SOVIETS PUT PINCER MOVE ON U.S. AS 'MAIN ENEMY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100060014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 20, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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Y f/
WASHINGTON TIMES
20 May 1985
Soviets put pincer move
on U S. as `main enem '
a,.eoFO~.a~dF
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The Soviet espionage apparatus, includ-
ing the B, GRU and East European er-
vices, is stepping up its activities on the
North American continent White House
o ficials and members of the U S intelli-
gence community report.
The prime target of this increased atten-
tion, they say, is the United States, which
KGB training manuals have long termed
their "main enemy."
The officials portray it as a "pincer move-
ment" from Canada and Mexico. Because
the United States maintains friendly rela-
First in a five-part series
tions with both neighbors, and because both
borders are largely porous, the task of con-
taining and countering Soviet activity
becomes that much more difficult, they say.
The increased Soviet threat is in terms of
both quantity and quality: There has been a
dramatic rise in the number of secret agents
operating in all three countries as well as an
increase in the sophistication of their per-
sonnel
Soviet bloc agents are said to have become _
effective at pinpointing their targets of
opportunity and concentrating their ener-
gies where it is deemed most useful.
U.S. intellieence and law enforcement
Officials maintain that the United States is
also eettine better at trackine and
&ountering Soviet bloc clandestine oper-
a tons. But others question if the
improvement is good enough.
"We have substantially enhanced our own
capabilities against the threat" states
Edward O'Malley the FBI's director of intel-
li ence. He terms countering Soviet espi-
onage that agency's "top investigative
.priority."
But the problem "is very serious, and has
been for some time," he adds. Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese calls Soviet espionage "a
major problem" and "a matter of great con-
cern." '
"We know that the number of Soviet
agents in this country is massive and
severely strains our counterintelligence
resources;' he says.
i~TFis st a n is evident foremost in the num-
bers game. The FBI estimates that there are
some 4,000 Soviet bloc personnel in the
United States alone. Between 30 and 35
percent of these -1,200 to 1,400 -are full-
time professional intelligence officials oi?
agents, the bureau reports. It is a
number that has doubled in the past
decade.
These include not only Soviets but
East Europeans as well, including
Czechoslovakians, Poles, Hungar-
tans, East Germans and others. Aug-
menting the Warsaw Pact
contingent are the Cubans who,
increasingly, are called upon to do
Soviet bidding.
Zb these numbers in America are
added the 300 to 400 Soviet-bloc p r-
sonnel to Canada and Mexico each.
One-third of these are said to he
invo ved to intellieence operations. .
This total of some 1,600 full-time
Soviet bloc espionage agents across
the continent includes only those
operating under the "cover" of being
diplomats, journalists, trade offi-
cials or students, and "officially
approved"by the host governments.
It does not count an additional
unknown number of "illegals" -
people who have entered Canada, the
United States or Mexico under
assumed names and identities ("leg-
ends" in spy terminology), and
recruits -citizens who, for what-
everreason, have become active par-
ticipants in the Kremlin's work.
In the United States in 1980,
Soviet-bloc inte tsence personne
outnumbered FBI and other coun-
terinte tgence agents y some to
1? i e era ios are sat to a et-
tertoday, FBI officials will not reveal
by how much.
Continent-wide the situation is
even worse: Canada historically has
been far less aggressive than the
United States in countering Soviet
' espionage activities. The Trudeau
regime expressed little interest in
the matter, and the new Mulroney
government is only beginning to get
its security appratus in order.
And Mexico for decades has
turned a blind eye toward espionage
of all stripes - as long as officials
there felt it wasn't directed against
them. ?
What is clear; however, are the tar-
gets of Soviet activity and the meth-
ods they use to go about it.
Interviews with dozens of
Canadian, Mexican and U.S. sources,
both in and out of official capacity,
have revealed a broad picture of
Soviet operations on the continent:
? Canada and Mexico are both
used as staging grounds for oper-
ations against the United States.
This is said to involve recruitment
and handling of agents in relatively
secure environments, far from the
probing eyes of U.S. surveillance.
? Mexico, in the words of one for-
mer U.S. counterintelligence offi-
cial, constitutes "a giant safehouse"
for the Soviets. Agents and
operatives from the states (never
Soviet nationals) come and go with
little risk of detection.
Information and documents,
especially those purloined from
high-tech industries in California's
"Silicon Valley," can be dropped off.
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? ~.
Tl?avel back and forth across the
Mexican border is simple, with
record keeping perfunctory, at best.
~ Both countries, but Canada in
particular, are used as diversion
points for acquiring U.S. and West-
ernhigh technology goods and infor-
mation.
Canada's membership in NATO,
its military cooperation with Wash-
ingtonand its historically open trade
border with the United States (no
export licenses are required for
shipments) make that country par-
ticularly valuable in this regard.
Mexico, while far less technologi-
callydeveloped than either of its two
northern neighbors, is seen as hav-
ing agrowing role in technology
acquisition, especially given its
proximity to the West Coast high-
tech industry.
? Major U.S. acquisition targets
include high technology goods and
know-how, especially relating to
semiconductor manufacturing and
military information. Also of prior-
i ity is the recruitment of agents hav-
' ing access to secrets. T_he~lacem~ent
of agents and "illegals m-"T tfi~'ed-
i eral overnment es ecra~tn tTie
' inte ligence agencres, is a constant
~_
7 ? The Soviets use a "vacuum
', cleaner approach" toward obtaining
information in the United States,
including a massive effort to acquire
tens of thousands of unclassified
technical reports and magazines
yearly.
Eavesdropping on microwave
telephone and telex communications
is such a priority that nearly every
Soviet-controlled embassy and com-
mercial building in the country is
equipped with electronic intercept
and recording equipment.
These facilities include their
embassies in Washington and New
York, their consulate in San
Francisco, their "recreation center"
on the Eastern shore of Maryland
and residential complex in
Riverdale, N.Y., and East European
commercial establishments across
the nation.
Key words and selected telephone
numbers are programmed into com-
puters that scan thousands of simul-
taneous conversations plucked out
of overhead microwave traffic chan-
nels. When a computer detects one
of the target phrases or numbers,
the conversation is automatically
recorded. The tapes are sent reg-
ularly to Moscow where experts
translate and analyze their content.
? The manipulation of U.S. foreign
policy through "active measures;'
such as disinformation, forgeries
and support for disarmament move-
ments is another priority, which
comes under the direct supervision
of the KGB.
Former U.S. Attorney General
William French Smith termed these
"hostile active measures" as among
the most insidious of the means used
to influence public opinion and the
political process through "disinfor-
mation" and "agents of influence:'
The KGB delineates several types
of agents and operatives in its global
network. An agent who actively and
knowing cooperates is called a prin-
cipal agent, or osnovny agent. Those
who politically agree with Soviet
direction but who have not been for-
mally recruited by the KGB are
called doveryonnoe litso, or trusted
person. Finally, there are those the
KGB calls tyomhaya verboura, or
unconscious source. They serve the
KGB's interests without knowing it;
Lenin termed them "useful idiots:'
One indication of the growing
importance the Soviet ruling appa-
ratusplaces onthe KC;B can be seen
from last month's elevation of KC:B
chief Viktor M. Chebrikov to be a full
voting member of the Soviet Polit-
buro, Western analysts say. Over' the
past 20 years, the number of KGB
officials on the Central Committee
has increased fourfold.
Mr. Chebrikov, a protege of the
late Yuri Andropov, runs Iris
worldwide network out of a nine-
story building at 2 Dzerzhinsky
Square, just a mile from the Krem-
lin. It was the former Lubyanka
Prison, site of countless executions
of those found guilty of "counter-
revolutionary activities:' Political
rivals occasionally met similar fates
there.
The KGB, or Committee for State
Security (Komitet Gosuc~arstvennoi
Bezopastnosti), is said to employ
some 500,000 officers, technicians,
clerical workers informants in the
Soviet Union. The major thrust of its
activities is on keeping tabs on its
own citizens, operating an internal
security network that includes over-
seeing the elite border guards.
The KGB's First Directorate is in
overall charge of foreign operations.
While it comprises only IS percent
of the KGB's total personnel, they
are, in the words of one former coun-
terintelligence official, "the cream
of the crop:'
Worldwide, the KGB is estimated
to control 700,000 agents and an
equal number of informers. Massive
as this network is, it does not operate
with complete impunity - at least
not in the United States. In the past
five years U.S. counterintelligence
ca abilities be an to reverse
declines t at resu to rom congres-
sional attacks in the late '60s and
'70s.
But continent-wide, numerous
problems remain. One of them is on-
going and institutional. While the
Soviet network can work without
much difficulty over the borders of
the three North American counU?ies,
counterintelligence efforts are ham-
pered by significant institutional as
well differing national interests.
Meanwhile, Soviet-backed intelli-
gence activities show no sign of let-
ting up. As the FBI's intelligence
chief O'Malley puts it, "The KGB is
very large, very well trained I and
use] very bright people. The Soviets
can choose among the elite of Soviet
society for the KGB:'
lbmorrow: Soviet activities in
Mexico.
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WASHINGTON TIMES
20 May 1985
~ ` ?
re robbin
Russians a
g
- - - - - ~ "Hardware, but also documents
- THE WASHINGTON TIMES
"We all know that the Soviets are robbing
us blind," says presidential science adviser
" George Keyworih.
He is referring to the acquisition of U.S.
high technology. Buying it or stealing it, by
hook or by crook, is one of the principal
secret missions of Soviet bloc agents in
North America. .
"I think there is an increasingly wide per-
ception that we've not been as good as we
could in running faster in this security corn-
! petition," he admits. _.
Attorney General Edwin Meese adds, "A
great deal of the technological advance by
the Soviet military has been a result of stolen
technological data from the United States:'
Acquisition of U.S. high technology is one
~ of the main activities of Soviet bloc agents.
~ in North America, according to senior U.S.
officials.
As troublesome as the problem is, it is
expected to get worse as more U.S. compan-
ies undertake Pentagon-funded research
into the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "star
wars" technologies. These anti-missile sys-
terns employ high-powered lasers or particle
I _ - - -----1-_._ _ _ _
~ beams using futuristic technologies coveted
by the Kremlin.
The Soviets have been working for 15
i years on developing their own "star wars"-
type svstem and reportedly have made gains
are just as valuable;' says Stephen
Bryen, deputy assistant secretary of
defense-and an expert on technology
diversion. ,4
William von Rabb, commissioner
of the U.S. Customs Service, agrees.
"What we're dealing with here? is
equipment -hardware -things
that the Russians either need or
want to maintain their military,
industrial and scientific operations.
It's a terribly expensive operation to
set up to make some of this equip-
ment;' he says, so they seek to steal
it.
'IZirgets of this Soviet acquisition
effort include almost any private
company, university or contractor
engaged in science and technology.
More than one million Americans in
industry alone have been granted
security clearances.
"Never before in history," says FBI
Director William Webster, "has the
U.S. been faced with as many cases
of espionage:' It used to be that ide-
ology was once the main lure, he
adds. Now it's simply greed, or
money. .
Prime targets include the hun-
dreds of small- to medium-sized
high-tech firms that populate Cali-
fornia's "Silicon Valley" south of San
Francisco and their counterparts
along the East coast, from Boston to
the Capital Beltway in Washington.
These and hundreds of other
firms specializing in advanced com-
puters, memory designs, periphe-
rals and software have sprung up
across the country. Many of these
companies are run by young entre-
preneurs; most are hungry for capi-
tal - a fact that officials say make
them tempting targets of Soviet bloc
operations.
But large and established com-
panies, especially those having
defense contracts, also attract KGB
scrutiny. More than 600 firms in Sili-
con Valley alone are engaged in
some form of classified government
work.
But intelligence experts estimate
tha a oviets et ercent of
etr sclenti tc an technical infor-
mation rom o en sources Hun-
re s o agents under the control of
irec orate T of the KGB comb
t roug u is avai a e We
scientl is and technical publica-
tions.
These officials and operatives
ir.=:;. ur~r:;tical. studies_ But.they are said to
seek the precision engineered components
and know-how developed by U.S. firms
through very costly and time-consuming
research and development.
Officials in the U.S. intelligence and
enforcement "community," as they refer to
j themselves, claim they know fairly
? well how Soviet bloc agents are
attempting to purloin U.S. science
and technology.
But
the
add
the KGB
GRU and
y
,
,
,
! East European surrogate services in
'. turn have become more sophisti-
c sated. It is acat-and-mouse game
that is played across the face of the
~ United States and spills over into
~; Canada and Mexico, where surveil-
lance and restrictions are not as
great.
Fundamental objectives of the
Soviet high-tech effort include raw
data, plans and studies, hardware,
such as high-speed computers and
semiconductor manufacturing '
equipment and advanced software
or programming instructions for
sophisticated data processing appli-
cations frequently having military
applications.
us blind'
attend scientific conferences and
trade shows and loin scientific soci-
eties -all in the hopes of gleaning
use Ti~'ormatinn a~ ~ aT- G cePk_
ing potential recruits, savs Edward
a_ey, _trectnr n__ the FRIs intel-
ligence division.
Scientific and technical informa-
tion often is sent back to the Soviet
Union for translation and analysis.
This open-source information, Mr.
O'Malley says, "helps them to
orchestrate their clandestine oper-
ations "
"They know from overt sources
t at somet ing is emg produced by
a cer atn company. a now at
t ey cannot et tt overt ,the call
on t e covert st a to see if the can
o~rt,~e sates.
KGB, he says, frequently
"tasks" East European agents in the
United States to collect the desired
technology. This not only is a good
use of available labor but it has an
added advantage: the East Europe-
ans are not subject to the 25,mile
i radius travel restrictions as Soviet
diplomatic personnel are.
In fact, Soviet use in the United
Statesof East Europeans services -
the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, East
Germans and Bulgarians -appears
to be on the increase.
The National Technical Informa-
l lion Service (NTIS), for.instance, is
i a federally funded program oper-
ated by the Commerce Department.
Each year NTIS makes publicly
available some 80,000 scientific and
technical documents on a wide vari-
ety of topics, including tens of thou-
sands that are military and
defense-related. Defense intelli-
gence officials said that the Soviets
had been ordering each of the 80;000
documents offered.
..Commerce Secretary Malcolm .
Baldrige, not usually thought of as a
tiardliner on strategic trade issues,
recently called NTIS "a massive
giveaway program" that greatly
benefits the Soviets.
In 1982, the Soviet Embassy was
cut off from the services of NTIS.
But since then. East European diplo-
mats and commercial establish-
ments have correspondingly
increased their orders for the NTIS
documents. They then quite simply
turn the reports over to the KGB.
Much of the KGB's bidding is
done by the East Europeans through
their legally established commer-
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' ~.
cial trading operations in the United
States. The FBI's O'Malley says that
the number of East European com-
mercial enterprises now numbers
about 23U, up from l0U three or four
years ago.
Representatives of these trading
companies are f ree to travel to areas
restricted to Soviet personnel,
including Silicon Valley and Las
Veeas (which is off-limits due to its
proximity to Nevada nuclear testing
sites).
The Polish-American Machinery
Corp., known as Polamco, has offices
in seven U.S. cities. In 1981, Marion
Zachharski, who was Polamco's
president, was convicted on espi-
onage charges and sentenced to life
in federal prison. In 1978 he
recruited William Holden Bell, a
radar expert employed by Hughes
Aircraft Co.
Mr. Bell testified that he gave Mr.
Zachharski some 20 classified
defense reports over athree-year
period in exchange for about
$110,000. The technology was val-
ued in the hundreds of millions of
dollars; the loss to U.S. national secu-
rity was inestimable, officials said.
Soviet bloc agents also operate
clandestinely as an "illegal" or
under a "false flag;' Mr. O'Malley
explains. As an "illegal;' an agent
portrays him or herself under an
assumed name and an assumed "leg-
end" or cover to disguise his or her
true identity and background.
Under a "false flag;' an East Ger-
man agent might claim to be from
West Germany and a Czech agent
might claim to be from France. This
is done, Mr. O'Malley says, to ease
American apprehension of talking
with someone from the communist
bloc.
One big problem, U.S. officials
agree, is corrupt U.S. businessmen
who place profits above the law and
national security. "Corrupt middle-
men [are] prepared to do business
with a foreign agent," says Customs'
von Raab.
"Whether he knows or cares if
that fellow is a KGB agent is almost
irrelevant to the guy who wants to
make a fast profit:'
Sen. Dave Durenberger, R-Minn.,
chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, bemoans the fact that
"we have an unfortunate situation in
this country in which we are trusting
a lot of very good technology to a lot
of people who can be easily bought."
'Iivo weeks ago a Maryland engi-
neer was sentenced to five years in
i prison and fined $110,000 for violat-
'~ ing federal export laws.
D. Frank Bazzarre, chairman of
~'~ the board of Technics, Inc., admitted
in court that he illegally sold micro-
circuits abroad. The federal pros-
ecutor for the case said that the
microelectronic production
equipment Mr Bazzarre supplied
was transshipped to East Germany,
Poland and the Soviet Union, where
they "enhanced ... military cap-
abilitiesand threatened our national
security."
And two weeks ago ahigh-ranking
East German trade official was in
town to encourage U.S. high-tech
nology exports to that country.
Gerhard Bell, second highest offi-
cial of the GDR's Foreign 'Trade
Ministry, told the U.S.-East German
Trade Council that they are willing
to give "priority to U.S. exports of
microelectronics, energy, machine
and other industries during the next
five years.
Customs and FBI officials say that
U.S. capability to clamp down on
Soviet bloc technology acquisition
efforts is improving. Much of the
credit, they say, goes to those busi-
nessmen in the private sector who
have become sensitized to the Soviet
efforts and now actively cooperate
with federal law enforcement
efforts.
But J. Fred Bucy, president of
Tbxas Instruments and an expert on
Soviet technology theft, says that
such enforcement activities as
Project Exodus have not been suc-
cessful
"There's no doubt about it.
They've not been successful in what
they set out to do," he says, "because
they've been concentrating on pro-
ducts and not technology." Tbchnol-
ogy or know-how is more of a
security threat because it can be
directly applied to Soviet military
purposes.
The Soviet-U.S. cat-and-mouse
game of technology acquisition
remains an uphill battle, and the
stakes are very high.
A Pentagon report released last
week assessed the cost benefits that
accrued from denying specific tech-
nologies to the Soviet Union.
Between 1983-84, the report found,
the United States and its allies saved
up to $17 billion in weapons develop-
ment by not allowing the Soviets
access to specific technology for
which export licenses were openly
requested.
Acquiring the technology, on the
other hand, would have saved the
Soviets anywhere from $6.6 billion
to $13.3 billion between now and
1997 in weapons development,
according to Richard Perle, assis-
tant secretary of defense for inter-
national security policy.
Last month French intelliEence
officia s re ease conf idential Soviet
ocuments that the had ac utred
etat to t e rem ins success in
c an esune y ac4utrme estern
Industry, which is responsible for
aircraft development, alone saved
$256 million by obtaining advanced
Western technology between 1976
and 1980 -most of it from the
United States.
The purloined technology was
used to solve design construction
problems in weapons aiming sys-
tems for advanced Soviet jet
fighters, including the MiG-25,
Su-25 and Su-27 aircraft, the Soviet
report stated.
KGB:
TARGET
AMERICA
A five-.part series '
TODAY: How the Soviet spy
apparatus is stepping up its
efforts in North America
TUESDAY: Mexico: KGB's
"safehouse"against the U.S
WEDNESDAY: How Soviet bloc
intelligence operates in Canada
THURSDAY: The KGB's "active , ;
measures"in the U.S.
FRIOAY: How the KGB_goes
fishing for recruits
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~~Tlr~~ ~?~~=~~~D
O.N Pp"~_~_~-
WASHINGTON TIf~ES
21 May 1985
Mexico a `safehouse' for Soviets
spying on U.S.
Second in a five-part series
By Roger Fontaine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
MEXICO CITY -Just off acon-
gestedfreeway, in a rundown neigh-
borhood south of this city's center,
sits an odd, out-of-place mansic_.
partially hidden by trees and a dark
green fence.
Built in the 1920s as a private resi-
dence, the gray house at Avenida
Tacubaya 204 is identified only by a
small brass plate in Cyrillic letters
as the embassy of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.
Those who seek to enter the
embassy must wait in their cars
between double gates until cleared.
The embassy's interior has been
described as ?pure Charles
Addams" -dark and vaguely men-
acing.
As many as 350 Soviets are at
work inside; 100 to 150 of them are
embassy officers. Counting the
employees of TASS, Aeroflot and the
Soviet trade organizations, the num-
ber of Soviets in Mexico City rises to
400 or more.
Knowledgeable sources, includ-
ing present and former intelligence
officials here and in the United
States, say 30 to 40 percent of these
Soviet officials are actively engaged
in espionage activities under the
auspices of the KGB or its affiliated
military intelligence directorate, the
GRU.
Their primary target, the sources
agree, is the United States.
Simply put, Mexico City hosts one
of the largest Soviet intelligence sta-
tions in the Free World. Counting
Cuban and East European countries
whose intelligence services are inte-
grated with the KGB, there are
approximately 600 communist-bloc
diplomats and officials working in
Mexico. In the words of one counter-
intelligence expert here, "Mexico is
one giant safehouse" for the Soviets,
meaning they have virtually free
rein to do as they please.
Officials in Washington are
expressing increasing concern over
efforts against U.S. interests by the
KGB and its .proxy services from
our neighbor to the south.
The Soviets seem interested in
two main areas - stealing U.S.
secrets, primarily high-technology
documents and information, and
recruiting and "running" agents into
and out from the United States, offi-
cials say.
:Mexico provides an ideal location
for this, having a largely unguarded,
nearly 2,000-mile open border with
the United States. The Soviets also
-take advantage of Mexico's laid-
back, benign tolerance of espionage
- as long as it is not directed against
them.
"There isn't any sense in Mexico
of a KGB threat;' says U.S. Customs
Commissioner William von Raab.
The Soviets historically have con-
sidered iViexico to be one of the three
best places in the world to operate,
the others being Vienna and Geneva.
This makes 1-lexico City a prize
assignment for the new breed of
ambitious KGB officers who are pol-
ished, suave and fluent in both Span-
ish and English.
This sprawling capital of 17
million people is ideal, too, for agent
contact since there is little likelihood
of surveillance.
It is a relatively simple matter for
an agent to drop off whatever sen-
sitive material he has and to do it
with little chance of detection.
"The KGB has a huge operation in
Mexico City;' llr. von Raab told The
`,t'ashington Times. "The 1~lexican
border is a serious problem both for
drugs and for smuggling technology.
The KGB is tree to operate in
;~Icxico"
nne of the most notorious U.S.
espionage cases involving Mexico is
that of C.".ristopher Boyce and
Andrew Daulton Lee - "the Falcon
and the Snowman"
Boyce, a one-time employee of
1'R~l' Systems Group in Redondo
Beach. Calif., and Lee, a boyhood
friend, were convicted in 1977 of
selling U.S. secrets to the Soviets.
They had handed over top-secret
documents and satellite surveillance
information to the Soviets in 1~Iexico
City, occasionally making contact at
the Soviet Embassy itself.
In 1981, Joseph G. Helmich Jr, an
Army warrant officer, pleaded
guilty on conspiracy charges. For
nearly two decades he had been sell-
ing the Soviets U.S. military secrets,
including sensitive cryptographic
information on military codes.
Helmich never delivered those
secrets to the KGB in the United
States, but took them to Paris and
Mexico City. For his efforts, he was
given the rank of colonel in the
Soviet army, a distinction he enjoys
today in an American jail with a life
sentence.
One .favorite KGB activity,
according to intelligence sources, is
"spotting"-the practice of singling
out Americans in sensitive positions
who might be vulnerable to
recruitment.
According to one former U.S.
intelligence official, the practice
extends to Soviet officers
eavesdropping on conversations of
Americans in this city's bars and
hotels for interesting tidbits and
clues for approaching them.
The GRU, the military arm of
Soviet intelligence, is given the task
of handling U.S. armed forces per-
sonnel, with their agents and con-
tacts easily shuttled between here
and the United States. But the divi-
sion of labor tends to break down
when it comes to obtaining military
technology.
"GRU officers have a reputation
for being hamhanded. They walk
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recruit an American;' says one for-
mer intelligence officer here.
"The KGB is better on sensitive
operations than the GRU," one intel-
ligence source said, including in his
assessment the acquisition of mili-
tary technological secrets.
1b do this, the KGB residence
here works closely with its counter-
parts in the San Francisco consulate
which, for years, has specialized in
the illegal acquisition of high tech-
nology, especially from California's
"Silicon Valley" and other high-tech
firms throughout the Southwest.
'Ib get the documents from the
United States back to Mexico City,
the KGB uses American citizens or
other non-Soviets as couriers. Offi-
cialsreport that in some cases flight
attendants have been recruited by
the KGB as couriers and take advan-
tage of the nearly 100 flights weekly
from California to 1~4exico City to
transport the purloined material.
Travel to Mexico from the United
States is easy, and virtually no accu-
rate records are kept. One former
counterintelligence official said that
any one can make a plane reservation
under an assumed name and fill out
the tourist card with the same name.
Immigration and customs in Mexico
City are perfunctory, he said.
"It is a simple matter to meet your
case officer in Chapultepec Park
without anyone spotting you;' the
former official added.
The Soviets also enjoy a rough
division of labor with their East
European and Cuban surrogates
who conduct clandestine efforts on
their behalf. Officials from and
agents for Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Poland, East Germany, and the
Cubans are assigned specific tasks
by the KGB.
The Czechs, for example, are
known for their skill at planting bugs
and devote considerable time and
effort to accomplishing their assign-
ments, especially in Western diplo-
matic residences and embassies.
James Harper Jr., who had access
to technological secrets from the
Silicon Valley area of California,
passed highly sensitive documents
on the Minuteman missile and other
military secrets to the Polish intelli-
gence service in ;Mexico City.
For 2"~ years beginning in 1979,
Harper fed volumes of classified
data to the Poles. ~6'hile the Poles did
the leg work, the Soviets reaped the
benefits. They verified the impor-
tance of the information Harper sup-
plied and even handed out
commendations -one signed by
Yuri Andropov himself - to the case
officers involved. Last year, Harper
was sentenced to life imprisonment
on espionage charges.
The acqutsttton of technology
through the Mexico channel,
according to intelligence sources,
frequently involves the theft of doc-
uments and information from the
United States, but seldom the
equipment itself.
In general, the Soviets seek a wide
range of U.S. technology, according
to Dr. Stephen Bry?en, deputy assis-
tant secretary of defense for inter-
national economic trade and
security policy.
Documents "are just as valuable"
as hardware to the Soviets, 1~Ir.
Bryen says. "Software has become
the new thing"
A comprehensive report on
"Soviet Acquisition of Western Tech-
nology," compiled by the CIA in 1982,
lists areas of major Soviet interest.
These include computers, data
bases, memories, image processing
design, superconductor materials,
semiconductor design and produc-
tion technology, microwave and mil-
limeter wave communications and
control equipment, lasers and
microbiology equipment and infor-
mation.
"They've still not managed to pro-
duce the computers they
desperately need, so they just steal
them," Mr. Bryen told The Washing-
ton Times.
Mr. von Raab, the Customs com-
missioner, maintains that his agency,
through its Operation Exodus pro-
gram, has been making progress in
educating U.S. firms to watch out for
unscrupulous buyers who may be
fronting for the Soviets.
And Theodore Wu, who heads up
the Commerce Department's Office
of Export Enforcement, says there
have not been many major cases of
diverting or smuggling high-tech
equipment over the border into
Mexico.
But the Soviets have begun to set
up Mexican cover firms to purchase
sensitive technology from U.S. elec-
tronics manufacturers, according to
sources. In this effort, however, they
shy away from the large, well-known
companies wary of unknown or new
buyers.
Rather, the Soviets target smaller,
often financially struggling, firms
that are eager to make sales and
which may not ask too many ques-
tions.
And some officials worry that, as
Western allies and neutrals get bet
ter at clamping down on illegal
transshipments through firms in
their countries, the Soviets will
increasingly turn to such less devel-
oped countries as Mexico through
which to ply their trade.
U.S. officials hope to discuss the
issue of Soviet technology diversion
with their A4exican counterparts in
the near future, according to
sources. But given the present
tenseness resulting from [he recent
death of a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency agent in Mexico and con-
tinuing immigration and border
problems, no one is taking bets on
how such talks might develop - if
they do at all.
"We have identified the potential
problem early, but, because of all the
other difficulties, no one wants to
create an additional problem now;'
one official remarked.
"But I guess we have to have a
couple of serious diversions before
we make it a negotiating priority," he
added.
Mexico also has the dubius dis-
tinction of being a place where U.S.
officials can make undercover con-
tact with Soviet officials without
embarassing TV lights or reporters'
questions.
While the Soviet-bloc intelligence
presence in Mexico is large, Moscow
has been intent on increasing its cap-
abilities here. For years, the Soviets
have pressed the Mexican govern-
ment for permission to establish 10
consulates along the U.S. border,
according to congressional sources.
In fact, they received the go-
ahead in 1981 from the l~lexican for-
eign ministry. It was vetoed by
then-President Lopez Portillo's
office in 1981, and the Soviets had to
settle for one consulate in Veracruz
in 1981, far from the border.
While there are some indications
that Mexican authorities are taking
a dimmer view of Soviet espionage
in their country, the situation is far
from settled.
Mexico's counterintelligence
agency, the Direccion Federal de
Seguridad, went into a steep decline
starting in 1981 when an exper-
ienced professional chief was
replaced with a political appointee
with no intelligence background,
according to a former U.S. intelli-
gence office-? with long experience
in Mexico.
The DFS has been undergoing a
thorough shakeup in the aftermath
of the murder of a U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency officer in
Guadelajara in February, sources
say. A subsequent investigation has
revealed serious corruption involy-
ing DFS officers and drug traffick-
ers.
So serious were the charges that
the head of the DFS, Luis Zorilla,
was fired in iViarch. Recent press
reports say Mr. Zorilla is running for
political office from the state of
Hidalgo.
The new head of the service,
Pablo Gonzalez, is said to be a pro-
fessional from within the service.
The choice, according to
knowledgeable sources, was a sur-
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prise since he was not previously a
top official. He has, nonetheless, a
reputation for competence and for
not being anti-American:
It is too early to predict the effect
of the shakeup on Mexican counter-
intelligence capabilities. But one
State Department official maintains
that surveillance by the DFS
improved even before its recent
changes.
But others remain unconvinced.
They say that decades of laxity and
acquiescence cannot be quickly
changed. As one former top U.S.
intelligence official put it, for Soviet
espionage activity in Mexico, "it's
like playing tennis without the net"
Washington Times staffer Ted
Agres contributed to this report.
Tomorrow: How the KGB oper-
ates in Canada.
`~~~M
~~~
~~E~~~~
A five-part series
MfJNDAY: tiow th@ Sovtet Spy
apparatus is Stepping up its
efforts ig Nvfttt America
TODAY: Mexico: KGB's
"safehouse"against the U.S.
WEDNESQAY:' How Soviet bloc
ntaiiigence opera#es in Canada
THUFtSQAY: The KGt3's ?actve
measures" in-the U.S
FRI[JAY: Haw the KGI~ goes
fishing far recruits
3.
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/20 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100060014-3
ARTl~'~ r ~~; ,..,;~iD
'
' ~-'~ ? ~ WASHINGTON TIt~tES
' ~ ~ ~
~~ F~'"e ~-~ 21 P4ay 1985
Cuba operates as KGB's chief errand
? ? efforts are not principally aimed a
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
iVIEXICO CITY - In this city's .
secret world of intelligence oper-
ations the Soviet Union does not act
alone. very ova,et oc country -
includin remote Mon olia - has an
em ass m t e ~ exican ca ita .
Accor mg to we -tn ormed
sources, each supports the Soviet
effort in one way or the other.
"All are running errands for the
Soviet Union," says one Western
diplomat. ,
It is Cubans, however, who are
said to be one of the most active of
1~Ioscow's allies. Their center for
operations is their embassy - a
massive, modernistic building in
Polanco, an upscale section of
Mexico City.
The Cuban Embassy is located on
a broad, palm-lined avenue running
through the western part of the city,
just beyond elegant furniture stores
(Galeria Chippendale) and bou-
tiques (Gloria Vanderbilt). It takes
up a full square city block - a gift
from the Mexican government
("along with the bugs they left
behind," according to one Western
diplomatic source).
O_n_e former U.S. intelligence offi-
cer_wtth experience in M i o cavcy
there are 95 officers in the Cuban
embassy -the lar?est such repre-
sentation after the Soviet Union
itself.
It was not always so. For the first
decade of Castro's rule, the embassy
was far more modest, having no
more than 35 officers. After 1968,
when Cuban foreign policy fully
aligned itself with Moscow, the num-
ber of officers mushroomed.
Havana has the most active intel-
ligence station in this city after
Moscow's, with both of Cuba's intel-
li ence arms -the Direccion Ge -
era a Inte i?encia (DGI) and the
Americas Department - repre-
sented. This large presence demon-
strates the importance Fidel Castro
attaches to Mexico in his overall
intelligence and political effort.
While the DGI has become the
Spanish-lap ua a branch of the
KGB since the ear v '60s an as
b~en_~sed to supplement Soviet
intelligence efforts, it differs from
East European services in that its
T1.S. industrial espionaee but han-
dles Mexican operations a's well.
There are reports that the DGI
has been involved in training Mexi-
can terrorists, but this is largely
unsubstantiated. One State Depart-
ment official said Mexicans were
taken to Cuba for training, but
doubted that terrorists had been
trained for operations here.
That view is shared by several for-
mer U.S. mtellt ence officials who
.remain up-to- ate on oviet an
Cuban acta.v>ta.es in Mexico. At least
one West uropean intel tgT ence
service re orted in a confidential
analysis late last year t at Cuba was
"unltkely to promote any dissidence '
io.
The widely held belief by intel-
li ence sources here and in Was -
in ton is that b exico an u a aye
agreed to an unwritten co e o con-
duct. In this, Havana doesn't oment
social unrest in Mexico and Mexico
City supports Cuba's foreign poli-
cies.
But other sources say the Cubans
are indeed active in this country.
They report that they have been agi-
tating peasant groups in southern
Mexico, specifically in Chiapas, a
state that borders Guatemala - a
region with a long history of sep-
aratism.
One effort in which Cuban int 1-
liBence has actively participated is
disinformation -the fabri ation of
misinformation and planting it in the
generally pliant and generally anti-
Amertcan extcan r From
t ere it frequently gets picked up
and repeated by U.S. and other
media representatives.
According to well-informed
sources here and in Washington,
some Mexican journalists have been
on the Cuban payroll.
The Cuban Americas
Department s port o io a so in des
runntng operattons out of M Y~~o
directed at Central- America - pri-
martly Guatemala -and providin?
support for left-wine rev-
oIutionartes based in M xi o,
accordm? to U.S. diplomatic and
intelligence source
Cuban operations are not limited
to Mexico City. Havana also has a
small consulate in Merida, the capi-
tal of Yucutan. What Merida does is
a matter of dis ute within U.S. intel-
tgence ctrc es. Estimates range
from ii being a conduit into Guate-
mala for guerrilla operations to it
serving as another transit point for
Mexicans going to Cuba.
The Cubans are not the only
Soviet partners working in Mexico.
The Czechs, in particular, have a
reputation of being especially active
among the Eastern bloc.
According to reliable sources
here and in Washin ton t e Czec s
perform standard aspects o inte -
lieence tradecraft. and are consi -
ered specialists in plantin? buss in
Western embassies and residences.
They also are used in attempting
to recruit Mexican and U.S. citizens
working for the American Embassy
here. "It's the lonel secretar "they
attempt to recruit. says one ormer
American intelli?ence official with
four years experience in Mexico
Ci..~_
"Sometimes they use Czechs, but
more often they use some Mexican
gigolo;' he'said.
- Roger Fontaine
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~nlE',SHINGTON TIf1ES
29, ~~1ay 1985
~_
~ ~~ada e r
Q OI~~S
l~s `leak
border
y
By James Morrison
THE WASHINGTON TIMES FOREIGN SERVICE
OTTAWA - TWo years ago, when
Brian Mulroney was leader of the
opposition party in Parliament, he
declared this Canadian capital was
"knee-deep" in Soviet spies.
Today Mr. Mulroney is prime min-
ister,and his Progressive Conserva-
tive government has the
responsibility of cleaning up -what
he saw as a nest of spies.
The task of monitoring, control-
'. ling or reducing the number of
i Soviet bloc secret agents has been
I and will continue to be an enormous
one, according to intelligence
sources.
What makes Canada such an
apparent happy hunting ground for
the KGB? Sources here and in Wash-
ington point to several reasons:
? Canada has a relatively open
border with the United States mak-
ing travel fast and, in most cases,
untraceable. This means that intelli-
gence agents operating in the states
can meet their KGB controllers in
Canada with little risk of surveil-
lance.
Until very recently, Canadian offi-
cials had put little effort into
monitoring activities of espionage
agents in their own country.
? Canada is a NATO ally and a
close strategic partner with the
United States. Many U.S. military
secrets are shared with the Canadi-
ans. Canada cooperates with the
United States for such critical mili-
tary operations as command and
control and early warning radars
(which are scheduled for major
upgrading).
A senior U.S. intelligence official
in Washington told The Washington
Times that Canada is expected to
play a key role in eventual operation
of the Strategic Defense Initiative or
"star wars" defense system.
? High technology equipment,
such as computers and semiconduc-
tor manufacturing equipment, may
be exported from the United States
to Canada without the complex
licensing and review process
reserved for export sales to most
other countries. This allows corrupt
businessmen in the United States
and in Canada to illegally re-export
these items to Eastern bloc destina-
tions in exchange for high profits.
Canada has recently gone
through a protracted and disputed
effort to establish a credible internal
counterintelligence capability. The
fledgling Canadian Security Intelli-
gence Service (CSIS) has just begun
to take over from the once-effective
but more recently limited efforts
that had been made by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police.
"Our government [the Progres-
sive Conservatives] has recognized
the need to purposely increase our
commitment to security and intel-
ligence and national defense efforts
to protect our sovereignty and to
honor our obligations to our allies,"
said Elmer MacKay, the Canadian
solicitor general in charge of the
CSIS and the RCMP.
"The Parliament of Canada, in
passing the Canadian Security Intel-
ligenceService act, showed its intent
to take the threat of international
espionage seriously," he told The
Times.
"It is our duty to prevent leakage,
particularly involving high technol-
ogy information:'
Many laud Mr. MacKay's inten-
tiohs. But some observers here
claim that the effort is too late and
too little to counter effectively the
long, concentrated push by the
Soviet bloc to penetrate Canadian
society and institutions.
Arkady Shevchenko, the high-
ranking Soviet diplomat who
defected to the United States in 1978,
claims Soviet spies have "penetrated
Canada very heavily."
John Starnes, a former Canadian
diplomat and former director of the
government's counterspy agenc};
calls Canada "the target of extensive
espionage activity by the Soviet
Union that has increased dramati-
cally" since 1983.
Soviet activity in Canada was first
documented in 1945 in the cele-
brated case of Igor Gouzenko, an
obscure cipher clerk at the Soviet
Embassy here who defected with
109 secret documents under his
arm.
The Gouzenko affair sparked an
intense effort to break up a Soviet
spy ring on two continents and is
credited with helping launch the
Cold War.
Canada has expelled 19 Soviet
spies since 1978 and has uncovered
some embarrassing Canadian skel-
etons in top-secret closets, including
the spy Hugh Hambleton, now serv-
ing 10 years in a British prison; and
a member of the RCMP who is cur-
e rently fighting a spy charge.
"Scores of Canadians have been
blackmailed or coerced into working
for the Soviets," said ahigh-level
intelligence source who asked not to
be identified.
Some observers of the murky
world of espionage doubt Canada's
resolve to tackle the problem.
They say the Soviet secret serv-
ice, the KGB, and its Russian mili-
tary counterpart, the GRU, operate
easily in Canada because of the
country's openness and reluctance
to see itself as a target of Soviet
spies.
"The average Canadian doesn't
even think about it," the source said
of KGB activity. "They think it's a
great big joke:'
Also, the KGB has grown over the
past two years as it took advantage
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of government confusion in creating
the new CSIS, which took over from
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
several intelligence sources have
said.
Soviet personnel at the Soviet
Embassy here in Ottawa and at a
consulate in nearby Montreal num-
ber about 125, although only 37 are
accredited diplomats. That number
is increased by another 100 when
accredited diplomats from Bul-
garia, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Cuba and Nicaragua are
added in.
And these figures include only
accredited diplomatic personnel,
not their spouses and staffs, an
External Affairs official said. Intelli-
Bence sources estimate that 40
percent of these personnel are
actively engaged in espionage.
By contrast, Canada has about 40
diplomats in Moscow, none of which
is involved in spying because Canada
has no foreign espionage service
such as the KGB or CIA, according
to Canadian officials.
"Canada is a staging ground" for
Soviet espionage operations, said a
former counterintelligence officer.
Agents can enter Canada easily
because of liberal immigration poli-
cies and slip into the United States
across the long, undefended border.
Aside from engaging in military
espionage, the Soviets take advan-
tage of massive Canadian-U.S.trade
to gain industrial secrets - some-
times through legitimate sales and
sometimes through shady methods.
Soviet spies also masquerade as
Russian exiles to infiltrate and dis-
rupt immigrant groups in Canada
and use their Eastern bloc allies to
expand their?spy,web, the .source
said.
"Canadians do not believe them-
selves threatened by espionage and
international terrorism;' Mr. Starnes
wrote in a recent edition of Interna-
tionalPerspectives, aCanadian jour-
nal on world affairs.
"We tend to think of ourselves as
universally liked and that others
perceive us as we see ourselves -
peace-loving, honest brokers filled
with good will toward everyone," he
said.
Canadians also have a habit of
"denigrating" the country's impor-
tance as a nation with military and
industrial secrets worth stealing, he
said.
"In fact," he said, "Canada is an
important nation. Not only impor-
tant, but, in relative terms, power-
ful" -
Alliance with the United States
and membership in the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization makes
Canada privy to top-level military
secrets.
"This alone makes us an obvious
espionage target," Mr. Starnes said.
"In addition, the 3,000-mile frontier
with the United States makes
Canada an attractive launching
point for intelligence and terrorist
operations against our powerful
neighbor."
The long, undefended border with
the United States and billions of dol-
lars in annual U.S.-Canadian trade
make Canada an easy country
through which to steal trade secrets
and .smuggle advanced Western
technology to the East.
Unlike most other countries, ship
ments of high-tech equipment
between the United States and
Canada do not require export
license approval. "This puts a tre-
mendouspressure on the Canadians
because they have to enforce not
only their own exports but ours, too,"
said Stephen Bryen, deputy assis-
tant secretary of defense in Wash-
ington.
U.S. Customs Commissioner
William von Raab said that Canadian
officials have decided to establish
their own version of "Operation Exo-
dus" patterned after Customs' 3-
year-old program to halt illegal
technology diversion.
Canadian government officials
will be seeking the cooperation of
Canadian businessmen and export-
ers in clamping the illegal flow of
goods to the Soviet bloc.
"The new Canadian. government
has a different attitude about this
stuff" compared with the T2-udeau
government, Mr. von Raab said in
Washington. The Tl-ttdeau adminis-
tration "sort of yawned and said it
wasn't happening," Mr. von Raab
stated.
"I am very comfortable about the
moves the Canadians are making"
now, Mr. von Raab said.
Recent thefts of high technology
from California's Silicon Valley have
found their way into Soviet hands in
Canada.
In one case, officials of a Califor-
nia firm, I.I. Industries, were con-
victed of selling semiconductor
processing equipment to the Soviets
without a license.
The firm had sent the equipment
in crates. marked "washing
machines" and "industrial ovens" to
Canada, where it was shipped to the
Soviet Union through Switzerland.
U.S. Customs agents intercepted
some of the crates and substituted
the equipment with six tons of sand-
bags. As a final touch, they thumb
tacked one of their business cards
inside the lid. The Soviets, presum-
ably, were not amused.
L
Sometimes through legally
licensed sales, occasionally
arranged through Canada, and
sometimes through theft. the Sovi-
ets have nonetheless acquired tech-
nology inrobotics, computers, radar,
inertial guidance systems, lasers,
metallurgy and integrated circuits.
These technologies, according to
U.S. intelligence and military offi-
cials, are quickly applied to Soviet
military projects. This process
saves the Soviets billions of dollars
in research and development costs
each year.
Harry Lake, a Toronto private
detective, says some of his corporate
clients are victims of Soviet indus-
trial spies.
"It's one of the biggest threats
we're facing in the high-tech field;'
he said.
Mr. Lake, president of the Intro
spec private investigation agency,
said many Soviet spies leave Russia
under the cover of Jewish exiles.
Those "overnight Jews;' as he called
them, take jobs in small consulting
firms for a few years and then
graduate to large research compan-
ies.
They then take advantage of their
inside information to help target
new technology of interest to the
Kremlin, he said.
Also contributing to this story
were Washington Times staffers Ted
Agnes and Doug Lamborne.
7bmorrow: How Soviet intelli-
gence targets the United States.
~~~
A five-part series
MQNDAY~ How~the aciVief ~}r
apparatus is ste up,its
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/20 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100060014-3
A~~~^~G ~~"~~Rr.D
WASHINGTON TIMES
23 May 1985
Service A runs
disinformation
in West's media
Fourth in a five-part series
By Roger Fontaine and Ted Agres
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
A few years ago details of a secret
new U.S.-Swedish agreement sur-
faced in the United States.
The agreement was a bombshell:
It would allow the United States to
use neutral Sweden as a base for pho-
tographic reconnaisance missions
against Warsaw Pact nations. Tele-
grams containing details of the
arrangement were sent to the press,
the Swedish mission to the United
Nations and to the U.S. ambassador
to Sweden.
Such a serious violation of Swe-
den's cherished neutrality should
have generated an international
uproar. But there was little reaction.
The reason is simple: There was
no agreement. The whole thing was
a scam, the work, officials believe, of
the KGB's Service A in charge of
"active measures."
Soviet intelligence didn't cover its
tracks very well. The scheme fell
apart when the purported senders
complained about bills from West-
ern Union for telegrams they never
sent.
The FBI concluded that the KGB
was behind the scheme because the
telegrams were written by a non-
native speaker of English but dem-
onstrated agood knowledge of photo
reconnaissance techniques and a
familiarity with the names of appro-
priateofficials inthe departments of
State and Defense.
Moreover, they appeared at a time
~~~hen the Soviets themselves had
been seriously embarrassed by
their Whiskey class submarine
being caught trespassing in Swedish
waters. Officials believe the forgery
operation was intended to deflect
world attention from this predic-
ament.
Edward .I. O'Malley, director of
the FBI's intelligence division, says
that such KGB forgeries are not
unusual. The KGB has one division
that concentrates on this and other
"active measures," including propa-
ganda, deception and disinfor-
mation. Active measures is but one
of a myriad of activities conducted
by Soviet bloc intelligence in the
United States.
Mr. O'Malley says the KGB's "gen-
eral objectives are the collection,of
political, economic, military and -
increasingly in recent years- West-
ern science and technology."
As the "main enemy" (glavnyy
', protivnik) of the communist world,
the United States is the object of con-
certed Soviet attention. U.S. officials
and analysts say the Soviets have a
number of specific targets, includ-
ing:
? recruitment of agents, their
handling and, if possible, placement
into sensitive government and indus-
try posts where they can feed infor-
mation to the KGB;
? handling of "illegals" -agents
who have been infiltrated into this
country under false passport and
who live under false identities;
? electronic eavesdropping and
espionage to acquire military and
industrial secrets;
? acquisition of high-technology
equipment and know-how;
? clandestine activities, including
"active measures" to promote or
influence Soviet policy objectives;
? operation of commercial fronts,
including those of East European
trading companies. to buy, borrow or
i steal technology.
"The KGB is a classier operation
today than it used to be;' says Sen.
David Durenberger, R-Minn., chair-
man of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee.
While the Soviet Union has
missions only in Washington, New
York, and San Francisco, East Euro-
pean countries have facilities, such
as commercial offices in major
cities across the country. And while
Soviet diplomats in Washington and
San Francisco are not supposed to
travel beyond a 25-mile radius with-
out prior U.S. approval, their East-
- ern European colleagues have no
such restrictions.
The Soviets do not act alone in this
country but employ or "task" the
services of East European surro-
gates, such as East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Romania and
Poland. The Cuban- intelligence
service - DGI -has been used by
the Soviets with increasing reg-
ularity, U.S. intelligence sources say.
Some East European services
specialize in certain operations. The
East Germans, for instance, are
~ good at electronic surveillance and
bugging; the Czechs are used to
watch the ever-increasing emigre
communities. This division of labor
not only promotes efficiency, it also
allows the Soviets a plausible excuse
in case they need to officially deny
spying charges.
Experts judge the Czechs as
being the most capable and reliable;
the Poles, from Moscow's point of
view, remain the least trustwot?thy.
For while Polish intelligence. offi-
cersare rated highly in professional
terms, they have a tendency to
defect.
Even the Romanian service,
whose government has established a
measure of independence from the
Soviet Union, cooperates completely
with Moscow in intelligence tasking.
So close is that relationship that, as
with other East European services,
the Soviets often take over a promis-
ing operation that the Romanians
may have started.
"Their degree of independence
politically does not extend to the
intelligence officer," says one former
FBI official.
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KGB defector Stanislav Lev-
chenko, who worked for Soviet intel-
ligence in Japan, has testified that
his journalistic cover was as a corre-
spondent for New Times magazine.
That publication had 12 foreign cor-
respondents abroad, 10 of which
were KGB operatives, he said. He
further testified that half the
employees of Aeroflot in Japan were
also working for the KGB. U.S. offi-
cials say similar situations exist in
all major world capitals.
Soviet bloc intelligence officers
are also placed in the United Nations
Secretariat. "Those people ... are
under the complete control and
direction of their mission, and
through the mission of very senior
agencies and people in their govern-
ment," says the FBI's O'Malley.
As far as the United Nations goes,
it is "a real nest of .[Soviet] espi-
onage," and the largest "safehouse"
the KGB enjoys in the United States,
according to Attorney General
Edwin Meese.
In fact, the Soviets are deeply
entrenched in New York. In addition
to the U.N. Secretariat, the KGB has
officers under official cover at the
large Soviet, Ukranian and
Byelorussian U.N. missions on 67th
Street. Amtorg, the Soviet trading
company on Third Avenue, and the
TASS offices located in Rockefeller
Plaza are likewise staffed with
Soviet intelligence operatives.
According to one former CIA
coup erm a tgence o tcer, a ovt-
e s are more ac them ew or tan.
to as tnston. he Soviets prefer
New York because it is larser, more
complex and far easier than Wash-
ington to avoid U.S. counterintelli- .
Bence observation.
"You can get clean in New York by
getting on the subway" or into
Bloomingdale's, says a veteran
source, referring to the intelligence
officer's biggest problem -losing
his surveillance. "You can't do that
with Metro" or in Garfinckel's.
Supplementing the efforts of
intelligence officers with official
cover are the so-called "illegals" -
men and women who have entered
the country with false documents
and pose as U.S. citizens. Many are
dormant until activated by the KGB,
and their number is unknown.
Getting illegals into the country
has been easier with the step-up of
Soviet and Cuban immigration -
more than a quarter million immi-
grants have come to the United
States since 1973 from these two
countries alone.
"We believe that a small but si -
nt tcant raction of these recent ref-
ugees aye been agents o Soviet and
Cuban intelli ence," then-Attorney
eneral William renc mtt sat
in testimQgy in 1981..
Young KGB officers assigned to
the United States are typically
among a new breed who have had
substantial training in Western man-
ners. Many are suave, well-dressed
and speak flawless English without
a trace of accent. Some wear button-
down shirts and Brooks Brothers
suits.
Their training in Moscow
includes study in such topical
American interests as baseball team
standings and players. This in-depth
training gives them the ability to
easily converse in a variety of social
settings and help put potential tar-
gets at ease.
"They've sot to look Western,"
adds a CIA official with a counterin-
telligence background.
"Some KGB officers still wear
baggy suits, .but they're in India
where they wear baggy suits."
One U.S. source comments that a
sure give-away that a Soviet is KGB
is if he or she criticizes the Soviet
system, leadership, or-even the KGB
itself. "Only those in the KGB have
the license to bad-mouth," the source
says. "They do it to put their Western
contacts at ease"
One indication of their real intent,
experts say, lies in their training.
One of the first items of study for the
KGB novitiate is Sun Tzu's `Art of
War." Written almost 2,500 years ago,
this classic on military doctorine is
noted for its sublime advice: The
best way of winning is to "subdue
your enemies without ever having to
fight them"
KGB officers will often have
repeat tours to the United States, but
because Moscow fears they may be
recruited, there is generally a long
gap between U.S. assignments.
While the KGB sends its best and
brightest to do surreptitious battle
here, FBI officials counter that the
Soviet agents are not "10 feet tall"
"There's a substantial amount of
corruption in the KGB; they know it
and we know it," says Mr. O'Malley.
That corruption often includes
payoffs from lower-ranking officers
to their seniors to grease the wheel
for promotion.
The Soviet military intelligence
arm, the GRU, is rated slightly lower
in quality because of its reputation
for impetuousness. But individual
GRU officers are considered to be of
a higher caliber than those in the
KGB and possess a "higher degree
of patriotism;' as one former official
said.
The GRU, however, covers only a
part of the espionage spectrum -
G,
those targets directly linked to the
military. But as an aggressive junior
partner in Soviet intelligence, the
GRU has earned the respect of some
in U.S. counterintelligence.
"If the GRU gets anything they'll
go all the way, across the board. It
doesn't matter what it is, they will
take everything," said one former
FBI official.
That Bung-ho attitude, however,
sometimes creates friction with the
KGB:
.TARGET
AMERICA
A five-part series
MONDAY; How the Soviet spy ,
apparatus is stepping up its
efforts in North America
TUESDAY: Mexico: KGB's
"safehouse" against the U.S.
WEDNESDAY: How Soviet bloc
intelligence operates in Canada
TODAY: The KGB's "active
measures" in the U.S.
fRtDAY:-How the KGB goes ,
fishing for recruits
KGB. In that case, the latter always
comes our on top, according to this
official.
A typical Soviet officer's work-
routine involves contact with four or
ive agents workins for him. At the
same time he will be cultivatins as
many as 10 others. "One or two of
them will be pretty ood;' accordin
to a ormer CIA offical. "But the FBI
tries to keep him busy with dou e_ _
asents"
Intelligence officers with official
cover spend little time at their pro-
fessed jobs - as opposed to U.S: offi-
cers abroad. For the Soviet
"journalist;' articles appearing in
his name are often written in Mos-
cow.
The Soviet intelligence officer
working in the United States main-
tains his own files - he has no sec-
retary -and only his superior has
access to his material.
"There is much less a erwork"
the ormer A o ficial said. "And it'.t
a good way to do it in contrast to the
CIA;' he said. But the drawback is
tat stnce outer agent work is so
compartmentaltzed aKGB or GRU
officer may be unaware of arallel
eve opments t at mi~hi help his
wor ..
When a KGB officer leaves the
country, "it's a terrible mess" since
his files are often skimpy and dif-
ficult tosort out, the U.S. source said.
Tomorrow: How the KGB recruits
secret agents in the U.S.
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~?i -.c.nr ~-~
WASHINGTON TIMES
23 May 1985
`Active measures' key to Soviet
discrediting campaign
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
lts name bore awful irony -The
'IPust.
'Ib its supporters in the 1920s -
White Russians, anti-Bolshevik emi-
gres, and concerned Western gov-
ernments -The 'Il-ust was an
underground organization in Mos-
cow dedicated to the overthrow of
the new Soviet regime. To them, it
was worth great expenditure of
money, faith and even human lives.
The Trust was, in fact, an
elaborate scam, a front group set up
and run by Felix Dzerzhinsky,
founder of the Cheka, father of the
KGB. "
The 'IYust was part of the start of
a tradition, of what KGB literature
today calls aktivnye meropriyatiya
- "active measures"-abroad term
used to embrace forgery, disinfor-
mation, manipulation of foreign
media, false rumor, use of agents of
influence, clandestine radio sta- '
tions, blackmail, bribery, and front
groups.
Active measures, covert and
overt, are distinct from espionage
and counterintelligence. They are
directed by Section A of the First
Chief Directorate of the KGB where
they enjoy ample financing and high
priority, having been upgraded sig-
nificantlyduring the 1970s. Man}~ of
Section As more ambitious projects
are known to command the attention
of members of the Politburo.
They also command the attention
of the CIA, State Department and
other U.S. agencies charged with
monitoring them and undoing their
damage.
Active measures is "another area
where we see the Soviets increasing
their emphasis," says Edward
O'Malley, in charge of the FBI's intel-
ligence division.
A comprehensive 1982 CIA study
on Soviet Active Measures deter-
mined that the "primary target" of
such Soviet operations is the United
States. It said that active measures
are "systematically employed to dis-
?credit, isolate and weaken the United
States," which the KGB manual
refers to as the "main enemy."
The Soviets are willing to spend
handsomely. Some estimates place
the cost as high as $3 billion a year
for disinformation, propaganda,
forgeries, political influence oper-
ations and other overt and covert
activities.
Once the Politburo decides to pro-
mote acertain foreign policy or
other issue, active measures cam-
paigns and operations are designed
to support these policies. This is the
responsibilty of the KGB's Service
A. It works with close cooperation
with the International and Interna-
tional Information Departments (ID
and IID) of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party.
The ID works with communist
and leftist and socialist political par-
ties in other nations to coordinate
policy, the CIA report states. It also
supports operations of hundreds of
international front groups, includ-
ing the World Peace Council, the
World Federation of 'Il-ade Unions,
the World Federation of Democratic
Youth, the International Organ-
ization of Journalists, the Women's
International Democratic Feder-
ation and the Afro-Asian People's
Solidaity Organization, among many
others.
The KGB's Service A runs more
than 1,000 operations a year in West-
ern and Third World media outlets.
The actual implementing of
active measures abroad is done by
the IID. Some of the means at its
disposal include: the Soviet news
agencies TASS and Novosti, Radio
Moscow and propaganda publica-
tions inforeign languages, including
New Times.
Former U.S. Attorney General
William French Smith said these
"active hostile measures" are among
the most insidious of the means used
to influence public opinion through
"disinformation" and "agents of
influence."
Stanislav Levchenko, a former
high-ranking KGB official in Japan
who defected to the United States,
says that the KGB uses a number of
techniques under the umbrella of
"active measures" These include
propaganda, organizing demonstra-
tions, controlling international orga-
nizations, establishing front
organizations and forging doc-
uments.
Running through these actions, he
says, is one major objective: "By
weakening or destroying the consen-
sus within a free country, active
measures do much more harm than
classical espionage," he said. "In the
West, few people understand this
concept."
"All Soviet field agencies and
representatives abroad are poten-
tiallyavailable to support or partici-
pate in Soviet active measures," the
CIA report states. These include
embassies and KGB residences,
Soviet trade missions abroad, Soviet
front groups, Aeroflot and other
commercial organizations, and visit-
ing delegations.
Examples of some of the more
significant cases of active measures
are:
? Disinformation. The most
recent, and prominent, example
occurred last year when the Justice
Department revealed that a letter
allegedly written by the Ku Klux
Klan and circulated in Africa and
Asia was, in fact, a KGB forgery.
Entitled "The Olympics -For
The Whites Only;' the letter appar-
ently was meant to suggest that rac-
ism and terrorism awaited Third
World athletes in the Los Angeles
Olympics.
One of the more durable disinfor-
mation projects was the matter of a
forged Army field manual, FM
30-31B. It surfaced in more than 20
countries in 1975 and purported to
guide American military personnel
in how to interfere in the internal
affairs of friendly nations. It was
cited in Italy in 1978 as evidence of
U.S. involvement in the murder of
Christian Democrat Aldo Mora
(The term dezinformatsia was for-
merly used by the KGB to describe
most of the activities now called
"active measures")
? Agents of influence, media
manipulation. French journalist
Pierre-Charles Pathe was exposed
in 1979 as having been a willing
mouthpiece for the KGB for 19
years. His articles and newsletters
carried great weight among govern-
ment leaders and heads of industry.
He was caught in the act of
receiving documents to be used as
articles under his byline and he
made a full confession. Pathe was
tried, convicted and sentenced to
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/20 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100060014-3
,- .
five years in prison, but was par-
doned in 1981 by Francois Mitterand
upon becoming the new Socialist
president of France.
Six KGB officers had handled
Pathe in more than two decades of
operation.
More recently, there is the case of
Arne'IYeholt, former head of the for-
eign press section of Norway's For-
eign Ministry, a position that gave
him considerable influence with key
government personnel and journal-
ists. He was watched by the FBI
while stationed at the U.N. and was
arrested last year with classified
documents. He faces trial this year.
Valdimir Posner, who appears
regularly on ABC's "Nightline" as a
Soviet correspondent in Moscow, is
said by several authorities to be a
member of the KGB.
? Front Groups. The Soviet-
controlled World Peace Council,
acknowledged by the State Depart-
ment and intelligence experts as a
KGB front, engineered widespread
demonstrations in Europe against
the development of the enhanced
radiation warhead (neutron weapon
system, which the KGB dubbed "the
capitalist bomb").
There was even a demonstration
at a Baptist church in Washington
during a service attended by Pres-
ident Carter, who eventually shelved
development plans for the system.
The CIA estimated that it cost the
Soviets $100 million to conduct the
neutron bomb propaganda cam-
paign.
The-WPC also figured
prominently in demonstrations
against deployment of Pershing II
and cruise missiles in Western
Europe. According to several
authorities, the KGB sent diplomats
and agents to the United States in.
1982 to assist with nuclear freeze
campaigns.
~ Forgeries. In 1981, a letter with
President Reagan's signature was
sent to the King of Spain urging him
to join NATO and crack down onleft-
istgroups. Itwas eventually exposed ',
as a Soviet forgery in the Spanish
press.
The Holocaust Papers, which pur-
ported to show U.S. military plans to
use Western Europe as a nuclear bat-
tleground in the event of World War
III, surfaced in Norway in 1967 and
have appeared on 20 other occa-
sions, as recently as 1982.
There have been several faked
telegrams allegedly from the
American embassy in Rome meant
to claim that Washington contrived
the "Bulgarian connection" in the
plot to kill Pope John Paul II. The
forgeries were cleverly done and
resembled genuine State Depart-
ment cables, but several technical
errors helped lead to their exposure.
According to William E. Knepper,
deputy assistant secretary of state
for the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, the Soviets have exper-
ienced their greatest successes in
active measures in Third World
countries.
"In Africa and South Asia, in par-
ticular, they have probably signifi-
cantly added to the U.S. image
problem;' Mr. Knepper stated.
The Soviets, he added, "regard
active measures like pawns in a
chess game, able to damage the
opponent at the margin:'
-'I~d Agres and Doug Lamborne
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/20 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100060014-3
ARTL~LE A~EtiARED 1 l;'~S{ ITNG`I'~N "I'TP~;~
D~ SAGE tP'~t ?4 "try 185
Double a ents re u on ea
ch
~ p ~' p
other in t mess
he s bus
pY __-
agents and double agents prey and
are preyed upon by numerous intel-
ligence services. The situation is
more troublesome because U.S.
intelligence officials and agents are
severely outnumbered by the other
side.
According to FBI sources, Soviet
and Eastern bloc representatives in
this country have increased in num-
KGB:
TARGET
AMERICA
MONDAY: How the Soviet spy
apparatus is stepping up its
efforts in North America
ber from 384 in 1956 to 557 in 1961 TUESDAY: Mex(co: KGB's
and 2,000 in 1980. In the past five "safehouse" against the U.S.
Agen[s and double agents in the
shadowy spy world -last of a
series; and a look at Soviet military
intelligence.
Last in a five-part series
By Roger Fontaine
and Ted Agres
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
It was a blow to the bureau's
morale. One of their own, a 20-year?
veteran of the force, had been
arrested on charges of conspiring to
provide national defense informa-
tion to the Soviet KGB.
For the men and women in the
FBI, especially those who concen-
trate on trapping Soviet spies in this
country, the arrest last October of
Richard W. Miller, an FBI foreign
counterintelligence agent, on espi-
onage charges was shocking.
Mr. Miller, whose trial is now
being held in Los Angeles, is
accused of passing classified FBI
documents to Svetlana Ogorod-
nikova, 34, a striking blonde iden-
tified as amajor inthe KGB. She and
her husband, Nikolai Ogorodnikova,
S1, from whom she was reportedly
separated, were both arrested. He is
identified as being her KGB super-
ior.
As part of his defense, Mr iVtiller
maintains that he was seeking to
recruit Mrs. Ogorodnikova and turn
her into a double agent.
The Miller case, though still pend-
ing, represents a peck into the shad-
owy world of espionage ~ti~here
years, that number has again dou-
bled and is now about 4,000.
About one-thtra of these are full-
time intelligence officers working
for the KGB, the GRU and other bloc
intelligence services,
U.S. capability at monitoring this
growing presence declined in the
1960s and 1970s. In the 1950s, the
ratio of Soviet bloc intelligence
operatives to bureau shadows was
1-to-1. By 1975, the bureau was out-
numbered by 4-to-1. In 1980, the esti-
mate was 10-to-1 in Moscow's favor.
FBI officials say in the United States
today the ratio is better, but decline
to be specific. On the streets of
Washington, however, the ratio
remains 10-to-1.
Adding to the problem is the pro-
liferation of classified information
and development of technology.
Recent congressional hearings have
revealed that one million people in
the United States currently hold
security clearances giving them
access to classified information.
Some 11,000 U.S. companies also
deal in classified information. Secu-
rity background checks have been
criticized as being perfunctory.
Targeting this network is a com-
plex business, and many experts
believe Soviet intelligence priorities
vary over the years. Nevertheless,
the overriding goal -that of pen-
etrating the American intelligence
community -remains highest on
the list.
But some experts and old counter-
intelligence hands disagree on the
KGB's effectiveness. Stories of
moles -deeply planted agents in
high intelligence positions -have
circulated in Washington for years.
"That mole must be 8S years old by
now;' says one retired FBI counter
WEDNESDAY: How Soviet bloc
intelligence operates in Canada
THURSDAY: The KGB's "active
measures'in the U.S.
TODAY: How the KGB goes
fishing for recruits
intelligence expert. "They are
always talking about the same mole"
But that doesn't mean the fears
are groundless. There were some
ideologically motivated recruit-
ments during the Vietnam War era,
when draft cards and CT.~.~Tags were
burned and Ho Chi Minh was glo-
rified.
David H. Barnett, a CIA staff offi-
cer in Indonesia, was recruited by
the Soviets in 1976. He subsequently
revealed the identities of some 30
CIA officers and foreign agents and
provided details of U.S. anti-sub
marine intelligence in exchange for
$92,600. He pleaded guilty in 1981
and was sentenced to 18 years in fed-
eral prison.
His primary assignment from the
Soviets, however, was to penetrate
the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the U.S. State Depart-
ment. There is no indication of how
successful he might have been had
he not been caught.
The KGB and the GRU have
emphasized stealing advanced tech-
nology - a target that will increase
in importance when President Rea-
gan's Strategic Defense Initiative
research and development program
gets into high gear.
Une former CIA counterintelli-
gence expert worries that the Soviet
priority given to U.S. SDI research
~~?ill pose a serious strategic threat
cm its own. ;Monitoring our research
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/20 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100060014-3 . ,
and development eft~,rts, h said,
should give the Soviets the up~ortu-
nity to discover the must prugtising
lines of research.
A former CIA counterintelligence
official says that emigres, especially
if they appear to he dissidents, gen-
erally elicit "sympathy and cache"
in industry, which further reduces
suspicions and improves access,
even if he works in a relatively low
staff position.
Soviet intelligence, however, is not
reluctant to use more direct meth-
ods in stealing advanced technology.
In the late 1960s, a Soviet technical
delegation was allowed to visit
Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell-
Douglas plants where wide-bodied
planes - 747s, L1011s, DC-lOs -
were being built.
The Soviets were watched care-
fully. Despite every precaution, how-
ever, U.S.intelligence subsequently
learned that the Soviets, too, were
making wide-bodied airplanes. The
visiting delegation was soon sus-
pected of the espionage, but no one
could figure out at the time how the
Soviets did it.
In 1980, a defector told the FBI
that delegation members had spe-
cial soles on their shoes which
picked up bits of scrap metal. The
metal was analyzed and the Soviets
learned what type of special alloys
were necessary.
Sometimes Soviet intelligence is
less successful. Five years ago, a
Belgian national was recruited to
obtain an American firm's computer
software technology. He offered
$500,000 dollars for the package -
to an undercover FBI agent.
Recruitment, however, is only half
the problem. The other half involves
placing recruits in good places or at
least keeptng them where they are
already. There are failures. In 1975,
the House Subcommittee on Inter-
national Security was looking for a
staff worker. The committee mem-
bers were particularly impressed
with one applicant, James Sattler.
But an inquiry with the FBI led to the
discovery that Mr Sattler was a paid
and controlled agent of the East Ger-
man intelligence service.
The East European services also
specialize in recruiting and placing
members of the emigre communi-
ties into sensitive posts and collect-
ing information from them.
"That is a built-in entree that all
the satellites can use;' says a former
FBI official. But when they do, East-
ern European intelligence services
do not use the soft approach they
employ with other Americans.
"'T'hey prey upon the emigre com-
munity here;' says FBI intelligence
chief' Edward O'Malley "They au
have relatives in the old country;' he
adds.
Occasionally, such coercion pro-
duces unexpected results -for the
Soviet Union. In 1977, the Hungarian
intelligence service attempted to
recruit a U.S. Army serviceman of
Hungarian descent after a visit to
Hungary.
A Hungarian agent made vague
threats about the man's visit, and the
possibility of halting future visits.
The agent then requested him to
obtain NATO military secrets. The
Hungarian-American reported the
contact to the FBI and consented to
act as a double agent. This later led
to the arrest of a Hungarian intel-
ligence officer in the United States,
caught in the act of buying classified
information.
Sometimes there is a windfall -
in tradecraft terms, a "walk-in. This
is an espionage volunteer who wants
to give, or sell sensitive intelligence
information to the Soviets.
One of the most famous and pos-
sibly damaging walk-in case
involved Christoper Boyce and Daul-
ton Lee, who 10 years ago sold the
Soviets information about sophisti-
cated U.S. intelligence satellites.
Other walk-ins have also provided
valuable information. One former
FBI official admitted, "There are
quite a few of them, but it would be
a smaller percentage than the ones
they recruit"
On other occasions there have
been ludicrous failures. In 1976
Edwin Moore, aloes-ranking CIA
official, placed aplastic-wrapped
manila envelope containing classi-
fied documents and a request for
money on the grounds of a Soviet
residential building in Washington.
The Soviet security agent,
thinking it was a bomb, notified the
Executive Protection Service guard
who, in turn, notified the local U.S.
Army bomb disposal squad. The
train of events eventually led to
Moore's arrest - a disgruntled
employee with financial problems.
Do U.S. counterintelligence offi-
cialsturn around Soviet bloc agents?
The answer is yes, but it is a subject
that officials will not talk about since
defectors are often still working at
their old jobs.
Is the United States doing better
in the counterintelligence wat??
Mr. O'Malley, chief of FI31 intel-
ligence, clearly thinks so. "We had a
very, very good base on which to
begin, and in the last fow? to five
years we also had substantially more
people, substantially more
equipment, we have enhanced our
analytical capability, we've
enhanced the training of our peo-
ple;' he says.
"It's the top investigative priority
in the FBI today. All the arrests that
you've been seeing" are a result of
this, he says.
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THE WASHINGTON TIMES
'
There are about 75 Soviet or
Soviet bloc recruitment attempts in
the Washington area each year, the
FBI says. Worldwide, iwo or three
U.S. citizens are approached each
day foi? the same purpose.
And while some 30 "hostile intel-
ligence services" operate in the
nation's capital, recruitment efforts
seem to follow a definite and recur-
ring pattern.
"There are three definite stages
in the recruitment process;' says
Edward J. O'Malley, the FBI's chief
of intelligence.
These stages can take anywhere
from several months to several years
to complete. But Soviet intelligence,
the KGB in particular, is very
patient.
Former KGB official Stanislav
Levchenko, who worked in the Soviet
embassy in "Ibkyo until defecting to
the United States, says that "the
KGB selects its targets very care-
fully, accumulating an incredible
amount of information"
When sufficient information is
collected and there appears a
chance for success, the .KGB will
act.
The get-acquainted stage is the
simplest. The person to be recruited
is first encountered under seem-
ingly innocent circumstances by a
member of any Soviet bloc service.
Typically, the "chance" contact is
at a trade conference or a university
lecture. Like countless such meet-
ings, introductions are made and
business cards exchanged.
If the individual is deemed wor-
thy of further effort, afollow-up con-
tact carried out by the intelligence
offioEi' usually occurs. "typically
thi~'~"takes the form of a lunch or
dinner someplace, fairly open,
maybe an exchange of trinkets of
one kind or another;' according to
Mr. O'Malley A bottle of Armenian
brandy or vodka also is standard
fai-c.
Next is "a developmental stage
~vherc the Soviets have done their
assessment in the acyuaintanceship
1c'ASI lI N(~'I'nN TT~O;~
24 ~t~t}' 1 X185
M.I.C.E. entrap
citizens as spies
useful to recruit;
Mr. O'Malley says.
In this stage the Soviet agent will
"test the person" to find out what
kind of access he has to information
and whether he is security con-
scious or istoo reckless to be consid-
ered.
"What are his strengths and
weaknesses, particularly, does this
person have a financial problem?
The KGB manual says all Americans
can be bought;' Mr. O'Malley states.
While he says this is not true,
among the reasons why Americans
agree to work for the KGB, "the pri-
mary motivation is money;' he says.
Adds Mr. Levchenko, "You can
sum it up with the four initals
M.I.C.E. -money, ideology, compro-
mise, ego.
"Human beings are complex and
each person has to be recruited dif-
ferently;' he says. "You frequently
have to use more than one lever. The
difficulty resides in approaching
and engaging the person and zeroing
in on his weak points and exploit his
ambitions. Some of them are espe-
cially motivated by money and get
paid up to $2,000 a month:'
In addition to the financial entice-
ment,the KGB also assesses a poten-.
tial recruit's attitude towards his
employer and probes for other pos-
sible weaknesses.
In Cuba, for instance, the DGI,
which functions as the Spanish lan-
guagebranch of the KGB, maintains
computerized files on all prominent
U.S. and European media people.
What these journalists and editors
report is updated every six months
and analyzed for bias, nuances and
shifts in viewpoints. Information on
financial vulnerabilities and sexual
proclivities also is collected. When
media stars visit Cuba, the DGI thus
knows what "emotional buttons" to
push.
At an advanced stage in the KGB
recruitment process, according to
Mr. O'Malley, the Soviet will ask the
American for some information
from his company. The Soviet might
explain he is doing a paper and the
information would be helpful,
emphasizing that he is seeking noth-
in~ classified.
"The idea is to get the American
in the habit of exchanging informa-
tion;' Mr. O'Malley says. After the
American provides the public infor-
mation, the Soviet will thank him
abundantly, saying "time is money, I
really appreciate this ... so let me
give you something for your time.
The American takes it." Mr.
O'Malley says.
But then comes the catch.
The Soviet will ask the American
to sign a receipt for the money -
innocent in itself. But in Mr O'Mal-
ley's words, "They go on and on and
suddenly it dawns on the American
that he's getting in pretty deep water
with this hostile intelligence" serv-
ice.
If they are successful, the KGB
recruitment pattern reaches the
final stage.
"The target will receive training
in intelligence trade craft, will be
given some equipment, be trained in
the use of what we call dead drop,
where they will secrete information
which will be later picked up by the
intelligence officer and will pick up
his payment from a second dead
drop;' Mr. O'Malley says.
The recruit also will "be given sign'
Haling devices to signal the intelli-
gence officer that there is
something in the dead drop. The idea
being that they are never together in
the same place, particularly in a
clandestine operation which com-
pounds the problem from a counter-
intelligence standpoint"
One real life example of Soviet
recruitment follows the pattern
closely.
William Holden Bell, a former
project manager for the Hughes Air-
craft Co., was found guilty and sen-
tenced to eight years in a federal
prison for giving sensitive technol-
ogy to a Polish agent in 1981.
Four years earlier, Bell and his
wife met "by accident" the Polish
gentleman and his wife and learned
they were neighbors in the same
apartment complex.
They soon became good friends in
the classic pattern, often playing
tennis and meeting on various social
occasions. The Polish agent, Marian
'7.acharski, knew Bell was the
Q~.ti~-r ~n~i~I
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Z
project manager of an advanced
dual weapons system. He asked him
for copies of the Hughes company
newsletter and another publication
- both innocent public documents.
Bell agreed.
A short time later, the apartment
building in which they were living
was converted to condominiums and
Bell expressed financial difficulties
over purchasing his apartment. Za=
charski made an offer of a loan,
which Bell accepted.
Soon the Hughes employee was
being pressured into giving his
"friend" classified information. He
gave in to that pressure and was sup-
plied with paraphernalia for espi-
onage.
Meetings were arranged with
Polish intelligence officers in a num-
ber of European cities. Code names
were adopted and payment took the
form of gold coins. Bell received a
total of $170,000 for his efforts.
His contacts continued until the
FBI arrested him in June 1981 along
with his Polish accomplice. Both
were convicted and sentenced.
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