REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001500030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 27, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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27 January 1969
Director of Central Intelligence
Report on the Organization' of CIA and the
Intelligence Community
1. ` I am submitting herewith my report on the organization
and the intelligence community.
As I have pointed out before, the report is in consider-
2
.
.able measure an explanation and a defense of existing organizationa]\
"arrangements (particularly as regards the Agency). Parts I., II.,
and V. of the report are purely expository. Part III. includes a dis.
cussion of what have appeared to me to be some of the more compli-
cated organizational problems in CIA and some indication of my
reasons for believing that the organizational dilemmas which these
problems present should be resolved in favor of the existing structure.
'In reaching these conclusions I do not intend to imply that everything
is working perfectly. I simply mean that organizational changes in
themselves will not, in my opinion, improve the effectiveness or
efficiency of particular programs.
3. Part VI. contains a discussion of what appear to me to
be the important factors involved in an assessment of the present
-.organization of the community. Here again, except for the specific
actions prbposed,.-l do not believe that organizational changes are
needed. to improve: the over-all intelligence effort although improve-
.ment is clearly necessary and possible and will depend more on the
individual competence and qualities of leadership of the senior
managerial officials of the community than anything else.
A. It will be noted that some at least of the items which I
have included in the list of matters requiring action are really not
organizational. matters.: Possibilities for improving. dissemination
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of counterintelligence information, personnel procurement or
research facilities do not necessarily have organizational impli-
cations, They, do, however, involve the interrelationship of
several organizational components and, it seems to me, are
properly noted within the context of an organizational survey
5. Finally, it will be noted that most of my specific
recommendations call for further reviews. This is not because of
any particular reluctance on my part to take a position on the prob-
lems at issue. All of them, however, are extremely complicated
and their solution involves what are in very considerable measure
.subjective judgements.' It seemed to me unlikely, within the time
frame of this review and without a staff which was larger than
appeared necessary or desirable under the circumstances, that I
could develop conclusions which were sufficiently informed and
which reflected anything like the consensus necessary to support
really helpful recommendations. On the other hand, it seemed to
me that it would be helpful to identify those areas where additional
attention and review would really serve a useful purpose.
. Attached, in addition to the survey itself, is a brief
summary of specific recommendations.
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20 JANUARY 1969
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Summary and Index Page No.
The existing legal arrangements for coordination
of the foreign intelligence activities of the U. S.
Government.
A. The nature and composition of the foreign intelli-
gence effort. 1.
B. Existing arrangements for the coordination of
intelligence activities.
Part II. The Central Intelligence Agency - its organization
and management.
A. The top management of CIA. 4.
B. The Directorates. 5.
Part III. Existing organization of CIA - general observations. 9.
Based originally on the WW II experience of OSS, the
organization of the Agency has changed and developed
to meet new circumstances and requirements. It has
been the subject of numerous reviews by distinguished
and competent individuals. Large areas of overlap of
responsibility are inevitable and no organizational
arrangement will achieve a totally clear-cut allocation
of authority. The effectiveness of CIA must depend in
large degree on the discipline, training and understanding
of its personnel, who must live with the organization and
make it work. The DDS&T is an essential component of
the Agency and should be continued substantially as it is
presently organized. While the inclusion of certain overt
collection and intelligence support responsibilities in the
DDI is not entirely logical, no change is recommended in
the composition of this component. Both the DDI and BNE
are essential. BNE is concerned with coordinated esti-
mates and DDI establishes the CIA position on substantive
matters. The present allocations of responsibility for
SIGINT within CIA are adequate. None of the arguments
for separating operational or other components from the
Agency have any validity.
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Part IV. The Central Intelligence Agency - proposals for organi-
zational action.
A. Board of National Estimates. 21.
B. Information handling and computer facilities in CIA. 25.
C. Training. 26.
D. Personnel. 27.
E. Distribution of information attributable to counter-
intelligence activity. 27.
F. The National Photographic Interpretation Center. 28.
G. Research. 29.
Part V. The intelligence community - its present organization. 32.
Part VI. Organization of the community - general observations. 35.
A. Arrangements for the production and dissemination of 36.
substantive intelligence are satisfactory. Changes in
the procedures or innovations in techniques for pro-
viding the White House with current intelligence will
have to await decisions in the new administration con-
cerning its organization.
B. Machinery for allocating jurisdictional responsibility 38.
amongst the components of the community is adequate.
Directives expressing these allocations are issued as
appropriate by the National Security Council or the
Director of Central Intelligence.
C. The basic problem in resource management is to iden- 39.
tify the contribution made by individual activities or
systems to our over-all knowledge of a particular
subject and determine how much this contribution is
worth. Arrangements for the review of each of the
three major Defense Department intelligence programs
are adequate, although some reallocation of elements
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or items as between these three programs may be
desirable. The Target Oriented Display of intelli-
gence resources by category has helped to provide
officials responsible for the intelligence effort with
a better understanding of the totality of the resources
engaged in this effort. The recent establishment of the
National Intelligence Resources Board should provide
the DCI with authoritative advice concerning the real
need for particular resources or activities. A better
structure is needed in the Defense Department, however,
to exercise centralized control over all intelligence
activities conducted in the Defense Department.
Part VII. The intelligence community - proposals for organizational
action.
E. Early warning - the Watch Committee and the
National Indications Center.
ANNEX A. Early reviews of CIA.
ANNEX B. Glossary.
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Part I. The existing legal arrangements which govern the coordination
of the foreign intelligence activities of the U. S. Government.
A. The nature and composition of the foreign intelligence
A tendency has developed to talk about intelligence as though
it were a product to be produced, packaged and distributed in a process
comparable to the manufacture of shoes. Actually intelligence is a
service which is used and needed by a great many senior officials with
different responsibilities for planning the activities of various depart-
ments and making decisions at various levels of the Government and
military establishment.
The interests of policy makers at the national level of the
Government in certain kinds of information are usually similar and
often identical. Senior officials in the-White House, the State Depart-
ment, the Defense Department, the military services and departments,
and the military commands all have a more or less equal interest in
important political events and economic developments; in evidence sug-
gesting an imminent attack on the United States or its allies and in the
strategic military capabilities of our adversaries. Some officials in
certain departments, however, have a peculiar and individual need for
information and analytical research on topics of little real concern to
others in the Government. Such, for example, are the obvious needs
of the Army for information, tailored to its own specifications, about
tank design and production in the Soviet Union or of the Director, AID,
for information about the economic requirements and potentialities of
particular sectors of a given country or geographic region.
The intelligence effort must be designed to service all its
customers. On the one hand there must be sufficient centralization of
authority over the activities of all agencies of Government with a man-
date or potential for the collection or evaluation of information to ensure
that the over-all effort is properly orchestrated and brought to bear on
the problems of those wi::: a common responsibility for national security.
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On the other hand, the legitimate needs of departments, military com-
mands and senior officials for information directly responsive to their
parochial interests must be recognized and protected. Moreover,
there is no organizational arrangement conceivable under which all
elements of the Government which engage in the collection of intelligence,
or otherwise contribute to the intelligence process, could be consoli-
dated and financed under a single command. Ambassadors and foreign
service personnel collect and report information but clearly belong to
the State Department. Large military airfields and satellite launching
and recovery facilities are essential to reconnaissance from space but,
as a practical matter, are best administered by the Air Force. Naval
vessels serve as platforms for the collection of electronic intelligence,
which can be of national significance. Obviously, however, these ships
must remain under naval command.
For all these reasons, centralized focus and guidance to the
foreign intelligence effort of the Government must be provided through
coordination and cannot be based upon central managerial authority or
command. Quite obviously machinery adequate to ensure effective guid-
ance and coordination of the many diffuse and confusing activities that
combine to make up the total intelligence effort must be both strong and
flexible.
B. Existing arrangements for the coordination of intelligence
The National Security Act of 1947 created a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) with a Director of Central Intelligence "who shall be the
head thereof." The Act provides that "for the purpose of coordinating
the intelligence activities" of the Government the Agency shall ". . .
correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and
provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within
the Government . . . " The Act further expressly provides that the
departments and other agencies of the Government "shall continue to
collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence."
It charges CIA with advising the National Security Council on intelligence
matters; recommending measures for the coordination of intelligence
and performing such services of common concern or other functions as
the National Security Council may from time to time direct. The Act
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declares that the DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
By establishing an agency with statutory authority to correlate
and evaluate all intelligence centrally and ensure its appropriate dis semi-
nation, the Congress obviously hoped to prevent a repetition of Pearl
Harbor. It was to be the Agency's business to see that everybody who
needed information affecting the national security should have it, and
have it promptly in evaluated form. It was a basic Congressional
objective to ensure that this is done. Otherwise the law preserves the
right of individual departments to satisfy their own departmental intelli-
gence needs and leaves (in effect) to the National Security Council the
function and authority of making such further adjustments in relationships
as may appear calculated to improve the intelligence effort or strengthen
its coordination.
The NSC, acting under this authority, has issued a number of
directives which, in the aggregate, have delineated the jurisdictional
scope of various components of the intelligence community and provided
a basis for centralized coordination of its activities. In brief these
directives allocate collection, production and other responsibilities
amongst the various components of the intelligence community and pro-
vide that "the DCI shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of
the Government in accordance with existing law and applicable National
Security Council directives." This personal role of the DCI has been
twice restated in letters issued respectively by President Kennedy on
16 January 1962 and President Johnson on 24 September 1965 which
both characterize the DCI as "the principal intelligence officer of the
Government" and confirm his personal responsibility for the coordination
of the foreign intelligence effort as a whole.
Finally, by NSC directive the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB), with membership from the chief intelligence agencies of the
Government, has been created as advisory to the DCI with certain stated
responsibilities for the establishment of policy and requirements for
intelligence activities and a prescribed procedure for appeal to the NSC,
by dissenting members, from decisions of the DCI and USIB.
If, as appears inevitable, U. S. intelligence activities are to be
conducted as a coordinated rather than an integrated effort and are to
continue to consist of contributions from separate agencies acting on a
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cooperative basis in accordance with their respective missions and capa-
bilities, the present legal arrangements for effective guidance and
coordination seem about as strong and flexible as can be devised.
Part II. The Central Intelligence Agency - its organization and manage-
A. The top management of CIA.
As stated above, the National Security Act provides that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be the head of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. He is supported by a Deputy, also a statutory appointment,
who serves as an alter ego and as the occasion requires. While it is
possible and desirable for the Deputy Director to assume certain specific
responsibilities, such as Chairman of the newly created National Intelli-
gence Resources Board (NIRB),* a permanent functional division of
authority as between him and the DCI is not practical. The attempt made
during the Kennedy administration, for example, to delegate substantially
all authority for management of the Agency to the Deputy Director did
not work very well and should not be repeated.
Apart from the statutory Deputy Director, a limited number of
other senior officials report directly to the DCI. One of these, the Deputy
to the Director for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE), is
concerned with the DCI's responsibilities for the intelligence effort of the
Government at large. His staff and functions will be discussed in a later
chapter of this report.
The Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) also
reports immediately to the DCI and also could be described as performing
a community function. However, as the Board has long been regarded as
an integral part of CIA, and as it provides the mechanism through which
CIA performs a substantial part of its statutory responsibility for =the
central evaluation of national intelligence, the Board will be treated in
the portion of this report that deals with CIA.
The offices of Executive Director and of Comptroller were cre-
ated in 1961 to assist the Director and Deputy Director in the management
of the Agency. In 1963 responsibility for the accounts and finances of the
At one time the Deputy Director was Chairman of the Watch Committee.
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Agency was transferred from the Comptroller to a Chief of Finance under
the Deputy for Support and the planning, programming and budgeting func-
tions then exercised by the Comptroller were merged with the other duties
of the Executive Director, who is now called the Executive Director-
Comptroller.
The General Counsel and his staff; a senior officer with a small
staff responsible for legislative liaison; another officer with an even
smaller staff responsible for dealing with the press; and the Inspector
General, who is also charged with auditing the Agency's accounts, all
report immediately to the D,CI.
Finally, the practice of establishing task forces directly under
the DCI to handle important and complex problems has been used on a
limited basis. The most important example of this practice is the Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs who was established in 1965 and will
presumably exist for the duration of the war.
The main business and functional responsibilities of the Agency
are otherwise carried out in four directorates under the supervision of
four Deputy Directors responsible to the DCI and his statutory Deputy.
No description of the top management of the Agency would be
complete without reference to the Director's regular morning staff meeting
which is attended by all these officials and which provides a daily oppor-
tunity for the candid discussion of problems of general interest to the
Agency and the provision of guidance to all elements concerned on matters
of policy.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) is responsible for
the production and publication of finished substantive intelligence other
than National Intelligence Estimates. The most important regular publi-
cations are various versions of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB),
a daily summary of significant intelligence coverage of current develop-
ments produced in coordination with DIA and the Department of State,
and the President's Daily Brief (PDB) which is handtailored to the
specific needs of the President and has an extremely limited distri-
bution. The DDI supervises the CIA Operations Center which is manned
24 hours a day and serves as an alert mechanism for fast breaking
developments. It also is the channel for the CIA input into the White
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House Situation Room,, Similarly, the DDI provides Agency support for
the Chairman of the USIB Watch Committee and the National Indications
Center (NIC) in the field of strategic warning intelligence. In addition
the DDI produces periodic and ad hoc briefings, staff studies and memo-
randa on a wide variety of subjects both on demand from consumers and
in anticipation of the needs of the DCI.
Several of the DDI offices engage in longer range studies and in
depth research. Pursuant to NSCID 3, CIA coordinates the production
of basic intelligence which is factual intelligence resulting from the collation
of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent nature. Basic
intelligence is published in the form of National Intelligence Surveys on a
country-by-country basis. Likewise, DCID 3/1 assigns CIA the responsi-
bility for the production of economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
More recently an Office of Strategic Research has been established to
concentrate on research relating to the production and deployment of
military hardware in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Both the economic and stra-
tegic research components provide a vital input into the production of 25X1
current intelligence, National Intelligence Estimates and staff memoranda
in support of the policy making levels of the Government.
The Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) is responsible for the con-
duct of the Agency's clandestine operations, including espionage, counter-
intelligence and covert operations. NSCID 5 gives CIA the primary responsi-
bility for the conduct of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence
outside the U. S. and its possessions, and for the conduct of liaison with
foreign intelligence and security services. Espionage is directed toward
the acquisition of information through clandestine operations while counter-
intelligence is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign
intelligence activities in order to protect the security of the nation and its
personnel and installations abroad.
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The Deputy Director for Support (DDS) exists solely to provide
administrative services in support of the other parts of the Agency. Com-
munications, finance, logistics, medical services, training, personnel,
and security are the areas which encompass this Directorate's responsi-
bilities. Of these, is the most extensive and, in terms 25X1
of personnel strength, by far the largest.
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The Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T) was
established in 1962 (originally as the Deputy Director for Research)
because of the increasing reliance of the national intelligence effort upon
technological resources and the consequent need for concentrated exploi-
tation of the Agency's capabilities in S&T fields. The new Directorate was
largely made up of S&T oriented components from the three existing Direc-
torates and its activities encompass collection, production and support.
The DDS&T is also responsible for conducting basic and applied research
and development. This includes responsibilities for liaison and contact
with the scientific community on intelligence matters involving S&T.
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In the Office of Computer Services the DDS&T has a centralized
computer capability which provides automatic data processing support to
the other Directorates.
Part III. Existing organization of CIA - general observations.
CIA, as presently organized and functioning, is a highly complex
mechanism, originally shaped by the experience of OSS in World War II,
which has evolved through the administration of five Presidents and has
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served the needs of policy makers from the Czechoslovakian coup of
1948 through the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia this fall. Its organi-
zational pattern has been changed as experience in crises, from the
Blockade of Berlin to the most recent Arab-Israeli military conflict, has
suggested better arrangements for the collation, analysis and speedy
dissemination of information and better procedures for supporting the needs
of policy makers with evaluated intelligence. The structure appropriate
for the Agency has necessarily had to be determined with due regard for
the overwhelming impact which developments in science and technology
have had on the problems and capabilities, as well as the expense and
complexity, of the American intelligence effort over the past 20 years.
Since its creation in 1947 the organization and activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency have been the subject of eight full scale reviews
by committees and groups of distinguished individuals. Since 1956 the
affairs and organization of the Agency (and the community) have been sub-
ject to continuing inspection by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board and its predecessor, chaired successively by Dr. James Killian,
General John Hull, Mr. Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor.
A striking feature of the organizational arrangement of CIA is 25X1
the very high degree of interdependence and overlap that inevitably exists
between the responsibilities and interests of different components in the
same activity or problem.
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In every field of Agency activity examples can be found of the
difficulty, or futility, of trying to fix anything like exclusive responsibility
in one component for the performance of a particular function or the achieve-
ment of a particular operational or analytical objective. The need for
computers, automatic data handling facilities and communications support
permeates every element of the Agency. Every component depends to some
degree on and, on certain matters, must consult and defer to the Offices
of Security and Personnel. A National Intelligence Estimate, approved
by the Board of National Estimates, is likely to be based, in considerable
measure, on analytical findings supplied to ONE by various elements of
the DDI, DDS&T and the DDP.
Enough has been said to make clear that completely clear-cut
allocations of responsibility and organizational tidiness are simply not
attainable in an agency with such complex and interrelated operational,
analytical and administrative responsibilities. Obviously, every effort to
fix responsibility and establish commensurate authority for the accomplish-
ment of determinable results must be made. This is the cardinal purpose
of any organizational structure. On the other hand, it is essential at the
outset to understand that the efficient functioning of CIA will, in the final
analysis, depend upon the discipline, understanding and good sense of
the senior officials of the Agency. This presupposes a thorough under-
standing by supervisory personnel of the limits as well as the extent of
their authority and adequate indoctrination concerning the existence, poten-
tialities and responsibilities of other elements of the Agency in their
particular areas of immediate concern.
With these general observations in mind, a number of organi-
zational problems in the Agency will be briefly identified. Almost all of
these constitute organizational dilemmas which will never be solved to the
complete satisfaction of everybody. For the rrost part the existing organi-
zational relationships have evolved over a considerable period of time and
represent practical adjustments which are workable.
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Probably the most important organizational development in the
past 15 years has been the creation of the Directorate for Science and
Technology. This Directorate was created (under a slightly different
name) to ensure the best possible analytical competence in the Agency to
work on substantive intelligence problems (Do the Soviets have an ABM
system?) and also the research and engineering competence necessary
to ensure adequate participation by the Agency in the design, development
and operation of new technical collection systems for use in clandestine
operations or in space.
All of the responsibilities of the Directorate of Science and Tech-
nology could be performed by other Directorates and would fall naturally
into the collection or production charters of the DDP and DDI. The long
term interests of the Agency, however, seem best served by keeping sub-
stantially all of the present components of the present DDS&T together.
Combined they provide the solid core of expertise in science and technology
which seems an essential element of any modern and dynamic intelligence
service. Without them it would be difficult for any individual, no matter
how competent or articulate, who serves as the principal advisor to the
DCI on scientific and technical matters, to function effectively. The growing
importance of science and technology throughout the Government has resulted
in the establishment of offices such as DDR&E in the Defense Department
and the Science Advisor's position in the White House. Congressional com-
mittees are increasingly concerned with scientific and technological problems
and developments. The success of an intelligence service depends, among
other things, on As credibility -- its ability to communicate its conclusions --
as well as on its operational efficiency and the skill and experience of its
analysts. The complex of components and activities which now support the
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DDS&T appears to be about the right mix needed to enable him to provide
the DCI with effective representation in the S&T field. Apart from some
awkwardness in bureaucratic relations which results from the separation
of the production responsibilities of OSI and FMSAC from DDI, no serious
impairment of the Agency's ability to perform its basic substantive and
operational missions seems to be threatened by the present arrangement.
An exception is the Office of Computer Services which does not
seem to be an essential ingredient of the DDS&T's charter and which, in
accordance with the proposal contained in the next section of this report,
should be transferred to the DDS.
Questions have been raised from time to time concerning the
activities which should properly be included in the DDI. As presently
constituted, the DDI includes a number of components concerned with
intelligence research and analysis in the broad area of the social sciences
which includes military matters. A number of other components in this
Directorate are concerned with processing and support. CRS, for example,
is essentially a registry, and NPIC does the photo interpreting for analysts
in the Pentagon as well as in the CIA. Some of the activities for which
the DDI is responsible would seem to have no particularly logical relatio25X1
ship to his substantive mission. The administrative burdens inherent in
the overt collection activities of th BIS strike one
as incompatible with the responsibilities of a principal advisor to the
DCI on substantive problems of critical strategic importance. If some
or all of these activities were removed from the DDI, however, at least
some of them which appear to fall within the category of intelligence
support, such as NPIC and CRS, would probably have to be established in
a new directorate. No persuasive reasons have been advanced for the
relocation of these or other components, such as FBIS
Offices, to any existing directorate. Any dismemberment of the Direc-
torate of Intelligence would therefore appear likely to result in the
establishment of an additional directorate further complicating rather
than simplifying over-all managerial arrangements in the Agency. On
balance, it would seem that the Directorate of Intelligence should continue
to exist with substantially its present functional responsibilities, providing
certain analytical and support functions, and acting as the component
responsible for the production of intelligence in CIA.
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Recognition of the DDI as the official of the Agency to whom the
DCI looks as responsible for the production of Agency intelligence and
therefore for the establishment of the Agency position on substantive
intelligence matters has certain implications which should be thoroughly
understood. The first of these is that other components of the Agency,
including particularly OSI and FMSAC in DDS&T, must be required to
coordinate their substantive intelligence activities and procedures for
the dissemination of their product with the DDI. Existing arrangeme is
between the DDS&T and the DDI seem adequate to encurP th;s rP
A third complicating factor in any decision concerning the functions
appropriate for the DDI is the existence of the Board of National Estimates.
The DDI, as the official responsible for the substantive production activities
of the Agency, is properly regarded as the competent authority within CIA
on substantive intelligence matters. He represents the CIA view on the
significance of developments of intelligence interest. Parallel with him,
however, and reporting directly to the DCI, is the Chairman of the Board
of National Estimates, who is also concerned with substantive intelligence
judgements. The line dividing the responsibilities of these two officials
has never been drawn with satisfactory precision. As a practical matter,
however, coexistence between these individuals has been the rule in the
past and cooperation is not only desirable but clearly possible in the future.
Both functions and positions are essential to the intelligence effort and
both are needed to implement the Director's responsibility as the principal
intelligence officer of the Government, finally responsible for intelligence
judgements, and for the coordination of intelligence activities. Both
positions contribute to the implementation of the Agency's statutory
responsibility for the central collation, evaluation and dissemination of
intelligence affecting the national security.
The line between the product of the Board of National Estimates
and the product of the DDI would seem to be determined by what needs to be
coordinated as opposed to what can be disseminated as the product of the
Agency. This is not a very clear-cut line. A very large proportion of the
product of DDI in fact represents ma:,: rial which has been coordinated in
the sense that appropriate analysts in the State and Defense Departments
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have been consulted and have at least indicated no serious objection. The
daily Central Intelligence Bulletin is of course a coordinated publication.
DDI production on the whole generally represents essentially Agency views
on matters, including and with special emphasis on current developments.
The Board, on the other hand, as a result of many years of institutional
development, has emerged as a respected tribunal for the establishment of
a consensus or the formal identification of differences on subjects of very con-
siderable national importance. The importance of the Board's estimates,
particularly for the purpose of military planning and for their impact on the
huge military budgets can hardly be exaggerated. The Board of National Esti-
mates and its Chairman is therefore the DCI's instrumentality for achieving
coordinated community estimates, while the DDI is the official to whom the
Director looks for substantive and analytical conclusions from CIA.
It is possible that some changes in arrangements for staff support
for the Board and in its relations with policy makers, particularly in the 25X1
field of political estimates, would improve its effectiveness. Possibilitie
along these lines are suggested in the next section of this report.
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One final comment about the Director's personal staff may be
appropriate regarding the office of the Executive Director-Comptroller.
This office combines the planning and program review functions which
were formerly established by Mr. McCone in the Comptroller's office,
and which are essential and are very effectively performed. The role
of the Executive Director is otherwise not all that clearly defined but
is obviously very useful in a number of capacities, some of them repre-
sentational. There appears so far to have been no particular disposition
on the part of any DCI, since the establishment of the Executive Director's
office, to attempt a formal delegation to it of managerial authority over
the Agency's affairs. There is much to be said for an informal and
flexible adjustment of responsibilities, on a somewhat ad hoc basis,
particularly in the representational field, as between the Director, Deputy
Director and Executive Director. It is possible, however, that additional
specific responsibilities could be assigned to the Executive Director. For
example, a case can be made, as recommended in Part IV. C., for having
the Director of Training report to the Executive Director instead of to
the DDS. The case would be particularly strong if the DDS acquires the
additional burdens contemplated in the recommendation to transfer the
Office of Computer Services from DDS&T to him.
Some mention should be made of proposals to separate the DCI
from the Agency and establish him as an over-all coordinator in the
Executive Offices of the President where, it is sometimes alleged, he
could discharge his responsibilities as a coordinator more effectively.
Any such move would create substantial legal problems in view of the
provision of the National Security Act which expressly establishes the
DCI as the head of CIA. Moreover, as a practical matter, the whole
complex machinery which has been painfully built up around the person
of the DCI and which involves the Agency as a central mechanism for the
evaluation and dissemination of national intelligence would have to be
very substantially dismembered and refashioned in the event of such a
move. Also, as a minimum, in order to function efficiently as a coordi-
nator, the DCI would require a staff which is roughly equivalent in size
to the present DDI plus the Board of National Estimates, with appropriate
communications, administrative and computerized data handling support.
Obviously a staff of this size is too large to accommodate in the Executive
Offices. Without such a staff, it would be impossible for the individual 25X1
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who has been designated as the principal intelligence officer of the Govern-
ment to assess the significance of substantive intelligence or develop
anything like an informed opinion about the emphasis appropriate for
particular intelligence programs or activities.
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Part IV. The Central Intelligence Agency - proposals for organizational
action.
The Board of National Estimates has emerged as institutionally
essential to the production of coordinated National Intelligence Estimates.
The intelligence community at large has developed confidence in the
machinery and procedures which have evolved around the Board to sift
and assess conflicting evidence and views which more often than not
reflect intense departmental pressures, and in the capacity of the Board
to arrive at objective conclusions and judgements. Given the importance
of National Intelligence Estimates and the impact which they have on a
broad range of national security policy issues, and especially on military
force planning and the multibillion dollar military budgets, the importance
of preserving the Board as an impartial tribunal for the adjudication of
important intelligence issues can hardly be exaggerated.
The subject of estimates is included among the list of items
which appear to deserve some organizational action because the importance
of the estimating process would appear to justify consideration of even
relatively minor proposals to strengthen the Board. Some discussion of
the subject under the heading of "organizational action" is therefore included
even though no very substantial or revolutionary changes are proposed.
Three aspects of the Board will be considered. One is its com-
position. A second is the question of the size and location of its staff. A
third involves the problem of possible measures to improve the contri-
bution made by intelligence estimates to the decision making process in
the political field.
Composition.
There appears to be general agreement concerning the
composition appropriate for the Board. It should remain relatively small
and high level. Its membership should be limited to ten to twelve members,
including the Chairman. Of these, some should be professional intelligence
officers selected for their competence and maturity. Qualified officers
from the Clandestine Services should continue to be included in this cate-
gory. The Board should also continue to include individuals with experi-
ence in the military and foreign policy fields. The practice of including
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one or more distinguished retired Foreign Service Officers appears most
desirable. Qualified representation with appropriate military experience
is clearly essential. Conceivably, military or Foreign Service officers on
active service might be considered for membership on the Board, although
it is doubtful whether service on the Board is likely to be entirely compatible
with the status and loyalties of a senior officer of one of the military services.
Possibilities for introducing "outsiders" on a regular basis, primarily from
the universities, should be given very serious consideration. Moreover,
it appears to have been conceded for a long time that the Board membership
should include a scientist. The practical problem has been to find one.
This, however, should not prove impossible, and the availability of qualified
candidates should be once again explored. Consideration should be given to
the desirability of requiring that some at least of the positions on the Board
be rotated fairly frequently in order to ensure the introduction of new views.
Turnover in the Board's membership, however, should not be permitted to
be so broad or so rapid as seriously to erode the continuity of experience
which is one of the Board's important attributes.
Staff.
A more contentious issue is the question of what kind of a
staff the Board requires to support its estimating responsibilities. Earlier
surveys of the Agency (notably the Kirkpatrick, Schuyler, Coyne report of
April 1962) have recommended elimination of an independent ONE staff.
On balance, however, experience appears to justify the Board's need for a
staff of reasonable size to assist in the compilation of data and assembling
of views and in the actual drafting of estimates.
What is reasonable depends on a number of factors, some of
them rather intangible. Perhaps the most important of these is the personal
judgement of the Chairman of the Board who must have assurance, within
reasonable limits, that the staff assistance immediately available to the
Board is adequate. No claim has been made, nor would any be justified,
for anything larger than the present ONE staff. A question exists as to
whether it might not be somewhat smaller. Every effort should be made
to reduce and hold it to the minimum size necessary to provide Board
members with the assistance actually needed in the preparation and drafting
of estimates.
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The staff should be small. It should also constitute an elite.
Staff personnel should be selected on the basis of proved general and intel-
lectual competence and drafting ability. Normally the source of candidates
for staff positions will be other components of CIA and the Board's require-
ments for qualified staff personnel should continue to be given a very high
priority. Efforts should be made to secure qualified personnel for service
with the staff on tours of duty from State and Defense.
A question remains as to whether and to what degree staff
personnel or staff sections of ONE should be experts or centers of expertise
on geographical or functional subjects. Staff assistants to the Board,
assigned to work on estimates, clearly require enough knowledge of the
subject matter of the estimate to prepare the first drafts of estimates and
have an informed and independent judgement concerning the validity of sub-
missions and comments from other components of the Agency and com-
munity. This presupposes a very considerable degree of expert competence
on the part of individual staff members. On the other hand, it is important
if possible to prevent and at least to minimize unhealthy competitive atti-
tudes between geographical or functional elements of ONE and comparable
units of other components of CIA. To the extent that two or more such
elements or units are concerned with identical areas or subjects, and come
to be regarded as conflicting centers of analytical expertise, a certain
amount of friction is probably inevitable. This, however, can be reduced
to tolerable levels by holding the size of the ONE staff to the essential
minimum; clarifying in certain areas the rather special and interagency
roles and character of the national estimating staff and process; reaffirming
the very high priority attached to this process and providing for the rotation
of staff personnel to other elements of CIA with reasonable frequency.
These and other measures should be adopted, emphasized or at least
examined with a view to making sure that ONE staff elements do not
become centers of needless bureaucratic conflict and antagonism.
There appears to be general agreement that the present
political estimates put out by the Board of National Estimates serve a
useful purpose in that they establish common assumptions throughout
the Government and therefore a common point of departure for discussion
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of policy matters. On the other hand, there is a general feeling that the
estimating process could be made more responsive than it now is to the
needs of policy makers for intelligence about specific situations and prob-
lems requiring decisions in particular geographic areas. The view has
been expressed by at least one former senior official of the Government
that the normal National Intelligence Estimate of political trends and
developments in a specific geographic area is too general to help very
much in the solution of specific policy problems. On the other hand, so
the criticism goes, these estimates are too abbreviated and formalized
to serve educational purposes by giving the policy maker a real feeling
for the various currents, pressures and factors at work in the area of
concern.
No very definitive proposal as to how this should be accom-
plished can be made until more is known about the organization of the new
administration. One possibility which should be explored, however, is the
practicability of making individual Board members available, as needed,
to work with and advise policy elements of the Government concerned
with regional problems and decisions. One criticism of the Board's pro-
cedures is that they isolate Board members from the discussions and
deliberations that go on at policy levels in the Government with the result
that political estimates tend to be produced in somewhat of a political
vacuum. It can at least be argued that Board members would benefit
from closer association with the policy making process.
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Arrangements calculated to give greater flexibility to
the Board's procedures and encourage more active participation by
Board members in policy discussions involve some risk of compromising
the Board's status as a detached tribunal. The statements which Board
members might make were they called upon to participate in discussions
of current problems would hardly constitute formally coordinated evalu-
ations. Committing the Board to participation in anything like this sort
of situation might tend further to confuse the respective roles of the
Board on the one hand and the DDI on the other. These respective roles,
however, are susceptible to practical delineation and some action designed
to involve the Board and its members more actively in the policy making
process as regards regional political problems should be considered.
As indicated above, any changes in the way estimates are
submitted will have to be tailored to changes in the decision making
machinery of the Government. Moreover, any gratuitous changes in the
process or machinery for producing National Intelligence Estimates
during the early stages of a new administration are likely to be disruptive
and confusing. A thorough review of the procedures for preparing political
estimates should be undertaken some time in the reasonably near future,
however, and it is recommended that such a review be initiated some time
in the summer or fall of this year.
B. Information handling and computer facilities in CIA.
Organizational changes to handle present and anticipated com-
puter support requirements of the Agency should be made at this time.
The Office of Computer Services (OCS), located within DDS&T, does not
appear appropriately positioned to maintain cognizance over and furnish
needed support to all of the Agency ADP activities or provide to top
Agency management.the backup it needs to control this very expensive
and important function. Another factor to be considered is the increasing
interdependence of the Office of Communications (OC) and OCS and
the advisability of placing them under common management super-
vision within the DDS. This change is recommended with both com-
ponents functioning under an Assistant DDS with a very small technically
oriented management group. Other organizational solutions are possible
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but this arrangement appears the best. DDS&T would of course continue
to work on the development and adaptation of new computer and infor-
mation handling technology to meet Agency needs.
As a part of this OCS organizational change, the findings of
the Communications Study Group relating to the dissemination and distri-
bution of messages and documents should be considered. At present the
Agency dissemination/distribution function is not consolidated, centrally
C. Training.
The training facilities and programs of the Agency have been
effectively administered under the over-all jurisdiction of the Deputy
Director for Support, and curricula have been developed which are
admirably suited to the professional development of career officers.
The importance of training to the future development and
indeed existence of the Agency can hardly be exaggerated and it is
essential that the facilities and faculty available for training should be
compatible with the high cultural and intellectual, as well as profes-
sional, standards which the Agency should seek to establish and maintain.
The Director of Training's authority and competence to provide
opportunities for extracurricular study by employees of the Agency as
well as to maintain the connections with universities and other academic
centers necessary to permit the conduct of individual research and study
projects by Agency personnel should be confirmed and emphasized.
With a view to underscoring the importance of the training
mission and the intellectual stimulus which it ought to represent, relo-
cation of the Director of Training immediately under the Executive
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Director-Comptroller is recommended. Such a change, while of no
immediate practical significance in view of the enlightened and construc-
tive attitude which has prevailed in the Directorate of Support towards
its training responsibilities, might have some long term value in estab-
lishing the importance of the role of training as a service of common
concern to the Agency as a whole.
How best to ensure recruitment of personnel of appropriate
caliber and suitable competence and educational qualifications is and
always will be the most important problem of any organization. The
problem has been complicated recently by the so-called "alienation" of
the universities, as well as by cutbacks and retrenchments in the scope
of Government and Agency activities and programs at home and abroad.
The career development program which has served efficiently to meet
the Agency's needs over a considerable time has had to be rather sub-
stantially readjusted to meet the constraints as well as the requirements
of the current situation. Obviously, recruiting will have to continue
through imaginative and energetically conducted programs which are
nevertheless very carefully tailored to the needs of individual components.
The problem at the moment is under active review in the Agency. It is,
however, of such importance as to warrant the establishment of a
special task force to consider all aspects of the problem of attracting
recruits of the highest quality and to develop clear-cut recommendations
for the personal consideration of the DCI. Such a group might well
consider the related questions of the rewards and incentives reasonably
available which are best calculated not only to attract new recruits but
also to retain those already on board. It would be desirable to consider
the inclusion in such a group of some distinguished individual with
experience in both Government and university life.
E. Distribution of information attributable to counter-
intelligence activity.
Determining the dissemination appropriate for counterintelli-
gence information presents difficulties. While not perhaps strictly an
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organizational problem, it is one which involves the interest of several
components of the Agency and appears of sufficient importance to warrant
some comment.
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There is a general impression that research facilities and
programs of CIA are inadequate, but how much and exactly what to do to
remedy this situation is not clear.
Criticisms are that research is diffused, lacks central control
and is overly short term in orientation. Lack of a solid research base,
particularly in areas of the political and social sciences, has allegedly
resulted in superficial judgements in certain areas and also a certain
lack of sensitivity to trends and developments of "cosmic" significance
such as the longer term but inevitable impact of the population explosion,
poverty, atmospheric contamination, the technological gap, etc., etc.
The Special Research Staff of the DDI has up to now concen-
trated mainly on what is essentially historical research on the causes
and evolutions of broad political and philosophical trends in Soviet and
Chinese affairs. In the main, the studies that have been produced have
tended to be long, detailed, thorough in using all sources, scholarly in
a diffident way and quite unique. At no other place in the Government or
in the academic world have all the sources at all classifications been
worked over together to glean the most that is knowable about import,.nt
developments in the closed Communist societies. The very completeness
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of these works, however, has tended to limit their readership to fellow
analysts in the intelligence community, and the problem has been to'
secure a hearing for their findings by those who can make practical use
of them.
Future plans for the staff appear to call for papers which deal
with trends and forces with current and future implications and with other
areas as well as the Communist world, which will be shorter and will
have summaries for busy readers. They will attempt to take into account
the needs of operational units, such as the area divisions of DDP, as well
as those of the analytical community. In support of this new direction,
plans are being made for rotating DDP personnel into this research effort,
for using DDP stations abroad as bases for field study, and for DDP partici-
pation in drawing up terms of reference. In a test of this orientation, the
African Division of DDP proposed a list of 27 topics on which research in
depth would be helpful to it. The staff also expects to continue and increase
its support of the Board of National Estimates. It would therefore appear
that the Special Research Staff will be increasingly responsive to the needs
of the DDP and should also constitute a research facility of considerable
usefulness to the Board of National Estimates.
Research in support of operations has traditionally been conducted
for the DDP by various parts of DDI and DDS&T, especially the geographic
and environmental studies of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelli-
gence (OBGI) and In 25X1
addition, various chapters of the Nib series are usefdl to . In the
main, research for operations as conducted outside DDP tends to be in
response to ad hoc requests, is usually fairly current and specific in
content and exploits some unique resource or expertise available within
the DDI or DDS&T.
Research for operations is also carried on within DDP on a
continuing and generally current project basis by case officers and
project officers themselves or by specialized groups, such as the China
Operations Staff in FE Division or the research elements in the CA, FI
and CI Staffs.
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Research in support of production is integral to individual
production efforts of such offices as Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI),
Office of Economic Research (OER) and Office of Strategic Research (OSR).
There is some reason to believe that pressures for current responses
and short-term or narrow-range analyses has made it increasingly diffi-
cult to extract analysts from the production cycle and let them work in
depth on some aspect of their speciality. This apparent lack of flexibility
is alleged to have operated against the accumulation of a broad research
base and exploration into fields which may be needed to deal with problems
in the future. It is charged by some that our present concentration on
current problems and production is eating up the research base developed
over the past decade or so without replacing it or restructuring it for
future needs. It is also charged that analysts are not made sufficiently
available for study in depth of new or better analytic techniques, of new
uses for new collection yields or for existing but only superficially
exploited information bases.
Research in the economic, scientific and technological areas
appears to be generally adequate for current needs, if not for future
requirements, given the resources available. More can perhaps be done
in depth and breadth, but for most purposes these areas are being covered
as part of the work of the Agency and of DIA. The behavioral areas may
well need greater attention. State, which once had responsibility in this
field, has reduced its commitments; a certain amount is done in connec-
tion with NIS production but mostly on the descriptive, expository level
with what appears to some- as inadequate attention to analysis in depth;
work done in the academic world on the whole is not directly applicable
to intelligence uses and the pressures on OCI for current publication are
not generally compatible with very much in depth research. As more
and more countries and peoples become targets for analysis and operations,
lack of adequate effort in this field can have serious effects on applicable
intelligence appreciations.
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Whether or not what appear to be deficiencies in research in
the Agency can and should be cured by the allocation of additional "in
house" resources, by greater centralization of control over existing
facilities or by an expansion of arrangements for external research,
or a combination of all three, is not all that clear. A thorough review
of the problem by a competent study group is recommended.
Part V. The intelligence community - its present organization.
The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence
Agency, the intelligence components of the Department of State, Defense
(Defense Intelligence Agency), Army, Navy and Air Force, the National
Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic
Energy Commission. To maintain the relationship necessary for a fully
coordinated intelligence community and to provide for an effective inte-
gration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort, the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) was established by NSC directive. The Director
of Central Intelligence serves as Chairman with membership as noted
above except that the intelligence chiefs of the military departments
attend USIB meetings as observers.
USIB advises and assists the DCI in the discharge of his statutory
responsibilities for producing national intelligence and in carrying out
applicable directives for coordinating intelligence activities. On the sub-
stantive side it serves as the final coordinating authority for the production
of National Intelligence Estimates and for the weekly Watch Report on
strategic early warning. In providing guidance USIB is concerned with
the formulation of intelligence policies and with the establishment of
intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities. Decisions and recom-
mendations of the USIB are transmitted as appropriate by the DCI to the
departments and agencies concerned or, when higher approval is required,
to the President or the NSC. Basic recommendations on the national
intelligence effort as a whole, when approved, are generally issued as
National Security Council Intelligence Directives. Appeals to the NSC
from rulings by the DCI on matters coming before USIB are permitted.
An appeal by any individual or agency under the jurisdiction of the Secre-
tary of Defense can only be made, however, with his personal approval.
Actions by the USIB are divided about equally between those
taken in regular weekly meetings and those which can be accomplished
by circulation of memoranda for written or telephonic concurrence. The
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Board's activities are also about equally divided between consideration
of substantive national intelligence and of guidance to the intelligence
community.
Much of the Board's work is carried out with the assistance of
or through a number of committees which have been established to main-
tain cognizance of the major sectors of the Board's responsibilities. The
Board of National Estimates in coordination with representatives of the
USIB principals submits drafts of National Intelligence Estimates for USIB
Several committees are production oriented and serve as vehicles
for coordinating submissions to National Intelligence Estimates and require-
ments for collection guidance. These include the Economic Intelligence
Committee .(EIC), the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC), the Guided
Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and the National Intelligence Survey
Committee (NIS). Major functional problems such as intelligence infor-
mation handling and security standards and practices are dealt with in
specially designated committees. Finally, the Watch Committee reviews
strategic warning intelligence indicative of a military threat involving the
security of the United States and reports to USIB weekly, or more often
as the situation may dictate.
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National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).
The National Reconnaissance Program encompasses all
projects for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic
information obtained through overflights of denied areas by both aircraft
and satellite vehicles. It is managed by the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) which is a_ separate agency of the Department of Defense.
The Director, NRO is simultaneously the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Air Force for R&D.
Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP).
The Consolidated Intelligence Program consists of the
various programs and activities of DIA and of the military services which
involve collection and production of information and intelligence of primary
interest to military planning, operations and readiness but which also make
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major contributions to national intelligence.
Part VI. Organization of the community - general observations.
The -organization of the intelligence community and its relation-
ship to the DCI's coordinating responsibility can logically be considered
under three headings:
A. The problem of coordinating the production and dissemi-
nation of substantive intelligence;
B. The machinery for the allocation of jurisdictional-
responsibility amongst the components of the community; and
C. Provision of effective guidance and coordination for
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A. Production and dissemination of substantive intelligence.
The fundamental objective here is to make sure that policy
makers have:
1. Immediate knowledge of events as they occur with the
best possible appreciation of the validity of the source of infor-
mational coverage and as much evaluation of the significance of
the event as can be afforded on relatively short notice; and
2. Thoroughly evaluated estimates of situations, develop-
ments or trends of serious concern to policy makers which
reflect views of all components of the intelligence community
concerned. Subjects appropriate for such estimates are,: for
example, the military capabilities and probable objectives of
Soviet Russia; the probability of a recurrence of hostilities in
the Middle East; or the chances for an insurrection in some
important country or region of Latin America.
The task of providing appropriate echelons of Government with
coverage of current events is primarily the responsibility of the Office of
Current Intelligence in CIA which has an efficient mechanism for ensuring
that, time permitting, the daily and other periodic reporting on individual
items has the approval or dissents of other interested components of the
intelligence community. Where time does not permit coordination, the
published report will so indicate
Obviously the form most appropriate for the dissemination of
current intelligence depends on the desires and organizational arrangements
of the consumers, particularly the White House. Considerable thought has
been given to ways of modernizing and improving facilities and techniques
for the immediate dissemination of current intelligence. Any specific changes
in existing procedures, however, will have to await decisions in the new
administration concerning the organization of the White House staff; the role
of the Situation Room, etc.
Further thought should be given to the problem of the proliferation
of publications originating with individual components of the intelligence
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community and disseminated throughout the Government. It would seem
desirable to limit to a minimum the number of bulletins and periodicals
produced as departmental intelligence by components of the intelligence
community which are given regular dissemination outside of the communit
Distribution,
In the meantime, as a preliminary step in an effort to get hold
of this problem, the Information Handling Committee staff has had under
development an Item Register which will maintain on magnetic tape a list
of titles and descriptions of intelligence publications.
The subject of formal intelligence estimates has been discussed
in the section of this report relating to the Board of National Estimates
in CIA.
Here it is worth stressing the importance of ensuring that all
agencies (State, DIA and the military services) which participate in the
estimating process are represented by individuals of the highest calibre
and qualifications. It is equally important that these representatives
should have direct access to the head of the agency they represent and be
in a position to speak authoritatively as well as competently for their
agencies during the course of discussion of a given estimate. In the past
considerable delay and confusion in the presentation of estimates to the
USIB has resulted from uncertainties concerning the ultimate or real
position, and the basis for the ultimate or real position, of participating
agencies (including, on occasion, that of the Director of Central Intelligence).
There remains a slightly gray area involving preparation and
dissemination of studies on very widely assorted subjects ranging from
studies of the Soviet submarine force to examinations of trends and develop-
ments in geographic areas of immediate political interest.
In the early stages of the development of the intelligence com-
munity, it was probably intended that the agency having primary responsi-
bility for a given subject should have a more or less exclusive franchise
for the analysis and production of studies on the subject for which they had
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been given primary responsibility. For example, the Department of State
was given primary responsibility for the production of political and socio-
logical intelligence on all countries, and the Department of Defense was
to produce military intelligence. Pursuant to this arrangement, depart-
mental intelligence services, such as INR in the State Department produce
studies within their areas of responsibility which are supplied to senior
officials in the Department of State and also given dissemination within
? the community at large. Over the past few years, CIA has substantially
expanded its competence to produce studies on a number of topics which
are the primary responsibility of other agencies. The right of the Agency
to do this is very clearly established by the provisions of the appropriate
NSCID. Furthermore, although these studies are not subjected to formal
coordination, they do reflect the very close working relationships which.
exists between analysts interested in given areas or subjects in CIA and
in the Departments of State and Defense. Obviously this practice, if
uncontrolled, could lead to serious friction and confusion. So far, however,
there has been no evidence of serious concern on the part of any of the
agencies affected by these studies and the USIB machinery is fully adequate
to provide for policing these arrangements and to permit the registration
of complaints by components who feel that they have been adversely affected.
Generally speaking, procedures for ensuring the coordination
of the production and dissemination of finished intelligence are working well.
B. The machinery for the allocation of responsibility amongst
the components of the community.
A second major problem in the coordination of the intelligence
effort as a whole involves the adequacy of procedures for the allocation
of basic jurisdictional responsibilities for the purpose of determining who
in the community is supposed to do what.
Jurisdictional allocations are made by directives emanating
from the National Security Council which, in the past, have established
the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence and USIB; allocated
collection and production responsibilities and established the basis for
the conduct of certain services of common concern such as the defector
program and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Imple-
menting directives are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence
to clarify or particularize the provisions of National Security Directives
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and make detailed provision for the operational, substantive or administra-
tive responsibilities of individual components in a particular field.
One of the basic directives of the National Security Council
governs the conduct of U. S. espionage and counterintelligence activities
abroad. This directive authorizes the establishment of machinery for the
coordination of these operations under the authority of the DCI and his
representatives abroad.
More recently, the Defense Department has embarked on a
national espionage program which involves the conduct of operations on
a worldwide scale under centralized direction in the U. S. for so-called
national objectives. The emergence of a very strong U. S. military espionage
effort, comparable to that conducted by the Soviet GRU, could be a compli-
cating factor and have an adverse effect on relations in the intelligence
community. So far the development of this national military capability
has been proceeding with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the DCI,
nor is any effort to curtail or limit the expansion of this effort thought
necessary or desirable.
C. Resources management.
The DCI's chief responsibility in the field of resources manage-
ment is to ensure that the resources developed and used in the over-all
American intelligence effort produce information which is as responsive
as possible to the real needs of policy makers. The initial question is to
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determine what these needs actually are. Assuming that it is not too diffi-
cult to establish what we want to know in general about the capabilities
and intentions of other countries, the problem is nevertheless compli-
cated by the tangential nature of most of the data on which intelligence
analysts must rely for the answers to their specific questions. It is very
seldom possible to develop direct evidence that the Soviets have developed
a new submarine; intend to blockade Berlin or propose to use a particular
missile system for ABM purposes. Normally the community is thrown
back on data which gives at best an indirect insight into these problems.
Elaborate and expensive mechanisms have been invented and put into
operation to intercept and analyze electronic emissions from weapons
associated radar. These, if properly interpreted, can tell you something
about the nature of a particular radar system -- whether it is used for .
acquisition, tracking or engagement purposes for example. This, taken
in conjunction with photographic coverage and other evidence, can tell us
a good deal, possibly all we need to know about the nature of the weapons
system in which we are interested. It will be obvious, however, that in
order to collect and identify particular electronic emissions which are of
strategic interest we will probably have to collect enormous volumes of
data, much of which is redundant, of marginal interest or totally irrelevant.
The essential question, therefore, is how much is enough, and how we can
refine and target the intelligence effort in a manner to ensure maximum
focus on the essential intelligence problems.
This objective of refining the priorities and objectives of the
intelligence effort as a whole has been achieved to some degree through
the USIB statements of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs).
These, however, are very broadly stated in terms of very general problems
and are not very helpful as guides to the. targetting of complex collection
programs. There is general agreement that the facilities available to the
DCI and the community for planning the intelligence effort and establishing
priorities and objectives should be improved. Measures to strengthen the
DCI's staff for this purpose are discussed in the next section of this report.
The actual managerial structures which have evolved to review
and control the four national intelli ence programs have improved immeasure-
ably over the past six years.
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B. The DCI community staff.
It was an early conclusion of this report that no substantial change
is necessary in the staff arrangement through which the DCI exercises control
over CIA. The DCI' s community staff (NIPE), on the other hand, should be
somewhat expanded and its mission clarified and confirmed. The basic pur-
pose of this staff is to support the DCI's responsibility for management,
coordination and guidance of community resources and activities. For this
purpose the staff should have the authority necessary to deal with components
of CIA which can contribute to a full understanding of the need for particular
resources and also with the chairmen of USIB committees with resource
responsibilities, as well as other components of the community. It should
support the NIRB and continue to develop and be responsible for custody of
the TOD. It should continue to represent the DCI in the review of Defense
Department programs. The staff also should be specifically charged with
improving the over-all focus of intelligence activities; refining the priority
objectives and emphasis appropriate for the Government's over-all intelli-
gence effort and for long range planning. It should continue to have a com-
petence for systems and operations analysis and also perform such liaison
functions as appear appropriate, including maintenance of relationships
with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
Specifically the staff should:
1. Have the authority to task that portion of the DDI
Information Requirements Staff concerned with the evaluation
of the product of intelligence operations.
2. Ultimately assume the community responsibilities of
the present SIGINT Officer and also the responsibility to support
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the DCI in his community capacity as a member of the NRO
Executive Committee (as distinguished from his responsibility
for CIA reconnaissance activities).
3. Maintain facilities and personnel necessary to:
(a) Provide staff support to the NIRB;
(b) Conduct systems analysis and evaluation functions;
(c) Continue custody, development and improvement of
the Target Oriented Display (TOD) of intelligence resources;
and
(d) Oversee information data handling activity which
has an impact on the DCI community responsibilities.
5. Include one or more area coordinators concerned with
examining programs and activities on an area wide basis and
recommending specific improvements in individual programs
designed to strengthen intelligence coverage of important targets.
The area coordinators would undertake long term planning in
their particular areas.
C. Enforcement of intelligence guidance.
Some difficulty exists in implementing decisions of the DCI and
USIB guidance generally. It is obviously important that procedures should
exist to ensure that action follows a decision to expand, curtail or eliminate
intelligence coverage or activity. Appointment of a Special Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, recommended above, will provide the point of
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contact necessary to synchronize the authority of the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI for this purpose. Some mechanism or procedure, to be estab-
lished jointly by the proposed Special Assistant and representatives of the
DCI, for follow-up inspection and review to ensure compliance with decisions
affecting resources will be needed. Better arrangements are also needed
for centralized review and approval, including DCI coordination, of ad hoc
proposals for individual program changes which are submitted from time to
time throughout the program year.
D. Tactical versus national intelligence resources.
There is reason for concern about what appears to be a growing
practice by the services of appropriating intelligence resources programmed
and budgeted for in one or another of the major intelligence resource programs
and using them for direct tactical support or for other purposes of benefit to
only one service or a specified command. On the one hand, there is obviously
a legitimate need on the part of military commands for adequate intelligence
facilities immediately responsive to these tactical requirements. On the
other hand, the DCI and intelligence agencies are in danger of losing control
of resources for which they are supposed to budget and for the utilization
and coordination of which they are responsible.
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E. Early warning -- the Watch Committee and the National
Indications Center (NIC).
In view of the manifest importance of the early warning mission
to the intelligence community, it is believed that the duties and responsi-
bilities of the Watch Committee should be reassessed and reaffirmed. At
the present time the activities of the Watch Committee are focused almost
entirely on the substantive requirements for the weekly Watch Report.
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Early Reviews of CIA
1. Hoover Commission Report - 1948.
Professor Arthur Sutherland
John A. Bross
(to Ferdinand Eberstadt)
2. Report to National Security Council on CIA - 1 January 1949.
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
William H. Jackson
Mathias F. Correa
3. President's Committee on International Information Activities -
William H. Jackson, Chairman
Robert Cutler
Gordon Gray
Barklie McKee Henry
John C. Hughes
C. D. Jackson
Roger M. Kyes
Sigurd Larmon
4. President's Special Study Group on Covert Activities of CIA -
30 September 1954.
J. H. Doolittle, Chairman
William B. Franke
Morris Hadley
William D. Pawley
5. Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities -
May 1955.
Mark W. Clark, Chairman
Richard L. Conolly
Ernest F. Hollings
Henry Kearns
Edward V. Rickenbacker
Donald S. Russell
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6. DCI Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities -
15 December 1960.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Chairman
Allan Evans
General Graves B. Erskine
Robert M. Macy
James S. Lay, Jr.
7. President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad -
23 December 1960.
Mansfield D. Sprague, Chairman
George V. Allen
Allen W. Dulles
Gordon Gray
Karl G. Harr, Jr.
John N. Irwin, II
C. D. Jackson
Livingston T. Merchant
Philip D. Reed
8. DCI Working Group on Organization and Activities of CIA -
6 April 1962.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Chairman
General Cortlandt Schuyler
J. Patrick Coyne
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AMB Anti Ballistic Missile (System)
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADP Automatic Data Processing
ARDF Airborne Radio Direction Finding
BNE Board of National Estimates
CA Covert Action Staff, DDP
CCP Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CCPC Critical Collection Problems Committee
CI Counter Intelligence Staff, DDP
CIB Central Intelligence Bulletin
CIP Consolidated Intelligence Program
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COS Chief of Station (CIA)
CRS Central Reference Service
DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DDI Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDP Deputy Director for Plans
DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DDS Deputy Director for Support
DDS&T Deputy Director for Science and Technology
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DIA Defense Intelligence Agency.
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
EIC Economic Intelligence Committee
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FE Far East Division, DDP
FI Foreign Intelligence Staff, DDP
FMSAC Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
GMAIC Guided Missile and Astronautics Committee
IDHS Intelligence Data Handling System
IHC Information Handling Committee
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research
LDX
MOL
NASA
Interdepartmental Regional Group
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
Long Distance Xerography
Manned Orbital Laboratory
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NIC National Indications Center
NIPE National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff
NIRB National intelligence Resources Board
NIS National Intelligence Survey
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