HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100090001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 197
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E:` COLBY
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
JULY 2, 20, AND 25, 1973
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
A.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-275 WASHINGTON : 1978
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN C. STENNIS, STUART E'h4s
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri, STROP[ T$V$MOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JOHN TOWER, Texas
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina _------ P.=Fi8 H. DOMINICK, Colorado
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hmmpshire, .WJ, eLIAM, S. BE, Ohio
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
HAROLD E. HUGHES, Iowa
SAM NUNN, Georgia
T. E4wA$n 4W. '*5'j6 Am'. Chief Caw+ect g+Nd 00 ,iQ Cgaia+t
JOHN T. TiCER, Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
William E. Colby, to be Director of Central Intelligence---------------- 2
119
Hon. Robert F. Drinan, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts-------
31
Samuel A. Adams-------------------------------------------------
55
Paul Sakwa-------------------------------------------------------
84
David Sheridan Harrington-----------------------------------------
95
Kenneth Barton Osborn--------------------------------------------
101
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'NOMINATION- OF WILLIAM E. COLBY
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The .committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in, room 318,
Richard B. Russell Senate-Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington'
(acting chairman).
Present : Senator Symington (presiding).
Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff direc-
tor; John.T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel;
John A. Goldsmith, Robert Q. Old, and Francis J. Sullivan, profes-
sional staff members; Nancy J. Bearg, research assistant; Dorothy
Pastis, clerical assistant; and Katherine Nelson, assistant to Senator
Symington.
Senator SYMlxc}Tox.- The hearing will come to order.
We :regret embers are absent. because 'of the recess. Inasmuch as
Director. Schlesinger has now become Secretary of Defense-we thought
it advisable to. have Mr. Colby here at the,.earliest opportunity to
consider his confirmation as the new Director of Central Intelligence.
[Nomination reference and report follow:]
NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT
IN E%ECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 24, 1973.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services : _ .
William Egan Colby, of Maryland, to be Director of
Central Intelligence, vice James R. Schlesinger.
July 26, 1973.
Reported by Mr. Jackson with the recommendation that the nomi-
nation be confirmed, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond
to requests to 'appear and testify before any duly constituted com-
mittee of the Senate.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Colby has had a long career in Government
service, chiefly in intelligence and related matters. He served for a
number of years in Vietnam on various assignments in one of which
he held the rank of Ambassador.
The Chair would emphasize that today's hearings will not only be
an eaaminatioi} of,Mri (alp ,~.4l~h io118" ground, but will
also review a number of po~icies relating to the Vi-al Intelligence
Agency itself.
There has been so much discussion about the structure and function-
ing of the Agency, Mr. Colby, aAd because of yt+iur long connection with
it, we are going to take this opportunity to try to get a better under-
standing for ourselves and for thepeople as to just what the CIA is and
what iris supposed to do.
.STATEMENT OF WILLIAM EGAN COLBY, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR
0! C TRAL `111'I` LLYiII tE
Mr. Cor.BY. I welcome that; Dir. Chairman:
Senator SYMnquTOrt. We believe this the appropriate time to ea-
.amine in some depth a ritimbet df Tissues that have been the subject of
consistent recent public attention with respect to the opetatious of
the Central Intelligence Akin:
Mr. Colby, do you have any preliminuty statement you would like
to make?
Mr. COLBY. No, Mr., Chairman. I welcome the chanie to explain to
you to the committee, and ttf the Senate, what tfiy gtialifations, I
hope, are, for this important challenge ahead of nles'and I thought the
4itost useful thing io twansvver the questions iii "your, mind, sir.
rei atol. SYMrauTort. - Very %t 4l.
As you know, the Senate Democratic Caucus' has adopted a policy
with respect to every nomination which requires that every nominee
be asked, do we hags your eornmltttrietit to roe 4i 4e *'-quests to appear
and testify before any duly-constituted committee of the Senate.
Would you respond? i 1,
Mr. Coui r. , i will, Mr. Chairman.
Seniator Sr INGTON. You will what?
Mr. Corny. I will testify.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. We will provide for the record at
this point a biographical sketch of your long and effective record as a
Government servant.
[Mr. Corby's biographical sketch follows:]
WILLIAM EGAN COLBY
Mr. William E. Colby was born in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1920. The son of an
Army officer, his early life was spent in various posts, including a three-year
period: to Tientsin, China.
In 1940 he was graduated from Princeton University and in 1941 joined the
United States Army, serving in the Parachute Field Artillery. When the Office of
Strategic Services put out a call for French speakers in 1943, Mr. Colby volun-
t *red and in 1944 wag porn luted bebt' d ene4tg life i* ndtfh eetntfal France to
Work with a resistance gait. Shortly before the end, Of the war .in 1945, he led a
team dropped In northern Norway to destroy it rail line used for transporting
dermah reinforcements.
Following the war, Mr. Colby obtained his law degree from Columbia Law
School and joined a New York law flrtd headed by William J. Donovan, former
head of OSS. He is a member of the New York State and U.S. Supreme Court
bars.
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In 1949 Mr. Colby, accepted his first U.S. Government position as an attorney
for the National Labor Relations Board in Washington. In 1951 he joined the
staff of the American Embassy in Stockholm and from 1953 to 1958 served in the
American Embassy in Rpme, Italy.
Mr. Colby became First Secretary of t4e_American Embassy in Saigon in 1959,
leaving in 1962 for an assignment as Chief of the Far East Division of the Cen-
tral intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C.
. In March 1968 Mr. Colby joined the Agency for International Development
and was posted to Saigon to assume the post of, Assistant Chief of Staff and in
November 1968 of Deputy to the Commander of MACV for the CORDS program
of support to the Government of Vietnam's pacification campaign, with the per-
sonal rank of Ambassador. He was reassigned to the Department of State on
30 June 1971.
On 10 January 1972 Mr. Colby was appointed Executive Director-Comptroller
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Colby was appointed Deputy Director for
Operations effective 3 March 1973.
Mr. Colby is married to the former Barbara Heinzen. They have four children
and. reside in Bethesda.
Senator SYMiNOTON. In the paper Sunday was an article "London
Paper Asserts CIA Engineered the Coup in Greece,"
. I will read the first sentence of that article in the New York Times
on Sunday, July 1.
The Observer said today that it has found evidence that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency engineered the 1967 military coup in Greece and is using secret
knowledge of Premier George Papadopoulos "war-time collaboration with the
Nazis", to maintain control of the regime.
Is there any justification for these assertions?
Mr. CoiBY. I had that researched, Mr. Chairman. The CIA did not
engineer the coup in Greece in 1967. Secondly, I think we are not in
possession of that kind of information about Mr. Papadopoulos that
is alleged there. And we did not train him in this country as alleged
there.
Senator SYMINGTON. At any time has Mr. Papadopoulos been an
agent fortheCIA?
Mr. COLBY.,He has not been an agent. He has been an official of the
Greek Government at various times, and in those periods from time to
time we worked with him in his official capacity.
Senator SYMINOTON. Did we pay him any money at any time?
Mr. CoLBY. I cannot answer that now, Mr. Chairman. I just do not
know. I can say that we did not pay him personally.
[The following statement was provided for the record:]
The CIA never paid Mr. Papadopoulos any money.
The only association the Agency ever had with Papadopoulos of any kind was
in his capacity as an officet of the Greek Intelligence Service, with which we have
maintained a liaison relationship since the Greek civil war in the late 1940's.
[The article from the New York Times follows :]
[The New York Times, Sunday, July 1, 19731
LONDON PAPER ASSERTS C.I.A. ENGINEERED THE COUP IN GREECE
LONDON, Sunday. July 1-The Observer said today that it has found evidence
that the Central Intelligence Agency engineered the 1967 military coup in Greece
and is using secret knowledge of Premier George Papadopoulos's "wartime col-
laboration with the Nazis," to maintain control of the regime.
The Sunday newspaper said that at the Athens headquarters of the joint
United States Military Aid Assistance Group, Mr. Papadopoulos is known among
senior staff members as "the first C.I.A. agent to become premier of a European
country."
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Mr. Papadopoulos has now proclaimed himself proVisIonal President" and de-
dared Greece' a'republic 'ii 11i t :
The Observer's writer, Charles 7010; quoted an unidentified Americas military
adviser in Athens as having said : "George gives- good value because there are
documents Hi? Washington'he woid'd3Ptlilee let otjt.4 s c ,
The British paper said that, thetgreek,secret WrvIee, built tip after the 194549
civil war, was formed by the United '$tates, and t~hlit, .aeterdtng 'to Andreas
Papandreop, miniate4~ of state in Char of fute li`gence i~h' the' ~ 1etllu ent brow gbt
down by tile Coup, it "was in reality a financial' and adikiiflstradtiie appendage
of theC.I.A" t .. :.
sgrr.r TdTHj U.e:
Mr. Papadopoulos, a former colonel, was among hundreds of secret-service
agents sent, to. the United dtatkd fCi training;' the- ObeeYref taid:. Hta .anti-Urm-
murdstcreftntiais* re stringently tnsreetigated at the time. '
The newspaper said that a comrade of Gen. George- krkas, leader; of
an anti}Cormmunist guerrilla. a4tinization had 'confirmed keports that Mr Papa-
dopoulos had served as a captain in a security battalion organized by-the Nazis
to holddowi partisans during the
The current Goveriimient stand. rtraying Communisia a9C#reec~e's only enemy
and minimizing the Geerman'AdeniAtibn "clearly tweets`the dletatoi s concern
at thei danger thaG'thsgaps i* kin official biographt*=map tinme day.be filled In,"
The Observer said.
It said that the composition of the cabal of officers who carried out the 1967
coup en*ested?C.I.A, involvement. Four of the five o>Hesre, It -said, were closely
eonnectedt with United, States forces or'Intelligence,-had"1th6 fifth was-brought
in because 'of the alfm`ored wnitabre ie0VdMended: ` , ' , , ;
The newspaper also suggested that American influence at'the-time-of the'coap
prevented the carrying out of a eon pgeucy plan.-drawn up by the North, Atlantic
Treaty.Oraanizatiou for use If Ox p" rasped war;or revplutign,
Senator ``S` MJNGTON. In a .laearhig of this character, if you would
like to defer, the question. for an,eaecutive hearing,; we will be glad .to
do se.
16Ir COLBr: I am prepared to provide every detail in executive. ses-.
sion, as you..know, Mr. Chairman..
Senator SYMINGTbN. This article was a flatout assertion. I thought
we, should;
know. .
Mr. COLsY. I can equally say that the CIA did not engineer the coup
in Greece in 1967.
Senator. SX>-wwGTpia. There is a,book.agmebody has given me called
"My War.'with.the OtA'i, the meinoilm gf,Prince Norodom Sihanouk as
related toWilfred. I3urchett,,,Agstralian journalist,; aye yeu..read the
book?
Mr. CoLBY. I have not had a chance to read the' book, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SY,MINGTON. I hat not ad.it all m-self, only some of it.:
Mr. CoT.s. I know: a 1;t 1e about our:.relationship with Prince
Sihanouk,' over. the years bwause. 1 have been invol'ed.: in; Southeast
Asia. And I know the thrust of his allegations that the CIA, was trying
to unseat him at various times. First, I can say that we did not have
anything to do with his ouster in 1970. That was conducted within the
Cambodian Government at that time.
In reference to an earlier incident, we did not conduct an attempted
coup against him,, although we did have certain'information'as to the
people who -'ere so doing.
Senator SYMINGTON.At any .time have we worked in 'conjunction
with Lois Nol or,Sirik Matak?
Mr. Cpiuy. As'ofcials of their Government we-have, of course; been
in conta t'with various people, but we have not conducted'ahy' private
relationship with Prime Minister Lon Nol.
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Senator SYDtINuTox. They were never paid employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency?
Mr. COLEY. No.
Senator SYMINGTON. You are familiar with the controversy over the
Phoenix program in Vietnam, which we understand you supervised as
Deputy U.S. Commander in Vietnam for Civil Operations and Rural
Development Support from 1968 to 1971. There have been allegations,
in effect, that the Phoenix program was an "assassination" program.
What are the facts?
Mr. CoLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have testified in extenso on this sub-
ject before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1970,
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Subcommittee on
Refugees in early 1971, and before the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations in July 1971. In each of those hearings I have made
the statement, and I was under oath and am prepared to repeat it, if
necessary, that the Phoenix program was not a program of assassina-
tion. The Phoenix program was a part of the overall pacification: pro-
gram which was designed to strengthen the Government of South
Vietnam and its people against the assault, led against them by the
North Vietnamese through a program of subversion, guerrilla war-
fare, and military operations. The pacification,proftam' dealt essen-
tially with the first two of those, subversion and guerrilla warfare.
The Phoenix program was developed in order to bring some order
into the fight between the subversion of the North Vietnamese and the
Vietcong, and the Government.' During the mid-1960's in South Viet-
nam, there was a great deal of anarchy and confusion. "Now; a large
number of activities went on then that are quite frankly, reprehensible.
The Phoenix program was designed in late 1967 and essentially
began to operate in mid-1968 with a view to bringing some order- into
the Government side, if not the Communist side, of this problem. The
Communists, as you know, were conducting.a campaign of terrorism
against the,people of South Vietnam, against local officials, and: against
National Government'oflicials. In the process the comamnd and control
structure of this terrorist campaign was run by an apparatus of the
Communist Party of North Vietnam, the Lao Dong Party; and in 1961
there was formed the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam
as a front to pretend a separation between those two parties. This ap-
paratus was'the controlling body and staff of the overall program. In
order to struggle against this apparatus it was necessary to bring
together the various intelligence, police forces, and local security forces
to begin to identify who the people were in this apparatus, because
they were sophisticated, clandestine operators. They used aliases, used
cutouts, and used a variety of intelligence procedures in order to con-
ceal themselves.
In the course of the Phoenix program we looked at the situation and
it was apparent that too many people in very minor contact with the
rebellion were being captured or otherwise affected by the counterac-
tion against this apparatus. The Phoenix program was designed to
make this a regular program so that the` attention could be given to the
main people that were involved in the command structure on the
Communist side.
For example, a form' of'dossier -was established by which the evi-
dence could be carefully collected on the names of'the people who
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were involved. A procedure was set up that three independent reports
had to be collected in order for a man to be named as a member of the
apparatus by the Government. The Phoenix program set up categories
of these different people on the Communist side. These were in the
three categories of A, B, C. The A category were the leaders, and the
members of the People's Revolutionary Party ; the B category were
the cadre, the ones who helped to make it operate. The C category
were other people who were somehow involved in supporting the
apparatus and the campaign.
The three categories were set up in order to distinguish the im-
portant enemy individuals from the ones who were really not so impor-
tant. For example, the Phoenix program was addressed only to the
A and B categories, and said, to the people who were in the police and
intelligence services that the'- C category was not part of the ;Phoenix
program because it was desired to leave those people as much alone
as possible and focus the effort against the leaders on the other side.
There were a variety of other programs instituted over the `course
of time to improve the legal basis and structure under which the pro-
gram operated. The Province Security Committee which had the au-
thority to detain individuals for security purposes used to be' made up
primarily of police and intelligence officials.
Senator SvxlNOToN. I do not mean to interrupt you but was this part
of the Komer plan for pacification, or part of the. Vung- Tau school
operation?
Mr. Coi aY. There was a continuum, Mr. Chairman, which Mr. Komer
started and which I then continued.
Mr. Kamer left, as you know, in November 1968, so most of the de-
velopments of the Phoenix program were my own after that. But a va-
riety of other legal procedures and practical procedures were instituted
in the Phoenix program. We tried to improve the accuracy of the in-
formation and, secondly, to improve the treatment given to the indi-
viduals captured. The thrust of the program was to capture people
who were on these lists or to get them to defect or rally to the Govern-
ment. But in the situation, in the middle of a war like that, a lot of
people were killed in the process of the incidents and the attacks. I
think some 87 percent, as I remember, of the people killed under the
program who were named members of the apparatus were killed by
military forces, and only 12 percent were killed by the police and local
forces of that nature.
Senator SYMINOTON. In 1970 you testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the Phoenix program was designed initially
to eliminate the Vietcong infrastructure by capturing its members,
"rallying" them-that is, persuading them to defect-or byeliminating
them. How many, roughly, would you estimate were eliminated?'
Mr. COLBY. Well, the elimination was all three categories because
the word "eliminate" referred to the entire program against .the
apparatus.
Senator SYMZNOTON. Kill them?
Mr. COLBY. We said kill, the figure we used was people who were
killed. There was no euphemism applied to it at all. The overall word
"neutralize" was applied to the apparatus whether it was neutralized
by the individuals being captured, rallying or being killed.
[See also p. 149.]
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Senator SYMINGTON. And you were operating this program under
instructions from higher authority during the course of the war, is that
correct?
Mr. COLBY. It was part of the war, and I was operating it-to answer
your question directly, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the figures in
mid-1971 that were testified to at the time were that some 28,000 had
been captured, some 20,00.0 had been killed, and some 17,000 had actu-
ally rallied by that time. Obviously, the program has been going on
since then, and those figures are larger today.
Senator SYMINGTON. There were statements in some congressional
hearings that South Vietnamese could be stigmatized as Vietcong
infrastructures by their enemies without hard evidence of such infra-
structure affiliation. Were you satisfied with the quality of the intelli.
gence on which these Vietcong infrastructure determinations were
made?
Mr. COLBY. I was not, and we made considerable efforts to improve
it and to improve the procedure so that only better evidence would be
used in the legal proceedings against these people. I would not pre-
tend to you that we were always successful, and there were certainly
abuses in that situation.
Senator SYMINOTON. What about charges made that South Viet-
namese authorities abused the Phoenix program-that suspected VCI
simply disappeared while under interrogation, and so forth?
Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the figures there about the number of cap-
tured and the number rallied indicates that very large numbers were
interrogated and did contribute to the intelligence base. Again, cer-
tainly, abuses took place but I think in the record we also included the
directive issued by MACV which, frankly, I drafted, which called
upon any American who was in the presence of something which did
not meet the laws of war, first, not to participate, of course. Second,
to indicate his displeasure and his rejection of it to the people involved
and, third, to report it to higher authority. I did receive some reports
of this kind of misbehavior, and I took these up with the Government
and I am very happy to say in those cases I saw action taken against
the individual doing it.
Senator SYMINOTON. According to earlier testimony, a suspected
VC could be imprisoned without trial under the "an tri" law, and
held for 2 years. What do you know about this?
Mr. COLBY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Like many other coun-
tries Vietnam had a procedure for detention as a threat to national
security, and a suspected VC could be held under that provision or he
could be passed to the regular courts for sentencing.
That particular provision permitted his detention for up to 2 years,
but that period could be extended, and in a number of cases was. One
of the purposes of the Phoenix program was to distinguish the length
of time of detention of the three categories of individuals I mentioned,
the A, B, and C. The A category, the senior leaders, were to be held
for 2 years. The B category, the cadre, were to be held between 1 and 2
years. The C category hopefully, were to be let go or at the most held,
in the absence of other circumstances, to 1 year.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did such absence of due process, in your
opinion, :result in the protracted detention of innocent people?
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II
Mr. Cor.BY. There were certainly people who were detained im-
properly. I think the Phoenix; program's objective was to. reduce that
to the minimum possible.
Senator SY iNoTow. Under, ssuch circumstances, could the.Phoenix
program be used by unscrupulous individuals to put away,their politi-
cal enemies--without any hard evidence of subversive intent l
.. Mr. COLBY. It became more wad more di a it ?or,.that.to happen,
Mr. Chairman.-
Early in the mid-1960's'I.-am sure that happened' quite generally.
But after the Phoenix program -and the reoulsrr zation.of the proce-
dures it was less likely. For instance, under?the tegniar procedures any
case would have to be referred to the village. chief. of the home of
the individual concerned to get. his view of the popularattitude toward
the man. - . . . .
Second, he was required to be given a copy of the charges against ?
him, which had not been the case prior to that, time., :He. was required
to have a hearing and to actually appear. This was only instituted in
1971, but part of the, program was to, make improvements:of this -na-
ture in the procedures.
Senator SymiNaTON. Some critics of the Phoenix. program have
charged. that, , as an intelligence program,. it. was both clumsy and
ineffective. Would you comment/6n, those assertions
Mr. Couit. I do . not think.: the 'enemy thought that. I think, the
enemy thought that 'it wasa major threat: :to theistyle.of war.tl ey were
trying to run. Certainly it was, bureaucratic and.,it had a lot of prob-
lems in it,' but I 'think it made a: contribution:?toi the struggle against
the Communist effort to overthrow the govdrmmtient there...... .. r
Senator. SYMINGTON. Now. the Director of rthb' Central. Intelligence
Agency reports directly to.the President-of -the United States.:That is
correct, is it not.? .
Mr. CoLBY. He does, Mr. Chairman. '
Senator SyxiNOTO1 . Including the Phoenix.program, did you, or do
you know of any'aet:ion: taken by the Agency that was .taken without
the approval or against the wishes of any President Y
Mr. CoLBY. I do not know of any such.
Senator SYMixa . tan November 5,1971, President Nixon directed
a reorganization of the intelligence community. ?We are interested
in your concept of, and how yow intend to implement your authority -
under that reorganization; also, What is the role of the White'i House
staff and the National : Security ~ Council staff ; andwhat. they should
be with respect, to the fdnctionifig of your Agency.
For example, this directive establishes a National Security. Council
Intelligence Committee. Could you tell this- -committee- what you "be-
lieve the role of that 'National,Security -Council 9.' ...
'Mr. COLBY. Yes, Mn Chairman. (,believe the panrpose-,4 that com-
mittee is to give. general guidance as to what kiitelsof'intelliigence are
needed and what kinds of intelligence,-perha , a+te?reallynnot'allthat
useful to the customer agencies, if' you 111, the Department of state;
the Department of Defense, and the White 1{ use ii lf4 of:o6irse, In
other words, to give guidance as to the' interestsof the customers of in?
telligence,-as to what things they are conhernec&-about, 'What things
they think::pprihwpe we do toovmch of,"and sib forth. II would propose
to work very closely with that committee and to try to define, as the
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Agency !has, the major subjects of intelligence interest so we can re-
duce activities which are perhaps marginal.
Senator SyMINGTox. Who is the chairman of that National Secu-
Council Intelligence Committee? Mr. COLBY. The chairman of that committee is Dr. Kissinger, and
the members' are the Undersecretary of State, the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
Senator SYMINGTON. If you report directly to the President of the
United States, and Dr. Kissinger is the chairman of the National
Security Council Intelligence Committee, do you take orders from Dr.
Kissinger or do you take orders from the President?
Mr. COLBY. As I understand it; Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kissinger is a
staff officer for the President and he then indicates subjects that
he thinks will .be of interest to the ,President but in terms of a direct
order the,-authority has to be the President alone, and I am prepared
to insist on that in any case in which it appears. dubious
Senator SYMINGTON. I do not want to labor it but we want to know
how it is 'handled. We have been having increasing problems finding
out just where and what is the authority of these various agencies.
If Dr. Kissinger came in and said, it is the wish of the President that
you do such and such, would you consider that an order?
Mr. COLBY. It would depend on what such and such was, Mr. Chair-
man. If it was to write an estimate of developments in China or some-
thing I would probably go ahead and write the report. If it were
something questionable, beyond the proper charter of the Agency,
I would object and insist on talking to the President about it.
Senator SYMINGTON. You report to the President; have you dis-
cussed your appointment with him?
Mr. COLBY. I have only met him once since my appointment, and
I did not have much chance to discuss it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Have you gone into any detail as to where
authority lies or does not lie?
Mr. COLBY. No, we have not, Mr.-Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Some things worry me with respect to the func-
tioning of your Agency. You have already stated you would come
up here and report to us and give us the facts.
Mr. COLBY. I will indeed, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Are there any other members, besides the ones
you mentioned, of this National Security Council Intelligence
Committee?
Mr. COLBY. Those are the only members, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON.. Are there any working groups that support
this National Security Council Intelligence Committee?
Mr. Corr. There are .officials who help work on the problem, yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. Who do they work for?
Mr. COLBY. Of course, there is a National Security Council staff
itself that works for Dr. Kissinger.
Senator SYMINGTON. The national security staff is. an ` advisory
body to the President under the law.
Mr. COLBY: Right:
Senator SYMINGTON. The working group of the National -Security
Council Intelligence Committee, who do they report to?
Mr. CoLnY. To the chairman of the committee, to Dr. Kissinger,
in other words.
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Senator SYMINOTON. Do you feel you are hemmed in, in any way,
in functioning on this job?
Mr. COLBY. I do not, sir. I have had a talk with Dr. Kissinger about
it and I have had the fullest assurances of eapport and help in this
job.
Senator SYbMINGTON. If there is any development which changes
your mind, will you feel ? free to come to, this coimmittee aald so state ?
Mr. COLBY. If I cannot resolve it in any other way, I will.
Senator SYhrJNoTox. These questions are asked in you interest.
Mr. COLBY. I appreciate it. '
Senator SYirINeTow. It has been my experience you should never
give a man responsibility without authority and vine versa. You
never have had, in the Central Intelligence Agency, the kind of public
relations developed by the late J. Edgar Hoover in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
there has been a CIA hearing of this character. Everybody realizes,
the way the world is today, we need an agency like the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. Some of us have been quite surprised, however, that
additional assignments have been given to an intelligence agency. Now
is the time to get these matters clarified.
You are satisfied based on what you know about this to date,
correct?
Mr. COLBY. I am satisfied, Mr. Chairman, that I have the amount
of authority I need to do the job that I will be asked to do.
Senator ~YMINGTON. What is the role of the Net Assessment Group?
Mr. COLBY. The Net Assessment Group is a staff which works with
the National Security Council to come to conclusions as to the relative
strength of ourselves and certain other countries that might be a threat
to the security of the United States.
Senator SYMINGTON. Who is the chairman of that group?
Mr. COLBY. I do not-I am not sure right now. I will supply that,
if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is there anyone here who can get that in-
formation. That must be a matter of general knowledge, is it not,
Mr. Maury? Do you know who is the chairman of the Not Assessment
Group?
Mr. MAURY. No, sir.
[The following information was provided for the record:]
The chairman of the Net Assessment Group Is Andrew W. Marshall.
that supports their efforts?
Mr. COLBY. The Net Assessment Group is an interagency group, a
group which consists of individuals from different intelligence agen-
cies, and the other departments of the Government who have worked
out a common understanding of the relative balance between ourselves
and other nations. There will be a number of officials who will partici-
pate in this.
Senator SYMINGTON. What is-the role of the Net Assessment Group?
Mr. COLBY. To try to determine whether some other country has
a particular advantage over us or vice versa in some particular situa-
tion. The reason for that, Mr. Chairman, is that the intelligence com-
munity is focused on foreign intelligence and we do not focus on the
strength of the United States. This is a matter for the National, Se-
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curity Council, the Department of Defense and so forth and, con-
sequently, if you are going to draw a net balance as to the situation
between ourselves and another country, you need the intelligence con-
tributed on one side and the American side of the equation contributed
on the other. The intelligence community and the CIA would con-
tribute the foreign intelligence to that net assessment.
Senator SYMINGTON. What is the function of the Intelligence Re-
sources Advisory Committee?
Mr. COLBY. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee is an
advisory group to the Director of Central Intelligence to assist him
in an examination of the resources devoted to intelligence throughout
the Government and to assist him in making a recommendation to the
President once a year for a budget for the entire foreign intelligence
activity of the U.S. Government.
Senator SYMINGTON. Who is the chairman of that board?
Mr. COLBY. The Director of Central Intelligence would be the
chairman of that.
Senator SYMINGTON. You are the chairman?
Mr. COLBY. That is right.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad it is planned for you to be the chair-
man of some advisory committee.
Mr. COLBY. I am going to be the chairman of quite a few things,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Who will be on this working group with you?
Mr. COLBY. On the Advisory Committee on Resources you have the
Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Depart-
ment of State.
Senator SYMINGTON. Under this machinery, who will have control
over the budgets of the intelligence agencies, including the CIA? If
you, for example, recommended a reduction in DIA personnel, do you
think you could make it stick under this committee structure?
Mr. COLBY. Well, the actual authority for the appropriation con-
cerned is in the hands of that department head, whoever it is, to whom
that appropriation was given. The responsibilities of the director
under this instruction are to look at how those resources are allocated
even though it is not his direct responsibility to control those funds:
As you can see, there is a chance for a difference of opinion, as to how
many people should be used on a certain topic or how many resources
should be allocated to it.
In that situation the Director is required to submit his view to the
President for resolution after listening to this advisory committee,
but there is no vote in the advisory committee. It is the director's view
as to what the allocation of resources should be even though some of
those resources, as a matter of fact, the great majority of them, are
not his direct responsibility.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe that any of the intelligence
committees of which you are not chairman will be able to influence
the substance of intelligence estimates?
Mr. COLBY. They will certainly help us choose the topics. They will
not affect the assessment made because the procedures are that the
intelligence estimates submitted to the National Security Council are
the Director's appreciation of what is going on. That is a very personal
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and single responsibility.. And- I propose to exert every effort I can,
and ?I 'plan to~ be successful }or not., continue the effort, to make those
objective and straightforwsr$ asessments.
Senator S-run xroo. More --speaifiea ly, Mr. Colby, :I': read ;a speech
by a General`- Graham: -who_ veaently joined the ,Centaal.-.Iutelligence
Agency, and then called the Director and asked, `sWhsa:is going on".,
because, in effect, thd? speech the, general i piiade stated the Defense
Department should appraise the military posture -of _ the = possible
enemy, when it came to weapon?s:systems, their operations,'the number
of troops,: and so forth. In the ye'arrsI have- been oti tale :Central, Intel
ligence Agency Subcommittee; I'have never seen an:estimate by' any.
of the services which did not estimate the. possible enemy's:oapacity
higher than the estimate' of the.',Central.. Intelligence Agency. With
one conspicuous exception, the Central Intelligence Agency's were.
always lower, and ultimately found always t6 be more on.target
Senator S I N o T O i . Does G e n e r a l 'Graham Work for you V .
Mr. COLBY. He does.
Senator SYMING}TON. Have you straightened out hia thinking on ?
this matter?
Mr. CoLBY. Well, it is, very clear toy us as ,to how our relationship on
military intelligence will work.
Senator: Symington. You say, "to' us." Does that include him? Mr. CoLBY. Yes. I talked to him about this in some depth.
Senator SnNOTON. Several' years `ago, a4i chairman of -a subcom-
mittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, I had two.?able staff then.
Walter Pincus and Roland Paiil. They weitt around. :the :world and
reported back there was a great deal of; duplication .in our. hundreds
of large bases and thousands of small bases all over the world. They,
said the most duplication they: found was :in the intelligence field. I
have been around myself and corroborate that finding.
In that speech this General said all intelligence, in effect, should
be concentrated in the Defense Department. I o not think the Amer-
ican taxpayer who already has mounting tax, problems, :would sup-
port that type of conclusion. There is no, 'use belaboring it; but
would you agree: now, if you have problems .along.these lines you
would report them back to this committee B
Mr. CoLBY. I do not anticipate havingany problems.
Senator SYMINcvroN -I know you do not so anticipate. Nobody an- ?
ticipates a car wreck until they .have it, but.'if you do get into that
kind of trouble, will you so report back to this committee?
Mr. COLEY. I will report back to the committee anything .1 cannot
handle, Mr. Chairman.
I would say that on that subject 'of military, intelligence, I have
worked in a military headquarters and I'think I khow some of the
strengths and some of the ' weakiaesses of; such ` an apparatus, I be-
lieve that we can use the military intelligence agencies; for a number
of the things ''that are necessayyr td accomplish in,, the, `intelligence
business.
However, as I said before, when the` Director gives 'his assessment
of -what ifi going on to the President it: has to. be his personal assess-
ment;' and he has to have a; bonviutioh'tl t it, is, ao urste,? and,,he has .
to . have;, and I will; insist . on every, libetGy to. eonduet independaat
research' i iew1. wvhatkver, :'n=d r twaseUIe .myself. of the-accnracy
of what he says.
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made through the U.S. Intelligence Board?
Mr. COLBY. Yes; they will be coordinated with the board but
again, that is not a vote, it is a consultation, and the estimate will be
the result of the Director's view and assessment. He is required under
the rules to indicate a substantial dissent by any member of the U.S.
Intelligence Board to an estimate in order to give the customer the
benefit of the fact that there is disagreement on some important point.
And that procedure will be continued.
Senator SYMINGTON. You would agree, would you not, that a sound
economy with a sound dollar is just as important to true national
security'as the latest weapons system?
Mr. COLBY. I very strongly believe that, Mr. Chairman. I, think
the security of the United States depends upon a lot more than just
guns. It depends upon our economy and a lot of other things.
Senator SYMINOTON. And you would also agree that there is no
position in Government more important than yours from the stand-
point of weighing what is, necessary for security and what is not,
based on what is the position of the possible enemy.
Mr. COLBY. Let me say I think this is a very important' position,
Mr. Chairman. I will not engage in comparatives.
Senator SYMINGTON. As we understand it, there has been a com-
mittee over the years one which went by different named-Tile 303
Committee; the 40 Committee; et cetera-which approves certain
operations of the CIA. Is this correct, and, if' so, who is on this
committee at the present time, and what is its function?
Mr. CoLBY Mr. Chairman, the, National Security Act of 1947
says that the Agency will do various things, and then 'in the last sub-
99-275-73-2
Senator 'SYMINOTOiv. In the years I have been on this committee
we have had incorrect"bomber gaps and missile gaps, and have built
against them; later found they were wrong. We would have built
more if it had not been for independent CIA estimates.
Today we are winding down the war, but asking for many millions of
dollars more because of what the possible enemy has. I think it impor-
tant we have a man in Government, totally independent, reporting to
the President, who also has an obligation under the Constitution to tell
us what his opinion is without being forced to present something he
does not believe correct.
Mr. COLA-r. I take that obligation very, very sincerely, Mn Chair-
man. I think that one of the contributions that intelligence can make
to a peacetime world is to bring more accuracy to our pteparations
against possible threats to national security so that we do not, oper-
ate only against what a possible enemy is capable of but rather that
we know precisely what he is planning and doing to the:extent we
can find that out.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am interested in your independence. I spent
some years in the Pentagon and have spent some years in the 'Senate
and think the Central Intelligence Agency important the way. the
world 'is today; but, its importance is almost completely nullified if
its best judgment can be subordinated to that of somebody else who is
not in the intelligence business.
Mr. COLBY. I think the structure is such that the Director has to
give you his very personal opinion and I assure you that it'is going
to be a straightforward one.-
Senator SYMINOTON. Will intelligence estimates, as previously, be
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paragraph it says that the Agency will conduct, perform such other
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting, the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to time
direct.
Now, that particular- provision of law is the authority under which
a lot of the Agency's activities are conducted. as we discussed a little
The National Security Council has set up,
while ago, the Intelligence Committee and it. has also set up some
other committees. I believe on this matter since I am talking about
the National Security Council, that I would prefer to respond fully
to you in detail in executive session, because I think some of these
matters are still classified, Mr. Chairman:
Senator SYMINOTON. Very well. What is the name of the latest
committee of this character?
Mr. CoLBY. Forty Committee.
Senator SYnrixaroN. Who is the chairman $
Mr. COLBY. Well, again, I would prefer to go into executive session
on the description of the Forty Committee, Mr.. Chairman
Senator SYMiNO'roN. As to who is the chairman, you would prefer.
an executive session?
?
Mr. C.oLBY. The chairman, all right, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kissinger is
the chairman as the assistant to the President for national security
affairs.
Senator SYMiNQ'roN. Do any of the committees we have discussed
so far have any role in evaluating, coordinating, or otherwise deal-
ing with domestic intelligence, or intelligence which is targeted at U.S.
citizens $
Mr. COLBY. No, the function of the Agency is foreign intelligence,
Mr. Chairman, and that is its function, In the course of our foreign
intelligence activities obviously, we have to employ people, we have
to investigate the people we employ. We deal with a number of Ameri-
cans who help us in a variety of ways. In that respect we have informa-
tion about those citizens but we do not target them for intelligence
operations.
Senator SYMINOTON. And you will issue instructions to your people
that under no circumstances are they to participate in any domestic
efforts?
Mr. CoLBY. That has been a very strong principle in the Agency. I
have every intention of reinforcing that principle and insisting on it
very vigorously.
Senator SYMINGTON. We understand that Dr. Schlesinger brought
to the CIA two military officers. Major General Allen and Major Gen-
Graham, toserve on his staff. Do you intend.to use these two officers
eral ?
on vour staff $
Mr. CoiBY. At the moment I do, Mr. Chairman. I obviously have not
developed my entire staffing plan at this point. But at the moment I do
plan to do so because I think that they are working on the intelligence
community staff which is the staff that helps the Director in his com-
munity responsibilities as distinct from his Agency responsibilities.
Senator SYMINOTON. What will their function be $
Mr. COLBY. General Allen is the head of that community staff, and
again, since most of the community resources are in the Defense De-
partment, it is perhaps appropriate that & military officer be a part of
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that. His deputy is a civilian at the moment and it is my intention that
that will still be the case.
Senator SYMINOTOx. That is General Allen?
Mr. COLBY. Yes-General Graham is in charge of a program of prod-
uct review as to what kinds of intelligence products we have and how
good they are, and so forth, and again, since he has familiarity with
the sweep of the intelligence community effort from his prior experi-
ence, I would propose to continue him for the time being in that role.
Senator SYMINGTON. This is important. We have been hearing about
a steady reduction of the gross national product total that goes to de-
fense, but a recent report made by a group of able and experienced men
would appear to blow that concept out of the water. Instead of being 31
percent of the budget it is 57-plus percent; $98:1 billion. That includes
such things as atomic warheads for missiles, over $12 billion for vet-
erans and so forth, all part of defense;.so in addition to the some $80
billion 600 million, being asked for you can add another $18 billion or
so to the true defense costs. This is one reason why it would appear im-
portant we get these estimates right.
Do you believe, in general, that the military services, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, should have a more dominating role in the intel-
li ante estimatingg rocess than in the past ?
Mr. COLBY. I do not be lieve they should have a dominating role. I
believe they should have a contributory role.
Senator SYMINOTON. Your former chief has just become Secretary
of Defense. He is able and persuasive. Naturally he is going to be in
terested in the Joint Chiefs position. Do you think you can hold up?
Mr. COLBY. I think so, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, my former
chief, as you know, was associated with the drafting of the November
1971 letter and the decisions that the President made about strengthen-
ing the hands of the Director of Central Intelligence and I believe he
has a very strong intellectual commitment. in this regard. I propose to
work with him very closely in that role but, at the same time, I propose
to take my own responsibilities very firmly.
Senator SYMINGTON. Once you are over in that building it is pretty
hard to have independent judgment, as we all know from past experi-
ence, but I will say that Dr. Schlesinger, when he was Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, he did more in less time to clarify the
overall position of that Agency, which has been operating under
totally unnecessary excess secrecy, at a cost to the taxpayers of many
billions of dollars.
Mr. COLBY. Well, he had a very short but, I think, an exceptionally
effective tenure in the Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator SYMINGTON. What he started out to do is being interpreted
now. It is a more healthy situation, in my opinion.
Mr. COLBY. Yes, and I propose to continue many of those programs.
Senator SYMINGTON. I was talking about the AEC.
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator SYMrNOTON. What primary problems of efficiency and cost
in the intelligence community do you believe should take first priority
in your attention?
Mr. COLBY. Well, we have a very serious problem, Mr. Chairman,
which is developing-which is the total amount of dollars required for
intelligence, and the increasing percentage of that which is necessary
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to pay the. personnel involved,'and these curves have been goingupfor
a long time and if you project the curves very far you, end up' with
all people and no program, alid ;I: do iiot thinl. that is a. satisfactory
outcome. Therefore, we are: going to have to figure out wuys to conduct
the important intelligence activitie& at a ~ lower. price than we have in
the ast; . ,
Senatar :STnthwrox. Do: you believe we ,tend to, bollect IxIor intelli
gence:thiun-we.caani efficiently process and' disseminate toi the:appropri
ate Government authorities. Do. -mu believe We .sometimes; overwhelm
ourselves with data'-we cannot, analyze?:
Mr CoLBY. I think in any large-scale, activity,' Mr. - Chairman, yoir
will. 6nd -corners of it that cannot bear close scrutiny' but I think in
general the intelligence: eff ort of the United States :is focused oti. the,
main things. There has been,avery substantial reduction of the-total
intelligence effort over the past several years partly re1iecting the draw-
clown 1x * :Southeast Asia. but, also, 4efiectmg: other' very-, substantial
reductions around the world. Some of this is a result of better tech-
nology, and some of it is a result of just aeleetive?priitn'*ng of things
that may have been nice to have but cannot, meet, the-test of these-times.
Senator SYMINGToN. It is sometimes said that it is,valuablein.intelli~
gents work to have more than-o w organization~analyaea problem' and,
make an estimate. We can all see why'seme competition in?analysis and
estimation would be valuable:%Do you believe it, is also necessary, how
ever, to have duplication in the collection of intelligence $
Mr.. CoLsY. In certain -situations it?.may be, Mr. Chairman. In: cer-'
tain situations one particular source foi-collection may not be reliable
at a: particular time of 'attention or' it may not be all that believable
and, consequently, you might -have to develop a redundant system, as
the scientists would say. But certainly, I think' this is a -value decision.
If intelligence is satisfactory through one channel -it should not be
du licated. We cannot afiorid'itin this day and time
Senator SYMINOTON. Within `tl a neat 6 months, 'Spec li you make a re-
port on this and submit it to this committee; with respect to collection,
after. you have had a good look at it from the top?
Mr. COLBY. I am in the eenrrse. of developin a presentation on the
budget of the entire intelligence community to the appropriations corn-
mittees of the Senate and of the; House. I assure you I will look at this
very, very severely, plus the fact that' I also have to submit my recom
to. the President on, the fiscal year, 1975 budget later on.
Senator SYMINGTON. We would appreciate reviewing what yougive
to. the appropriations:committees.Nt ' one has mbre respect for that
committee than we do, but this is the, I;dgielat'ive Committee involved
if we are going to make any changes in the law; and some for cl, arifica-
tion after Watergate, would appear desirable.' "" ,
Mr. CoL~BY. I certainly 11 ' report fully ,to this commnittee, Mr_
Chairman.
Senator SYMINOTON. Turning now from the management of the`in-
telligbwe'communit itself'tothe manugenietit of the CIA, the com-
mittee understands tt Dr Schlesinger rrlituited a vigorous program
of personnel reductions in the CIA. How far has this~'g~oone, and what
are your future plans in this regard? You %o answbr that briefly'.now
and supplement it. ; .,
Mr::Cot~arr. Yes.
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We have determined that quite a-substantial number of individuals
were excess to our needs and our total strength has 'dropped in the
neighborhood of 7 or 8 percent. I think, in the past 4 months; As to the
future, as I indicated, the problem.of the cost of personnel and the cost
of operations now are going to require, I believe, some -additional
pruning of activities that may not be able to stand the competitive situ-
ationfor resources that we have and, consequently, it is possible that
other reductions will ensue.
Senator SYMINGTON. You will continue this program of involuntary
retirements, particularly CIA personnel with overseas assignments?
Mr. CoLBY. I do intend to continue a program of identifying the indi-
viduals who stand lowest on the scale of performance among their
fellows and arranging a situation where they can be helped to leave
Government service early rather than having them wait around too
long.
Senator SYrtTNGTON. Several Members of Congress have called for
the overall budget of the intelligence community to be made public, so
the American people can see at least the' general amount which is spent
for intelligence functions. In~ past years, and despite the increasing
desire of the American people to know what is going on in their Gov-
ernment. the furnishing of intelligence information has been further
restricted.
Do von see any reason why overall budget information, 'Or even' a
breakdown of the intelligence budget into its major categories; would
endanger national security if it were made public?
Tktr. Conn'. I would propose to leave that question, Mr. Chairman,
in the hands of the Congress to decide. I think there are cohsidera-
tions pro and con on all sides of that question.,But I have foundthat the
f onRress is at least as responsible on this as our friends elsewhere in
Government, and wwe have, as you know, shared with the Congress: some
very sensitive material which has been successfully protected by the
Congress.
On the other hand, there are situations in which an American intelli-
gence service ' will have to be much more exposed than the intelligence
services of other countries. We are not rxoing to run the kind of intelli-
gence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the
American society and the American constitutional structure, and I
can see that there may be a'regnirement to expose to the American
neonle a' great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow
intelligence rioint of view.
Senator SYMINOTON. What would be your views regarding the re-
quirement for an annual authorization of the budget of the intelligence
community, prior to appronriat'ion, as is required for a portion' of
the Denamtment of Defense budget?
Mr.CoBY: That would be up to the Congress again, Mr.. Chairman.
I think that in that circumstance we would exnlain our Tlens to the
appropriate'oversight committees in the same way we do to the appro-
1- rpatpons Pommittees. 117 e would &it e, a full description of what we
have in mind to do.
Senator SYMi 'oTON. I do not want to belabor this. After some years
on the Porei-n Relations Committee and the .4 rmed Services Commit-
tee, where I have been a member of the CTA Su'bcommittPe, T came to
realize that many concents of policy were being made by foreign rela-
tions without accurate information. t'nder the so-called Kennedy let-
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ter, the Central Intelligence: Agency man in the country in question
reports to the Ambassador, but when he comes back here, CIA is light
years away from any review by,State of its functioning. So it was only
a question of time before we would run into some of the problems we
have now run into.
It is one of the reasons the CIA has had such recent unfortunate
publicity: for example, this recent Chilean episode. Sometimes secrecy
may be justified; other times, to my certain knowledge, it could never
be justified.
There is information, intelligence, which, of course, cannot be. made
public in the interest of national security ; but people believe excessive
secrecy can eive rise to unwarranted suspicion that intelligence agencies
are engaged in sinister activities. That is what they are saying. Would
you favor a policy of more' open disclosure regarding intelligence
activities than we have had in the Past?
'Mr.' Cor aY. I think it is probably" essential in America today, Mr.
Chairman, and I would favor a greater degree of exposure of what we
are doine, We have already bad some matters which we do expose.
Some of the exposure that we have. quite frankly. gives us problems
abroad. in our relationships with other intelligence services and even in
our relationships with individuals who secretly aurae to work with us,
who are somewhat freightened at the prospect of their names comjn'
into the public and things happening to them as a result. But I think
that there are ways in which the intelligence community and the CIA
in particular. can reassure the appropriate committees and also the
Senate as a whole and also the people as a whole as to the activities
we. are engaged in. I think we are going to have to draw that line. It
is !-ring to be a difficult one in mrnv situations but it is obvious that
ae 'in we haveto run an A merican intelligence service.
Senator SYMINO'roN. What would be your position regarding the
nrovision of written intelligence reports to the Congress, similar to
those reports which are provided to high level officials in the executive
branch?
Mr, CorBY. I plan to look into this very precisely, Mr. Chairman,
and do what I can in this regaard. As you know, the Agency has always
comQ nn and given executive session briefings to various committees
on +he enbatance of what is happening in the world. and the Director's
aacpssnhent as to what he thinks is going on. I would Propose to con- a
'-inns drat fl,nt.jvity and look very very seriously at whether these, are
irnnm-ernents that could be made by which the appropriate com=
mittepQ:Congssmen. Senators; could be given. the actual documents
whore they are important. ?
Senator SYMINCTON. We understand some limitations on, and
directives to the intelligence community, are `included in classified
rlcx+rrments Palled"National Security Conneil'Int.elligence Directives.
NC+CID's. Wondd you describe in general the snbnect matter of these
directives; and, if you believe they should remairi classified, would
von tell the committee why you think so?
Mr. Courv. These directives are the application of the nrorision of
tie law that I cited; Mr. Chairman. in such matters as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct: They include some
?eneral direetlvee which describe the functions of the different mem-
bers of the-irteelli -enee eomtnmity and there is certain sensitive infor.
mation in thus. Those are National Security Council documents;
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Mr. Chairman, and I do not have the authority for the declassifi-
cation since they originate with the National Security Council.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you, as Director of Central Intelligence,
have the authority to declassify National Security Council in-
telligence directives, or to provide them, classified or unclassified, to
the Congress?
Mr. COLBY. No, I do not believe I do. Those belong to the National
Security Council, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you report to this committee who would
have this authority, what the reasons are for this policy regarding
these documents?
Mr. COLBY. I will let you know.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
Now we turn to the National Security Act of 1947, which, for
reasons that are not important, I was involved in at that time, as
a member of the executive branch.
The 1947 act directs the Agency to perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as
the National Security Council may from time to time, direct.
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is this the provision of the 1947 act which
gives the CIA the authority, under the NSC's direction, to engage in
military type operations abroad, such as the war in Laos?
Mr. CoLBY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is the legal, statutory authority
because many of the activities of that nature do relate to intelligence
since intelligence techniques are an essential part of running a covert
operation of that nature.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Colby, you and I have had discussions
when you were in Saigon in the past. Are you saying that the war
conducted in Laos under the direction of the Ambassador, with the
full support of the CIA, primarily was an intelligence matter?
Mr. COLBY. No, no, not primarily, Mr. Chairman. I would say that
the initiation of CIA's activity in Laos was a matter which did require
the use of intelligence techniques because it was felt to be important
at that time that the United States not be officially involved in that
activity, and this was done over many years, as you well know, in an
unofficial way.
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, and that is one of the principal reasons
why the CIA has had a lot of unfortunate, in many cases unmerited,
adverse publicity.
Mr. COLBY. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, no activity of this nature is
done without the proper reviews, instructions and direction of the
National Security Council, each such
Senator -SYMINGTON. The National Security Council is an advisory
board to the President. So what you are saying is no activity of this
kind is done without instructions from the President?
Mr. COLBY. Correct.
Senator SYMINGTON. What you really can call the CIA then, is
"the King's men" or "the President's army."
Mr. COLBY. I do not think that is the case, Mr. Chairman. I think the
CIA is an intelligence agency, which has the capability of using intelli-
gence techniques as directed by the President and by the Congress-
by the National Security Council.
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20
Senator StmiNaTON. We worry about that Laotian operation which
we have,watched over a period. of years, have been there. o f ten, have
sent. staff' people out. Let, us -hope .that in ;tie future, inasmuch; as the
CIA is.fnildamentally an;intellligence agency,,not an agency designed
to conduct,a war, you would,try-to keep out of this type and character
of operation. It has done nothing to improve the stature of the CIA
'You would: agree with that.; :.
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, I think the- name of the #1.geney is mtelli-
~ence,.andthat is its primary responsibility and :focus. QbviQUsly,~ the
Agency will follow national policy but, I. think it, is clear ;th4t under
the present direction of U.S. policy it is very unlikely; that we, would
be involved in such an activity.
Senator SYMINOTON. This President did not start it so'. '.A is not
necessarily % criticism of this administration. -But, when you ?;ustify
a, war of this character on the,grounds,it is "related,to intelli nCe", ?
you are stretching your assigned role, ana ru ,ui, .g"' Into., potential
trouble.
Mr.-CoLBY.4 I do-not think it was, awar. when it,hege -r.. Chairman.
I think we were giving, some assistance to the .people in,.Laca who
were resisting the North Vietnamese coming into their countijy.:
Senator STMlNoroI.. In any case by:August.-15 we w11:1 b.out, let ,
us hope. ;
Do not large-scale operations,, such as. this. A lending war . U1 Luos,
go considerably beyond. what Congress intended when,,It providca,for
"other functions and duties related to intelligence''.? ,
Mr. COLBY. I thnk it undoubtedly: did,..and I think. also that, as a
practical matter a covert operation cannot be,a.very big one.beca,usc
it stops, being covert when it gets top big. I think this was the lesson of
the Bay of Pigs, among other things.
Senator Sim iNGToN. If you operate this Agency in.accordanee with
the philosophy you are now expressing, we may have.a,, uew ;day
coming up..
Mr. COLBY. Well, I will try to keep it out of. the kind of exposure
that some Of-these larger activities got us into.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe all CIA 'overseas operations
should support its basic objective of intelligence collection and
analysis ?
In other words, if Congress would wish to limit CIA, ov.erseasopera-
tions to those which clearly support -intelligence collection, woutd-it be
necessary to redraft the 1947 act? Mr. Coi.BY. I think the interpretation qt the.act to.date is'that: it is
a bit beyond pure intelligence: o p erations:-and;analysia. I,think?that it
would be appropriate to leave-the -set ae it is in that respect because- I
think that. the Agency might be'fettered in ;some respect whisk,would
be of importance to the United Statesrby, some-kind. of a,brnader-pro=
scription than is pert aps necessary`:I-think floe basietpointris that; the
Agency overseas is going to follow U.S. policy. And that.you have a
tool in the, Agencyto use in- support of policy -if .it is so.desired.
I think it might be appropriate to lieaat.th6~ Agency's functoont-to for-
intelligence and that. i,n every..eaae iii -the. set, iii, wlrieh.'the .word
intelligence: appears in the xesponsihilitries?of the Agency. that the wo i it
foreign could be inserted-
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Senator' SYMINGTON. I know you know that much of the CIA opera-
tion 'in Laos had as much to do with intelligence as the production of
carpets In the United States. It was the operation of a war conducted,
at leash in some cases, by the State Department and the Central In-
telligence Agency to cover up what we were actually doing. That is
what worries the American people, they find something going on for
years, killing a lot of people, about which they, had no idea.
Turning now to domestic activities the 1947 act provides: "The
Agency shall have no police; subpoena, law enforcement powers, or
internal security functions." I would ask you about several recent
events, some connected with the Watergate case, involving the CIA.
The purpose of these questions is not to elicit your opinion about-deci-
sions made by your predecessors or other CIA officials, right or wrong,
good or .bad, rather, to clarify the meaning of -these statutory restric-
tions on domestic activity as expressed in the 1947 act.
Do you believe the prohibition against the CIA having police or law
enforcement .powers, or internal security functions, would prohibit the
preparation of a psychological profile on a U,S. citizen? Mr. CoinY. Not in every case; Mr. Chairman, because, for instance,
we prepare a psychological profile on'our applicants, on our applicants
for employment, and I think we consequently have a legitimate func-
tion for. some' of these. But I think I agree with the thrust of your
questi'on,'which is with reference to Mr. Ellsberg. It is not our function
to use this capability it that ease. .
Senator SYMINGTON. That was my next question. Would it pro-
hibit the preparation of a psychological profile on a U.S. citizen who
was -under indictment for crime, .as was the case with Mr. Daniel Ells-
berg in August 1971?
.
Mr. COLEY. Let us say that I do not intend to do this, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. If anybody asks you to do it would you come
back here and protest?
Mr. COLBY.If I cannot handle it any other way.
Senator SYMINGTON. If you cannot handle. it any other way?
Mr. COLEY. Right.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
Would these provisions of the 1947 act prohibit the Agency from
providing a camera, tape recorder, disguises and alias documentation
to a White House employee if the Agency was informed that that
employee was to use these materials to conduct an "interview," as was
apparently the case with Mr. E. Howard Hunt, in 1971? ,
Mr. COLBY. This is a very complicated question, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTON. Simplify it for us.
Mr. COLBY. For example, the Secret Service Act calls for the full
collaboration of other agencies of the Government in the protection of
the individuals designated for protection by that service. The question
as to whether, we should give the Secret Service certain assistance
comes up. I propose to draw the distinction between
Senator SYMINGTON. This was not Secret Service. The White House
called the Deputy Director of the CIA requesting all of this apparatus
be give" 'Mr., Hunt.
Mr.,COLBY. Right. I was using this as an illustration of the com-
plexity of the problem, Mr. Chairman. In other, words, I find it very
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22
difficult to say here that we will.never give any other agency of the
U.S. Government help which they might use in. their responsibilities
because, for instance, we provide a considerable amount of intelligence
to the FBI, and there are other ways iii which we help the other
agencies of the Government.
The fact is, however, that I think in that particular case a mistake
was made and it will not be made again.
Senator SYMINGTON. A good answer.
Would the, provisions of the, 1947 act prohibit the .use of a so-called
safe house to provide such materials to a White House employee?
Mr. COLBY. I think the same atiswer applies to that questions Mr.
Chairman,
Senator SYatiNaTo. Would these provisions of the 1947 act pro-
hibit the developing, of a film for such a White Bouse employee?
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, that depends. I mean, if ..one, of the
White House, employees has a film of soh e'particular thing, or even
needs a safe house for some perfectly legitimate purpose I really see
no problem in the Agency helping him,with' that particular function.
I think it is really a matter of. what he is :doing and whether the
Agency participates by helping him ;in some improper activity, and I
assure you that the Agency is not going to participate i;n any, improper
activity, although I can envisage a sithiation in. which it, would be
appropriate for the Agency to help not Mr: How rid Hunt but a White
House official to meet somebody without coming to public notice.
Senator St iINoT-oN. In the CIA's interest, it is proper to state that
when the Deputy Director, General . Cushtnait found out the nature
and degree of this operation he notified the White Douse staff member
who had requested it that he would no longer approve it.
Mr. Cozsr. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. So I would not think you would have any prob-
lem with this question.
Mr. COLBY. I think that is exactly, it. When, it began to be indicated
that the Agency would begin to participate,in the activity in the United
States in that regard the Agency withdrew from that participatiotn.
- Senator SYMINGTON. Would these proviso of the 1947 act require
the Agency to insure materials loaned to a White House employee for
one function were not' used for another illegal function?
Mr. CoLsr. Let us say I think we are going to be very careful with
some of our unique equipment, Mr. Chairman, and we are not going to
let it out without control.
Senator SYMINGrON. Is there any practical way the CIA can moni-
tor the use of materials it provides to various employees in Govern-
ment, including those in the White House ?
Mr: COLBY. It depends on the equipment. With certain equipment
we can, and frequently do, insist on knowing precisely what is done
with that equipment, and that it is used in a legitimate purpose by the
Agency in question.
However, I think that it is possible in most cases for us to do this,
and we propose to do it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any agreement between the FBI and
the CIA regarding what is to occur if one agency, in the course of
its operations, comes across the operations of the-other?
Mr. COLBY. There is an agreement between the two agencies which
was drawn up some years ago. I have not had a chance to review this
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in detail but I propose to now that there is new leadership do both
agencies.
' Senator SYMINGTON. When you review it, will you submit to this
committee your conclusions?
Mr. COLBY. I would be glad to.
Senator SYMINGTON, Thank you.
Does either the CIA or the FBI have the authority to tell the other
not to continue with, or conduct, certain investigations; or, is there
merely an agreement to notify the other agency in case of a, potential
conflict?
Mr. CoLaY. I think the latter is correct. I do not think the CIA
has the authority to direct the FBI to suspend an investigation. We
do not. We do have the ability to explain to them that some activity
has another explanation which they might not have known and as a
practice we always db this.
Senator SYMIN roN. Nor would they have a right to do, so to you?
Mr. COLBY. They do not have the authority to give mean order to
Suspend any activity, except, I supposes in the area of domestic law
if they told me I was doing something improper, they might have au-
thorityto direct me not to do it or arrest me,
[The following additional statement was provided for the record:]
We have an agreenleht that CIA's fomgh intelligeuee operations in the
United States will be coordinated with the $'BI and tCrminated if the: 'BI deter-
mines them prejudicial to their activities.
Senator SYMINGTON. They would appeal to the President through
the Attorney General, and you would appeal to the President direct,
correct?
Mr. COLBY. I would go to the President, right.
Senator SYMINGTON. Aside from. protecting the physical security
of CIA property, such as the headquarters in Langley, Va., afid con-
ducting security investigations of its own employees, does the CIA
need to have authority to provide direct or indirect support to any
domestic law enforcement agency?
Mr. COLBY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do in terms of support to, for
example, the FBI. If we learn that a certain agent of another coun-
try is coming here, I think it is important we be allowed to pass that
information to the FBI and not be prohibited from doing so.
Senator SYMtNGTO1c. Does the authority of the CIA to collect in-
telligence outside the United States extend to collecting intelligence
on U.S. citizens abroad who do not appear to be involved with the
activities of foreign governments or foreign institutions?
Mr. COLBY. No; it does not.
Senator SYMINGTONN. Your answer is "No?"
Mr. COLBY. My answer is, "No," who were not involved with foreign
institutions.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you subscribe to Ambassador Helms state-
ment in his published address of April 1971, that "We do not target
on U.S. citizens?'I
Mr. COLBY. I do subscribe to 'that. We target on foreign intelligence,
Mr. Chairman, foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence services.
There is occasionally some incidental mention of American citizens in
this regard. That kind of information, if it indicates something im-
proper, is turned over by us to the FBI. It is not handled by our
Agency.
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Senator -S tixaTON. Now,; the, so-called ,Watergate Committee, the
one chaired by Senator Ervin, has recently released a set of documents
dealin1g with the plan during the :summer. of 197.), apparently approved
by the President, to establish an Inter-Agency, Committee on Intelli-
gence, which would include the Director: ofithe CIA,: and _ would :deal
with domestic intelligence operations Po you believe that the prohibi-
tion in-the .1947 act; against the Agdncy having. aiij- police'br law en-
forcenlent`powers; or any iiiterhal securityfunctions, would prohibit
the Director ' ?of Central Intelligence from participating in the evalua-
tion of intelligence on domestic groups?
Mr.- Coi t y. Ne; I do not; Mr. Chairman. I think that in that respect
the gaudy..hass"an, obligation',to provide too'the 0overnntent there'-
sults'bf 1ts:fdreign intelligence eietivitieS and collection and if this can
contr"rl te to the Government'g knowledge of, teme' problem in the
?
United States that this can properly be passed'b the Agency' toan
interttgen*ygrotip:but the Agetiby woul1not?itself:be'eiig4vd:In-those
fuiietiiotis or'exert'those. p6#ditt, It would merely-,pass the reeutttt of
its- activitie abroad t- O; a(t intari ney effort and tb the appropriate
authoi'i1 ie'eof the fioverhment;.
Senator ,SYXIxGTOW. Well, itr is any understiandinjr that when the
Centrali!ittell-igenee Ageiioy'was created the most Ydif'rcult problems
that they had in writing, the , lawweree.the objeeUQus,of,the. D tor. of
the Federal' Bureau of~ InvestVationi because-.f, his-apprehensions
about interference in domestic activities. You have no inteiitloii of do-
ing am Bing?of that clharaeter?
Mn Coe tat'. Absoiutal- not, Mr Chairman. "I repeat that I read the
word "foreign" before the word "intelligence" in the authority under
this act.
Senator STsarOx Based on so me. p per we received we. have the
right, I ltbiiik,.to belietTe that At toiavey General Mitchell did not know
of! this,eb:aalled plain' presented by Mr. Charles Toni Huston, a;.lawyer
in the' White House,at that time PF rhapsl Mr..Hoover in =reportingto
his boss, the Attorney General, request. that the, pibnie request,
be'put in =writing.- If he did that; .Mr; Mitchell, be1ng.a lawyer; ungites-
tionably: would have. felt `that higher authority was requesting Mr.
Hoover-tor break the law'. It may well be that is~ what happened and the
reason .the:plan, after a few days, was abandondeal. In -any case, the
people that I have discussed this matter with, who are %far greater au-
thorit lOn the Constitution,than Nairn, feel, that it was in effects re-
quest to?circumvent the-Con utiron, violate the Constitution. Yam not
asking for your opinion on that fact or lack of -accuracy but I would
hope that you would be very careful about this ~in the future because
now everybody will be considering this frond the standpoint of your
operations. As I understand it, you do not intend?to,participate in,any
wav in any domestic intelligence, is that correct?
Mr. Coimc.'I do not, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SvMINGTow. Would 04's prevent y-ou from ,heliing to make
policy, regarding the collection of intelligence on domestic groups?
Mr. Cotwr. I lielieve it' wo ld `yes,' Mr Chairman. I do not See that
as within: my responsibilities at all.
Senator vu'Itaotoxt.'Woufdthe 1947 act prohibit the CIA'from col-
lecting; or providing the siioport necessary for collecting, intelligen^e
within the United States on domestic groups?
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Mr. CoLBY. I believe that is the same question, essentially.;,
Senator SYazixcvrox. Yes.
Mr. COLEY. And it would prohibit me from doing that.
Senatot SYhiNGTOx. Would it clarify your responsibilities, Mr.
Colby, and the responsibilities of the CIA under the 1947 act;. if it were
made clearer that your responsibilities extended only to foreign intel-
ligence-namely, intelligence about or related to foreign governments,
groups, or individuals?
Mr. CoLBY. I would certainly have no objection to that. If it would
relieve any concern that anybody feels about CIA, I would fully recom-
mend that that be done. I think the easiest way for it is just to use the
words "foreign intelligence"
Senator SYMIxoTON. Ambassador Helms testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the requirement for the Director of
Central -Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods has
sometimes led to the existence of a "gray area," using his, ;words, of
CIA responsibilities by implication verging on the requirement to be
involved in domestic activities.
Do you know of any way to clarify or correct this situation?..
Mr. CoLBY. My interpretation of that particular provision, Mr.
Chairman, is that it gives me a charge but does not give me authority.
It gives me the job of identifying any problem of protecting sources
and methods, but in the event I identify one it gives me the responsibil-
ity to go to the appropriate authorities with that information and it
does not give me any authority to act on my own. So I really see less of
a gray area in that regard. I believe that there is really no authority
under that act that can be used. If, on the other hand, there is some
concern over the matter I would have no problem because I do not view
it as giving me any authority.
Senator SYaiixarox. Do you believe that some other Government
official should have the overall responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods in order to make it clear, for example, that it is
not the CIA's responsibility to get involved indomestic law enforce-
ment functions $
Mr. Coat. I think, in 9; sense, Mr. Chairman, we all : have the
responsibility of protecting national security information, and that
most intelligence sources and methods fall into that category.
Senator SYmxGTox. Well, if I understand; if there is' a Government
official that should have such responsibility, it should be yourself $
Mr. CoLBY. For the intelligence field, I think it is myself no question
about it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Right.
In general, what do you consider to be the proper scope of your
agency activities within the United States?
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, we obviously have to run a headquarters
here; we have to recruit people for our stags, and so forth; '-.we have
to conduct investigations on those people; we have to'protectioir own
intelligence sources and methods within the Agency; we have'to con
tract with a large number of American firms for the various kinds)
of equipment that, we might have need for abroad. We also ,,L believe
quite properly, can.colleot foreign intelligence in the United-States,
including requesting American citizens to share with their Govern-
ment certain information they may know about foreign situations.
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We have a service that does this, and I am happy to say, a very urge
number of American citizens have given us. some very important in-
formation. We do not pay for that information. We can protect their
pitoprietairy interest and eveib protect their names if zteeeseary, it they
would rather not be e gpc ed ?ab the soaiee of that infor ion1.
We also I believe, havej,ctvtain support, activitiies that we ]Aust.
conduct in the United Stature in-,order to,eottduct foreign in?elligeiI
operations abroad. Certain structures are necessary in. this country
to give oui? people abioa4 perhaps a reason. for operating abroad, in
some, reepebts so that-they! ioai a pear nob as CIA employees but as
representatives of some other ermtaty, Lastly; I think that, there ate ~s
number of activities in the United States where 'fq i intelligeuce
can be colleaete& from: fbreigmes, and as long. asthis, is foRgn.1- i lli-
#i0
gence, Ia think:! its quite, pz'oppr? that we do so, I can certainly go
more det thl: Ott ,this, in exec utive~ session any time you: would li t Mr.
Chaii+tnarn, .but:I reiterate that tha focus should ?axd, must be foreign:
intelligence only;. and that all the other activities;are only supportive
of that major function.
Senator,-SvaMYr ix. If you slvdtild. receive an order in the future
W hic1 =on on %f fans tn'ba Illegal, What would you ado ?
Mn I wqufd!a oat to it:.snd;- if, neoemary I: am quite prepared
to leave ttjis+respon4bikitaj4f?it cante,,to that..
SeazatgrBra xua rn i did mot hear you.,
Mn Cora And I am, quite. prep d to.leave the job if comes
to that. ~ ,,
Senattor c ,ym Toic. Do"yaw believe that CIA.,officiuls should re rain
from snaking 00licy, ter, explitntlya iu along' i 0i 10nd t shout
polwy, and, asb,custom he cane
before the CIA'. subcdt stn ittF Li1 t' h t13 ` ittge qf' ` ' Sew yy.,,,
T- -.L L~7?-----mot Lam-
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I have a few questions to ask you, sir.
As you know, we are glad to have you here. The question that is
before us is the qualifications of Mr. Colby; to be Director. He reports
to the National Security Council, but the National Security Council is
an advisory council to the President-that is, if he is confirmed he
would report to the National Security Council. In fact, the President
is the chairman of the advisory council that is his. So, therefore, in
fact, Mr. Colby reports directly to the President of the United States
if he is confirmed. And the Acting Director today, General Walters,
therefore reports directly to the President.
When your study team made its trip to Vietnam the war was in full
swing, was it not?
Representative DRINAN. It was in 1969, yes, it was one of the worse
years, after the Tet offensive.
Senator SmIINGTON. Putting aside what you felt were his inhibi-
tions on your team, do you believe that ,Mr. Colby's own efforts could
have remedied the situation in Vietnam which you have criticized in
your statement, in view of the policies and in the face of the policies
that had been set and were being set in Washington?
Representative DRINAN. Yes, I do. And we made it very clear in the
report, which is in the Congressional Record, that he could have
insisted on the fundamental right to a trial, and that he did not. We
pointed out to him in June 1969 that these people who were being
swept into prison by the U.S. forces didn't have a hoaxing, didn't even
know the charges against them. And he admits himself--and this is
in my testimony-I didn't read it-he admits himself that it was not
until 1971 that every Vietnamese person accused of being with the
Vietcong, it was not until 2 years after that that they had the basic
right to be presented with the testimony against them or the charges
against them and to be present personally at a hearing. So I do insist
that despite the orders that he had, he was responsible for the sweep-
ing injustices done to thousands. of individuals who were South
Vietnamese.
Senator SYMINGTON. As you know, the Phoenix program was not
a program of the United States, it was a program of the South Viet-
namese which we supported.
Representative DIUNAN. With U.S. military advisers in every
hamlet.
Senator SYMINOToN. He was sent out there with instructions to sup-
port the South Vietnamese Phoenix program. That I think we have
established.
Do you know about what might be called the pre-Colby policy inci-
dent to Phoenix and what was being done prior to his arrival?
Representative DRINAN. I think f do, Senator. I think it is fair to
say, though, that Mr. Colby was the architect of the Phoenix program,
of the pacification program. Something like that existed prior to that
time, and apparently was ineffective. Some people say that the Phoenix
program was ineffective. I think it was tremendously ineffective in that
it jailed the very people who alone could form some coalition that
might oppose in a genume election the present president.
Senator SYMINOTON. Now, on page 10 you sa "The CIA for the
first time in the history of this Nation has introduced a secret agency
into our Government." Would you say that the CIA created the CIA
or that the Congress created the CIA?
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Representative DRINAx. No, Fhave the basic law here created by the
Congress in 1947. And ~s you)pxovr'' this was for'the first time the crea-
tion of atx7 a ieY i&did'Ui i' &hj%ve secret p wets. And it may have
been required at that tirtie but I think all the Members of Congress at
this moment in history have the right and the duty to re-ask the basic
question of whether 9r not 4ny, secret agency of this, type can or shdtild
exist. .
Senator SYXXXGT`OX.'Would you say, with the way the world is,?t'hat
we should abandon -an agency that was created primarily to obtitaiii
intelligence about the energy ariA enemy actions in all tither counti~i l
Representative I)RiivA'X i can't answer that Senator,_as long as they ?
are holding from me and other Members of &ngress"e basl'c infor=
mation. I don't know about the CIA. I don't know kbotit' It? budget,
I don't know what it is doing. And I say-this''is'9L'fundarA6h 61'deniad
of my rights as a Me~rfber Congress and I say that that ques ion is ?
therefore Impossible to answer.
Stliator SYmiNdTON.' You have a CIA subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee===- .
Representative DurxAx. We do.
Senator S'mrx(;*X. Have you, discussed this matter with that %sub-
coinmittee g
Representative Mnvix. I have and r commctnd`Coz)gressmart Nedii
of Mieldgan for Join a very fine job in this newly revised subeozii-
mittee of the CIA. $ull.I am sure that Mr. Nedzi would agree with' me
that the M,emb m of: the house Gil& the Mez'rftof the Senate still
know virtually nothin abo{it the CIA. ne'oiilyr' time I hear abo4 the
CIA is when h does something foolish and .riiakes the headlines, lito
the ITT in Chile and'th6 '13ay of figs, and sbt,4fii other scaxida3s, ' .
Senator SYMTNfiTOIC Let me say; the rules of th?r's , committee' are to
get the testimony in 24 hours ahead if possible, so that we can study it
and establish answers against it, ?Ahd we 'only got yoni testimony 'a
short time ago. So there are perhaps other questions that I' would tikb
to ask you based on it. And with your approval, I will submit these for
the record.
When you say that the senior Members of the House and bf the
Senate have conspired to;prevent the yqunger Members'of the H90se
and Senate knowing-anything about the' CIA; that I think is a little
strong.
Representative MM AN. I'meant it to, be st r?art~+ Senator", "
Senator SYMINGTON. Would pori tell us a'little~more a!bo{4t that?,
Representative. DRINAN I p; an;t it to be strongAnd h am nbf ie'
treating from it. $ut all I can say is that the small snrbe
7
itt
o
nxi
tees of
the House and of the Senate that know something aliotA'the bud~ ge'et 61
the CIA have agteed to keep. this in f orznati~i ether Members of
the Congress. And I think that f s- ftdameritalta a~rorl They tivant` t
to make judgments on their knowledge ,snc1'to lxabie a~act of faith in
them. And many. months a this came izp the fi,por of the House.
And the chairman of the House Atoned, Servicps'Committee aj that
time, rather than to allow us to go `fdinvsrd "aflt an' ametidnient .t'o
delete all fundYng~in ttlis Bill for the't"~A'sfi''tHt He d6nfld reae'ri-
vate. the committee on the CIA, which lie' lid ? dcrnQ Ilizt'iye' have. never
ha'd a vote on how much money the M ,sf `t~`'c4ozi~'t Ikxxow where
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43
that money is buried, or for what purposes. So I just think it is funda-
mentally wrong. that
Senator SmrncGT0N. On page 10, Mr. Congressman, you say
Mr. Colby did not disclose the nature of the makeup of the so-called
Forty Committee. He gave us the details of that in executive session.
And therefore we understand the nature of that committee.
Let me say that I believe that the CIA has been instructed by higher
authorities to do things that it should not do and that its original
charter, you might say, did not justify us doing, like, for example,
running a war over a period of years in Laos. Perhaps some of us have
been instrumental in trying to brig all that problem to light, so that
the Agency contains itself as to what it was originally created for,
namely, an intelligence agency, an intell' ence-gathering agency. On
the other hand, the pee le who ran the Agency were under instruc-
tions from higher authority to do that.
One of the interesting things-and I submit to you that you might
consider discussing with Congressman Nedzi and others-is that
whereas in the country in question, like Laos, under the so-called Ken-
nedy letter, the head of the CIA reports to the Ambassador, and the
Ambassador directs his operation. But when you got back here to
Washington, there was no relationship carried on, and the CIA. wax
independent of the Foreign Relations Committee. You see my point.
So there seems to be a paradox, if not a dichotomy, you might say, that
there is a change of command as to congressional review.
Representative DRINAN. I think it is contrary to the statute. I think
they go far beyond their functions. And I think they go far beyond
what the National Security Act of 1947 provides for. And I might 'add
that when Mr. -Colby was asked about that in the letter or the gtiestion
posed by Senator Hughes, he would not concede, and.I have it before
me--that the activities of the CIA in Laos were improper, or inappro-
priate, or illegal. And I therefore think that this is a very key point,
that he will not concede that the CIA made any error in that escapade
in Laos.
Senator SmiINGT0x. You know the clause, which I do not have be-
fore me, in the CIA charter, which the administration says justifies its
functioning.
Representative DRINAx. They will do anything that the National
Security Council directs them to do. I have it here, Senator. I think
that is the operative word, is it not, that they will do anything that the
National Security Council mandates them to do?
Senator ,Svsrn OTON. What worries me is that I have felt for some
time that our military budget was too high in cost. And I am, depressed
with recent reports, such as that report that Mr. Warnke, former As-
sistant Secretary of Defense, presented before our committee in--an open
session earlier this week, where there was a savings estimated at $14
billion. And then I saw the Brookings Institute Report yesterday
which stated that there could be a savings anywhere from $10 to $25
million in the military budget if we moved more toward modernity, you
might say, in weapons as against tradition. And yet `invariably the mil-
itary budget will be decided on in the long rim on the basis of what any
possible enemy has capable of attacking in the United States. And
without an agency of this character, I don't see how we could be fairly
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44
sure'that we know what the enemy has. That is one point I submit to
you with great respect.
mother point is that everytime that-thg'servicis come up to justify
the billions of dollars. that each service wants each year we always get
an analysis from the Central Inteli gene "Agency as we1~l as an analysis
of the. possible, enemy from'the DIA. Acid with one conspicuous ex-
eeptlon, invariably the estimate of the. CTi as to.the' possible enemy
grow id':strength has been considerabl~~ less than that, submitted by our
own eopie in the Army. Invariably the estimate of the CIA as to the
actua' streng~tth of the ppossible enemy naval forces' has been less than
that of our Navy. And the same thing is true of the Air' Force. And the ?
record will show that over the years the CIA has been much more ac-
curate in its estimates than the services he, and therefore I do feel
in that 'field that it has performed as,kdrthy function, which it could
Qnl do if itoperated as an intelli$siice ag icy
Representative, I~RI . . That is one of the reasons, Senator, why I
ga t 6 get more credibility for.our intelli n'de activities. And in the
Tlentagon Papers" it was revei ,led that t3ie'.CIA:Vas less wrong than ?
everY y else.
Senator SYMINGrbN. The clause that we are told justifies running the
war in Laos is in the National SecurityAct of'i94 , as.amended :
Bbr the purpose od coor(iinating,the intelii yGe..activities of the several gov,
ernment departn}ente and agencies in the inteteste of national security, it shall he
the.duty of the agency Hader th'e direction of tiib' National Security Council
. And'that gives five maj or duties. The fii,h is
'To perform each other functions s11d duties related tp intelligence affecting the
national security as the National security Council may from time to time direct.
May say, I agree with you, that I think the ;functioning of the war
in Laos over, a ;period of years does, not come under that heading, and I
have so stated on the: floor of the Sonate a number: of times.
Representative Dlwi&N. I know you have, Senator,
Senator SYMIxOTox. Senator Cannon.
Senator CANNON. Thank yoii, Mr, Chairman.
Mr. Congressman, on page 4 ,of, your statement you say that there
are now some 200 000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Is that a
factual 'statement I
Representative ARINAN1, Yes.
Senator,CAxxox:;If so, how reliable do you'thilsk it-is? ?
Representative DRINArt. I think that is quite reliable, air, from every-
thing-we khow.,Presiderrt Thiieu disputes that and says that some of
these are not merely card-carrying Communists but dangerous. But
virtually none of those 200,000 have committed an overt act. I have
followed this situation over the last 4 years. I spoke most recently to
two French citizens who : have :been there for sometime and who were
in prison and who reported reliably, on this situation. And it is very
clear that President Thieu.has in fact consciously or otherwise impris-
oned those who could form a coalition against him. I think that is well
documented. And the figure 200,000 may in fact, be conservative. Some
people say it is 300,00!Orormore,:
These .people are in ~risoitsmade by the 'United States. And, last
year or this?year $21 million was appropriated by the Congress or, in
the military budget for the creation and maintenance of prisons in
South Vietnam.
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Senator CANNON. You said just then that President Thieu has had
these political prisoners put in, and then on page 7 you say the United
States has put all of the potential political opponents of President
Thieu in jail. How do you equate that with the United States has put
them in jail? Have we in fact been jailing those people?
Representative DRINAN. Under the pacification program there was
an American adviser in almost every hamlet. And we went up to the
hamlets and saw the military field tribunals. And if a local person said
that this particular citizen is dangerous, the American adviser would
acquiesce in the jailing of this individual, and would not insist upon
fundamental rigts of a hearing. The American advisers were,a party
to this lawlessness, and they acquiesced in it; they cooperated in it.
And to some extent they initiated it in the sense that they wanted to get
rid of the substructure of the Vietcong.
Senator CANNON. So that by their acquiescence then, of our advisers,
you are saying that the United States has jailed all of those political
opponents?
Representative DRINAN. We visited with these individuals in jail.
We spoke-
Senator CANNON. How many did you visit with?
Representative DRINAN. Dozens, hundreds. In our report we mention
name after name. And we had eight members of the team. Some went
to Konson; others went out to the highlands. And I saw dozens, hun-
dreds of people, including children 12 to 14 years old, suspected Viet-
cong. At least one-third or more, Senator, were there without any hear-
ing whatsoever at that time, 1969.
Sefiator CANNON. You blame Mr. Colby for being, as you say, unable
or unwilling to guarantee to South Vietnamese citizens the basic pro-
visions of due process? How can you blame that on Mr. Colby-who
is outside of the governing structure of South Vietnam?
Representative DRINAN. He conceded that he would prefer it that
way, he conveyed that he would like to have more lawyers. He assumed
the responsibility as the director of the Phoenix program for the jail-
ings that were going on as the American advisers, aided by function-
aries of the Thieu government, moved into the countryside and jailed
those who were associated with the Vietcong, the infrastructure, as
they called it. And I think it is fair to say that Mr. Colby felt that he
was in fact responsible for this. He admitted that he preferred more
due process. And in 1971 he changed the rules, so that at that time every
individual who was a ?outh Vietnamese citizen had a right to the
charges against him, and had a right to a hearing before he would be
sent to jail prior to that tune during most of the life of the Phoenix
program. In other words, the South Vietnamese citizens did not have
those fundamental rights.
Senator CANNON. Are they being guaranteed those rights at the pres-
ent time?
Representative DRINAN. I doubt it. Most of our advisers, of course,
have left. We are no longer in charge of it. I don't know the answer to
that question, Senator. I know that those 200,000 remain in jail, some-
times for an indefinite period. There is a very serious problem of polit-
ical suppression. I don't konw how many new individuals are going
to ' ail or what guarantees they might have.
Senator CANNON. My own personal feeling is that you are blaming
Mr. Colby for a number of things that he had no control over ; actually,
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he was sent there to do certain. things and carry out certain policies.
I think that blame. ought to lie with the people over Mr., Colby rather
than a man who is out: what; he is told to do.
Representative DRINAN a Spoke, with any number of ,officials,
Senator, here and in the State Department, mid, in !Saigon. An4 they
all said that the Phoenix program is carrying out this pattern. We
went there precisely for. the, purpose; of investigating this number of
political prisoners. This was ,a privately sponsored group, funded by
the churches and citizens of. America:,to find t". ,Out, what is our
Government doing. And I am not saying that Mr, Colby is exclusively
responsible, I say that we found many American officials who were
also implicated in the lawlessness. But the question is, should he be
confirmed as the Director of the CIA ? And in my jud~m en t, his oper-
ation of the Phoenix program does not justi confidence in him
Senator CANNON. You also said that he made no firm commitment
that the CIA under his direction would not become involved in another
operation such as the CIA conducted in Laos. I would say that if he
made such a commitment as that he would. not be a person to put, in ?
charge of the CIA, because he would have no say whatsoever as to
whether the CIA would or would not become involved in a situation
such as Laos. That again would be a policy decision of the U.S. Govern-
ment, whoever is over the CIA. And if he is told by his superior authority to conduct the. type of activity in Laos that has been con-
ducted in some other location, I would presume that he would have to
carry out his orders, wouldn't he?
Representative DRINAN. I don't think that even the Director of the
CIA has to be obedient to every command that is given to him. He
must live within the mandate of the Agency. And it is an intelligence
agency. And as the chairman has said, this goes far beyond anything
by way of intelligence, when the Embassy itself is in Laos conducting
an air war without the knowledge or consent of Congress or the people.
So I think there is a point in time when the Director of the CIA would
have to say, that is not within the 'jurisdiction, of the CIA, and those
functions wouid'not be lawful:
Senator CArrrroN. I would say that if he had been told to do that
by his appointing authority and failed to do it, he wouldn't be Director
of the CIA very long. I. am sure he would be removed by the appoint-
ing authority if he didn't carry out the policies that he was directed to
carry out.
I, too, raise the question about your statement on page 10. You said
you stood by it, and you admitted it was harsh. I think it is not only
harsh, but I think it is not factual. I don't think that you. have said one
thing here that indicates that any ' Members of the House or of the
Senate have entered into any conspiracy to prevent the younger Mem-
bers of the House and Senate from knowing anything.about the CIA.
I think that is a very unfair statement. I don't know whether I would
be considered one of the 'senior. Members in that category, but I cer-
tainly have had no part' in any conspiracy to deprive any Member, of
the Congress of the right to know what they ought to know about the
operations of the CIA. As, -matter of fact, 1, have tried to find out-
myself on many: occasions, what actually the CIA ivas, doing. And I
have been unsuccessful on occasion.' But I-certainly don!t+cantend that
that is the result of any conspiracy on the part Hof anybody.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMiNOTON. I would add that the same thing is true of me.
And when you say :
I want to state, with all due respect, that it has been the Senate Armed
Services Committee which, more than any other agency of the Congress, has pre-
vented the Congress and the people of this country from knowing anything
about the CIA."
I think that is a very unfavorable statement to the House of Repre-
sentatives. As I understand it, most Members of the House considered
that their body has a full and equal position under the Constitution,
and certainly in responsibility, that the Senate has, should be shared
by the House in a matter of this character, although the Senate does
confirm the Director of the CIA, as I am sure you know - under
the Constitution the House itself is responsible,. and is the only body
that can originate the appropriations that at least by inference you are
criticizing this morning.
all the information about the CIA.
Representative DRINAN. A very good point.
just like to say that as one of the younger Members of the Senate and
one of the youngest members of this committee, 34, and having just
arrived, I have had absolutely no problem in this committee or as a
Senator in securing information that I desire as far as the CIA opera-
tions were concerned. And Chairman Stennis; Chairman Symington,
Senator Cannon, Senator Jackson, and Senator Thurmond, everyone
that 1 have over asked for any kind of help in securing information,
has not only been cooperative, but they have arranged briefings and
done whatever is necessary. I personally cannot speak for the Members
of the House, but I can speak for the Senators. And I can also say
that as late as yesterday afternoon I talked to Senator Jackson, and he
suggested that I have a briefing. and ask' another freshman Senator to
come, about the CIA on the threat that we have on strategic weapons
now. So, as far as I am concerned, Congressman, as one Senator I can
say that I have had no difficulty.
Representative DaLNAN. First, let me say that this is rather new, to
have briefings.
And secondly; Senator Cannon says he doesn't have enough informa-
tion about the CIA. Maybe I should have stated that nobody in the
whole Congress knows enough about the CIA. And I hope that you
learn more and more. This is a welcome development.
Senator NuNN. I am not sure that even the Director of the CIA has
Senator Nuxx.. Mr. Chairman,, before I get into questions I would
agree with you, to monitor more and more carefully not only the CIA
but any other agency that we -give this kind of power to.
I would like to ask you a few,. questions,. Congressman.
This statement on. page 7 that Senator Cannon was asking about
seems to me to be pretty. far-reaching where you say:
I do not want to have a Director of the CIA who for whatever reason by his
own admission was unable or tmwilling to guarantee. to the Sottth Vietaam citi-
zens the basic provisions of due process.
If we had an American in~either the CIA or military who was guar-
anteeing the South Vietnam citizens due process, would he not ia'effect
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have to be a dictator of South Vietnam also 4 Wouldn't he have to take
over the Government of South Vietnam! And.isn't this directly con-
trary to your conception of America's role ?
Representative Daixnx. One good argument, Senator, is that we
have done that. Mr. Qolby did keep insistu g that we cannot interfere
in the internal matters of South Vietnam. We,were involved, of course.
All I can say is that when we directed a program like the Phoenix, in
which we were directly responsible four building Jails, and going
out in the Highlands and helping the elected government or the ap-
pointed government to destroy the intrastructure of the Viet Cong,
that we are in effect acquiescing and cooperating in'this denial of basic
due process.
. Senator Nuxx. Do_ you recall, the statute which'was a period in
1971-which was in our American law passed by Congress and signed
by the President which says :
Whenever there shall be in existence such emergency, .the President acting
through the Attorney General, is authorized to apprehend and by order obtain,
pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter, each, ppR~rsonwith respect to whom
there is-r,gmnnd to e"4" M "# l1prgbably will engage
Y-ith`'othere to Aftft r% ' acts of espionage and
sabotam
Representative DatNAN. I helped to remove that. That is the Japa-
nese Detention Act. One evil doesn't justify another.
Senator Numx. Nn,;sir. But we had that on our books at the same
time that we were running the Phoenix program in South Vietnam-
So, in effect, we didn't have due process, -ttn ed r` this analogy, guaran-
teed to our own citizens, and yet you 'would'impose the burden on the
Director of the CIA in wartime, in a country that had never had
democratic principles,,to guarantee due pirocess to those citizens. Is
that 'what you are saying Y
Representative Dtuxer . "That is what I" sin saying ;.one etil does
not justify another. And if we do what we did in South Vietnam, the
least that we could do is" to carry out the constitution of South Viet-
name itself. I am not asking them to impose American standards. And
I quoted the constitution of Vietnam, and that constitution provides
for wartime and emergency, but it goes on and says that nonetheless
the basic fundamental ga~arantees must remain under all circumstances,
Senator Nvxx. Uncle' that thedry he should' have been back home
trying to get this law off the bboks", shouldn't he, instead of being in
South Vietnam trying' to guarantee that due process a
Representative D1crNAx. Maybe all of us should have been back
home.
Senator Nuxx. But you do feel that he should have been able" to,
and you would think he was disqualified if he was not guaranteeing
that due process. ? :Representative Dunks. I think it is very clear, Senator= and' I
pointed out in the testimony that we pointed this out to him in June
1969, that these individuals that we. met in prison were swept there
not knowing the charges against them, having no? hearing, being de-
tained for months or-years without any reateon,given to them. And
it was not until 2 years later that Mr. Co iskied'a directive that
every South Vietnamese citizen must have. t'he' charges against him,
must have a hearing at which he can appear; before his liberty can
be taken away.
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Senator Nuxx. So he did do that 2 years later $
Representative DIUNAN.He certainly did.
Senator Nuxx. Do you know the situation prior to Phoenix in
South Vietnam? Did the Phoenix program itself have-was it directly
responsible for taking away any kind of due process, or was there
anything such as this before Phoenix ?
Representative DxiNAN. It wasn't as well organized. Phoenix was
designed as a so-called falsification-later called Vietnamization. It
means that in effect that we are the surrogates of the Thien govern-
ment, and that we do the work of the Thieu government, and are sup-
pressing or opposing thews political dissidents.
Senator Nuxx. I would like to ask you one other question relating
to your statement on page 11. You state here : "Mr. Colby has done
'intelligence' work for most of his adult life." And in the third sen-
tence of that second paragraph on page 11 you state : "He believes
in sending American citizens to other nations who will pretend that
they are not employees of the CIA." Now, are you saying that that
is a reason for not confirming him as head of the intelligence opera-
tions?
Representative DiuNAN. May I go back and quote what I omitted
when I read my testimony. Directly from the questions that were
raised on July 2 with Mr. Colby, and Mr. Colby was asked : "Would
you collaborate with corporations in your work abroad?" And he
said-and this is at the bottom of 9--he said : "Certain structures are
necessary in this country-America-to give our people abroad per-
haps a reason for operating abroad in some respect so that they can
appear not as CIA employees, but as representatives of some other
entity." And I just raise this question: If the-American people in the
Congress are going to finance James Bond types like Mr. Colby sug-
gests, I think that the elected Members of the Congress have a right
to know about it. And I am just raising that question-how many
people, American citizens, are there now abroad or will be abroad
pretending that they are not employees of the CIA when in fact they
are?
Senator Nuxx. Getting back to my original question, are you
saying that our intelligence network should in effect go up and have
badges on or uniforms saying that we are members of the CIA; here
we are, folks; we are in Germany; we are members of the CIA?
Representative DruNAN. I did not say that, Senator, I simply said
that if this is going to go on I think that the Congress should know
about it.
Senator Nuxx. Let me ask you a question on that point. Accord-
ing to that, did you think that every Congressman and every Member
of the Senate should have all the top secret information that relates
to CIA on demand? Is that the logic of your contentions ?
Representative DRINAN. The military trusts a lot of people and the
State Department trusts a lot of people. They all have clearance,
and there is no reason in my judgment why 535 men and women
could not be given' clearance.
Senator Nuxxs So your answer'is "Yes"' on that, that every Member
of Congress and every Member of the Senate on any day they wanted
to find out any top secret information, no matter how crucial
Representative DmNAN. I didn't say that.
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Senator NuNN. Where would you draw tho line ?
Representative DRINAN. I am sorry. All I can say, Senator, is that
I have not been able to learn anything sibout the CIA as a Member
of Congress. And all I can8 ay is
that wham; I know what the CIA is
doing and hove much inose~tthey have and how they spend it, then I
could make some judgment on that question
Senator. Nbxtx.'Do youthink there ought-, to be a line drawn some-
where? Is that the pointt?
Representative DILaNAN. I would shay so.,
Senator Nuww. In other words, there is some point--you wouldn't
say that every Member of the Congress should know everything going
on on a day--by-day basis?
Representative DRININ. No.
Senator NUNN. There has to be a line, and the question comes to
the judgment of Congress as to where that line. should be drawn.
Would you agree that Congress does make that judgment, and you
are really lodging a complaint against Congress rather than the CIA?
Representative Thuz r. I thought I made that clear.
Senator NuNx. I just want to make that clear. You are saying
that we ourselves are derelict, 'you are. not criticizing Mr. Colby or
the CIA when you say that every member couldn't get all the infor-
mation they should?
Representative Dnixax: No, the Congress has been derelict, I think
that is my word, in its oversight function. I
Senator NUNN. Congressman, if you were convinced that the
Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee in
the House and Senate which have the supervision over matters re-
lating to our national security were indeed formed--I am not saying
they were, and that was hypothetically the 'ease-and there was a
balanced representation in * these committees of the entire Congress,
do you think than under those conditions, numbers, that they were
informed,` and that they did have the proper supervision, and that
they were balanced cos ithttees ? .Do you think at that point that we
could draw a logical line on the crucial information as it relates to
international security?
Representative DRINAN. I am not certain of that, because there is
no track record to go on. And as I mentioned, two distinguished Sen-
ators conceded that they never heard of the CIA operation in Laos.
Consequently, I would have to say, I would have to have faith in
that committee that they did have sufficient information.
Senator Nuxx. But under that hypothetical-if they never did
exist--and we could get it to exist, your opinion might change,
wouldn't it?
Representative DRIIAN. It might.
Senator Nuivx. Mr. Chairman, I have, no further questions of this
witness,
Senator SYDQNOroN. Before calling on Senator HuO ies, I would
like to read into the record, Mr. Congressman, the testimony in open
session. Mr. Colby says : "I do not think it was: a war, *hen it began,
Mr. Chairman. I think we were giving some assistance- to the people
in Laos who were resisting, the North Vietnamese coming into this
country."
And I said : "Well, in any case, by August 15 we will be out of it,
we hope." And then is asked, "Do not large scale operations such
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as the war in Laos go considerably beyond what Congress intended
when it provided for other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence?"
That is part of that previous-and Mr. Colby's reply was, "I think
it undoubtedly did. And I think also that as a practical matter a covert
operation cannot be a very big one, because it stops being covert when
it gets too big. I think this was the lesson of the Bay of Pigs, among
other things."
So that, I think, you sand I would both agree with.
Representative DHINAN. I might point out that he is less direct than
that in his answers to the inquiries of Senator Hughes, and I read
from them.
Senator Hughes asked, "On reflection, do you think that it was wise
for the CIA to get involved in such military operations in Laos?"
Answer :
The agency's operations in Laos were undertaken in direct response to Presi-
dential and National Security Council directions in order to carry out U.S.
policy and at the same time voice the necessity for uniformed U.S. involvement
in Laos. These activities grew in size over the years to meet greater North
Vietnamese and Laos pressure. The size to which these operations grew make it
difficult to maintain normal intelligence procedures.
And then he adds, and concludes, "Despite the difficulty for the CIA,
I think that the Agency fulfills the charge given it efficiently and
effectively." In effect, contradicting what he said in open session.
Senator SYMiNOTON. No, I can't agree with that.
Representative DRINAN. In effect-
Senator SYMINoToN. In effect-you have a problem that if he is
given instructions, he has one or two things to do, based on my judg-
ment. I spent many years in the Pentagon, and I have been on the CIA
subcommittee for many years. In his case you either have to obey the
orders or resign. We even decided what we would have done in a par-
ticular case. But obviously he can no longer be constructive and func-
tion if he had refused to obey his superiors. And we do have a problem
in turn-for example, we have had three Secretaries of Defense since
the first of the year. We went for many, many weeks without a Sec-
retary of Air, and I don't believe we have had an Assistant Secretary
of Air for several years now. And the same thing is true of the Army.
We have an Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a gen-
eral, who was not in the Agency until he came in as Deputy Director.
And this Government, in spite of all its problems around this time,
has to continue functioning. What worries me is whether or not we
are discussing here the functions of the CIA. And I am the first to
ree, I think they have gone beyond what could be called their
charter. On the, other hand, I don't want to see it taken out on an
individual if he is able and experienced and understands the func-
tioning of the Agency. I agree with you that we can hope for more
thorough review of the Agency in the future. And I can say that the
chairman of this committee believed that the matter should be re,
viewed more thoroughly than it has been in the past.
Representative DRINAN. Thank you, Senator.
May I suggest, however, that it is not certain from the testimony,
which I have, read and reread very carefully, that Mr. Colby does
understand and appreciate and will live by the mandate of the CIA.
And in another question Senator Hughes asked him, "Would you abide
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by the directive of the CIA. that you must keep out of all local domestic
American activities?"
And Mr. Colby responded that in general he would do t h a t . How-
ever, he goes on and s a y s that "such actions will be taken only in the
most exceptional circumstances, and with the Director's personal
approval."
The statute says that they can't get. involved, and yet he weasles
like that.
Senator SymNOTON., Of course we will have to have Mr. Colby.back
now and discuss the matters that in a democratic fashion are now
being laid out before the Congress and the people.
Senator Hughes.
Senator HuonrDs. Thank, you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Drinan, you have obviously spent a .great deal of time
in analyzing the record, the background, and before your time in Con-
gress you visited. Vietnam as part of the study mission, and are very
concerned about what is happening. I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman; I was tied up on other
matters that were'related to the,committee work in another way.
But I would like to ask if the Oversight Committee of the Senate on
the CIA.has been placed into the record? Who knows in the Senate
what. is going on in the CIA ? I have been told ever since I have been
here that there is a committee composed of several people who actually
serve as an Oversight Committee on the CIA. Is there someone other
than the Armed Services Committee that does that? Does anyone on
the staff know?
Representative. Dxixex. The actual funding. of the Central Intelli-
gence. Agency has to go through the Appropriations Committee, of
course. And the five or seven senior members of. the Appropriations
Committee get in detail the, requests for -and' the j*Fificatibns' for?the
money that goes to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator Huoxzs. As the. chairman -knows, both he and myself-are
members of the Democratic Policy; Committee, and we have frequently
discussed some of what is happening. And I want tocompliment the
chairman, because he is pressed constantly and. consistently for more
openness and any information than at any time in the. 41/2 years that
I have been in the Senate He is continuously pressed for that, and; I
certainly think the record should show it
I am concerned, however, because' T think I'h'eard a x:chair.
man of the Appropriations Committee say in debate on the, floor of the
Senate that he himself did.notwant toknow the actual' facts-becaese
he was afraid he might talk iii his slee . If I recall, that is the stater
nzent he made..And Tthinltthatif:the c alrnian of the Appropriations
Committee and the responsible peopled n t-know the facts, somewhere
on this Hill, I thing something is wrongg.
We have recently, seen a verb broad display of what I consider
deception and deceit in relationship t' this'committee in the Pentagon.
And I am concerned that this may p eate other` areas of! thegovern-
mental structure also, is l know every member of this, committee must
be.
Father Drinan has pressed very hard ifr this statement, and in many
cases it is a ver, harsh statement,, which reflects what he must feel deep
within himself' about a system that, tolerate:' things like' the Phoenix
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program, for whatever reason. But I do believe, and I am not testify-
ing, Father Drinan, I apologize, but I do believe that somehow we
must improve the oversight of the CIA and what is happening over
there, and how the money is being spent.
And, again, I compliment the chairman; because in the last Congress
he pressed very hard to get the appropriations out into the open, and
what we were doing with them. And I might add that we did not suc-
ceed too well with that. I supported the chairman in this.
Father Drinan, do you believe that there should be some side, some
view of the facts that we are probably not going to get 535 Members
of the Congress-and I agree with you-if we can trust thousands of
personnel with all kinds of secret information, are we in fact saying
that they are more trustworthy than the men and women the people
have elected to represent them in this Government?
Representative represent I heard you make that point before, Sena-
tor, and give security clearance or deny it to Members of the Congress
and make them accountable.
Senator Huours. I wish that could be done. Because I don't believe
myself that certain members of the committee should be given informa-
tion that other members are not given unless we specifically set up some
sort of oversight subcommittee or special committee in the Congress
of a cross-section philosophically that can be cleared to know the total
of what is going on in the CIA.
Representative DRINAN. If I may say so, Senator, that was proposed
way back in 1955 by Senator Mansfield. He introduced a bill for a
joint committee of the House and the Senate on the CIA. He had 34
cosponsors for the bill, and it came to the Senate floor on April 9, 1956.
The result was negative. The Members did not vote for it. But it seems
to me that that would be a very good idea, to have Members of the
House and the Senate picked and selected according to their ideology,
a balanced committee, and I would be satisfied with that.
Senator HuoiEs. That would satisfy your needs?
Representative DRINAN. I would assume so-the ordinary joint
committee-and they would be responsible and accountable for the
operations of the CIA.
Senator HuGHES. I personally feel that the people of Iowa elected
me to represent their interests with the CIA as well as every other facet
of Government, and that I have an entitlement to be informed. And
if I am untrustworthy, then I feel the CIA ought to tell the people of
Iowa and the country why I am untrustworthy and on what they base
it. I would be satisfied also if the Joint Committee would be picked on
such a basis to serve as an oversight committee that would have straight
information on everything that we are doing in the CIA. I share your
concerns about what we might be involved in around the world right
now, and in the future, as well as what we have been involved in in the
past. I am not relating this particularly to Mr. Colby. I am relating it
as a common concern on the need to know of the American people, at
least by a group of their elected representatives.
I know this is not an easy thing for you to do in testifying this way
and expressing your' concerns, but I commend you for having the
courage to do it.
Representative D1uNAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Senator SYMINOTON. Thank you, Senator.
First let me thank you very much for your gracious remarks.
Based on recent events in recent months on this oommittee, as far as
my colleague, Senator Hughes, is concerned, I am reminded of an old
phrase, "They :laughed when he sat down at the piano." Now, as to the
joint committee, I sit on a joint committee of the Senate and the House
that you might look at at your discretion. And if you think there has
been any excessive secrecy around thisrogram, I wish you would take
a look at the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, where, for example,
even though they supply the warheads and pay for them, they will not
allow me as a member of this committee, and acting chairman in a
hearing before the Military Appropriations Subcommittee of the Joint
Atomic Energy Committee which I chair, they will not allow me to
bring into that Committee not only a member of my staff, but the chief
of the staff of the Senate Armed, ervices Committee, even though the
discussion is entirely about whether or not we need these weapons
which will cost many billions of dollars, nor will they allow any
members
Representative DiuNAN. Excuse me, Senator, who is'"they $"
Senator SYMTNOTON. The majority of the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee, good question.
Nor will they allow my members to appear at any hearing of that
committee except the open hearings-and I have never seen an open
hearing when it comes to military appropriations--to bring any staff
member in.
So we have a lot of things to clean up from thestandpoint of not
only the public's right to know but of our own right to know. They
will not allow any members of my staff or any members of the Armed
Services Committee staff to go over and read classified data incident
to weapons unless the Senator in question or some Senator and Con-
gressman go over and read the books while they read the memoranda
in the vault of the Joint Committee. How this grew I don't know, but
it was started years ago. But it is an unfortunate situation. I say that
because I do believe in all honesty that we have the right setup here if
we will go to work and make it work. And Senator Hughes is right,
and in time I hope that more information can be obtained about lust
how this setup functions.
Now, back to the problem. I have known Mr. Colby for a good many
years, and I do think he is an honest, dedicated, good American. I do
think there are forces in the world which could endanger the security
of the United States. And therefore I do think we need an agency
like the Central Intelligence Agency in order to assess to the best of
its ability what our possible enemies around the world are doing. If
we don't, then for the first time in the history of the modern world,
you might say--and I would go back several hundred years on that-
it would be the first time that it'was felt that such an agency was not
needed.
So what I believe we are talking about now is the 'capability of the
gentleman in question to 'handle the Agency in an efficient and ap-
propriate fashion and report what he should back to the Congress
what he is doing.
I would like to say to the committee, that' Father Drinan wrote me
a letter which I was much impressed with-l don't know whether to
call him Congressman Drinan or Father Drinan-the letter was im-
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pressive, and I called him and asked him if he would like to testify.
And, of course, we welcome his testimony here this morning.
And we are very grateful that you have come to give us your posi-
tion, sir.
Are there any further questions?
Senator N &N.I have one thing.
Senator HUGHES. I would like to make a statement in the light of
what you have said.
I want to go on record as a member of this committee as saying
that I am not willing to trust any one man in this country in any posi-
tion without an oversight committee of some sort by this Congress
being totally informed as to what he is doing and what and how he is
doing it.
Representative DRINAN. I fully agree, that was the precise point of
my testimony, and that now at this moment in history we should de-
lay his confirmation until the Congress has the apparatus that we can
supervise
Senator HUGHES. Excuse me, Senator Nunn.
Senator Nmvx. That is all right. This is not a question; there is
something that I don't have an answer for and don't intend to, but
I want to share it with you. Senator Hughes and I talked about it the
other day. I think in this situation of classification, secret and so forth,
we start off with perhaps overclassification, or a degree of classification
that even the people involved don't have very much confidence in.
And then we get to an Ellsberg situation where we have disclosure
which hits the front pages, leaks, and then we have a loss of confidence
all through the branches of Government, particularly the execu-
tive, in the classification system, top secret, and so forth. Then we get
into a situation which is extremely dangerous, and perhaps the most
dangerous part of the system, as Senator Hughes has pointed out
in recent days, and that is a situation where there is so little confidence
in the classification system that we do away with that and start falsify-
ing and omitting information, which deprives even key people at the
very top of the chain of command from the very essential informa-
tion relating to our role in our policy. And the question is, you can't
have it all ways on all parts of the circle-and it is a circle, in my opin-
ion. And how do you draw the line, and at what point in the circle do
we really start, and where does the circle end? I just leave that with
you as an observation and a frustration that I have.
Representative DRINAN. Thank you, Senator. Let's begin to un-
ravel it.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I appreciate
? your kindness.
Senator SYMINOTON. We are very grateful to you for appearing.
The next witness is Mr. Sam Adams.
Mr. Adams, will your rise and raise your right hand, please?
Do you swear that the information you give this committee is the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. ADAMS. I do, sir.
Senator SYMINGTox. Have you a statement prepared?
TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL A. ADAMS
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you read it?
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Mr. ARAMs, I will, Sir.
First I would like to apologize 'forappearing so late;.but I didn't
realize that I was going to testify before this committee until relatively
a short time ago.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think sometime back yyon said you would be
ready to testify, and we said we would alway's-be'willing to hear you.
Is that correct $
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator SxoTOx. Thank you.
Would you read your statement, please Q
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
My name is Samuel A. Adams. I resigned from the,Central Intclli-
gency Agency on June 1, 1973. My resignation stemmed from dismay
over what 'I thought was the sloppy and. often- dishonest way U.S.
intelligence conducted research on the struggle in Indochina.-An ex-
ample of the shortcomings, I believe, was the manner ~ in which U.S.
intelligence produced reports on the political and administrative agen-
cies of the Vietcong. These agencies,: sometimes called' the infra- ?
were the target of the allied Phoenix program.- The Phoenix
program was overseen at one time by Mr. Colby,.a candidateto receive
the CIA's directorship.
Seven of, my 10 yyears at the Agency were , devoted to research on
our adversaries in Indochina. My reports inalgdeal:gn extensive study
on the Vietcong police system, a treatise on Gomm;nist subversive
agents in the South Vietnamese'Army and rpolices and-an-examination
of the Vietcong's covert 'structure in Snutli i imtnamese territory.
In 1970, I wrote a lengthy study entitled !'Guide to a Viet Cong
Province" which ~ the CIA uses as its standard; field ,handbook on the
Communists in South Vietnam. For about-6 years I gave the Agency's
training course on the Vietcong to CIA case officers bound for Vietnam.
The Phoenix program is an example of a sound concept gone awry.
It was meant to destroy the-Communises? political: apparatus, but it
has not done so,. and the Vietcong" are in _ the middle of it resurgence
throughout South Vietnam. Although the country's ` surface looks
peaceful enough-at least compared to,the last' few years-the appear-
ance is deceiving. Beneath the surface' of the South, Vietnamese Gov-
ernment, the unraveling is well along.
Phoenix was conceived when the Allies' main weapons in South ?
Vietnam were American warplanes, and heavily armed battalions
whose mission was to "search and destroy.'.' The: rbeapons `were, bludg-
eons, which all too often failed to discriminate between the enemy
soldier and the innocent bystander. Mote important, ? they were vir-
tually useless against the Vietcong political cadre, who, it came to be
reaiized,..was;jest as dangerous asthe'Vietcong warrior.
Phoenix was designed to fill the gapp. Copied from a British concept
which had,succeeded' in Malaya, the Phoenix progrram--wad meant to
replace the, bludgeon with a scalped.- 'I'he key to ! the, operation was
precise targeting Instead of bdmbss-- hioh, killed' large>.nurihbers of
civilians in addition to the occasional political. opereutioeiof-the Viet-
cong-Phoenix's main tools,theoretically,,-wbte;good, intelligence and
good files. The object of the program was to find out who among the
Vietnamese population were'P7etctn ' c iifi ;rkhd'"to arrest or kill
them. In theory, arrests were preferable to assassinations, because a
I
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prisoner could lead to further arrests, and a cadaver led nowhere.
In order to work, the Phoenix program had basic needs. These are
five of the most important :
1. A clear perception of the nature and organization of the target.
2. Good intelligence concerning the names, the whereabouts, and the
activities of the people who belong to it.
3. A tight, well-run police organization, with secure files, with the
ability to keep close track of the population, and with a high state
of training and morale.
4. An efficient and fair judicial system, with stout prisons and a
rehabilitation program which could turn rebels into citizens.
5. Most important, popular support.
The trouble with Phoenix, however, and the reason it did not work,
was that its needs, although recognized in theory were never fulfilled
in practice. The divorce between hope and reality, became so wide that
the program degenerated into a game of statistics, in which numbers
were paramount, and the object of the exercisethe crippling of the
Communist Party-was never even approached. I will deal with the
needs listed above, and unfulfilled, one by one.
When U.S. troops first landed in force in Vietnam in early 1965,
we were abysmally ignorant of the nature of the threat. It was thought
that the application of enough military force by the United States
would eventually compel the Communists to lay off. But they didn't,
and the introduction of each new American battalion only seemed to
get us in deeper than we already were.
Finally, the Tet offensive demonstrated the Vietcong's ability to
get large numbers of troops into the South Vietnamese urban areas
without detection, and jarred II.S. intelligence into the realization that
the Communists had something there besides an army. The Phoenix
program-which had existed in one form or another for several years-
began to take serious shape.
The initial problem was that the basic research on the nature of the
adversary and of his or ation was either undone or misunderstood.
When the time came to designate a target for the Phoenix organization
to aim at the most readily available entity was something U.S. intelli-
gence called the infrastructure, a catchall phrase long used to describe
the nonmilitary portion of the Vietcong organization. Unfortunately,
the Communists themselves had no such term, and U.S. intelligence
has no precise definition of what it included. It did have a number,
however, 39,175, which had remained the same from June 1965 up
until the eve of the Tet offensive. Although the number cha after
Tet-it has ranged since then from 60,000 to 90,000-the d itional
problem was never cleared up. As a result, no one knows even now
who belongs to the infrastructure, and the number given out officially
is the sum of the guesses from the field, made by people who have
varying ideas of what they are counting. It is conceivabble, using the
loosely defined official criteria, that we could say the infrastructure
was anywhere from 10,000 to a quarter of a million strong.
A salient problem of who to count arose from the fact that for some
time the Vietcong's convert operatives in South Vietnamese territory
were not included in the official lists. Thus a spy in Thieu's office-
there was one-would be excluded from the infrastructure because he
failed to fit the official U.S. definition. The problem was compounded
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 i_J i III11,'II.~Wlllllll;.,',ILI II.I1111..111.
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because of the reluctance xa the part of U.S.. intelligence to look into
the smatter of Vietcong subaiersi on. For example, in May 1969, the CIA
Chief of Station for Saigon indicated on a visit to Washington his
belief that the Vietcceig had only 200 agents in the South Vietnamese
Government. He spoke from ignorance. An indepth research study
going on at the same time suggested the real number of such agents
was more like 30,004.
They question of the Communists' covert presence im Soutk Vietnam-
ese territory became particularly vexing after the coup in Cambodia in
March 19710. When it oeeurred, most of the Communists' army in the
southern half of Soatlu Vietnam left for duty next door, *nd large num-
bers of Vietcong cadres in Vietnam's Delta shifted from Vietcong to
South Vietnamese territory, often by false defection through Ch-ieu
Hoi Centers. The ensuing quiet in the Delta---along.with'an appar-
ent increase in the enemy's defection rates-gave rise to optimism
among American officials in Vietnam, including those who manned the
Phoenix program.
Although had intelligence on the names, whereabouts and doings of
Communist cadres is much sought after, it is very hard to come by.
Allied files bulge with information of this sort, butih the vast major-
ity of caso it is either false or incomplete. Thin improved 1ha v e since
the early days of Phoenix when operations aegairisbspecific targets were
almost nonexistent. Brit the improvements Haves been sYi+srgi tai, and the
latest reports from the field suggest the situation is getting worse
instead of better. In any case, the type' of person. neutralized by
Phoenix is about the same as it always wazs; they are mostl low-Ievel
and of little consequence. The hardeove,pagrtq member isstlilI uncaught.
The South Vietnamese national joliee and'1FGlitary Security Serv-
ice-both of which work for Phoenix-are better now than they were,
say, in 1966. But the base was so low that it' is-difficult to conceive that
they could have gotten worse.
The problem There is much more complicated than ,simply low mo-
rale-which recent reports suggest is endemic. among the South Viet-
namese constabulary. The most trying a of the situation is the
Vietcong's continued penetration of 'theSth Viet=namese security
apparatus, Captured documents indicate than many hundreds of South
Vietnamese policemen are in reality, Vietcong agents. The penetra-
tions occur at all levels. A goverment 2'olltip which took place in
northern South Vietnam in 19'Tl; show the dimensions,of-the problem.
Among those reportedly apprehended :as 'ietcong agents were the
chief of police of Do Nang City. The chief ' the police special branch,
and his assistant for operations, and the chief of police for I corps.
The first three were jailed. The last, after evidence proved insufficient
for co iction, was reputedly transferred to Saigon as w police adviser
to the Phoenix program.
Although the American advisory effort to Phoenix contained no
Vietcong agents, it often was of questionable help. One. of its main
shortcomings was the ignorance of most dd4isom of the Vietcong tar-
get. Prior to August 1968, the ' average CIA case er received no
training whatsoever in the organization and'rijetho operations of
the Communist structure. Then, in later 1981$, training program
started up which by the end of the year e tind for Vietnam,
24 hours of instruction. This was rapidly ` cut baclf." Th+e number of
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hours in the Vietcong target now given to CIA case officers going to
Saigon is four.
An ancillary problem is the one of population control. Despite many
attempts over the last 5 years, there is still no adequate ID card system
in Vietnam, and large numbers of persons, particularly in the slums,
roam about without the police knowing who they are. Likewise, the
Phoenix system has yet to devise as mundane a thing as a catalog of
fingerprints. If, say, the U.S. Ambassador was killed tomorrow, and
the gun was found which accomplished the killing, there would be no
wa to trace the assassin, from the prints on the gun.
South Vietnamese prisons continue to leak, although not as badly as
a few years ago. Still, the average Vietcong captive-unlike the com-
mon criminal-will likely go free within a very few months. Again,
one can point to improvements, but the basic problem remains that
the accounting system which comes into play after a suspect's arrest
is so loose that it is often very difficult to tell what happens to him
shortly thereafter. In several areas of Vietnam, at present, the system
has broken down completely, so that Communist prisoners in these
areas frequently fail to go to prison at all.
Furthermore, there is an almost complete lack of a rehabilitation
system. The old saw that the most dedicated Vietnamese Communists
have usually done time, continues to have a ring of truth. Captured
documents still show that those who leave South Vietnamese prisons
frequently rejoin the Vietcong organizations after their release from
jail.
But the biggest single drawback to the Phoenix program is that ex-
cept in a few areas it lacks popular support. What this boils down to is
the reluctance of the average South Vietnamese citizen to turn in a
Vietcong cadre when he encounters one. Whether the reluctance stems
from fear or admiration of the Vietcong, it amounts to the same thing;
that is, the extraordinarily large Vietcong apparatus continues its
covert existence in South Vietnamese territory.
In connection with my statement to your committee, I respectfully
put forward three conclusions :
1. The Phoenix program largely failed to come to grips with basic
problems, and claimed improvements were so marginal as to be of
little consequence. Perhaps doomed from the start by built-in flaws,
the program's problems were worsened by such shortcomings as woe-
fully insufficient training.
2. The game of statistics into which Phoenix plunged allowed the
U.S. Government to conjure a picture of progress arose from such
factors as the exit from South Vietnam in 1970, of most of the Com-
munist army, and the transfer of large numbers of Vietcong cadre
to so-called government territory, where even today they operate un-
recorded by Phoenix statisticians.
3. The faulty execution of the program, which was expensive and
? didn't work, demonstrates once again the need for congressional
scrutiny of the CIA. Until Congress begins to inspect closely what the
CIA is up to, we may expect further questionable programs such as
Phoenix.
That is the end of my prepared statement, sir. I have another
codicil that I would like to add to it if I might.
Senator SYMINOTON. How long is it?
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Mr. ADAMS. Two of these pages.
Senator SYMINOTON. Didn't they tell you the rules of the commit-
tee, that when it comes to prepared statements we would like 24 hours'
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, they did, but I had such short notice.
Senator SYMXNOTON. Do you have a copy of it I
Mr. ADAMS. It is still handwritten.
Senator SYMINGTON. If you only had a short notice we had short
notice B
notice too, because we didn't know you wanted to testify.
Who asked you to testify ?
Mr. ADAMS. Senator Kennedy's office, Sir.
Senator Sr nNoTox. He is not a member of this committee.
Mr. ADAMS. No sir, he is not, sir. But on the other hand, I didn't
find out-
Senator SYMINGTOx. I understand, I am not being critical but the
short notice had nothing to do with the staff of this committee.
Mr. ADAMS. Absolutely not 'no sir.
Senator SrMn oTox. How long is your additional statement g
Mr. ADAMS. It is three of those pages.
Senator SmrrrraTox. Will you proceed I
Mr. ADAMS. Thank you very much, sir.
I would like to attach this codicil to my main statement. It has to
do with Cambodia, and what I believe was the deliberate fabrication
of statistics of the Khmer Communist order of battle by the CIA.
I made allegations concerning the fabrication to the CIA Inspector
General in December 1972, and, I was told that Mr. Colby was aware
of the allegations. As far as I can determine, no attempt was made
to investigate the charges.
The circumstances of the fabrication are as follows :
I would respectfully like to lay out the circumstances of what I
believe was a fabrication.
Senator HUGHES. Would you restate that again clearly? You are
talking about a fabrication of CIA statistics.?
.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes sir, that is correct.
Senator HvonES. I want to make sure I understand what you say.
Mr. ADAMS. On the Khmer order of battle, that is, how many Khmer
Communist soldiers are in Cambodia 9
As I said, I would like to lay out briefly what I believe is the cir-
cumstance of the fabrication.
Between April 1970 and June 1971, was a range of from 5,000 to
10,000. The range remained constant during this period because no
one within the U.S. Intelligence Community was looking at the prob-
lem or investigating how large the Khmer Communist Army was,
A memo written b the CIA in May 1971 in fact gave us this range
of 5 to 10,000 as the cial number.
In June 1971 I wrote a memorandum of approximately 40 pages
based on a review of all available evidence on the matter of the Khmer
Communist army. Within a week or so the paper was killed, I was
threatened with firing, and told to work on weekends for the foresee-
able future. I did so, that is, I worked a 7-day week throughout the
summer of 1971.
Senator SYMnvOTOx. Who told you that?
Mr. ADAMS. My immediate supervisor, sir.
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Senator SYMINGTON. What was his name?
Mr. ADAMS. Harold Ford, sir.
Senator SYMINOTON. What was his position?
Mr. ADAMS. He was head of the special research staff to which I
belonged, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. In Washington?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir-well, largely.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
Mr. ADAMS. In 1971 I would respectfully submit, sir, that this was
one rare instance in which an intelligence analyst was punished dur-
ing time of war for finding an enemy army.
Right after the paper was removed from my control the job of
researching the order of battle was assigned to an analyst who had
never worked on Cambodia, and who had never worked on combat
order of battle. I would put in parenthetically, sir, that I had worked
on Cambodia for a long time, and on orders of battle for several years,
often as the CIA's only order-of-battle analyst.
The day the new analyst was given the job of researching the order
of battle for the Khmer Communists, he was also given a range to come
up with, that is, a range of from 10 to 30,000. He was instructed to
come up within that range.
The new analyst took 5 months to devise a way to come up with the
assigned range. In November 1971, that is, 5 months later after this
analyst was told to do this, the CIA finally released its official order
of battle. The number in the official order of battle was a range of 15
to 30,000, that is almost precisely the range given the analyst 5 months
before.
The present Khmer Communist order of battle, approximately
50,000, is derivative of the old number, that is, the 15 to 30,000. I re-
spectfully submit that it understates it. And I would make the observa-
tion that U.S. Intelligence currently asks us to believe that the
Cambodian Government Army of 200,000 outnumbers the Khmer Com-
munist Army -about 4 to 1 since Phnom Penh seems about to fall. I
would suggest that the order put forth by U.S. Intelligence are some-
thing of an anomaly.
I would also like to note that I am in the process of laying out a
much more detailed account of what happened, which will include
names, dates, and who did what to whom.
In any case, I submitted the detailed oral complaint to the CIA
Inspector General on the matter. The Inspector General, or rather
his assistant, took lengthy notes on what I had to say. A day or so
later-in December 1972-I was told that Mr. Colby, the Executive
Director, had been informed of my complaints, and that he had said
concerning the complaints, let the chips fall where they may.
Senator SYMINGTON. Who said that now?
Mr. ADAMS. I was told that Mr. Colby said that.
(Senator SYMINGTON. Who told you that?
Mr. ADAMS. It was another-it was either Mr. Breckenridge or a
Mr. Greer of the Inspector General's Office, I forget which one it was.
Senator SYMINGTON. Inspector General's Office of where?
Mr. ADAMS. The CIA, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you find out who told you that and re-
port to this committee?
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Mr. ADAMS. I will.
Senator SYMINGTON. Check your memory. You see, that is a per-
sonal attack against a nominee by hearsay.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, this isn't an attack against the nominee.
Senator SYMINOTON. I think it is. We just have a difference there.
But as long as you mentioned that somebody told you what he said,
I would like to know who it was, so that we can question him.
Mr. ADAMS. Fine. Thank you, sir. It was either Mr. Breckenridge
or Mr. Greer.
Senator SYMINGTON. You find out who it was and let us know.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes sir. Thank you very much.
As far as I can tell, only two things happened concerning my com-
plaint, which as far as I was able to determine was never looked into.
The first time was during my testimony before the Defense of the Ells-
berg trial in March 1973. The matter of my complaint over the Khmer
Communist order of battle was brought up by the prosecution. The
prosecutor, Mr. Nissen, used my trip to the CIA Inspector General in
order to impeach my testimony as a witness. He said that this showed
that I was a chronic complainer.
The second time-and I cannot be sure that this is directly con-
nected-was after my return from the Ellsberg trial. I was told that
my employment at the CIA was about to be terminated, although
eventually the Agency backed down. I have reason to believe that per-
sons who proposed my termination, that is, fired me, were those who
were responsible for fabricating the Khmer Communist order of
battle.
That is the end of my codicil.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you repeat that about the people being
fired ?
Mr. ADAMS. Right after I came back from the Ellsberg trial, sir, I
was told that my employment with the Agency was about to be termi-
nated. I made several attempts to try to find out who it was that was
putting me on the list to get fired. I was unable to find out. But I be-
lieve that it was probably the people who,had been responsible in'my
opinion for fabricating the Khmer Communist order of battle.
Senator SYMINoTON. You said in your statement-you were reading
from a supplementary statement--that you got up in the last few
hours
Mr. ADAMS. That is right, sir.
Senator SYMINOTON. You said in your statement that you resigned
in the Central .Intelligence Agency on the first of June.
Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. So whoever attempted to fire you did it before
that time ; is that correct ?
Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why did they fail ? Didn't they have the
authority to discharge you ?1
Mr. ADAMS. Oh, yes, they did have the authority to discharge me.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why did they chap a their minds?
Mr. ADAMS. I have never really been able to find out. I tried to. find
out and couldn't.
Senator SYMINGTON. How did you try to find out ?
Mr. ADAMS. I wrote a number of memoranda asking why.
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Senator SYMINGTON. You see, in the years that I have been con-
nected with the CIA in one way or another I have had many what you
call disgruntled employees of the CIA get in touch with me. And that
is also true in business, and it is also true in any governmental agency.
And I was just wondering if you were saying that you were notified
that you were fired. But in your previous statement you said you
resigned.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir; I was notified that I was fired, and I was un-
able to find out who was trying to give me the sack. And then I threw
in the sponge and quit.
Senator SYMINGTON. You testified before the Foreign Relations
Committee ; did you not?
Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, sir.
I get these confused. Does that mean House or Senate?
Senator SYMINGTON. Senate.
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir, I haven't. I testified in front of the House.
Senator SYMINGTON. Somebody told me that you testified before the
House.
Is it fair to say that the thrust of your testimony is that the Phoenix
program is not particularly effective for good or for ill?
Mr. ADAMS. That would be the thrust of my testimony, yes, sir; that
it was ineffective.
Senator SYMINOTON. Was one important objective of the Phoenix
program to coordinate various types of legitimate intelligence
activities?
Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Was the Phoenix program more successful in
acquiring intelligence not subject to abuses in some regions of Vietnam
to a different degree than in other regions?
Mr. ADAMS. I think that is a correct statement; yes, sir.
Senator SYMINOTON. If so, what accounted for those differences if
they occurred during Mr. Colby's tenure?
Mr. ADAMS. I suspect it is the same as you can say about anything,
some people in some areas are better than others in other areas. Also
there is the matter of degree of penetration in the Da Nang area,
where the Viet Cong in essence ran the cops; things didn't go very
well. And in other areas where they didn't run the police things went
? better.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you have any specific evidence about Mr.
Colby's conduct of the Phoenix program ?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir; I do not, except insofar as the reports came
back from the Phoenix program which I read.
Senator SYMINGTON. You have been in Vietnam yourself quite a lot?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir, I have been on four temporary duty assign-
ments in Vietnam, yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. One thing that worries me about all this is that
I still believe we need an intelligence agency.
Mr. ADAMS. So do I, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you agree with that?
Mr. ADAMS. Absolutely.
Senator SYMINGTON. And whereas the FBI over 30 years has been
very successful in building up a superb public relations department,
it is difficult if not impossible for the Central Intelligence Agency to
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have such a departmentbased on the nature of its work. You agree
with that; don't you?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMrrmTorr.. And `therefore when something happens like
the killing of, an ageri;' or.perhaps the finding out about the raiding
of a doctor's office, everybody looks around and says, well, there is only
one place we believe we can dump this, and that is the CIA. Would
you agree with that, that that has happened in the past t
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And it is very difficult foie the Agency itself to
answer such criticism as ~agafst the public' relations departm'etits" of
the Services, you would agree with that, would yott not 2, Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir, it is easier than the Services.
Senator Srtnxa oir. iTarn thinking about the- assassination of an
agent. And the story was given to the -American. people through-the
press that the CIA' did'it. And being a member of this subcommittee,
I went to work to find out what actually happened. And I found out
that the CIA recommended urgently that the agent in question'not be
killed. Do you remember that incident?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes; Sir, I do:
Senator STMrNGTON. Do you know the details of it?
Mr. ADAMS. Not the absolute details, but more or less as you put it.
Senator SYasrrra;toi4. If 'you had said yes,' I would ask you, becafise
I am.; confident--I don't remember what you jtigt said, thb staff said
something to me, but I know that your answer would have been what
you stated if you did know the details of it. You have i'to reason to
doubt that
Mr: ADAMS: 1I have no reason to doubt either as you said it or what I
remember at the time.
Senator S nw rotr. Do you know' of Ian domestic'. intelliggnce
checks by the Central Intelligence Agency s ieciall against any Mem-
ber of Congress? This question is being asked forenate or House.'
Mr. ADAMS. I know that the CIA has pebble such as businessmen or
s m foreigncountries.
mttissionarie that are comin back fro
Senator SYMINo!rO . I didn't hear that.
Mr. ADAMS. The CIA has people to qc~uestion, say, businessmen or
missionaries or something that come back from foreign countries. But
as I understand your question, I think it has-to do with whether they
spy on Senators-I don't know.
Senator SYMINGTON. Let me repeat the question. Do you know of any
domestic intelligence by the CIA especially against any Member
of Congress.
Mr. ADAMS. I know of no domestic intelligence against Congressmen,
nor do I know of any domestic intelligence in the sense that. it is trying
to find out something that is going on in the United States. However,
there is an intelligence processing going on locally within the country.
Senator SYMINGTON. You wouldn t object to an intelligence agency
questioning American citizens who have returned from a foreign
country?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir, not at all.
Senator SYMrNGTON. Under the organization in South Vietnam at
the time did the man who was the head of the position held by Mr.
Colby have operational control over American military units?
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Mr. ADAMS. I don't believe he did, sir, in the sense that he could
tell the First Division to move in a certain area, no sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. You see, that is a very important question to
me, because I happen to know in a case that I just saw that when they
got caught they dumped it on the CIA, and they dumped something
that was exactly against what the CIA recommended. And ultimately
the agent in question was allowed to leave the Services, but he was
not dishonorably discharged, the one who carried it out. I think that
you probably know what I am talking about now.
Mr. ADAMS. I know what you are talking about.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will the killing. of prisoners or other atrocities
committed by military units be the type of thing which the Com-
mander of the Corps could just. order to' be stopped and it would.:be
stopped.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, I am : sura that he could order that not to occur
and could not.
Senator SYMINGTON. If he ordered it not to occur do you think that
the South Vietnamese would have obeyed,that order?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON, Are you primarily critical of the Phoenix pro-
gram because it was ineffective or, because it was cruel?
Mr. ADAMS. Primarily -because it was ineffective. But also I suppose
you could say that I would criticize it for cruelty as well. And that has
ty I think, was accom.
to do with its ineffectiveness. But the cruel,
pushed mostly by! the South Vietnamese rather than the Americans.
Senator SYMINGTON. Now, in your first statement that you presented,
Mr. Adams, you did not take a position for or against the nomination
of Mr. Colby to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, but in
the second statement my impression is that you have taken that posi-
tion, is that correct?
Mr. ADAMS. No, Sir. As a matter of fact, I don't think I am taking a
position on whether I-think Mr. Colby should be nominated or should
not be nominated. I have certainly heard good things of Mr. Colby
as well as bad things of Mr. Colby.
Senator SYMINGTON. That is the purpose of this hearing.
May I say that with much that you say I am in agreement?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And I think that the program is very badly
handled, and I think much too much of it was kept unnecessarily
secret from the American people by the administrations that were
involved.
I turned against this war many years ago, long before the President.
And I have so stated in speeches to the Senate. So we don't have that
problem about the conduct of the war. The purpose of this hearing is
the qualifications of this man who has been nominated to be Director.
Among them and much of the testimony-we have had many people
commend this recommendation. And we have also had other people
who opposed it. And I was just wondering how you felt about it, be-
cause that is the basic purpose of this hearing.
Mr. ADAMS. I suppose vis-a-vis that question, I really feel unquali-
fied as to Colby, whether he is a good or bad man. However, I would
tend to agree with what I was told of Senator Kennedy's position;
namely, that a matter of this importance needs a good deal of looking
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into, more than I think he felt was being done in those hearings on Mr.
Colby's nomination. It is my opinion, for what it is worth, that some-
thing which is as keen as the Director of Central Intelligence needs
a great deal of looking into, a job like that, and that very often people
tend to be glib either in their recommendations or in their disapproval
of the candidate in question.
Senator SYMINGTON. You constantly refer to Senator Kennedy. May
I say that I have the greatest respect for Senator Kennedy. But he was
not in the executive hearing that we had on Mr. Colby after we had
the open hearing. And I was much influenced by Dr. Schlesinger's un-
qualified recommendation of Mr. Colby. Because Dr. Schlesinger be-
came Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee and did more in
less time to put that committee under proper civilian control in my
opinion than anybody, he did more in a few months than anybody had
done in many years. And after that he went into the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and he reorganized it, and he let a good many people
go that he felt were unnecessary. And he was in the process of attempt-
ing to do a job from the standpoint of the taxpayer. And it was his
recommendation of Mr. Colby that had a great deal to do with my
believing that he would be a proper man for the job.
And I would ask you this question. Do you know of anything specific
against Mr. Colby that you think disqualifies him for the position?
Mr. ADAMS. I know of nothing specific, no sir. I threw in that codicil
to show'that I have heard something. And If, of course, can't tell what
Mr. Colby had to do with any of that business, so I can't say one way
or the other whether he is at fault. I have submitted a number of com-
plaints over the years-this is the problem T' have had-I have sub-
mitted a number of complaints over the years to the Agency. And
usually what happens is that that very little occurs. So no so-called
facts are ever established.
Senator SYMINOTO:~. And then as I understand it anybody in the
Agency who would be in a position to be Director you would be wor-
ried about because of the past activities of the Agency, is that correct?
Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, sir. Over the years I have seen, particu-
larly concerning Indochina and South Vietnam, a great many in-
stances of what I believe are fabrications of statistics, and very ques-
tionable practices having to do with research. And I have grown over
the years to have a very uneasy feeling about the hierarchy of the CIA.
And this included Mr. Helms.
Senator SYMINGTON. So you would say that there is nobody in the
CIA who is fit to be Director?
Mr. ADAMS. No, I wouldn't say that at all.
Senator SYMTNOTON. Who have you got in mind that you prefer?
Mr. ADAMS. I have no one in mind that I would prefer. And-I say
I don't believe that is a direct attack on Mr. Colby. But it is my belief
that I think the Congress should be very careful about the person that
they put at the top.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then this hearing gives us the opportunity to
investigate your apprehensions about past functions of the Agency, is
that correct, more than it has to do with confirmation or lack of con-
firmation of Mr Colby?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir. But I think the two matters are not unrelated,
that because Mr. Colby was for a long time right close up to the
top
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Senator SYMINGTON. How many years have you been with the
Agency?
Mr. ADAMS. I was there 10 years, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And in all of the 10 years you can't remember
anybody that you think would be a good director?
Mr. ADAMS. For all I know, Colby might be a good one, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I just thought maybe you had somebody else in
mind.
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir; I am not running for the job myself.
Senator SYMINGTON. I have been asked by the staff to ask this ques-
tion and clarify a previous question. Could the Director of Cords
directly give orders to U.S. soldiers, and would he have to make a
recommendation to the U.S. military commanders?
Mr. ADAMS. I would imagine that he would have to make a recom-
mendation to the U.S. military command.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
Senator Nunn.
Senator NUNN. Mr. Adams, were you here a little while ago when
Congressman Drinan was testifying? Did you hear Congressman
Drinan's testimony immediately preceding your own?
Mr. ADAMS. I wasn't listening, sir, I was scribbling this stuff down.
Senator NUNN. He made a couple of statements based on your past
experience that I would just like to ask you about, based on your state-
ment. On page 2 of his statement he says that many political pris-
oners under this program did not receive trial, and that many of them
remained for months and years in prison merely because of the petition
of local officials. And also I believe in one of your statements one of the
criticisms of the Phoenix program is that the jails leak, they come out
as soon as they go in.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes sir, but they leak the wrong people. Whereas a hard-
ened Communist cadre had a whole system pulling for it, the Vietcong
program apparatus, the average poor guy that was thrown in there for
political reasons usually didn't, and it would be more likely these guys
that might end up in the pokie for years, whereas the hard core Com-
munist would. be more likely let loose.
Senator NUNN. Was that under the jurisdiction of the South Viet-
namese primarily, when they got out of prison?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator NUNN. The CIA didn't have any jurisdiction over that, did
they?,
Mr. ADAMS. The CIA had no direct jurisdiction, no sir.
Senator NUNN. One other question relating to the Congressman's
testimony. Although he didn't directly state it, he implies-and he
later altered this to some degree-that there should be a committee that
would have some supervision over the CIA in Congress. But based on
your experience do ,you think that every Member of the Congress
should be briefed at their request on every kind of top secret informa-
tion in the CIA?
Mr. ADAMS. That is a very broad question, sir. I think on most things
of substance, yes. What I mean by substance, if a Senator or Congress-
man is interested in knowing how many missiles the Russians have, and
how we came about the estimates, I think that any Senator or Congress-
man should have every right to get that type of information. However,
if the way we got the information was from some hypothetical Spy in
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the Kremlin, and the Senator asked the guy's name, I don't think that
that is the kind of thing that should be released.
Senator NuNN. You are drawing the line between the method of pro-
curing the information and the information itself ?
Mr. ADAMS. That is right.
Senator NuNN. I would like another: comment from you on the Con-
gressman's statement. And I quote directly :
I do not want to have a Director of the CIA who for whatever reason by his
own admission was unable or;tmWllling to guarantee to' South Vietnam citizens
the basic due proces .
is that also your criticism, or do you 'agree wit that $
Mr ADAMS. No sirs' [ think I? tend to agree w t~ 'sortie of the comments
that were made, or at least,the `Way 'the 'questions `were put, "from; the
committee; namely, that' it is very hard for d? to Control'what`the So th
Vietnamese are going to do. W& can' plug' for }'t; but thee :is not much
we can do when a man is deprived of?his,rights. t ; .i .
Senator NIINN..So, you wouldn't criticize Mr. Colby on the'ground
that' he' hould have p uai nteed' everybody' doe process in Sd'uth
Vietria'li$:
Mr. ADAMS. I think oniec6AId iAke the critisizi,althdugh I woul It
be the one to do it, 6 it may he didn't ' iu]ll hard enou' h' for t, at
type of`thing.~ But he Kash?t"the ability to ?~t as Soutl Viei namese''op
to stopp hitting a guy over the head with a truncheon:"
Sen~t~ br`NtiNN 'One o'ther' question on'this arti'culaetestimony. Do
you thi ik it is necessar~yy for he CIA agents throu'gg'hout the world to
have a"cover, so to speak,* should' they idienli'fb thiemselves as CIA ?
Mr. ADAbts. I'think von.hare'to have coblet' Youi',mean with a CIA
sweatshirt a
. Senator Norm. You wouldn't agree that they should wear badges or
muiforms or identify'themselres as CIA? Mr. AnAMS. It woul'd` make it very difficu'lt'to be'a spy that way.
Senator NTIxN'. You bouldn't agree with that criticism that the
Congressman had of the CIA agents of Mr: Colbyi
Mr. AbAats. I wouldn't agree, if that is how. it'wasput.
Senator NuNN. I get the. impression throughout your testimony=
and correct me if I am wrong-that your major criticism of the
Phoenix program was the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of it. Is that
generally the right impression that I have?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't think I would put it that narrowly. I think when
it was conceived it was a great idea and. everything. But it wasn't
looked into, what we were trying to do there. And a great deal more
thou.rhtrshould have been given to it, even whether the darned thing ?
should have been started up at all, or whether it was worth a candle. In
other words, my criticism wouldn't be simply that we weren't good
enough in putting away Vietnamese in the pokie, but that maybe we
should have given a great deal more thought to what the problem was.
And I would again bring out what to me is an astonishing piece of in-
formation, that the CIA chief of station in May 1969 only thought that
there were 300 agents in the South Vietnamese Government, he had
never looked. And that blew. my mind then and it blows it now.
Senator Nuivx. I notice somewhere here, I don't know where it is,
you said that instead of 300 that later estimates were about 30,000 in
the government, is that right ? .
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Mr. ADAMS. Yes sir.
Senator Nuxx. They have got a big government, then. What per-
centage of the government would that be ?
Mr. ADAMS. That always includes the Army, which would be part
of the government.
Senator Nuxx. It would be a large percentage, though, wouldn't it?
Mr. ADAMS. It would be over 1 percent.
Senator Nuxx. And that was an estimate that was made?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir; it was an estimate based on extrapolations from
captured documents.
Senator Nuxx. Do you have any idea what year that estimate was?
How close was that to the original 300 estimate in time period? Was
that recently?
Mr. ADAMS. It was practically contemperaneous. The CIA Chief
of Station made the statement in May 1965. The estimate was come up
with within a couple of months. But the material on which the esti-
mate was based of 30,000 has been available for years.
Senator Nuxx. So that was a criticism basically of whoever was the
head of the station had estimated it, that would be a criticism di-
rected at him?
Mr. ADAMS. It would be a criticism directed at him. But also a
criticism of the Agency at large.
Senator Nuxx. Lack of coordination?
Mr. ADAMS. And again that is narrowing the criticism., The overall
criticism is that we were in a war in: which- our allies' government'was
so penetrated with Communist spies and subversive agents that it was
practically ineffective. And we had not looked into the mattet- of
whether these guys existed; nobody had done a study before that atall.
In this connection I would bring up one other matter, that in Feb-
ruary 1966, when I was doing a study on the Viet Cong police, I was
in Saigon. And I asked the head of the CIA counterintelligence ap-
paratus-I was inquiring of the head of the CIA's counterintelligence
apparatus in Saigon about the Communist security service. The Com-
munist security service is the VC's equivalent of the KGB, that is the
Soviet Union Secret Police. And this guy, the head of the CIA staff,
the counterintelligence staff in Saigon station, had not heard of this.
And this was the CIA's principal enemy in South Vietnam-again, to
me a mind-blowing episode which illustrates the lack of research and
forethought.
Senator Nuxx. I notice in here that you imply very strongly that
they should have had a fingerprint system and much tighter police
security in South Vietnam. How would we have implemented a finger-
print system at that time?
Mr. ADAMS. We tried to do it, but I think it never got off the ground
because there were so many Communist agents in there trying to screw
it up. Everybody that has an ID card in South Vietnam, as I under-
stand it, has his prints on it. And yet there was no central filing system
back in Saigon where those prints could be retrieved.
Senator Nuxx. Basically your testimony is not that we had a cruel,
tough, efficient Phoenix program, but that we really had a weak,
clumsy, inefficient Phoenix program; isn't that about itf
Mr. ADAMS. Well, without trying to say that we should have a
cruel-I forget you put that first business-but I would agree with the
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second part of your statement, that we had a very ineffective, very
clumsy, very badly managed system going, and it didn't work.
Senator NuNN. The real gist of it is that your criticism of the pro-
gram is almost exactly opposite of Congressman Drinan's, isn't it?
Mr. ADAMS. Not necessarily, sir.
Senator Nuxx. You wanted a tighter police system of fingerprints,
ID cards, and so forth and so on, which is certainly a tighter system
and much more dictatorial in a police state than the program was
itself. And he criticized it on the basis of the detention. I might just
ask you the question : Do you believe in this detention method that was
used?
Mr. ADAMS. I certainly think it is better than killing the guy. How-
ever, I wouldn't like to put myself in opposition to what he said, be-
cause I think a great deal of what he did say made an enormous
amount of sense.
Senator Nuxx. Have you all coordinated your testimony?
Mr. ADAMS. I have never met the man, and I don't know what he
looks like. I passed him in the hall.
Senator Nuxw. The first page of your statements indicates that you
know that the Phoenix program was implemented as a scalpel rather
than a bludgeon.
Mr. ADAMS. That is right.
Senator NUNN. And it was implemented as an alternative to what
you described
Mr. ADAMS. It was the alternative to the passive search to destroy
where you just herded everybody; it was more of a selective thing.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, I think that is the case.
Senator Nuwx. And do you consider it as an alternative to that kind
of a search to destroy, that it was in effect less cruel than the search-
and-destroy type?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes ; it killed a lot less people, and certainly it was less
cruel than the bombing.
Senator Nuww. Both_ of them were cruel, but the degree of cruelty
were less than the alternative?
Mr. ADAMS. That is correct. I think as it came to be implemented
there were many of the problems which arose which the Congressman
was complaining about.
Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I am through with this line of ques-
tioning. But I would like to go into some of his supplement statement,
although I haven't had a chance to examine it.
Senator SYMiwOTON. Would you leave us the supplemental state-
ment and come back at 2 -301
Mr. ADAMS. You mean have it typed pp?
Senator SYMIxoTmzc. No, you can give it to us the. way it is and we
handle that part of it.
Mr..ADAMS. All Tight. What I said in the record was not precisely
what was here. I was using this as a copy.
Senator SYMINOTON. Let's do it anyway you would like to do it. But
let us know what you think in the supplemental statement. Thank you.
We will recess and at 2:30 we will return.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee went into executive
session.]
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1973
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:35 p.m., in room 235,
Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington
(acting chairman).
Present : Senators Symington (residing), and Nunn.
Also present : John T. Ticer, chief clerk ; R. James Woolsey, general
counsel; John A. Goldsmith, Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff
members; Doris Connor, clerical assistant; and Katherine Nelson,
assistant to Senator Symington.
Senator SYMINOTON. The hearing will come to order.
Is Mr. Adams here?
Senator Nunn, you said that you had some questions.
Senator NuNN. I just have a few more, Mr. Chairman.
I just got a copy of the supplemental statement.
Mr. ADAMS. Sir, I wonder if in deference to the committee I might
e (ear up three points that I think came up in this morning's testimony,
sir, very briefly.
Senator SYMINOTON. Let's see what you have to say first. Have you
got any statement there you would like to make? That is our standard
rule.
Mr. ADAMS. Scribbled notes.
Senator SYMINOTON. No volunteer statements; you have to show it
to us 24 hours before.
Mr. ADAMS. Scribbled notes.
Senator SYMINOTON. Then will you just supply it for the record,
because we have other witnesses that we want to question.
Mr. ADAMS. Very well.
Senator NuNN. In the supplementary statement which I have now
? gotten, you say :
In June 1971, I completed a memorandum about 40 pages long, which was
based on a review of all available evidence. Shortly after I handed the paper in
it was killed. I was threatened with firing and told to work on weekends for the
foreseeable future.
Who told you that?
Mr. ADAMS. The paper was killed about a day or so after I handed
it in. In other words, I was told that the typed paper would never we
the light of day. That came from several sources. The threat of firing
(71)
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came the day after I handed the paper in. It was by Mr. Harold Ford,
I believe.
Senator NUNN. Harold Ford?
Mr. ADAMS. That's right.
Senator NUNN. Why was he going to fire you? Did he say ?
Mr. ADAMS. The way it was>phrased, he said, "If you insist on, push-
ing this kind of stuff you are going to find yourself out in the streets."
Senator NUNN. What was that 40-page report? I am not at all clear
on it from your statement. Was it taking issue with the previous report
that the Agency had made?
Mr. ADAMS. Well, the previous Khmer Communist order of battle,
as I mentioned in paragraph 1 there, was a ring of 5,000 to 10,000.
And where that had ox'i~ gnally come from was the 'Cambodian G-2,
that is, the Cainbgdian Government intelligence. And they came up
with this rin right after the coup which overthrew Sihanouk in March
1970. And the U.S. intelligenceiwhen asked how many Cambodian
Communist koldiers theree-.were, robe said there were 5,(E0 ~ to 10;000
Nobody ever questioned or even looked at the number. And .what hap-
pened was that :I ;sat down ~ in May of 1971 and' discovered'that this
number had newer been[ ?ldbked at before,: and thereupon drew together
a 'available evidence coriceriiing the size of+th6 Cambodiai Commu-
nist military strtio'tdre. I wrote this: 40-page,-paper which Fame to the
conclusion that the number was not 5,0Qb to 10,000 as; the of tial order
of battle put it'but 100;000 to 150;000.
Senator NUNN. What I don't understand, are you saying that -the
CIA doesn't want their,,analysts to in any way. critique- previous
reports?
Mr. ADAMS. I am shying that it? happp l -in this particalkr' ease,
tliai didn't' like: the finding that'I had come ~up with'.* Senator NuNx.,Has that ever happened'.to ybu' before?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator Nni N: Yoii' mean you simply siibnlit n finding,?and if they
don't like it they savi thoy are goi'ng tore you ?.
Mr. ADAMS. Well, that is the first time they have ever said they were
going to fire me. In August 1966, I looked for.the'.first time: at the Wet-
eong order of battle, -which' at that time was .listed' as 275;000 men.
I discovered that the Vietcong order of battle was divided into four
parts, and that three of the four parts had not been baked at.for a
period of some years; I looked'at'the three i eglected'parrts'and came
to the conclusion that, the! overall' order of battle was not 27 ,000, but
600,000. And I discovered in the last part of 1966~thatis, from August
on;' that every paper I ; wtote on the subject. was killed. So I had had
some previous experience with this kind of business. And then eventu-
ally the CIA came to accept .the findings,I,hadniada in 1966.,
Senator. Ned fv. Who,, was nshing the 10;000 to 80,000 figure? Do
you know' anybody, that `had- a res,son for Vushing it! What: is the
motive behind this? I don't seem to know what the mot`; ?e` would be.
Mr. ADAMS. I believe that there was a motive-?of' eo(ti e, I ca+n't
really tell the motive,). because I am'not the pre sots that did tt'his, ut
my 'suspicion i that, peint'One, there was embarrassment Ott the part
of the CIA !research hierarchy that they-had not,lobked'at the size of
the Cambodian Communist structiue for a period of some 15 months,
never even looked at it. And the reason that they assigned this number
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of 10,000 to 30,000 was that it is not that much dissimilar from the old
number, the 5,000 to 10,000, it just looks like there is a gradual rise.
Senator NUNN. Who was the person that said they were going to
fire you now because of this report?
Mr. ADAMS. His name was Mr. Harold Ford.
Senator NuNx. Is he still with the agency?.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir. I don't think, however, that he was the one
who-
Senator NUNN. Initiated that? Who do you think was the one who
initiated that? Do you have any way of knowing?
Mr. ADAMS. I have no way of knowing that. I have had a number
of run-ins with the research hierarchy. My suspicion was that it would
be Mr. Edward Proctor, who runs the research department of the
CIA, or his deputy, Mr. Paul Walsh.
Senator NUNN. On the other subject, on page 3 of this-of course
you don't have the same page number, I suppose- you say:
In any case, I submitted in December 1972 a detailed .oral complaint to the
CIA Inspector General on the matter. The IG official took lengthy notes on what I
had to say.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator NUNN. A day or so later he told me that Mr. Colby, then the
CIA Executive Director, had said vis-a-vis my complaint, "Let the
chips fall where they may."
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator NUNN. I don't know whether that is good or bad. I don't
know what he meant by that. Do you have any idea what he meant?
Did you put that in here? Does that mean he wants another
investigation?
Mr. ADAMS. I believe that they intended, or at least the idea was,
that this was going to be some kind of an investigation. But as far as
I am concerned it never came about.
Senator NUNN. It sounds like to me Mr. Colby ordered an investiga-
tion, and let the chips fall where they may.
Mr. ADAMS. The. way I put it in, it sounds very good, let the chips
fall where they may.
Senator NUNN. This is in effect complimentary to him.
Mr. ADAMS. It would be complimentary to him if something hap-
pened after that. But apparently there was no investigation which
transpired after he made this remark.
Senator NUNN. Are you saying that is his fault, if he gives an`order
and it is not carried out? With the details he has on his mind, do you
think that he can follow through that closely on everything? I am just
wondering whether this is an overall criticism of him or whether it is
complimentary. I am a little puzzled.
Mr. ADAMS. I am saying, what I meant to portray here was, he had
made this remark, let the chips fall where they may, but there was no
investigation of what I was trying to get investigated as far as I could
tell, and the only two chips that fell were on me. First, the report of
my having a complaint went out to the prosecution and they tried
to portray me, the prosecution did,, as a chronic complainer. And
second, in.March of 1473, I was told that I was about to get the sack.
Senator NUNN. That was how long after the first time you were told
you were going to be fired?
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Mr. ADAMS. Let me see. The first time
Senator Nvxx. June of 1971.
Mr. ADAMS. June of 1971.
And then it came around again in March of 1973.
Senator NUNN. Which was about 2 years later.
Mr. ADAMS. About 2 years later. There were a couple of interim
threats, however:
Senator Nuxx. What were they related to? Was that some other
document you submitted?
Mr. ADAMS. They seemed to be closely related to this whole matter
of the Khmer Communist order of battle. I kept complaining that the
things had been, the way I put it, hoaxed or fabricated.
Senator Nvxx. But you are not saying that Mr. Colby had anything
to do with that ?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir, I am not. I am making the observation, however,
that he was aware that at least somebody had made allegations con-
cerZing the fabrication, and that nothing happened thereafter except
those two chips falling.
Senator Nuxx. Was Mr. Helms the head of the CIA then?.
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, he was until February 1973.
Senator Nvxx. Was he aware of that, do you think?
Mr. ADAMS. I think he probably was, yes. Helms had also been A'
involved
Senator Nuxx. What was your exact job?
Mr. ADAMS. Primarily just analyzing, sir.
Senator Nvxx. And how many people did you have under you?
Mr. ADAMS. It ranged-ordinarily I was working by myself, but I
had at one time as many as three people working for me.
Senator Nuxx. How many were over you? Were you at the bottom
of the pole?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, I was at the bottom of the heap.
Senator Nuxx. How many people would be on your level in the
CIA?
Mr. ADAMS. Most of the CIA would be on my level, I mean Indians.
Senator Nvxx. How many of them submitted these counter memo-
randums? Was this an unusual thing ?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir; it is very unusual. I would point out that when
I wrote the memorandum which said that the CIA order of battle
was not 5,000 to 10,000 but 100,000 to 150,000, that suggested an error
of between 1,000 and 3,000 percent, which is pretty big.
Senator Nuxx. Was that your responsibility? Was that part of
your responsibility, to review that?
Mr. ADAMS. It would have come within the charter I had for the
paper I was writing at that time. If somebody asked me, why the
dickens were you doing that, I would wave a piece of paper about and
say, here is why.
Senator Nuxx. Did you have any discussions with your superior
about this? Did you tell us you were frustrated because obviously there
was an error being made?
Mn ADAMS. Yes sir.
Senator Nuxx. That is what the memorandum said? Mr. ADAMS. Frequently, yes, I pointed out a number of. times-
Senator Nuxx. What was his response to that? Did he say, mind
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your own business, did he say go ahead and write a memorandum?
Was this memorandum written contrary to the wishes of your superior?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir. It wasn't necessarily contrary to the wishes
of my superior. He didn't know I was writing it until I handed it in.
Senator NUNN. To him ?
Mr. ADAMS. To his deputy, who was also above me.
Senator NUNN. To the Ellsberg trial for a minute. As I read your
statement :
Second, upon return from the Ellsberg trial, I was informed orally that my
employment with the -CIA was about to be terminated, although eventually the
agency backed down. I have reason to believe that the persons who opposed my
termination were the same ones who were responsible for the fabrication of
the Khmer Communist order of battle in 1971.
Mr. ADAMS. That is correct.
Senator NUNN. Were you suggesting here that it was the previous
conflict 2 years prior to that that was still kindling that was causing
the possibility of your being terminated?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir. I am suggesting that. The reason is that this
memorandum I wrote in June of 1971 was really an opening gun,
because I wrote several other memorandums after that which indi-
cated exactly the same thing. For example, when this analyst who had
been assigned the number 10 to 30,000 came out with a memorandum in
November 1971 indicating there was 15 to 30,000-
Senator NUNN. Who was this? Have you got his name?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir, I do. I would prefer if I could, because I am
not sure whether he is under cover or not, to give you
Senator NUNN. Would you furnish that, and we can determine
whether it ought to be a matter of the public record or not.
Mr. ADAMS. Fine, I will, sir.
Senator NUNN. Thank you.
Mr. ADAMS. After he came out with this paper I wrote a lengthy
criticism of his official paper which became the official order of battle,
pointing out that he had used many of the same techniques in devising
the order of battle that the military assistance command-that is,
MACV, had used prior to the Tet Offensive. I had been in a con-
siderable fight at that time before the Tet Offensive, pointing out
that the enemy order of battle then was way too low, and in fact when
the offensive hit, large numbers of units which showed up in the mid-
dle of Saigon and other South Vietnamese cities had never been in
the order of battle. Then I was afraid that that kind of thing was going
to recur.
Senator NUNN. Was this analyst that gave this 15,000 to 30,000
figure on your level, so to speak?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir, so to speak.
Senator NUNN. So you were two at the same level challenging each
other, is that right?
Mr. ADAMS. I wouldn't say challenging each other, but we were both
at the same level, yes, sir.
Senator NUNN. Do you think he was the one that was instigating
your termination or firing?
Mr. ADAMS. Oh, absolutely not, sir. He is a good friend.
Senator NUNN. Someone up the line was?
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. Mr. ADAMS. Somewhere up ,the line, I imagine it would probably be
either the head of research or his deputy.
Senator_ Nrrxx. And. the rsason that:.you would surmise that is be-
cause they. had been using this erroneoti information, and they didn't
want to correct it because it would be admitting that they would be
wrong?
Mr. ADAMS. I. think that is dart of it. And. one of.the reasons that
they could get away with this thing, I think, is that I feel ,that the
administration perhaps-I don't want to lay too much blame on the
administration-would not- ; 11I I
Senator Nuxx. They are secustorned to it, I think.
Mr. Ar xs. At any rate, if an'.unalyy'sstt comes out with a low number,
the administration is not to go about beating him on the head and have
him raise the number. In other words, administration policy vis-a-vis
Cambodia is--at least at that time, and I think i continues more or
less this way--the bad guys in Cambodia are Vietnamese, and if you
come up with a big Cambodian ,army, this tends to disapprove the
underpinnings of our policy. Are you-with the $ .
Senator Nrrxx. I am with you.
Mr. ADAMS. Thank-you, sir.
Senator Nuwx. On this Ellsberg trial, then your testimony there
didn't really have much to do with the fact that you were threatened
to be fired, is that right $
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir? it had to do with rnq'questioning of or rather-my
doubts about the honesty of some testimony of a prosecution witness,
one General Deputy. And he was saying that release of certain statis-
tics by Ellsberg was detrimental to the national security of the United
States. The statistics includled! the order of battle statistics of the
1967 period. And I knew, because I had worked on this at the time,
that those had been fabricated, too. And my question was whether it
was a Federal crime on the part of Ellsberg to release fabricated
statistics.
Senator Nrrxx. You said they had been fabricated. You mean they
are erroneous, or did you know that someone with a motive had falsi-
fied them?
Mr. ADAMS. I believe that someone with a motive had falsified them.
I have been trying ever since then to find out who was.
Senator Nvxx. You don't know $
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir, I have been trying to get an investigation going
to see who it was before the Tet Offensive that was the case of
fabricating the statistics. I tried in December 1972 to get an Army
investigation going and failed.
Senator NUNN. Is this due to the CIA analyst again, or is it pri-
marily the military intelligence?
Mr. ADAMS. It is primarily the military intelligence, yes, sir. The
CIA was conscious of the fabrication and went along with it at the
time.
Senator Nuxx. You say they were conscious of the fabrication. How
do you know?
Mr. ADAMS. Because I told them.
Senator NuNx. You told them.?
Mr. ADAMS. The CIA hierarchy.
Senator NUNN. So if they believed you they were conscious of it.
it
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Mr. ADAMS. Well, they came to believe me, because after the TET
Offensive they used my figures.
Senator NUNN. So what you are telling us is that in your opinion
if the CIA is convinced that they are wrong, even if one of their own
people tells them, that they are not willing to make any changes be-
cause they would be saying that they were wrong, and it would be
contrary to policy ?
Mr. ADAMS. I wouldn't say that of the whole CIA, but perhaps to
some individuals in the CIA. My problem is, I don't know who is re-
sponsible for this kind of stuff, so I find it very difficult to make a
broad statement on it.
Senator NUNN. You said a minute ago you thought it was someone
in the research division.
Mr. ADAMS. That's correct. Yes.
Senator NUNN. Mr. Colby is not in this division, is he?
Mr. ADAMS. No, sir. But it could be-and I could never find out about
things like this-it could be that the director himself was aware of
this. Now, I know that Helms had been aware of the fabrication that
went on of statistics back in 1967.
Senator NUNN. How do you know that?
Mr. ADAMS. Because I was working in his office at the time.
Senator NUNN. You might tell us a little bit about that. It is a pretty
serious charge. He is not here.
Mr. ADAMS. In 1967 I was working in the CIA under an officer called
Special Assistant to Vietnamese Affairs, which is an office directly
under Helms. And I was an analyst within this office. It is a small
one, and perhaps has a dozen or so people. From 1966, until a few days
before the Tet Offensive. I had been pushing for higher numbers to
describe the size of the Viet Cong Army. In other words, I thought
it was bigger than the official statistics said it was. There was a series
of order of battle conferences over findings that I had made in August
1966, which suggested that the OB was a larger figure. Starting, I
believe, somewhere around June or July 1967, the order came down
from the MAV heirarchy to its order of battle section that they were
to try and keep the order of battle willy-nilly under the number of
300,000.
Senator NUNN. The order came from where?
Mr. ADAMS. This I have never been able to ascertain, where it came
from.
Senator NUNN. Did you see the order?
Mr. ADAMS. I heard about the order. I saw it reported in a cable
within the CIA, that the Army wanted to keep the number below
300,000.
Senator NUNN. The Army gave the directions for this to be kept?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes ; the Army was responsible.
Senator NUNN. The Army was telling the CIA what they wanted
to report?
Mr. ADAMS. In essence, yes. And the question was, it seems to me,
whether the CIA was willing to accept the Army's number.
Senator NUNN. What month was this?
Mr. ADAMS. Well, there was a series of fights, and it was really June
1967 through September 1967. And in September 1967, we threw in the
99-275-73-G
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sponge and said, yes, we would accept the Army number, or something
very close to it, not exactly it.
Senator Nuxx. Did you go along with that ?
Mr. ADAMS. No; I raised the roof.
Senator Nuxx. To whom?
Mr. ADAMS. To. first, in a series of memoranda that went to the Di-
rector, to the head of the research, to the head of Economic Research,
and a number of other offices, and to the head of the Board of National
Estimates. I later went to the CIA Inspector General. I also com-
plained to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. And I
also complained to the National Security Council staff. And then in, I
think it was February or March of 1969, they threw in the sponge.
Senator Nuxx. You did a lot of complaining?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator Nuxx. Did anybody agree with you in the whole CIA?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator Nuxx. And have you got names ?
Mr. ADAMS. I have. But I would like to submit them if I could
Senator Nuxx. You do have people that agree with your analysis?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator Nuxx. And agree with your allegation of falsification and
fabrication, I think that you said?
Mr. ADAMS. I don't know whether they would characterize it as that,
but I think that they would certainly go along with the facts--a lot
of people would go along with the facts as I present them; yes, sir.
Senator Nuxx. And is there a reason you don't want to b ve it in
public ?
Mr. ADAMS. Well, I hesitate. to do that, because I am on the hook with
a secrecy agreement, and I don't want to put my neck on the chopping
block now.
Senator Nuxx. Are some of these people still with the CIA?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.
Senator Nuxx. When did you terminate with the CIA?
Mr. ADAMS. June 1973, was when my resignation became effective.
Senator Nuxx. And were you not fired ?
Mr. ADAMS. I was not fired ; no, sir.
Senator Nuxx. But you were still under the threat of being fired,
or had that threat subsided?
Mr. ADAMS. No. sir. It was on the 19th of March 1973, when I was
told that I was going to be terminated, orally, that I would get a writ-
ten notification shortly thereafter.
Senator Nuxx. And who told you that?
Mr. ADAMS. A Mr. Maurice Ernst told me that. And he said that I
would get a written notification shortly thereafter, and the notification
never showed up. In the meantime I was raising quite a stink, because
I said that I thought that the reason I would be fired was because of the
Cambodian Communist order of battle. Also, it occurred to me-and
this was almost. a form of paranoia-that after the Ellsberg break that
maybe somebody in the White House had sent the word to put the
whammy on me. And so I sent a memo to the Director asking him, hey,
was it the White House
Senator Nuxx. How many people sent these memos? I don't know
how the Director had time to read all your memos.
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Mr. ADAMS. He very seldom got memos from me. He did for a little
bit after I was trying to find out who put me on the termination list.
What he did generally was to send it over to the legal counsel's office;
in fact, the guy that used to write me is sitting right back there, his
name is-I don't know, he was there this morning-his name is John
Green. And he had my account. And I would send a memo to the Di-
rector. And I said something to the effect, Director, was it the White
House or was it you that put me on this list? And the first memo I got
back, not from the Director but from the legal counsel's office, said,
you are not on the list at, all.
Senator NUNN. And you kept trying to find out who was trying to
fire you?
Mr. ADAMS. And then I said, that wasn't the question I asked. I
asked who put me on the list. And he kept saying, you are not on it
anymore.
Senator NUNN. I am a little bit puzzled. If you were going to be
fired and that threat subsided, how did you find it out? Everytime
you sent a memo asking who was firing you it looks like it would
jeopardize your job that much more.
Mr. ADAMS. I was annoyed, because I don't like to be threatened
as I was, and I wanted to And out who did it. So the next time I went
to the Inspector General.
Senator NUNN. So you had sort of a corollary investigation going
as to who was trying to fire you for almost 2 years, didn't you?
Mr. ADAMS. No; I didn't really start trying to find out directly
until May 1973, this year. I think it was April or May 1973, asking
who it was that was sticking me on this list all the time, or had stuck
me on the list.
Senator NUNN. What made you finally decide to leave?
Mr. ADAMS. I think it was-as I put it in my letter of resignation-
a sort of longstanding dismay over the fact that I thought that those
statistics were being faked all the time.
And, incidentally, I would like to mention something, if I could,
at the moment, that Senator Symington in questioning me brought
up the term "disgruntled employee." I don't consider myself a dis-
gruntled employee, because I think the CIA performs it very useful
mission. I wouldn't even mind going back there, as absurd as it sounds.
But I simply got sick of faked statistics. And I was hoping that the
CIA would get back to its job, what I think, of telling the truth.
Senator NUNN. None of this relates directly-you don't have any
direct criticism of Mr. Colby, you are talking really about the whole
CIA basically?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes; but this morning's testimony, and particularly my
statement this morning, was about Phoenix
Senator NUNN. I know that part of it. But these memoranda you
were sending back and forth, and so forth, you are not alleging Mr.
? Colby tried to get you fired, because you were bringing them out?
Mr. ADAMS. I could never find out who it was. Mr. Colby at the time
was Executive Director.
Senator NUNN. It could have been anybody from your level, right on
up to the top?
Mr. ADAMS. Yes; I tend to think it was more in the hierarchy than
the lower-archy.
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1
Senator Nfrxx: The hierarchy?
I would like very much if you could give counsel those names that
you referred to. I've got to go vote.
The hearing will?,resume-when: either Senator Symington or I get
back.
Mr...A.dams, we appreciate very much your coming and testifying.
And that,will be all. We willh&ve the next witness When we get back.
tr. ADAMS. Thank you. , '
Senatw NuNN. Mr. ,Sakwa will be the next witness. And that will
be in approximately 15 or 20 minutes.
[Becees.]
[Mr. Samuel A. Adams' statement follows:]
INT,$ODUCTION
My name is Samuel A. Adams. I resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency
on 1 Ju46 1973. My insignlatiolii. stemwed from dismay; over what'I thought was
the sloppy--and often dishonest, way, U. S. intelligence conducted- research on the
struggle, in' Indochina, An example. of the shortcomings, I believe, was the man-
ner~iii which U.S. intelligencce' produced reports on the'political and administra-
tive agencies of the Viet Cong. These agencies; sometimes called the "infrastrnc-
tuve"M we* the target' -oE the -Allied: Phoenix Program, The Phoenix Program
was overseen at one time by Mr. Colby, a candidate to receive the CIA's Director-
ship.
Seven of my, ten years at, the Agepcy were devoted to -research on our adver-
-saries in'Indaehina. My reports'?ineltided an 'extenkive study on the' Viet Cong
police system, a treatise on Communist subversive agentn in the South Vietnamese
Army, and, .police, and an examination Of, the Vet iCopg's covert structure in
South Vii: t ese, territory. In i970,, ?I wrote en. thy ;study- entitled : "Guide
to a 'Viet ,Cong Province," which the ,CIA fides as its standard field handbook
on the;Comtunists in South Vietnam. For about five years ?I gave the Agency's
training course on the Viet Cong to CIA case officers bound for Vietnam.
I respectfully submit the following statement to your committee.
raiACE
The Phoenix Program is an example of a Round concept gone awry. It was
meant to destroy the Communists' political apparatus, but it has not done so,
and the Viet Cong are in the middle of a resurgence throughout South Vietnam.
Although the country's surface looks peaceful enough (at least compared to the
last few years) the appearance i$ deceiving. $eneath the surface of the South
Vietnamese government, the unravelling is well,?along.
Phoenix was conceived' when the Allies' main weapons in South Vietnam were
American warplanes, and heavily-armed battalions whose mission was to "search
and destroy". The weapons were bludgeons, which all too often failed to discrimi-
nate between the enemy soldier and the innocent bystander. More important,
they were virtually useless against the Viet Cong political cadre, who, it came
to be realized,. was just as dangerous as the Viet Cong warrior.
Phoenix was designed to fill the gap. Copied from a British concept which had
succeeded in Malaya, the Phoenix Program was meant to replace the bludgeon
with a scalpel. They key' to the operation was precise targetting. Instead of
bombs-which killed large numbers of civilians in addition to the occasional
political operative-Phoenix's main. tools, theoretically, were good intelligence and
good files. The object of the program'was to find out who among the Vietnamese
population were Viet Cong cadres, and to arrest or kill them. In theory, arrests
were preferable to assassinations, because a prisoner could lead to further arrests,
and a cadaver led nowhere.
In order to work, the Phoenix Program had basic needs. These are five of the
most important:,
1. A clear perception of the nature andorganization of the target.
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2. Good intelligence concerning the names, the whereabouts, and the activities
of the people who belong to it.
3. A tight, well-run police organization, with secure files, with the ability to
keep close track of the population, and with a high state of training and morale.
4. An efficient and fair judicial system, with stout prisons and a rehabilitation
program which could turn rebels into citizens.
5. Most important, popular support.
The trouble with Phoenix, and the reason it didn't work, was that its needs,
although recognized in theory, were never fulfilled in practice. The diverse be-
tween hope and reality became so wide that the program degenerated into a game
of statistics, in which numbers were paramount, and the object of the exercise-
the crippling of the Communist Party-was never even approached. I will deal
with the needs one by one.
When United States troops first landed in force in Vietnam in early 1965, we
were abysmally ignorant of the nature of the, threat. It was thought that the
application of enough military force by the U.S. would- eventually .compel the
Communists to lay off. But they didn't, and the introduction of each new Ameri-
can battalion only seemed to get us in deeper than we already were.. Finally the
Tet offensive demonstrated the Viet Cong's ability to get large numbers of troops
into South Vietnamese urban areas withoutidetection and parred U.S. intelli-
gence into the realization that the Communists-had something there besides an
army. The Phoenix program-which had existed in one form or another for sev-
eral years began to take serious shape.
The initial problem was that the basic research on the nature of ,the adver-
sary and of his organization was either undone or misunderstood. When the, time
came to designate a target for the Phoenix organization to aim at,the mpet readily
available entity was something U.S. Intelligence called the, "infrastiructure", a
catchall phrase long used to describe the non-military portion of the: Viet Cong
organization. Unfortunately, the Communists themselves had no such: term, and
U.S. intelligence had no precise definition of what it included. It did have,a num-
ber, however, 29,175, which had remained the same from June 1965.u p until the
eve of the Pet offensive. Although the number changed after Tet-ithas.ranged
since then from 60,000 to 90`000-the definitional problem was never cleared up.
As a result, no one knows even now who belongs to the, "infrastructure".,. and the
number given out officially? in the sum-of guesses from the field, made by people
who have varying ideas of what they are counting. It is conceivable, using the
loosely-defined official criteria, that we could say the "infrastructure" was any-
where from 10,000 to a quarter of a million strong.
A salient problem of who to count arose from the fact that for some time the
Viet Cong's covert operatives in South : Vietnamese territory were not. included
in the official lists. Thus a spy in Thieu's_office-there was one-would be excluded
from the "infrastructure" because he failed to fit the official U.S. definition. The
problem was compounded because of the reluctance on the part of U.S. intelli-
gence to look into the matter of Viet Cong subversion. For example, in May 1969.
the CIA Chief of Station for Saigon indicated on a visit to Washington his belief
that the Viet Cong had only 200 agents in the South Vietnamese government. He
spoke from ignorance. An in-depth research study going on at the same time
suggested the real number of such agents was more like 30,000.
The question of the Communists', covert presence in. South Vietnamese terri-
tory became particularly vexing after the coup in Cambodia in., March, 1970.
When it accurred, most of the Communists' army in the southern half of South
Vietnam left for duty next door, and large numbers of Viet Cong cadres in Viet-
nam's Delta shifted from Viet Cong to South Vietnamese territory, often by
defection through Chien Hot centers. The ensuing quiet in the Delta-along with
an apparent increase in the enemy defection rates-gave rise to optimism among
American officials in Vietnam, including those who manned the Phoenix program.
PRECISE rnrn 'r6ENCE
Although hard intelligence on the names, whereabouts and doings of com-
munist cadres is much sought after, it is very hard to come by. Allied files bulge
with information of this sort, but in the vast majority of cases it is either false
or incomplete. Things have improved since the early days of Phoenix when opera-
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tions. against specific targets were almost nonexistant, But the Improvements
have been marginal, and the latest report from the field suggest the situation is
getting Worse instead of better. In any case, the type of person "neutralized" by
Phoenix is about the same as it always was ; they are mostly low-level and of
little consequence. The hard-core Party member is still un-caught.
The South Vietnamese National Police and Military Security Service-both of
which work for Phoenix-are better now than they were, say, in 1966. But the
base was so low that It is difficult to conceive that they could have gotten worse.
The problem here is much more complicated than simply low morale, (which
recent reports suggest is endemic among the South Vietnamese constabulary).
The most trying aspect of the situation is the Viet Cong's continued penetration
of the South Vietnamese security apparatus. Captured documents indicate that
many hundreds of South Vietnamese policemen are in reality Viet Cong agents.
The penetrations occur at all levels. A government roll-up which took place in
northern South Vietnam In 1971 show the dimensions of the problem. Among
those reportedly apprehended as Viet Cong agents were the chief of police of Da
Nang city. The chief of the police Special Branch, and his assistant for opera-
tions, and theehief.of pollee fat I Corps. The ftrktthree were jailed. The last, after
evidence proved insufficient for conviction, was reputedly transferred to Saigon
as a police advisor to the Phoenix program.
Although the American advisory effort to Phoenix contained no Viet Cong
agents, it often was of questionable help. One of'Its=main shortcomings was the
Ignorance of most advisors of the Viet Cong target. Prior to August, 1968, the
average CIA case officer received no training what so ever in the organization
and methfds of operations of the Communist structure. Then, In late 1968, a
training program started up which by the end of the year gave those bound for
Vietnam 24 hours of instruction. This was rapidly cut back. The number of
hours In the Viet Cong now given to CIA case officers going to Saigon is four.
An ancillary problem Is the one of population control.' Despite many attempts
over the last five years, there is still no adequate ID card system in Vietnam, and
large numbers of persons, particularly In the slums, roam about without the police
knowing who they are. Likewise, the Phoenix system has yet devise as mundane
a thing as a catalogue of fingerprints. If, say, the U.S. ambassador were killed
tomorrow, and the gun was found which accohiplished the'killing, there would
be no way to trace the assassin, from the prints on the gun.
THE MATTER OP PRISONS
South Vietnamese prisons continue to leak, although not as badly as a few
years ago. Still, the average Viet (long captive-unlike the common criminal-will
likely go free within a few months. Again, one can point to improvements, but the
basic problem remains that the accounting system which comes into play after a
suspect's arrest is so loose that It is often very difficult to tell what happens to
him shortly thereafter. In several areas of Vietnam, at present, the system has
broken down completely, so that Communist prisoners in these areas frequently
fail to go to prison at all. '
Furthermore, there is an almost complete lack of a rehabilitation system. The
old saw that the most dedicated Vietnamese Communists have usually done time
continues to have a ring of truth. Captured documents still show that those who ?
leave South Vietnamese prisons frequently rejoin the Viet Gong organization
after their release from jail.
POPULAR SUPPORT
But the biggest single drawback to the Phoenix program is that except In a
few areas it lacks popular support. What this boils down to is the reluctance V
of the average South Vietnamese citizen to turn In a Viet Cong cadre when he
encounters one. Whether the reluctance stems from fear or admiration of the
Viet Cong, It amounts to the same thing. That Is, the extraordinarily large Viet
Cong apparatus continues its covert existence in South Vietnamese territory.
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I would like to attach this supplement to my main statement. It has to do with
Cambodia, and what I believe was the deliberate fabrication of statistics of the
Khmer Communist Order of Battle by the CIA. I made allegations concerning the
fabrication to the CIA Inspector General in December 1972, and I was told that
Mr. Colby was aware of the allegations. As far as I can determine, no attempt
was made to investigate the charges.
The circumstances of the fabrication are as follows :
1. The Khmer Communist Order of Battle, as put forth by U.S. intelligence be-
tween April 1970 and June 1971, was a range of from 5,000 to 10,000. The range
remained constant during this period because no one within the U.S. intelligence
community was looking into the matter.
2. In June 1971, I completed a memorandum, about 40 pages long, which was
based on a review of all available evidence. Shortly after I handed the paper in,
it was killed ; I was threatened with firing, and told to work on weekends for
the foreseeable future. I did so-that is I worked a seven-day week-throughout
the summer of 1971. I would respectfully submit that this was a rare instance in
which an intelligence analyst was punished during time of war for finding an
enemy army.
3. Right after the paper was removed from my control, the job of researching
the Communist OB in Cambodia was assigned to an analyst who had never
worked on Cambodia, and who had never researched a combat OB. (By contrast,
I had worked on Communist strength estimates for several years, often as the
Agency's only analyst on the matter.) The day the new analyst was given the job,
he was also given a range to come up with-namely, 10,000-30,000. The analyst
took five months to devise a way to come up with the assigned range. In
November 1971, the CIA finally released its official OB. The number it came up
with was a range of from 15,000-30,000, almost precisely the number the analyst
had been given the previous June.
The present Khmer Communist (KC) Order of Battle approximately 50,000-
is derivative of the old number. I respectfully submit that it is extremely mis-
leading, and greatly understates the strength of the Communist military
organization in Cambodia. I would make the observation that U.S. intelligence
currently asks us to believe that the Cambodian Government army of 200,000
outnumbers the KC army by four to one. Since Phnom Penh seems about to fall,
I would respectfully suggest that the odds, as put forth by U.S. intelligence, are
something of an anomaly.
I would note that I am in the process of laying out a more detailed account of
what happened, which will include names, dates, and who did what to whom.
In any case, I submitted in December 1972 a detailed oral complaint to the
CIA Inspector General (IG) on the matter. The IG official took lengthy notes on
what I had to say. A day or so later, he told me that Mr. Colby, then the CIA's
Executive Director, had said vis-a-vis my complaint, "Let the chips fall where
they may."
As far as I can determine, only two things appeared to happen as a result of
my complaints.
1. First, the Prosecution, during my testimony for the Defense at the Ellsherg
trial brought the matter up to impeach my credibility as a witness. My trip to
? the CIA Inspector General was portrayed as the act of a chronic complainer.
2. Second, upon my return from the Ellsberg trial, I was informed orally that
my employment at the CIA was about to be terminated. Although eventually the
Agency backed down, I have reason to believe that the persons who proposed my
termination were the same ones who were responsible for the fabrication of the
Khmer Communist Order of Battle in 1971.
? Senator NUNN [presiding]. The committee will reconvene.
And we have Mr. Sakwa, who will be our next witness.
Senator Symington will be back in just a few minutes.
Do you swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
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want to be sworn in?
Mr. Sakwa, do Z.
Mr. SAKWA. I do.
Senator Nuxx. I believe you do have a prepared statement.
STATEMENT OF PAUL SAKWA, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. SARWA. Yes, I do, Senator..
Senator NUNN. We would be delighted to have that.
Mr. SAKWA. This is very brief, I have submitted a number of docu-
ments to the committee, and I'didn't want to spend the whole day
reading them to_ you since you have them here.
My name is Paul Sakwa. I reside at 825 New Hampshire Avenue
NW., in Washington, D.C. I was a CIA employee in the clandestine
services, from 1952 until 1962. At our Washington headquarters,from
February 1959 until August 1961, ,I had responsibility for political,
psychological, and paramilitary warfare operations, in the Far East
Division, for Vietnam When left this positron to join thestaff of
Deputy Director (Plans), my t tle was Qhief,, Covert.' Activity,
Vietnam.
I ask, respectfully, that my memorandum of July 4;1973, addressed
to Mr. Woolsey of this committee staff on the sub7ect'.of Mr. William
E. Colby, be made a matter.o f record. ,
In this memorandum T state
Mr. Colby is an uncontrollable Agent, he Mlante ini'el~i ence; stibmitted misin
11, 1 1. ,
formation, and permitted U.S. funds to be used n, rig tag the 1961 eleCtign in
South Vietnam, while he was Saigon . C#Sief of. eta ion}. ?
In the same memorandum, I cited the number !identifications i of 38
documents, plus the dates and titles'of five memoranda"whichI zarbte
and addressed to the'IDP who then was;l' r. It chart 11f . Bissell Jr'When I was informed by the committee staff that, CIA.could not
locate my memoranda, addressed to Mr. Bissell,- I. gave copies to the
committee. I ask, respectfully, that these memoranda be plitt ed in the
record. ]Names of thgs dot involved in this hearing` shqulc be,,deleted,
if I have not-already done soy , ! ? ; .
Although I have indicated to 1 Mr. Bissell that I could not account
for Mr. Colby's strange per'forlnatice in;Saigon ,there is a possible
explanation. I have no proofof this : An unod'icial''effort on the.part of
senior CIA officers to worsen the; situation -in, South, Vietnam so that
a greater military, presence would be justified and.an early n~t~clear con-
frontation with Communist China ,might take?'plaCe, Among others,
Charles S. Whitehurst (Qhief VCL) .andpossibly Desmond Fitz-
Gerald (Chief FE) were of this mentality.
I would like to add that regretfully:Mr.'FitzGerakl is, no longer
alive, and of course, cannot counter niy, interptetatidnof ?*hat he felt
about Vietnam. I regret that.
1962 and edited a bit- in 1964.
I want to thank the committee. for the?opportunity to testify. And I
would be happy to answer any qquestions,
[The document referred to #Ollow
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PROBLEMS OF A CLANDESTINE AGENCY
(An Inside Critique by Paul Sakwa)
(Author's note: Since the author has had extensive experience in the area
discussed by this article he is writing under a pseudonym in order to avoid any
possible embarrassment to the U.S. Government. Although this is a critique of
a certain federal agency, it does not contain classified information. It was writ-
ten in early 1962 and elaborated on slightly in 1964.)
INTRODUCTION
Inspired by the conviction that no outside group or individuals could obtain
an accurate view of s certain Agency's workings and problems without opera-
tional experience within the Agency itself, this article seeks to provide an inside
critique.
In the Agency the arts of security, concealment and deception have been so
highly refined and made almost instinctual that some of these practices have
manifested themselves on official levels where truth and accuracy are a com-
mand necessity. The natural hostility of the other agencies which operate more
openly compounds the universal bureaucratic tendency to thwart criticism.
Psychological factors incline those totally. absorbed with secret information
to disdain. other information. Ambitious men, driven to obtain more intelligence
and more agents, become blinded to the purpose of operations. The compartmen-
tation and secrecy required for very sensitive activities. perverts personnel poli-
cies so that there is a tendency to offer assignments only to one's friends.
Lacking a public record of achievement, a clandestine employee can hardly
avoid becoming a prisoner of his job. In some instances the internal mechanism
for handling grievances functions as does a Soviet trade union-promises are
broken and discipline, is enforced. This is a-closed society if not a sealed one.
Technical and craft requirements and the hypnotic fascination of clandestine
(dames. Bond) techniques have given the -technicians a predominant role, dis-
placing men of political judgment in an activity where mistakes have the grav-
est policy consequences. ,
It could be maintained that any critique of the Agency can be refuted on the
grounds that the author does not know all the facts. The reply to this is that no
one knows all the facts, there has often been confusion between what constitutes
absurdity or intelligence and those presently in control can hardly be expected
to point the accusing finger at themselves. Facts exist and can be found by those
who have access to the files and the persons concerned.
Until recent years there was in the Agency an atmosphere that encouraged
daring, new ideas and objectivity. A residue of daring remains, a majority of
the better men have left, and much of the remaining talent is busily engaged in
avoiding responsibility and in ossifying their minds. Inter-agency struggles,
internal political conflicts and an over-extended involvement in matters of for-
eign policy (a process begun during the Eisenhower Administration when there
was a lack of policy) have made some men giddy with power and imbued them
with self-righteousness. In 1962 about half the operations were useless if not
counter-productive or just plain not worth the expense.
Paying for misinformation has consequences more serious than a mere waste
of money. Those holding responsible positions on the middle and senior levels
know that the present situation protects them from embarrassing inquiries and
they naturally prefer the status quo. As a consequence many of them have not
only lost some degree of objectivity but they have also become inordinately sen-
sitive to the kind of criticism contained herein.
The Agency performs most of its operational functions with admirable
professionality; its personnel are probably the most devoted if at times most
misguided men in our government. Its deficiencies result in large measure from
its very rapid growth, the pernicious byproducts of secrecy, the lack of coordina-
tion with other agencies and with the White House, and the lack of effective
Congressional review. Cultural personal and operational factors influence po-
litical judgment ; a ranking official with an old-fashioned banana company
mentality simply will not cooperate in promoting peaceful social revolution in
Latin America-and may even thwart such policies ; a commander in the Cold
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War with a counter-espionage mentality frequently cannot distinguish between
a Democratic Socialist and a Marxist Communist. Even so-called positive oper-
ations are corrupted by the participation of professional anti-Communists who
know what they are against but not what they are for. Granting that all agencies
make mistakes, the task is to discover if the propensity to error has become a
habit and also to create the checks and mechanism whereby most of the avoid-
able mistakes are indeed avoided.
Inasmuch as this article concentrates on the errors and mistakes inherent in
the very nature of a clandestine agency to the exclusion of its accomplishments,
it might produce the impression that the Agency is a bureaucratic morass devoid
of any saving grace. This is not the came. The Agency still contains a high per-
centage of dedicated men and women whose main concern is the welfare of their
country. In some areas pleasant informality persists. Moreover, the Agency
treats its employees who suffer, personal calamities-service or otherwise in-
duced-with a humanity and consideration which might well be emulated else-
where. Woe the heretic, however, who renounces this religion and leaves this
order.
A CLOSED ORGANIZATION IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
By its very nature, a clandestine agency conceals its activities, including its
mistakes. And all bureaucrats tend to avoid blame and responsibility, curry
favor and, on occasion, accept credit for the work of others. However, since
there is often more than a fair amount of resentment and odletal criticism directed
at the Agency, the recipients of this antagonism are understandably reluctant lid to compound possible unfairness. In addition, any vali external a security criticism In vath is
only because it cites examples) suggests the
way security considerations, self-defense and misguided self-righteousness be- s
come unavoidably lntermingted
The pursuit of secret knowledge develops a "keyhole" frame of reference in
the mind of the pursuer which severely limits his perspective. The narrow task of
cultivating or handling an intelligence source 'allows little time for reflection
or the assessment of an overall political situation. In the newer nations, where
there may be close liaison relationships with high ranking members of a friendly
government, biased reporting may result from adopting the political bias of one's
opposite numbers, and some foreign officials may come to believe that the Agency
is a quicker- and more effective channel to action in Washington. If the Agency
concludes that there is no alternative to a particular policy or regime (suggest-
ing some leader's immortality and thus placing him and his regime in mortal
jeopardy), there is an element of career risk involved in submitting reports or
evaluations which contradict Agency policy.
The procurement and handling of secret knowledge fosters a feeling of omni-
science and promotes an attitude of disdain for material from overt sources
which could implement, support or question intelligence reports. The procedures
designed to prevent outside scrutiny have become reverse barriers which in im-
portant instances screen out truth, objectivity and the possibility of sound judg-
ment. Documents stamped SECRET tend to be regarded as necessarily true.
Those charged with carrying out political operations also supervise the procure-
ment of intelligence, which may reflect on the purpose and success of the same
political operations. Even men of, high dedication cannot easily allow the ac-
curacy and thus the success of one activity to announce the failure of the other.
Here the lack of effective Executive and Congressional scrutiny prompts ir-
responsibility which results in initiating and continuing unnecessary operations.
Empires are sometimes judged by their wealth, and a sensible reduction In a
unit's budget may complicate the obtaining of adequate funds at a later date.
The performance of junior officers is evaluated on the basis of the number of
agent recruitments and the number of intelligence disseminations. There is no
record of an officer being promoted because he recommended the termination of
a useless project.
Agency links with certain communications media may tend to influence Ameri-
can public opinion in both their operational and advertising functions.
Extreme security measures, overclassifieation of sensitive material, exag-
gerated use of compartmentation, the creation of special Inter-agency units for
the handling of sensitive material and composed of men who have not done their
homework promote a kind of bureaucratic chauvinism and paranoia which. in
turn, complicate or even prevent coordination in areas where responsibilities
overlap. New channels often frustrate and block established and tested chan-
nels of policy formulation and action. The aura of secrecy induces an enjoyable
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conspiratorial flavor while, at the same time, it breeds suspicion of capable offi-
cials who have the necessary clearance but are strangers. The keepers of secrets
are not necessarily wise. At times they are even corrupted by them.
Clandestine operations involve modes of behavior which would be considered
immoral within national boundaries. Such behavior becomes "realism" beyond
our borders and, in the process, tends to promote indifference to moral and
democratic values : there is a compulsive delight in activities wherein the breach
of ethical behavior can be justified on patriotic grounds. Given a common enemy,
the character and deportment of foreign contacts become almost unimportant
considerations. Certain that the honor of Americans cannot be corrupted by for-
eign currencies, it is assumed that the services of foreigners-who have stature
and integrity-can be purchased with dollars. The doctrinal procedures for hir-
ing an intelligence source would present any intelligent foreigner with evidence
of a lack of mutual trust, and working bonds of mutual interest become rather
crude business relationships. The man who can be purchased works only for
himself.
PERSONNEL : TECHNICIANS AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT
A clandestine technician is one who knows the mechanics of espionage accord-
ing to established doctrine. His skill in this area is usually compensated by his
inability to anticipate the political or other consequences of operational failure
or success. He is to the Agency what a diesel engineer is to a steamship com-
pany : his services are essential, but his perspective is limited. A petty security
infraction may enrage him, while a blunder of some magnitude may evoke little
concern provided that doctrinal requirements have been followed. A technician
has an insatiable appetite for intelligence (sometimes propelled by unlimited
requirements levied by other agencies). Quality must surrender to quantity, since
lie cannot judge the former. The process of identifying a useful piece of intelli-
gence has been compared to the task of gleaning a diamond chip from a pile of
broken glass. When everything has been reported, the Agency cannot lose.
To a considerable degree the need for covert political action is reduced in pro-
portion to the improvement in the quality and consistency of American foreign
policy. Even prior to this happy development, many political operations became
merely a means of payment for the "intelligence" received from liaison sources. If
the liaison source represented a corrupt, inefficient and unpopular government,
subsidies and close relationships helped to sustain the regime in its disastrous
direction, making the United States a partner in corruption and complicating
later efforts at reform. If such regimes are under pressure by the American
Ambassador to institute reforms, high level officials of the regime may find a
sympathetic ear in the person of the ranking Agency officer present. In addition
to the obvious confusion, some very weird intelligence reporting may result from
the maintenance of this "vital" liaison.
Since the Cold War was the main justification for the creation and rapid ex-
pansion of the Agency and since the end of the Cold War (a prospect not easily
expected in 1962) would remove its raison d'Etre, there appears to be an uncon-
cious bias favoring action which could aggravate what is mostly a political prob-
lem to the point where there is no choice but to adopt paramilitary measures.
Impatience with sophisticated diplomacy and indirect political action follows
from the fact that the enemy has many advantages in this game, as he has in con-
ventional diplomacy. War is war, and in a war one does not question the char-
acter of one's allies. What is often missing, however, is an understanding of the
political and social factors which make internal subversion and warfare suc-
cessful. The halo of strident anti-Communism blinds the cold warrior to the
fact that his ally may have created and fostered the preconditions for successful
internal .conflict. In the process of buying affection we lose the respect of our
allies and they may lose their territories.
The Agency's operational area resembles the baronial system of 11th Century
France : changes in command are referred to as a game of musical chairs. Senior
officers who filled important slots ten years ago still retain the same or similar
positions, interrupted at times with ours to the desirable foreign posts. In con-
trast, the Foreign Service retires some sixty to ninety men a year, mostly from
the senior level. Perpetuating themselves in office and cultivating personal ties
for over a decade, these officers inevitably develop proprietary attitudes and the
assumption that longevity in a senior position makes for unassailable judg-
ment. Incentive is reduced, new ideas are not encouraged and stereotyped opera-
tions result. Old friendships tend to supersede operational necessity in a closed
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i
society, Mid the game of baronial polities more ' than adequately fulfills the
gossip requirements of the Agency.
When incompetents achieve, positions' of authority (as they will in any
ag6*y), security procedure's cart:-ebneeal thelr incompetence and errors. Such
individuals become adept at noisily *nt commtunist-and often useless-oper-
atibns. (Surely no one will critiolse the }production' of antiieommunist propaganda
even if His dull and unreadable:)-lOw i'deitsiahd imaginative minds are justi-
fiably regarded as a threat to incompet+entsi Assignments are made by the oper-
ating units, and when an officer"rkurnslrom a field post he may walk the halls
for months Yf the old school -tie fails' to meet'slmilhr colors. This procedure may
be contrasted with the otm inaeftectin the Foreigni Service.
The Agency, blithely asentnes -tlhat elandestine training :produces labor experts
and officers with politital' jttdocilit 1. where' as ino one would dream of -expecting
the same process to ?prodhtle attorneys and- violinists. {7iandestine expertise is ?
Confused with;-proficiency tai dth"er"*elde.- Disda1n"is? external criticism and
discouragement of internal dissent prevents anyone from saying that the em-
peror or operational baron has forgotten his Clothes:
Aff
~T64TICI~M pSrALx~ ;
-Ihi 1aslt'of$understa`ading al dfspptehiation'Ymn'thelpart nf'other agencies pies
the'timiA-etfWMming stitiggWtefiga1WtitU1nnes,tlfeir'a@Q{eiesence for 'even the most
neCeMttty+.and obvknl* operAtiettrs1ht4*r'ee t&1 a1mmenta1iti f which is supersensitive
to af-y kitnd`of erithiism.'This'includes}edtibttktCtivd oritlcistn;`the function MO t
netrled'.?Ohtt3id1e roviinittees!and>irbtips'tvitliiauthority t6 monitor Agency activi-
ties't{te' 4'ne'titkbiy regarded `itgaa"pbtential ithrftt;, Sinte'rt?quired seieurity prae-
tices are- bett' obtahtedrftom `ehttdnslvu}traintn'g Arid' eenditioning, there -is 1 an s
understandable reluctance, fo Ih ntArt'Vital a *d 'eoitrbvetsial' -secrets to visiting
scholaars MT military' s: THerh is'ithe''r4al? possibility, that some personality
will be undulyshoclted77this ekpti'ieiice 'Ttlmsftiuth as,&e. Agency f1ecialiSeQ. in
the arts ofJ*eception it'ib -not'dMiult?to dash MOO uaaitittiated visitors with a
couple of gobdspy stories:'it i's'relmtivei~+ehsy'4b Ulnt'e all, criticism by adopting
the -pious" posture oY lonely anti: set etls'tilledidatidts(;a ail t a' diabolical enemy
whose' evil Is only fmpeifectly, 'gndet'Sbed lelseWhere it tour government.
The lhvettse pride' in aaronytnit '9tii8 the , trAme dedication required for this
profOssion forces the Agency to, act' like' a stale , within a state. Joining the
Agency' l44"like 'taking holy' briers fof'life. Aigt}er l yalty to it rather than to
the go tntYient is a reflex phehpmenan: Ci4tndes finely' operating personnel have
ho public'recard (altlio>igh therm' c is~e an' office to help with this problem),
there can' be`no appeal' for oiitsi a untlerstantling Theis are severely lessened
opportunities for employment el here''since oils cannot; describe previous
employment experience. Resignees, are. stamped as'-renegade . These mostly in
herent conditions discourage dariiig.;tirid dissent:' Officers th family respon-
sibilities wlio lack a private inch e and aYe. not identified with the original
OSS and F'BI elements, tend to degenerate into.the' drones Stewart Alsop once
claimed that he discovered in the l5epartmentof State.
cor ctuaIo cs AND xEcOMMENDATIONS
Those who are acquainted with the Agency's responsibilities, accomplish-
ments and dedicated personnel will not question the vital role it must continue
to play in the national security. Other spokesmen for the Agency will continue
to justify or even glorify it. This article is a critique, hopefully an honest and
constructive one. The Agency's difficulties are built into the system and go
back some fifteen years. If bureancracles have their own laws, logic and purpose,
a clandestine bureaucracy would challenge even Mr. Parkinson's description.
The weaknesses of the Agency result from its very rapid growth in an area
where expertise had to be acquired the hard ways-by accepting risks and by
acting swiftly where other agencies were unable or unwilling to act:.
This rapid expansion placed "any young men on upper professional levels
where they have remained too long.
Necessary security procedures in the clandestine operation area have all but
sealed - openings to the healthy sunlight of outside criticism and to important
realities. The receipt of some unwarranted criticism has eliminated receptivity
to any Criticism.
The lack of outside scrutiny and' the aabsence' of a court of ' appeal requires
that the internal mechanism for handling grievances-where so much can be
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concealed for so long-function with the highest integrity. While this machinery
has performed many useful functions, it has also lied and exerted greet power
to protect its immediate master, the Agency. .
Technical requirements of an unusual profession have placed a premium on
clandestine expertise, relegating to a very secondary place the foreign policy
requisite of foresight, anticipation, and sound political judgment. The Agency
makes policy by the simple expedient of submitting a proposal for approval in an
area where policy is unclear or non-existent. Its Director, who plays a Merlin-
like role, sits in the highest councils. An Assistant Secretary of State will not
contradict him. The Agency, like any agency which helps to carry out foreign
policy, is capable of modifying it and of thwarting it.
The reorganization of the Agency, undertaken by those who have perfected
the game of musical chairs, results only in a variation of the same, game-musi-
cal offices or other units-leaving the main problems unresolved.
All these factors have combined in such a way that the Agency's capacity to
make mistakes has become institutionalized. Any attempt to remedy this grave
situation must take into account the enormous power wielded by this Agency.
Secret knowledge is secret power. Other agencies must continue to coordinate
with it and maintain its cooperativeness. It has vast legal, political and
institutional links and power, It has sought and gained (with no evil intent) the
cooperation of a large number of important individuals and organizations, in
a response to patriotic needs. These patriots are naturally reluctant to see
friendships, idols, past activities. and even the liberal establishment questioned.
In any event, it appears that sentiment is growing in the Congress for a stronger
review function. Such efforts might find some guidance in the following rec-
ommendations.
Senior Agency officers must have unqualified loyalty to the President and
should have demonstrated foreign policy views which are in concert with if not
identical to the views of the President. In turn, these officers should have full
Presidential support in fending unjustified attacks from other agencies, the
press and the Congress. Since it claims, to be a clandestine agency, it should
not seek publicity. If senior officers are permitted to lecture, write and release
papers concerning the Agency, then every present and former employee is justi-
fied in doing the same, including the author.
Since clandestine activity and its inevitable failures are of crucial concern to
the success of foreign policy, an objective monitoring element should be intro-
duced. Three functions are required : supervision by a Killian-type committee
under the Executive, a permanent physical link with the Department of State,
and the creation of a Joint Congressional "watchdog" Committee to oversee its
operations.
(a) The new Executive Committee would consist of a member of the White
House Staff (with access to all Agency facilities at any time), experienced
officers from sister agencies and two non-governmental representatives (avoiding
local institutions having links with the Agency) who reside in or near Washing.
ton, D.C., so as to permit frequent inspections.
(b) The link with the Department of State would consist of twelve carefuly
chosen officers from State who would have desks in both agencies, covering iden-
tical geographical or functional areas, who would have access to all Agency ma-
terial in the areas of their assignment. This would be a two year assignment,
without prejudice to considering the officers for promotion by State in the normal
lapse of time. This bridge would provide a secure window to and for a closed
support organization, and it would facilitate cooperation between two agencies
which waste much time thwarting and detesting each other. Present lialsion ar-
rangements cannot perform these functions and these functions would not be a
substitute for all present liaision links. This secure non-Agency scrutiny in depth
would produce automatic pressures on the most serious existing deficiencies.
(c) It should be made clear that the Agency is a foreign support agency of the
Department of State and that the Director of this Agency is of lower rank and
power than the Secretary of State.
(d) Agency operations in the U.S. territories should be reviewed by the Ex-
ecutive before possible illegality is exposed by the Congress.
(e) Although the Agency falls under the authority of the President, this re-
sponsibility can be a political and policy liability. The Agency tends to be a power
unto itself and U.S. Presidents have felt obliged to select as its directors-ad-
mirals, generals, individuals who are not always best qualified in the areas of
foreign policy. President Kennedy failed to control this Agency because he and
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his advisers failed to appoint to it and protect within it the men who were loyal
to him and dedicated to his foreign policy objectives.
Senator SYMINGTON (presiding). Mr. Sakwa, I understand you vol-
untarily contacted the committee office and then met with two staff
members and left the memorandum that suggested we obtain certain
documents pertaining to the period in which Mr. Colby was station
chief in Saigon; is that correct? At that time-we are particularly
interested in 1961-you were a CIA.employee supervising covert activ-
ities in South Vietnam?
Mr. SAKWA. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did'you have prior experience in Indo-China?
Mr. SAKWA. No, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Among-the materials you suggested we request
from the CIA are 31 documents which can be described as incoming
intelligence reports from the field; is that right? Those documents are
classified; are they not? Have you requested a declassification of them?
Mr. SAKWA. I don't know how I will go about it, but I think it is a
good idea. ?
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you have copies of them yourself ?
Mr. SABWA. No, I don't.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did you submit them to the committee?
Mr. SABWA. I submitted a number so the committee could obtain the
documents and review them.
Senator SYMINGTON. The CIA has furnished all those reports to us
now. In addition you suggested the file numbers of 10 other documents,
both incoming and outgoing traffic. And in three instances you sug-
gested that we also request replies;.am I correct?
Mr. SABWA. That is right, sir.
Senator SYMINOTON. Two of the documents supplied in response to
your numbers refer to other countries, and one could not be found.
It is possible that some of your reference numbers were in error?
Mr. SAKWA. That is possible ; yes, sir.
Senator SYMiNOrroN. In addition, you suggested that we request five
memos which you wrote, as a CIA employee in the June-December
period of 1961; is that correct?
Mr. SABWA. Yes, sir.
SenatorYMINGTON. The CIA was able to supply only one of those
memos, and officials believe they may have been hand-carried or han-
dled in such a way that they were not lost. Do I correctly understand
that ,when the staff advised you of this you were able to supply the
five memos?
Mr. SAKWA. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. You left one additional 14-page paper with our
staff when you met with them?
Mr. SABWA. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Does this summarize fairly the materials you
have suggested for our review?
Mr. SsxwA. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. We may have some difficulty here in open ses-
sion, because each of those documents, with the exception of your un-
dated 14-page paper, is classified. In your covering memo to our staff
you say that this collection of documents which 'we have now obtained
to prove, "Mr. Colby is an uncontrollable agent."
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What do you mean by that?
Mr. SAgwA. I mean Eby that, sir, that he acts with a certain flamboy-
ance which is perhaps typical of the older OSS group, who were un-
doubtedly very talented and brave men, but who form a kind of clique
in the Agency. They go way back. And they were performing these
functions during World War II. And they do free wheel. I know there
were times when I would address a cable to the Chief of Station, Sai-
gon, that is, to Mr. Colby, and all the cables went out from Washington
had a DIR number, that is, they have the authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know Mr. Colby IF
Mr. SAgwA. No, I met him once in Roger Hillman's office in State
years ago, and I think that is the only time. I have nothing personally
against him.
Senator SYMINGTON. You have nothing personally against him?
Mr. SAKWA. No, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Why did you leave the CIA?
Mr. SAKWA. I was forced to leave.
There is another circumstance which I have not yet presented to the
committee. I don't think it would be proper, as you pointed out, unless
I give you a few days warning on this, but I would be happy to relate
that to you, because it is similar to this. There were two stories in-
volved. One was the Vietnam story
Senator SYMINGTON. Go ahead, whatever you have in your mind,
let's have it.
Mr. SAKWA. Well, I wasn't prepared to come out with this at this
time.
,Senator SYMINGTON. You say that Mr. Colby, who has been nomi-
nated for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is an uncon-
trollable agent. And that is a pretty serious indictment.
Mr. SAKWA. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. You have made it, and you have made it pub-
licly. And therefore I ask you if you are in erect a disgruntled dis-
charged employee, or if you have resigned and you want to help.
Because it takes a long time to build a reputation, and you can destroy
it overnight. I would just like to know your background and why you
left the CIA, inasmuch as yyou have asked repeatedly and talked to a
lot of people around town about this situation, and you asked to testify,
and you are here.
Mr. SAKWA. Okay, sir; if you want me to I will be very happy to
explain that.
Senator SYMINGTON. You would know whether it violates security
or not. But I just asked you why you left the CIA.
Mr. SAKWA. All right.
I don't have the exact dates, but perhaps around-when I was still
working in the Far East division I had previously worked in the In-
ternational Organizations division for Cord Meyer, Jr., who is now in
London at our Embassy there.
Senator SYMINGTONv. I didn't hear you.
Mr. SAgwA. Cord Meyer, Jr. I had worked for what they call IO
division.
Senator SYMINGTON. You say he is now where?
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Mr. SAgWA. He is now in London in our Embassy there. And I
had been engaged in certain kinds of. operations where I feel that
too much injection of CIA' money and control would be detrimental
to U.S. policy, and would inieffect benefit the Soviet economy.
Senator SYMINOTON. In other words, you were in covert operations,
is that what you were saying?
Mr. SAKWA. Oh, yes.
Senator SYMINOTON. What did that have to do with your leaving the
Agency?
Mr. SAgWA. I brought my impression of those operations to .the at-
tention of two White House aides, Arthur Sehlesinger,:Jr., and Rai, h
Dungan, who was special assistant to President Kennedy. And I,sftid,
what can be done about this ?
Senator SYMINGTON. Done about what?
Mr. SAKWA. I am not going into detail, Senator, but I can sort, of
give you the picture. , 1
Senator SYMINOTON. For. whom wete you workin
at that time
Mr. SAKWA. I was working for the Far East divvision at that time.
Senator SYMIxGTON, And who headed up this division ?
Mr. SAgWA. Desmond FitzGerald ; .
Senator SYMINambN, And Mr. FitzGerald, is dead, yes?.And he is
the one that gave you your instructions;?
Mr. SAgWA. Yes, sir. . .
Senator SYMINOToN. Of course, he is not here to discuss the matter
with us
Mr. SegwA. Unfortunately that is so:
Senator SYMINOTON. Did you think that he was the same kind of 'a
person as Mr. Colby?
Mr. SAKWA. Senator, he was in charge of the Far East division, and
he made policy.
Senator SYMINOTON. Would you call him an. uncontrollable agent?
Mr. SAgWA. I don't know that. I know about Mr.'Celby, because I
used to send Mr. Colby dispatches and cables. ~ Now, I didn't' have a
close relationship with Mr. FitzGerald
Senator SYMIxGTON. You worked for, Mr. FitzO ei,ald, and you only
saw Mr. Colby once, and you met in the State Department, but you
knew him better than Mr. FitzGerald, is, that right? I am just trying
to get the story straight.
Mr. SAKWA. No, I wouldn't say I knew him better. I knew of his
performance, or nonperformance.
Senator SYMINOTON. I thought I saw something about Mr. Fitz-
Gerald in your statement here, but I guess I was wrong.
Mr. SAgWA. If you want me to continue, sir, on why I left the
agency, I will be happy to complete that story. -
Senator SYMINOTON. All right. Why don't you go ahead?
Mr. SAgWA. At the request or permission of two White House
aides during the administration of President Kennedy, I drafted a
memo on certain kinds of international operations which, in the proc-
ess of being typed by my secretary on a Sunday afternoon, was inter-
cepted by one of my superiors in the Far East Division. The memo
was addressed to the President of the United States. I don't think it
has been done very often. And it caused a bit of a furor.
Senator SYMINOTON. Your memo to the President?
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Mr. SAgwA. I had addressed a memo to the President.
Mr. SAI WA. It was intercepted by one of my superiors.
Senator SYMINGTON. Who intercepted it?
Mr. SAKWA. I think it could have been Bill Jones.
Senator SYMINGTON. Bill Jones?
What was he doing?
Mr. SAKWA. Well, we worked odd hours sometimes in the Agency,
and he happened to be in on Sunday when my secretary was typing
this up for me.
Senator SYMINGTON. How did you know he intercepted it?
Mr. SAKWA. My secretary told me.
Senator SYMINGTON. That he took it from her?
Mr. SAKWA. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. How did he know you had written it?
Mr. SAEWA. My name was on it, and she was my secretary.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did he come and ask for it, or did he get it in
the mail, or how did he do that?
Mr. SA&WA. No, she was typing it at the time. I don't know how
much she had been able to type, but he took the draft that had already
been typed
Senator SYMINGTON. He asked her for it and she gave it to him?
Mr. SAXWA. Sir, he was my boss, and there was no question that he
could ask for it and get it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have the same office space together ?
Mr. SAKWA. We were rather crowded in temporary buildings at the
time, and I think my secretary was in my office-we had tie same'space.
I was not there at the time.
Senator SYMINGTON. What I am trying to get at, then, did he look
at your mail or did he just happen to see this particular item that he
wanted?
Mr. SAKWA. He was in that day, and he heard a typewriter going,
and he opened the door, and my secretary was typing a memorandum
for the President.
Senator SYMINGTON. How did he know it was for the President?
Mr. SAKWA. It was addressed that way.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did he go and look at what she was typing?
Mr. SAKWA. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINorox. Is that the first time he ever did that?
Mr. SAKWA. As far as I know, yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. And it was just by coincidence that he hap-
pened to look at what your secretary was typing?
Mr. SAKWA. I do think it was by coincidence, yes, there is no reason
to believe otherwise.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Now, will you proceed?
Mr. SAKWA. Well, when I learned about this I guess-my secretary
told me that day-and when I came in Monday morning I must say
it was a very strange day in my life. It was very quiet. No one would
drop a pin.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did you generally drop-I am trying to follow
you there-did you generally drop pins every morning?
Mr. SALWA. Usually when it is quiet you do that, I understand.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did you keep some pins in your pocket?
99-275-78-7
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Mr. SAKWA. Paper clips.
I was called into the office of the Inspector General. And that was
Lyman Kirkpatrick at the time. And he questioned me about this.
And he called me in, I think, a few days later and told me that the
memo had been given to an Allan Dulles, and that Mr. Dulles thought
it was not a bad memo.
Senator SYMINGTON. How do you know that?
Mr. SAKWA. This is what Mr. Kirkpatrick told me.
Senator SYMINGTON. That Mr. Dulles thought the memo was all
right $
Mr. SAKWA. He thought it was a pretty good memo, there were some
inaccuracies. And as we always say, I didn't have all the facts. This
is the big excuse everywhere, no one has all the facts. Someone suj-
gested earlier today that the Director of Central Intelligence doesn't
have all the facts. In any event, Mr. Kirkpatrick told me that Mr.
Dulles thought it was important enough and worthy enough to be sent
over to the White House. But since it was a classified document, it
would be sent through CIA channels. And I was enormously flattered
by this. And I called Ralph Dungan, and I said, I have a little trouble
here, m memo got intercepted. But the memo will be sent over to
your o wee.
And so Ralph began to wait for it. He waited week after Week after
week. I recall from time to time I insisted that he had received it. The
secretary tore the office apart and couldn't find it.
Finally, I got in touch with Mr. Kirkpatrick, and asked him what
had happened. And then in an offhand way he said, we decided not
to send it to the White House.
I had a certain opinion of Mr. Kirkpatrick, but I don't want to take
up the valuable time of this committee.
Senator SYMINoTON. Is that the Mr. Kirkpatrick who is at Brown
University now?
Mr. SAKWA. Yes, sir. That is him all right. I know where he is.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am beginning to think from your testimony
that you, don't approve of Mr. Kirkpatrick.
Mr. SAKWA. Sir, you are correct there, yes. You are very discerning.
Of course, I was in trouble then. So Mr. Bissell, who was then Dep-
uty Director of Plaris, called me down to this office, and we had a
little discussion about this. And while we were going through this he
asked hie, he said, "I understand you've been working on Vietnam.
How are things there $"
And I said, Sir, things there are a disaster."
And he said "What?"
And I said, ""Yes, they are a disaster."
And he said, "Well, golly, if you feel that way, we'll have to take
you out of the FE division." And he said, "Did you ever see Des Fitz-
Gerald 47
And I said, "Only, sir, in the john."
And he said, "Well, with your attitude on Vietnam--"
And I indicated that I was a good soldier, carried out my orders-
Senator SYMINGTON. You see, the reason I'm asking these ques-
tions--and I am sure you were'a good soldier-is that you have talked
about,a lot of people so'far, Mr.' Dulles; Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr.' Bissell,
and Mr. Jones. But: what; we;are here for' now its to discuss the con-
firmation or possible confirmation of a recommendation for the Direc-
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tor of the Central Intelligence Agency. And during all this period did
you have any connection with Mr. Colby?
Mr. SAKWA. Only the dispatches and cables.
Senator SYMINGTON. I beg your pardon.
Mr. SAKWA. Only by sending cables to the field and rgceiving re-
ports from the Saigon station.
Senator SYMINGTON. And as I understand it, you felt that those
cables were incorrect, is that correct?
Mr. SAgwA. I wouldn't say they were all incorrect, sir. I think that
there is a pattern there of misinformation or slanting of intelligence.
When Mr. Colby's lesser reports came to Washington that indicate
Senator SYMINGTON. You just felt he was supplying this informa-
tion, is that correct?
Mr. SAgwA. Sir, I refer to CS3/475063. And I quote : "It was clear
that the President wanted a solid majority everywhere on his own
merits."
This refers to President Nguyen Diem.
Senator SYMINGTON. The reason I remember Mr. FitzGerald's name,
the Chief of the Far East, as you pointed out, for whom you worked
and who is now deceased, you said in your statement :
Although I have indicated to Mr. Bissell that I could not account for Mr.
Colby's strange performance in Saigon, there is a possible explanation. I have no
proof of this: an unofficial effort on the part of senior CIA officers to worsen the
situation in South Vietnam so that a greater military presence would be justified
and an early nuclear confrontation with Communist China might take place.
Among others, Charles S. Whitehurst (Chief VCL) and possibly Desmond Fitz-
Gerald (Chief FE) were of this mentality.
Mr. SAgwA. That's right, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. We may have some more questions that we
would like you to answer for the record, Mr. Sakwa.
Senator Nunn, any questions?
Senator Ni7NN.. No questions.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. SAgwA. I want to thank the committee for this opportunity.
Senator SYMINGTON. It is a privilege to have heard you, sir.
The next witness is Mr. David. Harrington.
Mr. Harrington, do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir.
Do you want to swear me in first, sir?
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, I would like to swear you in first.
Will you raise your right hand.
Will you swear that the information you give this committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I do.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you proceed?
STATEMENT OF DAVID SHERIDAN HARRINGTON,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. HARRINGTON. My name is David Sheridan Harrington, and I
reside at 105 Ferry St. NW., Washington, D.C.
The events I am about to describe occurred in early 1969 while I was
assigned to CORDS/Vietnam as a program officer at the I Corps re-
gional headquarters. At that time I was a first lieutenant in the U.S.
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Marine Corps and on a voluntary extension of an initial 13-month tour
in Vietnam. My selection into CORDS was based on my combat in-
fantry experience, my fluency in Vietnamese and French, and my train-
ing in psychological operations. Since then, I completed my 3 years
of active duty in March 1970 and resigned my commission at the end
of my 6-year service obligation.
The passible confirmation of'Ambassador'William E. Colby as the
Director of Central Intelligence disturbs me because I have believed
for a long time that he has never explained fully the Phoenix program
at its operation level. Furthermore, he has never, to my knowledge,
offered anything more than vague statements on his efforts either to
cease the widespread killings occurring under the Phoenix program
or to divest the United States of any involvement in the assassinations
of Vietnamese-civilians.
Specifically, in testimony before the Committee on Government
Operations in 1971, Ambassador Colby answered questions on the
Phoenix program by resorting to evasive and misleading bureaucratic
language to distinguish Phoenix policy from operations, and to claim
that only a few abuses occurred at the local level, and those without the
approval of Phoenix administrators.
However, I attended a meeting in 1969 at which Mr. Colby was told
directly about. the operational problems of Phoenix, and the many
abuses occurring at the local level. From this briefing, he could only
eonelude that large ga existed between Phoenix policy in Saigon
and operations in the feeld. Until Mr. Colby provides a complete f&'
port of the Phoenix program and his role in it, I believe that Mr.
Colby's involvement in Phoenix raises a serious question as to his
suitability for high Gpvernment,office.
Not long after my assignment to DaNang, either in late Feb us y
or early March 1969',1 was informed by the Deputy for CORDS in I
Corps. Mr. Alexander Firfer, that Mr. Colby was coming up for a high
level briefing on the status of pacification. Since I had prime respogsi-
bbility for all statistics and briefing materi'als,'this important meeting
-stands out in my mind. I was invited to attend the meeting to provide
?backup information as needed and to take notes. This opportunity
Teased me because I was very interested in meeting, officials from
Saigon and hearing a discussion on pacification.
The meeting was held in the second'. floor conference room of
CORDS regional headquarters, at 22 Bach bang, DaNang. Present at
the meeting from'saigon were Ambassador Colby, ,Mr. George,T ob-
son, and Colonel Montague; from DaNang, Mr. Firfer, his de uty r.
Fritz, myself, and 'Mr. Harry Mustakos, the regional CT k Director.
Two other senior DaNang staff, Robert K. Olson and' Robert Mills,
attended portions of the briefing.
The initial phase of the meeting lasted about 11/2 hours, and included
a briefing by my boss and su}pseqquent questions, answers and discussion
of the presentation "Mr. Colby had prepared thoroughly for the brief-
ing, and asked pointed questions on all ffimaes of the pacification pro-
gram. Mr. Mustakos was in turn to make presentation. I lew, very
little about Mr. Mustakos, besides his pos~i ion andthe. fact t a~ paa'y
CORDS people, myself and my boss inclficled, had serious 'questions
about the known 01A agents who carried luger pistols' and folding
stock automatic rules. Rumors 'were fairly widespread. that these
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covert operators were engaged in a very dirty war with the Vietcong
and their sympathizers.
Mr. Mustakos appeared quite defensive from the beginning of his
presentation. After a few moments I learned that it was due to com-
plaints from Saigon about I Corps' poor quality intelligence and low
neutralization rate of quality Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI). Mr.-
Colby nodded in such fashion that he was acknowledging his concern
and his desire to hear Mr. Mustakos' defense. Mr. Mustakos focused on
three areas of discussion in responding to Saigon's criticisms : One, the
low qualityy of o rational groups such as Provisional Reconnaissance
United (PRU's)two, the high number of VCI killed before possible
interrogation; and three, a criticism of Saigon pressure for high qual-
ity VCI. Mr. Mustakos was drawing a clear picture of the Phoenix
program at the local level in order to ward off what he considered
bureaucratic harrassment.
The logic of Mr. Mustakos' presentation moved very clearly toward
a sound defense for his efforts in I Corps. He began with the fact that
the ill-disciplined nature of the PRU's resulted in very poor opera-
tional control over these PRU's by his agents. As a result of the poor
discipline and lack of control, many alleged VCI were killed instead
of captured. These killings took place away from CIA supervision
and consequently, Mustakos could not guarantee who was killed and
certainly could not collect more information on the VCI from these
dead Vietnamese. Mr. Mustakos gave the general example of a nervous
PRU unit out on assignment in Vietcong territory killing a struggling
Vietnamese suspect with a silencer-equipped pistol for fear of attract-
ing attention. At this point Colby interjected that killing was not
CORDS policy regardless of breakdown at the local level.
Senator SYMINGTON. Let me interrupt you there.
Who were members of the Provisional Reconnaissance Unit?
Mr. HARRINGTON. This was not outlined completely in this particu-
lar briefing. That is why I did not mention it. But as I understand it,
the Provisional Reconnaissance Unit-the members of the Provisional
Reconnaissance Unit were recruited by the national police from hood-
hims or thugs or people who were at least willing to engage in covert
activities against the Vietcong.
Senator SYMINGTON. Were there any Americans in those units?
Mr. HARRINGTON. No; I stated that, I believe, earlier in my testi-
mony.
Senator SYMINGTON. I just want to be sure that the Provisional
Reconnaissance Units were Vietnamese.
Mr. HARRINGTON. That's correct, although I will add that in 1971
testimony, Ambassador Colby did acknowledge the fact that Ameri-
cans did on occasion accompany groups such as the PRU's on covert
operations, but that is the extent-the extent of my knowledge.
Mr. Mustakos found the quota system from Saigon particularly
? vexing in that he considered himself an operations type and had
little use for bureaucratic demands. He used the allegory from Mao
about the sea and the fishes to present his view on the status of guerrilla
warfare in I Corps. He stated that the sea had been rolled back (that
is, the civilian population had largely been driven to the edge of the
sea by the advent of bombing and free-fire zones) and what were left
was flsh, (that is, VC 1). ,M W. Mistakos theh' asked what difference
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does it make whether we get big fish or little fish. His aim was to
obtain permission to include all Vietnamese suspects neutralized in
his monthly VCI quota. Mr. Colby gave no response at this point.
The clear understanding gained from the Mustakos briefing was
that many abuses occurred at the operational level of the Phoenix
program, including widespread and uncontrolled assassinations.
My difficulty with Mr. Colby's possible confirmation sharpens in
light of his testimony before the House Committee on Government
Operations, particularly on pages 206 and 207. This is the 1971 testi-
mony. There, Ambassador Colby limited his knowledge of abuses to
some isolated acts by individuals. Furthermore, he added that it took
CORDS nearly 3 years to refine the intelligence gathering system
to the point where they were reasonably sure that a Vietnamese civil-
ian was actually a member of the VCI. Today, I have told you that
Ambassador Colby was briefed in 1969 about a poor pprogram involving
widespread abuses, including murder. Yet, Mr. Colby allowed this
program to continue for another 2 years, apparently without any bet-
ter assurance that those killed were anything more than innocent
Vietnamese civilians.
Hopefully, my testimony has provided a clear base for understand-
ing the important questions raised by Mr. Colby's role in Vietnam,
and a firm direction for further inquiries into his knowledge of and
involvement in the Phoenix program. Mr. Colby was informed of
the widespread abuses at the operational level of the Phoenix pro-
gram in at least one region. What did he learn about operations else-
where in Vietnam? If he knew of the abuses in the program and the
lack of hard information on VCI, why did he allow the number of
"VCI killed" to continue to climb in 1969, 1970, and 1971? What
specific actions were taken, or specific directives issued to disengage
U.S. support of Phoenix? What specific restraints were placed on
Phoenix operators as a result of Mr. Colby's learning of abuses in
the Phoenix program ? What requirements for the reporting of war
crimes did Mr. Colby initiate to insure feedback on abuses in Phoenix?
I believe a full acquittal on all charges against the Phoenix pro-
gram apd Mr. Colby's direction of it to be a minimum requirement
for his confirmation by the U.S. Senate.
Senator SYMINOTON. Thank you, Mr. Harrington.
I have been to DaNang myself several times during the war. The
Vietcong were pretty active up there, were they not?
Mr. HARRINOTON. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And many people were killed up there by the
Vietcong, were they not?
Mr. HARRINOTON. Yes, sir; I believe that Ambassador Colby sub-
mitted figures on that which indicated that the Vietcong terrorism
resulted in 12,000 Vietnamese being killed, whereas the Phoenix
program had resulted in over 21,000 Vietnamese civilians being killed.
Senator SYMINOTON. Don't misunderstand me, I regret this war,
but I would just like the record to show that General Walt, who was
in command, and later General Cushman, who was in command
Mr. HARRINOTON. And General Nickerson was there.
Senator SYMINOTON. I will only talk about the ones I saw there
starting in 1965 in command. They were very upset about the Vietcong
attacks on other Vietnamese and the village chiefs and also Americans.
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As I understand it, your primary concern about this nomination
is that you feel that Mr. Colby was responsible for the Phoenix
program.?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir; I believe that as the director of CORDS
program he had an operational overview of the Phoenix program,
and therefore should have reported these abuses to the higher authori-
ties back in Washington. And what really particularly concerned me,
I was not in Washington following the 1971 testimony very closely
at that time, I was out in California on vacation. But what would
concern me on reading this afterward was that I felt on direct ques-
tioning, particularly from Congressman Reid-and I have the testi-
mony here and I could read excerpts which indicate that at least before
Congress he used at least evasive and misleading language in sug-
gesting the extent of the abuses in the Phoenix program. And as the
Senator says, on the basis of his own visit to DaNang, I think the
Senator was aware of more widespread abuses that he acknowledged
in testimony before the House. And that is the concern that I bring
to the Senate, in the hope that this situation can be cleared.
Senator SYMINGTON. Have you evidence that he did not report
this to his superiors in Washington ?
Mr. HARRINGTON. No, sir; I don't. I was not privy, of course, to
his line of communication with his seniors. I only have the public
testimony from the House to really go on as a ide.
Senator SYMINGTON. So what concerns you the most, as I under-
stand it, is what he said with respect to the Phoenix program before
the House committee?
Mr. HARRINGTON. That is correct, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And what committee was that again?
Mr. HARRINGTON. The House Committee on Government Operations.
I have just a brief excerpt here that I could read.
Senator SYMINGTON. That is all right. I think we got the thrust of
it. If, you want to put it in the record you are welcome to do so.
Senator Nunn.
Senator NUNN. I .Just have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Harrington, what do you do now?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Right now I am the director of a day care center
here in Washington, D.C., for preschool children.
Senator NUNN. How long were you in the service?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I was in the Marine Corps on active duty for 3
years, 3 months; 3 months at officer candidate school in early 1967,
and then a formal commissioning on March 4, 1967, and I served my
3 years as an officer in the Marine Corps. And when I resigned my
commission, at the time I was a captain in I Corps.
Senator NUNN. You got out in 1970?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir, March 24,1970.
Senator NUNN. And what were the dates you were in Vietnam?
Mr. HARRINGTON. I was in Vietnam as a Marine infantry officer from
December of 1967 until December of 1968.
Senator NUNN. From 1967 to 1968?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir-1967 to December 1968 as a Marine
Corps officer. I extended my 13 months' tour of duty with the Marine
Corps specifically on the basis of a very disillusioning experience as an
infantry officer to go into the pacification program and to become
involved in that in the hope of seeing a better situation. It is not perti-
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nent- to my testimony here, so I didn't discuss it. But that situation
didn't turn out very well, unfortunately:
Senator NIINN. Did you hear Mr. Adams' testimony this morning
to the effect that the Phoenix program was meant to replace the
bludgeon with a scalpel and that, instead of bombs I am quoting him :
Instead of bombs-which gilled Ia numbers of civilians in addition to the
occasional poritical operative' of the Viet Cong-Phoenix's main tools, theoreti-
etily,were good Intelligence and goad Ales. The object of the program was to find
out who among the VietnauWp population were Viet Cong cadres, and to arrest
or kill tAea}, In theory, arrests were preferable to assassinations, because a
prisoner co $ lead to further arrests s s s
Did you read that testimony I
Mr. H4.R&INGTOx. I heard the testimony, but I didn't catch that.
Senator NUNN. In theory, arrests were preferable to assassinations
because a prisoner could lead to further arrests..;
Ur HaauuNGTON. I will agree to it at that point. I think the theory
.was definitely the CIA. theory for the development of the program.
And in that connection I would just like to say, pareuthdically that
atr one point in the discussion this morning, I. think between Senator
Symington and Congressman Drinan, there was the inference made
that the Phoenix .program was a Vietnamese. ,program, and that the
Americans
thetically question that by saying that Ambaiasadar Colby himself
under testimony agreed t1 at the CIA was more than one-half respon-
sible fOX the creation and development theory, etcetera, of the Phioenix
program.
But in returning to your question, I would just-like.to say that with
regard to replacing bombing with the Phoenix program, that that
image of .the scalpel instead of the bludgeon is correct. However, I do
take exception to the statement-that arrest was better than assassina-
tio , b" Use Vie Phoenix program had three categories of neutraliza-
tion , neutralizati was a general term used to describe killing, rally-
ing,-and arrest. And so arrest was not used instead .of . ,assassination,
arrests and assassinations were two of three vehicles used to.neatralize
so-called Vietcong suspects.
Senator NuNN. You are saying that was part of the overall Phoenix
program in theory, assassination was part of it 4
Mr. HARRINGTON.. Yes, sir. Ambassador Colby submitted testimony
which. shows figures for three categories : Vietcong, killed, Vietcong
eaptured,,and Vietcong neutralized.
Senator NVNN. Some of those figures had to do. with Army and mili-
tary troop killing, didn't they
Mr. AARRINOTON. Yes,. Sir., The largest figures would include those
operations, although even in pinning it down as be : didto;only 10 per-
cent covert operations, which was his operational definition or under-
standing of what was going on, we are still talking minimally of 3,000
to 4,000 Vietnamese civilians.
Senator N'nNN. What I am judging by is, your statement made it
rather clear, I thought-I believe at page 4 at the,bottom you said in
the conversation I suppose . you heard, at this 'Point Colby. interjected
that killing was not the CADS policy regardless of breakdown at the
local level.
Mr. IIARRINOTON. Yes, sir. Ina sense--in, this sense, only. As Mr.
Adams explained: mnuch more clearly than I could, because his back-
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101
ground is as an analyst for the CIA, the thrust of the program was to
capture Vietcong infrastructure types in order to gain more intel-
ligence on the Vietcong. However, as Mr. Adams has testified, and
as Ambassador Colby himself has acknowledged and as I have stated
myself today, that did not work out. That just did not work out. Many,
many Vietnamese civilians were killed during the alleged capturing
event at a time when the targeting, as pointed out from Ambassador
Colby's testimony, was so weak that he could not in any way guarantee
that those people were anything more than innocent Vietnamese
civilians.
Senator NUNN. Are you implying that if there had been no. Phoenix
program there would have been no killing by the South Vietnamese?
Are you implying that had there been no Phoenix program there
would have been no rounding up of political prisoners?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, certainly there would not have been U.S.
support or involvement in that.
Senator NUNN. You are talking about our involvement?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Absolutely. I am talking about. Ambassador Colby
today and not about the Vietnamese.
Senator NUNN. But the only testimony you can give us as far as
Mr. Colby was concerned is that killing was not part of the policy?
Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir. And at the same time-which was sig-
nificant in the sense that at this meeting he made a distinction between
policy in Saigon and operations in the field. But even in his 1971 testi-
mony he continues to make this at the stages when he was in fact being
told that this was happening at the operations. And I think this is
alarming, a program by his figures when over 20,000 Vietnamese
civilians were killed during a year period when he wasn't sure that
they were at all involved in Vietcong operations.
Senator NUNN. You don't know` what actions he took with the South
Vietnamese, nor. do you know what actions he reported back to his
superiors, nor do you know what the recommendations were on this
subject, do you?
Mr. HARRINGTON. No, sir. I am asking the Senators to make.that.
clear on the public record prior to his confirmation by the Senate.
Senator NUNN. I think these questions ought to be asked.
I appreciate your appearance.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Harrington.
The next witness is Mr. Kenneth Osborn.
Mr. Osborn, will you raise your right hand.
Do you swear the testimony that you give this committee is the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. OstoRN. I do.
TESTIMONY OF KENNETH BARTON OSBORN, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Senator SYMINGTOx. Do yoU have ~, statement ?
Mr. OsBORN. Yes, Sir. I submitted a statement to the committee
earlier. I would like to read that.
Senator SYMINGTON. I'would like'you to read the statement that you
submitted to the committee.
Mr. OSAORN. Very well, sir.
My name is Kenneth Barton Osborn. I have lived in Washington
D.C. for the last 4 years. My present address is 1112 East Capitol
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Street NE. I come before the committee today to describe my involve-
ment and firsthand knowledge of the Phoenix program, and to present
facts and documents which will show how that program has been one
of continued illegal practices, including gross examples of torture and
assassination, from 1968 to present.
Since December 1970, when I first spoke about the Phoenix program
publicly, I have become increasingly concerned that the Congress and
the public be made aware of our country's sponsorship and encourage-
ment of these practices in Southeast Asia. In August 1971, I testified
before :the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Govern-
ment Information concerning the atrocious treatment of South Viet-
namese civilians which I had witnessed in 1968. This is a copy of my
testimony along with the followup report of the committee. Both of
these documents will be discussed in my testimony.
In the next few moments I would like to state to this committee the
danger, both to U.S. prestige abroad and to the welfare of many poten-
tial victims of programs such as Phoenix, of allowing an individual
with the record which Mr. William E. Colby has, to be trusted with the
powerful position of Director of Central Intelligence.
Since I am more at ease talking from notes rather than from a pre-
pared, text, I would like to provide the members of the committee
with an outline of the testimony I will now begin.
Senator SymxoTox. I don't quite understand that.
Mr. OsBoRN.I have made an outline there which I would like to use
as an outline for what I would like to say.
Senator SYanxOTOx. I would rather have you read what you have
given us. That is the rule, and then you can supply anything addi-
tional for the record. It is getting late now, and we have been here all
dav,And, if necessary, we will ask you, to come back.
Mn OSBORN. I understand. Thatis very kind.
I have here (1) Army Intelligence; I was in Army Intelligence from
1966 to 1969.
I, was .in Vietnam in the .Occupational Specialty and Training of
97040, Air Intelligence Specialists, which is an agent handler. I was
trained at Fort Holabird for that job.
My assignment to the 525th Military Intelligence Group was from
September 1967 to December 1968,
Senator SYMiNOToN. Are you reading from your statement?
Mr. OSBORN. Here is the outline, Senator.
Senator SYMiNOTON.,Will you read the outline that you have given
us,, please $
Mr. OSBORN. No. 2, my assignment to Da Nang' if I am given
a chance I would like to discuss my cover status, my agent handler
job. The liaison I had with the unita,and my contact with the Phoenix
program, the collection of information, both combat and political, the
dissemination of information, and describe how the overlap of civilian
and military operations occurred so that Phoenix special intelligence
collection requirements applied both to civilian and military opera-
tions, and the followup reports which I received back from the units
of my information, which included followups to those reports of B-52
strikes, search and destroy missions and detainment of the Viet Cong
suspects. I would like to describe the mentality of the operation while
I was in Vietnam, the mind'set of those 'operations and their approach
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to the operations, and the resultant abuses. And in particular, I would
like to describe interrogation methods I saw firsthand, including spe-
cific interrogation of South Vietnamese detainees and how they re-
sulted in the murder of my interpreter in the spring of 1968 by an
American captain out of racism.
And I say, I had recounted these incidents before the House sub-
committee hearings in 1971. As a result the subcommittee, under the
able chairmanship of Representative William Moorhead, directed the
DOD to investigate the charges that I had made. Their report, sub-
mitted by Assistant Secretary of Defense Doolin to the staff of the
committee 15 months later, was an obvious attempt to minimize the
significance of the incidents and even went to some extent to reflect
upon my credibility as a witness. If the office of Mr. Doolin is not in-
terested in examining the policies and practices which led to wide-
spread mistreatment of civilians under American advisorship, then I
sincerely hope that this committee will look into the evidence presented
today.
It is my contention that while Mr. Colby has consistently claimed
that it was his desire to improve the Phoenix program and to discour-
age the use of torture and assassination, that, in fact, during his di-
rectorship of CORDS/Phoenix and since, that inhumane practices
have not only continued but increased. In support of this statement,
I would like to present two documents, the Newsweek article from
July 23, 1973, issue, that is this week's Newsweek, wherein is described
the torture and detainment of civilian political offenders under the
An Tri law; and more recently, a telegram which was issued on April
5, 1973, by one of the South Vietnamese directors of the Phoenix
program stating that it would be accepted policy to broaden the spec-
trum of the Phoenix mistreatment of civilians, and that they no longer
had to be called Communists, that they could be called simply disturb-
ers of the peace, and they cover An Tri laws, the detainment of 2 years
multiplied by any number of detainment years applied to them.
Mr. Colby no doubt maintains that this sort of torture and murder
which I witnessed in Vietnam were bfore his time, and that he acted
responsibly in dealing with such incidents, but that would be untrue.
I call upon Mr. Colby to present evidence that the documents and facts
which I have submitted today do not reflect seriously on his ability to
apply human values to his duties as a representative of the American
people and a public servant.
[The statement follows:]
My name is Kenneth Barton Osborn. I have lived in Washington, D.C. for the
last four years. My present address is 1112 East Capitol St. NE. I come before
the Committee to describe my involvement and first hand knowledge of the Phoe-
nix Program, and to present facts and documents which will show how that
program has been one of continued illegal practices, including gross examples
of torture and assassination, from 1968 to the present.
Since December, 1970, when I first spoke about the Phoenix Program publicly,
I have become increasingly concerned that the Congress and the public be made
aware of our country's sponsorship and encouragement of these practices in
South East Asia. In August, 1971, I testified before the House Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations and Government Information concerning the atrocious
treatment of South Vietnamese civilians which I had witnessed in 1968. This is
a copy of my testimony along with the follow-up report of the committee. Both
of these documents will be discussed in my testimony.
In the next few moments I would like to state to this committee the danger,
both to U.S. prestige abroad and to the welfare of many potential victims of
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I
programs such as Phoenix, of allowing an individual with the record which
Mr. William E. Colby has, to be trusted with the powerful position of Director of
Central Intelligence.
Since'I an more at ease talking -from notes rather than from a prepared text,
I would like to provide the members of the Committee with as outline of the testi-
mony I will now begin.
1. Army Intelligence-1966-1969:
a. Military OcCupationul Speciality and training.
b. Assignment to the 525th Military Intelligence Group.
II. Assignment to DaNang :
a. Cover.
b. Status.
c. Agent Handler job.
d. Liaison with units.
e. Contact with Phoenix.
III. Collection of Information :
a. Combat.
b. Political.
IV. Dissemination of information
a. Overlap of military'and civilian operations.
b. Follow-up reports (B-52 strikes, search and destroy missions and detain-
ment.)
V. Mentality of operatives in Vietnam :
a. mind-set.
b. resulting abuse.
TI. Interrogation methods :
a. Three examples.
b. Interpreter.
I havo recounted these i cidents before the House subcommittee hearings. in
2911. As s result the subcommittee, under the able chairmanship of Representative
1i'dilianl Morehead di ed.the DoD to .investigate the charges that I had made.
heir retSbft, r}ub fitted Assid'tiant Secretary of Defensc'IYoolin to the "staff' of
the 'C`orhmittee 1b "mont s later, was an obvious attempt bo minimize the sig-
sificanoe of the incidents sud even went to ao~he extent to !reflect upon my cred-
ibility ass witness. If the office of Mr. Doolin ?e nQt irGterested, in examining the
policies and practices which lead to "wide spreafl.miatreatifient of civilians under
American adviaprsbip, `Ch'en I sincerely hope that this 'Committee will look into
the evidence presented boday.
It ismy contention that. while Mr. Colby has consistently claimed that it was.
his "desire" to improve the Phqenia.Program and to discourage the use of torture
and assassination, that in tact'duting his ;directorshi of. CORDS/Phoenix and
since, that Inhumane practices have not only continu but increased. In, support
of this statement, r would like to present two documents
? Newsweek: iirtdde, ddIy 2* 197'S.
Mr; 4o`%by no doubt maintains that this sort of torture and murder which I wit=
nessed in V1etham were before his time, mind that he acted responsibly in deal-
ing with such incidents, but that would be untrue. I call upon Mr. Colby to present
evidence that the documents and facts which I have -submitted today do not re-
flect seriously on his ability to apply human values tA,kiAautim as a. rep; ta-
tive of the American people and a public servant.
COMMITTEz IFDR ACTION/Rgs A$o'H OX -11 INT LLIGENC COMMUNITY,
Wash lnjllon, D.C., July 23, 1973..,
Hon. STVART SYMINGTON,
Acting Chairman,
Senate Armed Serpicea Committee,
Washisl1too, I),C,
Dnaa SEiv. SYMINOTON: As follow through to the testimony I presented to the
Committee on Sulu 10, 1973, I wish to submit the attached Supplementary State-
ment for inoiu0pn in. the e1ai record. . ,
Senator -Nunn has requested,tW I furnish the Committee with the name of
the U.S. Army Captain that'murogred,my.Vietnamese,translator, I-have always
believed that doing so would only, result in a soapegoating of . the Captain, and
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the total question of de-facto and written military policy would be completely
ignored.
I have now decided that I will release the name of this man to the Committee
with stipulation. If the Senate Armed Services Committee will guarantee that
open and public hearings on the matter of U.S. war crimes and military policy,
I will immediately release the name of the Captain. My decision is based on the
fact that I still believe that anything less than a full and public hearing into
these matters will only result in another cover-up of the truth by the military
and their civilian allies.
Concerning the Senator's personal interest in the appearance of President
Dwight David Eisenhower's name on a list of U.S. officials responsible for the
Pacification effort, I would like to take this time to again point out that the list.
in question is one concerning the entire pacification effort, not only the Phoenix:
Program. As the Senator already knows, President Eisenhower did allow John
Foster Dulles to send Edward Geary Landsdale to Vietnam as a pacification
advisor during the Eisenhower years. The inclusion of President Eisenhower's
name was necessary to complete the historic overview that led to the Phoenix
Program.
I stand ready to further the Committee's investigation into the Phoenix Pro-
gram and the nomination of Mr. William E. Colby, and request that this cover
letter also be made part of the record.
Sincerely yours,
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF MR. K. BARTON OSBORN
After my enlistment in the U.S. Army on October 10, 1966, and basic military
training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, I was assigned to a classified military
intelligence training program at Fort Holabird, Maryland. I was trained in the
Military Occupation Specialty of 97C40, Intelligence Area Specialist. My training
was designed to prepare me as an agent handler, and consisted of classes designed
to teach recruitment and training of agents and the management of agent net-
works. Included in the training course was an off the record session concerning
the termination of agents through various methods, including assassination.
After the completion of my training and a leave period prior to assignment,
I reported to the First Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Group, in Da Nang,
South Vietnam, in September, 1967. I was given a civilian cover as a GS-7 (later
promoted to GS-9) working in the refugee program. For the first six weeks I was
in Da Nang, I worked on the problem of establishing my own network of agents.
When my agent network was established to the strength of 40 to 50 agents,
I began to relay information they gathered on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
military activity., In addition to combat information, I received information of
a political nature; information on the political activities of Vietnamese not
overtly involved with military actions.
Through the reports sent to me describing the follow-through actiong initiated
as a result of my intelligence gathering, I was able to ascertain that the Phoenix
Program was receiving and utilizing my information. Through my battalion and
civilian contacts, I was able to identify the Phoenix Coordinator in Da Nang,
and his location. I visited the Phoenix Coordinator, a U.S. Army major, and
talked to him about the information that was laterally disseminated to him. He
asked if I could gather more information, and told me that any information &
gathered would be used in the context of the Phoenix Program. In return, I was'
guaranteed financial remuneration for my agents, the use of various "safe houses"
for clandestine meetings, and access to Air America transportation. At no time
did, I make personal financial gains from this arrangement.
Thus, I became involved in the Phoenix Program. During the period that fol-
lowed, until the time Of my departure from Da Nang in December, 1968, I sap'-
plied information to the Da Nang Phoenix Coordinator on. a regular basis.
The Phoenix Coordinator. was not the only consumer of my intelligence reports:
I continj}ed 'tp .supply i>formation ,to the First Marine Division, the 525th M.I.
Group, as well as other military Units. The prime difference between types of
ttellgence. provided to; military units and to the Phoenix Coordinator was that
all information going to Phoenix was of a political nature, while information
going to military units was both combat .and political Intelligence concerning
troop movements and anticipated activity by North Vietnamese and National
Liberation Front Forces, sand on,-the Viet Cong Infrastructure, respectively.
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From the follow-up reports that wqre routed to me, I was able to guage the
response of Phoenix and military personnel to the information I had channeled
them. The Phoenix Program, while under the sponsorship of the office of Civil
Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), was a joint military-
civilian venture, and my follow-through reports reflected the intertwining nature
of this fact. Among the typical responses that resulted from the information I
supplied, I noticed that military units were utilized to carry out operations as a
result of Phoenix Information. For example, a Provisional Reconnaissance Unit
(PRUs) may be dispatched to kidnap and detain for interrogation a suspected
member of the VCI, or a B-52 raid may be called on a village in which suspected
members of the VCI were reported to be meeting. As I was not a member of the
Phoenix Coordinator's staff, or In the G-2 office, I had no way of knowing how the
decisions were made to carry out such activity, but the follow-up reports did
reflect these types of actions.
Before talking of the interrogation techniques used by American personnel,
I would like first to explain the mind-set of intelligence operatives in Vietnam.
To begin with, the nature of training during the period I was in basic training
and intelligence school was permeated with a deep-seated racism. While the
reasons for this may have been many and varied, few Vietnam veterans can claim
that they were not affected by the racism to which they were exposed. The process
of making a yellow person a non-human or a sub-human made possible the types
of activities I am about to describe. The "abuses" that Mr. Colby talks of when
speaking of murder and torture are not abuses as much as they are the logical
extension and inexorable result of American policy, both written and de-facto.
In the course of my work in Da Nang, I was invited to witness the interrogation
of a man whom my agents had identified as being a member of the local farmers
association, and reported to be a Viet Cong logistics officer. The interrogation was
conducted in a U.S. Marine helicopter by a Marine officer and two enlisted men.
The suspect and a second Vietnamese national (who had been previously inter-
rogated and, beaten) were loaded into the helicopter and flown approximately, 20
miles from Da Nang into an isolated area. The second detainee, the person I had
not. reported, was asked several questions but did not answer. The process of
interrogating this second detainee was a ploy, as he had already been interrogated
and beaten so badly that he was unable to speak. After threatening. to throw the
second man out of the helicopter several times, the man was asked a question
again; when he could not or would not answer the question, he was tossed out of
the helicopter by the Marines.
The man whom I had reported did talk and answer all questions put to him, but
because he feared for his life, there was no way of guaranteeing the accuracy of
the information. It is very logical that the man answered any question in,anch
a manner as to satisfy the Interrogator and save himself from being thrown from
the helicopter by the Americans.
1 took part in a second such interrogation about one month later, again with a
second person thrown from a helicopter in order to intimidate a second person
into talking.
One other occasion, I witnessed. the protracted starvation of a Vietnamese.
woman >suspect.. She was kept in a cage In the First Marine Division. Counter
intelligence Team complex near Da Nang A:irbase, without food. or water. I passed
her several times during the course of, my trip .to the team.'s ? ofltce, and when I
noticed she was gone one day, I was Informed that she, had, dled'? of maln?tritioh.
On another occasion, I was following through on a.reported suspect that one of
my agents had identified. The man was being Interrogated at the Marine Counter-
Intelligence complex, and I was invited to witness it. As I entered the hooch ?
where the interrogation was, taking place, the man was being taken out, dead.
He died from a six inch dowel that pusbed through his ear. and into his brain., ?
. One last incident that I, would like to recount to the Committee concerns the'
murder of my interpreter by .a U.S. Army Captain. My interpeter was of, Chinese-
ancestry; born in Hue and, educated to France. She was multi-lingual. and operated
as both an interpeter and a courier for. me. ?
On.an afternoon .i the Spring of 1985,.I returned to my house and was inside
when I heard a shot. ,I went. outside and found that. my interpreter bad been shot
through the neck, and witnessed a Military Inteil$geilce Captain leaving 'the
scene. After tending to. the body,'I located the d twin Arid asked him why he~had
shot her. The Captain's. initial response. was , st .she was only a slope (a
derogatory term for Asians) and ,th$C ? I should not be . concerned about the
incident. When I pressed the matter, the of8ce'r claimed that. the woman knew`
too much about my operationg-and was a possible security risk. In fact, however;
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this woman was central to the success of my intelligence gathering as I spoke
little Vietnamese.
I hope that I have been able to show this Committee, through my testimony on
July 20th and this supplementary statement, some of the realities of the Phoenix
Program on the operational level. If I had to summarize my observations of the
Phoenix Program, I believe that my training, operations in and knowledge of
the Phoenix Program have shown me that :
1. The military was integrated into the Phoenix Program at both the opera-
tional and management levels.
2. That the training given to intelligence operatives is conducive. to the types
of activities conducted under Phoenix, as explained in this statement ; both
formal and informal training sessions teach "extra-legal" activities as being
necessary to the successful completion of intelligence missions.
3. That while Ambassador William E. Colby was not in charge of CORDS while
I worked in Phoenix, he was aware of the widespread use of assassination,
kidnapping, and torture that he has termed "abuses." Ambassador Colby was
also aware of the casualness and ineffectiveness of these operations, and the
inability of Phoenix to neutralize the VCI through the use of these tactics.
4. If Ambassador Colby is to claim that he attempted to alleviate the symptoms
of abuse, he must produce supporting evidence beyond directives explaining
official policy. The Vietnam War was a war that utilized the unwritten and
de-facto policies with the same consistancy as official and written policy. Because
de-facto policy was !a fact of life at the operational level, Mr. Colby must show
that he directed his energies and efforts towards eliminating the de-facto policies
of Phoenix. Reports of war crimes committed by Phoenix operatives, with their
follow-through reports, directives on the handling of war crimes incidents and
complaints, and CIA documents showing the neutralization figures of Phoenix
coupled with the analytical reports showing the effectiveness of Phoenix and
the result of the neutralization efforts must be made public.
Senator SYMiNOTON. Thank you, Mr. Osborn. You have added con-
siderably in your testimony to the statement that you gave us. And if
you have anything additional that you would like to add, would you
supply it for the record?
Mr. OSBORN. That is very kind, Senator.
Senator SYMiNOTON. That is the rule of the committee over the years.
I would like to get your position status in Vietnam clear. What was
your rank in service when you first went there, and what was your rank
when you left?
Mr. OSBORN. I was an enlisted man in Army Intelligence. I arrived
in Vietnam in September 1967, as a private, first class. Sometime dur-
ing my tour I was promoted to corporal, and then to sergeant as E-4
and E-5.
During the entire time that I was in Vietnam I was under a cover
name and cover documentation as a GS-7 and a GS-9, working in the
classification program.
Senator SYMINOToN. Where-were the atrocities that you alleged
that you witnessed all committed by American military men?
Mr. OSBORN. They were in fact.
Senator SYMINOTON. Where were they committed?
Mr. OSBORN. In the DaNang area.
Senator SYMINOTON. In the DaNang area?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINOTON. Do you know Mr. Colby ?
Mr. OSBORN. No, sir ; I have never met him.
Senator SYMTNOTnx. Have you ever seen him?
Mr. OSBORN. No ; I have never seen him either.
Senator SYMTxGTON. In what way do you believe Mr. Colby as a
civilian head of CORDS program would have had the authority to
give orders to the men involved in those alleged atrocities?
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Mr. OSBORN. I believe it was Mr. Colby's responsibility to see that
the Phoenix-initiated operations, such as I have participated in and
which resulted in mistreatment of South Vietnamese civilians, were
much more responsibly controlled, and if Mr. Colby had been inclined
to so control his operations, then what I saw and witnessed firsthand
as a rule would not have happened.
Senator. SYnuNGTON. You mentioned your intelligence officer
igned you as shot and Wed. _ _
streets of DaNang one afternoon murdered an interpreter of mine who
was'a'South Vietnamese civilian.
Senator SYM,uvGToN. No W,, we have asked about that in the Moorhead
Committees and the statement is :
An inveatigatlon revealed tliat personnel IntervieWed, to include Osborn's
teams s#f'gis,,,stated Osborn did not have a fepiale interpreter as$igned to him at
a reter of hiuese na a t,y or traction. No evidence was obtained
other rn's testimony to to than an interpreter. male or female,
badz , 4,St. o j; " ese Poliee Agency at PaNang, or Vientiane
9 ~ dt 1n4 se the death of any person In the area,
qtA. An th APt;of D ember X 't Mr. Osborn refused to Identify the alleged
Mr. OSBORN. That is true.
Senator SYxiNOTON.. In; his ?statement, however, he testified. that
the person in charge of the ICF killed the interpreter, contrary to.his
previous testimony before the subcommittee.
Are any`o f fhe. acts wrong in this statement?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir; in fact, I have just been handed an unclassified
version; of .the se get document which was given to the House subcom-
mittee which is the result of -investigative effort, which was previously
classified a "Secret" and "submitted by Mr.,I)oolin,to that committee.
It'contains considerably less evidence of the RIIJ's,,the result of
investigative effort, than the original document did4 I4 ,'Ws ,,entire
document, for instance, you have read points 1 and. -,let me read this,
and I can tell. you, where. it is.inaccurate.
Yes, it say's -here : "Irivestikation revealed that personnel interviewed,
to include sborn's team chiefs"`I had two during my .tour:`in? Viet-
nam"stated Osborn did not have;a female interpreter assigned to him
at any time."
I, triad two American team chiefs. They were in charge of several
agent handler: in the area. The.,firstrof those two mould have been
fully knowledgeable of my employment of a Chinese.. Vietnamese
national female interpreter, in the spring ?of 1.968. I had been,giaven
permission to hire her by my' battalipn. A d it Was, to, ex-
pedite my operations, because, I did trsp. yet amese, and f was
debriefing Vietnamese agents. JLn fact, that was .the interpreter who
was killed. I can understand that the, Army -would not. want to re-
spond to those charges. I pan: understand". that they. would..coma out
with a report like this that is inaccurate. But I. have taken, an oath
before this testimony, and I swear to you at thistime .that. the Army
is not.. user.uwate in their r aorti of ;this, investigation of this inel-
dgnt.. ,he~j.hav 't.reapondebl tc~ e cu estzans y,haven'tresponded:
to the policies; they haven't put.their, finger, on; any of the mentality.
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of the entire battalion that I was with; the encouragement that I had
to run the operations that I had ; and the specific mentality of the
marines who created the brutality as a result of Phoenix information
which I submitted to them.
Senator SYMINGTON. Now suppose you take this document, if you
will, from the Department of Defense, and point out for the record
where they are inaccurate in their comment. Will you do that?
Mr. OSBORN. Shall I do that now?
Senator SYMINGTON. Not now, but take it and supply it to us for
the record.
Mr. OSBORN. Fine. I will take this document and submit it for the
record.
Senator SYMINGTON. We have the document. We have given it to you.
Mr. OSBORN. What are you asking me to do, Senator?
Senator SYMINGTON. To comment on its inaccuracy, or inaccuracies.
Mr. OSBORN. I am sorry, I just did for a few minutes
Senator SYMINGTON. You did on one item; I would like you to
do it for altitews for the record, and supply it in writing.
Mr. OsB'oRN. I would be glad to. I will. When would you like that,
as soon as possible?
Senator SYMINGTON. As soon as you can give it to us.
You left Vietnam in December 1968. And Mr. Colby became the
head of CORDS in November 1968?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is it your contention that all or any of the
atrocities you describe occurred because of any specific action of Mr.
Colby's?
. -Mr. OSBORN. It is my contention that they only happened as a result
of the- state .o# the .'Phoenix program before Mr. Colby took the
directorshi
Senator SYMINGTON. Did you submit any official complaint about
any of those atrocities while, you were in Vietnam ?
Mr. OssoRN. No, sir. They seemed; to me at the time to be standard
operating procedure.
Senator SYMINGTON. Have you made a complaint since you left the
service?
Mr. OSBORN. Only in the form of my testimony, which has been
minimally investigated by the Army.
Senator SYMINGTON. Your testimony before the House?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did you ever give the Department of Defense
or anyone with authority to conduct investigations in this matter the
names of the individuals who had committed atrocities you said you
witnessed ?
Mr. Osm RN: No, sir. I am'convinced that if I did, they couldscape
goat the individuals and avoid answering my questions, because of
the policies which caused that death.
Senator SYwLxGTort. Sax that again.
Mr. OSBORN. I am convinced that the military has taken the case
you mentioned this morning through the special agent. employed, and
with Ambassador Colby's avoidance of the question we are-
re _putting to
him, that they would use the names of the individuals which I would
submit to them who committed these crimes as a matter of policy, they
99-275-73-8
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would scapegoat those individuals and not investigate the policies
which caused the incidents. And we were most interested in getting
the policies.
Senator SYMINOTON. Have you got the names of the people whom you
say committed those atrocities?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, I have.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you submit them to the committee?
Mr. OSBORN. Would it reflect seriously upon my credibility if I did
not?
Senator SYMINGTON. I am leaving that up to you, Mr. Osborn. You
are here objecting to the appointment of another public servant. We
are considering the confirmation for his position.
Mr. OSBORN. I am reticent to do that, and I don't want it to reflect
upon the accuracy of the things I have said.
Senator SYMINOTON. It is very clear that regardless of whether Mr.
Colby has or has not been a good public servant, you are attacking
his reputation.
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. His intelligence, his actions, you are attacking
him, period. Now, you base a lot of that attack on some people whom
you say committed atrocities which he permitted.
Mr. OSBORN. No, sir, that happened before he was there, as I tried
to point out.
Senator SYMINOTON. But you brought it into the. confirmation, I
should think that you should furnish those names to the committee for
the record. But I won't press the point.
Senator Nunn:
Senator NUNN. I don't have any questions.
I would just like to observe that it is almost impossible for anybody
to complete an investigation, certainlythis committee, if we don't have
the names. We have got to find, out who made policy and who carried
it out and trace it back to the command. 'that is the only way I
know that you can do it. So 1-will .certainly say that the lack of names
would virtually preclude any kind of making full investigations.
But certainly as far as overall credibility before this committee I
don't think that is the issue. I think the issue is whetherr or not any. in-
vestigation can meaningfully take place.
Mr. OSBORN. I am convinced that less of an investigation, Senator
Nunn, could take place if I submitted those names, because the Depart-
ment of Defense so far has been oriented only toward the individual
and not the policy. We are talking about policies' which extend from
my time of observing-those.' atrocities through to the"present. I have
documents which I would like further to submit to the committee
which point out the existence of those policies being carried under not
only the program Phoenix under CORDS, under Mr. Colby's direction,
but which continue today in the program F-6, and will probably con-
tinue under the, special assistant to the Ambassador for field operations
under General Jackson, under the four councilp geieral in the !all,,
Senator SYMINOTON. What are' you talking about 'now? You have
lost me.
Mr. OSBORN. I thought you were following what I was saying.
Senator NUNN. I was.
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Mr. OSBORN. I am trying to point out that in the time of my observa-
tion of those things, which I first observed in 1968, to the present, the
policies regarding obtaining interrogation and assassination and mur-
der of those people who are perhaps innocent Vietnamese civilians has
extended from 1968 to 1973, the policies of mistreatment, the follow-
through of the mentality of the program have not appreciably changed.
Senator NUNN. That is still taking place, and you say it is going to
continue to take place?
Mr. OSBORN. I feel, from this directive from the South Vietnamese
Government, that the thing ought to be broadened, that is ought not
only to apply to Yankee law-the detainment law, the open-ended law
that says you can arrest anybody in classes A, B, and C of guilt by
association, and so forth, which includes the members of & family of
President Thieu, anyone at all can be detained and held for 2 years
plus 2 years. That applies to anybody at all, men, women, and chil-
dren of any age or category.
Senator NUNN. You are saying that still exists in South Vietnam?
Mr. OSBORN. And I am saying that it will continue to exist until
we get two policies, and the specific decrease, and the American policy
which continues under not just the Phoenix program, but an undating
of that program, and Phoenix has dropped its
Senator NUNN. You are not saying that we are still involved in that
right now, are you?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir, I have tried to say that during my testimony.
I have tried to show you
Senator. NUNN. You are saying that is still a policy of the United
States' and we still,have a Phoenix program going on that is directed
by us?
Mr. OSBORN. It has become the F-6 program, it no longer is required
by CORDS, that has been disbanded. And I have a document here
which traces the history of the Phung-Hoand and Phoenix program
that goes from late 19th century all the way through the fall of 1973.
It has charts and graphs-
Senator SYMINGTON. You say the late 19th century ?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir. It traces how the French did this thing, it
traces how the Japanese did it, and how the Americans did it.
Senator NUNN. You are not saying that that had anything to do
with Colby's involvement?
. Mr. OSBORN. I am saying that he did not do what he said he would.
He had sworn under oath that he worked hard to improve that kind
of thing, that he would like to see it improve, that he would make efforts
to improve it. He did no such thing.
I submit that the burden of proof is on him to show one way in
which he really. tried to. curb this treatment of South Vietnamese
civilians.
Senator NUNN. You do not think that we now have charge of the
South Vietnamese program, or the South Vietnamese Government?
Mr. OSBORN. I would like to submit that program, F-6, under the
Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations headed by
Mr. Jake Jacobson out of the Saigon Embassy and in four. Councils
General in Hue, DaNang, Bienhoa, and Kontoum will continue the
same policies which we have discussed here and which were blatant in
1969 at the top of the war.
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Senator NUNN. What are you saying we should do about it right
now in the United States?
Mr. OsBORN. I think we ought to call Mr. Colby in and ask him
what he did during the time he was in charge of the thing to change
that situation. And we ought to bring before the committee the people
who can submit documentation and prove that these, things don't exist.
Senator Nuxx. Do you think we ought to break relations with
Saigon until they change?
Mr. OSBORN. I am not recommending any such thing.
Senator Nuxiv. I am saying we are not in this role there.
Mr. OsBORN. Don't we have an Embassy there?
Senator NUNN. We have in Russia and China too, but we don't
control their policy.
Mr. OSBORN. No. 13ut I am saying that our advice and sponsorship
is beyond the F-6 program which has the same
Senator NuNN. You are saying that we are still involved in that F-6
ro~rram which was the Phoenix pprogram f
p Mr. OSBORN. Very definitely, and which has the same policy.
Senator NuxN. You are not contending that we had anything to do
with the French policy in the igth century ?
Mr..0sBORN. I am not making any such contention. I am saying
that since 1968 things have not improved; they have gone downhill.
And the treatment, of South Viet amese civilians has gone downhill.
Senator NUNN. So the gist of our 'testimon is that the atrocities
that you saw were not committed while Mr. Colby was there, and they
were not directly his policies, but you are sayin tli'at, based on informa-
tion that you surmise, that his tenure in office there did not change that,
and is continuing today, is that correct; is that a fair spmmary ?
Mr. OsBORN. hat is correct,'9ir.
Senator Nvxx. What is your present occupation ?
Mr. OsBOnrr. I am a member of the Committee ,for Action and Re-
search on the Intelligence Community; ? which dyes exactly that.
Senator NIINN. The Comrri ttee for fiction and' 1 eseitrch
Mr. OSBORN [continuing] : Qn the Tntelhg$nce Community.
Senator NuxN. Where is the home be of that' f
Mr. Osnon.iv: Washington; I),C: sir
Senator Nnin And is it an official corporation,; nonprofit corpora-
tion ~
Mr'. OSBORN. We have applied for corporate stators, ye!s, sir, and we
will.be incorporated.
Senator Nuxx. How manypeople involved f
Mr. OSBORN. There are only .three 'of us, exintelligence people taho
are concerned about Phoenix and other programs;
senator. Nux6r. When did you start this organitation t
Mr. OsBonr . In February,1973.
Senator Nux*r. Sb you just started'?
Mr. Osstitiir:'We have not gotten off the, gro tnd.
Senator NuNN. And what is your goal and gbleetive I
Mr. OssoRZV. 'Oux goals dridobjectivs' include the, investigation and
researEh into intklhgence ageuclee which are oveiste nig their bounds
by Government authority'tarrying out' ~suoh ' blat programs 'and'
Phoenix.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much, Mr: Osborn.
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If you have any further comments or statements you would like to
make, we would be glad to have them for the record.
Senator NUNN. Do you want to submit that document there for
the record?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir.
Senator Nuxx. What is that document?
Mr. OSBORN. This is the bulletin of the Committee for Action and
Research on the Intelligence Community, May 19 7 3. It is entitled
"Counterspy.))
Senator NUNN. Do you mind telling me what that is on the front?
Mr. OSBORN. If you will open the document up to its centerfold
you will see a wanted, book which was issued on individuals, South
Vietnamese civilian individuals, a wanted poster saying that these
people were wanted by the South Vietnamese Government, and should
be detained for political questioning.
The figure on the front, you will notice a blown-up figure of the
Phoenix on the top of the wanted poster. it is Phung-Hoang, which
is the title under that, which means the same as Phoenix.
Senator NUNN. When did you getout of the service? You were
in the Army, I believe?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir, Army Intelligence.
I got off of active duty in October 1969, and was honorably dis-
charged in October 1972.
Senator NUNN. And what has been your occupation since then?
Mr. OSBORN. I have been, in graduate school at American University.
I have worked with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and sev-
eral other organizations, the Citizens Committee of Inquiry into U.S.
War Crimes in Southeast Asia. This documents the work of the com-
mittee today.
Senator NUNN. What is your source of living? Do you have an
independent source of income?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir. The committee does not provide an income.
I work at a restaurant here in Washington, D.C.
Senator NUNN. What is the name of that restaurant?
Mr. OsBORN. Bixby's Warehouse. , . "
I do that in order to provide a living, because when we are dealing
with this kind of thing we don't find any sponsorship for research.
Senator NUNN. You don't have a'salary in this particular organi-
zation?
Mr. OSBORN. No, sir. When we are properly financed we will be
salaried.
Senator NUNN. Thank you.
Senator SYMiNG~,QN. You have here a list, I just noticed, a partial
list of those responsible for Pacification Phoenix.
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I notice that among those you have Ambassa-
dor Graham Martin.
Mr. OSBORN. Yes. sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. How is he responsible? He has just gotten him-
self in there.
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir; today he took over as Ambassador to South
Vietnam, I believe, to replace Ambassador Bunker.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then., how can he be responsible for it if he has
just taken over?
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Mr. OsBORN. I feel that anyone who is the Ambassador of South Viet-
nam should be totally knowledgeable that the Phoenix program con-
tains the things that I say and the other witnesses who have come
before the committee say.
Senator SYMINGTON. He can be knowledgeable, but how can he be
responsible, because I visited him last year in Italy, and he was our
Ambassador in Italy, and I think last week he became our Ambassador
in Saigon. How can he be responsible for the Phoenix program.?
Mr. OSBORN. We say here, "Partial list of those responsible for
Pacification Phoenix F-6."
We feel'that this list of names are people who should be asked about
these programs, who have had complicity in the programs
Senator SY M iNGTON. You say it is a list that should be asked about-
I notice you have Dwight David Eisenhower and. John Fitzgerald
Kennedy. President Eisenhower happened, to my certain knowledge
to have resisted efforts made by various people, including some in high
office today, to go into the situation at the time of the Dien Bien Phu.
And he had no position whatever in Vietnam at that time from any
military standpoint. How can he be responsible for the Phoenix pro-
gram $
Mr. OSBORN. Senator we are pointing out the fact that this is a broad
sweeping accusation. this list includes four Presidents under whom
Phoenix and Phung-Hoang have been operating in South Vietnam.
Senator SYMINGTON. Are you saying that the Phoenix o ration of
the U.S. participation was under. ,the administration of President
Eisenhower?
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir; I an saying that it was certainly the Phung-
Hoang program existed as early as the late 1950's.
Senator SYMINGTON. With U.S. participation $
Mr. OSBORN. And sponsorship.
Senator SmXiNGToN. Mr.. Osborn, you are under oath, you know
that$
Mr. OSBORN. I realize that, sir.
Senator SYMINOTOx. Let me repeat the question.
Are you saying that the Phoenix program was participated in by the
Unite States in the years that President Eisenhower, was Presiddent $
Mr. OSBORN. The phoenix per `se, the official startin date of Phoe-
nix was August 1, 1968. So that would be well after that. No, sir; I am
not saying that.
Senator SYMINGTON. That would be after the death of President
Eisenhower.
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir. What I am saying is that these four Presidents
were present while we had pacification and American advisorship and
political repression as part of our advisorship to the South Vietnamese
Government.
Senator SYMixOTON. I want you to file for the record to justify this
charge against President Eisenhower any participation that he had,
because I was in this operation in 1954, and tremendous effort was made
to get the United States to participate in it prior to the fall of Dien
Bien Phu, which was to the best. of my recollection the spring of 1954.
And President Eisenhower followed the' advice of General Ridgeway,
against the advice of other ' people, and refused to intervene in this
situation. And therefore I am surprised to see him listed as one who
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was partially responsible for this Pacification Phoenix program which
you are critical of and which you bring up with respect to the nomina-
tion of Mr. Colby to this position.
Mr. OSBORN. Yes, sir. I have no reason to cast aspersions on Presi-
dent Eisenhower, sir. I feel, though, that since our advisorship has
been strong in Vietnam, we have encouraged the South Vietnamese
and ourselves to participate in atrocity programs which have brought'
the demise of at least several thousand Vietnamese civilians who by
Mr. Colby's admission may well be totally innocent people.
Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Nunn, any questions?
Senator NuNN. Just one other question.
On page 25 you say that the British are getting back into the pro-
gram now under. F-6.
Mr. OsBolx. No, sir, it says here-you mean in the lower right hand
corner?
Senator NuNN. In the lower right hand corner you say "British
Adviser return to Saigon. CARIC has recently learned"
Mr. OsBORN. Yes, sir.
Senator NuNN [reading] :
CARIC has recently learned that Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, who served as
an. adviser to early pacification techniques and programs, dating back to the
1950's, has recently returned to Saigon to assist the GVN during the coming era
of the "F-6" program.
So you are saying he, Colby, and President Eisenhower and Presi-
dent Kennedy, all of them?
Mr. OsBORN. Sir Robert G. K. Thompson has returned recently to
Saigon as adviser now to our mission there. He is a British citizen.
He is in the employ of the United States. And he has always been
connected with the Phoenix program such as several of the advisers
whom we list on the partial list.
Senator NuNN. He is not related to the British Government in any
way, then?
Mr. OSBORN. Not that I know of, sir. I think he is still in the Amer-
ican employ.
.If I could, going back to that list which Senator Symington brought
up, at the top of that list we start with advisers and designers of the
pr know
. ogram, we go through the ambassadors during the time that we
the program existed, we go on to COMUS MACV commanders, the
CIA station chiefs and the Chiefs of Saigon, and the Presidents dur-
ing that time.
Sir I didn't mean to imply that I didn't have a great respect for
Dwigt David Eisenhower, I didn't mean to cast any aspersions. on him.
I mean to say that during the American sponsorship and the adviser-
ship in Vietnam these atrocities have been going on and have not been
improved on, and that Mr. Colby needs to explain the fact that he
swore he would improve on them, and he has not improved on them.
Senator SINOTON. Let me say for your information, Mr. Osborn,
that I once believed in this war, and many years ago, long before this
administration, I turned against it. And the record will so show. But
at no time have I ever had anything but respect for President Eisen-
hower, because he consistently refused to become involved in it. And
that, is true even though the French told him that they would lose this
country unless he did become involved. And that is the reason I chose
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116
to make that one observation that I read in this pamphlet which I
have just seen.
Thank you for your testimony.
If there is anything further you would like to tell us, we would
be very glad to have you supply it for the record.
Mr. Ossoitx. Thank you.
[Subsequently to the hearing the following statement was submitted
by Mr. Colby.]
JULY 10, 1978.
STATEMENT BY WILLIAM E. CoLSY
I have been informed that there have been ,two cdiamunications to the Com-
mittee from citizens questioning my qualifications for thisjob:
The first is by Mr. Paul Sakwa, who cites a! series of various documents that
he says he was associated with while he was in the CIA. I have had a search made
for these documents, and frankly I have not beeiable?tofind, tli m all. I.think,
however, I can answer Mr. Sak*a's assertions that am ananco trollable agent,
that I slanted intelligence, submitted misinformation and permitted U.B. funds
to be used in rigging the 1961 election in Saigon while I was Saigon Chien of
Station.
While I was in Saigon as`Chief of Station, was quite; meticul}oous in forwar4ing
intelligence which called the shots against the gov rnment of Vietnam as well as
those which indicated that it was doing a good job.
A number of the references provideo by ? Sakyea ape
Indt
porting vidual reports re-
01 arlous p~alfeasanaes, try ry { , ,:?icilchl}. were for-
warded under my per~onsl'autl~1,a positive , fyUog
toward the government of South 'Vietnam under 'si ent 1cm, and I area , do
consider the overthrow of President Diem one of the real disasters that occurred
in our history out tfiere: _ . , , Mr. Sakwa had the feeling that if we had promaited Zoe systems things
would. have been beltpp~ I bad slightly d rent the Diem gF~oyp~rrnn
went was about as good a Bove t as yo ere to et l i Soatheast''Asiand that difference, problem' was e ~Amfnitminty leffiort ! licit'- It''9 his w##~ an
honest cof opinion. I give Mr. [9akwa scull Credit I.e the shacerity:of his
views., I a.s t-ie aerie for my oWn ,I di4.a at.gonoe our lnf tl4r atno: ~hbs-e
in what was forwarded to Washington. Altho . siubm1tte? y own views, I
will take full responsipility for, r gem. I prop a ~coilti~hhe, to make a choice "be-
tween the various a1ble I' tib if'a to, take r.efmnsibliity"fbr assum-
ing a position that one situation is more likely than another. I think that it what
I am requited to d@ es an Intell#gence.4lhceR
The second communication which tfie Committee forwarded to me Is , letter
from a Committee for Action Rees~earch on the Intelligence Community which asks
for a chance to present eer'taiii'coseiderdtlene' against me, -iaf~gely' dediinkwwith
the Phoenix grog> am in Southh Vletmim. Wirer Mte two poSsidle ivitUesses, a wK.
Bart Osborn and.Mit. ]David Harringt olL
I testified before the , House Coosp~i stte~e 0410 Government , Operations in , , 5u&v
1971 on. the Phoenix program and my timoe`as followed byMr. Osborn,~aaynd~
Mr. Harrington. The Committee's'concitisions after healing 01bf the Nit! y
dnwere included in their report. Concern about the Phoenix program was expressed
in the report and, it,was rwon dedlthatithe tayyi q Refs y. t4gate
legations ;oi:.c;i b U S
pspc~ 7~ v~' i ? a' iri
ra am a9inst.civiIians.s o ' et Ceti A ed? 1
by 'M! 'K. ' Barton"03born, a.'stibcofd ttee ? a' i fdllftllr
intelligence and CIA activities: In Vietnam ? tad are tlontained in ithe!; hearing: ieco
The laelenAe L aitple inges tgd,-flt a ailegagoi f;40 s$nhltted,in A
letter to .Ch irrp~,an. Moorhead . N9 enibeF..19t2 a. e o rifled
"U.S. Aa fst pce Programs in'Vi tram." The fnemo nduni`states n pare!
"Witht res ect to the 'recommendation dii' ?age : of e' mlt'tee` rt,
the Department of Defense completed an extenelve :slnrd~ pgrtiai inveetig on
on March 14, 19P'd, into the alldgadons #lade by.Mr. Osbort-1dArliig the leering
held August 1971 , by the Foreign Qperstlo end ? oAgmment; Info tion
& V1
Subcommittee.
"Thisip pestigation,, whicp fa ~ o ut~ceded to port Mr. ?sbppirI~`'is
allegations, revealed niuinerbtis`tlispar3t ?-tiet~ t ih ti 7is'hkade:Iibtle
testifyieg before the , Committee, slid.thefactual evidmr~eproadeed?in the coarse
of the investigation.
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"It should be made a matter of record that on two occasions during investiga-
tive interviews Mr. Osborn refused to identify specific persons, facts or offer
precise information involving the alleged incidents which would assist investiga-
tive efforts. This reluctance to give specific information was also evident during
the hearings of August 2, 1971. Since an investigation has already been conducted
and in view of the unsupported and imprecise allegations made by Mr. Osborn,
many of which are inaccurate, nor can be proved or disproved, it is the opinion
of the Department of Defense that no useful purpose would be served by further
inquiry into this matter."
I might add one additional comment which I think brings Mr. Osborn's allega-
tions into better focus. The Phoenix program was essentially instituted during
the summer of 1968 and began to work during the fall and on into the succeeding
years. Mr. Osborn was a military intelligence officer. He was not assigned to the
Phoenix program as a Phoenix adviser. He alleges that he had certain connec-
tions. It is a little hard to determine what these are. But Mr. Osborn served in
Vietnam from September 1967, to December 1968. In other words, his service
essentially was before the Phoenix program really got rolling in any degree.
As I testified in the Committee's open hearing, the Phoenix program was an
effort to bring some order into the fight on the Government's side between the
Communist apparatus and the government of South Vietnam.
I think that various of the things that Mr. Osborn alleges might have happened.
I have no judgment on that, but we did issue instructions, as I indicated in my
testimony, that the Phoenix program was not to be a program of assassination
and we issued instructions and directives out of the MACV headquarters, which
I drafted, that not only were Americans not to participate in any such activities
but they were to make their objections known at that time and they were to
report the fact that they took place. I did receive some reports of this nature
during the Phoenix program and took them up with the government of South
Vietnam whom I found to be receptive to the problem. I frankly think that Mr.
Osborn's allegations are not well founded.
With respect to Mr. Harrington, he alleges that he was in a briefing with me
in the spring of 1969 and says that his account of that meeting is in conflict with
my allegation that the Phoenix program was not a systematic program of
assassination. I don't recall any such briefing. I received many briefings and he
may well have been in a briefing with me.
I believe that I conducted the Phoenix program throughout with a rejection
of the idea it be a program of assassination. I knew there were people killed,
there is no question about it, and I have testified publicly that most of these
were killed in a perfectly natural combat situation in a war, that there were
some abuses that did take place, but I certainly reject the idea that it was a
systematic program of assassination.
[Whereupon, 4:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the
call of the chair.]
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1973
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room 212,
Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington
(acting chairman).
Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Hughes, Nunn, Thur-
mond, Dominick, and Goldwater.
Also present : T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff di-
rector; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; John A. Goldsmith and
Edward B. Kenney, professional staff members; Nancy J. Bearg,
research assistant; and Katherine Nelson, assistant to Senator
Symington.
Senator SYMINOTON. The committee resumes its consideration this
afternoon in executive session of the nomination of Mr. William E.
Colby to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Senator Kennedy has requested to ask Mr' Colby some questions.
And it was discussed and agreed to this morning in the committee
meeting that the committee will waive the 10-minute rule, and will
allow Senator Kennedy to proceed a reasonable additional time.
Following his departure, the committee will proceed in the normal
way to examine Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby, will you raise your right hand, please?
Do you swear the testimony you give this committee will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM EGAN COLBY, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Corse. I do.
Senator SYMINGToN. Senator Kennedy, will you proceed.
Senator KENNEDY. First of all, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I want to express my very deep sense of appreciation for
permitting me to inquire into two areas of my interest, and hopefully
they will be of interest to the members of this committee and also to the
Senate.
I want to express a very warm sense of appreciation to Mr. Colby,
who has been kind enough to visit with me in my office in response
to some of the particular areas that I was concerned with. And I want
to again express thanks to the members of the committee for permit-
ting me to ask these questions.
(119)
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I know there is a time problem. There are two principal areas that
I would like to develop if I could, Mr. Colby, and then to the extent
that the time constraints apply, I would like to ask if we could have
some written response to some of these questions. And I understand
thq committee wants to move ahead. But,. I hope that we would be
able to pet some response before At least pethaps this committee con-
sidered it, or certainly before. the te. R
I would like to, if I could, at the start, go into the area of the con-
tacts that you had that involved the particular Watergate affair, if
we could, and then move to the Phoeni "te,program.
I would like initially if you ootild just ' 11 us a little bit about your
service out in Vietnam in the State Department; is that correct, as
;
a matter of fact?
Mr. Corgi. When I was in Vietnam, I was assigned to the State
Department. When I came home from Vietnam on the 1st of July
1971, I stayed on the State Dej rttnent rolts technically until some
time in September or October. But I actually went to work at CIA
on September 7, the Tuesday after Labor Da`y.
Senator SYMINx TON. What year?
Mr. COLBY" 1971.
Senator J sNNEDY. Did you have any lmowledge,of Howard Hunt's
visit to the Department of State in September 1971 ?
Mr. C ou,y. To the CIA? Senator KENNEDY. I was thinking in regard to the State Depart-
ment.
Mr. CoLaY. Hunt's visit to the State Department?
Senator KENNEDY. In,1971.,This was involved.in tlps allegation and
the cha,rges of. the changing or forgery of, the oarious ft to Depart-
ment cables. Do you know anything about that whatsoever?
Mr. Cow. Wo, I did not.
Senator KurrNEDY. Could you tell us howv you got the job as the
Executive Director to Mr. Helms? : ti . , .
Mr. CoisY. During the spring of 1971., I ;was .4w home leave at one
point, and Mr. Helms asked_ me. whether I wanted to came- back to
I came, he
the g ncy afr my Vietnam ? servaee. He started, mat in
atot;hl,lxke to have me take tthelnb o kikeeutive Direotc>#,.,
I answered him a few days later and said I would with great
P S nator KENNEDY. Did yo~ talk tof auene-It the White House
about this assignment?
Mr. CorsY. I do not believe so.
Senator KENNEDY. Did yot talk-to.Mr. Ehrliehman about it? ?
Mr. Cor,.er., No.
Y*zwwrzy. Did you talk to the Presidnt about it? ; - ,
Mr. Cox ay. NO.
Senator KENNEDY. There are:three clifferenA documents, or three dif-
ferent occasions which relate to the Watergate affair-and I will, dieot
your attention to there particular,datew and expand oa the factual situ-
ation if you like-in which. I leretand there has been no, record of
these various meetings or conversationsr 1
I,would like to know if that is because, no record was kept, or has
been misplaced, or has not been made available. One is the November 16
meeting that you had with Mr. Ehrlichman.
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Mr. GoLBY. Mr. Helms suggested that I might go down and have
lunch with Mr. Ehrlichman and talk a little bit about Vietnam, and
my experience there and what I did there.
I did that, I talked about Vietnam.
The second subject that came up was the problem of crime in the
United States, and the need of citizens for protection, and so forth. I
commended the example of the participation of the Vietnamese in their
own protection, noting that, of course, in America you do not think
of arming our people to defend themselves in their homes and streets
but, rather, as has been done in some communities, organizing the
youth to escort the lady from the bus back to her apartment, and things
like that.
The third thing that we discussed was the problem of declassifica-
tion of various documents, classified documents after they become
dated. This was in the light of some consideration being given at
that time to accelerating the declassification of a lot of documents in
the Government, which eventually ended up in the President's Execu-
tive order.
On this topic, I made a suggestion which was later incorporated
in a letter from Mr. Helms to Mr. Ehrlichman. It was that while we
have some very sensitive material in the intelligence area, it seemed to
me that it might be possible to generalize an account of what actually
happened, and declassify that general account, leaving the original
documents and the identification of the agents, and things like that
still classified. This would respond to the quite proper requirement that
the public be informed about some events in the past, but at the same
time protect intelligence sources.
That letter I could provide if the committee wishes it.
Senator KENNEDY. Was there a record of the meeting at that time,
was there ever a record kept of your meeting?
Mr. CoLBY. I cannot remember whether there was a record or not, or
whether it was just written up in a letter. If there is a record, it would
be somewhere in my own files, and I would be very happy to provide
it. I will certainly look for it. I rather think there was not, and that
I just incorporated it into the letter.
Senator SYIMLINGTON. If you have a record, will you supply it to the
committee?
(See p. 168.)
And Senator Kennedy, we will see that you get a copy of it imme-
diately.
Mr. COLBY. I will.
Senator KENNEDY. As I understand. you were charged with the
general responsibility by Mr. Helms for the Watergate investiga-
tion, were you not?
Mr. CoLBY. I was sort of the chief of staff, drawing the staff to-
gether to produce the papers and take the actions appropriate at the
time, after Tune 1972, in the Watergate affairs.
Senator KENNEDY. What happened, when the FBI agent tried to
talk to CIA employees? Can you tell your reactions about that?
Mr. CoLBY. I think at that time we received a lot of quite natural
questions from the working levels of the FBI. asking about the back-
ground of various individuals in the case. A number of these were
sent back in written form by our Director of Security to the working
levels of the FBI.
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Shortly after the event itself-and I cannot think of the exact
date-it came to my attention and to Mr. Helms' attention that we
had indeed given Mr. Hunt that assistance during 1971. And at that
time our feeling was-and Mr. Helms and I shared it-that we were
convinced in our investigations that we had nothing to do with the
Watergate affair itself, but that it was highly dangerous from a pub-
licity sense to get the idea abroad that CIA was somehow involved in
the Watergate affair.
Consequently, we were trying to keep CIA's name out of the pub-
licity, but to respond to the proper authorities who had responsibility
for investigating, and so forth.
With that frame of mind, we drew up a report of the various activ-
ities involved in this incident in 1971, the Howard Hunt business, and
provided those at the top level to Mr. Gray.
Senator KENNEDY. You were aware at that time of the request` for
cooperation from Mr. Hunt and then Mr. Ehrlichman?
Mr. CorsY. About that time, because about that time we found the
transcript, I believe, of a recording that was made of the conversation
between Mr. Hunt and General Cushman. In that recording, ag I
think the record shows, Mr. Hunt said at one point, Mr. Ehrlichman
called you, did he not, or some words such as that.
General Cushman replied, yes, he did.
It was on that basis that we believed it was Mr. Ehrlichman that
had originated the request. It was not, quite frankly, until about May
of this year that we discovered an item in our journal which indicated
that that phone call had been made on Jul' 7, 1971.
Senator KENNEDY. But again, as far as the cooperation with the
FBI, were the CIA employees made available to the FBI?
Mr. COLBY. We said to 1V1r. Gray that we would be very happy to
supply anything he needed at that level, but we requested that he call
off the probes and contact at the lower level. Our concern was a matter
of leakage of a misunderstanding of CIA involvement in the Water=
gate. And it did so happen that several of the documents that we gave
to the working level of the FBI did result-I think result is the word-
in a phone call to us from a couple of newsmen later on asking us
rather direct questions about some of the remarks made in those re-
ports.
So that our feeling was that this subject, which could so easily be ?
misunderstood, should be handled at the top level, and then called off
at the bottom level.
I believe that the FBI asked to interview two of our officers, I
have forgotten the names right now, but two of them. And Mr. Helms
asked Mr. Gray if we could provide the information that they would ?
have. But there was not a refusal, there was a request to handle them
in that fashion.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, as I understand it, you.were in charge of
the. investigation, and this was your decision?
Mr. Corny. I think, to be very specific about it, the decision to have
the two officers not respond to the FBI request was Mr. Helms' deci-
sion. The basic philosophy of keeping. the CIA out of the misunder-
standing of being involved and consequently handling the material
through the top level of the FBI and the Justice Department was a
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decision in which I shared. It was obviously Mr. Helms' decision,
because he was in charge.
But I certainly would not say that I disagreed with him.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, at some time Mr. Silbert asked for the
detailed questions on November 27, and a detailed reply was prepared
by the CIA on December 13, but it was not sent. I understand that Mr.
Helms directed you to meet with Cushman to discuss Cushman's
involvement with Howard Hunt. And as I understand further .
Mr. COLBY. I think you have your sequence there a little wrong.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you have a conversation with General
Cushman that confirmed that Ehrlichman was the man who con-
tacted the CIA about this time, in response to the request of Mr.
Silbert?
Mr. CoLBY. We prepared a similar package to what had been given
to the FBI for the Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
This was given to him, it passed through Mr. Peterson and Mr. Sil-
bert. Mr. Silbert then had some further questions, and we prepared
the answers to these.
In the discussion with Mr. Silbert I had said that Mr. Ehrlichian
had been the originator of the request to General Cushman.
Sometime later Mr. Helms and I went to see Mr. Ehrlichman and
Mr. Dean. Mr. Ehrlichman was quite quizzical about how his name
could have been used, because he said that he did not remember the
phone call.
I told him about the phone call, and that it was General Cushman's
memory that we were operating on as to whether the phone call ac-
tually took place. And I have said that really the question was one
between him and General Cushman. I suggested that he get together
with General Cushman and straighten it out.
He asked if I would call General Cushman and ask him if he could
get in touch with him. I did. General Cushman called me and asked me
to show him what I knew about it.
I went and first told him this story. Then General Cushman said
he remembered a phone call, he was not quite sure who had been at
the other end of the phone call, he knew it was from the White House,
it was either Ehrlichman or Colson or Dean, at which point I showed
him the transcript of the conversation between him and Mr. Hunt.
He said yes, I guess that was Mr. Ehrlichman.
He then used my current secretary, who was his secretary at the
time, to type up the memorandum to Mr. Ehrlichman.
That was what I talked to General Cushman about.
Senator KENNEDY. I would like to break that apart. Is that the
first memorandum-let's go back
Mr. COLBY. There were two memorandums by General Cushman.
Senator KENNEDY. If you could just respond to the precise ques-
tion, it would be a good deal clearer for me as establishing a series of
events.
As I understand, after the Silbert meeting in the Justice Depart-
ment-you had a meeting with Mr. Silbert in which Mr. Silbert
pressed you, I think were the words you used in your own memoran-
dum, for the name of the White House contact. You had supplied
the words "White House contact," or words to that effect. in an earlier
memorandum provided to Silbert in describing the contact.
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124
. Mr. CoLBY, A memoranduih, provided to.the #i;ttTp y ;C?eneral which
1r. Silbert saw.
Senator KENNrnY. Which Silbeirt,sawr- :which ypvstated, I think,
in a note to Mr. Helms, that you thought this .would satisfy the FBI,
or words to that effect. I think those woWs,or words to that effect., are,
in the materials that have been suppliiad.
Even at this time you: knew, Mr.: Colby,,that it was Mr. Ehrlichrash
who was from the White House. So as:I.understand the sequence, Mr.
Silbert asked for the information, and in your, response you just ia-di
cated that the request had come from- an extra-agency official, even
though you knew it was Mr. Ehrlichman.
Mr. COLEY. I thought it was Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator KENNEDY. You thought it was Mr. Ehrlichman.
Now later, sometime later, you had a meeting over in the Justice
Department with Mr. Silbert, who continually apprised the CIA in
its investigation, as I understand
Mr. Cor ar. I saw Mr. Silbert once, yes.
Senator KExxrur. As I would interpret the circumstances at the
time, in the'preparation of its c tsq and anticipating what defense Mr.
Hunt may have,'Mr. Silbert pressed. ahead,
You at some time had a meeting over in the Justice Department. And
as I understand from the materials that, have been provided, in your
own description of this meeting which you had related to Mr. Ehrlich-
man, you used the words "I danced around to avoid mentioning Mr.
Ehrlichman's name to Mr. :Silbert."
Are you familiar with that, sir i
Mr. COLEY. Yes, sir.
Senator KExxsny. Why did you feel that you, had to dance around
with Mr. Silbert, who was charged with the responsibility to find this
information out f
I believe that you used the words you ,had .to dance around. What
was your reluctance when you knew that Ehrlichman, had made the
contact initially with the CIA about providing the material, and was
also the person who obviously Silbert was trying to find out about,
what reluctance did you feel and why did you feel that, and why did
you feel that you had to use those words to Mr. Ehrlichpnan, whom
you later talked to, about dancing around to avoid bringing up the
name?
Would you tell us about that?
Mr. CoLBY. The reason I,went to see Mr. Silbert was that, the Justice
Department and the Attorney General had said that in the preparation
of the case against Howard Hunt and the other Watergate burglars,
they were concerned that the defense might raise the issue that :some
how CIA was. involved, and, therefore the prosecution;would not.be
able to go ahead with the case, because CIA would n $ testi f y. ,
Therefore, the prosecution wanted to be informed of, the: reality of
any allegations of CIA involvement. I believe our responsibility. was
to demonstrate to him at that tipe the limited nature ref ;the CIA's
involvement with Mr. Hunt, an4 the fact that whatever activity we
had with Mr., Hunt was an authorized activity. And it-, was for that
reason that we told Mr. Silbert and the FBI previously .what the as-
sistance had been, and that our giving assistance, had- been duly
authorized.
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Nov, we were concerned gat a public misunderstanding of CIA in-
volvement in Watergate, and consequently, there was -a reluctance to
drop somewhat inflammatory names into the kind of atmosphere that
was around us at'thattime.
For that reason I felt, and I think I was 'Following the general
thought of the leaders in CIA at the time, that if we could respond ,to
the legitimate requirements of Mr. Silbert as to the knowledge of CIA.
activity, and that it was'a properly authorized activity, without get-
ting an inflammatory name in it, it would be'all right. But if we were
asked the direct question, as I was asked within 5 minutes, I, of course,
gave it.
Senator KENNEDY. You used the words "I danced around the room
several times for 10 minutes, and then was pinned by Silbert with a
demand for the name."
Mr. COLBY. He asked me the name directly,'and I gave. it to him.
Senator KENNEDY. That was your description, your reluctance?
Mr. COLBY. My description, my reluctance, yes. And in the course
of it I referred to the fact that we were duly authorized, and he asked
me who was actually the authorizing authority in the White House.
Senator KENNEDY. What was the name?
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator HUGHES. [presiding]. Senator Kennedy, if it is an appro-
priate time, we have a vote, and I think we had just as well recess and
vote and come back and resume-with your permission, Mr. Colby.
We will recess until we get back.
[Recess.] .
Mr. HUGHES. The chairman told ;ne to go ahead, Senator Kennedy.
The committee is reconvened.
Senator KENNEDY. As I understand the sequence, Mr. Colby, on
November 27 you had the meeting with Silbert in the Justice Depart-
ment ~ at which time he pressed you, and you revealed the name of Mr.
Ehnczm'an. And he asked for ~a memorandum to update the CIA's
involvement -as a result of your own investigation.
That memorandum was prepared by, as I understand it, Decem-
ber 13, is that correct?
Mr. COLBY. I think so. Approximately.
Senator KENNEDY. On December 13, you had a conversation with
Mr. Cushman to verify that Erlichman really is the extra-agency
person that contacted the Agency about Hunt. And you understand
from that conversation that you are reaffirmed in your belief that
Ehrlich-man is the man that may be contacted.
On December 15, you go to the White House; Mr. Helms and you
go to the White House. And you have a conversation with Mr. Ehrlich-
man. Now, who initiated the meeting in the White House?
Did you request that you go to the White House, or did the White
House call and ask for it?
Mr. COLBY. It is my belief that Mr. Ehrlichman asked for it.
Senator KENNEDY. When?
Mr. COLBY. I do not know. I got the request to go from Mr. Helms.
Senator KENNIDY. And you do not know when Mr. Ehrlichman
called Mr. Helms and requested that they have a meeting?
Mr. COLBY. It is not in my memory right now. And I am not trying
to evade it.
99-275-73 9
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Senator KENNEDY. Was it some time after the 27th of November?
Mr. Coney. I would guess that it was a day or two before we actually
went down.
Senator KENNEDY. At any time did you talk to Mr. Ehrlichmau
during this period of time after the 27th and before December 15?
Mr. COLEY. I actually talked to Mr. Ehrlichman three times in my
life; once in Vietnam, and once at the lunch that we talked about
earlier; and the third time'was this occasion that we are talking about.
Senator KENNEDY. 'Did ,you talk to anyone in the White House
after the November 27 meeting when you had indicated to Mr. Silbert
that Ehrlichman was the person?
Mr. CoLny. No.
Senator KzxNEDY. And the time that you went to the White House
on December 15?
Mr. CoLBY. No.
Senator K=fNEDY. You did not talk to anyone?
Mr. COLBY. No.
Senator KmxxmY. Did you ask anybody to call the White House
in yoiir'behalf?
Mr. COLEY. No.
Senator KENNEDY. But evidently out of the clear blue, Mr. Ehrlich-
man called, to the best of your knowledge, Mr. Helms and asked to
see you and Mr. Helms?
Mk. CorBY. In the contest of the meeting-I do not know whether
this was in the memorandum, I doubt it,'because it was not all that
important at the time-the impression I had from the meeting was
that Mr. Ehrliehman had heard that his name had been used in my
conversation with Mr. Silbert, and I was the source of using his name,
and that he asked to be able to talk it out' a' bit to find out what this
was 'about. And r must say that Mr. Ehrliehman in that meeting
appeared genuinely perplexed, because when ,I pinpointed the date of
the Hunt visit at July 2zh-- --
Senator. KENNEDY. If r'could just'ask you here :-how did Mr.
Ehrliehman hear that his name had been mentioned?
Mr. COLBY. I do not know.
Senator KENNEDY. It was not through you '4
Mr: CORY. No.
Senator KENNEDY. To the best of your knowledge, it was not through
Mr. Helms?
Mr: CoLBY. I do not think so.
Senator KENNEDY. But the call which originated from Mr. Ehrlich-
man to the Department was at the request of Mr. Ehrlichman? For
the December 15 meeting?
Mr. CoLBY. The call that originated the meeting with Mr. Ehrlich-
man that took place in the White House.
Senator KENNEDY. Was Mr. Ehrlichmanfs call to either Mr. Helms
or
Mr. CoLBY. I believe to Mr. Helms.
Senator KENNEDY. And so you went to the meeting?
Mr. COLBY. I went to that meeting. And , II described how his name
had been used.
Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us what the conversatin was,
to the best of your knowledge ? :0
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Mr. COLBY. As I recall, he asked what the circumstances were, how
his name had come to be used in this account. And I described the
way in which we had proceeded to respond to the FBI's questions at
the working level, and then when we had gotten into the sensitive
relationship with Mr. Hunt, that we had gone to the level of Mr. Gray,
and that then the question had come up of the involvement of. the
prosecutor, so that we had gone to the Attorney General, and had
been passed to Mr. Peterson and Mr. Silbert. And in the conversation
with Mr. Silbert I had described that I had given his name, after
initially trying not to reveal it, but that I had given his name. And he
seemed perplexed, because the date that I had fixed on was the 22d
of July, so that we thought at that time that he might have called
a day or two before, we just didn't know.
He said that he thought that he had been out of town the previous
week or so, that he didn't see how it could have been him.
At which point I said that we really had no independent knowledge
of this beyond what General Cushman had said, and that really he
could perhaps solve that best by talking to General Cushman.,.
It wasn't until much later that we discovered the journal item in
our own records that indicated that the phone call had been made on
July 7. And we didn't know that at that time.
Senator KENNEDY. So then what happened?
Mr. COLBY. So at the end of the meeting we left it that as a con-
venience I would get in touch with General Cushman
Senator KENNEDY. Why you?
Mr. COLBY. Just somebody had to go do it, I don't know of any
particular reason, frankly.
Senator KENNEDY. If it is Ehrlichman who is questioning, why
couldn't he have called him; why couldn't Cushman get it straightened
out?
Mr.' CoiBY. I don't know. I didn't see any particular reason for
the kind of concern that exists today, and he just asked as a favor,
"Would you ask him to call me," and I said, "Sure, I will ask him to
call you."
Senator KENNEDY. And so you went and spoke to Cushman?
Mr. COLBY. I phoned Cushman and asked him to call Ehrlichman
and tell him the circumstances of that meeting.
Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell us now what the conversation was
that you had with Mr. Cushman?
Mr. COLBY. I just said that in that December 15 meeting, I had
told Mr. Ehrlichman that our information was that he had originated
the phone call, and that he didn't remember it, and that we had
said that that would be a matter best worked out between the two
of them, and that we had suggested that he and Cushman get
together.
Senator KENNEDY. This is 2 days after you had had a conversa-
tion with Mr. Cushman when you had reaffirmed that Ehrlichman
had actually made the phone call?
Mr. COLBY. Remember, I am still working on General Cushman's
recollection, even though we had a record of General Cushman's rec-
ollection, it was still General Cushman's recollection. And so there-
fore the question as to who was on the two ends of that phone was
something that could only be solved by General Cushman and Mr.
Ehrlichman.
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Senator KENNEDY. But he had had some conversation with you on
the 13th which had satisfied ?you that' Ehrlichman had been the one
that had made the calls, had he not ?
You had had the convorsadtien with Cushman on the 15th-.-.-
Mr. COLEY. No, I don't think so.
Senator KBxrrnuY. You had a meeting with Cashman before you
went to the White House after the, preparation of the memoranda,
did you not? i
Senator Htvaxm. When we get to an appropriate breaking place,
we have another'vote.
Senator KENNEDY. You had a meeting with General Cushman
on December 13 to discuss the White House contacts with, Hunt. Sil-
bert had asked the questions on the 27th, and-the reply had been
prepared of December 13. As I :understand, Mr. Helms directed Colby
to meet with Cushman to discuss Cushman's involvement with Ho-
ward Hunt. And Mr. Colby and Mr. Oashman confirmed Ehrlich-
man as the White House official who'coantaated Hunt, he told Cush-
man that the CIA was trying to keep Cushman out of it, but the FBI
was being compelled to respond to Silbert; So as I understood it you
had had this converation on the 18th where at leant in conversation
you had been satisfied that it was Ehrlichman that made the call.
Then you went to the White :House
Mr. COLBY. I essentially, told General Cushman that it was our in-
formation that it was Ehrlichman.
Senator KENNEDY. From where?
Mr. CoLBY. I don't think I showed General Cushman a transcript
until later.
Senator KENNEDY. But you had independent knowledge that it was
Ehrlichman-----
Mr. COLBY. The only knowledge that I had was the transcript.
Senator KYi snr: But you 'had. independent knowledge that it
was Ehrlichman--just the ;transcript
Mr. C LBY. That ie the, transcript, that was the only basis of our
knowledge at that time.
Since, that time we had the journal item.
Senator KBxxwr. But the transcript. led you to believe that it" vvas
Ehrlichman?
Mr. C LBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And then Cushman reaffirmed that it was
Ehrlichman.
Of course, Cushman was right ultimately.
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. So you were satisfied.
Now, you go on to the White House, you have a conversation with
Ehrlichman, and he said he is fuzzed up about it. And you go back
and tell Cushman to give Ehrlichman a ring and try to work it out?
Mr. Cor.BY. But Ehrlichman does not seem to recall it, and suggests
that he get together with him and refresh his memory.
Senator KENNEDY. Which ho did?
Mr. CoLBY. Which he did, yes.
Senator KrxNEnr. And then in his memorandum, in spite of the
fact he had indicated to you earlier that it had been Ehrlichman, he
.a lntioned three names, did he not
Mr. CoLBY. Yes.
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Senator KENNEDY. He mentioned Colson's name, and Dean, and
E hrlichman ?
Mr. CoLBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And all the time Silbert's request for the infor-
mation is outstanding, is it not?
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. But still even when Mr. Helms said, "Ehrlich-
man has called and wants us over to the White House," did you ever
say to him, "Shouldn't we get this memorandum out to Mr. Silbert ?"
Mr. COLBY. He knew the situation with respect: to the memorandum,
and he was kept very closely advised as to that.
Senator KENNEDY. But since you were in charge of it, did you ever
feel, shouldn't we-did you tell Mr. Helms afterward. that Ehrlich-
man asked you. to talk to Cushman to bry
Mr. CoLBY. He was there at the meotang.
Senator KENNEDY. But he didn't hear your conversation with Mr.
Cushman.
Mr. CoLBY. No, he did not. But I reported it to. him when I got back.
Senator KENNEDY..Aud :did Mr. Cushman tell you of his conversa-
tion with 'Mr. Ehrliohman ?
Mr. Cor:BY. He said that he had talked,to him And that he had asked
him to write a memorandum. So he did..
Senator KENNEDY. And what did he say?
Mr. CoLBY. It is a problem
Senator KENNEDY. Isn't the point of the problem whether Ehrlich-
man made the call or not? And didn't you change, that
Mr. COLEY. That was a matter between Cushman and Ehrlichman.
Senator KENNEDY. You were in charge of the CIA involvement in
the Watergate investigation.
'Mr. CoLBY. The question at that point was really a matter of whether
Ehrlichman or someone else had originated the authorization for
CIA's involvement. .
Senator KENNEDY. It was ,pretty important, was it not? Does the
CIA usually treat facts of this importance this casually?
Mr. CoLBY. But this was General Cushman deciding where he got
his authority for taking the action he did, and the matter of whether
he got it from Mr. Ehrlichman or someone else had best be worked out
by General Cushman, so that he could tell us what his final decision on
that was.
Senator KENNEDY. Even if you believed as the person in charge of
the overall investigation that of your own knowledge and understand-
ing, and of your previous conversation, that Ehrlichman was the man,
you weren't either distressed or upset or concerned, or where you,
and how much, so that Cushman would mention two other people?
Mr. COLBY. I was frankly quite startled at Mr. Ehrlichman's obvious
perplexity, and I thought that there might be some legitimate con-
fusion here between General Cushman and Mr. Ehrlichman, and that
that was a problem that could best be worked out between them, be-
cause the clear indication was that Mr. Ehrlichman just did not
recall the thing, and it seemed to conflict with where he was that
particular week.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you think that particular question was of
importance, sufficient importance that Silbert ought to know about it,
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or be made aware of it, who was charged with the investigation of it?
I mean, this is not an insignificant fact
Mr. COLBY. At this point it was not.
Senator KENNEDY. But who'set up the whole Hunt operation? And
when every American is reading the newspapers, it is not an insignifi-
cant and unimportant fact, is it?
Mr. COLBY. That is not an unimportant fact. It. was not all that im-
portant, who made the phone call from the White House to General
Cushman about this one little assistance for Mr. Hunt.
Senator Huon s.~ The committee will recess until we have the vote
and get back.
[Recess.]
Senator SYMTNGroN [presiding]. The hearing will 'come to order.
I have some more questions, but I yield to Senator Kennedy.
Senator KENNEDY. Just to brh'tg`us back, Mr. Colby-I>'m sorry we
are all being interrupted- here Mr. COLBY. I might be able to clarify one thing, Senator
SenatorKEw1Eny. Fine.
Mr COLBY. I: refreshed my memory on that December-13 meeting
with General Cushman. I must have been asked: to ice- to see Mi.
Ehrlichman prior to that time,, and decided to go to see General Cush-
man to make sure that my facts were accurate before I repoirted -then
to Mr. Ehrlichman. '.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you remember what the circumstances- were
for your request to!go to see Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. COLEY. I do riot remember that, Mr. Chairman.
I think' I was 'use `asked : by 'Mr. "Helms to go down and see Mr.
Ehrlichman. And I think it ca1ne as I said' earlier, from'a repetition of
the fact that I had mentioned the name to Mr. Silbert."
Senator KENNEDY.. Y-ou had your memorandum completed on De-
cember 13, and 'then' at some'' time,' your memory is not clear when, you
were requested to go down and see Mr. Ehrlichman in the White
House. Aiid that appointment was set for the 15th.,:
Mr. COLBY. Prior to that time I went to see General Cushman. When
I went to see Geheral Cushman I said that I had, used, his, reference to
the phone call' to state that 'Mr. Ehrlichmaan'had called him. I had
come to.seewhat his memory was.
He said, well, I knbw I got a phone call from downtown,' and it was
either Ehrlichman or Colson or Dean. He said that on the, 13th to
me.
At t$at point I'slibwed'hini the transcript.
He then said, "Y6,1ILgu6A it was Ehrlichman."
When 'I' then went'to 'sere' Mr: Ehrlichman; Mr. Ehrllchman had
indicated that he'did hot recall the phone-call.In fact I thought there
may 'have'b6bn some eofifi!ession because his aehedule :indicated' that
he, was' out of `.town: I then said;- 'well, I really don't know,j the best
way is for the two en;ds iE =the phone, call to 'wdrk this out 'together.
He t. asked me ' to 'ask' General Cushman , to I get in-touch with him.
And- I did.
Senator' KEN1c1thY. You did not, as ' T asked yon before, feel that
he ought.to make the contact himself, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr.
Cushman:?
Mr.- COLBY.' I ,did not feel that was' importbnt.
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Senator KENNEDY. You felt that you could ask it.
The conversation took place between Cushman and Ehrlichman?
Mr. COLBY. It must have, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And the memorandum was prepared which
was later supplied to Mr. Ehrlichman ?
Mr. COLBY. By General Cushman, yes, a letter to Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator KENNEDY. The request of Mr. Silbert is still outstanding,
is it not ?
Mr. COLBY. The request of Mr. Silbert, we took down that request
and then went to see Mr. Ehrlichman and Dean on the 15th.
We said that these papers had been prepared for it. We said, we
really have to send these. Mr. Dean asked if we could hold them a
day or so, so that he could see sort of what was going on.
Senator KENNEDY. Where did Dean come into this?
Mr. COLBY. He was in the meeting, four people in the meeting,
being Mr. Ehrlichman, Helms and myself.
Senator KENNEDY. Didn't that surprise you than Dean was in the
-
meeting?
Mr. COLBY. He was counsel to the President.
Senator KENNEDY. And what was Dean's participation in the
meeting?
Mr. COLBY. Basically, just to listen.
Senator KENNEDY. In other words, you :talked at that meeting to
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Dean?
Mr. COLBY. No, not to Mr. Haldeman.
Senator KENNEDY. 'I mean to Mr.. Ehrlichman and to Mr. Dean
on matters other than just the reference of Mr. Ehrlichman being
mentioned in the November 27 meeting with Mr. Silbert, you talked
about other matters?
Mr. COLBY. We gave him the full story of how his name had. come
up, and the places in which-we had given it to the FBI and to the
Attorney General, and to Mr. Silbert.
Senator KENNEDY. And did you bring down your memorandum
that had been prepared for Mr. Silbert who was .conducting the
Watergate investigation and leave that in the White House? -
Mr. COLBY. We did not leave it, we showed it to him, and we
took it back
Senator KENNEDY. You showed it to whom?
Mr. COLBY. To Mr. Dean, as I remember. And lie read through it.
Senator KENNEDY. At this meeting?
Mr. COLBY. At that meeting, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Why did he want to see it?
Mr. COLBY. He didn't ask to see it particularly. We had it, and this
was the status of our reporting of CIA's involvement in this, activity.
And we showed him this material that we were going to send t4 l r.
Silbert.
Senator KENNEDY. This is against a background where Mr. Ehrlich-
man had tried to get Mr. Helms and General Walters to participate in
the coverup ?
Were you ever aware of the request that Mr. Ehrlichman had made
to the CIA?
Mr. COLBY. I was, yes, General Walters had told me about it.
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Senator KENNEDY. So you were aware that Mr. Ehrlichman had at
least attempted to compromise the integrity of the agency, were you
not $
Mr. CoLBY. We were aware that Mr. Dean particularly had indicated
that they did not want the FBI investigation to run across any CIA
activity..
Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield at that point f
Mr. Colby, what was your position at that time?
Mr. Cony. Eai2cutive Director of the'Aigency.
Senator $- nfitxcrrox. Aud the dOentrai Intelligence Agency reports
directly to the National Seiothrity Onune 1, does it not $
1
Mr: CotB r It does. , "i -
.
Senator SY #errox. Wheh hs ati advisory board:to the President?_ Mr. CoLBY. It- iu. , r
oiiatoi i Irr+s~cdrro : Atid'tlau; Presidents is; the.Ohaitman of t1 i Ra-
tional Security Qouncil $
Senator SYMINOTON. Therefore, in effect the CIA reports directly, to
the President, is that coire t $ 1 - , ? _, i .. j/
Senator SYMINGTON. Now, when you went to the White Housej did
you go there oyour own, or were'yoti requeateu tIO,O0niB 1
,QLBY By Mr. Elirlichtnan itb:Mr,. Helmsy,i belfe ---v (
Mr (
.
Se~hator Si~k~trta~+yx:'Arlii 11fir. EHrla ihmacu's posititur as what $
Cbt Y I' knt nbtj~/sure of the title, it ii3.Assistant,to the. President.
"Senator S Td Biit? he Was; :supposed to bb very close to the
President, was he not?
SetiatCit' 4 niti1 1'or iahtorn your boss,!the Director of-the CIA,
was worinng, is tnat correct v
Mr it r: yes. '
Senator Sy*im lot. And at' that time, what was -Mr. Dean's
position $
Mr. CoLBY. He was Counsel to the President.
Senator SYMINOTON. Were you in charge of the CIA response to any
questions regarding Watergate, or merely ea'rrying out: orders ,and
coordinating the various respoike5 g
Mr. COLBY. I was coordinatingthe varietis responses tinder Mr.
Helms' direction.
Senator SYMINGTON.'Thiwk you.
S atot 'IQs atn. At T understated from yetir testimony -earlier,
yo}t indicated that the mgtrest trorhi M. 'EhT*0,httithh "to tome dorvn to
tlho Wh1t6 1tOu8e bu this date was ns' a result of the fact that Mr.
Ehrli~an's name had been named.to Mr. Silbert?
qtr. r.'Y'at iS sTtrtnise.
enatt~t u Sa o : That .s y Mi 3tirmise. l
Sr you, were noit g+4~rrg down} there-you did not at least assume that
yoga do'*ti t i+~ to'ta'Ik itt'c 1'Q"stiftal Secut(ty. Cttun-
cil matters.or CIA matters, did you a ; ,
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Mr. COLBY. It was possible there was CIA involvemeut in having
given some assistance to Mr. Hunt.
Senator KENNEDY. But you had a good idea, Mr. Colby, why you
were going down there, did you not, the fact that you had named Mr.
Ehrlichman just a few days before, and then he was, asking to have
a meeting down there, didn't he know why you didn't really assume
you were going down there other than on this matter?
Mr. COLBY. I was going down there to ascertain the precise fact as
to how CIA had given help to Mr. Hunt.
Senator KENNEDY. And you ha abeen aware previously, as I under-
stand, of Mr. Fhrlichman's a u Mr.' Dean's attempt to bring the CIA
into the whole Watergate affair, had you not?
Mr. COLBY. I had been aware that the suggestions had been made
that the FBI investigation might reveal CIA activities in Mexico, and
others in the agency had checked whether this would happen or not.
And we were satisfied, and had so informed the people who expressed
their concern, that there was no likelihood of any CIA involvement
becoming revealed.
SeriatQr KENNEDY. But you were aware of the attempt by the White
House, were you not, in their meeting with Walters and Helms to at-
tempt to speak to Mr. Gray and cool-off the investigation?
Mr. COLBY. Because of this danger of running into CIA operations,
which we then determined eould not happen, because there' weren't
any such CIA operations.
senator KENNEDY. And were you aware at any time that M. Dean
had been in touch with the CIA about trying to provide some bail
money for the Watergate defendants?
Mr. COLBY. I think General Walters had perhaps mentioned that
to me.
Senator Kr NEn-r So voter nu derstandin
Mr. CO BY. And the also mentioned his immediate rejection of that
idea.
Senator KENN :nv: And admirably so?
Mr. COLBY. And I had said, "Fine."
Senator SYMINGTON. We have a vote coming up, but you can con-
Senator KENNEDY. Maybe we will all go over.
FRecess.l
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Colby, we had reviewed the fact that you
visited the White House-we have to sort of catch up again, because
this is a factual situstimi=--that you had had a conversation with Mr.
Cushman at some time at the direction of Mr. Halms. And you agreed
that it was Mr. Ehrlichman, at least the initial testimony was of such
it description.
Then you went down to the White House, and Ehrliohman indicated
some concern that he was named at the Silbert meeting. And you went
back and talked to Mr. Cushman, and Mr. Cushman had a conversa-
tion with Mr. Ehrlichman, and then three names appeared. And you
reviewed with us after the last vote.
I believe that actually Colson's and. Dean's name had come up with
Mr. Cushman. Do you know whether your memorandum of that par-
ticular meeting reflects that, because T do not believe that it does?
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Mr. CoLBv. It may not. But I do recall it, frankly, myself rather
closely, because I went through the exercise of asking him before I
showed him the transcript.
Senator KENNEDY. But at least, as I understand it, your own memo-
randum indicates, refers to just the White House, and does not indicate
either the three named
Mr. CoLBT. No, it does not.
Senator KENx nr. Now, you had the meeting at the White House
with Mr. Ehrlichman, and you made available to Mr. Dean the mate-
rialsthat were to be submitted to Silbert,?is;that rights ;,,
Mr. CoLB-k. He casually looked at them,' not too carefully.
Senator KENNEDY. Tell us about that.
Mr. CoLBY. He just paged .throuug~h them and, looked at them. Then
he asked if we could hold- up on delivering them for a couples of days,
I think . . .
Senator KENNEDY. Did anybody else comply? ?,
Mr. CoLBY. I think, in order to try to resolve. the accuracy. of .this
use of Mr. Ehrlichman's name, I think that was the context o$. it;
quite frankly. In any case, within, I believe. 5 days thereafter, I: was
in touch with' Mr. Dean: telling him that Mr. ;Silbert ,needed h s;,am
swers, and that I recommended that we send the answers along.. And
he agreed to let me do so.
Senator: KnNxEDT., At the meting,, you showed the. material to Mr.
Dean, and then after the meeting you went out 'and asked- Cushman
to call Ehrlichman $
Mr. COLEY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And a memorandum was,prepared that indicated
those three names, is that dorrect $
Mr. CoLBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. ' Acid . then Ehrlichman said: he was :dissatisfied
with that inenioranduna that: ndriied, three namess, is-that correct ?
Mr. CoLBY. That is what General Cushman told me, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And so then they prepared:another memorandum
that deleted those names, right?
Mr. CoLBY. Ri#ht.
Senator KENNEDY. And sent that over to the White House, that,was
the one that was provided to the White House ? ' . : i ? 1
Mr. CoLBY. Both were provided to the White House.
Senator KENNEDY. Both were,provided.to th,e White.House:
Those.were the, niemorandumstintended,for Mrt'Silbei't?
Mr: CoLay;. No. The papers' prepared for- Mr:~ Silbert finally we it'to
' Senator KENNEDY. I understaiid'tlnat.
The two memorandums presenledby General Cushman; each oftl m
went to thb White House. Ahd' thbse'Wem' not'sent;to Mr. Silbert. .
Senator Ki mmy. They wefe hot sent to Mr; Silbert $
Mr. coLiBT. They -were addressed! t6- i Mr:, EhIiLh hike bird sent to
Ehrlichman; it was a communicatiotnbetw!eeTi,G, era& Cushman and
Mi. Ehrlichman. And we had'a copy. , '; ,' , : . " ' +
Senator w+xEDr: ' Have you :made avail"! the memorandumss that
you haves aotaauUy provided tt> Silbert, to thy' com# nttee t
Mr. CoLBY. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. That has been provided?
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Mr. COLBY. It is in the record, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And does that name Mr. Ehrlichman as the
source of the conversation?
Mr. COLBY. The written memorandum does not name him, although
Mr. Silbert knew it. I am not sure that the questions Mr. Silbert re-
quested really asked that question.
Senator KENNEDY. He .asked you that on November 27, and you re-
sponded that it was Ehrlichman, is that right?
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And yet that is the memorandum that was ac-
tually provided by the CIA?
Mr. COLBY. These were additional questions asked by Mr. Silbert
during the course of that meeting, and in a followup meeting with one
of our other officers, he asked some additional questions based on the
material we gave him at the November 27 meeting;
Senator KENNEDY. Now, after this
Mr. COLBY. And we prepared the answers for those additional ques-
tions, and then sent those answers down to him on the 21st of December.
Senator KENNEDY. After the December 15 meeting, did Silbert' get
in touch with you?
Mr. COLBY. No, I do not believe I? had any further contact with Mn
Silbert.
Senator KENNEDY.. You called Dean after this, did you not?
Mr. COLBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And can you tell us about that conversation ?
Mr. COLBY. I said that our legal' counsel, who werie the channel that
was giving the material to Mr. Silbert, said that Mr. Silbert was ask-
ing for the material, and I thought that'we ought to go ahead and give
the material to Mr. Silbert.
And Mr. Dean said all right.
Senator KENNEDY: Did he not say, give a minimal part, or some-
thing of that description ?
Mr: Cor:BY. That is my record of what was given. And we sent down
the papers that we had prepared.
Senator SYMINOTON. We will recess for a vote. .
[Recess.]
Senator SYMINOTON. Senator Kennedy, will you proceed.,;
I am sorry about these. votes, but there is nothing tvecan do about it.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Colby, just so that we understand what the
situation is, you went down to the White House and. had the conversa-
tion with Mr. Ehrlichman, who indicated perplexity by the fact that
his name had been raised at a meeting with Silbert. And, Mr. Dean at-
tended that. You showed Mr. Dean the memorandum that was going
to be made available to Silbert, as.I understand it.
Do you remember why you. brought the memorandum that was going
to be made available to Silbert to the White House?
Mr. COLBY. Not particularly.
Senator KENNEDY. Was there any reason for doing,that ?
Mr. COLBY. Just to show them the present state of the play, I believe.
Senator KENNEDY. Did they ask-did you initiate the fact that you
had the memorandum prepared? Did they want to examine it? Mr. CO BY. In the course of explaining the conversation with Mr.
Silbert, we covered the fact that Mr. Silbert had asked a series of
additional questions, and that we had researched the answers to
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those questions, and we were providing these answers that T had
prepared at that time.
Senator KENNEDY. And did Mr. Ehrlichman examine, the doen-
ment as well ?
Mr. CoLBY. I cannot be sure. I really do not think so, but I am
not sure. I think only that Mr. Dean looked at it and he just paged
through it like this.
Senator KENNEDY. You are aware even at this meeting that took
place at the White House with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Dean that
Mr. Ehrl ehman had attempted through direct conversations with
Mr. Helms and Mr. Walters to try to get the CIA to effectively
dampen the FBI investigation of the Watergate affair vis-a-vis the
Mexican involvement, were you not?
Mr. CoLBY. As I interpreted it, they had raised the 'possibility
that the FBI investigation would interfere with'CIA operations.
We had determined that they would not, and, had so adtised them.
Senator KsxNnr'r. But it was a little bit more than that, was it
not?
You are familiar, I 'ate sure; with the, testimony of Mr. Helms
and others that, at least as I gather it, they felt that there was a
coktscious ef'foe on4hti paot~of? Mr. E?helikchman, tie try and get the
Agency to put a dampener on the investigation? You must have
been aware of thpaei wits; mere you net; by Mr. l hrliehri7arc?
Mr. Corer. I was aware of those, yes.
Senator -KKr amuv : Pritt ay+ i aft&r - the conversations ivhich took
puladei with'Mr: Hilmar w ti'ts'iWhite House 'tr4itli Elirliehman, 'Mr.
Dean called 'Mt. ? (' ishiiiaf : , *sp' I isrrderstand,- ' and ' he , hacl meson s
with him for,8 days l rvhiolf 'the ` k-erest 'vta'. ri+iader'thict" the CIA
provide bail money for the Watergate defend9tnts:
Are you familiar with those conversations! Mr. CoLuu. t eneraal' Walters irtfornned me~ of his verot discus-
sions with Mr. Dean.
Senator H-Vwx ;DY. What dud you think ,thee pnrposA of'the' Th n-
Walters conversations were?
Mr. CoLBY. I thought that Dean was asking whether we could
provide bail for these prisoners.
Senator KmxigR vr. Did you think that was proper $
Mr. Coa.Br. No. And General Walters merely informed me that he
had turned it `down. And I Agreed with him 1dl percent.
,Senator KENiaEnr. What' id this mean to`you about Mr. Dean?
Did this raise aril kind of flags with you thereafter, now that you
know that Dean had. niadethis 'unusual and highly irregular request
of, the Agency i
Mr. COLBY. I certainly, was %*are, that- he mi ht igake an improver
request. And if an improper request was mad, it would be turned
down.
He was, however, still counsel to the President:
Senator KENrtxnv. And how would yowcharacterse your' assessment
of Mr. `Ehrlicbmau's request' of Mr.felms and'Mr.` Walters, how'do
you characterise- that a Did ,yo thirilr that was' a proper request that
was made of Mr . -Helras,and Mr. Waltors to atteemp't to have the CIA
effectively dampening the 'RBI's ifiv7tstigatron' with CTA involvement
in Mexico?
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Mr. Coa.,ar. As I interpreted that at the time, a couple of names had
come up which had been suggested as possibly involved. with the. CIA.,
and also possibly involvedwii,r inavi pt;seed money to. Mr. Hunt aad
the others involved in that operation. When they had raised ,the pos-
sibilityof the, in os atmg elementsrcaitting intio CIA's..opeeation, it
was a pure question of fact. Were we-still involved in operations with
these people? And the answer was no.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Helms' responses were somewhat more
emphatic
Mr. COLBY. He was in direct relationship with the conversation.
,Senaater K&Nxto . d his tflrn.dewu, as I iiistand?his,admoni-
tion to Walters, sort ref r stif?eni ng his back, made !oim think that it. was
not just a routine type of request. ;And I mould ,certainly gather that
he felt that tdaere was an oflort really to inv?ive the integrity of the
Agency.
Now, maybe that,is my gown assessment -of tIm. Dut.I ;arm i3itevested
in what yours would be. Do you think it was proper, the ,kind of re-
gaest Fhrlichman was :making ?of .helms a;nd Walters ion that Friday
in June ?
Mr. Cos.eY. I don't think I had a judgnneft as to whetker it was a
knowing wrong ,request, or a scimewhat iaanaoceut confused request
about the facts.
And when we found the facts, we -acted on the basis of the facts,
and that was the end of it.
Senator KENNEDY. So at any time did YOU have a feeling that either
Ehrlichman or Dean were involved in the Watergate incident at all?
Mr. COLBY. They were certainly concerned about the way it was
being handled.
Senator KENNEDY. And how did you interpret that concern?
Mr. CoLBY. As concern about the possible implications and the pub-
lic understanding of what those actions had been about. And the
impact and responsibilities for those actions.
Senator KENNEDY. Is that really your answer on it, that they were
concerned about the possible impact and the public reaction to this?
Am I to assume, Mr. Colby, that the top figure in the CIA, with
these kinds of facts that. are presented to you, that this last answer
represents your best judgment, given the kind of facts and the involve-
ment of Ehrlichman, and the attempt really to question the whole
integrity of the CIA, when you have got a response like Helms' and
Walters',, who felt that these questions and Cushman who felt that
these requests were improper and irregular, you are here even in the
benefit of hindsight to say that you thought that this kind of invoiv-
ment was only dealing with public policy concerns or issues 1
Mr. C?LBY. Their requests were, it seemed to me, on the edge of
propriety, and the CIA responsibility was to hold itself very specifical-
ly to the facts and act within its proper authority, and the CIA did
that.
These officers were still in their positions in the White House, and
consequently they had to be dealt with as White House officials with
certain authority.
Senator KENNEDY. We found that even Mr. Gray, who was head of
the FBI, recognized at once Mr. Ehrlichman's name, and when he
recognized the involvement of Mr. Dean and Mr.Ehrlichman, he took
precautions.
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Mr. Coi aY. I think the key,onthis, Senator, is the resolution on our
side that we would not do aa. hing improper, and that we would deal
with the other authorities of tQovertnme.
Senator KENNEDY. ,And you- felt that when Mr. Ehrlichman made a
request of you to go back and talk to Cushman, and ask liim to delete
his name, you thoughthat that was--, Mr. COLBY. He did not ask me to delete his name, he asked me to ask
Gceneral;Cushman to phone,higi:
Senator KENNEDY. And you did, in spite of the fact that your
own
Mr Con e ? HO r asked, me 1 to phone, him ito, rreolvb the difference of
report as to who was.onthe other lend of tl phiene
: ; I merely called iGGeneral; Cushman? and;aaid; "Thera seems to be some
misunderstanding between you two. And 1 suggest you t wo 1 esol' e e it.'i
Senator KENNEDY. But there wasn't any misunderstanding,?accord-
ing to,your note,; ih Mr 'Cushman's -mind, that Mr.- Ehrlichnian' had
been,the one that had contacted him.
.. Mr. CoLBY. But you will recall that when first, asked'General Cush-40
man he used three names, when he replied to me orally. I then showed
him the transcript, so that -I thought it was possible'that there might be
some confusion, particularly as-l' did not know- the 'date of_ the phone
call, when Mr. Ehrlichman had said that during that particular week
he had been out of town, and there might have been a misunderstand-
ing, and there might not.
Senator KENNEDY. Your notes do not reflect that three names were
mentioned?
Mr. CoLBY. No, they do not.
Senator KENNEDY. And your notes reflect also that Mr. Cushman
refreshed his memory and recalled the incidents clearly.
Mr. COLBY. He refreshed his memory with the transcript which
I showed him after my initial question to him..
Senator KENNEDY. Shall we vote and come back?
Senator SYniNOTON. Yes.
[Recess.]
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you proceed, Senator Kennedy?
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Colby, this memorandum that was being
prepared-there are two memorandums that are being prepared, one in
response to the Silbert request, is that correct, and another memo-
randum that was being prepared to transcribe the occasion of the
White requests for Hunt-for cooperation with Mr. Hunt-that is
the Cushman-Ehrlichman conversation.
Mr. COLBY. There were literally hundreds of memoranda prepared,
Senator. We prepared a set of answers to Mr: Silbert's questions.
General Cushman prepared a note to Mr. Ehrlichman fr6m him
which describes the circumstances of the initiabion'of the help for Mr.
Hunt.
Senator KENNEDY. Let me tell you what is troubling me, Mr. Colby.
It would appear to me that you were aware that Mr. Ehrlichman had
made the contact with Mr. Cushman requesting the cooperation for
Mr. Hunt, and that you had had a conversation with" him that sup-
ported that idea in your own mind. And than YOU had the eonv'ei a-
tion with Mr. Ehrlichman. And dour' notes of that conversation' with
Mr.. Cushman reflect that at least when he refreshed his recollection
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he remembered clearly the incident. Now, you go down and you talk
to Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Ehrlichman, among other things, shows
perplexity, and requests you to have Cushman call back Mr. Ehrlich-
man about Mr. Ehrlichman's ,involvon nit? And., now Mr;.;Cusluww
does so, and he prepared the memorandum and indicates three different
names. And even you are satisfied in your own mind that Ehrlichman
was the man.
Now, Mr. Ehrlichman destroys that memorandum, and requests
another memorandum coming from Mr. Cushman which does not
indicate any names: And Mr. 'Cushman sends such a memorandum
over to Mr. Ehrlichman. Now, what in the world did.you -think Mr.
Ehrlichman wanted that memorandum for?
. :Didn't you realize that it was to be -a defense against any kind of
Mr. Ehrlichman's involvement With the CIA.?
Mr. COLBY. I heard about these memorandums from General Cush-
man. He used my secretary, who had been his,secretary, and he mere-
ly gave me a courtesy copy of the memorandums, the two memoran-
dums that he sent.
It was clear to me that there had been a difference between their
memories as to that event.
Senator SYMINOTON. Between whose memories?
Mr. COLBY. Between Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Cushman. They
had gotten together, and they were resolving the situation between
them.
Senator KENNEDY. But your recollection of your conversation
with Mr. Cushman
Mr. COLBY. Was that when first asked he gave three names, and
then when shown the transcript, he said Ehrlichman.
Senator KENNEDY. Your memorandum does not reflect that?
Mr. COLBY. That is right.
Senator KENNEDY. Your memorandum reflects that when his
memory was refreshed he remembered clearly?
Mr. COr.BY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. It does not mention the other two names?
Mr. COLBY. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And you understood from your own informa-
tion that it was Mr. Ehrlichman as well that was the contact?
Mr. COL BY. From the transcript I had, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. The transcript you had.
And now we know that even though you were satisfied in your own
mind from the transcript you had, and Mr. Cushman, when his
memory was refreshed, you knew it was Mr. Ehrlichman, we find
you going over talking with Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman requesting
that you get Cushman to call him, because there is a confusion about
the names, and now Cushman sends three names over in the memoran-
dum, and Ehrlichman indicates that is not satisfactory, he wants a
blank memorandum, and Cushman sends a blank memorandum and
a copy to you, and you are aware of it.
Now, maybe- it is just the benefit of hindsight, but quite clearly
the reason that Mr. Ehrlichman was doing that was to clear himself.
Mr. COLBY. In hindsight, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. In hindsight. But there was no kind of red
flag that went up to you at all about what did you think at that time 8
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Mr. Coi.BY. General Ctishtnan ? told me when he sent . the second
memorandum, that Mr. Ehrliohnian i ad pointed out that he, General
Cushman, could not sptati0 *kith mane, and so? he asked that tht
specifl names be left out Oho , roferenue . maIe < to an, authorized-
wha'tevcr tii pl> 'iiig wa Whits Hex official
And so did it. Andshe centme a copy of it.
Senator KENNEDY. And what was your reaction to it?
Mt. Cot.ar. My reaction Was that that was the way they had resoled
it.
TAM thought tit Mr. f4 rxiehman had learly made the phone 0,41.
Senator I NRt ,vvr. And hate.ya am as the me that has been selected
by Mr. Helms to coordinate all of the CIA information on this par-
ticular occasion, and ai+e awe now of the-yo i Rare awart of Mr.
Ehrlichman's attempt to. Mlle the VIA it the FBI investigt;ati *.
Yoti , *rb awa.re bf Mt,- t+n't :ftquof M. Waiters, and then you
are -ftry tintith aware of the details +o# Mr. Ehrlichman'e request to
elirnina. ehN tiaa a in the nvWh- neat.
Mr. COLBY. And the other two men.
Senator # rtN Ys "( as Mr.~thrtichinati,'whea:you went over there
and talked to him, worrying about the possibility of other names or
his name?
Mr. ()Or.SY. Ise tt s worrying about the fact that I. had used his
name, the other names had not b inentia ted.
Senator KENNEDY. And this did not seem-as the person that Mr.
Helms had asked to ccordin*ta ti ns a,nd -re4ll+q,be the person in the CIA,
you were not distressed or upset or felt that you hard better get ahold
and keep Mr. Sil aware of this t' of reriuest?
Mr. CoLBY. We had told Mr. Silbert that W thougght it was Mr.
Ehrlichman, and there was no ehan a in that.
Senator KENNEDY. But you had not supplied to Silbert the memoran-
dum yet, had you $
Mr. CoLBY. The memos andui did go down
Senator KENNEDY. But it had not gone down yet after the 15th, as a
matter of fact, it did not go down tail you csleared it with Dean to
send it down?
Mr. C r.st. That is right.
And the memorandum said that General Cttshmah called the appro-
priate individual in the White House, and that was the reference need.
Senator KENNEDY. You mean-' -*"--
Mr. Cor iff. And Mr. Silbert knew that that referred to Mr. Ehrlich-
man.
Senator KENNEF,t. That has been mwde available?
Mr. CN.Bs. This is the mamorundnm of Mr. ['deleted] knowledge of
CIA assistance.
Senator Krv EDY. And this was-~--
So'rrator :9nnNvcoat. Has that been snide availab* to this oon3-
mittee?
Mr. CoLBY. Yes.
Senator. KEi X1rD But this mtdimahdutn was not made available
to Silbert until afi you had mulled Dean,ia't thsit right?
Mr. CoLBY. No, it was held between embear "15 and 20, and
shortty after December 20, it wain sentTte wii Flo c3Ir.Bilbert.
Senator SY c' arm. Will you yield at this point, Senator ?
Senator Thurmond asked General Cushman :
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General'Cushman, with regard to the memorandum, when were you requested
to write this ,memorandum and were you able to recall all of the context and
what they. concerned?
General' CuaHMAN, I was caked to 'write the memorandum as I recall, on
about the 12th or 13th of December when Mr. Colby visited me. I was always
a'ele to ret lnnber the rather atief conversation itself but I had certain people
that I had,known over the years In .the White House and I was not able to
recollect whether at the time, it was Ehylichaian or. Haldeman who had called
me and rather than make a statement when I wasn't sure I simply said it was
not a stranger but a friend whose'iranie I could recollect at that time. It Was
true. Since then I have seen the statervcnt where I announced it was Ehrlichman
which settled it. for me.
Senator THURMOND. And you are confident it was Mr. Ehrlichman.
General CusaMAN. Yea, Sir.
Senator TnuRMONO. W#io mane the'reriuest`?
Was there:aaiy tither contaetthntywn remember besides Mr. Ehrlichman?
General CusHMAN. No, sir, only whey I called to say I thought this had gone
too far in terms of Mr. Hunt exceeding any kind of reasonable request that I
was going to'ttirn that off and, all right, he said I will restrain him, and that
ended It had Mr. Hunt never tame back.
Senator THUBMor o. You were requested to write this remorandum, weren't
you?
General CUSHMAN. Yes, SIT.
Senator'I'l1VRMONo. And Mr. Ehrlichman requested you to write it?
General CUSHMAN. It seemed to me I wrote it of my own accord at Mr. Colby's
request but I just don't know whether he was relaying Mr. E`' hrlichman's request
that the prosecutor be able to look at all available memoranda in the case or not.
I think it was destined for the prosecutor whom I have never met. I believe
his name is Silbert.
Is that. as you remember it 1
Mr. COLBY. The letter was addressed to Mr. Ehrlichman, and it is my
impression that Mr. Ehrlichman requested that General Cushman
write it to him. That is my impression from the talk with General
Cushman at about the time that the memorandum was written. Gen-
eral Cushman feeds that perhaps I suggested it be written down. It is
possible that I mentioned that to him I don't know-just as advice
to General Cushman, why don't you write down what you think.
Senator KENNEDY. But could it have come from Ehrlichman re-
questing that this be written down ?
Mr. ColsY. No. The context was that I should ask General Cushman
to call Mr, Ehrlichman. And I did not have any further contact with
Mr. Ehrlichman, so I did not have a way to pass any message from
Ehrlichman from then on.
Senator SYMINGTON. I see you testified on this, Mr. Colby :
Well, at the time that we tfirst started talking to the Justice Department, we
had some impression in the Agency that it was Mr. Ehrlichman who had called
and we had used that name with the prosecutor, Mr. Silbert, and with the At-
torney General. We didn't really have direct evidence of that and in mid-
December Mr. Helms and I were asked to go see Mr. l hriiehman and Mr. Dean,
and I recounted the material that had been forwarded to the Justice Department
or summarized it and mentioned that we had told them we thought the name was
Ehrlichman that had made the original call.
Mr. Ehrlichman said that he didn't recall that particular phone call, he just
didn't recall, and he seemed people ed about It, and I said that, well we didn't
have any really good evidence oh it, the only fellow on our side who would know
anything about it wound be General'Cushman, and Mr. Ehrliehman asked me to
get in touch with General Cushman so that they could refresh their memories
directly, anh thereafter I ?did get It tenth with General Cushman, showed him
what we had, told him about this, and I :dbn''t l hots what suggested that We
aetuhils? wt~ s~xuroram~rn;'
General CUSHMAN. I got that from Mr. Ehrlichman. H* oalled t>n the phone
and said the same thing you just said, that 'he didn't think lie made the call,
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that the 22d, I think it was. of July, Hunt same to call, that he, Bhrliehman,
had not been in town to be able to place a call. Well, this. upset my recollection
even more because, while I was fairly sure he called, he. said he was out of
town and I had not come across this other evidence to show when it was, and
since r announced it on July 8; therefore; it must have been on the 7th. I can
now state on or about July 7, 1971 that it was : Ehrlichnnan who called me, but
at the time that I was preparing this memoranda I .couldn't-swear to"it even
though I was quite sure in my own mind.
And it goes on. It seems that General, Cushman was not able to re-
collect, and then he finally did : recollect? ;
Senator. KENNEDY. Of course in that he had no reference to Colson
or Dean.
Do you know where those names, c?ai a ffprp1 Rene is- Mr. 'Cushman
who does not remember those names being:mentioned: in conversations
with you, nor do your notes refl ct them
Mr. Coui r I remember that whefi. T went to' see hiin, I wanted to
make sure that the memory was accur~ te, and so..I. did not slides'kiln
the transcript first but asked him if' be . remembered. who' had called
him.
Senator SYMiNOTON. Had you not already gven Ehrlichrpai's,name
to the prosecutor when all this happened
Mr. Corer. Yes.
Senator NuxN. I am confused on that point. You used ""he" three
times.
Mr. CoLBY. When I went to see General Cushman on December 13 I
took along the transcript that we had of General Cushman's talk with
Howard Hunt on July 22, 1971. In that transcript it says that Mr.
Hunt said, "Didn't Mr. Ehrlichman call you ?"
And General Cushman said yes, he did.
When I went to see General Cushman on December 13 1972, I first
asked General Cushman if he remembered who had made the phone
call to him sometime before Howard Hunt's visit to him on July 22.
And at that point he said, well, I think it was either Ehrlichman or
Dean or Colson or somebody like that.
Then I showed him the transcript, which had his statement yes, Mr.
Ehrlichman called me. And he said, well, that is right.
Senator KENNEDY. Then after this, in the memorandum that he did
for Ehrlichman, I think Cushman just indicated that the request may
have come from Ehrlichman, he changes it back again.
Mr. CoLBY. In the first memorandum he said one of the three, and
in the second memorandum he leaves the three names out.
Senator KENNEDY. So the development of this memorandum at least
according to Cushman, may have come at the request of Ehrlichman
for a memorandum on this, conversation $
Mr. CoLBY. It may have.
Senator KENNEDY. Cushman may have and your memory is not
Mr. COLBY. I do not remember particularly' recommending it, but I
might. have said, it might, be worth writing down.
Senator KENNEDY. Did it ever occur that with the changes from
Ehrlichman to these othernames, or just the White House, that this
might be serving the interest of the, possible defame of Ehrlich=an at
r ?
this:time,, about his involvement 9 >, :I , .
Mr. CoLBY. Obviously it was leaving the tlm?+a names out `as Alnct
from pinpointing the three names:
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Senator KENNEDY. Or his name; you were convinced that it was his
name?
Mr. COLBY. I was convinced that it was Mr. Ehrlichman.
Senator KENNEDY. You had a conversation, you called Mr. Dean on
the 20th, as I understand it, did you not?
Mr. CoLBY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And you indicated to him that. Silbert was
pressing?
Mr. CoLBY. Silbert had asked questions on November 27, and we
had prepared them in about a week or 2, and than held them since the
13th when they were prepared. We took them and showed them-to Mr.
Dean and said that we would be sending them shortly.
He- said, would you. hold them a couple of days until I do some
checking.
In 5 days it seemed to me that we were holding them unduly. long
with respect to Silbert. So I called Mr. Dean and said that we were
being pressed for the answers to these questions which we had promised,
and we would like to go ahead and give them:
Senator KENNEDY. What did Dean say?
Mr. COLBY. He said go ahead and release that amount, that minimal
,bit as is stated in the transcript of the telephone call.
Aenator KENNEDY. Why do you think he said give the minimal bit?
What was your reaction?
Mr. COLBY, My interpretation to that minimal bit was in the general
context of my approach to handling this problem for Mr. Helms, which
was that the CIA was not involved in the Watergate, and it was dan-
gerous to get too many stories at large, so let us answer any questions
that are asked very directly and very straightforwardly at the appro-
priate level: but let us not take the chance of confusing, creating mis-
understanding that somehow the Watergate was a CIA operation, as
it had been very generally alleged to be.
Senator KENNEDY. And this is even though you are aware of the
background of Dean of trying to bring-you must have realized that
Dean was not the person wo was interested in keeping the CIA
out?
Mr. CoLBY. That is correct, sure.
Senator KENNEDY. You understood this. And then he is talking
about the minimum bit, and you are suggesting here that he was
interested, as he turned around and changed, being now interested
in protecting the Agency? You are aware of what he tried to do with
the Agency before?
Mr. COLBY. No, but he realized that those responses to Mr. Silbert
were responses, but that, as was indicated, we did not use. Mr. Ehrlich-
man name in the response in the paper, but actually had given the
name Ehrlichman orally, and only the name Ehrlichman orally.
Senator KENNEDY. Could you review for us just a bit why you felt
that you had to use those words when you were meeting -with Mr.
Ehrlichman about dancing around his name, why did you feel that that
characterization was an appropriate characterization of your conduct
of the meeting with Silbert in the Justice Department?
Mr. CoLBY. Because when I had started in the conversation
Senator SYMINGTON. Let me get this straight.
Dancing around, who did you say that to?
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Mr. Cot. I said it in the mernors adum I wrote to myself of the
meeting with Mr. Ehrlic'hman and Mr. Dean.
Senator SYMINGToN. You wrote it for yourself ?
Mr. COLBY.
Senator SYMINGTON. It was a 9atemmranduuxi for the record?
Mr. COLBY. I probably used it in talking to Mt, Item and Mr.
Ehrlidwiian and Helms.
Senator SYMiNOTON. And how did it get to be a part of this-record?
Mir.CotaY;It^ovaaesnbmitt* tbyCIAto thet n# ittee.
SenarturXxrarsur.Mat, Iclarity i!t?
This :desi2tip~ti at was an a bake; ta me omudlu ii that vns made by
Mr. Colby, after ilia tneehia g with Mr r1i hrtan but it refemid !to
the eltauradteria tiaati; as I uhtle tend it, df' his beuduttt, or tie reluc-
tance to supply the name at the meeting with Mr. Silbert earlier. When
Mr. Silb* : ,hrud gbed the 'Ytame I think that yna indi aced -
Mr. Cotes: `li i Mt, Alb t* the n e, be got it. But
in mp4aijiing. the eiruum a w of ewmd Haatt&s a ce -ftern
CIA, we first started out s*,Viug that Hbwam Haute had t enie in and
gotten the assistance, that it kad beeA'Atrly aattherised.
Then I *id, duly anthGelmd by a of er agetteyi and t my authotited
by the White Home, when.a4ke what sg m y.'And *ho in 'the White
1I>cise ; Mr, Ehrhohauan.
Senator SYMINOTON. I know about this, I reinett be it.
Was there any aeffort tm yn r l#at+t to or r ttpp' anything with respect
to the activti~es of Ehrii,cch nor any 4lu+er s,ett'vities ?
You - were reporbin to athe President, and h hAtc'hhrnan was with the
President, and Silbert was the :prosecut t. And this is an internal
memorandum.
The more I think about it, the more I do not see anything wrong
in your not wanting to vol'anteer `information to the prosecutor so
long as you at that time did not knew that 'Chafe had been any dis-
honesty in the picture. Is that a fairstatement?
Mr. Comer. I think my 'position had always been one oftvirig
the full story to anyone who needed to know the full story, and in any
case always to answer any question truthfully. At the same time I
believed, and I think Mr. Helms felt this, that it would be very un-
fortunate'if too much noise were made about the peripheral details
of CIA's activities which in any possible way could be -connected with
the Watergate.
Senator SYitTiNGTO N. I think that was intelligent from the stand-
point of the good name of the CIA. But was there any effort on your
part to withhold anything that you thought was important in the
investigation.
Mr. COZir. Quite to the contrary I think we brought out things
that were sometimes not even asked fbr, but which we brought out and
showed to the top levels of the 1PE1 or to the prosecutor.
Senator S n smTox. Thank you.
Senator ICErrx?Emr. Now, just in terms of your own response to this,
and your own -description o ,your ,conduct, as I understand, when 'Sil-
bert focused in on the teferonce to the duly auth riled extra-agency
request, after Colby had-these are a I '"'danced around the room
several times for 10 minutes; and'~oy waa tlren pinned by Silbert's
demand for the name." And`yoti understand Mr. Silbert was the pros-
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ecutor then of the Watergate break-in, and that Mr. Helms had
asked you to coordinate at least to the extent possible any knowledge
or information, relevant information that had been developed by the
CIA.
Now, we are not talking now about making it generally available to
the FBI, we are talking about Mr. Silbert making this request.
Mr. COLBY. We had gathered this available information, and had
sent a copy of the material we had sent to the FBI to Assistant At-
torney General Peterson, who showed it to Mr. Silbert. And Mr. Sil-
bert focused on the phrase used in the 7th of July memorandum, which
says, a duly authorized extra-agency source, and asked what that was.
And I indicated that that was an agency which had the authority to
give direction to CIA, and then that, yes, it was the White House. And
then, well, who in the White House? And I gave the name Ehrlichman.
Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell me, Mr. Colby, when your name
was placed in nomination for this--did you ever talk to Mr. Ehrlich-
man about the nomination for the head of the CIA
Mr. ConBV. No.
Senator KENNEDY. Who did you talk'to?'
Mr. COLBY. General Haig called mes
Senator. KENxsjsv. Arid tyou neber had a conversation with Ehrlich.
man or Mr. Dean
Mr. COLBY. With Ehrlichman, the three I mentioned earlier, once
in Vietnam- -not about my nom nation.
Senator KENNED7r. Yee.
Mr. COLBY. Haig called Inc and said 'that the President had? decided
to name Mr. Sehleenger to 'lie Secretary of Defense and wanted me
to take over as Director of the CIA'.
Senator K$NNEDT. That was the' only communication that you: had
from the White House about the nomination?
Mr. COLBY. I went to a Cabinet meeting shortly thereafter when-the
President announced it and spoke to me -at that time. But General
Haig phoned me and told me this.
Senator KnxNffi/Y. And at ne time during any of the conversations
or discussions, either on November 16, or'otherwise, was this question
of the nomination brought up ?
Mr. ConnY: The November 16
Senator KENNEDY. The November 16 meeting 'with Ehrlichman, or
anyone other than Mr. Haig?
Mr. CoLBY. No,
Senator I?uxxEny. I wanted to get into some other questions on the
Phoenix, but the hour is late.
I will be glad to do whatever the chairman would like.. I could
probably put these down and get a response from you.
Senator SYMINGTON. What we want to do is either have Mr. Colby
confirmed by the Senate, or not, prior to the recess, because this agency
is now leaderless in effect.
That being true, what I would suggest, Senator, tihat any questions
you would like to have on any other aspects,. including Phoenix, or
Watergate, or anything else, if you could got them in writing, we
will ask Mr. Colby to reply as soon as possible. It was suggested we
vote today, and I said I did not think it was proper until you had
interrogated the witness.
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 II I
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Senator KENNEDY. I'have absolutely no intention or desire to hold
it up. I would like to have these dates. in sequence, I think it is ex-
tremely important, and it is d fllcult. generally for individuals or
Members of the Senate to tie everything together.
Senator SYMINGTON. Supposing we submit the name next week to
the Senate?
Mr. BR. SWELL. Then it goes on the Executive Calendar.
Senator SYMINGTON. And how long can it be held on the Executive
Calendar.?
Mr. B$AswELL. It is up to the leadership then as to when it is
motioned up:
Senator' SYMINOTON. I see.
Senator KENNEDY. So it is really, up to the leadership about when
to take it up. And what I:would like to do is, as early as possible I will
get these:questions-tonight I , : .
Mr. Cor:igz. I can sit here and, take them from ,you if you wish.
Senator NuNN. Mr. Chairman, I have got:a~ whole lot of questions,
but I have one or two that I think ought to be part of this particular
record relating to General Cushman. V
Senator SYMINGTON. All right,.
.
Because of my respect for Senator Kennedy and, my belief that every
Senator has the right to interrogate a witness, I went, out and asked
Senator Stenriis if it would be 41 right to have h$n appearin a ecutri.ve
session. And he agreed to that.. We have wai,ved,the,10-minute, rule,
and with minor exceptions, he has been the :oely. Senator to, question
the witness except whon,we were going to vote.
But I have, a time problem, with respeet to-the pprrocurement bill.
What I think we could do is, tomorrow, based on.the, factthat it. would
be up; to the, leadership, Senator Kennedy can s1ee. that Mr.. Colby gets
these questions on Phoenix, and,the answers can,be made a part of the
record.. ,
l)oe that suit you, Senator?.. .
Senator KENNEDY. Fine.
Senator ~SYMIN&rOx. And then we will vbte+ on, General Ryan,-tlie
committee will, and as I see it-now,.we can,discuss it in conzmitteei to-
morrow morning. And we will vote on Mr, Colby.,But then it will not
be taken up on the floor until say, Monday ;or. Tuagday, we will.ldave
that up totheleadership:
How does that sound to you?
Senator KENNEDY. I don't expect that there will be any desire to hold
it up. I would like to, get ~ responses and have. the record. complete on
it.
I personally 'find that whole Phoenix . program enormously dis-
tressing. And I think there have been a. great deal of misrepresenta-
tions as well asrepresentations on it. And I think it is. important that
we have a full record ,on this. And, I would '-have thought that we
would at least be a long ways down the road withithe number of ques-
tions that I was prepared to get into. I think that ought to be a part of
the record; Mr. Chairman. But I want to give von assurance; I have
absolutely no intention of requesting the, leadership for any time,
unreasonable time, or to attempt in any way to delay the nomunation.
But I would like to get the information on this. And I would like
to get some response. And I think there are a number of~my colleagues
who would want a full record on that point.
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Senator SYMINGTON. May I say, we already have had considerable
testimony in the committee on Phoenix. If you have additional ques-
tions that you would want to ask, of course, it is very logical and right
that you should get the answers to them. And they can be included
as part of the record. So what I would suggest to you is that at your
earliest convenience you get the questions to Mr. Colby, and then you
answer them, if you will, Mr. Colby, as soon as you can.
Mr. COLBY. I will answer them tomorrow.
Senator SYMINGTON. And then we will make the record. And next
week we can discuss when to take up the nomination.
Senator KENNEDY. OK.
Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Nunn, do you have some questions you
would like to ask now?
Senator NUNN. I just want to ask him two questions this afternoon,
and I can discuss with you later some of these others.
To clarify this, I sat through and heard General Walters' testimony
from his recollection of all the events concerning conversations with
Messrs. Ehrlichman and Haldeman and Dean, and so forth, and I
heard Mr. Helms' testimony. And I heard General Cushman's testi-
mony. And now I have heard your testimony. And I think the main
point we have been talking `about this afternoon has. been the Cush-
man me+.morandum and the conversations that you had with the At-
torney General. It seems to me that 'at the first point in time- that you
were asked the question you did respond to the Attorney General and
told them to the best of your knowledge your understanding of the
relationship between the phone call from Ehrlichman and General
Cushman. It is my understanding 'further that General Cushman
later on sent another memorandum that did not give the name, but
implied it was a White House source, or.words to that effect. And I
just want to ask you a couple of questions. Did you encourage Cushman
at any time to change his mind on who made the phone call?
Mr. COLBY. I was trying to help him remember accurately who made
the phone call by showing him the transcript. And I tried to indicate
to him what the thrust of the matter' was so that I could help him
to testify to that.
Senator NUNN. You actually showed him a memorandum which re-
freshed his recollection to the effect that it was Ehrlichman that made
the phone call?
Mr, CoLEY.'I did, Senator.
Senator NUNN. So' in effect you showed' him and refreshed his rec-
ollection at a' point in time when it had become hazy according to
him?
Mr. CoLBY. I believe so, yes-it was hazy when I went in first, his
memory was hazy when I walked in.,
Senator NUNN. So you never in any way prevented him from getting
this information to the Attorney General?
Mr. COLBY. No ; I did not.
Senator NUNN. And you never in any way encouraged him to have
a hazy memory or forget about the event?
Mr. COLBY. Quite the contrary.
Senator NUNN. But on the other hand, on did encourage him to
recollect by showing him that memorandum
Mr. COLBY. I did, Senator.
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Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I won't ask any more questions today.
And I can talk with the chairman afterwards about the matter.
Senator SYMINGTON. You can ask any questions. you want now.
Senator NUNN. If I start on the questions I have it would take
considerable time, and I would like to talk to the chairman about it
beforehand.
Senator SYMINOTON. All right.
Senator NUNN. I might work out something where I submit them
for the record.
Senator SYMINGTON. We. can work out right now any questions that
you would like answered.
Senator NtTxx. Is this going to be the last opportunity we have with
Mr. Colby before we vote?
Senator SYMINOTON. I would think .so. The members of the com-
mittee were anxious to vote today.
You see, we have had Mr. Colby's name before us for quite a while.
Senator -Nuxx. Well, I have no fuztherm quesbieus at this time. I
.Just wanted to ask those particular qubatioins relating bo tl%e:,sequ 6
that Senator Kennedy has been putsii '9- : , ; ,
Senator SYmixoro . I think we have gonenow td a poir>it Where we
will submit a lot, of questions fiorthe reeobd:.
Mr. Cotar. Mr. Chairman.: ,I alsa will reply, to the questions sub-
mitted by Senator Proxmire; I believe.:
If I may beg the chtirim h's indulg ce, one or two of the wit-
nesses against me the other day'suggested bhat.I be asked to show --what
I had clone :in terms of dooumeritationAo, improve th& Phoenix pro-
gram. I have a packages here rwlidch'hasa.nuamber od-Viet2iiamese..Gov-
6, rnment documents.
Senator SYMINOTON. ' You 'iearn 'submit- aa. !thing 'You wish' btcsed ; on
the testimony.
Mr. CoinY. It was 'documentation that ,1 had. some influence in
producing.
Senator `STMTNo roi4. Senates, N inn, will you submit any questions
yvat have to submit' for, the records and ' S1Bnabor . Kennedy; -will you
submit any questions you have to submit for the record, and bWe -try
to get the record together as soon, *& we tawny ,and let's have tha;nomi-
nation before the committee foraprort al.
Senator KENNEDY. May I ask for the record for some clou uts
One was the November 27 meeting with Silbeftl-As: I understand' it,
there ha sn't been any notice provrided tothatmeetiog.
Mr. COLBY. I believe there his,,, yea I think that has been sub-
mitted. There was a memo produced by Mr. Warner which was in
this.recard.
Senator KENNEDY. If you could
Mr. CoLBY. That has been submitted in volume III, that memo-
randum.
Senator KENNEDY. The meeting with Ehrlichihan on November .16,
I asked you that before:
Mr. COLBY. I will produce whatever I ca aim that. ,'
Senator KENNEDY. And do you have1e.Teeorel 4 your conversation
with Cushman at Ehrlichmati's-request after.tike itbetingat the White
House? Do you have that?
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Mr. CoLBY. I believe there is a record of that; yes. That is the one
you referred to.
Senator KENNEDY. Could we get those ?
I will give you the cMtions on those three, Mr. Woolsey. Could
those three be made available?
Senator SYMINGTON. Can we do that informally now? Whatever
you want done you can do.
Mr. Colby, there seems some confusion between the Phoenix program
Congressman Drinan described you as "in charge of
For example
,
the Phoenix program or CORDS." Will you distinguish between the
two and describe your role in eakh of them?
'I ask unanimous consent that the question and answer be put after
the question and answer of Senator Kennedy.
Will you distinguish between the two and describe your role in
each of them?
Mr.-( Or r. The underlying program was the pacification? program
of the =Government of Vieetnam, Mr. 6 Chairman. The advisory re-
sponsibility for that pacification program on the American side was
in the CORDS organization. CORDS provided assistance - .to a va-
riety of isubpro rrnans of the, pacification program to include local se-
curity, the self-defense force, local erections, local development, the
Chi eti Iloiprogram,'the re=fugee program; and a variety of others.
Phoenix was one of1those!.sub0ograms, and by no means the most
important. The most' important was , !to' my mind, the territorial se-
curity ` and peoples self-d Pease,' although' Phoenix was about equal
to that in terms of! importance.
Senator SYMINOTON. Now, we had the testimony from Congress-
man Drinan that the pacification program under your direction was
"making a mockery of the Constitution of South Vietnam." Would
you comment on that?
Mr. CoLSY..I think that is an erroneous statement, Mr. ,Chairman.
The pacification program under my direction advised the Govern-
ment of Vietnam to reactivate the -village governmental structure,
for example, which is called for in one of the articles of the Vietnam-
ese Constitution.
We also, in our advisory work, stressed the application of article
VII of the Constitution to the extent possible in the confused and
dangerous period in which the Government then was existing. So that
I think we were endeavoring to carry {out the Constitution.
Senator SYMrNOroN. M. Colby. The record shows that more than
20,000 South Vietnamese were killed in Phoenix during your tenure.
And a couple of our witnesses have deplored that large figure. Could
you let us know the nature of these people who were killed, and why
were they killed?
Mr. COLBY. The 20,000 figure was one which t reported in 1971, Mr.
Chairman. The figure is a part of the total members of the enemy
apparatus who were taken out of service by either rallying to the
(iovernment, by being captured, or being killed in the course of the
fight.
The vast majority of the people killed were killed in military
combat actions by military forces.
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A small portion of the total were killed by police and similar se-
curity forces in the course of resisting arrest and fighting.
There were also some abuses in which, people were wrongfully
killed, but I think this was a very small number.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
The .suggestion has been' made to us that you as head of CORDS
were "unable to, unwilling to, guarantee to South Vietnamese cit-
izens the basic provisions of duo process."
What are your comments with respect to that statement?
Mr. CoLBY. On that statement, Mr, Chairman, I-think I was en-
deavoring to support the Vietnamese citizens and government in the
preservation of the constitution and "its application against a threat
and action against it by enemy military, guerrilla and terrorist forces.
We endeavored to follow the constitution, and in fact -the various
programs- applied were efforts to apply the, constitution in the middle
of that fight.
Senator SrxrivoTox. Will you discuss your-meeting with the study
team of which Congressman brihan was & member? Ike has: said: that
you were-evasive, that you withheld information and sought to "brush
off" the group.
Mr. CoLBr. Mr. Chairman, that study team.. visited my house in
Saigon at my invitation. I gave' them. a briefing; We discussed, for
about 3 hours or so : one afternoon the situation : in Vietnam; And I
believed I was amply responsive,to their questions.
In the final report: of t;hat study team, Mr . " Chairman, page 12, it
says that "Ambassador Colby said that the numbers of prisoners shad
gone up and will continue to go up as the pacification program de-
Upon his return from South Vietnam, Congressman Drinan wrote
an article, in the Washington Post of June 21, 1969, which includes the
following phrase:
The American l'mbassy official most familiar with the problem of'political
prisoners admitted that the number of this type of prisoner Is increasing steadily.
This officer was indiscreet or honest enough to adsait,that the, increase in politi-
cal.prisoners will continue as the U.$. pacification -program gets. further out?into
the country.
I believe at that tiine,-Mr. Chairman, Congresuman,Drinan thought
I was either indiscreet or, honest, rather than evasive.
Senator SYMiNGTON. Thank you.
One of our witnesses, a Mr. Osborn, testified tliat under your direc-
tion, "inhuman practices; have not oply- continued but increased" in
Phoenix and CORDS.
What is your answer to that?
Mr. COLBY. As I -indicated-- in the record,. Mr._ Chairman, the De-
fense Department investigated the specific allegations of:Nr, ,Osborn,
and were -unable- to find any specillo in them,, [See p. 116.1
As to the general statement you. quoted; that,Mr. Osborn made,. it
is my belief. that the Phoenix program contributed to a decline in
inhuman or improper activities` in Vietnam, in,thae.?course.of the,fight
against the Vietcong.
Senator SYMINGTON. I would like. to ask we more question.
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We have just been notified that 81 American servicemen, mainly
Green Berets, have been killed on intelligence missions in Laos and
Cambodia since 1965, and charged up as casualties inside South Viet-
nam. Do you know about this?
Mr. CoLBY. Just what I read in the papers. I do know that the U.S.
Special Forces were running cross border operations in Laos and
Cambodia at various times in the past few years. But these were not
CIA operations, and CIA was not a part of those. [Deleted.]
Senator SYMrNGTON. 'One other question. The day before yesterday,
Tammy Arbuckle had a story about representatives fanning out, you
might say, of Phnom Penh into various parts of Cambodia. I asked
whether or not they were Central Intelligence agents, and was told
that they were.
Who gave instructions for these people to fan out around Cambodia,
inasmuch as we are supposed to be out of that country at this time?
Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, we were concerned about the poor quality
of our intelligence coverage in Cambodia, and the fact that it was
largely focused in Phnom`Penh itself.
As a result, the Washington Special Action Group of the National
Security Council directed some weeks ago that officers be sent out
into the country.
Senator SYMINGTON. What is the Special Action Group B
Mr. COLBY. This is a part of the National Security Council structure.
Senator SYMINoTow. And who chairs that?
Mr. CoLBY. Dr. Kissinger chairs that particular group.
Senator SYMINGTON. Were these people fanned out on his instruc-
tion s ?
Mr. Cor,BY. His authority, yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. Did he approve it?
Mr. CoLBY. Yes.
Senator SYMiNGTON. Who took it up with him?
Mr. COLBY. I believe there were several agencies that mentioned
the need for better intelligence in that area.
Senator SYMi e.TON. Is that the Committee of Forty?
Mr. CoLBY. No. This was not the Committee of Forty. That was an-
other unit. This was.a pure intelligence matter.
Senator SYMTNGTnN. And who chairs the Committee of Forty?
Mr. CoLBY. Dr. Kissinger. He is the Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security.
Senator SYMTNGTON. Ife needs quite a lot of furniture, doesn't he?
Mr. Corz There -are a number of committees, Mr. Chairman, that
really represent the same people under different names.
Senator SYMINGTON. Specifically, did you recommend to Dr. Kissin?
Pler. or did he recommend it to you, or who recommended it to whom,
to the best of your knowledge?
Mr. COLEY. I did not do the action myself that I remember, but I
believe the Agency expressed concern at the lack of coverage. And
we looked at the ways in which it might be done, and the best way
seemed to be the use of personnel to conduct intelligence operations to
improve the intelligence coverage in the countryside.
Senator SYactrrcrroN. Especially after the tragedy of the Laos situa-
tion, many of us feel that we should have gotten out of Cambodia a
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long time ago. My advice would be to get those people back, if you
are confirmed and run the Agency.
The man who runs the Agency now. is General Walters.
Mr. COLBY. General Walters is the Acting Director..
Senator;S nnNG,roN. And does he direct the Agency?
Mr. COLBY. He does. He : is responsible for it. And I defer to him.
We obviously work together on many things..
Senator Syiint-mTON. And he was the interpreter for President
Nixmf
Mr. Gax,uy.He has interpreted fora number of P.res c eats.
?SenatorSfMIr aTo}. Will you tell him. that, my advice is to get those
agants out of thaw various ontptais in Cambodia.
Mr. COLBY. I would be glad to pass that message to hiui,, IVIr. Chair-
min.. ... ~ .
Scmaftr. t iitaNMWm - I wish iyou ,would.
11Ir. C Y.:I5 Would say, that those are .only iitelligeaco operatigns.
Sell ,t*r. 8Yl[txv0*. , Tha#f i ,wailt, they, said in the ; :beginning in
Laos when I was there, that is whitthey tod nit i* t11e btgMining,.that
th -: intallii people. lAaidE tt~ie pattiatn. w gktite comparable,
ifzI TMW MWw; do!ndt sayit-ib.si niia*r, X_1 y its uike.0amperabla.
And I do not want to get into any dogfight about it.]Ky;.advice -would
be to cut it but..
Mrv Qo ...I think : eut! reedxdrov*r'; the , Baat se'ral years, 'Mr.
Chairman, has been to condiltt?ion, intelligence oporatioe. in Cam-
bodia. Mr. Hejmawas gnitnfta 'otx , 1
i a rrgs.1 Rea P1ttW4d qp aciglgti*e
and technological #utalttgenpe glttherusg, w ah b4s m a gent 59 t4bWou to
accurate knowledge of important foreign dev$Qpp}gpta. Overee$ .lAtelljgence
operations must only $e conducted in circumstances fully justify ng the risks
involved 4nd in situations which cannot becevt e b~yy more normal methods.
Analysis 'hut! made 8 substantial contributten to intelligence an is being Im-
proved and refn4~d to the greatest degree passible.
Question. Published reports also psve you a key policy rule , .decisp'on8 to.
involve the United States in clandestine operations in Laos in the late 1950s and
early 1960--operations which puns inte a secret, (111-r m war.
On reflection, do you believe that it was wise for the Agency to Set involved
in such military operations?
Answer. The Agency's activities In Laos were undertaken in direct response to
Presidential and National Security Connell direction in order to carry out U.S.
policy and at the sane time avoid the necessity for nnilarmed U.S. i vaiwensent
in Laos. These activities grew in sine over the years to amt gfreaber.North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao pressure. The size to 'which these operations grew Made
it difficult to maintain normal intelligence procedures. Despite the difficulties for
CIA, I submit that the- Agency fulfilled the charge given it efficiently and
effectively.
Question. Do you elieve that it is proper us4ler our ~a?p#ytu ,lt. f9; #,c4 *Wi-
tary operations to be conducted without the knowledge or approval of the
Congress?
Answer. The appropriate committees of the Congress and. a number of individ-
ual senators and congressmen were briefed on CIA's tietivities In Laos during the
period covered. In addition, CIA's programs were described to the Appropriations
Committees in our annual budget hearings.
Question. Where should the line he drgwn petween CIA anti Vefe lee Depart-
ment activities involving the use of arW4 forget
Answer. In general, the line should be drawn between CIA and the Det'enae
Department with reapet to armed force at the .point in which the United states
acknowledges involvement in such activities. As a practteal nulltter, however, the
scale of the activity will, in sunny cases, also affect whether t ie 'V* t4 States is
revealed as engaged in the activity.
Question. Where do you-and should we-dm o the Use between simply gather-
ing intelligence and manipulating events or interfering in the istwani affairs of
other countries? In particular, why sh old the CIA play any .vie I shier, of
the underdeveloped world which pose no aoneeisia$le threat to Ndf
Answer. As indicated above, the use of Intelligence techniques should be re-
served to cases of Importance in which no other means will ser lei. This same
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approach is even more stringently applied to any activity which could be con-
strued as interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, and such activities
are only conducted under the specific direction of the NationalSecurity Council.
With this approach, It would be unlikely that CIA would play a role of this nature
in any nation whose policies pose no conceivable threat to United States Interests.
[Questions submitted by Senator Proxmire. Answers supplied by Mr. Colby.]
Question. Given your previous testimony that it is up to Congress to decide
to release the intelligence community budget, please indicate the degree to
which tdis information can be prudently broken down. By Directorate? By
Ofce? By function?
Answer. This question is an excellent example of the problem raised by the
release of ii telligence budget figures. While I believe that disclosure of the
total figure of the intelligence community budget would not present a security
problem at this time, It is likely to stimulate requests for additional detail.
There is a danger to national security in the release or leakage of such detail ;
there is also a potential danger to national security in the revelation of trends
of different details of the budget over several years even though any one
year's figures would not present a major problem. For example, a substantial
decline or increase in the funds provided to any one Intelligence system would
be a clear indicator of a change of emphasis on that system, which could alert
possible targets of such a system. Thus, I rely upon Congress to make the
determination, but I cannot positively recommend the publication of the total
or any subdivision thereof. The information requested is of course fully avail-
able on a classified basis to the appropriate subcommittees of the Appropria-
for the CIA and other intelligence component cannot be r ased publicly?
Answer. The same considerations discuss above for the udget figures apply
to manpower figures. For example, the aloe tion of man er among programs
would immediately reveal a high degree of a phasic on particular collection
technique and could only alert other powers toeed to tect themselves against
that.
Qoe. tion. Have you provided the committee with en indication where the in-
telligence budget is hidden in the federal budget? If not, why not?
Answer. The location of the intelligence budget is fully known to the Chairman
and members of the Appropriations Subcommittee dealing with intelligence. To
the extent desired. it has been and could be made available to members of the
subcommittees of the Armed Services Comnrlttees on request. The appropriations
arrangements are in accordance with the wishes of the Appropriations Com-
mittees.
Question. What is the proportional allocation of the CIA budget by directorate?
Answer. By function, the 1974 CIA budget is allocated as follows: [deleted]
of the total budget is devoted to collection activities; [deleted] is devoted to
production activities; [deleted) is devoted to special operations; and [deleted]
is devoted to support, including the operation of the [deleted).
? The Agency's budget is allocated among its four directorates as follows : The
Directorate for [deleted] ; the Directorate for [deleted]; the Directorate for
[deleted] and [deleted); and the Directorate for [deleted] and [deleted]. The
remaining [deleted] is allocated to the DCI Area.
Question. How has this (proportion allocated to each function or directorate)
changed in the last ten yearA?
Answer. In functional terms, collected of intelligence Consumed [deleted] of
the CIA budget in 1964; today It is [deleted]. Production accounted for [deleted]
of the Agency's total in 1964; today it is [deleted]. Special operations used
[deleted] of the Agency's resources in 1964: today that percentage is [deleted].
Support in 1964 used [deleted] ; today it is [deleted].
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1S2
In organizational terms, the DCI Area [deleted] from [deleted] to [deleted]
of the. Agency's total during the period -1;964 to 1974; the [deleted] .Directorate
[deleted], fjom [deleted] to [deleted].; the [deleted] Directorate [.deleted] from
'[deleted]'to [deleted] during the same period; the [deleted] and [deleted] Direc-
torate [deleted] from [deleted] to [deleted]'; and the Directorate for [deleted]
and [deleted] has [deleted] from [deleted] in1964 to [deleted] today:
These figures are general because there have been a number of organizational
changes within the Agency over this Ii -year?period which affect the comparability
of these figures. especially with respect to the directorates. The above figures
are considered quite sensitive for the reasons outlined in tbe? answer to question 1,
i.e., the ability to deduce the major thrust of our Intelligence effort. For this
reason, these are held on a most restricted basis even within the Agency..
Question.. Who audits the CIA budget? With what frequency?
Answer.. The CIA budget is reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget
in detail prior to inclusion in the President's recommended overall budget to Con-
gress. With respect to auditing CIA expenditures, there is an audit staff within
CIA reporting to the Director through the Inspector General, which audits' all
Agency- accounts. In most cases this is? done on an asmuai basis although some
of the small accounts are audited on a. lees frequent basis. In some: situations
outside audit firms are used or the Defense Contract Audit Agency is used on
accounts where this Is appropriatae. In addition, is% an industrial-contract
audit staff to~ audit many of the Agency's contracts'-with industry. In certain
larger accounts a resident auditor conducts continuing audits.
Question. What economies have been instituted the last five years? At
what savings?
Answer. By far the most significant economies and savings that?have been in-
stituted in the past five years flow from the overall reductions in:-personnel
which have been carried out by the Agency. From'a 1967 total of [deleted] posi-
tions, the Agency has been reduced to a, 1974. budget level of [deleted]: positions
with still further reductions to, [deleted] as a result, of decisions, made after the
budget request was Rletermiaed, in December. The total reduction over the period
1967 to 1974 is [deleted] position or [deleted].
Our budget today would be [de ted] higher if these personnel reductions had
not been taken. Cumulative savin resulting, from these personnel reductions
total [deleted] over a period 1967 o 1974.
There have been n erous oth reductions and savings the Agency has ab-
sorbed significant cost bwLease!~Averseas and in the U.S. in recent' ;years. Since
1967, the Agency budget h uctuated between [deleted] and [deleted]. Our
pending.,Congressional resquest is [deleted]. During this same period, the per-
centage of our budget devoted to personal services has ir-ereased.from [neleteal
even while total personnel levels have been declining. This has meant a significant
reduction in funds available for other than personnel, and it indicates the extent
to which we have been forced' to reduce and consolidate our activities.
Question. Given the fact that many thousands of employees at CIA and other
intelligence agencies have been, shown, the National Security Council Intelligence
Directives as part of their indoctrination/familiarization process, why have not
these NSCIDs become a part of prior Congressional briefings?
Answer. National Security Council Directive, as are all sensitive intelligence
documents, are made available only toemployees with a 'need' to know." Many
employees are aware of NSCIDs and the general 'nature of them but do not see
them directly. While the NSCIDs are not Agency documents, I have been author-
ized to show them to the subcommittees on a classified basis.
Question. What authority does the National $eourity Council have to' interpr?el
and extend the National Security Act of 1047 withoai.t the approval of Congress?
Answer. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that the National Security
Council shall. issue directives pursuant to the Act.
Question. What is the CIA's official position on the bill S. 1935?
Answer. CIA's position on this bill will be madeavallable;to Congress upon ap-
propriate clearance by. the Office of Management and Budget for the President.
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Question. What reason does the National Security Council give for,:ytot making
public the secret "Charter" of the CIA, the NSCIDs?
Answer. I respectfully suggest that this matter be raised with the National
Security Council.
Question, Could you provide copies of National Security Action Memorandums
(NSAM) numbered 55, 56, and 57 to the Committee?
Answer.' Since these three documents are Presidential documents, I do not
Question. Is it accurate that NS AM 55, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, charged him with responsibility for all military type operations by the
intelligence community? Is this NSAM still in effect! How is it presently inter-
preted ?
Answer. Since the document is a Presidential document, I do not have the au-
thority to.release it,
Question. Is it accurate that NSAM 57 expressly set out guidelines foropera-
tions being restrained to a small size and only then with adequate deniabilityt Is
this NSAM still in effect? How is it presently interpreted?
Answer. Since the document is a Presidential document, I do _pot have the
authority to release it.
Question. What other NSAMs or other forms of direction from the executive
department detail or describe the operations of the CIA or other intelligence com-
ponents? Are these available to the Committee?
Answer. Operations of the CIA and other intelligence components are con-
ducted under the authority of the NSCIDs and a variety of other executive orders
and directives. I have been authorized to brief the Committee on the basic ones,
the NSCIDs, on a classified basis.
Question. At the present time, is the CIA or any other intelligence components
engaged in. training or assistance to any laic enforcement agencies or bodies
within the US aside from the FBI? Where and under what arrangements?
Answer. Yes. CIA disseminates its foreign intelligence reports to several agen-
cies concerned with the matters covered in these reports such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Armed Services, the Customs Service, the Secret Service and others on a routine
basis. With respect to training, we provide limited training to the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration personnel in inter-agency procedures, intelligence coordina-
tion practices in overseas missions, to the Secret Service in defensive driving
and explosives and demolition devices as related to the Secret Service protective
responsibilities against terrorist activities and to representatives of USIB mem-
bers in counter-audio surveillance measures. Any such training by CIA is under-
taken only upon formal request and detailed review and senior approval.
With respect to other intelligence components, I do not have precise informa-
tion immediately available but will determine that if the Committee so requests.
Question. At the present time, with how many foreign internal security or in-
telligence agency organizations does the CIA have contact? How many have rep-
resentatives here in the United States? How are these arrangements formalized?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. Has the CIA ever trained or assisted in the creation of foreign intel-
ligence agencies? When and Where! Under what authority? Is any such assist-
once presently being carried on?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. Moving to the question of domestic CIA operations, would you
please describe the full extent of CIA operations here in the US including
those that relate to overseas programs?
Answer. CIA's operations in the US can be summarized as follows:,
(a) Headquarters and administrative activities, to include procurement, re-
cruitment; security clearances, experimentation, training, etc.
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(b) lyol-testic collection, Amerlchn eitimens are interviewed on a knowing
voluntary basis for their knowledge of foteign intelligence which they will share
with their Government.
(c) Foreigners-operations are. conducted to collect foreign intelligence from
foreigners temporarily resident in the US.
(d) Mechanisms, eelationehips and, facilities are required within the US
to support foreign intelligence operations abroad.
(e) Analysis and research of foreign intelligence matters by CIA staff and
contractors, consultants and Institutions.
Question. Would you explain the role of the Domestic Contact Service?
Answet. Domestic collection-American citizens are interr^lewed on a know-
ing and voluntary basis for their knowledge of foreign intelligence which they
will share with their Government.
Question. Is it true that the 136mestte Contact Service now has been placed
under the organizational authority of the clandestine services? If so, why?
Answer. Yes, In order to improve the coordination of its collection activities
with those of the Agency abroad.
Question. Have covert programs or personnel ever been run out of or in co-
operation with DCS operations or ojftces? If so, under what conditions?
Answer. Covert programs are not run out of DCS offices but DCS contributes
from time to time to the identiitcatloti of operational ojYportunities.
Question. Would you please indicate the relationship between the CIA and the
following organizations: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Air America/
CAT, Joint Publicdtiolts Research Service, Interarmeo, Southern Air Trans-
port, Saturn Airlines.
Answer. FBIS Is the oldest element of CIA. It was established In 1941 and
became an element of CIA upon the organization of the Agency In 1947.
AirAmerielt (deleted.]
JP1ts [deleted.]
Interarmeo [deleted.]
Southern Air Transport [deleted.]
Saturn Airways Inc., none.
Question. Is it true that the CIA or other intelligence components have
secretly helped finanee certain political parties in India? In any other eoun-
triesf Pllease indicate the speciflo countries involved and the clrchmstances
surrounding each example.
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question, Has the CIA or the intelligence community ever been involved in
commodity manipulation on the world or domestic markets? Please explain.
Answer. tDeleted.]
Question. As Director of Central Intelligence, will you have full responsibility
for the budget of the entire intOE rtee Ebmmnnity" Cangak o?ntrol the defense
components aA 1707!
Answer. The DCI does not have full responsibility for the budget of the entire
intelligence community. His responsibility, stemming primarily from the Presi-
dential Directive of 5 November a97l4 is to recommend to the President through
the Office of Management and Budget the general level and composition of the
budget and the appropriate distribution of resources among the different pro-
grams. He does not "control" the defense intelligence community. Through a vari-
ety of mechanisms and authorities, however, he can exetelse leadership with
respect to it in the manner directed by the President.
Question. Do you report directly to the President? $ot frequently!
Answer. The Director of Central Intelligence does report directly to the Presi-
dent as frequently as fecltiired.
Question. Can the 40 Committee or its equivalent direct you to carry out pro-
grams without your consent?
Answer. No, the DCI can appeal to the President.
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Question. What is the present voting and nonvoting composition of the United
States Intelligence Board?
Answer. The United States Intelligence Board is an advisory Board to the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence and thus there is no formal voting procedure al-
though dissenting views will normally be reported.
The current membership is :-Chairman. Director of'Central Intelligence.
Members: CIA, represented by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Direc-
tor, NSA. AEC, represented by Assistant General Manager for Nattonai Security
Director, DIA. Treasury, represented by Special Assistant to the Secretary.
State, represented by the Director of Intelligence and Research. FBI, Assistant to
the Director.
Observers: Army-Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence. Navy-Director of
Intelligenoe. Air Force-Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence.
Question. What is the status of PFIAB?
Answer. The Board was established under Executive Order 11460 of 20 March
1969. It advises the President on various activities making up the overall na-
tional intelligence effort, and conducts continual reviews and assessments of
activities of the intelligence community. It reports to the President with recom-
mendations to achieve increased effectiyenesi in the foreign intelligence effort.
The Board is active and the member, Ip : George W. Anderson, Chairman,
Former Chief of Naval O err Ba er, Vice President, Research,
Bell TelepIione Laboratoes, Inc. Leon Cherne, u ve 1regtoj RPep
_ __.a,rc
Institute of America. John B. Connally, Former Governor of Texas. John S.
Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.
Robert W. Galvin, Chairman of Board, Motorola, Inc. Gordon Gray, Former
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Edwin H. Land,
President, Polaroid Corporation. Clare Booth Luce, Former Congresswoman from
Connecticut and Former Ambassador to Italy. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of
New Yeek. Dr. Edward 'a ellPr W +eat~n B. Byers, Executive Secretary.
Question. Where are CIA's t~17liabye uras~elcawes locttte7t3l7rs3tl Zlel - -
Answer. Logistics Facilities in U.S. (Deleted.] Logistics Faellttns Overseas.
[Deleted.]
Question. Could you provide the comtiitittee with a list of US companies
presently under contract to the CIA orather intelligence components?
Answer. CIA maintains l4tg..ofcompanies with which it has contracts. A
careful examination would be required toinsure that such a list is, con letely
accurate. With respect to other lntelligenoe components we do not have im-
mediate access to this information which Is handled by the Department of De-
fense and the Department of State.
Question. Does the CIA object to the practice of placing FBI personnel in
foreign embassies?
Answer. No.
Question. Is there an unwritten rule that any in-house Director must come from
the clandestine services? Is there any reason why a future Director could not
come from the DD/I?
Answer. No.
Question. What is the current CIA recruitment program?
Answer. The CIA Recruituwat Division consists of 22 Recruitment Officers.
Ten of these officers are located throughout the United States. Portland, Oreg.,
Los Angeles, Calif., Austin, Tex., Denver, Colo., St. Paul, Minn.. Chicago. Ill.,
Kansas City, Kans. (clerical), Pittsburgh, Pa. (clerical), New York Oily, N.Y.,
Boston, Ma:. (eleriual).
The remaining 12 officers con" -of two who direct and manage the Divisciou,
three who staff the Washington Recruitment Office to interview Walk.tn's and
Job inquiries in the Metropolitan area, and six who are speciallred recruiters
and are headquartered in Bosolyn, Virginia. Approximately 12 of the total of
22 are presently involved in recruitment of professionals.
The Agency's recruitment effort is year-round and nation-wide. Our Career
Trainee, Co-op, and Summer Intern programs are the primary avenues through
which our young officers enter the Agency. We employ [deleted] Career Trainees
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186
per year, [deleted] Summer Interns per year, and average [deleted] Co-op
employees in that particular program.
In adQition to the above, we employ, ,area. specialists, linguists, physical science,
engineering, and economics majors, These, are but a few, of the disciplines we
seek.
During the past,five years, our ; average number.of new professional. employees
has been .approximately [deleted],. per, year.. This, represents about a one to eight
ratio for all applications received and I*%lividuals Interviewed.
Our cierical recruitment is nuix-erically larger than our professional recruit-
ment. Six.ef the 22. Recruitment :Ofileers specialize in clerical recruitment and
the others devote ' as much of their time as possible to this effort. Our 5-year
average. employment, of clericals amounts to approximately [deleted. per year.
Question. Has the CIA recruitment program been adequate quantitatively and
qualitatively?
Answer.-.luring the past , five. years, the Agency has been reducing in size and
tightening 'Its, manpower belt each year. At the beginning of.fiscal year 1969,. we
had., slightly more than [deleted) emplopvees qn, duty. ?oday, we have slightly
The combination of our desire to ce manpower and a generally favorable
labor market has enabled us to ma nk a continuing supply of new officers for
m a ~ M ..m.....n
selective in our recruitment, and with the increase an technology, .we find qur.-
selves In competition with engineering, computer, and aerospace industries.
Although-,pressures to produce are greater and programs. Must constantly be
evaluated for. relevance and_ productivity, theadequacy of our. recruitment
_ -
____ -tell able t, ..
--
t
t
eet
os
Question. What is the attrition rite in CIA?
Answer. For the fiscal year just p,
Our professional attrition rate wa
www lA_.riRol.
edu o n in r c e . BgRuse [deleted] em oyees were so sep-
ara ed, ur overall and professional. attrition rates were higher than, normal.
Total separations for all reasons in FY 1978 were. [deleted]:
Question. Is there any reason why the excellent analytical skills bf the CIA
could not lie used more publiclyf
Answer. Where consideration of classification and propriety permits; we en-
courage our people to participate in professional meetings, publish in professional
journals, and turn out unclassified material.
Question, Would you object to DD/I personnel testifying before Congress on
a regular basis much like Department of State experts?
Answer. Because of the peculiar requirements of intelligence, such testimony
would have to be coordinated, but I can envisage many situations in which it r
Senator Smrixcrox. I am glad that Senator Kennedy came, brit it is
the responsibility of the committee, and therefore this is all still execu-
tive session.:
Senator KENNEDY. And may I express my warm appreciation to, the
chairman and the members of the committee for extending, me this
courtesy, and to..thank Mr. `Colby for responding to the que extending, and
n
.-.,
taking the time and being. as patient as- he, ;has .tee
'
[Whereupon, at 6:15 p.m.; the committee adjourned..
overall attrition rate was 14.0%.
and our clerical attrition rate
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AEC;. 15
Abuse of Authority (Phoenix Program) ...............?........ 34
Adams, Samual A.
Comments on testimony ................................... 175
Questions about testimony ............................... 156
Statement ............................................... 80-83
Termination............................................. 72-78
Testimony begins ..................................... 55 and 71
Agents see Intelligence Agents
Air America .......................................... 152, 154, 184
Allen, Lew, Jr., Maj. Gen . ................................. 14, 15
American business firms ............................. 25-27, 49, 185
American citizens ....................................... 25, 26, 37
American Civil Liberties Union .............................. 33, 37
American Friends Service Committee (in Vietnam) ........... 176, 177
An Tri Law ............................................. 103, 155
Appropriations Committee, Senate .................... 38, 39, 50, 52
Arbuckle, Tammy ............................................. 151
Armed Services Committee, Senate ............................ 37,
38, 40, 47, 50, 54
Armstrong, James, Bishop ................... 37
.................
Assassination (Vietnam) ..................................... 5,
6, 64, 98, 100, 101
Atomic Energy Commission see AEC
Attorney General ........................... 123, 124, 147, 162, 167
Barker, Bernard ............................................. 165
Bay of Pigs ................................................. 20, 41
Bissell, Richard M . ........................................ 84, 94
Board of National Estimates ................................. 78
Breckenridge, Scott ......................................... 61
Briefings (for Congress) .................................... 27, 179
Brookings Institute report .................................. 43
Budget, CIA ..................... 27,
............................
28, 35, 36, 38-40, 42, 179, 181-193
Budget, intelligence community............ 15-17,
..................
27, 38, 39, 179, 181, 184
Budget, military ............................................ 15, 43
Bunker, Ellsworth ........................................... 113
Burchett, Wilfred ........................................... 4
CIA Directcr ................................. 185
...............
CIA "hierarchy" ............................. 66, 72, 73, 76, 79, 80
CORDS ..3,
.....................................................
5, 32, 36, 67, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 106, 107, 109-111, 149,
150, 154, 155, 171, 173-176, 178
Cambodia ............. 4,
.......................................
60-63, 72-74, 76-79, 83, 151-154, 156-158, 174
Cambodian Government Army ................................... 61
Captured documents .......................................... 58, 69
Category A ..................................... 6, 7, 111, 174, 176
Category B ..................................... 6, 7, 111, 174, 178
Category C ......................................... 6, 7, 111, 178
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Chile .......................................... 18, 26,
34, 37,
42
Citizens Committee of Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes in
Southeast Asia .......................................... 113,
115
Civil
Liberties .............................................
37
Civil
see
Operations and Rural Development Support
CORDS
Classification see Security Classification
Colby, William E . .......................................... 61,
63-66, 68, 73, 79, 83, 84, 90, 91, 95-103,
105-110, 112, 115, 128, 141, 150, 163-166, 170, 171
Statement on Sakwa, Harrington and Osborn, K. ........ 116, 117
Testimony, 23 July 1973 begins .......................... 119
Colson, Charles W . ......................................... 123,
129, 130, 133, 164, 167
Committee for Action and Research on the Intelligence
Community ................................................. 112-117
Committee of Forty see Forty Committee
Commodity manipulation ...................................... 184
Communism, Vietnam ................................... 57, 58, 67-69
Con Son Island .............................................. 32, 36
Congress, relations with .................................... 2,
10, 16-18, 27, 38, 49, 50, 57, 58, 67, 179
Congressional inquiries .................................. 2, 27, 67
Congressional testimony ..................................... 2
Constitution, U.S . ................................... 24, 28, 180
Constitution, Vietnam ....................................... 149
Coordination, intelligence .................................. 69
Corporations see American business firms
Correction and Detention Centers (Vietnam) ................
177, 178
"Counterspy" ................................................
113
Coups,
Cambodia .............................................
4
Coups,
Chile ................................................
18
Coups,
Greece ...............................................
3, 4
Cover,
agent...... ......... ........................
68
Covert operations ...........................................
20
Critique of CIA (Sakwa) .....................................
85-90
Cuba ........................................................
168
Cushman, Robert E., Gen . ...................................
98,
123, 127-131, 133, 134, 138-142, 146-148,
159-161,
166,
167, 171
DDI ......................................................... 186
DIA ......................................................... 11, 15
DOD ................................................ 15, 28, 173, 174
Daquerre, Manuel Ogarrio .................................... 165
Davis, Robert Thurston ...................................... 165
Dean, John Wesley, III ...................................... 123,
129, 130-137, 140, 143, 144, 147, 163, 164, 166, 167, 171
Declassification authority .................................. 19
Declassification of documents ......................... 121, 168-170
Defense Department see DOD
Defense Intelligence Agency see DIA
Democratic National Committee ............................... 158
Deputy Director for Intelligence see DDI
Disseminated intelligence, declassification ............... 169, 170
Domestic collection.................................... 25, 26, 184
Domestic Contact Service ............. ............. 184
Domestic intelligence ....................................... 14,
21-27, 39, 63, 158-168, 171, 180, 183
Domestic operations ......................................... 22-28,
52, 120-148, 157-168, 171, 180, 183
Doolin, Dennis J . ........................................ 102, 108
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Drinan, Robert F., testimony begins ......................... 31
Drug Enforcement Administration ............................. 157
Dulles, Allen W . ........................................... 94
Dulles, John Foster ......................................... 105
Dungan, Ralph ............................................... 92, 94
Economic Research (office) .................................. 78
Eisenhower, Dwight David ............................. 105, 114, 115
Eisenhower, John S . ........................................ 164
Ellsberg, Daniel .............................. 21, 37, 55, 159, 160
Ellsberg trial .................................. 62, 75, 76, 78, 83
Erlichman, John D . ....................................... 120-145,
147, 148, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166-169, 171
Ernst, Maurice C . .......................................... 78
Ervin, Sam J., Jr . ......................................... 24
Estimates see Intelligence Estimates
Executive Branch, relations with ........................ 9, 10, 184
Executive calender .......................................... 146
Export controls, U.S . ...................................... 157
F-6 Program ................................ 110, 111, 114, 115, 156
FBI ................................................. 22-24,
39, 63, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 130-132, 136, 140,
144, 145, 157-162, 165, 166, 168, 171, 185
FBI-CIA Arrangement ......................................... 39
FBIS ........................................................ 184
Fabrication (Cambodian order of battle statistics) .......... 60-62,
72-74, 76, 77, 83
Federal Bureau of Investigation see FBI
Felt, Mark ................................................ 162, 163
Fielding, Lewis J., Dr. ..... .... .................. 159
Fingerprint system (Vietnam prisoners) .................. 59, 69, 70
Finished intelligence, declassification ..................... 169
Firfer, Alexander ........................................... 96
Fisher, [ ), Comdr., U.S.N . ............................ 171
Fitzgerald, Desmond ......................................... 84, 94
Foley, Charles .............................................. 4
Ford, Harold P . ............................................ 61, 72
Foreign Broadcast Information Service see FBIS
Foreign intelligence ..................................... 20, 23-26
Foreign liaison activities .................................. 183
Foreign Relations Committee, Senate ......................... 43
Forty Committee .......................................... 13,
14, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43,151, 184
Fritz, I I ................................................ 96
Funding ..............................................? 15-17,
27,34, 38, 39, 52
GVN see Vietnam, South
Government agencies, relations with ..................... 21, 22, 35
Government Operations Committee, House ................. 99, 171-174
Graham, Daniel 0., Maj. Gen . ................ 14, 15
...............
Gray, L. Patrick III ........................ 122, 127, 133, 159-163
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'Gray Area" .................................................
25
Greaney, John K . ...........................................
79
Grece ......................................................
e
3, 4
een, John see John K. Greaney
Gr
Green Berets ................................................
151
Greer, Kenneth E . ..........................................
61
Haig, Alexander M., Jr., Gen . ..............................
145
Haldeman, H. R . ................................ 131, 141, 147,
171
Hampton, Robert E . .........................................
164
Harrington, David S.
Question about testimony ................................
154
........................ ..
Testimony begins ..
95
Helms, Richard M . .. ... ........?.... ... ..?....?....?.
23,
25, 66, 74, 77, 120-123, 125, 126,
137,
140, 143-45, 152, 157-159, 161, 162, 164, 166, 167, 169,
171
Hilsman,
Roger ..............................................
91
Hoover,
J. Edgar ............................................
24
Houston,
Lawrence R . .......................................
163
Hughes,
Harold E . ..........................................
43
Hunt, E.
Howard .............................................
21,
27, 35, 39, 120, 122-124, 127, 128, 130, 133, 137, 138,
141,
171,
163-166
168
158-160
144
142
172
,
,
,
,
,
Huston, Charles Tom .........................................
24
I Corps
(CORDS) .....................................? 95, 97,
154
ID card system (Vietnam) ............................ 59, 69, 70, 82
ITT......... ................................... 24, 34, 37, 42
Indochina........ ................................ 56, 66, 156
"Inspection Guide" .......................................... 173
Inspector General
Investigation of Samuel A. Adams ........... 61, 73, 79, 83, 156
94
Inve
stigation of Paul Sakwa .............................
Intelligence
agents (Cambodia) ............................ 151,
152
Intelligence
agents (Vietnam) ...............................
58
Intelligence
Committee ................................ 8, 9, 14, 15
Intelligence Community ...................................... 8,
9, 15, 16, 26, 112, 113, 179, 185
Intelligence estimates ...................................... 11-13,
15, 16, 44, 68, 69
Intelligence operational traffic, declassification .......... 170
Intelligence products ....................................... 15, 16
Intelligence resources ...................................... 11
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee ................... 11
Intelligence sources and methods ...................... 25, 121, 169
Intelligence techniques ..................................... 180
Inter-Agency Committee on Intelligence ..................... 24
interarmco .................................................. 184
International Telephone Telegraph see ITT
JCS ........................................................ 15
184
JPRS ........................................................
Jackson, ( 1. Gen . ...................................... 110
Jacobson, George ............................................ 96
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Jacobson, Jake .............................................. 111
Japanese Detention Act ...................................... 48
Johnson, Lyndon B . ......................................... 32, 36
Joint Chiefs of Staff seep JCS
Joint Atomic Energy Committee ............................... 54, 65
Joint Committee on CIA ...................................... 53, 67
Joint Publications Research Service see JPRS
Jones, (Bill] .............................................. 93
Justice Department ........................................ X122-125,
141, 158, 159, 161-163, 166, 168, 171
Kennedy, Edward M . ......................................... 65, 66
Kennedy, John F . ..................................... 92, 114, 115
Kennedy letter .............................................. 17, 43
Khmer Communist Army ........................................ 60-62,
72, 78, 83, 156
King's men .................................................. 19
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B . ...................................... 94
Kissinger, Henry A . ............................... 9, 14, 40, 151
Komer Plan .................................................. 6
Landsdale, Edward Geary ..................................... 105
Laos ........................................................ 19-21,
28, 34, 38, 43, 46, 50, 51, 151, 153, 154, 157, 180
Law enforcement powers ...................................... 21
Liddy, G. Gordon ...................................... 27, 164, 165
Logistics facilities ........................................ 185
Lon Nol, Mar ................................................ 4
MACV ........................................................ 3,
7, 73, 77, 115, 117, 154, 155, 176, 178
MACV Directive # 525-36 ..................................... 175
Malaya ...................................................... 56
Mansfield, Michael J., Jr . ................................. 53
Marchetti decision .............................. ......... 164
Martin, Graham .............................................. 113
McCord, James W . .................................... 165, 166, 171
Memos for the record ........................................ 171
Mexican operation (Watergate) .............................. 136, 161
Meyer, Cord, Jr . ........................................... 91
Military budget ............................................. 15, 43
Military intelligence ...................... 12, 13, 28, 29, 44, 180
Military operations ............................ 19, 20, 28, 29, 180
Military "orders" ...................................... 65, 67, 77
Military Security Service ................................... 58
Mills, Robert ............................................... 96
Mitchell, John Newton ....................................... 24
Montague, [ 1, Col . ..................................... 96
Moorhead, William ......................................... 102, 108
Mullen Co . ................................................. 158
Murder of interpreter, Kenneth B. Osborn testimony .......... 101-117
Murfin, Gary D . ............................................ 175
Mustakos, Harry ............................................. 96, 154
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NSAMS ....................................................... 183
.............. ................ .......... ...
NSC.......... 8,
11, 14, 18, 19, 29, 35, 41, 43, 132, 151, 153, 180-182
NSCIDs................................................ 18, 182, 183
National Liberation Front Forces ............................ 105
National security ........................................... 12-14,
17-19, 24, 25
National Security Act (1947) ................................ 13,
19-22, 27, 36, 39, 42-44, 157, 182
National Security Advisory Memorandums sec NSAMs
National Security Council see NSC
National Security Council Intelligence Directives see NSCIDs
Nedzi, Lucien N . ........................................... 42, 43
Need for CIA ............................................ 10, 54, 63
Net Assessment Group......................................... 10
Neutralization (Phoenix Program) ............................ 99,
100, 107, 154, 173, 175, 178
Nickerson, Herman, Jr . ..................................... 98
Nissen, David R . ....................................... 62
Nixon, Richard M . .......................................... 152
Nixon doctrine .............................................. 174
Nguyen Van Thieu, Lt. Gen . ................................. 32,
33, 37, 38, 44, 45, 49, 57
OSS Group ................................................... 91
Olson, Robert K . .......................................... 96
Order of battle statistics, Cambodian ....................... 60-62,
72-74, 78, 83
Osborn, Howard J . ........................................ 158, 160
Osborn, Kenneth Barton, testimony begins .................... 101
Overclassification .......................................... 55
Overseas operations .................................. 20, 49
Oversight Committee ................................. 17, 52, 55, 67
PFIAB ....................................................... 78, 185
PRU ......................................................... 97, 106
Pacification ................................................ 5,
6, 32, 33, 37, 45, 96, 105, 149, 15G, 175
Pacification Phoenix ........................................ 113-115
Papadopolous, George ........................................ 3, 4
Papandreou, Andreas ......................................... 4
Paul, Rolland ............................................... 12
Pemberton, John ............................................. 33, 37
Pentagon Papers ........................................ . 44
Personnel, attrition ........................................ 186
Personnel, CIA statistics ................................... 181
Personnel, marginal .................................... ... 17
Personnel, recruitment ................................ ?25,?185, 186
Personnel, reductions ....................................... 16, 17
Petersen, Henry E . ......................... 127, 163, 164-166, 170
Phoenix Program .......................................... .. 5-8,
32-34, 36-38, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 56-59, 63, 65, 67-69,
79-82, 96-117, 120, 145-150, 155, 172-176, 178, 179
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Photography (for E. Howard Hunt) ............................ 159
Phung-Hoang ................................. 111-114, 156, 174, 175
Pincus, Walter .............................................. 12
Pindar, Barbara L . ......................................... 171
Police, South Vietnamese .......................... 58, 82, 155, 174
Police powers ............................................... 21
Police training ............................................. 27, 183
Political prisoners (Vietnam) .................... ..... .... 32,
36, 37, 44, 45, 59, 69, 70, 82
Pre-Colby (Phoneix) policy .................................. 41
Prepared questions from Sen. Hughes ......................... 179-181
Prepared questions from Sen. Kennedy ....................... 168-179
Prepared questions from Sen. Nunn ........................... 158-168
Prepared questions from Sen. Proxmire ....................... 181-186
Prepared questions from Sen. Symington ...................... 154-158
President's army ............................................ 19
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board see PFIAB
Prisoner accounting system (Vietnam) ................ 59, 69, 70, 82
Prisoner jurisdiction (CIA) (Vietnam) ....................... 67
Prisoner rehabilitation (Vietnam) ................ ..... 59
Prisoners ................................................... 32,
33, 36, 37, 44, 59, 67, 69, 70, 82, 100, 101, 177, 178
Prisons (Vietnam) ........................................... 32,
33, 36, 37, 44, 59, 67, 70, 82, 177, 178
Proctor, Edward W . ..................... ...........
73
Product review ..............................................
15
Provisional Reconnaissance United see PRU
Psychological profiles .............................. .....
21
Public image ................................................
17, 18
Public relations ............................... 17, 18, 63,
64, 122
RAND Corporation .................................. ......
159
Recruitment, CIA ...................................... 25,
185, 186
Regional and Popular Forces (Vietnam) ........
...............
176
Reid, Ogden R . .............................................
99
Reports
to Congress .........................................
27
Research
policy ........................................ 66,
72, 156
Ridgway,
Matthew B., Gen . ................... .........
114
Sakwa, Paul
Questions about testimony ...............................
156
Statement ...............................................
84-90
Testimony begins ........................................
84
Saturn Airways, Inc .
.......................................
184
Schlesinger, Arthur,
Jr . ...................................
92
Schlesinger, James R .
................ 14, 15, 27, 37, 66,
145, 180
Science and technology ......................................
28
Scientific intelligence .....................................
28, 180
Secret Service .............................................
157
Security
classification ........ .......... 55, 121, 164,
168-170
Security
clearances (for Congress) .................. 49, 50, 53, 67
Security
investigations ..................................... 25
Self-Defense Forces (Vietnam) ...............................
176
Sihanouk, Norodom...........................................
4, 157
Silbert, Earl J. III ..
....................................
123-129,
131-135, 138, 140, 141, 143-145, 148, 163-167, 170
Southern Air Transport ...................................... 184
Special Assistant, Vietnamese Affairs .........97
..............
State Department ............................. 32, 46, 120, 154, 172
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Statutory authority ......................................... 27
Students, foreign ........................................... 157
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information,
House ..................................................... 102
Summer interns .............................................. 186
Technical intelligence ...................................... 28, 180
Terrorists, foreign ......................................... 157
Testimony, congressional ............................ 2
Tet Offensive ..................................... 57, 75-77, 80-82
Thieu see Nguyen Van Thieu, Lt. Gen.
Thompson, Robert G. K . ..................................... 115
303 Committee ............................................... 13
"Tiger Cages" ............................................... 32, 36
Training (on VCI) ........................................... 58
USIB........................................................ 185
"Uncontrollable agent" ................................. 84, 90, 156
U.S. Agencies, relations with ............................... 21, 28
U.S. Attorney's Office ...................................... 171
U.S. Intelligence Board see USIB
U.S. Study Team on Religious and Political Freedom.......... 32
....................................
VCI ....................
97, 98, 105, 106, 154, 155, 172 .-175, 178, 179
Vietcong ...................................... ...... 6,
7, 41, 45, 56-59, 63, 67, 76,~77,*80-82, 97, 98,
100-102, 105, 178-180
Vietcong Infrastructure see VCI
Vietnam, South. 5-7,
31-38, 41, 45, 47, 48, 56-58, 66, 68-70, 75-77, 80-82, 95-101,
111, 113, 114, 120, 148, 150, 151, 154-156, 172, 175, 179
Vietnam Veterans Against the War ............................ 113
Vietnamese Communist Party ................................. 7
57, 58, 67-69, 76, 77, 80-82, 97, 98, 105, 106, 154, 155,
172-175, 178, 179
Vietnamese Constitution ..................................... 149
Vung Tau .................................................... 6
Walsh, Paul Vincent ......................................... 73
Walt, Lewis William, Gen . .................................. 98
41,
Walters, Vernon A., Maj. Gen . .................... 41,
131, 133, 136, 137, 147, 152, 160, 161
Warner, John S . ...................................... 148, 162-164
Warnke, Paul C. .................... ...................... 43
Washington Special Action Group of the National Security
Council .................................................. 151
Watergate ....................... 21, 24, 120-148, 158-168 170, 171
Watergate Committee ......................................... 24
White House ................................................. 122,
123, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133-135, 137, 140, 142,
144, 145, 154, 158, 159, 168, 171
White House pressure (Adams' termination) ................... 78
Whitehurst, Charles S . ..................................... 84
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