OPERATIONS SECURITY UPDATE - APRIL 1985 KEY PERSONNEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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JtUKt I NUt UKN
ARMY review completed.
L
APRIL 1985
Office of Origin:
HO Electronic Security Command/DODO
San Antonio, TX 78243-5000
Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR r------------~
SECRET NOFORN ~ WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Intelligence
Sources and Methods
Involved (WNINTEL)
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FOREWORD
(U) The Operations Security Update is published aperiodically by HQ Electronic
Security Command. It is intended for use by Air Force OPSEC program managers
to assist in the development of local training materials, and promotion of the
Air Force OPSEC Program. We encourage subscribers to submit articles, OPSEC
poster ideas or comments to improve the publication. Local reproduction of the
Update is authorized. Questions concerning the Update or submissions for
future publication may be submitted to HQ ESC/D000, San Antonio, Texas 78243,
AUTOVON 945-2112.
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OPERATIONS SECURITY UPDATE - APRIL 1985
*** KEY PERSONNEL ***
Commander
BGen
Paul H. Martin
Vice Commander
BGen
Regis F.A. Urschler
DCS/Operations
Col
John P.
Lynch
Director, C3CM Operations
Col
Robert
D. Green
OPSEC Division
Col
Marlin
L. Logan
Editor
Mr.
Joseph
R. Folk
**** TABLE OF CONTENTS ***
1.
ESC INK Message for 1985 (U) ....................................
1
2.
U.S. Military Member Possibly Provoked While in the Soviet ......
Union (U) .......................................................
2
3.
Soviet Activity on the Berlin-Marienborn Autobahn (U)...........
3
4.
Soviet Access To Western Computer Networks Through Swedish......
Computer Conference System (S/NF/WN/NC) .........................
6
5.
Electronic Data Processing Security (S/NF/WN/NC) ................
8
6.
Operations Security For Small Computers (U) .....................
9
7.
The HUMINT Threat (U) ...........................................
12
8.
HUMINT Threat to Secure AUTOSEVOCOM Facilities (KY-3) (U)....... 21
9.
Counterintelligence (U) .........................................
23
10.
TEMPEST and You (U) .............................................
25
11.
COMINT Threat to U.S. AUTOVON and German Bundespost .............
?
Telephone Network (U) ...........................................
26
12.
Soviet Military Attache Travel In The U.S. (U) ...................
31
13.
Imagery Intelligence (U) ........................................
35
14.
USSR: Technology Transfer (U) ..................................
37
NOCONTRACT
WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE
i i INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTB)
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ESC INK MESSAGE FOR 1985 (U)
EDITORS NOTE: The following information from our ESC INK folks
appeared in their 20150OZ Dec 84 weekly OPSEC Threat highlights
message. Those personnel utilizing the INK Services are encouraged
to submit their requirements for threat information IAW Para D.
A. (C) During 1984, we in the United States again saw further
expansion of Communist Signals Intelligence collection capabilities.
Year by year, hostile forces continue to increase the numbers and
capabilities of intelligence collection platforms directly exploiting
virtually all operations within U.S./Allied military forces.
B. (S/NF/WN)
C. (S) Several other examples highlighted in INK weekly messages
come to mind, but needless to say the USSR and its allies have been
able to continue to gain and exploit significant information on U.S.
military activities by completely overt intelligence collection
methods. Given the closed door nature of Soviet Intelligence
Services, we cannot completely fathom the scope and success of their
operations.
D. (C) Therefore, only by continued vigilance and by taking
cognizant actions, can we cope with ever improving enemy signals
intelligence systems. Description of the threat, and its importance
to Operational Security (OPSEC), must receive wide dissemination.
Our goal in the coming year is to provide ever increasing detail on
the deployment, actions, and capabilities of the hostile signals
collection threat. In line with this goal we request your assistance
in the coming year to aid in establishing requirements and priorities
for evaluating all aspects of this hostile threat to our national
security. Your priorities are our priorities.
WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTEQ
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U.S. MILITARY MEMBER POSSIBLY PROVOKED
WHILE IN THE-=-F UNION (U)
(U) A USAF NCO provided the following information concerning an
Embassy support mission flown to Moscow on 13 Jun 84. The NCO served
as a steward on the flight mission.
A. (U) The Embassy mission took off from Rhein Main AB,
with AEROFLOT navigators on board, at approximately 1030L. The
AEROFLOT navigators, as in past Moscow flights, did not converse with
the airmen except to get something to eat or drink and just prior to
entering Soviet air space talked with the pilot to advise him once he
was in Soviet air space. Upon landing in Moscow, at approximately
1500L, the aircraft was downloaded and the Defense Attache office
(DAO) contact officer took the crew through customs. Source had
brought with him a video camera which the customs officials seized,
saying he could pick up the camera the next day when they departed.
After clearing through customs, the DAO contact officer took the air
crew on a short tour of Moscow prior to taking them to a hotel. The
crew checked in without any problems. In the past, the air crew had
to stand in line with everyone else checking into the hotel, now
there is a separate check in line for the air crews. After checking
into the hotel the DAO contact took the crew to a restaurant in an
out of the way area of Moscow. Upon arriving at the restaurant which
was located on the second floor, they found the entrance door
locked. The DAO contact officer finally got the attention of an
employee in the restaurant and someone came down and unlocked the
door to let them in. Source was the last in the door and the door
was locked behind them. They lingered at the entrance for a moment
and an unknown individual came to the glass door motioning source to
come to the door. Source went to the door and the individual asked
him in English if he was an American. Source told him he was. The
individual then told source he (the individual) had to talk to him.
At the same time the individual kept pulling a piece of paper up and
down out of his coat pocket. Source did not know what the piece of
paper was. Source then told the individual he could not talk to him
and backed away going upstairs to the restaurant. Source then
informed the DAO contact officer about the incident when the group
was upstairs and the contact officer stated he had done the right
thing by leaving. The DAO attended the dinner later and was briefed
about the individual who approached the subject.
As the group exited the restaurant the individual was still
outside the door and the DAO talked with the individual.
Source's group went back to the hotel for the night.
Source and the rest of the crew checked out of the hotel at 0600L
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and went to the airport to prepare for the return trip. When they
processed through customs, source's video camera was returned to him
and did not appear to have been tampered with. The mission departed
the airport at approximately 0930L with the AEROFLOT navigators on
board. They did not converse with the aircrew and they got off the
aircraft in Paris.
B. (U) OSI Comments: This report is provided to inform
U.S. personnel of possible methods of Soviet provocation in order to
better prepare them in the event they are faced with similar
circumstances. A review of past incidents of similar nature
indicated the U.S. person may have been a target of a provocation
designed to either embarrass him or to place him in a compromising
situation. Frequently, U.S. persons have been asked to do something
which appears innocent on the surface but is illegal by law. A prime
example of this would be to take any personal correspondence out of
the country for Soviet persons; exchanging currency, trading of items
such as clothes, books, magazines, or other objects; and to discuss
politics which is prejudicial to the Soviet system. The actual
intent of the Soviet in the above text is not known; however,
whatever the intent, the U.S. person reacted most appropriately.
(SOURCE: AFOSI)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The following article provided by our ESC/IN office gives a prime
example of Soviet methods of contacting U.S. military and DOD
civilians who are associated with intelligence activities. Although
the geographical area is Germany, the tactics employed by the Soviets
are apt to occur In any Eastern Bloc country visited by U.S.
personnel. The article stresses the need for education. Personnel
must be made aware of how to cope with and report incidents of this
nature.
**********************************
SOVIET ACTIVITY ON THE BERLIN-MARIENBORN AUTOBAHN (U)
A. (C) Members of U.S. Forces traveling over land from West Germany
to West Berlin (or reverse), over 100 miles within East Germany, must
use the limited access highway between Marienborn and West Berlin.
Following processing of personnel and vehicle documents at the allied
checkpoints, travelers proceed to the Soviet checkpoint. At the
Soviet checkpoint, the travelers must dismount and show their travel
orders and personal ID documents to the Soviet sentry. After a
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F. (C) Conclusions about the Soviet modus operandi and the
checkpoints are:
. . . There is a watch system to alert the checkpoint officer
when one of his targets is due. Persons waiting in the shack for
their paperwork are under some sort of observation.
. . . Soviet officers have a standing requirement to the sentry
to identify Russian speakers or ethnic Russians determined by the
name on the travel orders. An alert mechanism exists that enables
the sentry to signal the shack (a burst of light).
. . . Soviet officers almost invariably probe for subjects
capability to travel to East Berlin. Soviets modus operandi
prescribes meetings in East Berlin if possible. Those who say they
can't travel to East Berlin or who must travel in groups tend to be
identified as intelligence personnel.
. . . Persons approached tend to be repeat travelers. The
Soviets almost invariably ask about subjects frequency of travel.
. . . Soviet officers often give subjects a chance to show their
amenability to repeat meetings.
G. (C) A profile of "Konstantin" based on descriptions provided
during debriefing of U.S. Army personnel reveals that he is a 30 year
old Lieutenant, who speaks with a Moscow accent and speaks good
German and English. He is in his third year of a five year tour. He
claims to be the commander of a "translation platoon" in Magdenburg,
East Germany. His wife likes western fashions. He is well spoken
and has a well polished delivery. He is alert and quick to respond.
Friendly rather than pushy, and in general, quite well suited for the
role assigned to him.
H. (C) Subjects most likely to be approached can be male or female.
"Konstantin" seems to speak more freely with females and doesn't hide
his marital status. Those who travel alone after having made three
or more trips in the past, those who drive an eye catching car, those
having a Russian appearing name on the travel orders and those
showing an interest in the literature (Soviet) on the table are
likely to be approached. Other indicators for an approach are
assigned to a security or intelligence unit, officer or senior NCO,
and enlisted linguists from a SIGINT unit on assignment in West
Berlin versus West Germany.
1. (C) Some lessons learned indicates that the awareness program
needs to be fine tuned. Some people did not report promptly because
they did not think it was important. Others failed to report
promptly because they feared trouble from U.S. authorities, such as
being banned from further travel in their vehicle. Many people did
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not know how to cope with the approach. Some became hostile while
one agreed immediately to meet with the Soviet in principle. "Would
you meet me for dinner in East Berlin?" The U.S. Service member
replied, "sure, anytime." Personnel with Russian and German language
capabilities should not flaunt their skills. Personnel with Russian
or Eastern European names should be briefed. School teachers tend to
travel frequently and should be briefed as a group.
J. (C) The 24 approaches reported equate to an average of one per
week during the survey period. Even when one considers the other
approaches to the British, French, or U.S. Air Force personnel, this
is not a heavy workload for "Konstantin." It must be assumed that he
has approached others who have not reported. Soviet checkpoint
personnel are obviously under orders to produce leads. These
approaches are bold, they are made in the face of a known allied
counter intelligence program and they are often directed against
intelligence personnel or others of higher rank who would be likely
to report such approaches to authorities. This indicates that the
Soviets are enjoying some measure of success and that checkpoints
are their most readily available conduit into our ranks. There is a
clear and present danger that "Konstantin" or one of his colleagues
will succeed in contacting a naive, malleable or gullible prospect.
K. (C) CITD comment: The Marienborn-West Berlin highway is unique
to U.S. forces and allies in West Berlin and provides a controlled
environment for Soviet intelligence activities. A good briefing and
awareness program about the checkpoints will alert U.S. personnel
traveling on the highway of possible approaches by Soviet
intelligence personnel. The above study points out that "Konstantin"
could possibly succeed in his mission as a result of some approaches
not reported to authorities.
SOVIET ACCESS TO WESTERN COMPUTER NETWORKS THROUGH
SWEDISH COMPUTER C NFERENCE SYSTEM S W. C
Source for this report is the director of a computer communications
department at a U.S. Academic Institution.
A. (S/NF/WN/NC)
NOCONTRACT 6
WARNING NOTICE: SENSMVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTE )
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. S/NF/WN/NC)
ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING SECURITY (U)
The following article indicates some of our allies are concerned
over our computer vulnerability and are taking steps to counter
hostile exploitation.
(S/NF/WN/NC) As of Oct 84, Electronic Data Processing (EDP)
Security has become a major concern to most foreign countries as well
as to the United States in both governmental and private sectors.
Data Security Systems have taken on a new importance due to computer
networking and prolification of personal computers that have
individual data storage capacities. (Source Comments: The move to
National Security Standards and National EDP Security networks will
take place in Japan and Western Europe prior to occurring in the U.S.
This is due to the governmental or institutional characteristics of
Japan and Western Europe. Government organizations and large
institutions are in a stronger position than private or commercial
computer users to agree on security standards and requirements and to
work towards the development of such standards.)
NOCONTRACT 8 INWARNIN TELLIGENCE NOTICe SENSITIVE
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTE )
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(S/NF/WN/NC)
(S/NF/WN/NC) The Japanese Diet committee or security has also
tasked the ministry of finance to develop a bank to bank data
security network. However, the ministry of finance is encountering
some difficulties with the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
There appears to be a turf battle developing among these three
Japanese government organizations. MITI and Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications believe that the national data security network
should include not only encryption of bank transactions, but should
also include encryption of voice and executive correspondence.
(SOURCE: CIA)
S/NF/WN/NC
OPERATIONS SECURITY FOR SMALL COMPUTERS (U)
EDITORS NOTE: The following article submitted by 1Lt Evelyn
Rockwell of our OPSEC Education Branch creates an interesting
approach to small computer security. The author, presently serving
as an 8031 Intelligence Officer, has an extensive background in
computer programming. She is a fully qualified 5135b, having
previously served as a Small Computer Systems Analyst for Air
Training Command.
(U) The recent growth of small computers throughout the Air Force
has created a new problem for Operations Security Managers. During
the mid-1970's and early 1980's when small computers were coming into
general Air Force use, many bases acquired first one computer, then
another, and another.... TAC has the CROMENCO, ATC the Burroughs
9 WARNING NOTICE: SENSRIVE
N O C O N T RAC T INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTEy
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XE500, and the Air Force Data Systems Design Office has recently
acquired the Z-100 and Z-150 for Air Force-wide use. This is in
addition to the IBM's, WANGS, APPLES, TRS-80s, and numerous others
already on inventory. How does the average OPSEC Officer/NCO handle
the micro-explosion? Absolute security in the average Air Force
office is unlikely and probably not necessary. But not making any
attempt to minimize the risks is inviting trouble. To begin, let's
look at a modified OPSEC process for microcomputers as a cyclic
function.
ANALYZE f IMPLEMENT
T HREAT COUNTERMEASURES
ASSIGN PERSONNEL
FOR SECURITY
ESTABLISH GUIDELINES
MODIFY MONITOR
WHEN &
NECESSARY EVALUATE
EFFECTIVENESS
If we consider the modified OPSEC process for small computers as a
simple application of common sense, each step of the process is easy
to analyze. Let's consider the process step by step:
a. ASSIGN PERSONNEL FOR SECURITY & ESTABLISH GUIDELINES - This
should always he a person familiar with the software and preferably
has an office close to the hardware. A person familiar with the
equipment will be better able to assess needs and establish
guidelines. He should be able to develop a list of authorized users,
and insure that only those personnel use the equipment. He must know
enough about the hardware to realize if it is being harmed, or if the
software is being tampered with. Once he has established a list for
security and/or established user guidelines, it will be his
responsibility to insure that they are adhered to. One word of
advice here, make sure your security person has enough rank to make
his policies stick! Use common sense here. The two striper in the
office may be your "computer-whiz kid"; however, if the average grade
of operator is E-7 or higher the Airman may initially need a
considerable amount of support from you, or his supervisors to ensure
the necessary procedures are enforced. If you go to the trouble of
assigning a security person, then don't defeat your program before
you start.
Step 1 - Select a qualified person to develop your security,
establish your guidelines and protect your office investment - a
small computer.
b. ANALYZE THREAT - What is small computer threat? Are you
looking for people in trench coats stealing classified secrets off
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your high-tech devices? If you are, you're probably looking for a
problem that doesn't exist, or is beyond the scope of this paper.
The average office in CONUS is not going to have an alien agent
problem in their midst (check with your local OSI), however, if you
are running unauthorized classified on your computer you may have a
very real TEMPEST problem. You could even have a problem with
classified trash or the release of unclassified EEFI.
Consider your office trash, within the United States, the
majority of offices never worry about what goes in the trash, but
let's look at where the trash goes. First, there is the maid that
takes it to the dumpster, then there is the dumpster that sits
unwatched until the truck comes to take it to the dump. From the
dump it could go anywhere. One California base contracted all of its
paper waste to be sold as scrap to Thailand. The paper was
compressed, boxed, and shipped by the ton straight to Thailand.
Let's hope it was all "unclassified."
And what about the physical threat? Is your computer in a high
traffic area? How easy would it be for that just counseled Airman to
"snip" the keyboard cord, or what about that Field Grader who doesn't
think the no coke, no smoke rule applies to him. If you have
important operational plans, programs, or procedures on your TEMPEST
approved Z-150 or unclassified information on your B-25 you could
have an Operational Security problem. Your mission could be slowed
down or stopped by your dependence on one information device and
failure to protect it.
Then there is the "accidental" threat areas. Do you have
procedures to insure that all disks are "backed up" with copies
stored in separate areas. Are the storage areas safe from extreme
heat, cold, humidity, or magnetic effects? A floppy disk set next to
a telephone can be ruined by one incoming call. When the phone
rings, a strong magnet is initiated which will scramble your
electronically stored information.
Step 2 - Consider your threat from three angles: Hostile Agent
Threat; Physical Threat; Accidental Threat.
c. Implement Countermeasures - This takes us to the
countermeasures area. Once you have defined your threats, know how
to counteract them. If you have already prepared for a problem, your
operations will not suffer if the problem can be countered quickly
and efficiently.
Step 3 - Be prepared for a threat problem, and know how your
operations might be affected and can be corrected before a problem
arises.
d. MONITOR AND EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS. No program will be
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successful if it remains static. Your program must be a dynamic
process, just as your personnel change, your program can change.
Consider the everyday office considerations of moving furniture.
Maybe when the computer first arrived it had a dedicated spot safe in
a quiet corner. Due to office space realities, it now must be moved
next to a busy hallway. Your physical security needs have changed.
What about office personnel? When the computer first arrived maybe
there was a little hostility toward the device. It was new, and
meant change to procedures that were familiar and, above all, not
well understood. Maybe the small computer is more accepted now, with
less need for constant surveillance and more room for creativity on
the part of your users. "Accidents" should be less likely and there
should be room for more trust. The small computer can be a great
office tool. Let your people use it as such.
Step 4 - Monitor your program and make sure it stays effective.
e. MODIFY WHEN NECESSARY - This takes us to our final stage.
Don't be afraid of change. You got the computer for the office - use
it, but don't forget to protect it.
Step 5 - Learn from experience. If your program fails, make it work;
if it works, make it better.
That's the OPSEC Small Computer process in a nutshell - five easy
steps. You won't find it in any regulation, and the IG will not be
there to make sure you use this exact process (they do inspect for
other items). But, the Air Force does expect you to keep your small
computer system safe from threat and operationally secure. Order
copies of, and become familiar with: AFR 300-3, Management of Small
Computers; AFR 300-13, Safeguarding Personal Data on Automated Data
Processing Systems; and AFR 700-10, Information System Security.
This may not be the process for you. Design your own OPSEC system.
Implement it and stay with it. Remember, if you don't who will?
THE HUMINT THREAT (U)
This article was produced by the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations to acquaint Air Force OPSEC Officers with the nature
and scope of the threat to the resources for which they have
protective responsibility.
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requests by U.S. officials in the PRC.
7. (U) Since there are no travel restrictions for East
European officials, no closed areas for PRC officials, and since
Soviet Officials travel through "closed" areas with special
permission, virtually no section of the U.S. is immune from visits by
hostile intelligence officers. In addition, there are no travel
restrictions on Soviet or PRC tourists, exchange students, or
employees of the UN Secretariat.
e. (U) Illegals
1. (S) F
S NF
3. (C/NF) Since 1973 when the Soviet Union reduced
immigration restrictions, especially for Soviet Jews desiring to
resettle in Israel, the Soviet immigration population in the U.S.
increased dramatically - - by over 20,000 in 1980 alone. The SIS
have not overlooked this influx of well-educated and talented
Soviet-born immigrants as a cover for infiltrating intelligence
operations.
4. (S/NF/WN)
f. (C) The intelligence role of the Soviet Journalists.
15 WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTEL)
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Soviet journalists abroad for the most part represent
TASS, the Soviet Wire Service; the Novosti Press Agency; Pravda, the
CPSU daily; Izvestia, the official government daily; and the State
Committee for Television and Radio broadcasting. While their
journalistic productivity is less than impressive, in the collection
of information, they have notable advantages. Since they are not
official representatives of the Soviet Government, their travel in
non-communist countries is normally not subject to the restrictions
imposed on members of official Soviet missions. They are
particularly valuable in the Soviet intelligence effort since their
overt role as collectors of information is readily accepted. Many of
the Soviet foreign news correspondents assigned abroad may be
intelligence officers.
g. (S) Communist-nation visitors to U.S.: In 1955 the United
States and the Soviet Union began discussion leading to what has
become known as the East-West exchange program (EWEP). While the
first agreement under the EWEP was signed in 1958, the program
witnessed dramatic growth beginning in 1972. Summit conferences that
year spawned a series of educational, cultural, commercial and
scientific/technical agreements which brought increasing numbers of
communist-nation visitors to the United States. Between 1978 and
1980, the number of communist-country commercial and cultural
visitors almost doubled (from more than 14,000 to about 28,000). PRC
student presence increased almost five fold between 1979 and 1980
(from about 950 to 4,600). The tourist influx from some communist
countries almost tripled from 1979 to 1980. These increases, coupled
with a parallel growth in communist-nation official presence,
provided the USSR an unprecedented opportunity to exploit its access
in the U.S. for intelligence purposes.
h. (U) Students
1. S
They are
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interest as are the details of school job requirements and hiring
practices.
3. (S/NF) Three academic fields accounted for most of the
1980-81 Soviet applicants' courses of study: Computers (18
students), microelectronics (11), materials processing and
manufacturing (8). Because of the large number enrolled in
scientific and technological fields of study, it is obvious their
primary objective is to learn as much as possible about advanced
Western technology.
i. (U) Merchant Ships
1. (S) There is increasing evidence that Soviet Merchant
Ships (merships) engage in intelligence collection activities. The
tremendous size and worldwide deployment of the Soviet Merchant Fleet
offers a significant maritime intelligence collection potential.
State control of this fleet makes it relatively easy for the ships
to be tasked with a maritime intelligence role. As of Jan 80, the
Soviet ocean-going merchant fleet consisted of about 1800 ships. The
Soviet fishing fleet numbers in excess of 3800 units. Augmenting the
commercial fleet is a vast special service fleet that includes ice
breakers, ocean salvage ships, dredges, and training and scientific
units. The extensive trade routes followed by these merchant vessels
provides a means of surveillance in areas far removed from the
ordinary coverage of other surveillance systems.
2. (S)
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h) (S) Reporting on Soviet Emigres.
c. (U) Western Visitors to USSR.
1. (S)
. (S/NF/WN)
d. (U) Soviet Trade Activities Abroad
1. (S/NF)
2. (S/NF)
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4. (S) Soviet trade activities abroad also include the work
of inspectors dispatched to western countries to inspect and receive
industrial equipment and materials purchased by Soviet trade
organizations. These inspectors may make short trips abroad or may
actually be assigned to a factory in the west where the equipment is
being produced for the Soviet customers.
5. (U) Soviet trade representatives such as those described
above have a significant advantage over personnel assigned as
official staff members at Soviet diplomatic establishments.
Commercial employees are not normally subject to the travel
restrictions imposed upon diplomatic personnel.
e. (S/WN) Scientific Conferences and Symposia:
Both the KGB and GRU recognize the collection potential
represented by conferences, symposia, conventions and congresses
sponsored by Western professional and scientific societies.
According to a U.S. intelligence agency, while Soviet intelligence
officers do not expect to collect classified information, such
meetings are regarded as opportunities to identify targets
(personnel, materials, projects, industrial firms, governmental
agencies, new scientific or technological developments, etc.) for
future exploitation. In addition to face-to-face contact with
Western scientific and technical personnel, these events afford
access to reports, speeches, papers, and technical publications which
may not otherwise be easily obtainable by the Soviets. Access to
meetings is often obtained by joining the sponsoring society.
f. (C) Trade Fairs, Exhibits, and Air Shows:
Opportunities to collect scientific and technical data at
events open to the public attract the interest of, and attendance by,
Soviet Intelligence Officers, co-optees and agents. For example,
Director of the KGB First Chief Directorate (responsible for
collecting and analyzing scientific data) is reported to maintain
special task forces which operate at international trade fairs. Air
shows, in particular, attract attention as lucrative targets. Not
only do such shows provide an opportunity to scrutinize the latest in
Western aviation technology, but they also enable the Soviets to
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gather sales brochures and other literature. These shows also
provide an opportunity for face-to-face contacts with aviation
personnel possessing direct access to the latest Western aviation
developments. The Farnborough Air Show in the United Kingdom, the
Paris Air Show, the Hannover Air Show in West Germany, and the Japan
International Air Show invariably attract Soviet Visitors.
g. (C/NF/WN) Patents and Licenses:
Soviet pursuit of Western technology increasingly involves
the acquisition of Western patents and licenses. According to a
Soviet immigre, it became apparent after the mid-1970's that even by
producing Soviet prototypes based on single items of Western
equipment - - acquired illegally or by purchase - - the USSR was
still at least several years behind the West. Foreign technology
presented by patents and licenses needed to be obtained, even at
great expense. For this reason, the all-union association (V/0)
responsible for export and import of patents was established to
acquire high-technology patents from abroad. Patent services were
also created in all government ministries and departments. The
number of Soviet personnel involved in patent services reportedly
almost doubled from 1970 to 1976.
h. (U) Open Sources
1. (U) A major source of information continues to be
publications available in the public domain. In addition to
newspapers, magazines, technical and academic journals, maps,
industrial and trade promotional literature, corporate directives and
reports, and congressional publications, Soviet institutions and
representatives systematically obtain American official and private
publications, from organizations such as the National Technical
Information System (NTIS).
2. (U) The NTIS bibliographic data file consists of hundreds of
thousands of summaries of technical documents prepared by major
federal departments and agencies, including the Department of
Defense. The Soviets are estimated to collect over 80,000 documents
yearly from NTIS. Although NTIS has curtailed its response to overt
Soviet requests, the use of third parties as requesters is
anticipated.
i. (U) Hostile Intelligence Targeting of USAF Personnel
1. (U) During 1981, 894 USAF personnel in the CONUS made
reports of contacts responsive to AFR 205-57, "Reporting and
Investigating Espionage, Sabotage, Terrorism and Subversion." The
majority of contacts reported represented a minimal intelligence
threat to the USAF, i.e., solicitations to subscribe to Soviet
magazines, Ham radio contacts, correspondence with relatives living
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behind the Iron Curtain, etc. In more than 200 incidents,
defense-related information was solicited from USAF personnel by
unauthorized individuals and organizations.
2. (U) Requests for information were occasionally received
telephonically or by mail; however, the overwhelming majority of
requests were made during a personal contact in which the requester
approached the USAF member and initiated a conversation.
3. (U) Most incidents involved young, first-term airmen in
the grades of E-l through E-4. The individuals approaching USAF
members represented both sexes and several racial groups. They range
in age from the late teens into the sixties, and many appeared to be
U.S. citizens.
4. (S) Some unauthorized requests for information may have
represented mere curiosity on the part of the requester or were
otherwise attributable to a motive not necessarily inimical to USAF
security. AFOSI analysis, however, disclosed that most of the
inquiries fell within the parameters of known hostile intelligence
collection requirements directed against the USAF.
5. (C) Frequently the timing of the questions corresponded
with some significant activity such as an exercise, deployment,
alert, ORI, etc. In some instances, AFOSI analysis was able to
correlate the time frame of the request or content of specific
questions with other known hostile intelligence activities targeting
the USAF installation or activity involved.
j. (C) This article describes some of the dimensions and
complexity of the intelligence threat posed by Communist-Nation
Intelligence Services, particularly those of the Soviet Union, to an
Air Force target. A clear knowledge of the threat is essential
before effective countermeasures can be undertaken. Although OPSEC
activities in the Air Force vary, there is a need for aggressive
"awareness" programs and effective countermeasures tailored to
individual units/situations. (SOURCE: AFOSI)
HUMINT THREAT TO SECURE AUTOSEVOCOM FACILITIES (KY-3) (U)
(U) A recent message from HQ USAF/SIT (quoted below), emphasizes
the HUMINT threat to our secure AUTOSEVOCOM facilities. As the
preceding HUMINT article states, the Soviet Intelligence Services and
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their BLOC representatives seek classified information, scientific
and technical data and endeavor to identify targets for future
exploitation. A prime target of the Soviets is U.S. cryptography.
1. (S) Ensuring the integrity of keying material against possible
exploitation by hostile agents is a vital consideration in the
maintenance of a viable COMSEC posture. The National Security Agency
has noted an alarming increase in COMSEC insecurities resulting from
the loss of two-person integrity of AUTOSEVOCOM Wideband key cards.
Although the circumstances of reported COMSEC insecurities differ,
the principle cause of the COMSEC insecurities appears to be the
same:
A. (U) Lack of awareness and sensitivity on the part of users to
the importance to the national security of the COMSEC keying material
they handle.
B. (U) The need for stringent compliance with prescribed
physical security safeguards.
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The following article by Mr. Pat Martin, HQ ESC/CSI appeared
previously in our October 1983 edition of the OPSEC Update. We feel
the information is worth repeating.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (U)
(U) Counterintelligence is an often misunderstood term both inside
and outside the USAF. In order to understand counterintelligence as
a term and a practical and integral aspect of OPSEC, a knowledge of
the intelligence threat posed by adversary intelligence services is
necessary.
(U) Intelligence gathering activities currently directed against the
United States Air Force are multifaceted. They can generally be
divided into two categories: Technical collection efforts (i.e.
SIGINT and IMINT) and human collection (HUMINT). Although vast
quantities of information can be collected through technical
collection efforts, adversary intelligence services have demonstrated
time and time again that human acquired information is considered
the most reliable indicator of the true workings and details of any
specific event. Human collection, while often difficult to initiate,
can be specifically targeted, can be extremely difficult to detect,
can remain hidden until required (the "sleeper agent"), and can be
relatively inexpensive to sustain. The human collector, if properly
trained, can also re-direct his/her efforts to meet the needs of the
situation and can often provide collateral information while working
a specific target. With proper cover and documentation the human
agent can penetrate the most secure areas by obtaining employment and
gaining trust. If such long term preparation is not considered
feasible, the adversary intelligence service can attempt recruitment
of an employee in place through monetary or ideological persuasion.
All of the factors which make the human so valuable to any system can
also be made to work against the system we are trying to protect.
(U) One hypothetical example can be given to further illustrate the
benefit of HUMINT. Let us assume that ALPHA AFB, anywhere, has
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recently acquired the F-25 weapons system. Operational elements have
determined that day to day sortie generation is susceptible to
technical exploitation and have thus ordered that "look-down-shoot-
down" radar capability be exercised only during specific and randomly
selected times. With strict compliance it is felt that this should
severely limit technical intelligence collection against the system.
After repeated attempts to establish technical collection against the
F-25, an adversary intelligence service concludes ALFA AFB must
receive priority HUMINT collection. An assessment of ALFA and its
environs is made and the following scenario is created. Local
intelligence officers assigned to diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic
establishments are instructed to activate their contacts in the local
civilian population who. cater to the entertainment needs of ALFA AFB
personnel. These contacts are to begin collecting information on
personnel who are engaged in excessive drinking, gambling and
socializing with members of the opposite sex. They are also
instructed to be alert for those military members interested in
selling goods from ALFA's BX and commissary. Anger, disgruntlement,
and ideological naivete' were also to be reported. After some
frustrating false leads, an avionics technician is identified.
Through careful targeting and patient waiting, the reward finally
comes. The adversary intelligence service obtains the complete tech
order of the radar. Cost? Time and $5,000.00 paid to the technician
for "services provided."
(U) What does the OPSEC manager have at his/her disposal to combat
the HUMINT threat? The Air Force Office of Special Investigations.
Through AFOSI's counterintelligence efforts, the OPSEC manager can
insure his units receive AFR 205-57 briefings (Reporting and
Investigating Espionage, Sabotage, and Terrorism), he placed on
distribution for Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) outlining
significant counterintelligence and terrorist - threat charges
affecting his unit/base, and arrange for specialized AFOSI
counterintelligence efforts to work the problems relating to security
and protection of significant systems or events. In accordance with
AFR 55-30, the OPSEC manager can request a multi-disciplined
counterintelligence (MDCI) threat estimate for OPSEC planning. This
threat description currently includes the HUMINT threat and the
SIGINT threat as provided by HQ ESC/INKC. The OPSEC manager may also
contact the AFOSI MAJCOM rep to his/her command for assistance.
AFOSI has currently placed MAJCOM reps at HQ MAC, HQ SAC, HQ AFSC, HQ
TAC, HQ ESC, and USCENTCOM. Officers assigned to these commands can
offer assistance in OPSEC planning in the area of counter-HUMINT and
anti-terrorism. They can also provide assistance in understanding
MDCI threats and their value in command level OPLANS and CONPLANS.
(U) Effective OPSEC cannot become a reality unless the OPSEC manager
makes full use of all resources. AFOSI is charged with Air Force
counterintelligence and MDCI responsibilities under AFR 23-18. Know
your experts in AFOSI.
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TEMPEST AND YOU (U)
(C) TEMPEST is an unclassified short name for the study and control
of electromagnetic emanations which can be used to "read" classified
information. Emanations are the result of any electrical process
either natural or manmade. Lightning strikes and your automobiles
spark plugs are examples of natural and manmade electrical processes
which are easily detectable on your AM or FM radio. The problem
begins when classified information is processed electrically and the
information leaves a "fingerprint" on the emanation which can be
detected and broken back to the original text. In many cases, the
detected emanation is no more difficult to decipher by the trained
operator than the word puzzles you find in the Sunday paper.
(S) How do we control something which is the natural result of using
electricity? The only thing we can do is minimize those signals or
if that is not sufficient, contain them. The efforts of the
designer, installer and operator are needed to minimize signals. The
designer can use several methods to aid him. The most important is
low-levels of current and voltage. The lower these levels, the lower
the energy of the emanation, and the harder it is to detect.
Grounding is very important for both the designer and installer. A
good ground will conduct many undesirable signals into the world's
biggest conductor, the earth itself, where they cannot be recovered.
When all else fails, it is necessary to encase, or shield, the
offending component or equipment to prevent leakage of the emanation.
Shielding is undesirable because it is difficult to maintain its
integrity and it usually requires operational restrictions. These
methods will usually reduce the emanation to a level that is only
detectable a short distance away from the source and is easily
protected by the Control Space.
(S) The emanation, if still detectable in the immediate area, will
impress itself on any antenna that is available. Telephone lines,
conduits, water pipes, air conditioner ducts or any other metal
structure can act as the antenna, and then conduct the emanation out
of the Control Space on any conductor which is attached. Conducted
emanations from a weak emitter can travel many miles when the
radiated emanation may only travel a few meters.
(C) There are two ways to prevent conducted emanations. The first is
to keep all conductors outside the Control Zone. This is not always
easy to do, and in some cases may be impractical. A filter or an
isolator may be used to stop emanations from being conducted out of
the Control Zone. Filters allow desirable signals to pass, and block
undesirable signals while isolators block all signals.
(U) So, what can you do to help? Just being aware of your TEMPEST
responsibilities is a big help. Anytime classified information is or
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will be processed electrically, TEMPEST must be considered. If you
are involved in buying or leasing equipment, you should be aware of
all Air Force policies regarding TEMPEST, and you are responsible for
including TEMPEST requirements in the contract. Maintenance
personnel who install or maintain this equipment are charged with
maintaining the TEMPEST integrity of all the equipment they service.
(S) Be alert to open cabinet doors or broken wires. A broken shield
or a bad ground can ruin several thousand dollars worth of TEMPEST
modifications. Also, be aware of the separation requirements between
RED equipment (which is used to process classified information) and
BLACK equipment (which should never be used to process classified
information). The administrative telephone is the worst offender.
It makes an excellent antenna, and has a conductor which extends far
beyond the bounds of any control space.
(U) The best place to go for TEMPEST information is to your local
TEMPEST Officer and/or NCO. They have the answers to your questions,
or know how to get those answers.
(C) You are encouraged to contact them with all your questions.
Trying to correct a TEMPEST problem as an afterthought is much more
costly in time and money, and exposes our carefully guarded
classified information to easy and safe interception.
SOURCE: ESC TEMPEST Office, 1Lt Hackett.
COMINT THREAT TO U.S. AUTOVON AND GERMAN BUNDESPOST
TELEPHONE NETW RK (U)
(C/NF) The purpose of this article is to reveal the extensive and
sophisticated effort that the Warsaw Pact has dedicated to the
collection of information from the highly lucrative, and vulnerable,
U.S. AUTOVON and West German Bundespost telephone system. Thousands
of AUTOVON calls are made daily by European assigned personnel.
Although reminders warning against discussion of classified
information are posted on all military phones, Communications
Security (COMSEC) monitoring of AUTOVON lines has disclosed that
classified information, or information considered hazardous to
National Security, is discussed openly over AUTOVON phone lines.
These discussions provide Warsaw Pact intelligence services with
valuable and sensitive data.
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(4) (S/NF) AEROFLOT, the Soviet National Airline, is possibly
being used to monitor AUTOVON communications. In Oct 83, three
AEROFLOT flights deviated from scheduled takeoff and approach paths
to overfly the U.S. Army military facility in Livorno, Italy. This
facility consists of an ammunition storage area, a depot area, and
the Altano AUTOVON switching center. One of these aircraft was an
AN-12 CUB -- a type suspected of conducting covert SIGINT
collection.
(5) (S/NF) The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet
General Staff (GRU) has technical service elements established in
Soviet legal residences throughout the world. These technical
service elements conduct continuous COMINT collection against U.S.
Communications, to include the AUTOVON network. In Central Europe,
COMINT collection occurs at the Soviet trade mission in Brussels,
Belgium, the Soviet Embassy in Luxembourg, the Soviet Embassy in
Bonn, and probably the Soviet trade mission in Cologne. Exploitation
targets include format messages such as Emergency Action Messages
(EAM) passed on AUTOVON channels from the CINCEUR, and phone
conversations between military personnel both in Europe and the U.S.
(6) (S/NF) At the SMLM facility in Frankfurt, two 19-element
Yagi Ultra High Frequency (UHF/Very High Frequency (VHF) antennas are
pointed towards the Donnersberg and Geldberg, West Germany, AUTOVON
switching centers. Intercept of communications emanating from these
centers would allow access to a large amount of unencrypted AUTOVON
circuits. On 10 Mar 77, a SMLM vehicle from Frankfurt was detailed
less than 100 yards from the V Corps Mobile Tactical Command Post
(CP). Signal Security (SIGSEC) monitoring of USAREUR phone lines
reflected a 4 Mar 84 conversation in which the Corps Tactical CP was
indicated to be "700 meters south of the 3rd Armored Division at or
near NB414133." There is a possibility the SMLM could have had
foreknowledge of the CP location as a result of the AUTOVON
monitoring.
(7) (S/NF) Microwave communications intercept sites are located
throughout East Germany and Czechoslovakia along the West German
border. The site at Brocken, East Germany, maintained by an
unidentified Soviet SIGINT brigade subordinate to HQ GSF6, is a major
Soviet intercept facility tasked with the monitoring of Bundespost
and U.S. AUTOVON telephone communications. This site is perfectly
placed for the intercept of telephone calls transmitted via microwave
links physically located within West Germany.
(8) (C/NF) A former senior lieutenant with the Czechoslovak 7th
Radio Regiment, a major COMINT organization tasked with radio
intercept of CENTAG communications, disclosed that the most lucrative
intelligence was derived from monitoring of the U.S. AUTOVON network.
He was assigned to an intercept company at Cerchov, Czechoslovakia,
intercept site monitoring on a daily basis the super high frequency
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(SHF) AUTOVON switchboard of the U.S. VII Corps.
(9) (C/NF) The 78th Radio Center, a regimental size COMINT
collection unit subordinate to the Czechoslovak ministry of National
Defense is responsible for the intercept of troposcatter
communications between USAREUR and the U.S. Army Berlin Brigade.
This intercept of AUTOVON communications transmitted via microwave is
conducted at Dylen and Cerchov. Parabolic antennas are used for this
intercept.
(10) (C/NF) West German Intelligence/Security Services are well
aware that Soviet Bloc nations intercept telephone calls made both
within West Germany and between West Berlin and West Germany. An
official of the Bonn government stated that long distance calls
transmitted via microwave are intercepted by the Soviet Bloc using
special equipment and then analyzed with the help of sophisticated
computers. West German governmental telephone communications are a
high intercept target for HOIS.
(11) (C/NF) In an effort to limit the success of this monitoring
activity, the Bonn government has replaced their conventional
telephone cables with fiber-optic cables for their official telephone
communications. This will minimize the effect of electromagnetic
"bleeding" from the cables making hostile intercept much more
difficult.
(12) (S/NF) Since the early 1970s, high emphasis has been placed
on the intercept of microwave channels owned and operated by the West
German Bundespost and leased by the U.S. and West German military.
Targets for this intercept include the telephone exchanges at
Frankfurt, Kaiserslautern, Munich, and possibly Augsburg. The
exploitation of AUTOVON links serving U.S. Corps and division
elements, as well as individual units fielding Theater Nuclear Force
(TNF), Readiness, exercise plans/results, equipment capabilities, and
operational limitations.
(13) (S/NF) HOIS also monitor selected AUTOVON circuits carried
over U.S. communications satellites. The Defense Satellite
Communication System (DSCS) is the principal Super High Frequency
(SHF) SATCOM system providing communications among DOD users. The
DSCS is responsible for maintaining AUTOVON satellite communications
servicing some 130 globally deployed earth terminals. The Soviet
Union and other Soviet Bloc nations intercept DSCS Communications
Satellites (COMSATS) carrying AUTOVON communications.
(14) (S/NF) Of the nine GRU military associated satellite
intercept facilities located in the Soviet Union, the site at Vicak
USSR, is believed to be tasked with the exploitation of AUTOVON
communications carried by the Atlantic DSCS II Satellite. A 16.5
meter parabolic antenna is used to intercept the DSCS. DSCS
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communications are also probably intercepted at the Lourdes Central
SIGINT complex near Torrens, Cuba. The KGB maintains satellite
intercept sites in the Soviet Union for the intercept of commercial
satellite signals not associated with the U.S. military.
(15) (S/NF) The East Germans and the Poles are also believed to
possess satellite intercept sites used to monitor U.S. AUTOVON
communications between West Germany and the continental U.S. The
Czechoslovakian 78th Radio Center also monitors satellite
communications in the range of 200 to 400 MHZ and eight GHZ. The
Soviets primarily use the Soviet Intelligence Collection Ship (AGI)
fleet for mobile COMSAT intercept. Many AGI's are assessed to be
capable of intercepting signals in the range of 15 KH3 to 100 GH3,
easily covering all DSCS frequencies.
(16) (C/NF) Conclusion. At this time, U.S. AUTOVON and West
German Bundespost telephone circuits are being consistently exploited
for their intelligence value since the reliance on these
communications are critical to USAREUR in both peace and war. There
is little doubt that HOIS will continue to heavily monitor these
circuits. The only methods available for ensuring AUTOVON/Bundespost
security from hostile monitoring activities would be to bulk encrypt
all communications emanating from the major switching centers or to
provide speech encipherment devices at all line terminals
(telephones). In the case of the AUTOVON network, this is not
feasible in the near future and is cost prohibitive. With regard to
the Bundespost system, the cost of total network encryption could not
be justified by the West German government based on the philosophy
that the Bundespost is a public, as opposed to a military,
communication network.
(17) (S/NF) A recent defector assigned to a major
Czechoslovakian SIGINT unit stated his organization collected their
most valuable data by monitoring the phone calls of U.S./NATO flag
officers. Since this is the case, it would be appropriate to supply
these personnel with speech encipherment devices in lieu of, or
attached to, their telephones. A likely candidate for this device
would be the STU-2M recently developed by NSA. An addition of more
AUTOSEVOCOM terminals throughout the USAREUR command would also help
to eliminate the need to "talk around" classified information when a
secure telephone is unavailable.
(18) (C/NF) The HOIS capability to intercept, process and glean
intelligence from the AUTOVON or Bundespost networks is formidable.
This capability represents a serious threat to USAREUR and will
become an even greater threat in the future as more U.S. military
telephone lines are leased from the Bundespost. At the present time,
HOIS can accurately determine USAREUR's readiness posture,
operational deficiencies, organization, exercise plans/results, and
the complete status of the TNF force. The HOIS acquisition of more
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sophisticated intercept equipment and large scale computers obtained
through western technology transfers, will increase USAREUR's
vulnerability to hostile collection derived from the monitoring of
AUTOVON/Bundespost telephone circuits and poses an even greater
threat to Operations Security throughout the command.
SOURCE: CINCUSAREUR - Extract from ESC OPSEC Highlights Message
23150OZ Feb 85.
SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE TRAVEL IN THE U.S. (U)
The following article was extracted from a U.S. Army Intelligence
and Threat Analysis Center Intelligence Brief. It provides a
synopsis of Soviet Military attache travel within the United States
during 1980-83, and a summary of their overt collection
activities.
A. (S) As the "main enemy" of the Soviet Union, the U.S. is
subjected to pervasive intelligence targeting by the Committee of
State Security, or KGB, and the Ministry of Defense's Chief
Directorate for Intelligence or GRU. Collection efforts to satisfy
this targeting range from legal and overt to illegal and clandestine.
This article will provide insight into the intelligence threat posed
by one type of Soviet Intelligence Collection Activity: Overt
collection by Soviet Military Attaches (SMA) during travel in the
B. (S) SMA travel in the U.S. from their Washington DC Embassy base
during the period 1980-83 showed little significant change from
travel performed in prior years. Travel was invariably in pairs with
at least one attache having experience traveling in the U.S. Neither
rank nor service affiliation seemed to bear on who was paired with
whom.
C. (S) Because of the frequency and numbers of SMA and other Soviets
who travel the Washington DC - New York City corridor, routine
monitoring has been very limited. Information on this route of
travel is not included.
D. (S) SMA's generally use Soviet-owned vehicles for travel to
destinations that lie within about 500 miles of Washington DC. One
exception to this rule was an April 1982 trip when they made a round
trip drive to Fort Lauderdale FL from Washington DC. The normal mode
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of travel is public transportation, usually flying to a base city and
then using local airlines, buses, or taxies for shorter trips. SMA's
are not permitted to rent vehicles. The SMA's have deviated from the
schedule outlined'in their travel requests only twice in the past
three years. Once they deviated and drove by the Pratt and Whitney
Plant in Hartford CT and once they had to remain overnight in Chicago
IL because of a cancelled airline flight.
E. (S) While traveling by car, the SMA's make numerous stops for
food, refueling, picture taking, and driver changes. They are
usually safe and careful drivers, having been stopped for speeding
only twice in the past three years. When traveling by air, they
check their suitcases but never their attache cases. They are also
careful to avoid having their cameras x-rayed at airport security
check points.
F. (S) While traveling, the SMA's invariably carry at least one, and
often two, attache cases, which never leave their possession. They
also have at least one, and often two, 35mm cameras. They carry what
appears to be a normal amount of luggage for the trip to be
undertaken. Despite this, they have been observed wearing the same
clothing for a four-five day period with a resulting strong body
odor.
G. (S) Hotel or motel accommodations are made for SMA's in advance.
They tend to stay at moderately priced national chain motels. Upon
registration, they identify themselves as Soviet diplomats. If
asked, they will admit to being Soviet military officers although
they always travel in civilian clothing. About half the time they
eat their meals in their rooms, combining Russian canned goods they
have brought with them with bread, fruit, and vegetables acquired in
a local grocery. When they do eat out, it is usually at an
inexpensive place and the meal usually consists of pizza or
hamburgers. They very often drink beer with both lunch and dinner
and usually consume one or two bottles of vodka in their room at
night. They will occasionally invite someone they meet by chance in
the halls or dining room of the motel to come to their room for
drinks. The drinking and conversation often lasts until early in the
morning. These guests are always male. On one occasion, the guest
was an FBI undercover agent.
H. (S) The SMA's have made a total of 10 or 11 major trips each year
for the past three years. On each of these trips, the SMA's usually
spend one or two nights in different cities on their scheduled
itinerary.
I. (S) The daily routine of the SMA's while on a trip does not vary
greatly. They visit the local chamber of commerce, telephone
company, library, book stores, and sometimes a museum, amusement park
or art gallery. They acquire information on local employers, maps, a
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local telephone directory, and any other available information. Most
of the material is available free, but the Soviets will pay for the
material if required. If the material is not for sale, they will
copy it whenever possible. In libraries at state capitols and state
universities, the Soviets will sometimes spend hours obtaining
materials of a statewide nature. They seem especially interested in
heavy industry, power companies, port facilities, and transportation
networks.
J. (S) The SMA's have been observed taking a large number of
pictures during their trips. Often they appear to be merely
photographing local tourist attractions. Some of the photography
appears to be designed to include microwave towers, radio relay
antennas, or local government-related communications antennas in the
background. At other times, the SMA's purposely walk to an otherwise
insignificant building or areas and carefully position each other for
a photograph. This latter type of photography may have any of
several purposes: To spot and record suspected surveillants, to
provide a mix of general subjects among overt intelligence subjects
in case the film gets into the hands of strangers who would otherwise
turn it in to U.S. authorities, to get non-mission related photos for
family or friends, or, possibly to support mensuration of Soviet
overhead photography.
K. (S) The SMA's are avid collectors of overt information at nearly
every city visited on their itineraries. Examples of information
collected include:
Local telephone directories
Local and statewide business directories
Local, state, and regional maps
Directories of research facilities
Guides to sources of information which businessmen and
researchers can use as references
Marketing Information
Data on local, state, and regional industries
Economic profiles of areas visited and manufacturing guides
Relocation packets providing local area information, e.g.,
housing, schools, churches, recreation facilities, and employment
Listings of industrial firms
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Directories from colleges and universities
Copies of unclassified military manuals, dealing with basic
military subjects, that are available in university libraries.
Photographs of landmarks, buildings, and other areas of
political, economic, or historical interest.
Local chamber of commerce, Federal Information Center, and State
Information Center handouts of all types.
Local newspapers, especially those that contain items relating to
area military bases or prominent Defense contractors.
Environmental Impact Statements
Zip Code Directories
Adult Education Programs.
Directories of electronic and light assembly manufacturing
plants.
Data on Florida ports and International Airports, facilities,
docks, tide tables, and warehouses.
Directories of research facilities which provide mailing
addresses.
Published items on the MX missile program.
Directories published in 1982 and 1983, of military commanders,
public affairs officers, protocol officers, and secretaries (provides
lists of individuals by rank, area of assignment, and telephone
number).
Who's Who in business and professions.
Department of Defense or local directories of military officers.
L. (S)
Attempts to detect and identify surveillants.
Great attention to detail in positioning attache cases which
could indicate possible short range agent communication activity.
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libraries, and tourist areas.
Brief trips to certain areas where the only observed activity was
a telephone call from a public telephone booth.
Unexplained, unprovoked periods of apparent tension or great
nervousness.
Frequent checking of watches.
Non-typical periods of inactivity in parks or extended stays in
restaurants or movie theaters.
Suspicious activities of unknown individuals in the immediate
vicinity of SMA's.
M. S
IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (U)
A multidiscipline threat utilized by Hostile Intelligence Services
is Imagery Intelligence (IMINT.) This article explains a few of its
capabilities.
(U) The importance of imagery interpretation was demonstrated
effectively during WWII, Korea, and the Cuban crisis. In WWII,
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military experts found that almost eighty percent of the intelligence
was derived from aerial photography. Imaging sensors can collect
information over otherwise inaccessible areas. This is perhaps
their most important military advantage. The imagery is a permanent
record of the detail within the sensor field of view, and provides a
first-hand impression of the target to the expert qualified to
interpret it, though he may be many miles distant. The imagery is
unprejudiced and reproducible; it can be studied and restudied for
various purposes by different users. It can be compared, detail by
detail, with other imagery of the same area to provide comparative
intelligence. Imagery may be used to map or chart an area as to
geographic and cultural detail, and to provide beach and coastal
information as well as bottom conditions in the shore area. It can
sometimes provide detailed data on shore water depths, but it cannot
confirm deep-water soundings. Sensor imagery can provide much
detailed military information, such as strength and disposition of
enemy forces and general terrain features of areas under his
control.
CAPABILITIES:
(U) ... Imagery interpretation provides an accurate and extensive
source of information relative to the strength, disposition, and
activities of the enemy in areas not readily accessible to ground
observers.
(U) ... It provides extensive and detailed information regarding the
enemy's installation and equipment and general terrain features of
areas under his control, such as vegetation, soil, beaches and water
depths.
(U) ... It provides a means of detecting errors in bombing, and data
from which recommendations can be made for improvement in operational
techniques.
(U) ... It furnishes indications, as in bomb damage clearance and
reconstruction studies, of the enemy's evaluation of the importance
of damage inflicted on him.
(U) ... It provides target data for operational use, such as
annotated plans of enemy installations.
(U) ... It can usually detect and see through camouflage designed to
confuse the aerial observer or attack pilot. In addition, it makes
possible an evaluation of friendly camouflage techniques.
(U) ... It provides highly accurate information for the preparation
and revision of maps and charts.
(U) ... It provides checks on the accuracy of reports from other
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intelligence sources covering visible objects or activities.
(U) ...It provides a means for assessing the physical effectiveness
of geographic and cultural detail, and to provide beach and coastal
information as well as bottom conditions in the shore area. It can
sometimes provide detailed data on shore water depths, but it cannot
confirm deep - water soundings. Sensor imagery can provide much
detailed military information, such as strength and disposition of
enemy force and general terrain features of areas under his control.
USSR: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (U)
A. (S/NF/NC) The Soviet Bloc is using United Nations Programs
to gain Western technology. Reportedly, the Soviet Union will use
$20,000 of the United Nations Education and Scientific Cooperation
Organization (UNESCO) funds to establish a pilot project on
microcomputers for their polytechnic schools. Undoubtedly, key
features of computer hardware/software, as well as know-how and
experience, will flow from the schools to be used in military
applications. Normally, UNESCO funds are intended to help transfer
new technology to developing countries; however, because a Soviet is
directing the microcomputer pilot project, Soviet acquisition of
funds was assured.
NOCONTRACT
WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE
37 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTE )
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OPSEC UPDATE - APRIL 1985
COMMENTS:
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HQ ESC/D000
ATTN: OPSEC UPDATE
SAN ANTONIO, TX 7 8 2 4 3- 5 0 0 0
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OPSEC
YOUR OPSEC OFFICER IS:
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I
OPSEC YOUR OPSEC OFFICER IS:
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KEEP THE 11D ON EVERYTHING!
OPSEC YOUR OPSEC OFFICER IS:
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9 I
CAN YOUR OPERATION
WEATHER THE STORK"?
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Lon
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YOUR OPSEC OFFICER IS:
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SgHH! IOMEONE~' F/SalG!
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ARE YOU "BREWING UP" AN
OPSEC ;YF,,-ASjT;
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OPSEC YOUR OPSEC OFFICER IS
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RADINT
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
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RADIATION
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THREAT
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OPSEC DISTRIBUTION
FILE NAME: DISTRO1 DATE OF PRINTING: 24 APRIL 85
1 ALLRESSLES
3 1ST CEG/REOO
5 2BMW/DOC
7 3AF/ESO
9 3D AIR DIVISION
11 5TH AF/DOP
13 8AF/DOXF
15 9TH AF/INS
17 9 STRAT RECON WING/IN
19 12TH AF/DOXE
21 12 ABG/XPR
23 1 E.A F/DOXM
25 16 AF(INS)
2? .17 SUPS/10A
29 20 MWS/DOS
31 23NR/AD
33 31 ARRS/CC
35 38 ARRS/CC
37 40 TACG/IN
39 41 CAMS/CC
41 41 RWRW/INS
43 42NLBW/LO
45 54 WRS
47 60 MAWG/INS/STOP 6
49 71 ARRS/CC
51 102 ARKS
53 140 TAW'/DOX
55 185 TAS
57 317 TAW/DOT
59 435 TAW/INS
61 443 MAW/DOXC
63 6O1TCW/FS
:65 160' MAC 5Q
67 1901 ISG/SP
69 1915 ISS/KT
71 1965 ISG
73 19E5 ISS/ASC/SSR
75 2049 ISG
77 2152 ISS
79 2189 ISS/DONA
81 3270TTCP/TTGE
83 3902 AE'W'/XP
85 AFCC/LFT 6
87 AFTC/XRO STOP 31
59 AND/RDI
91 ARMEL FORCES STAFF
2 *DMAAC/SOFA*
4 2AD/INS1
6 2 WS/SQ
8 3ACCS/DOF-B
10 5TH AF/INS
12 7TH WEATHER WING
14 8AF/INS
16 9 STRA T RECON WING
18 10 T'WTR/INS
20 12Th AF/INS
22 13TH AF/DOY
24 15AF/INS
26 16Th SURVLILLANCE SQ
28 178CF(SIT)/DC
30 21 AF/INS/STOP 11
32 30 4 FATHER SQ/DOX
34 33 ARKS
36 39 ARRk/DOI
38 41 A.RRS/CC
40 41 RWR/DO
42 41 1CS/DOI
44 53WRS/CC
46 55 WRS/CC
48 62 MAW/LOXC
50 100/119 TCF/DOT
52 121 TFW/DOX
54 165 TAG/DOI
56 304 AERS/DOI (AFRES)
58 4.16NMS/MAWSM
600 437 MAW/DOXE
62 497 RTG/INS
54 931 AFREEG/DOI
66 1883D ISS
68 1905 ISS
72 1954 RADAR
72 1974 ISG/TPA
74 204E ISC
76 2130 ISS
78 2160 ISS/ATC
80 3246 TEST WG/CCU
82 3395 TAG/TTEOOAF
84 7113 SAS (USAFE/INCES)
86 AFDSCP/SCP
88 AFWL/INS
90 JOINT LIAISAON DET
92 SURVEY SFCT. SHAPE
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93
FLEET AIR EEFLAVIK
2
94.
US FORCES CAR:RI FEEAN
95
COMMANDI IN CEIFF US
2
96
DEFENSE COMM AGENCY
97
DEL' 257 AFTAC
2
98
DET 1 2046 I SG
99
DFT 1 AECOS
2
122
DET 1 USAF IAWC/DA
101
LET 10 5 WS/CC
2
102
LET 2 SPACE DIVISION/ENI
103
DET 23 17 4:S/CC
2
104
DET 3 23 AF/DA
105
LET 75/ r WFATEER 'eG
2
125
DET 9 37 ARES
107
LIA
2
108
DIA/0S-1C
109
DOL C3CM J.F/IN
2
110
ELECTRONIC SYS DIV/INS
111
FAA ISL/ACS-300
2
112
FFMA REGION 6
113
AFWAL/GLX?S
2
114
FTD/SF
115
HQ
129 A.RES
2
116 HQ 137/I AY.
2
117
EQ
166TAC GP
2
118 EQ 2187 ISG/SF
2
119
HQ
22AF/LGRSS
2
120 ESQ 25. IFAVO
121
HQ
2ND 4;EATHER WING/DCX
2
122
HQ 326 STEAT Y.G/INS
2
123
HQ
314.AD/INS
2
124
EQ 3AF/XN
2
125
HQ
4AF/P0 (AFRES)
2
126
HQ 834. AIRLIFT DIV.
2
127
EQ
914 TAC AIRLIFT GP (AFRES)
2
128
HQ A:AC/POY
2
129
HQ.
AAC/INS
2
130
EQ, A.L/INS
2
131
HQ
ADCOM/INXS
2
132
E.Q. AF GLOBAL WEA TEER CFNI
AL 2
133
HQ
AFAFC/LGVS
2
134
EQ.AFCC/DOY 2
135
HQ
AFCC/SIMS
2
136
EQ,
AFCC/XORIA
2
113?
HQ
AFCOMS/IGS
2
138
EQ
AFDSD?/SCP
2
139
HQ
AFISC/LEOF
2
142
HQ
AFISC/I:.OEF
2
141
HQ
AFIS/INOI
2
142
HQ
AFIS/INOI
2
143
HQ
AFIS/INSC
2
144
HQ
AFIS/INSP..
50
.145
EQ
AFISC
2
146
E:Q
AFISC/IGAK
2
147
HQ.
AFLC LCC/XOWVj
2
148
HQ
AFMCD/SP
2
149
EQ
AFOSI/IVOA
2
152
HQ
AFOSI/IVOX
2
151
EQ
AFOSP
2
152
HQ
AFOSP/SPI
2
153
HQ
AFOSP/SPO
2
154
HQ
AFRLS/L'OXE
2
155
HQ
A.FRLS/PCXX
2
156
EQ
AFSC/TEOX
2
157
HQ
AFSC/INS
2
158
EQ
AFTAC/LOR
2
159
EQ
AFTPC/CK
2
160
HQ
AFTPC/IC
2
161
HQ
AMD/PDI
2
162
CiQ
A TC/XPR
2
163
HQ
AWS/DOJR
2
164
h Q
tAC INS/INU
2
165
HO
MAC/DOOAS
2
166 HQ PACAF/INS
167
N.Q
SAC/LOCCO
2
168
EQ
SAC/LOR
2
169
HQ
TACOPS/INO
2
170
HQ
SPACE COMMAND/DOCE
2
171
HQ
SPACE DIVISION
2
172
HQ
SPACE DIVISION
2
173
HQ
SPACFCM D/DOCE
2
174
EQ
TAC/LOXC
2
175
HQ
TAC/SIS
25
1'6
EQ
USAF/XOEO
42
177
EQ
USAFE/DOFF
2
178
HQ
USA FE./DOFF
2
179
EQ
USAFF/INS/INST
2
180
HQ
USAIFRC/CC
2
181
HQ
USCENTCOM/CCJ3-OC
2
182
JOINT CRUISE MISSLE PROJECT 2
183
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONAL
2
184
LA.NIIRN TEST TEAM
185
NAFCOS (BA.F)/LOXT
2
186
NGE/XOX
18?
NSA C/O CIE
2
188
NSA-F61
189
NSA/S-15
2
190
NSA/S112
191
NSA/S114
2
192
OHIO ANG
193
OJCS/NEACP
2
194
PACAF/DOXZ
195
PACOPS/LOX
2
195
SPACE DIVISION/CSI
197
SPACE DIVISION/INS
2
198
SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER
199
USAF INTL REP (USAFINREP FM)
2
200
USAFF. ELF 1 CMD/INS
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201 FAQ ADCOM/J3CE 2
203 HQ USCINCLANT 2
205 HQ USREDCOM 2
207 JEWC 2
209 OJCS/J1 2
211 USCENTCOM 2
213 USCINCPAC J316 2
215 CI DETACHMENT 2
217 DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY 2
219 FAA 2
221 INSTITUTE-DEFENSE ANNALYSIS 2
223 LOS ALAMOS NL 2
225 NR LIRNSA FMDE 1522 NRC 2
227 US DEPT OF STATE 2
229 HQ ESE 2
231 HQ ESP 2
233 HQ ESS 2
235 DET 1 HQ EST 2
237 DET 3 EQ EST 2
239 OLTS. HQ EST 2
241 6906 ESS 2
243 6911 ESG 2
245 6913 ESS 2
24? 6916 ESS 2
249 6918 ESS 2
251 6922 ESS 2
253 6931 ESS 2
255 6947 ESS 2
257 6948 ESS 2
259 6945 ESS 2
261 6952 ESS 2
263 6960 SPS 2
265 6981 ESS 2
267 6988 FSS 2
269 6990 ESG 1
271 6994 ESS 2
273 8075 ESS (AFRES) 2
275 34EOTTG/TTN2 2
277 AFCSC 2
279 JEWC 2
251 HQ ESC/AC 1
283 HQ ESC/DA 1
285 EQ ESC/IF 1
287 HQ FSC/DOC 1
229 HQ ESC/DOQ 1
291 EQ ESC/L;OT 1
293 EQ ESC/DP 1
295 HQ LSC/HO 1
29? HQ ESC/IN 1
299 HQ ESC/PA 1
301 HQ ESC SFI 1
303 1TFW/DO 5
305 4TF4'/DO 5
307 9A.F/DOX 5
202 HQ LSOC 2
204 HQ USEUCOM 2
206 HQ USSOUTECOM 2
208 JEWC/CDC 2
210 OJCS/J3/J33 2
212 USCINCLANT (J625) 2
214 USECENTOCM 2
216 DCA 2
218 DIS 2
220 FEMA. 2
222 JS DEPT OF JUSTICE 2
224 NASA HQ DOD AFFAIRS DIV. 2
226 US DEPT OF ENERGY 2
228 HQ ESA 2
230 DET 1 HQ ESE/SP 2
232 OLYO HQ ESP/5AF 2
234 HQ EST 2
236 DET.2 HQ EST 2
238 OLTE hQ EST 2
240 6903 ESG 2
242 6910 1SW 2
244 6912 ESC 2
246 6915 FSS 2
248 6917 ESG 2
250 6920 ESC 2
252 6924 ESS 2
254 6940 ESW 2
255 DET 1 6947 ESS 2
253 6949 ESS 2
260 6950 FSG 2
262 6960 ES4. 2
264 6964 CPSS 2
266 6985 ESS 2
268 6990 ESG 2
270 6993 ESS/DOGA 2
272 DET 1 6994 ESS 2
274 3420TTG/TTM1 2
276 3480TTW 2.
278 AFEWC 2
280 HQ. FSC/CC 1
282 EQ ESC/AL 1
284 HQ ESC/DC 1
285 HQ ESC/DO 1
288 EQ ESC/LOO 1
290 EQ ESC/DOS 1
292 HQ PSC/DOZ 1
294 HQ ESC/P.C 1
295 HQ F.SC/IG 1
299 EQ ESC/LG 1
300 HQ ESC/SP 1
302 HQ ESC/XP 1
304 3TF'W/IN 5
306 ETFW/IN 5
306 10 AF/R/DOX S
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
309
15ABW/DOX
310
1ETFW/DOT
311
23AL/LOX
312
231 Fb;/L0
313
24COhiPw/D0
314.
24_A D/D0
;15
25AD/DOF
316
26 I D/DCX
317
27TF'W/D00
318
31TFW/I:0
319
33TEW'/D0
320
35TFW/D0
321
3?TFW/L0
322
49`11W,/Do
323
51TFW/IN
324
56TTW/LO
325
57FW'W/DO
325
5ETIV/DO
32?
671RW/LO
329
102 FIW/IN
329
108TFW/DO
330
113TFW/D0
331
116TFW/LO
332
11?TRW;/I'0
333
121TFW/D0
334:
122 TFtiv/L0
335
123 TRW;/DO
336
128 TEW/DO
33?
131 TFW/LO
338
132 TFW/DO
339
140 TFW/D0
340
144 FIW/DO
341
174TFW'/DO
342
301 TFW/D0
343
325 FW'W/LO
344
326AD/IOT
345
347TFW/D0
346
354TFW/I:0/IN
347
355TT'W/DO
348
36F'#/D0
349
366TFW/10
350
374TAW/LOX
351
388'1 FW/D0
352
40STTW/D0
353
419 TFW/DO
354
432.TFW/DOC
355
434TFW/IN/D0
356
4351FW/CCA
357
442TFW/D0
3E9
4741FW/D0
359
4?5AB4v/0T F
360
479TTW/LO
361
482TFW/D0
362
507TAIRCW/D0
363
552AWACD/DOX
364
602 AIRCW/D0
365
831AL/CCE
366
832AL/CCE
36?
833D CS6/SPOM
368
833AD/CCV
369
833AD/IGC
370
833AD/IG
371
836AL/CCE
372
5542SW/CC
373
EQ 20TFW
374
EQ A F I /DO
375
SE ROCC INTFLL FACILITY/
3?6
USAEADWC/D0
37?
USAFSO/D0
378.USAFTAWC/L00
379
USAFTAWC/DOX
380
USAETFWC/CS
381
EQ AFOT'FC/CV0
382
EQ AFOTEC/TLF
383
DET 1 AFOTEC
384
DET 2 AFOTEC
385
DET 3 AFOTEC
386
DFT 4 AFOTEC/TSE
38?
LET 5 AFOTEC
329
OL-AC AFOTEC
389
OL-AE AFOTEC/OTEA
390
OL-AF AFOTEC
391
01-AI AFOTEC
392
AFOTEC ICBM
393
OL-AN AFOTEC
394
OL-PS AFOTEC
395
CL-AT AFOTEC
396
OL-AW AFOTEC
397
0L-AV AE0TEC
396
OL-f.Y AFOTEC
399
OL-BA AFOTEC (AF/LF)
400
OL-EC AFOTEC
401
OL-BF AFOTEC
402
OL-EW AFOTEC
403
OL-BT AFOTEC
404
OL-DD AFOTEC
405
HQ 1 CEVG/RBOO
406
LET 1. 1CEVG
407
DET 2. 1CEVG
408
DET 4. 1CEVC
409
DET 5. 1CFVG
410
DET 7. 1CFVG
411
DET 8. 1CEVG
412
DET 9. 1CEVG
413
DET 10. 1CEVG
414
DET 11. 1CEVG
415
DFT 12 1CEVG/RBO
416
DET 14 1CEVG
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
417
DET 16 1CEVG
419
DET 24 1CEVC
419
AFOSI
DIST
1
420
AFOSI
LIT
102
421
AFOSI
DET
106
422
AFOSI
DET
109
423
AFOSI
DET
110
424
AFOSI
DIT
111
425
AFOSI
LET
140
426
AFOSI
LISTRICT 4
427
AFOSI
DET
403
428
AFOSI
DET
411
429
AFOSI
DET
412
430
AFOSI
DET
413
431
AFOSI
DET
414
432
AFOS1
DFT
440
433
AFOSI
DISTRICT 5
434
AFOSI
105
OL-L
435
AFOSI
LET
509
436
A.FOSI
DFT
512
437
AFOSI
LET
514
438
AFOSI
LEI
515
439
AFOSI
DET
516
440
AFOSI
LET
518
441
AFOSI
LET
540
442
AFOSI
DISTRICT 7
443
AFOSI
DET
707
444
AFOSI
LET
709/CC
445
AFOSI
DET
710
44.6
AFOSI
.DET
711
447
AFOSI
LET
712
448
AFOSI
DFT
716
449
AFOSI
DET
717
450
AFOSI
LET
721
451
AFOSI
DET
740
452
AFOSI
DO?
OL-E
453
AFOSI
DO7
OL-F
454
AFOSI
DISTRICT 8
455
AFOSI
DET
810
456
AFOSI
LET
811
457
AFOSI
DET
812
459
AFOSI
LET
813
459
AFOSI
DE.T
814
460
AFOSI
LIT
815
461
AFOSI
DET
816
462
AFOSI
BET
840
463
AFOSI
DISTRICT 10
464
AFOSI
LET
1001
465
AFOSI
DET
1008
466
AFOSI
DET
1012
467
AFOSI
DET
1014
468
AFOSI
DET
1016
469
AFOSI
DET
1018
470
AFOSI
LIT
1042
471
AFOSI
DISTRICT 11
472
AFOSI
DET
1101
473
AFOSI
LET
1103
474
AFOSI
DFT
1108
475
AFOSI
DET
1110
476
AFOS I
LET
1114
47?
AFOSI
DET
1117
4?B
AFOSI
LIT
1140
479
AFOSI
DISTRICT 13
460
AFOSI
DET
1302
481
AFOSI
LET
1306
482
AFOSI
DET
1312
483
AFOSI
DET
1313
484
AFOSI
DET
1314
485
AFOSI
DET
1340
486
AFOSI
DISTRICT 14
487
AFOSI
LET
1401
488
AFOSI
LET
1402
489
AFOSI
DET
1404
490
AFOSI
DET
1405
491
AFOSI
LET
1406
452
AFOSI
DET
1407
493
AFOSI
DET
1406
494
AFOSI
LET
1440
495
AFOSI
DISTRICT 16
496
AFOSI
DET
1801
497
AFOSI
DET
1802
498
AFOSI
DFT
1803
499
AFOSI
DET
1810
500
AFOSI
LET
1811
501
AFOSI
DET
1812
502
AFOSI
DET
1815
503
AFOSI
DET
1816
504
AFOSI
DFT
1817
505
AFOSI
LET
1840
506
AFOSI
LISTRICT 19
507
AFOSI
DET
1901
508
AFOSI
DET
1902
509
AFOSI
LET
1904
510
AFOSI
DET
1905
511
AFOSI
DET
1910
512
AFOSI
LET
19 OL-C
513
AFOSI
DET
1940
514
AFOSI
DISTRICT 20
515
AFOSI
DET
2001
516
AFOS I
LIT
2004
517
AFOSI
DET
2006
516
AFOSI
DET
2007
519
AFOSI
DFT
2010
520
AFOSI
LET
2011
521
AFOSI
LET
2040
522
AFOSI
LISTRICT 21
523
AFOSI
DET
2101
524
AFOSI
DET 2102
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
525 AFOSI LET LET 2103 1
527 AFOSI DET 2105 1
529 AFOSI DISTRICT 42 1
531 AFOSI DET 4203 1
533 AFOSI DISTRCT 45 1
535 AFOSI LET 4503 1
537 AFOSI DET 4506 1
539 AFCSI DET 4540 1
541 AFOSI LET 4606 1
543 AFOSI DEl 4641 1
545 AFOSI DISTRICT 62 OL-B 1
547 AFOSI DET 6203 1
549 AFOSI DET 6205 1
551 AFOSI LET 6207 1
553 AFOSI DET 6209 1
555 AFOSI DF:T 6240 1
557 AFOSI DET 6801 1
559 AFOSI DET 6803 1
561 AFOSI DET 6805 1
563 AFOSI DET 6807 1
565 AFOSI DET 6809 1
567 AFOSI DET 6901 1
569 AFOSI DET 6903 1
571 AFOSI DET 6940 1
573 AFOSI US EMBASSY (D-321) 1
575 AFOSI RA OL-L 1
577 AFCSI DET 7008 1
579 AFOSI DET 7011 1
581 AFOSI DET 7014 1
583 AFOSI DET 7028 1
585 AFOSI 7031 1
587 AFOSI DET 7033 1
589 AFOSI LET 7040 1
591 400 MP P.W. CAMP 2
593 USSASSD BERLIN 2
595 470TH MI GROUP 2
59? COMMANDER 2
599 USASSD WI;ITE SD 2
601 EQ 1ST BN 209TH FA NYARNC 2
623 HQ USA MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT 2
605 HQ VII CORPS 2
607 HQS 7TH SIGNAL COMMAND 2
609 US ARMY COMBINED AREA CTL 2
611 BRAVO COMPANY - 104TH MI BN 2
613 CINCUSNAVEUR 811 2
615 C03 CORPS 2
61? COMMANDER NSG COMMAND/G123 2
619 TEWC 33 2
621 6MR 2DMD FMF 2
623 EQ 25TH COMBAT AVIATION BT 2
625 MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 2
627 NIS DIRECTOR 2
629 OPNAV (OP-944) 2
631 USN MOBILE CONST. BAT. 74 2
526 AFOSI LIT 2104 1
526 AFOSI DET 2140 1
530 AT.OSI DET 4201 1
532 AFOSI LISTRICT 44 1
534 AFOSI BET 4502 1
536 AFOSI DET 4504 1
536 AFOSI LET 4507 1
540 AFOSI DISTRICT 45 1
542 AFOS I LET 4607 1
544 AFOSI DISTRICT 52 1
545 AFOSI LET 6202 1
548 AFOSI DET 6204 1
55fc AFOSI DET 6206 1
552 AFOSI LET 6206 1
554 AFOSI DET 6210 1
556 AFOSI DISTRICT 68 1
558 AFOSI LET 6802 1
560 AFOSI DET 6804 1
562 AFOSI DET 6806 1
564 AFOSI LET 6808 1
566 AFOSI DISTRICT 69 1
568 AFOSI 69-CA 1
5700 AFOSI LET 6905 1
572 AFOSI DISTRICT 70/IVOE 1
574 AFOSI OL-G 1
576 AFOSI RA OL-M 1
575 AFCSI DET 7012 1
580 AFOSI LET 7013 1
582 AFOSI DET 7024 1
584 AFCSI LET 7030 1
586 AFOS I LET 7032 1
5#?8 AFOSI DET 7034 1
590 193D MIL INT F.L
592 CDR TRADOC 2
594 USASSD MUNICH 2
596 USASSC USARERU
2
598 USAESD BELVOIR 2
600 COMMANDER USASSD HANCOCK 2
602 EQ LA (LAMI-CIC) 2
604 EQ CTSA INSCOM 2
605 HQ XVIII ABN CORPS
608 SECURITY SPT LET/INSCOM 2
610 3482 TTS/INAF
512 CINCPPCFLI (N234)
614 CO 2ND RADIO BTN
616 USASSD BRAGG
618 FITRON ONE ZERO ThREEE
620 USN MCB 74
622 FCTCLANT
624 HQ NAY MAT. MAT 098
626 NAVAL AIR TEST CENTER
62B NSGP. OPS 35
630 USCINCLANT
----->>>>>>>>>>>> TOTAL # OF COPIES REQUIRED:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9
i7LURL I MUFU RI1
r WARNING NOTICE:
SECRET NOFORN j Sensitive Intelligence
Sources and Methods l
I Involved (WNINTEL) 1
I-------------I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/24: CIA-RDP87M00539R000400540016-9