COMMERCIAL NEWSGATHERING FROM SPACE A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T02051R000200260001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMERCIAL
NEWSGATHERING
FROM SPACE
A TECHNICAL MEMi~RANDUM
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
r Olfice of Technology Assessment
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Office of Technology Assessment
Congressional Board of the 100th Congress
ORRIN G. HATCH
Utah
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY
Iowa
EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Massachusetts
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS
South Carolina
CLAIBORNE PELL
Rhode Island
WILLIAM J. PERRY, Chairman
H&Q Technology Partners
DAVID S. POTTER, Vice Chairman
General Motors Corp. (Ret.)
EARL BEISTLINE
Consultant
CHARLES A. BOWSHER
General Accounting Office
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.
California
JOHN D. DINGELL
Michigan
CLARENCE E. MILLER
Ohio
DON SUNDQUIST
Tennessee
AMO HOUGHTON
New York
JOHN H. GIBBONS
(Non voting)
Advisory Council
CLAIRE T. DEDRICK
California Land Commission
RACHEL McCULLOCH
University of Wisconsin
S. DAVID FREEMAN
Lower Colorado River Authority
MICHEL T. HALBOUTY
Michel T. Halbouty Energy Co.
CARL N. HODGES
University of Arizona
CHASE N. PETERSON
University of Utah
JOSEPH E. ROSS
Congressional Research Service
LEWIS THOMAS
Memorial Sloan-Kettering
Cancer Center
The views expressed in this technical memorandum are not necessarily those of the Board,
O'I'A Advisory Council, or individual members thereof.
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COMMERCIAL
NEWSGATHERING
FROM SPACE
A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Ollke of Tseftnobyy Assessment
Waehnplon, OC 20510-8025
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Recommended Citation:
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Commercial NewsgatheringFrom Space
-A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-40 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, May 1987).
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 87-619818
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325
(order form on p. 51)
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Foreword
The news media have begun to increase the use of satellite imagery in reporting
on world events. This has led some to believe that the media will soon wish to own
and operate their own remote sensing systems dedicated to newsgathering. The media
have generally supported the idea of a dedicated "mediasat" because it could supply
a stream of timely and critical information, peering where repressive governments or
dangerous natural environments have heretofore kept the press at bay. However, the
mediasat concept has also generated concern. Some U.S. policymakers believe that the
media's use of this potentially intrusive technology could create national security prob-
lems, complicate U. S. foreign relations, and, perhaps, erode the average citizen's ex-
pectation of personal privacy.
In order to become more fully aware of the opportunities and risks associated with
the media's use of remote sensing technology, the House Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology requested the Office of Technology Assessment to examine this issue
in a technical memorandum.
This technical memorandum concludes that although the technology is available
to create a mediasat system, the high cost and current low demand for remotely sensed
data will limit media efforts to own and operate a dedicated remote sensing satellite
system. Nonetheless, government and commercial remote sensing activities will con-
tinue in this country and in other countries. These activities will provide the media with
an increasing variety of sophisticated and relatively inexpensive remotely sensed images.
As the media's use of such images increases, conflicts are certain to arise between the
media's first amendment rights and certain U. S. national security and foreign policy
interests. OTA concludes that such conflicts are ultimately manageable, but that the
existence of foreign remote sensing systems (which can only be indirectly affected by
U.S. laws) may require some international consultation.
OTA was assisted in the preparation of this technical memorandum by many out-
standing advisors anal reviewers. We express sincere appreciation to each of these in-
diviuals and organizations. As with all OTA reports, the content of this technical
memorandum is the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment and does
not necessarily represent the views of our advisors or reviewers.
JOHN H. GIBBONS
Director
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Workshop Participants
Harvey Brooks (Chairman of the Workshop)
Professor of Technology and Public Policy
Harvard University
Bob Barker
Director, Commercial Applications
SPOT Image Corp.
Jerry Berman
Chief Legislative Counsel
American Civil Liberties Union
Mark Brender
Assignment Editor
ABC News
Dino A. Brugioni
Consultant
Stillman Chase
Assistant Manager
Space Sensors Laboratory
Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center
Craig Covault
Aviation Week and Space Technology
Peter Fend
President
Ocean Earth Construction and Development
Robert Filep
Program Development, FSD
Space Communications System
TRW, Inc.
Eilene Galloway
Honorary Director
International Institute of Space Law
William Headline
Vice President and Bureau Chief
Cable News Network
Roland S. Inlow
Consultant
John L. McLucas
President and Chairman of the Board
QuesTech, Inc.
Albert C. Pierce
Professor of National Security Policy
Department of Military Strategy
National War College
Rita Ann Reimer
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service
Gilbert Rye
President
COMSAT Government Systems, Inc.
Walter B. Slocombe
Caplin and Drysdale, Chartered
Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
Matthew R. Willard
Director
Market Planning and Analysis
EOSAT
Thomas R. Wolzien
Vice President
Editorial Services
NBC News
Peter D. Zimmerman
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The
workshop participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility
for the report and the accuracy of its contents.
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OTA Project Staff on Commercial Newsgathering From Space
Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA
Energy, Materials, and International Security Division
Peter Sharfman, Program Manager
International Security and Commerce
Richard DalBello, Project Director
Ray A. Williamson
Gordon Law
Administrative Staff
Jannie Coles Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson
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Additional Reviewers
Robert J. Aamoth, Esq.
Pierson, Ball and Dowd
Kim Ford Coffman
Presidential Management Intern
General Accounting Office
Paul Kreisberg
Director of Studies
Council on Foreign Relations
Phillip Kunsberg
Assistant Deputy
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy
Earl S. Merritt
Vice President
Earth Satellite Corp.
David H. Moore
Natural Resources and Commerce Division
Congressional Budget Office
Lt. Col. J. David Patterson
Air Force Fellow
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
and Research
Charles Sheffield
Vice President
Earth Satellite Corp.
Paul Uhlir
National Academy of Sciences
Space Science Board
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Related OTA Reports
Civilian Space
? Space Stations and the Law: Selected Legal Issues. OTA-BP-ISC-41, September 1986. GPO stock #052-
003-01047-0; $3.75.
? International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities. OTA-ISC-239, July 1985. GPO
stock #052-003-00958-7; $17.00.
? U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space OTA-TM-STI-27, July 1985. GPO stock #052-003-01004-6; $4.50.
? Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space. OTA-STI-241, November 1984. GPO stock #052-
003-00969-2; $7.50.
? Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion. OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984. NTIS order
#PB 84-180 777; $4.50.
? Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space. OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983. GPO
stock #052-003-00937-4; $4.50.
? UNISPACE 82: A Contextforlnternational Cooperation and Competition. OTA-TM-ISC-26, March 1983.
NTIS order #PB 83-201 848.
? Space Science Research in the United States. OTA-TM-STI-19, September 1982. NTIS order #PB 83-166 512.
? Civilian Space Policy and Applications. OTA-STI-177, June 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-234 444.
? Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administration Radio Conference of 1979.
OTA-CIT-163, January 1982. NTIS order #PB 82-177 536.
? Solar Power Satellite Systems and Issues. OTA-E-144, August 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-108 846.
Military Space
? Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control. OTA-ISC-281, September 1985. GPO stock
#052-003-01009-7; $6.00.
? Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies. OTA-ISC-254, September 1985. GPO stock #052-003-01008-9; $12.00.
? Arms Control in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984. GPO stock #052-003-00952-8; $3.00.
? Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space. OTA-BP-ISC-26, Apri11984. GPO stock #052-003-00948-0; $4.50.
NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20401-9325,
[phone]; and the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161, [phone].
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Contents
Page
Introduction ................................................................ 1
Principal Findings ........................................................... 2
Remote Sensing Technology and the Media ..................................... 8
Mediasat Described ........................................................ 8
The Media and the Uncertain Value of Satellite Imagery ....................... 11
Alternatives for the Media .................................................. 17
National Security and Foreign Policy .......................................... 30
National Security Concerns ................................................. 30
The Effect of Foreign Remote Sensing Systems on U.S Policies .................. 34
National Security and the First Amendment .................................... 35
Mediasat Restrictions and the First Amendment ............................... 35
The 1984 Landsat Act ...................................................... 36
Appendix A. The Technology of Newsgathering From Space ..................... 39
Appendix B. Media Access to and Use of Remote Sensing Data: A Legal Overview 45
Boxes
Box Page
A. A Remote Sensing Satellite System ......................................... 8
B. Why Remote Sensing Can Be Useful for Newsgathering ....................... 11
C. Spatial Resolution and Spectral Resolution ................................... 12
D. The Challenge of Timely Global Coverage ................................... 13
E. Remotely Sensed Data and News Presentation ............................... 16
F. The Status of Land Remote Sensing in the United States ...................... 19
G. Remote Sensing and the Public
Interest .................................................................. 27
H. Mediasat and Personal Privacy ............................................. 36
Figures
Figure No. Page
1. Landsat-5 Spacecraft ....................................................... 3
2. Artist's Conception of the French SPOT Remote Sensing Satellite ............... 4
3. A Remote Sensing System .................................................. 9
4. Data Processing and Interpretation .......................................... 9
5. Polar Orbit Provides Global
Coverage ................................................................ 10
6. The Orbital Path of Remote Sensing Satellite Is Sun Synchronous ............... 14
7. The Earth Revolves 2, 752 km to the East Between Passes ...................... 14
8. Adjacent Swaths Are Imaged 7 Days Apart .................................. 15
Tables
Table No. Page
1. Some Recent Uses of Remotely Sensed Images by the Press .................... 15
2. Remote Sensing Data Needs of Foreign and Domestic Users .................... 26
3. Summary of Applications of Landsat Data in the Various Earth Resources
Disciplines ............................................................... 27
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 CNES. Provided courtesy of SPOT Image Corp., Reston, VA
Soviet Chernobyl nuclear reactors (circled) and surrounding cooling pond. This image, taken by the SPOT satellite, combines
a 20 meter multispectral image with a 10 meter panchromatic image for greater clarity. Such images allow for
ongoing monitoring of the Chernobyl area.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. news media'sl recent use of satellite
images to cover such newsworthy events as the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Soviet "shuttle"
launch site at Tyuratam, and the progress of the
Iran-Iraq war has raised the possibility that news-
gathering from space could become a routine and
profitable commercial activity. Some media ex-
perts have supported the concept of a mediasatz
because it could supply a stream of timely and
critical information, peering where repressive gov-
ernments ordangerous natural environments have
heretofore kept the press at bay.
The mediasat concept has also generated con-
cern. Some U. S. policymakers believe that the me-
dia's use of this potentially intrusive technology
could increase the visibility and risk of military
operations, complicate U.S. foreign relations by
angering allies and adversaries, and erode the aver-
age citizen's expectation of personal privacy.
Believing that "the use of space technologies by
the media and the merging of traditional journalis-
ticpractices with long-held national space policies
has not yet been satisfactorily addressed," the
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy3 requested the Office of Technology Assess-
'This technical memorandum uses the terms "news media" or "me-
dia" interchangeably to refer to both the electronic and the print
media. The branches of the media are referred to separately only
when their different needs would appear to dictate unique technol-
ogy or policy choices. Except where otherwise indicated, the term
media refers only to the U.S. media.
:"Mediasat" is not an existing satellite system or business orga-
nization. As used in this technical memorandum, the term "media-
sat" refers to the concept of a satellite system and business organiza-
tion that would routinely collect news and information for media
use Erom space.
'Letter from The Hon. Don Fuqua, Chairman, House Committee
on Science and Technology, to John H. Gibbons, Director, Office
of Technology Assessment, Oct. 16, 1986; letter from The Hon. Bill
Nelson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space Science and Applica-
tions, House Committee on Science and Technology, to John H.
Gibbons, Director, Office of Technology Assessment, Oct. 7, 1986.
ment to examine this issue. In response to the com-
mittee's request, OTA contracted for papers on
remote sensing technology, the media's needs and
desires, the national security implications, and the
legal issues associated with newsgathering from
space.4 OTA held a workshop on December 18,
1986, to discuss these papers and to explore gen-
erally the opportunities and risks of the media's
use of satellite imagery. This technical memoran-
dum relies heavily on, but is not limited to, the
information found in the contract papers and the
workshop discussion.
Although the U.S. media currently make some
limited use of satellite imagery, OTA is unaware
of any serious planning to establish a mediasat
organization. The purpose of this technical memo-
randum is not to examine the feasibility of a spe-
cific satellite system or business plan, but rather,
to assess whether current government policy is
appropriate to accommodate both current activ-
ities and future developments. Because the media-
sat concept is, for the most part, undefined, OTA
was forced in this technical memorandum to make
a series of assumptions regarding fundamental is-
sues such as cost, markets, technical capability,
and utility of a mediasat. Although these assump-
tions are critical to OTA's conclusions, they are
only "best guesses," based on the advice of ex-
perts in the media and in the field of remote sens-
ing. With regard to specific issues-such as the
economic viability of a mediasat or its effect on
national security and foreign policy-altering these
underlying assumptions could dramatically alter
the conclusions reached in this technical memo-
randum.
(In January 1987, the committee's name was changed to the Com-
mittee on Science, Space, and Technology.)
"A summary of the papers on remote sensing technology and le-
gal issues are included in apps. A & B.
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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
Finding 1
The media s experience with satellite imagery
has thus far been extremely limited. Therefore,
the precise value of satellite imagery to the media
is uncertain and is likely to remain so until ex-
perience and a more robust remote sensing mar-
ket combine to define a stable demand for these
data.
The media have used and continue to use satel-
lite images in their news gathering activities.
Whether this limited use will blossom into exten-
sive, routine use or even a dedicated "mediasat"
organization will depend on:
1. the cost of remotely sensed data;
2. the demand for, and therefore the value of,
"media-quality" images to the media and to
other users; and
3. U.S. and foreign government policies regard-
ing the collection and distribution of high-
quality satellite images.
Much of the current writing on the mediasat
concept has stressed the desire for high resolution,
timely delivery, and assured access to data. Al-
though these demands follow logically from cur-
rent newsgathering practices, they are not the
product of detailed technical or economic research
or of experience. It is important to recognize that,
in the absence of such research or experience, the
news media can have only an imprecise under-
standing of the value of low- and high-resolution
data and the value of real-time and delayed in-
formation.
Finding 2
The current commercial remote sensing systems,
the U.S. EOSAT and the French SPOT, allow the
media to experiment with satellite imagery but lack
the high resolution, timely delivery, and assured
access to data that some media experts feel could
make satellite imagery an integral part of the news-
gathering process.
EOSAT (figure 1) and SPOT (figure 2) provide
a relatively low-cost means by which the media
could practice both using satellite imagery and
working within current government policies. How-
ever, existing commercial systems do not provide
"timely access" or high resolution, primarily be-
cause these capabilities are expensive and unnec-
essary to meet the needs of the traditional pur-
chasers of remotely sensed data. In addition, the
media's access to data cannot be assured because
the remote sensing companies currently depend
on ground stations owned by other countries to
collect certain data. Experience gained with the
current commercial systems has shown that de-
livery of data considered by a foreign government
to be sensitive may be delayed or denied.
Finding 3
It is possible to build a mediasat system with
high resolution, timely global coverage, and as-
sured access to data using current technology.
Experts generally agree that costs and market
uncertainties, more than technology, inhibit the
establishment of a mediasat system. Media experts
have identified high spatial resolution (5 meters
or less) as the principal performance requirement
for a mediasat. By comparison, the Thematic Map-
per (TM) and the Multispectral Scanner (MSS) sen-
sors on EOSAT's satellite provide 30 and 80 me-
ter resolution, respectively. The French SPOT
system provides 10 meter panchromatic (black and
white) as well as 20 meter multi-spectral (color)
imagery. Nonetheless, sensors capable of produc-
ing 5 meter images are readily available and could
be flown on existing spacecraft designs.
To be effective, a mediasat needs more than
high resolution; it must also be able to sense news
wherever and whenever it occurs and to trans-
mit the news rapidly to the news agency. A media-
sat system would need at least two satellites to en-
sure same day coverage of events around the globe.
In order to receive data in near-real-time, a medi-
asat system would need to have access to ground
stations all over the earth, use on-board tape
recorders, or use space-to-space communications
similar to the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration's (NASA) partially complete Track-
ing Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). The
technology exists to obtain high-resolution, near-
real-time imagery; what is lacking is the clear fi-
nancialjustification for employing this technology.
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Figure 1.-Landsat-5 Spacecraft
~~y
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Figure 2.-Artist's Conceptiion of the French SPOT
Remote Sensing Satellite
Finding 4
Although cost and market research have yet to
be done, preliminary calculations indicate that the
costs of a mediasat might exceed the expected rev-
enues of such a system.
To be financially viable, a mediasat would have
to generate revenue sufficient to offset the costs
of the system. Experts have estimated that a com-
plete one or two satellite mediasat system (i.e.,
sensor, spacecraft, launch vehicle, data collection
facilities, and image processing facilities) capable
of 5 meters resolution, designed to operate about
5 years, could cost between $215 million and $470
million to establish and $10 million to $15 mil-
lion ayear to operate. Even if each network used
satellite images every day, only a few thousand
images would be used per year; hence the system's
development and operating costs could only be
paid back if networks were willing to pay $35,000
to $73,000 per "story," an order of magnitude more
than existing expenditures for daily news coverage.
Nonetheless, should it turn out that OTA's cost
estimates for a mediasat are dramatically over-
stated (because the technology has become more
sophisticated and/or less costly) or a very high
demand (from the media and other data users)
were to develop for satellite images, mediasat
might become an economically viable concept.
Finding 5
A mediasat would probably compound prob-
lemsinherent in the management of national secu-
rity and foreign policy in a spirited democracy;
however, such problems would likely be man-
ageable.
Experts generally agree that the media's exten-
sive use of high-resolution satellite imagery for
newsgathering could complicate certain U.S. na-
tional security activities and certain U.S. foreign
policies. Experts disagree, however, about the na-
ture and seriousness of these "complications," and
the extent to which they differ from traditional
tensions between the press and the national secu-
rity and foreign policy communities.
Although each is the subject of some contro-
versy, national security experts consulted by OTA
identified five areas where a mediasat could com-
plicate U.S. national security and foreign policies.
The media could:
1. disseminate information regarding U.S. mil-
itary operations, thereby depriving U.S.
troops of the critical element of surprise;
2. reveal information considered sensitive by
foreign governments, thereby prompting
them to retaliate against U.S. Government
activities, assets, or personnel;
3. provide valuable intelligence to countries cur-
rentlylacking their own reconnaissance sat-
ellites;
4. reveal facts about an unfolding crisis, mak-
ing it more difficult for government leaders
to act calmly and responsibly; and
5. misinterpret satellite data in such a way as
to precipitate a crisis.
SSome of the costs of a mediasat could be offset by selling data
to map makers, geologists, agricultural planners, and other current
users of remotely sensed data.
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 EOSAT. Provided courtesy of EOSAT.
Washington, D.C., and surrounding area-Thematic Mapper band 4 is used, and illustrates major
areas and buildings of the downtown area. For example, the Washington Monument, Pentagon,
Capitol, and National Airport can be seen.
The most common media response to all of these
allegations is that, although a mediasat could pro-
vide asubstantial new source of data, the media's
extensive contacts and information sources within
the United States and around the world already
provide the press with near-real-time information
concerning fast-breaking news stories. The U.S.
media are also proud of their "track record." They
assert that where lives have been at stake or seri-
ousnational security issues have been raised, they
have cooperated with the government by with-
holding information until the danger or sensitiv-
ity has passed. Finally, some national security and
media experts argue that granting the media ac-
cess to high-resolution satellite data could have
a stabilizing influence, in that nations would realize
that aggressive actions would be seen and reported
throughout the free world.
Finding 6
Within a decade, many nations will have their
own remote sensing systems. It is unclear whether
the U.S. Government could effectively limit or
control media access to satellite imagery if for-
eign governments do not exercise similar controls.
The almost assured proliferation of sophisti-
cated, government-owned, remote sensing systems
has caused many analysts to question the practi-
cality of attempting to regulate the media's use
of satellites to gather news. Some experts main-
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tain that since U.S. laws would not be applicable
to foreign systems, U.S. news agencies could by-
pass U.S. restrictions by purchasing data from,
or investing in, foreign remote sensing systems.
Others disagree, arguing that foreign remote
sensing systems-either as a result of financial
constraints, less sophisticated technology, or a
country's own domestic policies-might have lim-
ited resolution. Therefore, it is possible that, with
minimum intergovernmental coordination, the
United States could substantially delay the time
when the media would have access to very high-
resolution satellite images.
Finding 7
Government attempts to limit access to or use
of satellite imagery would likely result in first
amendment challenges to such limitations. The
outcome of these challenges would turn on the
exact nature of the government limitations and
the Supreme Court's ultimate determination of the
status of newsgathering activities under the Con-
stitution.
Should the U.S. Government desire to inhibit
a media-owned satellite from gathering potentially
sensitive information it could-either permanently,
through the licensing procedures established in the
1984 Landsat Act, b or temporarily during a crisis
-attempt to limit:
1. the resolution of the satellite's sensors;
2. the images that the satellite is allowed to col-
lect; or
3. the images the media are allowed to dis-
seminate.
The 1984 Landsat Act requires all remote sens-
ing system operators to obtain a license from the
Secretary of Commerce, who is charged with the
duty of ensuring that applicants comply with the
"international obligations and national security
concerns of the United States." Some media rep-
resentatives have argued that such licensing pro-
visions should be declared invalid because they
are not drafted with the narrow specificity required
of statutes affecting first amendment interests. The
validity of this point of view will rest heavily on
the Supreme Court's ultimate determination of the
status of newsgathering activities.
If newsgathering is given the degree of first
amendment protection afforded traditional speak-
ing and publishing activities, the licensing proce-
dureestablished in the Landsat Act and future re-
strictions on mediasat activities might be regarded
as impermissible "prior restraints" on free speech.
The doctrine of "prior restraint" holds that ad-
vancelimitations on protected speech may not be
"predicated on surmise or conjecture that un-
towardconsequences may result."' Prior restraints
are allowable only if necessary to prevent "direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation
or its people."8 On the other hand, should the Su-
preme Court hold that news gathering was deserv-
ing of some lesser degree of protection than pub-
lication of information already obtained, the
government would have considerably more lati-
tude to limit mediasat activities. Restrictions on
the dissemination of information already gathered
would, of course, receive the full protection of
the first amendment.
If the media do not own a satellite system, but
rather rely on a commercial company such as
EOSAT to provide them with data, it would be
less clear whether the media could successfully ar-
gue that licensing restrictions violate their first
amendment rights. Should the U.S. Government
ask EOSAT to stop distributing raw data for a
few days during a crisis and EOSAT agreed, the
news media might have a case against EOSAT for
breach of contract, but their case against the U. S.
Government for infringing their first amendment
rights would be less clear.
Finding 8
Should the U.S. Government wish to encourage
the eventual development of a U.S. mediasat in-
dustry, it should continue its support fcsr the U. S.
Landsat system; such support would likely require
sizable subsidy for a period of years.9
'Justice Brennan concurring in, New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971).
BJustices Stewart and White, concurring, New York Times Co.
v. United States, ibid.
?The funding problems and opportunities of the Landsat program
and EOSAT are beyond the scope of this paper. In reaching this
conclusion, OTA drew upon its previous work. See: U.S. Congress,
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A mediasat industry is less likely to develop in
the United States if the media must shoulder the
entire cost of the "infrastructure" needed to sup-
Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and
Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA-ISC-239 (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1985), p. 15; U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote Sensing and
the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion-A Technical Memoran-
dum, OTA-TM-ISC-20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, March 1984).
port its occasional use of satellite images. If, on
the other hand, there already existed in the United
States a strong "value-added" industry-small
firms expert in the interpretation and visual pres-
entation ofdata-and a large pool of experienced
photointerpreters, the mediasat concept would be-
come more viable. A robust value-added indus-
try and a cadre of experienced photointerpreters
are more likely to develop if the United States has
a healthy land remote sensing industry catering
to diverse scientific and commercial needs.
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REMOTE SENSING TECHNOLOGY AND THE MEDIA
Mediasat Described
At present, the news media obtain data from
two commercial remote sensing systems, EOSAT
-formerly the U.S. Government's Landsat sys-
tem10-and SPOT, a French system.ll Neither of
these commercial systems was designed to meet
the specific needs of the media and neither firm
has plans to buy new satellites or alter its busi-
nessstructure to allow it to meet these needs. Con-
sequently, media experts have begun to examine
the feasibility and desirability of a "mediasat;" a
spacecraft owned and operated-in whole or in
part-by the news media and dedicated to news
and information gathering activities [see box A
and figures 3 and 4; box B and figure 5]. Although
individual conceptions of a "mediasat" vary, as
it is most often described, a mediasat would dif-
fer from the current commercial systems in three
important ways:
1. Spatial Resolution: Spatial resolution of 5
meters or less [see box C] is often identified
as the principal performance requirement for
a mediasat.12 By comparison, the TM and
the MSS sensors on EOSAT's satellite yield
30 and 80 meter resolution, respectively. The
French SPOT system provides 10 meter pan-
chromatic as well as 20 meter multispectral
imagery. At present, neither SPOT nor
EOSAT has plans to fly sensors capable of
approaching the 5 meter resolution sought
by the media.13
10For a history of the U.S. Landsat system and the details of its
somewhat stormy transfer to the private sector, see: U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Remote Sensing and the Private
Sector: Issues for Discussion-A Technical Memorandum, OTA-
TM-ISC-20 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
March 1984); National Research Council Space Applications Board,
Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space: A Program in Crisis (Wash-
ington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985).
"The French Government controls the SPOT satellite and a pri-
vate French company, Spot Image, S.A., and its American subsidi-
ary, Spot Image, Corp., market the data.
'=At the workshop it was clear that the media's desire for sensors
allowing a resolution of 5 meters or less is not based on experience
or research. The exact number is flexible and could be more accurately
stated as "that degree of resolution which is better than either the
SPOT or EOSAT systems but which is still affordable."
"It is important to note the relationship between resolution and
the width of coverage (swath width). Had the French chosen a 20
km by 20 km swath width instead of their current 60 km by 60 km
coverage, they would have had a resolution of 3.3 meters, assuming
the same number of minimum picture elements (pixels) in their sen-
Box A.-WA Remote Sensing Satellite System
A renitote sensing satellite system consists of
four major components, each of which. is crib-
cal to producing useful data:
The Spacecraft, Sensors, and Transmitters:
The spacecraft provides a stabilized plat-
form and power for the sensors and their
optics, the receiving and transmitting an-
tennas, and the associated electronics nec-
essary to control the spacecraft and to de-
liver data to Earth. Some remote sensing
spacecraft may also carry tape recorders to
store data until. the spacecraft is within sight
of a receiving. station.
The Receiving Statiozt and Other Commu-
nications C?mponents: A ground station
may receive data in digital form directly
Pram the satellite as it passes overhead, or,
if the satellite is not in a position to c~m-
municate with the ground station, through
a system equivalent to NASA's 3-.satellite
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System.
{TI)RSS}. * In the latter case, data are passed
Pram the remote sensing satellite to a c~m-
municationsatellite in geasynchronous orbit
and then retransmitted to a ground facility.
From the ground facility, the data are then
passed directly to a processing laboratory.
The Data Processing Facilities: Before the
raw data can be converted into photographic
images or computer tapes capable of being
analyzed by the end user, they must be proc-
essed to remove geometric and other distor-
tions inevitably introduced by the sensors:
Far the pu~oses of newsgathering, hgh-
speed mainframe computers may be required
to process the data from current spacecraft..
Interpretation of the IJ'ata: After the raw
data are processed and converted to cam-
pater tapes ar photographs, they must be
interpreted. Part of the interpretation proc=
ess may involve merging or integrating other
data either directly on the computer tape,
or comparing such data with photographs.
At this stage,: computer analysis could be
performed by micro- or mini-computer. A
variety of advanced techniques (see box G}
are available to turn remotely sensed data
into new products far different users..
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 Figure 3.-A Remote Sensing System
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Tape
storage
Data
handling
Command
receiver
Command
& control
Initial
processing
Data
processing
Initial
data
tape
? Calibration.
+ Radiometric
correction
+ Geometric
correction
+ Formatting
Data
processing
Relay
satellite
ommunicatlons
components
pate
interpretation
pisptays Photos
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Information processing and
interpretation
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Figure 5.-Polar Orbit Provides Global Coverage
Ground
track
2. Timely Global Coverage: To be most effec-
tive, a mediasatwould have to deliver news
in a matter of hours from anywhere on the
globe [see box D and figures 6-8]. Neither
the satellites nor the business structures of
EOSAT and SPOT are designed to produce
imagery that quickly. Such timeliness would
require new ground processing techniques
continued from page 8
sor array. Reducing swath width, however, would have greatly in-
creasedthe time it takes to obtain global coverage with one satellite.
It would also have reduced the synoptic view desired for many other
uses of the data.
and delivery methods and at least two satel-
lites and supporting communication facilities
to ensure that the media would have the op-
portunity to image every spot on Earth at
least once a day.
3. Media Control Over System and Products:
EOSAT and SPOT, although commercial
systems, receive substantial financial support
and guidance from their sponsoring govern-
ments and rely on the cooperation of those
countries that maintain ground stations (see
the following section, National Security and
Foreign Policy). As a result, issues such as
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Box B.--Why Remote Sensing Can
Be Useful far lVewsgathering
From. the technical standpoint, remote sensing
from space provides data users with several key
features:
+ ability to view remote, difficult, or denied
terrain.;
+ view unaffected by political boundaries;
+ synaptic view of large portions of Earth's
surface;
+ the possibility of near real-time data recovery;
+ signals suitable far digital storage and sub-
sequent computer manipulation into news-
ready imagery;
+ repetitive coverage over comparable view
ing conditions;
? selected. combinations of spectral bands far
identifying and analyzing surface features.
In addition, data from space provide the fallow-
ing advantages:
? Convenient Historical Record; Stored an
MagneticMedia and Photographs: Each im-
age establishes a baseline that is of critical
importance in recognizing the inevitable
environmental and other changes that oc-
cur aver time.
+ Tovl for Inventory and Assessment; Satel~
life images could be used whenever a major
natural ar technological disaster strikes an
area and massive breakdowns of eommu-
ncatian, transportation, public safety, and
health facilities, prevenk the use of normal
means of inventory and assessment.
? Predictive Tvvl; Properly interpreted fm-
agerycan beused topredct the onset of nat-
ural and. technological. disasters..
? Planning and Management Tool: Imagery
can be used for a variety of planning and
management purposes.
SOURCE: Office df Technology Assessment, 1987.
limitations on sensor resolution and the re-
lease of sensitive data can be strongly influ-
enced by government policy. A successful
U. S. mediasat would have to eliminate such
government intervention to ensure the de-
gree of independence the media now enjoy
in their other news gathering activities.
The Media and the Uncertain Value
of Satellite Imagery
During the course of the OTA workshop, it be-
cameclear that with the exception of certain trade
publications and the magazine Aviation Week and
Space Technology, the media's experience with
satellite imagery-excluding weather satellite
imagery-has been extremely limited (table 1). As
a result, the media-especially the major television
networks-have no clear idea of the type of im-
agery they want, how much they might need, or
how much they are willing to pay. In short, the
value of satellite imagery to the media is, at
present, uncertain and is likely to remain so until
experience and a more robust remote sensing mar-
ket combine to define a stable market for these
data. ~'
Fundamental to this issue of uncertainty are
questions concerning the type and quality of data
needed by the media. Several of the media repre-
sentatives at the OTA workshop brought exam-
ples of how SPOT and EOSAT data have been
used in recent news broadcasts. After viewing sev-
eral such news stories, one workshop participant
commented that,
The pictures themselves are unremarkable .. .
most of these pictures are essentially illustrations
of a story that you have to make up.
This comment goes to the heart of the media's
problem-does it need images that the viewer can
identify and interpret, or is there value in images
that, although not identifiable by the viewer, hold
important information when interpreted by an ex-
pert? One panelist noted,
It is important to distinguish between informa-
tion that has to be interpreted and ...material
the viewers at home ...could draw their own
conclusions from. There is obviously much more
value in material that does not require interpre-
tation.
"It is interesting to note, however, that the media's use of remote
sensing imagery has increased substantially since the launch of the
higher resolution SPOT satellite. This suggests that at even higher
resolutions, such as 5 meters, there could be another substantial in-
crease in the demand for satellite imagery.
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Box C.----Spatial Resolution and Spectral Resolution
Spatial resolution refers to the ability of an optical device, such as the sensor of a remote sensing space-
craft, to segarate objects of a given size. An instrument of high resolving power can segarate two small
objects very close together, or resolve the image of relatively small features on a larger object. For example,
a spatial resolution of ~ meter {approximately 39 inches} could allow a viewer to distinguish between an
automobile and a bus, but such resolution might not allow one to distinguish between an automobile and
a pickup truck.
The best resolution available on images formed by civilian remote sensing satellites is the ZD-meter
resolution offered by the sensors and optical systems on the French SPOT satellite. * Such resolution allows
one to see individual buildings and streets in a city landscape. It also permits one to pick out semi-trailer
trucks on the streets or ships at a dock. It would generally not make it possible for the viewer to distinguish
between the image of two semi-trailer trucks parked side by side and a building of similar dimensions,
because the images of the two trucks would merge.
Overall resolution is limited by the resolving power of the sensor's individual picture elements. The
minimum picture element, or pixel, of SFOT data, for example, corresponds to 10 meters {approximately
33 feet} on the ground. No amount of simple magnification of the remotely-sensed image will improve the
resolution beyond this. minimum pixel size. For an object with dimensions less than 10 meters, the sensor
will effectively spread out the light emanating from such an object so that it is impossible to determine
the position of the object within the 10 meter pixel. Structural details of the object will also be spread out.
in a similar manner.
However, knowledge of the general terrain, the detailed characteristics of particular objects, and ex-
perience in photointergretation, can vastly improve an interpreter's ability to understand the details of an
image. In addition, sophisticated. and costly computer processing can improve on the theoretical resolution
of an image by as much as a factor of 2.**
Although the spatial resolution of a sensor provides a general guide to its ability to "see" objects on
the ground, photointerpretersore also concerned with spectral resolution, Since all objects reflect light differ-
ently, an object's color or its contrast with the background environment can also be used to distinguish
it. For example, the Great Wall of China is wide enough to be detected on Landsat TM images {resolution
of 3Q meters, or 98 feet}. However, because the wall is nearly the same color as the surrounding countryside,.
it is extremely difficult to pick out in certain Landsat spectral bands. On the other hand, it is often possible
to see a bridge or roadway of less than 30 meters wide when their contrast with the surrounding water
or earth is extremely high. In effect, the bridge or road tends to "fill" each pixel with its reflected light,
and because there are many such pixels spread out in a line across the scene, the eye links them together.
Because objects that appear to have similar color characteristics as seen by the naked eye reflect light some-
what differently in different parts of the spectrum, it is often possible to distinguish objects on the image
by subtracting the different color bands from one another. In this way, a field of corn can be distinguished
from a field of soybeans, even though the sensors are incapable of resolving individual plants.
*Early in their program, France considered building a system of higher resolution that could be used by both civilian and military data users. How-
ever, because of high costs and other priorities for research and development Eunds, it deferred ouch a program.
*"See John A. Adams, "t`ounting the Weapons; ' 16 $peCtrttYr;, July 1988, gg. 48-56, for a general discussion aE spectral and spatial resolution.
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Box D,--The Challenge of Timely Global Coverage
The Landsat satellite travels in a near-polar orbit at a distance of 7A6 kilometers and circles the Earth
every 98..9 minutes. The SPOT satellite flies in a similar orbit, 832 kilometers above Earth, with an orbital
period of 101.5 minutes. Because Earth is spinning, as a satellite travels from pale to pole, it flies over
a different part of Earth on each orbit, hash of the two I.andsat spacecraft, for example, passes over the
same portion of Earth at the Equator once every 16 days. {Near the pales, the "footprint" of its sensors
overlap in successive orbital passes, covering the same portion of Earth in as few as 8 days.) SPOT repeats
its orbit only once every 26 days. However, because the SPOT sensors can be pointed to the side (off-
nadir), their ability to sense a particular area on Earth in successive passes is substantially increased. The
SPOT sensors can revisit a site 7 days out of 26. The ability to point its sensors also allows the SPOT
satellite to take quasi-stereo images.
For the purposes of a mediasat capable of providing daily coverage of the Earth, it is necessary to
have several identical satellites with pointable sensors to ensure that one is always in position to see the
area of interest. `
Delivering the data collected to Earth far processing.. is an important part of the overall process of land
remote sensing. Because the satellite orbits the Earth, for some part of every orbit it will not be within
"sight" of national ground stations. A satellite system must have one or more of the following capabilities:
1. tape recorders to stare data until they can be played back. as the satellite passes aver a ground station,
2. space-to-space communications such as NASA`s Tracking and Data Relay Satellites {TDRSS} to pass
the information around. the globe and then to Earth, or
3. ground stations in many foreign countries to ensure that data collected over other countries are
eventually passed back to national territory:.
None of these alternatives is without difficulty: high-capacity space-rated tape recorders have a high fail-
ure rate, historically, and are still not regarded as reliable; TL7RSS cannot yet provide worldwide coverage
(the second of three Critical. satellites was destroyed along with the Shuttle Challenger in January 1986),
it is expensive to use, and commercial users currently receive very low priority; finally, receiving data from
foreign ground stations can be slow and subject to political interference,
One of the mast substantial impediments to timely delivery of imagery is the effects of Clouds.. On
any one day.., substantial portions of the Earth's surface are covered by clouds. Some areas can be obscured
for weeks or even months at a time. Other areas are difficult to see even in "clear" weather as a result
of smog or other obscuring atmospheric problems,
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Figure 6.-The Orbital Path of Remote Sensing Satellite Is Sun Synchronous
Attitude = l05 krn
(nomthal)
Each pass of the satettite crosses the equator
at the same time (9:d5 arrt)
Figure 7.-The Earth Revolves 2,752 km to the East (at the equator) Between Passes
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Figure 8.-Adjacent Swaths (moving westward) Are Imaged 7 Days Apart
i;
~~
orbs en day 1
aay 2
day 3
daY 4 ~~~?
day s
day 8
daY 7
tlwv A
day 9 I ' I ~ ~.
day 7f3 ..~
day 11
daY 12
day 18
day ice'
Table 1.-Some Recent Uses of Remotely Sensed Images by the Pressa
Television news
Date Event
April 1985 Iran/Iraq border area-ABC. '
Janauary 1986 Libyan military airfield and SA-5 sites-ABC.
February 1986 Naval facility at Murmansk-ABC.
April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant-all networks.
July 1986 New York City harbor-ABC.
July 1986 Soviet nuclear testing facility at Semipalatinsk some 1800 miles southeast of Moscow-ABC, CBS, CNN.
August 1986 Soviet shuttle facility at Tyuratam in central USSR-ABC.
October 1986 Soviet Submarine base at Gremikha-Swedish television.
January 1987 Iran/Iraq war-ABC.
April 1987 Soviet radar facility near Krasnoyarsk-ABC.
Newspapers, magazines
March 1986 Libyan SA-5 sites and military bases-New York Post-
April, May 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant-many newspapers, magazines
September 1986 U.S.S.R. Kola Peninsula-Jane's Defense Weekly
October 1986 Soviet cosmodromes at Plesetsk and Baikonur-National Geographic.
March 1987 Soviet Navy base at Murmansk and Soviet Air Force base at Severomorsk-Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology. b
March 1987 Pakistani nuclear processing facility-London Sunday Observer
aThese citations are representative only. The news media have put remote sensing data to many other uses.
bAviatlon Week and Space Technology pioneered the use of remotely sensed Images from space. Since 1974, the journal has published more than 22 major news stories
based on remotely sensed Images.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1987.
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Other panelists generally agreed with this com-
ment and emphasized that material requiring inter-
pretation is similar to a "source story;" that is,
a story based on inside or expert information but
lacking images to allow the viewer to draw his
or her own conclusions. Although useful in the
print media, "source stories" have a more limited
value in television news where the viewer expects
the picture to tell the story [see box E].15
'gone panelist felt that the attention given to the issue of "source
stories" was unwarranted. He maintained, "Those of us who have
lived through the technological developments that have affected the
media over the last tenor twenty years would never attempt to neatly
categorize the potential uses of remote sensing. Experience tells us
that every time a significant technological advance has been made, '
its early planned uses either became secondary or were lost in the
huge quantity of additional applications that developed once ex-
perience had been gained. Remote sending will simply open up a
variety of options to illustrate all sorts of stories in different ways
and in different media."
One panelist commented that the media "clearly
had a lot of homework to do,"but that this learn-
ing process could proceed in stages. First, he sug-
gested that the media should gain as much experi-
ence as possible working with current satellite
images and within current government policies.
This would allow the media to define the kinds
of news stories that would gain from "eye in space"
graphics every day. Second, the news media
should test the ability of SPOT, EOSAT, or some
other source of data to meet their needs. Third, ,
examine the attitudes of readers and viewers
toward the use of these new graphic displays to
reach some conclusions regarding the compara-
tive values of high- and low-resolution data. Fi-
nally, when they had gained sufficient experience
regarding both the value of current imagery and
the cost and future demand for high-resolution
Box E,--Remotely Sensed Data and News Presentation
Remote sensing will open up a variety of options to illustrate stories indifferent ways. and in different
media. In particular, the news media will likely use satellite images to provide background information
for stories and to illustrate the story directly. To elucidate this difference, imagine using images gathered
from space to support a story that a country is amassing aircraft and other materiel on its border, possibly
in preparation for invading its neighbor. Three broad levels of resolution capacity lead to different catego-
ries of stories:
1. Story Requiring Extensive Analysis of the Image: If the news media had access to images of 3d me-
ter resolution, they could run a story showing a somewhat grainy image of runways and an amor-
phous mass of bright spots that, in the opinion of an expert photoin#erpreter, represent a buildup
of aircraft. ZBy carefully examining the images, the photointerpreter might be able to offer some
judgments about the categories of aircraft and other objects reflected in the image, In such a case..,.
however, the images convey little ar no information to the untutored viewer, because from the. m-
age alone, he or site can make no independent confirmation of the expert's judgment.
2. Mixed Story. At 3.0 meter resolution, the image of the runway would appear much sharper and
.might even reveal navigation markings.;In addition, large aircraft, such as cargo planes, would be
readily identifiable as aircraft to the lay: viewer, ante the newscaster had drawn the viewer`s atten-
Lion to them. Smaller aircraft, such as fighters, would :still appear as=amorphous shapes to the un-
formed observer. To be understood by the viewer, such an image would still require the analytical.
judgment of a photointerpreter.
3. Story Allowing the Viewers To Draw Their Own Cor:elusions About the Images. 1#, however, a
mediasat existed with a resolutiort of much better than 5 meter, the evening newscast might be able
to show a variety of aircraft on the runway, and perhaps even large objects being unloaded from
cargo planes. In such a case, the'irnage itself might carry most of the story, because viewers would
be-able to recognize that: it contained many aircraft of different sizes and could draw :their own
conclusions about the country's intentions, especially as the media's audience becomes more so-
phisticated about viewing imagery from space.
In all three cases, photos or drawings of the various types of aircraft exist,. and these could be shown on
a split screen, with a news reporter or" expert analyst pointing to relevant details,.
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Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam port facility. Combatants shown in this image are the Foxtrot diesel-powered attack submarine, the
Echo nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarine, the Kashin destroyer, and the Grisha frigate.
Photo resolution estimated to be about 1 meter.
imagery, the media could then make an informed
judgment regarding the practicality of pursuing
the mediasat concept.
The media's difficulty in assessing the value of
satellite imagery is reminiscent of problems en-
countered by scientists in the 1970s when they first
began to experiment with the Landsat data. Many
experts believed then that with a little experience
and a little. government support, remote sensing
could become a thriving commercial industry. It
is instructive to note that, after nearly 15 years
of experimentation, the overall market for re-
motely sensed data is still weak. This is true even
for applications such as minerals exploration, for-
estry, and agriculture, where the history of experi-
mentation demonstrates that remote sensing from
space is cost effective compared to other means
of gathering similar information.lb
'"See: Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discus-
sion, op. cit., ch. 4, for a discussion of the developmet of the market
for remotely sensed data.
Alternatives for the Media
The media have at least two choices should they
decide to increase the use of satellite imagery in
their news coverage:
1. they could continue to use the images pro-
vided by the current commercial systems; or
2. they could fly their own satellite or a sensor
on a host satellite.
Although these choices are not mutually exclu-
sive they vary drastically in cost and complexity.
Use of EOSAT and SPOT Images
Several panelists bluntly stated their belief that
the concept of a media-owned satellite system was
"just not economical" today, and that, "The best
way to go is to get the [EOSATs and SPOTS] of
the world to supply the data that the media need."
Although certainly the simplest and most economi-
calpath for the media to follow, the current com-
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~. _
Photo credit: U.S. Department of De)ense
Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam airfield. This photo, taken from an aircraft, was released Feb. 9, 1987, by the Department of Defense
to refute Soviet and Vietnamese denials of the existence of Soviet forward?deployment bases in Vietnam. Shown in this image
are Soviet TU?95 Bear aircraft, TU-16 Badgers, and Mig-23 Flogger aircraft. Photo resolution estimated to be about 1 meter.
mercial systems cannot provide timely access to
data, assured access to data, and high resolution
[see box F].
The workshop discussed two aspects of the time-
~I liness issue: l) the problem of getting the data from
the satellite to the media user; and 2) the need for
the human resources to interpret the data.l' On
"Both of these problems were illustrated by one newsman's ex-
perience in trying to obtain and use the satellite images of Cher-
nobyl. He recalled: "I remember working the phones all day trying
to get the Chernobyl images and finally at three in the afternoon
they arrived and everyone was excited and we looked at the images
and said, 'what the hell are we looking at?' So I called up EarthSat,
the image processing company, and I said, 'Hey, can you send some-
body down and help us interpret this stuff7' He said, 'Well, we can
do it next week.' You know they're used to dealing with geologists.
I said, 'Next week? I'll send a helicopter this afternoon.' "
the subject of timely access to data, one panelist
pointed out that neither SPOT nor EOSAT is de-
signed to meet the particular needs of the news
media. The Landsat system, now operated by
EOSAT, had been agovernment-designed research
system that was never expected to deliver data
rapidly. "If you call today and ask for a scene from
last year, EOSAT may be able to get it to you
within a week if it's already been processed," the
panelist commented, but "if it's unprocessed it
takes 4 to 5 weeks." The panelist pointed out that
EOSAT had been able to provide the Chernobyl
images in 24 hours only because it was lucky
enough to have a satellite in position and it had
been willing to suspend all its other activities. Most
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Box F.--The Status of Land Remote Sensing in the United States
The value of viewing Earth from space to provide crucial resource and environmental information
an the atmosphere, oceans, and land masses was recognized early in this Nation's development of space
technology. Twv years after the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was signed, the United States
received its fast images from space, taken by the polar-orbiting weather satellite called the Television and
Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS}.
Today the TIROS satellites, and their geostationary cousins, the Geostationary Orbiting Environmental.
Satellites {GOES) continually monitor weather systems within. their field of view. Originally developed
by NASA, both systems have been operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) since 1970..
NASA designed and built the Landsat system in the early 1970x. Landsat 1 {originally called the Earth.
Resources Technology Satellite} was launched in 1,972, followed. by Landsat 2 and 3 in 1975 and 1978. All
three satellites carried a multispectral scanner {MSS} capable of a spatial resolution of 80 meters in four
spectral bands. The output of this sensor, transmitted ko Earth, then corrected and stored, constitutes the
primary archival library of Landsat data, extending back to 2972. Landsat 4, which NASA launched in
1982, Carries bath the MSS sensor and the mere powerful Thematic Mapper {TM), capable of 30 meters
resolution in 6 spectral bands, and 120 meters resolution in the near infrared.. An identical Landsat 5 was
launched in 1984, after Landsat 4 began tv experience technical difficulties. Both satellites still provide broth
MSS and TM data, although Landsat 4 is limited in the amount of TM data it can transmit.
In the late 1970x, believing that the development of land remote sensing would fare better in the pr-
vate sector, the Carter administration began #a plan for the eventual transfer of the Landsat system to pr-
vate ownership. The first stage in that process was to transfer the control ever the system to NOAA,~`
Transfer to NOAH was completed in 2.9$4. The Reagan Administration decided early in its tenure to has-
ten the process of transfer to the private sector. In January 1984, the Department of Commerce released
a request for proposal (RFP) designed to solicit offers from private industry tv own and operate the Land-
sat and any follow-on civilian remote sensing system...
Concurrently, Congress began. to develop legislation to promote the transfer to private ownership and
operation. The goal of both efforts was to assist the private sector in developing aself-sustaining, commer-
cial land remote sensing enterprise. The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization. Act of 2984 was signed
into law on July 17, 19$4.
In October 1484, after examining a total of seven RFPs, the Department of Commerce accepted the
proposal of EOSAT, a new company formed by RCA and Hughes Aircraft Corp. However, EOSAT and
the Department of Commerce had difficulty reaching agreement on the terms of the subsidy. After consd-
erable discussion, involving the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Commerce, end
Congress, the principals agreed on a government subsidy of $250 million for two follow-on Landsat satel-
lites. The government agreed to launch Landsat 6 and 7 on the shuttle. In addition, the government also
contracted with EOSAT (for a fee) to operate Landsat 4 and 5 and to market the resulting data. However,
although Congress has generally supported the subsidy, the Reagan Administration has proved reluctant
to complete the subsidy payments to EOSAT, believing that the private sector should shoulder a greater
share of the burden of providing the data. Neither the 1987 nor the 1488 proposed budgets contained fund-
ing for the subsidy.. EOSAT recently submitted a new proposal and a new budget to the Department of
Commerce, which calls for a cost increase of nearly $50 million. In addition, space transportation costs
will certainly be greater than earlier envisioned..
Some Members of Congress have expressed eorcern that the United States will lose its leadership in
remote sensing from space if the civilian program is allowed to die far lack of funding. However, as of
May 1, 1987, the issue of funding. for Landsat b and 7 had not been resolved. The lack of a U.S. civilian
system and the attendant value-added industry could seriously inhibit efforts by the U,S. media to make
serious use of data taken from space for newsgathering and analysis.
':For a mare detailed. account of the early steps taken to transfer the Landsat system, see L1,5.Corr.tgress, r~?A, Remote Sensing and the Private
Sector: Issues !or Discussiarry-A Terhrucat Memorandum. OTA-TM-ISM-2?(washington, t1~: U.S. Government Printing Of{ire. March Y984), FP. ~~.
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 EOSAT. Provided courtesy of EOSAT
New York City and Harbor, 1986. This image utilizes Thematic Mapper band 4 to differentiate
urban and rural features of the City and Harbor. The detail of the 30 meter sensor allows clear
definition of roadways, docks and ships in the Harbor, and the infrared illustrates parks and
grassy areas in brighter shades, as opposed to the dark areas of urban New York downtown.
panelists felt that neither of these conditions would
be repeated very often.18
Should the media decide that, even with their
limitations, SPOT and EOSAT data were still val-
uable, they might negotiate special agreements for
receiving raw data on a rapid basis and under-
take the expense of doing their own ground proc-
essing and interpretation. One panelist estimated
18It is useful to note that most of EOSAT's Thematic Mapper tapes
have never even been processed to image format. The rate of data
collection (100 scenes per day) far exceeds the rate of scene process-
ing (20 scenes per day).
EOSAT's future business plans do include improvements that
would allow a turn around time Erom acquisition to finished prod-
uct of only one week. Although this is a substantial improvement,
for most news stories, a delay of one week would probably be unac-
ceptable.
that a fully operational ground receiving and proc-
essingfacility might cost on the order of $10 mil-
lion to $15 million. Even if the media invested in
their own ground processing facilities, they would
still not have solved the problems caused by the
limited global coverage and resolution of current
satellites.
There was considerable disagreement at the
workshop regarding the press' ability to interpret
satellite imagery correctly. One panelist stated that
the media had done a poor job of covering Cher-
nobyl and contributed to the general hysteria by
announcing that two reactors were on fire instead
of one. The panelist argued that any competent
analyst looking at the images would have recog-
nized that:
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 EOSAT. Provided courtesy of EOSAT
Chernobyl, U.S.S.R., on Apr. 29, 1986. The first image collected by satellite of the nuclear reactor
is illustrated using band 7 of the Thematic Mapper. The reactor facility (circled) and surrounding
agricultural areas are clearly illustrated and defined, and the still-burning reactor can be identified
by a bright pixel-whose digital evaluation helped the United States determine the correct status
of the reactor during the incident. Evaluation of infrared and thermal imagery of the reactor
cooling pond also confirmed U.S.S.R. reports of plant shutdown and startup.
... nuclear powerplants must have cooling ponds
and effluents and no one looked at the imagery
to say, "where is the effluent for the second
reactor?"
Another panelist countered that it was one thing
to say that:
...any idiot knows that a nuclear reactor has
an effluent pond, but what makes the problem
hard is that you don't know which idiot to hire.
If you're going to do lots of stories about nuclear
reactors you hire people who know that nuclear
reactors have effluent ponds. If, on the other hand,
you are going to have a lot of stories about Forest
degradation you need to have people who know
a lot about forests.
It was clear from the workshop discussion that
if the media intend to use satellite imagery exten-
sivelythey must solve the interpretation problem.
This would mean either hiring photointerpreters
-much as they now hire meteorologists-or rely-
ing on outside contractors (the so-called "value-
added" industry) to turn the raw satellite data into
newsworthy information. At present, the value-
added industry is small and, like the commercial
remote sensing companies, is not organized to re-
spond to the needs of the news media. But, as one
panelist pointed out, a news organization's most
important asset is its credibility. Most panelists
thought that the industry would be able to solve
the interpretation problem once it had more ex-
perience with the technology.
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Assuming the media could arrange to receive
most data in a timely fashion and arrange for their
interpretation, it might still be difficult to get as-
sured access to politically sensitive data. Govern-
ment support and control of the two existing com-
mercial systems and the operational independence
of the foreign ground stations create at least the
possibility that governments could, on occasion,
prevent politically sensitive data from reaching
the media.
Both EOSAT and SPOT rely on foreign ground
stations to collect data when the satellite cannot
communicate with earth stations in the United
States or France: The owners of the Earth stations
pay an annual fee which allows them to collect
the data from their region and sell it. The Earth
station owners pay royalties on sales of the re-
gional data. In the case of the Landsat Earth sta-
tions, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
is between the U.S. Government (with NOAA [the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion] as the U.S. representative) and the foreign
government. Under the U.S. MOUs, foreign ground
stations are supposed to provide nondiscrimina-
tory access to all purchasers. In practice, how-
ever, the ground stations can refuse to sell data,
delay the shipment of data, or deny that data even
exist.19 The only recourse after a ground station's
refusal to honor the "nondiscriminatory access"
clause of their contract is for the U.S. Govern-
ment to terminate service to that ground station.
This would mean a loss of the annual fee ($600,000
in the case of the U.S. MOUs) and, given the un-
reliability of on-board tape recorders and the uri-
certain status of NASA's Tracking and Data Re-
lay Satellite System (TDRSS),20 the potential loss
of a great deal of data.
All of these problems notwithstanding, perhaps
the biggest difficulty the media have with current
systems is their limited resolution: Neither EOSAT
"When a buyer asks EOSAT for data that were collected by a
foreign ground station, EOSAT must request that the foreign ground
station sell EOSAT those data. One panelist pointed out that cer-
taincountries were notorious for refusing to release data. For exam-
ple, the panelist said that it was very difficult to purchase data from
India, particularly if they contained scenes of the India/Pakistan
border.
20It is important to note that, as a result of the cost, complexity,
and limited access to TDRSS, EOSAT does not have plans to in-
clude TDRSS communication packages on its next two satellites.
nor SPOT has plans to provide the very high reso-
lution sought by the news media. Several panelists
pointed out that focusing on high resolution was,
in some respects, misleading-the question is not
what is the best technology the media can buy,
but rather, what does the media need? If the me-
dia'sprimary use of satellites is to show a typhoon
in Bangladesh, a volcano in Hawaii, or an oilspill
off the coast of England, then there is no reason
to incur the costs associated with very high reso-
lution. If, on the other hand, the media wish to
count tanks in East Germany or show the effects
of street rioting in South Africa, then the news
media would probably want the highest resolu-
tion they could afford.zl
Other panelists suggested that the media had
yet to make innovative use of the available low-
resolutionimagery. "Spatial resolution is only part
of the game," cautioned one panelist, "We are only
beginning to understand spectral [see box C] differ-
ences." Because different objects reflect light differ-
ently, certain objects are identifiable even though
they are smaller than the spatial resolution of the
sensor. For example, a road or a river might be
less than 10 meters wide and yet still appear on
an image of 30 meter resolution if the road or river
reflected light in a substantially different manner
than the surrounding area. One panelist recalled:
When we looked at the high spatial resolution
data from Chernobyl it was hard to tell how
many reactors were damaged, but on the spec-
tral data the fact that one reactor was burning
popped out immediately.
Another panelist cautioned that, although spec-
tral differences were important, when EOSAT
brought back images of China, the Great Wall was
not visible in certain spectral bands because the
Wall was made from, and therefore reflected light
in the same wavelength as, the surrounding rock.
Panelists agreed that each system has its own spe-
cific strengths and limitations, and that to date,
the media had not used the available images crea-
tively.
21It is interesting to note that of all the remote sensing images used
in Aviation Week and Space Technology-including many mages
of the Soviet Union and of Soviet technology-the images that gen-
erated the most sustained interest were those of the Mount St. He-
lensexplosion. Several panelists predicted that the media would find
a large demand for satellite images of major natural events.
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Implement Mediasat Concept
If the media should decide that satellite imagery
was very valuable, bu(: that the operating proce-
dures of the current commercial systems were too
rigid or that access tohigh-quality data could not
be assured, then the media might be driven to de-
velop their own system. The exact nature of this
system would be the product of two important
considerations. First, the media would have to de-
cide on the appropriate level of technology, which
would include, but not be limited to, a choice of
the resolution of the sensors to be used (e.g., 5
meter, 3 meter, etc.) Second, the media would have
to decide how much they could afford. These two
considerations are very closely related.
If a mediasat is to become a reality, the news
media must be able to assess the value of both
current satellite images and successive technical
improvements. As a result of the media's inex-
perienceusing satellite imagery, the uncertainties
regarding the present market for data, and the lack
of credible cost estimates for high-resolution im-
agery, deciding how good is "good enough" is a
difficult task. During the workshop, several par-
ticipants suggested that 5 meter resolution might
meet the needs of the news media. Yet, when one
panelist illustrated the effect of increased resolu-
tion by showing 10 meter and 5 meter images of
Washington, D.C., several panelists were notice-
ably unimpressed. "You say that 5 meter resolu-
tion will produce good pictures," commented one
participant, "I still say it's a source story [see box
E]. You show that picture and you will have peo-
ple saying: 'What is this? You're telling me this
is Washington? It looked to me like New York.' "
Another panelist, familiar with satellite imagery
countered that, "You ought to take a look at this
under a magnifying glass. There is a great deal
more information in this 5 m picture than in the
10 m picture." This interaction highlighted, one
of the basic dilemmas facing the news media-
how to assess the value of increased information
when that information can be transmitted to the
consumer only imperfectly.22
zzFollowing the workshop, OTA received a letter from Earl S.
Merrit, Vice President of EarthSat, a corporation specializing in the
"value-added" business of imagery processing. The letter, which called
into question the value of even very high resolution imagery, stated:
[Tjhe satellite-acquired information will always be "source" material
even if the resolution was 1 meter due to [the need for expert interpre-
If cost were not a consideration, the media might
want the highest resolution pictures they could
get, but costs rise dramatically as resolution in-
creases. This results, in part, from the fact that
the data rate23 rises as the inverse square of the
resolution. This means that, assuming the satel-
lite is covering the same area, as resolution im-
proves from 10 meters to 5 meters, the amount
of data that must be collected, transmitted, and
processed increases by a factor of 4. Similarly,
improving the resolution to 2.5 meters would in-
crease the origina110 meter data rate by a factor
of 16. This led some panelists to conclude that
data rate could influence the ground segment costs
for the mediasat system more than any other
single element.24
Panelists cautioned that although increased data
rate was a "problem," it was possible to identify
some potential solutions. Data rate, it was argued,
could be greatly diminished by using the satellites
to take pictures of specific, pre-identified events
(e.g., an oil tanker beached on the California coast,
a hijacked airplane sitting on the tarmac in Tripoli),
rather than taking pictures of the entire Earth and
then sifting through the raw data in the hopes of
finding "news." In addition, data compression
techniques could be used to greatly diminish the
data flow problem.25
Cation]. This fact would seem to provide a "damper" on the network
use of such source material since the number of "experts" in interpre-
tation is limited. Thus, I see the networks eventually using the "source"
to highlight a story but not to provide the bottom line ... human-
intelligence gathering "journalism" will continue to dominate news
gathering.
2JData rate refers to the flow of information about the picture
"seen" by the satellite's sensor. At higher resolutions the pictures
are more detailed and therefore contain more information. In order
to transmit more information about the same scene in the same time
period, the data rate must increase.
2?EOSAT's 30 meter TM sensor has a data rate of 85 million bits
per second (MBPS). The data rate fora 5 meter mediasat with the
same swath width would be 3,060 MBPS. By narrowing the swath
width (therby reducing the coverage) and using data compression
techniques, the data rate could be reduced to the 100 to 150 Mbps
range. Even this much reduced data rate would require more so-
phisticated data systems in both the sensor and the satellite than
we now possess.
zsData compression is a process that reduces greatly the amount
of data which must be transmitted from the spacecraft to the ground
station. Although there are many data compression techniques, most
operate by reducing or eliminating the redundanty that is inherent
in raw data. Where the quality of the resulting image is to be judged
by subjective criterion such as visual appearance-as may be the
case with media images-the transmitted data need only be suffi-
cient to construct a facsimile of the orginal data. Under these
circumstances-and depending on the amount of redundancy in the
data-compression ratios of more than a factor of 2 could be achieved.
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 CNES. Provided courtesy of SPOT Image Corp., Reston, VA
Baltimore city and Baltimore harbor. Ten meter panchromatic image taken by the SPOT satellite.
Increased data flow was not the only problem
identified by the panelists. One technical expert
noted that while a 5 meter sensor could be flown
on a "host" satellite or a relatively inexpensive sat-
ellitebus, at very high resolutions, spacecraft sta-
bilitybecomes aproblem. Therefore, flying a sen-
sor of 3 meter resolution or better would require
amore sophisticated and much more expensive
satellite. The combined effect of increased data
rate, more complex and expensive sensor systems,
and more rigorous demands on the satellite bus,
could mean that even slight increases in resolu-
tion could have a dramatic effect on costs. One
panelist estimated that an entire mediasat system
(i.e., sensors, satellite, communication links,
ground processing and distribution) with a 5 me-
ter resolution might be obtained for as little as
$215 million for aone-satellite system. A com-
parable 1 meter system, on the other hand, might
require amulti-billion dollar investment. (See app.
A, table A-3, for alternative cost estimates.)
Throughout this discussion, panelists made clear
that cost, not the availability of advanced tech-
nology, was the limiting factor in achieving high-
resolution images. As one panelist put it, " 3 meters
is do-able, just bring your checkbook."
One panelist argued that, in light of the finan-
cial resources of the television networks, the cost
issue was being exaggerated. He pointed out that
ABC "paid $309 million just to buy the rights to
the '88 Olympics and will spend another $300 mil-
lion to produce it." Others felt that the value of
such comparisons is doubtful, because such large
expenditures are made only in light of a carefully
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 CNES. Provided courtesy of SPOT Image Corp., Reston, VA
Baltimore harbor area. Ten meter panchromatic image taken by the SPOT satellite.
calculated expectation that they will increase rev-
enues at least as much.
The hard question, then, is "what value would
satellite images add to current news stories?" or,
more to the point, "what additional news stories
and revenue could be generated by the use of sat-
ellite imagery?"Obviously, satellite images would
not be useful in all of any given day's news sto-
ries. Even assuming that ABC, CBS, NBC, and
CNN use one satellite image per evening every
day of the year, it is difficult to imagine how rev-
enues could be generated to offset the cost of a
$215 million to $470 million satellite system. If
all four major networks used 1 satellite image every
night, this would mean that about 1,500 images
would be used every year. If one assumes that a
mediasat would cost approximately $215 million
to $470 million to build and launch, and another
$50 million to $75 million to operate over a period
of 5 years ($10 million to $15 million per year),
then the average cost over the 5-year period would
be $53 million to $109 million per year. Putting
these admittedly speculative figures together, one
concludes that each satellite image would have to
be worth about $35,000 to $73,000 to the net-
works (see app. A for cost assumptions). Given
that the average network news story is produced
for less than $5,000, it is hard to imagine how the
networks could justify this additional expendi-
ture.zb
26Several panelists felt that OTA cost and demand projections were
too pessimistic. One panelist stated:
I particularly want to challenge the assertion that each network
would not use images every day. It reminds me only too well of the
similar statements made ... in the wake of the first Telstar feeds to
the United States from Europe and the confident predictions that there
was no possibility that such programming would ever become com-
monplacebecause the intercontinental link would always be too costly.
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There are ways that the news media might try
to reduce the cost of a mediasat system: they could
form aconsortium-either domestic or international
-to share the cost, they could resell data to other
users to subsidize their own use,27 or, they might
wait until technical advances reduce the cost of
sensors, satellites, and launch vehicles.28 At pres-
ent, it is unknown whether any of these measures,
or combinations of measures, would reduce the
cost of a mediasat to the point where it would be
economically viable today. Two points, should
however, be kept in mind: first, it is impossible
to estimate accurately the future demand for re-
motely sensed data; and second, simple calcula-
tions that compare the cost of a mediasat and po-
tential mediasat revenues could be misleading. It
is difficult to describe the value of a press "exclu-
sive," and, as banks have recently demonstrated
with their electronic teller machines, there is value
in providing new ser.vices.29
Some panelists expressed the view that inter-
estedgovernments should combine their resources
in an INTELSAT-like organization to ensure con-
tinued, cost-effective access to remote sensing data.
Inherent in this concept is the belief that a medi-
asat would not be economically viable even if
funded by a consortium of news agencies. In one
panelist's opinion:
The money received from Chernobyl would
fit in a thin wallet. When will there be another
such accident located in a place where we can-
notfly in with a good hand-held cameral An in-
ternationalgovernmental consortium is the best
way to ensure the continued availability of re-
mote sensing data. It could begin to form when
EOSAT and SPOT get tired of throwing money
at the problem, when Congress takes Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings seriously, and when someone
"It is significant to note that total remote sensing data sales be-
tween 1979 and 1984 only produced a little over $30 million. See:
"Landsat Data Users Notes," No. 35, March 1986, p.7.
2BMany of the technologies currently being investigated by the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (i.e., inexpensive launch
vehicles, satellites, and sensors) could make mediasat a reality.
390ne panelist, noting that the fortunes of the major networks
had been in decline recently, argued that a mediasat might be justi-
fied partly on the grounds that while a network might be able to
operate a mediasat, its affiliates could not do so on their own. There-
fore, anetwork might want to operate a mediasat because it could
hold the network together, thereby preserving other revenues.
sees other countries as a set of partners eager to
help share costs, and more importantly, help pro-
mote the use of [remote sensing] systems.
Finally, it should be noted that some experts
see "mediasat" as one aspect of a more profound
transition of the news networks from the status
of news providers to a much broader role in the
information industry. As one panelist noted:
It is my belief that the largest market for
medisat data will not be the news divisions but
rather the secondary markets. Media companies
will sell the interpreted data to buyers around
the world ...and will change their structure to
become huge value-added entities ...The me-
dia [will never] be able to spend the amounts of
money for a mediasat without aggressively open-
ing new markets around the world.
Should the networks undergo the radical trans-
formation foreseen by this panelist, the assump-
tions and conclusions of this technical memoran-
dum would have to be similarly modified. The
likelihood and prospects of such a transformation
are beyond the scope of this technical memoran-
dum. Box G and tables 2 and 3 provide informa-
tion on many of the possible uses for remotely
sensed data beyond newsgathering.
Table 2.-Remote Sensing Data Needs of Foreign and
Domestic Users
? Agriculture (Federal, State, and private): specific sampl-
ing areas chosen according to the crop; time-dependent
data related to crop calendars and the weather patterns
? Forestry (Federal, State, and private): specific sampling
areas; twice per year at preselected dates
? Geology and nonrenewable resources (Federal, State,
and private): wide variety of areas; seasonal data in ad-
dition to one-time sampling
? Civil engineering and land use (State and private): popu-
lated areas; repeat data required over scale of months
or years to determine trends of land use
? Cartography(Federal, State, and private): all areas; repeat
data as needed to update maps
? Coastal zone management (Federal and State): monitor-
ing of all coastlands at selected dates depending on lo-
cal seasons
? Pollution monitoring (Federal and State): broad, select-
ed areas; highly time-dependent needs both for routine
monitoring and in response to emergencies
? Newsgathering (private): selected areas; highly time?de-
pendent needs in response to fast breaking news stories
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
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Box G.~--Remote Sensing and the Public Interest
U,S. land and meteorological remote sensing systems have Pram the beginning been intended to serve
the public interest, whether primarily for research, as in the ease of the Landsat system, or for operational
weather forecasting and severe weather warning., as in the case of the meteorological satellite systems..
The Landsat system has demonstrated to a small but dedicated group of customers, both inside and
outside the government, that satellite data can be highly effective in meeting their resource information
needs.. Land remote sensing systems serve a wide variety of data users {table 2), most of whom require
satellite data of 10 to 100 meters resolution on time scales of weeks to months. However, the agricultural
community and those who monitor the courses of natural and manmade disasters have need for data on
a mare timely basis.
It is clear from examining table 3 that the public interests and those of the media are often synon-
ymous. Data from a mediasat could make an important contribution in warning of and assessing natural
and manmade disasters, as well as in managing disaster recovery..
The value-added industry has developed a number of techniques for converting data to information
that would serve the public good. Some of these would be of interest to the media:
? use of time lapse images to compare scenes over time;
? overlay of black and white imagery with spectral imagery to bring out features not visible in either;
? use of ground-based images to illustrate features close-up; and
? ? using stereo pairs to generate three-dimensional images from different perspectives,
As one expert on photointerpretation and remotely sensed imagery has pointed out:
..remote sensing. technology, properly applied, could. save countless lives and billions of dollars in property
damage each year. Few outside the military and intelligence [communities] are aware of this resource. Fewer
still know how to interpret that technology and even fewer know how and when to apply it. Yet it is the same
technology? with which the United States monitors SALT and the Middle East Truce Agreement, observes and
predicts crop yields in the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, Argentina, and India, and assesses damage caused
by such catastrophes as the Italian, Guatemalan, and Alaskan earthquakes.
... If existing multisensor imagery had been analyzed, the plight of 150,000,tM30 in Ethiopia. and. other African
countries could not only have been predicted, but actions taken before disaster struck.
Table 3.-Summary of Applications of Landsat Data in the Various Earth Resources Disciplines
Agriculture,
Oceanography
forestry, and
Land use and
and marine
range resources
mapping
Geology
Water resources
resources
Environment
Discrimination of
Classification of land
Recognition of rock
Determination of
Detection of living
Monitoring surtace
vegetative types:
uses
types
water boundaries
marine organisms
mining and
Crop types
Cartographic mapping
Mapping of major ge?
and surtace water
Determination of fur-
reclamation
Timber types
and map updating
ologic units
area and volume
bidity patterns and
Mapping and
Range vegetation
Categorization of land
Revising geologic
Mapping of floods
circulation
monitoring of
Measurement of crop
capability
maps
and flow plains
Mapping shoreline
water pollution
acreage by species
Separation of urban
Delineation of uncon-
Determination of aerial
changes
Detection of air
Determination of
and rural
solidated rack and
extent of show and
Mapping of shoals
pollution and
range readiness
categories
soils
snow boundaries
and shallow areas
its effects
and biomass
Regional planning
Mapping igneous in-
Measurement of gla-
Mapping of ice for
Determination of
Determination of
Mapping of transpor-
trusions
cial features
shipping
effects of
vegetation vigor
lotion networks
Mapping recent vol-
Measurement of sedi-
Study of eddies and
natural dis-
Determination of
Mapping of land-
conic surtace
ment and turbidity
waves
asters
vegetation stress
water boundaries
deposits
patterns
Monitoring en-
Determination of soil
Mapping of wetlands
Mapping land forms
Determination of
vironmental ef-
condltions
Search for surtace
water depth
facts of man's
Determination of soil
guides to minerali-
Delineation of irrigat-
activities (lake
associations
zation
ed fields
autrophication,
Assessment of grass
Determination of
Inventory of lakes
defoliation,
and forest fire
regional structures
etc.)
damage
Mapping linears
(fractures)
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 EOSAT. Provided courtesy of EOSAT
Portion of Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper image showing Augustine Volcano, Alaska during eruption on Mar. 27, 1986. Band 4,
in the near infrared, clearly defines snow/cloud area from surrounding vegetation and terrain, with 30 meter ground resolution.
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 EOSAT. Provided courtesy o/ EOSAT
The 120 meter thermal band on the Thematic Mapper displays the hot flow at the north end
of the Augustine Volcano through the smoke and cloud cover. By combining the spectral bands
of the Thematic Mapper, the clarity of 30 meter resolution
is complemented by thermal information.
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NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
So far, this paper has examined the desirability
and feasibility of a mediasat from the perspective
of the press. It is also important to examine the
U.S. Government's interests, attitudes, and con-
cerns regarding this concept. The remainder of this
technical memorandum will focus primarily on
the tensions that are certain to develop between
this Nation's commitment to freedom of the press
and its commitments to current national security
and foreign policies. As one author framed the
problem:
In a robustly pluralist society such as ours, free
speech is easy to accept and to enjoy, and in a
hostile, potentially lethal international environ-
ment such as the one in which we live, national
security seems a fundamentally worthwhile pur-
suit. The difficulty lies in making tradeoffs.30
In the preceding discussion, this technical memo-
randum concluded that, in the near-term, the high
cost of gathering and processing satellite imagery
would inhibit the news media's attempts to estab-
lish amediasat. Nonetheless, in the long run, the
media are likely to continue using satellite imagery
and gain access to increasingly sophisticated re-
motesensing technology. Accepting this fact, the
United States will eventually have to balance the
guarantees of free speech and the need for national
security with respect to media use of remotely
sensed data from spacecraft.
National Security Concerns
Experts generally agree that the media's exten-
sive use of high-resolution satellite imagery for
newsgathering could complicate certain U.S. na-
tional security activities and certain U.S. foreign
policies. They also agree that this Nation's strong
and unwavering commitment to the principle of
freedom of the press has served it well. The task,
therefore, is to balance these two fundamental con-
cerns. As the following discussion illustrates, the
arguments on both sides of this issue are strong
and clear choices are few.
Participants identified and discussed five sets
of national security and foreign policy concerns
during the workshop.
30Paul B. Stephens, The First Amendment and National Security,
Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia, vol.
1:2, May 1984, p. 1.
1. Dissemination of Information Concerning
U.S. Military Operations
Some panelists expressed the concern that, with-
out adequate oversight of a mediasat, the media
might disclose information concerning U.S. mili-
tary operations under circumstances that could
result in casualties and/or frustrate U.S. objec-
tives. The disclosure by the media of information
concerning U.S. troop movements, shipments of
materiel, or the location or heading of ships and
cargo planes could deprive U.S. troops of the ele-
ment of surprise-a critical tactical advantage in
fast-paced, modern warfare.
The most common media response to such alle-
gations is that, although a mediasat could pro-
vide asubstantial new source of data, the media's
extensive contacts and information sources within
the United States and around the world already
provide the press with real-time information con-
cerning fast-breaking news stories. "The system
leaks like crazy anyway," asserted one panelist,
"I find it hard to get excited over the incremental
damage that a mediasat could do."The media are
also quick to assert that their past record is a good
one. Where lives were at stake or serious national
security issues in question, they argue that the news
media have acted responsibly, often refusing to
release information that would seriously prejudice
national security.31
One media representative said that in 1986, his
network's correspondent was flying in a chartered
airplane and saw the U.S. fleet turn south towards
Libya hours before the United States' retaliatory
bombing. Although this information was radioed
to the network affiliate in Rome and then passed
back to the United States:
We did not go on the air with it because we
realized that specific lives were in jeopardy .. .
"Although the workshop participants generally accepted the prop-
osition that the news media acts responsibly, a minority of experts
and media pundits have argued the opposite. For example, analysts
at Accuracy in Media, Inc. (AIM), have argued generally that the
media's "policy of publishing sensitive information ...may jeop-
ardize the lives of innocent people." (See: "AIM Report," July-A,
1985, No. XIV-13, p.1) The media have been criticized for speculat-
ingabout sensitive programs such as the launches of classified DOD
payloads on the Space Shuttle. More recently, the media were criti-
cizedbecause some felt that they were putting the lives of the Beirut
hostages in danger by speculating on the nature of U.S. efforts to
free them.
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It is our policy that when there is a specific issue
of life or death we will not broadcast that infor-
mation.
Another panelist commented that although the
network's restraint in the Libyan incident was com-
mendable:
I assume you don't have Fancy cryptographic
communication equipment; therefore, you gave
Libya the message when you radioed it from the
airplane to the ground station.
This comment identifies two important problems:
1. the media have only a limited ability to pro-
tect sensitive information even if they desire
to do so; and
2. the national security community may have
to rely on the press' restraint to withhold in-
formation that once was under the control
of the national security community.
Some media experts argue that a "newsgather-
ing" satellite would work to the advantage of the
United States by providing additional reconnais-
sance capability. It would be more difficult for
nations to cheat on treaties or hide hostile activi-
ties if faced with frequent overflights by both
media- and government-owned satellites.
friendly foreign governments might retaliate by
expelling diplomats or closing valuable U.S. mil-
itarybases should the press reveal information that
embarrassed or threatened the national security
of those nations. Governments already hostile to
the United States could resort to terrorism or di-
rect armed aggression.33
Some panelists felt that this was neither a sig-
nificantnor anovel issue, and that although coun-
tries might initially complain, eventually they
would accept a mediasat as they now accept
EOSAT and SPOT.39 The Soviets, one panelist
noted, had complained bitterly through diplomatic
channels when the magazine Aviation Week and
Space Technology first ran pictures of its launch
facilities at Tyuratam, but over the years their
complaints gradually ceased.35 Other panelists
took an uncompromising view of threats of for-
eign retaliation. They maintained that this issue
was one that should now and always be non-
negotiable by the U.S. Government as it lies at
the heart of the principle of freedom of the press.
One panelist commented hotly:
When the Soviets or other countries call and
say, "why aren't you stopping that story on the
evening news," you say, "we can't, and that's the
difference between our country and yours."
2. Retaliation by Foreign Governments for
Media Disclosures
Recent world events have demonstrated the
strange symbiotic relationship that exists between
the U.S. Government and the U.S. news media.
The taking of media hostages in Beirut and the
arrest and detention of Nicholas Daniloff in
Moscow are just two examples of the willingness
of certain foreign governments to use the U. S. me-
dia as pawns in their struggle with the U.S. Gov-
ernment. Mediasat raises the opposite concern-
that the U.S. Government might be held respon-
sible for the actions of the news media.32 Some
workshop participants expressed the concern that
32The U.S. Government accepted legal responsibility for the ac-
tions of its citizens in space in the Outer Space Treaty (18 U.S.T.
2410; T.I.A.S. 6347). Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty states:
States ...shall bear international responsibility for national activ-
ities in outer space ...whether such activities are carried on by gov-
ernmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assur-
ing that national activities aze carried out in conformity with ... (this)
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space .. .
shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appro-
priate State party to the Treaty.
3. Loss of Control During a Crisis
Advances in transportation and communication
technologies have made the world smaller and re-
duced the time available to leaders to make deci-
sions. Although far from perfect, the communi-
"One panelist pointed out that some nations already have, and
others may eventually have, the capability to destroy or incapaci-
tate satellites of the types likely to have commercial value.
"For many years after the U.S. Landsat program began, many
developing countries claimed that a state should not be "sensed"
without its prior consent. It is significant to note that the Arinciples
Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth From Space (A/RES/41/65,
Jan. 22, 1987), recently published by the United Nations, omits any
reference to prior consent. This is at least some indication that as
nations become more familiar with this technology and as the tech-
nology becomes more widely available, countries will cease to re-
gard it with suspicion.
"The initial Soviet complaints resulted in part because this was
the first publication of such images and, in part, because of the tim-
ing of the release. The pictures appeared immediately before the 1975
Apollo-Soyuz U.S./Soviet link-up in space and may have been
regarded by the Soviets as a violation of the "spirit of cooperation"
which both governments were trying to project to the world. One
panelist noted, however, that the Soviet's ability to disable satel-
lites was far less in 1975 than it is today.
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Photo credit: Copyright ?1987 C.NES. Provided courtesy o1 SPOT Image Corp., Reston, VA
Soviet nuclear testing facility, Semipalatinsk, U.S.S.R. Visible are cable scars and access roads
connecting with drill holes. Ten meter panchromatic image taken by the French SPOT satellite.
cation and information assets available to world
leaders have allowed them to stay just ahead of
breaking events. This small grace period has given
leaders time to plan and confer with.advisors be-
fore being forced to make critical decisions that
could lead to confrontation or conflict. As medi-
asats become more capable, some fear that this
"grace period" could be reduced to zero and that
world leaders would be forced to respond to press
reports on which they had little or no informa-
tion. One analyst noted that President Kennedy
had 6 days to formulate a response to the discov-
ery that Soviet missile sites were being built in
Cuba. How might the President have handled this
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crisis had he been forced by media disclosures to
respond to Congress, the press, and the Amer-
ican people within the first few hours?
During the workshop, participants put forward
two responses to this issue. The first was similar
to the response to the issue of dissemination of
military information; that is, that a mediasat
would provide only an incremental increase over
current capabilities. The sophisticated communi-
cation equipment now employed by the media al-
readyforces world leaders to respond in real-time
to breaking news. Second, no matter how ad-
vanced the media's assets were, they could never
rival the sophistication and timeliness of the en-
tire intelligence apparatus currently available to
the superpowers, of which satellites are only a
small part.
4. Providing Valuable Intelligence
to Third Parties
The United States and the Soviet Union still hold
a virtual monopoly on sophisticated, global recon-
naissance data. These data are, for the most part,
jealously guarded, although in certain circum-
stances discrete portions of these data have been
released to aid allies or confound adversaries.
Some panelists expressed concern that mediasat
activities, by making satellite images more gener-
ally available, would erode this important U.S.
advantage. Workshop participants were unable
to reach consensus on either the dangers posed
by this potential erosion or the nature of the sup-
posed advantages now enjoyed.
The issue seems to turn on the judgment that:
1) there exists a sizable set of issues about which
the United States and the Soviet Union would have
a common interest in withholding or controlling
the flow of information, and 2) the fact that So-
viet reconnaissance systems could detect some-
thing does not necessarily mean that they have
detected it. Some panelists simply discounted the
importance of the first concern, stating that, "the
situations where the United States wants to con-
ceal something from a third country that the
Soviets wouldn't cooperate with would be few and
far between." In response to the second concern,
certain panelists noted that the likelihood that
commercial news gathering satellites would find
out things that the Soviets didn't already know
was, "conceivable but extremely unlikely."
5. Dangers of Media Misinterpretation of Data
The previous section has already discussed the
problems that the media have had in interpreting
the satellite imagery they have already obtained.
Some panelists expressed fears that inaccurate
reporting-caused primarily by the strong pres-
sure to "break the news"-could precipitate a cri-
sis. For example, one expert recently wrote that:
[S]everal networks showed SPOT photographs
of the Soviet nuclear proving grounds at Semi-
palatinsk and claimed that the Soviets were pre-
paring to resume nuclear testing. They showed
photos of what was described as a "drill site."
Looking at the photo, any competent imagery
analyst would have pointed out that the arrange-
ment and the cable scars terminating at the site
would have proved that it was not a drill site but
rather an instrumentation site, common to all nu-
clear proving grounds.'?
It is conceivable that similar media misinterpre-
tations on more serious issues such as troop move-
ments or arms control violations could seriously
disrupt international affairs. Some media experts
discount this concern, arguing: first, that as the
media continue to use satellite data they will grow
more sophisticated and become less prone to er-
ror; and second, the common practice of verifying
major stories with multiple sources of informa-
tion should reduce the likelihood of misinterpre-
tation.
One panelist felt that the media should be forced
to use a common pool of qualified analysts to en-
sure that image misinterpretation was kept to a
bare minimum. Most panelists strongly disagreed
with this suggestion, claiming that:
It's part of the process of free speech to permit
and encourage diverse interpretation. Attempts
to limit interpretation will have a direct impact
on the American people's ability to get informa-
tion and make their own judgments.
'"D.A. Brugioni, Satellite Images on TV: The Camera Can Lie,
Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1986, p. Hl, col. 1.
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The Effect of Foreign Remote Sensing
Systems on U.S. Policies
Within a decade, many nations will have their
own remote sensing systems. The U.S. Govern-
ment cannot effectively limit or control media ac-
cess to satellite imagery if foreign governments
do not exercise similar controls. At present, the
only non-U.S. commercial remote sensing system
is France's SPOT. However, research-oriented re-
mote sensing systems are currently under devel-
opment by Canada, China, the European Space
Agency, India, and Japan. Japan launched its first
Marine Observation Satellite (MOS I) in Febru-
ary 1987. In addition, instruments flown on the
shuttle and on the proposed international space
station and its related polar platforms will supply
another source of high-quality data with poten-
tial media application. All these systems, even
those not considered "commercial," add to the pool
of data available for exploitation by the media.
The almost assured proliferation of sophisti-
cated remote sensing systems has caused many
analysts to question the practicality-except for
minimal launch vehicle and payload licensing37-
of attempting to regulate the media's use of satel-
lites to gather news. The most obvious means for
controlling a mediasat organization would be to:
1) allow the launch of only certain types of satel-
lites (e.g., limit the type and resolution of sen-
sors); 2) control what the satellite takes pictures
of in orbit; and/or 3) limit the flow of data from
the satellite to the end user. Disregarding for the
moment the constitutionality ofany ofthese pro-
posals, U.S. laws attempting to accomplish one
or more of these tasks would not be applicable
"Both the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984
[15 U.S.C. 4201-4292] and The Commerical Space Launch Act [49
U.S.C. 2601-2623] require licensing for private systems operated
within the United States.
to foreign systems. As a result, U.S. news agen-
cies could purchase data from, or invest in, for-
eign remote sensing systems. In the opinion of
some panelists, the only effect of U.S. limitations
would be to stifle a domestic mediasat industry.
Others argue that foreign remote sensing sys-
tems-either as a result of high costs, less sophis-
ticated technology, foreign government policies,
or a simple lack of need for high-resolution images
-may have only limited capabilities.38 Therefore,
with minimum international coordination, U.S.
policies could substantially delay the time when
the media would have access to very high-resolu-
tionsatellite images. The U. S. Government might
attempt to negotiate agreements39 with other coun-
tries regarding sensor resolution or data dissemi-
nation. Such agreements would certainly be op-
posed by the news media and, given the U.S.
commitment to both the freedom of the press and
the "open skies" policy,40 it is not certain how much
support such agreements would find in either Con-
gress or the executive branch.
38The option of a satellite owned by a U.S. entity but launched
under a foreign "flag of convenience," to evade U.S. Government
regulation appears to be foreclosed by the recent 7 national agree-
ment not to export rockets that could serve as long-range missiles-
and therefore also rockets capable of launching satellites into polar
orbits. See John H. Cushman, Jr., "7 Nations Agree to Limit Ex-
port of Big Rockets," The New York Times, Apr. 17, 1987, p. 1.
39Such an "agreement" could be a fonmal treaty or a more flexible
set of gentlemen's agreements concerning topics such as sensor reso-
lution or data distribution. COCOM is a current example of such
an informal agreement. COCOM coordinates the export control re-
gimes of the member nations but COCOM agreements have no le-
gal standing in any of its member nations.
dOTo reduce tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union, President Eisenhower in 1956 suggested to the Soviets that
each country should allow the other to overfly its territory on a
regular basis. Although the Soviets rejected this suggestion as a trans-
parent espionage device, the United States' continued commitment
to the principle of "open skies" allowed it to support its later asser-
tion that spaceborne reconnaissance was a peaceful activity. See:
Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1985), p. 127.
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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law ...abridging the freedom .. .
of the press." Since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed
the depth and breadth of its commitment to these
few powerful words, even when confronted with
serious national security concerns. Although it
would be possible to write a treatise on the legal
issues that a mediasat could generate, this paper
is concerned with merely outlining the issues re-
lated to two narrowly drawn questions:
1. Are there restrictions that the government
could impose in the interests of national secu-
rity that would pass constitutional muster?
2. Is the licensing scheme established in the 1984
Remote Sensing Act a reasonable exercise of
U.S. domestic and international responsibil-
ities and is it consistent with the first
amendment?
Mediasat Restrictions and
the First Amendment41
Before one can assess the constitutionality of
mediasat restrictions, it is important to consider
the legal status of newsgathering. In Branzburg
v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that news-
gathering qualifies for some first amendment pro-
tection, because "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated."'Z But, the Court in Branzburg did
not say-and has never said-that newsgather-
ing is due the same degree of protection afforded
traditional speaking and publishing activities. In-
deed, the Court has upheld restrictions on news-
gathering where reporters sought access to gov-
ernment facilities or government information not
generally available to the public.93 The degree of
protection ultimately granted to news gathering
activities will determine which restrictions the U.S.
"This paper discusses only the first amendment issues raised by
a mediasat. Media owned satellites would, of course, be subject to
all the domestic laws and regulations (e.g., Federal Communication
Commission regulations, Space Launch Act of 1984) that would ap-
ply to other satellites. In addition, treaties that have been signed
and ratified, such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Lia-
bility Convention, are legally binding on private sector activities.
'=408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
63See: Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817 (1974), and Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
Government could properly place on a mediasat.
Unfortunately, until the Supreme Court has oc-
casion to rule on this specific issue, it will not be
settled decisively.
As noted above, should the U.S. Government
desire to inhibit amedia-owned satellite from
gathering potentially sensitive information it
could-either permanently or during acrisis-
attempt to limit: 1) the resolution of the satellites
sensors, 2) the images that the satellite is allowed
to collect, or 3) the images the media may dis-
seminate. Ifnews gathering is granted the highest
degree of first amendment protection, all such re-
strictions might well be regarded as impermissi-
ble "prior restraints" on free speech. The doctrine
of "prior restraint" holds that advance limitations
on protected speech may not be "predicated on
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences
may result."" Prior restraints are allowable only
if necessary to prevent "direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."'s
If newsgathering is given full first amendment pro-
tection by the Supreme Court, U.S. Government
restrictions would have to meet the strict tests re-
quired of allowable "prior restraints." CM the other
hand, should the Court decide that news gather-
ing was deserving of some lesser degree of pro-
tection, the government would have considera-
bly more latitude to limit mediasat activities.
But even if the government could not meet the
strict "prior restraints" test, it could still enforce
post-publication sanctions.96 Federal espionage
laws prohibit gathering or transmitting defense
information, photographing defense installations,
publishing or selling photographs of defense in-
stallations and the disclosure of classified infor-
??Justice Brennan concurring in, New York Times Co. v. United
States (The "Pentagon Papers" case), 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971). The
ruling in New York Times was a brief per curium decision, but each
Justice elaborated on his views in a separate concurring or dissent-
ing opinion. See also: Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
65Justices Stewart and White, concurring, New York Times Co.
v. United States, Id.; To date, the only case which upheld a prior
restraint in this context is a 1979 decision by a U.S. District Court,
United States v. The Progressive, Inc. (467F.Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.)).
In that case the court issued an injunction against a magazine that
was planning to publish a detailed description of hydrogen bomb
technology.
'?Although they do not involve issues of "prior restraint," post-
publicationsanctions must still be consistent with the first amendment.
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motion."' Should the media violate any of these
laws by disseminating satellite images, the gov-
ernment could-subject to the limitations of the
first amendment-prosecute those responsible.48
If the media do not own the satellite system,
but rather rely on a commercial company such
as EOSAT to provide it with data, it would be
less clear whether the media could successfully ar-
gue that licensing restrictions violate their first
amendment rights. Should the U.S. Government
ask EOSAT to stop distributing raw data for a
few days during a crisis and EOSAT agreed, the
news media might have a case against EOSAT for
breach of contract, but its case against the U.S.
Government for infringing its first amendment
rights would be less clear.
If the media were buying their data from a for-
eign satellite system and the foreign government
decided, for political or national security reasons,
to halt or delay delivery of the data, the media
would have no constitutional protections. They
might, of course, be able to proceed with a breach
of contract action.
The 1984 Landsat Act
Under current international 1aw49 and in con-
sideration of valid concerns about the national
security50 and the public welfare,sl there seems lit-
?'18 U.S.C. 792 to 799.
68Most of these statutes require that the person taking the proscribed
action have "reason to believe" it would have a harmful impact.
This would raise a number of difficult issues. For example, would
it be a violation to include accidently a defense installation in a ser-
ies of satellite photographs, or to include information that was not
visible to the media but which was visible to a foreign power using
sophisticated processing techniques?
'9Outer Space Treaty, Article VI, Supra, Note 32; Some authors
have suggested that a state's responsibilities under article VI are ex-
tensive:
(W)hile no one would doubt the need for government control over
space activity at its present stage, ...Article VI would prohibit, as
a matter of treaty obligation, strictly private, unregulated activity
in space or on celestial bodies even at a time when such private activ-
irybecomes most commonplace. Although the terms "authorization"
and "continuing supervision" are open to different interpretations,
it would appear that Article VI requires a certain minimum of licens-
ing and enforced adherence togovernment-imposed regulations. Man-
ual of Space Law, Jasentuliyana and Lee (eds.) (Oceans Publishing,
1979), vol. 1, p. 17.
eoA rocket that can put a payload into polar orbit can also deliver
a warhead to any point on the Earth. As with other technologies
on the Munitions Control List, the government has a valid interest
in closely monitoring foreign access to this technology.
51Launch vehicles and payloads present a potentially extreme safety
hazard to the citizens of this and other countries. In addition to cur-
tle doubt that the U.S. Government has the right,
and indeed, the duty, to exercise its supervision
over the space ventures of its citizens. In light of
these serious concerns, some form of licensing and
regulation is required. The question, then, is
whether the specific licensing system requirement
in the 1984 Landsat Act is a proper exercise of gov-
ernment authority.
Among its other provisions, the Landsat Act
requires those seeking an operating license to
"operate the system in such manner as to preserve
rent international law, common sense would dictate that the U.S.
Government should play some role in ensuring that launch activi-
ties and payload do not cause injury.
Box H.--Mediasat and Personal. Frivacy
The media's rights under the first amendment
are not the only rights that a mediasat would call
into question. , As remote sensing satellites be-
come more sophisticated, it is possible that the
average person's expectation of privacy could be
eroded. Satellites are currently capable of spot-
ting certain. crimes, such as environmental pot-
lotion. Eventually, satellites may be able to
perform other law enforcement functions such
as identifying and. locating. marijuana fields. In
the fax future, satellites may be able to monitor
the activities of individuals.
Under current law, a person is protected against
publicity given to facts of his or her private life.
Although. this ?right of privacy" is sometimes
hard to define in specific terms, it seems clear that
its protections are reduced when a person ap-
pears in public. * Mediasat could alter the cur-
xent understanding. of what the law regards as
"appearing in public." Recently, in California v.
Craola the Supreme Court decided that aerial
reconnaissance was an acceptable law enforce-
ment technique and that activities taking place
in the defendant's back yard were in "plain view"
even though they were surrounded by a 1p ft.
high fence.** Applying Ciraolo's logic broadly,
one could argue that. citizens have no right of
privacy for any activity that might be seen from
an airplane or by a satellite. * * *
*I. Hanson, Libel sad Related Torts, sec. 266 (1969).
**166 S.Gt. 1809 (1986).
* * *Ciraolo was a criminal law case involving a warrantless search.
The case's reasoning may not be relevant to civil suits involving n-
vasion of privacy.
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and promote the national security of the United
States."52 Some attorneys' have argued that the
licensing provision of the Landsat Act should be
declared invalid because these provisions are nei-
ther "susceptible of objective measurement,"54 nor
drafted with the "narrow specificity,"55 required
of statutes affecting first amendment interests.
Given both the government's valid national
security interest in regulating the use of launch
vehicles and payloads, and the necessarily chang-
ing nature of national security concerns, it is dif-
sz15 U.S.C. 4242(b)(1).
53See: Robert J. Aamoth, "From Landsat to Mediasat,"American
Enterprise, the Law, and the Commercial Uses of Space (Washing-
ton, DC: National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1985), vol.
II, p. 1.
51Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
SSHynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976J.
ficult to assess how courts might respond to this
argument. The references to national security in
the 1984 Remote Sensing Act are certainly very
general. However, a court might choose instead
to focus on the specific facts of each case or on
past Government actions in granting or denying
licenses. The court could also decide that the reg-
ulations supporting the statute are sufficiently spe-
cific tosupply both the necessary "objective meas-
urement" and "narrow specificity."
Should a court decide that the licensing provi-
sions of the act were not invalid on their face, then
the news media might still argue that the govern-
ment's use of license denials or license-imposed
system limitations was unconstitutional. As dis-
cussedabove, the freedom the government would
have to impose restrictions would be directly re-
lated to the court's final determination of the con-
stitutional status of news gathering activities.
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Appendix A
The Technology of
Newsgathering From Space'
Stillman C. Chase, Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center; and
Matthew Willard, Earth Observation Satellite Co.
Introduction
Remote sensing of the Earth from space began in
1960 with the launch of the first TIROS weather sat-
ellite. The U.S. environmental satellite program has
since expanded to provide low-resolution, broad-scale
data from both low-Earth polar orbits and from geo-
synchronous orbit. These data have been widely used
by the media for more than two decades to illustrate
the form and motion of large-scale weather patterns.
Higher resolution multispectral images of the Earth
from space first became available to the civilian user
in 1972, when NASA launched the first Landsat satel-
lite into anear-polar orbit.z That spacecraft carried
a sensor called a multispectral scanner (MSS), which
produced experimental data in four spectral bands that
could be used to aid cartography; agricultural inven-
tories; mineral, oil, and gas exploration; and land-use
planning. The media have found these images of little
interest primarily because the data provide a spatial
resolution of only 80 meters (262 feet). Although the
images generated with MSS data reveal some cultural
features, including large road ways such as the inter-
state highways, and even large buildings, such as the
Pentagon, or the shuttle assembly plant at Cape Ca-
naveral, the identity of smaller features cannot be dis-
cerned.3 In addition, because the first three Landsat
spacecraft passed over the same longitude at the Equa-
tor only once every 18 days, and because the interval
between data collection and subsequent delivery to the
user (the turnaround time) could be as great as 2
months, any information they might have provided
was not timely enough for media use.
In 1982 NASA launched Landsat 4, which, in addi-
tion to the MSS, carried an improved sensor, the
Thematic Mapper (TM). When Landsat 4 began to fail
in 1984, an identical Landsat 5 was launched. Land-
sats 4 and 5 are still providing data from both MSS
and TM sensors, although the ability to transmit data
from the TM on Landsat 4 is limited. The TM is capa-
ble of providing images of 30 meters (98 feet) resolu-
tion in seven spectral bands. The TM senses a swath
185 kilometers (115 miles) wide directly under the
spacecraft. Its relatively high resolution provides im-
ages that have already proved useful for news report-
ing. Data are sold in the form of computer-compatible
tapes or black and white or color photographs.
Each spacecraft crosses any particular longitude at
the Equator only once every 16 days,? which means
that its chance of passing over a part of the world in
which a newsworthy event is taking place is low. How-
ever, because Landsats 4 and 5 are 8 days apart in their
cycles, the two together can provide better coverage.
For example, although the TM of Landsat 5 was able
to provide an important image of the failed Chernobyl
reactor, it passed above Chernobyl on Apri129, 3 days
after the first explosion, and could not return until So-
viet technicians had extinguished the fire. In other
words, it was unable to monitor the detailed progress
of the fire, although it did show that the fire had been
extinguished. The thermal band on the TM demon-
strated that only one reactor had burned. Eight days
later, Landsat 4 was able to acquire an additional im-
age of the reactor site.
Over the years, 11 other countries (table A-1) have
built data-receiving stations. Landsat 4 and 5 are ca-
pable of transmitting data directly to these foreign sta-
tions when the satellites are within range, or transmit-
ting data to Earth via the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS). Basic processing by the EO-
SAT Corp. corrects the data for geometric and radio-
metric distortions.
The Landsat system, which was originally developed
and operated by NASA, was transferred to the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in
1983.5 In order to transfer land remote-sensing tech-
nology to the private sector, the Federal Government
turned over operation of the Landsat system and mar-
keting of its data to the EOSAT Corp. in December
'This appendix is adapted from a paper originally prepared for the OTA
workshop on Newsgathering From Space.
'It was then called Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS).
'Objects just below the limit of resolution, generally can be discerned as
objects on the images, but their identity generally cannot.
'Because the Landsat orbit is a polar orbit, it can "revisit" areas north of
the Equator more often. The exact number of days between overhead passes
varies according to latitude.
?NOAA assumed operational responsibility for the TM sensor in 1984.
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Table A-1.-Foreign Landsat Ground Stations
Actively receiving data (MOU signed with NOAA):
Australia
Brazil
Canada
European Space Agency (Sweden, Italy)
India
Japan
Thailand
Peoples Republic of China
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Not presently receiving data:
Argentina
Pakistan (under construction)
Indonesia (no signed agreement)
Bangladesh (no signed agreement)
SOURCE: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
1985.6 In return for a government subsidy of $250 mil-
lion,' EOSAT was to build and operate Landsat 6 and
7. However, because EOSAT has received only part
of the agreed-upon subsidy, it has been forced to stop
construction of Landsat 6. The future of civilian land
remote sensing in the United States is in serious doubt.e
In February 1986, France successfully launched its
own system, called the Systeme Probatoire d'Obser-
vation de la Terre (SPOT). SPOT provides 20 meter
data in three spectral bands, as well as 10 meter pan-
chromatic (black and white) imagery of Earth's sur-
face. Although the SPOT satellite recrosses the same
longitude only once every 26 days, its sensor is capa-
ble of viewing at an angle, oroff-nadir, making it pos-
sible to gather images from a particular surface area
7 out of 26 days.9
remote-sensing satellite system consists of four major
tasks, each of which is critical to producing useful
images:
1. data acquisition-the spacecraft, sensors, and
transmitters;
2. data collection and delivery-the receiving sta-
tionand other communication components; and
3. initial image processing; and
4. interpretative analysis.
In addition, a launch vehicle is required to place the
spacecraft in orbit.10
Media proponents of using remotely sensed data
have suggested the following key requirements:
? high spatial resolution (5 meters or less);
? sensors operating in at least three spectral bands,
or colors;
? frequent revisit of each area (1 to 2 days);
? relatively narrow field of view (10 to 15 miles); and
? quick delivery time to the media (24 hours or less).
For purposes of discussion, OTA has selected a base-
line system capable of 5 meters resolution that would
satisfy most of the conditions the media say they need
for a mediasat (table A-2 and table A-3). For compari-
son, OTA also selected a less capable, but less costly
minimum system capable of 10 meters resolution that
could serve the interim needs of the media (table A-4).
The sensor and associated electronics of the second,
less capable system might be carried as an auxiliary
package on a large spacecraft similar to the Omnistar
satellite proposed by EOSAT. This step would allow
news agencies to gain experience with using remotely
sensed data in preparation for constructing a much
more capable, but more costly, baseline system.
A Mediasat System
Although attention generally focuses on the sensors
and their capabilities, the imaging instrument itself
would be a small component of an overall satellite sys-
tem capable of providing the data for media use. A
?See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Land Remote Sens-
ing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, March 1984, for an extensive discussion of the
history behind transfer of the Landsat system to the private sector. See also
International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1985; and U.S.
Congress, '"The Commercialization of Meteorological and Land Remote-
Sensing Satellites," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources,
Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications of the House of Representatives Committee on Science and
Technology, 1983 [No. 53j.
'Not including launch costs, which were estimated to be $50 million to $70
million.
?Theresa M. Foley, "Reagan Asked to Intercede To Save Landsat Program,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Apr. 6, 1987, pp. 29-30.
?Note that viewing objects at an angle causes the resolution to decrease.
In addition, objects in the shadow of tall structures will generally not be visible.
10Until at least 1990, the ability of the United States to launch payloads
will be severely constrained. The first flight of the refurbished shuttle may
not take place before late 1988. In addition, because building an expendable
launch vehicle takes 2 years or more, even if a launcher were ordered in May
1987, it would not be ready until mid to late 1989.
Table A?2.-Moderate and High-Performance
Concepts Drive Sensor Cost
Pushbroom optics ........
Refractive
Reflective
Focal lengthlf-number ..
60 cm; f/4
212 cm; f/6
Resolution at nadir .......
10m
5m
Number detectors and
spacing ...............
512, 7?m
5,120, 15 ?m
Swath width at nadir......
5 km
25 km
Pointing mechanics ......
One axis
One axis
System powerldata rate ...
gimbel
10-30W/
gimbel
50.100W/
Sensor size (1 xWxH) ....
8.3 Mbps
30"x30"x30"
166 Mbps
60"x30"x30"
Sensor weight ...........