PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TAYACAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001300010029-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: October 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
DC I
7D60 HQS
18 October 1984
25X1
---2525X1
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column of ter each comment,)
Attached herewith is
the translation of the
Psy-Ops booklet in
question.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE
Tayacan
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
25X1
DATE
C LA
18 October 1984
25X25
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
DDCI
7D6011 HQS
Attached herewith is the
2.
translation of the Psy-Ops
Booklet in question.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
?
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
X1
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I J'
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PREFACE
Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war. For this reason, its
area of operations goes beyond the territorial limits of conventional warfare,
penetrating the political being "par excellence' itself: the 'political
animal' defined by Aristoteles.
In effect, the human being must be considered as the priority objective in
a political war. And viewed as the military target of guerrilla warfare, the
most critical point of the human being is the mind. Once the mind has been
reached, the 'political animal' has been vanquished, without necessarily
having received any shots.
Guerrilla warfare emerges and grows in a political environment; in the
constant struggle to dominate that area of the political mentality which is
inherent in every human being, and which collectively constitutes the
'environment' in which guerrilla warfare moves, and which is precisely the
arena in which its triumph or defeat is defined.
This concept of guerrilla warfare as a political war turns Psychological
Operations into the factor that determines the results. The target, then, are
the minds of the population, the entire population: Our troops, the enemy
troops, and the civil population.
This book is a guerrilla training manual for Psychological operations, and
it is applied to the specific case of the Christian and democratic crusade
being conducted in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.
Welcome!
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I INTRODUCTION
1. General Background
The aim of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to
psychological operation techniques, which will have an immediate and practical
value in guerrilla warfare. This section is introductory and general in
nature; the following sections will cover every point mentioned here in more
detail.
The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not allow
sophisticated psychological operations, and it becomes necessary for the
group, detachment and squadron leaders to carry out, with minimum direction
from the upper echelons, psychological action operations with the contacts who
know the reality from the roots.
2. Propagandist Combatant Guerrillas
In order to obtain the maximum results from psychological operations in
guerrilla warfare, each combatant must be highly motivated to engage in
propaganda face to face, to the same degree that he is motivated to fight.
This means that the guerrilla's individual political awareness, the reason for
his struggle, must be as acute as his capacity to fight.,
Such a degree of political awareness and motivation is obtained through
group dynamics and self-criticism as a standard teaching method for guerrilla
training and operations. Group discussions increase the spirit and the unity
of thought of the guerrilla squadrons, and they exert social pressure on the
weaker members to perform a better role in future training or in combat
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actions. Self-criticism is made in terms of one's own contribution or
failures in one's contribution to the cause, the movement, the struggle, etc.,
and this introduces an element of positive individual commitment to the
mission of the group.
The desired result is a guerrilla soldier who may justify his actions
persuasively when he is in contact with any member of the Nicaraguan People,
and especially to himself and his guerrilla companions when enduring the
vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. This means that each guerrilla will be
persuasive in face-to-face communication--propagandist, combatant--in his
contact with the people; he must be capable of giving 5 or 10 logijcal reasons
why, for example, a peasant must give him fabric, needle and thread to mend
his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves this way, enemy propaganda will never
turn him into an enemy in the eyes of the population. It also means that
hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity will have a meaning, psychologically, in
the struggle for the cause, because of constant orientation.
Armed propaganda includes every action performed, and the good impression
which this armed force may give will result in the population having a
positive attitude towards those forces; it does not include forced
indoctrination. Armed propaganda improves the behavior of the population
towards its author, and it is not achieved by force.
This means that an armed guerrilla unit in a rural town will not give the
impression that its weapons are a force that they hold over the peasants, but
rather that they are the strength of the peasants against the repressive
Sandinista government. This is achieved through a close identification with
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the population, as follows: hanging up the weapons and working alongside then
in their fields, in construction, harvesting the grain, fishing, etc.; giving
explanations to young men about basic weapons, for example, giving them an
unloaded weapon and allowing them to touch it, see it, etc., giving a basic
description of its operation; describing, with simple slogans, how the weapons
will serve the people in winning their freedom; adopting the demands of the
people for hospitals and education, a reduction of taxes, etc.
The objective of all these actions is to create an identification of the
people with the weapons and with the guerrillas who carry them, so that the
population feels that those weapons are, indirectly, the weapons that will
protect them and help them in their struggle against an oppressive regime.
There is always implicit terror in weapons, since the people are internally
'aware' that they could be used against them; however, as long as explicit
coercion can be avoided, we may achieve positive attitudes about the presence
of armed guerrillas in the midst of the population.
4. Armed Propaganda Teams
Armed Propaganda Teams [Equipos de Propaganda Armada (EPA)] are
constituted through a careful selection of persuasive and highly motivated
guerrillas, moving within the population, motivating the people to support the
guerrillas and resist the enemy. They combine a high degree of political
awareness and the guerrillas' capacity for armed propaganda, towards a
planned, controlled and programmed effort.
The careful selection of personnel, based on their persuasive powers in
informal discussions and on their combat capability, is more important than
the level of their education or than the training program. The Armed
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Propaganda Team's tactics must be carried out covertly, and they must be
parallel to the tactical efforts in guerrilla warfare. Knowledge of the
psychology of the population is a primary necessity for the Armed Propaganda
Teams, but much more intelligence data will be obtained from an EPA program in
the area of operations.
5. Development and Control of "Front" Organizations
The development and control of "front" organizations is carried out
through internal subjective (concealed) control, through group meetings of the
"internal cadres," and by calculating the time needed for the combination of
these two elements to be applied to the masses.
Established citizens--doctors, attorneys, businessmen, teachers,
etc.--will be recruited initially as "Social Crusaders" in typically
'innocuous' movements in the area of operations. When their "involvement"
with the clandestine organization is revealed to them, this exerts
psychological pressure on them so that they can be used as 'internal cadres"
in groups to which they already belong or groups which they could join.
Then, through a gradual and skillful process, they will receive
instruction in persuasion techniques for the control of target groups which
will support our democratic revolution. A system for the control of cells
isolates individuals from one another, and at the appropriate moment, their
influence is used to fuse the groups together into a united national front.
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6. Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies
The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is carried
out internally through a covert commando element, bodyguards, messengers,
shock troops (incident initiators), poster carriers (also used to give
signals), and slogan shouters, all under the control of the external commando
element.
When the cadres are placed in or recruited from organizations such as
labor unions, youth groups, agricultural organizations or professional
associations, they will begin to manipulate the groups' objectives. The
psychological apparatus of our movement, by means of these internal cadres,
will prepare a mental attitude which, at the crucial moment, could become
involved in a fury of justified violence.
This can be carried out through a small group of guerrillas infiltrated
within the masses, who will have the mission of agitating, giving the
impression that there are many of them and that they have great popular
support. Using the tactics of a force of 200 to 300 agitators, one can create
a demonstration in which 10,000 to 20,000 could take part.
7. Support from Contacts Who are Rooted in Reality
The support of local contacts who know reality down to its roots is
achieved through the exploitation of the social and political weaknesses of
the target society, with propagandist-combatant guerrillas, armed propaganda,
armed propaganda teams, front organizations and mass meetings.
The propagandist-combatant guerrilla is the result of a constant program
of indoctrination and motivation. They will have the mission of demonstrating
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to the people the greatness and the justice of our movement, to all
Nicaraguans and to the world. By identifying with our people, sympathy
towards our movement will increase, which will result in greater support from
the population towards the freedom commandos, taking away sympathy from the
regime in power.
Armed propaganda will extend this process of identification with the
Christian guerrillas, providing [an awareness of] common traits against the
Sandinista regime.
The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a stage-by-stage persuasive planning
program in all areas of the country. These teams are also the 'eyes and ears'
of our movement.
The development and control of front organizations in guerrilla warfare
will give our movement the ability to create the effect of a 'whip" within the
population, when the order to merge is given. When infiltration and
subjective internal control have developed parallel to other guerrilla
activities, one of our commanders will be able to literally shake down the
Sandinista structure and replace it.
The meetings and mass assemblies are the culmination of a broad base of
support among the population, and they occur in the later phases of the
operation. This is the moment in which an overthrow may be achieved and our
revolution can come out in the open, requiring the close collaboration of the
entire population of the country, and requiring contacts who are rooted in
reality.
Tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the enemy's
weaknesses, and toward destroying their military capability to resist, and
must go parallel with a psychological effort to weaken and destroy their
sociopolitical capability at the same time. In guerrilla warfare, more than
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in any other type of military effort, psychological activities must take place
simultaneously with military activities, in order to achieve the desired
objectives.
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II PROPAGANDIST-COMBATANT GUERRILLA
1. General Background
The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with
psychological operation techniques, which maximizes the social psychological
effect of a guerrilla movement, turning the guerrilla into a propagandist, in
addition to a combatant. The nature of the guerrilla warfare environment does
not allow sophisticated facilities to conduct psychological operations; for
this reason, we must make use of each guerrilla's effective face-to-face
persuasion.
The guerrilla's individual political awareness, the reason for his
struggle, shall be as important as his ability to fight. This motivation of
political awareness will be achieved by:
- Recognizing the guerrilla as a vital link between the democratic guerrilla
and the support of the people, essential to the subsistence of both.
[movement] through the support of the local guerrillas, which provides a
psychological base in the population for [participation in] politics, after
the achievement of victory.
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- Promoting the value of guerrilla and popular participation in the civic
Developing in each guerrilla the capability for face-to-face persuasion on
the local level, in order to gain the support of the population, which is a
key element for the success of the guerrilla warfare.
3. Group Dynamics
This political awareness and motivation is obtained using group dynamics
at the level of small units. The group discussion method and self-criticism
are general techniques for training and guerrilla operations.
Group discussions increase the [group] spirit and a unity of thought in
small guerrilla groups, and exerts social pressure on the weaker members, so
that they may better carry out their mission in future training and combat
action. These group discussions will place particular emphasis on:
- Creating an opinion favorable to our movement. Using the national and
local history, making it understood that the Sandinista regime is "foreign,"
"repressive" and "imperialistic," and although there are some Nicaraguans
within the government, we will make it evident that they are power "puppets"
of the Soviets and the Cubans, that is, foreign powers.
explained only as support for local events in guerrilla warfare.
the armed Sandinista forces is our priority. Our insurrectional movement is a
pluralist political platform, from which we are determined to win liberty,
equality, a better economy with opportunities to work, a higher level of
living and a true democracy for all Nicaraguans without exception.
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- Providing each guerrilla with a clear understanding about the struggle for
national sovereignty against Soviet-Cuban imperialism. Discussion guides will
lead the guerrillas to see the injustices of the Sandinista system.
- Demonstrating to each guerrilla the need for good behavior in order to win
the support of the population. The discussion guides must convince the
guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population is a determining
factor, because victory is impossible without popular support.
Self-criticism will take place in constructive terms that will contribute
to the mission of the movement, and that will provide the guerrillas with the
certainty that they have a constant and positive individual responsibility in
the group mission. The method for instruction shall be:
a) Divide the guerrilla force into squadrons for group discussions,
including command and support elements, as long as the tactical situation
allows it. The integrity of the small units must be maintained when these
groups are designed.
b) Assign a political cadre in the guerrilla force to each group, to
guide the discussion. The squadron leader must help the cadre to promote the
study and the expression of thoughts. If there aren't enough political cadres
for each squadron or detachment, the leaders must guide the discussions, and
the available cadres must visit groups alternately.
c) The cadre (or the leader) should guide the group discussion in order
to cover a number of points and reach a correct conclusion. The guerrillas
must feel that they have made their own free decision. The cadre must act
like a tutor. The cadre or leader will not act like a lecturer, but rather
will help the members of the group to study and express their own opinions.
d) At the end of each discussion, the political cadre will make a
summary of the principal points, taking them to the correct conclusions.
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Any serious differences with the objectives of the movement must be noted by
the cadre and reported to the commander of the forces. If necessary, a
meeting of the combined groups will be held, and the team of political cadres
will explain and clear up the misunderstanding.
e) Democratic conduct on the part of the political cadres: living,
eating and working with the guerrillas, and, if possible, fighting at their
side, sharing their living conditions. All of this will propitiate
understanding and a spirit of cooperation which will help in the discussion
and exchange of ideas.
f) Holding group discussions in towns, and in areas of operation with
civil populations, whenever possible, and not limiting them to the camps or
bases. This is done in order to emphasize the revolutionary nature of the
struggle and to demonstrate that the guerrillas identified with the objectives
of the people move within the population. The guerrilla is focused toward the
people, like the political cadre is toward the guerrilla, and they must live,
eat and work together in order to achieve unity of revolutionary thought.
The principles for the group discussions between guerrillas and political
cadres are:
- Organize discussion groups at the detachment or squadron level. A cadre
cannot be certain of comprehension and understanding of the concepts and
conclusions on the part of the guerrillas in large groups. In a group the
size of a 10-man squadron, judgment and control of the situation are greater.
This way, all the students will participate; in an exchange among them, the
political leader, the leader of the group, and also the political cadre.
Special attention will be given to the individual ability to discuss the
objectives of the insurrectional struggle. When a guerrilla expresses his
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opinion, he will be interested in hearing the opinions of others, and this
will result in unity of thought.
Combine the different points of view and reach a common judgment or
conclusion. This is the most difficult task for a political cadre in the
guerrilla. After the group discussions about the democratic objectives of the
movement, the leader of the team of political cadres of the guerrilla force
must combine the conclusions of the individual groups into a general summary.
In a meeting with all the discussion groups, the cadre will provide the main
points, and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or modify
their viewpoint's. In order to do this, the conclusions will be summarized as
slogans, whenever possible.
political cadres must always be prepared to discuss solutions to the problems
observed by the guerrillas. During the discussions, the guerrillas must be
guided by the following three principles:
-- Loyalty of thought.
-- Freedom of expression.
-- Concentration of thoughts towards the objectives of the democratic
struggle.
The result desired is that a guerrilla may persuasively justify all his
actions whenever he is in contact with any member of the people, and
especially to himself and his fellow guerrillas, while enduring the
vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare.
- This means that each guerrilla will be able to conduct effective
face-to-face persuasion as a propagandist-combatant in his contact with the
people, to the point of being able to give 5 or 10 logical reasons why, for
example, a peasant should give him a piece of fabric, or needle and thread
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to mend his clothes. When a guerrilla behaves like this, no kind of enemy
propaganda will be able to make him a 'terrorist' in the eyes of the people.
- Thus, even the hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of a
guerrilla, will acquire meaning in the struggle for the cause, due to the
constant psychological orientation.
Camping gives greater motivation to guerrilla units, in addition to
reducing distractions and increasing the spirit of cooperation of the small
units, relating the physical environment with the psychological atmosphere.
The squadron leader will establish the regular procedure of the camp. Once
they have disposed of their knapsacks, the leader will choose the suitable
site for camping. He must select a site which overlooks the zone, providing
for two or three ways to escape. He will choose among his men and give them
responsibilities such as:
shooting in case of emergency. Likewise he will build the kitchen, which will
be built by making a few small ditches and placing three rocks on them; in
case the kitchen is built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and rocks.
- Build a wall for protection against the wind, the top and sides of which
will be covered with branches and leaves of the same vegetation that is
present in the zone. This will serve as camouflage and protection from being
seen from the air or by enemy patrols in the surrounding areas.
- Build a latrine and dig a hole where all wastes and trash will be buried;
these must be covered with earth when the camp is abandoned.
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watch post at access points and at a reasonable distance, from where a cry of
alarm could be heard. At that same time, a password, which must be changed
every 24 hours, will be established. The commander must have previously
established an alternate meeting point, in case the camp has to be abandoned
suddenly, so that they can meet at this other previously established point.
The patrol must be warned that if they cannot come together at the established
point in a certain amount of time, they must have a third meeting point.
These procedures contribute to the guerrilla's motivation and improve the
spirit of cooperation within the unit. The danger, the insecurity, the
anxiety and the daily anxiety [entailed] in the life of a guerrilla establish
the need for tangible evidence of belonging in order [for the soldiers] to
retain their good spirits and morale.
In addition to good physical condition, the guerrilla must be in good
psychological condition. [To achieve this,] we recommend group discussions
and self-criticism, which will greatly benefit the spirit and morale of the
guerrillas.
- Striking camp with the effort and cooperation of all strengthens their
esprit de corps. The guerrilla will then be inclined towards a unity of
To insure popular support, which is essential to the good development of
guerrilla warfare, the leaders must lead to positive interaction between
civilians and guerrillas, by the principle of "live, eat and work with the
people,' and they should maintain control of this activity. In group
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discussions, the leaders and political cadres must emphasize a positive
identification with the people.
Talking about tactical military plans in discussions with civilians is not
recommended. The communist enemy must be identified as the number one enemy
of the people, and as a secondary threat against our guerrilla forces.
As long as there is an opportunity, we must choose groups of elements who
have a high degree of political awareness and high discipline in the work to
be performed, to be sent to populated areas in order to conduct the armed
propaganda. They must persuade people through dialogue in face-to-face
encounters, following these principles:
- Respect of human rights and respect of the other's property.
- Helping people in community work.
- Protecting people from communist aggression.
- Teaching environmental hygiene or reading to the people, etc., in order to
win their trust, which will result in a better ideological democratic
preparation.
These activities will arouse the peasant's sympathy towards our movement,
and he will immediately become one of ours, through logistical support, cover
and intelligence information about the enemy, or participation in combat.
Guerrillas must be persuasive through the word, and not overbearing through
their weapons. When they behave this way, the people will feel that they are
respected, and will be more inclined to accept our message, thus consolidating
popular support.
Anyplace where tactical guerrilla operations are conducted in highly
populated areas, the squadron must also carry out parallel psychological
actions, which must precede, accompany and consolidate the common objective,
and give explanations to all people about our struggle, indicating that our
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presence means to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans without
exception, and explaining that our struggle is not against the nationals, but
rather against Russian imperialism. This will serve to assure greater
psychological achievements to augment the tactical operations of the future.
6. Conclusions
The nature of the guerrilla warfare environment does not permit
sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and face-to-face
persuasion from the propagandist-combatant guerrillas towards the people is an
effective and available tool, which we must use as often as possible during
the process of the struggle.
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III ARMED PROPAGANDA
1. General Background
There is frequently a misunderstanding about 'armed propaganda,' that this
tactic consists in prevailing over people with arms. In reality, it does not
involve force, but the guerrilla must be very knowledgeable in the principles
and methods of this tactic. The objective of this section is to give the
guerrilla student an understanding of the armed propaganda that must be used,
and which can be applied in guerrilla warfare.
Armed propaganda includes all actions performed by an armed force, the
results of which will bring a better attitude from the people towards that
force, not including forced indoctrination. This is performed by a close
identification with the people at any opportunity. For example:
- Hanging up one's arms and working side by side with the peasants in the
field: building, fishing, carrying water, fixing roofs, etc.
- When you work with people, the guerrillas can use slogans like: 'Many
hands doing small things, but doing them together.'
Participating in the people's work you can establish a strong bond between
them and the guerrillas, and at the same time, you generate popular support
for our movement.
During patrols or other operations near or in the middle of towns, each
guerrilla must be respectful and polite with the people. Likewise, he must
move cautiously and always be ready to fight, if necessary. But he must not
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see everyone as an enemy, with suspicion or hostility. Even in war, it is
possible to smile, laugh and greet people. Truly, the reason for our
revolutionary base, the reason why we fight, is our people. We must be
respectful towards them at all times.
In place and situations whenever it's possible, for example, while resting
during a march, the guerrillas can explain to youths and children how to
handle arms. They can give them an unloaded rifle, so that they can learn to
assemble it and disassemble it, how to use it; and they can point to imaginary
targets, since they are potential recruits for our forces.
The guerrillas must always be ready with easy slogans, to explain to the
people, whether by chance or intentionally, the reason for using arms.
- 'Arms will be used to win freedom, they are for you.'
- With arms we can set demands, such as hospitals, schools, better roads
and social services for the people, for you.'
- Our arms are, truly, the arms of the people, your arms.'
"With arms we can change the Sandinista-communist regime and return to the
people a true democracy, so that we all may have economic opportunities.'
All of this must be designed to create an identification of the people
with arms and with the guerrillas who carry them. Lastly, we must make the
people feel that we are thinking about them, and that the arms belong to the
people, to help them and to protect them from a communist, totalitarian,
imperialist regime, which is indifferent to the needs of the population.
3. Implicit and Explicit Terror
An armed guerrilla force always entails an implicit terror, because the
population, without saying it aloud, is afraid that the arms could be used
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against them. However, if the terror is not made to be explicit, positive
results can be expected.
In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant thread of physical
harm. If the government police cannot put a halt to guerrilla activities, the
population will lose confidence in the government, which has the inherent
mission of guaranteeing public safety. However, the guerrillas must be
careful not to become an explicit terror, because this would result in a loss
of public support.
In the words of a leader of the HUK guerrilla movement, in the Philippines:
"The population is always impressed by arms, but not because of the fear
that they cause, but rather because they give a feeling of strength. We must
present ourselves before the people, supporting them with our arms, and this
will give them the message of the struggle."
This is, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda.
An armed guerrilla force may occupy an entire town or small city that is
neutral or relatively passive with regard to the conflict. In order to carry
out armed propaganda effectively, the following must be done simultaneously:
- Destroy military or police installations, and moving the survivors to a
"public place."
- Cut all external lines of communication: cables, radio, messengers.
- Set up ambushes, in order to delay efforts on all possible access routes.
- Kidnap all Sandinista government officials and agents, and replacing them
in "public places" by military or civil personnel trusted by our movement; in
addition, do the following:
-- Establish a public court dependent on the guerrillas, and going through-
the entire town or city, gathering the population together for this act.
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-- Shame, ridicule and humiliate the 'personal symbols' of the repressive
government in the presence of the people, and promoting popular participation
by means of guerrillas placed within the crowd, yelling slogans and taunts.
-- Reduce the influence of individuals sympathetic to the regime, exposing
their weaknesses and removing them from the town, without damaging them
publicly.
-- Mix the guerrillas into the population, and have all members of the column
demonstrate very good conduct, practicing the following:
-- Any article taken will be paid for in cash.
-- The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this
opportunity will be exploited to carry out face-to-face persuasion regarding
the struggle.
-- Courtesy calls must be paid to prominent and prestigious citizens of the
place, such as doctors, priests, teachers, etc.
-- The guerrillas must instruct the population, so that when the operation is
over and the repressive Sandinista forces interrogate them, they may reveal
EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out. For example, the kinds
of weapons used, how many men arrived, from what direction they arrived and in
what direction they left, in other words, EVERYTHING.
-- Likewise, indicate to the population that in meetings or in private
discussions, they may give the names of Sandinista informers, who will be
removed together with the other officials of the repressive government.
guerrilla leaders or political cadres (the most dynamic one), including
explicit references to:
-- The fact that the "enemies of the people,' the Sandinista officials or
agents, must not be mistreated in spite of the criminal actions, even though
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the guerrilla forces may have suffered casualties, and that this is done
thanks to the generosity of the Christian guerrillas.
-- Give a statement of thanks for the 'hospitality" of the population, as
well as let them know that the risks that they will run when the Sandinistas
return are greatly appreciated.
-- The fact that the Sandinista regime will not be able to resist the attacks
of our guerrilla forces, in spite of the fact that they exploit the people
with taxes, control of currency, grain, and all aspects of public life through
the associations, to which they are forced to belong.
-- Making a promise to the people that they will return to make sure that the
"leeches' of the repressive Sandinista regime will not be able to impede the
integration of our guerrilla with the population.
-- A repeated statement to the population to the effect that they may reveal
everything about this visit by our commandos, because we are not afraid of
anything or anyone, or either the Soviets or the Cubans. Emphasize that we
are Nicaraguans, that we struggle for Nicaragua's freedom, and to establish a
wholly Nicaraguan government.
Against an Illegal Government
Armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the impression that the
arms are the power of'the guerrillas over the people, but rather that the arms
are the strength of the people against a repressive regime. Whenever it is
necessary to use armed force during an occupation or a visit to a town or
village,the guerrillas must emphasize and make sure during this action that
they:
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. them, the people, not the guerrillas themselves.
Admit frankly and publicly that this is 'an act of democratic guerrillas,'
with the appropriate explanations.
- That this action, although not desirable, is necessary because the final
objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of
force are not necessary.
- The force of arms is a need provoked by the oppressive system, and will
cease to exist when the 'forces of justice' of our movement assume control.
- If, for example, it became necessary for one of the advance posts to have
to shoot a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the
guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the
following is recommended:
near the town or city, and they would come in with reprisals such as rape,
pillage, destruction, captures, etc., terrorizing the inhabitants of the place
for having been attentive and hospitable to the guerrillas in the town.
- If a guerrilla shoots an individual, make the population see that he was
an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrillas
recognized their primordial duty, which is protecting the citizens.
- The commando tried to stop the informant without shooting, because he,
like all Christian guerrillas, advocate non-violence. Having shot the
Sandinista informer, although it is against his own will, was necessary to
avoid repression on the part of the Sandinista government against the innocent
people.
caused this situation, that really killed the informant, and that the weapon
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fired was one that was recovered in combat against the Sandinista regime.
Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended its
repression, with the corruption sponsored by foreign powers, etc., the freedom
commandos would not have had to take up arms to cut down the lives of their
Nicaraguan brothers, which hurts our Christian feelings. If the informant had
not tried to escape, he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the
population, because he would not have tried to inform to the enemy. This
death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, and
this is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.
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5. Selective Use of Violence for Propaganda Effects
We could neutralize carefully selected and planned-for targets, such as
court judges, cattle judges [jueces de mesta), police or state security
officers, CDS chiefs, etc. For purposes of the psychological effect, it is
necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is essential to gather the
affected population together to attend, take part in the act, and formulate
The target or person must be selected on the basis of the following:
- The spontaneous hostility. which the majority of the population may feel
- Using potential rejection or hate on the part of the majority of the
affected population against the target, rousing the population and making them
- If the majority of the people supports or backs the target, don't try to
change these feelings through provocation.
- Relative difficulty of handling the person who will replace the target.
The person who will replace the target must be selected carefully, on the
basis of the following:
Degree of violence necessary to effect the change.
- Degree of violence acceptable to the affected population.
Degree of violence possible without causing damage or danger to other
individuals in the area around the target.
- Foreseeable degree of reprisals on the part of the enemy towards the
affected population or other individuals in the area around the target.
The mission of replacing the individual must be followed by:
- Extensive explanations to the affected population of why [this action]
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Explaining that the Sandinista reprisals are unfair, indiscriminate, and
above all, a justification for the execution of this mission.
- Carefully sounding out the reaction of the people to the mission, as well
as controlling this reaction by assuring that the population's reaction is
beneficial to the Freedom Commandos.
6. Conclusions
Armed propaganda includes all actions performed and the impact achieved by
an armed force, resulting in positive attitudes on the part of the population
towards that force, not including forced indoctrination. However, armed
propaganda is the most effective instrument available to a guerrilla force.
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IV. ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS
1. General
In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a campaign of
psychological operations in guerrilla warfare, the commanders will be able to
obtain maximum psychological results from a program of Armed Propaganda
Teams. The purpose of this section is to inform the student guerrilla of what
the Armed Propaganda Teams are in the milieu of guerrilla warfare.
2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda
The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political consciousness-raising with
armed propaganda, which will be conducted by carefully selected guerrillas
(preferably with combat experience), for personal persuasion within the
populattion.
The selection of personnel is more important than the training, because we
cannot train guerrilla cadres solely to demonstrate the feelings of ardor and
fervor, which are essential since person-to-person persuasion is important.
However, it is even more important to train persons who are intellectually
cultivated and agile.
An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members. This number, or a
smaller number, is ideal, because then there is more camaraderie, solidarity,
and esprit de corps. The subjects discussed are assimilated more rapidly, and
the members react more rapidly to unexpected situations.
In addition to being a combined armed combatant and propagandist, each
member of the team must be well prepared to conduct constant person-to-person,
face-to-face communications.
The leader of the team will have to be the commando who is most highly
motivated politically and most effective in face-to-face persuasion.
Position, hierarchy, or rank will not be the determining factor for
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performing this function, but rather it will be performed by whoever is best
qualified for communication with the people.
The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the same
social groups of Nicaraguans toward whom the psychological campaign is
directed, such as peasants, students, professionals, housewives, etc. The
peasants must be made to see that they have no land; the workers, that the
state is closing down the factories and industries; the doctors, that they
are being displaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as doctors they cannot
exercise their profession because of lack of drugs. A rewquirement for
recruiting them will be their skill in expressing themselves in public.
The selection of personnel is more important than the training.
Individual consciousness-raising and capacity of persuasion in the discussions
of groups for motivation of the guerrilla as combatant-propagandist, selecting
as cadres and organizing into teams those who have the greatest capacity for
this work.
The training of guerrillas for armed propaganda teams is focused on the
method, not on the content. A training of two weeks is sufficient if tshe
rescruitment is conducted in the form indicated. If a wrong selection process
has been followed, the individual selected will not produce a very good
result, no matter how good the training provided.
The training will have to be intensive for 14 days, by means of
discussions within the team, alternating the position of discussion leader
among the members of the group.
The topics to be discussed will be the same; a different topic will be
introduced each day, for varied practice.
The topics will have to refer to the local conditions and to the
significance which they have for the residents of the locality, such as
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speaking about crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation, etc. The following
topics may also be included:
- Lumber, tiles, carpentry tools for houses and other buildings;
- Boats, launches, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing, and
agriculture;
- Problems which they may have locally with neighbors, offices of the
regime, visitors, taxes, etc.;
- Forced labor, service in the militias;
- Forced association in Sandinista groupings, such as women's clubs,
youth associations, workers associations, etc.;
- Availability and prices of consumer goods and articles of prime
necessity in local grocery stores and shops;
Characteristics of the education in public schools;
Concern of the population about the presence of Cuban teachers in the
schools and political interference, that is, using the schools for political
purposes rather than for educational purposes, as they should be used;
- Indignation over the lack of freedom of religion and over the
persecution of which the priests are victims; and over the participation of'
priests such as D'Escoto and Cardenal in the Sandinista government, against
the explicit orders of His Holiness the Pope.
NOTE: Other topics may be developed by the members of the team.
The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the persons with
sophisticated political knowledge but those whose opinions are formed from
what they see and hear. The cadres will have to use persuasion to carry out
their mission. Some of the methods of persuasion which may be used are the
following:
- Internal group/external group. It is a principle of psychology that we
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Techniques of Persuasion in Chats or Speeches
- Be simple and concise. Avoid the use of difficult words or
expressions. Prefer popular words and expressions, that is, the language of
the people. In dealing with a person, make use of concise language, avoiding
complicated verbiage. It should be recalled that we use oratory to make our
people understand the reason for our struggle and not to show our knowledge.
- Use vivid and realistic examples. Avoid abstract concepts, such as
those used in universities in the higher years; instead of them, give
concrete examples such as children playing, horses galloping, birds in flight,
etc.
- Use gestures to communicate. In addition to verbal communication, we
can communicate through gestures, such as moving our hands expressively,
movements of the back, facial expressions, focusing our glance, and other
aspects of "body language", projecting the individual personality in the
message.
- Use the appropriate tone of voice. If in addressing the people one
speaks about happiness, one will have to use a happy tone. If one speaks of
something sad, the tone of voice must be of sadness; in speaking of a heroic
act or act of valor, one will speak with an animated voice, etc.
- Above all, be natural. One must avoid imitating others, since people,
especially simple people, can easily detect a charlatan. One will have to
project one's individual personality when addressing the population.
3. Eyes and "Ears" within the Population
The abundance of information for intelligence which the deployment of
Armed Propaganda Teams will generate will permit us to cover a large area with
our commandos, who will become the eyes and ears of our movement within the
population.
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The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team program will provide
us with exact details on enemy activities.
- The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda Team
cadres will have to be reported to the chiefs. Nevertheless, it is necessary
to emphasize that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teams is to
conduct psychological operations, not to obtain intelligence information.
Any intelligence report will be made through external contact of the Armed
Propaganda Team, so as not to compromise the population.
The Armed Propaganda cadres are capable of doing what others cannot do
in a guerrilla campaign: determine personally the development or
deterioration of popular support, and the sympathy or hostility which the
people feel toward our movement.
effective psychologically, increases the capacity of the guerrilla group to
obtain and use the information.
Likewise, the Armed Propaganda Cadre will report to his superior the
reaction of the people to the radio broadcasts, insurrectional leaflets, or
any other medium of our propaganda.
.of the voice, and the use of suitable words greatly influence face-to-face
persuasion with the people.
With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed Propaganda Teams, the
commanders will have exact knowledge of the popular support, which they will
use in their operations.
4. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility
Psychological tactics will have the maximum flexibility within a general
plan, permitting a continuous and immediate adjustment of the message, and
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making sure to create an impact on the indicated target group, at the moment
at which it is most susceptible.
Tactically, a program of Armed Propaganda Teams should cover the greater
part, and if possible all, of the operational territory. The communities in
which this propaganda will be conducted will not necessarily have to coincide
with political units of an official character. A complete understanding of
their structure or organization is not necessary, because the cadres will
operate by applying social-political action and not academic theory.
The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be selected
because they are part of the operational area, and not because of their size
or the extent of their territory.
- _In this respect, each work team will have to cover approximately six
population centers, for the purpose of developing popular support for our
movement.
The team will always have to move in a covert manner within the population
centers of its area.
- It will have to vary its route radically, but not its itinerary. This
is so that the inhabitants who are cooperating may depend on its itinerary,
that is, on the time at which they may frequently contact it to give it
information.
itinerary slightly, using different routes, as well as by arriving or leaving
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While the surprise factor is used, vigilance will have to be exercised in
order to detect the possible presence of hostile elements.
One should not stay more than three consecutive days in one populated
place.
The three-day limit has obvious tactical advantages, but it also creates a
psychological effect on the people when they see the team as a source of
current and up-to-date information. Also, it may overexpose the target
audience and cause a negative reaction.
Basic tactical precautions will have to be taken. This is necessary for
greater effectiveness, as was indicated in the discussion of the topic of
'Armed Propaganda'. When it is conducted in a discreet manner, it increases
the respect of the population for the team and enhances its credibility.
The basic procedures are: covert elements who exercise vigilance before
and after the departure and at intervals. There should be at least two of
them, and they should meet at a predetermined place at a signal or before any
hostile action.
The goal of the team is to motivate the entire population of a place, but
to remain constantly aware that specific target groups exist within this
general configuration of the public.
Although meetings are held in the populated place, the cadres will have to
recognize, and keep in contact with, the target groups, mingling with them
before, during, and after the meeting. The method of conducting this type of
meeting was included in the topic of 'Armed Propaganda', and it will be
covered in greater detail under the title of 'Control of Mass Meetings and
Demonstrations'.
The primary focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres will have to be on the
residents of the populated place, where their knowledge as shapers of
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.opinion can be applied.
On the first visits of identification with the inhabitants, the guerrilla
cadres will be polite and humble. They can work in the fields or in any other
way in which their skills can contribute to improving the standard of living
of the local inhabitants, winning their confidence and talking with them;
helping them to repair the fences of. their pastures and to clean them;
helping them in vaccinating their animals; teaching them to read -- that
is, living closely together with them in all tasks characteristic of the
peasant or the community.
In their free time, our guerrillas should mingle with the community groups
and participate with them in community activities, fiestas, birthdays, and
even in wakes or burials of members of the community. They will try to talk
with both adults and adolescents. They will try to penetrate within the
family, in order to gain the acceptance and trust of all the residents of the
sector.
The cadres of the Armed Propaganda Teams will give ideological training,
mixing these instructions with folk songs, and at the same time telling
stories which have some attraction, trying to have them allude to heroic acts
of our ancestors. They will also try to tell of the acts of heroism of our
fighters in the present struggle, so that the listeners may try to imitate
them. It is important to let them know that there are other countries in the
world, where freedom and democracy cause the rulers to concern themselves with
the welfare of their people, in order that the children have medical attention
and free education; where they also concern themselves with seeing that
everyone has a job and food and all freedoms, such as those of religion,
association, and expression; where the greatest objective of the government
is to keep its people happy.
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The cadres should not mention their ideology during the first phase of
identification with the people. They should orient their chats toward things
which are to the liking of the peasants or the listeners, trying to be as
simple as possible so that they can be understood.
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[Original pp. 48-50]
The tactical objectives for identification with the people are the following:
-- Establishing close relations through an identification with the people, by
means of the same customs.
-- Determining the basic needs and desires of the different target groups.
-- Discovering the weaknesses of the government control.
-- Little by little, sowing the seed of democratic revolution, in order to
change the vices of the regime towards a new order of justice and collective
well-being.
In the motivation of the target groups by the Armed Propaganda Teams, the
cadre must apply themes of "true" and 'false' groups. The true group will be
the target group and the false will be the Sandinista regime.
-- For the economic interest groups, such as small businessmen and farmers,
we must emphasize that their potential advantages are 'limited' by the
Sandinista government, that the resources are increasingly scarce, profits are
minimum, taxes high, etc. This may be applied to transportation entrepreneurs
and others.
-- For elements ambitious for power and social position, we will emphasize
that they will never be able to belong to the government social class, since
their circles of power are hermetically closed. For example, the nine
Sandinista leaders do not allow other people to participate in the government,
and they impede the development of the economic and social potential of those
who, like them, have the desire to better themselves, which is unfair and
arbitrary.
-- Social and intellectual criticism. They must be channeled towards the
professionals, professors, teachers, priests, missionaries, students and
others. They must see that their writings, comments or conversations are
censored, which does not allow a correction of these problems.
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-- Once the needs and frustrations of the target groups have been determined,
the hostility of the people toward the "false" groups will become more direct
against the present regime and its repressive system. The people will be made
to see that once this system or structure is eliminated, the cause of their
frustrations would be eliminated and they could make their wishes come true.
It must become evident for the population that supporting the insurrection is
really supporting their own desires, since the democratic movement is aimed at
the elimination of these specific problems.
As a general rule, the Armed Propaganda Teams should avoid participating
in combat. However, if this is not possible, they must react as a guerrilla
unit with 'hit-and-run" activities, inflicting the greatest amount of
casualties on the enemy with aggressive assault fire, recovering enemy weapons
and withdrawing quickly.
-- An exception to the rule of avoiding combat shall be when they are
challenged in the town by hostile actions, be it by an individual or by an
equal number of men from the enemy side.
-- Hostility from one or two men can be dominated eliminating the enemy in a
quick and efficient manner. This is the most common danger.
-- When the enemy is equal in numbers, they must withdraw immediately, and
later ambush them, or eliminate them by means of sharpshooters.
In any case, the cadres from the Armed Propaganda Teams must not turn the
town into a battlefield. Usually, our guerrillas will be better armed, for
which reason they will obtain greater respect from the population if they
carry out opportune maneuvers instead of putting their lives in danger, or
even destroying their homes in an encounter with the enemy inside the town.
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5. A Tight-Knit (Compresivo) Program of Teams: Mobile Infra-
The psychological operations carried out through the Armed Propagan-
da Teams include the infiltration of key guerrilla communicators (i.e.,
cadres of Armed Propaganda Teams) among the country's populace instead of
sending messages to them through outside sources, thus creating our
"mobile infrastructure."
A "mobile infrastructure" is a cadre from our armed propaganda team
moving around, i.e., maintaining contact among six or more towns, from
where their source of information will come; and at the same time it will
be used so that at an opportune time they can be integrated into the'full
guerrilla movement.
In this way, a program of Armed Propaganda Teams in the operational
area builds for our commanders in the field a source for the continual
gathering and compiling of data (infrastructure) on the entire area. it
is also a means to develope increased popular support, to recruit new
members, and to obtain supplies.
In the same way, a program of Armed Propaganda Teams allows the
expansion of the guerrilla movement since these teams can penetrate areas
which are not under the control of the combat units. In this way,
through an exact evaluation of the combat units they will be able to plan
their operations more precisely since they will have a sure knowledge of
the existing conditions.
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The commanders will remember that these types of operations, such as
the Fifth Column, were used in the first part of the Second World War and
that using infiltration and subversion tactics allowed the Germans to
penetrate the target countries before the invasions. They succeeded in
entering Poland, Belgium, Holland and France in a month; Norway in a
week. The effectiveness of this tactic has been clearly demonstrated in
several wars, and it can be used effectively by Commandos of Freedom.
The activities of the Armed Propaganda Teams run some risk, but no
greater than any other guerrilla activity. Nevertheless, the Armed
Propaganda Teams are essential for the success of the struggle.
6. Conclusions
The same way in which scouts are the "eyes and ears' of a patrol, or
of a column on the march, the Armed Propaganda Teams are also the source
of information, the "antennas" of our movement because they find and
exploit the socio-political weaknesses in the target society making
possible a good operation.
(Map Title) ZONE HEADQUARTERS Deeper in country towards Managua.
(Map Legend)
Highways
Infiltration of Armed Propaganda Teams
Major operations carried out by several small groups
Cites (which) should be isolated by rural guerrillas
Small towns
One squad area of operation
Scale: Approximately 15 kilometers
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V. DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL OF FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
1. Generalities
The development and control of front organizations (or "facade" orga-
nizations) is an essential process in the guerrilla effort to realize the
insurrection. This is actually an aspect of urban guerrilla wars, but it
must advance parallel to the campaign in the countryside. The objective
of this section is to give the guerrilla student an understanding about
the development and control of front organizations in guerrilla warfare.
2. Initial Recruitment
The initial recruitment to the movement if involuntary will be
carried out by means of several "private" consultations with a cadre
(without the recruit realizing that he is speaking to one of our mem-
bers). Afterwards, the recruit will be informed that he or she is al-
ready in the movement, and will be running the risk of the government
police if he or she does not cooperate.
When the guerrillas carry out missions of armed propaganda and a
program of regular visits to the towns by Armed Propaganda Teams, these
contacts will provide to the commanders the names and places of persons
that can be recruited. Voluntary recruitment is effected by means of
visits from guerrilla leaders or political cadres. After a chain of
voluntary recruitments has been developed, and their reliability has been
established by completing some minor missions, they will be instructed on
widening the chain by recruiting in specific target groups, according to
the following procedure:
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-- From among their acquaintances or through observation of the
target groups--political parties, labor unions, youth groups, farming
organizations, etc.--find out the personal habits, preferences and aver-
sions, as well as the weaknesses, of the "recruitable" individuals.
-- Make an approach through an acquaintance, and if possible, develop
a friendship, attracting (the individual) by means of his preferences or
weaknesses; possibly by inviting him to lunch in a restaurant he likes,
or to have a drink in his favorite bar, or an invitation to dinner in a
place he prefers.
Recruitment should follow one of the following patterns:
--If in an informal conversation the target seems susceptible to
voluntary recruitment based on his beliefs and personal values, etc., the
political cadre assigned to carry out recruitments will be notified. The
original contact will indicate to the assigned cadre in detail all that
he knows about the possible recruit, and the style of persuasion that
should be used, and introduce the two.
-- If the target does not seem susceptible to voluntary recruitment,
meetings which will seem accidental can be arranged with guerrilla
leaders of political cadre (unknown to the target until then). The
meeting will be done so that "other persons" know that the target was
there, because they saw him arrive at a certain house, or seated at a
table in a certain bar, or even seated on a park bench. The target is
then confronted with the fact of his participation in the insurrection
and he will also be told that if he fails to cooperate or to carry out
future orders, he will expose himself to reprisals on the part of the
regime's police or military.
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-- Notification of the police, informing on a target who refuses to
join the guerrillas, can be easily carried out, when it is necessary, by
means of a letter with false declarations by citizens who are not impli-
cated in the movement. Care must be taken so that the person who re-
cruited him covertly should not be uncovered.
-- With the completion of clandestine missions for the movement, the
involvement and commitment of each recruit will gradually become greater,
and his confidence will increase. This should be a gradual process, in
order to prevent confessions from frightened individuals to whom very
difficult or dangerous missions have been assigned too early. Using this
recruiting technique, our guerrilla can successfully infiltrate any key
target group in the regime, in order to improve internal control over the
enemy structure.
3. Established Citizens, Subjective Control
Established citizens--such as doctors, lawyers, businessmen, land-
owners, minor state officials, etc.--will be recruited into the movement
and used for the subjective internal control of groups and associations
to which they belong or may belong. Once the recruitment/involvement has
been accomplished, and has progressed to a point of reliability which
permits specific instructions to be given to the cadre in order to begin
to influence their groups, directions will be given to them to carry out
the following:
-- The procedure is simple and requires only a basic knowledge of
Socratic dialectics: that is the knowledge which is inherent to another
person or to the established position of a group; some topic, come word
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or thought related to the goal of persuasion of our person in charge of
recruitment.
-- The member then should introduce this topic, work or thought into
the discussions or meetings of the target group, by means of a casual
remark, which will improve the focus of other group members in relation
to it (the topic, etc.). Specific examples are:
-- Groups of economic interests are motivated by profit, and general-
ly feel that the system prevents the use of their abilities in this
effort in some way, taxes, import/export tariffs, transportation costs,
etc. The cadre in charge (of recruitment) will make this feeling of
frustration increase in later conversations.
-- Political aspirants, especially if they are not successful, feel
that the system discriminates against them unjustly by limiting their
capabilities, because the Sandinista regime does not permit elections.
The cadre should channel political discussions towards this frustration.
-- Social-intellectual critics (such as professors, teachers, priests,
missionaries, etc.) generally feel that the government ignores their valid
criticisms and unjustly censors their commentaries, especially in a revo-
lutionary situation. This can be easily demonstrated by the guerrilla
member as an injustice of the system, in meetings and discussions.
-- In all of the target groups, after the frustrations have been
established, the hostility towards the obstacles to their aspirations
will gradually be transferred toward the present regime and its system of
repression.
The,guerrilla cadre working among the target groups should always
maintain a low-key presence, so that the development of hostile feelings
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towards the Sandinista regime will seem to come spontaneously from the
group's members, and not from the cadre's suggestions. This is subjective
internal control.
The anti-government hostility should be generalized and not
necessarily in our favor.
4. Organization of Cells for Security
Internal cadres of our movement should be organized into cells of
three persons, with only one of them having contact outside of the cell.
The three-man cell is the basic element of the movement; it has
frequent meetings in order to receive orders and pass on information to
the cell leader. These meetings are also very important for the cell
members' encouragement of each other as well as for their morale. They
should carry out self-criticism on the successes and failures in
completing individual missions of subjective control.
Coordination of the three-member cell provides a secure network for
two-way communication, each member having contact with only one
operational cell. Members shall not reveal in cell coordination meetings
the identity of their contact in an operational cell; they shall divulge
only the nature of the activity in which the cell is involved, e.g.,
political party work, medical association work.
There is no hierarchy of cells beyond a coordinating member, who is
the leader, through whom direct, but secret, contact will be maintained
with the commander of our guerrilla group in the operational area or
zone. The diagram that follows does not indicate which new operational
cell is the limit, but indicates that for every three operational cells
we need a coordination cell.
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u !D U
M 4-J
a~ w
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5. Incorporation into a "Front" Organization
The merging of organizations recognized by the Sandinist government,
such as associations and other groups, through internal subjective con-
trol occurs in the final stages of the operation, in close relationship
with mass meetings.
When armed guerrilla action has spread sufficiently, large-scale
armed propaganda missions will be conducted: propaganda teams will have
clearly expressed open support for the institutions; the enemy system of
target groups will be well infiltrated; and the preparation of these
groups when mass meetings are held. Then internal cadres will have to
start discussions toward the "merging" of forces into an organization--
this organization shall be a front "facade" group of our movement.
Any other target group will be aware that other groups are evincing a
greater hostility toward the government, the police, and the traditional
legal bases of authority. The guerrilla cadres in that group, such as
teachers, will cultivate this awareness by making comments like "so and
so, who is a farmer, said that members of his cooperative believe that
the new economic policy is absurd, poorly planned and unfair to the
farmers."
When awareness that other groups are hostile to the regime is
increased, group discussions are held openly and our movement will be
able to receive reports that most of its operations are equally shared.
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There will develop greater hostility toward the regime and the order to
merge will come forth. The incorporation into a "facade" organization is
undertaken as follows:
-- Internal' (Q~) from our movement will meet with others in posi-
tions of leadership, such as presidents, leaders, and others, in orga-
nized meetings presided by the organization's chief of our movement. Two
or three escorts may assist the guerrilla cadre if it becomes necessary.
-- Following the meeting a joint communique is to be issued, announc-
ing the creation of the "facade" organization, including names and signa-
tures of participants and names of the organizations they represent.
-- Following the issuance of this communique, mass meetings should be
initiated, whose aim must be the destruction of the Sandinist control
system.
6. Conclusions
The development and control of "facade" organizations in guerrilla
warfare will provide our movement with the capability of creating the
effect of a "backlash" within the population when the order to merge is
given. When infiltration and internal subjective control have been
developed alongside other guerrilla activities, one commander of the
democratic guerrilla could literally shake up and replace the Sandinist
structure.
VI. CONTROL OF MEETINGS AND MASS CONCENTRATIONS
1. Generalities
During the last stages of a guerrilla struggle, meetings and mass
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concentrations are a powerful psychological instrument to carry out the
mission. The purpose of this section is to train the guerrilla student
on techniques on meetings and mass concentrations in guerrilla warfare.
2. Infiltration of Guerrilla Cadres
-- Infiltration of guerrilla cadres (either a member of our own move-
ment or an outside member) in trade unions, youth movements, peasant
organizations, etc., preconditioning these groups to act among the
masses, where they will have to proselytize in a clandestine fashion for
the insurrectional struggle.
-- Our psychological war team must develop in advance a hostile
mental attitude among the target groups, so that at the given moment they
can turn their anger into violence, demanding their rights taken away by
the regime.
-- These preconditioning campaigns will be aimed at the political
parties, professional organizations, students, workers, the unemployed
masses, the ethnic minorities, and at any other vulnerable or recruitable
sector of society; this also includes the popular masses and sympathizers
to our movement.
-- The principal objective of a preconditioning campaign is to create
a negative "image" of the common enemy, for example:
-- To describe managers of government collective entities as
"slave drivers" in their treatment of the personnel.
-- To say that the police mistreat the people the same as the
communist "gestapo."
-- To say that the officials of the Government of, National
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Reconstruction are lackeys of Cuban-Soviet imperialism.
-- Our psychological warfare cadres will create temporary compulsive
obsessions in mass concentrations or group meetings by hammering on spe-
cific or selective topics; in informal conversations by expressing dis-
content; writing editorials for newspapers and radio, aimed at condition-
ing the people's thinking for the decisive moment, at which time they
will turn to general violence.
-- To facilitate the preconditioning of the masses we must repeat
phrases frequently to let the people know, for instance, that:
-- The taxes they pay to the government do not benefit the
people at all, and that, on the contrary, they are used in the form of
exploitation and to enrich government officials.
-- Make evident to them that the people have been turned into slaves,
and are being exploited by privileged political and military groups.
-- That foreign advisors and their advisory programs are in actuality
"interventionists" in our country, that they direct the exploitation of
the nation in accordance with the objectives of the Soviet and Cuban
imperialists so as to turn our people into slaves of the hammer and
sickle.
3. Selection of Appropriate Slogans
The commanders of the guerrilla war select their slogans according to
the circumstances, for the purpose of mobilizing the masses in a broad
range of activities, and on the highest emotional level.
When the insurrection of the masses is being carried out, our covert
cadres should make partial demands, initially demanding for example: 'we
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want food," 'we want religious freedom," 'we want labor union freedom,'
steps that will carry us toward the realization of the goals of our move-
ment which are: GOD, COUNTRY AND DEMOCRACY.
If a lack of organization and command is observed in the enemy autho-
rity, and the people are in an excited state, this situation may be
exploited so that our agitators may raise the tone of the watchword
slogans to the point of carrying them to the highest pitch.
If the masses are not emotionally excited, our agitators will con-
tinue with the 'partial' slogans, and the demands will be based on daily
needs, connecting them with the goals of our movement.
An example of the necessity for giving simple slogans is that few
people think in terms of millions of Cordobas, but any citizen, however
poor he may be, understands that a pair of shoes is a necessity. The
goals of the movement are of an ideological nature, but our agitators
must keep in mind that food, "bread and butter," "tortilla and heape,"
win over the people, and they should understand that is their primary
mission.
4. Creation of Nuclei
This involves the mobilization of a specific number of agitators from
the guerrilla organization of the village. This group will inevitably
attract an equal number of curious individuals who are looking for adven-
tures and thrills, as well as those who are dissatisfied with the system
of government. The guerrillas will attract sympathizers, citizens who
are discontent as a result of the repression of the (....}. To each
guerrilla sub-unit will be assigned specific tasks and missions which
they should carry out.
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will be mobilized in the largest number possible,
together with individuals who have been affected by the communist dicta-
torship, whether it be that they have been robbed of their possessions,
imprisoned, tortured or experienced any other type of aggression against
themselves. They will mobilize to the areas where the (Ck&iminal) and
hostile elements of the FSLN, (M) and others live, making an effort to
(~t?..GII?) with clubs, iron ( ~), placards, and if possible small
arms, which they will carry concealed.
If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out speci-
fic selective "jobs."
Our agitator will visit the villages where unemployed individuals may
be present, as well as unemployment offices, in order to hire them for
unspecified "jobs." The recruitment of the (........) individuals is
necessary because it creates a nucleus under absolute orders.
The designated cadres will arrange in advance the transportation of
the participants'so as to take them to the meeting places in private or
public vehicles, boats or any other means of transportation.
Other cadres will be designated to make placards, flags and banners
with different types of slogans or watchwords, be they of the partial,
transitory or of the more radical type.
Other cadres will be designated to prepare leaflets, posters, hand-
bills and pamphlets so as to make the meetings more colorful. This mate-
rial will contain instructions for the participants, and will also be
useful against the regime.
Specific jobs will be assigned to other elements in order to create a
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master" for the cause, leading the demonstrators into a confrontation
with authorities, so as to provoke riots or shootings which may cause the
death of one or more persons who would become martyrs, a situation which
should be taken advantage of immediately against the regime so as to
create greater conflicts.
6. Way of Carrying out an Uprising in Mass Meetings
(It may be) affected by means of a small group of guerrillas infil-
trated among the masses, those who will have the mission of agitating,
giving the impression that they are numerous and that.they have extensive
popular support. Employing the tactics of a force of 200 to 300 agita-
tors, a demonstration can be created in which 10,000 to 20,000 persons
take part.
Agitation of the masses in a demonstration is carried out by means of
socio-political objectives.- One or several agents from our covert move-
ment, highly trained as mass agitators, should participant in this
action, involving innocent persons so as to provoke an apparently sponta-
neous protest demonstration. These individuals will direct the entire
meeting until its conclusion.
External command. This group stays out of all activities, situated
in such a way that it is able to observe the unfolding of the planned
events from where it is stationed. As observation point, for example, he
should look for a church steeple, a tall building, a tall tree, the
highest tier of the stadium or an auditorium, or any other high place.
Internal Command. This individual will remain inside the crowd.
Great importance should be given to protect the leaders of these indivi-
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duals. Some placards or allusive banners should be used to designate the
Command Posts, and to send signals to the sub-units. This individual
will avoid placing himself in locations where fights and incidents could
occur after the demonstration begins.
Our key agitators will remain inside the crowd. The person in charge
of this mission will in advance instruct the agitators to stay near the
placards he has assigned to them, in order to protect the placards from
any opponent. This way the commander will know where our agitators are
located and will be able to send orders regarding the change of watch-
words or slogans or any other unforeseen event, and eventually, if he so
desires he can even encourage violence.
At this stage, once the key cadres are spread out, they should posi-
tion themselves at visible places, such as signs, light posts, and other
conspicuous places.
Our key agitators should avoid places of disturbances, once they have
made sure they have started.
Defense Detachment. These individuals will act as moving bodyguards,
forming a protective circle around the chief to protect him from the
police and the army, or to help him escape if it were necessary. They
should be highly disciplined and will only react to a verbal order from
the chief.
In the event that the chief takes part in a religious gathering, a
funeral, or any other kind of activity which should be conducted in an
orderly manner, the bodyguards will remain in the rows that are very
close to the chief of to the placard carriers or banners in order to give
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them the best protection.
.;
The participants in this mission should be guerrilla fighters dressed
in civilian clothes, or else hired recruits who sympathize with our
struggle and are against the oppressing regime.
These members should be very highly disciplined and will use violence
only on verbal orders from the person in charge.
Messengers. They should remain close to the leaders, transmitting
orders between the external and internal commands. They will make use of
radios, telephones, bicycles, motorcycles, automobiles or they will
travel on foot or horse, taking trails or paths to shorten the distan-
ces. Young adolescents (male and female) are ideal for this type of
mission.
Shock troops. These men should be equipped with non-firing weapons
(knives, razors, chains, clubs) and should march behind the innocent and
unwary participants. They should conceal their weapons. They will take
action only as "reinforcement" if the guerrilla agitators are attacked by
the police. They will appear in a sudden, violent and surprising manner,
in order to distract the authorities, thus making possible the quick
retreat or escape of the internal command.
Banners and placards carriers. The banners and placards used in
demonstrations or gathering, will express the complaints of the popula-
tion but when the demonstration arrives to its highest level of euphoria
or popular dissatisfaction, our infiltrators will make use of the pla-
cards containing slogans and watchwords benefitting our cause and against
the regime which we may be able to infiltrate in a covert manner. The
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,person in charge of this mission will in advance instruct the agitators
to remain near the placards of any member of the opposition. This way,
the commander will know where the agitators are located, and will be able
to send orders to change slogans and eventually encourage violence if he
so wishes.
Watchword and applause agitators. They will be given specific
instructions to use rehearsed watchwords. They will be able to use such
phrases as 'we are hungry,' 'we want bread,' 'we don't want communishm.'
These tasks and techniques to agitate the masses are quite similar to the
ones used by the cheer leaders at high school baseball and football
games. The objective is to gain more supporters not just to shout
slogans.
6. Conclusions
In a revolutionary movement of guerrilla warfare the gathering of the
masses and protest demonstrations are the essential elements for the
destruction of the enemy's structure.
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VII. MASSIVE GRASS-ROOTS SUPPORT THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
1. General Information
Covering these sections separately could leave the student with
some doubts. Therefore, all sections are herewith summarized, in order
to give a clearer picture of this book.
2. Motivation as a Propagandist-Combatant
Each member of the struggle should know that his political
mission is as important as, if not more important than, his tactical
mission.
3. Armed Propaganda
Armed propaganda in small towns, rural villages, or city
districts should give the impression that our weapons are not to exercise
power over the people, but that weapons are for the protection of the
people; that they are the power of the people against the FSLN government
of oppression.
4. Armed Propaganda Teams
The Armed Propaganda Teams will combine political awareness with
the capacity for effecting propaganda for personal persuasion, which will
be carried out within the populated area.
5. "Cover" Organizations
The merger of various organizations and associations recognized
by the government occurs by means of internal subjective control in the
final stages of the, operation, in close cooperation with the mass
meetings.
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6. Control of Mass Demonstrations '
Mixing members of the struggle with participants in the
demonstration will give the appearance of a spontaneous, undirected
manifestation, which will be used by the agitators of the struggle in
order to control the behavior of the masses.
7. Conclusion
Too frequently we view guerrilla war only from the point of
combat actions. This evaluation is erroneous and extremely dangerous.
Combat actions are not the key to triumph in guerrilla warfare, but a
part of one of the six basic efforts. None of these efforts bears a
priority; rather, they should progress in a parallel fashion.
Emphasize-ING or excluding any of these efforts could bring about serious
DIFFICULTIES-difficulties and, at worse, even failure. THE HISTORY OF
REVOLUTIONARY WARS HAS DEMONSTRATED THIS TRUTH.
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ORATORICAL TECHNIQUES
1. General Information
The purpose of this appendix is to complement the guidelines and
recommendations to guerrilla/propagandists expressed in the topic
"Techniques for Persuasion in Conversations and Speeches" (Sec. IV), in
order to improve the capabilities for organization and expression of
thought on the part of those who wish to perfect their oratorical skills.
After all, oratory is one of the most valuable resources in exercising
leadership. Oratory can be used, then, as an extraordinary political
tool.
2. The Audietnce
Oratory is the coincidental means of communication par excel-
lence; that is, the speaker and his audience coincide in a single time
and place. For that reason, each speech should be a different
experience, framed in "that" circumstance or actual situation in which
the audience is living and is influenced. So that audience should be
considered as a "state of mind": Happiness, sadness, anger, fear, etc.,
are psychic states.that we should consider to exist in our audience, and
it is the environment that affects the target public.
The human being consists of a mind and a soul; he acts in
accordance with thoughts and feelings, and responds to the stimuli of
ideas and emotions.
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Therefore, there are only two possible approaches to any
exposition, including speeches: a real approach, based on appeals to,
reason, that is, to thought; and an idealized approach, which appeals to
the emotions, or to the sentiments.
As far as the speaker is concerned, even though he should be
sensitive to the existing collective emotions, at the same time he should
set himself apart in order to be able to effectively lead and control the
emotions of the audience. When during the oratorical momentum the
antithesis between heart and mind is produced, judgment, the
characteristic of a leader, must always prevail.
3. Political Oratory
Political oratory is one of various forms of public speaking and
usually accomplishes one of the following three objectives: it teaches,
persuades or moves the audience; the method used boils down to appeals,
commands, questions and answers.
Oratory is a quality so tied to political leadership that it can
be said that the history of political speakers is the political history
of humanity, a statement upheld by names such as Cicero, Demosthenes,
Dante; Mirabeau, Robespierre, Clemenceau, Lenin, Trotsky, Mussolini,
Hitler, Roosevelt, etc.
4. Positive Aspects of a Speech
In general the features most valued in a speech, and
specifically in a political speech within the framework of psychological
action in the armed struggle, are the following:
Brevity and succinctness: a-five minute speech is ideal. A
speaker who is brief demonstrates even more his ability as stated in that
well-known expression: "if they want a two hour speech, I'll begin now;
if they want one that lasts only two minutes, let me think awhile."
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Development around a theme: a speech must be a group of
organized ideas which develop around a subject. A good speech is
expresssed in concepts and not only with words.
Logic: the ideas presented must be logical and easily
acceptable. Never should the logic in the minds of the audience be
challenged, since this would lead immediately to a loss of what is most
important: namely credibility. When possible it is advisable to base a
speech on a syllogism which the speaker should adapt to his exposition.
For example: "Those who enrich themselves while governing are thieves;
the Sandinists have become rich while governing; therefore, the
Sandinists are thieves. This could be the message of a speech on the
administrative corruption of the regime. Whenever a speech lacks an idea
or a group of directing ideas, it can easily become dispersed and
confusing.
5. Parts of a Speech
There is no true improvisation in oratory. Every speaker uses a
"mental plan" which permits him to organize his ideas and concepts
quickly. With practice it is possible to do this in only a few seconds,
almost simultaneously with speaking.
The elements which constitute a speech appear below in the order
recommended to those who wish to consistently improve their speaking
ability:
Introduction or exordium: Upon initial contact with the
audience, a personal introduction can be made or one for the group to
which we belong as well as the reason for our presence there, etc.
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6. Some Literary Resources
Although there are typically oratorical figures of speech, truly, oratory
has borrowed a large number of figures from other literary genres, several of
which we use, often unconsciously, in our daily expressions and even in our
speech.
Below we list a'good number of literary figures which are frequently used
in oratory, recommending to those interested that they use them in moderation,
since an orator who makes excessive use of literary figures loses authenticity
and sounds false.
The figures that are most often used in oratory are those obtained through
the repetition of words at certain points of the speech, such as:
Anaphora or repetition of a word at the beginning of each phrase; for
example: 'Freedom for the poor, freedom for the rich, freedom for all.' In
reiteration, a complete phrase (slogan) is repeated insistently throughout the
speech; for example: With God and patriotism we will defeat communism,
Conversion is repetition at the end of each phrase. For example: 'The
Sandinist [movement] pretends to be above everyone, dominate everyone, lord
over everyone, and as an absolute tyranny, eliminate everyone.'
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During these first seconds it is important to make a strong impression,
? attracting the attention of and stirring interest in the listeners. In
order to achieve this, the speaker can begin with a famous saying or a
previously prepared slogan, or he can tell a dramatic or humorous
anecdote, etc.
Proposal or statement: the subject of the speech is defined,
either by explaining it as a whole or in parts.
Assessment or argument: arguments are presented in exactly this
order: first the negative arguments, or those which oppose the thesis
which is to be upheld, and then the positive asrguments, or those
favorable to our thesis, immediately adding proofs or facts which support
these arguments.
Summing up or conclusion: a brief summary should be made and the
conclusions should be made more explicit.
Exhortation: an appeal for public action is made, in other
words, the audience is encouraged almost always energetically to do or
not to do something.
t-- Complexity: repetition takes place at the beginning and at the
end of the clauses. Example: Who brought the Russian-Cuban intervention?
The Sandinists. And who trades in arms with the neighboring countries?
The Sandinists. And who proclaims now to be a supporter of
non-intervention? The Sandinists."
Reduplication, when the phrase begins with the same word that
ends the previous phrase. Example: We fight for democracy, democracy
and social justice." Linking is a chain formed by several duplications.
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Example: 'Communism transmits the deception from the child to the youth,
from the youth to the adult, and from the adult to the elderly.'
-- In the play on words one uses the same words with a different
meaning to obtain a clever effect. Example: "The greatest wealth of each
human being is his own freedom, because slaves will always be poor, but
we the poor can have the wealth of our freedom.'
-- Similar rhythum, by using verbs of the same tense and person, or
nouns of the same number. and case. Example: "We who are fighting will
enter marching because who perseveres reaches and who gives up falls
behind.'
-- Synonymity, the repetition of words of similar meaning. Example:
"We demand a Nicaragua for all without exceptions without omissions.'
Among the most commonly used background figures of speech are:
Comparison or simile which determines the resemblance relation
between two or more beings or things. Example "Because we love Christ we
love his bishops and ministers." "Free as a bird."
-- Antithesis, is the contrast of words, ideas or phrases of opposite
meaning. Example: "They promised freedom and gave slavery; that they
would distribute wealth and distributed poverty; that they would bring
peace and brought about war."
Among the logical figures are the following:
-- Concession which is a clever way of conceding something to the
opponent in order to better emphasize the difficulties by using
conjunctions such as: but, however, although, nevertheless, in spite of,
etc. Example: "The mayor has been honest here, but he is not the one who
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handles all the monies of the nation." This is an effective way of
A
rebutting when the opinion of the audience is not completely on our side.
-- Permission, when apparently one agrees to something but in reality
rejects it. Example: "Do not protest but subvert.' 'Speak low but tell
everyone (rumor)."
-- Prolepsis is a refutation in advance. Example: "Some will think
it is only promises; they will say just like the others said it, but it
is not so. We are different, we are Christians, we consider God witness
of our words.'
-- Preterition consists of a ruse which by feigning discretion,
something very clear and indiscrete is said. Example: 'If I were not
obligated to safeguard military secrets, I would tell all of you about
the great quantity of armaments in our possession, so that you may have
greater confidence in the certainty of our victory.'
-- The communication is a way of asking and answering a question
oneself. Example: "If they have disrespect for God's ministers, will
they respect us, simple citizens that we are? Never.'
-- Doubt is a way to express perplexity or helplessness in saying
something, used solely as an oratorical aid. Example: "I am only'a
peasant and can tell you very little. I don't know very much and cannot
explain the complex issues of politics. That is why I'm speaking to you
from the heart, my simple heart of a peasant, which we all are."
-- Litotes is a means of signifying much while saying very little.
Example: "The nine commanders haven't stolen much, only the whole
country.'
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-- Irony consists of meaning the exact opposite of what is being
said. Example: "The divine throngs who threaten and kill, those are
really Christian."
--Amplification is presenting an idea from different angles. Example:
"Political votes are the power of the people in democracy. Economic
votes are their power in the economy. The majorities decide what is to
be produced whether they buy or not. That is the way of economic
democracy.
The pathetic figures most commonly used are:
-- prayer or supplication to obtain something. Example: "Lord, free
us from the yoke, grant us freedom."
-- The implication of threat, expressing a feeling against what is
unjust or unsolvable. Example: "May there be a Fatherland for all, or
for none at all."
-- The threat, similar to the above, presents a feeling of ill-will
towards others. Example: "May they sink into the chasm of their own
corruption."
-- The apostrophe, consists of addressing something extraterrestrial
or inanimate as if it were a living being. Example: "Mountains of
Nicaragua, make the seed of liberty grow."
-- Interrogation consists of questioning oneself for the sake of
emphasis. It differs from the communication in that the latter gives an
answer which is logical, not pathetical. Example: "If they have already
killed my family, friends, my brother peasant, do I have another recourse
but to take up arms?"
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-- Insinuation consists of intentionally presenting an incomplete
thought to be completed mentally by the audience. Example: "They
promised political pluralism and delivered totalitarianism; they promised
social justice and they have increased poverty. They offered press
freedom and delivered censorship. Now they promise the world free
elections.....'
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