REFERENCE POINTS RE AGENCY PROVIDED PUBLICATION SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00858R000200310017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: August 20, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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 ._. I
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20 August 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Office of Congressional Affairs
Legislative v son,
PRB Reference Center
SUBJECT: Reference Points re Agency Provided Publication Support
In response to your questions regarding the Church Committee testimony,
the following reference appears to meet your search criteria. The reference
passage (see attachment) discusses Agency support of publication for
propaganda purposes.
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities, April 1976, Book I; pages
179-203.
For your information I am also enclosing two other references of roughly
the same vintage as the Church Committee Report that also discuss the subject
of Agency supported publication:
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John
Marks, Tom, pages T64-5, TT T79.
The CIA's Secret Operation, by Harry Rositzke, 1977, pages 158, 163-4.
Attachment
As Stated
STAT
STAT
STAT
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ierican citizens and to prod
)re effective defense of the
interintelligence, including
ation setting standards for
a, are made in the Commit-
[ the Rights of Americans.)
X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE
OPERATIONS: THE CIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITU-
TIONS, THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Although its operational arena is outside the United States, CIA
clandestine o orations make use of American citizens as indivicua7s
or rou American institutions. Clandestine activities much
American. ttions and individuals have taken many forms and are
effected through a wide variety of means: university of 1e al8 and pro
es8or8 rov' and make introductions for intelligence pur-
po8e8; ' scholars and journalists collect intelligence; journalists devise
and place propaganda; United States publications provide cover for "j
CIA agents overseas.
These forms of clandestine cooperation had their origins in the early
Cold War period when most Americans perceived a real threat of a
communist imperium and were prepared to assist their government
to counter that threat. As the communists pressed to influence and to
control international organizations and movements, mass comniunic t-
tions, and cultural institutions, the United States responded by in-
volvin r American private institutions and individuals in the secret
struggle over minds, institutions and ideas. Over time national per-
ceptions would change as to the nature and seriousness of the com-
munist ideological and institutional threat. Time and experience would
also give increasing currency to doubts as to whether it made sense for
it democracy to resort to practices such as the clandestine use of free
American institutions and individuals-practices that tended to blur
the very difference between "our" system and "theirs" that these
covert programs were designed to preserve.
These covert relationships have attracted public concern and the
attention of this Committee because of the importance Americans
atbwh to the independence of private institutions. Americans recognize
that insofar as universities, newsy~ )ors, and religious groups help
mold the beliefs of the public and the policymakers, their diversity
and legitimacy must be rigorously protected. It is through them that,
a society informs and criticizes itself, educates its young, interprets
its history, and sets new goals.
At the same time, Americans also recognize the legitimacy and
necessity of certain clandestine operations, particularly the collection
of foreign intelligence. To conclude that certain sectors of American
life must be placed "off limits" to clandestine operations inevitably
raises questions not only on possible intelligence losses which would
result from such a prohibition, but on whether the United States can
'The material italicized in this report has been substantially abridge at the
request of the executive agencies. The classified version of this material is avail-
able to members of the Senate under the provisions of Senate Resolution 21 and
the Standing Rules of the Senate. See also p. IX.
(179)
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afford to forego the clandestine use of of universities, our media, and
our religious groups in competing with our adversaries.
In exploring this problem the Committee has given special atten-
tion to the CIA's past clandestine relationships with American institu-
tions. The Committee has examined the past to illuminate the attitudes
and perceptions that shaped these clandestine programs using Amer-
ican institutions and to determine whether the internal CIA regula-
tions established in 1967 are sufficient to prevent the large scale pro-
grams of the past from being reinstated in the future.
Some of these concerns were addressed almost a decade ago during
an investigation that proved to Abe a watershed in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's relationship to American institutions. President
Lyndon Johnson, moved -by public and congressional uproar over the
1967 disclosure of the CIA's covert funding of the utiona Student
Association (NSA) and other domestic private institutions, established
the atzern ac ommittee. The Committee, chaired by the then Under
Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzen'bach, directed its investigation
primarily at the CIA's covert funding of American educational and
rivate voluntary oro'aniza tons. The recommendations of the Kaitzen-
ommrttee, a t oug e ad great impact on the CIA's opera-
tions, spoke only to the issue of the covert funding of institutions.
In its investigation the Committee has looked not only at the impact,
of foreign clandestine operations on American institutions but has
focused particular attention on the covert use of individuals. It should
be emphasized from the outset thatt, the integrity of these institutions
or individuals is not jeopardized 'by open contact or cooperation
with Government intelligence institutions. United States Govern-
ment support and cooperation, openly acknowledged. plays an essen-
tial role in American education. Equally important, Government po]-
icymakers draw on the -technical expertise and advice available from
academic consultants and tin i versity-related research organizations.
Open and regular contact with Government agencies is a necessary
part of the journalist's responsibility, as well.
A secret or a covert relationship with any of these institutions, how-
ever, is another matter, and requires careful evaluation, given the
critical role these institutions play in maintaining the freedom of our
society. In approaching the subject the Committee has inquired: Are
the independence and integrity of American institutions in any way
endangered 'by clandestine relationships with the Central Intelligence
Agency? Should clandestine use of institutions or individuals within
those institutionsbe permitted? If not, should there be explicit guide-
lines laid down to regulate Government clandestine support or opera-
tional use of such institutions or individuals? Should such guidelines
be in the form of executive directives or by statute?
In addressing these issues, the Committee's access to CIA documents
and files varied with the subject matter. In reviewing the clandestine
the Select Committee had full and unfettered access to most files and
documentation, With sink a exception o records on mec to re la-
I'M
r . n ate. di'tion, the mmrttee took extensive sworn testimony
1 rom yr ually all of those involved in the management and review of
the pre-1967 projects. Access to post-1967 material was far more re-
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Iniversities, our media, and
ulversaries.
ae has given special atten-
ips with American institu-
to illuminate the attitudes
ne programs using Amer-
Me internal CIA regula-
?event the large scale pro-
- the future.
most a decade ago during
led in the Central Intelli-
I institutions. President
re%ional uproar over the
of the National ,fit bleat
to institutions, established
'haired by the then Under
Erected its investigation
.merican educational and
le,Il ations of the Katzen-
pact on the CIA's opera-
funding of institutions.
ed not only at the impact.
can institutions but has
of individuals. It. should
rity Of these institutions
contact, or cooperation
United States Govern-
wledged, plays an essen-
ortant, Government pol-
c1 advice available from
research organizations.
agencies is a necessary
F these institutions, Vow-
el evaluation, given the
ping the freedom of our
rittee has inquired: Are
institutions in any way
the Central Intelligence
is or individuals within
there be explicit guide-
ustine support or opera-
Should such guidelines
acute?
cress to CIA documents
viewing the clandestine
Inittee inquiry of 1967.
access to most files and
recce s on me Ia re a
unsive sworn testimony
agement and review of
erral was far more re-
stricted : certain of the titles and names of authors of propaganda
book. published after 1967 were denied the Committee; access to files
on the contemporary clandestine use of the American eacac~T miC om-
information which would provide, the num-
bers of institutions and individuals involved an a escript.ion o e
ro e o e In IvI ua s. s or e media, and relationships w1 -re-
ligious groups, the Committee inspected precis or summaries of all
operational relationships since 1951 and then selected over 20 cases for
closer inspection. The documents from these some 20 files were selected
and screened by the Agency and, by mutual agreement, names of indi-
viduals and institutions were removed.
Therefore, the Committee has far from the full picture of the nature
and extent of these relationships and the domestic impact of foreign
clandestine operations. Nevertheless, it has enough to outline the
dimensions of the problem and to underscore its serious nature. The
conclusions and recommendations must necessarily be considered
tentative and subject to careful review by the successor intelligence
oversight committee(s) of the Congress.
In presenting the facts and issues associated with CIA covert rela-
tions with United States private institutions, this report is organized
as follows: I. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations.
II. Covert Relationships with the United States Media. III. Covert
Use of United States Religious Groups.
A. COVERT IT5E OF ACADEMIC AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
The Central Intelligence Aaenc has Ion -developed clandestine
relations r wrt the American academic commurlr w Iic ran
rrom. ac .em.iea making intro uctzons or an to igenre purPoscs to,M
intelligence collection while abroad, to academic research and writing
where sponsorship Is hidden. a Agency has fun t le ac i
lies of American private organizations around the world when thoe '
activities supported-or could be convinced to support-American
foreign policy objectives. Until 1967 the Agency also maintained
covert ties to American foundations in order to pass funds secretly to
private groups whose work the CIA supported.
The relationships have varied according to whether made with an
institution or an individual, whether the relationship is paid or un-
paid, or whether the individuals are "witting"-i.e. aware--of CIA
Involvement. In some cases, covert involvement provided the CIA with
little or no operational control of the institutions involved; funding
was primarily a way to enable people to do things they wanted to do.
In other cases, influence was exerted. Nor was the nature of these re-
lationships necessarily static; in the case of some individuals support
turned into influence, and finally even to operational use.
rin the 1950s and 1960s. the CIA turned increasingly to covert
action in the area of student and labor matters, cultural affairs, comm ens. he s ruggle with communism was seen to
be, at center, a struggle between our institutions and theirs. The CIA
subsidized, advised, and even helped develop "private" organizations
that would compete with the communists around the world. Some of
'For explanation of italics, see footnote. p. 179.
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these organizations were foreign; others were international; yet others
were U.S.-based student, labor, cultural, or philanthropic organiza-
tions whose international activities the CIA subsidized.
The CIA's interest in the areas of student and labor matters, cul-
tural affairs, and community development reached a peak in the mid-
1960's. By 1967, when public disclosure of NSA's funding and the sub-
sequent report of the Katzenbach Committee caused a major curtail-
ment of these activities, interest in the major covert action efforts in
these areas was already waning.
There appear to be two reasons for this. First, there was considerable
skepticism within the CIA as to the effectiveness of this approach. It
differed from classical CIA "tradecraft" in that the organizations
funded were basically independent from CIA control. Richard Helms
expressed this skepticism when he remarked in testimony before this
committee,
The clandestine operator ... is trained to believe that you
really can't count on the honesty of your a ent to do exactly
what you want or to report accurately unless you own him
body and souul.za
Mr. Helms contended that "the clandestine operator sneered at the
other kind of operation"-the aiding and abetting of people or orga-
nizations who are your "friends" or "have the same point of view that
you do."
Skepticism of the clandestine operators was directed particularly
at the Covert Action Staff/International Organizations Division, the
CIA units which conducted the programs in the area of student and
cultural exchange. Second, it became increasingly difficult to conceal
the CIA funds that supported these activities as the scale of the opera-
tions grew. By fiscal year 1967, for example, over $3 million was
budgeted for youth and student programs and $6 million for labor.
Most of the funds were transmitted through legitimate or "devised"
foundations-that is, fictitious entities established by the CIA.
1. CIA Use of Private Foundations, Pre-1967
The use of philanthropic organizations was a convenient way to
pass funds, in that large amounts could be transferred rapidly, and
in a form that need not alert unwitting officers of the recipient organi-
zations to their source. In addition, foundation grants bestowed upon
the recipient the apparent "blessing" of the foundation. The funding
pattern involved a mixture of bona fide charitable foundations, devised
foundations and funds, "front men" drawn from a list of America's
most prominent citizens, and lawyers representing undisclosed clients.
The CIA's intrusion into the foundation field in the 1960s can only
be described as massive. Excluding grants from the "Big Three"-
Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie-of the 700 grants over $10,000 given
by 164 other foundations during the period 1963-1966, at least 108
involved partial or complete CIA funding. More importantly, CIA
funding was involved in nearly half the grants the non-"Big Three"
foundations made (luring this period in the field of international
activities. In the same period more than one-third of the grants
awarded by non-"Big Three" in the physical, life and social sciences
also involved CIA funds.
" Richard Helms testimony, 9/12/75, r. 25-26.
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re international; yet others
1r philanthropic organiza-
subsidized.
snt and labor matters, cul-
reached a peak in the mid-
SA's funding and the sub-
ee caused a major curtail-
or covert action efforts in
rst, there was considerable
eness of this approach. It
in that the organizations
A control. Richard Helms
1 in testimony before this
I to believe that you
a ent to do exactly
unless you own him
operator sneered at the
etting of people or orga-
same point of view that
,as directed particularly
*anizations Division, the
the area of student and
ingly difficult to conceal
as the scale of the opera-
le, over $3 million was
ad $6 million for labor.
legitimate or "devised"
lied by the CIA.
is a convenient way to
ransferred rapidly, and
of the recipient organi-
11 grants bestowed upon
oundation. The funding
)le foundations, devise
'on1 a list of America's
ing undisclosed clients.
:i in the 1960s can only
)m the "Big Three"-
ints over $10,000 given
963-1966, at least 108
ore importantly, CIA
s the non-"Big Three"
field of international
'-third of the grants
ife. and social sciences
183
Bona fide foundations, rather than those controlled by the CIA,
were considered the best and most plausible kind of funding cover for
certain kinds of operations. A 1966 CIA study explained the use of
le timate foundations was the most effective way of concealing the
CIA's hand as well as reassuring members of funded organizations
that the organization was in fact supported by private funds. The
Agency study contended that this technique was "particularly effec-
tive for democratically-run membership organizations, which need to
assure their own unwitting members and collaborators, as well as their
hostile critics, that they have genuine, respectable, private sources of
income."
2. The CIA'8 Foundation-funded Covert Activity, Pre-1967
The philanthropic fronts used prior to 1967 funded a seemingly
limitless range of covert action programs affecting youth groups, labor
unions, universities, publishin houses, and other private institutions
in the United States"ViT a ro`a'd" M*6* following list illustrates the
diversity of these operations :
(1) The CIA assisted in the establishment in 1951 and the funding
for over a decade of a research institute at a major American univer-
sity. This assistance came as the result of a request from Under-secre-
tary of State James Webb to General Bedell Smith, then Director of
the CIA. Mr. Webb proposed that the center, which was to research
worldwide political, economic, and social changes, be supported by the
CIA in the interest of the entire intelligence community.
(2) A project was undertaken in, collaboration with a nationall?l
prominent American business association. The object of the project was
to promote a favorable image of America in a foreign country unfavor-
ably disposed to America and to promote citizen-to-citizen contacts
between Americans and influential segment8 of that country's 8ociety.3
(3) The cooperation of an American labor organization in selected
overseas labor activities.
(4) Support of an international organization of veterans and an
international foundation for developing countries.
(5) Support of an organization of journalists and an international
women is association.
(6) Partial support for an international educational exchange pro-
gram run by a group of United States universities.
(7) Funding of a legitimate U.S. association of farm organiza-
tions. Agency funds were used to host foreign visitors, provide scholar-
ships to an international cooperative training center at a United States
university, and to reimburse the organization for various of its activi-
ties abroad. A CIA document prepared in 1967 notes that although
the organization received some overt government funds from AID, the
CIA should continue its covert funding because "programs funded
by AID cannot address themselves to the same political goals toward
which Agency operations are targeted because AID programs are
part of official government to-government programs and are designed
for economic-not political-results."
' For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179.
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184
The Beet Ii notvn Cabe : Covert Funding
Association of the NatianaJ Student
CIA funding of the National Student Association
to 1967 is a Particular) (NSA) front 1952
ernment entered the good example of how the Uni
vulnerabilities felt b eld of covertly supportin ? r States Gor_
g pi't oris' of the
and individuals that cannot lbe cont-d ledki and of the p
tatioe to move front su banizations
pport to 41 control.,, Operational tennp-
immediateson the CIA decided to hel
tr in Yafter World War II the Soviet Union ti Organize
student movement.
of the International Union of Stu
dents, for example, teas Alexan der N.
Chairman of the Soviet Slielepin wh le
American students w State Security , o ater becaCommittee
managed and directed studen sought t oucompe comm. The
finds, while the communist e with hampered c a lack sf
groups hadr enough n one by a lack of
world youth festivals conferences and formils, and regi to
Onal ences. In seeking funds at home, the American studentuee
to confer-
were considered too far to the left in the g s found thY
Carthyism and anti-intellectualism of the 1950x. eneraAgainst hrO11tld, NSA o ate of Mc-
and rebuffed bffctals, after being refused by g` this back-C
ongress an
Depart d rement in 1 52nto the CIA * the State Department
were finally directed by The CIA maintains that its funding efforts were based on shared tin-
terests, not on manipulation. CIA h
funding of the National Student
association appears to have been intended prinnaril% to permit I'nite
States students to represent. their own ideas, in their Own way, in t) le
y.
forums of the da Nevertheless , the Committee has
CIA moved from blank-clieclt stn > port to
?he1?ational use of individual students...; For example, over 250 T
1 I
.5. students were
attend youth festivals in Moscow, Vi sponsored by time CIA to
ennna, and Helsinki and were for missions such as reporting on Soviet and Third World or observing Soviet, used a
example, was e tsecurity P radices A I?nited States student rfor
exam , was ecrtitel in N,457 to serve as a CIA "asset"
h
was instructed to report on Soviet couunten lltelligence, measures an
to purchase a piece of Soviet-manufactured equ P1 t documents, lie
d
`Under the agreed arrangement. CIA funds would support
tional division of the National Student Association;
the International Affairs vice Pr only' the tut and the Each Year. after the election of~new st dent leaders,vthe CINSA A President and
briefing the new officers, and elicited ,,using t1980s however, from them held a secret
came g the IncreasinglY 1960 however witting National Student a secrecy
e-
leaders agreement.
athem revealed the relationship abhult the CIA s A sofa anon leads ne
be-
p to Itampartaomagazi until finally in 1967 one
orb t Operational use" of individuals as used magazine
Dining, on eisher a vivid in this report means recruitment use,
That is, the individual is witting Unwittin
ep~s~ to Volunteering is directed i r ed or "tasked" oasis, for intelligence purposes.
tasked" to do something for CIA-as
destine intelligence collection (espiona a Poses include covert rt action , clan-
functions. g) and various kinds of support
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4'unding of the National, Student
lent Association (NSA) from 1952
pie of how the United States Gov-
tly supporting "friends," of the
lertaking to support organizations
oiled, and of the ope
ro1." rational temp-
belt) NSA is clear. In the years
be Soviet Union took the lead in
ze the world student movement..
the International Union of Stu-
N. Shelepin, who later became
urity Committee (KGB). The
compete with these communist-
p were hampered by a lack of
had enough money to put on
id forums, and regional confer-
American students found they
in the general climate of Mc-
f the 1950s. Against this back-
fused by the State Department
finally directed by the State
efforts were based on shared in-
riding of the National Student
ded primarily to permit United
ideas, in their own way, in the
vertheless, the, Committee has
rd from blank-check support to
were sponsol.e by the CIA to
La, and Helsinki and were used
and Third World Personalities
A United States student, for
as a CIA "asset" at the Sixth.
ording to CIA documents, lie
lterilltelligence measures and
fired equip-nenlt.
would support only the interna-
tion ; only the NSA President and
be witting of the CIA connection
leaders, the CIA held a secret
om them a secrecy agreement.
Student Asssaciation leaders be-
orship, until finally In 1967 one
-gazine.
is report means recruitment, use,
')afor intelligence purposes.
o do something for the CIA-as
uses Include covert action, clan-
id various kinds of support
Althouth the CIA's involvement with the National Student As-
sociation was limited to the organization's internittional activities,
CIA influence was felt to some extent in its domestic programs as well.
The most direct way in which such influence may have been felt was in
the selection process for NSA officers. The Summer International
Seminars conducted for NSA leaders and potential leaders in the
United States during the 1950's and 1960's were a vehicle for the
Agency to identify new leaders and to promote their candidacy for
elective positions in the National Student Association.
Tile Central Intelligence Agency's experience with the NSA under-
lines the basic problem of an action-oriented clandestine organization
entering into a covert funding relationship with private organizations :
support of friends turns into the control of their actions and ulti-
mately to creation of new "friends."
.1. Corer is Blown The Pa.tm,an and Ramparts "Flaps"
In a public hearing in 1964, Congressman Wright Patman, Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Foundations of the House Committee
on Problems of Small Businesses, revealed the names of eight, of the
CIA's funding instrunnents the so-called "Pat man Eight." These dis-
closures sharply jarred the Agencyy's confidence in the security of these
philanthropic funding mechanisms.
The Patn-an disclosures led the CIA to take al hard look at this
technique of funding, ,but not. to reconsider the propriety of bringing
the. independence of America's foundations into question by using
them as conduits for the funding of covert -action projts. According
to the Chief of the Covert. Action Staff's Program and Evaluation
Group :
The real lesson of the Patman Flap is not that we need to get
out of the business of using foundation cover for funding, but,
that we need to get, at it more professionally and extensively.
Despite the best efforts of the Agency throughout 1966 to shore ill)
its vulnerable funding mechanisms, it became increasingly clear that
Ramparts magazine. the Nero York Times, and the lVa,8hangton Post
were moving, ever closer to unraveling not only the CIA's system of
clandestine funding but, to exposing the source of the support for the
National Student Association. In an effort to determine whether there
was foreign influence on funds behind the Ramparts expose, the CIA,
in coordination with the FBI, undertook through its own counterintel-
ligence staff' to prepare extensive reports on the Ramparts officers and
staff members.
At a press briefing on February 14, 1967, the State Department
publicly confirmed a statement by leaders of NSA that their organiza-
tion had received covert support from the CIA since the early 1950s.
The NSA statement and disclosures in Ramparts magazine brought on
storm of public and congressional criticism. In response, President
.The Agency appointed a special assistant to the Deputy Director for Plans,
who was charged with "pulling together information on Ramparts, includ-
ing any evidence of subversion [and] devising proposals for counteraction." In
pursuing the "Communist ties" of Ramparts magazine, the "case" of managing
editor, Robert Scheer, was one of the first to be developed and it report was sent
on Scheer to Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to President Johnson.
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ever went t
e first book the U.S. Government
a ion
to censor, before public
,ourt WAMIMM=
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had engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed
by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for
the Vietminh takeover of the Hanoi region in early October,
including items about property, money reform, and a three-day
holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the
distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled. Two
days later Vietminh took to the radio to denounce the leaflets;
the leaflets were so authentic in appearance that even most
of the rank and file Vietminh were sure that the radio
denunciations were a French trick.
Lansdale's black propaganda also had an effect on the Ameri-
can press. One of his bogus leaflets came to the attention of
syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop, who was then touring South
Vietnam. The leaflet, indicating that many South Vietnamese were
to be sent to China to work on the railroads, seemed to have been
written by the communists. Alsop naively accepted the leaflet at
face value and, according to Lansdale, this "led to his sensational,
gloomy articles later.... Alsop was never told this story." Nor,
of course, was the false impression left with Alsop's readers ever
corrected.
CIA propaganda activities also entail the publication of books
and periodicals. Over the years, the agency has provided direct
su si ies to -a- number of magazines and publishing houses, rang-
ing from Eastern European 6migr6 organs to such reputable firms
as Frederick A. Praeger, of New York-which admitted in 1967
that it had published "fifteen or sixteen books" at the CIA's request.
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rike in Hanoi: leaflets signed
Idnese on how to behave for
not region in early October,
oney reform, and a three-day
ver. The day following the
gee registration tripled. Two
ddio to denounce the leaflets;
appearance that even most
were sure that the radio
C.
had an effect on the Ameri-
;ts came to the attention of
who was then touring South
many South Vietnamese were
ailroads, seemed to have been
naively accepted the leaflet at
e, this "led to his sensational,
s never told this story." Nor,
eft with Alsop's readers ever
tail the publication of books
agency has provided direct
and publishing houses, rang-
rgans to such reputable firms
rk-which admitted in 1967
~ books" at the CIA's request.
Propaganda and Disln/ormadon - 165
DELETED )
Many other anti-communist publishing concerns in Germany,
Italy, and France were also supported and encouraged by the
agency during the post-World War II years. (
DELETED ) According to a former high-ranking agency
official, (
DELETED ) and the Parisian newspaper, "Le
Combat." This same ex-official also recalls with an ironic smile that
for several years the agency subsidized the New York communist
paper, The Daily Worker. In fairness to the Worker's staff, it must
be noted that they were unaware of the CIA's assistance, which
came in the form of several thousand secretly purchased prepaid
subscriptions. The CIA apparently hoped to demonstrate by this
means to the American public that the threat of communism in
this country was indeed real.
Although the CIA inherited from the OSS responsibility for covert
propaganda operations, the agency has no specific authority in the
open law to engage in such operations-other than the vague
charge to carry out "such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct." Yet since its founding in
1947 the CIA has spent over one billion dollars for propaganda
activities (mainly foreign but also domestic) to further what it
perceived to be the national interests of the United States.
Sometimes this means simply telling the truth to an audience
(called "white" propaganda); other times a mixture of truths,
half-truths, and slight distortions is used to slant the views of the
audience ("gray" propaganda); and, on occasion, outright lies
("black" propaganda) are used, although usually accompanied
for credibility's sake by some truths and half-truths.
"Black" propaganda on the one hand and "disinformation" on
the other are virtually indistinguishable. Both refer to the spread-
ing of false information in order to influence people's opinions or
actions. Disinformation actually is a special type of "black"
propaganda which hinges on absolute secrecy and which is usually
supported by false documents; originally, it was something of a
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174 ? THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
The CIA has also used defectors from communistgovernments
for propagandapes-a practice which has had more impact
in country than overseas. These defectors, without any prod-
ding by the CIA, would have interesting stories to tell of politics
and events in their homelands, but almost all are immediately taken
under the CIA's control and subjected to extensive secret de-
briefings at a special defector reception center near Frankfurt, West
Germany, or, in the cases of particularly knowledgeable ones, at
agency "safe houses" in the United States. In return for the
intelligence supplied about the defector's former life and work, the
CIA usually takes care of his resettlement in the West, even
providing a new identity if necessary. Sometimes, after the lengthy
will
debriefing has been finished, the agenc will encourage-and
help.-the defector to write articles or_books about? past life.
th
t
d
e
on
en
As he may still be living at a CIA facility or be depen
agency for his livelihood, the defector would be extremely reluctant
to jeopardize his future by not cooperating. The CIA does not
try to alter the defector's writings drastically; it simply influences
him to leave out certain information because of security considera-
tions, or because the thrust of the information runs counter to ex-
isting American policy. The inclusion of information justifying U.S.
or CIA practices is, of course, encouraged, and the CIA will pro-
vide whatever literary assistance is needed by the defector. While
such books tend to show the communist intelligence services as
diabolical and unprincipled organs (which they are), almost never
do these books describe triumphs by the opposition services over
the CIA. Although the other side does indeed win on occasion,
the agency would prefer that the world did not know that. And the
defector dependent on the CIA will hardly act counter to its
interests.
In helping the defector with his writing, the agency often steers
him toward a publisher. Even some of the public-relations aspects
of promoting his book may be aided by the CIA, as in the case
of Major Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelligence officer who de-
fected in 1968. Prior to the 1972 publication of his book, The
Deception Game, Bittman was interviewed by the Wall Street
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communist governments
hich has had more impact
rectors, without any prod-
, stories to tell of politics
t all are immediately taken
i to extensive secret de-
;nter near Frankfurt, West
ly knowledgeable ones, at
States. In return for the
former life and work, the
ment in the West, even
metimes, after the lengthy
will encourage-and will
books about his past life.
ty or be dependent on the
Auld be extremely reluctant
ating. The CIA does not
ically; it simply influences
ause of security considera-
nation runs counter to ex-
information justifying U.S.
ed, and the CIA will pro-
ed by the defector. While
st intelligence services as
h they are), almost never
e opposition services over
indeed win on occasion,
id not know that. And the
hardly act counter to its
ig, the agency often steers
he public-relations aspects
y the CIA, as in the case
itelligence officer who de-
lication of his book, The
ewed by the Wall Street
Propaganda and Disinformation ? 175
Journal, which quoted him on U.S. intelligence's use of the dis-
information techniques. "It was our opinion," the former Czech
operative said, "that the Americans had more effective means than
this sort of trickery-things such as economic-aid programs-that
were more influential than any black propaganda operation."
While Bittman may well have been reflecting attitudes held by
his former colleagues in Czech intelligence, his words must be
considered suspect. The Czechs almost certainly know something
about the CIA's propaganda and disinformation programs, just as
the CIA knows of theirs. But Bittman's statement, taken along with
his extensive descriptions of Czech and Russian disinformation
programs, reflects exactly the image the CIA wants to promote to
the American public-that the communists are always out to de-
fraud the West, while the CIA, skillfully uncovering these deceits,_
eschews such unprincipled tactics.
,eschews
the CIA, propaganda through book publishing has long
been a successful technique. In 1953 the agency backed the
publication of a book called The Dynamics of Soviet Society,
which was written by Walt Rostow, later President Johnson's
Assistant for National Security Affairs, and other members of
the staff of the Center for International Studies at the Mas-
Institute of Technology. The center had been set up
sachusetts
with CIA money in 1950, and this book was published in two
versions, one classified (for the CIA and government policy-
makers) and the other unclassified (for the public). Both versions,
except in some minor details, promoted the thesis that the Soviet
Union is an imperialistic power bent on world conquest, and that
it is the responsibility of the United States to blunt the communist
menace.
Most CIA book operations, however, are more subtle and
clandestine. A former CIA official who specialized in Soviet affairs
recalls how one day in 1967 a CIA operator on the Covert Action
Staff showed him a book called The Foreign Aid Programs of the
Soviet Bloc and Communist China by a German named Kurt
Muller. The book looked interesting to the Soviet expert, and he
asked to borrow it. The Covert Action man replied, "Keep it.
We've got hundreds more downstairs." Muller's book was some-
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1761 ? THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
thing less than an unbiased treatment of the subject; it was highly
critical of communist foreign assistance to the Third World. The
Soviet specialist is convinced that the agency had found out Muller
was interested in communist foreign-aid programs, encouraged
him to write a book which would have a strong anti-communist
slant, provided him with information, and then helped to get the
book published and distributed.
Financing books is a standard technique used by all intelligence
services. Many writers are glad to write on subjects which will
further their own careers, and with a slant that will contribute to
the propaganda objectives of a friendly agency. Books of this
sort, however, add only a false aura of respectability and authority
to the information the intelligence agency would like to see spread
-even when that information is perfectly accurate-because they
are by definition restricted from presenting an objective analysis
of the subject under consideration. And once exposed, both the
writer and his data become suspect. (
Spies, however, do not keep journals. They simply do not take
that kind of risk, nor do they have the time to do so while they
are leading double lives.
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the subject; it was highly
to the Third World. The
icy had found out Muller
d programs, encouraged
a strong anti-communist
~d then helped to get the
ie used by all intelligence
on subjects which will
nt that will contribute to
r agency. Books of this
spectability and authority
would like to see spread
' accurate-because they
ing an objective analysis
once exposed, both the
They simply do not take
:ime to do so while they
Propaganda and Disinformation ? 177
) Allen Dulles seemed to be rubbing salt
in their wounds when he wrote in The Craft of Intelligence that the
Penkovsky defection had shaken the Soviet intelligence services
with the knowledge that the West had located Russian officials
willing to work "in place for long periods of time," and others who
"have never been `surfaced' and [who] for their own protection
must remain unknown to the public."
And, of course, the ublication of The Penkovsky Papers opened
the Soviets up to the embarrassment of having the worTa earn that
the top level of their government had been penetrated by a Western
spy. Furthermore, Penkovsky's success as an agent made the CIA
look good, both to the American people and to the rest of the
world. Failures such as the Bay of Pigs might be forgiven and
forgotten if the agency could recruit agents like Penkovsky to
accomplish the one task the CIA is weakest at-gathering intelli-
gence from inside the Soviet Union or China.
The facts were otherwise, however. In the beginning, Penkovsky
was not a CIA spy. He worked for British intelligence. He had
tried to join the CIA In Turkey, but he had been turned down, in
large part because the Soviet Bloc Division of the Clandestine
Services was overly careful not to be taken in by KGB provocateurs
and double agents. To the skittish CIA operators, Penkovsky
seemed too good to be true, especially in the period following the
Burgess-McLean catastrophe. The CIA had also suffered several
recent defeats at the hands of the KGB in Europe, and it was
understandably reluctant to be duped again.
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178 ? THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE
Penkovsky, however, was determined to spy for the West, and
in 1960 he made contact with British intelligence, which eventually
recruited him. The British informed the CIA of Penkovsky's avail-
ability and offered to conduct the operation as i joint p elab-the
CIA operators in Moscow and elsewhere ~ formation from
orated clandestine techniques used to
his visits to Western
Penkovsky and to debrief the Soviet spy on
Europe. ( DELETED
The Penkovsky Papers was a best-seller around the world, and
especially in the United States. Its publication certainly caused
discomfort in the Soviet Union.
DELETED
Richard Helms years later again referred to Penkovsky in this
vein, although not by name, when he claimed in a speech before
the American Society of Newspaper Editors that "a number of
well-placed and courageous Russians . . . helped us" in uncovering
the Soviet move. One person taken in by this deception was Senator
Milton Young of North Dakota, who serves on the CIA oversight
subcommittee. In a 1971 Senate debate on cutting the intelligence
budget, the Senator said, "And if you want to read something very
read
interesting and authoritative where intelligence is concerned,
the Penkovsky papers ... this is a very interesting story, on
the intelligence we had in Cuba was so important to us, and on
what the Russians were thinking and just how far they would go."
Yet the CIA intelligence analysts who were working on the
Cuban problem at the time of the missile crisis and preparing the
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to spy for the West, and
Iligence, which eventually
1A of Penkovsky's avail-
ation as a joint project.
participated in the elab-
eceive information from
on his visits to Western
.r around the world, and
lication certainly caused
ed to Penkovsky in this
imed in a speech before
,tors that "a number of
helped us" in uncovering
is deception was Senator
es on the CIA oversight
a cutting the intelligence
t to read something very
,ence is concerned, read
nteresting story, on why
mportant to us, and on
how far they would go."
were working on the
crisis and preparing the
Propaganda and Disinformation ? 179
agency's intelligence reports for the President up to and after the
discovery of the Soviet missiles saw no such information from
Penkovsky or any other Soviet spy. The key intelligence that led
to the discovery of the missiles came from the analysis of satellite
photography of the U.S.S.R., Soviet ship movements, U-2 photo-
graphs of Cuba, and information supplied by Cuban refugees.
Penkovsky's technical background information, provided well be-
fore the crisis, was of some use-but not of major or critical im-
portance.
Several scholars of the Soviet Union have independently char-
acterized The Penkovsky Papers as being partly bogus and as not
having come from Penkovsky's "journal." The respected Soviet
expert and columnist for the Manchester Guardian and the Wash-
ington Post, Victor Zorza, wrote that "the book could have been
compiled onlbjthe Central Intelligence Aden Zorza pointed
out t a[ Penkovsky had neither ttl time nor the opportunity to
have produced such a manuscript; that the book's publisher (Dou-
bleday and Company) and translator (Peter Deriabin, himself a
KGB defector to the CIA) both refused to produce the original
Russian manuscript for inspection; and that The Penkovsky
Papers contained errors of style, technique, and fact that Penkov-
sky would not have made.
British intelligence also was not above scoring a propaganda
victory of its own in the Penkovsky affair. Penkovsky's contact
officer had been MI-6's Greville Wynne, who, working under the
cover of being a businessman, had been arrested at the same time
as Penkovsky and later exchanged for the Soviet spy Gordon Lons-
dale. When Wynne returned to Britain, MI-6 helped him write a
book about his experiences, called Contact on Gorky Street. British
intelligence wanted the book published in part to make some money
for Wynne, who had gone through the ordeal of a year and a half
in Soviet prisons, but the MI-6's main motive was to counteract
the extremely unfavorable publicity that had been generated by the
defection of its own senior officer, Harold "Kim" Philby, in 1963,
and the subsequent publication of his memoirs prepared under the
auspices of the KGB.
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Interestingly, nowhere in Contact on Gorky Street does Wynne
cite the help he received from the CIA. The reason for this omis-
sion could have been professional jealousy on the part of British
intelligence, good British manners (i.e., not mentioning the clan-
destine activities of a friendly intelligence service), or most likely,
an indication of the small role played by the CIA in the operation.
Another book-publishing effort in which the CIA may or may
not have been involved-to some degree-was Khrushchev Re-
members, and the second volume of Khrushchev memoirs scheduled
for publication this year. While these autobiographical and some-
what self-serving works unquestionably originated with the former
Soviet premier himself, there are a number of curious circumstances
connected with their transmission from Moscow to Time Inc. in
New York, and to its book-publishing division, Little, Brown and
Company. Time Inc. has been less than forthcoming about how it
gained access to the 180 hours of taped reminiscences upon which
the books are based, and how the tapes were taken out of the
U.S.S.R. without the knowledge of the Soviet government or the
ubiquitous and proficient KGB. The whole operation-especially
its political implication-was simply too important to have been
permitted without at least tacit approval by Soviet authorities.
Unlike Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Khrushchev was subsequently
neither denounced nor exiled by Moscow's all-powerful party
chiefs.
Most of the explanations offered by Time Inc. to clarify the
various mysteries involved in this episode have a slightly disin-
genuous air. They may be true, but a number of highly regarded
American and British scholars and intelligence officers dealing with
Soviet affairs find them difficult to accept in toto. Why, for example,
did Time Inc. find it necessary to take the risky step of sending a
copy of the bound galleys of the book to its Moscow bureau-
secretly via Helsinki-before it was published? The complete story
of the Khrushchev memoirs, in short, may never be publicly
known. And if it is, it may turn out to be another example of secret
U.S.-Soviet cooperation, of two hostile powers giving wide circula-
tion to information that each wants to see published, while
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THE. \ERET OVEUTIOLZS
7/11"'
ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, AND COVERT ACTION
Harry Rositzke
READER'S DIGEST PRESS
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158 COVERT ACTION: PROPAGANDA
To cover its military intervention the Soviet Union followed a
familiar line: the Hungarian uprising was a bourgeois coun-
terrevolution fomented by capitalist agents aimed at destroy-
ing the achievements of the new socialist state. It charged
that RFE, the tool of the Western imperialists, had helped
incite the mobs by advocating "liberation" and anti-Soviet
attitudes. At the same time in Europe and the United States,
many people criticized American policy for inciting the "cap-
tive peoples" of Eastern Europe to revolt and then failing to
back them up with arms.
A postmortem examination of RFE broadcasts in the period
preceding the revolution uncovered no evidence of direct in-
citement to revolt, but it was clear that the steady barrage of
assurances that the West was firmly opposed to the continu-
ing Communist exploitation of subject peoples could not fail
to give RFE's listeners the hope that the United States would
come to their aid if they did revolt. This ambivalence in
American policy toward Eastern Europe has survived to this
day: official acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe
paired with an annual congressional resolution on Captive
Nations Day.
Anti-Soviet emigre organizations in Western Europe were
also given support to produce a broad variety of
publications-from flyers and leaflets to magazines and jour-
nals, some of them of high intellectual caliber addressed to a
sophisticated audience. Most of this material reached a
largely Western audience, but some publications were smug-
gled behind the Iron Curtain by legal travelers or sent into
the East by balloon.
A more systematic program was carried out by CIA within
Western Europe itself, in effect as a covert annex to the
Marshall Plan. The war had devastated the cultural and
intellectual life of Europe as much as it had destroyed its
industrial establishment. CIA's financial support was de-
voted to reviving the cultural groups that had survived the
war. Subsidies were given to publications meetings con
COVERT ACTION: PROPAGANDA 159
gresses. Individual authors and artists were given help. Books
were underwritten, travel grants supplied, lecture tours
arranged. Organizations like the Congress for Cultural Free-
dom were founded. As Europe revived, these operations de-
clined. A longer-range covert effort addressed itself in these early
days to a more formidable task: to match and counter the
"Red fronts," that vast Soviet apparatus of international front
organizations devoted to bringing the democratic Left into the
Soviet camp of anti-imperialism. Soviet fronts such as the
World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic
Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, were working
hard among women, journalists, scientific workers, school-
teachers, and intellectuals.
To provide an alternative forum for the non-Communist
elements in these professional and social groups, the CIA's
"international organizations" program sought to establish
counterfronts. Some of these democratic fronts survived to
become viable organizations, others did not.
A substantial effort was devoted to students, always a
prime target for both Soviet and Communist Party organizing
work. In 1946 a group of American students attended the
first World Student Congress in Prague, and the following
year organized the National Students Association (NSA) to
represent American students in the world forum. The NSA
was prepared to join the International Union of Students
established after the meeting in Prague, but when its pro-
Communist bias became clear after it refused to condemn the
1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the NSA joined
with other non-Communist student groups to form a second
international, the International Student Conference. This
counterfront soon developed a fairly rigid Cold War program
against the Soviet-sponsored International Union.
NSA's international operations were funded by a number
of foundations that enabled it to sponsor annual international
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/02 : CIA-RDP87B00858R000200310017-2
186
Johnson organized a committee composed of Undersecretary of State
Nicholas Katzenbach, Secretary of HEW John Gardner, and CIA
Director Richard Helms to review government activities that may
"endanger the integrity and independence of the educational coninln-
nity." The committee's life was short-43 days-but its recommenda-
tions, accepted by President Johnson on March 29,1967 ' were to have
a profound effect on the CIA's clandestine operations, both in the
United States and abr
d
oa
.
4. The Katzenbach, Committee
President Johnson's concern for the integrity and independence of
American institutions could have resulted in the Katzenbach Commit-
tee being charged with general review of the domestic impact. of
clandestine activities and their effect on American institutions; includ-
ing consideration of twhether all covert relationships should be
prohibited, and, if not, what guidelines should be imposed on the use
of institutions and individuals.
Instead, the Johnson Administration carefully and consciously
limited the mandate of the Katzenbach Committee's investigation to
the relationship between the CIA and "U.S. educational and private
voluntary organizations which operate abroad." In a February 24
memorandum to Gardner and Helms, Katzenbach cited the narrow-
ness of the mandate in listing problems faced by the Committee :
1. The narrow scope of this mandate, as compared with the
demands, by Senator Mansfield, et al, that this flap be used
as a springboard for a review of all clandestine financing by
CIA.
2. More specifically, the exclusion in this mandate of rela-
tionships between CIA and American businesses abroad.
3. Focusing the mandate on CIA, rather than on all private
organization relationships with government agencies.
In testimony before this Committee, Mr. Katzenbach said that his
committee was designed by President Johnson not only to deal with
the relationship of the CIA to educational and voluntary organizations,
but to head off a full-scale congressional investigation.'
All other covert relationships were to be excluded from the investiga-
tion. In a memo to his colleagues, the Deputy Chief of the Covert
Action Staff reported :
It is stated that the country o Aerations funded by black bag
[sterilized or laundered fmid! I were not, to be, included in the
CIA's response to the Katzenbach Commission and empha-
sized that the focus of this paper was to be on organizations.
In addition the Katzenbach Committee did not undertake investi-
gation of CIA domestic commercial operations, specifically those de-
signed to provide cover for clandestine intelligence operations which
'Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 10/11/75. p. 5. Katzenhach also said of the
President's decision on membership :
. he [the President] wanted John Gardner on it because he thought that
would help politically in getting acceptance of whatever the recommendations
turned out to be because he thought Helms would defend everything and wanted
to continue everything. Gardner would want to stop everything. It was my job to
come out with something in the middle." (Aid).
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>osed of tTudersecretai_y of State
EIEW John Gardner, and CIA
hoverlllllellt activities that may
fence of the educational conlulu-
-43 days-but its reconunenda-
on March 29, 1967, were to have
destine operations, both in the
integrity and independence of
ted in the Katzenbach Commit-
aw of the domestic impact of
American institutions; includ-
3vert relationships should be
s should be imposed on the use
on carefully and consciously
Il Committee's investigation to
"U.S. educational and private
e abroad." In a February 24
Katzenbacll cited the narrow-
faced by the Committee :
ate, as compared with the
al, that this flap be used
clandestine financing by
in this mandate of rela-
nll businesses abroad.
rather than on all private
ernmenl. agencies.
1Ir. Katzenbacll said that his
)hnson not only to deal with
and voluntary Organlzatlolls,
nvestigation.'
excluded front the investiga-
Deputy Chief of the Covert
ms funded by black bag
not, to be included in the
0111111issi011 and empha-
to be on organizations.
did not undertake investi-
Itions, specificallty those de-
telligence operations which
5. Katzenbacll also said of the
on it because he thought that
whatever the reeoanaeadatiou.14
I defend everything and wanted
op everi thing. It was any job to
the U.S. directed at such targets as foreign students, foreign business-
1nen, foreign diplomatic and consular officials travelling or residing
in the United States.
Despite the narrowness of its mandate, the actual investigation of
the Katzenbach Committee was vigorous and thorough. After delib-
eration, the Committee issued the basic recommendation that:
It should be the policy of the United States Government that
no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assist-
ance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's
educational or private voluntary organizations.
In May 196 tthe Deputy Director for Plans Desmond FitzGerahl
interpreted the post-Katzenbach ground rules in a circular to the field.
He stated :
Several operational guidelines emerge:
a. Covert relations with commercial U.S. organizations are
not, repeat, not barred.
b. Covert funding overseas of foreign-based international
organizations is permitted.
He indicated that greater care would be needed in the conduct of
clandestine operations, in order to prevent disclosures:
a. The care required under the Katzenbach Report, with
respect to the recruitment and use of U.S. students, and U.S.
university professors, applies equally to the recruitment and
use of foreign students... .
In simple terms, we are now in a different ballgaine. Some
of the basic ground rules have changed. When in doubt, ask
l 1Qs.
5. A Different Ballgame: CIA Response to Katzenbach
The policy guidelines established in the Katzenbach Report aril
supplemental guidelines with which the CIA interpreted the Report,
brought major adjustments in covert action programs and methods.
Some 77 projects were examined at high levels within the CIA, and
lists were drawn up of projects to be terminated, projects to be trans-
ferred to other sources of funding, projects to continue, and projects
whose future required higher level decisions. The 303 Committee met
frequently throughout 1967 and 1968 to deal with difficult questions,
such as how to provide for continued funding of Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty.
At the same time the Agency was withdrawing from support of
a large number of domestically-based organizations, it moved rapidly
to shelter certain high-priority operations from the Katzenbach pro-
hibitions and to devise more secure funding mechanisms. This process
was facilitated by what was termed "surge funding." The Katzen-
bach guidelines called for termination of CIA funding of domesti-
cally based U.S. organizations by December 31, 1967. With 303 Com-
mittee approval for the largest grants, the Agency "surge funded" a
number of organizations, giving them advances before the December
deadline which carried them in some cases for up to two )-cars of op-
erations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were so funded.
In adjusting to the "new ballgame." the appearance of contraven-
ing the Katzenbacll guidelines, rather than specific regulations, was
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seen as it reason not to continue relationships with certain institutions.
At the same time, at least. one case suggests that even a clean termina-
l ion of funding with a private organization did not necessarily end
the CIA's support of the policies and programs of the organization. A
CIA report . on termination plans for a large project in the Far East
indicated that, with surge funding, the organization could continue
into fiscal year 1969, and that thereafter "[the organization's] Board
of Trustees will assume full responsibility for the organization and
has pledged to continue its policies and range of activities."
The following are examples of the score of projects which the CIA
reviewed in 1967 and decided to continue to fund :
(1) A publications and press institute that maintained a worldwide
network of stringers and correspondents. A CIA report on the project
asserted that. it. exerts virtu ally no domestic influence in any quarter,
although its publications are read by U.S. students."
(2) Several international trade union organizations.
(3) A foreign-based news feature service.
(4) A foreign-based research and publishing institute.
In reviewing the CIA's adjustments to the Katzenbach Committee's
recommendations, the Committee found no violations of the policy
the report sets forth. However, it is important. to recognize how
narrow the focus of the Katzenbach Committee's concern was. The
problem was approached by the committee and by the CIA essentially
as one of security: how to limit the damage caused by the revelations
of CIA relationships with private U.S. institutions. Many of the
restrictions developed by the CIA in response to the events of 1967
appear to be security measures aimed at preventing further public
disclosures which could jeopardize sensitive CIA operations. They did
not, represent. significant rethinking of where boundaries ought to he
drawn in a, free society. Moreover, although President .Iohrlson adopted
the Katzenbach report as policy, it was not issued as an executive order
or enacted as a statute. Thus, it has no firm legal status.
6. Post 1.967 relations with. the U.S. Academic Community
In analyzing the adequacy of the Katzenbacll regulations
and of the CIA's compliance with them, the select Committee concen-
trated much of its attention on contemporary relationships between the
CIA and the U.S. academic community. 'T'ile Committee interprets
"academic community" to include more than the Katzenbach Com-
mittee undoubtedly had in mind when it, recommended prohibition of
"covert financial assistance or support . to any of the nation's edil-
cat.ional . . . organizations." "Academic conununity" has been inter-
preted by this Committee to include universities, university-related
research centers, and the full range of individual scholars and school
administrators, ranging from department. heads to career counselors
and to Pll.D. candidates engaged in teaching. The. Committee has
approached this inquiry with three principal questions:
(1) What is the extent and nature of CIA relationships with F.S.
academic institutions and with individual American academics?
(2) What are the guidelines and ground rules governing CIA post-
Katzenbach relations with the academic community ?
(3) What issues are at stake; what threats, if anv, do current rela-
tions pose for the independence of this influential sector of society?
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38
t.ionships with certain institutions.
suggests that even a clean termina-
;anization did not necessarily end
d programs of the organization. A
or it large project in the Far East
r, the organization could continue
after "[the organization's] Board
risibility for the organization and
and range of activities."
e score of projects which the CIA
111ne to fund:
itute that maintained a worldwide
ents. A CIA report on the project
domestic influence in any quarter,
IT.S. students."
ion organizations.
service.
publishing institute.
is to the Katzenbach Committee's
Mind no violations of the policy
is important. to recognize how
i Committee's concern was. The
nittee and by the CIA essentially
lamage caused by the revelations
U.S. institutions. Many of the
1 response to the events of 1967
d at preventing further public
isitive CIA operations. They did
of where boundaries ought to be
ough President-Johnson adopted
not issued as an executive order
firm legal status.
^adeniac Community
the Katzenbach regulations
m, the Select Committee concen-
orauy relationships between the
pity. The Committee interprets
we than the Katzenbach Com-
it, recommended prohibition of
. . to any of the nation's edii-
aie community" has been inter-
universities, university-related
individual scholars and school
lent heads to career counselors
teaching. The Committee has
ncipal questions:
,f CIA relationships with U.S.
hiial American academics?
u rid rules governing CIA post-
community?
hreats, if ally, do current rela-
s influential sector of society?
The CIA relationships with the academic community are extensive
and serve many purposes, including providing leads and making intro-
ductions for intelligence purposes, collaboration in research and anal-
ysis, intelligence collection abroad, and preparation of books and other
proLnaganda. materitlls. ..~...~ -----
ITieeTect omnnittee's concentration has been on the area of clan-
destine relationships untouched by the Katzenbach Committee-
individuals.
7. Covert Relations with Individuals in the Academic Community
As already noted, from the first days of the Katzenbach Commit-
tee, the CIA proceeded on the operating assumption that the inquiry
was directed squarely at, institutional relationships-not individuals in
or affiliated with those private institutions. After the Katzenbach
report, the Agency issued a basic instruction entitled "Restrictions on
Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals." This instruc-
tion remains in force today. The instruction states that the "basic rule"
for the use of human agents by the Operations Directorate is that
"an i consenting adult" may be used.
While all members o the American academic community, including
students, certainly qualify as "consenting adults," the CIA since 1967
has been particularly sensitive to the risks associated with their use.
In order to control and confine contacts with American academics, the
handling of relationships with individuals associated with universities
is largely confined to two CIA divisions of the Directorate of Opera-
tions-the Domestic Collection Division and the Foreign Resources
Division. The Domestic Collection Division is the point of contact
~-?it i large numbers of American academics who travel abroad or who
are otherwise consulted on the subject of their expertise. Tine
Foreign Resources Division on the other hand, is the purely o era-
tiona arm o t e CIA in ealin with merican academics. to-
ge er, -and FRD are currently in contact-ranging from the
occasional debriefing to a continuing operational relationship-with
many thousands of United States academics at hundreds of U.S.
academic institutions.
It is imperative to underline that the majority of these relationships
are purely for the purpose of asking an academic about his travels
abroad or open informal consulting on subjects of the academic's ex-
pertise. The Committee sees no danger to the integrity of American
private institutions
sucn
- 71 The s Office of ersonne also maintains relationships with
university administrators, sometimes in the placement office. These
relationships, which are usually contractual, enable the CIA to ap-
proach suitable United States students for CIA employment.
The "operational use" of academics is another matter. It raises trou-
bling questions as to preservation of the integrity of American aca-
demic institutions.
overt Use of the U.S. Academic Community
The Central Intelli enwe A enev is now using several hundred
American academics ", who in addition to providing & ads a. on
""Academics" includes administrators, faculty members and graduate students
engaged in teaching.
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occasto~a, mutiny introductions or intell' epee ur oses occasionally
write booee and otTier materia to a nee or propaganda purposes
abroad. Re and these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting
manner or minor activities.
Me-se ae mxes are oeated in over 100 American eolle es univer-
es re a ins 2 xl es. t t e nw ott o institutions no one
of er t an t e x xv ua concern is aware o t e CIA ink. At
t ae of ers at east one unrveratt o cr xs aware o t e o eration use
in e o ac
emus on is cam
us. n ion, ere are severs mer-
lean ac en ues a ro w to serve operational purposes, primarily the
collection of intelligence.12
The CIA considers these o rational relationships with the United
eta acs emir community as per aps its most sense Ive ome Ic area
Anltl has e+ + 4 __.
V
gency s interna lrectives, E110 O owing distinctions lgovern the
operational use of individuals : the CIA's directives prohibit the opera-
tional use of indiv;~l,, ,l
__
-.1-
s
a
d
an
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, commonly known as
the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this particular prohibition are
teachers, research scholars, lecturers, and students who have been
selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign
Scholarships. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several
other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Ful-
bright-Hays Act, such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists, or par-
ticipants in international trade fairs or expositions, who do not come
under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships. As
far as the three major foundations-Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie-
are concerned, the prohibition extends to "persons actively participat-
ing in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of
these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made
of the officials or employees of these organizations." (These large foun-
dations were cited by a CIA official in 1966 before the 303 Committee
as "a trouble area in New York City-reluctant to cooperate on joint
ventn res.")
9. Corert Relationships with Acadameic and Voluntary Organizations:
Conclusions
With respect to CIA covert relationships with private institutions
and voluntary organizations, the Committee concludes:
(1) The CIA has adhered to the 1967 Katzenbach guidelines govern-
ing relationships with domestic private and voluntary institutions. The
guidelines are so narrowly focused, however, that the covert use of
American individuals from these institutions has continued.
(2) imerican academics are now being used for such operational
/l)111'l)oses as vialrinn vn ro TT~T -: r
-' " ` ? `~ 'o?u a0[Oa(1. 1It11011f'h the 11 limbers are Ilot as teat
ay as ul 196 ), t ere are no pro 1 )itio11S to nreven
ith the exception of those teacher's, scholars and students
who receive scholarships or grants from the Board of Foreign Scholar-
" For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. M.
12 Ibid.
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sntelli epee ur oses occasiontally
be 2i8e or propaganda purpo8e8
few Score are u8ed in an unwitting
er 100 A m e r i c a n cone e univer-
ma rzt o institutions no one
i8 aware o -th-e-CTF ink. At
'ware o t e o erationa u8e
a2 (1on, sere are severs mer-
erational purpo8e8, primarily the
ial relationshi s with the United
)s its most sent ive domestic rea
ese o era to
owing distinctions govern the
A's directives prohibit the opera-
eiving support under the Mutual
pet of 1961, commonly known as
er this particular prohibition are
and students who have been
rants by the Board of Foreign
ally does not apply to the several
I by other provisions of the Ful-
etes, leaders, specialists, or par-
er expositions, who do not come
rd of Foreign Scholarships. As
ird, Rockefeller and Carnegie-
to "persons actively participat-
isored and controlled by any of
will be no operational use made
minizations." (These large fotin-
1966 before the 303 Committee
-reluctant to cooperate on joint
c and Voluntary Organizations:
Iships with private institutions
nittee concludes:
Katzenbach guidelines govern-
and voluntary institutions. The
Dwever, that the covert use of
itutions has continued.
ping used for such operational
M a rgenve purpo8e8 17a and
I'll the numbers are not as rest
is to prevent an increase in t e
Jilese operation.,, is eternune
archers, scholars and students
the Board of Foreign Scholar-
ships, the CIA is not prohibited from the operational use of all other
categories of grantee support'uitder the Fulbright-Hays Act (arthsts,
athletes, leaders, specialists, etc.). ;Nor is there any prohibition on the
operational use of individuals participating in any other exchange
program funded by the United States Government.
In addressing the issues of the CIA's relationship to the American
academic community the Committee is keenly aware that if the CIA
is to serve the intelligence needs of the nation, it, must have unfettered
access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce.
But this advice and expertise can and should be openly sought-and
openly given. Suspicion that such openness of intellectual encounter
and exchange is complemented by covert operational exploitation of
academics and students can only prejudice, if not destroy, the pos-
sibility of a full and fruitful exchange between the nation's best minds
and the nation's most critical intelligence needs. To put these intel-
lects in the service of the nation, trust, and confidence must be main-
tained between our intelligence agencies and the academic community.
The Committee is disturbed both by the present practice of opera-
tionally using American academics and by the awareness that, the
restraints on expanding this practice are primarily those of sensitivity
to the risks of disclosure and not an appreciation of dangers to the
integrity of individuals a.ad institutions. Nevertheless, the Commit-
tee does not recommend a legislative, prohibition on the, operational
ex oI a Ion of individuals in ]private institutions by the intelligence,
agencies. a ommittee views sucTile islatioii ns t?Ti uinenforceable
an in I self-an intrusion on ie rlvac an integrity o the American
aca emit -comr1inity. The Committee a Ieves t nat it is t Ie res on-
si iltty of rivate institutions an articularl ? the American academic
communit to set the ro essional and ethical stan arc s o its mem-
bers IIS repo o the nature an extent o covert un wiai 'eln-
t s
dons with the CIA is intended to alert these institutions that there is
~ rohlem._
d
A
amen
At the same time, the, Committee recommends that. the CI
alent o cia o t ne re evant aca emic institutions, informed o tie
can estane eT a ions t .
e Committee a so fee s strongly that there should be no opera-
tional use made of professors, lecturers, students, artists, and the like
who are funded under United States Government-sponsored programs.
The prohibition on the operational use of Fulbright grantees must be
extended to other government-sponsored programs; and in this case
the prohibition should be confirmed by law, given the direct responsi-
bility of the Congress for these programs. It is unacceptable that
Americans would go overseas under a cultural or academic exchange
program funded openly by the United States Congress and at the
same time serve. an operational purpose directed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
B. COVERT R?F,LA1'ION SIIIPS WITH TIiF. ITNITED STATES (MEDIA
In pursuing its foreign intelligence mission the Central Intelligence
Agency Ias use ie media for both the col ection of intelligence
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192
and for cover. Until February 1976, when it announced a new policy
toward U.S. media personnel
the CIA mai
t
i
,
a
n
nedtl
cover reation
ships with about 50 American journalists or employees of IJ.S.
organizations. They are part media
of
t
a ne
work ofl h
Severaundred foreign
I individuals around the world who provide i
t
lli
n
e
gence for the G'IA and
at times attempt to inffrien,e foreign opinion the h the use o
covert propaganda. These individ~,,.~/A ,? of
o
'
f foreign n1Cw8paper8 and periodicals
of press services and news a
, 8core8
en
i
g
c
e
s radio and tlii
eevson Stations com_
mercial book publishers and other foreign media outlet8.19 '
The CIA has been particularly sensitive to the charge that CIA
covert relationships with the A
i
mer
can medi jdi
aeoparze the credibil-
tilt h e U.S. publicriForme Dam or Willipossibil ty of propagandizing
Intelligence: ------ J ""`"""? Lite House 6elect Committee on
Ave have taken particular caution to ensure that our opera-
tions are focused abroad and not at the United States in order
to influence the o
f U
inio
p
n o
the Amil
ercan peope about things
from a CIA point of view.
As early as 1967, the CIA, in the wake of the National Student
Association disclosure
moved t
fl
l
,
o
at
y prhibit th
oe publication of
magazines, or news
a
er
i
h
p
p
s
n t
e untd St
ieates. More recently)
George Bush, the new Director, undertook as one of his first actions to ,
Crecogn
ostitnizetithe" "special status afforded the American media wider our
uon and therefore pledged that "CIA will not enter into
any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time
news correspondent accredited by any United States news service,
newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." r+
In approaching the subject of the CIA's relationship with the United
States media, the Select Committee has been guided by several broad
concerns. It has inquired into the covert publication of propaganda
in order to assess its domestic impact; it has 'investigated the nature
and purpose of the covert relationships that the CIA maintains with
bona fide U.S. journalists; it has examined the use of journalistic
cover by CIA agents
it h
;
as pursued th diffil
ecut issue of domestic
"fallout" from CIA's foreign press placements and other propaganda
activities. Throughout, it has compared current practice to the regula-
tions restricting activities in this area, in order both to ish
establish
whether the CIA has complied with
existinlti
g reguaons, and, more
impomsel
\ rtave.
th e nts, in order to evaluate the adequacy of the regulations
1. Books and P
bli
u
shing H
ouses
C
overt Propad ih
ganas te hidden exercise of the power of persua- ?
I sion. In the world of covert propaganda, book publishing activities
I have a special place. In 1961 the Chief of the CIA's Covert A
ti
c
on
" For
l
\
exp
anationf f
oootnotes, see " George Bush stn to,.,o.,. ~ ,, , ,,.,, 179.
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1, when it announced a new policy
CIA maintained covert relation-
aalists or employees of U.S. media
etwork of several hundred foreign
"ovide intelligence for the CIA and
sign opinion through the use of
cols provide the CIA with direct
newspapers and periodicals, scores
radio and television stations, eom-
roreign media outlets."
sensitive to the charge that CIA
,an media jeopardize the credibil-
the possibility of propagandizing
Tilliam Colby expressed this con-
he House Select Committee on
nn to ensure that our opera-
at the United States in order
merican people about things
c wake of the National Student
tly prohibit the publication of
he United States. More recently,
took as one of his first actions to
the American media under our
that "CIA will not enter into
with any full-time or part-time
ry United States news service,
;ion network or station." 14
As relationship with the United
is been guided by several broad
ert publication of propaganda
it has investigated the nature
s that the CIA maintains with
amined the use of journalistic
I the difficult issue of domestic
cements and other propaganda
current practice to the re la-
a, in order both to establish
xisting regulations, and, more
adequacy of the regulations
,rcise of the power of persua-
da, book publishing activities
f of the CIA's Covert Action
sons regardless of commercial viability." Examples included :
(1) A book about, the conflict in Indochina was produced in 1954
at the initiation of the CIA's Far East Division. A major I.S. publish-
ing house under contract. to the CIA published the book in French and
English. Copies of both editions were distributed to foreign embassies
Staff, who had responsibility fQr the covert propaganda program,
wrote :
Books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily
because one single book can significantly change the reader's
attitude and action to an extent unvaatchecl by the impact of
any other single medium . . . this is, of course, not true of all
books at all times and with all readers-but it is true signifi-
cantly often enough to make books the most important
weapon of strategic (long-range) propaganda.
According to The Chief of the Covert Action Staff, the CIA's clan-
destine handling of book publishing and distribution could:
(a) Get 'books published or distributed abroad without
revealing any U.S. influence, by covertly subsidizing foreign
publications or booksellers.
(b) Get books published which should not be "contam-
inated" by any overt tie-in with the U.S. government., espe-
cially if the position of the author is "delicate."
(c) Get books published for operational reasons, regardless
of commercial viability.
(d) Initiate and subsidize indigenous national or inter-
national organizations for book publishing or distributing
purposes.
(e) Stimulate the writing of politically significant books
by unknown foreign authors-either by directly subsidizing
the author, if covert contact is feasible, or indirectly, through
literary agents or publishers.
Well over a thousand books were produced, subsidized or spon-
sored by the CIA before the end of 1967. Approximately 25 percent of
them were written in English. Many of them were published by cul-
tural organizations which the CIA backed, and more often than not the
author was unaware of CIA subsidization. Some books, however, in-
volved direct collaboration between the CIA and the writer. The
Chief of the Agency's propaganda unit wrote in 1961:
The advantage of our direct contact. with the author is
that we can acquaint hint in great detail with our intentions;
that we can provide him with whatever material we want him
to include and that we can check the manuscript at every
stage. Our control over the writer will have to be enforced
usually by paying hum for the time lie works on the ruturu-
script, or at least advancing him sums which he might have
to repay . . . [the Agency] must make sure the actual manu-
script will correspond with our operational and propagandis-
tic intention... .
The Committee has reviewed a few examples of what. the Chief of
the Covert Action Staff termed "books published for operational rea-
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194
in the United States, and to selected newspapers and magazine editors
both in the United States and abroad
2
.
() A book about a student from a developing country who had
studied in a communist country "was developed of the CIA] and produced by the Domestic Operations Division ...
by [two area divisions
and has had a high impactwasin thue U.hSe.dasbywelthe l as tile [foreign area]
book , which pblis
market." The major
U.S. Publishing house, was published in condensed form in twoe
U.S. magazines. Eric Severeid, the CBS political commentator, in
reviewing this book, spoke a larger truth than he knew when-_
hen he- sug-
ested that "our propaganda services could do worse than to flood
foreign] university towns with this volume."
(3) Another CIA book, 'the? -
?r~,a published in
the United States in 1965 "for operational reason W+>s'
became commercially viable. The , but actually
by witting Agency assets who drew onkactual pcaseamat materials. Publi-
cation rights tote manuscript were sold to a publisher through a
trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher as
unaware of any U.S. Government intere
t Th
s
.
e Publih
A
sing program in the period before the National Student
100,11-1 - ssociation disclosures was large in -i.._-._ _
l
pub
ishes or subsidized well over 200 books, rang-
in g from books on wildlife and safaris to translations of Machiavelli's
The Prince into Swahili and works of T S
d
paro
.y of the famous little red book of ti Qu
u to a
t
t
i
q
o
at
ons from Chairman Liu.o at ons from Mao entitled The publicity which in 1967 surrounded several CIA Lions and threatened
quickly to expose others caused the CIA to act
Katzenbactoh limit its use of U.S. publishers. In direct res o
report
D
,
eputy Dit fdI t ald
recoror Plans Desmon FizGe ordered, "We will, under no circumstances
or newspapers in the United States," ,Publish books, magazines
Wi
h
t
thidh
s orer, te CIA suspended direct publication and subsi-
dization within the United States not only of books, but also of jour-
nals and newsletters, including: a in
a
azi
Stat
b
g
es
a p
sea
ne published by a United
-roprietary for cultural and artistic exchange. letter mailed to foreign students studying in North Amer an uni eews r-
sities under the sponsorship of a CIA proprietary foundation; and a
publication on Latin American affairs published in the United States,
Thus since 1967 the CIA's Publishing activities have almost entirely
been confined to books and other materials published abroad. During
the past few years, some 250 books have been published abroad, most
of them in foreign languages.
As Previously noted, the CIA has denied to the Committee a number
of the titles and names of authors of the propaganda books
since 1967. Brief d
bli
i
pu
escr
shed
ptionid
s proved by the Agency indicate the
breadth of subject matter, which includes the following topics, among
many others :
Vi(t1)am Commercial ventures and commercial law in South
(2) Indochina representation at the U.N.;
(3) A memoir of the Korean War;
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cted newspapers and magazine edi
road. tors
from a developing country who had
was developed by [two area divisions
he Domestic Operations Division ...
1e U.S. as well as the [foreign area]
ublished by the European outlet of a
shed in condensed form in two major
the CBS Political commentator, in
der truth than he knew when he sug-
'vices could do worse than to flood
iis volume."
l iona published in
op t
e book was but actually
aw on actual pared and written
rere sold to a case materials. Publi-
or the publisher through a
for the purpose. The publisher was
Period before the National Student
in volume and varied in taste. In
ibsidized well over 200 books, rang-
iris to translations of Machiavelli's
s of T. S. Eliot into Russian, to a
k of quotations from Mao entitled
ounded several CIA sponsored or-
ose others caused the CIA to act
3lishers. In direct response to the
)r for Plans Desmond FitzGerald
stances, publish books, magazines
ded direct publication and subsi-
st only of books, but also of jour-
nagazlne published by a United
I and artistic exchange; a news-
lying in North American'
proprietary foundation . and a
s published in the United States.
19 activities have almost entirely
veabeenl published labroad, mostt
pied to the Committee a number
he propaganda books published
ed by the Agency indicate the
3es the following topics, among
commercial law in South
;he U.N. ;
(4) The prospects for European union;
(5) Chile under Allende.
-2. Covert Use of U.S. Journalists and Media Institutions
On February 11, 1976, the CIA announced new guidelines governing
its relationship with U.S. media organizations:
Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or
contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news
correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper,
periodical, radio or television network or station."
Of the approximately 50. U.S. journalists or personnel of U.S. media
organizations who were employed by the CIA or maintained some other
covert relationship with the CIA at the time of the announcement,
fewer than one-half will be terminated under the new CIA gnidelines.
About half of the some 50 CIA relationships with the U.S. media
were paid relationships, ranging from salaried operatives working
under journalistic cover, to U.S. journalists serving as "independent
contractors" for the CIA and being paid regularly for their services, to
those who receive only occasional gifts and reimbursements from the
CIA
"
.
"'- More than a dozen United States news organizations and commercial
publishing houses formerly provided cover for CIA agents abroad. A
few of these organizations were unaware that they provided this
cover.18 .._ )
Although the variety of the CIA relationships with the U.S. media
makes a systematic breakdown of them almost impossible, former CIA
Director Colby has distinguished among four types of relationships.19
These are :
(1) Staff of general circulation, U.S. news organizations;
(2) Staff of small, or limited circulation, U.S. publications;
(3) Free-lance, stringers, propaganda writers, and employees of
U.S. publishing houses;
(4) Journalists with whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional,
covert contact.
While the CIA did not provide the names of its media agents or the
names of the media organizations with which they are connected, the
Committee reviewed summaries of their relationships and work with
the CIA. Through this review the Committee found that as of Febru-
ary 1976:
(1) The first category, which would include any staff member of a
general circulation U.S. news organization who functions as a paid
undercover contact of the CIA, appears to be virtually phased out. The
1? According to the CIA, "accredited" applies to individuals who are "formally
authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to represent themselves
as correspondents."
"Drawn from "operational case studies" provided to the Committee 12/16/75
and 10/21/75.
"'For expla notion of footnotes, see p. 179.
"On November 30, 1973, the WaBhinaton Star-NewQ reported that Director
Colby had ordered a review of CIA media relationships in September of that
year, and reported that Colby would phase out the first category but maintain
journalists in each of the other three categories. In his testimony to the House
Select Committee on Intelligence on November 6, 1975, Colby made a general
reference to these categories.
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196
Committee has found only two current relationships that fit this cate-
gory, both of which are being terminated under the CIA's Febru-
ary 11, 1976 stated policy.
The Committee has also found a small number of past relationships
that fit this category. In some cases the cover arrangement consisted of
reimbursing the U.S. newspaper for any articles by the CIA agent
which the paper used. In at least one case the journalistic functions
assumed by a CIA staff officer for cover purposes grew to a point where
the officer concluded that he could not satisfactorily serve the require-
ments of both his (unwitting) U.S. media employers and the CIA, and
therefore resigned from the CIA. He maintained contact, however.
with the CIA and continued, very occasionally, to report to the CIA
from the countries in which he worked.
(2) Of the less than ten relationships with writers for small, or
limited circulation, U.S. publications, such as trade journals or news-
letters, most are for cover purposes.
(3) The third, and largest, category of CIA relationships with the
U.S. media includes free-lance journalists; "stringers" for newspapers,
news magazines and news services; itinerant authors; propaganda
writers; and agents working under cover as employees of U.S. pub-
lishing houses abroad. With the exception of the last group, the
majority of the individuals in this category are bona fide writers or
journalists or photographers. Most are paid by the CIA, and virtually
all are witting; few, however, of the news organizations to which they
contribute are aware of their CIA relationships.
(4) The fourth category of covert relationships resembles the kind
of contact that journalists have with any other department of the U.S.
Government in the routine performance of their journalistic duties. No
money changes hands. The relationships are usually limited to occa-
sional lunches, interviews, or telephone conversations during which
information would be exchanged or verified. The difference, of course,
is that the relationships are covert. The journalist either volunteers or
is requested by the CIA to provide some sort of information about peo-
ple with whom he is in contact. In several cases, the relationship began
when the journalist approached a U.S. embassy officer to report that
he was approached by a foreign intelligence officer; in others, the CIA
initiated the relationship.
The first major step to impose restrictions on the use of U.S. journal-
ists was taken by former Director Colby in the fall of 1973. According
to Mr. Colby's letter to the Committee : IIl
(a) CIA will undertake no activity in which there is a risk
of influencing domestic public opinion, either directly or in-
directly. The Agency will continue its prohibition against
placement of material in the American media. In certain in-
stances, usually where the initiative is on the part of the
media, CIA will occasionally provide factual non-attributable
briefings to various elements of the media, but only in cases
where we are sure that the senior editorial staff is aware of
the source of the information provided.
Al Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75.
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196
rrent relationships that fit this cate-
,rminated under the CIA's Febru-
L small number of past relationships
s the cover arrangement consisted of
for any articles by the CIA agent
one case the journalistic functions
over purposes grew to a point where
not satisfactorily serve the require-
media employers and the CIA, and
He maintained contact, however,
occasionally, to report to the CIA
:ed.
inships with writers for small, or
ns, such as trade journals or news-
ory of CIA relationships with the
ialists; "stringers" for newspapers,
s; itinerant authors; propaganda
? cover as employees of U.S. pub-
exception of the last group, the
category are bona fide writers or
ire paid by the CIA, and virtually
news organizations to which they
lationships.
t relationships resembles the kind
any other department of the U.S.
nee of their journalistic duties. No
;hips are usually limited to occa-
ione conversations during which
verified. The difference, of course,
'he journalist either volunteers or
me sort of information about peo-
veral cases, the relationship began
.S. embassy officer to report. that
ligence officer; in others, the CIA
ctions on the use of U.S. journal-
lby in the fall of 1973. According
ee: 21
ivity in which there is a risk
amnion, either directly or in-
nue its prohibition against
erican media. In certain in-
itive is on the part of the
'ide factual non-attributable
he media, but only in cases
r editorial staff is aware of
ided.
t Committee, 10/21/7.5.
(b) As a general policy, the Agency will not make any
clandestine use of staff employees of U.S. publications which
have a substantial impact or influence on public opinion. This
limitation includes cover use and any other activities which
mlht be directed by CIA.
(c) A thorough review should be made of CIA use of non-
staff journalists; i.e., stringers and free-lancers, and also those
individuals involved in journalistic activities who are in non-
sensitive sensitive journalist-related positions, primarily for cover
backstopping. Our goal in this exercise is to reduce such usage
to a minimum.
Mr. Colby's letter specified that operational use of staff-that is, full-
time correspondents and other employees of major U.S. news maga-
zines, newspapers, wire services, or television networks-was to be
avoided. Use would be less restricted for "stringers" or occasional
correspondents for these news organizations, as well as for corre-
spondents working for smaller, technical, or specialized publications.
The public statement that the CIA issued on February 11, 1976, ex-
pressed a policy of even greater restraint :
-Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid
or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time
news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service,
newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.
-As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing rela-
tionships with individuals in these groups into conformity
with this new policy.
-CIA recognizes that members of these groups (U.S.
media and religious personnel) may wish to provide infor-
mation to the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of
interest to the U.S. Government. The CIA will continue to
welcome information volunteered by such individuals?
From CIA testimony later that month, the Committee learned that
this prohibition extends to non-Americans accredited to U.S. media
organizations. Nevertheless, this prohibition does not cover "unaccred-
ited" Americans serving in U.S. media organizations, or free-lance
writers. As previously noted, the CIA has informed the Committee
that, of the approximately 50 CIA relationships with U.S. journalists
or employees of U.S. media organizations, fewer than one-half will be
terminated under the new guidelines.23
3. Two Issues : "Fallout" and the Integrity of a Free Press
In examining the CIA's past and present use of the U.S. media, the
Committee finds two reasons for concern. The first is the potential, in-
herent in covert media operations, for manipulating or incidentally
"CIA instructions interpreting the new policy explain that "the term 'con-
tractual' applies to any written or oral agreement obligating the Agency to
provide financial remuneration including regular salaries, spot payments, or
reimbursement of, out-of-pocket operational expenses or the provision of other
material benefits that are clearly intended as a reward for services rendered
the Agency."
"CIA response of March 17, 1976 (76-0315/1).
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198
fnisleading the American public. The second is the dame to the
credibility and independence o ..-.cared
oovBI~E t~[tf f ,9-10e V ..Bthich may be caused by
In his 1967 order prohibiting CIA anbl c tand in indthis o lryat
p
Deputy Director for plans Desmond FitzGerald raise d the first issue.
He stated then
Fallout in the United States from a foreign publication
which we support is inevitable and consequently permis-
sible.
In extensive testimony, CIA employees both past and
conceded that there is no way to shield the American publc resent have
from such
"fallout." As a former senior official of the Agency put it in testimony :
There is no wa
in thi
i
y
s
ncreasingly small world of ours of
insulating information that one puts out overseas and con-
fining it to the area to where one puts it out.... When Brit-
ish intelligence was operating in the last century, they could
plant an outrageous story in some local publication and feel
fairly confident that no one else would ever hear about it,
that would be the end of it. . That is no longer the
case. Whether or not this type of overseas activity should be
allowed to continue is subject to differing views and judg-
ments. My own would be that we would be fools to relinquish
it because it serves a very useful purpose.'5
The same former CIA official continued :
If you plant an article in some paper overseas, and it is
a hard-hitting article, or a revelation, there is no way of nnar-
anteeing that it is not going to be picked up and published
by the Associated Press in this country.zsa
The domestic fallout of covert propaganda comes from many
sources; books intended primarily for an English-speaking foreign
audience, press placements that are picked up by international wire
services, press services controlled by the CIA, and direct funding of
foreign institutions that attempt to propagandize the United States
public and Congress.
In the case of books, substantial fallout in the U.S. may be a neces-
sary part of the propaganda process. For example, CIA records for
1967 state that certain books about China subsidized or even pro-
duced by the Agency "circulate principally in the U.S. as a prelude to
later distribution abroad." Several of these books on China were
widely reviewed in the United States, often in juxtaposition to the
sympathetic view of the emerging China as presented by Edgar Snow.
At least once, a book review for an Agency book which appeared in
the New York Timee was written by a CIA writer under contract.
E. Howard Hunt, who had been in charge of contacts with U.S. pub-
lishers in the late 1960s, acknowledged in testimony before this Com-
mittee that CIA books circulated in the U.S., and suggested that such
fallout may not have been u
i
t
i
n
n
ent
onal.
Thomas H. Karamessines testimony of a former Deputy Director for plans,
10/22/75, p. 46.
'6a Fbrmer Deputy Director for plans testimony, 10/22/75, p. 36.
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c. The second is the damage to the
a free press which may be caused by
ournalists and media organizations.
CIA publication in this country, then
and FitzGerald raised the first issue.
es from a foreign publication
able and consequently permis-
iployees both past and present have
Meld the American public from such
11 of the Agency put it in testimony :
asingly small world of ours of
one puts out overseas and con-
)ne puts it out.... When Brit-
in the last century, they could
some local publication and feel
else woul
That isno d ever hear about it,
of overseas activity longer the
shoulto differing views and judg-
ve would be fools to relinquish
purpose.25
inued:
me paper overseas, and it is
ation. there is no way of vnar-
be picked up and published
country.2S?
propaganda comes from many
for an English-speaking foreign
picked up by international wire
the CIA, and direct funding of
propagandize the United States
Bout in the U.S. may be a neces-
For example, CIA records for
China subsidized or even pro-
ipally in the U.S. as a prelude to
of these books on China were
s, often in juxtaposition to the
na as presented by Edgar Snow.
Lgency book which appeared in
a CIA writer under contract.
arge of contacts with U.S. pub-
i in testimony before this Com-
e U.S., and suggested that such
1.
i former Deputy Director for plans,
Imony, 10/25/75, p. 36.
Question. But, with anything that was published in Eng-
lish, the United States citizenry would become a likely audi-
ence for publication?
Mr. HUNT. A likely audience, definitely.
Question. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that
things that were published in English were kept out of or
away from the American reading public ?
Mr. HUNT. It was impossible because Praeger was a com-
mercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be
reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read.
Hvrrr. If your targets are foreign, then where are they?
They don't all necessarily read English, and we had a bilateral
agreement with the British that we wouldn't propagandize
their people. So unless the book goes into a lot of languages
or it is published in India, for example, where English is a
lingua franca, then you have some basic problems. And I
think the way this was rationalized by the project review
board ... was that the ultimate target was foreign, which was
true, but how much of the Praeger output actually got abroad
for any impact I think is highly arguable.26
An American who reads one of these books which purportedly is R
authored by a Chinese defector would not know that his thoughts
and opinions about China are possibly being shaped by an agency
of the United States Government. Given the paucity of information
and the inaccessibility of China in the 1960s, the CIA may have helped'
shape American attitudes toward the emerging China. The CIA con-
siders such "fallout" inevitable.
" Another example of the damages of "fallout" involved two propri-
etary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe. Inevitably
these news services had U.S. subscribers. The larger of the two was
subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout., the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S.
dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services.
A serious problem arises from the possible use of U.S. publications
for press placements. Materials furnished to the Committee describe
a relationship which poses this problem. It began in August 1967-
after the Katzenbach Committee recommendations-and continued
until May 1974. In this case, a IT.S.-based executive of a major U.S.
newspaper was contacted by the CIA "on a confidential basis in view
of his access to information of intelligence and operational interests."
The news executive served as a witting, unpaid collaborator for intel-
ligence collection, and received briefings from the CIA which "were of
It was visualized that . . . propaganda (if agreeable to
him) might be initially inserted in his paper and then be
available for reprinting by Latin American news outlets....
There is no indication in the file that Subject agreed
or
...
' that he did place propaganda in his newspaper. 17
E. Howard Hunt testimony, 1/10/76 pp. 73, 74.
CIA Operational case study #14.
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200
The danger of CIA propaganda cont
i
ti
"
am
na
ng U.S. media-
fall.
out"--occurs in virtually any instance of
sibility is propaganda use. The
quite real even when the CIA does not use any U.S. journal-
ist or publication in carrying out the propaganda project. Where a
CIA propaganda campaign causes stories to appear in many pres-
tigious news outlets around th ? 1
u "or 3 as occurred at the of the
Chilean elections in 1970, it is t
ruly impossible to insulate theeUnited
States from propaganda fallout.
Indeed, CIA records for the September-October 1970 propaganda
effort in Chile indicate that "replay" of propaganda in the U.S. was
not unex
ected
A
bl
p
.
ca
e summary for September 25, 1970 reports:
Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo,
Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme
materials. Items also carried in New York Times, Washington
Post. Propaganda activities continue to generate good cover-
age of Chile developments along our theme guidance ....Y8
The fallout problem is probably most serious when the U.S. public
is dependent on the "polluted" media channel for its information
on a particular subject. When news events have occurred in relatively
isolated parts of the world, few major news organizations may have
been able to cover them initially, and world-wide coverage reflects
whatever propaganda predominates in the media of the area.
Another situation in which the effects of "fallout" in the United
States may be significant is that in which specialized audiences in the
United States-are
t
d
a s
u
y specialists, for example-may unknowingly
rely heavily on materials produced by, or subsidized by, the CIA. The
danger of this form of dependence is less now than it had been prior
to the freer flow of Western travelers to the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe and China.
In its inquiry into the activities of a Vietnamese institution the
Committee discovered a particularly unfortunate example of domestic
fall-out of covert propaganda. activities. The institution was a CIA-
inspired creation. The intention of the CIA, according to its own
records, was not to undertake
propaganda against the United States.
Whatever the design, the propaganda effort had an impaet on the
American public and con
i
l
gress
ona
opinion. The CIA provided $170,-
000 per year in 1974 and 1975 for the sunport of this institution's pub-
lications. The embassy in the United States distributed the magazine
to American readers, including the offices of all United States Con-
gressmen and Senators. The institution on at least one occasion invited
a group of American Congressmen to Vietnam and snonsored their
activities on at least part of their trip. Through this institution the
CIA-however inadventently-engaged in propagandizing the Amer-
ican public, including its Congress, on the controversial issue of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.
One particular kind of possible "fallout" has aroused official concern.
That is fallout upon the U.S. Government of the CIA's "black nrona-
gnada"-propaganda that appears to originate from an unfriendly
source. Because the source of black propaganda is so fully concealed,
the CIA recognizes that it risks seriously misleading U.S. policy-
"Chile Task Force Log (R597).
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contaminating U.S. media-"fall-
tance of propaganda use. The pos-
CIA does not use any U.S. journal-
the propaganda project. Where a
s stories to appear in many pres-
)rld, as occurred at the time of the
y impossible to insulate the United
ptember-October 1970 propaganda
y" of propaganda in the U.S. was
:)r September 25, 1970 reports :
os Aires, Lima, Montevideo,
tinued replay of Chile theme
Yew York Timee, Washington
rtinue to generate good cover-
ig our theme guidance ....28
nost serious when the U.S. public
dia channel for its information
events have occurred in relatively
jor news organizations may have
ind world-wide coverage reflects
in the media of the area.
ffects of "fallout" in the United
hich specialized audiences in the
for example-may unknowingly
V, or subsidized by, the CIA. The
less now than it had been prior
ors to the Soviet Union, Eastern
c)f a Vietnamese institution the
in fortunate example of domestic
ies. The institution was a CIA-
the CIA, according to its own
anda against the United States.
a effort had an impact on the
pinion. The CIA provided $170,-
unport of this institution's pub-
States distributed the magazine
'flees of all United States Con-
i on at least one occasion invited
Vietnam and sponsored their
Through this institution the
d in propagandizing the Amer-
the controversial issue of U.S.
ut" has aroused official concern.
ant of the CIA's "black nrona-
originate from an unfriendl
,paganda is so fully concealed,
iusly misleading U.S. policy-
makers. An Agency regulation specifies that the Directorate of Opera-
tions should notify appropriate elements of the DDI and the In-
telligence Community if the results of a black operation might in-
fluence the thinking of senior U.S. officials or affect U.S. intelligence
estimates. Regular coordination between the CIA and the State De-
partment's INR has been instituted to prevent the self-deception of
"senior U.S. officials" through black propaganda. It should be noted
that this procedure applies only to black propaganda and only to
"senior U.S. officials." No mechanism exists to protect the U.S. public
and the Congress from fallout from black propaganda or any other
propaganda.
The Committee recognizes that other countries make extensive use
of the international media for their propaganda purposes. The United
States public is not insulated from this propaganda either. It is clear,
however, that the strongest defense a free country has from propaganda
of any kind is a free and vigorous press that expresses diverse points of
view. Similarly, the most effective way for this country to respond to
the use of propaganda abroad is to permit American Journalists and
news organizations to pursue their work without jeopardizing their
credibility in the eyes of the world through covert use of them.
C. CovERT USE OF U.S. RELIGIOUS Gaours
The Committee considers religious groups-like academia and the
press-to be among the most important of our society's institutions.
As such, any covert relationship that might either influence them or
jeopardize their reputation is extremely sensitive. Moreover, opera-
tional use of U.S. religious organizations differs from the use of other
elements of U.S. society. It is a special case, in that virtually all re-
ligions are inherently supra-national. Makingoperational use of U.S.
religious groups for national purposes both violates their nature and
undermines their bonds with kindred groups around the world.
In its examination of CIA relationships with domestic institutions,
the Committee has focused exclusively on the use of U.S. religious or-
ganizations.
1. Restrictions on the Use of Religious Personnel
The CIA guidelines issued in the wake of the Katzenbach Com-
mittee report required prior approval by the DDO for operational use
of any employee, staff member, or official of a U.S. educational or pri-
vate organization. This restriction applied to operational use of these
individuals who were affiliated with American religious organizations.
The CIA has provided the Committee with no other regulations that
apply specifically to the use of religious groups. In a letter to this Com-
mittee, however, Mr. Colby stated that the CIA used religious groups
with great caution, and that their use required special approval within
the Agency :
Deputy Director for Operations regulations require the
Deputy Director for Operations' approval for the uze of re-
ligious groups. He has the responsibility of ensuring that
such operational use avoids infringement or damage to the
individual religious personnel involved in their group. Such
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use is carefully weighed and approvals in recent years have
been relatively few in number.29
On February 11, 1976, the CIA announced :
CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any
American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be
continued as a matter of policy.
The CIA has assured the Committee that the prohibition against "all
paid or contractual relationships" is in fact a prohibition against any
operational use of Americans following a religious vocation.
2. Scope of Relation.gAjp8
The number of American clergy or misionaries used by the CIA has
been small. The CIA has informed the Committee of a total of 14
covert arrangements which involved direct operational use of 21
individuals.
Only four of these relationships were current in August 1975, and
according to the CIA, they were used only for intelligence collection,
or, in one case, for a minor role in preserving the cover of another
asset.
The other ten relationships with U.S. religious personnel had been
terminated before August 1975; four of them ended within the last
five years. In six or seven cases, the CIA paid salaries, bonuses, or ex-
penses s to the religious personnel, or helped to fund projects run by
Most of the individuals were used for covert action purposes. Sev-
eral were involved in large covert action projects of the mid-sixties
which were directed at "competing" with communism in the Third
World.
8. I88ue8 : "Fallout," Violation of Tru8t
As several of the relationships-all terminated-involved the reli-
gious personnel in media activity, some of the same concerns must be
voiced as when U. S. journalists are used covertly. The danger of
U.S. "fallout" of CIA propaganda existed in three or four of the
relationships with U.S. religious The more serious issue, however, personnel.
the
confiden-
tiality of the relationships among members of the clergy and their
congregations.
Of the recent relationships, the most damaging would appear to be
that of a U.S. priest serving the CIA as an informant on student and
religious dissidence.
Of the earlier cases, one exemplifies the extent to which the CIA
used confidential pastoral relationships. The CIA used the pastor
of a church in a Third World country as a "principal agent" to carry
out covert action projects, and as a spotter, assessor, asset developer,
and recruiter. He collected information on political developments
and on personalities. He Passed CIA propaganda to the local press.
According to the CIA's description of the case, the pastor's analyses
were based on his long-term friendships with the personalities, and
the agents under him were "well known to him in his professional life."
At first the CIA provided only occasional gifts to the pastor in return
"Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75.
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i approvals in recent years have
r .29
'lnounced :
ontractual relationship with any
issionary. This practice will be
y.
ttee that the prohibition against "all
" is in fact a prohibition against any
lowing a religious vocation.
y or misionaries used by the CIA has
ied the Committee of a total of 14
)lved direct operational use of 21
s were current in August 1975, and
used only for intelligence collection,
in preserving the cover of another
h U.S. religious personnel had been
four of them ended within the last
ie CIA paid salaries, bonuses, or ex-
or helped to fund projects run by
ed for covert action purposes. Sev-
action projects of the mid-sixties,
ig with communism in the Third
rust
-all terminated-involved the reli-
some of the same concerns must be
are used covertly. The danger of
la existed in three or four of the
rsonnel.
r, is the question of the confiden-
members of the clergy and their
'lost damaging would appear to be
A as an informant on student and
ifies the extent to which the CIA
ships. The CIA used the pastor
.ry as a "principal agent" to carry
spotter, assessor, asset developer,
nation on political developments
A propaganda to the local press.
of the case, the pastor's analyses
ships with the personalities, and
vn to him in his professional life."
ional gifts to the pastor in return
lest Committee, 10/21/75.
for his services; later, for over ten years, the CIA paid him a salary
that reached $11,414 annually.
4. The CIA aid U.S. Religious Organizations and Personnel: Conclu-
sions and Reconh'mendation8
The Committee welcomes the policy, announced by the CIA on
February 11, 1976, that prohibits any operational use of Americans
following a religious vocation.
The fact that relatively few American clergy or missionaries have
been used by the CIA suggests that neither this country's capacity to
collect intelligence nor its covert action capability would be seriously
affected by a total ban on their operational use. Therefore, the Com-
mittee recommends that the CIA's recent prohibition on covert paid or
contractual relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency
and any American clergyman or missionary should be established by
law.
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