CRITIQUE OF A SOVIET REAR SERVICES EXERCISE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 163
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 14, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Critique of a Soviet Rear Services Exercise
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Ministry of Defense of the union of SSR's
Top Secret
Copy No.
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CRITIQUE TH* TROUT T11110-STAGE
OPERATIO -I?-REAR AREA EXERCISE CONDUCTMD
IF JULY 1961
Mpg,COI - 1961
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Report of the Chief of the Directing Staff
General of the Army Y.Y. Popov
Report of the Director of the Exercise -
Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops
Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov
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Sketch 1 The operational situation at 0700
hours on 18 July and the tasks of
both sides.
Sketch 2 The situation of the rear services
at 0700 hours on 18 July.
Sketch 3 The decisions of both sides in
accordance with the situation at
0700 hours on 18 July.
Sketch 4 The organization of the rear services
of the 2nd Front in the offensive
operation.
Sketch 5 The course of combat operations-
20 to 22 July.
Sketch 6 The supply to troops of the front of
missiles and missile fuel.
Sketch 7 The radiation situation in the zone of
the 2nd Front three hours after the
first nuclear strike by the "west"
(0200 - 0240 on 20 July)
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Sketch 8 2The nd Front in accordance withr the
the
situation at 2200 hours on 22 July.
Sketch 9 Diagram of the basic communications
of the 2nd Front on 20 July.
Sketch 10 The organization of the rear services
.and materiel support of the aviation
and missile units of the 78th Air
Army in the offensive operation.
Sketch 11 anization of
troops andhofatheainstallations
of the rear services of the 2nd Front
in the offensive operation.
Sketch 12 The loganization for and artillery tharm'men o of of
thehe
missi
front.
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REPORT
of the Chief of the Directing Staff
General of the Army
M.M. POPOV
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Comrade generals and officers
I have been commissioned to report to you on the
characteristics and course of the unilateral two-stage
d In
operational-rear ith area econductfeDefense
ofeDefense
accordance in 1961.
for operational training
The purpose of the exercise was to study further
the questions of the organization of the rear support
of troops of a front, especially ^i
the first operation of the initial period of a war.
The following were used as trainees for the
operations by the "Bast" side: the commander and staff
of the Carpathian Military District, the commanders of the
and staffs of the 13th and 38th Combined Arms, and 8th Tank and 57th Air Armies, the operational group
of the 8th Army of the Anti-Aircraft Defense (Protivo
Vozdushnaya Oborona - PVO) of the Country, the command-
ing officer and staff of the 28th Army Corps and also
operational groups of the 15th Motorized Rifle and
23rd Tank Divisions. These appeared respectively
the roles of front, army, corps
The following missile troops appeared in the
exercise: the 35th and 164th Missile Brigades, the 579tL
Independent Aviation Engineer Regiment of Cruise
Missiles, 715th and 28th Antiaircraft Missile
Regiments.
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The rear services of the front were actually
represented by a. directorate(upravleniye) of,
the forward front base with depots of missile fuel,
POL, rations, transport units (chast podvoza),
pipeline and area road-traffic control brigades, the
hospital base with four hospitals of various designa-
tions and other rear units and establishments.
The missile-technical units of the front were
represented by the front missile-technical base and
the front technical base of the antiaircraft guided
missiles.
The rear services of the lst Army were actually
deployed under the control of the mobile army base
with its depots, two motor vehicle transport battalions,
an area road traffic control battalion, a separate
medical detachment and othe? subunits.
In addition, an army missile transport battalion
(raketno-parkovyy division) actually participated.
The divisional regimental rear services were
represented by rear service units and subunits of
the motorized rifle and tank d:-::isions.
More than 50 rear service large units, units and
establishments participated in the exercise.
In all, about 22,000 persons, some 7,000
motor vehicles, 18 missile and antiaircraft missile
launchers, 4 launchers for the front's cruise missiles,
98 tanks, 66 aircraft and helicopters, 14 radar stations
860 radio stations and other combat and special equip-
ment were used in the exercise.
The directing staff, umpiring staff and scientific-
research groups were made up of generals and officers
of the Main Staff of the Central Directorates of the
Ministry of Defense, of a number of military districts
and of the academies of Ground Troops.
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The following initial situation was established
for the conduct of the exercise (Sketch 1).
In connection with the aggravation of international
relations and'the increasing threat of military
operations in Europe, the "West" and "East" began
hurriedly to deploy their armed forces operationally
and to bring them to increased combat readiness.
During the night of 1,8 July, the 2nd Front of
the "East" brought its troops, alerted for combat
(po boyevoy trevoge), out of their permanent ?Lisposition
areas and began to move them toward the national border.
Elements of the operational rear and of the missile
technical units were deployed at the same time.
With the aim of frustrating the attack being
prepared by the "West", the front was given the task
of preparing and conducting an offensive operation, of
destroying the nuclear/missile weapons and of routing
the main forces of the Central Group of Armies; on the
fourth day of the operation to occupy the areas and
communications centers of: Vlodava; tholm, Erasnystav,
Zamostye; Yaroslav, Peremys rov.
Subsequently , developing a swift offensive in
the general direction of Sandomir and Ostrava, the
front was to rout the approaching reserveir oY the
enemy, to destroy his means of nuclear attack and on
the eighth day of the operation to occupy the areas:
Chenstokhov, Ostrava, aremnitsa.
The readiness of the troops of-the front for the
offensive was determined on 19 July.
IFor the operation, the front was allotted 226
nuclear warheads and 277 missiles with chemical filler
(khimicheskoye snaryazheniye).
At the beginning of combat operations, the Head-
quarters (Stavka) delivered nuclear/missile strikes
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with its means against the most important targets and
communications lines of the enemy west of the line
Radom,Tarnuv, Debretsen. In addition, the use of ten
nucle ar arheads-in support of the front on its request
in the course of the operation was provided for.
For the conduct of the operation, the front had:
two combined arms, one tank and one air armies, an
army corps, two front and three army missile brigades,two
;#,ndepemde*t missile battalions, nine missile anti-
aircraft regiments of types "A" and "3" and twenty-four in-
dependunt antiaircraft missile battalions of the type
In all, the front was composed of twenty-three
divisions, including seven tank and one airborne.
The air army had an. #:md4Rdent - av iRt ion eAgineer
regiment of cruise missiles, two fighter aviation
divisions, a division of fighter-bombers and a bomber
division.
For the use of nuclear weapons, the front had
at its disposal 88 missile launching mounts (36
o rational-tactical, 44 organic and 8 FFR-1
robabl "front-cruise missile" -"frontovaya krylataya
raketa 7 and 39 missile delivery aircraft.
The lst Front operated from the right, with the
task of advancing in the direction of Warsaw and,
on the 7th or 8th day of the operation, of occupying
the Lodz area with the troops of its left flank (krylo).
From the left, the 3rd Front prepared for an
offensive operation with the goal of routing the main
forces of the Southern group of Armies of the "west"
and of occupying an operational bridgehead-on the Danube
in the area of Budapest on the 8th or 9th day of tee
operation.
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In the zone of operations of the 2nd Front the
"West" deployed troops of the Central Group of Armies
comprising nineteen divisions (including four armored
and one airborne). The group had the task of destroy-
ing the "East" in the direction of Kiev occupying a
bridgehead on the Dnepr and of developing an offensive
in the general direction of Kursk.
The operational position of the troops of the 2nd
Front at 0700 hours on 18 July was characterized as
follows.
The 3rd Army Corps composed of three motorized
rifle divisions was concentrated in reserve areas,
having the 33rd Division at a distance of 30 kilometers
from the national border, the 59th Division north of
Olevsk and the 31st Division north of Ovruch.
The 6th Army had two divisions 30 to 50 kilometers
from the national border and two divisions west and
south of Belays Tserkov. The army missile brigade was
located 125 kilometers from the border.
The 1st Army continued to move troops toward the
border. Three of its divisions were located at- &
day's rest (dnevka) northwest of Kiev, 150 to 200
kilometers from the border. The army missile brigade
was located in the Radomyshl area. Two divisions were
bringing their comp en up to full strength
(doukoaplaktovaniye) (the 5th Motorized Rifle Division
in the area south of Ichnya and the 11th Motorized Rifle
Division south of Shoat .
The 4th Tank Army consisting of four divisions
was located in the area south of Kiev on the west bank
of the Dnepr.
The 21st Front Missile Brigade (R-170) was
concentrated southwest of Korosten 100 kilometers
from the border.
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The 22nd Front Missile Brigade (R-300) was located
at a day's rest in the Kanev area.
The 10th Independent Missile Battalion (KR-500)
was concentrated 50 kilometers south of Kiev.
The 12th Independent Missile Battalion (R-550)
arrived on 19 July.
The 14th Motorized Rifle Division was brought up
to the reserve area east of Kiev on the left bank of
the Dne r .
The 37th Motorized Rifle Division completed its
concentration in the woods southwest of Yagotin.
The 93rd Airborne Division was located in a
concentration area 25 kilometers east of Sudzha.
The 78th Air Army changed the bases of its large
units and units to reserve airfields, maintaining them
at full combat readiness.
The primary basing and deployment areas of front
and army rear service units and establishments were
(Sketch 2): Ovruch, Korosten, Zhitomir, Malin, Fastov,
Kiev, Nezhin.
During this time, the rear services of the front
and of the armies were deployed on a base of stationary
depots, military hospitals, repair plants and workshops.
At the beginning of the operation, missile-technical
bases and depots were almost completely up to full
strength in all types of supplies, and the remaining
rear service units and establishments at 40 to 50% of
the prescribed strength. The rear services of the
combined arms and tank armies were at 50 to 60% of
Suil strength at the start of the operation. 50X1-HUM
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During the course of the operation, the missing
rear service units and establishments were to join the
composition of the front and were able to go to work as
they arrived in the area of combat operations.
At the beginning of the operation, reserves of
materiel were generally maintained in the troops
according to norms, with the exception of fuel.
Reserve stocks at the mobile army bases of the lot
and 6th Armies were sufficient to meet the requirements
of the troops for 24 hours while at the base of the 4th
Tank Army, reserve stocks were not yet established.
At the stationary depots of the district, which
were given to the 2nd Front, reserves of materiel were
sufficient to meet the requirements of the troops
available for 12 to 15 days. During this time, up
to 50% of the reserve stocks were located on the east
bank of the Dnepr.
At the front missile-technical base there were
148 missiles of the "surface-to-surface" (zemlya-
zemlya) class.
By that time the front had 1,870 antiaircraft
guided missiles.
At the front there were ten hospitals with an
overall capacity of 3,000 beds which were fully
occupied by patients with varying lengths of treatment.
Thus, the initial situation and, in particular,
the situation of rear services support of the troops
of the front, especially the missile troops, required
that a whole series of measures betaken
inithear
deployment and corresponding organization
services in the interests of fulfilling the assigned
tzsk.
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The commander of troops of the 2nd Front of
the "East", Colonel-General of Tank Troops A.L. Get-tan,
decided to launch the first mass strike with sixty- e
nuclear warheads and twenty-four chemical missiles with
the aim of destroying the primary groupings of nuclear/
missile weapons and troops of the "West".
Following the first nuclear strike, the front,
having concentrated its primary efforts in the direction
of Shepetovka, Sandomir, Ostrava, went over to a
determined of fei~isv-from nes at a distance of 30 to
40 kilometers from the national border.
The front allocated 101 nuclear warheads and 124
chemical missiles to fulfil the immediate task.
Forty-nine nuclear warheads and 79 chemical missiles
were allocated to fulfil the subsequent task.
Thirteen nuclear warheads and 50 chemical missiles
remained in the front's reserves.
The front had an operational structure of one
echelon. Five divisions, including one tank and one
airborne, remained in the front's reserves. Ten
divisions were deployed in the first echelon of the
armies.
The depth of the operation was 650 kilometers,
the width of the offensive zone was 350 kilometers
and the planned average rate of advance was 80
kilometers a day.
The troops of the front were assigned the
following tasks:
The 3rd Army Corps - to launch a strike in the
direction of arny, oval, Ylodava, to destroy the
opposing enemy and by the end of the second day to
occupy the Bol, Obzyr, Povorsk, ltanevichi area.
Subsequently, devTing a offns 3ve, by the end of
the fourth day to seize a bridgehead on the
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Western Bug in the area of V lodava . The corps was
a lotted nuc lear warheads .
The 1st Army - to go over to the offensive in the
direction of Zdo1bunov and Torchin and by the end of
the second day of the operation to occupy the Rakitse,
Torchin, Berestechko area. Subsequently, developing
the o ensivve`inth direction of Grubeshuv and
Lrasnystav to rout the approaching reserves of the
enemy, to force the Western Bug quickly (s khodu)
and on the fourth day of the operation to reach the
Savin, Brasnystav, Zamostye area.
The army was allotted 31 nuclear warheads and
33 chemical missiles.
The 4th Tank Army - to go over to the offensive
in the direction o ritsev, Chervonoarmeysk, Sokal
axis in coordination wifg-the and Armies to
rout the opposing enemy and by the end of the second
day of the operation to occupy the Ivanichi, Ugnev,
Velikiye Mosty area.
In developing the offensive in the direction of
Zamost e)Annopol in coordination with the 93rd Airborne
Division to force the Viola 'Vistula) quickly and on the
fourth day of the opera on to occupy the area vest of
Sandomir.
Subsequently, in developing the success achieved,
to reach the Ostrava area on the seventh day of the
operation.
Thirty-two nuclear warheads and 42 chemical missiles
were allocated for the operation.
The 6th Army - to go over to the offensive in the
direction o elnitski and Ternopol to rout the
opposing enemy grouping of nuclear/missile weapons and
troops, by the end of the second day of the operation to
occupy the Podkamen, Zolochev, Berezhany area and on the
fourth day of the operation to reach the- Lyubachuv,
Yaroslav, Hhyrov area.
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Twenty-nine nuclear warheads and 37 chemical missiles
were allocated for the operation.
The 78th Air Army - together with the missile
troops of the front, to launch a mass nuclear strike
against the "West" using three atomic bombs and eight
cruise missiles. During subsequent operations to
continue the destruction of the nuclear/missile weapons,
reserves and aircraft of the enemy, to support the
offensive of the armies and also to cover the primary
grouping of the troops and objectives of the rear
services of the front.
To fulfil these tasks the army was allotted 49
nuclear warheads, including 24 cruise missiles.
The decision of the commander of troops of the
front concerning the organization of rear services came
to the following (Sketch 4).
Rear service support of the troops of the front
was accomplished by stationary depots and by the rear
units and establishments of the district with the
simultaneous formation and deployment of front and
army rear service large units and units.
In order to support the missile troops of the front,
a front missile-technical base was not up consisting of
the :.base :BQ tq five mobile-technical repair bases
(reaontno-tekhnichesk,L.ya baza) and an independent
missile transport battalion. Of these, two mobile-
technical repair bases were designated to assemble
the R-550 and KR-500 missiles to be supplied to the
front's independent missile battalions and three mobile-
technical repair bases to assemble 8-30, 2-170 and
8-300 missiles, and each was deployed in the zone of the
army which it supported. The missile transport battalion
received missiles at the unloading stations of the front
and transported them to the mobile-technical repair bases.
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To support the antiaircraft missile units, a
front technical base for antiaircraft guided missiles
(zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa - ZUR) was set up
consisting of :the.?HQ`s.9 four technical battalions and
one independent transport battalion.
One army missile transport battalion was set up
for each army.
Subsequently, when at the beginning of the exercise
it was discovered that the HQ's J the front missile-
technical base and of the front technical ZUR base
was a_superfluous superstructure, they were disbanded
on the instructions of the director of the exercise,
Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Vasiliy Ivanovich
Chuykov and command of the missile-technical units was
coed out directly by the chief of missile-artillery
armament of the front and appropriate departments were
created (Sketch 12).
Before the operation started, during 18 and 19
July, the missile-technical units of the front prepared
87 missiles with nuclear warheads and 44 with chemical
filler, sending the majority of these to the troops.
The front's technical ZUR bass assembled, prepared
and, by the end of 19 July, sent 444 missiles to anti-
aircraft missile units.
Depots of missile fuel were located In two areas -
in the woods south of Zhitomir and in the woods north-
east of Radomyshl.
In order to provide the troops with materiel,
it was arranged for a section of the forward base of
the front to be deployed south of Ovruch (150 kilometers
from the border) and be functy 'inina^'before the second
day of the operation. The base itself was to be
deployed on the second day in the 8hepetovka area.
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The work of the rear supply base of the front in
the area 30 kilometers east of Nezhin, and of its
section 20 kilometers east of ago n, was planned
to begin on 22 July.
After accomplishment of the immediate task by
the troops of the front, it was arranged that the
forward bases of the front should be brought closer
to the troops, with the deployment of one section in
the Kovel area and of the second in the woods northwest
of Lvov.
In the zone of the front, three basic railroad
routes were selected - northern, central and southern,
together with two lateral routes.
During the operation the network of railroads w
to be built up in two directions: Barn - Chenstokhov,
Shepetovka - Ostrava.
In all, four railroad brigades were deployed for
the servicing, technical coverage (prikrytiye), and
reconstruction of the railways.
To provide against the event of the destruction
of the railroad bridges across the Dnepr, the laying
of a floating bridge south of Kiev was provided for
on the third day of the operation.
It was also decic'ed to have three basic motor
vehicle;-roads for the front and to prepare two lateral
routes.
In order to ensure the most effective use of all
the roads in the zone of the front, a road zone and
a road traffic control area were organized within the
system of military communications by the beginning of
the operation.
During the course of the operation, the organization
of three road zones (dorozhnaya zona) was planned,
together with the designation of several road traffic
control areas within these.
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Three road traffic control brigades were used in
the preparation and during the course of the operation
to service roads for motor vehicles and to establish
road traffic control areas in the road zone of the
front.
It was planned to use the 40th Bridge-Building
Brigade, which arrived on 25 July, primarily to
support the crossings of the Western Bug, San and
Dnepr. Before the arrival of the brigade, two
motorized rifle and one road-building battalions were
charged with supporting crossings of the Dnepr, using
Dnepr river transport resources.
In all, it was intended to-organize ten ferry
crossings across the Dnepr.
In addition, two crossings, temporarily set up
to support the regrouping of troops, were used to
ensure motor vehicle traffic across the Dnepr.
By the beginning of the operation, the. laying
of a field main pipeline was completed from the area
of Zhidinichi along the line Malin, Novograd-Volynskiy
extending during the course o3 f tie operation to
Badekhov - an overall length of 600 kilometers. It
was Tap nned to lay a second pipeline starting on 21 July
from an area 20 kilometers east of Shepetovka in the
direction of Krenenets, Brody and Bava- s aya -
also an overall length or WU kilome rs.
The daily total capacity of both pipelines was
to consist of some 3,000 tons of gasoline and diesel
fuel. Two pipeline brigades were charged with laying
the pipelines.
After the report to the director of the exercise,
substantial corrections were made in the overall organiza-
tion of the rear services.
It was decided to refrain from setting up the
front base on the left bank of theDne and to expedite
the concentration of basic reserve socks on the right
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base way w &M -_ -
70 to 80 kilometers from the national-border. 50X1-HUM
bank, in order to decrease the dependence of the troops
on the Dnepr crossings. It was, also decided to have
primary reserve stocks in the zones of the 4th Tank and
1st Armies.
Measures were taken for the bringing up of reserve
stocks from stationary depots on the left bank of the
Dnepr to the troops of the 4th Tank Army and depots
oT tTie front's forward base.
To provide against the destruction of the crossings
over the Dnepr, a reserve of txans loadingeareasesouthsoi
created to set up temporary
Kiev and north of Cherkassy.
In addition, the organization of rear services
support for the regrouping of troops and the the two
primary axes of troop deployment
of hospital bases and oecperat ins were envisaged and
planned.
the shipment of wounded personnel being
Tosupport two hospitals with an
ouated ve capacpacifyity fe Dnepr, oo(-eds were allocated.
overall r
Evacuation of the wounded to front hospitals was
provided for mainly by the motor vehicle and air
transport of the front. The vehicular mevacuation
of the front availab. a for evacuation provided for 2,000 persons in one trip and the medical aviation
regiment - for 250 persons.
Since the rear services were actually deployed only
in the let Army, permit se to dwell in somewhat more
detail on its organization.
By the beginning-of the operatiloon,vthe mobile army
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An area 55 kilometers west of Zhitomir was assigned
to the army missile transport battalion for deployment.
All five independent medical detachments were attached
to divisions, of which three did not deploy at the
initial position.
The motor medical (avtosanitarnyy) company was
to ensure the evacuation of wounded from the regiments.
The motor transport battalions were designated to
ensure the transport of materiel to large units and
units of the armies from the army depots.
Two road traffic control battalions were to prepare
and service the two basic motor vehicle roads and also
to prepare two reserve and two control roads.
Control of rear services units and establishments
was accomplished from the rear control post (tylovoy
punkt upravleniya - TPU) of the army, which was set
up in the woods 10 kilometers north of Kovograd-Volynskiy.
Preparation of the rear services of the army for
the rear support of troops in the operation entailed
the necessity for the transfer of rear service units
to a new area. This transfer was accomplished during
the night of 20 July over a distance of some 150
kilometers in accordance with the directive of the
front for rear services which was received at the TPU
of the army after a very long delay - 20 hours after
receipt by the army of the operational directive.
It.was planned to transfer some 24 various units
and establishments in the complement of the mobile
base in 425 motor vehicles. All of these were
consolidated in two columns, 12 to 15 kilometers in
length. Some 15 hours were needed for the transfer of
the base to the area designated.
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Ten hours were spent in transferring the TPU to
the new arEa. During this time, control over the army
rear services was completely lost because of the lack
of communications with rear service units.
The organizationinitial services
and 6th Armies in the fundamentally from the organization of rear services
in the is t Army.
?
f rout At 1845 hours on 19 July the directivecwh~ichdreQuiredehim to
received a Headquarters
bring the troops of the front to full combat readiness
to go over to the offensive by 2400 at 30-minute
maintain missiles with nuclear charges readiness from that time.
However, indications of urgent preparation by the of th enemy for a nuclsranstrike d iorcedthisemiseiledunits toe
front on the alert switch successively to 15-minute and then to 2-minute
readiness.
Combat operations by both sides began Pt 0200 hours
on 20 July with nuclear/missile strikes (Sketch 5).
t
The "lest" used 43 nuclear warheads intthe f birstruise
mass strike which was delivered by
and ballistic missiles. During this strike, wiilhslasted
for 40 minutes, 18 major rail centers, airf,
mobile technical-repair base, the mobile army base of the
high-
6th Army, 5 bridges and crossings on the Dnepr,
way junctions and a missile fuel depot were destroyed.
The 2nd Front of the "East" used first 27 nuclear warmissile
heads an c em ca mss es its
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strike. Its effect was felt by the means of nuclear
attack, airfields and troops of the enemy. The air army
participated in this by delivering strikes by five
cruise missiles and one atomic bomb on an airfield, on
"Shanicle" radiotechnical systems, on a "Matador" cruise
missile launch site and also with operations by fighter-
bombers against the forward radar posts of the enemy with
conventional means of destruction.
Following the nuclear/missile strike, the troops
of the 2nd Front went over to the offensive and joined
a meeting engagement with tank and infantry large
units of the enemy in the border zone.
During the period from usuu to 1200 hours, troops
of the front moved forward to a depth of 15 to 20
kilometers in separate directions.
With the aim of developing a higher rate of advance
bj his troops and of destroying the nuclear means and
the reserves of the "West", moving from the interior
in the direction of Kremeneta and Be orodka, the
? commander of the 2n ron ecided a ours to
launch a mass strike in the zone of the tank army with
fifteen nuclear warheads and to rout the main grouping
of the enemy by a decisive offensive.
By the end of 20 July, troops of the 2nd Front,
having overcome the resistance of the enemy, advanced
in sep..?ate directions to a depth of 60 to 70
kilometers (4th Tank Army) from the national border.
On 20 July, the missile-technical units of the front
and armies were located in departure areas, and were
thus separated from the missile troops by a-distance of
170 kilometers at the end of the day. They continued
to receive missiles arriving from the center, assembled
them and delivered them to the troops (Sketch 6).
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During the day 33 "surface-to-surface" missiles
and 320 antiaircraft missiles were delivered to the
troops.
The work of the operational rear services proceeded
under :copplez_.1conditions during the first day of the
operation.
As a result of nuclear/missile strikes by the
enemy the Bakhmach and Grebenka front regulating
stations rasporyaditelaay a s ntsiya) were destroyed,
together with about 20 large rail junctions, including
Nezhin, Chernigov, Kiev, Zhitomir, Novograd-Volynskiy,
alms Kazatin and Berdic fi v; the bridges across the
Dnepr in a-Kiev, Stayka, G rigorovka and Cherkassy areas
and across thePripya n the Yanov area were pout of
commission.
The railroad network of the front broke down in
isolated sectors and the transport of materiel from the
large stationary depots located on the east bank of
the Dnepr ceased completely. The front was also unable
to receive transport and troop trains from the interior
of the country.
In addition, a considerable portion of the territory
of the rear service area of the front became contaminated
with varying levels of radiation (Sketch 7).
The front sustained large losses in personnel,
combat equipment and reserves of materiel.
Thirty-eight rail cars with missiles, abort
24,000 tons of fuel, 1,500 tons of mentions, 580 tons
of missile fuel, some 3,000 tons of rations, 21,000
sets of uniforms, and such other equipment was destroyed.
At front and army depots, storage capacity for 38,000
tons of fuel was destroyed and 5 hospitals were also
destroyed. Up to 250 kilometers of usable motor
vehicle roads were contaminated.
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The wire communications system of the rear area
of the front was 75 to 80 percent destroyed.
In this situation, the command element of the
2nd Front introduced the following changes in the
organization of the rear services.
In view of the destruction of the regulating
stations of the front, the troops coming to the
front by rail detrained and continued further under their
own power. In order to cross the Dnepr, forces of the
bridge brigade using the crossing equ-rent of two
divisions set up an additional pontoon bridge in the
Pereyaslavl-Hhmelaitskiy area.
In order to let through trains with supply goods
it was planned to set up a floating rai~td56bridge
th
(NZhI-56 - naplavnoy zhelaznodorozhnyy
of hey by the end of 20 July and to make use of ferry
crossings .
? In order to ensure
~h for front
from the left bank
set up a temporary trznsshfp nt area from hanev to
Cherkass on the morning of 21 July, designate the
section of the 3rd Front Base to direct it.
A section of Forward Front Base No. 2 moved up
to the Slavuta, S,petovka, Dubrovka area in order to
support a mope of the let rmy and 3rd Army Corps.
Front Base No. 3 moved up to the zone of operations of
the troops of the 4th Tank and 6th Armies in the Erasilov,
Zapadintey, Staro-Konstantinov area.
The hospital bases which were set up on 20 July in
the Mfovograd -Volyaskiy and l a~cas altiessfram the troops .
receive woun Ie e
In the rear area of the front, work in eliminating
the resu%ts of the enemy's nuclear attack was carried
out. With this aim, two nuclear bursts on the 22nd
Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 13th Motorised Rifle
50X1-HUM
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Division were simulated at the Tuchinskiy firing range
(poligou).As a result of these up to 600 persons were
presumed to have been hit.
The separate me the aorganization of medical Arm,y ~
which was used for a arrived
evacuation measures in centers of dama8
at the site within 3?~gyacuati?nioitwes and ounded went
d
to work one hour later.
and casualties from the centers was complete
in 24 hours.
By the end of 20 July the sector of pipeline from
a distance
0 khalsksya to ha been extended by
operation. The, overall
0 om,etel ration reached 360 kilometers.
length of pipeline in operation 800 tons of fuel
In a day of the pipeline's opera
were actually pumped through it.
? in view of the destruction of the stationary depot
I air transport was
of missile fuel nthee reserve stocks '
used to replenish had
By the end of 20 July, the mobile army bases
fallen considerably behind the troops. Thus t for example, the mobile base of the 1stt Am a was
at a located dittdn in
n of
the 3taraya Guta, Yablonoye, ~e units. The mobile
100 ome errs fro eves o the Velikiye ioro~riatsy,
base of the tank army in all only . , one ere .
Ivanopol, Oiadovka area, 0
j re-came rep armed from, the troops by more than aan n 12 12
kilometers in the first day of the operation, traich
created great difficulties in organizing
of materiel.
98
In view of the fact that the mobileh?baa.+~of the
6th Army was completely destroyed t KM W"
t 'ofd. 1Dhe
nuclear strike, further support the
directly accomplished by the forces and equipsssn
front.
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During 21 July the troops of the front developed
a swift offensive, repelling counterattacks by reserves
of the "West" in separate directions.
The "West", delivering nuclear strikes against
troops, con rol points and objectives in the rear area
of the "East" conducted delaying operations and by
2000 hours had fallen back to the line Ternopol,
Dubno, Povorsk.
During this day the "East" thus advanced to a
depth of over 120 kilometers with the forward units
of the 4th Tank Army and of 80 to 100 kilometers with
other units.
The operational situation during the second day of
the operation did not require the commander of the 2nd
Front to make new decisions. Success was exploited by
the use of nuclear and chemical weapons and by committing
the second echelons of the armies to battle.
During the course of the day the front and the armies
used 19 nuclear warheads, the larger portion of these in
the zones of the 4th Tank and 1st Armies.
During the day one division from the complement of
each of their second echelons was committed to battle
as the result of decisions by the commanders of the
4th Tank and 6th Armies and also by the commanding
officer of the 3rd Army Corps.
At 1410 hours, a nuclear strike by the enemy put
out of commission the command post (komandnyy punkt - IP)
of the front which was located south of Zhitomir. Control
of the troops was carried out from the alternate command
post (zapasnoy koaandnyy punkt - ZXP) in the Baranovka
area, at which a communications center had previous ly
been set up.
The 78th Air Army continued to support the troops of
the front, having allocated half of the planned regiJental
sorties by fighter-bombers, 7 front cruise missiles with
?
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nuclear charges and three nuclear bombs to the support
of the combat operations of the 4th Tank Army.
In the first half of the day, the 78th Air Army
delivered strikes with three cruise missiles with
nuclear warheads against the enemy's nuclear weapon
depots in the area southwest of Rovno and with four
cruise missiles with chemical filler-against his troops
to the west and north of Dubno.
During the day, units of the air army carried out
a total of 450 aircraft sorties (samoleto-vylet).
In developing the offensive, troops of the front
advanced up to 180 to 190 kilometers in the direction
of the main strike in two days of the operation.
On 21 July, the missile-technical units of the front
and armies were transferred to new areas. In a day
they assembled and delivered to the troops 20 "surface-
to-surface" class missiles and 300 antiaircraft missiles.
The maximum distance separating the missile-technical
units from the troops reached 200 kilometers and the
minimum was 20 to 30 kilometers.
Units of the front and army rear services, continuing
to eliminate the results of the enemy's nuclear attack,
carried out materiel, technical and medical support of
large units operating in wide zones in separate directions.
The forward front bases, in order to move reserve
stocks of materiel nearer to the troops, moved out to
areas 15 kilometers northeast of She etovka and 10
kilometers north of Staro-Konstan nov, having reserve
stocks for li to 2 days.
In order to support the large units and units subordinate
to the front and to transship goods across the Dnepr,
sections of these bases were dispatched to areas north
of aorosten and Kanev.
?
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The mobile base of the tank army was transferred
to the pochayev area and of the 1st Army was located
in the 1ormer area, 150 kilometers from the troops
(behind the forward front bases), where it eliminated
the results of the nuclear strike.
By this time, rail traffic had been successfully
restored through Belokorovichi to Sarny and through
Halinovka to Staro- ons an nov, w'fi'ii h permitted the
delivery of goods rom a section of Forward Front
Base No. 2 for large units of the 3rd Army Corps and
the transfer of fuel reserves from the stationary depot
in the Kazatin area to the Staro-Konstantinov area.
A road traffic control service was actually organized
by the forces of the 21st Road Traffic Control Brigade
and ohvvehicleIroadsnofatheofrontaand Control
on motor
In a 24-hour period about 20,000 tons of
various The
supplies were brought up by all types of
pipeline brigade extended 80 diesel kilometers el
on 21 July and actually pumped
for a distance of 440 kilometers.
Materiel reserves in the front as a
the army mobile bases and among the diminished, but still permitted the conduct of active
combat operations for several wdays. However, about
40 percent of these supplies
Dnepr as before.
Medical losses for the day were also great. Two
sections from the hospital bases were moved forward
by the end of the day to collect wounded from the troops
and to afford them specialized medical aid. Rvacuation
of wounded was carried out over a distance of from
50 to 100 kilometers by the medical transport of the
front and armies.
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50X1-HUM
The separate medical detachments of the 1st Army
which were actually brought into the exercise, developed
a from
an organization to render medical aid to casualties
toxic chemical agents of the "Sarin" type,
chemical attack by the enemy was simulated on the
Tuchiaskiy firing range, as a result of which there
were presumed to be up to 500 casualties.
Rendering aid to the casualties was carried out by
the 84th Iudepeeadent Medical Detachment, which arrived
at the center of damage one hour after the launching of
the strike.
?
In the situation which had developed by the end of
21 July, the "West" decided during the night of 22 July
to hold with its basic forces a line along the west banks
of the Seret, Ikva and Styr rivers, to withdraw part of
its troopsfo organize a ease on a line along the
Zolotaya Lipa*lesterzl and Turya rivers, and beginning
on the morn ng oT 9-12 u y to-deliver a strike with 15
nuclear warheads on the main forces of the 4th Tank Army
of the "East" in the Podgortey, Brody. Kremenets area and
complete their rout with a counters ike: 6th
Armored and 15th Infantry Divisions from the line of
Nikolayev, Demidovka, in the direction of Berestechko and
emene s; by the 3rd Division withva the line bov
the 2nd Cavalry Reginent
and Snovichi in the direction of Zborov and Pochayev?
Troops of the 2nd Front continued combat operations
along the primary directions. The dander of thf, front
decided, in delivering nuclear/mi*sile and chemical
strikes against the approaching reserves of the enemy,
to develop the offensive in the direction of Brody,
Tomushuv and Zamoetye.
?
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In order to fulfil the tasks allotted, the following
allocations were made : to the 1st Army 2 nuclear and
4 chemical warheads, to the 4th Tank Army 6 nuclear
warheads and to the 6th Army 3 missiles with chemical
filler .
The reserves of the front were brought up to the
line of the front by the morning of 22 July and the
armies brought in their second echelons to develop the
offensive.
At 0700 on 22 July, the "West", with the aim of
defeating the main forces of the 4th Tank Army and of
containing the offensive of the "East" intheudidirection
of Lvov, delivered a counterstrike using 15
warheads against the flanks of the army with the forces
of the 6th Armored and 15th Infantry Divisions from
the Beresteehko area and with the 3rd Division and a
tank groin the Pomoryany area in the general
direction of gremene s.
As a result of the counterstrike, the "West"
of the
succeeded to some extent in squeezing the troops
lot and 6th Armies and in reaching into the Chervonovarneysk
and Zalozhtsy areas.
During the day of t oseba t , troops of the front, having
repelled the counterstrike of the "Test ; and bringing
second echelons of the armies into the battle, advanced
40 to 50 kilometers and gained the line Hovel, Studinka,
Chervonograd, E.ulikov, Zborov, Podgaytsy.
In the course of a 24-hour period, by means of
raids by aircraft and by missile strikes, the enemy
put out of commission the rail junctions of Shepetovka
and Staro-Honstantinov.
Considerable losses were sustained by the rear
services of the let Army, which until then, as previously,
stayed bridge northeast
whof Novo icb van T in tae
The h ev
The pontoon railroad
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50X1-HUM
?
area was also destroyed. A large number of wounded
were accumulated in the armies.
The mobile army base of the 1st Army was transferred
to the Zdclbunov area, and the mobile army base of the
4th Ta racy_vas brought up toward the combat formation
of the divisions.
The organization of the rear services of the 6th
Army did not undergo substantial changes and its troops
continued their support work primarily with the forces and
equipment of the front's rear-services.
In order to restore railroad traffic across the
Dnepr, it was envisaged by the morning of 24 July to
establish two ferry crossings with a traffic capacity
of 10 trains (in one direction) at the center line of
the destroyed pontoon railroad bridge. At the same
time, the task of constructing a low (nizkovodnyy)
bridge in this same area (parallel to the destroyed
bridge and using the approaches to it which remained)
was assigned.
On this day, the bringing up of materiel and the
evacuation of wounded to hospital bases of the front,
using air transport, wie increased. In 24 hours up
to 900 tons of goods were brought up and more than
5,000 wounded were evacuated. Using AN-12 and AN-8
aircraft, 6 missiles and 166 tons of various goods were
actually brought up to the Sitno airfield area and
150 presumed wounded were evacuated. Fifty to 60 minutes
were spent in converting AN-12 aircraft from the transport
to the medical version.
Considering the future development of the operation,
it was planned to move part of the forces and equipment
of the rear services of the front closer to the armies.
Specifically, beginning on 24 July, it was envisaged that
a section of the 3rd Forward Front Base should move to the
Nagerov area (west of Lvov) and also one section of the
Gth pital Base of tS-e-Tront was prepared to move on
23 July to an area west of Kovel. 50X1-HUM
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During the third day of the operation, four mobile
technical repair bases, two army missile transport
battalions and one independent technical battalion were
transferred for a distance of 145 to 220 kilometers to
new areas.
The maximum separation between missile-technical
units and the troops on this day was 30 to 50 kilometers.
Units of the rear services of the air army restored
materiel and technical facilities at the Novograd-Volyrs ;:.y
and Chortoriya airfields and also establish-e-T reserve- o
fuel awn munitions at the Stepan, Sosnovka and Krasilov
airfields which had been captured rom a enemy.
On 22 July, 29 missiles of the "surface-to-surface"
class and 308 antiaircraft missiles were prepared and
delivered to the troops.
In the situation which had arisen, the 5th Army,
composed of four divisions, arrived from the reserves
of the Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme High Command
to reinforce the 2nd Front (Sketch 8).
By decision of the Commander of the 2nd Front, the
5th Army was designated to go into battle on the morning
of 25 July with the task of swiftly developing the advance
of the troops of the front from the line Ilzha, Ivaniska
in the direction of Radonsko and Volchin an y ffie en
of 27 July ^f occupying 7deris uv, _~-ublineis,
Chenstokhov area.
In view of the participation of the 5th Army, the
rear services of the front were additionally strengthened
with six motor vehicle transport battalions in the
Yinnitsa area and with a hospital baso with 10,000 beds
and six separate medical detachments in the Unan area.
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In concluding an account of the course of the combat
operations, I consider it necessary to report briefly
on the measures and work actually accomplished in the
exercise, which have the greatest practical significances.
The capabilities of a number of units and large units
in providing materiel and technical support both in
the period of preparation for an operation and during
the course of it were checked and established.
Thus, in the exercise, 75 missiles were actually
deliveredito the front by air, rail and motor vehicle
transport.
Twenty-six missiles were actually assembled and
delivered to the troops by the mobile technical repair
bases and six antiaircraft missiles by the independent
ZUR technical battalions.
Twelve AN-12 aircraft of the 6th and 3 AN-8's
of the 12th Military Air Transport Divisions were used
to ship missiles and materiel by air.
In addition, aircraft moved 200 tons of freight,
including 100 tons of munitions, 80 tons of fuel and
20 torus of rations; of these, 24 tons of munitions,
5 tons of fuel and 5 tons of rations were delivered by
parachute.
The 50th Pipeline Brigade extended the pipeline
by a length of 600 kilometers from Zhidinichi to
Radekhov . 4,800 tons of diesel fuel were ac ua lly
pumped long the pipeline.
The missile fuel depot received 181 tons of missile
fuel and distributed it to the missile-technical troops.
The missile fuel transport battalion shipped 48
tons of miseile fuel for a distance of 350 kilometers.
Prom 22 to 24 July, the motor transport battalion
of heavy duty trucks which was formed during the period
of the exercise actually accomplished the shipment of
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t
a tank regiment (98 tanks) from the Ovruch area to the
Lutsk area and back, over a distance More than 500
eters .
During the exercise, engineer troops prepared
(oborudovat) the disposition areas of the 5th Mobile
Technical Repair Base, of the army base of the 1st ArmY areas and of the front mi3sile and depot frontlwerehloc ted.
in which the zP, Zgp
In addition, about 100 square kilometers wereaded
checked for sines, 80 kilometers of roads were graded
and 15 bridges were repaired.
The road traffic control brigade organized 250
kilometers of dirt roads and serviced 600 kilometers
of motor vehicle roads.
The independent medical detachments carried out
the evacuation of 1,100 presumed wounded personnel by
? motor vehicle transport and 150 by aircraft.
On 20 July, an independent evacuation company was
deployed in the area of *e',Tuchinskiy firing range carried out practical work ainathe eevacuation of damaged
vehicles in the center
Some consents on the operations of the independent
mixed helicopter regiment.
All the helicoptethe regiment were equipped
to transport nuclear/missile
The regiment was allotted to the chief of the
missile and artillery armament of the front. During the
first day it shipped 32 missiles s and warheads, for
which 40 helicopter flights
?
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The task of shipping 26 missiles and 11 warheads from
their unloading stations to the disposition areas of
the mobile technical repair base, over a distance of
250 to 300 kilometers, was accomplished by the regiment
in 7 hours.
The exercise showed that, in cases when it is
impossible to bring transport with missiles closer to
the troops by rail or motor vehicle in directions
where crossings are destroyed, the loading.of
helicopters with missiles can take place at a considerable
distance from the disposition areas of a mobile technical
repair base. In this case, helicopters are forced to
make flights whose total range in both directions is
some 850 to 900 kilometers, which requims one or two
refuelings with landings at fields prepared for these
purposes.
This obliges one to examine the problems involved
in developing the most mobile rear service subunits to
support helicoptersoperations.
Permit me to dwell on some of the questions of the
control of troops and the organization of communications
in the exercise.
The exercise showed that front and army staffs have
not yet fully grasped the art of working out a plan for
an operation in a limited time and that they were late
in formulating the decisions of the commanders and in
delivering these to the troops.
Thus, in the 6th Army, combat missio$a were only
delivered to the troops 10 hours after the decision
had been taken by the commander of the army .
?
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The situation was even worse in the 1st Army. The
combat orders committing the 28th Motorized Rifle
Division to battle were sent to the division by cypher
at 1120 hours on 21 July but were only handed to the
commanding officer of the division at 1630 hours,
when the division was supposed to enter the battle
already by 1100 hours on that day.
Essentially, the commander and chief of staff
did not concern themselves with organizing the
commitment to battle of tthis division. As a result,
it was detected by the enemy and subjected to a nuclear
strike and was unable to go into battle.
Cases of an irresponsible attitude toward the
deciphering of combat documents were noted in the exercise.
Important enciphered4aessages, requiring the establishment
of a 24-hour tour of duty (dezhurstvo) for missile
batteries together with signals giving information on
opening fire were deciphered in the 28th Division 15 hours
after they were received. The parties responsible for
such a disgraceful state of affairs should be punished.
The proper procedure was ale. not observed in
determining the stamp (grif) to be put on documents.
Officers of the staff of the front unnecessarily abused
the priority of the series "G" stamp. Ninety percent
of all correspondence went out under this series. Really
important and urgent combat documents were buried and
held up. This was the case, for example, with the
attack order for the 3rd Army Corps.
The timely dispat$h of tasks to the troops was
not controlled in certain staffs and commanders were
misled, being confident that troops were operating
according to the instructions they had been given.
We must organize the work of staffs in such a way
that any instruction given by a commanding officer is
written down in the staff with a note of the time and
of the name of the writer. Without this, it is impossible
to establish who is guilty of creating confusion or
to organize control over the performance by the troops of
a task which has been received.
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We shall gradually introduce to staffs sound-
recording equipment which will facilitate the
recording of instructions which are issued. At present,
however, when staffs have not yet received this equipment,
all instructions by officers of staffs should be precisely
stated. With great regret, it must be observed that
certain generals and officers in the evaluation of their
work in the control of troops embarked on the path of
direct deception of the directors of the exercise. Thus,
because of mismanagement by the chief of the missile
troops and artillery of the 1st Army, General Mitakevich,
the siting area of one of the battalions of -?.t e 23r
Army Missile Brigade was located for a long period of time
within the range of the enemy's tactical missiles.
General Mitakevich reported to General of the Army Comrade
A. S. Zha ov at the battalion had been given instructions
to change the siting area. However, a check showed that
no such instructions were given.
In the staffs of formations and large units, a proper
tendency was shown toward. a decrease in the overall
quantity of documents being formulated and toward an
increase in their clarity and terseness. However, as in
t:.+o past, many staffs are still formulating a large
quantity of bulky documents in preparing for an operation,
some of which are not in practice used for control of
troops. This applies especially to documents of arms
of troops and of services. The working maps of staff
officers are overloaded with a large quantity of all
kinds of references and tables. Much time is expended in
coveting maps with drawings, to the detriment of the
lively control of troops.
We must resolutely heck ourselves from verbosity
in documents and in conversations donducted over
technical means of cosumunications.
Documents of the staffs of formations and large
unite which were worked out by then during the exercise
and which have been reviewed and studied by us indicate
that the majority of then suffer from carelessness and
slipshodness in formulation, were worked out in a hurry
and without correct operational practice and are even
without any indication of the time of signing.
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Serious omissions were observed in the organization
of the service for information on the situation at the
control points of the front and of armies. Within
the field control of the front, operational information
was put out irregularly. In view of this, generals
and officers of the arms of troops and of services were
forced continually to address themselves to the
operational control of the staff of the front, thus
disrupting the organization of its work.
Because of the lack of precise information, chiefs
of the arms of troops and services in formations and
large units found out about the operational situation
very late and were unable to react to its changes in
good time.
In the exercise which was conducted, three
control points were established in the front and in the
armies: KP, ZIP and TPU. The alternate command posts
were headed by the deputies to the commanders of troops
of the front and of the armies and included in their
complement responsible representatives from the combined
arms staff and from the chiefs of arms of troops and
services.
At the ZIP of the 2nd Front there were in k11 93
persons, headed by the deputy to the commander of troops
of the front,Colonel-General I.I. Provalov. The number
of personne`L. at the ZIP of therfron exceeded the number
at the previously created forward command posts by 25 to
30 persons.
At the ZIP, the necessary mans of communications,
permitting the assumption of control of the troops in
the event that the command post should be put out of
commission, were set up and kept at constant readiness.
I!e:formation on the situation of the troops reached
the ZIP with a delay of 1j to 2 hours. Thus, by 1400
hours on 21 July when the command post was excluded
from the exercise and the ZIP took over the control of
the troops, data on the situation in the zone of the front
was available at the ZIP only according to the status
(sostoyaniye) at 1200 hours.
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We must think about and eliminate the shortcomings
in the receipt of information at the ZKP.
At the ZKP of the front, regular records of the
most important instructions and orders issued from the
command post were also not maintained, and the position
and status of the missile troops and of rear service
units and establishments were not fully considered.
The ZIP of the front was not even entrusted with control
over the arrival in its area of each unit or installation.
Questions of the location of the ZIP and also of
the organization of its communications with the command
and rear area control points and with the troops also
need to be carefully worked out.
In the exercise, the ZIP of the 2nd Front was
located in the main direction, 90 kilometers from the
command post. We believe that such a distance must not
be regarded as normal. In order to ensure stable multi-
channel communications between the ZIP and the IP of the
front without expenditure of a large quantity of means
of communications, the distance between these control
points shouli not exceed 30 to 40 kilometers. With
the same objects, the ZIP of armies should probably be
deployed at a distance of 10 to 15 kilometers from the
command post.
Some words on the procedure of moving control points.
Many staffs did not give due attention to this problem.
KP and ZIP of the armies were usually moved once in
24 hours, which,with high rates of advance led to their
sharp separation from the troops.
Thus, the IP mad ZIP of the 6th Army in individual
cases remained 140 to 150 kilometers behind the first
echelon troops, as a result of which it took some 10
to 12 hours to not up communications for these control
points in new areas and to move the command and staff
there.
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50X1-HUM
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During 20 July, the KP of the 4th Tank Army was
120 to 140 kilometers from the troops and in the second
half of the following day the separation reached 160
to 180 kilometers and more.
Still worse was the situation concerning the control
of rear service units and establishments during the
transfer of the rear area control points of~'the armies.
The lack of second positions for the communications
centers of these points did not permit previous
preparation of communications from their new areas of
location. As a result of this, during the time required
to move the TPtJ, that is, for almost 10 to 12 hours, the
direction of rear services of the armies in practice
ceased completely.
In the given exercise, particular attentio'.? was given
to the problems of ensuring communications for the control
of the missile-technical units of the front and army and
of the rear services as a whole.
The experience of the exercise showed that stable
control of the operational rear services is possible now
only with the existence of a special communications system
with wide ramifications, based on the combined use of all
existing means of communication , but without going to
excess. The most important communications of the rear
services must be made secure by means of automatic
encoding equipment.
Sketch 9 shows the organization of the basic
communications of the 2nd Front. On this, the instructions
of the Commander-in-Chief on organising .the control of
missile-technical units of the front directly from the
rear control point are taken into account.
The basic wire and radio-relay communications of the
chief aLd staff of the rear services of the front with
subordinate units and establishments are axial (osevoy)
and lateral (rokadnyy) lines of the overall communications
system of the front and auxiliary communications centers
not up at the places where they intersect. The multi-
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channel telegraph and telephone communications of the TPU
e aomandappoosts
of the front with the primary andalternate
o! the front and rear connit8~ ~ n units and establishments
also with primary large
of the rear services of the front are conducted on these
lines.
In order to hook the auxi%iary communications
centers into the overall communications system of the
front, a special radio relay-cable communications
The
battalion is at the d:.sposal of the staff.
reception of communications channels at the TPUartiallof
front and organization of the internal and, the organic
long-range communications is accomplished by
resources of the TPU. addition, small communications
service elesen c
subunits which enable them to establish communications
with the nearest auxiliary communications centers and
to set up the necessary internal communications. Thile,
should apply primarily to front bases, including m
pipeline and road traffic control brigades, railroad
? brigades and other units.
It is understood that the details
aeod t this cotun
tions system of the zear aiea respect,
and provision in the organ ica-
especially for missile-technical units.
The experience of the exercise showed that it is
necessary to bring order to the system of controlling
all the numerous rear service units and establishments,
especially those which operate at a great distance bases.
the TPU of the front and from their respective eorganizing
It would be meaningless to pose direct electrical communications with each of these. To
must consider the possibil:.ty of their territorial
consolidation with certain major rear service elements,
through whose centers they could receive instructions
on their work and could transmit essential messages.
Such elements could b~hshcn?a of~ossd trstf icfront
control
regulating stations,
brigades, etc.
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For radio control over thf rathe diorintelligence
work of the 2nd Freatedan operational
group actually ope
As a result of the check, during 18 July the work
of six radio networks and of the point-to-point radio
However,
nets (radionapravliniye) was monitored.
no intelligence information was obtained from theirrst rk,
since the radio nets worked for short,.per the
radio communications. But atnightirnp1 19 Julyly, hestablished
radio nets of the front changed
This could furnish radio
working procedure sharply.
that
intelligence with aaFrontrhhaad been broughtltoeincreased
the troops o of the 2nd
combat readiness.
By the morning of 21 July, radio direction-finding
3r Army 2nad rthe
had of the determined the let Army, the
and of the YPsof the
21st Front Missile Brigade.
Unfortunately, the order of the Minister of Defense,
the directives of the General Staff and Mainof
Staff of Ground Troops and, also, the
ise
coof-the exerc
the directors given before the start
troops
on the question of covert (skrytyY) control
generals ofd officers.
were buried insoblivion by certain ge
Many generals and officers disregard the fact that
not iar from the borders of the Soviet Union there are
some 2,000 radio intercept posts of American radioradio
intelligence which intercept the work of milit~c es .
stations on a large scale, especially
It must be stated that ereef~lya~suiticiantitoedetermine
over open radio chsnne conducted.
the location and nature of the exercises being
This must not be considered
redino staff After troopps had c
been informed by the
verfrathe diorules
facts of the crude breaches
and radio relay channels
of troops, iconversations
practically ceased. This is in which
Itais radio
necessary to achieve a position
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50X1-HUM
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relay communications, as the basic means of communication,
are used without breaches of the rules of covert control
of troops.
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Comrade generals and officers
The exercise which was conducted placed before the ief Main staff and apparatus of the Corn mander giio hoe toe
Ground Troops, before the staff and app Des Defense,
Chief of Rear Services of the Ministry
before the Academy of the General Staff, the Academyhe
i/n Y.V. Frunze, the Military-Engineering Academy, t
Academy of Rear Services and Transport and the
collectives of the professor-instructor (pr-sfessorsko-
ptepodavatelAk*cy) personnel which took part in our
exercise, a series of great and urgent questions which
still need a great deal of serious work.
our joint work during the course of several days,
observation of your laborious and strenuous laabborxaand nd of
all the defects which were disclosed during
permitted us to determine the main questions that require
further clarification and resolution nddia also
our assistance
understanding of the directions along
to troops and staffs is most needed.
We gained a great deal in this exercise,as I hope
that you also learned a great deal.
In this is the basic and great meaning and
significance of all the work which was accomplished.
Permit so, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union,
to conclude my report at this point.
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REPORT
of the Director of the Exercise
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Troops
Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. CHUTEOV
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50X1-HUM
The operational?-rear services exercise has been
conducted by us in a situation in which the Soviet
people are preparing for the honored meeting of the XIIIi d
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The
particular significance of this Congress - said Nikita
Sergeyevich Khrushchev at the graduation of students of
the military acs em es - lies in the fact that it will
adopt a new Party program, in which the main tasks in
economic and cultural construction, in the field of
foreign politics, in the @ommunist education of people
will be defined and the specific paths of the soviet
people's movement to Gomunism will be pointed out.
The enemies of peace and of Socialism are afraid
of the victorious progress of the Soviet Union toward::
Communism and are trying to deal with us by means of
military threats. Our party and government, knowing
the prodatdi habits of` the imperialists, are taking all
measures to strengthen the economic and military might of
the Soviet government. But this might does not threaten
the world with war. On the contrary, it is the dependable
guarantee of the peace and security of the peoples.
West Germany is now becoming the main breeding-ground
of military danger. On its territory, besides its own
12 divisions, the main strike forces of MTO are deployed
aimed at the countries of the Warsaw Pact.
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The command element of NATO makes every effort to
kindle the revanchist feeling in the Bonn militarists
and to set up a massive West German army in the near
future, as the main striking force of the Western powers
for the achievement of their imperialistic goals.
The Bonn revanchiats, instigated by the ruling
circles of the U.S.A., Britain and France, are taking
intensive measures to strengthen their military powitioon
in West Berlin - this cancerous growth on the body of
the German people.
The Soviet Government is showing determination
in the matter of concluding a German peace treaty, being
convinced that if measures are not taken sow to normalize
the situation in Germany, and in particular in West
Berlin, the people might find themselves faced with the
fact of aggression br the West German militarists and
the unleashing of a world war.
A peace treaty, Nikita Sergeyetifb Khrnshchev has
repeatedly indicated in his speeches, wIll be signed this
year. lu this connection the possibility of provocation
by the aggressive NATO bloc shouldisdt be excluded. There-
fore the Central Comittee of our Communist Party demands
of the Armed Forces great vigilance and constant readiness
to offer a reliable defense of the interests of the Soviet
Union and of the other countries of the Socialist Camp
at any moment.
The Soviet Goverment persistently tries to achieve
the establishment of a durable peace throughout the
world, the respect of sovereignty and non-intervention
into the internal affairs of other countries. No other
government in the world has done as such as the Soviet
Union in the matter of ensuring durable peace and
international cooperation.
The ruling circles Of the imperialistic states, under
all kinds of pretexts, continue to ignore the proposals
of our government for disarmament and international
cooperation, speeding up the armament race and preparing
to unleash a new war.
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In his recent message to Congress,President of the
U.S.A. Kennedy proclaimed a "new course of action-':
This probes for the speeding-up of the program of
nuclear/missile armament, for)the heightening of the
combat readiness of all types of armed forces and for
an increase in the military appropriations of more than
three and a half billion dollars. These dollars and
the "new course of actiorl`.' are directed against the
peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union and of the whole
Socialist Camp.
The strengthening of'.-the aggressive military-
political bloc of NATO continues, it already has in its
composition 50 divisions at constant readiness, more than
50 missile and artillery units able to use nuclear
warheads, and a considerable number9l aircraft. Besides
this, in the countries which have entered NATO themselves,
there are an additional 52 divisions which are maintained
in a high state of readiness forrmobiliaation.
All this tells us that we aunt continuously improve
our knowledge, discover the most effective methods of
.armed combat and maintain our means of combat in a high
state of readiness for powerful counterblows against an
aggressor. The operational-rear services exercise which
we have conducted, which was one of the important measures
in the operational training of the current training year,
was dedicated to this goal.
Experience of conducting war, shows with complete
clarity, that the outcome of a battle, of an operation,
and of a war as a whole depends, to a great degree, on
the organization and work of the rear services. In
speaking of the role of the rear services in a war
Y.I. Lenin explained: "The best army, the persons most
dedicated to the cause of the revolution, will be immediately
destroyed by the enemy, if they are not arueprovided with
rations and trained to a sufficient degree".
1. Lenin, Works, volume 27, page 54
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World War II confirmed the great role of the rear
services in the attainment of victory over the enemy.
The front constantly demanded a large amount of varied
combat equipment., munitions, fuel, rations and other
materiel supplies. All our industry, agriduclture,
transport, human and materiel resources were put to the
service of the front, thanks to which the rear service
successfully fulfilled its great and critical tasks.
A future war, if the imperialists unleash one, will
be a nuclear/missile war. In order to conduct and
and
conclude it successfully, enormous moral, military of
economic efforts will be demanded fswa the people the Socialist countries.
We must realize very clearly that in this war not
only the operational rear services of the army but,
first of all, the deep rear of the countr3, will be
subjected to massed nuclear/missile strikes.
? The possible disruption of the functioning of
communications will hinder the operational so ution of
questions of replacing massive losses at a time when the
operating troops will demand the timely delivery of
nuclear/missile weapons, hundreds of thousands of tons
of fuel, munitions and foodstuffs and the evacuation of
tens of thousands of wounded and contaminated personnel.
New means and methods of armed combat have introduodd
substantial changes in the volume and content of the
tasks performed by the operational rear services.
First of all the expenditure of materiel supplies
in combat and in operations has increased. If in World
War 11 the front used some 20,000 tons of f mel in an
offensive operation, under modern conditions its needs
might be 100,000 to 120,000 tons or more. Here, the
appearance of the missile weapon, and also, together with
it, of special types of fueli and oxidizers, has necessitated
the creation of special new large units, units and subunits
to prepare and transport missiles, and also to provide
troops with the missiles and with fuel for them.
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The volume and the assortment of other materiel
supplies required by the troops have also increased.
considerably. For a front operation lasting 8 to 10
days the operational rear services will have to deliver
a total of 200,000 to 250,000 tons of various goods
to the troops. These goods will have to be delivered
while an operation is developing at 80 to 100 kms a day.
The performance of these tasks cannot be compared in
any way in their complexity with the tasks of supplying
troops in the past war.
The massive puttiang. out of commission of combat
and special equipment, which may reach from 50 to
80 percent during a front operation, will make it necessary
for the rear services of the front to assume the whole
burden of repair and restoration. The efforts of the
repair facilities of large units must be directed toward
the restoration of the slightly damaged equipment in
order to return it as soon as possible to the formation
and to ensure the conduct of combat operations at high
speeds.
Now the organization and execution of medical
support for the troops is becoming considetably more
complicated. Medical losses (sanitarnaya poteriya)
will increase sharply and will be characterized by
extreme variations during the different days of the
operation. Now combined casualties (kombinirovannoye
porazheniye) will predominate, requiring the creation of
new specialized medical institutions.
The increased volume and the qualitative change in
the tasks of the rear services demand unity in their
organization, coordination and close cooperation of all
elements, irrespective of the organic subordination anu
the specific nature of the tasks being fulfilled. This
must be ensured by the centralized resolution of all
questions concerning the organization of the operational
rear services in the hands of the deputy commander of rear
services, and by the constant control of the rear services
by the commanders and their staffs. 50X1-HUM
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Uninterrupted work by the rear services is possible
only when effective antiaircraft defense and the retention
of the stability and viability of the basic elements
during conditions of widespread use of nuclear/aissile
and chemical weapons can be ensured.
Zztrenely high demands are imposed on the rear
services during the preparation add support of the first
operations during the initia], period of a war. Here,
the timely concentration and correct distribution of
stocks of materiel supplies in accordance with the proposed
missions of the future fronts assumes great significance.
The combat readiness of the rear services must correspond
to the level of combat readiness of the troops being
supported. This primarily concerns the aissile-technical
large units and units which are supporting the combat
operations of the missile troops. Their role in providing
for the high combat readiness of missile troops of the
front and army is, strictly speaking, determined by this.
I will move on to an examination of the decisions
and operations of those being trained. (Diagram 3)
The decision of the Commander of the 2nd Front.,
Colonel-General of the Tank Troops Andrey Lavrentretabh
Getaan,concerning the initial situation, the contents of
were reported to you by General of the Army
rarkian rikhaylovich Pbpov, was tensible.
The planned first nuclear/missile strike with da
nuclear warheads, with their skillfwl a against definite
and reliably reconnoitered targets, with the subsequsat
offensive by a strong grouping of troops, permitted the
destruction of the basic forces of the "west" in a border
engagement, and made it possible to develop the offensive
in depth.
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However, a series of sizable operational faults and
miscalculations was tolerated in the decision which was
made; these could have exercised a substantial influence
on the fuif ilment of the task assigned to the front.
First of all, it should be noted that the decision was
not characterized by deep foresight into the consequences
of a massed nuclear strike by the "West" for the troops
of the front. Therefore it made no provision for _the
execution of the operational measures necessary to eliminate
these consequences.
This is a major error. In the actual condition of
a nuclear/missile war such an error leads straight to
destruction. The direct selection of targets for destruction
with nuclear weapons was made by the chief of the missile
troops and artillery and the air army commander and not
the commander of the front and his staff. lack of these
responsible chiefs selected targets independently. In the
process, stationary targets with dependable antiaircraft
cover were first designated for strikes Tsair Taft, for
while , at the same time , moving targets
the missile troops. The neutralisation of the sassy's
system of antiaircraft defense along the liaes of flight
of the delivery aircraft was not provided for, thus
condemning then to destruction even before they approached
their assigned targets. laterally, such a s ituat ion could
not lead to the effective use of nuclear weapons is the
first nuclear/nissile strike.
During the creation of the offensive grouping a
completely unwarranted over-concentration of troops was
permitted. Thus, in a some of the front 350 km wide, in
a sector 120 he along the front and 40 k a in depth, there
were concentrated six divisions, four missile brigades and
one engineer-av*stion regiment, is other warns, the Omsk
forces of the first "below of the armies sad the bas
grouping of the frosts missile troops. gook an aectnsa -
tion of troops under the clear threat of the infliction of
a mighty nuclear strike by the enemy is
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By regrouping the large units of the 1st Army toward.
the right flank, the front commander should have enlarged
the offensive zone of the 4th Tank Army, which was
compelled to operate in a narrowed zone both in the
attack position and during the offensive, without freedom
of maneuver, while the lst Army was not using a considerable
portion of its zone on its right flank.
Considerable miscalculations were also permitted
during the planning of the regrouping of the troops of
the front. In the decision of this question coordination
was not achieved between the sections of the front's
staff and the chiefs of the arcs of troops and services.
The latter tried to decide questions connected with the
regrouping independently. As a result of this the missile
large units were not allotted independent egress routes and
siting areas. This led to the fact that certain aissile
large units and units were unable to occupy the firing
position areas.assigned to them in good time. For example,
the 22nd Front Missile Brigade moved out directly behind
the 34th Tank Division and was amble to occupy the launch
sites assigned to it in good time. And the 23rd and 25th
Army Missile Brigades were actually assigned to siting
areas in the attack areas of the tank and motorised-rifle
divisions of the 4th Tank and let Combined-Arms Armies.
In the commander's initial decision mistakes were
permitted in the determination of the time necessary to
prepare the troops for operations by the nosing of
19 July. The missile large units of the front and am
had already moved out to the siting areas without missiles,
and a large part of the large units designated for operations
in the first echelons of the army. wire located 100 to 120
kma from the national border and 150 to 170 km from the easny.
When preparing for an operation in the initial period
of war the t Ise necessary to prepare the troops for the
offensive must be determined, starting from. the complete
readiness of the launching mounts for Siring and the
movement forward of the first echelon large units to a
distance of 30 to. 59 km from the national border.
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The main efforts of front and army intelligence during
the preparation of the operations were aimed at the depth.
Under normal cdacumstances this would be correct. But
during the preparttion of the first operation of the
initial period this situationecaunot be accepted as normal,
because the divisions, which should carry out reconnaissance
in the immediate depth. will be iocated at a considerable
distance from the national border during thls period;
also they do not possess those resources which could be
used to conduct reconnaissance before the initiation of
a war. The enemy, preparing for an attack, will be
moving his forces and nuclear/missile means closer to the
border. Therefore the front and army intelligence means
are obliged to carry out reconnaissance against them during
this period.
As we know, the exercise was an operational-rear
service one, ands it would seen that questions of the
organization of the operational rear services should have
been allocated a great deal of attention. But bow
strange it is that neither the commander nor the staff of
the front seriously busied themselves with the questions
of the rear services until the directing staff intervened.
And the chiefs of the arms i troops and services remained
apart and took no interest n how the rear services
planned to carry out the materiel and technical support
of the troops subordinate to them.
Colonel-General of the Tank Troops A.L. Getman, in
actuality, reduced his directive to the rear services
to a paraphrase of the generally known regulations.
The deputy Cosmander o4or-ie Rear Services, Lieutenant-
General Y.I. lk.ros reported his ideas for the organisation
of the rem se= 'Tex three timse, on 18 and 19 July to the
IP of the front and on 21 July to the TPU, but he was
still unable to mks proposals for the most acceptable
organization of the operational rear services for the
particular conditions . 50X1-HUM
Is his proposals no provision me made for the creation
of the necessary groupings of the rear services. which would
supply the swift troop operations with all that was needed.
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In the situation which had come about by the start of
the operation it was completely wrong to deploy two
front bases behind LI .e . vast ofJ the Dnepr, inWwhich
50 percent of the total materiel means was concentrated.
(Diagram 4). The presence of only one front base and of
sections having little power close to the troops could
not ensure the uninterrupted supply of troops advancing
at the rate of up to 100 km in a day.
If one imagines this scene grpphically it than
appears that the troops are straining swiftly forward
and the rear services are holding them back. laturally
the directing staff could not agree with this situation
and required that the base for materiel be shifted to the
western bank of the Dnepr River.
Tory little initiative was shown in questions of perform-
ing a series of the tasks of the operational rear services.
For example, Lieutenant- General V.I. l oroz "cudgelled his
brains" for a long time over the pose ty of moving
freight, and primarily munitions, missile fuel and gasoline,
to the western bank of the Dnepr after an e neuy strike on
the bridges of the Dnepr. However with a proper analysis
of-the capabilities front this question could have
been solved much faster.
In the first place, there was the possibility of laying
a pipeline on the bottom of the raver and of pumping the
fuel through it to the right bank. Secondly, there was
the possibiltVyof having 12 to 16-ton underwater bridges
built by the forces of the 36 military-construction
battalions, or by any other units located in the zone of
the front, or even by the local population. The forces
and mesas available, according to the very modest cs.lcula-
tions of the chief of engineer troops of the front, Major-
General of Zngineer Troops L.S. B,could have built
18 bridges during three days-: Wse you have a way out of
a difficult situation in the delivery of freight to the
troops. This should have been foresees sad the necessary
zessures should have been taken in advance.
50X1-HUM
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The Chief of staff and the chief of engineer troops
the front athis t tathe sk, chief which was e difficult Services
in for
the performance of
his.
In deciding on the organization of the operational
rear services the command of the front did not pay due
attention to so important a question as the supply of
missile troops with ready missiles. The control of the
missile-technical large units and units of the front was
not organized. The tasks of the front allsile-technical
base in supplying missiles to the troops
assigned in good time, as a result of which, up until
ntil
0500 hours on 19 July, all the missiles prepay for
launching were located in the missile transport battalion
and the missile brigades mowed out to their siting areas
without missiles on the launch mounts. The plan for
missile delivery to the troops was not thought out as it
should have been. As a result of this the 0th Amy had
to receive ^isalb simultaneousl from
one of which was the 6th biwhicb
technical repair of the army.
was located 250 ha from the troops
The Chief of the Directorate of Missile and Artillery
Araaasnt of the Front, Colonel T .K. Zoloontse ~t with t the
;dhief of the missile troops a the ime
ing
an4 carriedout seand ahart?sad=technical
la lact~wasilreaoved
memoranda, lists
of
from the fulfilment
ryh of direct
missiles to the troops.
organizing the delive
The staff of the front showed no concern about
organising close cooperation between the rear services
staff and the chiefs of the arcs of troops and services
and did not ensure clear-cut planning of the delivery of
similes to " the troops. This was particularly evident
from the reports and planning docmaents of the deputy
commander of the troops of the frost's rear services and
of the chief of the directorate of sipile-artillery
armament. It is hard to imagine more uncoordinated
operations than those of these two responsible bchi fs. he roar
The plans for rear services support, _
arunloading tillery designated
services staff, show issile certain
troops and freight
t
while whithe chieof
others .
-53-
50X1-HUM
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In the organization of the rear services measures
for the medical support of the troops in the event that
tiav vueay delivered the first mass nuclear strike were
not envisaged. The staff of the front did not direct
the ^ilitary-medical directorate of the front to do this,
while the latter did not consider it necessary to work
out.this question and used average daily casualty figures
in its plans and cia lculat ions for the entire operation.
This is the same as It one were to take the average daily
temperature of all the patients in:.a hospital and, on this
basis, to prescribe the same medicine for all.
The backbone of the rear services organization in an
operation is the network of communications roi tee . The
networ_c of railroads and motor vehicle roads in the zone
of the front was, basically, correctly defined in the
decision. However, in the preparation and buildup of
the network of communications routes a mistake was tolerated.
Instead of 5 to 6 actor vehicle roads that the front could
have serviced, only three were planned.
The chief of 'military communications of the front,Major-
General of Technical Troops A.A. Si a vski_~ , did not
consider the possible variations or nov3reight across
the ~nne~r in the event that the means of crossing were.,put out
of c i$sioa. In general, Comrade Si a ski showed
a weak knowledge of the railroad networ walch Js actually
in operation and of the motor vehicle road network in the
territory of the Carpathian and Kiev Military Districts,
even though he has been stationed in the Carpathian Military
District (PrikVO) for three')rears already. Apparently,
he is guided by the dielum =of the mother of Mitrofanushka
in the comedy "Ignoramus" ("Kedoros i") by tonv iz in, that
there Is no reason to study geography if there are cabmen.
In organizing the operational rear services, little
attention was given to ensuring the stability and vtability__
of its basic objectives. The rear services units and
installations were often located close to other likely
targets f9r nuclear attacks, were densely disposed, tied
to main"rdad functions in populated points and even in
towns. Such a piling up of rear services units occurred,
for example, in the area of Zhitoa r. At the same tine,
50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
the requisite cover for operational rear services
installations was not provided for by the Chief of the
PVO of the Front. ,Major-General Y.A. Yermolov.
In general, the decision of the army commanders and
corps commander conformed to the situation which had
developed. However, they were not without important
faults.
The Commander of the 4th Tank Ara Lieutenant General
of the Tank Troops T. . Binyarin.nade -the missions o
echelon d v ons too deep. (Diagram 3)
There was little likelihood that these two divisions
could move 100 to 120 ka in the first day of the operation,
having before then an enemy army corps. Apparently the
calculation was made on the assumption that the enemy
would not bring the second echelon of his corps into
combat on that day. But there were no grounds for this
assumption. Besides, to have carried out such a deep
mission there should have been provision for the delivery
of a massed nuclear strike against the enemy',s reserves
from the army some during the course of the operation, with
the subsequent commitment to combat of one of the second
echelon divisions. The correctness of such a variant
of the operations was confirmed by the course of the
operation.
The Commander of the 6th Arn Lieutenant-General
?.D. v,pa little a en on o the questions o
coon na U on and of the operational supply of troops
during the operation. His instructions were of a
nonspecific nature and did not ensure the coordination of
troop operations with the nuclear strikes which were being
delivered.
Ihile the divisions of the second echelon of the army
were 250 to 380 he distant, General hov did not trouble
to set up a reserve, which be could ve needed while the
first echelon was performing its tasks. Moreover, he
did not take the appropriate measures to bring up the
divisions of the second echelon quickly.
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During this exercise, the lst Army had its rear
services fully deployed, and r -W-111 therefore go into
the decisions of Commander of the Army Lieutenant-General
P.S. Vashurin in greater detail.
In the decision which he made, the idea of using
nuclear weapons was not clearly expressed and specific
tasks were not assigned to the missile troops. The
commander and staff avoided the decision of this important
question and entrusted it to the chief of missile troops
and artillery, Major-General of Artillery I.S. Mitskevich,
who determined the targets for nuclear str es n an
incoaipet9at manner and who, up to the start of the operation,
was unable to give them proper evaluation. Asa result,
most of the nuclear strikes were planned against empty
areas.
While the offensive none of the army was more than
120 km wide, the commander of the-army concentrated all
the divisions and missile means on the left flank, in a
70 ka zone, which led to overconcentration in the
operational formation of the troops. In this case, this
was not dictated by necessity. It was possible to dispose
the troops in a departure area over a wider zone, foreseeipg
the subsequent move of large units in the most favorable
directions for the offensive.
The 7th Tank Division, which made up the basic strike
grouping of the army, was located 70 km from the national
border at the time appointed for troop readiness, which did
not give it an opportunity to make effective use of the
results of the first nuclear/missile strike.
The commander and the staff did not concern themseaves
with the questions of antiaircraft defense at all, having
handed them over to the chief of the PVO troops, Major-
General 1.1. Vilkho , , who proved to be uapr pad zonal cover
these ta-*U . ns es of organising depends
for the troops of the army, he in fact dispersed all the
effective PVO means to cover tndividal objectives through-
out the entire zone of the army.
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50X1-HUM
An especially large number of shortcomings were
tolerated in the organization of the rear services of the
1st Army (Diagram 4). The army commander did not even
consider it necessary to allot tasks for the impending
operation to the chief of the rear services, having
farmed out all the questions of rear services organization
to his for solution.
The staff of the army rear services by carried the
planning of materiel-technical support then
on the preliminary decisions of the commander, which were
changed three times. By the start of the operation this
planning was not completed. The deputy commander Sor
show
rear in Major-General o To. A. pperrationaI situation
determination or of the missions before the army. As a result, his
"port
tions connected with the support of troops with on
rations and fuel.
The most important element of the organization of the
work of the army rear services - the support of army
missile large units and units with ready missiles -
disappeared. becosnaissance of the routes for missile
delivery from the army. missile-transport division to the
missile brigade and to the missile battalions of divisions
was not carried out. Thus, it was no accident that there
was no bridge over the $luch River, on one of the routes
chosen for the transporT-O-T-aissiles.
planning the movement of the rear services units and
installations is the most important facet of the organiza-
tion of army rear services. In the army this planning was
carried out in such a manner that the mobile army base end of
completed its move to the new area only ate troops for
90 July and was in fact unable to support
a 24-hour period both during the preparation sad the
start of combat opesations.
The aria staff did not coordinate the work of Mw
rear services with that of the chiefs of are of troops
and services, and the deploy of the rear services was
unable to organize cooperation between the services of
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0
the rear, as a result of which many problems of rear
services support were found to be unsolved.
The maneuver of materiel means was not foreseen
in the event of an enemy nuclear strike against the rear
services targets. Measures to ensure the viability and
stability of the rear services were not worked out.
In ending the analysis of the decisions and actions
studied in the initial situation, I must dwell upon
several general shortcomings in the planning and use of
nuclear weapons in the initial strike.
As we know, the questions of the use of nuclear/missile
weapons have already been worked out at the command-staff
exercise "DON", from the experience of which the functions
of various command echelons in planning the use of
nuclear/missile weapons were determined. These postulates,,
as shown by the practice of the operational preparation of
troops, are correct. During the preparation of the
operation in this exercise everything occurred the other
way round.
The staff of the front and of the armies kept aloof
from the planning of the use of nuclear weapons, having
entrusted this to chiefs of missile troops and artillery
and to the commander of the air army. Affairs reached the
stage where the targets for nuclear strikes which should
have been destroyed by army means were determined not
by the army commander but by the chief of missile troops
and artillery of the front and were transmitted to the
army by, its staff directly to the staff of the missile
troops and artillery of the army.
This, for example, is the way it happened in the
1st Army. The commander and staff of the army received
these targets on trust, did not check them and accepted
the assigned tasks for fulfilment.
The chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant-General
N.Y. Volodin,did not transmit to the armies a single
order br a single piece of information concerning
the delivery of nuclear strikes. Documents prove this.
From this one can conclude that the orders to deliver
nuclear strikes were not transmitted to the troops by the
staff of the front.
50X1-HUM
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Thus, the army commanders frequently did not know when
or against which targets nuclear strikes were delivered
by the means of the front, and sometimes did not even know
about nuclear strikes carried out by the army brigades
and battalions of the motorized rifle (tank) divisions.
This is the only apparent explanation for the fact
that, during the first nuclear strike of the front, it
was planned to use 24 R-30 missiles with nuclear charges
to destroy the "Honest John" installations , and the so-
called stockpiles of the enemy's nuclear weapons, which
according to the deep conviction of the chief of missile
troops and artillery of the 1st Army, Majur-General of
Artillery I.S. Mitskevich, should be located 40 to 50 km
from too "L oaa order. It is not hard to be convinced
of the naivete of this approach to the selection and
determination of targets. Of course the enemy will not
locate stockpiles of nuclear weapons at such a distance.
For this reason, it was no accident that some nuclear
? strikes fell upon empty spaces or on targets without
operational significance.
I did not find a single, document about the planning
of nuclear/missile strikes or their connection with troop
operations, which should have been signed by the chief
of staff of the front, and this was not accidental. An
incorrect tendency is appearing among the generals and
officers of the missile troops and artillery - "Fe
command and we deliver the strikes". In order to
eliminate such a tendency, the Minister of Defense,
Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade R.Ya. Malinovskiy,
demands that all questions of principle connected
with the use of nuclear weapons are decided personally
by the commander of the front (army) and are not entrusted
to other persons. They must determine the missions for
the use of nuclear weapons in a concrete manner, indicating
the targets, the coordinates, the yield of the nuclear
charge, the type of burst and the order of delivery of
the nuclear strike.
?
Nooone will be better able to allocate tasks to the
missile large units and units, and to direct the efforts
of the troops for the attainment of the goals of the battle
and of the operation, than the commanders of fronts and
armies and the divisional commanders.
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The commander of the air army and the chief of missile
ns are
troops and artillery, tc~ whom the ncleeadr we ppoo fr then
directly subordinated, are only
tasks allocated by the commander of the front and army
accurately and in good time.
The- nuclear weapon is a very expensive and formidable
weapon and its use should therefore pnot be regarded tl g fort'
and irresponsibly. Any attempt
the commanders (command.ing officers) or for the organizing
function of the combined-arms staffs in questions of i--he
use of nuclear/missile weapons must be decisively suppressed.
I am quite convinced that Colonel-Gen al of at h Tank
Troops Comrade A .L. Gettan correctly
questions, part ar $e demands of the Minister
commarider
Defense of all the personal decision by the
concerning concerning the use of
of all questions ons of pri during the exercise, in praoctice,
nuclear weapaas ? However ,
he still entrusted the solution of these problems to
other persons-
0
The chief of the directing staff has reported to you
that the combat operations of both sides began at 02E)O
20 July at almost the same time as
hours on the night of
both sides exchanged mutual massed nuclear strikes.
On the whole , during this difficult period, the
commander of the front troops and his staff correctl..y
organized the control of the troops and they took metasures
to carry out the first planned nuclear/missile striUce in
good time.
As a result of the "1[estern"oftthee2nd Fronttat rerywith
43 nuclear warheads In the zone ted, especially in the
complex radiation oft the second echelons Oft arm-ies,
disposition areas of the rear services units and installations of the Iron
?
a
50X1-HUM
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?
and also along the lines of communications (Diagram 7).
However, the commander and the chief of staff of the
front did not evaluate the situation thoroughly and
carried out measures to eliminate the results of this
strike very slowly and impractically, which naturally
had a negative effect on subsequent troop operations and
on the work of the rear services of the front.
At the same time, the commander and the staff of the
front clearly overestimated the results of their strike
against the energy with 27 nuclear warheads. This seems
to be the only way to explain that only 8 missiles in
all were used by the front in the zone of the offensive
after the first strike right up until the middle of the
day. Moreover, not a single strike with aerial nuclear
bombs was delivered against the advancing "Western" troops,
although the front had the capability. All this led to
prolonged battles in the immediate border zone between
the front troops and moderately strong groupings of the
enemy, and to the slowing down of the tempo of the
offensive.
Only after appropriate directions from the directing
staff did the commander of the 2nd front make the dec isIoa
to deliver a second nuclear strike, at 1730 hours,with
15 nuclear warheads (11 out of the 13, aerial bombs),
against the enemy troops with the aim of developing the
offensive and of fulfilling the assigned mission. This
solution was correct and ensured the destruction of the
advancing enemy reserves and the development of the
operation. However this should and could have been done
considerably earlier instead of basking in the results
of the first strike.
The Commander of the 1st Arm did not control the
did pot ol make the
too?hetbegnningof combat operations. He
existing breaks and gaps in the
operational formation of the enemy for a swift develop-
ment of the offensive in depth (Diagram 5).
With three enemy divisions, one of then an armored
tank division, in front of the army, he found no
targets for missile weapons.
?
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The commander of the front made the decision to
deliver the repeat nuclear strike at 1730 hours but
-
Comrade Vashurin for some iekaason 1900 ed the time and
planned o ver the str hours. To
- he replied
question - why was this done in this way? be
This at
I can find no targets for nuclear ome i r at
a time when the troops had only enemy's divisions
15 km in 26 ~nover?toscountez'attackshad themselves gone
Great lack of coordination was observed eiinnt~ally
workings of the field control of the army and spe sally
between the staff of the missile lack of precision
and the staff of the army ? missile brigade fire. The
in the control of the army
army commander entrusted this important question to the
and artillery.
chief of missile troops
The Commander of the 4th Tank Ar*x did not make use
of t appor or masse use o nuclear/missile
~' es
weapons with the aim Of increasing the rates of advance
which of the of the large units of the echelonto ensureaa decisive
had slowed down. He took rations to his advantage
change in the course of combat operations the secc ad
by timely commitment of the largg waeeIIits its of-t- the clear threat
echelon of the army to combat, e under
Corps of the essay.
of a counterstrike by the 5th Army
The staff of the tank army did not display coordinated
work and organization in ensuring firm` control of the
troops.
ceder of the 6th Arm reacted correctly and
quit y The Co on n o e, to the nation created by the
, w
massed "western" nuclear strike against the troops and
rear area targets of the army.
At the same time, he did not avoid serious faults inthe control of troops during the course of combat operations.
The army commander did not take operational measures to second move up to the line of the ront the
~ s>~,eand this ecwashelonat
divis ions , located more than 250
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a time when he did not have on hand the forces necessary
for the elimination of the enemy breakthrough on the
left flank of the army, or for the destruction of the
airborne landing, of up to a regiment in strength, which
had been made here. He had to take several regiments
quickly away frem the front and send them to carry out
these tasks.
The situation in the rear services of the army was
greatly complicated by the fact that the enemy delivered
a nuclear strike against the army mobile base. Despite
this, during the course of combat operations, the
commander paid little attention to the liquidation of
the consequences of this strike or to the organization of
materiel and technical support of the troops. For a day
he did not even define the tasks, which needed to be
performed in a highly operational manner, to his deputy
for rear services.
In the solution of all these questions the field
cos and of the army gave insufficient help to the
commander.
The Commander of the 3rd Ara Cor made the
correct decision on the use o the missile battalion of
the second echelon division, carrying out a march to
support the combat operations of the 59th Motorized Rifle
Division; whidh was in combat. In this case it was Justified.
The rear services of the front, with the initiation of
combat operations, to perform simultaneously such
tasks as the support of troops, carrying on active combat
operations on a. wide front, taking measures to eliminate
the aftereffects of the enemy's nuclear attack ou the
troops and rear services objectives, and continuing with
the formation and deployment of the basic groupings of
rear service unite.
The directorate of the front's rear services had
great difficulty in handling these tasks.
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50X1-HUM
?
?
Due organization and operational efficiency were
lacking in the work of the staff and services of the rear.
Situation data was collected and collated very slowly,
and orders for the rear services were given with great
delay. For example, tasks concerned with the elimination
of the afteref`.rects of the enemy's nuclear attack were
allotted to rear service units only 8 to 10 hours after
the delivery of the strikes. The working out of concrete
measures for the restoration of communications routes,
for the rendering of medical aid and for the organization
of transport, took a full 24 hours.
Delay in making decisions about the rear services of
the front also had negative effects on the work of the
rear services of aruniesy. . Thus the rear service of the
let Army, instead of busying itself with the support of
the troops. who had suffered great losses, was forced to
move to the areas that it had to occupy. by the end of
19 July. The separation of the mobile army base from the
advancing troops was more than 100 km. A similar situation
was also observed in the other armies.
Another serious fault in the work of the staff and
services of the front and army rear services was that
radiation situation '. data in rear areas wase not
transmitted to the rear services units.
The large losses of stocks of materiel supplies and
of rear services units, on which General of the Army
Comrade N.Y. Popov reported, can be explained only as an
underestlma oaThy the commanders of the correct echelon-
sent of stocks, and also of their dispersion and of the
weak protection of the rear services targets by the means
of the PVO.
The crossing of the Dnepr represented an especially
important and difficult Ta-s-V-for the troops, rear services
unite and transport. arriving from the depth of the country.
The staff of the front did not attach due significance to
this task, and the chief of engineer troops of the front..
Major-General of Engineer Troops L.S. Bukhtin, who had
sufficient capabilities, kept aloof - from-Its solution.
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The poor coordination between the front and army in
the questions of road preparation and of the organization
of the road traffic control service must be considered as
a big fault in the work of the highway maintenance and
construction service (avtodorozhnaya sluzhba). The lines
at which army roads were to be turned over to the front
were not designated. The order of using available forces
was not determined accurately.
The clear-cut organization of a workable dispatcher's
service on the motor vehicle roads was favorable in the
work of the rear services. Reports to the staff brigades
and motor vehicle road directorate of-the front on the
passing of transport echelons arrived in good time.
In this respect, the experience gained through the work
of the 21st Road Traffic Control Brigade deserves to be
included in the practice of troop preparation for combat.
The poor use of the available medical aircraft for
the evacuation of casualties from centers of mass
destruction must be considered to be among the faults of
the work of the front medical service. The movement and
the order for using the independent medical detachments
and medical battalions were not thought out. Thus, for
the let Army the independent reserve medical detachments
were positioned at a distance of 50 to 80 km from the troops,
which made it difficult for them to move to the zones of
the divisions in good time and to deploy for work.
The decisions of the troop commander of the 2nd Front,
of the commanders of the armies and of the commanding
officer of the 3rd Army Corps during the second day, on
the use of nuclear and chemical weapons and on the
development of the offensive were basically in conformity
with the situation which had taken shape.
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The commander of the lst Army, Lieutenant-General
P.B. as us n, having made e decision to commit a second
echelon division (28th Motorized Rifle Division) to
combat, did not give clear-cut orders to the troops to
ensure its commitment to combat. The chief of staff of
the army, Major-General V.K. Dyatlenko,did not exercise
control over the execution of the commander's decision.
As a result, the 28th Motorized Rifle Division was, there-
fore, not committed to combat during 21 July.
The decision of the 6th Army co nder,Lieutenant-General
V.D. Ukhov,to commit the 5th Motorized le Division to
combat, n order to repel the enemy counterblow and to
increase the efforts of the army, conformed to the situation
which had taken shape. The time to move up the army
antitank reserve and t Motorized of le regiment of the
37th Motorized Rifle Division, to cover the gap between
the 9th Tank and the 40th Motorized Rifle Divisions, was
calculated unrea3lstically, which created the threat of
the enemy's gaining the rear area of the 9th Tank Division.
The army commanders and their staffs did not analyze
the situation and targets for nuclear strikes deeply, so that
strikes with nuclear warheads were often delivered against
an empty area or against secondary targets.
The work of the rear services, during the second day
of con-tiat operations,. procee n a more organized manner.
Forward front bases were deployed in the advanced sectors
of the railroads and sections of the front's hospital
bases moved up closer to the troops. This permitted a
decrease in the distance (plecho) of transport by motor
vehicle to 150 km.
In addition, the weak direction of the work of the army
apparatus. and its inadequate control, out the part of the
front rear services, led to a considerable separation of
the mobile army bases from the troops.
The rapid rates of advance and the abrupt changes in
the situation demand that the army rear services be
constantly ready to support the troops with supplies of
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materiel. With this aim, the rear services of a modern e
army are made completely mobile. However,
peculiarities of the work of the army rear services are
often not taken into cnd~tsilttbe'wo=~ ~ethoda ofsthe
the used to work out in of advance of 80 to
army mobile rear services at speeds 100 kms a day and to train the rear services organs to meet
this situation. by
on 21 July we forced the front troop commander,
means of going to the TPO, to participate directly This was
the organization and itrwasf clearthe theifront command
aof some benefit, thEE;timely and
and his staff were not prepared for
organization of the work of the rear services.
The business of organizing coordination between the the ,various services, not subordinate tonthepe~tief' of cularly badly .
rear services of the front (army)
It is on just this thand Eeanisfornthe comprehensive
of all available forces desupport of troops depend,,,.
The greatest number of discrepancies was in the
organization of the rear services support of missile units -arms and large units. The command did?rcconstant stipsipj,tion
must put this important question
and ensure the organization of the coordinated work of
all interested aGrvices.
In examining the decision of the commander of the
troops of the front on the situation on 22 July, which
in
led to a continuation of the offensive byand all
Zarme i
e
the general direction of Brody, Tomashuv
sassy and Us
with the aim of routing t e oppot ng
approaching reserves, it is impossible to overlook the
fact that,the commander, who knew
are& oftBeresechko ands
of "Western" groupings in
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Pomor an which were intended for a counterblow against
the of the 4th Tank Army, did not take measures
to rout them and did not appreciate the danger which
this counterblow could represent to the fulfilment of their
task by the troops of the front during 22 July. The enemy
had the opportunity of delivering a strike and of
successfully forward to
theasitingtareas of communicationilinesrof
4th Tank Army
of the army and front missile troops.
Despite this danger the commander and the staff of
the front did not take aim with the nuclear/missile means
of the front and of the air army in time to rout the enemy
groupings which were preparing for a counterstrike. The
readiness of the missile troops of the front to deliver
a strike with seven nuclear warheads against the infantry and
a na.mad divisions, concentrated in the area of Berestechko,
was tardily determined.
The tasks of the let and 6th Armies in the routing of
? the enemy counterstrike groupings weetnhot ra assigned. The
army commanders made the decision for
groupings on their own initiative; the commandertof the
front limited himself solely to the appr
decisions. Hence, a coordinated
dep at breaking strike the
means of the front and army,
enemy strike, did not materialize.
The commander of the front assumed responsibility for
the coverage of the flanks of the 4th Tank Army but he
did not carry it out in good time. As s-a result, the army
commander was compelled to move half the forces of a second
echelon division to cover the army's flanks, thus losing
the opportunity of making full use of them to strengthen
his efforts.
The delay in the delivery of nuclear strikes and of
troop operations against the counterstr ike grouping resulted
in the enemyts success in crowding our troops together
and in drawing a significant portion of the let and 6th
Army forces into prolonged battles and, to a certain
degree, in restricting the freedom of operation of the tank
army. As a result of this, the rate of advance of the
basic grouping of the front decreased.
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During 22 July, the rear services of the front and
of the armies operated more effectively and smoothly.
The staffs and services of the rear area determined the
tasks of the rear service units and installations correctly,
on the whole, and made timely changes in the organization
of the rear area in accordance with the situation which had
taken shape. The use of air transport to provide materiel
and the evacuation of wounded and casualties improved
considerably.
It is only necessary to indicate a
ness on the part of the deputy commander
rear services,Lisurenanteaeneh al Moroz, in sproviding ustained
assistance to the 6th Army?e rear area
considerable losses.
The army rear services, with the exception of the 6th
Army, were brought close to the troops. Such ximce
was particularly important for the 4th Tank Armysing the
Otroogave the ps ps even if the enemy should esuchance of cceed in:cutting the
communications of the army.
The decision of the front coommander n}the was final
situation (at the end of 22 July, Sketch in its general outline but it did not embody a determined
effort to mass nuclear weapons in the directions of the
ured the
basic efforts of the front, which enemy ensmovement
rapid destruction of the opposing of the main forces of the front toward the Visla.
The Minister of Defense, hMarshal 8 of the Soviet Union
Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy,
to the f ac a n e making of decisions onh the delivery
of nuclear strikes, some commanders speak of ma she
of nuclear weapons while, in practice, they prolong
timing these slenumberdelivering
wain an rheadsnandrdispersing
nuclearthen
fashion, , with a small
them over many objectives.
In the exercise, the 2nd Front wasfallocated 226
had
nuclear warheads for the optr
taken one half of theeionrtheo! irstexample, of the about
operation,
and had delivered then
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using a large proportion in the first mass strike against, let
us say, ten divisions and other important "Western" targets,
then you will understand that in reality almost nothing
of these enemy divisions would have remained. The breach
needed by the front for an advance westward at high speeds
would be ensured.
However, this did not happen. A portion of the nuclear
weapons was employed at the beginning of the first day of
the operation, toward evening another small strike was
delivered, and from the morning of the second day several
nuclear units of ammunition were again used, and in this
way they continued to prolong the delivery of nuclear strikes
further. This shows that we must study realistically, that
we must plan practically, and that we must carry out nuclear
strikes capable of inflicting decisive destruction on the
enemy, of annihilating several divisions in his operational
formation immediately and of ensuring fire superiority.
In their performance of the basic task of the operation,
the 4th Tank Army and the 5th Tank Army, which had been
newly committed to action, were not reinforced by river
crossing means for the forcing of the Visla River.
Aircraft were given deep missions, instead of having /
their strikes directed first of all at the suppression
of the enemy who was offering resistance to the troops of
the 4th Tank Army and of the 1st Army in order to ensure
the most rapid possible movement by the latter to the Visla.
With this, I end the critique of the operations and
decisions taught in the course of combat operations and
turn to an exposition of some conclusions on separate questions.
The rear area. Today, the operational rear area
presents an%).rganism which is very complex in composition
and versatile in rerformance. Under modern conditions,
the role of the rear area has considerably increased. The
correct organization of the rear support of troops is
therefore one of the most important conditions for the
successful conduct of a battle and of an operation.
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In examining the questions of the combat readiness of
the rear area and the creation of groupings of rear service
units and installations, one should note the lack of complete
understanding revealed by many of the participants in the
exercise of the special features governing rear troop
support in the first operations of the initial period of
a war. For some reason, many staffs and organs of the rear
consider it necessary to spend time in calculating which
forces and rear units are missing from, the fixed establish-
ment. Is this the basic task? Of course not. All calcu-
lations on bringing up to strength (otmobilizovaniye) and
on activation plans are worked out in peacetime with a
searching analysis of the capabilities of the national
economy. The periods of arrival (srok pribytiya) of rear
units and installations are determined in accordance with
this. It is by this that we should be guided.
As regards the arrival at the front of rear area units
and installations, the missing forces and weapons of the
rear of the armies which are conducting swift offensive
operations must be replenished first of all, and forward
mobile groupings of rear area units must be created at the
front to support the missile troops and the formations
carrying oUt the main task of the operation.
But, in order that these problems may be correctly
resolved by combined-arms staffs and rear area organs,
it is necessary to consider carefully all the available
supporting forces and weapons of the rear and to undertake
immediate measures for their most effective employment.
In the light of what has been said, it seems incomprehensible
that during 17 and 18 July the completely organized front
motor transport battalions stood idle because they had no
task, while many army and front rear units, not knowing what
to do, spent days attempting to obtain specific instructions
from their superiors.
In the light of the decision of the task of the initial
period of a war, it is wholly advisable that organic
transport and,specifically,that of divisions and brigades,
should support itself, with regard not only to unit
reserves (vozimyr zapas.) but also to all that is necessary
for 24 hours of combat.
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It is advisable to draw the mobile army rear and
the front supplies closer to the front in good time. This
permits the squeezing of the rear area "accordion" for
future extension during an offensive. Comrade Moroz did
not make any such decision and the front command dTd not
give any instructions on this matter.
The major defects, which occurred in the work of the
combined-arms staffs during the exercise which has been
conducted.are explained primarily by the fact that staff
personnel are weak in their knowledge of the organizations
of the rear and of the principles of rear troop suppo
modern operations. Consequently, the requirements of
Ministry of Defense Directive No. 0061 were not completely
fulfilled.
Combined-arms staffs cannot be indifferent to operations
concerning the organization of control of the rear or the
organization of mutually coordinated work by the rear organs
of the front and armies.
During the exercise the working out of directives and
orders regarding the rear was held up for 15 to 20 hours.
The rear area control organs, not receiving timely operation-
al orientation from the staffs, spent such time on un-
productive mathematical calculations of different variations
of rear support. The documents worked out were cumbersome
and it was often difficult to grasp their basic idea or task;
errors and inaccuracies in the calculations were not in-
frequently allowed.
Some comrades are inclined to make allowances for the
fact that the control organs of the rear services of the
front and of the armies were only 60 percent ,dobialr4d
according to wartime TOM. Furthermore, the army control
organs of the rear were supplemented with 30 percent of
officers who had not previously worked in these capacities,
and the time for their training and incorporation
(skd lachivaniye) before the exercise was completely insufficient.
But this cannot serve as an excuse, since in every military
district and in every army there are appropriate plans for
the supplementing of rear organs being formed for wartime
with both cadre officers and reserves. Such plans were
evidently forgotten during the preparations of this exercise.
50X1-HUM
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Generals and officers intended for the appropriate
functions should be brought in on all such exercises.
In this way we will achieve an increase in the level of
their own personal training and a knitting-together of the
control organs, which is most necessary for the smooth
functioning of work in :the operations of the initial period
of a war.
The new structure of the unified organs of military
communications and of the road service was worked out for
the first time in the exercise which has been conducted.
A&,the experience of the exercise showed, the creation
of a unified organ of military communications can help to
improve the complex solution of the questions of planning
the nets of communication ro tea , c_! -.pairing then and,
especially important, of achieving unity of movement control
and all types of commundcation. However, for a final
confirmation ..of the advisability of creating these organs,
a large-scale research job is needed, since the conclusions
of one exercise are not in themselves enough.
It is very important to organize, in good time, reliable
technical coverage (tekhnicheskoye prikrytiye) and the
rapid liquidation of the consequences of nuclear strikes
on communication routes; this increases the viability and
stability of communications work to a considerable degree.
The experience of the exercises which have been conducted
confirm the advisability of timely constructionoof detours
around the most important transport junctions, of alternate
(dubliruyushchiy) bridges and of prepared approaches for
the subsequent laying of floating bridges or for the
construction of low and underwater bridges.
The task of increasing the rates of reconstruction of
railroads and motor roads is especially urgent; it must be
resolved mainly by equipping the troops with new, highly
efficient and maneuverable equipment and by creating the
necessary reserves of floating bridges and prefabricated
structures for the assembly of iaional~iaatal-l boos.
An operation in the initial period of a war is
characterized by the great volume of military transport
activity. Thus, for example, during our exercise the
2nd Front's routes of communication had to provide for
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the receipt and passage of 425 operational echelons and
had to transport more than 176 thousand tons of various
materiel.
The carrying out of this transportation was complicated
to a considerable degree by the existence in the territory
of the front of so large a water barrier as the Dnepr,
which split the communications into two sections, and by
the absence of deep biplAuums around the rail junctiC's of
Bakhmac h and Gre a ?
As a result of nuclear strikes by the enemy, the
bringing up of supplies from the rear of the country through
the regulating stations ceased. The carrying capacity
of the front's routes of communication decreased from 142
pairs of trains '.1 142 par poyesdov) in 24 hours to 52.
In the process, communications over the Dnepr were
interrupted for 2 to 3 days. The efficiency of motor
transport decreased by 20-25 percent.
An important deficiency in the organization of military
transport activities during the exercise was that they
were carried out without sufficient regard for the radiation
and chemical situation on the routes of communication. No
measures were undertaken to negotiate the contaminated zones
on the transport routes.
In some cases, questions of the reconstruction of destroyed
installations were resolved without a sufficient appraisal
of the consequences of nuclear strikes.
In questions of the combined use of the various types
of transport, serious shortcomings were tolerated du the
course of the exercise. During 17 to 19 July, was
almost no transport of materiel by rail or road. Water
transport was not used for military transshipment in the
preparatory period of the operation. The motor transport
battalions attached to the rear area received no transport
tasks during the first two days of the preparatory period.
There was no unified plan embracing all types of transport.
This is a very great deficiency in the work of the frost's
rear staff, especially of the new organ of military
communications.
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Now, when a new organization has been created, unit-
ing in its composition all types of communication,
one would have expected an examination of the question
of creating a road traffic-control area to indicate
all types of communication routes under a unified
control and dispatcher services for rail as well as
for water and motor vehicle communications.
The proper organization of the supply of missile
and other fuels has special significance for the success
of operations conducted by modern motorized rifle and
tank troops. The experience of the exercise which has
been conducted provides the basis for some comments on
these questions.
First of all, it should be noted that the two front
depots of special fuel (spetstoplivo) which were
available did not fully satisfy the requirements of
operational efficiency in supplying the missile troops
and in synchronizing the work of all the forces and equipment
of technical missile support. The fact is that, in the
situation which was taking shape, the mobile technical
repair bases of the ballistic missiles and of the
independent technical battalions of antiaircraft guided
missiles were dispersed at more than ten points along
the entire rear service area of the front. It does not
appear possible to organize the creation of reserves and
the storage of missile fuel, ensuring their dispersal,
while taking into account such a quantity of consumers.
Therefore, the question of further perfection of the
system and of the organs for supplying missile fuels
arisen.
The training of a specially formed front pipelaying
brigade was conducted in the background of our operational
rear area exercise.
During the preparatiofi of the operation, and during
its course, a 100 mm field main pipeline (magistralnyy
truboprovod) 600 kilometers in length was laid and put
into operation by this brigade. Bight hundred tons
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coordination between the rear
of diesel fuel were actually fed through this gain
line every day. The average rate attained waylaying
the pipeline and putting it into operation
kilometers. The experience obtained thonee
operating of a field main pipeline
that transport by pipeline is a reliable means of
n the and ensures the
delivering fuel at great fdistances
uninterrupted supply of
The medical support of the troops during the
exercise was carried out in accordance with a new
organization under which all work concerned with the
treatment of the wounded was concentrated at theto
front's medical installations.
This made it possible free an army of an unwieldy hospital base incoorporating
50 to 60 hospitals and to relieve the army ara
considerably.
rational rear
Some comments on the control of the operational
area,
area. In organ z ng the con ro 0 e of the most
mus be kept in mind that a large quantity
diverse special large units, units, andin taall&tions are
now used for the support of the troops and
rear area groupings must be created from these, inducted.
accordance with the plan of the operation
The indisputability of this truth is acknowledged by
by all, but in practice everyone is notalways rgiie
the
it. This is just what occurred during
which has been conducted. In spite of the fact that
an operational rear area exercise was being conducted,
the front and army troop commanders nevertheless did
not pay proper attention to the direction of the rear
area. This was especially evident during the planning of
the operation. Can one not assign tasks to the rear
services for several days under inform one's own conditions
worse still, not even like the commander
the beginning of combat operations,
of the lst Army?
the combined
During the whole course of the exercise,
arms staffs at all levels were unable to orgaizeeclor
area suppor
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rear very timidly.
to organize mutual and timely information about the
situation with the rear service staff.
The rear area support services often operated with-
out intercommunication, lacking the necessary data
about the operational situation and wasting forces and
weapons pointlessly. Specifically, the combined-arms
staffs cannot be pardoned for having forgotten about
the questions of close coordination between the operations
of the rear service staffs and the organs of the missile
artillery.
Speaking of the combined-arms-staffs, I do not in
the least underestimate the faults of the control organs
of the rear service themselves for those omissions which
we witnessed during the exercise. It is high time that
all the organs of control of the rear services understood
that you cannot control the rear services with old methods
and that the operational factor is now acquiring great
significance in their work.
We have particular grievances against the rear staff
of the front (chief of staff, Colonel V.I. Yuryer _) .
The officers of this staff are not tra n d to eva uate
quickly and efficiently the operational and rear service
situation which is taking shape, and do not know how to
make a brief formulation of the basic idea of the
organization of the rear area or how to anticipate the
possible future development of the situation of the rear
area. The staff of the front's rear worked without
foresight, organized the coordination of the rear services
badly and, in fact, did not assume control of the operational
rear area.
All work directly concerned with control of the
operational rear area and with the solution of general
questions of the organization of the rear area must be
entrusted to the deputy commander of the rear area.
I emphasize this because, during the exercise, few of
the deputy commanders understood their responsibilities
and rights properly {and took on the decision of general
questions regarding the organization of the operational
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First of all, it should be noted that many still
do not understand properly how to determine the composition
of rear area control points. The combined location at
the TPU of all the rear support services, irrespective
of their organic subordination, is called for by the
necessity for their continued and close coordination.
During the exercise, for some reason, the organs
of missile and artillery armament, tank armament, and
here and there even motor-tractor (avtotraktornaya)
services were located at command points. This weighed
down the command points and at the same time diverted
these services from combined work in the general system of
the organs of rear service support.
such work must be done on the equipment of control
points with technical means for the mechanization of
the work of calculation and planning (schetnoplanovaya).
As the exercise showed, because of the complete absence
of these means, the officers of the rear control organs
spend up to 75 percent of all their working time accounting
and calculating, and are diverted from the solution of
operational questions in their service as a whole. During
the entire time, almost none of the generals and officers
of the control organs visited the troops being supported,
or even rear service units and it>:tallations which had
actually been turned out for the exercise.
The support of missile troops with missiles, special
charges spetszarys and special fuel spe a oN vo
(Sketch 6). The exercise indicated c early that the
timely support of missile units with missiles is one of
the principal questions with whose solution the commander
of a front and an army must primarily concern himself. It
is already time that we learned thoroughly that the
readiness of a front, of armies and of divisions for combat
operations, especially in the initial period of a war, is
determined primarily by the missile units, whose combat
efficiency, in their turn, is entirely dependent on the
missile technical units carrying out the assembly,
preparation, and delivery of missiles for launching.
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In making a decision on an operation, it is necessary
to determine accurately the tasks of missile technical
support, indicating specifically when, how many, and
which missiles it is necessary to prepare and to deliver
to the missile brigades, regiments, and battalions. One
must also make a careful approach to an evaluation of the
capabilities of the units in the assembly of missiles
and to a definition of the time needed for their
preparation, to an evaluation of the deployment areas of
the missile technical units, and of the depots of missile
fuels, and also to the methods and measures for ensuring
the reliable delivery of missiles to the missile large
units and units.
Questions of the support of the troops with nuclear/
missile weapons are, as is well known, the direct
responsibility of the chief of the missile and artillery
armament.
In accordance with this, he is required: to receive
instructions from the chief of the missile troops and
artillery and the chief of the PVO troops about the
quantity and timing for the delivery of the missiles to
the troops; to coordinate with the chief of the rear
the disposition areas of the missile technical units,
the unloading points for the missiles, the motor roads
for their transport, the order for the use of helicopters
for transport, and questions regarding the support of
missile-technical units with missile fuels.
In accordance with the instructions of the commander
of the front and the tasks of the missile units in the
operation, the chiefs of missile troops and artillery
and of the PVO troops must give timely instructions to the
chief of the missile and artillery armament on the
transport of missiles and special charges, and also on
the timing for the preparation and delivery of missiles
to each missile unit.
On the basis of these instructions, the chief of
the missile and artillery armament works out plans for
the support of troops with missiles with nuclear and
chemical charges and with antiaircraft missiles.
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Unfortunately, the questions of supporting missile
units with missiles were not resolved with such
consistency at the front. Initially, the functions of
planning and disposition, and the work of mobile technical
repair bases were taken on by the artillery staff of the
front, while the role of technical executant (ispolnitel)
was assigned to the staff (apparat) of the chief of
missile and artillery armament.
One cannot acknowledge as normal a situation in which
the chief of the missile troops and artillery of the
front takes over functions which are unusual for him,
concerned with the immediate direction of the work of
mobile technical repair bases, and including the technical
units which prepare antiaircraft missiles, virtually
eliminating the chief of missile artillery armament of
the front from this work.
For 24 hours, the chief of the missile troops and
front artillery and the chief of missile artillery armament
were unable to give the troops even an orientation plan
for the delivery of missiles.
Despite repeated inquiries from the armies about
the plans for missile delivery, the front did not provide
these plans to the troops until the very beginning of
military operations. Just imagine: can armies plan
combat operations if they do not know what nuclear weapons
they will have at their disposal? Certainly not. For this
reason, it is incomprehensible that the front was able to
distribute conventional artillery between the armies and
yet did not at the same time evolve a plan and the
procedure for the delivery of nuclear and chemical missiles
for the missile units subordinated to armies and fronts,
that ? a , of those weapons which are assigned the decisive
role in the destruction of the enemy in a future war.
Not to provide the armies with missiles at the proper
time means, essentially, to disrupt the operation and to
lay oneself open to a strike. The front confused armies
and units with contradictory information on the delivery
of missiles for the operation. 50X1-HUM
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One should not be carried away by the composition
of voluminous and complex plans for an extended period,
as happened in the 2nd Front, where the plan for providing
the troops with missiles was worked out for a week with
instructions for the delivery of missiles to armies by
days and according to yield. Such planning is not
realistic. The delivery of missiles to the troops should
be planned for the first 2 to 3 days and then, during
the course of the operation, one should make operational
plans for each day's delivery depending on the situation
which has taken shape.
In the course of the exercise, we were forced into
a whole series of cases in which these elementary
requirements were not met.
Here are several examples of the way in which the
delivery of missiles was actually carried out.
The 27th and 40th Independent Missile Battalions
of the 6th Army began to move to new siting areas at
2100 hours oa 19 July, while the missiles for these
battalions were delivered by the 4th Mobile Technical
Repair Base at 2200 hours at the former areas, where the
battalions no longer were. In this same &ray during
18 July, the planning of the transport of missiles from
the 4th Mobile Technical Repair Base was carried out from
an area where the base was not, in fact, located,
since the front had changed this area without informing
the army.
In the 1st Army, on the orders of the chief of missile
artillery armament of the army, an R-30 missile was
dispatched to the 28th Independent Missile Battalion at
0130 hours on 20 July and was delivered to the rendezvous
point at 0530 hours. However, the battalion was no
longer located there. The missile stayed at the
rendezvous point and was returned at 1400 hours. Thus,
for fourteen hours, the a.asile was traveling along
lateral roads, or standir4t at a rendezvous point without
concealment, and still never reached the battalion. Many
similar examples of such direction can be provided.
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The control procedure (poryadok kontrolya) in the
front and armies is not worked out, and it was not
carried out in the passage of each missile from the front
to the unit. The directorate (upravleniye) of missile
artillery armament of the front and of the armies did not
handle these questions well in this exercise.
In a number of cases, plans for the delivery of
prepared (gotovaya) missiles to the units were unrealistic
since t' he condition of the routes, and their length, and
the regrouping of units and their locations at the moment
of arrival of the missiles, were not properly taken into
account in their formulation. The, directorate of
missile artillery armament of the front lacked data as
to when and on which route the detachments transporting
prepared missiles were proceeding to the units, on their
position or condition at a given moment, or on the time
at which the missiles were handed over to the missile units.
Without this data, one cannot speak of accurate preparation
or of the timely infliction of nuclear strikes.
,This once again confirms the need for reliable
communication between the chief of missile artillery
armament and the missile technical
troops with missiles
timely and accurate support
is Inconceivable.
There were also many shortcomings in and the ~eiorganization
cal
of the planning of movement by
units during the course of the operation.
As experience of the exercise Indicates, the movement
of the missile and missile-technical units of a front can
be correctly planned when the movement plan is coordinated
between the operational control, the chief of the rear area,
and the chief of the front's engineer troops.
The siting areas for the front's brigades and for
the battalions of army missile brigades and the disposition
areas of the mobile technical repair bases, the routes for
the movement
of
to missile uunits must be defined f in the movementt
of missiles
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plan for the days of the operation. In all cases it is
necessary to choose the best routes for the missile and
missile-technical units.
The operational control of a front planning the
regrouping and the forward movement of troops from the
depth must ensure that the selected siting areas and
disposition areas of missile-technical units and the routes
for their movement are not occupied by other troops and
organs of the rear area at the time for the movement of
these units through them.
The movement plan of missile and missile-technical
units must be coordinated with the chief of the front's
engineer troops, in order that he can provide in his plan
for comprehensive support of the movement of the missile
and missile-technical units as regards the engineering
aspect.
In accordance with the plan for the movement of the
missile-technical units of a front to new areas, the chief
of the rear area must plan and ensure the distribution of
the front's depots of missile fuels and of their sections
in such a way that the missile-technical units can organize
the receipt of this fuel in good time. Furthermore, be
must organize road support and regulation (dorozhnoye
obespecheniye i regulirovaniye).
If changes are made in the movement plan in the course of
an operation because of the situation, the chief of missile
artillery armament, the chief of the rear area, and the
chief of the front's engineer troops suet be informed
immediately.
The commander and staff of a front, in preparing an
operation, must investigate these questions thrArvughly in
all cases and oust supervise their fulfilment. 50X1-HUM
The defects which have come to light in questions
of the organization of support for missile large units and
units with missiles indicate that insufficient attention
was given to this important question by the chiefs of
missile troops, of the artillery and of the PVO troops.
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The single fact that, during the preparation for an
operation in the initial period of a war, in spite of the
availability at the mobile technical repair bases of a
sufficient quantity of assembled missiles, the front did
not deliver then to the missile units before their
movement forward to the siting areas, in itself testifies
to the lack of administrative ability of the front in so
important a question.
The control of the mobile technical repair bases
and of the transport (parkovyy) battalions at the beginning
of the exercise was accomplished through the front's
missile-technical base. As an examination has shown,
such a control plan did not respond to demands for the
rapid passing of orders to those who were to carry them
out.
The control of the front's alas ile-technical base
actually represented a transm iss iun echelon of command
which delayed the handing-on of these orders. It carried
out none of the planning of the work of the mobile technical
repair bases or of the transport battalion, since the tasks
of each of these subunits were determined by the chief of
the missile-artillery armament.
Thus, from the very beginning of the exercise, the
control of the front's missile-technical base represented an
intermediate element, and we were forced to liquidate it,
transferring all its functions of controlling units to the
chief of the front's missile-artillery armament. This
simplified control and reduced the time for handing down
tasks to those who were to perform them by more than
half (Sketch 12) .
The preparation of missiles for the missile battalions
of motorized rifle and tank divisions was carried out by
the mobile technical repair bases operating in the zones
of the armies. These bases also carried out the preparation
of missiles for the army and front brigades. As the
exercise showed, the availability of a combined mobile
technical repair base, operating in an army zone and
supporting it with all types of missiles with nuclear and
50X1-HUM
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chemical charges, is advisable and justifies itself.
Additional consideration should be given to the
advisability of setting up means to assemble tactical
missiles in the armies.
Questions of the transport of missile fuels to the
disposition areas of mobile technical repair bases should
be considered. Evidently we shall nead 3 to 4 sections
(otdeleniye) of missile fuel depots and we will have to
use front battalions for the transport of special fuels -
locating then at a short distance from the mobile
technical repair bases.
Some words on missile-technical support for the
antiaircraft guided missile units.
The deficiencies which I have indicated apply also
to the support of antiaircraft missile units. It should
be noted that the requirement for antiaircraft missiles
exceeds the front's requirement for the "surface-to-
surface" class of missiles in quantity by 5 to 10 tines.
This results frog the special features of the preparation
of antiaircraft missiles. Productivity in the assembly
of the missiles has a particularly great significance.
The actual work of missile-technical units in the
preparation of missiles during the exercise indicates
that their productivity can be increased by perfection of
the technological production lines and of the equipment.
Characteristic in this respect is the example of the
production line preparing an antiaircraft guided missile
(zenitnaya upravlayeaaya raketa - ZUR). Experience shows
that by a slight increase in the number of assemblies
and personnel, productivity can be increased three tines.
It is necessary to work urgently on the question of
increasing the productivity of missile-technical units.
Rare we have large reserves.
All these organizational questions must evidently
be resolved in conjunction with measures for the
perfection of the organizational and organic structure
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of all the organs controlling missile-technical units,
of the method; of organizing communications with these
units, and within themland of means for the improvement of
engineer support for the missile-technical units and
for their escorts (okbrana).
The air Arm; rear and the su port of cruise missile
units e c rearmarer~ o s r
Forces with new aircraft and missile equipment, the
principles of the use and the methods of combat operations
have changed, and consequently, the organization for the
basing of the large units and units of an air army has
also changed.
You know, comrades, that after the air parade at
Tushino during Aviation Day, the Americana began to clamor
that we had surpassed them by many years in the development
of aircraft. This clamor deserved attention, since they
say quite correctly in the U.S.A. that the Soviet Union
has displayed aviation equipment which they are themselves
a long way from building.
Speaking of our aviation, Mikita Sergeyevich ghrushchev
praised the pl;-ote and the designers very warmly an e- s ea
them success in the future qualitative and quantitative
development of our aviation.
At present, aircraft represent the basic seams for
the neutralization of mobile and small-sized targets,
especially missile weapons. They mart provide reliable
cover for the troops and their uninterrupted support,
and also carry out reconnaissance on behalf of the
troops.
For this, it is necessary that the rear -area of an
air army should be capable of building and restoring a
sufficient quantity of airfields to support extensive
maneuver by aircraft and their rebasigg in good time,
given the modern rates of advance of the ground troops.
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The decisions of the army commander and of his
deputy for the rear on quest ions of rear are& organiza-
tion and on the supply of materiel were basically correct
and corresponded to the conditions of the situation which
had been set up (Sketch 10).
An important deficiency is that, during the planning
and organization of rear support for aviation and for the
missile forces, the command, staff, and services of the
rear of the air army did not make a sufficiently deep
analysis of the rear area situation which had formed in
the zone of the front and allowed some miscalculations.
The deputy commander of the air army rear, Major-
General B.Y. Putruehinin, who had left the wain part of
the supplies of ammun on on the left bank of the Dnepr
before the beginning of the operation, was not able to
wake an immediate evaluation of the consequences to which
this miscalculation could lead in the event of the
destruction by the enemy of the rail river-crossings, when
the air army would be practically without supplies of
aviation ammunition. The dispersal of supplies before
the beginning of the operation, with their distribution
not in one direction, as was done, but in several, was
also not provided for; this would have afforded great
safeguards in preserving supplies of technical equipment
against the effects of the enemy's nuclear/missile strikes.
The further perfection of the organization and equip-
ment of aviation-technical units must be continued,
proceeding from the main demand, which is for an increase
in their nobility, so that they are able to rebase them-
salvos on new airfields , in one trip, at the sane time as
their air regiments and to work there at once and
without interruption.
During the exercise, special attention was given to
the resolution of questions of supporting air army units
with missile armament, with the actual deployment of an
independent aviation engineer regiment and of an aIrmv
depot of front cruise missiles. 50X1-HUM
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During the exercise, the delivery of four front cruise
missiles to the arty depot and to the technical position of
the regiment was carried out.
Experience was gained in the organization of loading
and unloading work and in the transport of missiles by
rail, by air, and in vehicles.
The exercise permitted us to check on and to make
more precise the organic organization of the army depots
of front cruise missiles and their technical equipment.
The organization of a depot must make provision for _the
possibil.A.ty of dividing its basic subunits into two
parts taking into account the deployment and the work
of the depot in two positions throughout the operation.
Toward the end of the third day of combat activities,
as a consequence of enemy action against the airfields
and of the large expenditure of aviation fuel, the air
army had almost completely exhausted its supplies,
*ile the transport leg (plecho) had increased to 200
kilometers wnd more. In these conditions, apportioning
t main pipelimsto the delivery of aviation fuel to the
sections of the army PVL depots, which had moved forward
on the ground, became *,crucial question..
The antiaircraft defense of troop>rs (Sketch 11).
During the exercise, the 2nd Front was opposed by an
enemy who was sufficiently strong in the air, having a
complement of nearly 1,000 combat aircraft of tactical
aviation and 18 launching mounts for cruise missiles.
Apart from these resources, strategic and carrier-borne
aviation could participate in the first mass strike against
the troops and the rear area of the front.
The front's antiaircraft defense had at its disposal
twenty-three antiaircraft missile regiments and battalions,
one battalion of special designation (%SPETWIAZ), ten
antiaircraft artillery battalions, and two fighter aircraft
divisions. In addition, an antiaircraft missile brigade,
two antiaircraft sissile,,and three fighter aircraft. regiments
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of the 7th Army of the PVO of the Country were operating
in the front zone. These forces permitted the organization
of a zonal PVO system for the basic areas in which the
troops were disposed and for the front's rear area; however,
this was not done by the Chief of the PVO Troops of the
Front, Major-General Y.A. Yerz o.lov. This situation was
only corrected at the eman ofthe directing staff, and
by the beginning of the operationcover for the front's
rear area was provided by six antiaircraft missile
regiments and battalions, by the front's fighter aviation,
and by the 7th Army of the PVO of the Country. The
antiaircraft defense of the rear areas was also strengthened
by WO means, covering the troops of the first operational
echelon while the troops of the second echelon and the
reserves were covered by organic means.
In planning the operation, it should, however, have
been taken into account that when the troops turn to the
offensive, the PVO means of the armies and of the division
will go forward together with the troops and the anti-
aircraft defense of the front rear areas will weaken. In
the antiaircraft defense plan, which, incidentally, was
worked out late, reinforcement of the antiaircraft defense
of the front's rear area during the transition to the
offensive was not provided for.
As the exercise showed, the organization of the control
of the combat operations of the PVO forces and weapons
covering the disposition areas of rear area installations,
presents particular difficulty. Toward the morning of
22 July, the majority of the antiaircraft missile units
subordinated to the front were located at a distance of
from 100 to 360 kilometers from the command point of the
PYO of the front. The chief of the front's PYO troops
cannot control combat operations of these units at such
great distances. The necessity for more thorough study
of this question arises from this.
During the exercise, the coordination between the
PPO troops of the 2nd Front and the formation of PVO
troops of the country showed itself in the fact that up
to the beginning of the operation the 7th Army of the PlO
of the Country conducted radar reconnaissanceof the air
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enemy on behalf of the front and also partially covered
the troops and the important installations in the front's
rear areas.
The coordination between the front's PVO troops and
the fighter aviation of the 78th Air Army during the
exercise was carried out essentially by distributing
their efforts through the zones of operations. Meanwhile,
with its main forces, fighter aviation destroyed the air
enemy in depth and on the flanks of the front's offensive
zones and with part of its forces on duty in the air
(iz polozheniya dezhurstva v vozdukhe)-those ahead of the
front - up to the killing zones (zona porazheniya) of the
antiaircraft missile units. However, three of the four
zones of duty in the air were located within the limits
of the killing adius (radius porazheniya) of the anti-
aircraft missile units covering the first operational
echelon.
In a combat situation such organization of coordination
would have led to the destruction of our own fighters.
Furthermore, it is not advisable because of the small
capabilities offered by the limited fighter forces assigned
to duty in these zones.
In organizing radar intelligence, the chief of the
PVO troops of the front envisaged the establishment of a
system of radar silence (rezhim molchaniya) of only seven
radar poatq,between 20 and 100 kilometers away from the
national border*. In the event of enemy destruction of
the radar posts of the PVO of the Country, this would
not ensure the timely detection of air targets.
In order to check the smooth functioning of the combat
teams of the P'VO command points and in calculating the
requirements for missiles, a competition (rozygrysh) of
the air situation was conducted. Seventy-four targets,
made up of nearly 250 aircraft, participated in the first
strike by the air enemy. Only 21 targets, that is nearly
30 percent of this number of targets, were plotted
(provodit) by the command point of the front's PVO, while
The remainder went unnoticed. From 30 to 60 percent of
the targets were plotted by the armies. The worst plotting
of all was done in the 4th Tank Army and the 6th ArN50X1-HUM
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The transfer of control by the PVO troops from the
command point to the alternate command point was badly
organized. In substance, there was no transfer and
throughout the entire direction of the movement there
was no control of the PVO troops by the K . P . There was
no contact between the alternate K.P. of the PVO and
the armies, the situations of the antiaircraft missile
units *s4 availability to them of missiles, and the
positions of radar means and their situations were not
known to the officers.
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Engineer support of the operational rear and of the
missileechn ca u -`fin tie cours .F c, a exerc se,
questions o engineer support and antiatomic protection,
which are of particularly great significance for the
viability of the operational rear and for the missile-
technical units, were studied.
The exercise showed that commanders and staffs pay
completely inadequate attention to engineer Preparation
(oborudovaniye) and to the camouflage of the disposition
areas of missile-technical and rear service units and to
the preparation and maintenance of routes for the supply
of materiel and for troop maneuver.
in the course of the exercise, the disposition areas
of missile-technical units were equipped slowly and
incompletely. For example, during the preparation of
the operation, the disposition area of the 5th mobile
Technical Repair base actually took a day and a halt to
net up, while the disposition areas of the front's
technical base for guided antiaircraft missiles which
were actually in operation were completely unprepared, in
the engineering respect. Furthermore, its technical
battalion was located virtually in the open, although large
tracts of forest were available in its area.
The supply routes for nuclear charges and missiles
tram unloading stations and airfields and the delivery
of prepared antiaircraft missiles from missile transport
subunits to siting areas passed along poor field roads
with bridges of small load capacity and through populated
points. One could only be amazed that the wore v-^'i
were selected for the transport of siss.les. 50X1-HUM
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Under all conditions, reliable protection for
personnel. and equipmect against the effects of means of
mass destruction must be a in he shortest 0lsible-
period of time after the ty of
mis units in rear areas. To an oration,
tin the o select and prepare new disposition areas
tecinicec units
it is necessary
for them in accordance with the forward demovvement and of the
troops. This will ensure their rapid th ion
creation of conditions rhigh productivity in the preparation
of missiles.
At present, missile-technical units do not have in
their composition engineer forces or means sufficient for
the rapid anti-atomic preparation of their disposition areas.
The experience of the exercise indicate 4 that it iir advisable
for missile-technical units (mobile technical repa engineer
qu~-nt itytof heirhighlyown
technical and transport a~'~~ 1c battalions)
equipped vehicles (mast~ina).
productive and maneuverable engineer Under modern conditions, an operation aunless?measureshf or
successful conduct
troop and late are carried out. ,
opeoaal camouf
The task consists of training the missile-technical
and rear service units their dispos$tio~c~darea~stcare~fully,
the ability to conceal
using the properties of concealment offered by the terrain
and making use of authorized cumouf lage equipment. Camou-
pots
flage units , front (army) subunits,
issile equipm$nten'itt'ewhich
seaat possess manufactured dummy missile
to set up false disposition areas of mis ileoandhmi sile-
technical units both during the preparation
and during its course.
The road su rt of an a ration now acquires an
por an ro e.
this question was not properly solved
Unfortunately,
during our exercise. Neither the contrrol of military
sect ions
communications of the front, nor 50X1-HUM
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of armies nor the staffs of the engineer troops accorded
proper significance to the organization of a new type of
road support, and the combined-arms staffs isolated
themselves from this weighty and important question.
It should also be noted that the allocation of reserves
of river-crossing equipment and bridge construction for
rapid restoration of river crossings in the event of their
destruction was not provided for. The result was that,
during the delivery of nuclear strikes by the enemy
against the bridges, the crossing of the Dnepr by the
troops and by the rear services of the front was interrupted.
On 21 July, with the aim of restoring river crossings,
the commander of the troops of the 2nd Front decided to
build four underwater bridges across the Dnepr. The work
of constructing two bridges in the Bukrin spas `Yrnev
sector was given to the .35th P ontoon i a Brigade, which
had approached the Dnepr from the depth of the country.
It was laid down that-Me bridges should be ready at 1100
hours on 23 July. The pontoon bridge regiments of the
lot and 6th Armies, located 380 to 400 kilometers west of
the Dnepr, were brought in for the construction of two
other bridges (in the Chernin and Grebeni areas). The time
at which the bridges were to`be rea was fixed at 0500
hours on 24 July.
As a result, the front's resources for ensuring the
impending forcing of the Visla were sharply decreased,
since only the pontoon bridge regiments of the 4th Tank
Army and the 5th Combined Arms Army could be used for the
laying of floating bridges.
One aunt consider that this decision to use pontoon
bridge units to restore the Dnepr crossings could have
brought about the frustration of thhi front's allocated
task of forcing the Vials swiftly.
The lack of a plan by the staff of the front for road
support for the operation caused serious difficulties
in the organization of support of the forward movement and
in the commitment to battle of the 5th Army, which had
been transferred to the 2nd Front.
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The protection of the front (army) rear against weapons
of mass destruction. In conditions when nuclear weapons
and o er weapons of mass destruction are used, the
protection of the operational rear, especially of missile-
technical units, is the most important task of the commander
and of the chief of the rear of a front and of an army.
In the delivery of the first mass strike in our
exercise, 34 of the 43 nuclear warheads used by the
"west" against the installations of the 2nd rront'e
operational rear area were used with a ground burst
setting (ustanovka na nazemnyy vzryv) (Sketch 7). As a
result of this strike, together with the destruction of
the railroad bridges across the Dnepr, of stations, and
of depots in the army and front rear area, three hours
after the burst an extensive and almost continuous zone
of radioactive contamination formed over a total area of
90 thousand square kilometers, with radiation levels from
0.5 up to 30 roentgens per hour, in which it was necessary
for all personnel to wear gas masks for 10 to 20 hours.
Over an area of 8600 square kilometers, where radiation
levels were from 80 to 100 roentgens per hour, personnel
had to stay in various types ,t cover, in dugout shelters
and in slit trenches for up to 24 hours, until the levels
of radiation dropped.
It was necessary to mows personnel out of areas of
contamination with radiation levels of more than 100
roentgens per hour, which totalled 1800 square kilometers,
into other areas.
It should also be noted that the contamination of so
large an area, as a result of ground nuclear bursts, limited
the movement capabilities of the rear in the frost's
rear area.
The front's staff and the army staffs did not make a
sufficiently deep analysis of the radiation situation which
had built up and did not therefore undertake all the
measures necessary to eliminate the consequences of nuclear
strikes and of radioactive contamination, to prevent the
re-irradiation of perso.-.nel and to restore the combat
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50X1-HUM
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effectiveness of rear service units and installations.
A calculation of the irradiation doses sustained by
personnel of the rear service units and subunits was not
organized by the rear staff of the front.
The experience of the exercise once again confirmed
that in the interests of proper organization of the
protection of the troops and of the organs of the rear
area and in the interests of their t .. ely information
about the radiation situation, It is necessary to provide
a constant reflection of the dynamics of the fall of
radiation levels on charts in the staffs of the front and
of the armies and in the rear area staffs.
In view of the difficulty of notifying the great
number of rear service units of the radiation situation in
good time, they must be provided with instruments for
radiation reconnaissance.
The exercise also showed that the complex of subunits
for chemical protection in the front's rear area, consisting
of three independent companies, is insufficient to
eliminate the consequences of a nuclear and chemical attack.
Here one must bear in mind that missile-technical units
have absolutely no means for special tre.trent (obrabotka).
Clearly, it will be necessary to reexamine the front's
complex of rear area chemical protection subunits with
a view to increasing their capabilities so that they may
support the missile-technical unite with means for special
treatment.
The transport of tanks on heavy-duty trailers. In the
course o e exerc e, ssr s of th7e ME a eg iment
were actually transported on heavy-duty trailers from the
Ovruch area to the Lutsk area and back, over a distance
*31 Wore than 500 kilometers. The experiment was conducted
with exploratory aims. The task of attaining high tactical
speeds of transport was not imposed. It was envisaged that
the operational, organizational, and technical capabilities
of such a movement should be dtteraiued, with the aim of
conserving the motor transportation potentials (motoresurs)
of combat vehicles during a troop regrouping, which for
some reason cannot; be carried out by rail in those areas
which are supported by road communications. The preliminary
cone lus lots drawn from this experiment are as follows.
0 .~._ -95-
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The transport of tanks over distances of 500 and more
kilometers provides an opportunity for considerable
economies in the motor transportation potentials of combat
vehicles. Here, the fact that a tank can be brought up
to designated areas with a complete unit of fire and with
a full load of fuel has great significance.
Additional equipment is not required on the tanks or
on the prize movers to load and unload the tanks, as the
exercise showed. A tank moves on to the trailer under
its own power and is also unloaded independently, and it
is made fast to the surface of a trailer with the trailer's
equipment. Special loading and unloading surfaces are not
required.
In organizing the march of heavy-duty prize movers
carrying tanks, the routes should be carefully prepared,
taking into consideration the weight of the tank carrier,
which is 61 tons in all, and the large turn radius,which is
13 to 14 meters. The movement of the vehicle convoys
(avtopoyezd) must be supported by movement support detach-
ments. They must be allocated the additional tasks of
reinforcing and widening bridges and of preparing turn-offs
(syezd) from the roads for halts and for the unloading of
tanks.
The march speeds of the vehicle convoys during this
exercise were 30 to 40 kilometers per hour on an asphalt
highway, 20 to 25 kilometers per hour on a hard (ukatannaya)
earth road, and 8 to 12 kilometers per hour on protracted
ascents with gradients of 10 to 12 degrees.
The low speeds of movement of the vehicle convoys
during this exercise can be principally attributed to
lack of experience in the organization of such transports,
to weak engineer intelligence, to poor preparation of routes,
and to the inadequacy of the forces of the movement support
detach*4nts. In principle, these speeds can be higher.
The experience of transporting tanks yielded positive
results which should be used in the course of combat and
operational training in order to prepare our tank large
units and units.
50X1-HUM
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The chief of the tank troops and the chief of the Central
.Motor- Tractor Directorate should work out and present
their proposals on this question to the Main Staff of the
Ground Troops on the basis of the experience of the
exercises conducted.
Party-political work during the exercise. The command
of t o s r c an o ar es , e po I ica l control,
the political organs, and the party-political appv.rat of
the troops involved in the exercise devoted considerable
work to preparing personnel for the exercise. All party-
political work was conducted with the aim of supporting
the basic questions being resolved in the course of the
exercise. The political organs and the party political
apparat organized specific work in the commands, staffs,-
large units, and units directed towards ensuring the
qualitative accomplishment of the tasks assigned. Tt*A
party and komsomol organizations mobilized the persor..ael
for the best fulfilment of their responsibilities.
It should be noted that an absolute majority of the
personnel taking part in the exercise regarded the ful-
filment of the obligations placed upon them conscientiously
and with great exertion. No cases of improper behavior
toward the local population or of other misdemeanors
were noted among the district troops throughout the exercise.
?s regards the work of the front's political control
and of the political sections of the armies during the
exercise, they still paid insufficient attention to the
activities of the rear area and had only a weak influence
on their operations. Apparently, they do not know the
rear area sufficiently well themselves. During the exercise,
moreover, serious defects in the organization of the work
of motor transport units and subunits were not avoided; not
all the drivers were included in educational training. It
was no coincidence that cases of combat equipment lagging
behind on marches and of accidents to vehicles involving
personal injuries were recorded.
Individual cases of poor work by supply service
officers in organizing the feeding of personnel also took
place, and led to irregularities and to the tardy distribution
0
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of products to a number of subunits.
On the whole, party-political work was conducted
purposefully during the exercise and helped the participants
to perform their practical tasks.
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Before ending my critique, I would like to note that
the commander of the front, Colonel-General of Tank Troops
Comrade A.L. Getman, and the district apparatus (okruzhnoy
apparat) disuch work on the preparation of the exercise
and of the troops taking part in it.
During the exercise Colonel-General of the Tank Troops
Comrade Getman displayed an adequate understanding of a
modern o ena ve operation and of the role of nuclear/missile
weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction, but the
revelation of defects during the exercise make it incumbent
upon him to occupy himself more seriously with the study and
mastery of questions of the practical application and use
of missile troops and also of the organization of rear service
support of modern operations. He must train his officers,
generals, and staffs thoroughly in the reliable control of
the rear in support of any operation.
It is necessary for the chief of staff of the front,
Lieutenant-General N.K. Volodin, to master the new scale of
work more rapidly, to study a modern means of combat
thoroughly, to examine the organization of the modern front
and army rear areas more seriously, to give more help to the
commander, and to provide the staff with a leading role in
questions of the organization of control of troops and of
their materiel and technical support.
The deputy commander of troops of the front's rear,
Lieutenant-General T.I. Moroa, although he has been in
this position for two years. still not acquired the
necessary experience in organizing and planning the work
of the front's operational rear area and displayed Indecision
in his work and in his direction of subordinates. He did
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not give the requisite attention to the organization or
to the thorough support of missile troops and missile-
technical units.
On the whole, the district and army apparatus taking
part in the exercise, in spite of the many errors which
they committed, worked most strenuously and conscientiously,
gained solid experience and skills in organizing the
work of the rear area, recognized the complete and direct
dependence of the success of an operation on the proper,
timely, and uninterrupted materiel and technical support of
the troops and by their work provided all of us with
the opportunity for practical study of the tasks which
were allotted before the exercise.
In conclusion, I would like to note the great and
fruitful work carried out by the directing staff, headed
by General of the Army Comrade M.N. Popov, and also by
Colonel-General Comrade F.M. uslyTchiln, Colonel-General
of Aviation F.P. Pol min, General of the Army Comrade
P.A. Kurochk n, an by all the intermediary apparatus
which ensured the instructive conduct of so complex an
exerciser .
Permit se on our joint behalf , 'zo thank the Commander
of the Troops of the Carpathian Military District, Colonel-
General of Tank Troops Comrade Audrey Lavrentyevich Getman,
for his attentive regard and for the care he has shown
to all of us as participants in the exercise and for the
great work he has done in supporting the exercise as a whole.
50X1-HUM
?
The front unilateral, two stage, operational-rear exer-
cise which has been coed is ted, has permitted us to give
practical study to a number of important questions concerning
the arrangement and work of the modern rear area of a front
and of armies, especially to the missile-technical support
of troqp combat operations in the first operation of the
initial period of a war.
50X1-HUM
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This exercise also permitted us to study, to a certain
degree, questions of the control of a front and army rear.
In the course of the exercise, much valuable material
on these questions has been amassed; this should be examined
thoroughly and in the near future it should be turned into
a fuller collation and implemented in a series of practical
organizational measures.
Together with this, a whole series of grave def is iences
came to light during the exercise, showing that some
responsible chiefs and their subordinates have a low level
of operational-rear training, and a weak knowledge of the
modern rear and that they do not know bow to organize its
arrangement and uninterrupted work specifically in support
of the troops under the conditions involved in the conduct
of modern combat operations.
The exercise also showed that the command and staff
of the front and the army commanders and their staffs do
not concern themselves enough with study of questions of
the rear, do not direct its work specifically, and do not
organize close coordination between the chiefs of arms of
troo,:e and services of the front , nd of the armies and the
chiefs ,of the rear services and their staffs.
The deficiencies which have been revealed in the
direction of the rear area cannot be tolerated. They must
be decisively eliminated. Each general and officer of the
rear services, the commanders and their staffs, dust make
a systematic improvement in their operational-rear training
and in their practical skills in directing the rear area.
Despite the fact that this was a special rear exercise,
a number of operational qu s t ions connected with the
organization and conduct of the first offensive operation
of a front and an army in the initial period of a waarU M were
also noted.
In the process of deciding operational questions, the
generals and officers broadened their knowledge and
experience in organizing and donducting modern operations.
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is
In addition, a number of major shortcomings in the
work of generals, officers, and staffs were also revealed
in their solution of operational questions, especially of
those connected with the use of missile troops and with the
application of nuclear weapons. These shortcomings indicate
that some generals and officers still do not concern them-
selves systematically with the completion of their
operational training.
The commander of the troops of the Carpathian Military
District and the army commanders must pay serious attention
to the shortcomings in the training of generals, officers,
and staffs on the questions regarding operational prepara-
tions which have been mentioned and must eliminate them
in the shortest period of time.
The chiefs of the rear, of missile troops and of
artillery and of the missile-artillery armament of other
districts who attended the exercise must understand that
the defects which have been indicated also apply fully to
then; they must draw the proper conclusions from this
exercise, and they must switch immediately to the study of
the many unclear and weakly resolved questions concerning
the organization of the rear area.
On the results of the exercise, one can draw the general
conclusion that it was, on the whole, instructive and useful
for all those taking part. The ezperieuue of the exercise
will permit the necessary conclusions on improving the organs
of the operational rear of a front and of armies to be drawn,
so that the solution of a number of most important questions
on the organization and arrangement of the modern rear
area may be more soundly resolved.
Comrades!
Approximately three months remain before the opening of
the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The whole Soviet people is seized with creative enthusiasm
and is striving to approach this significant event in the
life of the party and of the nation with new achievements in
the fulfilment of the Seven-Tsar Plan .
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Permit me to express my confidence that the personnel
of the Ground Troops and of the Carpathian Military District
will apply all its strength and knowledge to a further
increase in the level of combat preparations and combat
readiness and, together with the whole Soviet people, will
give a worthy welcome to the XXII Congress of our own
native Communist Party.
?
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50X1-HUM
NOM: The following are expansions of abbreviations which appear oe the sketches.
Those items marked with an asterisk were not expanded in the text, and therefore
are subject to error.
CYRILLIC T i6 T1 ATICI(
A
n Alt
aAM6
ax
? (AN) (AK)
ana6p apabr
app arm
iQPAip5I4lt
Army
tArtillery
Atomic
Artillery divisioc
tighter bcnber aviation
division
AraW took-destroyer
artillery reais+ant
Are' corps
Arricen forces
**rspr field artillery briNde
Are' nissl.le brilpdt
apnk arpd Army adesile transport
battalion
AT +Vehiele
a3eapad "Y" as+ arcab "l[" Arai antiaircraft sieslls
briode type or
6pxn
6pTd
trkp
batd
*Arua red Cavalry Hag4 t
Armored divisiao
?Arsored
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CYR L.T LIv
H,aBrs
BOCO
BLIP
BTAZ
BTAn
TRANSLIT:.. tATIC
Vid
VGB
VOSO
VPR
rpna "P"
fO7KOMnt doukompl
EXPANSicy
Air army
Airborne dIvlsion
Military Hospital Base
Military comxamicationa
Temporary Transhipping Area
Unloading station
Transport evtatioo division
Transport aviation regiment
Fuel
Hovit zer
Hospital bane
afield artillery gr' D "Redstooe"
Davis ion
Diviaion
Battalion
Before being brought v;p
to strength
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50X1-HUM
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3expa6 "Y"
3expan "A"
3 e Span "C"
xnTadp
x g-e
m Hcz 19.7
x 6.00 19.7
iai
X TTPY
zanrap "A"
lad
iazh
iptabr
k D-8
k iskh 19.7
k 6.00 19.7
KP
E7CPA1731
Railroad brigade
Reserve caaasmnd post
Sector casmeandant
Station ccrosaandaut
Antiaircraft missile brigade,
type "K"
Antiaircraft missile r-gimeut,
type "A"
Antiaircraft missile regiment,
type "8"
lighter aviation division
Engineer
+R`ank destroyer anti-tank brigade
Corporal
By the 8th day
By the end at 19 July
By 0600 19 July
Card post
By the ac ring at...
-105-
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CYP. ILLIC TRIaNSLITF.R.AT ICii
M
MIIA npd
H.a 60
Tto
Motorized infantry division
HD I&3 *Bridge a?cve water, 60 meters
long, 160 toss cape city
oap6 oe rb Independent vehicle repair
bri{ de
"6D'" Honest Jams
?
OAx6 odkb Independent traffic control
brigade
Independent bridge-building
brlpde
Op6 orb Independent recoci issence
battalion
opAH order
Iadepeadart xisaile battalion
opT6 ortb Independent missil*-technical
brigade
Xxdep*udeut special brldgs br1dede
*7 apead t ,7y aztillary CM "
Section of a*t1a tract base
Indepesdent tank grauRp
Independent pipeiarizH bripede
50X1-HUM
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I IVIVI
Otis
*Provisions
Yield arry
Mobile arnQ' base
pd
Infantry divisive
ME
PMIB
Mobile trait base
110
PC
Border guard detachment
UODOSH
popoin
Replacements
UU26
prtb
Mobile technical repair base
91
++Antitack
CrA
Jartbe= Mroup of Armies
From the morning of...
+8ignaL
-107-
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50X1-HUM
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C I'll fl LiC TRANSLI'1'ERATID Y
Tank army
Tank division
Rear supply base of a front
*Topographical section
Rear area control point
fuel base
WE TYB
TORO TOPO
TRY TPU
rat
Ts
W A TaGA
l
SDP n
? 'Wop frbr
opr rim
p noiz'i.
fr p-dch
WA
TWA
Central Gra:p of Armies
French fare"
Prent adawile bride
West German forces
Subordimted to the front
aCbenice 1
8wtbora Oranp at Armies
Squadron
-108-
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ASKS F THE DES
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(MSD
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-4, 3.
ft# : 4 T i; 1
Tern,ay#
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,mod`
13 A 1?
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m
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A .4} AT ~.=1' OF THE REAR AREA OF THE 2ND FRONT IN THE OFFEt
?
/J. 10 N+'r fl
8 0"VETS
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403190001-9
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