 countries have them and
more are trying to get them.
U.S. Initiatives
--For years, the U.S. has tried to achieve an effective chemical
arms ban. Since 1969, the U.S. has unilaterally frozen
production of such weapons. This approach has not worked. The
Soviet Union has continued to expand and modernize its chemical
weapons stockpile. It has a huge investment in chemical warfare
equipment and personnel with which it regularly conducts
large-scale military exercises.
--In April 1984, the U.S. presented a draft treaty for a
complete and verifiable chemical weapons ban at the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva.
--In the absence of a ban on chemical weapons, FY 1986 funds
have been requested by the Department of Defense to produce
binary chemical weapons to offset this dangerous asymmetry.
Binary weapons would also be safer to transport and handle than
are the unitary chemical weapons in our current, deteriorating
stockpile.
--This approach reflects our desire for an arms control solution
to the chemical threat and allows an opportunity to achieve a
treaty before any weapons are produced. At the same time, it
provides an incentive to the Soviets to negotiate seriously by
signaling our resolve to take steps necessary to eliminate the
current Soviet advantage in the absence of an effective arms
control agreement. Until the threat posed by chemical weapons
is effectively eliminated by a treaty, the U.S. must have a
credible chemical weapons deterrent.
--When the Vice President presented the U.S. draft CW treaty in
April 1984, he indicated that the U.S. looked forward to serious
negotiations and steady progress. Since multilateral progress
is dependent upon US/USSR progress toward agreement, we
indicated to the Soviets our willingness to meet bilaterally
with a view to facilitating the multilateral treaty
negotiations. The Soviets indicated their willingness to
conduct bilateral consultations in Geneva, and they nave met
with our delegation. They have not, however, agreed to our
draft treaty text.
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Points to Make
--Our main objective witn respect to chemical weapons is to
achieve an effective and verifiable global ban.
--We have sought to bring an end to tne use of toxin and
other chemical weapons through diplomatic and other means.
--Evidence of use has declined in Soutneast Asia and
Afghanistan.
--We are however, concerned about evidence of use elsewhere,
and the problem of proliferation. Chemical weapons are
relatively cheap and could be produced by many countries.
International prohibitions against use are not being
universally observed.
--For this reason, we have proposed a verifiable global
chemical weapons ban. In April 1984, Vice President Bush
presented a dratt treaty for such a ban at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva.
--We hope the Soviet Union will respond seriously and
constructively to our proposal which has the support of our
Allies and other nations around the world.
--In tne absence of an effective and verifiable ban, tne
U.S. is seeking to produce safer, more modern chemical
weapons to offset the existing Soviet CBW capability, and to
provide incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously
for a ban.
--The U.S. must nave a credible and effective chemical
weapons retaliatory stockpile to deter Soviet use or such
weapons.
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10C
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
- Confidence-ouilding measures (CBMs) are designed to
enhance mutual knowledge and understanding about military forces
and activities.
-- Effective CBMs can help reduce the possibility of an
accidential East-West confrontation, miscalculation, or failure
of communication; to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack;
and increase stability.
-- Extensive set of national and international mechanisms
already in place.
o U.S.-Soviet "dot Line" agreement of 1963 to
establish direct communiucations link and the 1971 and 1964
agreement to update it;
o U.S./Soviet "Accident Measures" agreements of 1971
to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war tnrough
unauthorized or accidential use of nuclear weapons and for
advance notification of certain missile launcnes;
o U.S.-Soviet "Incidents at Sea" agreement of 1972 to
prohibit acts at sea that could increase the risk of war;
o U.S./Soviet Agreement of 1973 on tne Prevention of
Nuclear War which requires both to refrain from acts tnat might
lead to confrontations between them;
o Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in 1975 pledged the
U.S., USSR, Canada, and states of East and West Europe to prior
notification of large military maneuvers to reduce risk of
conflict through misinterpretation.
-- But more needs to be done. We participate in the CDE,
which is seeking to negotiate CBMs going well beyond those
contained in the Helsinki Final Act, and proposed CBMs in tne
START, INF, and MBFR negotiations. Our basic aim is fuller
exchange of information about military activities such as
exercises, troop movements, and ballistic missil launches.
-- In START and INF, U.S. proposed additional bilateral
CBMs. These would require prior notification of ballistic
missile launches, major military exercises, and expanded
exchange'3 of forces data. We have indicated to the Soviets our
desire to renew discussion of these proposals in the current
Geneva negotiations.
-- In 1983, President Reagan proposed adding a high-speed
facsimile capability to tne Hotline, establisning a U.S.-USSR
Joint Military Communications Link, and improving diplomatic
communications links. All would permit faster, more extensive
communications to avoid miscalculation and misinterpretation at
all levels -- head of state, diplomatic, military.
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-- In 1984, we agreed with the USSR to add a high-speed
facsimile capability to the Hotline. Tnis capability will
enable U.S. and Soviet heads of government to send graphic
material over the Hotline for the first time. Written text can
now be transmitted more quickly than on tne existing teletype
system.
-- While Soviets were not willing to discuss most other
proposals, U.S. continues efforts to enhance U.S.-Soviet
bilateral communications.
-- In session of U.S.-USSR Standing Consultative Commission
which concluded in June 1985, the U.S. and the Soviets signed a
Common Understanding regarding the use of immediate
notifications in connection with the Accident Measures
Agreement. This Common Understanding records the parties'
understanding of their obligations under that Agreement, but
does not change it.
-- In nis address before the UNGA in 1984, President Reagan
proposed additional bilateral CBMs:
o Periodic U.S.-Soviet consultations on regional problems;
o Institutionalized cabinet-level meetings between U.S.
and Soviet officials;
o Exchange of five-year military plans for weapons
development and procurement;
o Reciprocal visits by J.S. and Soviet experts to each
side's nuclear test sites to help establisn the basis
for verification of effective limitations on
underground nuclear testing.
In his address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg
on May 8, 1985, the President offered a four-part proposal for
reducing military tensions. He proposed that:
o The U.S. and USSR exchange observers at military
exercises and locations;
o The U.S. and USSR institute high-level contacts between
military leaders to develop better understandings and
prevent potential tragedies from occuring;
o The CDE should promptly agree on the concrete CBMs
proposed by NATO; U.S. prepared to discuss no-first use
in that context;
o Permanent military-to-military communications link
should be established to exchange notifications and
other information regarding military activities.
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ioD
CDE
Background
On January 17, 1984, the United States, Canada, and 33
European states, including the Soviet Union and its Allies,
convened in Stockholm for the Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE).
The CDE is an outgrowth of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), otherwise known as the Helsihici
process. Specifically, the CDE is mandated to negotiate and
adopt confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)
designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe and to
strengthen and enlarge upon the limited confidence-building
measures of the Helsinki Final Act. Unlike arms reduction
provisions, confidence-building measures do not directly affect
the size, weaponry, composition, or structure of a state's
military forces. Rather they are intended to enhance mutual
knowledge and understanding of military activities through means
such as exercise notification and observation, information
exchange, forecasts of military activities, verification, and
communications. Consequently, they reduce the possibility of
conflict arising by accident, miscalculation, or
misunderstanding.
NATO Position
At the opening of the Stockholm Conference tne sixteen
members of NATO introduced a set of measures designed to:
- Reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe py enhancing
the openness of military activities;
- Establish greater predictability regarding peaceful military
exercises, thereby highlighting any departures from tne norm;
- Inhibit military intimidation or coercion against any
participating state; and
- Improve crisis communications.
Other Positions
- The Warsaw Pact states have so far introduced measures which
are generally unenforceable and designed for propaganda
effect, such as Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons, European
Chemical Weapons Ban, Freeze and Reductions of Military
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Budgets, and Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. These measures are
non-starters because they are outside of tne mandate of the
Conference, they are subject to discussion in otner fora,
and/or they give unilateral advantages to tne Warsaw Pact.
- In order to meet stated Soviet concerns about Non-Use of
Force, President Reagan stated in June of 1984 that tne
United States would discuss a reaffirmation of the existing
Non-Use of Force pledge if the Soviets would negotiate
concrete CSBMs in Stockholm.
- Tne Neutral and Non-Aligned countries (e.g., Yugoslavia,
Austria, Finland, Switzerland) nave submitted a set of
proposals on concrete CSBMs which are largely similar to the
Western package.
Vienna Review Conference
- We would like to see the Stockholm Conference reach
agreement on a set of concrete CSBMs wnich go well beyond
the limited measures adopted in Helsinki in 1975.
- The third follow-up CSCE meeting, reviewing implementation
of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, including the work of the
CDE, will convene in Vienna in November of 1986.
Points to Make
- The CDE is an integral part of tne Helsinki process and
consequently maintains the appropriate balance between human
rights and security concerns;
- The consensus mandate adopted in Madrid in 1983 calls for
the CDE to negotiate confidence- and security-building
measures;
- According to the Madrid Mandate, the confidence- and
security-building measures must be militarily significant,
politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole
of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals;
- Nuclear issues will not De negotiated in the Stockholm
Conference;
- By reducing the risk of war toy accident or miscalculation,
the CDE complements but does not interfere with existing
negotiations, such as the Geneva talks on offensive and
defensive systems.
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ioE
NUCLEAR WINTER
Background
History. "Nuclear winter" refers to the hypothesized
long-term consequences of nuclear war on the climate. Evidence
used by proponents of the theory suggests that nuclear war
might raise an enormous pall of smoke and dust that would
cover, darken and cool much of the Earth.
The first rough quantitative estimates of the potential
magnitude of the effects of nuclear war on the atmosphere were
contained in a paper published in Science in December 1983
generally referred to as "TTAPS"--an acronym derived from the
first letter of the names of the five authors (including Dr.
Carl Sagan). This study estimated conditions of near-darkness
and sub-freezing land temperatures, especially in continental
interiors, for up to several months atter a nuclear
attack--almost independent of the level or type of nuclear
exchange scenario used. Results presented in the TTAPS report
projected that even a "small" nuclear attack on population
centers could trigger massive smoke production and catastrophic
climatic effects.
US Approach. The US is firmly committed to a long-term
research program to investigate major scientific uncertainties
surrounding the nuclear winter hypothesis. The Us already has,
by far, the best scientific data and capabilities witn respect
to global circulation models. We embarked on a serious study
effort two years ago and initiated an interagency research
program (IRP) to coordinate a national effort to reduce tne
major uncertainties in this hypothesis. The US plan is
carefully formulated, and builds upon and enhances existing
research. Its purpose is to put the issue on a firmer
scientific basis.
Moreover, US arms control and security policies--including
unilateral US efforts to reduce the size and explosive power of
its nuclear arsenal, its initiatives in stimulating the
resumption of nuclear arms control negotiations, US substantive
proposals for deep cuts in nuclear weapons with the ultimate
objective of completely eliminating nuclear weapons, and the US
leading role in non-proliferation--are all ample evidence of
the US commitment to reduce the level of nuclear weapons and
the risk of nuclear war.
Soviet Approach. Soviet research began in 1983 when a tew
scientists moved quickly to conduct investigations and enter
into the growing debate on the subject. Their findings were
widely reported as independent confirmation of the hypothesis
that nuclear war would lead to widespread and devastating
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climatic changes. On closer examination, however, Soviet
research on nuclear winter is not convincing. Neither is it
well documented. It is derived almost entirely from US ideas,
data, and models.
Early US climate models are being used and run with input
data that grossly exaggerates the effects of smoke from burning
cities--the key variable in the nuclear winter equation. Not
surprisingly, Soviet scientists have consistently reported more
severe climatic changes than are usually found in similar
research in the West. Furthermore, Soviet reporting tends to
stretch conclusions well beyond what the research supports.
The location, nature and findings of Soviet research
suggest that the primary interest in nuclear winter thus far is
for external political purposes. A large, well-coordinated
propaganda campaign has been organized with the international
scientific community as the primary target audience. The
objective is to use these scientists to convince western
publics, and ultimately their political leaders, that the US
arsenal is already too large, and that new weapons are not
needed. There is no evidence that the Soviet leadership has
taken any steps to moderate its nuclear build-up in light of
the nuclear winter hypothesis.
Points to Make
o A recent report by the US National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) on the effects on the atmosphere of a major nuclear
exchange states that a clear possibility exists that a
major nuclear exchange could inject sufficient amounts of
smoke and dust into the atmosphere to block sunlight from
reaching the Earth, possibly causing temporary severe
temperature drops over at least part of the globe. This
NAS report--as well as others--also makes clear that major
uncertainties continue to exist concerning the probability
and extent of its predicted effects.
o We believe that these uncertainties make imperative a
thorough and rigorous scientific investigation of this
hypothesis. The US is convinced that the matter is too
important to permit judgments to be made on the basis of
imprecise or, in some cases, what appear to be
politically-motivated research findings.
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o The US is committed to a full scientific investigation of
"nuclear winter."
o The US government embarked on a study effort of tile nuclear
winter hypothesis two years ago and has initiated a
comprehensive follow-on long-term interagency research
program to assess the climatic effects of nuclear war.
o We recognize, however, as should other governments, that
even with the benefit of the most advanced modeling
techniques ana computational capabilities, we may continue,
even after completion of tnis research program, to nave
significant uncertainties about the range of the collateral
effects of nuclear exhanges.
o The limitations of our analytical efforts must not be
understated and must be coupled witn the inescapable
reality tnat we must do everything possible to reduce the
possibility and--failing in that--tne effect of a nuclear
exchange, including providing a further impetus to our
search for effective defenses against nuclear weapons. In
this respect, we believe that SDI may be a particularly
prudent and effective hedge against and response to the
possibility of severe, long-term effects to the global
climate.
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Nuclear Weapons Testing Limitations
U.S. Objectives
--Improving the verification provisions of the unratified
Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties.
A comprehensive test ban (CTB) continues to be a long-term
US objective when considered in tne context of deep and
verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities,
expanded confidence-building measures, and the need to maintain
an effective deterrent.
Background
--In 1963, the U.S., U.K., and USSR ratified the Limited
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in tne
atmosphere, outer space, and under water. Over 100 other states
have also ratified or acceded to this agreement.
--In 1974, the U.S. and USSR signed the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT) pronipiting underground nuclear weapons tests
above 150 kilotons, and in 1976, tney signed the companion
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).
--The latter two treaties have not been ratified. However,
since neither side has indicated an intention not to ratify,
both the US and the Soviet Union are under an obligation under
international law to refrain from acts wnicn would "defeat the
object and purpose" of the treaties.
--Despite that obligation, a number of Soviet tests have
likely violated the TTBT's 150 kiloton testing thresnhold.
--In addition, the Soviets have violated tne LTBT's
prohibition against the "venting" of radioactive debris beyond a
state's territorial limits.
--The U.S. has on several occasions proposed to the USSR
negotiations to improve verification provisions of the TTBT and
PNET. Such improvements would significantly reduce monitoring
uncertainties and constitute a solid foundation for furtner
steps in the nuclear testing field. The Soviets have refused
such discussions, and urge the ratification of the treaties as
they stand.
--On July 29, President Reagan, in a letter to Goroacnev
unconditionally invited him to send Soviet experts to the Nevada
test site -- with the equipment they deem necessary -- to
observe a U.S. nuclear test. The intention was to oegin a
process of increasing confidence so that verifiable nuclear
testing limitations could be agreed.
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--In early August 1985, Soviet leader Gorbachev announced a
unilateral nuclear testing moratorium to begin August b (the
anniversary of Hiroshima) and continue until tne end of the
year. He proposed that if the U.S. joined the moratorium, it
could be extended beyond the end of 1985.
Comprehensive Test Ban
From 1977 through 1980, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union sought to negotiate a
Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), out failed to reach agreement on
several major issues, including verification.
Because of serious concerns about the national security
implications of a CTB in current circumstances, including
problems related to verification, compliance, and deterrence,
the U.S. has not resumed the trilateral CTB talks since tney
recessed in 1980. In the existing environment, the security of
the United States and our Allies depends on a credible U.S.
nuclear deterrent, and nuclear testing plays an important role
in ensuring this deterrent. Furthermore, verification of a
comprehensive test ban, and especially any moratorium, remains
major problem. Expert testimony before Congress has indicated
that, in the context of the verification procedures discussed
(but not agreed) in the CTB trilateral negotiations, tnere would
still be uncertainty about our ability to detect and identify a
potentially significant level of clandestine testing.
Points to Make
--Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains a long-term U.S.
goal,, in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions,
improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence building
measures, and a secure and credible deterrent capability. At
this time the U.S. is not prepared to resume negotiations toward
a CTB.
--The danger of failing to provide for effective means of
verification was underscored by the fate of an international
testing moratorium which was unilaterally implemented by the US,
UK, and USSR from 1959 to 1961. During that time, the Soviet
Union began preparing clandestinely for the largest series of
nuclear explosions ever conducted. On August 1961, the Soviet
Union unilaterally announced that it would resume testing, and,
on the following day, began the first of 40 atmospheric tests
conducted over a two-month period. Commenting on the Soviet
breach of faith, President Kennedy remarked, "Now we know enough
about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and long test
series never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."
--Any consideration of a complete cessation of tests must
also be related to the West's ability to maintain credible
deterrent forces, for which testing is important.
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--A test ban cannot by itself eliminate the risk of war or
prevent nuclear proliferation.
--The US has, on several occasions, proposed to tne Soviet
Union negotiations to improve the verification provisions of the
Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. In
September 1984, President Reagan proposed tnat we fina a way for
Soviet experts to come to the US nuclear test site and for US
experts to go to theirs to measure directly the yields of tests
of nuclear weapons. The Soviets have not taken up tnese offers.
--On July 29, President Reagan unconditionally invited
Soviet leader Gorbachev to send a team of Soviet experts -- with
the equipment they deem necessary -- to the Nevada nuclear test
site.
--The U.S. intention is to begin a process of increasing
confidence so that verifiable nuclear testing limitations can De
agreed.
--Our experience of Soviet moratorium proposals indicates
that they are not a sound or acceptable basis for a genuine
agreement on verifiable testing limiations. (CF. Following page)
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TALKING POINTS ON US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING INITIATIVES
The U.S. proposal announced July 29, 1985 is a very
practical one, which builds on the proposal made by the
President in his September 24, 1984 speech to tne United
Nations General Assembly calling for an exchange of U.S. and
Soviet experts to each other's nuclear test sites to
directly measure test yields. Our new proposal features a
substantial new concrete element: an unconaitional
invitation to the Soviet Union for its experts to visit
U.S. test site -- and to bring tne equipment they deem
necessary -- to directly measure the yield of d U.S. nuclear
test. The objective of tnis proposal is to take a needed
first step in beginning to improve confidence in monitoring
capability and compliance with testing limitations, about
which both sides have expressed concern.
We have indicated to the Soviets that we believe a number of
their tests may have violated the 150 kt tnreshnola of the
unratified Threshhold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and tnat they
have violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The
Soviets, in turn, have questioned a number of our tests.
Clearly, confidence needs to be enhanced significantly in
this area before further steps can be taken.
We have several times previously offered to discuss with the
Soviets how we could improve tne verification provisions ot
the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
which they thus far rejected. Neither have they accepted
the President's UN initiative.
The new U.S. initiative reflects the President's willingness
to "go the extra mile" in the nuclear testing area, just as
he did in proposing a new framework tor truly mutual interim
restraints in regard to strategic arms limitations.
Although the new U.S. testing proposal WdS made without any
conditions, it is our hope that such practical steps will
get a process going which will enable the two countries to
establish the basis for verification of effective limits on
underground nuclear testing.
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In contrast, the Soviet moratorium proposal which was
carried in the Soviet press July 29, is similar to those
they have made many times over the years. What history has
taught us is that such proposals invariably are
self-serving, designed to lock in areas of Soviet advantage
and, therefore, largely propagandistic. In this same
pattern, the present Soviet moratorium proposal is largely
designed to divert attention away from their military
build-up and their failure to negotiate equitable,
verifiable agreements providing for real reductions in the
size of existing nuclear arsenals.
The historical record shows that the Soviets have in tne
past used such moratoria to consolidate their advantages:
in 1956-61, they used the moratorium to clandestinely
prepare for the largest series of tests ever conducted. In
the INF area, to take another example, the Soviets declared
a unilateral moratorium on LRINF deployments in October
1983, after which they continued to construct new SS-20
bases and to deploy additional missiles. Atter their
declared LRINF moratorium in April of this year, the Soviets
continued to deploy additional missiles in Europe and Asia.
Moreover, given the scope and scale of Soviet modernization
programs and U.S. restriant, U.S. testing is necessary to
insure the continued credibility and effectiveness of the
U.S. nuclear deterrent.
In the weeks preceding the Soviet moratorium proposal tnere
was a significant acceleration in the number of Soviet
nuclear weapons tests -- including several in the week
preceding the proposal. Obviously, this was designed to put
the Soviet Union in a position not to need to test over the
next five months, and to break out, (as they did in 1961) on
an accelerated scnedule if they choose, without real
cost to Soviet programs.
Thus, our experience of Soviet moratorium proposals
indicates that they are not a sound or acceptable basis for
a genuine agreement on verifiable testing limitations.
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NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES
The United States has supported the establisnment of
regional nuclear weapon free zones under appropriate conditions
and when consistent with the following criteria:
The initiative for the creation of the zone shoula come
from the states in the region concerned;
All states whose participation is deemed important
should participate in the zone;
The zone arrangement should provide for adequat'e
verification of compliance with its provisions;
The establishment of the zone should not disturb
existing security arrangements to the detriment of
regional and international security;
The zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its
parties from developing or otherwise possessing any
nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose;
The establishment of d zone should not affect tne
existing rights of its parties under international id4
to grant or deny to other states transit privileges
within internal waters, including port calls and
overflights; and
The zone arrangement should not seeK to impose
restrictions on the exercise of maritime and aerial
navigation rights and freedoms recognized under
international law, particularly the freedoms of
navigation and overflight of the high seas,
archipelagic sea lanes passage, transit through straits
used for international navigation, and the right of
innocent passage through territorial seas and
archipelagic waters.
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The Nuclear Freeze
Background
Since 1982, there have been a number of proposals in the
U.S. Congress and by citizens, calling upon the U.S. and Soviet
Union to agree to a "mutual and verifiable freeze on the
production, testing and deployment of all nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems." In May 1983, the House of
Representatives approved a non-binding version of the freeze
resolution, with numerous caveats. The Soviet Union has also
proposed a freeze on strategic nuclear arms, a moratorium on
deployment of further LRINF missiles in Europe and a ban on
research, testing development and deployment of so-called
"space-strike" arms at the negotiations on nuclear and space
arms in Geneva.
The U.S. Government position is that, while we share the
concern of those seeking to reduce the risk of war and end
costly competition in nuclear arms, the nuclear freeze is not an
effective or realistic way to achieve those objectives. Tne
freeze would preserve existing Soviet military advantages,
prevent the needed modernization of US and NATO nuclear weapons,
reduce incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for
radical and verifiable arms reductions, and many elements of the
freeze would not be verifiable, even if the Soviets were to
agree to more extensive verification provisions than those they
have so far been willing to consider.
Points to Make
1. The freeze would reward and legitimize the Soviet military
buildup and would lock in Soviet advantages. The freeze
would preserve the existing Soviet military advantages in
both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that
have resulted from tne massive Soviet arms buildup of tne
last decade--a period in which the U.S. exercised
considerable restraint. About three quarters of U.S.
strategic nuclear weapons are on missiles, submarines and
bombers over 15 years old. In contrast, over nalf the total
Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are on launch systems 5
years old or less; only 4% are on systems over 15 years
old. Thus, a freeze would ensure that U.S. strategic systems
would reach obsolescence much sooner than comparable Soviet
systems.
2. The freeze would undercut the US commitment to the NATO
Alliance's December 1979 decision to deploy LRINF weapons
unless the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its existing LRINF
forces. A freeze would leave the Soviets with an
overwhelming advantage (greater than 8-to-1 as of spring
1985) in LRINF warheads.
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3. The freeze would be difficult to negotiate, and even tnen,
many elements would be unverifiable. To be bilateral, as
proposed, the freeze could not be implemented
automatically. It would require extensive and complex
negotiations and agreement on specific systems and numbers
of weapons to be frozen and on the specific measures
necessary to ensure compliance. Many specific aspects of
the proposed freeze, especially those involving production
and testing of certain systems, would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to verify. The time and
effort would be better spent trying to reach agreement tor
genuine arms reductions.
4. By preserving Soviet military advantages, the proposed
freeze would reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously
for deep and verifiable mutual reductions.
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10 I
POINTS TO MAKE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
Basic Message
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is critical to world
peace. It is a cause that deserves and receives high priority
in U.S. foreign policy.
Policy Elements
Supporting nuclear power: Nuclear energy will play a rule
in providing electric power in the U.S. and abroad.
Making rational distinctions: We must make rational
distinctions between allies who pose no proliferation risk
and areas in which we have concerns about proliferation.
Reducing motivation to "go nuclear": We are striving to
improve regional and global stability, tnereby reducing tne
motivation of some states to acquire nuclear explosives.
Closer cooperation and consultation: U.S. is no longer
dominant in nuclear field. Tnus, we are trying to implement
our policy with a maximum of consultation and agreement with
other nations.
Reestablishing U.S. as reliable supplier: Our approach is
designed to give our closest nuclear trading partners access
to energy programs, while maintaining our firm commitment to
an effective international non-proliteration regime.
Broadening the dialogue: We are working to restore a
dialogue on the benefits of a strong non-proliferation
regime with nations such as Brazil and Argentina, where our
ties in the area of non-proliferation had been all but
broken.
Improving export controls: We are working hard to update
international export controls and are continuing to innibit,
where the danger of proliferation demands, tne transfer of
sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology.
Strengthening international safeguards: We strongly support
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its
efforts to provide for improved international safeguards.
Promoting comprehensive safeguards: We are working actively
to achieve a common policy among nuclear suppliers to
require IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in
recipient non-nuclear-weapons states as a condition tor
significant new nuclear supply commitments.
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Sharing benefits of peaceful nuclear technology: We will
continue to ensure, bilaterally and through the IAEA, that
those benefits are made available on a reliable basis to
nations that have good non-proliferation credentials.
Promoting adherence to NPT and Treaty Tlatelolco: We will
continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American
(Tlatelolco) by nations that have not accepted those
treaties.
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gist
10j
A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
Not a comprehensive policy statement
Bureau of Public Affairs ? Department of State
US and NATO Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Reductions
November 1984
Background: For more than 35 years the NATO alliance has preserved
the peace in Europe. Because NATO faces massive Soviet conventional
and nuclear forces, the alliance must have the capability to defend
itself and deter possible aggression. It must have credible
conventional and nuclear forces. At the same time, the allies are
committed to maintaining NATO's stockpile of nuclear weapons at the
lowest possible level needed for an effective deterrent.
The purpose of US nuclear forces is to deter war. The US nuclear
arsenal is designed to provide a strong, militarily effective, and
survivable deterrent force, also at the lowest possible level. The US
has made proposals to negotiate substantial, equitable, and verifiable
reductions in the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The US has also
reduced the number and megatonnage (yield) of nuclear weapons in its
arsenal. Over the years, the number of weapons in the US stockpile
has fluctuated, but the number and yield today are sustantially lower
than they were 20 years ago, and they are expected to remain well
below the peak level of the 1960s.
In contrast, the Soviet Union has consistently increased the size of
its nuclear stockpile. The number and total yield of its weapons have
exceeded those of the US for some time.
Reductions in the NATO nuclear stockpile: In December 1979, faced
with a major and continuing Soviet buildup in intermediate-range
land-based nuclear forces (INF), the NATO allies agreed to deploy 572
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic
missiles beginning in 1983 and, at the same time, to negotiate with
the Soviet Union to try to establish an INF balance at the lowest
possible level. The 1979 "dual track" decision also called for the
removal of 1,000 warheads from the NATO nuclear stockpile and, in
addition, stipulated that for each GLCM and Pershing II deployed, one
nuclear weapon already in the NATO arsenal would be withdrawn.
The withdrawal of 1,000 warheads was completed in 1980. In addition,
NATO agreed to study the alliance's defense needs further to determine
whether additional nuclear weapons could be removed without
undermining NATO's ability to deter war. This study laid the
groundwork for the October 1983 decision in which NATO defense
ministers meeting at Montebello, Canada, agreed to withdraw an
additional 1,400 warheads from Europe.
Thus, when these latest withdrawals are completed, five nuclear
weapons will have been withdrawn from the NATO nuclear stockpile for
every GLCM or Pershing II deployed and, as a result of the 1979
dual-track and 1983 Montebello decisions, NATO will have cut its
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nuclear arsenal by about one-third, to its lowest level in 20 years.
In contrast, the Soviet buildup in intermediate-range and shorter
range nuclear weapons continues unabated.
Reductions in the US nuclear stockpile: The number of weapons in the
US nuclear stockpile was about one-third higher in 1967 than it is
today. Moreover, its total detonation energy, measured in megatons
(millions of tons), has declined even more dramatically because the US
has withdrawn many large, high-yield weapons. Total US megatonnage
today is only one-quarter of what it was in 1960.
Most weapons in the US stockpile were built during the 1960s, and they
are now becoming obsolete. It is necessary to modernize our forces in
order to improve the safety and security of the weapons and to ensure
the continued viability of our nuclear deterrent. Greater safety,
survivability, and effectiveness are the goals of our nuclear force
modernization program. In some cases, we can achieve those aims with
fewer--but more modern--weapons than those we now have. As new
weapons are produced, old ones will be disassembled. The US nuclear
arsenal will thus remain below the peak level of the 1960s.
Arms control efforts: As an integral part of our national security
policy, the US seeks effective and verifiable arms control
agreements. Our principal objective is to establish a stable nuclear
balance at substantially lower levels of weaponry. We have made
proposals for significant reductions in nuclear arsenals to the Soviet
Union. We have negotiated flexibly and in good faith and are ready to
do so again. We are prepared to engage the Soviet Union in
far-reaching discussions for verifiable and substantial reductions in
nuclear forces. Such reductions would be in the interests of both
sides and would strengthen the foundation of international stability
and peace.
Harriet Culley, Editor [phone]
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10K
MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS (MBFR)
Background
History. Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, involving 12 members of
NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact member states, began in Vienna in
1973. They concern the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact
conventional forces in Central Europe.
The primary Western objective in MBFR is to enhance
stability and security in Central Europe through a reduction of
ground forces and establishment of parity at lower levels in
the form of a common ceiling on each side's military manpower.
The continuing Eastern superiority in ground forces is a
potentially destabilizing factor; its elimination could reduce
the risk of war in Europe.
In 1982, the West proposed a draft MBFR treaty embodying a
comprehensive proposal for staged reductions to parity along
with a full package of associated measures providing for
cooperative verification. To provide an objective equal basis
for setting the size of reductions needed to reach equal
levels, the Western proposal required full agreement in advance
on the current size of forces, a condition the East has been
unwilling to meet. In April 1984, the West made further
concessions by offering to ease initial data requirements in
exchange for enhanced verification measures.
The Data Problem. How to deal with the data discrepancy on
the number of military ground and air force personnel in
Central Europe has been a central unresolved issue of the
negotiations. Both sides have agreed in principle that the end
result of reductions should be parity at lower levels of
military manpower in the reductions area. The Soviet Union and
its allies claim that approximate parity already exists, wnicn
would mean total Eastern reductions of about the same size as
the West's. However, Eastern figures for tneir ground and air
forces are some 170,000 short of Western estimates--a margin of
Eastern superiority of about 20%. The East refuses to engage
in any detailed discussion to uncover the rationale for their
low figures.
April 1984 Western Proposal The most recent Western
proposal was presented in Vienna April 19, 1984. It was the
result of a thorough US review of MBFR policy and extensive
study within the NATO Alliance. This proposal amends the
West's 1982 Draft Treaty by reducing previous data demands.
The West now proposes a limited data exchange prior to treaty
signature to include only ground combat and combat support
forces. Additionally, this data may fall witnin an acceptable
range of Western data estimates, as opposed to the previous
requirement for agreement on precise numbers.
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Under this modification, full data agreement would not be
reached until after initial US and Soviet reductions and
subsequent verification of the levels of remaining forces had
taken place. In return, the West is asking that the East fully
address the need for adequate verification measures and their
early implementation. Although the East did make some
concessions in 1983 on the verification issue, their position
still falls short of Western requirements for effective
verification to ensure that necessary reductions to achieve
parity are carried out.
Recent Developments. The Eastern side presented a new
proposal on February 14, 1985. It essentially puts into
legally binding form previous Eastern proposals from 1983
calling for initial US and Soviet force reductions of 13,000
and 20,000 respectively and for a subsequent freeze on all
forces for two years. This proposal does not represent a major
move in MBFR and does not address the central issues of
verification and data.
The West has asked a number of questions about the details
of the East's February 1985 proposal, which it will have to
assess in considering how to respond. The West is fully
committed to move the talks forward and seeks an outcome
equitable to both sides to enhance security in Europe.
Points to Make
o The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR)
concern the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional
forces in Central Europe.
o 12 NATO and all 7 Warsaw Pact countries participate in the
talks, which have been going on in Vienna since 1973.
o The US and Allied goal in these negotiations is to enhance
security in Europe through a process of substantial,
assymmetrical reductions of conventional forces to parity.
Central to this objective is to reach agreement on measures
to assure that the East will comply with agreed obligations.
o The Soviet Union and its allies, while agreeing in
principle to NATO-Warsaw Pact manpower parity in Central
Europe, claim that rough parity in manpower already
exists. They therefore have not agreed on the size of
reductions we believe necessary to reach parity, or the
numerical levels from which such reductions would be taken.
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o The problem is that since the East has substantially more
forces in Central Europe tnan the West, it will need to
make substantially larger reductions to achieve parity.
o Though the talks have been going on for some 12 years
without agreement, progress has been made on some issues.
Guiding principles nave been established, and better
understanding of the two sides' security concerns nas
evolved, and the bargaining continues.
o The Key issues still blocking progress are verification,
data and the size of Eastern reductions needed to reach
parity.
o In April 1984, the West made a new proposal aimed at
breaking the deadlock. The new proposal offers to defer
full agreement on the size of Eastern Forces until after
the first reductions. In return, we asked for Eastern
flexibility on verification requirements.
o The East's February 1985 proposal simply puts in legally
binding form 1983 Eastern calls for initial US-Soviet
reductions and subsequent freeze of forces. It does not
address Key issues of verification and data.
o Nonetheless, tne West is committed to moving the talks
forward. The West is prepared to show appropriate
flexibility to acnieve an agreement; but tne East must snow
real flexibility as well.
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Soviet Arms Control Noncompliance
Soviet noncmpliance with arms control agreements is a
serious matter. It calls into question the security
benefits of arms control and undermines the confidence
essential to an effective arms control process.
The Reagan Administration is strongly committed to arms
control, to strengthening its contribution to our national
security and to reducing nuclear weapons. The January 1985
agreement with the Soviets to start the new negotiations
illustrates this commitment.
In January 1984, at Congress' request, the President
reported on seven issues where we believe the Soviet Union
has violated or probably violated its arms control
obligations or commitments.
In October 1984, also at Congress' request, the General
Advisory Committee's report on Soviet compliance issues was
released. This was an independent study, not formally
reviewed or approved by the Government.
In February 1985, again at Congress' request, the President
provided an unclassified update on the original seven issues
and addressed some additional issues. A classified report
was also sent to Congress.
The 1985 report reaffirms the conclusions of a year ago and
in some cases strengthens them.
Six new issues are covered in the 1985 report. These
include findings of one violation, one probable violation,
one too ambiguous to call, and two cases where no violations
were found.
In addition, concern is expressed about Soviet ABM and
ABM-related actions which in the aggregate, suggest that the
Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national
territory. Such a defense is clearly prohibited by the ABM
Treaty.
The report covers only those areas where questions of Soviet
compliance have been raised with the Soviet Union.
The U.S. Government has repeatedly raised compliance issues
with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, including
at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), at the
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January 1985 Geneva talks between Secretary Shultz and
Soviet First Deputy Premier Gromyko, and during the current
Geneva Arms Control Talks.
-- The Soviets have not provided satisfactory explanationstor
undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our
concerns.
The U.S. will continue to press these issues with the
Soviets.
The Administration will continue to work closely with the
Congress in seeking to make progress in resolving compliance
issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.
- In its February 1985 unclassified report the United States
Government:
o Reaffirmed the conclusions of its January 1984 report
that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two
provisions of SALT II:
telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization;
? Reaffirmed its previous conclusions that the USSR has
probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of
SALT II, andis likely to have violated the nuclear
testing yield limit of the unratified Threshold Test
Ban Treaty;
? Determined that the USSR rias violated the ABM Treaty
(through the siting, orientation and capability of the
Krasnoyarsk radar), violated the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, violated the SALT II provision prohibiting more
than one new type of ICBM, and probably violated the
ABM Treaty restriction on concurrent testing of SAM and
ABM components;
? Determined that the evidence regarding the USSR's
compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component
mobility was ambiguous;
o Expressed concern about Soviet preparations for a
prohibited territorial ABM defense; and
? Determined that the USSR is currently in compliance
with those provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement
and its implementing procedures that deal with re-use
of dismantled ICBM sites and with the reconfiguration
of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.
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Soviet Compliance in General
Q. Are the Soviets complying witn any arms control agreements?
A. Tne Soviets appear to be complying with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and tne Outer Space Treaty. With
respect to other major agreements, they appear to be
complying with certain significant provisions while
violating other provisions.
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Military Significance of Soviet Compliance Violations
Q. Are any of these Soviet activities militarily significant?
A. All have some degree of military significance. Prime
examples are:
The large phased-array radar (LPAR) being constructed
at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, in combination with
other radars and Soviet anti-ballistic missile programs
now under way, suggests that the USSR may be preparing
an ABM defense of its national territory, an action
which would have significant effects on the strategic
balance;
The SS-X-25 represents further modernization of the
Soviet ICBM force, which is already more modern than
the U.S. force;
Soviet chemical and toxin weapon activities are of
potentially great military significance since they have
allowed the USSR to enhance chemical and biological
warfighting capabilities and preparedness; and,
TTBT violations would permit the Soviets military
advantages in the testing of nuclear warheads.
In the near term, the U.S. defense modernization program,
including strategic, conventional, and chemical programs, if
fully funded, is adequate to cope with the military
implications of these Soviet actions.
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U.S. Policy on Soviet Compliance Violations
Q. What is the U.S. doing about Soviet violations?
A. The U.S. is taking a comprehensive approach to arms control
compliance issues involving the following elements:
At the request of the Congress, we have provided it
with a classified report on these issues and nave
briefed our Allies;
We are monitoring new information and systematically
analyzing existing facts, both on new issues and on
those about which no final conclusions could be reached
at this time;
We continue to raise the issues of concern with the
Soviets in confidential diplomatic channels, where we
are insisting on explanations, clarifications, and
corrective actions;
We are taking account of Soviet violations in our
defense modernization plans; and,
Finally, we are making particular efforts to ensure
that, in light of the findings about Soviet violations,
arms control agreements contain effective verification
and compliance provisions.
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Effect on U.S.-Soviet Relations
Q. Will the Administration's findings of Soviet violations
further exacerbate U.S.-Soviet relations?
A. We cannot ignore the evidence of Soviet violations.
Nevertheless, our objective remains to pursue satisfactory
resolution of our concerns through diplomatic channels. We
continue to believe that effective arms control requires
strict compliance as well as effective verification. We
have expressed these views to the Soviets many times during
the past three years. The extent of Soviet willingness to
work with us on compliance questions will determine how
compliance issues influence U.S.-Soviet relations.
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Why Negotiate New Agreements
Q. Why does the U.S. continue to negotiate new agreements with
the Soviet Union when it is violating existing ones?
A. We do this for several reasons:
First, new arms control agreements, if soundly
formulated and fully adhered to, can serve U.S.
interests. We should not abandon efforts to achieve
effective and verifiable agreements tnat can increase
U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war.
Second, entering new negotiations does not in any way
condone or ignore past Soviet benavior.
Third, continuing to negotiate can give us leverage and
another way for trying to get the Soviets to abide py
existing agreements.
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THE US RESPONSE TO SOVIET CHARGES
OF ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS
1. ABM Treaty: Strategic Defense Initiative
Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the US has
embarked on a course of undermining" the 1972 ABM Treaty and that
this intention was "proclaimed officially" by President Reagan
when he announced his Strategic Defense Initiative, involving the
"creation of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements,"
which is "explicitly forbidden" by the Treaty.
The Facts: The Soviet assertion is false. The US Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) is a research program and will be
carried out in compliance with all US treaty obligations. The
ABM Treaty permits research, and both sides have had research
programs since the signing of the Treaty; indeed, the Soviet
effort has been far more intensive than that of the US. The
Soviet Union maintains and is upgrading the world's only existing
antiballistic missile (ABM) system, installed around Moscow, and
has for many years been working on advanced technologies for
defense against ballistic missiles. Furthermore, as the
President stated in his 1985 Report to the Congress on Soviet
Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, Soviet ABM and ABM-
related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM
defense of its national territory. The Soviet Union has violated
the ABM Treaty. It is constructing a large phased array radar
near Krasnoyarsk in violation of an important ABM Treaty
provision that limits such radars to the periphery and oriented
outward. This radar is like other early warning radars we fear
could lay the base for a nation-wide ABM deployment. The Soviet
Union has developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-X-12, which
may have ABM capability. It has probably violated the Treaty
provision that prohibits testing SAM Components in an ABM mode.
The President stated in his March 23, 1983, speech that US
ABM activities would be consistent with US treaty obligations.
We have assured the Soviet Union both publicly and privately that
the Strategic Defense Initiative involves only a research effort
which will be carried out within the constraints of the ABM
Treaty. This research effort will permit an informed decision,
perhaps in the early 1990s, on whether to proceed with full-scale
engineering development. The US does not and will not violate
its Treaty obligations.
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2. The ABM Treaty
Soviet Allegations: The Soviet Union asserts that the US is
engaged in activity which "clearly contradicts" the provisions of
the ABM Treaty. Specifically, the US:
-- is working to create mobile ABM radar stations;
-- is testing Minuteman ICBMs to provide them with ABM
capabilities; and
-- is creating multiple warheads for ABM interceptor
missiles.
The Facts: Each of these charges is false.
-- The reference to mobile ABM radars refers to an
instrumentation radar now dismantled which was tested at the
Kwajalein test range. It was not an ABM radar. The Soviets, on
the other hand, have developed ABM components that are a
potential violation of the treaty provision prohibiting the
development, testing, and deployment of mobile ABM radars.
-- Only the first two booster stages of the Minuteman I
ICBM, but not the whole missile, were used in a research test
conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty. The
interceptor vehicle in question was observably different from
Minuteman I, as were its performance characteristics. The Soviet
Union should be able to verify this difference by national
technical means of verification. The Minuteman I ICBM no longer
exists.
-- The US is not now developing or testing and has never
developed or tested or otherwise pursued ABM interceptors with
multiple warheads..
3. The ABM Treaty: Pave Paws Radars
Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the deployment
in the US of Pave Paws radar stations is part of "Washington's
efforts to prepare for creating a large-scale ABM system."
The Facts: There is no merit whatsoever in the charge that US
deployment of new Pave Paws large phased-array radars (LPARs) is
part of an effort to prepare for creating a large-scale ABM
defense. The US has two Pave Pees radars, one in California
(Beale AFB) and one in Massachusetts (Otis AFB). Two more are
being constructed, one each in Georgia (Robins AFB) and Texas (SW
of Goodfellow AFB). All of these radars are for early warning of
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strategic ballistic missile attack (BMEW). As required by the
ABM Treaty, they are located on the periphery of our national
territory and are oriented outward. They are not ABM radars.
Furthermore, these radars are much less capable and powerful than
Soviet radars which the Soviets claim are for early warning of
missile attack, and not for ballistic missile defense.
4. SALT II
Soviet Allegations: The US "never intended to 'refrain from
actions'" which would undermine the SALT II Treaty. While the US
"pretended" not to object to limits on long-range cruise
missiles, it was preparing for the "massive deployment" of this
new type of strategic offensive armament. While it was agreeing
not to circumvent in any manner the SALT II Treaty, the US
already had a plan for the deployment of "several hundred
essentially strategic" nuclear missiles in Europe.
The Facts: The Soviet assertions are groundless. First, it
should be noted that the Soviet Union's long-range cruise missile
program has been intensive; an air-launched version is already
deployed and ground- and sea-launched versions are undergoing
testing. In 1977, the Soviet Union initiated the deployment of
the SS-20, greatly increasing the number of nuclear warheads on
its intermediate-range missiles deployed against Western Europe.
In 1979, in response to the growing Soviet nuclear threat from
weapons such as the SS-20, NATO decided to deploy longer-range
INF (LRINF) missiles in Europe, specifically US Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missiles. At the same time, NATO sought
an arms control agreement limiting or eliminating LRINF missile
systems on both sides.
NATO's Pershing II and GLCM programs do not circumvent the
provisions of the SALT II Treaty. Two points pertain. First,
the Pershina II ballistic missile falls outside the SALT II
Treaty since its range is less than the 5,500 km minimum set for
intercontinental ballistic missiles, as defined by SALT II.
Second, the only provision of SALT II which would have
applied to LRINF systems was contained in its Protocol which
prohibited deployment of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) capable of a range in excess of 600
km. The Protocol, however, would have expired on December 31,
1981, by its own terms, and the US made clear at the time SALT II
was signed that the Protocol would not be extended beyond that
date. -
Consequently, deployment of these systems does not
constitute circumvention. The Soviet assertion is merely an
attempt to provide the Treaty with an interpretation which it
clearly has never had on either side.
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The total US GLCM and P-II program even in the late 1980s
will only be a fraction of the current Soviet SS-20 force.
The U.S. remains committed to the achievement of radical
reductions and equitable limitations in LRINF systems. Our
recent agreement with the Soviets to begin new negotiations on
these systems is a demonstration of that firm commitment.
5. Nuclear Testing: TTBT
Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the US 'time
and again" tests "nuclear charges" above the 150 kiloton limit
established by the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
The Facts: There is no truth in the Soviet assertion. Since
1976, the year when the threshold provisions of the TTBT would
have become effective, the US has conducted no nuclear tests
having yield which exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold of this
treaty. As the President reported in his February 1985
compliance report, Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number
of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under
the TTBT. These Soviet actions continue despite US requests for
corrective measures.
6. Nuclear Testing: LTBT
Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that 'time and
again" US nuclear tests are accompanied by the escape of
radioactive substances into the atmosphere in violation of the
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.
The Facts: Both the US and the Soviet Union have
encountered some difficulty in totally containing all their
underground nuclear tests. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, the
United States has adopted extensive safeguards at the Nevada Test
Site to prevent the escape of radioactive material from its
nuclear tests. These safeguards, although quite costly, have,
for more than a decade, ensured that no US test has violated the
Limited Test Ban Treaty. In contrast, as the President reported
in his February 1985 compliance report, there continue to be
Soviet ventings involving traversal of radioactive materials
beyond Soviet borders, in violation of the Limited Test Ban
Treaty and despite US requests for corrective action. Until its
similar allegation following release last year of the President's
1984 Report on Soviet Noncompliance, the Soviet Union had not
raised its concerns about US venting since 1976.
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7. Chemical Weapons
Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that "US toxins
killed and crippled thousands upon thousands of inhabitants in
Indochina, that the US blocks international agreement on the
prohibition of chemical weapons, supplies chemical weapons to
"Afghan bandits," and prepares for a "chemical rearmament" of
America.
The Facts: Contrary to the implications contained in the Soviet
assertion, the US, in fact, is abiding by all obligations in this
regard.
Soviet allegations of US toxic chemical weapons use in Indochina
are completely false. Charges that the US killed inhabitants with
toxic weapons are completely unfounded. The US never at any time
used toxin weapons in the war in Southeast Asia. It is the
stated policy of the US that we will never be the first to use
chemical weapons in a conflict. The US is widely recognized as
making vigorous and constructive efforts to promote progress in
the CD and elsewhere. In April 1984, Vice President Bush tabled
a comprehensive draft treaty tha sought effectively to ban
chemical weapons everywhere in the world. The US remains
committed to the elimination of all CW and to the conclusion of a
complete, effective, and verifiable global CW ban. On the other
hand, the Soviet Union has shown no such willingness to negotiate
an effective, verifiable treaty. Bilaterals were initiated
between the US and the Soviet Union in an effort to further
progress toward a chemical weapons treaty. These bilaterals
lapsed in 1980, due to Soviet intransigence on verification
issues.
In contrast, the US has found clear evidence that it is the
Soviet Union that has aided its surrogates in that region of the
world in usina chemicals against defenseless tribespeople. The
Soviets' use of "Yellow Rain" is well known to the world.
At US initiative, bilateral discussions were undertaken in July
and August 1984 and are scheduled to begin again this year.
While we continue to seek warp to negotiate, the Soviet Union has
failed to comment constructively on our proposals -- the Soviet
Ambassador in Geneva rejected them even before he read them. It
is the Soviet Union which must take concrete steps to convince
the world that it is truly serious about CW arms control by
working with the US and the CD to develop effective and mutually
acceptable approaches to banning CW worldwide.
US policy concerning chemical weapons is first to negotiate a
treaty that will effectively end Chemical Weapons Worldwide.
Until that treaty becomes a reality, the US must maintain a
credible deterrent against Soviet chemical weapons use. The US
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has not produced chemical weapons for 15 years and we find that
through deterioration and obsolescence, our diminishing stockpile
amounts to unilateral CW disarmament. Extensive Soviet
stockpiles give them a clear military superiority in Chemical
Weapons and provide them no incentive to negotiate an end to that
superiority. In order to redress this imbalance, the President
has asked Congress this year to begin modernization of the US
Chemical Weapons stockpile. These efforts do not represent the
"chemical rearmament of America" as the Soviet Union has charged,
but instead will give us a smaller and safer stockpile in the
event we should ever have to retaliate against a Soviet chemical
attack.
US concern regarding the verification issue and insistence that
it be addressed has been amply justified by evidence of illegal
use of CW weapons in several conflicts since the late 1970s.
In this regard, Soviet involvement in the use of toxins and
chemical warfare agents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, in
violation of the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, does not inspire
confidence that expressed Soviet interest in CW arms control is
genuine or sincere, nor does the Soviet failure to respond
constructively to the U.S. draft CW treaty.
We are shocked by Soviet allegations that the US has supplied
chemical weapons to the Afghan resistance. This charge is
completely groundless and a pure fabrication. The US has not,
does not, and will not supply chemical weapons to the Afghan
resistance. To the contrary, the clear evidence, confirmed by
international sources, is that it is the Soviet Union that is
using chemical weapons against the Afghan resistande. We find
the Soviet charge doubly curious in that it calls attention to
the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in violation of
the most basic principles of international law, including
provisions of the UN Charter.
8. Helsinki Final Act
Soviet Allegation: The Soviet Union asserts that the
"contribution" of the US to the Helsinki process has been, inter
alia "the heightening of military tension in Europe" and the
deployment of "first strike nuclear armaments" in Europe.
The Facts: The Soviet Union is falsely asserting that we have
engaged in behavior of which it itself is guilty. The Soviet
Union initiated the modernization of intermediate-range nuclear
forces in Europe in 1977 by beginning its deployment of the new
triple-warhead SS-20 missile, and it, unlike the US, has greatly
increased the number of nuclear warheads maintained there. The
NATO allies have responded both belatedly and reluctantly.
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The Soviet allegation apparently refers to the deployment of US
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles which began in
late 1983. (The 1979 NATO dual-track decision recognized the
requirement to redress the imbalance in overall nuclear forces
highlighted by the growing Soviet force of triple-warhead SS-20
missiles, either through deployment of US LRINF missiles or
through a concrete arms control result.) The US sought during
the INF negotiations which began in 1981 to reduce substantially,
or, preferably, to eliminate all US and Soviet longer-range INF
missiles on a global basis. Pending unilateral Soviet reductions
in LRINF deployments or a negotiated solution, NATO counter-
deployments strengthen deterrence by helping to block
disproportionate Soviet military strength and hence reduce rather
than increase the danger of war.
The NATO force modernization programs envisioned for the European
theater are completely permissible under the Helsinki Final Act
and are in response to an unprecedented buildup and modernization
of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces. The deployment of US
Pershing IIs and GLCMs is in particular a response to that
unprecedented buildup of which the most obvious example is the
deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles. The Soviet Union began
deploying SS-20s in 1977 and to date now has deployed about 400
SS-20 launchers (over 100 during the course of the INF
negotiations) with some 1200 warheads, or over twice the
potential NATO deployment total of 572.
Moreover, the Soviet charge obviously lacks credibility in light
of the large reductions in the total NATO nuclear stockpile in
Europe. In addition to the 1,000 warheads already withdrawn as a
result of NTO's 1979 decision, the US will withdraw a further
1,400 nuclear warheads in accordance with the Montebello
decision. Additionally, for each Pershing II and GLCM which is
deployed to Europe, the US is withdrawing one nuclear warhead
from its European stockpile.
Finally, it should be noted that we and our Allies notify all
exercises which exceed the threshold of 25,000 troops established
by the Final Act, and often notify smaller-scale military
maneuvers, as a voluntary effort to strengthen mutual confidence.
We also invite observers, including Soviet military officers to
these exercises. The Soviets unfortunately have not accepted our
invitations.
We regret that the Soviet Union has not always reciprocated. Not
only have the Warsaw Pact nations generally declined to provide
voluntary notification of many exercises which did not reach the
25,000 troop threshold, as the President's Report to Congress on
Soviet Noncompliance indicated, but the Soviet Union, in a clear
cut violation of the Final Act, did not adequately notify the
exercise Zapad 81, which involved some 100,000 troops.
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Themes on Religious and Moral Issues
-- In a pluralistic society such as ours, we respect diversity
of views and encourage free expression of different opinions. We
welcome open discussion of our policies on national security and
arms control issues. This is an area where reasonable men and
women can differ.
-- We share the concern of those who wish to reduce the risk of
war, and end the costly competition in nuclear and conventional
weapons. The President has said he has no nigher objectives.
-- Our basic aim is to live in peace with freedom. Our nuclear
and conventional weapons are intended to deter war.
-- Our policy recognizes that, in the imperfect world in which
we live, some form of deterrence which relies on a balance of
nuclear and conventional forces is necessary to prevent war
while we seek a better way, including deterrence at much lower
levels of weapons than now exist. As Pope John Paul wrote in
June 1982, "In current conditions, 'deterrence' based on
balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step on the
way toward progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally
acceptable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, it is
indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum."
-- Our ultimate goal is the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons.
-- As a step toward that long-term goal, we are actively
negotiating with the Soviet Union for deep reductions in nuclear
arsenals and for new agreements that would reduce the risk of
war and lessen the chances of misunderstanding or
miscalculation. These negotiations present a real opportunity to
reverse the growth in nuclear arsenals and contribute to peace
and stability.
-- One of the issues we want to discuss with the Soviets is how
we can strengthen deterrence by moving away from relying solely
on the threat of nuclear retaliation as the basis for our
security, toward a world in which there would be greater
reliance on defensive systems -- should they prove feasible --
which threaten no one.
-- The US Strategic Defense Initiative is a long-term research
program, which is designed to explore the feasibility of such
defenses, emphasizing the non-nuclear. It will be many years
before a judgment on their feasibility can be made.
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-- In the meantime, to deter war, we must be able to convince a
potential adversary that the costs of undertaking aggression
against the US or our allies would outweigh any benefits he
could hope to gain.
o To do this requires that we have credible and effective
military forces, including nuclear weapons, since our
potential adversary possesses these weapons.
o It must also be clear that we have the resolve to defend
ourselves, our Allies, and the freedoms we value.
-- It has long been the policy of the US and our allies that we
will not use weapons -- nuclear or conventional -- except in
response to aggression.
-- For moral, political and military reasons, the US does not
target civilian populations as such.
-- Governments have the responsibility and duty to protect
their citizens from possible aggression. Just how much money
should be spent for defense is a matter for public discussion in
a democracy. However, the money spent on strategic forces now is
less than 1% of our GNP, under 6 % of our total federal budget,
and less than 15% of our defense budget. Given the stakes --
the ability of free people to continue to live in peace and
freedom -- the funds are not excessive.
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FOR USE WITH RELIGIOUS AUDIENCES AS APPROPRIATE
-- Our policy of deterrence is based on moral principles
shared by a majority of Americans:
o the principle of individual self - defense, i.e. the
right to protect oneself against unjust aggression;
o the principle of collective self - defense, i.e. the
obligation of the state to protect its citizens against
unjust aggression, and to join with other states to assist
them in defending themselves;
o the principle of discrimination, i.e. the immunity of non
combatants to direct, intentional attack; and
o the principle of proportionality., i.e. that our response
to aggression will be proportionate to the threat and will
end the conflict as soon as possible with the least loss of
life and destruction of property.
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US-Soviet Relations
Background
History. Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, the US-Soviet
relationship has evolved through several phases, including a
period of minimal contact, a wartime alliance, "containment,"
and an intense cold war rivalry. In recent years, tne hign
hopes of the 1970s for detente have given way to reassessment
of this fundamentally adversarial relationship.
The adversarial nature of US-Soviet relations stems from
several factors: the Eurasian location of the USSR, which
places it in close proximity to US interests; the Marxist-
Leninist ideology of the Soviet regime, which gives its leaders
a very different perspective from that of the West; and the
absence of political freedoms in the USSR, which permits the
Soviet leadership to conduct foreign policy witnout the
domestic constraints known to democratic states. There are,
however, strong incentives for US-Soviet cooperation, foremost
among them the need to avoid war. The US, therefore, has
sought to engage the USSR in constructive dialogue at all
levels on the issues affecting our two nations.
Soviet Challenges. Because of the American military
deterrent, the USSR has avoided direct aggression against the
US and its allies. Nonetheless, tne US has been concerned by
certain Soviet actions in recent years, including:
a continuing quest for military superiority;
the occupation of Afghanistan by 115,000 Soviet troops;
the unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet "model" on
nominally independent Soviet clients and allies;
harsh suppression of human rights within the USSR; and
violation of certain treaties and agreements, and
stretching the letter of others.
US Approach. US policy toward the USSR is based on three
principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Our dealings are
grounded in a realistic appraisal of Soviet strengths and
objectives: we must not overstate the Soviet challenge, out
neither can we overlook the potential dangers. In order to
counter Soviet objectives, the US must have the necessary
strength--military, economic, and social--to do so. The US,
however, strongly prefers to resolve differences through
negotiation. Thus we have conducted a broad dialogue designed
to develop peaceful solutions to our problems and to encourage
the USSR to fulfill its international obligations.
International Environment. The US is committed to maintain
the military balance vis a vis the USSR through our own and
allied defense programs and, where possible, through mutual and
verifiable arms reductions. To counter the use of threats and
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of force in Soviet foreign policy, we have made clear tnat we
will resist encroachment on our vital interests and those of
our allies and friends. In Europe, tne allies are united on
the need to counter Soviet missile deployments. The first
deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles
have proceeded on schedule. We also are continuing to upgrade
NATO's conventional forces.
To deter threats to vital interests outside Europe, we are
developing the ability, with allied support, to move forces
rapidly to key areas of potential instability such as Southwest
Asia. In the Western Hemisphere, the US and its friends are
firmly resolved to resist destabilization of democratic
countries in Central America. The US is also working to
restrict Soviet expansion by responding positively to tne
economic problems of developing nations and by working to
strengthen democratic institutions worldwide.
New Arms Negotiations. In January 1985, both countries
agreed that a new forum for renewed arms control talks would
begin in March in Geneva to address "a complex of questions
concerning space and nuclear arms--both strategic and
intermediate-range--with these questions considered and
resolved in their interrelationship."
It is a useful first step in what probably will be a long
and complicated negotiating process. Nevertheless, we hope
that through such negotiations we can reach agreements with the
USSR to reduce nuclear arsenals, strengthen stability, and
increase our security and that of our Allies.
New Leadership. Following the death of Leonid Brezhnev in
November 1982, Yuriy Andropov--former KGB Chairman--became the
new Soviet leader. He was seriously ill for most of his
15-month tenure and did not live long enough to implement fully
his new policies for economic reform and eliminating
corruption. East-West relations deteriorated under his brief
tenure with the Soviet walkout from the START and INF talks,
the tragedy of KAL flight 007, and other harmful developments.
When Andropov died in February 1984, the Politburo selected
Konstantin Chernenko to succeed him as General Secretary.
Chernenko died after barely a year in office. On March 11,
1985 the Politburo chose Mikhail Gorbachev, 54, to succeed
Chernenko, thus beginning the transfer of power to a new
generation.
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Future US-Soviet Relations. President Reagan wants to
develop a more constructive and productive relationship with
the USSR and has indicated publicly his hope for an opportunity
to meet Mr. Gorbachev in the near tuture. Prime US policy
goals include:
- verifiable reductions in nuclear arms;
- cessation of Soviet interference in the affairs of
sovereign states;
- respect for the human rights of Soviet citizens; and
- improvement in people-to-people, economic, and other
bilateral relations based on reciprocity and mutual
interest.
The development of more constructive relations witn the
Soviets is a complex process and we have no illusions that a
new era of cooperation automatically accompanies a leadership
change. We base our policies on US interests; we expect the
Soviets to continue to base theirs on tneir interests. No one
expects progress to be quick or easy.
Points to Make
o Historically, American policy towards the Soviet Union has
swung from one extreme to the other?from implacable
opposition and focus on increasing our strength to seeming
detente and pursuing a course of negotiations.
o Throughout this Administration, President Reagan has based
his policies toward the Soviet Union on a consistent and
solid foundation of realism, strength, and negotiation.
o The US seeks an international environment that enhances the
freedom, security, and prosperity of our own people, our
allies and friends, and of all mankind. We know that such
a promising future depends, above all, on stability and
global security.
o To pursue our goals successfully, we must persuade the
Soviets of two things: First, there will be no rewards for
aggression and we are strong enough and determined enough
to resist attempts by the Soviet Union to expand its
control by force. And second, we mean no threat to the
security of the USSR and are ready and willing?at all
times--to discuss and negotiate our differences.
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o The experience of negotiations shows that the Soviets
recognize reality and that tough, sober bargaining, when
backed by American strength, can lead to mutually
advantageous results. Negotiation without strength cannot
bring benefits, and strength alone will never achieve a
durable peace.
o We have been working to establish a more constructive and
realistic long-term relationship with the Soviets in a
number of areas?i.e. trade, excnanges and
communications--and will continue to do so.
o Arms control is an important part of our overall
relationship with the Soviet Union, but it is only one of
many US-Soviet issues. Part of our effort to improve
relations is to address differences we have on human
rights, regional issues and a variety of bilateral
questions.
o The Soviet human rights record remains deplorable: only
896 Jews were granted exit permits in 1984, compared with
50,000 in 1979. Repression of dissidents continues. We
must also look at regional problems, such as the 115,000
Soviet troops that occupy Afghanistan.
o The development of more constructive relations with the
Soviets is a complex process and we nave no illusions that
a new era of cooperation automatically accompanies a
leadership change. We snould not expect the Soviet system
or Soviet goals to change.
o No one expects progress to De quick or easy. Nonetheless,
some of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's early remarks are
encouraging. The crucial element will De whether Soviet
deeds will coincide with these initial positive
sentiments.
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