NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000602010004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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U.S.S.R.
April 1974
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now
published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater per-
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters-Country
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact-
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
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This chapter was prepared for the NIS under
the general supervision of the Central Intelligence
Agency by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Social
and Economic Statistics Administration, Depart-
ment of f Commerce. Research was substantially
completed by June 1973.
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'J
0
This chapter supersedes the sociological cover-
age in the General Survey dated March 1971.
A. Introduction ........................... 1
B. Structure and characteristics of the society . 3
1. Ethnic composition ................... 3
2. Social structure ...................... 9
a. Social classes ...................... 9
b. Family ........................... 14
3. Values and attitudes ................. 16
C. Population ............................. 18
1. Density and distribution .............. 20
2. Age-sex structure .................... 25
D. Living and working conditions ........... 28
1. Health and sanitation ................. 33
a. Health problems .................. 33
b. Medical care ...................... 34
c. Environmental sanitation ........... 36
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Page
2. Diet and nutrition ................... 37
3. Housing ............................ 39
4. Work opportunities and conditions ..... 42
a. The people and work .............. 42
b. Labor legislation .................. 43
c. Labor organizations ............... 44
d. Labor and management ............ 46
5. Social security ....................... 47
a. Social insurance ................... 47
b. Welfare assistance ................. 48
c. Administration and funding ........ 49
E. Religion ............................... 50
1. Government and religion .............. 50
2. The Orthodox churches ............... 52
a. The Russian Orthodox Church ...... 53
b. The Georgian Orthodox Church ..... 54
c. The Old Believers ................. 55
3. Other Christian churches ............. 55
a. The Evangelical Christian Baptist
Church ......................... 55
b. The Evangelical Lutheran Church
and other Protestant groups ...... 56
c. The Roman Catholic Church ....... 57
d. The Armenian Apostolic Church .... 58
4. Islam ............................... 58
5. Buddhism ........................... 59
6. The Jewish question .................. 59
F. Education ............................. 61
1. Education in national life ............. 61
2. Government and education ............ 62
3. Levels of literacy and educational
achievement ....................... 62
Page
4. The educational system ............... 63
a. Preschool institutions .............. 63
b. Eight-year basic schools ............ 64
c. General secondary schools .......... 65
d. Specialized secondary schools ....... 65
e. Vocational/ technical schools ........ 66
f. Institutions of higher education ...... 66
5. Teachers ............................ 68
G. Artistic and cultural expression ........... 69
1. Literature ........................... 72
2. Performing arts ...................... 74
a. Music and dance .................. 74
b. Theater and motion pictures ........ 76
3. Art and architecture .................. 78
a. Painting .......................... 79
b. Sculpture .......................... 79
c. Folk and applied art ................ 81
d. Architecture and city planning ...... 83
4. Minority expression .................. 87
a. Ukrainian ......................... 89
b. Belorussian ....................... 89
c. Baltic ............................ 90
d. Georgian and Armenian ............ 91
e. Muslim ........................... 92
H. Public information ...................... 93
1. Printed matter ...................... 94
a. Press and periodicals .............. 94
b. Books and libraries ................ 99
2. Radio and television .................. 100
1. Selected bibliography ................... 101
Glossary .................................. 104
Page
Fig. 1 Ethnic composition (table) ........ 4
Fig. 2 Location of ethnic groups (map) ... 5
Fig. 3 Ethnic composition, by republic
(chart) ........................ 8
Fig. 4 Distribution of basic ethnic groups
(table) 9
Fig. 5 Representative Soviet citizens
(photos) 10
Fig. 6 Class composition (table) .......... 12
Fig. 7 Vital rates (chart) ................ 19
Fig. 8 Vital rates, by republic (table) .... 19
Page
Fig. 9
Comparative population data (chart)
20
Fig. 10
Population density (map) .........
21
Fig. 11
Population, by republic (table) .....
22
Fig. 12
Fig. 13
Population change, by administrative
area (map) ....................
Urban-rural population, by republic
(table) ........................
24
Fig. 14
Population of major cities (table) ...
25
Fig. 15
Estimated age-sex distribution
(chart) ........................
25
Fig. 16
Age-sex structure (chart) ..........
26
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Fig. 17 Average monthly earnings (table) . .
Fig. 18 Per capita consumption of goods and
Page
27
services (chart) ................. 27
Fig. 19 Ownership of selected consumer
durables (table) ................ 28
Fig. 20 Worktime required for purchase of
selected consumer goods (table) .. 28
Fig. 21 Contrasting dress styles (photo) .... 29
Fig. 22 Comparative ownership of consumer
durables (chart) ................ 29
Fig. 23 Food markets (photos) ............ 31
Fig. 24 Campaign against alcoholism (photo) 32
Fig. 25 Sources of daily per capita caloric
supply (chart) ................. 38
Fig. 26 Comparative consumption of meat
(chart) ........................ 38
Fig. 27 Representative housing (photos) ... 40
Fig. 28 Self-service cleaning and laundry
shop (photo) ................... 42
Fig. 29 Trade union structure (chart) ...... 45
Fig. 30 Social insurance and welfare
expenditures (chart) ............ 49
Fig. 31 Religious edifices now put to secular
use (photos) ................... 52
Fig. 32 Level of educational attainment
(table) ........................ 63
Page
Fig. 33 Educational system (chart) ........ 64
Fig. 34 Data on institutions of higher learning
(chart) ........................ 66
Fig. 35 Folk dancers and musicians (photos) 75
Fig. 36 Major Soviet theaters (photos) ..... 77
Fig. 37 Religious art (photos) ............. 80
Fig. 38 Realistic art of the 19th century
(photos) ....................... 82
Fig. 39 Modern art of the early 20th century
(photos) ....................... 84
Fig. 40 Socialist realism in painting (photos) 85
Fig. 41 Soviet monumental sculpture (photo) 86
Fig. 42 Imperial Easter egg (photo) ....... 87
Fig. 43 Cathedral of St. Basil the Blessed
(photo) ........................ 87
Fig. 44 Winter Palace (photos) ........... 88
Fig. 45 Church of St. Nikolai (photo) ...... 88
Fig. 46 Moscow subway station (photo) .... 89
Fig. 47 Comecon Building (photo) ........ 90
Fig. 48 Fabled Samarkand (photo) ....... 92
Fig. 49 Newspapers, periodicals, and books
(table) ........................ 94
Fig. 50 National newspapers (table) ....... 95
Fig. 51 Editorial offices of Pravda (photo) .. 96
Fig. 52 Selected magazines (table) ......... 97
Fig. 53 TASS facilities in Moscow (photos). 98
Fig. 54 Data on libraries (table) ........... 99
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A. Introduction
The character of Soviet society derives from the
forcible imposition of revolutionary theories and
programs, Western in their dynamism and materialis-
tic in their assumptions, on profoundly religious
groups of peoples who for centuries had lived in
tradition-bound ethnic communities isolated from the
Western world. Impelled by a dynamic philosophy of
history and with a formidable territorial base of
operations, the Communist rulers of the U.S.S.R. have
succeeded in a period of some 50 years in pushing
forward the industrialization of a nation that was
largely agrarian and technically backward. This,
however, has been achieved at the price of creating a
state that controls and represses the individual.
Many of the tensions in Soviet society arise from the
fact that the regime has forced upon its citizens ways
that are foreign not only to their traditions but also to
their character. By nature, the Russians are a frank
and open people, free in the display of their emotions
within defined limits of social control, gregarious and
argumentative, and given to passionate discussions of
broad abstractions. They value group membership
highly and are dependent upon the group, especially
its leaders, but seek personal, particularistic
relationships. Veering between extremes of work and
idleness, deprivation and indulgence, delight and
despair, Russians have never been remarkable for the
individual orderliness of their lives.
It was such a people that the Communists had to ~
regiment. Rapid industrialization required order and
discipline, and the Communist ideology demanded t
single-minded acceptance of its principles. Resistance
led to compulsion and suspicion. Religion was seen as
a dangerous force that had to be counteracted. The
huge bureaucracy erected by the regime was not
geared to offer personal attention. Communist
insistence that the individual had and must fulfill
responsibilities to the abstract ideas of the state and
the Communist Party destroyed the traditional linkage
between subject and ruler. Cut off from many
traditional sources of personal strength, the Russian
was forced to hide his emotions, curb his curiosity,
work efficiently and consistently, and be very careful
about his talk and his associations.
The problems created by the revolution-primarily
those of industrialization and the practical application
by centralized power of an often inexact and loosely
drawn social theory-are still being worked out, and
consequently the society is still in flux. According to
some Western scholars, the traditional model of a
dynamic totalitarian Soviet society pushing forward
has been replaced with one of a society stagnating
under the rule of a conservative bureaucracy and elite
bent on resisting change for the sake of preserving
vested interests.
But whether "dynamic" or "stagnant," Soviet
society remains closely controlled. Yet, even though
control is in the hands of a relatively small group
which is capable of drastically changing policy or its
implementation at a given moment, there are limits
upon the power of the state over the individual. The
sources of these limits are found not only in current
ideology and political practice but also in
prerevolutionary Russian culture and tradition and in
the imperatives of technological progress. No system of
government can control a society and remain
untouched by the cultural context within which that
society functions. Thus, the Soviet regime is a Russian
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entity and has had to work with the culture it
inherited. Indeed, its ability to use the nation's
cultural heritage has been a major source of strength.
This Russian cultural heritage originated in an
agricultural society, considerably influenced by
Byzantium, that was a universe unto itself, relatively
untouched by the scientific, rational, and industrial
currents that swept through the Western world. The
Bolsheviks took power over a European people who
had broken with serfdom later than any major
Western nation, who had maintained a system of
absolutist government reinforced by a highly
centralized state church, and who had been bypassed
by the Renaissance and the Reformation. The
isolation of Russia from the West has been an
important element in Russian history, just as today the
isolation enforced by the regime promotes the goal of
forcing revolutionary development on the Russian
people.
The inward-turning attitude of the people is
fostered not only by the policies of the regime but also
by geography. The vast plains of central Russia have
always been an object of awe and pride to the people.
The harsh climate and few roads in the great stretches
of plain caused men to gather in tight, lonely
communities. Survival was for the hardy and for those
who learned that their only hope lay in the physical
warmth' and social protection offered by the group. An
individual counted for nothing against the limitless
and formless plain. Yet those who survived reveled in
the breadth of the land they occupied, and Russians
continue even today to call themselves a "broad"
people.
The land and the immutable forces of nature were
treated as sacred long before the introduction of
Christianity. This pagan belief was fused with
Christianity and respect for the state. For the mass of
the people, God, the motherland, and the tsar became
a triumvirate of powers, all of whom would come to
the aid of the individual if they could be reached.
Reverence for the motherland was effectively used by
the regime during World War II, when political,
specifically Soviet appeals did not meet with the
desired response. The inviolability of the motherland
has been a source of strength for any regime seeking to
defend Russia against invasion.
The primary units of allegiance in prerevolutionary
Russia, apart from the country and the tsar, were the
household, and the communal village or mir. The
household was headed by a patriarch whose rule was
absolute. The village elder, along with the mir council,
was responsible for the periodic redistribution of the
land, which was allotted to the household units on the
basis of need. The elder's power derived from the
community. Leadership was not sought; it was
considered a burden. All decisions were made
unanimously, on the basis of consensus without a vote,
and once reached had the moral force of law and an
aura of sanctity. Since decisionmaking depended on
the absence of open disagreement, there was
tremendous social pressure upon individuals to go
along with the group. No provision was made in the
mir for a dissenting minority or a loyal opposition. The
origins of the present-day Soviet stress on. "mass
participation" may be traced in part to the councils of
the mir.
Lenin and the Bolsheviks sought to remake the
Russian people according to the theories of Karl Marx,
but Marx had envisaged the socialist revolution taking
place in a society with a developed capitalist industrial
economy. The main necessity in Lenin's plan for a
direct transition to socialism, therefore, was industrial
development. Indeed, the Bolsheviks displayed a
simplistic.. faith in the liberating and rationalizing
power of secular industrial society once it was rid of
the "fetters" of private property. With this faith went
a corresponding contempt for what Marx and Engels
in the Communist Manifesto called the "idiocy of
rural life." The peasant was to be recast in the mold of
the urban worker. Rationality, science, and progress,
defined in material terms, were to replace the static
and traditionalist bias of the peasant world with its
reliance on magic and religion.
According to Marx, all social and cultural
phenomena were seen as a "superstructure"
dependent on and largely shaped by the economic
base of society. The government itself, literature, the
arts, science, the means of communication, morality,
religion, and the family all were either products of this
base or the servants of those who controlled the means
of production. In conformity with this doctrine, all
existing institutions would either disappear or have to
be radically changed as the economic base itself
changed from a system of capitalist exploitation to one
controlled by the proletariat.
As interpreted by Lenin, revolutionary Marxism
held the promise of a paradise on earth. The new
regime, as the precursor of a worldwide proletarian
revolution, was "in step with history" and would lead
the Soviet people to new greatness. Once the society
was fully industrialized and all vestiges of capitalism
were destroyed, the people would take over the going
industrial plant and, as there would no longer be a
need for repressive political controls, the state itself
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would "wither away." A classless society would
emerge, operating under the slogan "From each
according to his ability, to each according to his
needs."
The planning that became an essential part of the
scheme of things after 1928 followed a period of much
trial and error. Centralization of production inevitably
brought into being a complex bureaucratic machinery.
Rapid industrialization required broad integration of
the economy and forced sacrifices on the part of the
masses, who were considered not yet able or willing to
think in terms of ultimate, common goals. Moreover,
support of the new order was not universal and
spontaneous, and resistance was not limited just to
those who had been "in control of the means of
production." Even "backward elements" among the
industrial workers resisted. The real masses, the
peasantry, were left relatively free at first but, as a
result of the forced collectivization drive initiated by
the First Five-Year Plan, they found themselves being
reduced to a state as miserable as that from which they
had begun to emerge.
Proceeding on the premise that its program must be
pushed, whatever the resistance and the human toll,
the regime developed an extensive police system to
eliminate any possible disaffection or subversion. The
political police enjoyed arbitrary and extralegal
powers of arrest and conviction and thus became a
source of terror for the majority of the people, despite
their traditional acceptance of strong central
authority. The regime also developed "mass
participation" as a means of exerting constant social
pressure on the people for increased industrial and
agricultural production and for positive support of
their policies. The withholding of approval because of
apathy or indifference was interpreted by the
authorities as hostility or even subversion.
Following the death of Stalin, a gradual relaxation
of internal controls and pressures on the individual
ensued, particularly after Khrushchev's denunciation
at a closed party meeting of Stalin's excesses. The
demands of an industrial society for order and
predictability in life, as well as the emergence of an
established upper class with a vested interest in the
system and in the maintenance of its favored position,
have tended to push the regime away from punitive,
terroristic, and negative controls in favor of incentives,
exhortation, and orderly legal procedures. The
problem of when to have recourse to intimidation and
when to adhere to legal methods has been a continual
source of difficulty.
B. Structure and characteristics
society
of the
1. Ethnic composition
Although Russians comprise a majority of the Soviet
population and are predominant in national life, the
population of the U.S.S.R. is marked by striking ethnic
and linguistic diversity. According to the Academy of
Sciences, there are 169 different ethnic groups, or
"nationalities," representing a number of basic racial
or linguistic stocks. Twenty-two of these groups
number in excess of 1 million (Figure 1). Most of the
other groups are quite small, however, and are in the
process, or face the eventual possibility, of being
assimilated by a larger group, particularly the
Russians.
Official regime policy has always been to enable all
ethnic groups to achieve literacy in their own language
and to promote their own culture within the
framework laid down by the Communist Party. It has
also been policy to convert all nationalities to Marxism
and to attract members of all groups to the party.
Cultural autonomy, as well as proportional
representation for minorities in all-union political and
social institutions, generally has served to alleviate
tensions that could cause serious disruption within the
nation. Moreover, potential leaders of the various
ethnic communities continually are being lured by the
advantages which conformity to Soviet norms offers,
leaving the masses largely inarticulate.
The distribution of the various nationalities reveals
that the Russians occupy primarily the heartland of
the U.S.S.R., while the non-Russian groups are
concentrated chiefly in borderland areas, primarily in
union republics other than the R.S.F.S.R. (Figure 2).
The western border area, from the Arctic coast
southward, is inhabited mainly by Karelians,
Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Belorussians,
Ukrainians, and Moldavians, with the major
exception of Murmanskaya Oblast, the Lake Ladoga
region, and Kaliningradskaya Oblast, which are
predominantly Russian. The southern border region,
from west to east, is occupied by Ukrainians along the
northern coast of the Black Sea; Georgians,
Armenians, Azerbaidzhani, and other smaller groups
in the Caucasus region; and Turkmen, Uzbeks,
Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, and Kazakhs in Central Asia. Along
the Siberian-Chinese border, Russians predominate,
but there are significant pockets of Altays, Tuvinians,
and Buryats. Much of the Pacific coast area of Asiatic
Russia and most of the Arctic littoral are inhabited,
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POPULATION PERCENT DISTRIBUTION PERCENT
CHANGE,
ETHNIC GROUP 1959 1970 1959 1970 1959-70
Russian ...................... 114,114
Ukrainian .................... 37,253
Uzbek ....................... 6,015
Belorussian ................... 7,913
Tatar ........................ 4,968
Kazakh ...................... 3,622
Azerbaidzhani ................. 2,940
Armenian .................... 2,787
Georgian ..................... 2,692
Moldavian .................... 2,214
Lithuanian ................... 2,326
Jewish ....................... 2,268
Tadzhik ...................... 1,397
German ...................... 1,620
Chuvash ..................... 1,470
Turkmen ..................... 1,002
Kirgiz ........................ 969
Latvian ...................... 1,400
Mordvin ..................... 1,285
Bashkir ...................... 989
Polish ........................ 1,380
Estonian ..................... 989
Other* ....................... 7,214
129,015 54.6 53.4 13.1
40,753 17.8 16.9 9.4
9,195 2.9 3.8 52.9
9,052 3.8 3.8 14.4
5,931 2.4 2.4 19.4
5,299 1.7 2.2 46.3
4,380 1.4 1.8 49.0
3,559 1.3 1.5 27.7
3,245 1.3 1.3 20.5
2,698 1.0 1.1 21.9
2,665 1.1 1.1 14.6
2,151 1.1 0.9 - 5.2
2,136 0.7 0.9 52.9
1,846 0.8 0.8 14.0
1,694 0.7 0.7 15.2
1,525 0.5 0.6 52.2
1,452 0.5 0.6 49.8
1,430 0.7 0.6 2.1
1,263 0.6 0.5 -1.7.
1,240 0.5 0.5 25.4
1,167 0.7 0.5 - 15.4
1,007 0.5 0.4 1.8
9,017 3.4 3.7 .12.5
NOTE-A minus (-) sign denotes a decrease.
*Includes 147 officially distinct groups ranging in size in 1970 from 704,000 (Udmurts) down to
a few hundred.
albeit sparsely, by the primitive peoples of the North,
Siberia, and the Far East, interspersed with Russians.
Numbering 129 million in 1970, the Russians, or
Great Russians, are by far the largest of Soviet ethnic
groups. The second largest of the groups are the
Ukrainians who, totaling nearly 41 million, are
concentrated southwest of the Russians. North of the
Ukrainians and west of the Russians are the
Belorussians, or White Russians, who numbered
slightly more than 9 million in 1970 and are the fourth
largest ethnic community. The Russians, Ukrainians,
and Belorussians are all of Slavic origin, speak closely
related languages, were converted to Christianity in
the 10th century, and trace their early history to the
medieval principality known as Kiyevan Rus. All were
overrun by the Mongol hordes in the 13th century, but
thereafter the course of their histories diverged. Among
Ukrainians in particular, this divergence has been
reflected in a distinct national consciousness that
separates them from the Russians and has not yet been
erased despite continuing efforts of the regime. Other
groups of Slavic peoples are also found in the U.S.S.R.
The largest of these are the Poles (1.2 million), of
whom about half live in Lithuania or Belorussia and
others in Kazakhstan. Additional Slavic peoples
include Bulgars (351,000), Czechs (21,000), and
Slovaks (12,000). All together, persons of Slavic origin
accounted for three-fourths of the total Soviet
population in 1970.
Aside from the Slavs, the largest bloc of nationalities
is that comprised of Turkic-speaking peoples who, in
the aggregate, make up about 13% of the population.
These include, among others, the Uzbeks, Kazakhs,
Kirgiz, and Turkmen of Central Asia; the Azer-
baidzhani of the Caucasus; the Bashkirs, Chuvashes,
and Tatars of the Volga valley; and the Tuvinians and
Yakuts of Siberia. With few exceptions, e.g., the
Chuvashes and the Yakuts, the Turkic-speaking
peoples of the Soviet Union are Muslims. The Uzbeks,
numbering 9.2 million in 1970, are the most numerous
of the Turkic peoples and the third largest nationality
in the country. Seven other Turkic groups number in
excess of 1 million.
25X1
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Russians
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OTHER INDO-EUROPEAN PEOPLES
Lithuanians, Latvians, Armenians,
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X Germans
A Jews
TURKIC PEOPLES
Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz
Uzbeks
? Turkmen, Azerbaidzhani
Estonians, Karelians, Mari, Komi,
Mordvins, Udmurts, Mansi,
Khanty, Nentsy, Buryats, Kalmyks,
Evenki, Eveny, Nganasany
Georgians, Chechens, Ingush,
peoples of Dagestan
PALEO-SIBERIAN PEOPLES
Q Chukchi, Koryaks, Nivkhi
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Unlike most of the other peoples of Central Asia, the
Tadzhiks speak an Indo-European language that is
akin to Persian. As of 1970, there were 2.1 million
Tadzhiks, living in an area bordering on Afghanistan.
Some other small related groups are found in the
Pamirs and in the Caucasus.
A number of diverse peoples speaking languages
that, with the exception of Armenian and Ossetian,
have no known relationships to languages elsewhere in
the world, inhabit part of the Caucasus, the region of
hills and high mountains between the Black ;Sea and
the Caspian Sea. Collectively, the term "Caucasian"
has been applied to these peoples. The two most
important Caucasian peoples are the Armenians and
Georgians, who are culturally and racially but not
linguistically related. Speaking an Indo-European
tongue, the Armenians numbered 3.6 million persons
in 1970 and are part of a larger group whose members
live in other parts of the world, especially the United
States and the Middle East. The Georgians totaled 3.2
million. Other Caucasian peoples include the
Chechens, Ossetians (who speak an Indo-European
tongue), Circassians (some known locally as
Kabardians and others as Adighe), and Ingush, plus
some 40 smaller groups living in the mountains,
particularly in the remarkably diverse Dagestan,
where there are no.less than 30 different nationalities.
Among the non-Slavic peoples along the western
border of the Soviet Union are the Moldavians,
Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. The Mol-
davians, who numbered 2.7 million in 1970, live in the
area formerly known as Bessarabia, annexed from
Romania in 1940. They are practically identical with
Romanians and their language, a Romance tongue, is
indistinguishable from Romanian except for the fact
that it is now written in the Cyrillic alphabet rather
than the Roman one. In 1970, an additional 119,000
persons identified themselves as Romanians.
Lithuanians and Latvians, numbering 2.7 million
and 1.4 million, respectively, in 1970, comprise the
majority ethnic communities in two of the three Baltic
republics. They speak very old Indo-European
languages. Along with Estonians, with whom they
differ mainly linguistically, they are among the most
Westernized of the Soviet peoples. The Estonians,
totaling 1 million in 1970, occupy the northernmost of
the Baltic republics. They speak a Uralic language
akin to Finnish. Other Soviet peoples speaking Uralic
tongues include the Mordvins (1.3 million), Udmurts
(704,000), Mari (599,000), Komi (322,000), and such
smaller groups as the Permyak, Karelians, and Finns.
Most of these peoples live adjacent to or among the
Russians, and most are rapidly being assimilated into
the Russian majority.
A number of small groups speak Altaic tongues
other than Turkic; these languages are believed to be
distantly related to those of the Uralic peoples.
Included among these small Altaic groups are the
Kalmyks and Buryats, both Mongolian peoples. The
former live in the steppes of the lower Volga, the latter
in areas near Lake Baikal. Also classified as Altaic
peoples are some of those whom Soviet authorities
refer to as peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far
East. These include the Evenki, Eveny, Khanty,
Mansi, Nentsy, and Nganasany. Other small groups of
peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East are
classified as Paleo-Siberian peoples and are among the
least advanced of all Soviet residents. Principal among
the Paleo-Siberians are the Chukchi, Koryak, and
Nivkhi.
In addition to Poles, Bulgars, Moldavians
(Romanians), and Finns, several other nationality
groups are extensions of peoples residing in
independent states outside the U.S.S.R. These include
Germans, Jews, Greeks, and Hungarians. Within the
Soviet Union, only the Germans and Jews are
numerically important. The German community,
numbering 1.8 million in 1970, represents the
descendants of German immigrants of an earlier
period. Prior to World War II, they were resident in
the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and along the
Volga. Exiled to Central Asia and Siberia after the
German attack in 1941, they now live scattered about
the nation, but mainly in areas east of the Urals. The
2.1 million Jews reported in 1970 are mainly an urban
people. Centers of Jewish population include Baku,
Kharkov,' Kiyev, Leningrad, Minsk, Moscow, Odessa,
Riga, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Tashkent, and Tiflis.
The total number of Russians increased slightly less
rapidly during the 1959-70 intercensal period than the
population as a whole and therefore the proportion of
Russians in the total population declined. Nonethe-
less, Russians still constituted a majority (53.4%) of all
Soviet peoples. The other two principal Slavic
groups-the Ukrainians and Belorussians-also grew
less rapidly than the total. Significant increases in the
number and proportion of Kazakhs and other ethnic
groups in the Central Asian republics bear witness to
high growth rates in these areas.
Seven of the ethnic groups listed in the census results
showed a decrease in number between 1959 and 1970.
For five of these groups-Mordvins, Karelians, Finns,
Czechs, and Slovaks-the numerical decrease was
quite small and probably resulted from assimilation,
high mortality among an aging group of people, or a
'For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of
this chapter.
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combination of these factors. The largest decrease
shown was for Poles, who dropped by 213,000, or more
than 15%. All the factors listed above, as well as
emigration to Poland, probably were instrumental in
this decline. The decline of 117,000, or 5.2%, in the
number of Jews during the intercensal period is of
particular note, given the continuing controversy over
their status in Soviet society. Inasmuch as emigration
of Jews during the 1950-69 period has been estimated
at only 15,000, the most plausible explanation for the
lower total in 1970 is assimilation or expediency.
An analysis of the 1970 ethnic composition of the
constituent republics (Figure 3) shows that, with two
exceptions, the basic group, i.e., the one for whom the
republic is named, constituted a majority within the
republic. In Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya, however, the
basic group did not account for half the population,
and in Kazakhstan there were more Russians than
Kazakhs. The number of Russians increased during
the intercensal period in all republics but Georgia.
Outside the R. S. F. S. R., this increase was largest in the
Ukraine (2,035,000), followed by that in Kazakhstan
(.1,550,000). Nonetheless, the proportion of the basic
ethnic group decreased significantly in only two of the
non-Russian republics. In Estonia, the proportion of
Estonians in the total population declined from 74.6%
in 1959 to 68.2% in 1970; in Latvia, the decline in the
proportion of Latvians was from 62.0% to 56.8%. The
decrease in both instances was the result not only of
Russian in-migration, but also of the fact that the
natural increase of the Russian minority in the two
republics is higher than that of the indigenous ethnic
group. Aside from these two exceptions, the proportion
of the basic nationality in the various republics either
declined by an insubstantial amount or actually
increased. Even in the case of Kazakhstan, which
experienced a heavy in-migration of Russians and
other Slavs, in the 1959-70 period, the proportion of
Kazakhs in the population rose.
Two main factors explain the ability of most of the
non-Russian republics to retain their ethnic identity in
the face of in-migration by Slavs, especially Russians.
The most important of these is the higher rate of
natural increase among many non-Russian nationali-
ties, as compared with that of the Russians. Even
though large numbers of Russians have continued to
migrate to republics other than the R.S.F.S.R., the
frequently higher natural increase of the indigenous
population, particularly the Turkic-speaking national-
ities and the Armenians, has reduced or eliminated the
effect of this in-migration. A second factor of
importance in some republics has been the
reinforcement of the basic ethnic group through
immigration from abroad. Since the 1959 census, for
example, an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 Kazakhs and
Uighurs have immigrated into Central Asia from the
People's Republic of China, while 10,000 to 20,000
Armenians have moved into the Armenian S.S.R.,
primarily from the Middle East.
Russians are found in number in all of the union
republics. The smaller ethnic groups in whose names
republics have been established tend on the whole, to
be less widely distributed. They are heavily
concentrated, with one exception, in a single republic,
sometimes lapping over into an adjacent republic. The
Armenians, however, are remarkably dispersed for a
nationality granted republic status. Whereas the other
14 such nationalities were listed in 1970 as having at
least three-fourths of their numbers in their own
national republic, only 62% of the U.S.S.R.'s
Armenians lived in Armenia, with an additional 26%
divided nearly evenly between Georgia and
Azerbaijan, 8% living in the R.S.F.S.R., and smaller
numbers in all other republics. Nonetheless, Armenia
that year was far and away the most homogeneous
republic in the Soviet Union, with 88.6% of its
residents Armenian by nationality (Figure 4).
Most of the Russians who have migrated to
traditionally non-Russian areas have moved to the
major urban centers of these areas, as managerial,
professional, and technical personnel or as trained
industrial workers. In most non-Russian republics,
Russians constitute a larger proportion of the
population in the capital city than they do in the
republic as a whole, reflecting the important
administrative role Russians play throughout the
U.S.S.R. Their position as the dominant nationality is
particularly pointed up in Kazakhstan and the Central
Asian republics, where in 1970 they comprised at least
48% of the population in each of the capitals.
Because ethnic identification usually is determined
by mother tongue, it follows that the Soviet Union is a
land of many languages, some of which are closely
related and others totally dissimilar. Language
families represented include Indo-European, Altaic,
Uralic, and Caucasian. Despite the fact that two-fifths
of the population speak a language other than Russian
as their native tongue, Russian is by far the most
important of Soviet languages. It is not only the
language of the principal ethnic group, but it is also
the official national language, the main language of
higher education, and the language of communication
between the various nationalities. Although most
minority languages, under Soviet law, are granted
equal status with Russian in areas where they are
spoken, Russian has greater prestige and practical
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GEORGIAN
S.S.R.
4,686,000
AZERBAIJAN
S.S.R.
5,1 1 7,000
UZBEK S.S.R.
1 1,960, 000
TADZHIK
S.S.R.
2,900,000
NOTE: Areas of circles are proportional to population
"Other includes all nationalities comprising less than 5% of a republics population.
KIRGIZ
S.S.R.
2,933,000
R.S.F.S.R.
130,079,000
aQOe. Ukrainian
Belorussia
Polish
Lithuanian
Moldavia,
Latvian
Tadzhik
FIGURE 3. Ethnic composition of the population, by republic, 1970
importance. Nearly all well-educated minority persons
speak it fluently, and a command of Russian is
universally regarded as indispensable to political and
social advancement. Among culturally developed
minorities, such as the peoples of the Baltic republics,
the Georgians, and the Armenians, wide use of Russian
creates a certain friction, and even among less
developed minorities, such as those of Central Asia, it
has provoked a limited resistance. Minority languages
are accorded equal status in many spheres, including
law and public administration. Trials usually are
conducted in the language spoken by the majority of
the people of the area, and interpreters are supposed to
be provided for those who cannot understand the
language of the proceedings.
All together, 141.8 million Soviets claimed Russian
as their mother tongue in 1970. Of these, 128.8 million
were Russians and 13 million were members of other
nationalities. Another 41.9 million persons were
reported as speaking the language "fluently," as a
second tongue. Thus, Russian was the native language
of 59% of the population and was spoken by 76%. The
proportion of persons in the various non-Russian
nationality groups who claimed Russian as their
mother tongue provides some measure of the extent to
which they have been assimilated into the Russian-
dominated Soviet society. Using this criterion, the
Jews are by far the most Russified, followed by the
Poles. Knowledge of Russian as a second language
varies substantially among the non-Russian minorities.
In general, those peoples living near or among
Russians are far more likely to know Russian than
those in the more remote parts of the nation. Among
the Kalmyks, for example, 81.1% of those for whom
Russian was not their native tongue claimed in 1970 to
speak it as a second language. In contrast, the
proportion among Uzbeks was 14.5%.
Turkmen
j/j1, Kirgiz
OTHER"
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FIGURE 4. Distribution of basic ethnic groups
PERCENT OF TOTAL I
PERCENT OF TOTAL ETHNIC GROUP
POPULATION OF LIVING WITHIN
ETHNIC GROUP OWN REPUBLIC OWN REPUBLIC
Russian ............ 82.8
Ukrainian .......... 74.9
Belorussian ......... 81.0
Uzbek ............. 64.7
Kazakh ............ 32.4
Azerbaidzhani....... 73.8
Armenian .......... 88.6
Georgian ........... 66.8
Moldavian .......... 64.6
Lithuanian ......... 80.1
Tadzhik............ 56.2
Turkmen........... 65.6
Kirgiz .............. 43.8
Latvian ............ 56.8
Estonian ........... 68.2
83.5
87.0
80.5
84.1
78.5
86.2
62.0
96.5
85.4
94.1
76.3
92.9
88.5
93.8
91.9
Although a knowledge of Russian is spreading
throughout the population, the vitality of the minority
languages is still strong. Among most of the large
minority communities, at least 80% claimed the
language of their nationality as their mother tongue.
Major exceptions are the Jews and Poles and, to a
lesser extent, the Germans and Bashkirs. Only 17.7%
of the Jewish community in 1970 regarded Yiddish as
their native language; only 32.5% of the Poles
considered Polish as their mother tongue. In part, the
low proportion among Jews reflects not only their
assimilation to the Russian majority but also the
refusal of Soviet authorities since 1948 to sanction the
operation of Yiddish-language schools, notwithstand-
ing constitutional stipulations guaranteeing each
citizen the right to instruction in his native language.
Primary schooling is provided in most indigenous
languages, but secondary training is conducted only in
the more important languages. The Soviet Govern-
ment also supports the use of minority language by
publishing newspapers, magazines, and books in these
languages and by broadcasting in them. At the same
time, almost all minority languages have undergone
some degree of Russification. The Cyrillic alphabet is
now used in all major languages except Estonian,
Finnish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish
(which use Roman letters), Armenian and Georgian
(which have unique scripts), and Yiddish (which uses
Hebrew script). Words of foreign origin in minority
languages have in many instances been purged and
replaced with Russians words, and all minority
languages have borrowed words-from Russian.
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the ethnic an,25X1
linguistic complexity of society is found in the marked
physical diversity of the Soviet peoples. Long and
complicated racial history has produced such diversity
between and even within nationality groups, so that
there is no such thing as a typical Soviet citizen or even
a typical Russian. Representative inhabitants of the
U.S.S.R. are shown in Figure 5.
In the early years of the Communist regime, the
leadership called for the liquidation not only of the
rich and the middle classes but also of all disparities
("contradictions") between urban and rural workers
and economic differences and privileges which
determine social classes. Although the ultimate goal of
a "classless" society remains part of Communist
theory, successive modifications concerning the means
to achieve such a society have resulted in the
continuation of disparities in the social structure.
Thus, contemporary Soviet society tends to conform
with other expanding, industrial societies, with social
differentiations based on occupational groupings
perpetuating the sort of distinction that traditionally
has provided the basis for social classes.
A more distinctive feature of Soviet society is the
existence of two additional social differentiations
which cut across or merge with essentially
occupational groupings. The more important of these
is the unequal division of the population into party
and nonparty members. The second is the distinction
between Russians and non-Russians, which places
Russians in the positions with the highest pay,
privileges, and political power in all areas of the
U.S.S.R.
The persistence of social classes has conflicted with
the regime's ideological commitment to a classless
society. Thus, the regime has repeatedly had to modify
ideology to bring it into partial accord with reality.
While its goal is a society guided by the principle
"From each according to his ability, to each according
to his needs," the regime claims that in building
communism Soviet society must continue to be
governed by the maxim "From each according to his
ability, to each according to his work." As the work of
various groups, such as peasants and urban workers,
differs, so does their reward in terms of lifestyle,
responsibility, and power.
Differences in society because of wages, member-
ship in influential organizations, particular types of
employment, education, native intelligence, ethnic
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FIGURE 5. Representative Soviet citizens
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0
0
Yakut
origin, or religion are not considered by Soviet theorists
to be evidence of social exploitation or to be sufficient
in themselves to demarcate "antagonistic" social
classes. It is sufficient for them that all the traditional
"exploiting" classes-that is, the nobility and
bourgeoisie-have been eliminated. Communist
theorists do, however, recognize two "nonantagonis-
tic" classes, the workers and the peasants, and one
"stratum," the intelligentsia. According to Commu-
nist theory, although each of these groups has a differ-
ent status within the system, they are interconnected
through coownership of the most important means of
production. In terms of the three officially recognized
groups in society, the Soviet population consists of
20% intelligentsia, including white-collar workers;
20% peasants, including state farm workers; and 60%
workers. Figure 6 details the development of the new
class structure of Soviet society, as interpreted by
Soviet statistics.
The worker and peasant classes can each be
subdivided into three groups. Those in the upper
group of workers are the most highly skilled; "they more
or less consistently overproduce their quotas. Members
of this group receive higher.base pay, special awards
from the regime, special vacation leave, and other
bonuses. In terms of prestige and economic position,
they overlap the lower reaches of the white-collar
group in the intelligentsia. The majority of -workers,
however, are semiskilled. This large group shades off
into the unskilled, a relatively unproductive group of
workers estimated to make up 20%. of the work force.
Most of these, earning a minimal wage, are new
I1
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FIGURE 6. Class composition of the population
(Percent)
Workers ........................
14.6
33.5 49.5
59.8
Employees ......................
2.4
16.7 18.8
20.9
Collective farm peasants and mem-
bers of craftsmen's cooperatives..
...
47.2 31.4
19.3
Individual peasants and craftsmen.
66.7
2.6 0.3
Bourgeoisie, landowners, merchants,
and large-scale farmers.........
16.3
arrivals in the urban work force and frequently have
completed only a minimum education.
At least a few peasants are relatively well-to-do and
form the upper group of the peasantry. However, the
per capita annual income for the collective farm
peasantry ranks the more prosperous members of this
group only slightly above the low-paid unskilled
workers and not above the semiskilled. The more
prosperous peasants have achieved their position
through membership in a collective farm that has been
exceptionally fortunate in terms of kind and amount
of crops, fertility of land, and location. Some peasants
on less favored farms may, through skill or
development of "model farm practices," achieve the
higher income and official recognition that will place
them in the prosperous group. Transitional between
the prosperous collective farm peasantry and the
semiskilled industrial workers are the state farm
peasants, who share---the rural way of life with the
collective farm workers but are paid wages by the state
for their labor instead of depending on the vagaries of
nature and consumer demand. The bulk of the rural
work force, however, is lower on the social and
economic scale than almost any industrial worker. Still
further down the scale are the few remaining
independent peasant farmers.
While the regime prefers to lump together a great
many occupational and status positions under the
rubric "intelligentsia," this group can be subdivided
into an elite, a traditional intelligentsia, and a white-
collar group. With the exception of the elite, which
owes its position to the possession of political power,
divisions within the intelligentsia are determined by
such factors as income, education, type of
employment, and a system of privileges and
bureaucratic rank. Ethnic considerations. are not of
fundamental importance, although Russians are more
heavily represented in the higher ranks. Nor are the
14.7 million Communist Party members guaranteed a
privileged position in society, although party
membership is an important prerequisite for
advancement.
White-collar workers comprise the largest group in
the intelligentsia stratum; they include a variety of
nonmanual workers, descending from petty bureau-
crats, through accountants and bookkeepers,
technicians and teachers, down to ordinary clerks and
salesgirls. Although the regime, for internal
propaganda purposes, persists in lumping the white-
collar group with the political elite and the traditional
intelligentsia as a means of blurring the privileged
group within the general population, the workers and
peasants generally distinguish between the two higher
groups and the ordinary white-collar workers. This
latter group is broad not only in diversity of
occupation but also in range of salary. The average
salary is only slightly above the industrial worker's
level, but a few earn an income as much as 10 times
that amount. Members of this group have little in
common, save a desire to maintain their position in
Soviet society; to do so many belong to the party or to
the Komsomol, the official youth organization.
The traditional intelligentsia includes those
occupying the upper and middle ranks in the party,
government, economy, and military; most scientists,
artists, and writers, engineers, managers of industrial
enterprises, heads of collective and state farms, and
others in responsible administrative positions; and
those, regardless of their occupation, who are well
educated. To some extent these groups form exclusive,
strongly hierarchical castes along with some members
of the white-collar group in the same line of
employment. Thus, occupational group loyalties apart
from general class distinction are engendered. Those-
belonging to the traditional intelligentsia are well
paid, with earnings averaging five to 10 times the
average worker's wage, but rank and privilege are
probably even more important considerations. Within
this group the proportion belonging to the Communist
Party is high. Members of the traditional intel-
ligentsia, a majority of whom have had a higher
education, are well rewarded because their capabilities
are in great demand and their allegiance is essential
for the regime's continued existence. Yet members of
this group are not free from censure in instances of
poor performance or undesirable political tendencies,
and they must bear the brunt of recurrent criticism in
politics, the arts, and sciences.
The elite, numbering approximately 10,000 persons,
is composed of the top party officials, senior
government, economic, and military officials, and
prominent scientists, artists, and writers. The elite is
sharply differentiated from other Soviet groups, and
25X1
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there is little overlapping with the traditional
intelligentsia. Despite the elite's predominance in
authority, rank, and responsibilities, however, its
remuneration and privileges are not much greater than
that of the traditional intelligentsia. The elite shares
with the intelligentsia the various perquisites attached
to their positions, such as priority in housing, medical
care in special clinics and accommodations in the best
sanatoriums, access to special stores and restaurants,
and special opportunities for family members.
Entry into the elite is difficult. Entrants must
combine ruthlessness, great drive and ambition,
ability in some specialty, and at least some capacity
for scheming and maneuvering. Connections are also
important, as many individuals rise to the top as
proteges of one high official or another. The
educational level of the elite is high, usually consisting
of technical training. This education, however, has not
been sufficiently broad to provide less intellectually
gifted members of the elite with the critical ability to
distinguish dogma and stereotypes from reality when
making decisions. Despite their different activities,
members of the elite belong to the party-a fact which
tends to insure uniformity of interest and outlook and
deters the development of particularistic interests
counter to those of the top party leaders.
Notwithstanding the leap which must be made to
pass from the peasantry or working class into the
intelligentsia, or from one layer in the intelligentsia
into another, the Soviet social system is more fluid
than that of prerevolutionary Russia. Individuals have
greater opportunity to move up the social ladder on
the basis of demonstrated political and technical
merit. In the early days of the regime, this mobility
derived from the fluid revolutionary situation and was
continued by the rapid expansion and growth of the
industrial sector of the economy. This social mobility
proved a great source of strength to the regime, as
people rising into the intelligentsia and the upper
echelons of the working class had a stake in
maintaining the system that provided them positions
inconceivable under prerevolutionary conditions. The
presence of officials, scientists, and artists of peasant
and working-class background, even though their
actual number is exaggerated by the regime,
demonstrates to the Soviet citizenry that individual
productive, political, and administrative abilities can
receive recognition.
The higher the individual rises in the social
structure, however, the greater the possibility that the
current may suddenly reverse and drag him down,
possibly below where he started. The vulnerability
associated with high positions has been known to deter
some talented individuals from aspiring to them. Thus
the party must actively seek out individuals with
proficiency as technicians and leaders. This seeking
out of potential leaders is a twofold process reinforcing
the system. The capable are mobilized to serve the
interests of the regime and are assured proper
recognition, while those who are talented but refuse to
join the party become suspect.
The early egalitarian philosophy of the party
stressed equal opportunity for both men and women,
another avenue for mobility opened by the
Communists. On the basis of occupation, working
women theoretically are accorded the same position in
the social structure as men. There have been instances,
however, where job ratings have been manipulated
extralegally so that professional women are paid
somewhat less than men engaged in the same work.
Most working women are in agricultural, manufactur-
ing, and other semiskilled or unskilled jobs.
Nonmanual workers among women seem to be in
relatively "safe" and lower paid jobs-as is the
tradition in the United States-such as teaching,
nursing, bookkeeping, and secretarial work. The major
exception to this is in medicine, where nearly three-
fourths of the physicians are women; even in this field,
however, the top positions are usually held by men.
Whether by their own choice or by official policy,
women are generally excluded from superior party
posts and other positions notably high in vulnerability.
While it is questionable that widespread class
consciousness has taken root again in the U.S.S.R.,
there exists an awareness of and preoccupation with
social differences among the population. Each class
has its distinguishing marks which make it an
identifiable target to others, and these visible
distinctions reflect deeper differences in social
viewpoint and lifestyle. Each class, in addition, has. its
own problems, and to some extent other classes in
society are seen as either creating these problems or
failing to mitigate them.
Since the death of Stalin, the regime has adopted a
number of measures to counteract hardening class
lines and to reduce growing economic differences.
Thus, secondary school tuition fees have been
abolished, taxes in the lower income brackets reduced,
and the annual compulsory bond subscription drives
eliminated. Minimum wages have risen, as have
payments to collective farmers, while the wages of the
upper income groups have risen less sharply. A general
increase in pensions has benefited lower income
groups chiefly. Yet, despite these measures, the gap
between income extremes remains wide.
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Education remains the principal means of
surmounting social and occupational barriers. To
avoid the danger of developing a permanent and
closed elite, but at the same time to meet the need for
an army of technicians to staff the ever larger and
more complex economy, the regime has made several
efforts to expand the educational opportunities
available to the nation's youth. Khrushchev in
particular attacked preferential schooling assignments
based on parental influence rather than on merit and
also the marked underrepresentation of students from
worker and peasant families in higher educational
institutions. The 1958 school reform, in addition to
making available some financial aid, provided for an
expansion of correspondence and part-time schools to
give worker and peasant youths a better opportunity
to continue their education. The academic standards
in these schools were not equivalent to those in full-
time schools, however, and their graduates remained
at a disadvantage in competition with students from
full-time schools for admission to higher educational
institutions. The 1958 reform also made some effort to
restore balance among applicants by requiring 2 years
of work in production for all but the top fifth of
applicants to higher educational institutions. After
persistent criticism that these innovations lowered
academic standards, the regime dropped the 2-year
work requirement and substituted a percentage
distribution in admissions among graduates of full-
time secondary schools, production workers, and
demobilized servicemen. Despite these efforts to
increase social mobility, the children of the upper
classes still enjoy an advantage by virtue of their
parents higher income, more cultured home
background, favorable geographical location, and
personal influence and connections.
b. Family
The most distinguishing feature of the Soviet family
is its subordination to and circumscription by the
state. Fostered materially by low living levels, such
dependency also reflects a real need to remain on good
terms with regime authorities, particularly in the areas
of housing, employment, and higher education.
Otherwise, the behavior patterns of most Soviet
families resemble those of their counterparts in
industrialized Western European countries.
Significant variations, however, occur in the relative
values which the various Soviet peoples attach to the
family as an institution. The Central Asian family, for
example, with its respect for religious sanctions,
emphasis on perpetuation of the male line, and
extension of family relationships into political and
economic life, contrasts sharply with the modern
Russified family among whom, as in Western
countries, family ties have been attenuated and family
influence has waned.
The regime follows a nationwide policy of remaking
the family according to revolutionary theory which
holds that members owe primary allegiance to the
state rather than to each other. To achieve this
objective the regime uses all the powers at its
command, including legislation, police control,
education, and propaganda. In many areas, rapid
urbanization and industrialization have tended to
accomplish the same end, drawing youths out of the
family at an early age, reducing the family size, and
splitting the family structure into its smallest unit, the
nuclear family. In addition, because many women
work outside the home to supplement a meager
income, many child-rearing functions have been taken
over by state nurseries, kindergartens, and schools.
Early Soviet legislation governing marriage and the
family was motivated. by the Marxist mandate to
destroy the family as an instrument of "bourgeois
exploitation," as well as by the practical consideration
of minimizing parental influence potentially
unsympathetic to regime control. Indeed, decrees
altering marriage and divorce codes were issued before
the Bolsheviks were firmly established and preceded
the separation of church and state, the definition of
the rights and duties of local soviets, and many other
measures vitally important to a new government
struggling for survival.
The most complete embodiment of early Soviet
policy toward the family was contained in the 1926
code. Under this legislation, control of marriage and
divorce was removed from the family and church and
placed under the jurisdiction of the state. Marriage
became a simple procedure of registering with the
Government Civil Registry Office (ZAGS), while any
change in family status could be reported to ZAGS by
mail, a convenience that led to a rash of postcard
divorces in European Russia. Furthermore, persons
living together who wished to omit the formality of a
registry marriage could do so without censure and
could legalize their relationship retroactively at any
time. Children born out of wedlock were granted the
same rights as other children. Legal resources were
provided the mother to establish paternity and to force
the father to contribute to the child's support. In
addition, the code legalized abortion, making it free of
charge at government hospitals. Other provisions
included the right of a wife to a joint interest in
property accumulated during married life.
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By the 1930's the regime perceived that its success in
weakening family ties had resulted in a number of
detrimental and unforeseen side effects, including a
falling birth rate, a rising divorce rate, and disrespect
among youth for all authority. Changing course, the
state denounced the free, unbound socialist family as
"leftist deviationism" and returned to the ideal of a
disciplined, stable family. Marriage was declared a
solemn affair. Registry offices were made more
attractive, and the manufacture of wedding rings was
revived.
By the same token, divorce was made more
expensive and more difficult. In 1936, higher divorce
fees were established, and penalties of up to 2 years'
imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony were
instituted. Abortion was outlawed. The 1944 family
code introduced greater stringency. Divorce could no
longer be obtained by simple registration but only
through extended, expensive court action. Unregis-
tered marriages were no longer recognized, and
children born out of wedlock were not entitled to
inherit on equal terms with legitimate children.
Furthermore, a mother wishing to prove the paternity
of an illegitimate child was denied the use of the
courts, although the government supplied minimal
assistance until the child reached age 12.
Following World War II, the wave of reaction
against liberal family policies subsided, and the
regime began to pursue a more moderate course. In
1955, in view of popular feeling favoring abortion, the
1936 law was repealed, and abortions for other than
medical reasons were again legalized if performed in
hospitals under state supervision. In 1965, following
long years of public complaint, the divorce laws were
amended to make the proceedings less costly and less
time consuming. Although unregistered marriages did
not regain full legal status, in 1968 provision was made
for children born to couples living together for an
extended period to claim inheritance. Court paternity
suits were again allowed and, if successful, the father
was expected to contribute to the child's support.
Emphasis on the large, stable family remains,
however. Since 1944 the regime has extended financial
and social aid to the family, at the same time
penalizing the childless, whether married or not, by
taxation. With the birth of the third child, the family
receives a lump-sum payment, and monthly
allowances begin with the fourth child. Employed
mothers receive liberal maternity benefits, and
mothers of large families are honored with medals and
orders glorifying motherhood. On the other hand,
leading a loose moral life and shirking family
responsibility are grounds for expulsion from the party.
According to the 1970 census, 72% of all Soviet men
age 16 and older were married; the comparable
proportion for women was 58%. Because of the
shortage of men, sizable numbers of women over age
30 have been unable to marry; additionally, because
women outlive men and because of huge losses of men
during World War II, there are many widows in the
older ages. As revealed by the census, the average
woman marries between the ages of 20 and 25, while
the average man weds between 25 and 30. In 1959, the
latest date for which data are available, family size
averaged 3.7 persons (3.5 in urban areas and 3.9 in
rural areas). The 1970 census figures, when available,
are expected to show a slight decrease in family size,
despite regime efforts to encourage large families.
Indeed, the number of children appears to vary
inversely with family status, the more affluent families
tending to restrict the number of children and use their
resources to improve living levels. In 1970, the divorce
rate was 2.6 per 1,000 population.
Within the family the parents' mandate to govern
their children comes not from the fact of procreation
but from the government, which assigns them
responsibility for rearing citizens loyal to the state.
Through its representatives in the party, trade unions,
or schools, the regime may intervene in a child's
upbringing and will hold the parents responsible if the
child misbehaves, does not do well in school, or makes
deviationist statements. As a result, instead of stressing
religious principles and traditional virtues, parents are
inclined to foster caution in social relations and
actions and to point out the importance of a successful
career and material rewards. Pragmatic. adjustment to
regime authority is considered prudent. Although
ideological flexibility and political conformity are
emphasized, blind obedience to authority, which the
regime would like to have instilled, is not an objective
of family training. It is considered enough to teach the
child to stay out of trouble. Aware that school officials
may elicit information on parental attitudes from their
children, parents generally avoid political discussions
in the home or any open expression of dissatisfaction
with conditions or with regime policies.
Since the traditional authority of the father has
been transferred to officials of the schools and the
party, parents no longer seem to expect the obedience
and solidarity that once characterized the Russian
family. Despite regime propaganda that parents must
be strict, they seem to have intensified loving
relationships with their children as their authority has
waned. Because parents are nevertheless responsible
for the acts and thoughts of their offspring, greater
emphasis is placed on the relationship between
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husband and wife as the only refuge for the free,
confidential expression of ideas.
The role of the individual in Soviet society is
prescribed in detail by the party which establishes
social norms, values, and standards of morality to be
followed in all areas of life. The ideal citizen is the
"new Soviet man" who, having shed all encumbering
traditions, places the interests of the state above those
of himself and his family. He is unquestioningly
devoted to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and gives
unstintingly of his time and energy to further the
Communist cause. At the same time he is disciplined,
obedient, temperate, puritanical in conduct, and
steady in mood.
Although the party has secured a measure of surface
conformity to this ideal, personal interest often
motivates actions contrary to the general welfare as
defined by the regime. Laws restricting private
enterprise are often violated, and workers and peasants
frequently indulge in speculative buying and selling.
The crime rate may be rising. A constant propaganda
barrage exhorting the people to be patriotic and obey
the law belies the party's assertion that the people
wholeheartedly support its program.
The state discourages alternative loyalties to
churches, geographic regions, and friendship groups,
unless sanctioned by the party. Organizational ties
allowed and encouraged are those to such
instrumentalities of the state and party as the
Komsomol, trade unions, cooperatives, civil defense
and sports groups, and assorted cultural, professional,
and technical societies. The general frustration of the
Russians' natural gregariousness and the rigid control
imposed by the state have left their mark. Despite
outward conformity,. many individuals struggle to
preserve some shred of personal independence. Often
the struggle is manifested by escapist and "antisocial"
attitudes and behavior, including drunkenness, a
liking for foreign clothes and fads, and attraction to
"decadent" forms of entertainment. On a higher level,
many are preoccupied with the past and with
scientific and technical occupations as little concerned
with politics and ideology as possible. In all segments
of Soviet society most citizens want only to be left
alone to live their lives in peace, rear their families,
work at their jobs, and enjoy recreation and the
company of friends with minimum involvement in
state and party affairs.
Traditional values among Russians, Ukrainians,
and Belorussians were formed historically under the
strong influence of the teachings of the Orthodox
Church, a predominantly rural economy, and an
authoritarian political system unsoftened by
traditional West European humanistic values. Peasant
mentality was marked by fatalism, patience, and
obedience and was generally weak in the spirit of
individual initiative and competitiveness. Upon this
framework the Marxist-Leninist ethic has been
imposed with widely differing degrees of success in
rural and urban areas, among economic classes, and
among different ethnic groups. Rural areas have been
less affected by industrialization and official
indoctrination through the years. Therefore, although
the peasant seems to live the least satisfying life,
usually below the economic level of the average
industrial worker, old traditions continue to persist in
the rural areas. He is the farthest removed from the
system and the least concerned with the absence of
civil liberties, material comforts, and job potential or
satisfaction.
For generations the peasant had little hope of
improving his position, and the wealthy person had
little fear of losing his. Consequently there was no
incentive for exceptional effort on the part of the
individual. The state has set out to change these
characteristics of lethargy and passivity by
encouraging all to work diligently and demonstrate
initiative in all fields but politics. Exhortation,
education, economic and social rewards, contrived
competition, and even legal penalties have been used
to reshape the Soviet citizen into the "new Soviet
man." Despite this effort, passive obedience, devoid
largely of enthusiasm, characterizes the outlook of
most Soviet people. Although they seem to have an
extraordinary capacity for hardship, and take pride in
the amount of personal discomfort they can bear, they
have grown adept at avoiding cumbersome
bureaucracy by na levo methods, meaning "to the
left" or indirectly. They are painfully aware of the
imperfections and inequalities in Soviet society, and
yet they fundamentally do not seem to be opposed to
authoritarian rule.
Although most workers accept the Communist
ideology and the Soviet industrial system, there is a
wide divergence in attitude among industrial workers
as a result of the official policy of significant base pay
differentials and other rewards. Those in positions of
authority and responsibility within the regime
demonstrate the greatest support, and those more
distant from the source of power, the least. Skilled
workers tend to be more favorably disposed to the
regime, have more hopes and ambitions for self-
improvement, and derive more satisfaction from their
work than do unskilled workers.
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Similarly the bulk of the intelligentsia reflects this
group's generally favorable position in Soviet society.
In return for secure material position, intellectuals, for
the most part, are disposed to accept a system which
subordinates the individual to the state. Yet it is in this
privileged class that much of present-day Soviet
dissatisfaction is concentrated. The regime has been
successful in isolating dissenters from the rest of the
population, but not in preventing new outbursts. Most
recent were two brilliant indictments of the political
system by Andrei Amalrik, "Will the Soviet Union
Survive Until 1984" and "Involuntary journey to
Siberia." Amalrik has since been tried and imprisoned
for "disseminating falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet
state and social system."
What enthusiasm or devotion exists among
national, as opposed to social, groupings seems
confined largely to the dominant Russians.
Occasionally, however, they may experience
ambivalent feelings toward the regime, but they
remain unequivocally loyal to the nation. Alienation
in attitudes appears to proceed by degree from
resentment among the culturally conservative, but less
developed ethnic groups in Central Asia and Siberia,
to ill-disguised hostility among the culturally
developed non-Russian minorities in the Baltic
republics and the Caucasus.
Ethnic tensions exist between the various
nationalities of the Soviet Union, but except for anti-
Semitism they are given little publicity and are usually
kept under control. Nevertheless, these tensions
present a serious problem to the regime. Among the
more notable examples of hostility are the Balts'
hatred for the Russians and the mutual antipathy
between Georgians and Armenians. For their part,
Russians tend to be condescending toward all other
ethnic minorities, particularly the non-Slavic peoples.
Proud of their culture, their mutual advances in the
face of a harsh climate and foreign hostility, and the
present Soviet position of influence in world politics,
the Russians consider fitting the role assigned them in
Soviet doctrine as the "elder brother" of all the other
Soviet peoples. Even so, some privately admit to
feelings of cultural inferiority to the Baltic peoples.
Russian nationalism has received varying degrees of
official encouragement ever since the early 1930's,
with the aim of counterbalancing minority
nationalisms and the stresses imposed by the stratified
social system. At the end of World War II, the
Russians were officially recognized as having made the
largest contribution to victory. The histories of the
minority peoples have subsequently been rewritten to
show that their contact with the Russians brought
them to a higher civilization and a better way of life.
This indeed is a far cry from the Soviet propaganda of
the 1920's, which condemned such "Great Russian
chauvinism" as a tsarist device to keep down the
minority peoples. Since the death of Stalin, the
government has tended to play down Russian
nationalism in the hope of preventing any
spontaneous development which could promote anti-
Soviet feelings. Instead, the concept of Russian
cultural hegemony has been enunciated more subtly
and skillfully, with greater emphasis on the alleged
common desire of all Soviet people to build a new
Communist society.
The attitude of the public toward people of other
societies and cultures has been conditioned by Soviet
propaganda, which claims that the capitalist states are
unalterably opposed to the U.S.S.R. and represent a
threat, even though they are a "dying" political form.
This propaganda, while creating many misconcep-
tions, does not seem to have instilled hostility among
Soviet citizens toward most foreigners as such: This
may partly be a result of their acceptance of the
distinction Soviet propagandists have always made
between the "clique of capitalists and militarists"
ruling a foreign nation and that nation's "oppressed
and poverty-stricken common people." At the same
time the official line that only under the Communist
system are people free has gained some credence
because of the relative isolation of the Soviet citizen
and his resulting ignorance of the rest of the world.
The popular attitude toward most European
peoples is colored to a certain extent by traditional
prejudices. The Poles, for example, are generally
regarded by the Russians with distaste, if not
contempt, and have been for centuries. This antipathy
toward the sister Slavic state tends to be shared by the
Ukrainians and Belorussians. Likewise, all three
Eastern Slavic peoples tend to hold similar attitudes
toward the Germans, with hostile feelings somewhat
more marked among the Russians. Generally, there is
respect for the Germans' presumed orderliness,
technical efficiency, and ingenuity and dislike for
their supposed pettiness, meanness, and pedantry.
Since World War II these basic attitudes have been
expanded to include respect for the efficiency, fighting
quality, and might of a German army, and awe mixed
with fear at the barbarities Germans demonstrated
themselves capable of committing. Many Russians
distinguish between "good" and "bad" Germans, and
these categories are applied both to the Communist
East and capitalist West Germans. As for the other
peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, popular
attitudes are ambivalent, ranging from mild
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friendliness to apathy. Although most Soviet citizens
are satisfied that their nation's ties to the Communist
countries of Eastern Europe demonstrate that the
U.S.S.R. is not isolated in the world, many doubt the
durability of the loyalty of these nations in the event
of war.
Despite more than 50 years of propaganda
describing the "spiritual decadence" and predatory,
anti-Soviet designs of the major Western capitalist
countries, the present attitude of the great bulk of the
Soviet peoples toward them seems to be a compound
of admiration, apprehension, arrogance and pride,
and, in varying degrees, a sense of inferiority. The
Soviet people are impressed by the material progress of
these nations, sensitive to their own country's
shortcomings, and resentful of suggestions that they
are in some ways a "backward" people. There is a
fairly pervasive feeling that the U.S.S.R. represents a
moral and spiritual force superior to the materialistic
states of the West, and Soviet propaganda appeals to
this feeling when it stresses the bizarre and alarming in
its treatment of the affluent, consumer-oriented
United States.
Nevertheless, a generally friendly attitude toward
Americans persists among the people. This attitude
exists partly because of the earlier geographical
remoteness of the two nations and consequent lack of
traditional conflicts of interest and partly because of
the historical image of the United States as a haven for
political refugees and a land of opportunity. Acts of
friendship and collaboration, such as U.S. famine
relief in the 1920's, and the alliance and Lend-Lease
program during World War II, have also contributed
to U.S. popularity. After World War II, the Soviet
regime went to great lengths to destroy this legacy of
good will, and during the Korean War it charged the
United States with aggression, bacteriological warfare,
and Nazi-style atrocities. Following Stalin's death and
the end of the war in Korea, anti-U.S. propaganda
subsided, but with the development and expansion of
the war in Indochina it revived. Soviet society,
however, is no longer as inaccessible as it was in
Stalin's day. A cultural exchange program with the
United States has been in effect since 1958, and
American tourism is encouraged. The resulting
sporadic personal contacts between individual Soviet
and U.S. citizens, as well as the occasional U.S.
exhibits in various cities of the U.S.S.R., limited as
they are, have helped to correct, at least partially,
some Soviet misconceptions.
The popular attitude toward the non-Western
peoples of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East ranges
from tolerance to condescension. The technical
backwardness of these countries is attributed to
capitalist exploitation of these countries and neglect
by reactionary, feudal rulers, and the picture of the
peoples of these areas struggling to become masters in
their own house has aroused some sympathy.
Underlying such empathy, however, is a certain
ambivalance. An increasing number of Africans,
Arabs, and other third world peoples have taken up
residence in the U.S.S.R. for work, training, or study.
The Soviet people's reaction toward them has been
decidedly negative, their attitudes paralleling those of
Western Europeans exposed to an influx of
"uncultured" aliens. Russians traditionally have been
suspicious of Orientals, considering them untrust-
worthy and unreliable. As the People's Republic of
China has come into its own, the popular attitude has
developed into a mixture of fascination and growing
anxiety. This anxiety appears to have increased as the
rift between Moscow and Peking has deepened,
expressing itself in the reality of public polemics and
the possibility of military conflict.
Like other European peoples who fought World
War II on their home ground, the Soviet people are
anxious for their leaders to avoid war. In contrast to its
earlier touting of the ideological premise of a hostile .
capitalist world, full of oppressed workers waiting
impatiently to be liberated and set on the path of
communism, the regime now prefers to present itself to
the world and its own people as the leading exponent
of peace and the creator of a peace bloc among
nations. The Soviet people have responded to this line
more positively than to ideological messianism, and it
would be difficult for the regime to whip up
enthusiasm for an openly aggressive war. In view of
the vivid memories of the last war's terrible suffering
and privation, as well as evidence of collaboration
between some of the minority peoples and the enemy,
there is even some question whether tried-and-true
appeals along the line of "the motherland in danger"
or "the yellow peril" would evoke a uniformly'
favorable response.
C. Population
With an estimated 249,962,000 inhabitants as of
mid-1973, the Soviet Union is the third most populous
nation in the world, ranking behind the People's
Republic of China and India, but with nearly 40
million more residents than the United States. The
population as of mid-1973 represented an increase of
slightly more than 8 million over the 241.7 million
reported by the census of 15 January 1970, and 41
million more than the 208.8 million enumerated in
1959.
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Emigration and immigration being negligible,
population growth in the U.S.S.R. is due almost
wholly to natural increase. As in many European
countries, in the Soviet Union the population had a
spurt of growth in the immediate post-World War II
years, followed by a period of rapid increase
throughout the 1950's. By the early 1960's, however,
the rate had begun to decline (Figure 7). In 1969, the
rate of natural increase was 8.9 per 1,000 population,
just half the level of 17.8 per 1,000 reported for 1960.
It rose slightly in the years 1970-71 and will probably
continue to rise during the remainder of the 1970's as a
consequence of the entry into the prime childbearing
ages of large cohorts of women born during the 1950's,
but to a level far below that achieved in the late
1950's.
If fertility remains constant at the 1971 level, the
total population of the U.S.S.R. is projected to be
about 320 million on 1 January 2000, an increase of 70
million over the total estimated for 1 July 1973. If
fertility declines, as it has over the past decade, the
total is projected to be between 292.million and 306
million at the beginning of 2000. Under either
assumption, the excess of females over males will
continue to decline, and the population will slowly
reflect an increase in the older age groups.
The most significant factor in the decline in the rate
of natural increase during the 1960's was the decrease
in the number of births. The birth rate was fairly
stable in the 1950's, and in 1960, the year of the peak
number of births, stood at 24.9 per 1,000 population.
Reflecting the declining number of births in the
1960's, the birth rate dropped by nearly a third-to
17.0 in 1969. For 1970, it was 17.4 and for 1971, 1.7.8.
Of the two components of the rate of natural increase,
the death rate has changed less since 1950 than the
birth rate. Starting at the relatively low level of 9.7 per
1,000 population in that year, the crude death rate
dropped to a low of 6.9 in 1964, then gradually
increased to 8.2 in 1970-a decline of 15.5% over the
20-year period. It remained at 8.2 in 1971. The rise in
the death rate since 1964 has been due to the aging of
the population and to an increase in mortality rates for
males in all age groups 25 and above.
Vital rates for the republics (Figure 8) offer clear
evidence of the widely different patterns of population
growth within the country. With the exception of
Estonia and Latvia, where death rates are high
because of the older age structure of the population,
variations in the death rate among the republics are
not great, and significant differences in the rate of
natural increase result mainly from differences in birth
rates. In 1971, the highest crude birth rate was 25X1
reported for the Tadzhik S.S.R. (36.8 per 1,000
population). This rate was over twice the national rate
and nearly 21/2 times the rates for the R. S. F. S. R.; the
Ukraine, and Latvia. Unlike the birth rates for all
other republics, moreover, the Tadzhik rate did not
decline between 1960 and 1971, but actually increased
FIGURE 8. Vital rates, by republic
(Per 1,000 population)
RATE OF
BIRTH DEATH NATURAL
RATE RATE INCREASE
REPUBLIC 1960 1971 1960 1971 1960 1971
R.S.F.S.R .......... 23.2 15.1 7.4 8.7 15.8 6.4
Ukrainian S.S.R..... 20.5 15.4 6.9 8.9 13.6 6.5
Belorussian S.S.R.... 24.5 16.4 6.6 7.5 17.9 8.9
Uzbek S.S.R........ 39.9 34.5 6.0 5.4 33.9 29.1
Kazakh S.S.R....... 36.7 23.8 6.5 6.0 30.2 17.8
Georgian S.S.R...... 24.7 19.0 6.5 7.4 18.2 11.6
Azerbaijan S.S.R.... 42.6 27.7 6.7 6.5 35.9 21.2
Lithuanian S.S.R.... 22.5 17.6 7.8 8.5 14.7 9.1
Moldavian S.S.R.... 29.2 20.2 6.4 7.7 22.8 12.5
Latvian S.S.R....... 16.7 14.7 10.0 11.0 6.7 3.7
Kirgiz S.S.R ........ 36.$ 31.6 6.1 7.0 30.7 24.6
Tadzhik S.S.R ...... 33.5 36.8 5.1 5.7 28.4 31.1
Armenian S.S.R..... 40.3 22.6 6.8 4.9 33.5 17.7
Turkmen S.S.R ..... 42.4 34.7 6.5 6.7 35.9 28.0
Estonian S.S.R...... 16.6 16.0 10.5 10.9 6.1 5.1
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slightly. In general, rates for the Central Asian
republics were much higher than those for other
republics, and they fell less rapidly during the 1960's
than those for the western and Transcaucasian
republics.
The decreasing rate of population growth has
induced concern on the part of Soviet planners,
scholars, and the general public. Numerous studies
have shown that the fertility behavior of Soviet
women increasingly is being affected by factors
operating to lower the number of children desired.
These factors include urbanization, industrialization,
increased demand for more education, greater
participation in political, economic, and cultural
activities, and the shortage of housing. The ready
availability of abortion and the increasing availability
of contraceptives have made it fairly easy for Soviet
women to control births and accommodate to these
new patterns of life. A nationwide survey in 1969
revealed the ideal number of children desired by
Soviet women averaged 2.89; the range by republic
varied from 2.60 for Latvia and 2.69 for the R. S. F. S. R.
to 4.55 for Uzbekistan.
Although consideration is being given to the
question of instituting a pronatalist population policy,
to date explicit actions by the government relating to
population policy have been limited, and there is no
clear outline of a conscious and defined policy. Such
action as has been taken relates to abortion and a
system of allowances and awards to mothers with large
families. Abortion, legal in 1920-36 and again since
1955, is available on request, and one estimate in 1968
placed the number of legal abortions at 6 million per
year, a figure substantially higher than the number of
births. Soviet medical authorities openly comment on
abortion's harmful consequences on the health of
women and they campaign to reduce its incidence,
but it appears that abortion is still used as the surest
method of preventing the birth of an unwanted child.
Although oral contraceptives, the interuterine device,
and condoms are available in the Soviet Union, the
use of these seemingly is not widespread. The condom
is more commonly used than any other kind of
contraceptive, however.
Payments and allowances given to mothers
(including unwed mothers) with large families was
first instituted in 1936, but the program, altered at
various subsequent times, has never been openly
described by the Soviet Government as intended to
stimulate an increase in the birth rate. Also, the
average amount of the sums paid seems unlikely to be
enough to spur an increase.
Life expectancy at birth for both sexes increased
from 1954-55 until the mid-1960's and has since
remained fairly constant, as shown below:
MALE
FEMALE
1954-55
................
61
67
1955-56
................
63
69
1957-58
................
64
71
1958-59
................
64
72
1960-61
................
65
73
1962-63
................
65
73
1964-65
................
66
74
1966-67
................
66
74
1968-69
................
65
74
1970-71
................
65
74
The difference of 9 years between the values for the
two sexes since the late 1960's is clear evidence of a
much more favorable mortality pattern for females.
Life expectancy at birth for females in the Soviet
Union is comparable with that in the United States
and the countries of Western Europe. That for males
lags somewhat behind.
1. Density and distribution
Despite its large population, the Soviet Union had
an overall density at midyear 1973 of only 28.9 persons
per square mile, one of the lowest ratios in the world.
Population density in the U.S.S.R. is one-half that in
the United States and about one-eighth that in the
People's Republic of China (Figure 9). Moreover,
POPULATION POPULATION DENSITY
Millions of Persons , Persons per Square Mile
West
Germany
United
Kingdom
55 Italy
52 France
22 Canada
People's
Republic
of China
India
Sweden
FIGURE 9. Population and population density. U.S.S.R
and selected countries, midyear 1973
-25X1
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a?a?o
00Q0
DENSITY OF RURAL
POPULATION
Persons per square mile
0 3 26 65 130
O / 10 25 50
Persons per square kilometer
FIGURE 10. Population densi l
O Over 3,000,000
p 1,000,000 to 3,000,000
o 300,000 to 1,000,000
? 100,000 to 300,000
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because vast tracts of land east of the Urals are
uncongenial to human habitation, the population is
unevenly distributed, resulting in a marked disparity
in density (Figure 10). In 1970, density ranged from
less than one person per square mile in the Yakut
A.S.S.R. and in Magadan Oblast (both in the
R.S.F.S.R.) to 478 persons per square mile in Donetsk
Oblast in the Ukraine. The average density in the
European part of the U.S.S.R. was 85 persons per
square mile; it was nine persons per square mile east of
the Urals.
The distribution of the total population by republic
shows that the R.S.F.S.R. continues to account for
slightly more than half of the nation's inhabitants,
although the proportion has been gradually declining
for some years (Figure 11). Published results of the
1.970 census reconfirmed long-term trends in the
redistribution of the population among the various
republics and regions. Movement from west to east
continued. In 1959, there were 45,536,000 persons, or
21.8% of the total population, living east of the Urals.
The population in this vast area increased nearly twice
as fast as the total population in the 1959-70
intercensal period, and in 1970 numbered 58,153,000,
or 24.1 % of the total. This increase was due principally
to high rates of growth in Kazakhstan and the four
Central Asian republics, as only one of the economic
regions of the eastern part of the R.S.F.S.R.-the Far
East region-grew more rapidly than the nation as a
FIGURE 11. Population, by republic
(Thousands)
whole. It is of note that the heavily industrialized
Urals region and the Western Siberia region grew at
less than half the national rate. Despite plans to
continue developing industrial capacity in these
regions, the outflow of population, particularly from
rural areas, held down the overall growth of
population and labor force.
Continuation of another long-term trend in
population distribution-from the western and central
regions of European Russia to the southern republics
and regions-was also substantiated by the 1970
census. Thus, the North Caucasus region of the
R.S.F.S.R., the South region of the Ukrainian S.S.R.,
and the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Moldavia grew much more rapidly than the country
as a whole. On the other hand, the Georgian S.S.R.
barely kept pace with the national rate. Overall, of
160 principal administrative areas, 16 lost population
during the intercensal period, 71 grew at a rate less
than that of the nation as a whole, and 73 grew more
rapidly, with 10 of these latter areas registering
increases of more than 48% (Figure 12). Areas which
experienced a net loss in population were primarily
older rural regions where agriculture has stagnated
and new industries have not been developed.
Migration has played a major role in the
redistribution of the population. On the basis of total
population figures and natural increase rates reported,
by republic, for each year in the 1959-70 intercensal
PERCENT
HANGE
PERSONS PER
E MILE
UA
S
,
C
Q
R
R.S.F.S.R ................
117,534
130,079
131,771
10.7
19.7
Ukrainian S.S.R...........
41,869
47,126
48,048
12.6
203.2
Belorussian S.S.R .........
8,056
9,002
9,171
11.7
112.3
Uzbek S.S.R ..............
8,119
11,800
12,731
45.3
68.9
Kazakh S.S.R .............
9,295
13,009
13,592
40.0
12.3
Georgian S.S.R............
4,044
4,686
4,813
15.9
174.3
Azerbaijan S.S.R ..........
3,698
5,117
5,375
38.4
153.0
Lithuanian S.S.R..........
2,711
3,128
3,219
15.4
124.2
Moldavian S.S.R ..........
2,885
3,569
3,695
23.7
274.8
Latvian S.S.R .............
2,093
2,364
2,419
12.9
96.1
Kirgiz S.S.R ..............
2,066
2,933
3,110
42.0
38.3
Tadzhik S.S.R ............
1,981
2,900
3,149
46.4
52.4
Armenian S.S.R...........
1,763
2,492
2,635
41.3
216.8
Turkmen S.S.R ...........
1,516
2,159
2,328
42.4
11.4
Estonian S.S.R............
1,197
1,356
1,395
13.3
78.0
*Figures for 1959 and 1970, deriving from the censuses of those years, are for 15 January;
figures for 1972 are official Soviet estimates as of 1 July.
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FIGURE 12. Percent change in the
by administrative area, 1959-7O
15.9-31.9
DECREASE INCREASE
32.0-47.9
48.0 AND OVER
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period, it has been estimated that 11 republics had an
excess of in-migrants over out-migrants, while the
reverse was true in the other four. Growth through in-
migration was experienced in Kazakhstan, the Central
Asian republics, the Baltic republics, Armenia,
Moldavia, and the Ukraine. Decreases were noted in
Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the R.S.F.S.R.,
where out-migration was particularly common in the
central regions of the European part of the republic
and in the Eastern and Western regions of Siberia.
Also revealing the continuing movement of
population from rural to urban areas, the 1970 census
confirmed the fact that the Soviet Union had become
a predominantly urban nation. The urban population
comprised 56% of the total in 1970, compared with
48% in 1959, and it increased by 36% during 1959-70,
whereas the rural population declined by 3%. Of the
36 million increase in the urban population during the
intercensal period, 14.6 million were added as a result
of natural increase in urban centers, 5 million as a
consequence of converting erstwhile rural com-
munities into urban areas, and more than 16 million as
a result of rural-to-urban migration:
Estonia, the R. S. F. S. R., and Latvia are the most
highly urbanized of the republics, but the urban
populations there, as well as in Georgia and the
Ukraine, grew less rapidly than the urban population
as a whole (Figure 13). As a result of both high rates of
natural increase and migration, the increase in the
urban population was high in Kazakhstan, the Central
Asian republics, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Urban
growth was also at a high level in Belorussia,
Lithuania, and Moldavia, where rates of natural
increase have been low. In fact, Moldavia registered
the highest urban growth rate, although it remains the
least urbanized of the republics.
There were 10 cities with more than 1 million
inhabitants in 1970, compared with only three in 1959
(Figure 14), and these cities accounted for 15% of the
urban population and 9% of the total population.
Moscow and Leningrad are by far the largest of Soviet
cities, but they grew less rapidly in the intercensal
period than most other major urban centers. The
official policy of limiting the growth of Moscow and
Leningrad, however, has been only moderately
effective, as both cities grew more rapidly than the
nation as a whole. Of urban centers with populations
of 250,000 or more residents, Tolyatti, site of a large
hydroelectic plant on the Volga and of a new
automobile plant constructed by Fiat, registered the
largest intercensal increase (249%). Other cities which
' grew rapidly included Frunze (96%), Lipetsk (84%),
Minsk (80%), Tyumen (79%), and Ulyanovsk (70%).
Prokopyevsk, a coal mining center in the Kuzbas of
Western Siberia, was the only major city to lose
population during 1959-70.
FIGURE 13. Urban-rural, population, by republic
(Thousands)
25X1
Percent
change,
Percent
change,
1959-70
1959
1970
1959-70
R.S.F.S.R ..................
61,611
80,981
31.4
55,923
49,098
-12.2
Ukrainian S.S.R .............
19,147
25,688
34.2
22,722
21,438
- 5.7
Belorussian S.S.R ...........
2,481
3,908
57.5
5,575
5,094
-8.6
Uzbek S.S.R.* ..............
2,759
4,362
58.1
5,502
7,598
38.1
Kazakh S.S.R.* .............
4,037
6,498
61.0
5,116
6,351
24.1
Georgian S.S.R ..............
1,713
2,240
30.8
2,331
2,446
4.9
Azerbaijan S.S.R ............
1,767
2,564
45.1
1,931
2,553
82.2
Lithuanian S.S.R............
1,046
1,571
50.2
1,665
1,557
- 6.5
Moldavian S.S.R ............
643
1,130
75.7
2,242
2,439
8.8
Latvian S.S.R ...............
1,174
1,477
25.8
919
887
- 3.5
Kirgiz S.S.R ................
696
1,098
57.8
1,370
1,835
33.9
Tadzhik S.S.R ..............
646
1,077
66.7
1,335
1,823
36.6
Armenian S.S.R .............
882
1,482
68.0
881
1,010
14.6
Turkmen S.S.R .............
700
1,034
47.7
816
1,125
37.9
Estonian S.S.R ..............
676
881
80.8
521
475
-8.8
NOTE-A minus (-) sign denotes a net decrease.
*Figures for the Uzbek S.S.R. and Kazakh S.S.R. have not been adjusted to reflect a boundary
change between the two republics.
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inhabitants in 1970
(Thousands)
AVERAGE
ANNUAL
RATE OF
GROWTH,
Moscow ........ 6
,044
7,077 7
,300
1.4
Leningrad ...... 3
,321
3,950 4
,066
1.6
Kiyev.......... 1
,110
1,632 1
,764
3.6
Tashkent.......
927
1,385 1
,461
3.7
Baku ..........
968
1,266 1
,314
2.5
Kharkov.......
953
1,223 1
,280
2.3
Gorkiy.........
941
1,170 1
,213
2.0
Novosibirsk.....
885
1,161 1
,199
2.5
Kuybyshev.....
806
1,045 1
,094
2.4
Sverdlovsk.....
779
1,025 1
,073
2.5
*Figures for 1959 and 1970, from the censuses of those
years, are for 15 January; those for 1972 are official Soviet
estimates as of 1 January.
2. Age-sex structure
The Soviet population is slightly older than that of
the United States, the median age in the U.S.S.R. in
mid-1973 being an estimated 29.2 years, compared
with 28.0 years in the United States. Moreover, the
median age of the Soviet population has been rising
steadily since 1950, when it was 24.2 years.
At midyear 1973, an estimated 27.0% of the total
population consisted of persons under age 15, and
12.9% were age 60 or older. Reflecting losses in World
War II as well as the higher mortality rate among
males, the female population has a markedly higher
proportion of older members than the male population
(Figure 15). During the period 1950-70, the
population in the working ages-16 to 59 for males
and 16 to 54 for females-increased less rapidly than
did those in the other two broad age groups, and as a
consequence it declined as a share of the total
population. The proportion of persons under working
age also declined slightly, while the share of the
population in the older, pension ages increased, the
number of such persons nearly doubling in the 20-year
period. As a result of these shifts, the dependency ratio
rose from 739 persons in the younger and older ages
per 1,000 persons in the working ages in 1950 to 850 in
1970.
The profile of the 1973 Soviet population (Figure
16) clearly shows the effect of World War II.
Casualties of that war, especially severe among males,
account for the contractions in the pyramid in the 50-
59 age groups. Contractions in the 25-34 age groups
also stem from that conflict, family formation during
that period being uncommonly hindered. The age-sex
pyramid also portrays the declining birth rate in the
1960's, there being more than 7 million fewer persons
in the 0-9 age groups in 1973 than in the 10-19 age
groups. Because fewer children in the population
mean a smaller share of the nation's resources have to
be allocated for schools, child-care facilities, and some
consumer goods, the declining birth rate has provided
the Soviet Union with some short-term gains.
Moreover, because persons born during the baby
boom years of the early 1950's have now reached
adulthood, annual increments to the manpower pool
are larger now than they were in the 1960's. After
1976, however, the effects of the declining birth rates
in the 1960's will be manifest in declining annual
increments to the manpower pool.
More than a quarter century of "normal" growth
since the end of World War II has enabled the Soviet
population partially to overcome the deficit of males
created by that war, as well as by earlier wars, the
revolution, and other catastrophic events. Thus the
excess of 21.8 million females which existed in 1950
had been reduced to an estimated 18.5 million by
FEMALES
FIGURE 15. Wimated an-c- istribution,
midyear 1973
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6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Percent
Age
75
and
over
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
mid-1973. The process of rectifying an abnormal sex
distribution is slow, however, and the sex ratio of 86.2
males per 100 females estimated in mid-1973 was still
far from normal. At that time, males outnumbered
females in all age groups under 30, but the reverse was
true in all older age groups, with the disparity being
especially pronounced among those age 50 and older.
Of the total population age 50 and older in mid-1973,
there were but 51.1 males per 100 females. The
shortage of males has caused the Soviet Union to rely
on the physical labor of females in jobs normally
reserved for men, such as mining, construction, and
heavy industry.
As determined by the 1970 census, sex ratios varied
substantially by republic, being affected by the
impact of World War II, which was considerably
greater in some areas than in others, and by
differential birth rates in the various republics since
the end of the war. They were highest in the Turkmen
S.S.R. (97.0) and the Tadzhik S.S.R. (96.8), lowest in
the Ukrainian S.S.R. (82.5) and the R. S. F. S. R. (83.8).
D. Living and working conditions
Living conditions for the typical Soviet citizen,
while improving, still lag far behind those for
individuals in the United States and in most of
Western Europe, a circumstance that can be ascribed
partly to the regime's unwillingness to divert a greater
share of its resources from investments in heavy
industry and defense to those required for the more
adequate provision of consumer goods and services.
Defying the egalitarianism which ostensibly underlies
the social order, moreover, pronounced disparities exist
in income distribution and in levels of living among
the various societal groups. At one extreme, the elite
enjoy many of the comforts and amenities associated
with modern life. Certain material benefits and
personal privileges also accrue to those who are
particularly valuable to the regime. Better, more
spacious dwellings are made available to highly skilled
or productive workers, while automobiles are
furnished to some industrial managers and other
administrators. As a reward for a high degree of
responsibility or outstanding performance, some
workers are given access to special stores and to state-
operated vacation resorts, the quality of which varies
in relation to the status of the individuals concerned.
At the other extreme, living conditions among some of
the peasants are poor. In between, but at a level far
below that of the elite, are the urban workers, a group
that comprises those holding either blue-collar or
white-collar jobs, and the remaining peasants and
farm laborers. Within this intermediate group, the
blue-collar workers are somewhat better off than the
agricultural workers, while the white-collar employees
live at a level not far above that of their blue-collar
counterparts
To a substantial degree, variations in levels of living
stem from the regime's deliberate manipulation of
earnings, pensions, and other benefits. Higher base
wages and pensions, for example, are granted to
workers in high-priority industries. Additionally,
personal earnings are scaled according to a system of
job classification that seeks to account for differences
in skill and the difficulty of the task. In a measure
designed to reduce labor turnover, workers having
uninterrupted service in a single establishment are
granted more generous social insurance benefits than
those who change jobs. Irrespective of political status
or job tenure, however, earnings for all workers have
risen steadily since World War II. In the early postwar
years, real incomes were mainly raised by reducing
retail prices while holding the line on wages. In part to
help improve living conditions for individuals in the
lower income groups, the regime abandoned this
policy during the mid-1950's, adopting one that has
featured selective wage and salary increases and the
stabilization of prices for consumer goods and services.
Other methods for enhancing personal income have
included pension increases, payment by the state of
higher prices for agricultural products, abolition of
school tuition fees, tax reductions, liberalization of
tax-free allowances, and termination of compulsory
bond purchases.
25X1
-25X1
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sector
Construction ..................
34.0
60.5
92.4
157.4
Transportation ................
34.8
70.7
87.0
144.0
Science and scientific services...
47.1
93.7
105.3
140.9
Manufacturing ................
34.1
70.8
91.6
137.9
State cooperative institutions...
39.0
68.8
86.4
123.8
Credit and insurance...........
33.4
66.8
70.7
114.6
Education and culture .........
32.3
66.8
69.6
107.4
State and industrial enterprise
farms ......................
22.0
38.3
53.8
106.3
Communications ..............
28.2
52.9
62.7
99.2
Trade, supplies, and restaurants.
25.0
47.0
58.9
96.9
Housing and communal services.
26.1
49.2
57.7
96.8
Health services ................
25.5
48.6
58.9
92.9
Having nearly doubled since midcentury, the
monthly cash earnings of the typical worker in 1971
amounted to about 1.26 rubles (Figure 17). Because of
the importance attached by the regime to industrial
expansion and construction, persons employed in
those sectors, together with transportation workers,
generally earned incomes higher than the norm.
Although remaining among the nation's highest, the
earnings of workers in scientific and technical fields,
who as recently as 1960 were the best paid, have
increased at an appreciably slower pace than those of
manual workers in high priority occupations; by 1971,
in fact, the average earnings of construction and
transportation workers surpassed those of scientific
personnel. Irrespective of the type of occupation,
workers receive a variety of noncash benefits,
including free social insurance, medical care, and
education, for themselves and their dependents. Also,
many live in heavily subsidized, state-owned
dwellings, paying rents that amount to only 4% or 5%
of total earnings. Soviet sources claim that in 1971 the
value of the noncash benefits received monthly by the
typical worker was equivalent to 57 rubles. Provided
the claim is valid, the monthly remuneration for the
average worker in that year would have totaled 183
rubles, noncash benefits having accounted for some
31% of the amount. Although the average cash
earnings of laborers on state and industrial enterprise
farms have increased more dramatically than those of
workers in any other major employment sector, and
despite the fact that in 1966 the government
guaranteed fixed monthly payments to members of
collective farms, the family garden plot, usually about
an acre in size, has remained an important source of
personal income among rural dwellers. During the
mid-1960's, some 21% of the total family income 25X1
among state farm workers derived from the sale of
produce and livestock from such plots; among
members of collective farms, the proportion of family
income thus obtained was 37%.
The rapid increase in personal earnings in the
agricultural sector reflects to a large extent the
regime's implementation of a wage policy designed to
reduce income disparities between urban and rural
workers. Rather than being motivated solely by a
desire for equity, however, the measure also is viewed
as a means for curtailing the exodus of rural residents
to the cities. Indicative of the government's continued
commitment to the goal of comparability in pay, the
1971-75 Five-Year Plan calls for wage increases of 30%
to 35% for collective farm workers, as against 20% to
22% for urban workers. While progress evidently has
been made in equalizing incomes among members of
the various employment sectors, less headway
apparently has been made in realizing another official
aspiration-that of greater sufficiency in consumer
goods and services. On a per capita basis, in 1971 the
cumulative worth of the goods purchased and of
services utilized by Soviet citizens was equivalent to
35% of the amoi r r ed by their U.S. counter-
parts (Figure 18).
Although prices are high for most consumer
durables, notably automobiles and household
All goods and
services
Education
Food
Health
Personal
services
soft
goods
Durable
goods
FIGURE 18. Value ion of goods
and services, 1971 25X1
27
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appliances, as well as for some nondurables, including
clothing and certain scarce foodstuffs, the costs of
most essential items have remained stable, permitting
a substantial increase in real personal income. In fact,
while the cash earnings of the typical worker rose by
about 56% during the years 1960-71, Soviet authorities
claim that real wages actually increased by 166%
during the period, making possible the increased
acquisition of consumer durable goods (Figure 19),
and thus contributing to overall improvement in the
level of living.
Even thoug the basic necessities of life are
accessible to the vast majority of inhabitants, there are
chronic shortages of many goods, and long waiting
periods or queues are commonplace at retail outlets.
Because of their high cost, on the other hand, some
FIGURE 19. Ownership of selected consumer
durable
Bicycles ..................
116
134
153
Cameras .................
49
67
77
Motorcycles ..............
10
17
22
Radios* ..................
205
320
**390
Refrigerators ..............
10
29
106
Sewing machines ..........
107
144
162
Television sets ............
22
68
160
Vacuum cleaners ..........
8
18
33
Washing machines.........
13
59
161
Watches and clocks........
794
885
979
*Licensed receivers only.
**1970.
FIGURE 20. Estimated worktime required for the purchase of selected consumer goods,
goods are considered luxuries and, in effect, beyond
the reach of the typical consumer. To the average
Moscow worker, for instance, in late 1971 the
purchase price of a small automobile represented the
equivalent of 43.3 months' wages; this compared with
4.4 months' wages for workers in New York City, 7.6
for those in Munich, and 11.7 for Parisian workers.
Despite the high cost of such vehicles in the U.S.S.R.,
there is a lengthy backlog of orders, the waiting period
for delivery ranging from 2 to 3 years. Scarcities and
high prices are not confined to durable goods,
however. In relation to their counterparts in other
major world cities, workers in Moscow must work
considerably longer periods in order to be able to
acquire various soft goods (Figure 20). Although
Soviet citizens are able to buy sufficient clothing for
protection from the weather, the average wardrobe is
limited; in the early 1970's, a winter coat for an adult
reportedly costs more than the legal minimum
monthly wage of 70 rubles. Besides being expensive,
most factory-made wearing apparel is poor in quality
and unstylish by Western standards (Figure 21).
Notwithstanding the increased ownership of
consumer goods and the general improvement in
living conditions, most Soviet homes are simply, if not
starkly, furnished, containing few household
appliances or other amenities. Except for sewing
machines, which are more widely owned in the
U.S.S.R. than in the United States, the Soviet people
possess only a fraction of the durables owned by
inhabitants of many economically advanced nations
(Figure 22). Indeed, such items as automatic washing
---------- Minutes ---
Aspirin (100) ........................... 54 8 48 84
Cigarettes (20) ..........................
Detergent ..............................
Gasoline (10 liters) ......................
Lipstick ................................
Man's shirt .............................
Nylon stockings (pair) ...................
Razor blades (10) .......................
Toilet soap ..............................
12 8 15 22
116 11 48 35
57 19 117 61
410 25 102 95
607 80 509 221
82 14 15 36
41 13 19 52
29 2 17 11
---------- Hours ----------
Camera ................................ 69 5 11 13
Man's shoes ............................ 42 6 14 5
Man's suit .............................. 151 13 55 32
Refrigerator (small) ...................... 289 29 77 31
Television (black and white) .............. 585 56 151 65
Transistor radio ......................... 39 8 13 5
Washing machine ........................ 178 62 194 92
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that by Western standards are of
poor quality and lack style
United States
United Kingdom
West Germany
Finland
France
East Germany
Japan
Italy
Czechoslovakia
II I IV---l II I -11 1
Qa
0
II
I1
II
II
0
FIGURE 22. Comparative ownership of consumer durables, 1970
0
FIGURE 21. Contrasting dress styles
are common in the Soviet Union,
especially in the larger cities, but
most of the population wear clothes
II
II
II
II
II
El
11
II
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machines, clothes dryers, and freezers are neither
manufactured nor sold in the U.S.S.R. On the other
hand, both color and black-and-white television sets,
radio-phonographs, transistor radios, and tape
recorders are readily available. As with other durables,
however, the inferior quality and high price of the
domestically produced color television sets have
turned Soviet consumers away from the product. Most
consumer services also are markedly deficient.
Laundry and drvcleaning facilities, for example, are
difficult to find, even in the larger cities. Because of a
shortage of repairmen, residents are obliged to do
many repairs themselves; individuals who are more
competent in this regard are able to supplement their
incomes by offering their services after regular working
hours. Beauty shops exist but, because of high prices,
their clientele is largely from upper income groups.
Conversely, the prices for men's haircuts are low
perhaps because barbershops are plentiful.
Evidenced by urban dwellers who hire out for
household repair services and by farming families
engaged independently in cultivation, some forms of
private entrepreneurship, once summarily regarded as
anathema by the regime, have been allowed to
flourish. Another example of this are the numerous
farmers' markets which supplement the state-operated
retail stores (Figure 23). The markets supply fresh
produce, dairy products, meats, and even flowers in
quantities that are disproportionately larger than the
amount of farmland represented cumulatively by the
family units. The quality of goods offered in the
markets usually is far superior to that of the state
stores, and demand for the homegrown produce
remains high, even though prices are as much as three
times higher than those for comparable articles in the
latter stores. Although family plots and markets have
played an important role in the domestic economy,
numerous other economic activities considered
legitimate in non-Communist states are banned in the
U.S.S.R. In fact, "speculation," broadly defined as the
"buying and reselling of goods by private persons for
the purpose of obtaining a profit," is legally
recognized as a form of economic crime and, thus, is
regarded as a threat to the very foundations of socialist
society. Together with theft, destruction, and misuse
of state property, which also are considered economic
crimes, speculation in some instances is punishable by
death.
As with free private enterprise, social problems are
regarded officially as the products of a "class society"
and, therefore, alien to the U.S.S.R. Optimally,
according to the adherents of socialism, there should
be no competitive groupings in society and,
consequently, no "objective causes" for societal
conflict or problems. The continued evidence of crime
and other social problems in the Soviet Union,
proclaimed a socialist state in 1936, has been ascribed
officially to "survivals of capitalist mentality" and to
the "infiltration of socialist countries by agents and
spies of the capitalist world." Nonetheless, parents,
teachers, party members, and organizations and
institutions charged with the upbringing of youth,
have been criticized for failing to cope with the
various crimes, delinquencies, and other problems
typically associated with modern life and rapid social
change. The government has modified its earlier
policy of banning or heavily censoring studies on
social problems. Although still operating under
considerable restraint, Soviet sociologists and the press
have begun to shed some light on these manifestations
of social ills. Because Communist doctrine maintains
that criminal or otherwise deviant acts not only
constitute a breach of law but also an offense against
the whole political and social order, however, the
views of Soviet academicians and journalists alike
often are blurred as to gradations in the degree of
seriousness of antisocial behavior. Likewise, clearcut
distinctions often fail to be made between outright
criminal behavior and simple nonconformity in
personal lifestyle or outlook. 25X1
Besides economic crimes, Soviet law recognizes two
h
d
ff
ose
enses an
t
other categories of crime, ordinary o
committed against the state. The latter group consists
of certain clearly defined crimes, such as treason, most
of which are punishable by death. Other types of
crimes against the state, however, are so vaguely
defined that virtually any deed which meets the
disapproval of the regime can be construed as a threat
to the state simply on the word of the law enforcers.
Ordinary crimes, such as homicide, rape, and
burglary, are believed to constitute the bulk of
criminal cases prosecuted in the courts.
Appearing to stem from the causes that prevail in
most countries undergoing rapid urbanization and
industrial growth, juvenile delinquency receives
continuous attention from the authorities. Family
solidarity and control over children have been
weakened by regime policies, by overcrowding in
housing, and by the high proportion of mothers
working outside the home. Manifested by an increase
in the incidence of drunkenness among youths, the
sense of boredom and frustration afflicting many has 25X1
been aggravated by the scarcity of recreational
facilities. Because of the official belief that a new,
socially conscious individual shall emerge in the
U.S.S.R., juvenile delinquency has been a source of
great concern to the regime.
_25X1
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FIGURE 23. A farmers' market (top) and a state-run food store (bottom)
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There is little information on vagrancy in the
U.S.S.R., but local press reports indicate that some
young people obtain cash by begging. These youths
apparently are neither disabled nor destitute, but
merely find it easier and more profitable to beg than to
hold a steady job, taking advantage of the fact that
they are seldom arrested if their identity papers are in
order and they avoid engaging in "hooliganism."
Vagrancy and begging probably are uncommon
among the elderly, inasmuch as they are eligible for
social insurance benefits.
According to Communist doctrine, prostitution
results from the inequality of women in capitalist
countries and cannot exist in a socialist society. Yet it is
very much in evidence.in urban areas of the U.S.S.R.,
where women readily are able to supplement their
incomes by selling their favors. Casual prostitution
also is carried on by peasant women during shopping
excursions in town. Punishment for convicted
offenders includes confinement in Siberian detention
centers, but enforcement of the existing antinros it?-
tion laws does not appear to be vigorous.
In accordance with Communist ideology, alcohol-
ism, regarded as the product of a decadent society, has
no place in the U.S.S.R. Notwithstanding persistent
efforts by the regime to control chronic drunkenness
(Figure 24), which is recognized as a major
contributing factor in the commission of crimes and in
absenteeism, per capita consumption of alcoholic
beverages (mostly vodka) remains high, being nearly
triple that in the United States. Hard work for long
hours 'under strict dicipline, the lack of household
comforts, the shortage of recreational and amusement
facilities outside the home, and the general drabness of
life for the average worker are thought to be the main
causes of heavy drinking and alcoholism. Paradoxical-
ly, the changeover to a 5-day workweek and the
attendant increase in leisure time actually aggravated
the problem, evidently because most cultural and
recreational facilities, as well as many consumer
services, either close or sharply curtail their activities
on weekends. Even among members of the elite, there
have been repeated instances of drunkenness, often
leading to public scandal. In view of the high prices
for vodka and other liquors and the existence of an
insufficient number of sales outlets in relation to the
demand, illegal distilling and bootlegging exist
throughout the country. To buy a liter of beer or
vodka, it was necessary in late 1972 for the typical
Moscow worker to labor five or six times longer than
his. counterpart in New York City to make a
comparable purchase.
Less is known about the use of narcotics and other
dangerous drugs in the U.S.S.R. than about
ILEHA P1MKH
and excessive drinking. The "price of a shot" ultimately
leads to the loss of jobs and possessions.
alcoholism. Although Soviet sources report that the
U.S.S.R. has been relatively successful in preventing
smuggling, the transport of opium, heroin, cocaine,
and hashish has been a longstanding practice along
the country's boundaries with Afghanistan, Iran, and
Turkey. Synthetic drugs, such as the various
amphetamines, hallucinogens, and tranquilizers, have
been introduced by Western tourists as well as by
Soviet citizens returning from abroad; such substances
also have been stolen from Soviet laboratories or
manufactured illicitly. Judging from sporadic official
comment, drug abuse, although far less serious than in
most Western countries, has become a matter of some
concern to authorities. It is essentially an upper middle
class phenomenon and is particularly widespread
among better educated young urbanites. Evidently
prompted by the increase in drug abuse, the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the R. S. F. S. R. in August 1972
D
25X1
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undergoing cure, to facilities operated by the
republic's Ministry of Health; the measure provided
for a period of confinement lasting from 1 to 2 years.
issued a decree calling for the commitment of drug-
dependent persons who refuse treatment on a
voluntary basis, or who continue to use narcotics while
a. Health problems
Organic and degenerative diseases constitute the
principal health threats to the people of the Soviet
Union, as the incidence of endemic communicable
illnesses has decreased markedly, particularly since
World War II. Many of the remaining epidemiologi-
cal problems are associated with overcrowded housing
and environmental pollution, the latter stemming
largely from the inadequate enforcement of sanitary
regulations. Unsanitary living conditions, often arising
from ignorance, also contribute to the prevalence of
enteric infection, mainly in rural areas.
The principal causes of death are cardiovascular
diseases and cancer. In 1970, the former accounted for
41.5% of all fatalities and had a mortality rate of
about 385 per 100,000 inhabitants. Among the various
forms of cardiovascular disorders, arteriosclerosis and
hypertension are the most common and the leading
killers. Cancer was responsible for some 16.5% of all
deaths recorded in 1968; among males the mortality
rate was about 135 per 100,000, among females about
1.19. Of the numerous forms of cancer, that of the
stomach was the. leading cause of death among both
sexes, followed for males by cancer of the respiratory
organs and for females by cancer of the reproductive
organs.
With the application of effective control measures
and widespread preventive and therapeutic practices,
the incidence of many, if not most, communicable
diseases has decreased. Diseases under control or
virtually eliminated include malaria, typhus,
diphtheria, poliomyelitis, trachoma, smallpox, plague,
and typhoid and paratyphoid fevers. The decrease in
the occurrence of malaria, which as recently as 1940
afflicted 1,637 out of 100,000 persons, has been
especially dramatic; in 1971 the incidence of the
disease was only 0.14 per 100,000 inhabitants. In that
year, the incidence of three additional diseases-
diphtheria, tetanus, and poliomyelitis-also was less
than one case per 100,000 population. As indicated by
the following tabulation of the incidence of selected
diseases (per 100,000 persons), substantial progress also
has been made in controlling other illnesses:
1960
1971
Measles ......................
972
240
Scarlet fever ..................
313
208
Infectious hepatitis ..............
239
180
Whooping cough ..............
259
17
Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers .
22
8
Judging from the trend in infant mortality, the
U.S.S.R. likewise has made strides in lessening th25X1
danger of death at this vulnerable age. Having been
more than double that in the United States as recently
as 1955, by the early 1970's the rate of infant deaths
per 1,000 live births in the Soviet Union approached
that prevailing in the United States, as shown below:
UNITED STATES
U.S.S.R.
1950
.................
29
81
1955
.................
26
60
1960
.................
26
35
1965
.... ............
25
27
1970
.................
20
25
1971
.................
19
23
Despite progress made in curbing communicable
diseases, morbidity rates for numerous such ailments
remain high, occasionally attaining epidemic
proportions. The leading communicable illnesses
include respiratory infections, especially influenza,
tuberculosis, and pneumonia; enteric infections,
particularly gastroenteritis, salmonellosis, and
dysentery; viral infections, mainly hemorrhagic fevers
and encephalitis; and various protozoan and parasitic
infestations, the latter usually involving tapeworms. In
addition to respiratory ailments, the most frequent
childhood diseases are measles, hepatitis, scarlet fever,
chickenpox, and mumps; the danger posed to children
by diphtheria has been all but eliminated, and the
incidence of whooping cough and of tetanus has been
sharply reduced. Local outbreaks of diseases thought
to be under control, however, have occurred on
occasions. In 1970, for example, inhabitants near the
Black and Caspian Seas experienced an outbreak of
cholera, at least 750 cases having been reported to the
World Health Organization. Mental and other
nervous disorders constitute major health problems, as
do venereal diseases; while information is unavailable
concerning the incidence of these afflictions, it is
known that approximately one-tenth of the nation's
hospital beds are for psychiatric patients.
Improved living conditions and better personal
hygiene practices have been attended by a reduction
in the incidence of louse-borne typhus, although cases
still occur sporadically. Scrub typhus, however, occurs
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in many parts of the country, being particularly
troublesome in eastern Siberia. Other insect-borne
diseases are essentially confined to the more remote
rural areas. Rickettsiosis, which is transmitted by the
north Asian tick, is prevalent in central and eastern
Siberia. "Q" fever is the most widely distributed
rickettsial infection, affecting both men and animals.
Other animal diseases posing a threat to humans
(especially livestock raisers, veterinarians, and meat
packing plant workers) include trichinosis, hydatido-
sis, and brucellosis. Other animal diseases communi-
cable to man and of concern to the public health
authorities are tularemia, anthrax, tuberculosis, rabies,
and leptospirosis. On the other hand, several animal
diseases constitute a threat to work animals and to the
nation's meat supply. These include foot-and-mouth
disease, brucellosis, hog cholera, Newcastle disease,
tuberculosis, equine encephalomyelitis, and various
hemoprotozoal illnesses. From the standpoint of the
economic losses it brings about, foot-and-mouth
disease is the most serious of these, with brucellosis
ranking a close second.
The Ministry of Health formulates national health
policies and is ultimately responsible for the operation
of virtually all health care services, although the
Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs also engage
in some medical activities. Besides setting and
enforcing medical standards, regulating the training of
medical personnel, and governing the production and
distribution of pharmaceuticals and health care
materials, the Ministry of Health oversees the
activities and controls the budgets of health ministries
of the constituent republics. Furthermore, it
determines medical research priorities. Having gone
into effect in July 1970, the Fundamental Principles of
Health Legislation is the main decree governing
public health and sanitation on a national scale.
Avowing in its preamble that the "protection of the
people's health is one of the most important goals of
the Soviet State," the decree delineates administrative
responsibilities in health fields and sets forth general
goals and guidelines.
Disease prevention is emphasized by the public
health system, although therapeutic care increasingly
has become available. Each year millions of persons,
especially children of all ages, expectant mothers,
women over age 35, and industrial workers, routinely
receive medical examinations at outpatient depart-
ments attached to hospitals and at other outpatient
facilities, including some that operate outside the
regular public health system. Follow-up casework and
preventive care also are carried out in connection with
these services.
Soviet citizens ordinarily do not pay for medical
services, and there are no payroll deductions for health
care, most of the cost being borne by the government.
Assessing the value of public medical care, Soviet
sources have estimated that real wages for the typical
worker are increased by about 7% by this factor alone.
Since 1940, state budget allocations for health and
medical care have increased more than tenfold,
amounting to 9.6 billion rubles in 1971, or 5.9% of the
state budget, a proportion that has not fluctuated
appreciably through the years. In addition, other
institutions, including cooperatives, trade unions, and
collective farms, also contribute funds for the
operation of medical programs; in 1971 such
contributions totaled 2.4 billion rubles, making the
cumulative expenditure for health care 12 billion
rubles.
Having made dramatic progress in the field of
medicine since World War II, the U.S.S.R. outranks
most advanced nations in terms of the availability of
medical personnel and health care facilities. There is,
however, a substantial imbalance in the distribution of
personnel and facilities among the various republics,
with the residents of the European portion of the
R.S.F.S.R. and those of the Ukraine, Latvia, and
Estonia being appreciably better served than the
others. Likewise, the quality of medical treatment
varies widely, with that of urban residents being
markedly better than that of their rural counterparts.
In the countryside, much of the routine health care is
entrusted to paramedical personnel; residents of the
more remote areas are attended by "sanitation
squads," mobile units which regularly visit localities
providing on-the-spot care. Besides geographical
disparity in the availability and quality of medical
care, class considerations are evident. The bulk of the
populace is served by a network of health care
facilities administered by the Ministry of Health, but
special facilities are reserved for high-ranking
members of society-party officials, the technical and
scientific elite, and leading artists and sports figures.
Closed to ordinary citizens, these special facilities are
more comfortable and better equipped and staffed
than the general ones. Similarly, some military
medical facilities provide better care than the public
civilian ones. Preferring to pay for better or more
personalized health care services, moreover, some
wealthier individuals patronize those medical
professionals who carry on a private practice after
regular work hours.
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As of 1 January 1972 there were 603,400 physicians
and 94,400 dentists, stomatologists, and dental
practitioners in the U.S.S.R., or 24.5 physicians and
3.8 dentists and other oral health specialists per 10,000
inhabitants. While the population increased by
roughly 30% during the years 1940-72, the number of
medical professionals more than quadrupled and that
of paramedical or auxiliary personnel of all types
increased almost fourfold as indicated in the following
tabulation:
PER 10,000
NUMBER
INHABITANTS
Physicians and dentists:
1940 ..............
155,300
8
1960 ..............
143,700
20
1972 ..............
697,800
28
Paramedical personnel:
1940
.............. 472,000 24
1960
.............. 1,388,300 64
1972
.............. 2,195, 300 89
Despite the existence of overall favorable ratios of
health care personnel to inhabitants, there is a
shortage of surgeons and other advanced medical
specialists, including anesthesiologists, pediatricians,
radiologists, urologists, and psychiatrists. Certain
paramedical personnel, namely pharmacists and
dental, laboratory, and X-ray technicians, also have
been in short supply. The paramedical personnel in
service as of 1 January 1972 included 1,066,200 nurses;
485,700 medical aides, orfeldshers; 306,300 midwives
and obstetric feldshers; 141,400 laboratory, X-ray, and
dental technicians; and 195,700 individuals trained in
miscellaneous specialties. Contrasting to practice in
Western nations, the Soviet medical profession is
dominated by women, roughly seven-tenths of all
physicians being of that sex. Most high-ranking
positions in medicine, however, whether in
administration, research, or clinical medicine, are held
by men.
By and large, the performance of Soviet physicians
is good, but their overall level of training is lower than
that of U.S. physicians. Administrative duties and
tasks, that could be delegated to specialized
paramedical personnel, occupy an inordinate amount
of the Soviet physician's worktime. They are
nonetheless pressured by the authorities to keep
industrial absenteeism to a minimum and to meet
certain quantitative norms concerning the numbers of
patients they attend and the length of their
consultations per patient. Consequently, close and
trusting relationships seldom are formed between
doctor and patient. Most physicians are not accorded
high social status, being placed on a level comparable
with that of highly skilled industrial workers, and their
earnings are far lower than those of Western
physicians. Compared 'with their counterparts in
Western countries, the quality of Soviet dentists,
nurses, and paramedical personnel in general is fair.
The U.S.S.R. has an adequate number of hospitals
and other health care facilities, but the quality of
services purveyed is inferior to that available in the
United States. In contrast to custom in the United
States, Soviet hospitals in providing inpatient care
place more emphasis on physical therapy, exercise,
and diet control than on diagnostic work. Although
the newer hospitals are adequate, many of the existing
ones are small and obsolete. Many of the small units
are being replaced, however, by larger, modern
facilities. As a consequence, although the number of
hospitals has declined for several years, the total
number of hospital beds has risen. There were
somewhat over 26,000 hospitals with a total of
2,727,300 beds, or a ratio of .11.1 beds per 1,000
persons, as of 1 January 1972; in the United States, the
corresponding ratio was about 8.0 to 1,000. About
three-fourths of the Soviet facilities were of the general
type, with tuberculosis, pediatric, and maternity
hospitals being the most numerous among the
specialized units. According to the type of use that was
made of the beds, however, general purpose ones (for
therapy and surgery patients) accounted for about
one-third of the total and the majority were for
specialized care, as indicated by the following
distribution:
TYPE OF CARE
Therapeutic .............
562,900
20.7
Surgical ................
362,600
13.3
Pediatric ...............
335,200
12.3
Psychiatric ..............
274,500
10.1
Tuberculosis ............
265,500
9.7
Infectious diseases ....... .
205,300
7.5
Maternity ...............
200,100
7.3
Gynecology .............
157,500
5.8
Nervous disorders ........
76,300
2.8
Skin and venereal diseases .
55,300
2.0
Oncological .............
47,700
1.8
Otolaryngological ........
41,000
1.5-
Ophthalmological .........
39,400
1.4
Other .................
104,000
3.8
The bulk of public health care services are rendered
on an outpatient basis, either through hospital
departments established for that purpose or through
networks of so-called polyclinics, feldsher posts, and
dispensaries. In 1972 such facilities numbered about
40,000, including both independent units and those
attached to larger medical institutions; similarly, over
21,000 maternal and child care centers were in
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operation. Additionally, a large number of outpatient
facilities, operated independently of the public health
system, are attached to industrial establishments and
collective farms. In 1971, these included approxi-
mately 1,500 so-called medical and sanitary units,
12,700 shop dispensaries, and 32,300 first-aid stations.
Responsibility for the construction of medical care
facilities is largely decentralized, the cost being borne
by local governments, trade unions, factories, and
collective farms, which also staff the facilities. Funds
for their operation, as well as directives and guidance,
emanate from the Ministry of Health.
Patients are assigned to medical care facilities either
on the basis of their place of residence or their
occupation. Small district hospitals (25-50 beds)
generally serve areas containing 7,000 to 12,000
inhabitants, supplementing the rayon (county or
borough) hospitals (100-200 beds), which contain
wards for general medicine, surgery, maternity,
pediatrics, and infectious diseases; many rayon
hospitals also have tuberculosis wards, clinical
laboratories, and X-ray facilities. Rayon hospitals, in
turn, complement the services of oblast (province) or
republic hospitals, the largest and most important
medical facility in any administrative unit. Such
hospitals (500-1,000 beds) are situated in the main
cities and equipped to provide a wide range of
specialized care. Additionally, specialized care is
available at numerous clinics attached to research and
medical training institutions.
The government has elaborate plans for the
provision of emergency medical services, including
those resulting from natural disaster and war. The
Ministry of Health, in conjunction with the military
and paramilitary forces, the national civil defense
system, and voluntary organizations, are the main
entities charged with meeting such contingencies. The
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which
embraced more than 420,000 local affiliates having
over 70 million members in 1968, is the most
important voluntary agency; the organization's
members, who are trained in rendering first aid and
grouped into cadres, can be mobilized during
emergencies. During normal times, however, members
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies assist the
public health authorities in a variety of programs,
including mass inoculation drives and public
indoctrination campaigns concerning hygiene,
sanitation, and accident prevention; health and safety
inspections of living quarters and workplaces also are
carried out. Other volunteer organizations, such as
those associated with trade unions, the Committee for
Soviet Women, the Pioneer organization, and the
Komsomol, also participate in such activities.
c. Environmental sanitation
The nation's water supply generally is adequate,
except in the areas of permanent frost and in the
deserts and steppes. Besides rivers, the chief sources of
water for urban centers, water is obtained from lakes,
springs, and wells. Additionally, some coastal cities
receive desalinized water; 20 desalinization plants
were in operation in 1967, with more being planned
for construction. While all major urban areas and
some of the lesser ones have water treatment
installations, many of the facilities are inadequate.
Treated water is piped to the central portions of cities
and to industrial plants; inhabitants of outlying areas
usually are served by wells. In the extension of piped
water systems, industrial sites are given priority over
residential districts. Nonetheless, in most of the newer
apartment buildings, individual units have piped
water; many of the older apartments, on the other
hand, are served by community taps, as are most
individual homes.
Construction of piped water networks has
proceeded at a rapid pace, a growing percentage of the
population being served by such systems each year. In
1970, all cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants were
served at least partially by piped water, while more
than half of the urban centers having 10,000 to 50,000
residents were so equipped. In smaller cities and towns
devoid of such systems, wells are the principal sources
of water. Rural residents generally rely on wells, either
individual or communal, but also use surface water.
Most of the water supplied to urban residents is
potable. Contamination, however, frequently occurs
during distribution, particularly in the older systems,
in which case water intended for human consumption
must be boiled. Because of pollution from human,
animal, and industrial sources, raw water supplies
ordinarily are nonpotable, except in certain remote
areas.
Sewage disposal methods in much of the U.S.S.R.
are inadequate. The larger urban centers have
waterborne sewerage systems, but these generally do
not extend beyond the central city. According to a
1970 Soviet report, such systems served nearly three-
fourths of urban dwellings. Most cities having central
sewerage systems also are equipped with sewage
treatment facilities, but a high proportion of the
installations have insufficient capacities or are
antiquated or poorly constructed. The construction of
new facilities, moreover, has failed to keep pace with
the increase in sewage loads. As a result, many cities
discharge untreated or inadequatey treated wastes into
rivers and other bodies of water that also are used for
water supplies. Suburban areas, smaller cities, and
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towns generally have cesspools and septic tanks for the
disposal of human waste, while outdoor pit latrines
and cesspools prevail in the countryside. On many
collective farms and in other rural localities, however,
human waste is discharged directly into streams.
The disposal of solid waste and garbage is not a
major problem in the U.S.S.R. because the per capita
amount of refuse is much smaller than that in the
United States or Western Euope. Disposable
containers are uncommon in the Soviet Union, and
citizens are obliged to save and reuse many items that
ordinarily are discarded by Westerners. Refuse
collection on a regular basis occurs only in Moscow
and other large cities; disposal is by dumping, either in
sanitary landfills or in open areas, or by incineration.
Smaller cities have sporadic collections or provide
dumping grounds where residents may dispose of
garbage. The residents of small towns and rural areas
either burn their refuse or dump it in open areas or into
waterways.
Partly because of the inadequacy of existing
methods for the disposal of refuse and human waste,
the environmental problem of dominant concern in
the U.S.S.R., as reflected in the nation's press, is water
pollution, which is particularly severe in waterways
west of the Urals. Wastes from heavy industry and
processing plants are the major water pollutants. In
addition to industrial effluents, other sources of water
pollution include thermal and radioactive wastes from
electrical generating plants, oil spills, and phosphates
from detergents. Also, runoff from livestock raising
enterprises has contributed pollutants, while the
leaching of farmlands has added silt and pesticides to
the waterways. In certain heavily industrialized cities,
local geographical features and atmospheric
conditions have been conducive to the formation of air
pollution. In 1968, only 14% of industrial installations
reportedly had complete air-purifying equipment;
another 26% were partially equipped, but the
remaining 60% had no devices whatsoever for
reducing air pollution. Nonetheless, this form of
environmental disruption is not nearly as serious as in
the industrialized Western nations, in part because
contamination of the air by automobile emissions is
nominal in the U.S.S.R.
Formerly, legislative controls aimed at curbing the
various forms of environmental pollution were
initiated and implemented at the republic or local
levels. Increasingly, however, nationwide guidelines
and statutes have been passed. In August 1969, for
example, the public health authorities issued a listing
of the maximum permissible concentrations of
harmful substances in the air of population centers; in
April 1970 a comparable list was released pertaining to
the discharge of pollutants into bodies of water that
serve as sources for urban water supplies. And, a
statute known as the Principles of Water Legislation
was approved in December 1970. While the need for
centralized guidance and legislation had existed for
many years, responsibility for implementing the air
and water pollution guidelines, as well as the water
antipollution law, was vested in various jurisdictions
and penalties for noncompliance were mild.
Apparently in recognition of the limited effectiveness
of these measures, the Supreme Soviet resolved in
September 1972 that provisions for environmental
protection and for the rational utilization of natural
resources should be strengthened, and it instructed the
Council of Ministers to formulate new, more stringent
controls. Arising from the commonalty of interests
concerning the biological and genetic effects of
pollution, the United States and the Soviet Union in
1972 entered into an agreement on cooperation in the
field of environmental protection.
As with antipollution measures, a lack of uniformity
exists in the enforcement of food sanitation standards.
Regulations provide for the inspection of all dairies,
livestock farms, slaughterhouses, and food production
and handling establishments. The most readily
apparent violations occur in markets, particularly of
the open-air variety, where food frequently is
displayed on exposed counters, unprotected against
contamination by insects and dust and subject to
handling by shoppers. Storage and refrigeration
facilities also are inadequate, limiting the distribution
of many foodstuffs and often resulting in the spoilage
of perishable items. Similarly, milk pasteurization is
unsatisfactory in many areas, as is the handling of
milk. In some localities, the use of night soil as
fertilizer for fruits and vegetables results in
contamination of the crops.
Considerable progress has been made since World
War II in increasing the quantity and upgrading the
quality of the food consumed by the Soviet people.
Except in years of severe crop failure, such as 1972,
domestic agriculture provides an adequate quantity of
foodstuffs, notable exceptions being tropical fruits,
cacao, and coffee, which must be imported. Gaged by
weight, the per capita consumption of food has risen
by more than 60% since 1913, with over half of the
increase occurring since midcentury. In 1971, per
capita intake of food totaled about 2,160 pounds.
Potatoes and bread traditionally have been staple
items in the Soviet diet. As recently as 1950, the
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average person consumed some 530 pounds of
potatoes annually, or nearly one-third of the
cumulative amount of food. Partly as the result of
agricultural diversification and the increased
importation of foodstuffs, the average diet has become
more varied. The overall rise in living levels, moreover,
has enabled consumers to purchase a wider selection of
foodstuffs. By 1971, per capita consumption of
potatoes had dropped to 282 pounds, which
represented 13% of the total amount of food eaten by
the average person during the year. Bread and other
cereal products, however, have remained dietary
mainstays. Because of shortfalls in the domestic
production of wheat and other cereals, the U.S.S.R.
has been forced to purchase large quantities of these
commodities from other nations, mainly the United
States, Canada, and Australia. Other items in short
supply, including meat, eggs, and butter, have been
imported on occasion.
The diet of the Soviet people, although remaining
somewhat monotonous, contains an adequate supply
of calories and is not seriously lacking in essential
nutrients. In 1971, the daily per capita caloric intake
in the U.S.S.R. amounted to about 3,200 compared
with 3,330 in the United States. Over one-half of the
calories in the typical diet derived from grains,
potatoes, and pulses, compared with one-fourth in the
United States, while the consumption of meat,
vegetables, and fruit was lower in the U.S.S.R. (Figure
25). There is no evidence of diseases associated with
dietary deficiencies, although some people, especially
in the cities, may not receive sufficient vitamins
during the winter months, when fresh vegetables are in
short supply. Despite a 14% increase in the per capita
consumption of meat during the period 1965-71, in
the latter year the average Soviet person ate less than
half the amount of meat consumed by his U.S.
counterpart and substantially less than many
Europeans as well (Figure 26). Per capita daily intake
of protein in the Soviet Union in 1971, however, was
only slightly lower than the U.S. average of 101 grams.
Nearly half of the average Soviet worker's income is
spent on food. Except for bread, potatoes, and
cabbage, which are reasonably priced, most foodstuffs
and beverages are expensive. In late 1971, for
example, the typical Moscow worker had to work
more than three times as long as his counterpart in
New York City to purchase a cut of beef; the
acquisition of pork loin in Moscow required seven
times more labor. To purchase such scarce items as
chicken, eggs, oranges, peaches, coffee, or tea, the
Moscow worker had to work anywhere from eight to
11 times longer than the New Yorker.
Milk and
Milk Products
(Excluding Butter)
Sugar
Vegetables,
Fruits, Eggs, etc.
Meat and Fish
Grain Products
and Potatoes
United States and U.S.S.R., 1971
United States
West Germany
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
U.S.S.R.
25X1
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3. Housing
No other factor affects the quality of life of the
average citizen as much as the chronic shortage of
housing. Indeed, it is poor, overcrowded housing,
more than anything else, that makes urban life in the
Soviet Union dismal and tedious. Even families with
an adequate income by Soviet standards live in one or
two rooms, often sharing toilet and kitchen facilities
with relatives or neighbors. The average young
married couple has to wait years for a modest
apartment. A survey of Ukrainian factory workers
married 1 to 5 years revealed that only one-fifth
occupied their own apartments, while most rented
rooms or lived with relatives.
The housing deficit in large measure has been
responsible for the prevalence of a low birth rate,
which in turn has resulted in a growing labor shortage.
Social tension and friction apparently have increased
because of overcrowding, attended by such problems
as juvenile delinquency, crime, and alcoholism. In
addition, because of the housing shortage, the nation's
socioeconomic disparities are more evident. In
Moscow, for example, influential scientists reside in
the high-ceilinged, roomy apartments of a cooperative
belonging to the Academy of Sciences, while many
ordinary citizens living in the center of the capital are
crowded into old apartments, often one family to a
room.
Because rents are low, the average Soviet citizen
spends considerably less on housing than his Western
counterpart. Lower housing costs, however, are more
than offset by the smaller amount of living space, by
the inadequacy of cooking, heating, and plumbing
facilities, and by the general scarcity of furnishings
and other amenities.
Regime efforts to improve housing conditions have
been far from adequate. Soviet investment in housing
construction is lower than that in most Western
European countries, despite the greater need.
According to U.N. figures, West European investment
averages 20% to 25% of the gross national product, as
compared with 17% in the Soviet Union. Planners
failed to achieve the 1970 goal of at least 9 square
meters of living space per person, a standard set by
Soviet sanitation authorities; as of 1972 the average
was 7.8 square meters, which was, nevertheless, an
improvement over the 7.3 square meters reported 3
years earlier. Under the current Five-Year Plan,
investment in housing is planned to rise by 15.7%, a
smaller proportion than stipulated in the previous two
plans.
Although most of the housing being provided by the 25X1
government consists of plainly designed multistoried
apartment buildings, a wide variety of dwelling types
remain in existence, including some private units of
prerevolutionary vintage (Figure 27). State-owned
housing accounted for about seven-tenths of urban
dwelling units in the early 1970's. Besides the
multistoried apartment buildings, which are
communally-operated and inhabited mainly by
working class families, there are two other basic types
of public housing: communal apartments and
individually occupied, improved apartments. The first
of these, generally found in older buildings, frequently
consists of a three-room apartment which may be
occupied by as many families, one to a room, all
sharing the same bath and kitchen. The second, with
ample room and modern conveniences, is restricted
largely to the more privileged members of society.
Additionally, there are dormitories and barracks, both
of which accommodate unmarried persons, usually
collective farm or state enterprise workers; the
dormitories often are subdivided into rooms occupied
by four individuals, while the barracks may
accommodate 50 or more in a large, single room.
The remaining three-tenths of urban dwellings in
existence during the early 1970's were privately
owned, consisting largely of individual homes.
Because of the proliferation of state-owned
apartments, the proportion of privately owned
dwellings has tended to decrease gradually. In the case
of private home ownership, the land belongs to the
state. Privately constructed houses generally are small,
averaging three or four rooms. The homeowner may
rent or lease part of his house, but terms are fixed by
law, and the owner is responsible for maintenance.
Although dormitories and barracks have grown in
number, individual homes remain prevalent in rural
areas.
Practically all state-owned urban housing is
equipped with electricity. Gas, piped water, and
connections to central sewerage systems, however,
frequently are lacking, except in the more modern
centrally located apartment buildings. The occupants
of units devoid of piped water are supplied by public
taps situated in courtyards, or by street hydrants.
Similarly, common toilet facilities with cesspools are
provided. Private housing is poorly served, if at all, by
water and sewer lines and by electric power. In rural
areas there is still little plumbing. The lack of running
water in towns and cities has led to the development of
a system of public baths and municipal laundries
(Figure 28), both less than adequate in number and
quality of service.
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Worker housing under construction at
the Kama River industrial complex
near Naberezhnyye Chelny~
a a? ^
New housing on the Snekhov Collective Farm,
near Kharko
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and laundry shop, Moscow
4. Work opportunities and conditions
a. The people and work
Young Soviet citizens entering the labor market are
far less likely to become agricultural workers than was
the case in the early postrevolution period. Since 1917,
when peasants and farm laborers accounted for about
three-fourths of the labor force and nonagricultural
workers comprised the remaining fourth, the
proportions have been almost reversed. Within the
nonagricultural sector, the manufacturing and
construction industries are more capable of absorbing
new workers, a trend that has resulted from the
regime's longstanding commitment to industrial
development. Indicative of a maturing economy,
however, service-oriented activities, including those
related to public health, education, and welfare, as
well as occupations associated with science and
communications, have tended since 1960 to expand at
an even faster pace than those in the industrial realm.
Notwithstanding the emphasis on modernizing the
economy, the dwindling size of the agricultural work
force has been a matter of prime concern to the
regime. Among agricultural laborers, roughly two-
thirds are on collective farms and the bulk of the
remainder are employed by state enterprises; a small
number of peasants remain as private cultivators.
Since 1966 the regime has adopted a number of
measures designed to stem the flight of collective
farmworkers, particularly young ones. Thus far, the
measures have been unsuccessful.
Despite the rapid industrial expansion and the
regime's efforts at overcoming disparities in pay
among workers in the various branches of economic
activity, traditional attitudes favoring white-collar
over blue-collar work remain in evidence. Young
people, often at the urging of their parents, aspire to
become members of the intelligentsia. Youths who
lack the intellectual wherewithal and academic
training to realize this ambition usually opt for white-
collar employment. Perhaps emanating from the
peasantry's traditionally low social ranking,
agricultural pursuits generally are disdained.
Similarly, occupations in the realm of trade and other
service-oriented jobs are held in low esteem by youths.
To overcome the predilection for careers in the more
prestigious fields, the regime increasingly has
regulated the training of youths, endeavoring to
channel them into occupations that are needed to
fulfill economic goals. As a result, most new job seekers
come directly from educational institutions. In order
to satisfy the manpower needs of high priority projects,
such as the Kama River-industrial complex and the
automobile plant at Tolyatti, youths of both sexes are
offered private apartments and cultural and
recreational facilities that ordinarily are unavailable to
Soviet workers. Judging from the large number and
youthfulness of workers employed at such installa-
tions, the incentives (especially the housing) evidently
have been applied successfully. Among the 70,000
workers employed at the Kama River complex early in
1973, the average age reportedly was 23. At the
Tolyatti plant, which employed 72,000 persons, 36%
of them women, the average age was 25.
Irrespective of age, able-bodied persons willing inl g to
work have little, if any, difficulty finding
25X1
employment, as a manpower shortage exists in the 25X1
U.S.S.R. The shortage of workers has prompted the
regime to adopt a number of measures designed to
attract additional people into the labor force and to
retain those already employed. Inasmuch as more
than nine-tenths of all men of working age already are
42
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employed, special emphasis has been placed on
recruiting women. To this end, the minimum monthly'
wage was raised from 40 to 60 rubles in 1968, and
pension benefits were increased as an inducement for
retired middle-aged and older women to return to
work so as to enhance their pensions through added
years of service; by 1975, the minimum monthly wage
is scheduled to be raised to 70 rubles. Nursery and
kindergarten facilities have been expanded in order to
free mothers from child-care responsibilities, and
legislation authorizing the part-time employment of
women gradually has been liberalized, making it
possible for a growing number of housewives to obtain
commercial employment on that basis. Approximately
seven-tenths of the industrial development that
occurred within the scope of the 1966-70 Five-Year
Plan was in small- and medium-size cities, where the
proportions of women remaining outside the labor
force were higher than in the main urban centers. As
indicated by the increasingly higher percentage of
women in the labor force, the regime has had
considerable success in mobilizing the female labor
300 rubles.
reserve. By 1971 women comprised 51% of all wage
and salary earners, compared with 39% in 1940.
As a result of increased longevity and of the larger
age cohorts that attain retirement age each year,
nonworking pensioners have constituted a rapidly
growing labor reserve. Numerous individuals
possessing skills and experience badly needed by the
economy have been represented among their ranks.
Measures designed to draw pensioners back to work
were instituted in 1964 and 1969. In the former year,
selected retirees, such as those once employed in
construction and light manufacturing, were au-
thorized to collect full pensions if they returned to
work; however, a ceiling of 200 rubles per month,
inclusive of pension, was imposed over the. amount
that could be earned by each pensioner. In 1969,
retired skilled workers, junior service personnel,
engineers, and technicians were granted the right to
receive full pensions in addition to their pay,
regardless of the economic sector where employed.
Certain other categories of workers were authorized to
collect 50% of their pensions, or 75% if employed in
the Urals, Siberia, or the Far East. The monthly
income ceiling for working pensioners was raised to
To facilitate the employment of retired persons
wishing to work, local job placement offices maintain
lists of vacancies for which applications by pensioners
are invited. Lists of pensioners who are seeking
employment also are compiled, and openings of
possible interest to pensioners are advertised. In 1970,
about 8 million pensioners held jobs.
Despite the overall abundance of jobs, particularly
for skilled manual workers, employment opportunities
are not distributed uniformly throughout the U.S.S.R.
In the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics, for
example, the proportion of persons in the working ages
who actually hold jobs is lower (80% to 86%) than in
the other republics (91% to 92%). The disparity
evidently stems both from the lower levels of economic
and cultural development in these republics and from
the fact that the more prestigious positions are held by
Russians. Because of strong ties to their ancestral
localities and a lack of fluency in the Russian
language, moreover, native residents of those republics
tend to be less mobile, which limits their opportunities
for migration to districts where jobs are more plentiful.
Largely because of the nation's chronic shortage of
workers, particularly skilled ones, unemployment is
virtually nonexistent. For several decades, the regime
has disavowed the presence of joblessness and made no
effort to gage its magnitude. Similarly, the regime's
efforts at mobilizing greater numbers of persons into
the work force, either on a full-time or part-time basis,
and at reducing inefficiency while increasing
productivity no doubt have reduced underemploy-
ment. However, frictional unemployment resulting
from labor turnover has been a major impediment to
the maximum utilization of manpower. Among every
100 industrial wageworkers employed during 1970, for
example, 30 were separated from their original places
of work; 21 of the 30 either resigned voluntarily or
were fired for disciplinary infractions, often for reasons
relating to dissatisfaction with living and working
25X1
b. Labor legislation
An extensive body of legislation governing labor
affairs has existed since 1922, when the first labor code
was enacted. From that year until the death of Stalin,
however, the code and supplementary statutes by and
large were ignored. Motivated by the desire to raise
productivity, in the post-Stalin years the regime has
enforced the legislation more strictly and introduced
new measures. Because many provisions of the basic
law were obsolete, moreover, a comprehensive
recodification, known as the Principles of Labor
Legislation, was passed in 1970; when it went into
effect on 1 January 1971, it superseded all previous
labor legislation. Rather than introducing fundamen-
tal changes in the functioning of labor affairs,
however, the new law emphasized procedural
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modifications in the conduct of industrial relations.
More importantly perhaps, it failed to provide,
adequate enforcement machinery, thereby severely
limiting its efficacy as an instrument to protect
workers' rights.
Besides establishing the rights and obligations of
workers, the 1970 labor code regulates all aspects of
employment-labor contracts, worktime, remunera-
tion, health and safety, and labor disputes. In the past,
rules pertaining to these matters were loosely written,
resulting in widespread confusion and discontent
among workers and illegal practices by managers. The
new statute failed to correct all ambiguities stemming
from imprecise wording, but, by bringing all the rules
of employment under a single act, the number of
contradictions has been reduced.
During the mid-1960's, the 5-day workweek
gradually replaced the 6-day workweek which had
remained in effect for about 50 years for most wage
and salary earners. In terms of the total number of
hours worked, however, the length of the normal
workweek (41 hours) remained unchanged, as the
length of the workday was extended from about 7
hours to about 8. For workers ages 16 to 18, as well as
for those of all ages in occupations specified by law as
arduous and hazardous, the length of the workday is 1
hour shorter than that for the bulk of the wage and
salary earners; also, selected workers, such as teachers
and doctors, put in shorter workdays. During 1971 the
average length of the workweek among adult
industrial wage earners was 40.7 hours, down from
47.8 hours in 1955 and 58.5 hours in 1913; taking into
account all wage and salary earners, including young
workers and professionals, the average workweek in
1971 was 39.4 hours.
Overtime work
is forbidden without prior
authorization by trade union officials and public
authorities; even then, it is permitted only under
special circumstances stipulated by law, each worker
being limited in theory to 120 hours of such work
annually. A maximum of 4 hours of overtime work
within 2 consecutive days is allowed, with time and a
half paid for the ninth and tenth hours and
doubletime for all hours in excess of 10 during each
work period. Workers under age 18, certain partially
disabled persons, and expectant or nursing mothers are
exempt from overtime labor. Refusal to work overtime
when such work is deemed critical is considered to be a
breach of labor discipline, and violators are subject to
punishment. If the worker believes that management's
request for overtime is unreasonable, he may lodge a
complaint with his enterprise's trade union committee,
with its labor protection commission, or with a public
labor inspector.
Eight legal holidays are observed: New Year's Day
(1 January), International Women's Day (8 March),
International Labor Days (1 and 2 May), World War
II Victory Day (9 May), Anniversary of the 1917
Revolution (7 and 8 November), and Constitution
Day (5 December). If a rest day coincides with a
holiday, workers are not entitled to a substitute day of
rest. In 1968 the minimum amount of annual vacation
with pay was increased from 12 to 15 days. The length
of paid vacations, however, ranges anywhere from 15
to 48 days. Those receiving the longer periods are
minors, holders of hazardous or arduous jobs, workers
in the Far North, and professionals in scientific and
educational fields. In 1971 the average industrial
worker received 17.9 paid vacation days, while the
typical construction laborer received 14.5 days.
Legislative provisions concerning the conditions of
work for women and children are extensive. Among
other things, the contemporary statute stipulates that
women and youths cannot be employed in arduous or
hazardous work, and they cannot perform nightwork.
Pregnant women are entitled to maternity leave,
amounting to 112 calendar days for normal childbirth
and to a longer period if complications arise. In
addition, nursing mothers are granted shorter
workdays, and pregnant women are transferred, if
necessary, to lighter duties at the same rate of pay.
Soviet law stipulates that the basic working age is 16
years, but youths of 15 may be hired in exceptional
cases provided approval is obtained from the
appropriate trade union committee. Collective
farming, however, is exempt from the minimum age
regulation, and it is not unusual for youngsters ages 12
to 15 to be employed at such installations.
In accordance with the Principles o La or
Legislation, enterprises must maintain safe and
hygienic working conditions. Management is required
to provide special protective equipment for those who
labor under harsh environmental conditions or who
handle toxic or otherwise dangerous substances.
Specific regulations governing the safety and hygiene
of workplaces are drafted by the State Committee for
Labor and Wages in conjunction with the Ministry of
Health and the All-Union Central Council of Trade
Unions (AUCCTU); they are enforced both through a
system of inspectorates under the guidance of these
organizations and through the public procurator's
office.
c. Labor organizations
A trade union movement in the sense that workers
freely choose representatives to champion their
objectives does not exist in the Soviet Union. The
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regime wields absolute control over wages, work hours,
and working conditions, as well as over the social
insurance system. Nevertheless, as of mid-1973,
approximately 95% of eligible workers were reported
to be trade union members. The largest group of
workers remaining outside the unions are collective
farmers, who, although constituting nearly one-fifth of
the labor force, are not eligible for membership.
Soviet trade unions are organized along industrial
rather than craft lines, and virtually all wage and
salary workers, whether blue-collar or white-collar, are
union members. Although membership in a union is
not obligatory, the welfare benefits that accrue to
members promote a high degree of participation.
Trade union members, for example, receive twice the
sickness benefits available to nonmembers; disability
benefits also are higher. In addition, members receive
priority in the allocation of housing and in obtaining
passes to health resorts and sanatoriums. Children of
members are more likely to be admitted to nurseries
and summer camps. In addition, loans from mutual
aid funds, free legal counsel, libraries, and recreational
activities and clubs are available to union members.
Union dues range from 0.5% to 1% of monthly
earnings above 70 rubles.
Within the administrative structure of organized
labor, the basic unit is the local trade union
committee, nominally elected by the membership in
any enterprise, institution, or economic unit having 15
or more union members. In fact, however, such
elections frequently are dominated by factory officials,
and the committee invariably receives orders and
instructions from the trade union hierarchy, the party,
and management rather than from its constituency.
Trade union locals send representatives to
conferences, or congresses, held at the regional,
republic, and national levels. The national conference
of any given trade union represents in theory the
highest authority for that organization. Each of the
regional, republic, and national conferences in turn
elects a central committee, which serves as a
permanent administrative organ. The regional and
republic trade union conferences of the various unions
also elect representatives to interunion councils which
coordinate labor matters at their respective levels.
The national conferences or congresses of the
various unions choose delegates to the All-Union
Congress of Trade Unions, which in turn elects the
AUCCTU (Figure 29). As the highest ranking
administrative entity within organized labor, the
AUCCTU selects a presidium and a chairman. In
theory, the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions meets
every 4 years, but in fact the intervals have been
longer, the maximum being 17 years between the
INTERUNION INDIVIDUAL TRADE.
ORGANIZATIONS UNION ORGANIZATIONS
ALL-UNION CONGRESS OF
TRADE UNIONS 25 National Trade _
All-Union Central
Council of Trade Unions
25 National Trade
Union Committees
REPUBLIC i
Republic Trade Union
Council
Republic Trade Union L
Conference 11
Repubk'-trade Union
Committee
REGIONAL
Regional Trade Union
Regional.Trade Union Conference
Council
Regional Trade Union
Committee
General Meeting of
Enterprise Union Membership
Election
Subordination
ninth (1932) and 10th (1949) congresses. Between
congresses, the AUCCTU implements the policies
adopted by the last congress, exercises control, over all
trade union organizations and activities through
inspectors and professional union organizers, and
collaborates with the government on matters affecting
labor. Party control is exercised through party
members attached to union bodies; it is, however,
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concentrated in the upper echelons of the trade union
structure.
At all levels the organizational structure of the labor
unions generally parallels that of the Communist
Party, and changes in the latter usually are attended
by similar changes in the former. In 1962, for instance,
when the party apparatus was divided into separate
organizations to control industry and agriculture, the
AUCCTU formed separate bureaus for industry and
agriculture in the various interunion councils at all
levels. After the fall of Khrushchev, the party restored
its pre-1962 structure, and the trade unions followed
suit almost immediately.
Soviet trade unionism is founded on the general
premise that the workers own the means of production
and regulate the distribution of goods. Because of the
workers' supposed commonalty of interest with the
state, the main functions of unions are directed at
insuring fulfillment of the economic plan and at
raising productivity as a means for improving the
economic lot of the workers. Inasmuch as wages and
conditions of work are regulated by law or by
administrative fiat, trade union guardianship of the
interests of their constituents is confined mainly to
affording protection against infractions of established
rules and to overseeing management's compliance
with existing agreements. In a seeming paradox,
however, an even greater share of union energies is
expended in guarding management from disciplinary
infractions by workers.
Nominally, each enterprise's local committee has
the right to participate in drawing up production
plans for the workplace and in determining a wage
schedule. Production conferences; which bring
together representatives of labor, management, and
other interested parties, create the illusion that unions
do, indeed, play a role in the control of production.
Because of their responsibility for increasing
production, one of organized labor's main respon-
sibilities has been that of planning and encouraging
various forms of competition and emulation among
workers.
Notwithstanding the inability of Soviet trade unions
to function as champions of labor in the Western
sense, the unions are not without importance. By
participating in the intricate propaganda machinery
orchestrated by the Communist Party, they play a
vital role in bending workers to the goals of the regime.
The unions maintain 10 major newspapers, most of
which are published jointly with a ministry or central
board responsible for overseeing the corresponding
industrial branch. Those having the largest
circulation, however, are sponsored directly by the
AUCCTU. They include Trud (Labor) and Sovetskiy
Sport (Soviet Sport), with circulations of 5.0 and 2.6
million, respectively, in 1972. In addition, the unions
publish 11 mass-circulation magazines, the most
important of which are Sovetskiye Profsoyuzy (Soviet
Trade Unions), and Sovetskaya Zhenshchina (Soviet
Woman); the latter contains significant political
commentary and is issued in multilingual editions.
Soviet trade unions also are entrusted with certain
functions which, in Western nations, normally are
performed by the government. Thus, they administer
most of the worker welfare programs, notably those
pertaining to pensions, disability and maternity
benefits, resorts and rest homes, and facilities for the
care of members' children. So as to administer these
activities at the various levels, the trade union system
maintains an elaborate apparatus, which maintains a
close relationship with various agencies of govern-
ment. Although nominally independent, the trade
unions have in fact become surrogates of the regime
and are active instruments of governmental and party
policy. Indicative of this, key decrees on labor policy
normally are endorsed by the Central Committee of
the Communist Party, by the Council of Ministers of
the U.S.S.R., and by the AUCCTU.
d. Labor and management
In the U.S.S.R. labor and management alike are
employees of the state and both operate under strict
regulation by the regime. Management is required to
obey the laws and directives governing wages, hours,
sick and vacation leave, dismissals, transfers, and
various other details of the day-to-day relationship
with workers. The trade unions, in turn, act to some
extent as a check on management to assure that their
members are treated in accordance with the laws.
Collective agreements between management and
labor stipulate in detail the manner in which the laws
and directives of the central authorities are
implemented within each workplace. Disputes
between the two groups arise primarily when
management is accused by labor of either violating or
misinterpreting the law or the terms of collective
agreements.
Labor agreements in the U.S.S.R. do not evolve
from free collective bargaining as practiced in much of
the West. Soviet collective agreements, renewed on a
yearly basis, serve primarily as a means of applying
national policy at the enterprise level. About 100,000
such agreements are concluded annually between
trade union locals and enterprise managers. Only a
fraction of each year's agreements constitute revisions,
however, as most contracts simply are extended from
year to year.
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Collective agreements stress the importance of
fulfilling production goals prescribed by the
authorities. Following a general statement concerning
the obligations of labor and management, there are
sections dealing with wage scales; with the
organization and conditions of work, including
provisions for health and safety; with labor discipline;
and with the provision of housing, social welfare, and
cultural facilities. While wage rates are not
determined by collective agreement, the contracts
stipulate that the employer is to adhere to official
scales. In accordance with the agreement, manage-
ment and the union jointly assume responsibility for
adjusting norms in response to changing technology
and so as to increase productivity.
The Soviet method for settling labor disputes differs
markedly from that employed in the United States.
Working conditions, hours of work, and remuneration,
the dominant concerns of most Western trade
unionists, are fixed by the regime in the U.S.S.R.
Strikes and lockouts, although not explicitly
prohibited by law, are considered "counterrevolution-
ary" by the regime and are swiftly suppressed. While
the more punitive labor laws have been revoked since
1953, there remain measures designed to insure
discipline among workers, with penalties of up to 3
years' imprisonment for organizing or taking part in
"group actions" which impede the operation of state
and public institutions or enterprises. Unauthorized
absenteeism is punishable by disciplinary measures at
the discretion of management. Nonetheless, sporadic,
localized strikes and riots have occurred during the
past decade, but they have been quickly suppressed
and never officially admitted. Despite the heavy
emphasis on labor discipline, disagreements over a
number of issues occur regularly. The main causes of
labor disharmony involve job classification; wage
scales, overtime pay, and severance pay; vacations;
time lost by work stoppages and layoffs; wage
payments in connection with transfers; fines imposed
for the infraction of rules; damage caused by workers
and reimbursement therefor; dismissals; and the
receipt of fringe benefits. The machinery created to
handle such disputes serves to provide the worker with
some sense of participation in management and,
consequently, of influence over working conditions.
Three groups are involved in the handling of worker
grievances: joint commissions on labor disputes,
comprising representatives of the enterprise local
committee and management, which operate within
each workplace; the enterprise local committee itself;
and the courts. Decisions of the joint commissions
ostensibly are based on full consideration of the facts
at issue and on the proper application of the pertinent
regulations or agreements. If a worker fails to obtain
satisfaction before the joint commission, an appeal
may be made to the enterprise local committee, which
may sustain or modify the decision of the joint
commission, or pass on issues on which the commission
was unable to agree. If a worker remains dissatisfied,
an appeal may be made before the courts.
Management, on the other hand, may appeal to the
courts only if it feels that the enterprise local
committee's decision contravenes existing legislation
or regulations. The worker is entitled to legal
assistance from his union and incurs no financial costs
in connection with a court appeal.
Even with this elaborate machinery, considerable
effort is made to reach a consensus promptly and as
close as possible to the source of the dispute.
Grievances are not brought before the joint
commission until a worker has tried and failed to get
satisfaction directly from management. Often the
chairman of the enterprise local committee discusses
the matter with the foreman or other management
representatives and settles the case informally. The
great majority of such decisions are accepted and put
into effect without appeal, so that decreasing numbers
of cases reach the joint commissions or the higher
bodies.
5. Social security) 25X1
An extensive program of social insurance, in the
sense that it covers both a wide range of contingencies
and a large segment of the population, operates in the
Soviet Union. In accordance with the Constitution,
"citizens of the U.S.S.R. are entitled to material
security in old age and in case of sickness and
disability." Except for medical services, however,
which are free to all, the benefits available under the
social insurance program do not accrue in equal
measure to all members of society. Urban residents, for
example, receive more generous benefits than rural
dwellers, and union members are entitled to more
assistance, whether in cash or in the use of welfare
services, than nonunion workers. The quality of
welfare services, moreover, is better in the larger cities
than elsewhere. Generally, the income maintenance
provisions do not provide complete protection against
losses. And, while pensions have been improved, they
amount to about one-half of the average wage; for
many if not most retirees, pensions are lower even than
the legal minimum wage. As a result, many
pensioners, and particularly their survivors, are
obliged to live under substandard conditions.
Consistent with the regime's position that joblessness is
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nonexistent, unemployment compensation is not
provided.
The pension law of 1956, a milestone in Soviet
social security legislation, increased the number of
persons eligible for benefits and also substantially
raised the level of benefits. It extended coverage to
nearly all workers, the notable exception being
collective farmers, who were not brought under the
system until 1965, and then only with partial benefits.
In 1967 additional legislation liberalized the benefits
granted to collective farmers. Nevertheless, retired
wage and salary earners are entitled to markedly
higher pensions-the average for such individuals
being about 60 rubles per month, as opposed to
approximately 17 rubles for collective farmers. Pension
amounts are derived from a sliding scale based on
earnings during the last year of employment.
Although the base amount of pensions is subject to a
ceiling of 120 rubles per month, supplements are
awarded for length of service in a single workplace and
for dependents.
Men normally become eligible for retirement
pensions at age 60, with 25 years of service, and
women at 55, with 20 years of service. Age and length
of service requirements are reduced by 5 to 10 years for
those engaged in difficult or hazardous work, as well
as for mothers of five or more children, for the blind,
and for dwarfs. Eligibility for invalidity and survivors
benefits is established at 2 to 20 years of work for men
and at 1 to 15 years for women, depending on the age
of the insured worker at the time of invalidity or death
and on the type of occupation. Pensions for invalids
are based on the degree of invalidity and on the
amount of previous earnings. Survivor's pensions can
range from 21 to 120 rubles per month, governed by
the number and relationship of the survivors, as well as
by the amount earned by the insured. Regardless of
the type of pension, the amount of benefits is reduced
15% for rural residents.
Disability benefits rank second to pensions as the
largest social insurance expenditure. Temporarily
disabled individuals receive 100% of earnings, subject
to a minimum of 30 rubles per month, from the time
the disability is incurred until recovery. Permanently
disabled persons receive anywhere from 21 to 120
rubles per month, depending on the nature of the
disability and the amount of earnings. Supplements
are added for those disabled. while engaged in arduous
or hazardous work and for dependents. Medical care is
provided by the regular governmental health agencies.
The dependents of those who perish as a result of work
injuries are eligible for benefits, which also range from
21 to 120 rubles per month, depending on the amount
of the insured worker's earnings and on the number of
survivors. For rural residents, the amount of disability-
benefits is reduced 10% to 15%.
Cash benefits and medical care are guaranteed
under the sickness and maternity coverage of the
insurance program. Based on the length of
employment, sick pay ranges from 50% to 90% of
earnings and is payable from the day of incapacitation
until recovery; the benefits are 10% lower for rural
dwellers and 50% lower for nonunion workers.
Maternity benefits are the equivalent of anywhere
from two-thirds to the full amount of earnings,
depending on the length of employment, and are
payable 8 weeks before and 8 weeks after childbirth
(10 weeks after in the case of complicated delivery).
Nonunion workers receive only two-thirds of earnings
in maternity benefits. Whether unionized or not,
however, medical services are provided by the public
health facilities. Pregnant women and nursing mothers
are permitted to transfer to lighter work while
retaining the same pay. Grants of 12 rubles for a
layette and 18 rubles for baby food are provided if the
monthly family earnings are under 50 rubles.
b. Welfare assistance
Technically outside the social insurance system, the
state's family allowance program is, nonetheless,
related to it. Under the program a flat grant of 20
rubles is paid to families upon the birth of their third
child; for subsequent births, the amount of the stipend
is increased progressively, the maximum sum being
250 rubles for the 11th child and for additional ones
beyond that number. Also, a monthly allowance of 4
rubles is paid for the fourth child until age 5; for
families having more than four children, the
allowance is scaled upward to a maximum of 15 rubles
for the 11th and all subsequent offspring. Unwed
mothers receive monthly child support payments,
beginning at the time of the child's birth and
continuing until the 12th birthday; the payments rise
from 5 rubles per month for the first child to 10 rubles
for the third and all succeeding ones. An extensive
network of nurseries, kindergartens, day schools, and
boarding schools, most of which are free or charge
nominal fees, accommodate the children of working
mothers.
Besides pensions and other cash benefits, welfare
assistance for the aged, disabled, and handicapped
includes institutional placement and medical care.
Additionally, those able to work are offered training,
or retraining, and job placement assistance. Such
services are administered by the ministries of social
security (which operate solely at the republic level).
For educable school-age youngsters who are disabled
or handicapped, the national Ministry of Education
operates a network of specialized schools, including
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facilities for the visually impaired, blind, deaf, and
mentally retarded, as well as for children with speech
defects and orthopedic impairments. Children who are
not trainable are placed in homes for the physically
handicapped or mentally deficient; these facilities are
managed by the social security ministries. Societies for
the deaf and blind assist the government in
supervising the training and working conditions of
individuals who suffer such handicaps.
c. Administration and funding
The manner of administering the nation's social
insurance and welfare services has remained basically
unchanged since the 1930's. The entities involved
include the republic ministries of social security, the
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, and
the AUCCTU. Individuals requiring medical care are
referred to an agency of the Ministry of Health. If the
best approach to solving a person's problem is through
training, referral is made to an agency of the Ministry
of Education, and if long-term custodial care or
economic assistance are called for, a social security
agency is contacted. Workers in need of assistance,
whether economic or social, arising out of temporary
illness, or for rest and recreation, apply to their trade
union. Of the four types of bodies, however, only the
15 ministries of social security devote their resources
exclusively to public welfare, this being an auxiliary
function for the remaining three.
Republic social security ministries are tied to the
national administration through the bureau for state
pensions, an entity of the State Committee for Labor
and Wages. By contrast, the ministries of Health and
of Education function directly at both national and
republic levels. Thus, by being less important in the
bureaucratic hierarchy, the social security ministries
have fewer resources and are staffed by less competent
personnel than the national ministries, and
deficiencies exist in the coordination of welfare
services.
Since 1933, when it became responsible for
planning and administering the worker welfare
benefits, the AUCCTU has played a major role in the
social insurance system and in managing welfare
activities. Trade union social insurance commissions
are established in every state enterprise employing 100
or more workers. Besides processing pension and other
social insurance claims, the commissions adjudicate
whatever liability disputes arise between the workers
and management, operate and issue passes to rest
homes and sanatoriums, prepare social insurance
budgets for the enterprise, and supervise programs
designed to reduce the incidence of occupational
illnesses and injuries. Regional trade union councils
supervise the commissions, the AUCCTU being
ultimately responsible for overseeing the entire
program. In this capacity, the AUCCTU disburses
nearly three-fourths of all funds allocated for social
insurance and welfare services. The remaining one-
fourth is expended by health, education, and social
security agencies, as well as by the ministries of
Defense and of Internal Affairs and other organiza-
tions, including cooperatives and collective farms,
which attend to the welfare needs of specialized
occupational groups.
Largely as the result of the ever increasing number
of pensioners2 and of the expansion in welfare services
that has attended urban growth, expenditures for
social insurance and welfare activities have increased
appreciably, as indicated by the following percentages
of the state budget allocated directly for such
purposes:
1940
.....................
5.4
1960
.....................
13.4
1965
.....................
13.8
1970
.....................
14.1
1971
.....................
14.3
1972
.....................
14.7
(preliminary)
Having more than doubled since 1960, when they
totaled 10 billion rubles, the expenditures for social
insurance and welfare services in 1971 amounted to
nearly 25 billion rubles, 72% of the sum having been
for pension programs (Figure 30). In 1972, 27.3 billion
rubles were budgeted for such expenditures, with
slightly over 73% of the amount being for pensions.
2Between 1940 and 1970, the number of pensioners, including
civilians and military veterans retired because of advanced age or
invalidity, plus their dependents, increased slightly more than
tenfold, reaching a total of 40.1 million in the latter year. Of that
number, 12.1 million were collective farmers and 4.4 million were
veterans, both totals having included dependents.
Pensions
20.8%
Sanatoriums
4%
2
'
Other
Youth and
5.8% other
1.2%
FIGURE nd welfare expenditures
1971 25X1
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E. Religion
1. Government and religion
Marx wrote that "religion is the opiate of the
people," and Lenin subsequently made this idea a
cornerstone of Communist dogma on religion. The
Soviet regime has made it clear that it is implacably
opposed to all religions and that its ultimate aim is
their total destruction. In 1961 the 22d Party Congress
set 1980 as the date when "religious prejudices" would
be overcome, simultaneous with the expected
achievement of communism in the U.S.S.R.
In the interim the regime has addressed itself not
only to the combating of religious belief but also to the
neutralization and control of existing church
organizations. To these ends, the execution of its
policy has vacillated between repression and
toleration, the regime bearing down during periods of
confidence and easing up when trying to win the
support of the people. Since the fall of Khrushchev,
pressure on religious expression has slackened
somewhat, but the various churches have regained
none of the ground lost in 1959-64, the latest period of
severe represion.
The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of
Russia, published by the Soviet regime within a week
of its seizure of power in 1917, abolished all religious
privileges and restrictions. It thereby did away with
the traditional classification of the different religions
in the country as "dominant" (Russian Orthodoxy),
"tolerable" (Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Islam,
the Armenian Church, and other religions professed by
non-Russians), and "intolerable" (sects and schisms
within Orthodoxy, missionary religions among the
Orthodox, and Judaism). This declaration was
followed early in 1918 by a decree which
disestablished Russian Orthodoxy as the state church;
stripped all churches of civil functions, such as
registration of births, marriages, and deaths; banned
religious oaths and public rites; nationalized the
property of religious organizations without compensa-
tion; ended all state expenditures for religion and state
support for the clergy, as well as the right of a church
to tax members; removed religion from school
curriculums; and closed down religious schools. Other
measures allowed antireligious propaganda, reduced
priests and other clerics to a socially inferior position,
banned all religious instruction to persons under age
18, withdrew legal recognition of church marriages
and divorces, and dissolved monasteries and convents.
In 1929 a decree was enacted to establish rigid rules
for church activity, deal with the legal position of
religious organizations, and codify earlier regulations.
According to this decree, the state recognized those
religious denominations whose adherents registered as
religious societies (more than 20 believers) or groups of
believers (less than 20). Following registration with the
local civil authorities, the religious society or group of
believers was eligible to negotiate with these
authorities for the use of buildings and objects of
worship. The collection of funds by national or
regional church organizations was banned, such
activity to be carried on only by the registered local
religious societies or groups of believers and only
among their membership. Out of these donations the
church buildings and clergy were to be maintained.
Charitable activity on the part of the society or group
was forbidden, as was the establishment of church-
sponsored mutual aidfunds, medical aid units,
cooperatives, literary, handicraft, or study groups, and
sports organizations. Registered societies and groups of
believers were allowed to organize regional and
national congresses, which could elect administrative
bodies. The 1929 decree still largely determines church
organization and activity in the Soviet Union,
although some modifications have been introduced.
For example, according to a 1945 decree, churches
were given the right to build, rent, or acquire property
and articles of worship.
All religious groups are under the supervision of the
Council for Religious Affairs, a body attached to the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers which exercises control
over local church activities through officials at the
local and republic levels. Government authorities
approve the appointments of the hierarchies of all
denominations. Religious works, like all other
publications in the U.S.S.R., must be cleared by the
state censor. Other practical problems, such as
obtaining building materials for the construction and
repair of churches and church-connected buildings,
arranging for the manufacture of articles of worship,
and obtaining foreign currency for churchmen
traveling abroad, are handled by the appropriate state
agencies once the Council for Religious Affairs has
granted its approval.
In exchange for the official toleration of religion,
the regime has extracted support for its "peace"
policies from prominent religious leaders. Soviet
church organizations have been the principal backers
of the World Christian Peace Conference based in
Prague and also have taken part in the Communist-
front World Peace Council. From time to time, church
organizations have also denounced U.S. and Israeli
"aggression," concomitantly backing the "just"
struggle of the Vietnamese, Arabs, and other peoples.
The government has on occasion given support and
material assistance to various denominations when
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such efforts have aided Soviet foreign policy, and it
has sanctioned and even prompted efforts by Soviet
religious groups to exert influence or control over
fellow communicants abroad. In 1970 there were 14
officially recognized religious groups: Russian
Orthodox, Georgian Orthodox, Old Believer,
Evangelical Christian Baptist (including Pentecostals
and Mennonites), Seventh-day Adventist, Molokan
(Spiritual Christian), Lutheran, Calvinist (Reformed),
Methodist, Roman Catholic, Armenian Apostolic,
Muslim, Buddhist, and Jewish.
Although the regime has, within limits, tolerated
and made use of organized religion, it continues to
sponsor atheistic propaganda to destroy religious
belief. The basic outlines of the campaign against
religion were set down in 1923 and included the
following measures to be taken: 1) publication of
scientific literature which would "seriously elucidate
the history and origin of religion," and of pamphlets
and leaflets which would "unmask the counter-
revolutionary role of religion and the church;" 2)
organization of "mass antireligious propaganda;" and
3) special training of party agitators and propagandists
for the "struggle against religion," and organization
under party supervision of "special antireligious study
circles and seminars."
The first atheist newspaper, founded late in 1922,
was Bezbozhnik (The Godless), and a League of the
Godless was organized in 1925 as a mass organization
to spread atheism. In addition to issuing atheist
publications and conducting courses in numerous
languages, the league opened and maintained
antireligious museums, usually in confiscated church
buildings, organized antireligious festivals coinciding
with church holidays, conducted ceremonial burnings
of icons and seizures of church bells, and carried out a
campaign of church closures in response to "popular
demand." After 1930 the intensity of the atheist
campaign slackened-Bezbozhnik shut down tem-
porarily from 1934 to 1938 and for good in 1941, the
number of antireligious museums declined, antireli-
gious festivals were discontinued, and the league itself
was disbanded immediately after the German invasion
in 1941.
A powerful revival of religion during the war
persuaded the regime that the earlier blatant
antireligious campaigns would have to be replaced by
subtler methods. Beginning in 1944, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party stressed the need
for "scientific educational" propaganda in order to
"overcome the revivals of ignorance, superstition, and
prejudice." The All-Union Society for the Dissemina-
tion of Political and Scientific Knowledge, one of
whose tasks was to conduct antireligious propaganda,
was organized in 1947. Maintaining its campaign
against religion, it was renamed the Znaniye
(Knowledge) Society in 1963. A new periodical
devoted solely to atheism and religion, Nauka i
religiya (Science and Religion), began to appear in
1959 under the society's auspices. At the same time, a
network of Atheist Houses, Atheist Clubs, and
Universities of Atheism was established at the local
level to act as focal points for antireligious work. In
1964 an Institute of Scientific Atheism was set up in
the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the
Communist Party Central Committee to improve the
level of atheistic propaganda and the training of
propagandists, and to direct and coordinate
antireligious work at all levels.
From 1954 to 1959 there was a lull in the
antireligious campaign as a result of limitations set by
the party on the ridicule of religious people and the
use of "administ,rative action"-i.e., coercion. From
1959 to 1964, however, the antireligious campaign
once again intensified by degrees, reaching a peak just
before Khrushchev's fall. This period witnessed the
forcible closure of many churches, monasteries,
convents, and seminaries (Figure 31), and virulent
attacks on ministers of religion. Since that time, in step
with regime efforts to assure support for the leadership,
antireligious propaganda has become somewhat less
strident, although it is still much in evidence. Besides
the usual methods of printed and visual propaganda,
lectures, and courses, other devices have been resorted
to with varying success. These include the
introduction of secular ceremonies to replace baptism,
confirmation, and religious marriages and funerals, or
to obscure religious festivals.
Although severe repression and more than a half
century of atheistic and antireligious propaganda have
been mainly responsible for the decline of religion in
the Soviet Union, the changes introduced by the
increasing urbanization of the country have also been
a factor. It has been estimated that the total number
of professing believers for all religions dropped from
approximately four-fifths of the population in 1914 to
about one-fourth by the early 1970's. Along with this
group should be cited the large number of nominal
believers and even nonbelievers who persist in religious
practices relating to baptism, marriage, and burial.
Statistics on the extent of this custom are not known,
but on the basis of a poll taken in the city of Gorkiy
late in the 1960's well over three-fifths of the young
couples interviewed had had their children baptized.
Most of the believers belong to one of the 14
recognized religious groups. There also exist a large
number of religious bodies-perhaps 30 to 40-which
are either ignored by the authorities or harassed as
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Former Church of Simeon Stopnik (Russian
Ort now an exhibition
hall
FIGURE 31. Edifices built for religious purposes now put to secular use
illegal organizations. This" religion of the catacombs"
in the Soviet Union has many shapes and forms,
ranging from Uniate churches recognizing the Papacy
to small circles of Jehovah's Witnesses, and new
groups are constantly forming.
In addition to those members of the population at
large who have either remained loyal or returned to
organized religion, there are notable individual
examples within the intelligentsia, such as Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, who have found in religion a system of
values and ethics that serves as an alternative to that
offered by communism. For a larger number of
intellectuals motivated by an awakened nationalism,
the church is seen as the inheritor and transmitter of
the traditions of the past, and as such its architecture,
art, music, literature-and if necessary even its
beliefs-must be preserved.
Eastern Orthodoxy in its various forms has from 30
million to 35 million adherents in the Soviet Union.
These include large numbers of Russians, Ukrainians,
Belorussians, Moldavians, Georgians, Chuvash,
Mordvins, Udmurts, Mari, and Komi, and smaller
numbers of Estonians, Latvians, Tatars, Ossetians,
Koreans, and other groups.
25X1
D
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a. The Russian Orthodox Church
By far the largest group in Eastern Orthodoxy is the
Russian Orthodox Church, whose fate and that of the
Russian state have been interconnected for nearly a
thousand years. The first contacts between the Eastern
Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians) and
Byzantine Christianity were made through Bulgarian
,Slavs in the eighth century. The ruling class began to
adopt Christianity in the ninth century, and the first
mass conversion took place in about 860. Christianity
and paganism coexisted until 988, when Vladimir,
Grand Duke of Kiyev (at that time the senior Russian
ruler), declared Orthodoxy the official Russian faith.
The Russian church remained subordinate to the
Patriarch in Constantinople for the next 500 years, but
in the 13th and 14th centuries these ties were seriously
weakened on the one hand by the Mongol invasion
and isolation of Russia and on the other by the
Western crusaders' seizure and temporary control of
Constantinople. During this period the church rallied
the squabbling Russian princes and persuaded them to
accept the leadership of the Grand Duke of Moscow.
At the same time it began a successful mission to the
pagan Finnic tribes on the fringes of Russian rule. In
1448 the Russian church became autocephalous,
determining its own affairs without reference to
Constantinople and choosing its own Metropolitan
(Archbishop). The fall of Constantinople to the Turks
in 1453 convinced the Russians of the rightness of their
decision. To their mind Moscow became the center of
Orthodoxy and the last refuge of the unaltered faith.
A conflict arose early in the 16th century between
advocates of a more spiritual religion and those of a
centralized, power-oriented persuasion. The latter won
out, and late in the century the Metropolitan of
Moscow assumed the rank of Patriarch. However, the
seeds were sown for schism. After a series of reforms
were introduced in the mid-17th century in an
attempt to bring Russian ritual into line with that of
the Greeks, the church was -split by the Great Schism,
leading to the formation of the various sects of Old
Believers. From this point on, the Russian Orthodox
Church fought and lost a series of battles with the
state. The office of Patriarch fell vacant in 1700 and
was finally abolished by Peter I in 1721. The church
was governed instead by a Holy Synod consisting of
bishops named by the tsar and led by a high lay
official. Throughout the rest of the imperial period the
church functioned as a department of the government,
and in the 18th century it lost to the state most of its
economic wealth in the form of extensive lands.
Concurrently its priests steadily declined in social
status, so that by the 20th century their station in
Russian life was analogous to that held by petty
officials.
Following the revolution of 1905, the Russian
Orthodox Church underwent an intellectual and
spiritual revival, and sentiment developed within it
favoring separation of church and state. When the
imperial regime collapsed, the church responded by
calling a council for August 1917 and simultaneously
democratizing its internal administrative structure.
After 3 months of wrangling, finally terminated by the
fact of the Bolshevik Revolution, the church council
elected a Patriarch, Tikhon. The great revival of
Orthodox Christianity, however, clashed head-on with
revolutionary communism, and the church soon found
that it was destined for annihilation. In swift
succession it lost the remainder of its lands, its
churches, monasteries and schools, its status as an
established church, and its very corporate existence.
Many of its leading clerics were arrested, exiled, and,
in some cases, executed. Even the Patriarch was not
spared, being jailed in 1922-23. At the same time, the
regime promoted a schism within the church, leading
to the creation of several groups to challenge the
authority of the Patriarch. Following the Patriarch's
release from jail, the church announced that it would
no longer oppose Soviet power, and for this the regime
withdrew its support of the various schismatic sects.
After the death of Tikhon in 1925, the office of
Patriarch remained vacant for 18 years. At the height
of World War II, Stalin allowed a council to be
convened to fill the office. The new Patriarch, Sergey,
died within a year, and in 1945 a successor, Aleksey,
was elected. The latter served. until his death in April
1970. Metropolitan Pimen of Krutitsy and Kolomna,
whose see includes Moscow, filled the office as a
locum tenens until June 1971, when he was elected
Patriarch. The Patriarch exercises supreme church
authority when the church council is not in session.
The council, which consists of bishops, clerics, and
laity and is convened only when necessary, is
theoretically the highest church authority and is
charged with electing. a Patriarch when the office is
vacated.
Regulations for administering the Russian Orthodox
Church, drawn up by the council in 1945, vest
governing power in a 10-man Holy Synod consisting
of the Patriarch, the metropolitans of. Leningrad-.
Ladoga, Kiyev-Galicia, and Krutitsy-Kolomna
(including Moscow), three bishops drawn in rotation
from the dioceses of the church, two administrators of
the Moscow Patriarchy, and the chairman of the
department of foreign ecclesiastical relations of the
Patriarchy. Estimated to serve about 30 million more
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or less active adherents, the church is divided into 73
dioceses whose boundaries coincide with Soviet
administrative divisions. Each diocese is normally
headed by a bishop who is elected by the Holy Synod
and who administers the affairs of his diocese with the
aid of a council consisting of from three to five
persons. As of 1970 there were about 60 bishops in
office; vacant sees are headed by temporary clerical
administrators. The bishop ordains priests and deacons
for his diocese and appoints various parish officials.
Parishes are nominally headed by priests, but a church
council elected by a general parish assembly serves as
the actual executive body. The council is responsible
for managing the church funds, which consist of
voluntary offerings at divine services; payments for
communion bread, candles, and other ritual
accessories; and special donations. The antireligious
campaign under Khrushchev resulted in the closing of a
large number of Russian Orthodox churches. Of the
16,000 existing churches, only 6,000 reportedly
survived.
A number of theological academies and seminaries
have been allowed to function since 1944. In 1970
such institutions were operating at Zagorsk (near
Moscow), Leningrad, and Odessa. Seminaries also
functioned for varying intervals between 1944 and
1966 in five other locations.
The church has secured permission to issue a
monthly review, the Russian-language Zhurnal
Moskovskoy Patriarkhiy (Journal of the Moscow
Patriarchate), but no provision is made for its sale or
subscription, and the extent of its circulation is
unknown. For propaganda purposes, a high
proportion of its press run is sent abroad. Under the
auspices of the Metropolitan of Kiyev-Galicia, the
church also issues the monthly Ukrainian-language
Pravoslavniy Visnik (Orthodox Herald).
Since the mid-1960's a number of Russian Orthodox
clergymen, the most prominent among them being
Metropolitan Yermogen of Kaluga, have addressed
appeals to the Patriarch, the President of the Soviet
Union, foreign church leaders and organizations, and
the United Nations, detailing their discontent with the
continued violation of constitutional guarantees of
freedom of worship and other laws concerning
religion. Increasingly this protest movement has joined
its small voice with that of the intelligentsia, the
principal link being church publicist A. Levitin-
Krasnov, who made the initial connection by
contributing material to the underground publication,
Phoenix 1966, and who has subsequently taken part in
several protests against specific acts of the regime. The
official church response to this protest has been to
suspend the dissenting clergymen from their functions
while denying the truth of the various charges.
The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church
extends beyond the borders of the Soviet state, as the
church has dioceses in France, Austria, Israel, Canada,
and other countries. In an apparent change of policy,
the Russian Church gave up its authority over its
dioceses in the United States early in 1970, asserting
that they should form the nucleus of a distinctly
American Orthodox Church in conjunction with the
other ethnic Orthodox bodies on U.S. soil.
Complicating the Russian Orthodox Church's
relations with overseas Russian churches are the
frequent conflicts between clergy loyal to the Patriarch
and schismatics who have split away in the period
since 1917; the differences arising between anti-
Communist emigree laymen and representatives of the
Patriarchate; and the process of de-Russification as the
church has taken root outside the Soviet Union. From
1943 to 1956 the Moscow Patriarchate, with tacit
government support, sought to establish its primacy
not only over the scattered overseas church groups that
have, or once had, connections with the Russian
church, but also over the autonomous and
autocephalous Orthodox churches in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere. To this end, church leaders obtained
permission for numerous trips abroad at a time when
such opportunities were open only to a very small
number of top government officials. In the process,
representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church
clashed with those of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in
Istanbul, and subsequently with those of the
Patriarchate of Serbia. In 1957 the Moscow
Patriarchate announced its willingness to wipe out all
canonical disputes with other Orthodox churches. At
about this time the Russian church also made its first
approaches to the ecumenical movement, abandoning
first its strictures against Protestants and subsequently
its denunciations of Rome. Contacts were established
with the World Council of Churches in 1958, and the
Russian church became a member in 1961. In the
same year the church was permitted to accept an
invitation to send observers to the opening session of
the Second Vatican Council. Paradoxically, this
acceptance came during the period when internal
activity of the Moscow Patriarchate was at a postwar
low because of official restrictions.
J
b. The Georgian Orthodox Church
The existence of the autocephalous Georgian
Orthodox Church within the Soviet Union contra-
venes a basic principle of Eastern Orthodoxy-that
the jurisdiction of each Orthodox church is based on
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the state boundaries of the nation within which it
functions. Thus, in the 1920's the Russian Orthodox
Church fought and won a lengthy battle against
autonomist and autocephalous trends which had
arisen in the confused postrevolutionary years in
Belorussia and the Ukraine. In 1940 and again in
1944, the Russian church reasserted its control over the
autocephalous Orthodox churches in the formerly
independent Baltic republics, in the formerly Polish-
ruled areas of Belorussia and the Ukraine, in the
formerly Czech-ruled Transcarpathian Ukraine, and
in formerly Romanian-ruled Moldavia. The Russian
church went one step further with respect to so-called
Uniate churches in western Belorussia and the western
Ukraine. These churches, recognizing the Papacy but
using the Byzantine liturgy, were the subject of
constant government and church pressure in the 18th
and 19th centuries. The Uniate churches revived
following the 1917 revolution but were again
suppressed in the 1920's, and following World War II
the Russian Orthodox Church, backed by the Soviet
regime, presided over their liquidation in overt form
on Soviet territory.
The Georgian Orthodox Church, which traces its
origins back to approximately 330, became
autonomous in the sixth century and autocephalous in
the eighth. It developed its own Georgian liturgy and
had only sporadic contact with Russian Orthodoxy
before Georgia was incorporated piecemeal into the
Russian empire in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries. With this political absorption came a
gradual Russification of the church, and the Georgians
by degree drifted away from their traditional
Orthodoxy. In 1917, however, a resurgent Georgian
church again declared its autocephaly and elected a
Catholicos (Patriarch) to lead it. The Russian church
refused to recognize this step until 1943, when as part
of the arrangement with the regime which resulted in
a revival of its organization, it conceded the
autocephalous status of the Georgian church.
Despite the normalization of its canonical status,
the Georgian church has not returned to the same
degree of health as the Russian church. With perhaps
as many as 1 million communicants, it has fewer
houses of worship and priests than an average Russian
Orthodox diocese. There are seven bishops, only three
of whom are in charge of dioceses. Publication
activities are limited to a liturgical calendar, and
although the church is reported to have a seminary, no
recent information concerning it has come to light.
Since 960 the Georgian church has been headed by
Catholicos Efrem II, who was elected by a church
council, and since 1962 it has belonged to the World
Council of Churches.
Old Believers, or Old Ritualists, occupy a unique
position, standing apart from both the Russian
Orthodox Church and from the mass of groups usually
termed "sectarians." They came into being in the
Great Schism of 1666 as a conservative opposition to
an Orthodox church which, under Greek influence,
had supposedly distorted the ancient rites and
liturgical books of Russian Christianity. The Old
Believers are not a single church as they encompass a
large variety of religious opinions. By the end of the
17th century they had split into two groups, the
Priestists and the Priestless, over the question of
whether to retain the priesthood and the other
sacraments. Both groups subsequently underwent
additional splits. Estimates of the total number of
adherents vary widely, but most estimates fall between
1 million and 2 million. The bulk of Old Believers live
in the European part of the U.S.S.R.
The largest group of Old Believers is the Church of
the Belo-Krinitsa Concord, a Priestist group formed in
Austrian Bukovina (now part of the Ukrainian S.S.R.)
in the mid-19th century. This group has a hierarchy
with an archbishop in Moscow and five dioceses. It is
governed by a council, and between sessions by an
archepiscopal council. The Church of the Belo-
Krinitsa Concord owns its own printing press, but its
publishing output is limited.
One group of Priestist Old Believers has persisted in
resorting to dissident priests from the Russian
Orthodox Church. This group is called the Church of
the Fugitive Priests, or, more formally, the Old
Believer Church of Ancient Orthodox Christians. In
the confusion of the 1920's this church enlisted the aid
of a defecting Orthodox bishop and created its own
hierarchy. It is headed by an archbishop whose see is
in Moscow, but little is known of its activities. or
strength.
The Priestless Old Believers have never inclined
toward firm organizational ties, and the effect of
religious persecution has been to encourage their
natural tendency to split into ever smaller groups. The
most important of these are centered in Moscow,
Latvia, and Lithuania; the Lithuanian group
sometimes being referred to as the Eastern Orthodox
Church of the Ancient Rite.
a. The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church
Perhaps the most widespread of the non-Orthodox
churches is the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church,
the product of a "voluntary" union in 1944 of the
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Evangelical Christians and the Baptists, with the
Pentecostals joining in 1945 and the Mennonites in
1966. The union resulted from an attempt by the
regime to establish a "clarification on the religious
front" by the absorption of small groups and sects into
larger bodies which would be easier to control. The
Evangelical Christians trace their origins to English
missionary work among the Russians in the latter half
of the 19th century, and the Baptists derive from the
adoption of German Protestant religious forms in the
Ukraine somewhat earlier. The Mennonites in the
union are descendants of a German group which was
granted refuge in Russia in the 18th century, while the
Pentecostal sect was introduced by Americans early in
the 20th century.
In the 1920's, Evangelical Christians and Baptists
benefited from official toleration aimed at undermin-
ing the dominant Orthodox church, and during this
period both churches experienced substantial growth.
Restoration of a working relationship between the
regime and Orthodoxy brought a change in official
attitudes toward the two non-Orthodox groups, but
despite this they continued to grow. The most serious
difficulty experienced by the church born of the 1944
merger occurred during the 1959-64 campaign against
religion when various Evangelical and Baptist sects
protested against policies adopted by the church under
pressure from the regime. Among these groups were
communities of "Pure" or "Free" Baptists, who
maintained that they were free from submission to any
religious hierarchy or to the Soviet authorities. In 1960
the church had been forced to issue new governing
statutes calling for a sharp reduction in its activity. As
a result, many of the Pure Baptist dissidents coalesced
in an Action Group whose aims included removal of
the restrictions, general decentralization, and
democratic reform. Despite government harassment
and numerous arrests, the reform Baptists had
considerable success in winning adherents from the
parent church as well as from the population at large,
and in 1965 they finally declared a schism. The
Evangelical Christian Baptist Church, distressed at the
split and alarmed by intensified government
repression of the dissenters, sought to heal the division
by making constitutional concessions and providing
for increased reform representation in its central
bodies. However, the dissidents have remained
convinced that there can be no accommodation, and
several thousand have been jailed for their
independent stance.
Estimated to comprise at least 3 million members,
who conduct as active a religious life as the law allows,
the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church is governed
by an assembly of representatives which. meets every 3
years. At each meeting the assembly elects a 25-
member All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian
Baptists which serves as the administrative body for
the church. To keep in touch with the All-Union
Council, presbyters (pastors) elect senior presbyters at
regional meetings; presbyters in turn are chosen by the
local congregations.
The Evangelical Christian Baptists do not maintain
a theological seminary in the Soviet Union, but
permission has been granted to set up a correspond-
ence course for the training of clergy, and on occasion
the regime has allowed individuals to study at Baptist
seminaries in the United Kingdom, Sweden, West
Germany, and Canada. The church engages in an
active publishing program, issuing a bimonthly
periodical, Bratskiy Vestnik (Fraternal Herald), as well
as psalters and hymnals. It has also published an
edition of the Bible. The Evangelical Christian Baptist
Church has been a member of the World Council of
Churches since 1962. Additionally, it belongs to the
Baptist World Alliance, the European Church
Conference, and the European Baptist Federation.
Smaller Evangelical groups influenced by the
Evangelical Christian Baptist Church but not
affiliated with it include Seventh-day Adventists and
Molokans. Seventh-day Adventist beliefs spread to
Russia from the United States via German settlements
in the 19th century. The Molokans are an indigenous
sect whose origins go back to the 18th century. They
place great stress on the Bible and their beliefs draw
some inspiration from the Quaker tradition.
b. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and other
Protestant groups
The Evangelical Lutheran Church survives as the
principal religion of Estonia and Latvia and as a
minority religion in Lithuania. A large number of
Germans and Finns in the Soviet Union are also
Lutherans, but without a structural base for their
religion many have tended to drift into the
D
Evangelical Christian Baptist Church. The extensive a
network of the Lutheran Church existing in Russia
before 1917 was gravely damaged following the
separation of Finland and the Baltic republics from
the disintegrating empire, and the subsequent
identification of the church in the 1930's with ethnic
Germans and Finns, whose mother countries were
hostile to the U.S.S.R., was sufficient ground for the
government to dissolve the Lutheran parishes. After
the annexation of the Baltic republics in World War
II, however, the Soviet Union found itself with a
compact Lutheran community too large to extirpate
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through exile. At present there are perhaps 1 million
Lutherans in the Baltic area.
The officially sanctioned Estonian and Latvian
Evangelical Lutheran churches are headed by a
consistory and a supreme church council, respectively,
and these bodies are responsible for electing members
of the hierarchy. Lithuanian Lutherans also manage
their affairs through a consistory but have no clerics
above the local level. There is a severe shortage of
Lutheran clergy because of the large-scale flight to the
West or exile to Siberia of many pastors in the mid-
1940's and the closing down of seminaries. As a
makeshift substitute for theological training, the
churches in the Baltic republics have instituted
correspondence courses for pastoral preparation. Also,
a few prospective pastors have been permitted to study
in Western Europe. Publishing activity is limited. Both
the Estonian and Latvian churches have been
members of the World Council of Churches since
1962; they also belong to the Lutheran World
Federation and the European Church Conference.
A few Protestant groups in the western border areas
of the U.S.S.R. have managed to survive while most of
their coreligionists in the interior have merged with the
Evangelical Christian Baptists. Officially recognized
among them are the Calvinists (Reformed),
concentrated in the small Hungarian population of
the Transcarpathian Ukraine, and minute Methodist
communities in Estonia and the Ukraine.
c. The Roman Catholic Church
Through Russian acquisition of Polish territories in
the 18th century, Roman Catholicism became one of
the major churches within the empire. Previously it
had been regarded by the Russians as the militant and
hostile church of their dangerous neighbors to the
west. The various attempts made by Rome to encroach
on the Russian Orthodox Church, first through
Crusades led by the Teutonic Knights in the 13th
century and then through more or less compulsory
unions enforced upon Orthodox dioceses under the
authority of the Polish crown, combined with the
centuries of estrangement between Rome and
Constantinople, all made a deeply unfavorable
impression on the Russian people and sometimes
produced a profound hatred of what Orthodox
believers called the "Latin Heresy." This heritage and
the well-established hostility between Catholicism and
communism placed the Roman Catholic Church at a
marked disadvantage after the Russian Revolution.
Having lost most of its territorial base following the
separation of the Polish lands and Lithuania from
Russia, the church found its adherents among
scattered upper class Russians, ethnic Germans and
Poles, and Uniates of Ukrainian and Belorussian
nationality. None of these groups could claim many
friends in the Soviet regime, and an official assault on
the church in the 1930's led to its virtual liquidation.
Once again, territorial changes (1939-40 and 1944-
45) resulted in Soviet acquisition of a large Catholic
community, consisting of approximately 12 million
adherents of the Latin and Byzantine rites
concentrated in the western parts of the Ukraine and
Belorussia, in Lithuania, and in southeastern Latvia, a
development' which changed the position of the
church from a small and scattered group to the third
largest religion (after Russian Orthodoxy and Islam) in
the U.S.S.R. However, the subsequent forced reunion
of the Byzantine Rite (Uniate) Catholics with the
Orthodox Church, the repatriation to Poland of ethnic
Poles, and the annihilation or exile of countless other
believers, has reduced the number of Roman Catholics
to an estimated 4 million, mostly in Lithuania and
Latvia, with additional clusters in the western parts of
Belorussia and the Ukraine and scattered groups in the
R. S. F. S. R. Even though reduced by two-thirds,
Roman Catholics reportedly still constituted the third
largest religious group in the Soviet Union in 1970.
An accurate assessment of the situation of the
Roman Catholic Church in the Soviet Union is
difficult to make, but some of its dimensions can be
gaged from a report made public by the judiciary
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in
1964. The report indicated that during the period from
1917 to 1959, in the U.S.S.R. and countries occupied
by the Russians, almost 13,000 Catholic clergy were
killed, more than 32,000 were imprisoned or exiled,
and thousands of others were forced to abandon the
priesthood and accept other jobs. In addition,
seminaries and religious communities were dissolved,
almost all churches were closed, and Catholic
organizations were disbanded. Information released
by Catholic sources in 1973 show a church structure
which includes 10 dioceses (four in the R.S.F.S.R., four
in Lithuania, one in Latvia, and one in the Ukrainian
S.S.R.), and a hierarchy of eight bishops. Seven of the
bishops are in Lithuania and one in Latvia; of the
eight, three are known to be "impeded" in the exercise
of their ministry, and there is no evidence that the
others are permitted to function with any effective-
ness. Contacts with Rome are nonexistent. When the
Vatican Council opened in 1961, no Roman Catholics
from the Soviet Union were allowed to be present
although observers were sent by the Russian Orthodox
Church. In addition to the Catholic churches that
may be operating in Lithuania and Latvia, four are
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reported to be open elsewhere in the Soviet Union-
one each in Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, and Tiflis.
An American chaplain is stationed in Moscow to serve
Catholics at the U.S. Embassy there.
Religious sentiment among Catholics in the Baltic
region reportedly remains strong, despite restrictions
on formal church organization and activities. When
linked with nationalism, such sentiment can assume
explosive proportions. For example, in May 1972, riots
erupted in Kaunas, Lithuania, that were due at least
in part to religious persecution, specifically the arrest
and sentencing to 1 year's detention of two priests for
violation of a 1966 decree banning religious
instruction to children. During the rioting, buildings
were set on fire, one policeman was killed, and 500
persons were arrested. Shortly after the arrest of the
priests, an appeal for their release was signed by more
than 17,000 Lithuanians and sent to Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev and to the U.N. Secretary General.
d. The Armenian Apostolic Church
The Armenian Apostolic Church is perhaps the
oldest Christian church on Soviet territory. Its origins
go back to the beginning of the fourth century, when
the King of Armenia was baptized and became the
first monarch to decree Christianity as the religion of a
whole nation. Actually, a Christian community had
already been in existence in Armenia for nearly 100
years. In the fifth century the Armenian church
refused to accept the decisions of the Council of
Chalcedon, cutting itself off from the rest of
Christianity, and from that point on its fate and that
of the Armenian people and nation were identical.
The authority of the Catholicos of the Armenians,
whose see is in Echmiadzin, was undivided until the
mid-15th century when a second jurisdiction was
founded in Cilicia, in what is now south-central
Turkey. These two sees are independent of each other,
but the Catholicos of Echmiadzin has primacy of
honor over that of Cilicia (now resident in Lebanon),
whose religious authority does not, in theory, go
beyond the Middle East. The jurisdiction of the
Echmiadzin Catholicos extends not only over the
approximately 2 million Soviet members of the
Armenian Apostolic Church but also over most
Armenians of the diaspora. The Soviet Government is
conscious that its treatment of the church can
influence foreign Armenian communities, whose
economic and political significance is not negligible,
and repression of the Armenian church therefore has
never been as rigorous as that of most other religious
groups in the U.S.S.R.
The present Echmiadzin Catholicos, elected in 1955
by a national church assembly, is assisted by a
supreme council in the administration of church
affairs. Only five of the 27 dioceses of the Armenian
church are on Soviet territory, the others located in
such disparate places as France, Indonesia, the United
States, and Iran. Most of the church's followers in the
U.S.S.R. outside the Armenian Republic are in
adjacent Georgia and Azerbaijan and in a number of
cities in the R. S. F. S. R.
The church runs a theological seminary which
includes foreign Armenians among its student body
and faculty. It is also allowed to publish a periodical,
Echmiadzin, the bulk of whose press run is distributed
abroad. Both divisions of the Armenian church
entered the World Council of Churches in 1962, and
the Armenian church of the Echmiadzin See also
belongs to the European Church Conference. The
Echmiadzin Catholicos has attended several
conferences outside the U.S.S.R.
After the Russian Orthodox Church, Islam has the
greatest number of followers, religious leaders, and
places of worship within the Soviet Union. An
estimated 15 million to 20 million Muslims are
concentrated in the republics of Central Asia, adjacent
Siberia, the central Volga regions, and the Caucasus.
Approximately 10%, located mainly in Azerbaijan and
Dagestan, are of the Shia branch of Islam; almost all
of the remainder are of the Sunni branch. A small
community of Ismailite Muslims loyal to the Aga
Khan exists in the mountainous southeast border
regions of Tadzhikistan. For the most part Turkic-
speaking peoples, the Muslims of the U.S.S.R. came
under Russian rule beginning with the conquest of
Kazan in the 16th century and ending with
annexation of the protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara
early in the 20th century. The Russian conquest
encountered fierce resistance, rooted in the doctrines
of Islam which prescribe opposition to regimes of
another faith. A particularly bloody struggle against
the Russians took place in the Caucasus over a period
of 80 years under the leadership of the fanatic
Muridist sect. When it annexed the Muslim areas, the
tsarist government declared the inhabitants subject to
the laws of the empire, regardless of their national and
cultural characteristics, but it left them their religion,
which could be preached freely. The Muslim religious
law, the Sharia, was left undisturbed, and Muslim
religious schools (madrasahs) were preserved.
Moreover, an ecclesiastical administration was formed
to protect Muslim rights.
During the first 10 years of its existence, the Soviet
regime was quite circumspect in its treatment of Islam.
J
D
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By the late 1920's, however, the regime felt sufficiently
confident to impose on the Muslims the same
antireligious measures it had applied to others. Their
schools were closed; religious law was abolished except
in the narrowest ecclesiastical sense; the study of the
Arabic language was banned; and religious
endowment property was confiscated. In addition,
numerous mosques were closed, Muslim clerics were
arrested and exiled, and the central ecclesiastical
administration was dissolved.
With the general revival of religion during World
War II, Islam was able to recoup some of its losses.
Four ecclesiastical administrations, selected by
congresses of community representatives, were set up:
in Ufa, covering the European regions of the U.S.S.R.
and Siberia; in Tashkent, covering Central Asia; in
Baku, covering the Transcaucasus; and in Buynaksk,
covering the North Caucasus and Dagestan. Mosques
were reopened, as were madrasahs in Bukhara and, for
a brief time, in Tashkent. Editions of the Koran were
printed in the 1950's, mostly for foreign consumption,
and the regime began to allow a small number of
believers to make the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca.
No specific information is available concerning the
effect of the 1959-64 antireligious campaign on Soviet
Muslims. In any case, Islam continues to survive
within the Soviet Union, and it has been officially
acknowledged that ritual practices such as circum-
cision and Islamic marriage and funeral ceremonies
have persisted. The Soviet regime has found Islam to
be much more firmly entrenched than it had initially
believed, its basic staying power relatively unaffected
by cultural regimentation, secular education,
antireligious propaganda, and coercive measures.
Buddhism spread into the territories now occupied
by the U.S.S.R. in the 17th and 18th centuries in the
form of Lamaism, the so-called Yellow Cap sect of
Buddhism, which was adopted by the Mongol Buryats
and Kalmyks and the Turkic Tuvinians. The Russian
Government recognized the religion as early as 1741
when it created the Bandido Hambo Lama to head
the Buddhist hierarchy. The number of temples,
monastaries, and clergy (lamas) grew rapidly
throughout the next century, until the government
became concerned about their proliferation and
restricted further growth.
Following a period of relative toleration under the
Soviet regime, the Buddhist religion suffered all the
vicissitudes experienced by the other religious groups
in the U.S.S.R., and on the eve of World War II
organized Buddhism was on the verge of extinction.
The small (approximately 400,000) Buddhist
community received a major blow when the Kalmyks
were exiled to Siberia in 1943 and their cultural life
snuffed out following charges of collaboration with
the German invaders. During the war the remaining
Buddhists did not seem to benefit from the general
easing of conditions afforded other religions.
In the 1950's the Soviet regime decided to improve
its image among Buddhist nations of the Far East by
allowing a slight renewal of religious life to its own
Buddhists. The Kalmyks were allowed to return home
in 1958, but there were no traces of their traditional
religion left in their home territory. Even the Buryats,
who had been left relatively undisturbed, could not
revive more than a remnant of their religion, as most
of the monastaries and temples, as well as statues of
Buddha and other religious artifacts, had been
destroyed. One or two monastaries were reported to be
functioning in the early 1960's. A Buddhist Central
Council and a Soviet Buddhist Monks Society are said
to exist, both headed since 1963 by Bandido Hambo
Lama Jambal Dorji Gamboev, resident at Ivolginsk.
There is some question as to what his functions are,
other than to travel abroad to meetings of the World
Fellowship of Buddhists or to be shown off to foreign
coreligionists.
6. The Jewish question
No universal agreement exists on the definition of
the term "Jew," that is, whether it connotes a religion
or a nationality concept. In the Russian empire, Jews
were considered both a religious group and an alien
element ineligible for the civil rights granted other
subjects. The traditional Russian attitude toward the
Jews has generally been hostile. Groups of Jews have
been resident on Russian territory from time to time
throughout the nation's history, but many were
expelled during one or another of the Orthodox
Church's crusades carried on in the name of
eradicating "Judaizing" tendencies alleged to be
subverting Orthodox beliefs. When large communities
of Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi (Central European)
Jews came under Russian control as a result of the
partitions of Poland (1772-95), a Pale of Settlement
was established along the 1772 frontier barring them
from moving into the Russian interior. This restriction
was later partly lifted in order to populate the Black
Sea regions, however, and Jews with wealth and
education were also allowed to settle in Moscow, Saint
Petersburg, and other major cities. In the late 19th and
early 20th centuries the government embarked on a
campaign of conversion, expulsion, and extermination
of the Jews. It was at this point that the Russian term
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"pogrom" entered Western vocabularies. War and
revolution dealt significant blows to Russia's Jewish
coummunity, both in terms of individual lives and the
religious and communal structure, and when the
Soviet regime came to power, promising an end to
anti-Semitism, it had no difficulty attracting the
loyalty of the exhausted Jewish remnant.
The Oriental Jews had been an exception to the
general Jewish experience. Descendants of Jews who
settled in the Caucasus, the Crimea, and Central Asia
at least 1,500 years ago, they had become integrated
into the surrounding societies, speaking only slightly
Hebraized versions of the local languages. After
coming under Russian rule in the late 18th and 19th
centuries, they remained undisturbed by the central
government, and they had little or nothing to do with
the majority Ashkenazi community. Since the advent
of the Soviet regime they have preserved their customs
and institutions remarkably well, suffering little
erosion in numbers (except for the small Crimean
community, which was totally exterminated by the
Germans in World War II), and in 1970 they
accounted for approximately 190,000 of the 2.2
million Jews in the U.S.S.R.
In the early Soviet period the Jewish religion came
under attack, as did other religions, but the Jews were
allowed to preserve their group identity through the
formation of national districts in the Ukraine and
Belorussia and an autonomous region in easternmost
Siberia, and by means of Jewish collective farms, a
Yiddish press, literature, and theater, a network of
Yiddish-language schools, and other approved vehicles
of national expression. Such currents as the Zionist
movement and the Hebrew language renaissance,
which began in Russia and were flourishing on the eve
of the revolution, were disapproved, however, and
quickly suppressed.
During the late 1930's many of the privileges
granted the Jews as a nationality were withdrawn, and
in the years after World War II the Jewish community
had to endure a virulent revival of anti-Semitism
lasting until the death of Stalin. Many prominent Jews
disappeared, including loyal Communists of Jewish
origin; Yiddish-language schools, theaters, and
publications were shut down; and Jewish religious life
was reduced to a new low. As with other religious
groups, the Jews were allowed to repair some of the
damage in the mid-1950's, although new waves of
anti-Semitism burst forth in the wake of Israeli
successes against the Arabs and the gradual adoption
by the Soviet Union of the Arab cause. During the
next decade, a trickle of Jews was allowed to emigrate
as a means of removing troublesome individuals and
potential leaders in the Jewish community. At the
same time, scurrilous anti-Semitic pamphlets and
brochures, articles, and books were appearing, and a
suspiciously high number of Jews were denounced in
the press in the course of campaigns against
"speculation" and other economic "crimes."
Following the Israeli victory in the 1967 war against
the Arabs, a strong outburst of anti-Zionism with anti-
Semitic overtones occurred.
Although Soviet pressure has given rise to a highly
vocal Jewish national movement, it has also
stimulated some Jews to "disappear" into the Russian
majority, judging by the decline in the number of Jews
from 2,268,000 in 1959 to 2,151,000 in 1970, and a
corresponding decline in the proportion of Jews
claiming a "Jewish" language as their native tongue
(from 21.5% to 17.7%). Meanwhile, the religious life
of the Jewish community has been feeble. It is
estimated that about 500,000 Soviet Jews conscien-
tiously practice their religion. They are served by fewer
than 70 synagogues, most of them without rabbis. A
Jewish theological seminary (yeshiva) barely
functioned from 1957 to 1964; after a 5-year closure it
reopened in 1969, but the level of its functions has
remained minimal. Circumcision and the kosher
slaughter of livestock and fowl have been banned or
discouraged sporadically since the 1920's, although
both are still carried out surreptitiously. A small
number of prayer books were allowed to be published
in 1956 and again in 1968, but foreign visitors attest to
their inadequacy in meeting congregational needs.
The manufacture or import of religious articles such as
prayer shawls and phylacteries continues to be
banned.
In comparison with other religious groups, the
Jewish congregations in the Soviet Union are quite
isolated from each other. No central organization
exists; except for a rabbinical assembly specially
convened by the regime in 1971 to counter Western
charges of Soviet anti-Semitism, conferences of rabbis
have been banned since 1926. There is no Jewish
J
religious periodical, and no contact is allowed with
coreligionists in other countries. Occasionally,
however, the Chief Rabbi of Moscow is permitted to
go abroad in an effort to demonstrate the "well-
being" of Judaism in the Soviet Union. Despite the
disabilities, the various Jewish congregations manage
to communicate with each other and with the outside
world by means of an informal grapevine fostered by
individual contacts.
As an organized religious community, the Jews of
the Soviet Union have a bleak future. Of the many
young Jews intensely interested in their culture and
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history, few are religious believers. The crowds who
dance in the street near the synagogues on the holiday
of Simchat Torah do so not as an expression of
religious faith but as an affirmation of Jewish identity.
Paradoxically, the Soviet regime, which began by
announcing its intention to destroy the twin "evils" of
anti-Semitism and Jewish nationalism, thereby
attracting to its cause many secular, Russified Jews,
and which subsequently used one of these "evils" as a
club against the other, has in the process kept both
alive.
An enhanced sense of Jewish identity undoubtedly
has been an important factor motivating large
numbers of Jews to request permission to emigrate to
Israel in recent years, and in 1971 the Soviet regime
began to soften its restrictions against such emigration
in the face of considerable international pressure. In
that year, 14,000 Jews left the U.S.S.R., compared
with an average of 1,000 to 2,000 per year over the
entire postwar period preceding 1971. During 1972,
Jewish emigration rose to about 31,000. In mid-1972,
however, the regime instituted prohibitive exit fees
based on the estimated cost of state-paid higher
education received by a prospective emigrant. This
move caused widespread protest outside the Soviet
Union, most notably in the United States, and early in
1973 the regime unofficially "suspended" the exit fee
legislation because of its adverse effects on Soviet-U. S.
trade negotiations.
F. Education
Since its earliest days, the Soviet regime has
attached great importance to the development of an
educational system that will not only effectively
educate the youth of the country but also imbue them
with a loyalty to the regime and gain their acceptance
of officially prescribed ideological, moral, and social.
standards. One of the chief goals of the educational
system is the creation of the "new Soviet man," a
skillful and tireless worker who views labor as a social
duty and who values the public interest above his
own. The process of molding the individual in the
image of the "new Soviet man" continues long after
the completion of formal education, through
organizations such as the trade unions, and above all
through constant pressure from an officially controlled
information system. Even an informal group such as a
collective is drawn into the education process through
the social pressure it exercises to induce conformity to
officially prescribed patterns of conduct.
Education in the Soviet Union provides a means of
escape from the ranks of unskilled laborers, ordinary
factory workers, collective farmers, and other groups
among whom the material rewards of life are minimal.
For the children of the privileged it is a means of
preserving the social position and monetary advantage
enjoyed by their parents. But whatever the benefits to
the individual, utility to the state is the basic purpose
of Soviet education. Prestige and rewards vary greatly
with the level of schooling attained and with the
importance attached by the state to particular fields of
educational endeavor.
During the early years of the regime, when trained
technicians were scarce and great stress was placed on
political reliability, persons with little formal
education but with great zeal for the Communist
cause were frequently placed in positions of
responsibility after hasty training in a given specialty.
A number of the present party and government leaders
are in this category, owing their progress to the
successful handling of such assignments. However, as
new generations of specialists have emerged from the
educational system, key administrative posts have
been filled increasingly on the basis of professional
competence as well as political orthodoxy. And
because advancement within the Communist Party
usually follows achievement in such positions, the
successful completion of higher education along
approved lines has become highly important to the
politically ambitious.
Until recent years, the educational system was able
to meet the economy's minimum requirements for
technical and professional personnel, but as Soviet
technology has progressed, these needs have become
greater and have placed increasing demands on the
educational system. Under the current Five-Year Plan,
institutions of higher education are expected to
produce a total of 10 million specialists by 1975. In
1971, the first year of the plan, only about 670,000
were graduated, and in 1972, 700,000. Obviously, in
order to meet the goal the number of graduate
specialists will have to be greatly expanded. In an
effort to solve the problem, the regime in 1973 eased
the requirements for entrance to higher educational
institutions by eliminating the need for both an oral
and a written entrance examination; one or the other
is now sufficient. The regime is also reported to be
considering shortening the average period of study in
postsecondary institutions from 5 to 3 years. Only a
minority of high-ranking students would remain after
3 years for the purpose of gaining a broader theoretical
knowledge of their subjects. The majority would have
received the practical instruction necessary to enable
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them to function adequately in positions of technical
responsibility.
On the surface there appears to be no central
authority for education. In theory, the national
Ministry of Education and the education ministries of
the various republics share responsibility for
elementary and general secondary schools, as well as
for nurseries and kindergartens, while the Ministry of
Higher and Specialized Secondary Education and
corresponding agencies in the republics have joint
responsibility for specialized secondary schools and
institutions of higher education. Similarly, the
Ministry of Culture and its republic counterparts
theoretically share authority over educational
institutions and activities outside the formal system,
exercising jurisdiction over libraries, museums,
theaters, etc., as well as general adult education. In
fact, however, the ministries and equivalent agencies
in the individual republics have little actual power.
Constitutional authority for education rests with the
Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, which in
turn are effectively controlled by the central organs of
the Communist Party-the real source of policy in
education as in other spheres.
It is at the national level that the requirements of
the Five-Year plans are translated into specific goals
for the educational system, and it is at this level that
the educational budget is drawn up and the
development of the system is determined. Republic
and local authorities are responsible for the day-to-day
administration of educational institutions and the
enforcement of directives from the central authorities.
At the actual teaching level, the area of personal
discretion is very small; curriculum content, work
schedules, and teaching methods are prescribed in
considerable detail. The nationwide link and the
overall coordinator in the administration of education
is the Communist Party.
One result of this highly centralized system is a high
degree of uniformity, extending to school plants,
curriculums, textbooks, and teaching methods. In
general, children in the same grade throughout the
country study the same subjects from the same
textbooks at the same pace, and when they complete
their compulsory education at age 15, the alternatives
available for the next stage are substantially the same
nationwide. There are some variations, mostly having
to do with language differences. Most schools provide
instruction in the local mother tongue rather than in
Russian, which in turn often leads to curriculum
changes because of the extra burden of learning
Russian. In the Baltic republics children remain in
school a year longer than their Russian counterparts,
largely because of the language problem. Also, while
most textbooks in the non-Russian republics are
straight translations of those used in the R.S.F.S.R.,
official policy encourages the national cultures of the
several minorities, and textbooks on such subjects as
art, music, and literature are therefore oriented toward
the particular nationality.
Other breaks in the picture of nationwide sameness
emerge, although not officially acknowledged.
Evasion of regulations is under constant fire in the
educational press, implying a lack of strict uniformity
in local administration and practice. For instance,
some children are being allowed to leave school and
take jobs before reaching the minimum legal age.
There is also evidence that in the more remote areas
full teaching programs are not always realized because
of a shortage of facilities. In education as in living
conditions, there is still a marked disparity between
town and country. Rural schools are usually at a
disadvantage in terms of buildings, equipment, and
supply of teachers. Furthermore, the choice of
educational facilities is much more limited in the
countryside, where nearly half the population of the
Soviet Union continues to reside.
Soviet education is free at all levels, although
parents who can afford it are expected to pay for
textbooks and school supplies. Financial support for
the educational system is derived largely from the
national budget, the funds being allocated roughly as
follows: 5% to the national ministries of education and
culture, 30% to the comparable agencies at the
republic level, and 65% to regional and local
authorities. Some contributions to education are made
by various public enterprises and organizations, such
as cooperatives, trade unions, and collectives.
3. Levels of literacy and educational achievement'
According to the 1970 census, 99.7% of the Soviet
population between ages 9 and 49 were literate. No
figure was given for persons age 50 and older. Despite
Soviet claims that the U.S.S.R. is essentially "a
country of complete literacy," qualified observers
have estimated that there may have been as much as
5% illiteracy among the adult population as a whole
in 1970, a relatively small proportion in view of the
disruption suffered by the citizenry in extended
periods of war, famine, and terror in the 20th century.
The official Soviet version of the growth of literacy
among the population ages 9 to 49 since 1897 is shown
below.
MALES
FEMALES
BOTH SEXES
1897
............
40.3
16.6
28.4
1926
............
71.5
42.7
56.6
1939
............
93.5
81.6
87.4
1959
............
99.3
97.8
98.5
1970
............
99.8
99.7
99.7
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In some of the western borderlands a high rate of
literacy was achieved well before the advent of the
Soviet regime. For example, as early as 1897 literacy in
Estonia had reached 96% for the 9-49 age group, and
the 1959 census revealed a rate of almost 100%. In
contrast, the literacy rate for the same age group in the
region now comprising the Central Asian republics
was only 5% in 1897. By 1959, however, it had risen to
97%. Even allowing for some official optimism in the
census-taking, literacy for the area was probably over
90% at that time, reflecting the notable success of
Soviet authorities in expanding educational opportu-
nity.
In 1930 the Soviet regime established 4 years of
compulsory education for children aged 7 to 11, and in
1949 the number of years was raised to 7 for those in
the 7-14 age group. The requirement was lengthened
by 1 year in 1958 so that 8 years of education are now
compulsory. Soviet educational authorities hope that
by 1975 this can be extended to 10 years for all youth
aged 7 to 17. The educational level of the Soviet
population has been rising steadily, the drive to
increase educational opportunity being accompanied
by a considerable growth in the number of people
acquiring higher and secondary education (Figure 32).
As a general rule, urban people have a higher level of
attainment than those in rural areas, and the people of
the European regions of the U.S.S.R. have more
education than those of the Asiatic regions. The 1970
census indicated that the median number of years of
schooling for the population as a whole was 6.7.
4. The educational system
The Soviet school system is unified and continuous
through all stages of education, encompassing
preschool institutions, 8-year basic schools, general,
specialized and vocational/technical schools at the
secondary level, and universities and other institutions
of higher education (Figure 33). The various types of
schools have been developed according to a plan
which in theory precludes the existence of dead-end
situations and makes it possible for the capable
student to progress without hindrance from one level
to another. In all sectors of the system the school year
runs from September to June, classes meeting 6 days a
week.
a. Preschool institutions
Preschool education in the U.S.S.R. is neither
compulsory nor available to all. Nevertheless, it is
expanding, and in some locations it can take in the
majority of eligible children. Preschool institutions are
of two kinds: nurseries for children aged 3 months to 3
years, and kindergartens for those aged 3 to 7. In 1970
there were about 102,700 nurseries and kindergartens,
accommodating 9.2 million children. These figures
represented a substantial increase over 1960 when the
number of preschool institutions totaled 43,600 and
enrollment stood at 3.1 million.
Many nurseries and kindergartens are run by
factories, offices, collective farms, and other
enterprises for the children of their employees. Some
are sponsored by ministries of education and other
entities. All come under the jurisdiction of the
educational authorities and are subject to inspection
and control. Parents of children attending preschool
institutions are expected to pay fees, which vary from
one locality to another and are adjusted to family
income. All of the nurseries and kindergartens
emphasize health care for the children, who are
regularly examined by doctors and given medical
treatment when necessary; those with serious physical
defects are sent to special schools for the handicapped.
FIGURE 32. Level of educational attainment, population age 10 and over, selected years
(Thousands)
1950
1959
1970
LEVEL ATTAINED
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Higher .....................................
1,915
1.3
3,778
2.3
8,262
4.2
Incomplete higher ...........................
881
0.6
1,738
1.1
2,605
1.3
Specialized secondary ........................
5,006
3.4
7,870
4.8
13,420
.6.8
General secondary ...........................
6,300
4.3
9,936
6.1
23,391
11.9
Incomplete secondary........................
22,390
15.3
35,386
21.8
47,368
24.1
Primary and incomplete 7- or 8-year level......
54
569
37.3
50
308
31.0
,
,
101
637
51.7
Less than complete primary ..................
55,414
37.8
53,448
32.9
,
..........
Total
146
475
100.0
16r1
464
100.0
683
196
100.0
i
..........................
Median school year attained ..................
,
5.0
,
5.7
,
6.7
~i
63
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HIGHER EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
Age
19
1 I
1 1
7
GENERAL
SECONDARY
SPECIALIZED
SECONDARY
VOCATIONAL
TECHNICAL
INCOMPLETE
SECONDARY
Considerable attention is devoted to making the
children health conscious by providing them with
elementary instruction in hygienic habits.
Nurseries are primarily concerned with the physical
care of the children enrolled, serving as institutional-
ized babysitters in order to release mothers for work.
The activities consist largely of supervised play and
rest. In the kindergartens the pupils are taught singing,
dancing, drawing, and clay modeling; older children,
in addition, learn the letters of the alphabet and work
with simple numbers. The staffs of the kindergartens
are supposed to include teachers qualified in preschool
work. Some have taken a full course at a teachers
college, but most are trained in specialized secondary
schools where they receive a more modest preparation
for the job.
b. Eight-year basic schools
Until 1958 the basic school was a 7-year institution
divided-into a 4-year elementary course and a 3-year
"incomplete" secondary course. But reforms in that
year resulted in an 8-year basic school with a 4-year
elementary and a 4-year secondary level. In 1966 the
elementary course was reduced to 3 years and the
secondary segment was increased to 5 years, the
purpose being to give pupils more intensive instruction
in academic subjects in preparation for general
secondary school. In 1971, 14.6 million children were
enrolled in the 3-year elementary course and 26.4
million in the five grades making up the incomplete
secondary level. Comparable figures in 1960 for the
same grade groupings were 14.2 million and 19.4
million, respectively.
Children in the elementary grades of the 8-year
school have a single class teacher for all subjects except
physical education. From the fourth year onward they
are taught by subject specialists. Each grade has an
adviser whose duty it is to keep an eye on the welfare,
progress, and behavior of the pupils. The progression
from elementary to secondary grades does not
,J
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normally involve any selection or transfer. Except for a
few children who transfer to special schools or
boarding schools, the pupils remain in the same
building for the entire 8-year period. The courses are
coeducational, comprehensive, and unstreamed
throughout, and the general pattern is for the number
of subjects to increase gradually from year to year. For
children whose mother tongue is not Russian, teaching
is usually carried out in the native language, Russian
being introduced as an additional subject in the
second year. A foreign language is taught beginning in
the fourth year; most 8-year schools offer only one
foreign language.
A major change effected by the 1958 educational
reforms was a greater emphasis on vocational training
in the 8-year school. Previously the curriculum had
been highly academic, centered on language and
literature, mathematics, history and civics, geography,
and sciences. Today vocational training begins in the
first year of the elementary course, with simple lessons
in the manipulation of tools and materials. Carpentry
and allied skills are introduced in the fourth year, and
various mechanical skills are added later. In rural
areas there is instruction and practice in the care of
gardens and livestock. Girls as well as boys are
required to take vocational classes since they almost
certainly will be workers as well as wives and mothers.
They are given less manual training than boys,
however, and in the upper grades the vocational
emphasis for girls is on home economics. It appears
that boys are also required to have some instruction in
home arts. The difference in the amount of time spent
by the respective sexes on industrial and domestic skills
is almost the only concession that Soviet education
makes to sex differentiation.
Considerable emphasis is placed on tests and
examinations. The results are graded on a 5-point
scale, and those with year-end averages below "3" are
given additional assignments and reexamined before
the beginning of the new school year. Students failing
this examination must repeat the grade. Approxi-
mately one-sixth of the students graduating from the
8-year schools take regular jobs thereafter. The others
continue their education in various types of "middle
schools"-general secondary, specialized secondary,
and vocational/technical.
c. General secondary schools
The general secondary school, largely academic,
provides a 2-year course comprising the equivalent of
ninth and 10th grades. Total enrollment in such
institutions stood at 8.1 million in 1971, more than
triple the 1960 figure of 2.6 million.
About three-fourths of the student's time in the
general secondary school is spent on academic
subjects, including Russian language and literature,
history, social science, economic geography, a foreign
language, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology,
and astronomy. Nonacademic subjects include
physical education, general technical subjects, and
training in "production," both theoretical and
practical. Throughout the course of study, 6 hours per
week are allotted to electives. There is also an
opportunity for accomplished students to adjust their
curriculums so that special aptitudes may be
developed. For example, those who elect to follow a
mathematics specialization may reduce class time
spent on literature, history, or economic geography in
favor of mathematics. Such students are expected to
make up for the reduced instruction in humanities
courses on their own, however, and they must take the
same year-end examinations as their classmates. Upon
successful completion of the 2-year course, graduates
receive a Certificate of Maturity which entitles them
to apply for entry to an institution of higher
education.
For the exceptionally gifted student in the ninth
and 10th grades, there are a few special schools with
curriculums favoring mathematics, the physical and
natural sciences, foreign languages, or the performing
and creative arts, e.g., music, drama, ballet, painting,
and sculpture. The foreign-language and arts schools
also offer specialized instruction to a rigorously
selected number of elementary-level pupils. Competi-
tion for entry into the special schools is intense, and
their graduates have a decided advantage over other
children in competing for entry into higher
educational institutions.
d. Specialized secondary schools
Specialized secondary schools offer a combination
of academic and vocational training, but the
vocational element predominates. These schools,
sometimes known as tekhnikums, provide courses for
students wishing to enter semiprofessional fields, such
as draftsmanship, clerical work, library science,
bookkeeping, and nursing. Most preschool and
elementary teachers still receive their training in
schools of this kind, but the aim of the educational
authorities is to phase out such programs in favor of
training all teachers in institutions of higher
education. Enrollment in specialized secondary school
programs more than doubled in the 1960-71 period,
rising from 2.1 million to 4.4 million. Many of the
students work in the daytime and carry on their studies
in evening classes and through correspondence.
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Students may enter the specialized secondary
schools directly from the 8-year schools, in which case
they enroll in a 4-year course, or they may enter after
completing general secondary school, enrolling in a 2-
year course. As general secondary education becomes
more widespread, it is the aim of the authorities to
phase out the 4-year course and upgrade the 2-year
course, tying it in more closely with postsecondary
educational institutions and feeding graduates into
them in much the same way that U.S. junior colleges
feed into full-term colleges and universities.
At present, students graduating from specialized
secondary schools receive both a professional
certificate and a Certificate of Maturity and are
eligible to apply for admission to institutions of higher
education. The vocational bias of the school provides
skills for those not proceeding to higher levels and
furnishes a basis of practical training for those who do.
Most of the students go straight into employment
upon graduation.
e. Vocational/ technical schools
Sometimes referred to as "trade schools," the
vocational/technical institutions are much more
specialized than the two other types of secondary
schools. The main emphasis is on learning a particular
trade. Class time devoted to academic subjects is
limited, accounting for only 15% to 20% of the total,
the remainder being spent on practical training and
work in the shops or in agriculture. Types of training
encompass about 800 different occupations, and
students are paid at apprenticeship rates. Length of
course depends on the trade involved, ranging from 1
year or less to 3 years. Admission is open to graduates
of the 8-year schools; those with more education who
enroll in such institutions usually take special short
courses. On completion of a course, the trainee is
awarded a trade diploma and usually proceeds to take
a job in the field in which he has been trained. As in
the case of the specialized secondary schools,
enrollment in vocational/technical schools more than
doubled in the decade of the 1960's. The number of
students enrolled totaled 1.1 million in 1961; by 1971
the figure was 2.4 million. Like the specialized schools,
the vocational/technical institutions are scheduled to
be upgraded as general secondary education continues
to absorb increasing numbers of students.
In theory it is possible for a student to go from
vocational/technical school into higher education, but
to do so with any degree of success he must first raise
the level of his academic schooling. Some vocational/
technical graduates accomplish this by taking
"continuation" courses in their spare time, obtaining a
Certificate of Maturity. However, most students with
aspirations for educational advancement select either
a general or a specialized secondary school as a means
of preparation.
f. Institutions of higher education
Of all the advances in education in the U.S.S.R.,
few have provided more cause for pride on the part of
both the government and the people than the spread
of higher education. In the early days of the Soviet
regime it was difficult to find enough secondary school
graduates to fill the institutions of higher learning.
Today the problem is to cope with the rising tide of
would-be entrants for whom there is no place. In 1940
there were 812,000 students enrolled in undergraduate
courses in the various postsecondary educational
institutions. By 1960 the total had risen to 2.4 million
and by 1971 to 4.6 million (Figure 34). Over the years,
a large proportion of the enrollment in higher
education has consisted of "night and correspond-
ence" students, a situation which is both financially
and ideologically desirable from the standpoint of the
regime since it avoids the expense of extra classrooms,
laboratories, and libraries and at the same time helps
Night*
0
1940 60 71
FIGURE 34. Number of institutions of higher education,
students, and graduates, selected years
Students Graduates
(in thousands) (in thousands)
5,000 1.000 r -
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combat "academic exclusiveness" by keeping as many
students as possible close to the realities of working
life.
Soviet institutions of higher education are, on the
whole, more specialized than their U.S. counterparts.
A clear division is normally drawn between, on the one
hand, the humanities and pure sciences, which are
taught at the universities, and, on the other, practical
and applied studies, which are taught at specialized
institutes. Many disciplines, such as law, medicine,
and engineering, which in the West are usually
included within a single university, are more often
than not studied in separate establishments in the
U.S.S.R.
Theoretically, the universities and the institutes
have the same standards and enjoy the same status.
The universities have greater prestige among the
population, however, partly because of their broader
curriculums and partly because of a traditional respect
for universities which predates the revolution. All
higher educational institutions have the power of
conferring diplomas, and most award advanced
degrees and conduct research. The following
tabulation shows the number and types of Soviet
institutions of higher learning as of 1966, the latest
year for which such a breakdown is available. By 1971
the total number had increased from 745 to 805.
Agriculture and forestry institutes .......... 106
Economics institutes ..................... 26
Law institutes .......................... 4
Medical institutes ....................... 82
Pedagogical and related institutes ......... 208
Performing and creative arts institutes ...... 46
Physical culture institutes ................. 16
Polytechnical institutes .................. 59
Specialized technical institutes ............ 156
Universities ............................ 42
745
Most of the specialized institutes were formed in the
1930's by splitting off the relevant faculties from
existing universities. This process was not thorough-
going, however, and to the present day some
universities still offer courses in engineering,
agriculture, economics, business, law, medicine,
physical culture, and library science. Furthermore,
since the mid-1950's there has been a trend to create
new universities, using pedagogical institutes as a
base. Nevertheless, the common practice of confining
professional and technical studies to specialized
institutes means that Soviet universities represent a
small proportion of higher education. Together, the
universities accounted for only 10% of total student
enrollment in higher education in 1970.
The Moscow State University is the oldest and most
prestigious Russian university, established in 1755.
(The universities of Vilnyus, founded in 1579, and
Lvov, founded in 1661, arose under Jesuit auspices on
territory then under the Polish crown). Moscow State's
main building, a massive 32-story skyscraper on the
Lenin Hills overlooking Moscow, contains science
faculties, lecture halls, laboratories, and a 5-million-
volume library. The university's humanities faculties
are housed in early 19th century buildings near the
Kremlin.
All institutions of higher education are headed by
rectors and are divided into faculties, each of which is
headed by a dean who is selected from among the
faculty's professors by the rector and the academic
council of the institution. Faculties are subdivided
into departments in charge of departmental chairmen,
usually professors. Each department deals with a
special field within its faculty. Assisted by prorectors,
the rector of a university or institute is responsible to
the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary
Education for the efficient operation of the institution.
The chief body for planning and administration is the
academic council, which is chaired by the rector and is
composed of the prorectors, the heads of faculties and
departments, some of the professors, and represen-
tatives of the Ministry, the Communist Party, the
Komsomol, and the educational trade union.
Courses in institutions of higher education vary in
length from 4 to 6 years, with part-time study taking 1
to 2 years longer. Competition for entry is keen,
sometimes fierce. All Soviet citizens under age 35 who
have successfully completed a full secondary school
course and obtained the Certificate of Maturity are
eligible to apply for admission, but the universities
and institutes have room for only a fraction of these.
Because the number of applicants has skyrocketed in
recent years, the practice of automatic admission of
students solely on the basis of their overall secondary
school record has been dropped, and entry is
determined instead by the applicant's performance in
competitive examinations and by the priorities
established to meet manpower needs in given fields.
Other things being equal, preference is given to
applicants who can produce references from party or
Komsomol organizations, trade unions, or factory
managers, and standards for admission are flexibly
interpreted to benefit former servicemen and workers.
Applicants may apply to only one institution each
year; those who are not accepted may reapply
repeatedly. Standards tend to be lower in some
institutes than in others, and it is easier to enter a
university in Alma-Ata or Dushanbe, for example,
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than in Moscow or Leningrad. Once admitted,
students receive all tuition free. The only fees payable
are dormitory charges for those not living at home.
Apart from the 10% to 20% of students whose parents'
incomes are too high to qualify them for aid, students
who maintain satisfactory progress are awarded
stipends. Although the regime makes much of the
system of student stipends, the average grant is
insufficient for even the barest necessities. To meet
expenses, students must rely on family assistance or
part-time jobs.
Instruction consists of formal lectures, seminars,
laboratory work, and practical studies, with a heavy
burden of required reading in addition. Lectures and
seminars are compulsory, although the cutting of
classes is not unknown. All students, whatever their
special field, have to take courses and pass
examinations in Marxist-Leninist political theory.
During the first 2 years there are classes in the history
of the Communist Party, which is actually a survey of
the history of the U.S.S.R. and of 20th century world
events from the approved political standpoint.
Political economy and dialectical materialism make
their appearance in the third year, and include a fairly
detailed study of Marxist philosophy and economic,
political, esthetic, social, and historical theory. These
studies occupy a considerable part of the students'
time and this side of higher education is taken very
seriously by the authorities, but according to critical
reports in the Soviet press, the material is often taught
mechanically and dogmatically, with the result that
many students regard it as something to be learned for
examinations and then forgotten once the require-
ments have been fulfilled.
Apart from the political studies and a foreign
language, a student's curriculum is confined
throughout his course to his special area of study and
allied subjects. Training in mathematics and the
natural sciences is of high quality and has produced
skilled mathematicians, engineers, and other
technicians with good qualifications. Because of the
high degree of specialization, however, graduates in
technical and professional fields are not so versatile as
might be desired. Education in the social sciences and
humanities falls far short of Western standards, largely
because of the enforced conformity to party dogma
and its use as a vehicle for political indoctrination. All
curriculums are subject to approval by the national
Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary
Education and are generally uniform throughout the
U.S.S.R. for any given field.
Students are continually assessed throughout their
coursework by means of tests and term examinations.
The final test is the diploma thesis or, as it is known in
the technical institutes, the diploma project. This is a
study of some particular aspect of the student's
specialty in which he has to demonstrate his ability to
use the basic material of his subject for research or
experiment. If the work is accepted he is awarded his
diploma. In 1971 the number of graduates receiving
the diploma totaled 672,000. Graduates are subject to
assignment for 2 or 3 years to any job in any part of the
Soviet Union. At the end of that time they are free to
seek employment wherever they wish. A graduate who
fails to report to an assigned post is liable to legal
penalties and in addition must forfeit his diploma. P
Certain categories of graduates are awarded a "free
diploma," which releases them from the work
assignments. The governing regulations are compli- r
cated, but they exempt such people as active members
of the armed forces and those with dependents. Health
considerations are also taken into account.
Of the more than 800 institutions of higher
education in the Soviet Union, approximately 550
offer graduate courses. In addition, graduate programs
and degrees are available through a number
of "scientific institutions" attached to various
"academies" of the U.S.S.R., including academies of
the arts, medical sciences, pedagogical sciences,
agricultural sciences, and economics. The advanced
degrees are those of Candidate of Sciences and Doctor
of Sciences. Both carry considerable prestige and
economic advantage for those who acquire them.
Despite their titles, these degrees are not limited to the
scientific field. Few students are admitted to higher
degree work directly from diploma courses; graduates
usually have to work for 2 years or more before they
can apply. The degree of Candidate of Sciences,
roughly equivalent to the American Ph.D., requires at
least 3 years of study after receipt of the diploma. In
addition, the aspiring candidate must conduct
research in his field with a view to publication and
must defend the results before an examining board.
The degree of Doctor of Sciences is comparatively rare
and is regarded as an extremely high academic
distinction. In addition to holding the Candidate's
degree and completing several years of active work in
his field, the student aspiring to a doctorate is required
to conduct and publish major independent research
which must eventually be accepted by an academic
council. In 1969, a total of 25,810 persons were
awarded advanced degrees in the U.S.S.R.
J
Teacher training in the U.S.S.R. varies according to
educational level. In general, elementary and
preschool teachers receive their training in a secondary
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school specializing in pedagogy, while secondary
teachers are trained in a pedagogical institute or a
university. The eventual goal of the authorities is to
train all teachers at the level of higher education. In
1969, 72.9% of secondary school teachers had the
benefit of higher education; the equivalent figure for
teachers at the elementary level was 12.4%. Women
dominate the teaching field below the univer-
sity/institute level, comprising 71% of all educational
personnel from elementary through secondary school
in 1969.
Secondary pedagogical, or teacher training, schools
provide 2-year courses for prospective preschool and
elementary teachers, the curriculum consisting of
educational methodology and psychology, instruction
in the subjects to be taught at the respective levels,
and prescribed political subjects. Practice teaching is
part of the program in the second year. In 1971 there
were 411 pedagogical schools at the secondary level,
graduating a total of 100,300 students. Higher
pedagogical institutes have been growing in number
and importance since the mid-1950's. By 1971 they
numbered 205, with graduates totaling 152,600. The
course extends over a 4-year period and the curriculum
is divided into three main areas: general and political
subjects, educational theory, and subject specialties.
The institute's main emphasis is on the trainee's
specialty, the field in which he will presumably teach.
Practice teaching begins in the first year and continues
throughout the course. A university graduate may go
directly into a teaching post with only a minimal
background in educational theory and practice. In
fact, universities are supposed to direct more than half
of their graduates into teaching; the actual number of
those who enter the profession is much smaller,
however. On the average, the university graduate is
about a year ahead of his institute-trained colleague as
a subject specialist, but he is liable to be a less
competent teacher. In 1971 there were 2,640,000
teachers employed in general education throughout
the Soviet Union, resulting in a student-teacher ratio
of about 18 to 1.
Soviet teachers are expected to keep abreast of the
latest developments in their subject matter and
teaching methods, and refresher courses are provided
for this purpose. These are organized on a 1-day-a-
week basis, the enrolled teachers being given "released
time" to attend. All teachers are expected to take such
courses at least once every 5 years. The pedagogical
institutes, like other types of institutions of higher
learning, have facilities for both. full-time and part-
time graduate study and research. The most
prestigious center for educational research is the
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
Teachers generally find themselves obliged to work
longer hours than the standard established for the
different levels of schooling, and demands on their
time go beyond actual classwork. All are expected to
visit the homes of their pupils, attend meetings of
various kinds, and take part in a variety of
extracurricular activities. Salaries depend on a number
of factors, including educational qualifications, length
of service, and location. In general, a teacher's
earnings are below those of a skilled industrial worker.
The staffs of the various institutions of higher
education usually include a rather small number of
professors, who in most cases hold the Doctor of
Sciences degree; a large number of docents (equivalent
to the associate professor in the United States), mostly
with the Candidate of Sciences degree; and
instructors. There are also research specialists and
other assistants. Appointments are made by the
institution's academic council after advertising in the
press; confirmation by the Ministry of Higher and
Specialized Secondary Education is required for the
posts of professor and docent. All academic staff are
appointed for a 5-year term, and in practice the
appointments are usually renewed. The continuing
threat of possible nonrenewal, however, serves as a
strong incentive to achieve the utmost competence in
one's post.
G. Artistic and cultural expression
Artistic and cultural expression in the Soviet Union
is rigidly controlled by the state. According to official
policy, all cultural activity must serve the cause of
building communism and creating the "new Soviet
man." The concept of "art for art's sake" is an alien
one, and any book, painting, musical composition, or
other art form that does not conform to official
ideology is banned.
As it relates to cultural expression, official ideology
is embodied in the concept of "socialist realism,"
defined as the "truthful, historically concrete
presentation of reality in its revolutionary develop-
ment which must be combined with the task of the
ideological remaking and education of toilers in the
spirit of socialism." According to' Soviet ideologists,
socialist realism requires a work of art to manifest three
qualities: narodnost, or "people" quality; ideinost, or
"idea" quality; and partiynost, or "party" quality.
More specifically, narodnost means that any work of
art must be both understandable to the people and
capable of stirring them to some positive action or
attitude. Ideinost is the quality that makes a work of
art a vehicle of ideas, not merely an expression of "art
for art's sake." Finally, partiynost requires a work of
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art not only to express the party line but also to show
the party as the guiding force in all positive activity in
the U.S.S.R.
Thus, political content is of overriding importance.
If a work of art has no political content, then it is of no
value as art. On the other hand, if its content deviates
from official ideology, it is worse than useless-it
represents an act of political hostility toward the
regime. Under certain circumstances, even the absence
of political content is construed as an act of political
"negativism" against the regime. Content, further-
more, must be concerned with the external world and
the common goal of the masses. Portrayal of the inner
world of the individual is regarded with suspicion as a
distraction or an escape from this goal. Stylistic or
esthetic concerns are equally suspect. Ideologists resent
any form of expression not immediately comprehen-
sible to the masses, who must be inspired to work, not
think, while censors fear that ambiguity may contain
hidden meaning. The constant party pressure to infuse
works of art with an ideological message has, with few
exceptions, crippled creative initiative. As a result,
most Soviet expression is of minimal artistic value,
although a substantial number of works, as well as
performing artists, have received critical acclaim in
the West.
To implement its cultural policy the regime has
developed an extensive control apparatus. Ultimately,
cultural affairs are controlled by the party Politburo,
which acts primarily through the Central Committee's
propaganda departments and to a lesser extent
through the Council of Ministers. Below the
policymaking level an intricate network of agencies
screens the output of creative artists for conformity
with official policy. On the governmental side the
Committee for Cinematography has jurisdiction over
motion picture studios and theaters, the Committee
for the Press controls all aspects of printing and
publishing and the book trade, and the Ministry of
Culture concerns itself with the theater, illustrative
art, sculpture, music, and a variety of cultural
institutions. There are also "voluntary creative
unions" of writers, composers, artists, architects,
journalists, and motion picture personnel which act as
professional associations and provide an additional
control mechanism for the party.
The regime, however, did not assume control of the
arts immediately after its accession to power. On the
contrary, during the early 1920's it permitted
considerable cultural diversity. As a result, this was the
period of perhaps the greatest achievement in Soviet
art. By 1928, however, with the introduction of the
First Five Year Plan and the assertion of strong party
control over all aspects of society, creative artists were
required to produce works which would promote
industrialization. In 1932 the party further tightened
its control when it abolished all existing organizations
of writers, artists, and composers and called for the
establishment of a single union in each of the arts.
Shortly thereafter, socialist realism was enthroned as
the official, obligatory, creative method for all
branches of Soviet culture.
During the next two decades the quality of Soviet
artistic works declined markedly in the face of insistent
demands that they be solely propagandistic, praising
above all the many qualities of Stalin. Those refusing
to comply were eliminated in the purges of the late
1930's. During World War II pressure on the arts
eased, and the quality of creative production showed a
distinct improvement. These few years proved to be
but a brief interval, however, for in 1946-48 a series of
party decrees reminded creative artists of their
obligation to hew to the socialist realist line.
With the death of Stalin, the regime slowly loosened
controls over artistic and cultural activities, allowing
limited experimentation in art forms and narrow
access to foreign developments in the arts through
participation in international exchanges, festivals, and
congresses and increased distribution of foreign works
within the nation. Encouraged by Khrushchev's
denunciation of Stalin's "cult of personality," writers
and artists became more outspoken, daring to submit
books and articles for publication without official
clearance and to organize exhibitions and concerts of
works previously disapproved.
The "thaw," however, was brief, and beginning in
1957 some restrictions began to be reimposed.
Nevertheless, a generally liberal trend continued, with
the regime vacillating between relaxation and
repression. This irresolute attitude stimulated debate
between liberal and conservative factions, each camp
equipping itself with its own journals, cafes, theaters,
poetry readings, summer colonies, and other forms and
modes of expression and activity novel to the Soviet
experience. By 1964 liberal intellectuals felt
sufficiently confident to predict that cultural life in
the U.S.S.R. would soon be more diverse, since the
conservatives had finally overreached themselves.
The fall of Khrushchev in 1964 swept intellectual
debate under the rug momentarily, but disturbing
signs soon became evident that the conservatives were,
if anything, stronger than ever. The starkest evidence
of this change was the arrest of A.D. Sinyavskiy
(Abram Terts) and Yu. M. Daniel (Nikolay Arzhak)
late in 1965 and their trial early in the following year.
Charging them with sending "anti-Soviet" manu-
D
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scripts abroad to be published, the regime sought to
demonstrate how it would henceforth deal with those
intellectuals, usually young and not so prominent,
who were discontented with official cultural policies.
The liberals, now on the defensive, refused to mute
their protest; indeed, if anything, their desperation
made them more daring. Many refused to sign
denunciations of Sinyavskiy and Daniel circulated by
the regime, distributing instead their own petitions
and protests against the turn of events. Some of these
were broadly phrased as denunciations of creeping
Stalinism, to which many prominent intellectuals not
involved in the earlier cultural debate freely lent their
name. The regime refused to acknowledge these
appeals, however, and persisted in picking off the
members of the liberal coterie one by one. Thus, A.
Ginzburg and Yu. Galanskov, publishers of the
underground magazine Phoenix 1966 and of an
unofficial transcript of the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial,
were arrested early in 1967 and eventually sent to a
prison camp in the far north. V. Bukovskiy, a writer
who demonstrated on their behalf, was arrested and
jailed in 1967, and P. Litvinov, a mathematician who
distributed the minutes of the Ginzburg-Galanskov
and Bukovskiy trials and took part in numerous
protests, including one against the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, was arrested and exiled in 1968.
Retired military officer P. Grigorenko, who not only
participated in the protests against the literary trials
but also was an active supporter of the cause of the
dispersed Crimean Tatars, was arrested in 1969 and
declared insane in two separate inquiries. In 1970 the
publicist and writer A. Amalrik, whose alienation from
Soviet society was worn like a badge, was arrested and
sentenced to 3 years in a Siberian labor camp. Due to
be released in May 1973, Amalrik was abruptly tried
again and sentenced to 3 more years in the camps.
Apparently, the policy of detente with the West is
being accompanied by increasingly strict internal
discipline. Meanwhile, in 1968-69, such writers as A.
Belinkov and A. Kuznetsov took the step of defecting,
as did a number of performing artists, including ballet
dancers and choreographers, instrumentalists, and
acrobats.
More prominent liberals have been dealt with more
discreetly. Thus, the poet A.A. Voznesenskiy was not
permitted to travel abroad and his works were barred
for brief periods; Ye. A. Yevtushenko was eased off the
editorial board of the liberal youth magazine in 1969
and on occasion has had to resort to patriotic verse to
get into print; the controversial author A.I.
Solzhenitsyn ceased to appear in print in 1966 and was
ousted from the Writers Union in 1969; and the
champion of liberalism, the late A.T. Tvardovskiy,
was removed as chief editor of Novyy Mir, the
principal liberal literary journal, early in 1970. As of
mid-1973, the renowned Soviet cellist M.L.
Rostropovich was still not permitted to travel abroad
because of his symphathetic support of Solzhenitsyn,
who was living and working at Rostropovich's dacha
near Moscow.
In other ways, the regime has moved to tighten
controls over the arts. Early in 1973, for example, the
publication of Soviet Culture was transferred from the
Ministry of Culture to the Central Committee of the
Communist Party. As an organ of the Central
Committee, the journal presumably will carry greater
weight and authority and provide Soviet leaders with
a vehicle for reprimanding those who stray from the
ideological path.
For the most part, literary works that do not
conform to the precepts of socialist realism can only
find an outlet in underground samizdat (self-
publishing) activity, although as of mid-1973
samizdat writings were appearing less frequently.
Occasionally a work of above-average interest
surfaces, a recent example being the play The Ascent
of Mount Fuji, staged early in 1973 at Moscow's
Sovremenik (Contemporary) theater. According to
press reports, the play sharply condemns those
individuals who by conventional standards are the
most successful and respected members of Soviet
society, dealing in essence with the issue of Stalinist
repression as it affects citizens today. Despite its strong
critical tone, the play was well received by the Soviet
press. Such provocative works of art as the Ascent of
Mount Fuji are a rarity in the usual cultural fare of the
Soviet citizen who must satisfy his craving for culture
by turning to the classics, both Russian and foreign, in
preference to the pedestrian Soviet product.
Indeed, only an infinitesimal part of the Soviet
population has ever heard of petitions and protests,
and virtually all social classes continue to enjoy the
arts, particularly literature and music. This popularity
reflects partly the persistence of a traditional respect
for culture and partly a desire to escape the drabness
and regimentation of everyday life. The regime has
encouraged interest in the arts and literature and
fostered their development by rewarding approved
creative and performing artists with material
advantages as well as social prestige; by issuing large,.
low-priced editions of approved literary works, prints,
and phonograph records; and by maintaining
numerous museums, libraries, theaters, and concert
halls.
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Soviet museums range from the world famous to the
woefully inadequate. In 1970 there were 1,444 such
institutions, visited by some 103 million persons.
Principal types included regional (493), memorial
(235), historical (176), art (172), and natural science
(36). The largest museums are the V.I. Lenin Central
Museum (housing a general collection), the Museum
of the Revolution, the Kremlin Armory (containing
crown jewels, thrones, imperial robes, and carriages),
the Historical Museum, the Polytechnic Museum, the
AS. Pushkin Museum of Decorative Arts (featuring a
small collection of French impressionist paintings,
Egyptian and Greek art, and 18th century, Western-
inspired furniture and painting), and the Tretiakov
Gallery (housing a superb collection of icons and 19th
century Russian art)-all in Moscow; the Hermitage
(featuring a collection of paintings, furniture, coins,
gems, and other objets d'art comparable in quality
and quantity with those of the Louvre), the Russian
Museum (dealing with history and art), and the
Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography in
Leningrad; and the Historical Museum and the
Museum of Ukrainian and Russian Art in Kiev. In the
past, the regime limited the display of early modern
art collections to approved individuals only, but of
late, realizing the value of exhibiting them to the
numerous foreigners shepherded through the galleries
by Intourist, these works have increasingly been taken
out of museum reserves and rehung.
In addition to its museums, the U.S.S.R. is dotted
with "houses of culture," city and rural clubs, "houses
of science and technology," "popular universities,"
parks of "culture and rest," and other institutions for
"cultural-enlightenment." Their functions are to
propagate political and scientific knowledge, to
disseminate the achievements of science, technology,
art, and literature, and to provide cultural activity for
workers in their leisure time. In 1970 there were
134,000 such institutions-sponsored variously by the
Ministry of Culture, the Komsomol, trade unions, and
collective farms-which served as centers for lecture
and study programs, motion pictures, and other
activities.
According to official interpretation, contemporary
literature is the offspring of the 1917 revolution. In
fact, however, the Soviet literary tradition is to a great
extent an extension of the Russian literary experience.
The major period of world significance for Russian
literature lies in the 19th century, but its origins can be
traced back to the 11th century. For 600 years
virtually all the literature was church related and
church produced and written in Old Church Slavonic,
an ecclesiastical language which drew heavily on old
Bulgarian and contained many Grecisms. Chronicles,
lives of saints, tales, sermons, and letters were the
principal forms of expression, many of them indebted
to Byzantine models and subject to revision as they
were copied and disseminated over time.
In the 17th century Polish and Latin influences
were reflected in Russian literature, and a Russian
secular language slowly began to take shape. The
conscious effort made by Emperor Peter Ito introduce
Western culture early in the 18th century had a
revolutionary effect on the language and subsequently
the literature. A new, simplified secular alphabet was
developed; printing and publishing independent of
the church were inaugurated; vast numbers of words
of Western European origin were incorporated into the
Russian language; and a heterogeneous, literate
audience concerned with affairs of state, commerce,
fashion, technology, and, to a lesser extent, the
intellect was rapidly assembled. Throughout the
remainder of the 18th century Russian language and
literature digested these changes. Russian poetry
evolved through the efforts of M.V. Lomonosov and
V.K. Tredyakovskiy; tragedy and comedy were
developed by A.P. Sumarokov and D.I. Fonvizin;
satire was introduced by N. I. Novikov; and a modern
prose style was created by N. M. Karamzin.
Building on all these accomplishments and
launching a uniquely Russian literature was A. S.
Pushkin. Poet, dramatist, and master of prose fiction,
Pushkin is one of the great figures of world literature
and is universally regarded by Russians as their most
illustrious national genius. It is from Pushkin's career
that Russians date the onset of their literary Golden
Age (1820-80). Pushkin was followed by a chain of
literary masters (M. Yu. Lermontov, N.V. Gogol, IS.
Turgenev, F.M. Dostoyevskiy, and L.N. Tolstoy)
whose works are an integral part of the Western
literary heritage and about whom libraries of critical
literature have been written. The emerging Russian
school of realism was profoundly influenced by the
literary criticism of V.G. Belinskiy, N.G. Chernyshev-
skiy, and N.A. Dobrolyubov, all of whom were deeply
influenced in turn by contemporary radical Western
philosophy and social thought and were stout
advocates of literature as a socially useful tool rather
than as a work of art. According to some observers, the
uncritical acceptance of the principles of these
thinkers led to the end of the Golden Age. There is no
question that these men, through their influence on
such Russian Marxist ideologists as Plekhanov and
Lenin, are the godparents of socialist realism.
1)
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Even after the end of the Golden Age, new writers of
international rank continued to appear. Among these
were A.P. Chekhov, I.A. Bunin, and M. Gorkiy, all
skilled realist writers of the short story, novel, or
drama. Their success, however, marked an end to the
initial realist phase in Russian literary history. At the
beginning of the 20th century, partly under Western
influence, a series of "modernist" movements,
variously described as symbolism and futurism,
appeared on the literary scene. The advocates of these
modes stressed experiments in language, the perfection
of form, and the creation of a new theory of esthetics.
Their influence led to what is called the Silver Age of
Russian poetry, during which such practitioners as
A.A. Blok, A. Belyy, A.A. Akhmatova, and V.V.
Mayakovskiy flourished.
During the years of war, revolution, civil war,
famine, emigration, and political harassment Russian
literary efforts temporarily ceased, but with the easing
of pressure during the period 1921-28, creativity
briefly resumed. These years are frequently
characterized as the richest of the Soviet period in
terms of the quality and variety of the literary product.
Soviet writers had many points of contact with the
West and shared an experimental approach to the
medium of literature. Mayakovskiy, by virtue of his
identification with the Bolsheviks, dominated the
scene, although his self-assumed role as a propagandist
for the regime cut into his literary output. Coming to
prominence in this period were K.A. Fedin, B.A.
Pilnyak, M.M. Zoshchenko, S.A. Yesenin, L.M.
Leonov, and M.A. Sholokhov. Many of the best
literary talents of the period were neither Communists
nor consciously proletarian but, being sympathetic to
the revolution, were dubbed "fellow travelers." Most
were "modern" and favored experimentation, whereas
the "proletarian" writers tended to be conservative
and favored the traditional realism.
With the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan
and regime efforts to narrow the diversity of literary
expression, the Russian Association of Proletarian
Writers was assigned the task of policing the field. In
1932, when all literary groups were dissolved,
approved writers became members of the Writers
Union and committed to the doctrine of socialist
realism. The works produced in the next two decades
were not only tendentious, but simple, direct, and
traditional in language and literary form. Many of the
more brilliant writers whose political credentials were
suspect perished in the purges of the late 1930's, and in
1946 party control was made even more rigorous after
A.A. Zhdanov, a close associate of Stalin and party
spokesman on cultural affairs, denounced such
leading figures as Akhmatova and Zoshchenko.
During the "thaw" which followed Stalin's death in
1953 a more critical tone was introduced into literary
works, although traditional standards of language and
form persisted. As noted above, the reaction of the
regime to this trend has since been marked by
vacillation, shifting from relative tolerance to reaction
and reassertion of control. The movement for greater
freedom of literary expression was embraced not only
by such established writers as I.G. Erenburg
(Ehrenburg) and B. L. Pasternak but also by such new
writers as V.D. Dudintsev, Sinyavskiy, and
Solzhenitsyn and such poets as Yevtushenko and
Voznesenskiy. The works of these and many other
writers have been received with great acclaim in the
West, in some cases for other than artistic reasons. The
resentment of the regime to these manifestations has
ranged from refusal in 1958 to allow Pasternak to
become the first Soviet and second Russian writer to
accept the Nobel Prize for literature (the first was
Bunin in 1933, at the time an emigre) to Daniel's
imprisonment and subsequent enforced residence in
the provinces, and of course bans on any publication
of recent works.
If an author and his works are approved, however,
nothing is too good for him. Thus, Sholokhov owns a
large estate in the Don country and extensive property
elsewhere, he is a member of the Supreme Soviet and
the Academy of Sciences, and he went to Stockholm in
1965 with official blessing to accept the third Nobel
Prize for literature proffered to a Russian writer. The
regime's negative reaction to the fourth award of this
prize to a Russian-Solzhenitsyn in 1970-bears out
the difference in treatment of approved and
disapproved authors.
With all his vacillations, Khrushchev attempted to
control and use intellectual ferment. His successors
have been more concerned with smothering it, and
recent landmark events in the literary field have been
trials, not publications. Instead of retreating to writing
literature for the "drawer," without knowledge of the
authorities and with no intention of publishing it, or
sublimating their creative impulse by translating
foreign literature, as was the case in the Stalin era, the
active nonconformist writers of today engage in the
traditional Russian practice of samizdat, circulating
their works in manuscript among sympathetic readers,
who risk arrest by reading such works and passing
them on to others. As the political content of the
dissident movement has increased in recent years, so
has the nature of samizdat. In addition to literature, it
now contains civil rights protests, political tracts and
programs, and increasingly sophisticated analyses of
Soviet society, even "internal Kremlinology." It is
these samizdat "editions" which find their way to the
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West, where many are promoted with great fanfare as
the latest in Soviet protest. As of early 1973, however,
a regime crackdown on the movement was beginning
to have an effect. The chief samizdat publication, the
Chronicle of Current Events, was being investigated
and a number of suspects in the case had been arrested
with others expected to follow. What this means for
the future of samizdat as a vehicle for free literary
expression is not yet clear.
2. Performing arts
a. Music and dance
As with literature., Soviet music ostensibly derives
from the October Revolution, but in fact it is an
integral part of the Russian musical tradition. There
are two basic forms of Russian music whose influence
persists, even though transformed, to the present day.
The first is folk music, which took the form of songs
intimately connected with natural forces and human
emotions. Initially, the adoption of Christianity had
little or no effect on this type of music, which
continued to flourish, absorbing Oriental color from
adjacent nomadic cultures. In addition to ritual songs
connected with funerals, weddings, and changes of the
season, the bylina (epic ballad) developed, along with
numerous comic, humorous, and satirical folksongs
played and'sung by jesters and buffoons. In later
periods lyrical, satirical, and historical songs
commemorated important political and domestic
events. In the late 18th and the 19th centuries many of
these songs were collected and served as sources of
inspiration for Russian composers such as M.A.
Balakirev, N.A. Rimskiy-Korsakov, and P.I. Chay-
kovskiy (Tchaikovsky),
At the same time a rich tradition of church music
evolved, based on the use of choirs in the Eastern
Orthodox liturgy. Some of the longer masses, such as
those performed at Easter, developed into a feast for
the senses through the sound of the choirs, the sight of
the heavily jeweled icons, and the scent of incense.
With this tradition of folksong, choral music, and
spectacle, the Russians easily accepted the introduc-
tion of opera by Italian court performers in the mid-
18th century and swiftly made the form their own. A
series of Russian composers of opera, most of whose
works were based on folk or historic themes, appeared
in the last quarter of the century, their works being
performed not only in the capital but throughout the
country, wealthy landowners vying with one another
to procure trained musicians. The influence of
German romantic opera early in the 19th century
brought about a general expansion of operatic forms
and ideas, and a series of major works were composed
which remain standard items in the Soviet repertory
but have only recently become familiar in the West.
Among the better known composers in this field were
M.I. Glinka, A.P. Borodin, M.P. Musorgskiy,
Rimskiy-Korsakov, and Chaykovskiy.
Ballet was also introduced into Russia by Italian
court performers in the mid-18th century but for many
years remained essentially an alien art form. Most of
the choreographers and many of the dancers were
Italian or French. Indeed, for the entire latter half of
the 19th century Russian ballet was influenced by the
French choreographer and teacher Marius Petipa, who
produced the standard versions of Chaykovskiy's
ballets. The persistence in Russia of the French
classical and Italian acrobatic styles long after they fell
out of fashion elsewhere marked the character of
Russian ballet and, despite a brief "national" period
at the turn of the 20th century, these styles have been
preserved to the present day. The leader of the
national school was S.P. Dyagilev (Diaghilev) who,
after working as a promoter in the fields of drama,
painting, orchestral music, and opera, introduced the
Ballets Busses to the Western world. Dyagilev
benefited from the scene painting of L.S. Bakst and
A.N. Benua (Benois), the choreography of M.M.
Fokin (Fokine), the dancing of V.F. Nizhinskiy
(Nijinsky) and T.P. Karsavina, and the music of
Borodin, Rimskiy-Korsakov, and IF. Stravinskiy.
Following several successful seasons in Western
Europe, the Ballets Russes became permanently
established outside Russia, and the company's notably
successful transition from a nationalist to a modernist
ballet style after 1912 had greater impact on the West
than on Russia.
The symphony and other forms of orchestral music
did not emerge in Russia until after the works of
Berlioz, Schumann, and Liszt had become known,
although there had been some experimentation by
Glinka using folk themes and fantasy. These
influences were fused by a group known in Russia as
"The Mighty Handful," commonly called "The
Five" in the West, which comprised Balakirev,
Borodin, C.A. Kui, Musorgskiy, and Rimskiy-
Korsakov. Their intention was to create Russian
orchestral music free of German influence. Chay-
kovskiy and S.V. Rakhmaninov (Rachmaninoff)
occupied a position in between "The Five" and the
" Westerners," represented by A.G. and N.G.
Rubinshtein (Rubinstein). By the early 20th century a
modernist trend appeared, the principal repre-
sentatives of which were Stravinskiy, A.N. Skryabin
(Scriabin), and S.S. Prokofyev (Prokofiev).
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In music as in literature, the revolution of 1917 led
to the emigration of many leading figures. After a brief
period of modernist experimentation, the regime
encouraged and then ordered a return to music which
would be more "comprehensible" and less "divorced
from life." Folk music and dance were endorsed, and a
number of groups have been formed to cultivate these
traditions, including the Aleksandrov Red Banner
Ensemble of Music and Dance of the Soviet Army, the
Piatnitskiy State Russian Folk Choir, the Moiseyev
Folk Dance Ensemble of the U.S.S.R., the Berezka
(Little Birch) Folk Dance Ensemble, and the
Andreyev Russian Folk Instrument Orchestra (Figure
35).
Such traditional composers as N. Ya. Myaskovskiy,
R.M. Glier (Gliere), and A.K. Glazunov put their
talents at the disposal of the regime, turning out
numerous operas, ballets, concertos, symphonies, and
other forms of orchestral music in the approved
socialist realist style. Despite the clampdown on
musical experimentation, notable works continued to
be produced, especially by Prokofyev, who returned to
Girls performing the national Koryak dance in the far north region
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the U.S.S.R. after a decade abroad, and by such new
composers as D.D. Shostakovich and A.I. Khachat-
urian. At the same time the regime made great efforts
to expand the network of theaters, concert halls, and
music and ballet schools. A Soviet generation of
performing artists became internationally recognized,
including violinists D.F. Oistrakh, 1. S. Bezrodnyy, and
L.B. Kogan; pianists E.G. Gilels and S.T. Rikhter;
cellist M.L. Rostropovich; and dancers G.S. Ulanova,
O.V. Lepeshinskaya, M.M. Plisetskaya, and R.S.
Struchkova.
Yet even such talented individuals as these could
not avoid the strictures of the regime in the late 1930's
and again in the late 1940's, once the party decided
that the arts needed closer supervision. Existing works
were withdrawn or rewritten, and many composers
and performing artists sought refuge in banal styles or
in the classics. During this period contact with
developments in the West was broken off, and new
forms and techniques were forbidden. Even after
controls were relaxed following Stalin's death,
dissonant and atonal music was frowned on, and most
experimentation was discouraged. Nevertheless,
individual Soviet artists and composers as well as
whole troupes have made extensive tours abroad
where their talents have been highly praised.
The regime has also made every effort to involve the
masses in the performing arts. Thus, in 1969 there were
nearly 2.5 million participants in more than 141,000
music, dance, or choral groups and numerous
"people's" symphony orchestras. Several large-scale
music festivals were held, mostly involving regional
and national choral competitions. In addition, there
were 40 theaters of opera and ballet, including the
famous Bolshoi in Moscow and the Kirov (Mariinskiy)
in Leningrad (Figure 36), 25 theaters of operetta and
musical comedy, about 130 professional symphony
orchestras, 19 conservatories, 190 music schools, more
than 3,000 children's music schools, 19 schools of
ballet, and other institutions.
b. Theater and motion pictures
Although considered primarily an art form in the
West, the theater has been recognized by the Soviet
regime as a powerful instrument of mass agitation and
propaganda. The theater had been resisted vigorously
by the Orthodox Church as a pagan practice from at
least the 11th to the 17th century, but the subsequent
introduction of Western cultural forms under the
auspices of the court brought an end to church bans.
Professional theaters were well established by the mid-
18th century, chief among them the Malyi Theater in
Moscow and the Aleksandrinskiy (now Pushkin)
Theater in Saint Petersburg, and such notable
playwrights as A.P. Sumarokov and D. 1. Fonvizin had
become well known. In the 19th century A.S.
Griboyedov and A.N. Ostrovskiv made notable
contributions to dramatic literature, as did Pushkin,
Lermontov, Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy,
Chekhov, and Gorkiy.
Psychological realism had taken hold in drama as
early as the 1840's, and from the demands of this form
that the actor identify internally with the character he
was portraying, the famous style of the Moscow Art
Theater developed at the end of the 19th century
under the aegis of K.S. Stanislavskiy and V.I.
Nemirovich-Danchenko. The Moscow Art Theater
went through several phases before the highly prized
"Stanislavskiy method" crystallized in the early Soviet
period. In the process, new directorial talent was
developed, and many of the younger generation went
on to form their own theaters and styles, including
V.E. Meierkhold (Meyerhold), Ye. B. Vakhtangov,
and A. Ya. Tairov.
All stylistic innovation was brought to a halt at the
end of the 1920's, when the regime decided that only
approved socialist realism could adequately serve its
propagandistic purposes. In part the crackdown was a
reaction to the flowering of highly experimental
theatrical groups whose efforts to combine esoteric
modern art forms with Communist ideology, as in the
works of V.V. Mayakovskiy, were disliked by the less
intellectual members of the party bureaucracy. A
series of party resolutions demanded a break with
"bourgeois-esthetic, decadent, formalist" styles and a
return to the utilitarian realism characteristic of the
mid-19th century Russian theater. Despite these
restrictions, worthwhile plays were produced by such
writers as M.A. Bulgakov, Yu. K. Olesha, A.E.
Korneychuk, N.F. Pogodin, and K.M. Simonov. For
the most part, however, although effectively staged,
the works of the 1930's were characterized by
monotony of theme and by a predictable conflict
between "negative" characters (spies, secret enemies
of Soviet power) and hackneyed "positive" images of
Communist heroes. The curtain finally fell on Soviet
theatrical originality during the purges of the late
1930's, when a series of theaters suspected of
"formalism" were shut down and such great directors
as Meierkhold and Stanislavskiy were arrested or
retired.
Since that period the Soviet theater has been
marked by high technical skill in production and
acting, particularly of 19th century classics, but little
thematic or literary ingenuity. During the "thaw" in
the mid-1950's some of the previously banned works of
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the 1920's were presented, but little original drama has
been created. The theater arts by and large follow the
party line, although there are exceptions, and even in
officially approved presentations there are occasional
veiled criticisms of the regime. Despite the decline in
the quality of new Soviet productions, the theater in
the U.S.S.R. continues to enjoy considerable
popularity, partly because drama provides an escape
from the drabness of everyday life.
As of 1970 there were 508 professional theaters-364
featuring drama and musical comedy and 144
catering to children, including puppet theaters. There
were also innumerable amateur theaters. In addition
to the Moscow Art Theater and Malyi Theater in
Moscow and the Pushkin Theater in Leningrad, some
of the better known Soviet theaters include the
Vakhtangov Theater, the Pushkin Theater of Drama,
the Theater of Satire, the Obraztsov Puppet Theater,
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and the Mossovet Theater, all in Moscow, and the
Gorkiy Dramatic Theater in Leningrad. Since the
mid-1950's several new theaters have been founded in
Moscow for young actors, directors, and playwrights
whose productions are quite daring by Soviet
standards. These include the Sovremennik Theater
and the Moscow Theater of Drama and Comedy,
locally known as the Taganka. Their audience is
largely composed of students and intellectuals who
find the older theaters smothered in tradition.
Lenin called the cinema "the most important of the
arts" and fully appreciated its value as a medium of
information and persuasion. For him and his
successors entertainment was strictly secondary. Before
the 1917 revolution the influence of motion pictures
was slight, most people regarding them as an
interesting novelty to amuse the literate urban
population. In 1919 the Soviet Government
nationalized the film industry and began to shape it
into an implement of Communist propaganda.
During the decade required for the process to become
effective, enthusiasm for the revolution and a shortage
of trained personnel and technical equipment
stimulated a sustained period of innovation in
cinematic technique and story method. By the mid-
1920's a group of talented young directors had
emerged, including S.M. Eizenshtein (Eisenstein), V.I.
Pudovkin, G.M. Kozintsev, L.Z. Trauberg, and A.P.
Dovzhenko. Among the classics of the period were
Strike, Battleship Potemkin, and October by
Eizenshtein and Mother, The End of Saint Petersburg,
and The Offspring of Genghis Khan by Pudovkin.
Eizenshtein in particular experimented extensively in
the medium and is generally credited with creating the
documentary film.
Yet no matter how much international acclaim the
Soviet film industry received, it could not avoid
denunciation by the regime for being overly
"formalist," and by the 1930's socialist realist dogma
had been superimposed on the medium. The
authorities took an active interest in the industry,
imposing an ever-narrowing political censorship, with
the result that it took 40 years just to restore the
number of feature films produced to the prerevolu-
tionary level of more than 100 a year. In 1952 during
Stalin's rule only five feature films were released out of
100 planned. The emergence of occasional mas-
terpieces in the 1930's, such as M.S. Donskoy's
Childhood of Maxim Gorki or Eizenshtein's Alexander
Nevsky, made the decline in the field all the more
poignant. During the purges of the late 1930's, many
film workers were arrested and some were shot, and all
signs of artistic independence were obliterated.
Eizenshtein took advantage of a brief easing of
restraints during the war years to produce Ivan the
Terrible, but in 1946 he and his fellow directors were
attacked during Zhdanov's campaign to reestablish
ideological conformity. The film industry, with its
high proportion of Jewish personnel, was particularly
vulnerable when the party began its "struggle against
cosmopolitanism," a veiled form of anti-Semitism.
The film industry began to revive in 1956, and since
then it has again been receiving international
recognition. Works by older directors, such as S.I.
Yutkevich's Othello and G.M. Kozintsev's Don
Quixote and Hamlet have appeared, together with
those of younger men, such as The House I Live In by
L.A. Kulidzhanov and Ya. A. Segel, I Am 19 Years Old
by M.M. Khutsyev, The Cranes Are Flying by M.K.
Kalatozov, and War and Peace by S.F. Bondarchuk.
Perhaps the most creative of present-day film directors
is G.N. Chukhray, whose The Forty-First, Ballad of a
Soldier, and Clear Sky are notable for their sensitivity
in treating contemporary themes.
In 1970 the Soviet film industry produced 218
feature-length films (including films for television), of
which 159 were art films and 37 were documentary
and instructional. In addition, in 1969 1,187 short
subjects were issued. Twenty-one movie studios were
devoted to art films and 19 to documentary and
instructional films. The largest of the former were the
Mosfilm and Gorkiy studios in Moscow, Lenfilm in
Leningrad, and Dovzhenko in Kiev. All studios are
administered by the state, and their production is
planned on the basis of ideological demands rather
than box-office appeal.
Late in 1970 there were 157,000 motion picture
theaters supplemented by more than 10,500 mobile
film units which traveled about the country, mostly in
rural areas. During the same year well over 4.7 billion
tickets were sold, for an average attendance of about
19 per person. The following tabulation compares
attendance per person in selected countries in 1970:
U.S.S.R. .......... 19
Italy .............. 11
United States ...... 5
Poland ............ 4
Yugoslavia ....... 4
United Kingdom .. 4
France .......... 4
Japan ........... 2.4
Despite regime restrictions on self-expression, Soviet
film directors and technicians have produced films
that are acknowledged to be world masterpieces.
In contrast to the worldwide renown accorded some
of the performing arts, achievements in painting,
sculpture, the applied arts, and architecture have for
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the most part passed unrecognized. In part this is a
reflection of Western indifference, but it also stems
from the lack of any particular national genius in these
areas. This lack may derive, not only from the
iconoclastic tradition of the Orthodox Church which
disapproved lifelike representations of the human
form, but also from the absence of any deeply rooted
secular tradition.
a. Painting
From the conversion to Christianity of parts of
Russia in the 10th century until the reforms of Peter I
in the 18th century, Russian pictorial art served almost
exclusively the interests of the Christian religion and
the Orthodox Church. Painters and craftsmen came to
Kiev together with Greek priests and monks bearing
Byzantine icons. Russian craftsmen soon assimilated
the Byzantine tradition and in the course of several
generations achieved a high degree of mastery (Figure
37). Churches were lavishly decorated with frescoes
according to the principles of Byzantine iconography,
and gradually, during 200 years of imitation, a
distinctly Russian style of icon painting developed
which was two-dimensional, ornamental, and brightly
colored, in contrast to the three-dimensional,
modeled, and subdued Byzantine style. A reintroduc-
tion of the latter style in the 15th century was
manifested in the work of A. Rublyov (Figure 37),
considered the master in the field of Russian icon
painting. Other notable icon painters of the period
were Dionisiy and the painters of the Stroganov
school. By the mid-16th century, however, Russian
icon painting had lost most of its vitality, largely
because the church decreed that no further changes
were to be made in the art.
An influx of foreign (chiefly Italian) artists in the
mid-18th century introduced the baroque and
classical styles; these were copied by Russian painters,
many of whom were trained at the Academy of Fine
Arts, founded in that period in Saint Petersburg.
Portraiture was the first mode to develop, since it best
suited the requirements of the court and nobility. The
classical style of painting with varied subject matter
persisted throughout the last third of the 18th and first
third of the 19th centuries. It was followed by a
romantic school in the middle third of the latter
century as prelude to the realistic style which was to
dominate Russian art for much of the next century
(Figure 38).
In 1863 an open rebellion against academic styles
and standards took place in Saint Petersburg. A group
of painters, inspired by Chernyshevskiy's insistence
that art should not be a matter of form but should
transmit a meaningful and realistic message,
organized an artists cooperative, subsequently named
the Society for Traveling Art Exhibitions, or
Peredvizhniki. This group dominated Russian realistic
art until the end of the 19th century. Among its more
successful members were V.V. Vereshchagin, I.I.
Levitan, and I.E. Repin (Figure 38).
In reaction to the realist style, a group of
impressionists emerged in Moscow at the end of the
century, and shortly thereafter a group which formed
in Saint Petersburg around the journal Mir Iskusstva
advocated the introduction of modern styles. The Mir
Iskusstva group split into many schools including
futurists, imagists, suprematists, constructivists, and
produced such well-known modern artists as V.V.
Kandinskiy, M. Chagall, V.A. Tatlin, and K.S.
Malevich (Figure 39). This era of experimentation did
not long survive the 1917 revolution, however, and
many of Russia's better known painters emigrated.
By the end of the 1920's official policy maintained
that art belonged to the people and must therefore be
understandable to them. Socialist realism in painting
turned out to be a revival of the late 19th century
realist school but with a restricted choice of subjects
(Figure 40). Art in the Stalin era reached an all-time
low in esthetic style and quality with the production of
many heroic portraits glorifying the leader, and the
post-Stalin period has witnessed little improvement.
Outside official art, however, younger painters have
produced numerous "closet" paintings, many of
which are in ideologically disapproved nonobjective
styles. Although for the most part these works have not
been shown in public, their existence is known to
sympathetic members of the Soviet elite as well as to
foreigners, and isolated examples have been purchased
and received favorable publicity abroad. One of the
largest collections of modernist and therefore
underground Soviet paintings is found at the Dubna
nuclear physics center. The community of interest
between experimenters in the arts and the sciences
probably has come about, not only because of their
common recognition of concepts too complex to yield
to conventional forms of expression, but also because
the sciences, less rigidly controlled by the regime, have
attracted some of the nation's most independent
minds. Apparently, controls have eased somewhat in
recent years. In mid-1973, for example, after 50 years
in exile, Chagall was invited to return to the U.S.S.R.
for an exhibition of his works.
b. Sculpture
By and large, sculpture has been a rather alien art
form. Indeed, the Orthodox Church explicitly forbade
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the embellishment of churches with three dimensional.
O images. Sculpture was introduced in Russia only in the
1 h d h fP t T Th
t
0
e ausplces.o e er . I
ear y 18t century un er
marbles imported during this period were mostly of
second-rate quality, as were ma y o,P the `foreign'
sculptors who agreed to come to Russia to work and to
instruct. A series of Russian sculptors of only local
significance worked in the late 18th and the 19th
centuries, fulfilling commissions for' numerous
monuments to rulers, generals, and other civic figures,
as well as decorating the many classical-style buildings
erected during this period. The-painter M.A. Vrubel
turned out some minor works at the end of the 19th
century, apparently, indebted to the style of the
contemporary French 'genius Rodin, and the Mir
Iskusstva movement produced one outstanding
sculptor, A. Archipenko, who was greatly influenced
by cubism. Archipenko, however, emigrated after
The Trinity by Rublyov, considered his masterpiece. Painted in 1411 in
an ancient Byzantine form rooted in Orthodox doctrine, it is a flaw-
lessly balanced composition portraying a mood of majestic calm. The
angle given to the heads and the slight forward bend of the bodies
creates an impression of depth without the use of perspective.
?eled,cross created for Emperor Justin II. The Byzantine ideal of the
-opulence to mirror on earth the image of heaven-was adopted
ewly Christianized Russia.
1917. Since the late 1920's the prevailing theme has
been realism raised to heroic scale, and the Soviet
landscape is littered with innumerable grandiose
statues and busts of Lenin and other party greats;.as
well 'as-'muscular workers and peasants (Figure 41).
Nevertheless, the experimental school in painting has
to a certain extent been paralleled in 'experimental
sculpture.
c. Folk and applied art
In the 1920's an effort was made to preserve existing
folk arts and to establish an industry incorporating
both folk themes and advanced Western design. Thus,
the workshops of Fedoksino, Palekh, and Mstera
producing lacquered miniatures were preserved, as
were the centers of carving in Bogorodsk, the
metalworking ateliers in Dagestan, the centers of
leatherworking in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the
The Virgin of Vladimir, probably painted by a Byzantine artist in the
1 2th century, is Russia's most revered icon. According to legend, it
protected Moscow, from invasion' on three occasions.
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FIGURE 38. Realistic art of the 19th century) ceramic art factories of Leningrad, and the art textile 25X1
Bleaching the Linen, painted by Vasily Serebryakov in 1884, is a late
example of romanticized Russian realism.
A portrayal~of Ivan's tragic murder in 1581 of his son and heir, by
Ilya Repin whose precise renderings of Russian life made his work the
epitome of 19th century Russian realism.
An 1893 painting of Leo Tolstoy at work in his study, one of many
portraits of Tolstoy by his friend Repin.
plants of Moscow and Ivanovo. Innovations in the
design of furniture, interior furnishings, apparel,,and
textiles were introduced in the 1920's by Tatlin, A. M.
Rodchenko, and V.F. Stepanova, under the influence
of modern European design, but these failed to take
root, and by the 1930's Soviet applied art was limited
to superimposing folk motifs, appropriate or not, on
nearly every type of consumer product. Since the mid-
1950's the regime has encouraged better design,
particularly in interior furnishings. As a result,
artisans-mostly in the Baltic republics-have
produced a series of good, if not great, designs in
limited editions of textiles, ceramics, and glass which
seem to draw inspiration from the more conservative
prewar Scandinavian products. In the prerevolution-
ary period perhaps the most famous examples of
Russian applied art were the imperial Easter eggs
(Figure 42) and other delicate, jeweled articles created
for the tsars by the Faberge firm in St. Petersburg.
d. Architecture and city planning
Because until quite recent times the principal
building material in Russia was wood, frequent fires
destroyed most early examples of architecture, the rest
disappearing through decay. The oldest surviving
buildings are the brick and stone churches which
initially were built according to Byzantine models. In
time, such local variations as the sloped roof (to shed
snow) and the onion-shaped dome were introduced;
the latter so caught . the public imagination that
multidomed churches became the standard. Wooden
churches were quite different in appearance, being
basically towers with tall, tent-shaped roofs covered
with small, lantern-like domes. Wooden church
designs were translated into stone in the 15th century
and served as one of the inspirations for the famous
16th century Cathedral of Saint Basil the Blessed in
Moscow (Figure 43).
In the late 15th and the 16th centuries Italian
architects began to work in Moscow, bringing with
them late renaissance and baroque styles which were
blended with traditional Russian designs. One
outcome was the Kremlin fortress, many of whose
features were subsequently copied in smaller versions
elsewhere in Russia. With Peter I the baroque style was
introduced in a strictly Western version. The Emperor
expended all his efforts on his new capital, Saint
Petersburg, which, with the continued impetus
provided by his successors and the talents of a series of
Italian and French architects employing a succession
of baroque, rococo, and classical styles, became one of
the most architecturally impressive and beautiful cities
in Europe (Figure 44).
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FIGURE 39. Modern art ofd the early 20th century
C
Double Portrait with Wineglass by Marc Chagall (1917); one of a
series commemorating his early years of wedded bliss, shows the
artist swept off his feet by love. Chagall crowded his canvases with
Jewish symbols, cows and chickens, fiddlers on roofs, and. lovers in
transports of joy. +I
Panel 3 by Vasily Kandinskiy (1,914), which expresses his subjective
vision through spontaneous line and color. In 1911 Kandinskiy produced
his, and perhaps the world's, first truly abstract art:
I -
Yellow, Orange, and Green by Kazimir Malevics (1915), founder of
the suprematist school, whose nonobjective paintings were intended to
free man from the shackles of natural forms.
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FIGURE 40. Examples of socialist realism in painting
Romanian Peasants' Delegation at the
Kharkov Tractor Plant, a painting emphasiz-
ing content rather than form in order to
convey the socialist message.
Mother, by Paul Kuznetsov. But for the tractor
and the peasant garb, the painting might
have been an icon madonna.
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FIGURE 41. Machine Tractor Driver and Collective
Farm Girl, by Vera Mukiiina, symbolizes the union of
industry and agriculture under socialism. One of the
most powerful of Soviet monumental sculpture, the
statue stands at the entrance to the Economic Achievement
Classical design proved particularly attractive to the
nobility, and all sorts of'lbuildings in this style were
constructed throughout Russia in the late 18th and in
the 19th centuries. The leading architects of the late
18th century, V.I. Bazhenov, M.F. Kazakov, and I.E.
Starov, are considered the originators of a distinctly
Russian classic style, with an emphasis on simplified
form and majestic scale. In the mid-19th century an
increasing eclecticism became evident in Russia, as
elsewhere in Europe. This was followed by a romantic
revival-parallel to the Gothic revival in the West-
resulting in a none-too-successful, pseudo-Russian
style featuring onion domes and pointed arches
(Figure 45). At the turn of the 20th century, some
interesting art nouveau structures were erected, but at
the same time Russian architects plunged into the
neoclassic revival sweeping Europe and the United
States.
Following the revolution, Russian architects
designed a series of structures in the international
m1 i style which was considered appropriate for a
new society. Many of the more ambitious projects,
embodying elaborate adaptations of the "architecture
of machinery," never were iealized; nevertheless, until
the 1930's, Moscow was one of the world's foremost
centers of experimentation lin architecture. The rapid
urbanization and industrialization of the country
produced many examples; of modern architecture,
including the town plan for Magnitogorsk, the rebuilt
center of Kharkov, and the Izvestiya and Pravda
publishing houses in Moscow.
Modern architecture went the way of all modern art
tendencies in Russia in the 1930's, but there were no
spectacular arrests, executions, or even rebukes of its
architects. Modernism gave way to a socialist realist
style which was really revived neoclassicism, at times
either blended or merely decorated with native
architectural motifs. Many! of the facades built in the
1930's along the new prospekts (avenues) of Moscow
were in this highly ornamented, neoclassic style, the
Moscow subway stations (Figure 46) being perhaps
the most thorough pre-World War II application of
the approved style. After 'the war neoclassic design
degenerated into what is sometimes called the Stalin
baroque or wedding-cake style, the best examples of
which are the skyscrapers built in Moscow housing the
State University and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
During World War II, the U.S.S.R. suffered
extensive damage to its building stock, and for more
than a decade afterward. the regime devoted its
energies to rebuilding apartment houses, factories,
offices, and schools as quickly and extensively as
possible. At the same time it lavished considerable care
on the restoration or rebuilding of architectural
monuments, many of them churches, damaged or
destroyed in the conflict. 1 Many of the rebuilding
schemes were poorly executed, and following the
death of Stalin the regime declared its intention to
introduce a better quality of design and construction.
This intention seldom materialized. The decorative
frenzy of the late Stalin period was dispensed with, but
25X1
It I
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FIGURE 42. The imperial Easter egg
known as the Chanticleer Egg,
created by Faberge. At each hour
the rooster rises from within the
shell, flaps its wings, crows, and
in its place was substituted prefabricated construction
of no character whatsoever. Extensive residential
districts of five-story apartment buildings sprang up
around the major cities, most soon displaying a
pervasive shoddiness. In addition, many of these new
districts had no provision for adequate public services
or transport, leaving residents to their own devices to
make life livable. Even such a well-built and fairly
well-designed building as the Palace of Congresses
FIGURE 43. The Cathedral of St. Basil the Blessed,
built for Ivan IV to commemorate his victories over
the Tatars. Its oriental splendor Red
Square for over 400 years. 25X1
fails architecturally because its designers neglected to
take into account the architectural heritage and
historical milieu of the heart of Moscow. On the other
hand, there have been a few successes in the last
decade, such as the Pioneer Republic complex in
Moscow and the Bratsk Hydroelectric Station in
Siberia.
Unlike the situation in the other arts, a "tame"
modern style is tolerated and even encouraged in
architecture, and there are signs that the increasing use
of painting and sculpture as part of overall design, as
well as more contemporary interior furnishings, may
lead to a tolerance of similar tame modernism in the
other visual arts. Recent criticism of architects has
focused on what the regime terms "excessive
modernism." As noted in Pravda late in 1972, this
trend has involved-among other things-the use of
too much glass (Figure 47). According to some
observers, current modernism is viewed by the regime
as an incorrect reaction to past criticism which
maintained that architects were designing uninterest-
ing buildings reminiscent of the Stalin era.
Regime controls over style and content pervade the
artistic and intellectual life of the entire U.S.S.R.
Except for differences in local color, many
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The archway of the former General Staff building opens, on to the
plaza before the Winter Palace, the imperial family's residence
until 1917. Built by Catherine the Great, its facade is 450 feet wide,
and the roof is ornamented with classical statues and urns.
FIGURE 44. The Winter Palace in Leningrad
FIGURE 45. Church of St. Nikolai on
Komsomolsky Prospekt in Moscow,
an example of the Inte 19th century
C
An ornate gallery of the Winter Palace, now housing a collection of
neoclassical sculpture. Murals depict the influence of ancient culture
on the development of art.
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Ukrainian people.
FIGURE 46. A Moscow subway station, built in the
approved neoclassical style of the early Stalin period.
The panels portray major events in the history of the
contemporary Russian, Estonian, or Armenian works
contain the same stereotypes and are practically
indistinguishable from one another. Among the major
non-Russian ethnic groups, however, the memory of
native cultural achievements and the survival of local
folklore, traditions, and customs help to keep alive a
sense of national consciousness and a desire for
national recognition.
In addition, the regime has sought to harness the
folk arts for the promotion of Soviet objectives.
Periodic national art festivals, replete with folksongs
and dances, are staged to emphasize such themes as
the brotherhood of the Soviet nations. By manipulat-
ing national forms and symbols, the regime seeks to
transform local solidarity into loyalty to the larger
Soviet society. While much in the content of native
cultural life in the Baltic region has been emasculated,
folklore and song continue to provide a focus for
national feelings which the regime has been unable to
eradicate.
The Ukraine is the cradle of Eastern Slavic culture,
as it was in Kiev that Byzantine literature, music, art,
and architecture were introduced and took root. In the
14th and 15th centuries the temporary seizure of the
Ukraine by Poland led to the introduction of Western
forms of art, but these did not reach beyond the
Westernized nobility who were assimilated into the
Polish ruling class, while the peasantry clung
stubbornly to Eastern Slavic traditions. After 1.9th
century European romanticism produced a national
awakening and the Ukrainian idiom was elevated to
the status of a literary language, Ukrainian writers
drew on the large fund of folklore which abounded
with fairy tales, legends, proverbs, ballads, and songs.
The leading Ukrainian poet of the 19th century and
still the chief symbol of the nationalist movement was
T.G. Shevchenko, also a locally distinguished painter.
Writing poems similar to Ukrainian folksongs,
Shevchenko protested against Russian oppression and
called for the casting off of Russian rule. Nationalism
was restricted to a relatively narrow section of
educated society, however, and some Ukrainian
writers, notably N.V. Gogol, preferred Russian as their
literary medium. By the beginning of the 20th century
the Ukraine had produced a number of locally
prominent poets, novelists, and dramatists, among
them I. Ya. Franko and L. Ukrainka, while a number
of literary journals attracted leading talents and
facilitated familiarity with trends in the West. 25X1
After 1921, however, artistic expression in the Soviet
Ukraine was made a tool of the regime, and during the
1930's many leading Ukrainian writers, scholars, and
scientists were silenced or liquidated. At the same
time, those aspects of the native tradition that could
profitably be used for propaganda purposes were
preserved and cultivated. The officially approved
Ukrainian arts have shown little vitality or originality
and have not attracted many new talents. Even so
noted a Ukrainian writer as A.E. Korneychuk has
preferred to write in Russian and figures prominently
as a "Soviet" author.
In recent years, however, a reversal has been noted.
0. Honchar (Gonchar), for example, head of the
Ukrainian Writers Union and recipient of a Lenin
Prize in 1964 for his faithful reproduction of the
standard Soviet production novel, suprised the critics
in 1968 with a novel idealizing the Ukrainian past and
the Eastern Orthodox tradition, and denigrating the
quality of modern urban life, identified in Ukrainian
eyes with the Russians. Even more outspoken have
been literary critics I. Dzyuba and V. Chornovil, who
have frequently denounced Russification and literary
conformity. For their efforts they have suffered arrest,
as well as repeated denunciations from the
conservative Ukrainian literary establishment.
Belorussia has no outstanding artistic and
intellectual tradition. The beginnings of the written
language can be traced to the 13th century, when it
was used as the official tongue of the Lithuanian
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kingdom, which at that time included the Belorussian
lands. Following the union of Poland and Lithuania
in the 16th century, Belorussian lost its favored
position, and the area was subjected to extensive
Polonization.
Belorussian folklore never became a force for
rallying national sentiment. Folk tales were usually
concerned with specific events in specific localities and
conveyed no sense of social or ethnic cohesion.
Folksongs expressed a spirit of melancholy defeat over
the general lot of man but engendered no sense of
defiance or national resistance. A vague nationalist
movement began to emerge late in the 19th century,
when a few writers chose to use the Belorussian
language as their literary medium. Concentrated
within a thin layer of educated gentry, these literary
activities met with practically no response from the
masses. At the turn of the 20th century a new
generation of writers, some of them representing the
lower stratum, attempted to foster a national revival
by creating myths about the Belorussian past. Of these
efforts, the works of Ya. Kupala and Ya. Kolas are
considered classics by Belorussian literary historians.
During the 1920's and 1930's artistic and
intellectual expression was subjected to censorship and
repression. In Soviet Belorussia, the leaders of the
national movement were eliminated and replaced by
FIGURE 47. The Comecon Building in
Moscow, a modern skyscraper. In
the background is a typical ex-
ample of the "Stalin baroque" or
"wedding-cake" style of architec-
Communist-oriented persons. Native literary,
theatrical, and musical activities were encouraged but
given a new direction. Anything emphasizing the
national aspirations of Belorussia was quickly stifled.
Since World War II Belorussian writers and scholars
have been charged with finding elements in the
national literary tradition which will emphasize its
similarity to both classical Russian literature and the
"multinational literature of the U.S.S.R." The use of
the Belorussian language in the schools, the radio, and
the press, as well as in literary works, continues as part
of official policy but is increasingly subject to the
pressures of Russification.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania possess a modern
literary and artistic tradition which has its roots in a
common 19th century awakening. The spread of
literacy and the impact of the European romantic
movement gave impetus, in these countries as
elsewhere, to a nationalist revival and clarified the
desire of the Baltic peoples for self-expression. In all
three countries written languages had evolved in the
16th century, and separate religious and secular
literatures had developed in the 17th and 18th
centuries, respectively. In the 19th century an
immense number of folk tales, epics, legends, poems,
J
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and songs suffused with nationalist sentiment were
collected and published. Native customs, dances, and
such crafts as wood and metal carving, ceramics,
weaving, and embroidery enjoyed a popular revival.
Each of the three Baltic peoples exhibited a particular
love of lyric poetry and song and had a strong
penchant for group singing. Hundreds of town and
country choirs assembled periodically to participate in
national singing festivals, which became one of the
principal expressions of national solidarity. At the
beginning of the 20th century, heavy emphasis was
placed on the use of the national language and on the
development of a national spirit. During the period of
their independence (1918-40), each of the countries
produced poets, novelists, dramatists, and musicians,
along with numerous scholars and scientists. Although
nationalism and local color continued as important
themes in the arts, Western movements, such as
symbolism, expressionism, surrealism, and other
modern schools, had a profound influence. In both
quality and range, Baltic literature and art far
surpassed the merely provincial.
Under Soviet domination, literature and the visual
and performing arts have been placed in the service of
Soviet propaganda. In consequence, the Baltic
republics have produced no outstanding literary or
artistic works since the Soviet occupation. As a form of
passive resistance, many writers have turned to
translation as their major occupation or at times have
been upbraided in the local press for writing about
personal concerns or impressions instead of
contemporary social problems. Artists and architects,
on the other hand, after a period of withdrawal during
the late 1940's and early 1950's, have cautiously
resumed working in the modern style prevalent in the
Baltic region in the 1930's. Because their efforts have
proved particularly attractive to the Soviet public, the
regime is encouraging the dissemination of Baltic
design throughout the U.S.S.R.
d. Georgian and Armenian
Georgia and Armenia have a cultural tradition
stretching back to the second millennium B.C. Gold,
silver, and bronze ornaments from the period survive
along with numerous examples of small sculpture,
ceramics, wood and stone carving, and painting, while
scattered ruins of forts and temples display a conscious
architectural style. Furthermore, the oldest literary
epic in the area, preserved as oral literature, dates back
to the second millennium, and much of the folk music
is believed to predate the introduction of Christianity
in the fourth century.
The conversion of the Georgians and Armenians
caused a profound redirection in their culture. For the
next 600 years all their energies were devoted to
building numerous churches and cathedrals in a
distinctive style, decorating them with sculpture and
painting, composing a rich body of church music and,
following the introduction of national alphabets,
writing vast amounts of religious literature. In the 10th
and 11th centuries, however, the religious impulse
declined, and the Georgians and Armenians
concentrated instead on writing various forms of
secular literature; creating highly sophisticated
portrait sculpture and miniatures, along with jewelry
and embroidery; and constructing numerous palaces,
bridges, and forts.
A decline set in during the 15th century, following
the conquest of the area by Turkey and Persia.
Although worthy examples of the old style in Georgian
and Armenian art continued to appear from time to
time, the native peoples readily adopted Russian
cultural styles in the early 19th century when most of
the area was brought into the Russian Empire. The
Georgians in particular tended to follow the Russian
pattern of development, passing through classical,
realist, symbolist, and futurist periods in succession.
The Armenians, on the other hand, maintained ties
with their fellow nationals in the Middle East and
other areas and thus were able to sustain a more
distinct cultural image.
After a brief interval of independence between 1918
and 1921, the Caucasian areas fell under the control of
the highly centralized Soviet regime, which soon
compelled the adoption of the socialist realist style,
varied only to allow fragments of local color. Many of
the oral tales and epics were transcribed and translated
into Russian, however, creating a stream of imitations.
Indeed, the regime has frequently criticized the
readiness of Caucasian writers to resort to historical
novels and tales in preference to descriptions of
socialist reality.
The authorities have encouraged the development
of Russian and European art forms in the Caucasus. In
addition to all the performing arts, painting,
sculpture, and architecture are given generous support
and have developed along typically Soviet lines. As a
result, contemporary artistic life in the region is losing
much of its indigenous character, and prominent
Caucasian writers, artists, and composers (e.g.,
Khachaturian) have achieved recognition as Soviet
rather than as strictly national artists.
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Samarkand, once Tamerlane's capi-
tal, in Russian Turkestan
The peoples of Azerbaijan and Central Asia, like
those of the Caucasus, have an ancient heritage.
Architectural monuments still extant date back to the
second and third millenniums B.C.; some of the
present cities, suyh as Samarkand (Figure 48), and
Mary, have been in existence since the first
millennium B.C. The area experienced a great artistic
and intellectual flowering following the introduction
of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries which was
parallel to Persian and Arabic cultural development
occurring immediately to the south.
The area was subsequently swept by several waves
of conquerors (Turkish, Chinese, Mongol), whose
deeds were the raw material from which numerous
tribal epics were created. The Turkic complexion of
the region was finally established between the 10th
and 12th centuries A.D. Persian remained the
language of culture for a protracted period, however,
being used to produce notable religious and secular
literature from the 11th to the 16th century, a Golden
Age of Turkestan literature occurring from the mid-
15th to the mid-16th centuries. During the latter
century, the Turkic peoples began to use the Turkic
Chugatai dialect as their literary language, although
Persian remained in use among the Tadzhik peoples.
As with literature, the art and architecture of the
region were heavily influenced by Persia and the Arab
world. Numerous fortresses, mosques, mausoleums,
and palaces were built from the sixth to the 10th
centuries in adobe and clay. Between the 11th and
13th centuries brick replaced these materials, spurring
a new wave of construction. In the other creative arts a
high level of accomplishment was achieved in stone
carving, mosaics, metal ornamentation, ceramics, and
rug weaving, all of which date from the 11th to the
13th centuries, and in the Persian style of miniature
and decorative painting introduced shortly thereafter.
Once Russian rule was established in Muslim areas,
a process beginning in the 16th century and
continuing into the 20th century, Muslim culture
tended to stagnate. At the end of the 19th century,
however, some Turkic imitations of Russian novels
and plays appeared, as well as secular Turkic poetry.
These did not find an audience, however, because
most of the native population were illiterate.
Following the revolution the Soviet regime made great
efforts to increase educational opportunity and at the
same time to transcribe the existing mass of oral
folklore. As much of this literature was in the form of
heroic epic poetry, serving as a repository of patriotic
sentiment and group loyalty, the regime paradoxically
can be considered the foster parent of modern
nationalism in the area. As a national spirit has
developed, however, the regime has attempted to
soften or expunge passages in the literature which
could be interpreted as anti-Soviet or anti-Russian and
has encouraged the creation of new epic poems
incorporating approved socialist realist themes. It has
also encouraged the substitution of the Soviet-style
novel for native poetry.
In the visual arts as in literature, most traditional
Muslim forms have been refashioned in the past half-
century to fit Soviet patterns and Russian tastes.
Native inspiration is used only for embellishment. In
architecture local variation is allowed in the
ornamental design of woodwork, mosaic, or brick tile.
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The ballet and opera, introduced by the Russians,
conform to the standard Soviet style, although local
motifs in song and dance are permitted. Even with the
best efforts of the regime to create a Soviet culture in
the region, however, local traditions persist,
encouraging group loyalty and pride in the native
cultural tradition.
H. Public information
The Soviet regime has developed one of the largest
and most complex systems of public information in the
world, and the Communist Party has forged a parallel
system of control more elaborate and thorough than
any other in existence. Justified in terms of Marxist-
Leninist theory, both the system and the control
apparatus are oriented toward mobilizing the mind
and will of the population and strengthening the
Communist Party in its self-assigned role as leader,
teacher, and guide of the people. There are other
goals, it is true. The media, for example, disseminate a
considerable amount of educational and cultural
material, but even these "nonpolitical" activities are
far from being ends in themselves. They are justified to
the extent that they facilitate the prime task of
ideological indoctrination and effective party rule.
Although freedom of speech and press are
guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution, they may only
be exercised if they "strengthen the socialist system,"
the sole arbiter being the Communist Party. Mass
communication is not based on the pursuit of profit,
nor does it provide a vehicle for the expression of
individual opinion. The right to issue information via
any legal public medium is accorded only to the party,
the government, and public organizations ultimately
controlled by the party, such as trade unions,
cooperatives, and scientific societies. No individual or
unofficial group has any legal means of presenting
information to the public.
All media are closely controlled and guided by the
appropriate national, regional, or local party
organization. Personnel are carefully selected, trained,
and supervised by the party. Key positions on editorial
boards and in other offices of authority are filled only
by party members or by persons considered reliable by
the regime. Important professional people, such as
editors, publishers, writers, and producers, are well
rewarded in terms of salary, prestige, and privileges,
but their function is strictly circumscribed by the
imperative that they communicate only the party line.
By virtue of their position alone they have no voice in
setting this line.
The indoctrinational line used by the media is
formulated in the party Politburo, subsequently
translated into directives drawn up by the responsible
departments of the Central Committee, and
implemented by the governmental bodies associated
with the various media at all administrative levels.
Committees for the press, radio, television, and
cinematography, as well as the Ministry of Culture or
the Ministry of Communications, carefully control the
substance and form of media activity. The committees
and the Ministry of Culture deal with ideological
matters and organization, while the Ministry of
Communications handles the technical aspects.
All public information is closely censored in
advance. The Main Administration for Safeguarding
Military and State Secrets (GLAVLIT) is the chief
governmental censorship body. Attached to the
Council of Ministers, GLAVLIT insures that all
publications, manuscripts, radio and television
broadcasts, still and motion pictures, lectures, and
exhibits intended for the public are in keeping with
the party line and do not disclose any economic or
military secrets. Representatives of this body-an
estimated 70,000 censors-are attached to all
publishing houses, printing plants, radio and
television stations, telegraph agencies, customs houses,
and central post offices in all districts throughout the
U.S.S.R. and also work closely with the Committee for
State Security (KGB).
In general, the public has adopted a cautious and
skeptical attitude toward official information. Aware
of the numerous shifts in the party line, most people
realize that false, contradictory, and misleading
information is disseminated, while other information
is suppressed. The public is especially skeptical about
media interpretations of internal events, as
contradictions in this area are frequently visible to the
average citizen. The regime has had more, but by no
means complete, success in communicating its version
of external events, largely because of the paucity of
competing foreign sources of information.
Only a few such sources, mostly from Communist
countries, are available to the Soviet public. A handful
of U.S. and West European newspapers and journals
are sold only to foreign visitors at In Tourist hotels in
Moscow and Leningrad, but some of these find their
way into the hands of Soviet citizens, as do occasional
copies of publications brought in directly by foreign
tourists. Some Western books and periodicals are
available for use by trustworthy members of the
intelligentsia, but all subscriptions to Soviet and
foreign newspapers and periodicals are controlled by
the Ministry of Communications, which issues a
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catalog of foreign publications available to Soviet
readers. Few nontechnical publications are listed. The
U.S. Information Service is permitted to distribute the
magazine Amerika in the U.S.S.R. under the terms of
a reciprocal agreement which allows the Soviet Union
to distribute the magazine Soviet Life in the United
States. The number of copies of each issue of Amerika
was limited to 62,000 in 1973, but deliberate Soviet
mishandling of distribution reduces the number
actually sold to well below that figure. Foreign radio
broadcasts are sporadically jammed, but those
programs which do get through-reinforced to a small
extent by increased tourism and occasional cultural
exchanges-afford the population, particularly in the
major metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and
Kiyev, supplementary means with which to judge the
outside world.
As a pivotal party weapon, Soviet publishing
activity has increased rapidly. Theoretically, the
public information channels are considered an integral
segment of Soviet society, intimately linked with the
arts, literature, and music and closely synchronized
with the economy and all other institutions and
systems of the state. Indeed, in terms of actual growth,
Soviet publishing efforts have been remarkably
successful (Figure 49). Between 1913 and 1971, for
example, the number of newspapers increased six-fold
with an annual circulation in the latter year of 32.4
billion.
The number of newspapers, periodicals, and books
and pamphlets issued by some 220 publishing houses
is quite large, partly because of the multilingual
character of the Soviet population. As of 1971,
newspapers were published in 57 native languages and
nine foreign languages; periodicals in 44 native
languages and 23 foreign languages; and books and
pamphlets in 65 native languages and 42 foreign
languages.
Of the publications in foreign languages, those
appearing in German, Polish, Hungarian, Finnish,
Greek, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Korean, to name
the major examples, are frequently also directed to the
large groups of native speakers resident within the
Soviet Union. Native Russian speakers are greatly
"overrepresented" if their share of the total population
(58.7% in 1970) is compared with the number of
printed items appearing in Russian (roughly 80% of all
newspapers, periodicals, and books and brochures). Of
the other Soviet nationalities, only the Estonians,
Latvians, and Lithuanians are overrepresented, a
testimony to their ability to maintain a high cultural
level and to resist the pressures of Russification.
a. Press and periodicals
The earliest periodical in what is now the Soviet
Union appeared in 1621 under the title Kuranty
(Chimes), a handwritten document circulated for the
benefit of the tsar and his court. The first Russian
newspaper, Russkiye Vedomosti (Russian Gazette),
appeared in 1703 under the auspices of Peter I, and
privately sponsored newspapers and magazines came
into being in the mid-18th century. Gradually, over
the next 150 years, the Russian Empire developed a
varied and, for the time, lively press. Although
experiencing censorship from time to time, for, the
most part it freely published the news. Even the
Marxists were able to disseminate their ideas, first by
smuggling tracts and journals into the empire from the
West in the late 19th century, then by publishing
illegally within Russia for a decade or so, and finally
by publishing legally after the 1905 revolution.
Lenin was the editor of the first Marxist newspaper,
Iskra (Spark), printed in various Western European
FIGURE 49. Production of newspapers, periodicals, and books
Newspapers:
Number ..............................
1,055
8,806
*6,804
*6,878
Annual circulation (millions) ............
na
*7,528.1
*14,977.1
*32,418.9
Periodicals:
Number ..............................
1,472
1,822
3,761
5,967
Annual circulation (millions) ............
116.5
245.4
778.6
2,572.3
Books and pamphlets:
Number (thousands) ...................
30.1
45.8
76.1
85.5
Editions (millions) .....................
99.2
462.2
1,239.6
1,581.3
na Data not available.
*Excludes collective farm papers which appear less than once a week.
D
J
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cities after 1900, but following the split between the
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903 he founded his
own organ, Vpered (Forward). The revolutionary
events of 1905 and the fluctuations caused both by
intraparty feuds and by changing governmental press
policies led to a swift and confusing succession of
Marxist newspapers, many published within Russia.
In 1912, Lenin fostered the establishment of Pravda
(Truth) as the chief editorial voice of the Bolsheviks.
Stalin was its first editor, followed by Molotov.
Although the Russian government made several
attempts to close Pravda, the paper persisted, using a
variety of different names, until 1914, when the
outbreak of war gave the tsarist regime a perfect
excuse to clamp down.
Pravda resumed publication in early 1917 after the
February Revolution, this time initially under the
editorship of Molotov and then of Stalin. The
Bolshevik press flourished throughout Russia during
the 8 months of democratic rule, assuming many of
the characteristics of style, content, and makeup
which have persisted to the present day. Following the
October Revolution the Bolsheviks closed the papers of
the other political parties and turned the assets over to
their own publishing houses. Out of the confiscated
media facilities a hierarchical press system was
organized, with a small nucleus of party organs, such
as Pravda, at the top, followed by such government
newspapers as Izvestiya (News), and with the workers'
journals, such as Trud (Labor), at the bottom.
Despite the proliferation of newspapers through
multilingual versions, the industry is highly
concentrated. Thus, of 6,878 newspapers published in
1971, only 647 fit the UNESCO definition of a daily,
i.e., a paper published four or more times weekly.
Daily circulation of such papers amounted to about
336 copies per 1,000 population. Of the 647 daily
newspapers, 186 were published six or more times
weekly, 10 of which were officially defined as national
in coverage (Figure 50).
Pravda is the most important newspaper in the
U.S.S.R. and the only one to appear 7 days a week; the
other 185 dailies omit one day, usually Monday.
Except for 30 separate evening newspapers issued in
major cities (e.g., Moscow, Leningrad, Kiyev), and an
early edition of Izvestiya which appears in Moscow on
the evening preceding the date of publication, Soviet
newspapers issue only morning editions. Most
newspapers are four to six pages in length and cost 2 or
3 kopecks.
The majority of papers use essentially the same
makeup techniques, and all use the same stories. Often
several papers will print identical stories in identical
positions, often under identical headlines, and
accompanied by identical pictures. Journalistic
language is highly stylized. In discussions of certain
questions on which there has been no final decision,
subtle variations may be used to signal controversial
opinions. A typical Soviet newspaper is arranged as
follows: page 1 carries government notices, official
bulletins, and usually a long editorial; pages 2 and 3
generally contain national news, letters, special
articles, and sometimes a feuilleton (a semifictional
feature story with a political moral); and page 4 is
given over to foreign news provided by TASS, athletic
events, and a potpourri of other items. Advertising is
supplied by the government or concerns public events
such as sports competitions and theater offerings. A
clutter of small personal advertisements about such
events as marriages, divorces, and deaths also
appear-items required by law to be published.
SINGLE ISSUE
PUBLISHED BY CIRCULATION
PRAVDA (Truth) .................................r..
IZVESTIYA (News) ..................................
GUDOK (Whistle) ...................................
TRUD (Labor) ......................................
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red Star) .......................
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (Komsomol Truth
) ..........
SELSKAYA ZHIZN (Rural Life) ........................
SOVETSKIY SPORT (Soviet Sport) .....................
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (Soviet Russia) .................
SOTS IALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA (Socialist Industry)...
1912
1917
1917
1921
1924
1925
1929
1933
1956
1969
Millions
CPSU ................................. 10.0
Supreme Soviet ........................ 8.0
Ministry of Communications, Railway *0.6
Transport Workers Union.
AUCCTU ............................. 6.0
Ministry of Defense .................... 2.65
Komsomol ............................. 8.4
CPSU ................................. 7.0
AUCCTU, Union of Sports Societies and 3.45
Organizations.
CPSU ................................. 2.5
....do ................................ 0.85
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Soviet newspapers do not attract readers by
sensationalism, brashness, or popular feature 'articles
common to most Western journals. Furthermore,
ideological correctness of interpretation rather than
speed in reporting news events is the guiding criterion.
Nevertheless, the content of Soviet newspapers,
perhaps. dull .from a Western perspective,' is not
without personal interest afforded primarily by the
extensive use of readers' letters criticizing the lapses of
petty officials. . .
In recent years, makeup and typography have'
improved significantly. Most papers take great care to
achieve esthetic layout and harmonious typography,
and the use of pictures has increased. Izvestiya, for
example, employs some of the best layout practices. in
the ' world, the paper presenting what -Westerners
might term an attractive package. It is probable,
however, that newspaper readers in Scandinavia, the
United, Kingdom, or the United States would still find
the Soviet press colorless and staid, perhaps even dull
in format.
With editorial offices in Moscow (Figure 51), the
press-leader is Pravda, which sets the standards not
only in ideological questions but also in general
editorial and technical matters: In 1971 Pravda
distributed daily approximately 9.2 million copies.
nationwide from printing plants in Moscow and 15
other cities. It rushes page.mats'to the more'distant of
its printing- sites each night by jet plane. Distribution'
of Pravda , texts :was facilitated in 1970. by the
introduction of a photoelectric process transmitted'by
communication satellite. Pravda is packed with serious
news., announcements,. and, speeches; occasionally the'
newspaper engages in some heavy-footed humor in its
feuilletons. Most of its foreign news comes from 'the
Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), but
the paper also 'maintains 'some 60 correspondents
abroad. Within the U.S.S.R.' Pravda has about 40,000
correspondents, both professional and amateur, whose
function is not only to channel any important news
back to Moscow but also to check on loeal newspaper
operations.
Pravda sets' a magisterial journalistic 'tone. It does
not 'write down to its readers. Editorials are always
prominently displayed, usually in the left-hand
column, although on occasion the-whole front page
comprises one long editorial. The usual' emphasis is on
foreign: and internal policy,' with items devoted to
industry, propaganda, party organization, agriculture,'
cultural affairs, and military policy following in'that
order. These' articles are reprinted throughout the
Soviet press, usually' being sent by TASS via voice
radio' to be copied'-down simultaneously in various
newspaperoffices. Through such means, as well as
through its elaborate ' publishing and distribution
network, Pravda is the most truly national newspaper
in'the U.S.S.R.-
In 1971, 1,208 magazines were 'published
comprising more than 76% of ' total : periodical
circulation.' An additional 4,759 ' periodicals were
divided among small-circulation publications such as
"agitators' notebooks" designed for party propaganda,
scientific 'and' scholarly proceedings,' and bulletins.
As a rule Soviet magazines range in price from 10 to 30
kopecks,' with glossy and literary journals ranging from
60 to80 kopeck's. Within the magazine category, there
are several fairly distinct groups: party journals such as
Partiynaya Zhizn' (Party Life) dealing with questions
Pravda, located in Moscow
C
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of organization, propaganda, agitation, current
policies, and other practical matters; ideological or
theoretical journals such as Voprosy Filosofii
(Problems of Philosophy) dealing with current policy
or historical approaches to ideological questions;
literary journals such as Novyy Mir (New World) and
Oktyabr (October) publishing new fiction and literary
criticism, respectively, and serving as forums for
debate between "liberals" and "conservatives"; trade
or professional journals such as Zhurnalist (Journalist);
health and sports journals, such as Zdorovye (Health);
magazines oriented toward a subsection of the
population, particularly youth and women, such as
Rabotnitsa (Woman Worker); humor magazines, such
as Krokodil (Crocodile); journals for foreign
distribution, such as Sputnik; popular science
magazines, such as Tekhnika Molodezhi (Technology
for Youth); digests of translations from foreign
publications, such as Za Rubezhom (Abroad);
academic and scholarly journals, such as Vestnik
Akadernii Nauk (Herald of the Academy of Sciences);
and general popular magazines such as Ogonek (Little
Flame). In 1973 estimated single issue circulation of
selected major magazines ranged from 12.5 million
(Rabotnitsa) to 170,000 (Novyy Mir) (Figure 52).
While the format and content of Soviet magazines
have become much livelier in recent years, they are
FIGURE 52. Selected magazines, 1971
RABOTNITSA (Woman Worker) .......................
PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN (Party Life) ......................
KRESTYANKA (Peasant Woman) ......................
KROKODIL (Crocodile) ...............................
OGONEK (Little Flame) ..............................
PIONER (Pioneer) ...................................
KOMMUNIST (Communist) ...........................
NovYY MIR (New World) ...........................
VOKRUG SVETA (Around the World) ..................
TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI (Technology for Youth) ........
NAUKA I ZHIZN (Science and Life) ...................
SEMYA I SHKOLA (Family and School) ................
ZDOROVYE (Health) .................................
AGITATOR ..........................................
POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE (Political Self-
Education).
YUNOST (Youth) ...................................
SLUZHBA BYTA (Public Service) ......................
*1969.
**1968.
still staid when compared with Western styles. More
than 90% of all periodicals are still printed on paper
roughly equivalent to newsprint stock. Layout and
design suffer not only from the general backwardness
of Soviet commercial art but also from the poor
quality of materials available. Despite an improve-
ment in appearance, the basic purpose of magazines
and newspapers in Soviet society-to indoctrinate the
people and mobilize them for assigned tasks-is not
likely to change.
There are two Soviet news agencies, TASS and News
Press Agency (APN), often referred to as Novosti. The
former concentrates on official government and
political information, while the latter is more apt to
report offbeat propagandistic items.
TASS was founded in 1925, taking over most of the
functions of an agency called ROSTA, which operated
from 1918 to 1925 as the chief national news agency.
From 1925 to 1935 there were five internal wire
agencies in the U.S.S.R., including ROSTA which
covered the R. S. F. S. R., but in 1935 all were
consolidated and incorporated into TASS. The
agency's leading position in the news field is
reinforced by its attachment to the Council of
Ministers. In 1970, from its headquarters in Moscow
(Figure 53), the agency maintained "feeder" services
in all 15 republics and averaged over 3 million words
1914
1919
1922
1922
1923
1924
1925
1925
1927
1933
1934
1946
1955
1956
1956
1956
1962
SINGLE ISSUE
PUBLISHED BY CIRCULATION
Millions
Pravda ................................ 12.5
CPSU ................................. 1.1
Pravda ................................ 6.2
....do ................................ 5.5
....do ................................ 2.2
Pioneer organization .................... 1.5
CPSU ................................. 0.9
Union of Writers ....................... 0.2
Komsomol ............................. 2.5
....do ................................ 1.7
Znaniye Society ........................ 3.0
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences......... *9.8
Ministry of Health, Union of Medical 10.2
Workers.
CPSU ................................. 1.3
....do ................................ 1.9
Union of Writers .......................
Ministry of Public Service, R.S.F.S.R.,
Union of Local Industry and Municipal
Public Service Workers.
2.1
**1.5
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daily to and from its offices in some 95 countries and
territories. Nevertheless, the Soviet public receives only
a carefully selected segment of foreign news. Many
major events are never made public, while minor
incidents which support the regime's position are
publicized.
Some 5,000 Soviet newspapers, as well as major
radio and television stations, subscribe to TASS,
paying for its service on the basis of their circulation or
listening audience. Within the Soviet Union TASS
news is supplied in Russian, while service to foreign
subscribers is transmitted in Russian, English, French,
German, Spanish, and Arabic. Agreements have also
been concluded with some 30 foreign news agencies,
including Reuters, Associated Press, United Press
International, Agence France-Presse, Deutsche Presse
Agentur, and Kyodo News Service, as well as the
agencies of Communist countries.
APN was founded in 1961 under the sponsorship of
the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the
25X1
25X1
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Znaniye Society, and the Union of Soviet Societies of
Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries. The agency provides feature stories,
commentaries, news items, interviews, and photos.
Service to foreign subscribers deals with various
aspects of life in the Soviet Union, while the domestic
service to Soviet subscribers mainly concerns the way
of life of foreign nations.
According to its charter, APN is a completely
autonomous body, cooperating with official
information services but not affiliated with them. In
1969 it was providing feature copy to more than 600
Soviet newspapers and was contributing to some 6,000
newspapers abroad. It maintains bureaus or
correspondents in 73 countries. Foreign correspondents
in the U.S.S.R. must rely on APN for their stories. It is
also responsible for some of the glossier Soviet
publications for foreign readers, including Sputnik
and Soviet Life, issuing altogether some 52 magazines,
eight newspapers, and more than 100 press bulletins
with a circulation of 2.7 million copies. In addition,
APN publishes books and pamphlets and produces
films for television. In effect, the purpose of the
agency is to counteract whatever the regime believes is
hostile propaganda about life in the U.S.S.R. Its
function as a public relations agency is facilitated by
its "public" rather than state sponsorship.
b. Books and libraries
In 1970, after the United States, the U.S.S.R. was
the largest producer of books and pamphlets in the
world, publishing a total of 78,899 titles, roughly a
thousand less than the number issued in the United
States. Major subject categories included industry
(8,101 titles), literature (6,379), political science
(6,137), natural sciences (3,477), and agriculture
(2,026).
In technical quality Soviet books are generally
inferior to those printed in the United States. Thinner
paper is used which frequently turns yellow and
becomes brittle after a few years. The quality of
printing is also low by U.S. standards, the impression
often being uneven and visible through the page.
Because of frequent misprints, errata slips in books and
journals are common. The binding is also weak and
easily torn from the book.
Soviet books are relatively inexpensive in
comparison with other consumer goods. The price of a
book, as well as the size of its edition, is determined by
its subject matter. Those on political subjects, for
example, are cheap and plentiful; others, for a more
restricted readership, cost more. Publishing houses can
offer books at low prices because they are exempt from
all taxes and are subsidized by the state, although they
are often unable to satisfy consumer demand because
of the limited quantity of paper available. Frequently,
a would-be purchaser must order well in advance of
publication. On the other hand, unsold books are a
chronic problem. Each year thousands of volumes
remain on the shelves, while others issued in smaller
editions disappear from the stores within hours of their
appearance. Second-hand books are an important
means of filling the gap, usually being bought back
from the public at approximately 80% of their original
cost and, if in reasonably good condition, resold as
new. Although no analysis of the categories of books
which remain unsold and those which sell well has
been made public, the speed with which certain
"controversial" works disappear from the shelves
suggests that many of the unsold volumes follow the
party line so slavishly as to promise only boredom for
the reader.
The U.S.S.R. has an extensive library system which
has grown substantially under the Soviet aegis (Figure
54). The number of libraries increased from 76,000 in
1913 to 360,000 in 1971, while the size of their
collections climbed from 46 million volumes to 3.3
billion volumes. Major-libraries include the V.I. Lenin
State Library of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow (founded
1862), comparable in status with the Library of
Congress, with more than 23 million volumes as of the
late 1960's; the M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public
Library in Leningrad (founded 1795) with about 14
million volumes; the Library of the Academy of
Sciences of the U.S.S.R. in Leningrad (founded 1714),
with more than 8 million volumes; the State Public
Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine in
Kiyev, with about 8 million volumes; and the A. M.
Gorkiy Research Library of Moscow State University,
with about 6 million volumes.
Public libraries:
Number (thousands) .........
14
95
136
128
Collections (millions) ........
9
185
845
173
School and children's libraries:
Number (thousands) .........
59
164
196
173
Collections (millions) ........
22
68
277
1,593
Technical and other specialized
libraries:
Number (thousands) .........
3
18
50
59
Collections (millions) ........
15
274
768
1,558
All libraries:
Number (thousands) .........
76
277
382
360
Collections (millions) ........
46
527
1,890
3,324
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Although quantitatively impressive, the Soviet
library network is less than adequate qualitatively.
Literature in the collections is often out of date, and
cataloging usually is far behind acquisitions. Because
of low-quality book production, the libraries are faced
with a nearly insuperable problem of deterioration in
their collections. The premises of individual libraries,
moreover, are frequently rundown, with wornout
furnishings and outmoded equipment. Many are
crowded, poorly lit, inconveniently arranged, and
frequently cluttered and unpleasant. Some buildings
are even critical fire hazards. On the other hand, the
major collections named above are housed in
capacious quarters and have facilities comparable
with the best in the West.
Radio and television broadcasting rank with the
press as a major source of political, cultural, and
esthetic indoctrination. Wireless telegraphy was
invented in Russia in 1896 by A.S. Popov
simultaneously with, and independently of, Marconi.
Broadcasting began in 1922 from a transmitter in
Moscow, and 2 years later three additional
transmitters were functioning in Leningrad, Kiyev,
and Nizhniy Novgorod (Gorkiy). Television transmis-
sions began experimentally in 1931; the first studios
opened in Moscow and Leningrad in 1938, the third
opening in Kiyev in 1951. By the end of 1972 there
were approximately 470 radio stations in operation, of
which approximately 250 were FM, an increase from
132 in 1965. There were also 130 television stations
(103 of which were capable of transmitting in color),
supplemented by some 1,280 retransmitting stations.
Radio and television transmission has been
facilitated since 1965 by 23 Molniya-1 communica-
tion satellites launched into high elliptical orbit. Since
1971, 5 Molniya-2 satellites have supplemented the
satellite network.
Radio and television coverage is quite comprehen-
sive. According to Soviet statistics, in 1973 there were
195.5 million radio-receiving points, a term which
includes wired and wireless radios and television sets.
The following tabulation outlines the growth in the
number of radio-receiving points since 1940 (in
millions):
1940
1960
1965
1970
1973
Wireless radios ..
1.1
27.8
38.2
48.6
52.0
Wired radios ....
5.9
30.8
35.6
46.2
48.5
Television sets . . . insig
4.8
15.7
34.8
45.0
In 1970, 390 radio sets and 143 television sets per 1,000
population were in use.
Radio Moscow, the central broadcasting station,
transmits five simultaneous programs, four of which
are directed to listeners throughout the Soviet Union.
The first program is the basic one, transmitting
political, cultural, and economic information 20 hours
daily. The second program, called Mayak (Beacon),
broadcasts light music and hourly newscasts around
the clock. With a more serious content, including
radio plays and classical music, the third program
broadcasts 14 hours daily to the central regions of the
European part of the U.S.S.R., the Transvolga, and
the Urals. The fourth program is beamed over the AM
and FM bands to the population of the Moscow
region, transmitting 8 hours daily during the week and
13 hours daily on weekends. Transmitted around the
clock, the fifth program is directed to Soviet citizens
abroad, seamen of the commercial and fishing fleets,
and foreigners knowing Russian. In addition, 1 hour of
stereo is broadcast daily on FM. Overall, Radio
Moscow broadcasts approximately 650 hours weekly,
while local stations transmit for an additional 6,000
hours. Music occupies 55.3% of total broadcasting
time, news 16%, social and political items 10.6%,
literature and drama 9%, programs for children and
young people 6.6%, and other programs 2.5%.
Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress (the
stations bear essentially the same relationship to each
other as do TASS and APN) broadcast programs for
listeners abroad on short and medium wave in 84
languages. The programs were beamed to all parts of
the world, as of 1973, for an estimated 1,900 hours a
week, second only to the combined efforts of the Voice
of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe, and Radio
Liberty. According to a Soviet source, the goal of these
programs is to describe the life of the Soviet people,
explain the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet
state, reveal the aggressive policies of imperialism, and
discuss the worldwide struggle of the working class and
the movements for national liberation.
Operating out of Moscow, the Central Television
Network transmits four simultaneous programs. The
first program, on channel 1, lasting 10 hours daily
during the week and 15 hours daily on weekends, is
devoted to "important events of national and
international life." The second program, on channel 3,
transmitting 5 hours daily during the week and 6 and
7 hours on Saturdays and Sundays, respectively, is
directed to the city of Moscow and its environs.
Devoted to educational television, the third program,
on channel 8, transmits 1 hour and 15 minutes 5 days
a week. The fourth program, also on channel 8,
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telecasts in color 2.5 hours daily. Altogether, Moscow
transmitters are on the air approximately 160 hours per
week, while local stations transmit an additional 4,800
hours weekly. In the four programs films occupy 22%
of total transmission time, literature and drama 19%,
music 18%, news 17%, programs for children and
young people 14%, social and political material 8%,
and miscellaneous programs 2%.
Moscow television programs are also relayed to local
TV stations throughout the rest of the U.S.S.R. by
communication satellite and microwave systems.
Satellite transmissions are beamed to 42 receiving
orbita stations over a fifth program on a daily basis.
Twenty-one additional orbita stations are either under
construction or in the planning stage. Microwave
transmissions of Moscow programs are beamed to the
southern portion of U.S.S.R. over a sixth program, also
on a daily basis.
Experimental telecasting in color was begun in 1959
but proved unsuccessful. In 1965, however, the
U.S.S.R. and France agreed to pool their efforts to
develop color transmission on the basis of the French
SECAM-4 system. To facilitate this operation, one of
the largest television centers in the world was built in
Ostankino, near Moscow. It is capable of broadcasting
on five television channels (four VHF and one UHF)
and six FM stations simultaneously.
Soviet radio. and television networks belong to the
International Organization of Radio-broadcasting and
Television (OIRT). Soviet networks are tied to those of
Eastern Europe, and a network called Intervision,
sponsored by OIRT, facilitates the exchange of
programs of international interest, such as soccer
matches and the May Day and 7 November
celebrations. The link between Soviet and Western
radio and television networks is made between Tallin
and Helsinki. The Soviet Union engages in the
exchange of programs with some 90 countries. In mid-
1973 the regime signed an agreement with the U.S.
National Broadcasting Company to exchange radio
and television programming.
In the unauthorized penetration of Soviet airspace,
however, the regime is less cooperative: The
government maintains an extensive system of radio
jammers, numbering between 2,000 and 2,500,
capable of blocking reception by wireless radios. Since
World War II, jamming has varied' in accordance with
the tensions of the cold war. During the Berlin crisis in
1948 the Russians started jamming the broadcasts of
the VOA in the various Soviet languages (Russian,
Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Estonian, Latvian,
Lithuanian), and a year later those of the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Jamming was soon
extended to almost all Western broadcasts to the
Soviet Union and its allied countries, as well as to
some other countries. Beginning in 1956, jamming of
BBC and VOA Soviet-language transmissions was
reduced and finally halted in 1963 following the
signing of the nuclear test ban treaty. On the other
hand, heightened tensions between the Russians and
Chinese after 1963 led to systematic and heavy
jamming of Chinese Communist transmissions by the
late 1960's. Jamming of BBC and VOA transmissions
to the Soviet Union resumed after the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but it has not returned to
the peak pre-1963 levels. Jamming of Radio Liberty
and Radio Free Europe has continued without letup.
1. Selected bibliography
1. General characteristics of the society
Brown, Donald R. (ed.). The Role and Status of
Women in the Soviet Union. New York: Teachers
College Press. 1968.
Churchward, L. G. The Soviet Intelligentsia: An
Essay on the Social Structure and Roles of Soviet
Intellectuals During the 1960's. London and Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1973.
Dmytryshyan, Basil. U.S.S.R.: A Concise History.
New York: Charles Schribner's Sons. 1971.
Dornberg, John. The New Tsars: Russia Under
Stalin's Heirs. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company. 1972.
Florinsky, Michael T. Russia: A History and an
Interpretation. New York: Macmillan. 1953.
Geiger, Kent H. The Family in Soviet Russia.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1968.
Grey, Ian. The Horizon History of Russia. New
York: American Heritage Publishing Co. 1970.
Inkeles, Alex. Social Change in Soviet Russia.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1968.
Inkeles, Alex and Bauer, Raymond A. The Soviet
Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959.
Kassoff, Allan (ed.). Prospects for Soviet Society.
New York: Praeger. 1969.
Matthews, Mervyn. Class and Society in Soviet
Russia. New York: Walker and Co. 1972.
Millar, James (ed.). The Soviet Rural Community.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1971.
Nettl, J. P. The Soviet Achievement. London:
Thames and Hudson. 1967.
Reshetar, John S., Jr. The Soviet Polity:
Government and Politics in the U.S.S.R. New York:
Mead & Company. 1971.
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Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. A. A History of Russia.
New York: Oxford University Press. 1969.
Thaden, Edward C. Russia Since 1801: The Making
of a New Society. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
1971.
Wesson, Robert G. The Soviet Russian State. New
York: John Wiley and Sons. 1972.
Readers of Russian will find the following Soviet
sources useful for information on youth, women,
family, and rural life in the Soviet Union:
Arutyunyan, Yu. V. Sotsialnaya struktura selskogo
naseleniya SSSR. Moscow: Mysl. 1971.
Bogdanova, T. P. Trud i sotsialnaya aktivnost
molodezhi. Minsk: Izdatelstvo BGU im. V. I. Lenina.
1972.
Gordon, Ya. and Klopov, Ye. V. Chelovek posle
raboty. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka. 1972.
Mikhaylyuk, V. B. Izpolzovaniye zhenskogo truda v
narodnom khozyaystve. Moscow: Ekonomika. 1970.
Stepanyan, Ts. A. and Semenov, V. S. (eds.). Klassy,
sotsialnyye sloi i gruppy v SSSR. Moscow: Izdatelstvo
N a uka. 1968.
Yurkevich, N. G. Sovetskaya semya; funktsii i
usloviya stabilnosti. Minsk: Izdatelstvo BGU im. V. I.
Lenina. 1970.
The following titles deal with the current dissent
movement among Soviet intellectuals and the so-
called samizdat writers:
Amalrik, Andrey. Will the Soviet Union Survive
Until 1984? New York: Harper and Row. 1970.
Brumberg, Abraham (ed.). In Quest of Justice;
Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today. New
York: Praeger. 1970.
Katz, Zev. Soviet Dissenters and Social Structure in
the U.S.S.R. Cambridge: Center for International
Studies. 1971.
Medvedev, Roy A. Let History Judge: The Origins
and Consequences of Stalinism. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf. 1971.
Reddaway, Peter (ed:). Uncensored Russia: Protest
and Dissent in the Soviet Union. New York: American
Heritage Press. 1972.
Rothberg, Abraham. The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence
and the Soviet Regime, 1953-1970. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press. 1972.
Scammell, Michael (ed.). Russia's Other Writers:
Selections From Samizdat Literature. New York:
Praeger. 1971.
2. Ethnic groups
Brown, Michael (ed.). Ferment in the Ukraine:
Documents by V. Chornovil. New York: Praeger.
1971.
Chornovil, V. (Compiler). The Chornovil Papers.
New York: McGraw-Hill. 1968.
Conquest, Robert (ed.). Soviet Nationalities Policy J
in Practice. London: The Bodley Head. 1967.
Dzyuba, Ivan. Internationalism or Russification: A
Study of the Soviet Nationalities Problem. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1968.
Goldhagen, Erich (ed.). Ethnic Minorities in the
Soviet Union. New York: Praeger. 1968.
Kochan, Lionel (ed.). The Jews in Soviet Russia
Since 1917. London: Oxford University Press. 1970.
Kolarz, Walter. Russia and Her Colonies. New
York: Praeger. 1952.
---. The Peoples of the Soviet Far East. New
York: Praeger. 1954.
Matthews, W. K. Languages of the U.S.S.R.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1951.
Rubin, Ronald I. (ed.). The Unredeemed: Anti-
Semitism in the Soviet Union. Chicago: Quadrangle
Books. 1968.
Smolar, Boris. Soviet Jewry Today and Tomorrow.
New York: Macmillan. 1971.
3. Religion
Bennigsen, Alexandre and Lemercier-Quelquejay,
Chantal. Islam in the Soviet Union. New York:
Praeger. 1967.
Bourdeaux, Michael. Religious Ferment in Russia:
Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious Policy.
London: Macmillan. 1968.
--=. Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the
Russian Orthodox Church Today. New York: Praeger.
1968.
Conquest, Robert (ed.). Religion in the U.S.S.R.
New York, Washington: Praeger. 1968.
Galitskaya, I. A. et al. (eds.). Molodezh i ateizm.
Moscow: Mysl. 1971.
Marshall, Richard H. et al. (eds.). Aspects of
Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press. 1971.
4. Population, manpower, health, and welfare
Feshbach, Murray. "Manpower Trends in the
U.S.S.R.: 1950 to 1980." Unpublished manuscript.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Washington. 1971.
Field, Mark F. Soviet Socialized Medicine: An
Introduction. New York: The Free Press. 1967.
Hanson, Philip. The Consumer in the Soviet Union.
London: Macmillan. 1968.
Harris, Chauncy D. Cities of the Soviet Union:
Studies in Their Functions, Site, Density, and Growth.
Chicago: Rand McNally for the Association of
American Geographies. 1970.
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Kirsch, Leonard Joel. Soviet Wages: Changes in
Structure and Administration Since 1956. Cambridge:
The MIT Press. 1972.
Leedy, Frederick A. "Demographic Trends in the
U.S.S.R." Unpublished manuscript. U.S. Department
of Commerce. Washington. 1973.
Madison, Bernice Q. Social Welfare in the Soviet
Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1968.
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Tsentralnoye
statisticheskoye upravleniye. Itogi Vsesoyuznoy
perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda, SSSR. Moscow:
Gosstatizdat. 1962-63.
--. Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970
goda, SSSR. Moscow: Statistika. 1972-73.
--. Statistiki migratsii naseleniya. Moscow:
Statistika. 1973.
United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, Social Security Administration. Social
Security Programs Throughout the World. Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1971.
---, Public Health Service. Medical Care in the
U.S.S.R. Report of the U.S. Delegation on Health
Care Services and Planning. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office. 1970.
5. Education, public information, and artistic and
cultural expression
Conquest, Robert (ed.). The Politics of Ideas in the
U.S.S.R. London: The Bodley Head. 1967.
Frankel, Tobia. The Russian Artist. New York:
Macmillan. 1972.
Froncek, Thomas (ed.). The Horizon Book of the
Arts of Russia. New York: American Heritage
Publishing Co. 1970.
Hopkins, Mark. Mass Media in the Soviet Union.
New York: Pegasus Publishing Company. 1970.
Inkeles, Alex. Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A
Study in Mass Persuasion. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 1950.
Kushev, Yevgery. Ogkyskom karandasha: Stikhi i
proza. Frankfurt/Main: Possev Verlag. 1971.
Kuzin, N. P. and Kondakov, M. I. (eds.). Education
in the U.S.S.R. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 1972.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602010004-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602010004-5
Glossary
ABBREVIATION RUSSIAN
APN .......... Agentstvo Pechati Novosti ................
AUCCTU ..... Vsesoyuznyy Tsentralnyy Sovet Profes-
sionalnykh Soyuzov
GLAVLIT..... Glavnoye Upravleniye Po Okhrane
Voyennykh i " Gosudarvspvennykh Tayn
V Pechati
KGB ......... Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.....
TASS......... Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza.
ENGLISH
News Press Agency
All-Union Central Council of Trade
Unions
Main Administration for Safe-
guarding Military and State
Secrets
Committee for State Security
Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet
Union
Government Civil Registry Office
'N.
?
'E.
Armenia (regn) ..............
..
......... 40 00
45
00
Lithuania (rep) .........................
56
00
24 00
Armenian SSR ..............
..
......... 40 00
45
00
L'vov .................................
49
50
24 00
Azerbaijan (regn) ............
..
......... 39 00
48
00
Magadan Oblast...:...:.' ..............
65
00
160 00
Azerbaijan SSR .............
..
......... 40 30
47
30
Magnitogorsk ...........................
53
27
59 04
Baku ....................
....... 40 23
49
51
Mary .................................
37
36
61 50
Baykal, Lake (lake) ........:.
..
......... 54 00
109
00
Minsk ................................
53
54
27 34
Belorussia (regn) ............
..
... I...... 53 00
25
00
Moldavia (regn) ........................
46
30
27 00
Belorussia SS R ..............
..
......... 53 00
28
00
Moldavian SSR ........................
47
00
29 00
Black Sea (sea) ..............
..
......... 43 00
35
00
Moscow ...............................
55
45
37 35
Bukhara ...................
..
......... 39 48
64
25
Murmanskaya Oblast ...................
68
00
34 00
Buynaksk ..................
..
......... 42 49
47
07
Naberezhnyye Chelny ..................
55
42
52 19
Caspian Sea (sea) ............
..
......... 42 00
50
00 '
Nizhniy Novgorod .....................
. 56
20
44 00
Caucasus (regn).............
..
......... 42 00
45
00
North Caucasus (regn) .................
. 4
3 00
45 00
Crimea (regn) ...............
..
......... 45 00
34
00
Novosibirsk ...........................
. 5
5 02
82 55
Dagestan (regn) .............
..
......... 42 00
47
00
Odessa ...............................
. 4
6 28
30 44
Dagestan A SSR .............
..
......... 43 00
47
00
Pamirs (mts)..... . ....................
3
8 00
73 00
Donetsk Oblast ............
...
......... 48 00
37
30
Prokop'yevsk .........................
5
3 53
8645
Dushanbe .................
...
......... 38 33
68
48
Riga .................................
5
6 57
24 06
Echmiadzin .................
..
......... 40 10
44
18
Rostov ...............................
4
7 14
39 42
Estonia (rep) ...............
..
......... 59 00
26
00
R.S.F.S.R ............................
6
0 00
100 00
Estonian SSR ...............
...
......... 59 00
26
00
Samarkand ...........................
3
9 40
66 58
Georgia (regn) .............
...
......... 42 00
43
30
Siberia (regn) .........................
6
0 00
100 00
Georgian SSR ..............
...
......... 42 00
43
30
Sverdlovsk ...........................
5
6 51
60 36
Gor'kiy ...................
...
......... 56.20
44
00
TadzhikSSR .........................
3
9 00
71 00
Helsinki, Finland ...........
...
......... 60 10
24
50
Tadzhikistan (regn) .....................
3
8 00
72 00
Ivanovo (famous for art textil
e i
ndustry).
Tallin ................................
5
9 25
24 45
Ivolginsk ..................
...
......... 51 45
107
14
Tashkent ...............................
4
1 20
69 18
Kaliningradskaya Oblast ....
...
......... 54 45
21
30
Tiflis ................................
4
1 42
44 45
Kaunas ...................
...
......... 54 54
23
54
Tol'yatti ............................
5
3 31
49 26
Kazakstan ..................
...
.........
Transcaucasus (regn) ...................
4
2 00
45 00
Kazakh SSR ...............
...
......... 48 00
68
00
Transvolga (regn) .....................
5
5 00
50 00
Kazan ....................
...
......... 55 45
49
08.
Turkmen SSR ........................
4
0 00
60 00
Khar'kov ..:...............
...
......... 50 00
36
15
Turkestan ............................
4
5 00
70 00
Kiyev .....................
...
......... 50 26
30
31
Ufa ..................................
5
4 44
55 56
Kiev ......................
...
......... 50 26
30
31
Ukraine (regn) ........................
5
0 00
32 00
Kirgiziya (SSR) ............
...
......... 41 00
75
00
Ukrainian SSR ........................
4
9 00
32 00
Kuybyshev ................
...
......... 53 12
50
09
Ul'yanovsk ...........................
5
4 20
48 24
Kuzbas (regn) ..............
...
......... 54 00
86
00
Urals(mts) ...........................
6
0 00
60 00
Ladoga, Lake (lake) ........
...
......... 61 00
31
30
Uzbekistan (regn) .....................
4
3 00
60 00
Latvia (rep) ...............
...
......... 57 00
25
00
Vil'nyus ..............................
5
4 41
25 19
Latvian SS R ...............
...
......... 57 00
25
00
Volga (strm) ..........................
4
5 55
47 52
Leningrad .................
...
......... 59 55
30
15
Yakut SSR ...........................
6
5 00
130 00
Lipetsk ...................
...
......... 52 37
39
35
Zagorsk (near Moscow) ................
5
6 18
38 08
Lithuanian SS R ............
...
......... 56 00
24
00
25X1
.-) 25X1
0
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602010004-5
ZAGS......... Zapis Aktov Grazhdanskogo Sostoyaniya...
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP08SO135OR00060201000
0
E
E
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/11: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602010004-5