D. USIB PASSES ITS TEST IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000200070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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D. USIB Passes Its Test in the Cuban Crisis
85. One of the most spectacular challenges to the USIB in
supporting the urgent intelligence needs of the President and the
NSC was posed by Khrushchev in the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba
during the fall of 1962. In view of the many appraisals and post
mortems written about this event, this section will be confined to
a summary of the actions taken by the USIB to deal with the crisis
situation as it developed from August through October 1962.
86. On 1 August 1962 the USIB approved an NIE on the
situation and prospects in Cuba which updated two previous estimates
in January and March. This August estimate noted that the USSR
was becoming more deeply commited to preserve and strengthen the
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Castro regime, but had avoided formal commitment to protect
and defend the regime in all contingencies. It stated that Cuban
military capabilities had been enchanced by Soviet Bloc provision
of military equipment and instructions but were essentially
defensive. It was believed unlikely that the Bloc would provide
Cuba with a capability to undertake major independent military
operations overseas, or station in Cuba Bloc combat units, at
least for the next year or so. It was estimated that Cuban armed
forces were probably capable of containing and controlling any
threat through guerilla action, and of repelling any invasion short of
direct US military intervention in strength. 194/
87. While there had been numerous reports from ground
observers that Soviet missiles or excessive numbers of Soviet aircraft
or submarines had been deployed to Cuba in 1961 and early 1962, NPIC
had disproved almost all of them until August 1962. The photography
from a U-2 mission on 29 August showing eight SA-2 sites was the
first firm evidence of what the Soviets had begun in Cuba and of how
far they had progressed. Coi,ncidentially, the Watch Committee report
approved by USIB on that same date contained an initial assessment of the
developing situation in Cuba. Also at that meeting the Board agreed
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during discussion of the Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations
that a SNIE on Cuba should be prepared for early consideration.
After the first version was considered but not acted upon at the
7 September meeting, USIB approved a SNIE on the military buildup
in Cuba at its 19 September meeting which contained the following
conclusions:
"a. We believe that the USSR, values its position
in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be
derived from it, and consequently that the main
purpose of the present military build-up in Cuba
is to strengthen the Communist regime there against
what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a
danger that the U. S. may attempt by one means or
another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently
hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro' s
defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military
retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize
that the development of an offensive military base in
Cuba might provoke U. S. military intervention and thus
defeat their present purpose.
"b. In terms of military significance, the current
Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense
and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political
significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet
statement of 11 September, they are likely to be regarded
as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in
power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition
at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these
developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime
thereby gains a sense of security at home, it will be
emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting
revolutionary activity in Latin America.
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"c. As the build-up continues, the USSR may be
tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons
represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more
'offensive' character; e. g. , light bombers, submarines,
and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface
missiles (SSM's). A decision to provide such weapons
will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate
as to whether they could be introduced without
provoking a U. S. military reaction.
"d. The USSR could derive considerable military
advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium
and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or
from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base
there. As between these two, the establishment of a
submarine base would be the more likely. Either
development, however, would be incompatible with
Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we
presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater
willingness to increase the level of risk in U. S. -
Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far and
consequently would have important policy implications
with respect to other areas and other problems in East-
West relations.
"e. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence
of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than
to the technical implications of the military build-up.
Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet
military intrusion into the Hemisphere, but will regard
the problem as one to be met by the U. S. and not their
responsibility. We estimate the chances are better now
than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-
thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short
of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear
that the USSR was establishing an 'offensive' base in
Cuba, most Latin American governments would expect
the U. S. to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary,
but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involve-
ment. "
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General Carter as Acting Chairman also urged all Board members to
keep their principals alerted to developments in the Cuban situation. 195/
88. On 31 August the President had ordered USIB through the
Acting DCI not to allow publication of the information from the
29 August U-2 mission about Soviet defensive missiles until U. S.
policy-makers had established a course of action. After the
President announced the presence of a missile defense system in Cuba
on 4 September, the community was able to publish information on
SAM sites. At executive sessions on 7 and 13 September however the
Board had discussed a further restriction on publishing any intelligence
on offensive weapons in Cuba. Agencies were to continue normal
distribution of raw reports. A few days after this restriction, reports
of actual sightings of offensive missiles began to come in from ground
observers in Cuba, and none of this information appeared in intelligence
publications although it did go to analysts with a need to know and was
on
used in the targeting exercise which led to the U-2 mission/14 October.
One exception to the restrictions was White House permission to
publish information on a shipment of IL-28 medium jet bombers that
arrived in Cuba for which there were pictures of the deck-loaded crates
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on ships. When this permission was granted on 11 October the
President instructed the DCI to put into effect a system for rigid
control of information on offensive weapons. A meeting on that same
date in the Pentagon of representatives of the USIB chaired by
General Carter agreed upon implementing procedures which also
would improve the flow of this sensitive information to the senior policy
echelon. The resultant DCI order specified that all such sensitive
information would require a special SECRET designator PSALM
and its dissemination within each USIB component was to be
strictly controlled by each USIB member personally without
inhibiting the essential analytical process. Such information also
would be disseminated outside USIB components only to specific
individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities
as advisors to the President had a need to know. 196/
89. The first reports out of Cuba suggesting the presence of
MRBMs did not reach Washington until after mid-September. On
5 October COMOR submitted to USIB its report which stated that
there was a pressing and continuous need for up-to-date intelligence
on the progress of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba to assist in making
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policy decisions of immediate and vital concern to the nation.
It noted that this intelligence could best be provided with
sufficient timeliness and broadness of scope by overflying Cuba
with the U-2. The most immediate concernswere the missile
installations springing up all over the islands. In addition to the
SA-2 sites, there were surface-to-surface (SSM) sites observed on
recent coverage. Also ground observers had reported sightings
they believed were the SS-4 MRBM, and these reports had to be
confirmed or denied by photo coverage. The presence of MIG-21
aircraft had been confirmed and overhead reconnaissance was
needed to substantiate estimates of the numbers involved. More-
over, to prepare for possible US operations in the area, responsible
commanders required up-to-date intelligence which, while secondary
to the above needs, were potentially of even greater importance.
COMOR therefore proposed frequent and regular U-2 overflights of
the island for coverage of listed primary objectives once a month. 197/
The next day, 6 October, COMOR forwarded to the Board a copy of a
memorandum to the Director of NRO at his request which reiterated
and
much of the previous report/which added a section on SIGINT require-
ments as well as giving an up-to-date list of objectives for search,
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surveillance and technical analysis. At the USIBmeeting on 10 October,
the Chairman first reported the discussion of this subject at the
9 October Special Group meeting and subsequent decisions by the
President. The Special Group had agreed that first priority be given
to one U-2 mission in the western part of the island. In answer
to a request at that Special Group meeting for the Board's opinion on
the COMOR report, the USIB also on 10 October (as previously
discussed in paragraph 63 of Section C) agreed that the Chairman
should express to the Special Group the Board's view that the two
groups of surveillance targets requiring resolution of 2-5 feet to
provide order of battle and operational status information should be
surveyed as promptly as possible. These targets included missile
sites, camps, airfields, ports, landing beaches and special areas.
The Board also requested COMOR to submit at the next weekly
meeting a specific list of priority targets in the technical analyses
group requiring a resolution of one foot. 198/ At its 17 October
meeting, USIB considered the COMOR response, and authorized
and directed COMOR to keep up-to-date the requirements, targets
and priorities for low-altitude reconnaissance contained therein,
and to keep USIB, NRO and appropriate operational authorities
currently informed. 199/
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90. The Board at its 17 October meeting also agreed that
a SNIE should be prepared on a crash basis on the Cuban
situation, taking into account broad Soviet intentions and the strategic
consequences related thereto. 200/ This action reflected the fact
that, after bad weather from 10 to 13 October, the U-2 mission
on 14 October
authorized on 9 October had flown over the area west of Havana/to test
the operational readiness of SAM sites and to look for suspected
SSM activity. This flight was the first to discover the presence of
MRBMs. On 16 October approval had been given for an unlimited
number of flights over Cuba. The intelligence community had also
geared to meet the crisis which now faced the nation. GMAIC was
charged with preparing an immediate evaluation, and agreed that the
observed missiles were clearly under Soviet control and the site
would probably hold up to 24 missiles although there was no evidence
of the presence of nuclear warheads. COMOR reviewed its target
planning, the Watch Committee directed the NIC to monitor closely
any Soviet actions elsewhere to determine how Cuban events fitted
into a broader picture, and BNE concluded that the Soviets would not
risk nuclear war if the U. S. took direct action against Cuba. At its
17 January meeting, USIB directed that GMAIC, NPIC and JAEIC
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jointly provide a continuing community evaluation of the Soviet
missile threat in Cuba, including 24-hour-a-day support from
NPIC. Based on the 15 October U-2 mission, GMAIC initially
estimated that at least 16 and possibly 32 missiles of 1, 020 n. m.
range would be operational within a week or so.
91. On 18 October 1962, the Chairman with the Board's
agreement initiated a series of special USIB meetings of Board
members, with one assistant each if desired, held every morning
for the next five days at 0830 in the Conference Room of the CIA
East Building in downtown Washington near the Lincoln Memorial.
Each of these daily meetings generally lasted throughout the entire
morning, and two of them were reconvened after a luncheon recess.
The sole agenda for these meetings was to review and discuss the
developments related to the Cuban situation, both there and
throughout the world. At the 18 October meeting the Chairman
=This account of the Board's actions in these meetings and the one on
24 October 1962 are based on material which, because it had to be
handled in accordance with PSALM procedures, was filed in separate
folders in the USIB Secretariat files under control of the Executive
Secretary, containing the minutes and records for each of these
special meetings. 201/
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also reported that, based on meetings with certain principals of
Board members, events had overtaken the SNIE on Cuba drafted
by BNE and therefore Board action was not appropriate. The Board
then proceeded with its review and discussion of developments with
respect to Cuba and their implications. After a briefing by the
Director of NPIC on the results of the latest reconnaissance
missions over Cuba, the Chairman tabled a brief memorandum of
the following problems to which USIB should address itself at
once and be prepared to report at a meeting the next day. He
explained that these were the policy problems being discussed in the
meetings of principals. The principal question for the USIB was to
analyze the effects of probable courses of action which might be
taken by the United States and to appraise all aspects of these actions.
The courses were three:
1. To accept the MRBM's and other offensive capabilities
in Cuba as a fact of life and do nothing about it.
2. To initiate a total or limited blockade under a declara-
tion of war against Cuba.
3. To take military action ranging from taking out identified
IRBM's, plus other Cuban air capabilities, plus SAM sites and cruise
missile sites, to invading Cuba. After general Board discussion,
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the USIB requested BNE, with the USIB representatives, to
prepare an estimate responsive to these problems. The USIB
also requested GMAIC and JAEIC to review their recent evaluations
on missile sites and nuclear weapons in Cuba.
92. At the 19 October meeting after the usual briefing by
the Director of NPIC, the first "Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile
Threat in Cuba, " by GMAIC, JAEIC and NPIC, dated 18 October,
was handled out and discussed. Its main conclusion was that a
Soviet regiment with eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm
MRBMs was deployed in western Cuba, must be considered opera-
tional and could launch the missiles within 18 hours of a decision to
do so. These missiles were Soviet manned and controlled, and it
was believed that offensive action by them would be by command from
the USSR. There was however no evidence of nuclear warheads in
Cuba but it must be assumed that they could be available. The
USIB agreed that this Joint Evaluation should be kept up-to-date
daily for the time being, and reviewed at each USIB meeting. The
Chairman of COMOR distributed a paper concerning possible
revision of the satellite reconnaissance schedule in light of the
USIB deferred action
Cuban crisis. After discussion, /until there was a better basis for
decision. The Acting Chairman, General Carter, then handed out
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in executive session a Memorandum from the DCI, which indicated the
probable US courses of action developed in discussion among the princi-
pals on 18 October, together with some of the reasoning involved. The
DCI asked for guidance from USIB members for his use in further dis-
cussions which were to begin at 1100 hours, 19 October, and probably
continue throughout the weekend. The discussion led into a consideration
of SNIE 11-18-62, " Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action",
dated 13 October. A shorter version distributed by the State member at
the meeting was amended and approved by USIB, which contained the
following basic conclusions:
This estimate stated that a major Soviet objective in their
military buildup in Cuba was to demonstrate that the world bal-
ance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US
could prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into
its own hemisphere. It was considered possible, but unlikely,
that the USSR was installing the missiles to bargain for US con-
cessions elsewhere. If the US accepted this buildup, it was
believed that the Soviets would continue the buildup of strategic
weapons in Cuba, probably to contribute to their total strategic
capability vis-a-vis the US. This would provide encouragement
to Communists and anti-American elements, and a loss of con-
fidence in US power and determination generally. If the US
confronted Khrushchev with knowledge of the MRBM deployment
and pressed for a withdrawal, it was not believed that the Soviets
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would halt the deployment but would propose negotiations
on foreign bases generally. Such a warning would degrade
surprise in a subsequent US attack. As to the effect of a
blockade, it was not believed that a blockade itself would
bring down the Castro regime. The Soviets would exert strong
pressures elsewhere to end the blockade, and heavily exploit
all adverse reactions. If the US took direct military action
against Cuba, the Soviets would be under great pressure to
respond in ways which would inflict injury to US interests.
While the possibility must be recognized that the Soviets
would again miscalculate and respond in a way which could
escalate to general war, it was not believed the Soviets
having no public treaty with Cuba would attack the US from
Soviet bases or with missiles from Cuba. Although the Soviets
would almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside
Cuba, it was believed that the Soviet leaders would not
deliberately initiate general war or take military measures
running the gravest risks of general war.
93. The USIB also approved a brief statement drafted during the
meeting on the "Difference Between Soviet Responses to a Blockade and
US Measures of Force Against Cuba", as a response to the aforementioned
memorandum from the DCI. The USIB agreed that the short SNIE 11-18-62,
the brief statement and the Joint Evaluation be provided to the DCI for his
use in meeting with the principals. Subsequently the USIB approved an
amended version of the Annex to SNIE 11-18-62 on "Military
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Significance of Ballistic Missiles in Cuba." General Carroll,
Director of DIA, advised the Board on certain steps which had been
taken to get necessary intelligence to the operational commanders.
During this meeting, a CIA Current Intelligence Memorandum on
"Evidence of a Soviet Military Commitment to Defend Cuba" was
distributed as requested at the meeting of the preceding
day.
94. The 20 October meeting began with the usual NPIC brief-
ing. The Chairman then raised a question about the Joint Evaluation
dated 19 October, particularly with reference to the assumption that
nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba to support the operational
missile capability as it becomes available. He pointed out that
this raised a problem for the policy makers. After discussion
which generally agreed that this assumption constituted a logical
appraisal, the USIB approved the Joint Evaluation for presentation
to the principals. This evaluation noted than an additional Soviet
MRBM regiment was deployed east of Havana, and that two fixed
sites being constructed near Havana were believed to be for the
2200-nm IRBM. The Board then considered a memorandum from
COMOR recommending, with a State Department dissent, that the
present schedule for satellite reconnaissance be reaffirmed. After
discussion, the USIB requested the Chairman, COMOR, to consult
with the NRO as to whether any other vehicles could be made
available for satellite reconnaissance missions. Later in the
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meeting, the Chairman of COMOR reported that no other vehicles
could be made available from a practical viewpoint. As suggested
by the Acting Chairman, the Critical Collection Problems
Committee (CCPC) was requested to study and recommend means
to maximize intelligence collection capabilities worldwide in this
critical situation. The Board then had a thorough discussion of a
new draft SNIE 11-19-62 on "Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses
of Action". After a new draft had been prepared, the USIB
approved as amended SNIE 11-19-62, making clear that it was a
slightly revised and updated version of SNIE 11-18 -62 approved the
preceding day. The principal changes were in a new section on the
status of the buildup, and a revised statement that, under any form
of blockade, the Soviets would concentrate on political exploitation
especially in the UN. They might however risk violent encounters
to penetrate the blockade and, if the US used force for the
blockade, the Soviets might respond but seek to avoid escalation.
95. In the 21 October meeting after the usual NPIC
briefing reported that 72 per cent of Cuba had been covered,
the Chairman in executive session reported on the discussion at
the meetings of the principals on the preceding day, including the
current status of plans to deal with the Cuban situation. He also
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explained the arrangements for briefings of allied nations. The
Chairman suggested that the USIB consider preparing an estimate
on the consequences of US strikes against the ballistic missiles
and IL-28's in Cuba. After the DCI had to leave for a meeting of
the principals, the Board discussed the subject of the proposed
estimate as well as the consequences of other possible US actions,
but after this USIB meeting the request for this estimate was
cancelled. USIB then discussed possible changes in a Supplement
to the Joint Evaluation, dated 20 October, as guidance in the
preparation of the next daily supplement. These changes concerned
the conclusion that the apparent Soviet objective to rapidly achieve
full operational capability for their MRBM and IRBM requirements
rather than to achieve immediate operational capability at each site
as missiles and equipment arrived, might be very significant to
planners judging various Soviet courses of action.
96. The USIB also discussed and approved, subject to certain
amendments and specific timing, the recommendations in a memo-
randum from CCPC on "Crisis Collection Recommendations. "
Dr. Scoville, DD/R, CIA, was to communicate to NRO the USIB
actions regarding the scheduling of satellite reconnaissance
vehicles, while the Chairman of CCPC was to follow up on the
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other approved CCPC recommendations.
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97. After discussion of the need for a sanitized version of
the "Evaluation of Offensive Threat in Cuba" for use in briefing
authorized personnel, such as allied officials, and a recess to
prepare it, the USIB approved such a sanitized version to be issued
as a CIA Intelligence Memorandum. Prior to the conclusion of the
meeting, General Carter read a one-page Special Watch Report No.
637A, containing a review of the Soviet Bloc military situation in
the light of developments in Cuba. The USIB noted and concurred
in this report, which had a 26 -page NIC compilation attached. This
Watch Report concluded that there was no evidence of (a) exceptional
measures by Soviet Bloc forces to increase general operational
readiness, (b) significant prepositioning or deployment of long-range
air and submarine strike forces although these could be initiated
suddenly, or (c) alerting of Soviet military forces. It noted a
continuing buildup of combat air strength in the European Satellites
but no significant ground force reinforcement of that area. It also
noted that the annual training cycle of Soviet Bloc forces reached a
climax late in the fall, and that there was a gradual but steady trend since
January toward improvement of Bloc military capabilities generally
and particularly those in the East European forward area.
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98. The 22 October meeting began with the Chairman
reporting to the Board on policy decisions which had been
reached in meetings of the principals, and the plans for a public
announcement by the President at 1900 hours on that date. The
DCI then consulted with and obtained the advice of the USIB
members, in anticipation of his further participation in meetings
of the principals to draft the Presidential announcement. Prior
to leaving for such a meeting, the DCI stated that no
photography should be identified with the U-2, but should be
discussed in general terms such as "the information derived from
military reconnaissance. "
99. Mr. Hilsman, the State Department USIB member,
then explained to the Board the arrangements for briefing representa-
tives of the Organization. of American States and of NATO prior to
the President's announcement, and certain neutral countries
following the President's announcement. The USIB discussed the
intelligence aspects of briefings on the Cuban situation of other
foreign governments and of the press, and agreed that:
(a) The sanitized Top Secret Evaluation approved the previous day
should be distributed to USIB members for use along the lines discussed
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in the meeting, subject to identification as PSALM and deletion
of the words "Background Use, Only" on the covers.
(b) State, in consultation with DD/I, should prepare a
further sanitized version of the Evaluation which could be used in
connection with briefings of the press and for similar purposes.
100. After noting Supplement 2 dated 21 October which
identified another IRBM regiment at Remedios, the USIB agreed
that the Joint Evaluation by GMAIC, JAEIC and NPIC should
continue to be prepared on a daily basis for the time being and
distributed to the USIB member agencies without Board review.
Mr. Cline asked for advice in answer to a question as to whether
there was any evidence that during the next 48 hours there might
be a substantial increase in Soviet capabilities in Cuba. The
consensus of USIB members was that there was no current evidence
to that effect. Following a current briefing by NPIC, the Board
discussed briefly, without attempting to reach a consensus, whether
the Cuban situation indicated a basic change in Soviet policy or in
the USIB appraisal thereof. The Board then agreed that the next
USIB meeting should be on the call of the Chairman rather than
regularly at 0830 each day as during the past few days.
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101. President Kennedy made his momentous
announcement to the American people on the Soviet Arms
Buildup in Cuba by radio and television at 1900 hours on
22 October 1962. He stated that he had directed the following
initial steps to be taken immediately: (a) a strict quarantine on
all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba, (b)
continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military
buildup (c) a policy to regard any nuclear missile launched from
Cuba against any Western Hemisphere nation as an attack by the
Soviet Union on the U. S. requiring full retaliatory response
against the USSR, (d) reinforcement of the Guantanamo base,
(e) calling an immediate meeting of the Organization of American
States to consider the threat to hemispheric security and to invoke
the Rico Treaty, (f) asking for an emergency meeting of the U. N.
Security Council to take action against the Soviet threat, with a
U. S. resolution calling for prompt dismantling and withdrawal of
all offensive weapons in Cuba under supervision of U. N. observers
before lifting the quarantine, and (g) calling upon Khrushchev to halt
and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to
world peace and stable relations between our two nations, as well
as abandoning this course of world domination and joining in an
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historic effort to end the arms race and transform the history
of man. An exchange of messages between the President and
Khruschev on 26, 27 and 28 October led to the latter's agreement
to order that the weapons "you regard as offensive" be dismantled,
crated and returned to the USSR under agreements "to enable U.N.
representatives to verify the dismantling of these means. " 202/
102. Meanwhile the USIB had held a regular USIB meeting
on 24 October which was solely concerned with developments related
to the Cuban crisis. The Board first approved a Special Daily
Watch Report which concluded that the Soviet Union in the past
several days had taken steps to bring its military forces to an
increased state of readiness. There were indications of prepara-
tions to deploy some Long Range Aviation bombers to Arctic bases
but no major redeployment of other Soviet Bloc forces had so far
been noted. There were tenuous indications of impending troop
movements into the East European area, and Bloc forces in the
Berlin area were in a high state of readiness. Almost all Soviet
merchant ships e nroute to Cuba
but so far no indications that any were altering their
courses to Cuba had been noted. There was some evidence that
3 or more Soviet long range attack submarines were on patrol near
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Soviet merchant shipping routes to Cuba. The Board then
noted a report by the Chairman that the Watch Committee would
meet each day at 0800 to prepare a Special Watch Report for
presentation to the NSC Executive Committee at 1000. Rather
than requiring USIB approval every day, each USIB member was to
arrange that his Watch Committee member be able generally to
represent his principal, subject to any Board member registering
a dissent if desired by advising Mr. McCone's Office prior to the
NSC Executive Committee Meeting. General Carter, as Chairman
of the Watch Committee, called attention of Board Members to the
"Recommended List of Key Indiators for All-Source Priority
Reporting" distributed by memorandum for the Watch Committee,
dated 23 October 1962. The Chairman said that he planned to
keep other USIB members informed immediately of current
developments, and requested all members to do likewise since
every agency was involved in the present situation, and it was
essential that the entire Community stay closely tied together.
103. After discussion USIB agreed that the Top Secret
"Evaluation of Offensive Threat in Cuba" should now be downgraded
to Secret, so that the information in it could be used to meet such
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63 estimate. The Board also amended and approved a COMOR
proposal that, in view of the public disclosure of such overflights
and information. derived therefrom, aerial overflight photography of
Cuba henceforth acquired be classified SECRET and handled outside
the TALENT control system, and that such photography previously
acquired be similarly downgraded and removed from the TALENT
system. The Board also approved that the following information be
authorized for public release by the USIB:
Release limited number of pictures both high
and low level on basis that surveillance is now overt
and no longer covert.
Release the number of sites and launchers by
order of magnitude - 8 to 10 bases of about 4 launchers
more or less per base - located at San Cristobal,
Sagua La Grande, Guanajay and Remedios.
Reports from all intelligence sources confirm
that at least 30 missiles are present in Cuba - this
evidence is undeniable. More than 20 IL-28's.
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Personnel, at least 5, 000, are in Cuba -
the exact numbers cannot be determined because
personnel have entered on a number of ships and
aircraft.
104. Distributed for information at this meeting were Supple-
ment 4 to the Joint Evaluation by GMAIC, JAEIC and NPIC, as well as
a memorandum from the Director of NSA describing additional actions
taken or planned by NSA to improve SIGINT posture. The Supplement
noted that 2 MRBM sites were estimated to achieve full operational
capability on 25 October instead of 22 October as previously estimated.
No new missile sites had been identified, and no IRBMs per se had
yet been identified. No new intelligence had been received to modify
the nuclear storage situation.
105. At the end of this 24 October meeting it was agreed that
the next USIB meeting would be on call of the Chairman and the
Board then resumed its regular weekly meeting schedule.
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106. One of the most interesting and knowledgable postscripts
to the intelligence coverage of the Cuban crisis was contained in an
article written in the spring of 1964 by Sherman Kent who was Chair-
man of the Board of National Estimates during this period. The
following paragraphs quoted from that article give a summation of his
conclusions:
"As is quite apparent, the thrust of these
paragraphs [conclusions p. and d. of the 19 September
1962 SNIE quoted on page 1361 was that the Soviets would
be unlikely to introduce strategic offensive weapons
into Cuba. There is no blinking the fact that
we came down on the wrong side. When the
photographic evidence of 14 October was in,
there was the proof.
"On 15 October we realized that our esti-
mate of the Soviets' understanding of the mood
of the United States and its probable reaction
was wrong. On 28 October we realized that
the Soviets had realized they had misjudged the
United States. In between we verified that our
own feeling for the mood of the United States
and its probable reaction had been correct. In
a way our misestimate of Soviet intentions got
an ex post facto validation.
"It is tempting to hope that some research
together with new requirements served on our own
intelligence services, might turn up new insights
into the Soviet process of decision-making. The
odds are pretty strongly against it; and yet the-
to us-incredible wrongness of the Soviet decision
to put the missiles into Cuba all but compels an
attempt to find out. Any light that can be thrown on
that particular decision might lessen the chances
of our misestimating the Soviets in a future case."
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107. The ultimate official postscript to the efforts of
the intelligence community during this Cuban crisis was the
following letter from President Kennedy to the Chairman of USIB
dated 9 January 1963, and presented by Mr. McCone to Board
members at the 23 January meeting together with his own letter
of appreciation:
"I wish to express to you, the members of
the United States Intelligence Board, and to the
individual members of the intelligence agencies my
deep and sincere appreciation for your outstanding
service to our Nation - - and the Free World --
during the recent international crisis.
"In the course of the past few months I have
had occasion to again observe the extraordinary
accomplishments of our intelligence community,
and I have been singularly impressed with the
overall professional excellence, selfless devotion
to duty, resourcefulness and initiative manifested
in the work of this group. The fact that we had
timely and accurate information, skillfully analyzed
and clearly presented, to guide us in our judgments
during this crisis is, I believe, the greatest
tribute to the effectiveness of these individuals and
agencies. The magnitude of their contribution' can
be measured, in part, by the fact that the peace
was sustained during a most critical time.
"It is, of course, a great source of strength
to me to know that we have such dedicated and skilled
men and women in the service of our Nation in these
times of peril. Although I cannot personally commend
each member of the intelligence community for their
individual efforts, I would like you to convey to them,
through the members of the United States Intelligence
Board, my personal word of commendation, my deep
admiration for their achievements, and the appreciation
of a greatful Nation." 203/
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