MARITIME CLAIMS AND CONFLICT IN NORTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100140001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign ~ t 25X1
Assessment t `~ ~ ~
Center
I~Vlaritime Claims and Conflict
in Northeast Asia
Secret
GC 78-10113
July 1978
N~ 160
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 25X1
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Maritime disputes in Northeast Asia prior to 1968 were, for the most part,
restricted to low-key debates over the ownership of several small, uninhabited islands.
A 1968 United Nations-sponsored geophysical survey reporting the possible presence
of petroleum beneath the waters of the Yellow and East China Seas rekindled these
old disputes over island ownership and prompted a series of unilateral extensions.of
continental shelf claims by the oil-poor countries of the region. The disputed islands
and the gross overlapping of some of the continental shelf claims have since been a
constant irritant in relations between the countries of Northeast Asia. The problem
worsened during 1977 when the global trend toward the 200-mile exclusive economic
zone spread to Northeast Asia, creating more overlapping maritime claims. This paper
delineates the recent extensions of maritime claims, updates developments in the
seabed and islands disputes since the initial spate of claims, and examines the areas
with the highest potential for future conflict. Earlier issuances on the legal and
historical origins of these disputes are listed on the back cover of 'this document.
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Page
Preface .................................................................................................:...................... i
Key Points ................................................................................................................ v
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1
National Maritime Claims ...................................................................................... 1
People's Republic of China .............................................................................. 1
Republic of China .............................................................................................. 3
Japan ...................................................................................................................... 5
Republic of -Korea ................................................................................................ 7
Democratic People's Republic' of Korea .:........................................................ 9
Potential Conflict Areas .........................................................................:................ 11
East China Sea ................................................................................................ 11
Senkakus ........................................................................................................ 11
Joint Development Zone ............................................................................ 12
Yellow Sea ........................................................................................................ 12
Northwest Islands .......................................................................................... 12
Southern Yellow Sea .................................................................................... 13
Sea of Japan .................................................................................................... 14
Tok-do .............................................................................................................. 15
North Korean Military and Economic Zones .......................................... 15
Glossarv ........................................................................................................................ 17
Graphics
Map 1-Northeast Asia ............................................................................................ viii
Map 2-PRG-Maritime Claims .......:.................................................................... 2
Map 3-ROC-Maritime Claims ................... ~................................:......................... 4
Map 4-Japan-Maritime Claims ............................................................................ 6
MaP 5-ROK-Maritime Claims .............................................................................. 8
Map 6-DPRK-Maritime Claims .......................................................................... 10
Map 7-Northwest Islands Area ............................................................................ 13
Map 8-Sea of Japan-Maritime Claims .............................................................. 14
iii
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Maritime Claims and Conflict
in Northeast Asia
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
July 1978
Key Points
The nations of Northeast Asia* are engaged in an extended feud over the region's
offshore waters. Little progress has been made in resolving the various disputes, largely
because the political struggles of the divided nations of China and Korea have been
transplanted to the seas of the region.
? The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC-
Taiwan), each claiming to be the sole legitimate government of China, continue
to vie for jurisdiction over a vast area of the East China Sea. Their dispute has
prevented compromise with Japan, one of the other claimants.
? The establishment of military and economic zones by North Korea adds a new
complication to the already complex situation in the waters off the
Demilitarized Zone.
? Japan, with important economic ties to all of the other countries, is caught on a
diplomatic tightrope and is reluctant to assume a leadership role.
Without a solution to the divided nations' problem the prospect is for recurring
maritime incidents in Northeast Asia, always with the danger that an isolated offshore
clash will escalate into a serious military or diplomatic confrontation. The following
areas are most likely to provoke such a confrontation:
? East China Sea
- The Senkaku Islands remain in limbo. The PRC and, Japan had subordinated
their dispute to larger bilateral issues, but Peking's dispatch of a fishing fleet
to the area in April 1978 provided Japan with a pointed reminder of China's
claim to the islands and the surrounding waters and shelf. Tlie ROC, the most
vociferous claimant, has been unable to find a drilling subcontractor willing to
risk PRC retaliation.
- PRC protests have slowed Japanese participation with South Korea in the
Joint Development Zone in the disputed continental shelf. The two nations'
plans have the potential to provoke a PRC response.
sFor the purpose of this study, Northeast Asia consists of fine states-the People's Republic of China,
the Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Korea. The
USSR, although geographically a part of Northeast Asia, is inooloed only peripherally in the area's
maritime disputes.
v
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? Yellow Sea
- The waters around the South Korean-held Northwest Islands have not yet
been included in the North's new military security zone. The military zone
provides yet another pretext for North Korea to renew its claims to these
waters.
- South Korea has chosen not to respond militarily to PRC attacks on Korean
fishing boats in the southern Yellow Sea; the clashes will continue if Seoul
cannot gain greater control over the movements of its fleet.
? Sea of Japan
- Japan and South Korea continue their public quarrel over the Liancourt
Rocks (Tok-do),* albeit at a lower decibel level than in the past. Japan may be
willing to drop the ownership issue in favor of a ioint development scheme.
- The new North Korean military and economic zones underscore the potential
for conflict in the waters off the east coast Demilitarized Zone. A decision by
South Korea to disregard the zones could lead to direct military confrontation
in the Sea of Japan.
* Liancourt Rocks is the accepted Board on Geographic Names placename. The Korean rendition, Tok-
do, is more commonly used, however, and has been used throughout this text.
vii
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China
(PRC)
~' North
Korea
Seoul
South '
Korea
Sea of Japan
,Lisncourt flocks
(Tok-do)
o
Tokyo
apan,~
Philippine
Sea
Northeast Asia
Boundary repreeenterion ie
ear neoeeeeri~J aNhariletive
VIII
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25X1 ~I
Maritime Claims and Conflict
in Northeast Asia
Introduction
Although the participants in the ongoing Third UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS) have been
unable to reach agreement on a new LOS treaty, a
consensus has emerged on the 200-mile economic
zone. * This consensus has encouraged the proliferation
of ~ expanded coastal state claims over the world's
oceans. In regions where coastal states border open
oceans, establishment of these new maritime limits is,
in most cases, a matter of unilateral extension. In
Northeast Asia, the East China, Yellow, and Japan Seas
are semi-enclosed and will ultimately have to be
divided among the countries of the region through
bilateral or multilateral negotiations (map 1).
Many problems are preventing such a negotiated
settlement of maritime claims in Northeast Asia: the
complicated coastal and seabed geography; the grow-
ing importance of offshore areas to each country's
economy; a history of conflict over offshore islands
and the continental shelf; and in addition, the
presence of two politically divided nations-the
greatest hindrance to an equitable division and
ultimate rational economic development of Northeast
Asian waters. Without a negotiated settlement the
region's offshore problems will continue to be a spark
capable of igniting a broader conflict.
National Maritime Claims
People's Republic of China
As the dominant country in Northeast Asia, the
PRC's participation is vital for a negotiated division of
the Yellow and East China Seas. Thus far, however,
Peking has taken an opportunistic attitude toward
both the international LOS conference and the
regional maritime problems, using the conference as a
forum to score Third World propaganda points against
the superpowers and showing little inclination to
negotiate an end to the unsettled situation in the
waters of Northeast Asia. Peking's stated sea limits, in
opposition to its territorialist Third World posturing,
* All distances are in nautical miles. Definitions of LOS terms
are contained to the Glossary, p. 17.
are a mixture of both modest and expansive claims
that best serve PRC political interests in Northeast
Asia.
In 1958 the Chinese Government established a
straight baseline system and claimed a 12-mile
territorial sea (map 2). The territorial sea has never
been formally mapped, but the mainland sectors, as
enumerated in 1958 and as established by Chinese
enforcement policies, are not expansive. Although
Taiwan and South China Sea islands controlled by
other governments were claimed in the declaration,
the PRC was only reiterating longstanding claims of
previous Chinese governments, including the rival
government 'on Taiwan.
Ocean Resource Claims
Exclusive Economic Zone
While vigorously supporting the Third World's right
to establish exclusive economic zones out to 200 miles,
China has not declared such a zone. The PRC does not
want to risk prejudicing a vast seabed claim, based on
the natural prolongation principle, or to stir up an old
territorial dispute with Japan over the ownership of
the Senkaku Islands.** Indications are that China will
enact some form of 'broad or extended exclusive
fishery zone as a response to the future establishment
of fishery zones by other Asian countries.
China has already instituted some controls on
fishing activity in a large area of the Yellow and East
China Seas. The fishery controls, established in a series
* In the 1958 declaration, China specified a 12-mile territorial
sea around all three mafor island groups in the South China Sea
and has since been engaged in disputes with Taiwan, Vietnam,
and the Philippines Doer their ownership. To Peking's later dismay,
the Senkaku Islands, called the Tiao-ytl T'ai by China, were not
specified in the declaration.
**In April 1978 China reinforced its claims to the islands by
sending 200 fishing boats near or into waters the Japanese
consider to be part of the Senkakus' territorial sea. Although
Chinese motives 'remain unclear, this action indicates that the
PRC may no longer be willing to moderate its maritime claims to
avoid angering the Japanese.
1
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Pei-thing
*(Peking)
Borth
Korea
r a
Korea,
Bay ~. P'yongyang
People's
Republic
of China
Protection
Area 1
South
Korea
Philippine
Sea
People's Republic of China
Maritime Claims
Hypothetical
territorial sea (12 nm)
Fishery control
area
Hypothetical
straight baseline
2
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of non-governmental fishing agreements with Japan
starting. in 1955, were cemented by a governmental
agreement in 1975. The agreement set up a number of
fishery protection and conservation zones and estab-
lished controls over such aspects of Japanese fishing
activity as location, fishing method, time of year, type
of equipment, and species and size of fish. It did not
establish catch quotas for the Japanese. Other Socialist
states, notably North Korea, are allowed to fish in the
Chinese zones, but South Korean boats fish at their
own risk. The South Korean Government has been
reluctant to restrain its fleet because the Chinese
zones, especially Protection Area 1, extend in places
well beyond a hypothetical median line drawn
between the PRC and the Korean peninsula.
The fishing agreement also imposes navigational
restrictions on Japanese and other countries' vessels.
Entry into a military warning zone in the Po Hai is
prohibited without the permission of PRC officials,
and fishing vessels enter a military operations zone
north of Taiwan at their own risk. These navigational
restrictions have, no precedent in international law but
are actively enforced for security reasons.
Continental Shelf Claims
China has made a general claim to the seabed and
resources of the entire East Asian Continental Shelf,
which theoretically could include the seabed from the
Chinese mainland up to the western periphery of the
Japanese islands and the Korean peninsula. The claim
is based on the natural prolongation principle, * and
the Chinese consider any exploration or drilling
activity on the shelf an infringement on China's
sovereignty. The government has also formally ob-
iected to agreements negotiated between other shelf
claimants that are designed to allocate shelf resources.
The Chinese have been especially annoyed by the
ROK-Japan plan to develop petroleum resources in the
Joint Development Zone (JDZ), stating that no country
can ,determine shelf jurisdiction without China's
participation. Yet China has refused to participate in
any consultations except possibly with North Korea,
with whom China is thought to have some kind of
agreement in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.
* The recent geophysical survey of the East China and Yellow
Seas highlighted in the November 1977, China Pictorial reported
that the "bottom sediments were mainly the load of the Yellow
and Yangtze Rivers and the product of the erosion of the
coast.... analysis of the sediments on the outer shelf throw light
on the fact that the rim of the continental shelf was out of the
water for a time in the evolution of geology and was the early
coast zone of China's mainland."
The PRC has so far resisted the global trend toward
defining a coastal resource zone in terms of miles from
a baseline. A proliferation of 200-mile fishery zones by
neighboring countries may force the PRC to follow
suit, but it is unlikely that the zone would be based on
the 200-mile principle. Instead, the Chinese will
probably use the same technique they used in their
seabed declaration and issue a sweeping but vague
claim with no specific boundary delimitations, leaving
a final division subject to "future" consultations.
The Chinese have shown no sign of reducing their
huge continental shelf claim, which seems to have
been designed to halt exploration by other countries
while China laid the groundwork for its own offshore
activity. * The PRC is now able to reinforce its claims
and demonstrate its intentions not only with naval
vessels but also with drill rigs. Whether it will engage
in the "consultations with other countries concerned"
or proceed unilaterally will depend upon the political
importance of the country involved. China will not
hesitate to explore or test drill in areas claimed by
Taiwan or South Korea. Although the recent Chinese
actions near the Senkakus indicate a new willingness to
risk antagonizing the Japanese, Peking will probably
try to reach a modus vivendi with them before drilling
in any sensitive areas of the East China Sea. In fact, on
two recent occasions PRC officials have even discussed
with the Japanese a joint effort to exploit offshore
petroleum, raising the possibility of future Chinese
flexibility on shelf jurisdiction. The continued exist-
ence of governments in Taiwan and South Korea that
are anathema to the PRC precludes any future
multilateral negotiations aimed at dividing the shelf.
Republic of China**
The Republic of China's LOS claims are based on
the assertion that the ROC Government represents all
of China. Its claims are supposed to represent legal
* The PRC has embarked upon an extensive program to develop
offshore mineral resources in the Yellow, East, and South China
Seas. The PRC claims to have completed aerial geophysical surveys
of this entire area, and numerous seismic survey ships have been
actively exploring in waters beyond 200 miles from the mainland.
At least eight offshore drilling rigs are operating in China waters,
and the Chinese are actively seeking modern offshore equipment
to add to the two rigs recently acquired in Singapore.
**Due to its worsening international position, Taiwan has kept
a low profile on LOS matters compared to other states in the
region. Taiwan's claims, however, contribute to a sticky regional
problem and help prevent a resolution of common maritime
problems by other states, notably Japan and the PRC, who might
otherwise reach an agreement.
3
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East
(S. Korea-
~J
J~
~v
South China
Sea
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Philippine
Sea
Republic of China
Maritime Claims
Territorial sea (3 nm)
Exclusive fishery zone (12 nm)
Map 3
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claims for all the mainland coastline but are, of course,
effectively limited to the island of Taiwan and several
other small islands. Without the legal assumption that
it speaks for the mainland, the ROC would have no
basis for some of its maritime claims (map 3).
change, the odds of military action by the mainland
against a drill rig will increase. In the meantime,
Taiwan's continental shelf claims should serve as a
hindrance to a Sino-Japanese accord in the East China
Sea.
The ROC enforces a 3-mile territorial sea and a 12-
mile exclusive fishery zone around Taiwan, the
Pescadores, the Senkakus, and other small island
groups near the main island. Some consideration was
given to enlarging the territorial sea claim to 12 miles
to counter other countries' extensions, but this step has
not been taken. A 200-mile economic zone was also
considered but was dismissed as unworkable because
of the political problems involved in establishing and
enforcing it.
The ROC, in . its role as the sole legitimate
government of China, has claimed extensive areas of
the continental shelf in the Taiwan Strait and East
China Sea. The ROC Government staked out five
seabed reserve areas extending to the Chinese main-
land, granted concessions, and actively promoted
drilling activity by the concessionaires. The offshore
activity in these reserve areas has all been on the
Taiwan side of a median line with the mainland,
largely because the US Government has warned
.American oil companies not to drill in disputed
offshore waters. Sizable commercial deposits of oil or
gas have not been found.
The ROC is not likely to establish any new
territorial claims beyond the 12-mile mark. The
economic advantages of enacting such sea limit
extensions are far outweighed by the accompanying
enforcement and political problems. Taiwan cannot
afford to stake out national maritime boundaries that
appear to treat the island as a separate nation, grid it
cannot enforce boundaries that pertain to the main-
land. The economic stakes are much higher in the
continental shelf, and the ROC's need for oil should
prevent a retreat from its original shelf claims. The
government will try to increase the rate of exploratory
offshore drilling, which has been slowed by numerous
dry holes and the return of leased areas to the
government. The PRC will probably continue to take a
tolerant attitude toward Taiwan's exploratory offshore
drilling activity as long as it remains comfortably close
to Taiwan's coastline, under the auspices of a one
China government, and fails to produce significant
quantities of oil or gas. Should any of these conditions
Japan
Japan's primary interest has been to preserve
freedom of access to the seas for its merchant and
distant-water fishing fleets. The government was
reluctant to increase its maritime limits,' but domestic
pressures and the aura of inevitability surrounding the
12- and 200-mile concepts finally combined to force it
to extend its claims (map 4).
On 1 July 1977 Japan increased its territorial sea
from 3 to 12 miles in response to pressure from
domestic opposition parties and the coastal fishing
industry. To avoid compromising its three non-nuclear
principles (one of which prohibits the presence of
nuclear weapons in the territorial sea) and damaging
its position favoring unimpeded transit through
international straits, Japan kept a 3-mile limit in five
heavily traveled international straits. Although consid-
eration was given to establishing a territorial sea
around the Northern Territories, the Senkakus, and
Tok-do, none of these disputed islands was specified in
the declaration. This avoided resurfacing territorial
disputes with its neighbors and did not seriously
undercut Japan's own claims.
Exclustive Economic Zone
Japan will probably refrain from declaring a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone until the zone is
formalized in an international LOS treaty. A prior
declaration would create political problems for the
cautious Japanese with the Koreas, Taiwan, and the
PRC. Japan instituted a 200-mile fishery zone on
1 July 1977, primarily to strengthen its bargaining
position in the difficult fishery negotiations with the
Soviet Union. To mollify the PRC and South Korea,
whose waters are heavily fished by the Japanese, and
to avoid reopening disputes with those two countries
over the Senkakus and Tok-do, Tokyo refrained from
drawing the line on the west side of the Japanese
islands opposite South Korea and the PRC. Also, the
exclusive provisions of the zone are not being applied
to Chinese and South Korean fishing fleets in order to
avoid abrogating existing fishing agreements.
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` Map 4
Chiroa
Se of
Japan
~Liencourt Rocks
South (Take-shims)
Korea n
Pacific
Ocean
Japan
o Maritime Claims
Q [] Territorial sea (12 nm)
-- Republic of Korea-Japan continental
shelf boundary
Scale 1:18,000,000
b
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North
Kore~^
P'y8n9~}ang
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Continental Shelf Claims
Japan's government has made no controversial
continental shelf claims. Under Japanese mining law,
the government becomes legally involved in seabed
mining only when it approves a company's application
to develop mineral resources or when it formally
defends the position of such an applicant. It has
avoided doing either in disputed areas, even during
the height of the oil fever during the late 1960s. Four
undersea blocks in disputed areas of the Korea Strait
and the East China Sea were staked out by oil
companies in 1969, but the government has not
authorized the concessionaires to proceed with devel-
opment, largely because of PRC protests. To alleviate
the dispute with South Korea, Japan signed a
continental shelf pact with Seoul in 1974 that divided
the Korea Strait shelf and postponed a final division of
the East China Sea shelf in favor of joint development
of any potential petroleum deposits. This attempt to
soothe South Korea involved Japan in a dispute with
China. Chinese protests helped postpone Diet ratifica-
tion of the pact for 3 years and delayed passage of the
implementing legislation, necessary to allow explora-
tion and development to proceed, until June 1978.
resources and to protect its coastline and waters have
led to a controversial JDZ agreement and an
adherence to the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a
military boundary of uncertain legality (map 5).
Territorial Sea Claims
South Korea established a new baseline and
extended the breadth of its 3-mile territorial sea to 12
miles on 30 April 1978. Although the final outline of
the baseline and territorial sea awaits publication,
Tok-do and the Northwest Islands were not specified
in the decree. The principal controversy surrounding
the location of the new boundaries is the status of the
waters in two important straits-Korea and Cheiu.
Seoul has decided to maintain a high seas corridor in
its half of the western channel of the Korea Strait. By
decreasing the breadth of its territorial sea in the strait
to 3 miles, South Korea hopes to reduce the chances
for a potential naval confrontation with the PRC or
the' Soviet Union. For security reasons, Seoul had
considered designating Cheju Strait internal waters.**
Apparently, US pressure has caused ~ the Koreans to
abandon this idea, but the strait will be included in
South Korea's territorial sea.
Outlook
Japan's position as a major maritime nation has
dictated a cautious approach to the expansion of
national sea limits and a compromising of both the 12-
mile territorial sea and the 200-mile fishing zone.
Tokyo will not enlarge its present sea limits or make
any controversial continental shelf claims unless a
clear consensus emerges from the LOS conference.
Japan has also shown a willingness to yield on
jurisdictional issues in favor of economic or political
considerations, atendency evident in both the joint
development zone agreement and the abbreviated
200-mile fishery zone.
Japan will probably continue to take a cautious and
flexible approach to the regional LOS problem, mainly
to avoid an involvement in the political feuding
between the rival Chinese and Korean Governments.
With a large economic stake in both halves of the
divided nations, Japan is sure to follow as close to a
middle course as possible.
Republic of Korea
As an emerging maritime nation, South Korea has a
keen interest in seeing that freedom of the high seas is
retained and, consequently, does not want to take a
territorialist approach toward its sea limits. However,
the South's need to develop offshore petroleum
Exclusive Economic Zone
The establishment of 200-mile exclusive economic
or fishery zones by some coastal countries badly hurt
the ROK distant-water fishing industry. Japan's special
treatment of South Korea and China's decision to
delay drawing up an exclusive fishery zone have
lessened the need for Seoul to enact a 200-mile zone.
Enforcement difficulties and concern over the subse-
quent, inevitable disputes with the PRC and Japan are
also reasons for South Korea's decision to table its
plans. An extension of Seoul's present 12-mile exclu-
sive fishery zone would probably require renegotiation
of the 1965 Japan-ROK fishing agreement and reopen
the debate with the Chinese over the legality of the
ROK-Japan joint development zone.
? The new law, although not expansive in area, contains some
security-oriented restrictions on passage that are not favored by
other maritime nations.
?' The Soviet Union once delivered a naval ship to North Korea
after sailing it through this strait, and the South has had problems
with North Korean agent boats near these waters. Seoul decided to
withhold the final outline of the territorial sea in the Cheju area
pending Japanese Diet action on the continental shelf pact
implementing legislation in June. This delay served as a reminder
to the Japanese Government that failure to pass the implementing
legislation could result in some lucrative fishing areas becoming
off-limits to Japanese fishermen.
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Nonhem
Limit
Line k
Republic
of
Korea
Soh6ksanido~
Seabed
Mining S
Area
~Rhee Line
~~ Territorial sea aad exclusive
fishery zone (12 nm)
Scale 1:7,300,000
Republic of Korea-
Japan Joint
Development Zone
.China Sea
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Rep. of Korea-lapen
Continental Shelt
i/ Boundary
Philippine
Sea
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The South Korean Government, in 1952, made a sea
claim-termed the Rhee Line=similar in concept to
the modern economic zone. The Rhee Line proclama-
tion claimed ROK sovereignty over all economic
resources for a large area of the water and seabed
around the entire Korean peninsula. The Rhee Line
claims, however, have not been actively advanced by
the Pak government, and many of its restrictions have
been whittled away by the ROK-Japan fishery and
continental shelf agreements.
Continental Shelf Claims
The Rhee Line's extensive claims of sovereignty
over seabed resources were superceded.in 1970 by
the Submarine Mineral Resources Development Law
and a presidential decree establishing limits for seven
seabed mining blocks. In delineating its shelf claim,
Korea chose principles of international law that
maximized its claims-a median line on the west
coast, natural prolongation on the south, and primar-
ily amedian line on the east. China is unwilling to
accept a median line as a valid method of dividing
the Yellow Sea, and has vigorously opposed both
Korea's shelf claims in the East China Sea and the
JDZ part of the ROK-Japan continental shelf pact.
Yet, if the Japanese Diet had failed to pass the
required implementing legislation, South Korea was
prepared to proceed with unilateral exploration of
the JDZ, despite PRC objections.
Miscellaneous Claims
The NLL was originally drawn by the Commander
of UN Naval Forces in Korea to help prevent
maritime incidents in the Yellow Sea. Vessels under
the UN naval command are forbidden to sail north of
this line, which is located between the UN-controlled
Northwest Islands and the North. Korean coastline.
Although the NLL could be completely enveloped by
a hypothetical North Korean 12-mile territorial sea
and has no basis in international law, the South has
promoted it as the de facto boundary line in the
Yellow Sea. Pyongyang, although generally respecting
the NLL, has never formally recognized it.
South Korea also utilizes various fishery control lines
in both the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan in an
effort to control its aggressive coastal fishing fleet,
which tends to follow migrating fish into contested
waters. The fishery control lines are generally several
miles south of the NLL (on the west coast) or the
Military Demarcation Line (on the east coast) and are
moved north only for short periods to allow the fleet to
follow the migrations of the more important species.
These lines have been only partially successful because
of the difficulty in keeping track of the thousands of
primitive fishing boats in those two areas.
With a new 12-mile territorial sea limit and an
official claim to the most promising areas of the shelf
already enacted, the ROK has only one sea limit left to
add-some form of extended exclusive economic or
fishery zone. South Korea appears to be reserving such
a zone as a retaliatory measure in the event that China
enacts a form of the 200-mile zone or Japan fails to
fulfill its obligations in the JDZ. South Korea will
continue to support the NLL, regardless of the line's
legality. Seoul believes the NLL is necessary to ensure
protection of the Northwest Islands, which have
become an important symbol of South Korean
determination to resist its northern neighbor.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
North Korea views the international LOS confer-
ence as an arena for the struggle by the Third World
against the developed nations. The North portrays
itself as a poor Third World nation struggling against
the US imperialist aggressors and the puppet South
Korean Government. P'yongyang's recent sea limit
extensions, especially its unprecedented 50-mile secu-
rity zone, illustrate the government's willingness to
flout international law in order to ensure its national
security (map 6).
Territorial Sea Claims
Pyongyang has neither revealed the baselines from
which its sea limits are measured nor published an
official proclamation on its territorial sea, hinting only
that a 12-mile limit is in effect.* The exact boundaries
of the territorial sea became moot in August 1977
when Pyongyang established a military zone off both
coasts that gives the North tighter control over the seas
than it would have with a territorial sea regime. The
North may ultimately install an official 12-mile
territorial sea, if only to help buttress its claims to the
waters around the Northwest Islands.
During the 1973 Northwest Islands crisis, the chief North
Korean representative at the Military Armistice Commission
contended that the waters surrounding these islands were within
North Korean "coastal waters." All the islands could be included
within a hypothetical 12-mile territorial sea, leading to the belief
that a 12-mile regime was being claimed.
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Democratic People's
Republic of Korea
Maritime Claims
Hypothetical
territorial sea (12 nm)
Chin a
D. P. R. K.?U. S. S.R.
Hypotheflcal Equfdlstani Une
~D. P. R. K.~Soufh Xo~ea
Hypolhefica/ Equidistant Une
Ocean Resource Claims
Exclusive Economic Zone
On 1 August 1977 North Korea established a 200-
mile economic zone a~pd a military zone "to reliably
safeguard the economic zone." This was the first time
the North Koreans publically announced having a
military zone, although different versions of a
military control zone have been intermittently
enforced by the North Koreans since the mid-1960s.
All foreign military activity is prohibited in the zone,
and foreign civilian ships and aircraft are allowed to
navigate through the zone only with prior govern-
ment approval. Foreign fishing vessels are not
allowed to fish or transit the zone. The economic zone
claims all resources for the Koreans. The economic
zone seems to be a genuine response to the global
trend toward the 200-mile zone, but the military
zone, purportedly to protect the economic zone,
appears to be an attempt by the security-conscious
North to control possible foreign intelligence activity
off its coastline.
North Korea has not announced the boundaries of
its military and economic zones in the Yellow Sea
except to note that the two zones are coincidental.
Although extending slightly south of the NLL, the area
presently being patrolled by the North implies
acceptance of the NLL. The western limits of North
Korean patrols correspond closely with the eastern
boundary of the PRC's military warning zone.
In the Sea of Japan, the military zone boundary, as
announced by the North, extends 50 miles from an
unspecified baseline and the economic zone 200 miles
from the same baseline, or to the "halfway line of the
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sea" where the line cannot be fully extended. The
North revealed a set of coordinates for the east coast
economic zone to a Japanese Diet delegation in
Pyongyang to negotiate a fisheries agreement. These
coordinates can be used to calculate both the extent of
the military zone and the coordinates of the baseline
from which the other zones were measured. This
calculated baseline runs in a straight line from the
Soviet border to the Demilitarized Zone, enclosing a
large area of what normally should be territorial seas
or high seas as internal waters and violating accepted
international LOS guidelines.
The Soviet Union has not yet published the
boundaries of its 200-mile zone in the Sea of Japan,
but the limits of the North Korean zone as given to the
Japanese Diet delegation clearly extend well past a
hypothetical Soviet-Korean equidistant line. North
Korea will probably agree to a more equitable division
of this area when the USSR defines the limits of the
Soviet zone. A more serious problem exists farther
south at the DMZ where the North's claims are sure to
overlap the South Korean 12-mile territorial sea or any
future South Korean 200-mile zone.
Continental Shelf Claims
The North Korean Government has made public
pronouncements that imply a claim to the continental
shelf of the entire Korean peninsula. Only those
portions of the seabed from the coastline to the limits
of the new economic zone have been formally
claimed. Apparently, Pyongyang is preparing to
exploit its shelf; a crude offshore platform has been
detected on the west coast in the shallow waters of
Korea Bav. The government has authorized the State-
owned Korea Industrial Technology Corporation to
engage a Singapore-based consulting firm to put
together a complete package of subcontractors for
offshore petroleum exploration.
Outlook
The most distinctive feature of North Korean LOS
policy, as evidenced by the new sea limits, is the
government's disdain for international norms. Neither
world opinion nor an international LOS agreement is
likely to force Pyongyang to retreat very far from its
expansive new boundaries. That the North would sign
a contract with a foreign oil exploration company
implies attachment of great importance to the
exploitation of offshore areas. This emphasis also
indicates that North Korea may ultimately renew its
claims to the waters south of the Northwest Islands, an
area denied it by the NLL.
Potential Conflict Areas
No other region contains as much potential for
conflict as this one, where two divided nations and
Japan are striving to increase their economic utiliza-
tion of the sea. Several islands and tracts of the ocean
where these countries' maritime claims overlap stand
out as the most serious and persistent areas of conflict.
The disputed islands-the Senkakus, the Northwest
Islands, and Tok-do-have little intrinsic value. They
will play an important role, however, in determining
jurisdiction over much of the shelf and waters of
Northeast Asia. Potential offshore petroleum reserves,
rich fishing grounds, and security concerns help fuel
the debate over areas of the East China, Yellow, and
Japan Seas.
East China Sea
The dispute in the East China Sea is primarily over
oil. The 196$ UN survey stated that the area between
Taiwan and Japan may be "one of the most prolific oil
reservoirs in the world." * Although all five govern-
ments have at least implied claims to parts of the East
China Sea, the Senkaku Island group and the ROK-
Japan Joint Development Zone are at the center of the
dispute.
Senkakus
The debate over ownership of the Senkakus is only
the superficial focal point for the dispute over the
right to exploit the petroleum thought to be present in
the continential shelf around the islands. Jurisdiction
over thousands of square kilometers of shelf may
depend on a determination of both the ownership of
these islands and the effect given them in a shelf
division.
Since the original dispute in 1970, Taiwan has
aggressively pressed its claims to the islands and
surrounding waters. Taiwanese naval craft regularly
patrol the area, often driving away Japanese fisher-
men. The ROC Government also attempted to coerce
an unwilling concessionaire, Gulf Oil, to drill in waters
around the islands. Gulf has since, relinquished its
concessions, and the State-operated China Petroleum
Corporation is searching for subcontractors willing to
accept the hazards of drilling in these contested
waters.
The possibilities for Taiwan to accomplish more
than exploratory test drilling are hindered by the
? Drilling activity in the outer margins of the East Ghin? Sea
(near Cheju-do and Taiwan) indicates that the original survey was
too optimistic. However, no significant test drilling has taken place
to the most geologically promising areas, and the governments of
the region still do not know how much oil is located beneath the
East China Sea.
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looming specter of potential adverse PRC action, the
increasing opportunity for oil companies to conduct
business with the PRC, and the disapproval of the US
Government. The PRC has nothing to lose by allowing
Taiwan to test drill in the area, but probably would
take a stand against any attempts at commercial -
production of oil.
Japan and the PRC, during their 1972 move to open
diplomatic relations, agreed to shelve their dispute
over the islands, and the Japanese Government has
since scrupulously adhered to this agreement, espe-
cially in drawing up its territorial sea and fishery zone
extensions in 1977. China had-also complied with the
informal agreement until its recent dispatch of a large
fishing fleet into the islands' waters. Although Chinese
motives in the April 1978 imbroglio remain unclear,
the two nations are unlikely to let the incident affect
their long term economic or political relationship.
Tokyo and Peking could . probably settle the
Senkakus issue if the two could factor Taiwan out of
the East China Sea equation. Without a positive
assurance that oil is present, Japan is unwilling to risk a
disruption of economic relations with Taiwan by
negotiating a division of the East China Sea with the
PRC. With no resolution of the two Chinas problem in
sight, Japan and the PRC are likely to return to their
earlier policy and treat the dispute with benign
neglect.
Joint Deaelopment Zone
Other Asian countries are closely watching China's
response to the attempt by the ROK and Japan to
develop jointly a large area of the continental shelf.
Progress toward this goal has been slowed by PRC
protests in spite of the fact that the JDZ is on the
Japanese side of an equidistant line with China.
Although Chinese objections initially delayed ratifica-
tion of the pact, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
succeeded in passing it through the Diet with a clever
parliamentary maneuver in June 1977. The strong
PRC reaction after the ratification alarmed the
Japanese Government, but the LDP, discounting the
PRC objections, decided to pass the domestic imple-
menting legislation in June 1978. * The two nations'
? The PRC threatened economic sanctions against the Japanese.
The only evidence of such action is the somewhat tougher stance
taken by the PRC at the December 1977 fishery talks with Japan in
which the Chinese proposed the institution of catch quotas. The
recent $20 billion long term trade agreement between the two
countries indicates that the threatened sanctions are not being
carried out. The Chinese also sent the Japanese a message in May
of 1978 by dispatching a marine research vessel into the southern
part of the JDZ.
determination to proceed, coupled with the statement
by Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien that "con-
crete" measures would be taken by the PRC if anyone
undertook actual exploration activities, promises to
keep the pot boiling. A military action against
Japanese-sponsored drilling activity poses unaccepta-
ble diplomatic risks, but China's invasion of the South
Vietnamese-held Paracel Island group and harassment
of South Korean fishing boats in the Yellow Sea suggest
that a military move against a South Korean drill rig is
a possibility. North Korea refuses to recognize the
validity of the ROK-Japan agreement but, given the
distances involved, is not likely to interfere militarily
with operations in the JDZ.
South Korea has had a number of clashes with both
China and North Korea in the shallow waters of the
Yellow Sea. Except for the 1973 Northwest Islands
crisis, these clashes have been isolated incidents
between armed patrol boats and fishing vessels. South
Korea has not backed off from confrontations with
North Korea in the Northwest Islands area but has so
far been unwilling to test PRC strength in the southern
part of the Yellow Sea.
Northwest Islands
Although the UN was given control of the
Northwest Islands in the 1953 Armistice Agreement,
jurisdiction over Yellow Sea waters near the islands
was not awarded to either side. In 1973 North Korea
provoked a confrontation by trying to enforce a claim
to waters around the five islands, all of which could
fall within a North Korean 12-mile territorial sea
drawn from straight baselines (map 7). In essence,
North Korea contended in 1973 that the UN-
controlled islands should not affect its juridical right to
put in force national maritime boundaries around its
coastline. * The South countered that the Armistice
Agreement obligates the North to respect the contig-
uous waters of the islands and also championed the
NLL as the de facto dividing- line in the Yellow Sea.
While North Korea never disavowed its claim to the
waters, it did end attempts to enforce the claim,
resulting in the present stalemate.
P'yongyang's recently established military and
economic zones add a complicating factor but have
not influenced the heart of this dispute-the disagree-
? It is indeed ironic that North Korea ignored LOS juridical
principles in establishing the east coast military zone yet relies on
them to justify claims to the waters around the Northwest Islands.
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\ti .
\~
\?
??
?3
~ yl
so
\~fhe'.
\'~ TP
~8 ~
NORTH KOREA `-'
MILITARY AND
ECONOMIC ZONE
126
ment over the effect the UN-controlled islands should
have on Yellow Sea jurisdiction. Since no real
precedent exists for this complicated situation-the
presence of UN-controlled islands near a nation's
coastline-a precise determination of each country's
rights in the area is nearly impossible. South Korea's
right of access to the islands is clearly granted by the
Armistice Agreement and customary international
law, but Seoul's contention that the NLL has become a
respected element of the armistice regime, and thus
should be the de facto boundary, is legally untenable.
North Korea's claim, that the Northwest Islands should
have no bearing on a division of Yellow Sea
jurisdiction, is also of dubious legitimacy.
South Korea is obviously content with the present
stalemate, as the NLL gives it direct access to the
Northwest Islands and denies North Korea the
effective use of a large area of the Yellow Sea. To
avoid upsetting the US troop withdrawal, the North
will probably continue to observe the status quo.
However, P'yongyang's initiation of the 1973 crisis
and increasing interest in exploiting offshore resources
are indications that North Korea will not let the
stalemate become permanent. The withholding of
boundary information on the west coast military zone
suggests that the extension of this zone into waters
south of the NLL will be the mechanism used by the
North to renew its claims to these waters.
' It should be noted that South Korea, in establishing its new sea
law, decided not to try to claim a national territorial sea around
the UN-controlled islands.
Southern Yellow Sea
The southern part of the Yellow Sea has been the
scene of numerous incidents between the Chinese and
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South Korean fishing fleets. Chinese vessels, often
armed or escorted by patrol boats, have abducted
ROK boats and crews, confiscated catch and equip-
ment, and generally harassed Korean fishermen. All of
the incidents have occurred in the PRC's Fishery
Protection Area 1 (map 2) between the Korean island
of Sohuksan and the Chinese mainland. The protection
area is partially on the Korean side of a hypothetical
equidistant line and partially within the ROK's
continental shelf claim.
The problem stems from both South Korean
reluctance to accept PRC enforcement of a fishery
protection zone in that area and the incompatible
fishing techniques used by the two fleets. Seoul
contends that a unilaterally declared restriction zone is
not binding on it or any other littoral state under
international law and practice. The voluntary fishery
control lines set up by the Korean Government have
not been effective in controlling its venturesome fleet.
Even when the two fleets are separated, Chinese trawl
nets being towed through the water are often fouled
by stationary nets previously set by the Koreans.
Sea of Japan
Maritime Claims
The potential is low for a violent confrontation in
this area. South Korea remains most deferential to the
PRC and has sent no armed boats to protect its fishing
fleet. Seoul has even tried to turn the incidents to its
advantage by using them as a iustification to call for
much desired joint consultations with the PRC on
fisheries and other matters pertaining to the economic
exploitation of the Yellow and East China Seas. China
has been unwilling to engage in such talks. Maritime
incidents in this part of the Yellow Sea will probably
continue unless Seoul gains better control over its
fishing fleet.
Sea of Japan
The Sea of Japan has been relatively free of serious
maritime incidents. However, two contentious issues-
ownership of the island of Tok-do and the North
Korean military and economic zones-have the
potential to provoke diplomatic and military confron-
tations, respectively (map 8).
HOrth Korea-U.SS.R.
Hypothetical Equlsdisfent Line
r Hypothetical
Equidistant L/ne
(Liancourt Rocks ~
"`Rocks
(Tok?do,
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*P'y5ngyang
-North Korea-South Koree
Hypothetical Equidistant Une
~~ /apan-U.S.S.R.
Hypothetical Equlsdlstant Llne
!apan-South Korea
Hypothetical Equldlstant line'
,~/ (Liancourt Rocks
to South Korea)
Scale 1:8,500,000 0~
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South Korea and Japan have had annual public
quarrels over the ownership of this island since 1952,
with no resolution of the problem in sight. * Although
the debate is focused on Tok-do, the island, like the
Senkakus, is a surrogate for the real dispute over the
surrounding waters and seabed. Japan helped mini-
mize the dispute by excluding the island from its new
maritime zones. South Korea followed suit by not
mentioning Tok-do in its new territorial sea decree.
Although Seoul has lowered its voice on Tok-do, an
ROK Coast Guard detachment remains on the island.
The question of ownership must be resolved, and
the South Koreans seem to have a more fervent
attachment to Tok-do than the Japanese. Tokyo's
pragmatic approach to the iurisdictional dispute in
the area of the JDZ indicates that it might be
amenable to a similar joint development solution to
the Tok-do dispute. If Seoul objects to this idea, Japan
might even concede on the ownership issue in return
for an equitable shelf partition that would reduce the
influence of Tok-do on the final boundaries.
North Korean Military and Economic Zones
In establishing its military and economic zones,
North Korea managed to encroach upon the potential
economic zones of all the countries bordering the Sea
of Japan (map 8). The overlapping claims with the
USSR should be easily resolved. Japan did not extend
its zone into the potential overlap area and is
apparently willing to ignore the situation as long as
Pyongyang allows Japanese fishermen unrestricted
fishing privileges in the economic zone. The overlap-
ping claim with South Korea, however, has the
potential to provoke maritime incidents in the waters
off the DMZ.
Until the early 1960s South Korea's coastal fishing
fleet had numerous confrontations with the North's
naval patrols off the DMZ. Since the North originally
patrolled only near the coastline, the South established
a near-shore fishery control line that effectively
controlled its fleet. However, the extension of
P'yongyang's claims and patrols to the center of the
Sea of Japan will seriously test the South's ability to
keep its fleet separated from North Korean patrol
boats actively patrolling both zones. Complicating the
enforcement problem for South Korea is the highly
migratory nature of the fish species in east coast
waters. Flatfish, squid, saury pike, and Pollack, all
highly prized fish, have seasonal migrations that carry
them, and pursuing fishing fleets, from South Korean
waters into the North Korean zone. * Some of the east
coast's best fishing grounds, formerly fished by both
the Japanese and South Koreans, are now within
P'yongyang's military zone. South Korea has extended
its fishery control line, but keeping the fleet away
from the lucrative fishing areas along the more than
200-mile-long southern border of the North's zone will
be a formidable task.
An even more serious problem will occur if the
ROK ever chooses to disregard the North's zones and
enforces its own version of a dividing line. Such an
action would almost certainly precipitate a violent
response from North Korea.
* This year's dispute arose in May when a Japanese fishing fleet
entered waters off Tok-do eliciting the usual claim by Seoul that
the island is South Korean territory.
* The waters off the DMZ have the highest concentration of
ROK boats in the October-March period.
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Glossary
Baseline: The low water line along a coastline or, in the case of deeply indented or
island-studded coastlines, a straight line drawn across indentions or between islands
from which all other sea limits are measured.
East Asian Continental Shelf: The subsea extension of the Asian landmass that
underlies the Po Hai, the Korea Strait, and the Yellow and East China Seas.
Equidistant Line: A line, or boundary, drawn between two adjacent or opposite
countries, every point of which is equal in distance from their respective baselines.
Exclusive Economic Zone: An area adiacent to its coast within which a nation
exercises control over all living and non-living resources in the sea and on or beneath
the .seabed.
Exclusive Fishery Zone: An area adiacent to its coast within which a nation has
control over all living resources.
Internal Waters: Waters landward from a baseline over which a nation exercises the
same degree of sovereignty exercised over its land territory, including the right of
exclusion of foreign vessels.
Natural Prolongation Principle: The theory that the continental shelf, being made
up of sediments from the landmass, is the seaward extension of the land territory of a
coastal state and therefore should come under the jurisdiction of that coastal state
regardless of its breadth.
Territorial Sea: Waters seaward from a baseline over which a nation has exclusive
sovereignty conditioned only by the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels.
Innocent Passage: The right of a foreign vessel to pass through the territorial sea
of a coastal nation, so long as the vessel commits no act prejudicial to the coastal
nation or contrary to the rules of international law.
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Secret ,
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