TRANSLATION OF NORTH KOREAN NEWSPAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S01540R002700070006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 11, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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`L
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.B. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY Korea
SUBJECT Translations of North Korean
Newspapers
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 11 September 1953
NO. OF PAGES 1
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
STATE ARMY NAVY AIR I IFBI AEC OCD I x
(Note: ' Washington DhNribMhin Indicated by "X"; Field Distribelion IV "#".) Forrl 1-.9. 51-61, January 1953
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STAT
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RESTRICTS
SECURITY INFORMATION
Tile' CtIU!'L}.'NT POLITIC,' J, TV G lN NO'tT:{ .KoorC'A
The curr?.ntr T ol.iti ai pur ye c,in:? on in ', Tort i; Koreas t.h : rst:
since the Con r-iAnis? ?egimee was established,, it a direct out-
growth o:' ri speech ?ieli.vered by KIM ?.L sung to the fi:f~., meeting r' t
Cen.tr l Committee of the t1K Lal-)or Party in Pyong3ra,ng on 22 Uecer-be:? 1:'+
The speech is quoted in _Lts entirety below;
" ~a must strengthen our nartyf loyalty, ani f : ght against
trend , f lihenaiism
"=arty . oya1ty I mean that every Party .:neriber should ?r,:a } owidieas1v =.oy l
to Lh Part ue active in the works of the Party, know he advantagen
of re-,!r;L. tion, eairifiee his own per sona._ advantages, ma~-TIta i.r1 thf:
pr i nci :;:1fes and advantages of the Party, fight a4 ipacti.3u r oe and fa .sc
thoug A.sn keep firm the rul,sq C-- ~A2f of the Part!1', a'pl ~',,hhen
the ti.cr hetween ..ho. Party a.i tie pt . u"'.~. it- r th Part. j- me,nber c to
poJse6:,ets t.hes3 qual.i_ties can ire ca' Le ;1 '# jeemb~3r firmly .tnral to the .' rty.,
These qualitie3 are the measure by which ire appraise Party loyalty ahct
Party .a ti it,udes of every me?nber' in our Paz-i,y?
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1
"i` uRITy INFORMATION
"But still there are many members in our P,: rty who Zak 'arty
loyalty and immerse themselves in a put.rifying atmosphf r a . tiher n,1n eir
of this sort are employed in responsible posts it the 1;overnment o:? .;7ar..y,
they will be blind to the. Party. and revolutionary work, in their p:.r u`~J.
of material benefits. They will make people leave the Party ati i
national crimes, drunken by their avarice,,. Even in th.s critical ;sc,,en6
in our listory, there are many leasers who do not faithfully acccompL sh
their Party work and do-not see and correct their mistakes, There a:e
many who complain about everything ,,. arid' even gather in groups to gossip
and exonange complaints. There are others who dc not offer their
in Party meetings but criticize the decisions of the Party secretly.
"There are many who do not follow the decisions of the Party
but think their own opinions are best, There are many who only talk and
prattle: not heeding the rules of the Party organization,. There are also
hermit nembers who have no interests in Party work but care only for their
safety, There are members who do not want to bear responsibility for
their work and who do not have the ability to accomplish anything great or
small, trusting, only our pa=st revolutionary history., The evil of implicitly
ignoring; and not fighting the defects and' mistakes of one's kin., friends,
or fellow citizens can be foand everywhere,, All these are the eeca:.s of
liberal:.smo These liberals are people without Party loyalty whose: V,Dt:tp bts
tnvariatly come from petty bourgeo::.rs egoism and end in the pursuit- oa their
own benefits? ?^'e must fight these liberal trends s uror ;; 711
"It is a common saying that there are no seta`s in our
but we cannot deny the fact that there, still remain re=,fi4ues of se ,t ;~~a ?_ni~
sm. Th:.s sectarianism. impa.:ir?s the unity and 3olidaritt5 of our "ar;y "I t
expresses itself in the following t;t anne=:_? ; members who have cont irrie ' t:1: ei r
unprincipled sectariar fighting, arili meribers who have ?-rudges a,xairts t'.e
Party oMaing to discontent about their jobs and Party ptnishment,, gro,,aa
topethe?+? and entice members with relat.i rely bad backgrounds into the .r H,roup
by~ telling them that they are not ?t rusted by the Party,. The sectarians
pay attention only to matters concernir_ - - , ee enkployrrte;:tt and d.ispoeit?ion
of workors0 They try to recommend' and tie e only their friends in the Party
and government, whatever their ability, background, ideological prog'0esc:},
or Party loyalty might. he,, They even try to recommend those who may ',ir:der
the revolutionary movement:, Therefore,, those who are not employed beeeaitse
of their unfavorable revolutionary background do not seek to improve them-
selves by strengthening their Party loyalty, but follow after those {ec:t,ari-
ans who may o?ive them ,jobs,, Taking advantage of these followers, me;ribers
who can not cast out their sectarian traits gather then -.:nier wing t~~
utilize them
"In or er to make safe the i ^ posts ir the ,overltme+trt or ''ari.y,
these y-3ctari.ans conceal each otherU s wrongdoing and beast vaingloriously
and praise es.ch other.. Some of them even try to benef`.;.t themselves by
playing off one employe against another, taking advan ya.':e of the cons t,an
difference of opinions an'. enmity amcne, the empl.eye:. ? If we leave t?hes,3
actions of the sectarians au they are, these actions will eventually grow
intc email group movement e
- ED
~ 1
[ + ;_
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1X"3iRIC1ED
"UR1TY 1NFoRM
AT/pu
'e must fight also another kind oi' sectarian express on; namely
those who wear masks of obedient demeanor to the Party line outside, bra;
really blame the Party line in secret. We must also fight against. thos,~
who flatter the Party but are dreaming other things in their hearts, 1 iay$
we can x}o longer ignore the present. er of these people,. It is best, to c aafess
frankly in. front of our Party and cease these anti-Party actions. 'i e n ist
watch their actions closely by stressing Party loyalty and revoluticrtar;r
alertness of all Party members, and prevent any move by these sectarian3,
In this day, when we are fighting a severe war with American and Pritis..i ag-
gressors, these sectarian actions cannot be pardoned, We cannot be blind to
the fact that. these remaining sectarians will eventually become enemy :gyp 1as
as the experience of the democratic people's republics rnd our brother
parties have taught us.
"There is also a trend among a,few members to trust individuals
rather than to trust the Party by ascertaining the accuracy of the Part;:-
line and the Party organization. These trends give hero-worshippers a
chance. In_or4er to eliminate these evil tendencies, we must firmly enforce
the principle of $Democratic Centralism' inside the Party by strengthening the
organization rules and building up firm Party loyalty among all Party members,
(The concept of !'Democratic Centralism" is a product of Bolshevism whic"i
seeks to combine democracy -- mass participation - with the centralism --
leadership -a of the Party, Ed.) Only by a perfect unity of the entire
party, accomplishe?i through the enforcement of the principle which says
that individuals must submit to the Party, minorities to majorities, lower,
organizations to higher ones, and the whole Party to the center, -- can we
expect to coin this lon;! and hard war for liberty and independence, Tha
most important characteristic of Party loyalty is the adherence to this
principle and non-compromise with every expression of those trends whica
breed enemy ideas in to-us. Therefore, by appraising the Party loyalty of
ever! leader in the Party, government, and army, we show our Bolshevik
adherence to the principle of 'Democratic Centralism,"
These words of KIM Il-song were an omen that the greatest ,
political purge in the history of North Korean Communist regime was on the
way.
South Korea's Chungang Illboo (The Central Daily News) (0022/
1+35/24'0/1032) stated the following in its article of 5 June 1953a "Puppet
'3tronaAo14 39 Collapsin
"/accordln z to news from North Korean refugees in Pu,an, the :?ecent
struigles for power, inside the North Korean-puppet regime are becomjpg
and more severe. The purge of PAK Hon -Yong (2613/2009/3057) ex-viaq?.pt4mjer
and ex Minister of Foreign. Affairs, an n ther important 1Radere and
- i'
,i. ^,C?.'ATr,. 3
r r l t
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SECURITY IAITA
i'? i"c3C men, is increa.stnr in its : once ii , who was one a," the
car =,in ,1ze9?9 of the Korean Communist Party 20 ye,afp iqp r,i the hea i of the
)o,.th K-o4?ean Labor Party before escrpina into I '$,iiore,a, 'was d~smiss'~d
fr its cabinet post and punished by the 1,abr r' ?Arty at the he,pinnin:~; of
C'I-:'tl Yon?-ha (2612/1360/3109) who was 4r, lporprre11 from the import ir:t
co,t ambassador to U.". .f . to the positit `p . Vice-:.inister of Com tuni.--
c:rt.iaris because of an anti-Soviet statement ~~o Korean sturients, was
1i.snisse.:t from the Party and removed from of~~ce,
'fI Sun'-yop (2621/2110/9756), jqho was mayor of Seoul during
the North Korean occupation in 1950 and was later NK Minister of Just.-,ce,
was also djemissel from the Party and removeri 'as head of the Office of People {. s
Inspection. He is believed to have been talon prisoner when he attem,,teri
to escape to South Korea, Among cultured me, more than 20 noted writers
were par,ved becxise their works were 'reactignarv'm Their writing is said
to have been remover-1 from textbonks, These purged writers include
vI Tao-chun (2621/3141/0193) and YIM Hwa (2651/0735), according to an article
r ihlishe,i in Norlonr 3inmun (Labor' News) (0525/3047/2450/5113) o
"Some people say this purge was ca'ised by the fight for rower
within the puppet regime revolving around the truce problem. The fight for
supremacy is between the pro.-Soviet group, which demands the continuance of
thf' war,, and the pro-Red China group, which wants a truce, The jingo . t;,
are le l by HO Ka-i (6079/ - / -), Vice-Premier and Chief Secretary of the
NK Labor Party The truce advocates are led by-Deputy Co odor of the ILK
People's Array, 'HOE Yong-kon (1508/1661/0256), a member of the Yena1 16?3/
1344) (Pr'o-Red China) group? He was recently promoted to the-, rank ,)f
vice-raar,sha11., 3y usinr, his powerful position, HO Kai--L at one time 'ad
the pe'sonal loyalty of the :Soviet Koreans and was the strongest power in
North Korean politics, ever, maneuvering KIM I1=sung. But as the agrr~ ssi_ve
war fail,ii, the members of the Yenan group, with their close ties to 'ed
China, bt gan to oppress the pro-Soviet group and tried to usurp its leader-
ship. This brow'%ht violent unrest to the whole ?TK regime,
"In the confusion, the domestic group led by PAK Hon-your
tried to enlarge its power by playing off one group against another,
outwardly assuming a neutral attitude., This was their undoing, howevr.r
for it was they who received the. first blow of the purge. Thus not oily
the orthodox NK Communist Party members but also the Communist fugiti\.es
from South Korea, including politicians like HONG Myong-hui (3163/073CC`/
3588) an i YI Kuk-no (2621/0344/7627), and writers like HAN Sol-yr& (72,11/
7105/6351) and YI Ki-yong (2521/4614/305'7), are in a stale of panic an-l
fear for their, safety,
':In the fall. of 1952, the Ministry of Polivicni Security
(2393/31'L2/02002/5g98/6752) was annexed t* like Ministry of Int:eAor a.r 1,-i
Political l Security 's'inister PAK I1-u (2613/0001/1342) was replaced by -b
new Interior Minister, PANG Hoak-se (2.,455/1331/0013), That a.,,:t was the e.asc
move ;,r the pro-Soviet group to gain power in the NK Labor Party and r..he
s{. -ret. police by changing cabinet posts, After, the success of their
they s_ntende i to overthrow the pro -Red China gro,p:, To, guar(
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SECURITY Ih'EUMATION
a ;air st this, the Yenan group ? npoin:.ed the Chairrar, of the Supreme T'-=opie's ?
Assemb1', KIM Tu-ponp; (6955/2122/1144), as its nominal chief an, tr+ -:gthene3
the army unie:r the CHO Yong-kon0s controls By pushing ,i1jE C', W- I 150g/
2410/4115) into the posts of Vice-Premier and Pinist e r o+' the they
attempted to det control of fiscal matters.
'It is vary interesting to guess which side in the .3t s Y e
between, the pro - o,u,-l t group, with its control of the Party and pr....., ?,
and the pro-Red China group, with its control of the army, will cgrr.4 :7uc
victorious.' Considering the occupation of North Korea by the Red`:4fiaess
Army ,anrt the evidence of Russia's commitment of Korean problems to d
Chinese hands, it is almost certain that the Yenan group will-win, Moreover,
if there is a truce, the power groups in the NK puppet army will ~.y+ a big
pat in rebuilding the political. system of North Korea, This wou .;4,'lead
to the downfall of the jingoistic pro-Soviet group. It is said thjx the
direct cause of the downfall of PAK Hon-,gong is the crime of acquie,cence
to the 'reactionary acts' of TI Sung-yop,"
It is difficu:ll to obtain accurate information on the r-:cerit
0
forth Korean purge because of . t: sufficient source material. But here a`
least an outline of it taken from a few North Korean publications, The 12
February 1955 issue of Minchu Cho son (Democratic Korea! published the
letters exchanged by the NK Minister of Foreign Affairs PAK Hon-yonq, and
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indo-Chinese 9enocr.~,.tic Republic
(presumably the "let Minh forces,. -- Ed.) I IRWANG Myong--kam; celebrating{ the
third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relationship between
the two Communist regimes:,
In an article in the 23 February 1953 Minchu Ch son wri,.,ten
about the commemorative meeting celebraa.ng the 35th anniversary of the
Soviet Red Army in P.vongang the names of Vice-Premier PAK Hon-yong and.
Secretary of the Central Committee of Korean Labor Party YI lung-yo-:"
appeared as members of the meetings top executive group,
The 13 March 1953 Non m' Sinmun (Farmer's,'lewspaper) published
A Korean Central News Agen~;y dispatch about the v!aite to the Soviet
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JlLll R
? Embassy male by the leaders of h~eIE~~v and government at the
time of ;italin~s death. The news included the names of Marshal KIM 11-sung;
the Chairman of the 3tandinn Committee of the Supreme Peoples Assembly
KIM Tu-pong; the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party
PAK Chung-ae (2613/2973/'1947); Vice-Premier HO Ka-i; the Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Korean labor Party PAK Chang-ok (2613/2490/3768);
and others, But the names of PAK Hon-yonp, and TI Sung-yop did not appear
In an article about visits to the Czechoslovakian Legation made
by leaders of the government and Party at the time of Clement Gottwald's
death, the names of PAK Hon *ong and vI Sung-yop did not appe+ro That
article was from a Korean Central News Agency dispatch of 15 March 1953
from Pvongyang, and included the names of the Secretary of the, Central
Committee of Korean Labor Party PAK Chang-ok, Vice-Premier. CHOE Chang-ik
(15OR/2490/4135), and others.
In the 4 April 1953 Minchu Choson,, a congratulatory letter
about the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary sent to the
Hungarian Foreign Minister, MOLLA- Elie, was signed by NK Vice-Minister of
Foreign Affairs YI Tong-kon.
There is no material which completely confirms the purge of
PAK Hon-Yong. But it is believed that he was purged during the latter
part of, February or early March, 1953. The fact that his name has die-
appeared from articles and documents where it should appear, and the
dates of the aforementioned newspapers, support our view.
In an article entitled "The Decision of the Education Members
of the Hwanehae Province Labor Party," published in the 1 April 1953 issue of
the NK Hwanahae Ilbo (Hwanghae Daily News), the fullowinv statement was
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thJRJCJED
~)L.UKITY INFORMATION
";Ile shall our very best in order to realize gloriously the
-re~,'7age of Cr ade KIM. -sung, in which he stressed the streegt.hening of Par-
ty 'Loyalty an4 t}' tight again, the liberal -trend and the l idues of
see ",arianism? Diet ! 14prese t%ing * teachers i
+~} 41l&nts in hwanghae
S'c ,since we impeach with 16s-#t "j#t lr.ahd ftn thft@ Lr-itorous dogs,
'fl` hwa :. `'I 'iae-shun, KIM iv ar ~ C'M:1 (6855/0589/ 1131) , PA K Chan-mo (261V6363/
?1 ' Ion--cho (2621/32c3/260o) , CHOE Mvong-ik (1.50,1,!2491+/50,42 )
PA!' Tae-won (2613/3141/667c), KIP3Sun-nam (055/7311/009), and others who
have committee vicious acts by instilling reactionary and bourgeois ideas
into the ileol ogical front. We shall patiently and firmly continue our
fi.p.ht to eradicate the vicious ideoloFrical :influences which they gave to the
thoughts of our teachers and innocent and simple students"
An article entitled "A Few Problems in the Progress of the General
Meeting of the Fifth General Assembly of the Party Central Committee" which
?a:> printed' .n the 2 April 1953 `iwanghae Ilbo, contained the following".
`,~fe must inform every member how harmful'to our Party and to
C11), ideological strengthening are the cowardly and sectarian acts of a few
:er;,arians such as C'FRI YonP-ha, YIM Hwa, KIN, Nam-chon, and CIi0 I1-myonp..,
lust fight to :prevent the slinhtest move of the sectarian elements in
cu.? Party by strictly guarding, against their actions with greater revolu-
ci ary alertness and Party loyalty",,
The purge of KIy Hyon-, and S0 Sun==ku along with YIN Hera and
Nam- chon can :)e surmised from the article entitledi "The Meeting of
,1r-hae Province writers and Artists on 25 February 1953", which was
,?111" . Ash4'ci in the 5 March 1953 Hwanizhae Ilboj. and from the decision made
at ',Iie meeting,
Those who appeared in Hwanghae blbo articles cf 71 an-i
Reh 'i;a r-v 195" were chiefly members of the former South Kore , n
'~ar?;y or the PAK Hon--prong groun and their friends, It car F,e presumed
1'r,_ ' i the date 6'{f` the decision ma,ie at the Eiwanghae Province writers and
rr S.sts meeting t'iat they were purged before PAK Hon-yong and "I -ong-yop.
It `:s certain that the group of former South Korean ~.,,'-cr
pay, .y rnemoers received a death blow oy this great purge of its h:.-7he'st
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~~ORITY INFORMATION
leaders such as PAK Hon-yong and "I Sung-drop, and its rxainstay of writer-3,..
The detailed reasons of the purge are obscure becau;se o' tha in--suffi.ciani.-y of
source materials. However, it, is certain that KIM Il-sung r s `'Fi; r:t ,gipdn;t
the Liberal Trends and the Residues of Sectar .aniam" wa:a directed at
former South Korey-in Labor Party menters, This purge was instigated r he
pro- "oviet, group which has KIM II-sunk at its heado It has been a l.c'
time .9-nee this group of former South Korean Labor Party members has ;.ot
been obedient to the Bolshevik line and policies of of he prop-,,;oviet
group, The iisvontent and disaffection of the former South Korear
Labor Party members toward the Soviet group? s high-handed arbit.rarine ;as
about important matters in the Party and government dee->-rootei,, It :;,q
not difficult to see that the trend of overtly expr%ssa g their discs; t?lt
and disaffect on and their desire to enlarge ;heir powe- must have irt.r ised
due to the loosened rules, disorder rani confu ;ion the "temporary retr:. at'"
in 950.s5la This must have offered reascr fo ? the vro--~cviet group to
purge them.,
Recently a South Korean newspaper puhlishe:i an artiddI.e
statin,T that eseveral people in South Korea had contactel ani conspire;' with
th:~ North. Korean Communists to establish a coalition cabinet,
some of these people escaped to North Kore:j and some wer
arrested when the conspiracy was disco?vr rei by ROK F.poli,:e author'itie
(A?uathar has forgotten name and date of newspaper,, - Ed,) It is highly
probable that the partner of these ?onspirato?s in tlort Korea was
Yl Surrguyop. he was Me of the hie i-est offic:ial* of thv South Korean Labor
Party-,
of of the NK Labor Party's Department for Lia3ion with Soutl, Aprea,
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S`~UR
.
IFE?RM~TI
an~i Chairman of Seoul people vs Committee when h2Nenemy occupied Seoul If
he contacted the conspirators of South Korea, it must a been after discuss
ions'with PAX Hon=yonp aria under the direction of the KIM Il-sung group,
'Whether these North-South discussions were only a means for espionar?e auai_nst
the political movements of South Korea or whether it was rea1]7 intended to
establish a coalition cabinet is unknown, At any rate, the conspiracy was
discovered ani KIM-I1-sung group blamed PAK Hon-Yong and Yi Sung-yop
It seems logical that the pro-Soviet group, under Russian
control, should continue the wars and that the Yenan group, with its ciosa
ties with Red Chinas shoul:i, want an armistice, But that they should fight
each other about the problem of an armistice is unlikelyy, ?t is also dou',tfui,
that CHOP, Yong-kon is leaiinr the truce-supportinrp group and that the er:an
group controls the NK People's Arn,r throurth him. CHOE Yong.kon was in
Russia for three or four years after his long guerrilla war against thtt
Japanese in eastern Maanyhuria, In Rxssia, he received his education t.'pe.-
ther with KIM II-sung' who fought in southern Manchur$arid KIMChaek "8i i5/
.5/
4595), who fought in northern Manchuria against the Japanese. Thus i! is
more likely that CHOE Yong?kon is allied with KIM Il-sung rather than ,;ith
the Yenan group, His close alliance with the pro-Soviet group i:r evident
from the fact that when KIM'Il-sung was made-,a marshal, he was promote