HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON NOMINATION OF ROBERT M. GATES TO BE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301220049-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 10, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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59-941 0 ? WASHINGTON : 1986
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office r
? U.S. Government Printing Office. Washingtoa, DC 20492
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C.4 ',VI' 4144J '4 .444 4
- CONTENTS
THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1986
Opening statement of Chairman Durenberger
Opening statement of Vice Chairman Leahy
Importance of Intelligence
Statement of Senator Warner, a U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia
Statement of Senator Hecht
Opening statement of Senator Specter ?
Opening statement of Senator Cohen
Opening statement of Senator McConnell
Background questionnaire
Financial disclosure report
Office of Government Ethics: Letter to Chairman Durenberger from David H.
Martin, Director
Letter to Dave? Durenberger, chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence from Lee H. Hamilton, chairman, House Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence
Statement of Robert M. Gates, Nominee to be Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
Congressional oversight
Intelligence Improvement Measures
. Future Intelligence Demands
Agency's Responsibility To Congress
Policymakers Consumers of Intelligence
Leaks
Inaccurate or Incomplete Information
Foreign Policy in Regional Conflicts
Covert Action Policy
Right Question, Espionage, Intelligence Structure
Intelligence, Academe
Analysis
Statement of Senator Murkowski
Intelligence Umbrella
Yurchenko
Statement of Senator Boren
? Intelligence Duplication, Coordination
Mission of operation?Trustworthy Information
Statement of Senator Nunn
Disclosing Information
Defector Program
Intelligence Budget
? Committee Vote
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD
Opening statement of Senator Nunn
Questions to Mr. Gates with answers
CIA and the University: Speech by Robert M. Gates at Harvard University
The Soviet Threat: A CIA paper by Robert M. Gates
Is the CIA's Analysis Any Good?: Washington Post article by Robert M. Gates
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tion Act. Oversight has created an environment that fosters adher-
ence to the rules at all levels and discourages corner cutting or
abuses. The committees have contributed to improving the quality
of our work and to efficiency. And, finally, the congressional com-
mittees and executive oversight organizations such as the Intelli-
gence Oversight Board and the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board should give Americans confidence that their intelli-
gence service is accountable, carries out its activities according to
the law and that we are guided by standards and values acceptable
to them.
The relationship between the congressional oversight committees
and the intelligence community is unique in the world?the first
attempt ever to conduct secret intelligence operations accountable
to the people and responsible to the law and to the Congress. While
the oversight process may occasionally lead to frictions in the gray
area resulting from the overlap between congressional authorities
and the duties of the executive, it has been the practice of both
branches of Government for 10 years now to try to resolve such dif-
ficulties in a spirit of comity and mutual understanding. This
unique relationship between us depends on mutual trust, candor,
and respect and I assure you I intend to conduct myself with this
in mind.
INTELLIGENCE IMPROVEMENT MEASURES
Twenty years have elapsed since I began my intelligence career
as an Air Force intelligence officer with a Minuteman missile
wing. You have before you the details of my career which I will not
repeat. There are three features, however, perhaps worth noting.
First, I've always believed that no matter how good U.S. intelli-
gence is?and it is in my view, quite good?it can always be im-
proved. I somewhat presumptuously first expressed dissatisfaction
with and suggested improvements in our analytical work on the
Soviet Union in an article published a short time after I joined the
Agency. Throughout my career, culminating in my present posi-
tion, I have endeavored to improve the quality of our work?its
substance, relevance and responsiveness to our leaders' needs. Be-
cause intelligence is secret and our Agency is closed to public scru-
tiny, I believe we must take the initiative to reach out to policy-
makers, the Congress, the private sector, and critics and experts of
all stripes for help in improving the substance of our work, our effi-
ciency and our effectiveness.
Second, I have spent a significant part of my career trying to
build a dialog between those of us in intelligence and the policy-
makers we serve. Intelligence must be relevant, timely, and respon-
sive to the real requirements of the policymaker if it is to be useful
and effective. And relevance can be insured only by a close, day to
day, working relationship. At the same time, intelligence must
remain independent. Our very existence depends upon a reputation
for integrity and for objectivity. Splendidly isolated, our independ-
ence is guaranteed but so is our irrelvance. While daily engage-
ment with the policymaker requires constant vigilance and sound
judgment to maintain our objectivity, this is the arena where we
must operate. This constant contact is imperative.
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environment that fosters adher-
discourages corner cutting or
ibuted to improving the quality
, finally, the congressional corn-
ganizations such as the Intelli-
sident's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
ns confidence that their intelli-
.!s out its activities according to
standards and values acceptable
gressional oversight committees
. unique in the world?the first
elligence operations accountable
law and to the Congress. While
ally lead to frictions in the gray
itween congressional authorities
L has been the practice of both
rs now to try to resolve such dif-
id mutual understanding. This
Tends on mutual trust, candor,
end to conduct myself with this
'?/EMENT MEASURES
; I began my intelligence career
cer with a Minuteman missile
tils of my career which I will not
however, perhaps worth noting.
o matter how good U.S. intelli-
uite good?it can always be im-
,ty first expressed dissatisfaction
in our analytical work on the
a short time after I joined the
'ulminating in my present posi-
,T the quality of our work?its
eness to our leaders' needs. Be-
y Agency is closed to public scru-
nittative to reach out to policy-
'sector, and critics and experts of
e substance of our work, our effi-
p.it part of my career trying to
S in intelligence and the policy-
r be relevant, timely, and respon-
e policymaker if it is to be useful
e insured only by a close, day to
?e same time, intelligence must
tence depends upon a reputation
pi endidly isolated, our independ-
irrelvance. While daily engage-
:Ts constant vigilance and sound
city, this is the arena where we
t is imperative.
Third, my years on the National Security Council staff opened
my eyes to the enormous cost imposed on the effectiveness of Gov-
ernment?including intelligence?by bureaucratic parochialism?
turf battles. As Deputy Director for intelligence and Chairman of
the National Intelligence Council, I have worked to break down in-
stitutional barriers within CIA and within the intelligence commu-
nity. Only by cooperation and by combining the strengths of each
organization can we do our work effectively. The present harmony
that characterizes the American intelligence community is due in
significant measure to Director Casey's leadership in reducing
these barriers, and I look forward to helping him make further
progress in this area.
My career has been spent primarily on the overt side of CIA and,
specifically, at that point where the product of our vast collection
apparatus emerges in finished form to help warn and inform pol-
icymakers and to help them understand better a complex world.
The pace of change is accelerating; challenges to our security and
well being are multiplying; opportunities to promote our democrat-
ic values and to help others share our economic prosperity are in-
creasing. The contribution of intelligence in discerning and ex-
plaining these developments is becoming more vital.
FUTURE INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS
We are entering an era when demands on the intelligence com-
munity are reaching beyond traditional areas into new worlds in-
cluding terrorism, narcotics, technology transfer, the proliferation
of chemical and biological weapons, and many other problems. We
must find the resources to support these new efforts while continu-
ing to place major emphasis on the collection and analysis of coun-
tries hostile to the United States.
Thanks to the rebuilding of the last several years and a policy
community willing to work with us, the American intelligence com-
munity in my view has never been in finer shape. Good intelli-
gence is a wise and necessary investment. It can, and has, saved
billions of dollars for the Department of Defense through informa-
tion we acquire on Soviet weapons and military plans. Even more
important, in analyzing, penetrating, and countering the shadowy
worlds of terrorism, narcotics, subversion, and other problems, we
save lives and help protect the Nation. But this investment in in-
telligence cannot be turned on and off like a faucet. It takes years
to train a case officer or a good analyst, and often a decade or more
to build a new technical collection system. Quality intelligence re-
quires sustained support. We have come a long way back in recent
years, but the challenges are multiplying and a continuing invest-
ment is required. Here, the understanding and support of the
President and of the oversight committees have been invaluable.
In closing, a rare public hearing such as this requires acknowl-
edgement of the brave men and women of American intelligence,
military and civilian, who live and work in dangerous and inhospit-
able places overseas and under enormous pressures here at home.
With courage and dedication, they endure personal sacrifice, in-
credibly long hours, a cloak of secrecy about what they do that ex-
cludes even their families, a lack of privacy, and yet anonymity. As
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the President said to some of them in 1984, "the work you do each
day is essential to the survival and to the spread of human free-
dom. You remain the eyes and ears of the free world. You are the
tripwire." The Nation can be proud of its intelligence corps and, if
confirmed, I would be proud to serve with them as Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. While I'm some-
what unaccustomed to a public forum such as this, I would be
pleased to answer any questions that you or the members of the
committee may wish to ask.
The CHAIRMAN. I know from your record of public education and
public information that you have taken advantage of opportunities
to educate the public on the role of intelligence, and I think that
this effort will continue to be of greater value in your role as
Deputy Director.
I wish to confirm your statement on the quality of your predeces-
sors in this job; John McMahon and Bobby Inman. One of the
things they understood is that critique of the oversight process is
valuable from two perspectives. It isn't just congressional oversight
critiquing the intelligence community, but it is on occasion the
community critiquing the process of oversight. And I don't think
there is anyone here that objects to seeing that process continue, so
long as it is accomplished in the spirit that you described. Your
predecessors, I think, did it very well.
I would, by way of additional advice, suggest that you continue to
emulate them in that regard.
With respect to the process of intelligence, let me ask you a
couple of questions taken from your answers to questions in the
background and financial disclosure statement, about congressional
oversight of the community. At one point you say:
Accountability, particularly with respect to the law, relevant Executive orders.
guidelines, and regulations is, in my view, the fundamental purpose for oversight of
intelligence activities that, of necessity must be conducted out of the public eye.
Do I read that statement to mean that you believe there are
limits on oversight, and if so, how would you define those limits?
Mr. GATES. No, sir; I don't believe there are limits in the areas
that oversight should extend to. I stated that accountability was
the fundamental purposes. It is by no means the exclusive or the
only purpose. The deep involvement of the committees in the
budget process itself is testimony to the wide-ranging involvement
of the committees in both resources allocation and in effective
management in the Agency.
AGENCY'S RESPONSIBILITY TO CONGRESS
Additionally, the amount of finished intelligence that we provide
to both of the committees implicitly recognizes the importance of
the committees in judging the quality and effectiveness of the fin-
ished intelligence product as well. So I see the involvement of the
committees as very broad. I believe however that my reading of the
history of the oversight process suggests that one of the primary
motives in establishing it was the need for accountability.
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hem in 1984, "the work you do each
ri and to the spread of human free-
ears of the free world. You are the
:roud of its intelligence corps and, if
serve with them as Deputy Director
es my statement. While I'm some-
tic forum such as this, I would be
ms that you or the members of the
your record of public education and
:ye taken advantage of opportunities
ole of intelligence, and I think that
e of greater value in your role as
lent on the quality of your predeces-
-ton and Bobby Inman. One of the
critique of the oversight process is
. It isn't just congressional oversight
Thmunity, but it is on occasion the
"ass of oversight. And I don't think
ts to seeing that process continue, so
the spirit that you described. Your
well.
advice, suggest that you continue to
of intelligence, let me ask you a
. your answers to questions in the
sure statement, about congressional
one point you say:
ipect to the law, relevant Executive orders.
?w, the fundamental purpose for oversight of
must be conducted out of the public eye.
mean that you believe there are
how would you define those limits?
,3lieve there are limits in the areas
a. I stated that accountability was
; by no means the exclusive or the
Tement of the committees in the
iy to the wide-ranging involvement
ources allocation and in effective
SIBILITY TO CONGRESS
nished intelligence that we provide
icitly recognizes the importance of
.iu ality and effectiveness of the fin-
Al. So I see the involvement of the
3ve however that my reading of the
suggests that one of the primary
le need for accountability.
43
The CHAIRMAN. Related to that, you endorse the concept of self-
restraint on the part of the congressional oversight committees,
and you say, in part:
This, in my view, involves restraint from unreasonably burdening the inelligence
agencies with reporting requirements and requests for information, and also, in
avoiding micromanagement of intelligence through the budget process.
What do you consider to be examples of unreasonably burdening
the intelligence agencies?
Mr. GATES. Mr. Chairman, my answer was in response to the
question which had to do with my perceptions of the obligations of
the DCI and DDCI, as well as the oversight committees. I made the
statement more as a matter of general principle than as a matter
of complaint.
The CIA alone last year conducted over or carried out more than
500 briefings of congressional staffs. That does not account for the
many formal hearings that were held or the many hundreds of
written questions.
So I would simply say we are willing to respond to any questions
that the committee has. I think that while I was Deputy Director
for Intelligence, I don't believe there was ever a question that we
did not answer. I would just ask that the committee be mindful of
the resources involved in this as it carries out its work.
The CHAIRMAN. In your view, do Members of Congress and the
oversight committees in particular, qualify as policymaking con-
sumers of intelligence?
POLICYMAKERS CONSUMERS OF INTELLIGENCE
Mr. GATES. Well, let me first define what I believe the role of the
policymaker is with respect to intelligence. It seems to me that in-
telligence is responsible for collecting and analyzing information
and arraying it for the policymaker. The role of the policymaker is
to draw on that information and on other sources to develop op-
tions for policy, to make recommendations for policy, and then
choices and decisions about policy, to advocate that policy, and
then finaly to implement that policy.
The only area where I see any real actual or potential overlap in
those between intelligence and policymaking is in the arena of de-
veloping options. And in some of the areas that we work in, for ex-
ample arms control, it is important that the administration have
our help?that any administration have our help in figuring out
what kinds of arms control options are viable in the context of our
abilities to monitor.
Now, that said, it seems to me that it is obvious that the Con-
gress frequently has a role in setting policy. Sometimes it does so
directly through passing laws. Sometimes it does so in more indi-
rect ways. But the key distinction for me is found primarily in the
question of the implementation of policy, and to a certain extent
also in decisions on policy, but primarily implementation. So I
think it is a separation of powers issue. I regard the Congress as a
legitimate consumer and user of intelligence. We have provided an
enormous amount of intelligence information to the Congress?not
just the oversight committees, but to the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tees, the Armed Services Committees, the Appropriations Commit-
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44
tees and so on. So I see 'you as certainly as legitimate consumer of
intelligence in the parlance that we use in our business. However, I
would regard the policymakers, as we usually refer to them, as
those that we work with in the executive branch.
LEAKS
The CHAIRMAN. The vice chairman mentioned the concern that
we have, and you know I have articulated regarding the serious-
ness of leaks in recent years. One of the more serious leaks appears
to have taken place recently in connection with intelligence on
Libyan reaction to United States naval maneuvers in the Gulf of
Sidra. What is your opinion about what can be done to prevent
these damaging disclosures of intelligence sources and methods by
policy officials in the executive branch?
Mr. GATES. Well, I think that the problem of leaks is one of the
most serious that we face in the intelligence community and also
in the Government. The Director spoke to this before the newspa-
per editors yesterday. Among other things, it makes it difficult for
us to maintain discipline. It is very difficult for us to read about
the disclosure of?or to read the disclosure of sensitive sources and
methods in the morning newspaper, and then turn around and
have to fire some youngster because he breached the discipline that
we impose, and perhaps told his parents too much about what he
does for us.
I think that the problem is a general erosion of discipline
throughout the Government. 1 think that there probably is too
much finger-pointing about who is responsible and too little consid-
eration about needs to be done. At a minimum, it seems to me, as
far more aggressive investigative process is required. I think that
perhaps more strict enforcement of our?in terms of intelligence
information, in terms of compartmentation is probably required.
But basically what we need somehow to do is to educate people
throughout the Government, in both branches, to the sensitivity
and the vulnerability of our sources and the damage that they do
when they release something without authorization or without due
consideration.
So I think that the main thing that we need to turn our atten-
tion to is what kind of an effective investigative process we can de-
velop.
The CHAIRMAN. I am going to defer to the Vice Chair, but cer-
tainly would endorse that. I have also been making the point that
you alluded to, and that the best way to stop this is by example.
That to the degree that people either on the congressional side or
the administrative side, are able to permit selective disclosure or
selective discussion, it sets environment in which others feel free to
do the same thing as long as they can justify their actions by ele-
vating their cause to a comparable level.
Pat.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Dave.
Dr. Gates, when your predecessor John McMahon was before the
committee on his nomination on May 26, 1982, I asked him a ques-
tion and stated at that time that I would ask the same question of
anybody else who would come before this committee on a nomina-
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nly as legitimate consumer of
4se in our business. However, I
hve? usually refer to them, as
tive branch.
mentioned the concern that
ulated regarding the serious-
he more serious leaks appears
anection with intelligence on
val maneuvers in the Gulf of
'what can be done to prevent
Tence sources and methods by
broblem of leaks is one of the
elligence community and also
tke to this before the newspa-
hings, it makes it difficult for
Idifficult for us to read about
Losure of sensitive sources and
L and then turn around and
te breached the discipline that
rents too much about what he
general erosion of discipline
that there probably is too
;ponsible and too little consid-
minimum, it seems to me, as
cess is required. I think that
our?in terms of intelligence
ation is probably required.
toow do is to educate people
branches, to the sensitivity
and the damage that they do
authorization or without due
it we need to turn our atten-
'vestigative process we can de-
to the Vice Chair, but cer-
DI been making the point that
y to stop this is by example.
on the congressional side or
ermit selective disclosure or
Eat in which others feel free to
4 justify their actions by ele-
el.
Am McMahon was before the
26, 1982, I asked him a ques-
Aild ask the same question of
this committee on a nomina-
45
tion to sensitive positions of this nature. In fact, a question I asked,
I also intend to ask of nominees before other committees I serve on.
I am going to read back from the transcript so I can make sure I
have it exactly the same way that I asked Mr. McMahon. I asked
for his assurance that he would see to it that the record were cor-
rected if ever inaccurate or incomplete information were given to
the committee by anyone in a position of authority in the intelli-
gence community.
INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
And here's what I asked. I asked Mr. McMahon, "If you were
aware that others in the CIA, whether the Director of the CIA or
anybody else, had given us misinformation, either intentionally or
negligently, on matters that come within our jurisdiction, would
you correct the testimony that had been given to us?" And he an-
swered, "Yes, sir, I would either correct it or cause it to be correct-
ed by those who gave the erroneous information." And I asked,
"Whether that was given by somebody over or under you?" And he
answered, "I can't imagine anyone over me doing that. I can't
imagine anyone doing that purposely, but I would certainly correct
the record." He added, "I don't think an oversight committee can
expect anything else."
I'll say now as I said then, that I don't mean to imply that I an-
ticipate any official, either over or under you, is going to do that,
that is, provide incomplete or inaccurate information. And I want
to add now as I did then that I would expect the same assurances
from a nominee to any position of trust such as yours, including
outside the intelligence world. So it is one of those boilerplate ques-
tions that a lot of people will hear from me.
Such an assurance, though, is particularly important on intelli-
gence. Congress and the pubic must know that the honesty and in-
tegrity of intelligence officials safeguards them from being misled.
So I am going to ask the same question I asked Mr. McMahon.
Dr. Gates, if you became aware that others in the CIA, whether the
Director or anybody else, had given us misinformation, either in-
tentionally or negligently, on matters that come within our juris-
diction, would you correct the testimony that had been given to us?
Mr. GATES. You have my assurance that I would do so.
Senator LEAHY. Dr. Gates, I would not expect anything less from
you, nor do I think any member of this Committee would.
Dr. Gates, in recent months it has seemed that the administra-
tion has more and more turned to intelligence programs as a direct
instrument of foreign policy. There has been much said about a
new Reagan doctrine of increasingly open and direct confrontation
with the Soviet Union and its allies and friends around the world.
There has also been, in the press, a great deal of discussion of pro-
viding so-called covert military assistance to various insurgent
groups around the world which the administration views as free-
dom fighters opposing Communist regimes.
Now, you are identified as an honest and capable individual who
has improved the quality of intelligence. You are also identified as
an internationalist who is supportive of the view that regional con-
flicts reflect the global competition between the United States and
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the Soviet Union. What are your views on the appropriateness of
using the CIA as a direct instrument of foreign policy in regional
conflicts? I realize we are speaking in the abstract.
FOREIGN POLICY IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS
Mr. GATES. Senator, I believe that we face a very complicated
international environment. We have resistance movements that
are fighting Soviet aggression in their country. We have groups
that are resisting the imposition of Marxist-Leninist regimes sup-
ported by the Soveit Union in Cuba and Vietnam in their coun-
tries. We have a very active Soviet covert action program aimed at
political destabilization that we estimate broadly is costing them on
the order of $4 billion a year. We are confronting problems in the
world of narcotics, terrorism, proliferation of chemical and biologi-
cal weapons, and a host of other problems.
I think that the experience of the last 10 years would suggest
that in many of these cases, diplomacy alone is not an effective in-
strument. I think that experience also would show that in many of
these instances, overt military action by the United States is either
not appropriate, or would not be supported by the American people
or the Congress.
At that point, the United States has two options. It can develop
other instruments by which to carry out its policy and to try and
protect its interests, or it can turn and walk away. One of those
other instruments available to the United States is special activi-
ties or covert action. And I believe that covert action is an appro-
priate instrument of foreign policy, as long as it is undertaken in
the context of a larger policy.
I believe this administration has made a significant step forward,
both in foreign policy and in the conduct of the oversight process,
by virtue of the appearance here of senior policy officials when a
covert action is presented to the committees, to explain why that
policy instrument was chosen and how it fits into the broader con-
text of administration foreign policy.
COVERT ACTION POLICY
I think that it is important to understand?there is a frequent
misunderstanding, I think, in the public that somehow covert
action is some kind of independent CIA foreign policy. That is not
the case at all. The decision to undertake covert action is a policy
decision. It is a decision made by the National Security Council,
and CIA is the instrument by which it is implemented. And I be-
lieve that when that decision is made, that CIA has the obligation
to implement it as effectively and as efficiently as possible.
Senator LEAHY. Do you see a danger, though, to the credibility or
the reputation of the CIA when it is involved in increasingly open
involvements around the world?when they are discussed at every-
thing from a Presidential news conference to widely publicized de-
bates within the administration, and when the CIA is continually
being referred to as the instrument of that foreign policy. Do you
see any potential problems resulting for the reputation or to the
effectiveness of the CIA?
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your views on the appropriateness of
-unient of foreign policy in regional
(king in the abstract.
IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS
ve that we face a very complicated
vre have resistance movements that
in their country. We have groups
ion of Marxist-Leninist regimes sup-
a Cuba and Vietnam in their coun-
[
;oviet covert action program aimed at
e estimate broadly is costing them on
We are confronting problems in the
proliferation of chemical and biologi-
-r problems.
of the last 10 years would suggest
!plomacy alone is not an effective in-
rice also would show that in many of
action by the United States is either
-le supported by the American people
ates has two options. It can develop
carry out its policy and to try and
turn and walk away. One of those
the United States is special activi-
4eve that covert action is an appro-
)licy, as long as it is undertaken in
has made a significant step forward,
le conduct of the oversight process,
re of senior policy officials when a
le committees, to explain why that
nd how it fits into the broader con-
plicy.
CTION POLICY
to understand?there is a frequent
the public that somehow covert
ant CIA foreign policy. That is not
undertake covert action is a policy
by the National Security Council,
rvilich it is implemented. And I be-
made, that CIA has the obligation
d as efficiently as possible.
tanger, though, to the credibility or
it is involved in increasingly open
-when they are discussed at every-
conference to widely publicized de-
and when the CIA is continually
lent of that foreign policy. Do you
thing for the reputation or to the
47
Mr. GATES. Well, I think that our recruiters on various universi-
ty campuses would suggest that we do see some problems resulting
from that. But more broadly, let me talk for a moment leading up
to the answer to that question, about large scale paramilitary
covert actions, which are primarily the ones that you are discuss-
ing, I think.
It has always?not just recently, but always?been difficult to
keep information or the fact of American involvement in a large
scale paramilitary action secret. It seems to me that we encounter
a certain gray area here in which open action is deemed not appro-
priate, and where despite rumors and a lot of information and a lot
of detail about presumed actions are known in the public forums,
you still do not have public confirmation or official confirmation or
acknowledgement of American government involvement in a par-
ticular activity. As small as that fig leaf may be, it still is sufficient
to allow third parties who have parallel interests to cooperate with
HS.
Now, that said, it seems to me also important that we not allow
a handful of people who lack discipline wherever they are located,
or maybe a larger number, to paralyze us from action by talking to
the press about these things.
Now, in terms of the consequences for the Agency, there is no
question but that we take some hits in the public media and in
terms of people's?perhaps some people's perceptions of us because
of our involvement in these activities. I think, though, that there
has been a trend over the last year or so toward focusing the
debate on these issues more on the policy issues and less on CIA.
And I think that? to the degree that we do a better job of advising
and keeping the committees fully and currently informed on these
things so that there are not complaints about our unwillingness to
share information or our giving information grudgingly, we will
help to focus this discussion where it ought to be, and that is on
the policy.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Dr. Gates.
? The CHAIRMAN. Chic Hecht.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nice to see you, Bob.
On your statement, I agree with many parts; I thought it was
very well done. I agree that?in my opinion, our intelligence has
never been better in the history of America than what we have
right now. And when you mentioned the brave men and women of
American intelligence enduring personal sacrifice, incredibly long
hours, and a cloak of secrecy, I can certainly attest to that. I have
been doing a lot of traveling the last year, seeing these brave men
and women in very sensitive spots. I have to tell you, I am very,
very impressed with the caliber, I am impressed with the esprit de
corps of all of them. They are dedicated Americans and they are
doing their job. And I am glad that on the basis of what you have
said, I assume you are going to continue on the same type of pro-
gram which has brought us up to this. And I cannot ask you that
question, because the next question would be, if you are going to
change, what are you going to change, and I wouldn't want that in
a public forum. But at a later time I will get into that, but I am
glad you are going to continue. It's nice to have you aboard.
Mr. GATES. Thank you, sir.
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48
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask you at some point that we
waive the 48-hour rule that we have in the committee, and vote
this afternoon on this nomination. I do that because, as I have indi-
cated earlier, the Director informs me he can't leave the country
until he has a deputy?without a deputy in place.
Senator HECHT. Mr. Chairman, since we are here, is it possible to
give you a proxy, because I will have to leave.
The CHAIRMAN. We need eight people physically present to take
the vote.
Senator HECHT. Can you pick a certain time certain and we'll
come back.
The CHAIRMAN. Let's pick a time, because we have some absent
members that are in mark-up and in committees that would be
willing to come. Three thirty? All right.
Bill Cohen.
Senator COHEN. Mr. Gates, I agree with your statement that
covert action is sometimes necessary, and that it does in fact in-
volve policy decisions. The difficulty with it is that covert actions
also bypass the normal congressional process. You don't go through
the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee; you don't go
through the normal appropriations process, as such, because of the
secret nature of the covert actions. And when you do get into the
gray area, I think you indicated you can't allow a small handful of
people to paralyze us.
I think what has been most frustrating for a number of us has
been the lack of definition of what a covert action entails, from the
black aspect of it to the white. The gray area becomes very discon-
certing. For example, if you have a covert action program to assist
a foreign country, you assume that that is for the purpose of main-
taining deniability, providing that fig leaf to cover ourselves or
third countries who might be of assistance. But it becomes rather
difficult when the President of the United States, for example, pro-
claims in front of the White House press corps, yes, we're sending
you aid. It makes it very difficult to even hold that small fig leaf
up at that point for this particular committee, and it undercuts, I
suppose, the ability of the members of this committee to then deal
with this effectively on the floor. We have a Presidential declara-
tion of assistance, yet we have a covert action program. And so it is
not just a small handful of people. This goes to the very highest
levels. When it suits our purpose politically, we declare our sup-
port. And yet we still hide it over here under a covert section
which by-passes the normal congressional process.
I would only suggest that we have to have some rather more de-
finitive explanation that will satisfy the committee and the Con-
gress about what a covert action should entail. Otherwise you are
going to continue to have the kind of policy discussions spill out
beyond this committee onto the Senate and House floors, with
members engaging in full debate over an issue because it has been
on the front pages of the press?not because of a leak by some low
level staff member at the Agency or indeed even here in Congress,
but one from the highest levels of our own executive branch. That
to me is one of the key difficulties we have had in recent years
dealing with covert actions. They are policy decisions which are on
the front pages not by leaks, but by public proclamations by our
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to ask you at some point that we
ve? have in the committee, and vote
ion. I do that because, as I have indi-
orms me he can't leave the country
t a deputy in place.
in, since we are here, is it possible to
have to leave.
ht people physically present to take
k a certain time certain and we'll
time, because we have some absent
and in committees that would be
,11 right.
I agree with your statement that
bessary, and that it does in fact in-
acuity with it is that covert actions
,sional process. You don't go through
ti Relations Committee; you don't go
,ions process, as such, because of the
ions. And when you do get into the
d you can't allow a small handful of
frustrating for a number of us has
hat a covert action entails, from the
The gray area becomes very discon-
a covert action program to assist
that that is for the purpose of main-
tint fig leaf to cover ourselves or
af assistance. But it becomes rather
the United States, for example, pro-
;use press corps, yes, we're sending
it to even hold that small fig leaf
ui?r committee, and it undercuts, I
!DEI'S of this committee to then deal
Dr. We have a Presidential declara-
covert action program. And so it is
?pie. This goes to the very highest
Dse politically, we declare our sup-
over here under a covert section
cressional process.
have to have some rather more de-
atisfy the committee and the Con-
in should entail. Otherwise you are
kind of policy discussions spill out
;le Senate and House floors, with
p over an issue because it has been
1-not because of a leak by some low
y or indeed even here in Congress,
of our own executive branch. That
;hies we have had in recent years
rv are policy decisions which are on
at by public proclamations by our
49
highest leaders. I think something has to be done to at least set
some ground rules about how those are handled. That is just from
a personal point of view.
RIGHT QUESTION, ESPIONAGE, INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE
Second, you indicated, or I should go back?there is a fictional
character I am familiar with who once said, if you don't ask the
right question, you don't get the right answer. And if you ask the
right question, you only get half the right answer. Now, I would
hope that that would remain within the realm of fiction, but I can
tell you that in my own experience, there have been one or two oc-
casions in which questions have been asked of various witnesses,
and in which an answer has been given, only to find out through
some story in a national magazine that the answer wasn't com-
plete. And then the response given from that witness at the follow-
ing hearing was, well, you didn't ask the right question, you
weren't that specific. This has occurred to the point where one
would have to spend all of his or her time with great specificity
asking 200 questions to get at that specific area.
So I think that oversight, if it is going to be effective and it is
going to be conducted in a spirit of comity and cooperation, has to
be carried out with a sense of a full answer and a sense of the
spirit as well as the letter of the law itself. That, I would say, for
the most part, has been the case not always, but for the most part.
A second point I would like to make is that you have stated you
can save billions of dollars from our Defense Department by moni-
toring Soviet military equipment and testing and so forth. We can
also lose billions of dollars through espionage. During the past
year, we have had three current or former CIA employees charged
with espionage: Edward Lee Howard; Larry Wu-Tai Chin; Sharon
Scranage. And we've had some former intelligence people such as
Ronald Pelton, NSA; Jonathan Pollard, Navy Intelligence; Richard
Miller, FBI.
What do you see as the most significant policy implications of
these cases, and what do you intend to do about it as the Deputy
Director?
Mr. GATES. I think that?let me answer the question in two
levels. First of all, the general implications, and second, some spe-
cific lessons.
In general terms I think first of all that the problems that we've
had in this area certainly are a strong argument in favor of con-
tinuing and strengthening the compartmentation within the Gov-
ernment, particularly within the intelligence community. Some of
these people gave away a good deal of information. There is no
doubt that without compartmentation, they would have given away
a great deal more.
A second lesson it seems to me is that all agencies, including
CIA, need to give particular attention to their reinvestigation pro-
grams. We have one, we have a formal one. The resources that we
have available for it are limited, but over the last 2 or 3 years, we
have been expanding them. I think that all agencies need to do
that.
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50
I think a third consideration is the need for probably tighter se-
curity measures throughout the Government and throughout the
intelligence community. There are some fairly significant differ-
ences in the standards of different agencies in terms of security
clearances, what is required for a security clearance at different
levels, and so on. And I think greater cooperation and standardiza-
tion to the degree possible in that area is important.
I think we have learned some specific lessons from these cases as
well. From one case, we have learned the need to have different
organizations within the same agency, like CIA, sharing informa-
tion with each other. We have learned something about giving
people very sensitive information before giving them a repoly-
graph.
I think one thing we have also learned, however, is that we are
dealing with human beings. There are people who are going to
change once they get into the intelligence community. And it is
only through the reinvestigation program that we can identify that
these people have become vulnerable or that they have begun
having some association with a hostile intelligence service. And I
think it also speaks to the importance again of compartmentation.
But no one could sit here and tell you that we can devise a set of
procedures that will prevent one person or another out of the very
large number of people working in intelligence from being recruit-
ed by somebody else. We have to have a set of security measures
and counterintelligence measures in place that limit the damage
and enable us to identify such people as quickly as possible. And I
think that there are countermeasures and other things that we can
do that can improve that process.
Senator COHEN. Mr. Leo Cherne, before the Defense Strategy
Forum, gave a speech recently, and he asked an important ques-
tion. I think you have also addressed this. I would like just to quote
his statement for you. He said:
Can our intelligence be as good as it must be as long as our knowledge of foreign
languages and cultures remains as poor as it is, especially when that handicap is
further compounded by the disinvolvement of our centers of learning, research, sci-
ence and technology, some of whom shun "contaminating" contact with the world of
intelligence.
I believe you also addressed this point before the John F. Kenne-
dy School of Government at Harvard. I have two quotes here that I
will read to you and ask you to elaborate on.
The first one is that:
Preserving the liberty of this Nation is fundamental to and prerequisite for the
preservation of academic freedom; the university community cannot prosper and
protect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the fortunes of the Nation.
INTELLIGENCE, ACADEME
And the second quote was:
In defending the Nation and our liberties, the Federal Government needs to have
recourse to the best minds in the country, including those in the academic commu-
nity. Tensions inevitably accompany the relationship between defense, intelligence,
academe, but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or elimination of such
tensions.
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50
is the need for probably tighter se-
Government and throughout the
are some fairly significant differ-
ent agencies in terms of security
r a security clearance at different
Heater cooperation and standardiza-
area is important.
Ispecific lessons from these cases as
'earned the need to have different
igency, like CIA, sharing informa-
learned something about giving
ion before giving them a repoly-
'o learned, however, is that we are
'iere are people who are going to
intelligence community. And it is
program that we can identify that
ierable or that they have begun
hostile intelligence service. And I
rtance again of compartmentation.
tell you that we can devise a set of
person or another out of the very
in intelligence from being recruit-
?0 have a set of security measures
in place that limit the damage
eople as quickly as possible. And I
'sures and other things that we can
me, before the Defense Strategy
and he asked an important ques-
sed this. I would like just to quote
lust be as long as our knowledge of foreign
! as it is, especially when that handicap is
nt of our centers of learning, research, sci-
"contaminating" contact with the world of
is point before the John F. Kenne-
Vard. I have two quotes here that I
,aborate on.
s fundamental to and prerequisite for the
Itniversity community cannot prosper and
!? fortunes of the Nation.
CE, ACADEME
ss, the Federal Government needs to have
,including those in the academic commu-
relationship between defense, intelligence,
quire reconciliation or elimination of such
51
Would you elaborate briefly on what the relationship has been
with the groves of academe, as such, in recent years, and what you
foresee for the future?
Mr. GATES. Well, in recent years I think that the relationship
has improved significantly from what was probably the nadir in
the mid-1970's when many university professors and scholars
would refuse even to talk to us. When I was at the Agency in early
1977, I did a survey of about 25 schools in the Midwest and the
West, to see what kind of cooperation we could elicit on Soviet af-
fairs, what kind of work was going on. And there was not a single
?
professor that I encountered who was willing to have any kind of
contractual relationship with us, and many refused to have any
kind of a formal relationship, including even a consulting relation-
ship.
Our experience in the last 2 or 3 years has been almost the oppo-
site. It is now a rarity to find a scholar who is not willing to talk to
us, who is not willing to share ideas with us, and who is not willing
to attend one of our conferences or talk to our analysts and so on.
I would hope that this would continue and expand. It seems to
me very important, and not just in the academic community but in
the business community, were our relationships have been more
steady and much better over a long period of time, think tanks,
and various other places where there are people who are thinking
about international problems. I would like to see these relation-
ships expand, and I think frankly, given the proliferation of the
subjects that we are having to address, that it is virtually impera-
tive that it expand.
The CHAIRMAN. One clarifying question. I thought when you
were responding to the vice chairman's questions relative to covert
action that you alluded to some renewed receptivity of CIA within
academia in the last couple of years. Does this reflect support of
the use of covert action.
Mr. GATES. There have been some demonstrations against our re-
cruiters. What is perhaps different from an earlier period is that
the demonstrations have often had to be moved out of the way for
the lines of students who were lining up to apply.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you not noticed an adverse impact of those
demonstrations in any way on CIA access to the resources of the
universities or on the faculty of universities and their willingness
to be responsive to the community's needs?
Mr. GATES. No, sir; we haven't.
The CHAIRMAN. Mitch McConnell.
Senator MCCONNELL. On several occasions over the past year or
so, including in the Vice President's recent report on counterterror-
ism, the administration advocated the formation of a single over-
sight committee. I am wondering, first, how you feel about that;
second, what kind of impact you think that would have on the
oversight process?
Mr. GATES. Well, I have heard arguments made both pro and con
for a joint oversight committee. Frankly, it comes out about a wash
for me, and I think it is essentially up to the Congress to decide
how it wants to organize itself. I think you can make arguments
both ways in terms of its value and whether it would cut down on
leaks or things like that. There are also offsetting arguments. I
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52
would think that that is basically a matter for the Congress to
decide.
Senator MCCONNELL. SO you have no strong views about it one
way or the other?
Mr. GATES. No, sir.
Senator MCCONNELL. So you don't conclude that it would neces-
sarily have an impact on the problem that the chairman and
others talked about of leaks that we all find troublesome, no
matter where they come from.
Mr. GATES. I don't think so. No significant. Perhaps some,
but--
Senator MCCONNELL. In your statement of qualifications, you
mentioned, and I quote from it, that you had "introduced a number
of measures to bring about the long-range improvement of CIA
analysis, including accountability (for the first time) of analysts for
the record of forecasting and assessments." I am interested in how
you structured and implemented that, and if there are any conse-
quences for reports that are not subsequently proved to be accu-
rate.
ANALYSIS
Mr. GATES. The way we implemented that was to create for each
analyst in the Directorate a file into which we placed a copy of ev-
erything that the analyst wrote on his or her particular area,
whether it was a short current intelligence piece or a longer range
research study. And one of the things we did that helped assuage
the analysts somewhat is that we allowed as how there was the
real possibility that the process of refining these reports as they
are produced may take a marvelous piece of analysis and destroy it
in the course of this review. So we always allow the analyst, if he
or she wishes, to include the first draft of their writing as well as
what was ultimately published. So that when you go through, the
analyst could say, see, I was right, and you guys messed it up along
the way.
One of the things that I assured the analysts of when we started
this was that we were not going to take action against or on behalf
of an analyst on the basis of one report. The best analysts are
going to be wrong occasionally. The purpose of the file, really, is to
guage several things. First of all, accuracy over time. Is this ana-
lyst pretty much on the mark most of the time. How good is the
analyst at conceptualizing the problem, of identifying what the
issues are. How good is the analyst in arraying the information
and in conveying it to the policymaker. And we use these files each
year or throughout the year, but particularly when it comes time
to evaluate the performance of an analyst, and when an analyst is
a candidate for promotion. And then the managers use these files
to guage what progress the analyst has made and how good we
think the analyst is compared to his or her peers.
Another purpose of it is, frankly, to guage whether an analyst is
getting better over time or getting worse. So it is used as a kind of
all-purpose means of evaluation. One of my hopes was that it
would be a system that would be far less subjective than just the
views of their immediate supervisor. Also, when a supervisor moves
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)2
ly a matter for the Congress to
ave no strong views about it one
on't conclude that it would neces-
problem that the chairman and
hat we all find troublesome, no
h. No significant. Perhaps some,
statement of qualifications, you
hat you had "introduced a number
long-range improvement of CIA
(for the first time) of analysts for
eFsments.? I am interested in how
that, and if there are any conse-
? tbsequently proved to be accu-
? LI SIS
lented that was to create for each
_rito which we placed a copy of ev-
?, on his or her particular area,
Htelligence piece or a longer range
;;hings we did that helped assuage
ve allowed as how there was the
of refining these reports as they
'als piece of analysis and destroy it
,-e always allow the analyst, if he
draft of their writing as well as
io that when you go through, the
, and you guys messed it up along
i the analysts of when we started
1 3 take action against or on behalf
le report. The best analysts are
:le purpose of the file, really, is to
ac.curacy over time. Is this ana-
ost of the time. How good is the
!Toiilem, of identifying what the
yst in arraying the information
aker. And we use these files each
particularly when it comes time
t analyst, and when an analyst is
hen the managers use these files
yst has made and how good we
ir or her peers.
to guage whether an analyst is
worse. So it is used as a kind of
One of my hopes was that it
far less subjective than just the
r. Also, when a supervisor moves
53
on, every analyst sort of has to prove himself or herself anew to a
new supervisor. Having these files in hand would allow a new su-
pervisor to learn fairly early on where the strengths or weaknesses
of his or her organization were.
So I think that there are a lot of purposes to them. One of those
purposes was not to take a single piece of paper out of it and pillo-
ry an analyst, or promote one, for that matter.
Senator MCCONNELL. I am kind of surprised it hadn't been done
before. I gather you might have been as well.
Mr. GATES. So was I, Senator.
Senator MCCONNELL. No further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mitch. Senator Murkowski.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MURKOWSKI
Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Gates, in our discussion yesterday, al-
though it was very brief, I expressed a concern over the magnitude
of the intelligence umbrella. And I am referring to the intelligence
community, the NSA, the DIA, the Department of Defense, and
those military organizations that have intelligence support includ-
ing the Army, the Air. Force, the Navy. Given my association on
the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have taken note of the com-
petitive aspects of their intelligence gathering capability; they all
operate somewhat on a parallel, a very high parallel level. We also
have the role of the FBI. In addition, the Department of Energy
maintains an intelligence capability, as does the Department of
State. And the CIA, through the Director's, I gather, responsibility
as the head of Central Intelligence, is responsible to ensure commu-
nication throughout the community. The realities are that the
budget process and the prospect of constrained budgets dictates a
high degree of efficiency in the intelligence-gathering process.
INTELLIGENCE UMBRELLA
Observing the activities of this committee, there is plenty of in-
telligence around; the question we have is the quality of that intel-
ligence. Now, we have got a tremendous resource out there, but the
resources appear to be competitive in many regards. And I am
wondering how you assess your responsibility to try and increase
the efficient operation of the intelligence community as a whole,
recognizing the competitive postures that exist within the military
framework of the Department of Defense, and the already estab-
lished agencies that are charged with specific intelligence responsi-
bilities obviously the decsionmaking process has to be made on the
basis of tough decisions. You can gather more intelligence, and
that is fine, but by the same token, somebody has to bite the bullet
and make those crucial recommendations.
Are we, in effect, because of the redundancy in the structure,
failing to put our budgetary dollars in the most efficient manner,
and would you suggest any reforms where we can utilize the physi-
cal resources of the intelligence community in a more responsive
manner in the national interest?
Mr. GATES. Senator, I believe that one of the reasons for the di-
versity of the community and the apparent redundancy is the
degree to which different elements of the community have differ-
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54
ent responsibilities. The Air Force, the Army, the Navy, for exam-
ple, while they have some national intelligence responsibilities,
fundamentally provide the tactical day-to-day intelligence support
that are required by their own military organizations, whether it is
putting together target folders or whatever. INR at the State De-
partment primarily serves the Secretary. DIA serves the Joint
Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, and CIA's primary customer is
not only the President and the White House and the National Se-
curity Council, but the members of the National Security Council
at the highest level.
So I think each of these organizations has a different role to
play, and in many respects, fundamentally a different mission.
Now, we have been concerned about efficiency. One of the things
that we've done, frankly, was in response to suggestions from the
oversight committees, and that had to do with the use of external
contracts by the different agencies of the intelligence community
and the worry here that there was redundancy in those contracts,
that we didn't know what each other was doing, and weren't shar-
ing the results and so on. Partly because of that, we established an
Intelligence Producers Council that represents all of the principal
analytic elements of the community, and within that Council we
now share all the information on contracts that are being let to
academe, to think tanks, to various organizations that work with
us, so that we can all share the information, make sure we're not
being double teamed by a contractor and so on.
So I certainly wouldn't want to say there are not efficiencies that
still are to be made. One of the concerns that this committee has
expressed frequently in the past is the concern to have greater
competitive analysis, particularly between the agencies, and to
have a clearer expression of differences between the agencies. This
means several different agencies working on the same problem
using the same data. It seems to me that in the interests of effi-
ciency, what we have to make sure is that when there is such a
duplication of effort, that we do it consciously and not by accident,
and that we have selected those areas.
Let me give you an example.
Senator MURKOWSKI. I have one short question remaining.
The CHAIRMAN. You can always elaborate for the record.
Senator MURKOWSKI. While I appreciate the necessity of sharing
the information which you have indicated you have in your formal
establishment of procedure, I still think any organization needs di-
rection and orchestration, and I am still not satisfied that the di-
rection is there in the sense of directing the other agencies, but I
have expressed that concern previously.
YURCHENKO
My last question is a procedural management question. The situ-
ation regarding the Yurchenko incident has received a great deal
of attention by this committee. And there was concern over proce-
dure and fixed responsibility in the sense of who was responsible
for that extraordinary situation where the individual was allowed
to leave the restaurant and for all practical purposes, disappear
from our scene and appear at the Soviet Embassy.
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Y Ce, the Army, the Navy, for exam-
;tional intelligence responsibilities,
:[cal day-to-day intelligence support
!nilitary organizations, whether it is
or whatever. INR at the State De-
Secretary. DIA serves the Joint
ense, and CIA's primary customer is
White House and the National Se-
rs of the National Security Council
?
ganizations has a different role to
fundamentally a different mission.
about efficiency. One of the things
in response to suggestions from the
; had to do with the use of external
icies of the intelligence community
was redundancy in those contracts,
t other was doing, and weren't shar-
iy because of that, we established an
that represents all of the principal
aunity, and within that Council we
on contracts that are being let to
5rious organizations that work with
le information, make sure we're not
7actor and so on.
to say there are not efficiencies that
le concerns that this committee has
)ast is the concern to have greater
any between the agencies, and to
ifferences between the agencies. This
cies working on the same problem
; to me that in the interests of effi-
a sure is that when there is such a
io it consciously and not by accident,
;e areas.
:one short question remaining.
rays elaborate for the record.
appreciate the necessity of sharing
we indicated you have in your formal
still think any organization needs di-
ii
I am still not satisfied that the di-
lf directing the other agencies, but I
reviously.
HICHENKO
[ural management question. The situ-
'Ko incident has received a great deal
e. And there was concern over proce-
' in the sense of who was responsible
Lou where the individual was allowed
for all practical purposes, disappear
the Soviet Embassy.
55
And without going into a great deal of detail, I think it is fair to
say that as a member of this committee, I was not satisfied that
the CIA had structured itself to ensure the necessary accountabil-
ity. And I am curious to know if that indeed is your assessment of
the situation, and if in fact it has changed, and if there is clear-cut
accountability and responsibility so that situations like that cannot
occur again.
Mr. GATES. Yes, sir. My perception is identical to yours. There
were organizational deficiencies. We have made organizational
changes so that a single individual and a single organization are
accountable and are in charge of the entire process for defectors.
Another element that we have changed that had to do with our
dealings with the individual himself, or an individual defector, is to
ensure that the same person is basically the principal case officer
for a defector with continuity, so that a defector isn't facing a
whole new set of people all the time and there is somebody there
that he gets to know and that he can depend upon and that under-
stands him and understands his concerns, and can identify when
he is going through a particular psychological crisis or so on. So we
have made those two organizational changes.
Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I commend you on that. I think that
is very important. Because it is inconceivable to me that an agency
structured as the CIA would not have a responsibility chain that
would be a primary foundation of the agency, and I think we were
all concerned that that situation occurred. I hope that those chains
of commands are permeated throughout other parts of the intelli-
gence community so that there is clear direction and responsibility
and accountability.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Frank.
Dave Boren, probably we've got 2 or 3 minutes before we have to
depart for a vote.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOREN
Senator BOREN. I'll be very brief, because I do know we have a
vote on the Senate floor. Senator Murkowski really touched on the
two major areas that are of greatest interest to me, and I am very
reassured to hear about the changes in the way in which responsi-
bility is now being clearly delineated in terms of the defectors pro-
gram, and I think those are important steps that you've outlined.
INTELLIGENCE DUPLICATION, COORDINATION
Let me go back to the area of duplication and overlap and coordi-
nation between the intelligence agencies. The Director of course, by
Executive order, is given the responsibility and the authority to co-
ordinate the budget for the various intelligence functions that are
spread among several different agencies. Let me just ask, do you
think that the legal authority now given to the director is suffi-
cient to empower him to reduce to the minimum degree possible
the amount of duplication and to make sure that we make the
most effective use of the dollars, or is there the possibility that we
should study the enhancement of that authority?
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Mr. GATES. Senator Boren, I think that the Director has suffi-
cient authority to deal with problems such as that, not only in
terms of his budgetary authority, but I think that perhaps equally
important, the interest that both he and his colleagues at the
senior levels of the intelligence community have in dealing with
those problems when we do identify them. So I think that we can
take action on a basis of an amicable understanding of, we've got a
problem and let's deal with it.
Senator BOREN. Well, let me just ask one last very brief question.
When we have an emergency situation, be it a hijacking situation,
perhaps a case of international terrorism, perhaps just the disap-
pearance of a defector, and you have various responsibilities shared
among agencies. You have, as has already been said, a role played
by the FBI, for example. There are situations that require close co-
ordination between the agencies in an emergency situation?almost
a task force to deal, let us say, with a terrorist situation or a hi-
jacking situation or something else. Who makes the decision as to
which agency shall be the lead agency in that kind of situation. I
gather it might vary from circumstance to circumstance in terms
of which agency would be most appropriate to give the leadership.
One of the things that has always concerned me is it seems some-
times we have a committee put together or a task force put togeth-
er without any clear chairman being in charge, without a lead
agency being clearly delineated in that situation. Does that have to
come from the President or is the Director empowered to make
that decision among agencies?
Mr. GATES. No, sir. I think that the Director has the authority
and the harmony in the community is such that, in consultation
with the other leaders, they can agree on and designate a lead
agency for dealing with those problems.
The CHAIRMAN. I am going to recess the meeting now.
Senator BRADLEY. Can I just do one quick question? Maybe he
can do it for the record?
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we all have to come back and vote anyway.
We need eight people here to vote right after this, so why don't you
defer, Bill, to take the time to ask questions. We'll probably vote
around a quarter to 4.
Thank you. We'll recess the hearing for 15 minutes.
[A vote recess was taken from 3:22 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.]
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.
In our rotation, Senator Bradley has at least a question or two. I
want to ask just one question, and try to bring this to a vote as
quickly as we can.
Senator Leahy asked you about the CIA's expanding role in
covert action, to support what might be called a counterrevolution-
ary activity, this means utilization of the CIA as an operational
entity. This presents us in the oversight process with a potential
difficultly in that this Committee must rely on the CIA for intelli-
gence?about what might be going on in a particular country
which is subject to activity under a special finding.
At the same time, the CIA, under a finding, might be involved in
an operation in that same country. Can you trust the agency that
is given the mission of operations to also provide you with reliable
and trustworthy information and intelligence about exactly what is
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56
think that the Director has suffi-
)roblems such as that, not only in
ty., but I think that perhaps equally
.)oth he and his colleagues at the
community have in dealing with
titify them. So I think that we can
icable understanding of, we've got a
just ask one last very brief question.
-ituation, be it a hijacking situation,
1 terrorism, perhaps just the disap-
have various responsibilities shared
has already been said, a role played
are situations that require close co-
in an emergency situation?almost
with a terrorist situation or a hi-
else. Who makes the decision as to
agency in that kind of situation. I
umstance to circumstance in terms
a.)propriate to give the leadership.
vays concerned me is it seems some-
together or a task force put togeth-
a being in charge, without a lead
in that situation. Does that have to
the Director empowered to make
hat the Director has the authority
unity is such that, in consultation
an agree on and designate a lead
loblems.
' recess the meeting now.
do one quick question? Maybe he
ave to come back and vote anyway.
I te right after this, so why don't you
ask questions. We'll probably vote
-?Jaring for 15 minutes.
3:22 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.]
ill come to order.
ley has at least a question or two. I
and try to bring this to a vote as
)out the CIA's expanding role in
Flight be called a counterrevolution-
lion of the CIA as an operational
oversight process with a potential
le must rely on the CIA for intelli-
izoing on in a particular country
a special finding.
4der a finding, might be involved in
Itry. Can you trust the agency that
is to also provide you with reliable
J intelligence about exactly what is
57
going on in that country and how effective the operation may or
may not be?
MISSION OF OPERATIONS-TRUSTWORTHY INFORMATION
Mr. GATES. Mr. Chairman, I think part of the answer to an
extent rests in the barriers within organizations that I spoke about
earlier that I'm trying to?that I tried to reduce in some areas.
Most of the analysts?well, no analyst, really, has operational re-
sponsibilities relating to any covert action. Most of the analysts
have no detailed knowledge of what is going on in a covert action
itself. The national intelligence officers who produce the national
intelligence estimates are not brought into the covert action proc-
ess. So that you have a group of people who are within the institu-
tion and representing the intelligence community who are, in most
respects, insulated from being, I think, affected or influenced by a
covert action.
Now, the truth of the matter is that sometimes we do encounter
some difficulty in coordinating some of our work with the clandes-
tine service, where the people are directly involved. But I do not
know of a single instance in the 4 years, more than 4 years that I
have been Deputy Director for intelligence where we have not been
able to describe the situation inside a given country as accurately
and as honestly as we know how. And I think that the information
that the committee has available to it in the various estimates that
we have done on some of these countries, would attest to that.
Senator LEAHY. I think, if I might, Dave, one of the reasons for
the series of questions I asked on that is that so long as there is a
covert operation reported to this committee as such?even if the
President of the United States is talking about it at a press confer-
ence, or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or any-
body else, or it may be the subject of a major newspaper or news
magazine story?we continued to be restricted under Senate Reso-
lution 400, which places an enormous amount of restraint against
any reference to it. As one Senator who when offered a chance to
come on the Intelligence Committee, said no, because he felt like
he was facing Pac Man, and the intelligence information was like
Pac Man, coming along and gobbling him up. So he couldn't say
anything. If something is made part of a covert operation, you can t
have any kind of full debate on it. There is no foreign policy
debate; it is here and that's it. And all of a sudden, those of us
most knowledgeable on it have to become mute.
And one of the reasons I asked the question is that you should
consider what the Congress eventually will have to do if the admin-
istration places more and more foreign policy matters under this
umbrella. We are going to have some pressure to change these pro-
cedures. I am not convinced that that would necessarily be a good
idea, but it is certainly a realistic prospect.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nunn. Sam, do you have any questions?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN
Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I know you are pressing for a
vote, and I unfortunately have been in other meetings, so I won't
detain the committee.
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58
The CHAIRMAN. I need two more members before we can go to a
vote.
Senator NUNN. Well, if we are not going to vote, I will ask one
question.
The CHAIRMAN. Sam.
Senator NUNN. Mr. Gates, I want to ask you a question that I
think at some point has to be in the public domain. I'll try to
phrase it in a way that will not get into classified information, but
when we have Presidential decisions to disc] ose certain information
that relates to perhaps sources and methods?I'll state this in the
hypothetical?is there a method by which that is released? That is
to say, if it is released by the President or the head of the CIA is it
carefully couched, so that people within the bureaucracy will un-
derstand that it is a Presidential exception based on real need,
rather than simply another series of leaks?
DISCLOSING INFORMATION
Mr. GATES. Yes, sir. In fact, when the decision is made to disclose
information, whether it is at the initiative of the executive branch,
the President, or the National Security Council staff, or the Secre-
tary of State, or at the behest of this committee, or one of the other
committees?the work that was done on the Soviets in the U.N. is
an example of where the initiative came from the Congress?it is
actually the analysts themselves who do the sanitization process,
working with the collectors directly, to either find a way to re-
phrase the information or to delete information in order to protect
sources and methods.
Senator NUNN. Is there a method by which the actual substance
is released, beyond the sanitization? What I have in mind is a
method of releasing it so that people know that it is an exception
rather than continuing to spread the belief that everybody leaks,
therefore it is OK to leak.
I have in mind, quite frankly, the tremendous number of stories
that have come out regarding Libya in the last 4 or 5 days. And I
am very concerned not only about the substance and so forth, and I
won't talk about that in this hearing, but about the demoralizing
effect of the leaks. Or, put it in reverse. These leaks encourage fur-
ther leaks because they are obviously coming from high level
sources in the executive branch and are obviously part of some
kind of overall decisionmaking process, which I don't necessarily
disagree with. But I think these leaks are devastating to our na-
tional security interests. And I think they are going to cause a lot
more leaks from other places.
Mr. GATES. Senator Nunn, I believe that the leaks that you have
seen over the last several days with respect to Libya are not the
result of any decision process, but the result of indiscipline on the
part of individuals.
Senator NUNN. Well, I think somebody at the highest levels of
Government has got to get this under control. It is not just this sit-
uation, but I am concerned that nothing is going to be a secret any-
more. When you start reading things that lead directly, or could,
hypothetically at least, to sources and methods of a sensitive
nature, I think it is deplorable. I don't cast any blame. We hear so
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re members before we can go to a
? not going to vote, I will ask one
-ant to ask you a question that I
in the public domain. I'll try to
:,-et into classified information, but
pris to disclose certain information
nd methods?I'll state this in the
ly which that is released? That is
sident or the head of the CIA is it
within the bureaucracy will un-
al exception based on real need,
of leaks?
NFORMATION
:in the decision is made to disclose
initiative of the executive branch,
curity Council staff, or the Secre-
liris committee, or one of the other
one on the Soviets in the U.N. is
re came from the Congress?it is
who do the sanitization process,
2tly, to either find a way to re-
information in order to protect
ad by which the actual substance
ion? What I have in mind is a
,ple know that it is an exception
the belief that everybody leaks,
'le tremendous number of stories
,a in the last 4 or 5 days. And I
.dle substance and so forth, and I
ring, but about the demoralizing
verse. These leaks encourage fur-
/iously coming from high level
I and are obviously part of some
rocess, which I don't necessarily
leaks are devastating to our na-
ink they are going to cause a lot
'eve that the leaks that you have
respect to Libya are not the
the result of indiscipline on the
1)rn ebody at the highest levels of
Ider control. It is not just this sit-
thing is going to be a secret any-
ngs that lead directly, or could,
es and methods of a sensitive
lon't cast any blame. We hear so
59
much about Congress leaking, but, to the best of my information
Congress hasn't even been briefed in these areas. which means that
these leaks are definitely coming from the executive branch. And I
think it is going to cause a lot more difficulty over the next few
months.
Mr. GATES. I share your concern entirely.
Senator NUNN. Is anybody investigating it? Have we got the FBI
looking at it? Is the CIA?you don't have the authority to investi-
gate domestic leaks, do you?
Mr. GATES. I am pretty certain, Senator, that some of the more
significant leaks in the last few days have been reported to the FBI
with a request that they investigate. If they haven't been, I am
sure that they will be.
Senator NUNN. In other words, your agency is concerned about
it, and you are being assertive in regard to what can be done?
Mr. GATES. Absolutely.
Senator LEAHY. You know, it's sort of like what Justice Stewart
once said?if everything is classified, then nothing is classified.
After awhile if everything starts getting leaked, nothing is held
back. This is certainly a great concern here.
I've made the comment on other occasions that I sometimes feel
that our way of getting intelligence briefings might be better if
they took the local newspapers, marked them top secret, and
handed them to us. There'd be three benefits: we'd get the intelli-
gence material in a more timely fashion; second, it would be more
complete; and third, there'd be a crossword puzzle.
But I share the concern you must feel when you see those same
intelligence matters on the front page.
The CHAIRMAN. Bill Cohen.
Senator COHEN. Let me ask just one question. You indicated in
your opening testimony about support for congressional oversight,
that nearly two-thirds of the employees at the Agency now have
come on since 1976.
Mr. GATES. YES, SIR.
Senator COHEN. With that fresh infusion of new blood also comes
perhaps some criticism that you have lost some of the old talent.
With respect to the defector program, for example, I know the
Agency came under quite a bit of criticism on the way in which it
handled the Yurchenko case. So I guess the question I have, is to
what extent?could you tell us that the ideal defector program
ought to entail? How close can we come to matching that ideal?
What are we doing now to correct whatever deficiencies existed?
DEFECTOR PROGRAM
Mr. GATES. Senator Cohen, I think that an ideal program would
start with a single individual in charge of the entire process from
the moment a defector walks in or appears on our doorstep to the
resettlement?a person who can be held accountable and who has
both the responsibility and the authority to deal with all aspects of
that. The second part of that, as I suggested earlier, involves
having a single case officer who can develop a relationship and
who can be responsible for an individual defector and can develop a
relationship with him and trust, and who can be there with him,
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60
and have his confidence. And so we would know if he were begin-
ning to experience some doubts or psychological problems, as many
defectors do. ?
Senator COHEN. What about guidelines? Up until last week and
maybe not even as of last week, we 'didn't even have an agreement
on consensus on what the status is of a defector in this country in
terms of what his legal rights are and what our legal recourse
might be in terms of restraint.
Mr. GATES. Well, my impression from talking to our lawyers is
that we do have the authority under the law?under the--
Senator COHEN. I am not questioning that. What I am saying is
there haven't been any guidelines.
Mr. GATES. That's correct.
Well, there has been a policy for 40 years, and it was articulated
first by Allen Dulles. The policy was that we would not restrain de-
fectors; that in the interest of encouraging other defectors and
giving an impression that they would be free to do as they pleased
if they came to this country, there was no exercise of?there was to
be no exercise of restraint.
Now, it seems to me, based on our experience with Yurchenko,
that we perhaps ought to step back at least one step from that, at a
minimum deal with defectors in a way that if they do begin to have
doubts, they do begin to think about going back, if they are as ap-
palled by leaks as Yurchenko and others have been, that they can't
just sort of step out the door and walk into the Soviet Embassy.
That we debrief them in circumstances where if they begin to have
these doubts, we have them apart where we can keep them for a
couple of days at least, at least for a temporary period, and try and
ascertain whether they've been coerced, whether they're under
drugs, whether they understand the full implications of their ac-
tions and so on. But then I think we still are in the position that in
terms of our interest in enticing other potential defectors, that over
the long term we would not want to be in the position of restrain-
ing a defector for a prolonged period.
Senator COEHN. You mentioned having one person in charge
from the defection to the resettlement. What about language bar-
riers. What about having individuals who speak the same language
as that defector available to talk to him or her in their own lan-
guages? .
Mr. GATES. My own view is that is imperative.
Senator COHEN. Has that been done successfully, to your knowl-
edge?
Mr. GATES. I don't know the answer to that, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Do other members have any questions of Mr.
Gates?
INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
. One of the questions we haven't touched on is the budgetary
question I referred to in my opening statement, we are in a time of
fiscal constraint with a need to prioritize intelligence requirements.
Obviously you have participated in the process of developing the
first national intelligence stratgegy with the DCI, which in part is
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-bk)
so- we would know if he were begin-
k or psychological problems, as many
vguidelines? Up until,last week and
we didn't even have an agreement
L.us is of a defector in this country in
.ts are and what our legal recourse
ssion from talking to our lawyers is
under the law?under the--
uestioning that. What I am saying is
6nes.
3, for 40 years, and it was articulated
cy was that we would not restrain de-
of encouraging other defectors and
y would be free to do as they pleased
here was no exercise of?there was to
on our experience with Yurchenko,
back at least one step from that, at a
in a way that if they do begin to have
about going back, if they are as ap-
an e others have been, that they can't
and walk into the Soviet Embassy.
-iastances where if they begin to have
,part where we can keep them for a
for a temporary period, and try and
en coerced, whether they're under
rd the full implications of their ac-
rik we still are in the position that in
g other potential defectors, that over
ant to be in the position of restrain-
;eriod.
oned having one person in charge
ttlement. What about language bar-
iduals who speak the same language
all: to him or her in their own Ian-
.'aat is imperative.
Hn done successfully, to your knowl-
answer to that, Senator.
lembers have any questions of Mr.
LEN:-;E BUDGET
iven't touched on is the budgetary
statement, we are in a time of
pidoritize intelligence requirements.
3d in the process of developing the
gye with the DCI, which in part is
61
an effort to overcome some of the problems of allocation of re-
sources within the defense budget.
How are we able to get a fair estimate of the need to protect in-
telligence budget resources from being robbed to accomplish other
defense ends?
Before you answer that, which you can do for the record, let the
record show there are eight members present, do any members
want us to go into a closed session before we vote on the recom-
mendation?
Senator LEAHY. Before we do that, Mr. Chairman?and I know
the press would prefer that we go into a closed session because it
would be more exciting?but Senator Bradley has a number of
questions for the record, and if we are to vote, let us note his abili-
ty to be able to submit those questions for the record. In fact, there
may be other questions for the record. I move that these be allowed
to be submitted later.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all of those questions will be
made part of the record.
Is there any member that desires us to go into a closed session?
Senator LEAHY. There is no request on this side.
The CHAIRMAN. If not, then is there any objection on waiving
committee rule 5.5 which prevents a vote on confirmation sooner
than 48 hours after transcripts of the hearing are available?
If so, not hearing any objection, I will ask the clerk to call the
roll on the question, shall the committee recommend that the nom-
ination of Robert M. Gates to be Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence be confirmed.
Senator LEAHY. And before the clerk does that, Mr. Chairman, I
would ask unanimous consent that any absent member be allowed
to be polled by the end of the day today.
The CHAIRMAN. There is a provision in the rules that all mem-
bers can vote by proxy. I have the proxy of Senator Roth already
voting in favor, by proxy. Without objection we will honor the Vice
Chairman's request.
COMMITTEE VOTE
The clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Senator Durenberger.
The CHAIRMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Senator Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Aye.
The CLERK. Senator Cohen.
Senator COHEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Senator Hatch.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator MURKOWSKI. Aye.
The CLERK. Senator Specter.
Senator Hecht.
Senator HECHT. Aye.
The CLERK. Senator McConnell.
Senator McCoNNELL. Aye.
The CLERK. Senator Bentsen.
Senator Nunn.
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