CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 12, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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/~' Tl~ >,
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CURRENT
I) ~oNF1pENilA
COPY N0. ~~
OCR NO- 0053/56
12 January 1956
DOCUMENT NO. _
f~0 CIiANGF IN CLASS--I
i ' GECLASSIFIEO
r ~~Y~, H ~ .~. EViEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956 - --
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
PART I
France?s continued adherence to its Western ties,
of the Atlantic alliance can provide a majority in favor of
FRENCH GOVERNMENT . . . . . Page 1
A minority Republican Front government, formed by the forces
of Mollet and Mendes-France but dependent'on Communist parlia-
mentary support on some domestic issues seems increasingly .likely
in France, In any case, the parties sympathetic to the goals
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATI?N . , Page 4
No significant military activity on any of the Arab-Israeli
borders has been reported over the past week: Israel is con-
centrating bn building up its military.rstrength, The situation
is such that war could occur through miscalculation by either
side. .Top Israeli:leaders apparently are opposed to preventive
action at this time and are continuing to seek a diplomatic
solution, but they do not appear prepared to make substantial
concessions.
N?TES AND COMMENTS
Ja an and USSR to Resume Negotiations in Landon:. The Japanese
government s expecte to to e a rm stand at the outset
when the negotiations with the USSR resume in London on
17 January. Should the talks reach a stalemate, however,
Tokyo is likely to seek a compromise rather than beak
off the negotiations, , Page 1 25X1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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~~ SECRET - -
CURRENT INTEi,,I.IGENCE YV'EEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
Peiping. Courts Asian and- African Nations: As part of its effort
to obtain w er internat ona recognition, the Peiping
government is making a number of commercial and cultural
approaches to Asian and African natd:ons. For the most Hart,
these are meeting with favorable xesponse. Page 2 25X1
Soviet Bloc Approaches in Africa: The Soviet bloc has followed
up its ac v ties~n`lt~e wear East by attempting to expand
its diplomatic and economic influence in Africa.. The USSR
has requested air base privileges in Libya and has offered
Liberia a friendship treaty and general economic assistance.
Most bloc states have recognized the Sudan, and the USSR and
Czechoslovakia have shown an interest in trade with Ethiopia.
. . . . . . Page S
Poland Makes Low Bid on He,jaz_Railway Survey: Poland has sub-
m~ttedTlow or a survey o t e Hejaz railway recon-
struction project. King Saud of Saudi Arabia, through whose
territory most of the line runs, has said Poland will not
get the contract, but he will intervene personally Qn1y as
a last resort. He may find such intervention embarrassing
and will probably expect a quid pro quo from the West.
. . . . Page 4
Tito Concludes Near East Visit: Tito's state visits to Egypt
an Et ?pia are part o the effort, begun a year ago, to
expand Yugoslavia's inf luence among the uncommitted states
of Asia and Africa and to strengthen its independent position
between East and West. The final communique signed in
Cairo emphasized the independence of Yugoslavia and Egypt
in economic and foreign affairs.. . Page 6 25X1
North Africa: Clashes between French and rebel forces in
eastern Algeria have taken at least 1:65 lives since 1 January.
In Morocco, Rif fighting has expanded into new areas.
French foreign minister Pinay has told the~Moroccan Nationalists
that it will be 15 February at the earliest before a new
overnment in Paris is in a position tc- begin talks with them.
? 6 0 O O . . . . O p Page 7
Pre-election Politics in Greece: Prime Minister Karamanlis expects
a ar g t n e ree elections on 19 February and is
reported to believe the USSR is lending substantial financial
support to his adversaries. Karamanlis' new party--the Na-
tional Radical Union--appears to be attracting most Greek
Rally adherents. . . Page 8
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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sECRE r
12 January 1956
Cyprus: Discussions on 9 January between British governor
arding and Cypriot archbishop Makarios on Britain's
Cyprus formula have ended incanclusivelyP Makarios,
however, "affirmed positively" his desire for a prompt
settlement and agreed to hold further meetings.
P ? P 4 P P P ? P P P P P Page 9
Postponement of Soviet Republic Party Congresses: Several of
t e oviet repub acs ev ent y ave postponed party con-
gresses sched~xled for late December and early January,,,
possibly because of policy differences or political maneu-
vering at-the top level in MasCOWP These congresses,
besides electing top party officials for the individual
republics, also are to elect delegates to the forthcoming
all-Union 20th Party Congress, scheduled to begin on 14
February, Delay of the republic congresses beyond late
?7anuary might involve postponement of the all-Union
congress ? P P ? . ? P P P Page 1C~
East German Armed Forces May Soon Be .normalized: Since last
September, t ere ave een n icatians t at early in 195:
the East German government would formalize its armed fo_~~ces
under a defense ministry and possibly institute conscription.
Reports from East .Germany indicate that final preparations
for a change in the status of East German military forces
may be under way. . . P P P P ? Page 11
Communist China Announces Principal Tasks for 1955: Peiping has
announce its pra.ncipa aims or 5 as t e fulfillment
of Five-Year Plan goals ahead of schedule and the acceleration
of the "transition to socialism," Page 1325X1
Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk has resolved the political crisis in
~lambodia by announcing that he will resume the premiership
after a short vacation abroad and that, in the interim,
the cabinet cif Oum Chhean sun will continue in a caretaker
capacity, P P P . P .. ? P . . . Page a.3
Surma: The Burmese government is planning to concentrate Soviet
economic and technical assistance on agricultural and irri-
gation projects4 Despite Soviet offers of assistance to
industry, no such help has been requested, and none is
contemplated unless current plans to procure equipment and
technical assistance from the West fail, The high honors
recently bestowed on Lord Louis Mountbatten and two other
~3ritish officials, immediately after the visit of Bulganin
and Khrushchev to Burma where they denounced British im-
perialism, appears timed i;o demonstrate that Burma main-
tains a friendly attitude toward the West, age 14 25X1
SECRF~'
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
25X1
Indonesia: The Indonesian cabinet is in ~, precarious position
as the result of opposition attacks on its handling of
problems in negotiations -with the Dutch, ~~~.::??;:cul:arly
the New Guinea issue. The negotiations,-which opened on
10 December, are now in recess; and in an effort to preserve
his cabinet, Prime Minister Harahap may agree to the demands
of two parties,?in his coalition not to resume the talks.
The government'~aces severe attacks in parliament,which
xecanvened on 11 January. .Pa~,e l~i 25X1
Discussions on Self-Government for Malaya and Singapore I~4alayan
c ie min stet a man w 1 egin to s wit. the British
on 18 January. The British government evidently has decided
to set in motion steps leading to self-government for Malaya
and Singapore, in the belief that only the prospect of
i,?adependence can kee these territories effectively allied
with the West. . . Page 1:~
Afghanistan: While discussing disposition of the X100,000,000
Quiet credit with Soviet officials in Kabul, the Af ghan
government
a lsas o
exc ange ar t e import via the USSR of trucks,
Arrangements are repa~~-Leclly being made for the USSR to
undertake oil dril~:ing at Shibarghan, in northern Afghan-
istan. Pakistaizi governor general b4irza has decided to
accept an invitation to visit afghan king 2a~~r Shah in
Kabul. . . . . . . Page lEi
released 1,000,000 in foreign
Chi?.e. The general strike called an 9 January by CUTCH, Chile's
largest labor confederation, in protest against the Ibanez
administration's bill to freeze wages and prices has been
an almost complete failure because of strong government
countermeasures and general public supporir of the government's
position. Labor unrest will continue,however, until the
administration's program to solve Chile's economic problems
shows results, Page. 18
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF`
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~' SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PIERRE POUJADE AND THE ANTITAX MOVEMENT, , . Page 1
The Poujade movement won 11.4 percent of the votes in the
2 January French election and 52 seats in the national assembly
largely because it secured much of the vote cast in protest....
.against the established order, A good part of this vote had
gone to the Gaullists in 1951 and traditionally makes up much
of the Communists' support. The movement will probably continue
its violent attacks on the government and parliament for the
time being, but its influence will be limited by the difficulty
of maintaining discipline anion its de utmes who include extreme
rightists and ex-Communists,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE US5R . , . Page 5
Faced with the strong religious sentiment of the Soviet
people, the Communist leaders in Moscow have reached an accom-
modation with church leaders, using them as instruments in
carrying out foreign and domestic policies when it suits their
convenience,- By thus publicizing the activities of the church.
and by promoting and aiding the church in times of crises in
return for support, the Soviet regime has undercut its own attempts
to eradicatereligious feelings among the masses. The church
hierarchy is completely controlled by secular bodies which function
under biV.D/KGB auspices, and most of the top layers of the hierarchy
and the majority of the lesser members are pressed into service
as police informers. 25X1
JAPAN'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY .
. . . . o . . . . . . o . Page 9
Japan's defense industry is geared to produce greater quern-
titles of small arms and ammunition than are required by the Jap-
anese defense forces, while it lackv Funds, equipment, and special-
ized experience to produce modern heavy weapons, For these reasons,
extensive government assistance will be required to bnild_up and
maintain a defens
i
d
e
n
ustry adequate for Japan's needs,
PART IV
SECRET'
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Tk~E WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1950
TRENCH GOVERNMENT
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
A minority Republican
Front government, formed by the
forces of Mullet and Mendes-
Fra.nce, dependent on Communist
parliamentary support on some
domestic issues seems increas-
ingly likely in France, There
a.re signs of eventual closer
co-operation between the still
bitterly divided center blocs.
In any case, the pa,rtie~s sym-
pathetic to the goals of the
Atlantic alliance can provide
a. majority in favor of France's
continued adherence to its
`Wes-tern ties.
Despite the necessity for
the two center blocs to co-
operate if a. moderate majority
government is to be formed,
Republican Front leaders have
so far rejected a.ll proposals
far a coalition with the Faure-
Pinay farces. They are banking
on the reluctance of the right-
center elements to widen the
divisions between the two cen-
ter blocs, a.nd on the eagerness
of the Communists to assume an
a.ir of respectability as a.
responsible "French" party. A
clear majority of those deputies
present a.nd voting is aal that
is constitutionally required
for the investiture of a new
cabinet.
The Communists are con-
tinuing a steady propaganda.
barrage for a popular front,
pointing au~t that they could
bring the Republican Front.
absolute control of the assem-
bly. Although they have been
consistently rebuffed on the
question of participation in
the new government, they would
almost certainly support a
government headed by a Socialist
or a Mender-France Radical. The
Communist domestic platform has
been adjusted to conform in
most respects to the anticipated
Republican Front program. The
party would probably avoid ob-
structionist tactics on the
Algerian issue a.nd domestic
questions in order to ma.inta.in
the fiction that a. popular
front indeed exists.
The Communists' prime ob-
jective will be to reorient
foreign policy, however, a.nd
the necessity for the non-Com-
munists to prevent disruption
of ..the Western alliance will
~be the possible means of bring-
ing the center blocs together.
Socialist leaders, remembering
that the party congress of o
December rejected co-operation
with the Communists by only a
55-percent majority,. a.re par-
ticularly sensitive to the
threat of local party pressure
far a popular front. Accord-
ingly, party secretary Guy Mul-
let is reported favorable to
an early rapprochement with
the Palpular Republicans, de-
spite his categorical rejection
of a. broad center coalition
now. Moreover, the pasty's
elder statesman, ex-president
Vincent Auriol, ha.s in a. recent.
press article hinted at his
own availability as premier of
a government embracing both
Center blocs.
The right-center parties,
for their part, are anxious to
co-operate with the Socialists.
Even the Independents are will-
ing to support a Socialist-
led gover.ntrient now a.s -insur-
ance against a popur~ar front.
The Popular Republicans are.
0~' IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 5
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SECRET'
I2 January 1956
particularly eager to reverse
their drift to the right by
working. out a close alliance.
.with. the Socialists.
Therefore, although the
bitterness of the recent elec-
t~aral campaign is still con-
sidered too strong to permit
an out-and-out coalition of the
center parties, eventual close
co-operation is not ruled out.
While extreme bargaining posi-
tions will probably be main-
tained at the various party
meetings to be held before the
assembly convenes on 19 January,
some hints of the initial align-
ments will Arobably be clearer
then.
SECRET
PART I O]E' IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pale 2 of 5
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`ECEET
12 January 1956
No significant military
activity on any of the Arab-
Israeli borders has been re-
ported over the .past week.
Following Israel's recent
parliamentary debate on foreign
policy and its "sober reap-
praisal" of the Tiberias raid,
Tel Aviv appears to be moving
more cautiously, but at the
same time building up its de-
fenses as rapidly as finances
and materiel permit. Israel
reportedly plans to increase
its petroleum stocks 250 per-
cent by 1 March and to divert
immigrant housing funds to
meet increased military ex-
penditures.
UN truce supervises Gener-
al Burns has said he believes
developments are leading to-
ward general hostilities be-
tween Israel and .~gypt. While
he considers Egyptian premier
Nasr "too smart" to launch a
war against Israel until Egypt
is prepared, probably in two
or three years, he fears that
certain of Nasr's subordinates
may not exercise the same
restraint. Burns believes
there is a good chance the
Israelis will precipitate-war
in the next several months.
Burns' views may reflect
increasing hopelessness in his
efforts to bring the Israelis
and Egyptians to some sort of
agreement. The American em-
bassy in Tel Aviv does not
believe Israeli leaders have
made any decision for preven-
tive action, and this opinion
was reinforced by a meeting
between Ben-Gurion, Sharett,
and Ambassador Lawson on 9
January. Ben-Gurion made a
strong plea for American "under-
standing" and for arms aid,
especially jet interceptor air-
craft. Lawson did not feel
that Ben-Gurion's appeal,
though emotional and strongly
worded, carried a threat that
Israel would take- action even
if it received no arms aid.
The Arab-Israeli situation
is sa tense that war could
occur through miscalculation
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST page. of a
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sEC~ET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
by either side. Top Israeli
leaders apparently are opposed
to preventive action at this
time and are continuing to
seek a diplomatic solution,
but they do not appear prepared,
to make substantial concessions.
Should they, for whatever rea-
son, authorize another major
"retaliatory" raid, N'asr would
be under strong pressure to
take counteraction, even though
he risked defeat for his countr
in doing So . 25X1
PART I' OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST pa!rp 5 ~.~ ~
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~ SE'Cd~ET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Ja.pa.n and USSR to Resume
ego cations in on on
The Japanese government
is expected initially to take
a firm stand when negotiations
with the USSR resume in London
on 17 January. Should .the
talks reach a, stalemate, how-
ever, Tokyo is likely to seek
a compromise rather than break
off the negotiations.
After the merger in No-
vember 1955 of Japan's two con-
servative parties~~, the govern-
ment adopted the former Liberal
Party's policy of firmness in
negotiating with the USSR. The,
merger, furthermore, provided
the government with strong
political support for this
position a.nd public opinion
also a,ppeairs to have crystal-
lized in its favor.
Prior to the suspension
of the Soviet-Japanese talks
last September, the Soviet
Union ha.d made concessions by
dropping its demand that Japan
not participate in military
alliances, by furnishing the
names of detainees, and by
agreeing to return Shikotan
a.nd the Halaomai Islands if
Japan agreed not to militarize
them. The major paints still
a.t issue include the timing o.~t
the return of the detainees,
the disposition of the Kurils
a,nd Sa.kha.lin, a.nd the Soviet
demand that the Sea of Ja.pa.n
be closed to all warships except
those of Japan, Korea, and the
USSR.
Tokyo probably intends to
seek the immediate return of
the detainees a.nd the removal
of conditions on the return of
the Habama.is a.nd Shikotan. The
Japanese also plan to make a.
strong, but possibly expendable,
bid for the return of the
southern Kurils, leaving the
disposition of the northern
Kurils a.nd Sakhalin to be deter-
mined by international agree-
ment. Questions relative to
fisheries dill be .reserved for
settlement after a peace treaty..
is signed.
The Ja.pa.nese are not likely
to give in on the issue of
jurisdiction in the Sea, of
Japan, since sensitive questions
of sovereignty a.nd relations
with the United States are
involved. Japan's chief nego-
tiator, Ambassador Matsumoto,
has said he does not intend to
snake an issue of Japa.n's entry
into the UN since he and Ambas-
sador Malik have already agreed
that Jap ah.'s admission will be
a by-product of t`xie norma.liza.-
tian of rela.tians between their
two countries.
Many Japanese leaders be-
lieve the Soviet Union is
likely to link Japa.n's admission
to the UN to that of Communist
China, irrespective of any
Japanese concessions a.t London,
and therefore that no conces-
sions should be made.
Prime Minister Hatoya.ma's
desire to achieve a. quick settle-
ment with Moscow ha.s for the
present been restrained by the
Foreign Ministry and the new
party . I f the talks reach a,n
S~C~E7'
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of lg
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~`" ,~.E~R~ `7'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
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25X1
impasse, however, he may in-
struct Matsumoto to make the
necessary compromises. Matsu-
moto reportedly agrees with the
prime minister, but
time he hopes to have become
foreign minister and could
conduct the negotiations as
he pleased.
~e a is until April, by which
he may try o e ay
Foreign Minister Shige-
mitsu, who is the principal
advocate of a firm line toward
the USSR, was not present at
consultations between Prime
Minister Hatoyama and Ambassa-
dor Matsumoto prior to the
letter's departure for London.
While the Foreign Ministry
explained that Shigemitsu was
"ill," the circumstances. sug-
.Peiping Courts
Sian an A rican Nations
As part of its effort to
obtain wider international rec-
ognition, the Peiping govern-
ment is making a number of com-
mercial and cultural approaches
to Asian and African nations.
For the most part, these are
meeting with favorable responses.
The Chinese trade fair at
Osaka, Japan, which was prima-
rily a propaganda exhibit, drew
over a million and a half visi-
tors before it closed last
month. Continuing Chinese Com-
munist efforts to woo Japan,
which apparently have been
favorably received by Tokyo,
are .reflected in the silencing
Best that possible compromises
with the USSR were discussed
by the prime minister and his
representative.
Tokyo, in any event, will
hold out for a compromise
settlement of Japan's demands
which can be made acceptable
to the Japanese public. One
possible compromise would be
acceptance of Moscow's proposal
to repatriate Japanese detainees
after diplomatic relations are
restored, provided the USSR
will agree to return the south-
ern Kurils to Japan. Alter-
natively Japan might drop its
territorial demands if Moscow
would respond by returning all
Japanese prisoners prior to
the normalization of relatit~nc
of Radio Free Japan broadcasts
from Peiping on 30 December
and the visit to Japan of a
Chinese science delegation
headed by Kuo Mo-j o, one of
Communist China's highest rank-
ing nonparty officials.
Peiping's progress in
normalizing relations with
Southeast Asian nations is
shown by the increasing willing-
ness of prominent leaders from
that area to visit China.
Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has
said he is willing to visit
China if invited and Peiping
has already extended a formal
invitation to Thai opposition
.~~~~~ ~'
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 18
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SECRET
12 January 1956
leader Thep Chotinuchit. The
American embassy in Bangkok
believes that if Th?p makes
the trip, the glowing reports
of Communist China likely to
be brought back by his dele-
gation might make possible a
"psychological breakthrough"
in Thailand of great value to
Peiping.
In the Near East, recent
trade agreements with Egypt
and Syria were followed on 31
December by a similar pact with
Lebanon. A Peiping broadcast
on 9 January said that a high-
.level Chinese Communist dele-
gation, led by a deputy minister
of foreign trade, is now in
Jidda discussing the develop-
ment of Sino-Saudi trade.
The Chinese apparently
hope, through an increase in
commerce and the exchange of
trade delegations as specified
in the pacts, to pave the way
for eventual recognition by
several Near Eastern govern-
ments. Peiping's approach to
the new Sudanese government was
through immediate recognition
of its independence on 4 Janu-?
ary. Premier Chou En-lai sent
a message expressing China?s
hope "to enter into diplomatic
relations" with the Sudanese.
Another Chinese maneuver
to win Near Eastern sympathies;
has been through a campaign
directed at Moslems. During
the recent visit to Peiping of
a delegation representing the
International Assembly of Moslem
Youth and a-group of Egyptian
,journalists, the Chinese stressed
their friendship toward Islam.
A Tunisian good-will dele-
gation recently toured Manchuria
and the Chinese dispatched a
group of Chinese Moslems on the
annual pilgrimage to Mecca last
year.. Propaganda is directed
at Asian and Near Eastern Mos-
lems through Burhan, former
chairman of the Sinkiang provin-25X1
cial government; the chief organ
of this propaganda is the China
Islamic Association.
Soviet Bloc Approaches
n t~fr ca
The Soviet bloc is fol-
lowing up its activities in the
Near East by attempting to ex-
pand its diplomatic and eco-
~omi:c ~ in~luer~~e ' i,n Libya., the
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Liberia.
The first Soviet mission
accredited to Libya reached
Tripoli on 6 January. .The
American embassy believes that
Moscow is about to embark on
a major offensive against the
Western position in Libya and
North Africa.
If the USSR has made such
a request in connection with
establishment of its diplo-
matic mission in Libya, Prime
Minister Ben Halim may see an
opportunity for further bar-
gaining with the West over base
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 1S
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~EGPET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
arrangements. Ben Halim has
indicated that he believes
Egypt successfully maneuvered
the West into an offer of fi-
nancial aid for its high-dam
project..
Within a week after the
proclamation of Sudanese in-
dependence on l January, most
states. of the Sino-Soviet bloc
had recognized the Sudan and
expressed the desire to estab-
lish commercial, consular, and
diplomatic relations. Sudanese
prime minister Azhari welcomed
the prospect of diplomatic re-
lations with the USSR. Moscow
quickly hailed the Sudanese de-
cision to remain aloof from
military pacts, and Radio Moscow
broadcast to the Sudan a glowing
account of trade possibilities.
Pravda printed an editorial on
~ January welcoming the "arrival
of the Sudan on the road to in-
dependent development."
Both the USSR and Czecho-
slovakia have shown an interest
in developing trade with Ethio-
pia. The USSR is interested in
a petroleum market, and Czecho-
slovakia still has a trade agree-
ment under discussion in Addis
Ababa. There has been an un-
confirmed report that the Czechs
have concluded a trade agreement
to sell Soviet petroleum products
to Ethiopia.
.Soviet overtures to Liberia
and the activities of A. P.
Volkov, the Soviet representative
at President Tubman's inaugura-
tion, demonstrate the USSR's
Poland Makes Low Bid
n Hejaz Ra lway Survey
Poland has submitted the low
bid for a survey of the Hejaz
railway construction project.
King Saud of Saudi Arabia,
through whose territory most of
eagerness to develop its initia-
tive in central Africa. In
his first interview with Tub-
man on 5 January, Volkov re-
quested that the president pre-
pare a-draft treaty. of friend-
ship with a view to establish-
ing diplomatic missions..
Volkov's conduct suggested
he was under pressuare from
Moscow to produce positive
results. When rebuffed in re-
gard to the immediate draf-tang
of a treaty, he countered by
proposing an interim arrange-
ment of representation until
such a treaty could be conclud-
ed. At one point he tried to
borrow a Liberian code to wire
Moscow for increased authoriza-
tion. He made a general state-
ment that the USSR was' prepared
to offer economic aid to Liberia
and requested that he be allowed
to announce an invitation to a
Liberian parliamentary delega-
tion to visit Moscow.
Tubman does not propose
to allow the USSR to establish
a mission in Liberia, and main-
tains that conclusion of a
treaty of friendship must pre-
cede regularizing relations
with the USSR. He has, in addi-
tion, indicated to the American
ambassador that Liberia will
reject the offers of Soviet
aid.
The. Soviet ambassador to
Belgium is to tour all-impor-
tant centers in the Belgian
Con o this month.
Concurre n ~y ORR
the line runs, and who presuma-
bly will furnish most of the
money, accepted the bid, and
the Syrian cabinet reportedly
approved it. Saud has told
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SECRET
12 January 1956
the American ambassador, how-
ever, that Poland will not get
the contract, but that he will
intervene personally only as a
last resort. Should the con-
tract go to the Poles, they will
be in good position to win a
subsequent contract for the
actual construction work.
The Hejaz railway was con-
structed in 1908 primarily to
carry Moslem pilgrims--and
Turkish troops--from Damascus
to Medina, whence they could
proceed to Mecca. The portion
of the line between Damascus
and Maan in southern Jordan is
still intact, but the section
from Maan to Medina, about 510
miles, was partially destroyed
in World War I and has been
inoperative since, The late
king Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud opposed
reconstruction of the line be-
cause he feared it would be a
means for his enemies, the
Hashemite rulers of Jordan, to
penetrate Saudi Arabia.
In December 1953, follow-
ing Abdul Aziz's death., King
Saud announced his wish to re-
establish the railway. A com-
mission of Saudi, Syrian, and
Jordanian representatives was
formed, and preliminary esti-
mates put the cost of recon-
struction, exclusive of rollint;
stock, at between $$,ooo,ooo
and $12,000,000. The commission
in September 1955 requested
bids by 5 December for a study
of the project .
The Poles, who had earlier
demonstrated interest in estab-
lishing commercial relations
with Saud::. Arabia, submitted a
bid of $40,000 for the survey,
while the next lowest bids were
$780,000 by an American firm
and $865,000 by a Japanese firm.
The disparity between the
Polish bid and uYestexn canapeti-
tion indicates Poland's determi-
nation to win this contract and
probably the actual reconstruc-
tion contract as well,
Although Ding Saud, who iri
practice has the final say in
the matter, has stated that
he would never allow a known
Communist inside Saudi Arabia,
he approved acceptance of the
Polish bid, Saud is said to
have believed it safe to admit
a Palish survey team, since it
would be working in the desert
under close supervision.
Saud reversed his stand
only after Western representa-
tion, The contract reportedly
has not yet been considered
by the Jordanian cabinet, the
:Las+, hurdle before final accept-
ance, although the Warsaw radio
on 30 December stated a contract
had been signed. Saud has the
power, both in terms of his
own position and his influence
in Jordan, to keep the Poles
from getting the work. He is
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CURRENT INTE"LLICENCE WEEKLY SU~I11iti4,RY
1~ Januar,y 1956
so far committed, however, that
he may find it embarrassing to
refuse the Polish bido If he
does refuse, he will certainl~~~
expect a quid pro quo from they
Tito Concludes Near East Visit
Tito's state visits to
Egypt and Ethiopia are part
of the effort begun a year ago
to expand Yugoslavia's influ-
ence among the uncommitted
states of Asia and Africa and
to strengthen its independent
position between East and West.
The communiques in general
strongly reaffirmed the usual
cliches of Yugoslav foreign
policy: the advantages of
a "nonalignment'? policy9 the
dangers inherent in "blocs",
the need for strengthening the
independence of "new countries'?;
and the importance of solving
international problems ''in ac-
cordance with the UN charter on
the basis of full equality and.
nonintervention in internal
affairs .'?
Tito and Egyptian prime
minister Nasr annaunced that
they had particularly reviewed
the problems of the Middle East
and southern Europe. Tito de-
clared on his departure from
Egypt that he had never sought
to mediate the Arab-Israeli
conflict, but that he '?had been
persuaded that the Egyptians
wanted peaces" His strong de-
nunciation of the Baghdad pact,
although consistent with long-
standing Yugoslav views on
military groupings, suggests
that Belgrade is sympathetically
inclined toward Cairo?s Middle
East policyo It appears that
Tito said. nothing to irritate
the Egyptians--as he presumably
would have done had he followed
through on his stated intention
to point aut that "Israel has
become a fact of life" and
should be recognized as such.
West, probably in the form of
favorable action on his out-
standing requests for arms.
The special emphasis in
the final co~mu~iique on the in-
dependence of Yugoslavia and
Egypt in foreign affairs and
economic programs is undoubtedly
intended to be a warning against
any attempts by the United
States or Britain to interfere in
Egypt,. as well as against any
Soviet efforts to influence the
foreign and economic policies
of either Gauntry. Yugoslav
officials have indicated that
they feel particularly qualified
to alert the Egyptians to the
dangers inherent in too close
r-elatians with the USSR.
The two leaders apparently
made no specific commitments
concerning mutual relations.
Pointing out the need for in-
creasing co-operation, they
preferred to leave the question
of expanding economic and cul-
tural relations to technical
ta:~.ks at some later date ,
Yug~aslavi~a has supplied some
military materiel to Egypt
as a result of negotiations
following Tito?s meeting last
February with Nasr on the
return leg of the Yugoslav
leader's Asian trip. Pre-
sumably additional supplies
will be forthcoming for bath
Egypt and Ethiopia.
Ta~to's state .visit to
Ethiopia returned the visit
which Haile Selassie paid to
Yugoslavia in July 1954. Al-
though the trip demonstrates
the increasing cordiality exist-
ing between the two countries,
nothing indicates that political,
economic or military talks of
any significance were held.
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~ ~~~~~~
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUI~IARY
12 January 1956
Nasr has accepted the Yugo-
slav invitation to return Tito's
visit, but it is unlikely that
a visit will be made before the
Egyptian leader's trip to the
USSR later this year, Tito also
plans to visit the USSR this
year, but as yet no date has'
been announced.
The American embassy in
Cairo reports that although
North Africa
Clashes between French
.and rebel forces in eastern
Algeria have .taken at least 165
lives since 1 January. Of
these, some 64 were reported
killed on 8 January in one of
the bloodiest single days since
the "'Army of .Allah" launched
its "war of liberation" in No-
vember 1954.
Under pressure from extrem-
ists, Moslem resignations from
municipal councils, the Algerian
Assembly, and French parlia-
mentary bodies have accelerated.
The ''Committee of 61," a group
of moderate Algerian legislators,
is still trying to avert a com-
plete breakdown in the existing
legislative structure. Its
members, however, threatened in
a communique on 4 January to
resign and incite remaining
Moslem officeholders to da like-
wise if a new French government
does not proclaim,-within 30
days of its investiture, France
intention to satisfy the as-
pirations of the Algerian people.
This communique also de-
manded that the French grant
formal recognition of Algerian
nationality, hold direct talks
with representative Moslems,
and immediately release all
the visit was cordial and re-
ceived a good press, the
general impression was that it
was "rather unproductive and a
considerable bore to Egyptian
officials."
The lack of foreign re-
action to the trip, particularly
in South Asia, presumably was
disappointing to Tito.
political prisoners. The con-
duct of negotiations with-Paris
by representatives drawn. from
French-dominated federations
of mayors was specifically
ruled out.
This communique was inter-
preted by American officials
in Algeria as a move to .retain
same control of the deteriorating
Algerian situation in moderate
Moslem hands in the face of
extremist threats that moderate
elements would be cast aside
when a nationalist victory. is
achieved.
FRENCH MOROCCO
In Morocco, Rif fighting
has expanded into new areas, and
the largest clash since the
Berber tribal revolt began on
1 October has taken place be-
tween French troops and rebel
guerrillas. French resident
general Dubois is pressuring
Sultan Mohamed V to issue a
public surrender call to the
dissident tribes. The sultan,
however, is reluctant to engage
his personal prestige before.
the French-Moroccan negotia-,
tions get under way, and has
refused to issue the call. As
a result.. his. r:elatians ,with
French officials have deterio-
rated.,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BUNMARY
12 January 1956
Preparations for the prom-
ised negotiations with France
dominate the :Moroccan political
scene. .Prospects for their
speedy and satisfactiory con-
clusion are waning because of
the delay in the formation of
a new government in Paris.
French foreign minister Pinery
has informed Moroccan national-
ists that 15 February is the
earliest date a new French
government will be in a posi-
tion to commence the talks,
Moroccan interest in the
American air bases in the
French zone continues. On 5
January the Moroccan minister
of public works asked the
American consulate general in
Rabat to make "nonsecret basic
information on the legal status"
of the bases available to the
.Moroccan government for use as
background material in prep-
oration for the negotiations
with France.
SFANISH MOROCCG~
Unrest in Spanish Morocco
increased greatly before the 10
January meeting between French
resident general Dubois and
Spanish high commissioner Carcia-
Valina, allegedly to discuss
Pre-election Politics in Greece
King Paul's dissolution of
-the Greek parliament on 10 Janu-
axy and the call for national
elections on 19 February will
further intensify political man-
euvering in Athens. Prime Min-
ister Karamanlis has announced
.the establishment of his Nation-
al Radical Union, and the Greek
Rally of the late prime minister
Papagos has virtually ceased to
exist. Karamanlis'party appears
to be attracting most Rally
adherents, while the remnants
are setting up still other new
differences involvin~~ the Ra.f
rebellion, Nationalist dis-
satisfaction was stirred up
by recent conflicting state-
ments of General Franca and
Garcia-Valino.
On 9 January, the two na-
tionalist ministers in the
Tetuan government resigned, re-
portedly after their party had
rejected a proposal by Garcia-
Valina to reorganize the zonal
administration. Sultan Mohamed
V is said to have ordered the
nationalists to refuse any plan
-which did not include a public
promise of independence for
Morocco, with the present zones
united under his reign.
The joint communique issued.
by Dubois and Garcia-Valino
stated that Dubois had been in-
formed of Spain's "intention to
introduce in the Spanish zone
political reforms that should
by parallel evolution permit
Morocco to achieve independence,
while respecting the legitimate
interests of bath powers,"
The American legation in
Tangier expects that nationalist
pressure, possibly short of a
full terrorist campaign, will
parties or seeking to associate
themselves an favorable terms
with established opposi~tian
groups.
.Karamanlis' announcement
of his new party on 4 January
was followed the next day by
the founding of the Popular
Socialist Party by former dep-
uty premier and foreign minis-
ter Stephanopoulos, who had
long considered himself the
rightful heir to the leader-
ship of the Rally.
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12 Januax?y 1JhG
I~~eanwhile, maneuvering
among the opposition parties is
centering on the question of
collaboration with the Com-
munist-front EDA. The right-
wing Party of Progressives of
former co-ordination minister
Spyros l~arkezinis is planning
such callabora,tion. A popular
front of all center a.nd leftist
panties is being pushed by the
neutralist National Democratic
Initiative Movement, which a.p-
pea.rs to be dominated by EDA.
In some districts, the Iti+love-
ment has gained the support of
Sophocles Venizelos' Liberal
Demacra.tic Union and other
left-of-center parties.
A popular front is likely
to be formed because the new
electoral law sponsored by
I~aramanlis discourages small
pari;ie~ from entering their
own candidates. EDA has already
offered to co-operate with the
center on condition that the
center agree in the event of
victory to Bold new elections
under the simple proportional
system within six to 12 months.
This would probably result in
Cyprus
Discussions on 3 January
between ]British governor Ha.rd-
in~ and Cypriot archbishop
Makario,; on t~ritain's Cyprus
formula. ended inconclusively.
Ma'_~ar ios , however , "a.f f firmed
positively" his desire for a.
prompt settlement and agreed
to hold further meetings.
Iia.rding appeared mildly
opti:r-istic regarding Iviaxcarios'
EDA winning enough, seats to hold
a balance of power in parliarnent.
I~aranranlis expects a. hard
election fi ?ht
He may lie
~a:ric~icappe~c ~~e timing of t'ie
election. The relatively con-
servative rural population tra--
ditionally votes in smaller num-
bers during the winter, while
the leftists in the towns and
cities are not materially af-
fected by this factor.
The government appears to
have been marking time rather
than advancing any bold new pr~~-
gram. It has had to contend
with the questions of Cyprus
and relations with Turkey,
neither of which is susceptible
of solution in any manner sati,s-
factory to Greek national pride.
The Greer public remains disil-
lusioned and resentful toward
its Western allies over these
issues, which can be exploited
by the opposition to the govern-
ment's disadvantage.
sues. and on the weather.
Pdevertheless, I~a.ramanlis'
Haut party seems lil~ely to win
the highest vote. An absolute
majority for I~a.rama.nlis, however,
will probably depend on the ef-
fectiveness of opposition co-
operation, on developments in
outstanding foreign policy is-
attitude, according to the Ameri-
can consul. A Foreign Office
official told the American em-
bassy in London, however, that
Makarios had not moved his posi-
tion "an inch" since November,
despite London's subsequent
revision of -Lhe formula. a.ncl
American and Greer efforts to
facilitate an agreement. This
statement suggests London gray ..
be unwilling to grant IIarding
the a.uthority.ta make any fur-
ther changes in the formula.
~~C~.~~'
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NOTES AND COM1~lENTS Page 9 of 13
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. SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
Harding told the consul
that Makarios remains adamant
against any reference in the
formula to "?international
treaties," which the archbishop
construes as giving Turkey a
veto over the eventual applica-
tion of self-determination to
Cyprus. Unlike the Gr?ek
government, however, Makarios
apparently accepted the double-
negative phraseology of the
formula's recognition of self-
determination. Harding and the
consul agree that Makarios is
now acting independently of
Athens.
Makarios' moderation and
desire far an early settlement
may be motivated by Turkey's
renewed diplomatic campaign
against any British concessions
tending toward the eventual
union of Cyprus with Greece,
by the increasing economic
distress caused by violence
and uncertainty,-and by Cypriot
Postponement of Soviet Republic
Party Congresses
Several of the Soviet re-
publics evidently have postponed
party congresses scheduled for
late December and early January,
possibly because of policy dif-
ferences or political maneuver-
ing at the top level in Moscow.
These congresses, besides elect-
ing top-party officials for
the individual republics, also
are to elect delegates to the
forthcoming all-Union 20th
Party Congress, scheduled to
begin on 14 February.
The Armenian Communist
Party congress, scheduled for
5 January 1956, has been post-
poned to 19 January, and the
Moldavian and Latvian congresses
were apparently not held as
scheduled. The Moldavian con-
gress,-scheduled for 26 Decem-
ber, conflicted with the USSR
Communist agitation designed
to prevent any settlement.
In anticipation of the Hard-
ing-Makarios negotiations,.vio-
lence on Cyprus had decreased,
but-the assassination of a
Turkish Cypriot policeman on
11 January ,threatens inter-
necine strife between the
Turkish and Greek communities.
The Turks staged angry demon-
strations in Nicosia demanding
revenge , and the Turkish Cxp-
xiat underground org~.ni~a.tian
VOLKAN recently threatened to
kill five Greeks for every
Turk who died as a result of
Nationalist agitation.
The Turkish mufti of Cy-
prus on 11 January recommended
calm and moderation to the
Cypriot Turkish community. Ankara
his instituted 'special police
precautions in Istanbul in
order to guard against a rep-
etition of `the anti=Gr+~ek' ratots
of September.
Supreme Soviet session held
26-29 December, and the Latvian
congress, scheduled for 5 Janu-
ary, was apparently postponed
because a Latvian Supreme Soviet
session was held on that day.
The absence of the-usual
Soviet propaganda build-up
and of extensive reporting on
the republic congresses by Mos-
cow and regional transmitters
probably indicates that the
Estonian, Georgian,. Kazakh,
Turkmen, Lithuanian, Tadzhik,
Azerbaidzhan,-and Kirgiz Com-
munist Party congresses sched-
uled to meet from 10 to 12
January have also been post-
poned .
The party congresses in the
remaining republics--Karelo-
Finnish, Ukrainian, Belorussian,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
and Uzbek-. are scheduled for
later in January and may be
held as scheduled. The Ukrain-
ian Party congress may have been
changed from the originally
scheduled date of 17 January,
however, since a Ukrainian Su-
preme Soviet session was later
scheduled to meet e-n 20 January.
Ukrainian party congresses
normally have four or five days
and the size of the party organ-
ization and complexity of the
republic's problems would seem
to require more than three days
for the congress.
The postponement of the
Armenian congress to a date
later in January suggests that
-the other postponed congresses
will also be held in the imme-
diate future. Scheduling prob-
lems, however, appear likely
in most of the republics to
avoid conflict with Supreme
East German Armed Forces
ay Dori a orma ze
Since last September there
have been indications that early
in 1956 the. East German govern-
. merit would formalize its armed
farces under a defense ministry
and possibly institute conscrip-
tion. Reports from East Ger-
many indicate that final prep-
. orations for a change in the
status of East German military
forces may be under way.
The Soviet-East German
treaty signed in Moscow on
20 September proclaimed East
Germany "free to make decisions
concerning its domestic and
foreign policy>..>" Although
the treaty provided for the
continued presence, "for the
time being," of Soviet troops
in East Germany, Waltier Ulbricht,
Soviet sessions now. planned in
most of the republics for the
latter half of January. Holding
the republic party congresses
and tk~e republic Supreme Soviet
sessions so nearly at the same
time is almost unprecedented
and would sacrifice a great
deal of the propaganda poten-
tial of these meetings.
20th Party Congress, originally
to the all-Union Congress.
scheduled for 14 February, has
been postponed until the latter
part of March or the early part
of April. There appears to be
no reason why the postponement
of the republic congresses until
later in January should affect
the date for holding the all-
Union Congress. However, a more
protracted delay might force a.
postponement since the republic
congresses elect the delegates
chief of-the East German Social-
ist Unity Party, declared at
the time of its signing that
East Germany now would "faith-
fully carry out its commitments
and rights arising out of the
Warsaw treaty." The Warsaw
treaty of 14 May 1955 provided
for mutual Soviet-Satellite
defense under a combined mili-
tary command, but left the
question of GDR participation
to be "examined later."
On 26 September, the East
German Volkskammer passed a
constitutional amendment per-
mitting legislation for nation-
al defense and stating that
"service to protect the father-
land...is an honorable duty
of .the citizens of the GDR."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
The amendment also provides
that the organization of-armed
forces will be regulated by
decision of the Council of
Ministers. Thus the GDR, which
already has a functioning mili-
tary establishment, needs da
little but issue a Council of
Ministers' decree formally
creating a defense ministry to
place its armed forces on a
legal footing.
In early November the new
West German army was formally
constituteet, with the appoint-
ment of two lieutenant generals
and 99 ether volunteers ranking
from NCO to lieutenant colonel.
An elaborate ceremony is planned
for 2,4 January formally author-
izing the induction of up to
6,444 men. Conscription is
not to be instituted, however,
until these 6,404 are trained,
and probably not until after
the West German elections in
the fall of 1957.
While the GDR may well
use the West German ceremony
on 24 January as justification
for an announcement legalizing
-its own defense establishment,
conscription may not follow
immediately. This would appear
to require further legislation
and may be put off until after
the corresponding West German
action.
In the debate an the GDR
constitutional amendment passed
in September, Deputy Premier
Stoph gave assurances that
"adoption of this law does not
as yet mean the introduction
of conscription." Two months
later, however, Premier Gro~te-
woh] warned the n~ablic that
"perhaps we shall be compelled
to pass a conscription law."
The probable effect of con-
scription on popular morale in
East Germany, already a source
of concern to the government,
continues to be a deterrent.
From the point of-view of main-
taining its military establish-
ment and conforming to practices
elsewhere in Eastern Europe,
however, some action on can-
scriptian would be desirable
for East Germany in the near
future.
The East German army has
had manpower problems because
of the difficulties of volun-
tary recruitment. In 1955,
the KVP suffered especially.
severe difficulties when large
numbers of personnel were de-
mobilized after completing
three-year enlistments. ,The
intensive recruitment campaign.
which followed the first wave
of discharges in May probably
succeeded in replenishing the
depleted ranks, but at the
same time caused a wholesale
exodus of military-age males
to West Germany during the
summer and early fall.
The absence of reports of
a similar recruiting drive
following the second wave of
discharges in Getober suggests
that the GDR does not wish to
farce further emigration of
potential conscripts, and may
indicate that conscription is
expected soon to make up for
the demobilization.
Registration of the popula-
tion has been the practice. in
East Germany for years and
conscription machinery already
exists. Reports to September
and Gctober 1955 alleged that
final preparations for institut-
ing conscription were under
way and,
conscription law would become
effective on 1 Ma.y 1956.
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PART II NGTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 18
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
Communist China Announces
ripe pa as ~s or
Peiping has announced its
principal aims for 1956 as the
fulfillment of Five-Year Plan
goals ahead of schedule and
the acceleration of the "trap-.
sition to socialism."
The official party .organ,
the Peiping People's Daily,
notes that t e eve opmen of
agriculture and industry will
"inevitably enhance our strength
of national defense for the cari-
rying out of the great task
of liberating Taiwan and safe-
guarding peace in the Far East
and the whole world."
In a section omitted from
the New China News Agency Eng-
lish release, People's Daily
reports that t eh pay wing
the past two years has struggled
against "rightist conservatism."
The "inclusion of tha.s theme
may indicate continuing
Prince- Sihanouk has re-
solved the political crisis
in Cambodia by announcing that
he will resume the premier-
ship after a short vacation
abroad and that, in the interim,
the cabinet of Ourn Chheangsun
will continue in a caretaker
capacity,
Oum came into office on
4 January as a compromise after
more qualified Sangkum leaders
had thwarted each other's bid
for the premiership. His
cabinet submitted its resigna-
t:?.on three days later in
disagreement over the tempo of
socialization.
While a violent peasant
reaction to the socialist move-
ment or a sharp drop in agricul-
tural production ~,s a result of
the socialization program could
precipitate an inner party
crisis, the general tone of Mao
Tse-tong's July report on agri-
cul-cure and subsequent propagan-
da suggests that the party does
pat anticipate a high-level
purge.
In any case, Mao will have
an opportunity at the eighth
party congress later this year
to rid th.e central. leadership
of apposition without the fan-
fare and di:~ruptive reactions
of a public purge. One of the
chief tasks of the party con-
gress will be the election of
a new central committee.
response to "spontaneous"
demonstrations for Sihanouk's
return to office.
This sequence of events
demonstrates that the seemingly
monolithic Sangkum Party, which
monopolizes the Cambodian gov-
ernmental apparatus, is in fact
a heterogeneous grouping of
personalities held together
only by Sihanouk. Sihanouk
readily admits that Oum's cab-
inet is "not good" and there
will presumably be a hiatus in
Cambodian government activity
until the prince returns.
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pale 13 of 13
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIVIMARY
12 January 1356
The Rangoon government is
planning to concentrate Soviet
economic and technical assist-
ance on agricultural and ir-
rigation projects. Despite
Soviet offers of assistance to
industry, the. more expensive
portion of Burma's development
program, no such help has been
requested, and none is con-
templated unless current plans
to procure equipment and techni-
cal assistance from the West
fail. A Burmese planning offi-
cial volunteered to the American
embassy on 29 December, more-
over, that Burma is satisfied
with its American and UN eco-
nomic advisers and is not con-
sidering replacing them with
Soviet experts.
Burma may find it difficult,
however, to limit the partici-
pation of the Sino-Soviet bloc
in its development program.
Unless the proportion of Burma's
xice exports sent to non-Com-
munist countries increases over
last year, the Burmese may lack
the foreign exchange necessary
to maintain their present rate
of economic development. Rather
than cut back, the country's
planners would undoubtedly turn
to the. bloc. The USSR has re-
portedly offered to take all of
Burma's unsold rice at current
prices, and Premier Chou En-lai
has stated that Communist China
is prepared to aid Burma eco-
nomically "'far mutual benefits."
The Indonesian cabinet is
in a precarious position as the
result of opposition attacks on
its handling of problems in ne-
gotiations with the Dutch, par-
ticularly the New Guinea issue.
The negotiations, which opened
on 10 December, are now in re-
Evidence that Rangoon de-
sires to show that it continues
to maintain a friendly attitude
toward the West is ,provided by
the inclusion in its Independ-
ence Day honors list of three
Britons closely connected with
the
British withdrawal
in
1948.
Lord
Louis Mountbatten
was
given
the
highest honor the
government
can bestow,. and the United
Kingdom?s last colonial governor
of Burma, who is currently
visiting Rangoon,- was-also
honored. These gestures could
well be the Burmese government's
way of repudiating Khrushchev's
attacks on Britain while he
was in Burma.
Premier Nu's public an-
nouncement on 10 January that
the .insurgent Burma Communist
Party (BCP) will be permitted
to participate in politics if
it lays dawn its arms, strength-
ens the growing belief that the
surrender of the insurgents is
imminent. Negotiations to this
end are apparently still going
on, and it seems only a matter
of time before the BCP returns
to a status more in line with
current international Communist
tactics. With greater freedom
of action and the opportunity
to pursue united-front tactics,
the Communists are likely to be
mare dangerous as a legal party
than in insurgency.
(Concurred in by ORR)
cess; and in an effort to pre-
serve his cabinet, Prime Minis-
ter Harahap may agree to the de-
mands of two parties in his co-
alition not to resume the talks.
The government faces severe at-
tacks in parliament, which recon-
vened an 11 January..
~~~~~~~'
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 1$
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM~dARY
12 January 1956
The parliament's draft
agenda calls for interpellations
by opposition members to begin
by 1S January on Prime Minister
I3arahap's failure to adopt a
forceful stand in talks with the
Dutch on Indonesia's claim to
New Guinea. If a vote is taken,
at least two and possibly more
government parties may join
the opposition in voting against
the government.
As party lines in parlia-
ment now stand, the opposition--
led by the National and Commu-
nist Parties--needs 18 votes
to defeat the government. Two
disaffected cabinet parties--
the Islamic League (PSII) and
the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)--to-
gether hold only 12 seats in
parliament, taut their desertion
of -the government could easily
encourage other parties to
switch sides..
The Masjumi, however, which
heads the cabinet, is eager to
stay in office until the newly
elected parliament is seated,
probably in April. The Dutch
talks are now in recess, and
Discussions on Self-Gavernment
-For Malaya and Singapore
Malayan chief minister
Rahman will begin talks with
the British on 18 January. The
British government evidently
has decided to set in motion
steps leading to self-govern-
ment for Malaya and Singapore,
in the belief that only the
prospect of independence can
keep .these territories effec-
tively allied with .the West.
In talks in Landon last
month with Chief Minister Mar-
shall of Singapore, the British
matte what apparently amounts
to a firm commitment to grant
full self-government at an
early irate. Marshall will re-
in an effort to preserve the
cabinet, Prime Minister Harahap
may agree to demands of the PSI I.
and the NU and refuse to re-
sume negotiations.
Should the cabinet survive
the present situation, it can
expect continued difficulties,
chiefly as a result of small-
party deviations and maneuvers
of the NU. The small parties,
as such, have largely lost
their identities as a result
of the September parliamentary
elections, but their leaders
hope for new political oppor-
tunities. They will watch
closely the activities of Presi-
dent Sukarna and. the National
Party and shape their own
tactics accordingly.
The NU,'now a major party
as a result of the elections
and obviously slated as ~,
member of the next coalition
government, appears to be
playing the Masjumi against
the National Party in the hope
of extracting maximum conces-
sions from each.
turn to London in April to
negotiate a timetable. A similar
commitment evidently will be
made to Rahman.
Britain's new policy also
envisages intensified security
efforts and new educational
and propaganda measures. During
his forthcoming visit to Wash-
ington, Prime Minister Eden
is expected to ask for American
financial and diplomatic assist-
ance on this ,phase of the pro-
gram.
Britain's ability to con-
trol the conduct of internal
affairs in Malaya and Singapore
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PART I I N?TES APZD .COMMENTS Page 15 of 18
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
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has greatly diminished. Further-
more, nationalist opposition to
both governments, directed by
the People's Action Party of
Singapore, is expected to be
greatly accentuated in the next
six months. Since the leaders
in both territories are probably
as pro-Western as they can af-
ford to be and still retain
their influence locally, London
believes their status as na-
tional leaders can be enhanced
only by thoroughgoing political
concessions,
The British are evidently
aware of the risks of their
"new-look"' approach, especially
in Singapore, where .the stabil-
ity of the government is already
in doubt. To grant Singapore
self-government might well as-
sure the ascendancy of pro-Com-
munist elements. Short of
Afghanistan
000 Soviet credit with Soviet
officials in Kabul, the Afghan
While discussing disposi-
tion of the promised $100,000,-
as also released
trucks, most of which will prob-
ably be supplied by an American
firm. Arrangements are report-
edly being made for the USSR to
undertake oil drilling at Shi-
barghan in northern Afghanistan.
for the import via the USSR of
,000,000 in foreign exchange
Although reluctant to ap-
pear conciliatory after having
SECRET
suspension of the constitution,
backed possibly by force, the
British would have no means
with which to meet such a
development.
The negotiations with Rah-
man are expected to result in
establishment of a constitu-
tional commission, which would
include Malayan leaders, to
provide for internal self-gov-
ernment, probably by early 1957.
The British apparently intend
to relinquish some of their.
control over matters of fi-
nance and internal security be-.
fore then. They wish to retain
some independent responsibility
for internal security, however,
in connection with agreements
they expect to negotiate gcw-
erning the continuation of
sought Soviet aid to strengthen
their position vis-a-vis Paki-~
sta~a, "the Afghans' have' ififormally
invited Pakistani governor
general Mirza to Kabul for a
meeting with King Zahir Shah.
Their purpose is probably to
demonstrate neutrality follow-
ing the recent Bulganin-Khrush-
chev visit.
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 16 of 18
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 January 1956
American embassy in
Kabul reports in-
tense social and pro-
fessional contact
between Afghan and
Soviet officials.
KABUL
Jalalabad
Shibarghan
ngemen s are being -
made for the- USSR to
undertake oil drill-
ing at Shibarghan in
northern Afghanistan
and to construct two
dams and other proj-
ects near Ghazni
and Jalalabad in the
southern and eastern
parts of the country..
The petroleum sup-
plies, if uncovered,
are to be exported
to the USSR as part
payment on the $100,000,000
credit. There is an oil-pro-
ducing field in the USSR across
the Oxus River from Shibarghan,
and refining facilities are
readily accessible nearby. It
seems likely ,that there are
also exploitable petroleum
deposits on the Afghan side,
Because of the primitive
state of the Afghan economy,
the Soviet credit will probably
be allt~"ated in small amounts
over a considerable period of
time. A few new aid projects
will, however, probably be
carried out promptly.
o;r F;ard: J',g
~~
Release of $1,000,004 at
favorable rates of exchange
for the import of .trucks by
private businessmen indicates
th~;~, Prime Minister Daud is
sensitive to hostile criticism
of Finance Minister Malik's
efforts to control foreign
exchange and regulate imports,
Most of the new. trucks,
which are badly needed by private
transport companies to replace
those worn out by six months o f
heavy usage on-the bad-roads to
the Soviet border are ex
to be American
ruc s cou a imported more
cheaply through Pakistan, Afghan-
istan has shown its intention
of remaining independent of
the transit route through that
country t:;y arderink the s'zitr-
tJS 5:~.. :Con-