COMMUNISM CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION PART TWO COMMUNIST PARTY MILITARY ORGANIZATION

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170003-2
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2012
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SECURITY INFORMATION
COMMUNISM
Clandestine Communist Organization
Part Two
Communist Party Military Organization
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Nate. This is an interim study. Statements
herein should be considered in many places
to be open to question and conclusions, to be
tentative. Comments, criticisms, additions
and suggestions are earnestly solicited.
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CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
PART TWO: COMMUNIST PARTY MILITARY ORGANIZATION
CONTENTS
"Periods" of Communist Military Activity
Types of Communist Military Effort
Military Resistance
Colonial Revolution
City Insurrection
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES'
Basis of the post-war insurrections
"Objective Conditions"'
Party Strength
Lessons of the Chinese Communist Revolution
The Safe-Base
Combination of Military and Political Action
General Role of Party Apparatus
"Phasing" of the Insurrection
Main Periods of the Insurrection
Period of the Military Defensive
Period of the Military Offensive
Adjustment of the Party to "Phasing"
Role of Party Underground
B. PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE
Ideal Features
Compromise of ideal features
Advantages of base on national frontier
Effect of Communications
Military utility
Political utility
The. "Liberation Government"
Disadvantages of Safe-base
C. THE POLICY DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION
Who makes it
Policy preliminaries
Influence of CPSU 'and other CP's
Evidence of 2 decisions
Content of the decision
Importance of the "Objective Situation"
D. ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS
Necessity for adjustment
Time Lapse
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
30 - 38
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
40
41
42
43
44
45
47
48
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Main Changes
Decentralization
Reassignment of Cadres
Discipline and Security
Purges
Control Mechanism
Qualifications for Jobs
Underground Organization
Removal of Headquarters to Safe Base
New Organizations Created
Other Organizations Strengthened
Some Functions Dropped
Emphasis on Schooling
Communications System.
Vulnerability
Para.
50.
E. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY 51 - 66
Initial Recruits 51
Size and Structure of Regular Units 52
Regular and Irregular Forces 53
Conditions Affecting Size of Units 54
Special Units 55
Organization and Functions of Staffs: Development 56
General Staff 58
Role of the "Liberation Government" 59
Overlapping and Separation of Local and Military Organizations 60
Party Control 61
Political Commissar System 64
Party Organization in the Military Force 66
F. ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT
Necessity
Organization in Safe Base Area
Manpower
Intelligence
Communications
Supply
Armaments
III. THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION
A. OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS
Aims
Types of Resistance
B. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE
Party Reorientation
Initial Forces
C. STAFFS
Origins
Composition
67
68
72
76
80
86
88
91 - 96
91
93
97
100
104
105
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Size
106
Types
107
Party Control
108
F. SERVICE FUNCTIONS
Intelligence
116
Tactical Intelligence
117
Non-Tactical Intelligence
118
Communications
122
Supplies
123
G. POST-LIBERATION DISPOSITION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE
125
- 129
STRENGTH
H. USE OF RESISTANCE BANDS IN KOREAN WAR
130
- 134
IV.
THE COMMUNIST CITY INSURRECTION
135
A.
MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION
135
- 139
Differences between the Proletarian and Colonial Revolution
Factors in Success of Proletarian Revolution
136
B.
ORGANIZATION OF MASS SUPPORT
140
- 149
Party control
143
Propaganda support
144
Slogans
145
Testing the Mass Temper
146
The General Strike
147
The General Task
149
C.
SUBVERTING THE DEFENSES OF THE GOVERNMENT
150
- 152
"Military Work"
151
D.
MILITARY PREPARATIONS
153
- 173
Planning organs
154
Service Organization
156
The Arms Problem
157
Communications
165
Intelligence
171
Transportation
172
E.
THE INSURRECTION
174
- 190
Timing
175
.Mobilization of the Party
176
Establishment of Coordinating Headquarters
177
Composition of Headquarters
178
Fighting Formations
182
Size of Formations
185
Activation and Utilization of the Subversion Apparatus
186
Current Preparedness
187
Conclusions
190,
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Para.
V. PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION OF ARMED FORCES 191 - 213
Purpose of Penetration
Party Organization for Penetration 192
The Bolshevik Penetration Operations 193
Conditions for Membership in the Comintern 195
Early Penetrations by the CP Italy 196
The CP Germany Apparatus for Penetration 197
Anti-Military Committees 199
A Small Party, Penetration Operation 200
Penetration During World War II and Later 205
Greece 206
Denmark 209
Czechoslovakia 212
APPENDICES
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP CHINA
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP GREECE
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP MALAYA
MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP PHILIPPINES
MILITARY RESISTANCE OF CP FRANCE
THE ORGANIZATION OF CP ITALY FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917
THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION OF 1935 IN BRAZIL
SOVIET PARTISANS DURING WORLD WAR II
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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
1. There has long been a need for a survey analysis of the way the Communist Party
organizes for military action. There are many places where the Party is already engaged in
armed rebellion. Existing world tensions and unstable internal conditions may encourage re-
bellion in other areas in the near future. Non-Communist governments may have to face such
action directly: it is important to know how the action is begun and directed and to know
something of the problems that the Communists themselves face in raising, maintaining and
controlling an armed force.
2. For these reasons the present paper has been prepared. It deals with the Commu-
nist armed insurrection in advanced capitalist countries and in "backward", agrarian
("colonial") countries. A section also has been included on Communist armed resistance to
foreign military occupation. This is of interest for two reasons: (a) it supplements the infor-
mation on military organization for Communist insurrection; and (b) it shows what might be
expected to follow should non-Communist forces be obliged to occupy a foreign country in
which the Communist following is significant.
3. The conclusions developed in the survey are tentative. In many cases there is not
sufficient information to draw reliable conclusions: for obvious reasons the Communist Party
does not publish details on the techniques and organization of its military effort. In the case
of city insurrections in the manner of the Russian Revolution of November 1917, they have
been unsuccessful; and failures are not generally recorded in objective detail by the Commu-
nists. Much more information is available on the Communist revolution in colonial countries
because they have occurred at a time of general public awareness and interest in Commu-
nist activities, and because, by their very nature, they cannot be kept secret.
4. Such shortcomings aside, it is believed that the present paper will enable its
readers to foresee more clearly what the Communists may be expected to do by way of pre-
paring and carrying out armed action. The "pattern" of organization and action cannot, of
course, be rigidly applied in every conceivable detail and there are many places where details
have been set forth to cover the actual situation in a particular country. It is hoped, however,
that alternative variations have been furnished that will suggest to the reader what he may ex-
pect in a given place, time, and set of conditions. There are natural limits to the variations
possible at any point in the pattern. The Communists are bound by conditions beyond their
control: their doctrine prescribes adherence to certain standards of organization (Parties are
modelled after the CPSU); they exchange experiences and thereby develop certain "school
solutions."
5. Two limitations have been imposed on this interim study: (a) no attention is given
to the organization of state armies in Communist countries; (b) military tactics are treated
only so far as they affect organization. The study is focused on the military organizations of
Parties not yet in power.
6. While this paper is primarily concerned with the efforts of the Communists to
organize a military force of their own, a section is devoted to penetration and subversion of
"enemy" armed services (i.e. the existing army, police force, etc. of the state). Penetration
and subversion operations of Communist Parties, especially in the city insurrection, contri-
bute directly and in a large proportion to their military potential. The organization for this
activity is discussed in greater detail, paragraph 176.
7. Several "case histories" of particular Communist military actions are appended
to the study. They should be referred to when illustrations are wanted on the application of a
"principle" as set out in the three general analyses of --
Organization for colonial revolution,
Organization for armed resistance, and
Organization for proletarian revolution.l
1 Communist military operations in conjunction with an invading Communist army have not
been considered separately In this study. It is believed that in the event of invasion by the
Soviet Union or Its satellites, CP military action would fall into one of the categories dealt
with in the paper. It would, perhaps, range from resistance type operations to isolated sei-
zures of power in cities in the advanced countries. An example of such aid already exists in
the colonial areas: the help of the South Korean guerrillas to the North Korean and Chinese
Communist armies, which is discussed in paragraph 130.
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8. These three types of Communist armed actions have characterized three histori-
cal periods of Communist strategy. They are --
a) The period of unsuccessful city insurrections based on the Bolshevik model,
roughly from 1917 to 1935, with a rash of attempts immediately following the
Bolshevik Revolution, Insurrections were attempted in Germany in 1921 and
1923; in Bulgaria in 1923; in Hungary in 1919; in Lativa in 1924; in Finland in
1918; in China, repeated attempts until 1928; and in Brazil, in 1935.
b) The period of armed resistance to Axis occupation: in occupied Europe
from 1941 to 1944; in China, from 1937 to 1945; and in Southeast Asia, from
1942 to 1945.
c) The period of armed rebellion in colonial Southeast Asia and Greece. Al-
though the principles employed in these revolutions had been applied as early as
1928 in China, it was not until World War II that their development had reached
its height and their validity had been proved. The CP's of Indochina, Malaya,
Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia and India following the war adopted them.
9. The breaking of the Communist strategy into three historical periods has largely
been the result of "objective conditions", i.e. social-political-economic factors outside the
control of the Communists, but providing them exploitable situations. The success of the
Bolsheviks in 1917 was achieved'by a combination of factors that is not likely to be repeated
again in any other country. Nevertheless, Communists in other "advanced" countries have
long been taught the "lessons" of the Bolshevik Revolution, and they include some military
tactics that would appear to be applicable to a city uprising anywhere. The special conditions
required for resistance operations are evident: the presence of enemy military forces and a
general patriotic hatred for them. There are many similarities between military resistance
and colonial insurrection. The application of the "lessons" of the Chinese Communist Revolu-
tion in colonial countries has been the main feature of the post-war period. It cannot be said
at this time that the lessons are more, or less, likely to succeed than the application of the
techniques of the Bolshevik Revolution. In Greece, the attempt failed; in Malaya, Burma,
Philippines and Indochina the attempts are apparently at stalemates. In Indonesia and India,
they have failed.
10. It is interesting to note that CP India, having unsuccessfully tried both the tactics
of the Bolshevik revolution and the tactics of the Chinese Revolution, now attempts to formu-
late a program which calls for a combination of the two. If it succeeds (and it seems doubtful
if the two types of revolution can be combined) it will be another major contribution to Commu-
nist revolutionary practice.
11. The three types of Communist military effort defined. The principles for the re-
sistance organization were develop during World War II, mainly to help the USSR in the war
with the Axis. They had limited objectives: to harass the occupying Axis armies, to collect
intelligence for Allied use and to deny the economic potential of the country to the Axis. The
organizational structure reflected these missions. Communist resistance formations were
generally small and mobile and only in rare instances did they engage Axis military formations
head on. In two cases (Greece and Yugoslavia) the resistance military formations went beyond
these objectives and during the resistance laid the groundwork for a later attempt to seize
power. The cases examined were the Communist resistance operations of the USSR, France,
Italy and Greece. The tactics developed by the Communists would be applicable by any Com-
munist Party fighting a non-Communist occupation army.1
12. The techniques of the Communist revolution in colonial areas have developed over
the past twenty years, largely as a result of the experiences of the Chinese Communists. The
distinguishing features of the colonial revolution are:
a) the creation of a large army based on the peasantry. The army is first cre-
ated from isolated detachments of armed peasantry, but as the revolution succeeds
the number of troops increases.
A current example being the utilization of Communist guerrilla forces behind UN'lines in
Korea in direct support of the North Korean forces. See paragraph 130.
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b) the occupation and protection by this army of a safe base or bases, which be-
comes the headquarters for the Party political and military campaign, and which
is gradually expanded as the power of the Communist forces increases.
c) a long-term, sustained effort, with a slow and gradual accumulation of mili-
tary strength. The Chinese effort took over 20 years.
Case histories for the preparation and conduct of a colonial revolution by the Chinese,
Malayan, Philippine and Greek Communist Parties have been included in this study. The
tactics appear to be applicable to all Southeast Asian countries, some areas in Latin America,
the Near East and Africa.
13. The model for the city insurrection, which takes place in "advanced" capitalist
countries, is the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The highly centralized communications of an
advanced country with strong, mobile coercive forces call for tactics very different from a
resistance operation or a colonial revolution. The main features of a city insurrection are:
a) the necessity to penetrate and subvert the state coercive forces, to win them
over to the support of the Communists or to neutralize them during the seizure of
power.
b) the creation of armed detachments of workers, and obtaining the support of
the proletariat for strike action and demonstrations.
c) The close timing and coordination of the forces of the Communists. The in-
surrection must be completed in a few days, before the opposing forces have time
to rally, although the political preparation for the insurrection precedes it for
years.
The Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd in 1917 was examined in detail for this study.
An account of the Brazilian Communist Revolution of 1935, which bears many similarities to
the Bolshevik model, is also included. Similar tactics would probably be employed by Com-
munists staging an insurrection in any "advanced, capitalist country", particularly in Western
Europe.
14. The general patterns of the colonial revolution, the resistance operation, and the
city insurrection are set forth in detail below.
H. COMMUNIST COLONIAL UPRISINGS
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
15. Basis of the post-war insurrections. The numerous Communist military uprisings
in the countries of Southeast Asia following the war were undertaken on the basis of several
complex factors: (a) events and conditions at home and abroad which the Parties considered
favorable for revolution (i.e.; the "objective situation" in Communist parlance); (b) enhanced
political strength of the Parties and the existence of at least the nucleus of a Party military
force (i.e., the "subjective" conditions); (c) existence of a body of practical doctrine about
strategy and tactics in "colonial and semi-colonial" countries developed during the Chinese
Communist Revolution.
16. "Objective Conditions." In the eyes of the Communists the war had a profound
effect on the political and social stability and economies of the countries of Asia, on their
relations with the "imperialist' homelands in Europe, and on the world balance of power be-
tween the democratic "imperialist" countries and the Soviet-satellite "camp." The Commu-
nists thought that these effects worked in their favor, as was stated by Andrei Zhdanov at the
inaugural session of the Cominform in 1947, and they believed that the favorable trend would
go on indefinitely, eventually leading to crises in which the Parties could seize total power.
The strongest manifestation of the changed situation in Asia was the rise of nationalism, upon
which the Communists had long tried to capitalize. Not until the end of the war, however, did
they consider the ferment strong enough and the colonial governments (and their principles)
weakened enough to capitalize fully on it.
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17. Party Strength. The Communist Parties participated actively in the anti-Japanese
resistance during the occupation. By doing so, they developed military forces, which they
were able to carry over in one form or another into the post-war, period and which provided
them with the nucleus pf an insurrectionary army. The Party leadership had gained valuable
experience from underground operations during the occupation, and from the military opera-
tions. Many of the Parties also emerged from the resistance with stores of arms, ammuni-
tion, and other supplies.
18. Lessons of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Out of necessity by way of his-
torical accident, the Chinese Communists hit upon a formula for revolution that was radically
different from the "classic" Bolshevik tradition and that, by extension, seems applicable to
other Asian countries. Following an abortive uprising in the cities, they organized an army
of peasants to protect themselves against the military forces of the Nationalists; they used
the army to seize and hold an inaccessible region in the far Northwest (Shensi Province);
after consolidating their position there - aided by the neighboring USSR--they used the army
to "politicalize" the peasantry in adjoining areas particularly through land rediptribution and,
gradually, to expand their base, finally accumulating enough strength and resources to engage
and defeat the forces of the Government and to take over complete state power.
From their experiences, a formula for revolution in what the Communist call the
"colonial and semi-colonial" countries was developed with the following terms:
a) The most immediately revolutionary section of the populatiori is not the city
proletariat, but the peasantry;
a o
b) By raising a military. force and seizing a safe base in the countryside, the
Communist Party can begin a political-military struggle aimed principally at the
enlistment of the peasantry for the armed struggle: the principal means of, in-
ducement is the distribution of land among the poor peasants;
c) The Communist Party can begin a military struggle with limited military and
political resources because communications difficulties will impede counter-
measures by the government;)
d) By a combination of military action and political organizing among the peas-
ant masses, the Party can gradually accumulate forces large enough and suffi-
ciently seasoned to engage eventually the forces of the enemy;
e) Even a limited military struggle will tax the strength of the government,
throw its economy out of balance and, consequently, cause frictions to grow among
the social groups supporting the government and thus lead to a crisis.
19. The Safe-base. Rough terrain, dense vegetation, and primitive roads common in
"colonial and semi-colonial" countries of Asia make it possible for Communist Parties to do
what the Chinese Communists did when they seized part of Shensi -- capture a defensible area
where the military- force can be built up, trained, and sustained. Having an armed force, the
Communists can relinquish an area that proves untenable and seize another. Several small
bases can be taken simultaneously, later to be consolidated into one, or given up as conditions
and strategy dictate. It is essential, however, that some kind of a safe area be secured.
20. Combination of Military and Political Action. The main functions of the Commu-
nist military force are - -
a) capture a defensible area; defend it;
b) aid in the expansion of the political basis of the revolution: facilitate land
distribution; protect Organizers; attract or coerce peasants to support the insur-
rection by show of force;
1 Conversely the existence of an effective communications system will impede the efforts of
a "colonial or semi-colonial" CP to begin and sustain military operations. See the recent
complaints of CP India to that effect.
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c) damage the resources of the enemy; make him operate a security force be-
yond his capacity to do so; weaken the morale of his troops by constant harassing
actions; disrupt his lines of communication and transport of commodities by am-
bushes, destroying roads, railroads, power and telephone lines, etc.
d) expand the safebase(s) until the opposing government is sufficiently weakened
and can be overthrown.
21. The political apparatus of the Party is largely stripped down to provide cadres for
the military force and the supporting mass organizations. It becomes a control and servicing
apparatus for the military force: it posts cadres in key military commands, forms mass
organizations among the peasants to provide food, intelligence, and recruits for the military
force; and creates special directing organs (staffs) and servicing elements (intelligence,
courier communications, weapons and ammunition production, supply, etc.).
22. "Phasing" of the Insurrection. Because colonial Communist Parties begin their
insurrections before they have gathere preponderant political strength, and use military
action as a politicalizing instrument, they expect the struggle to be long. (The Chinese Com-
munists fought for over twenty years.) Military forces will be accumulated gradually; the
enemy is reduced by political, economic, and military attrition. Communist military opera-
tions are adjusted to tactical and political conditions prevailing at any given time. If neces-
sary, the force can be withdrawn to the safe area for long periods and confine itself to de-
fensive actions. Communist military tactics in colonial countries can be much more flexible
than in "advanced" countries, where the military effort must be quick and overwhelming, or
be crushed.
23. There are two main phases in the colonial insurrection: the military defensive,
when the Communists are trying to accumulate forces and establish productive and military
strategic safe-bases; and the military offensive when sufficient forces have been accumulated
to launch the by-then developed regular army in powerful attacks on the main body of enemy
forces.
24. The period of the military defensive is marked by the use of guerrilla tactics. It
is divided, according to a document issued by the CP Brazil entitled "Guerrilla, Arm of the
People," into three phases:
a) "Acts of sabotage and terrorism, performed by individuals or small groups
native to the region, who usually work under the very eyes of the enemy." During
this phase, the Party must organize numerous small secret groups, whose duties
consist of "sabotage of transportation, communications and supplies; the collection
of information for friendly troops or for the guerrilla organization; and finally,
propaganda aiming at the complete revelation of the true character of the enemy
and the preparation of the people for the fight."
"Little by little, the enemy avoids the most warlike regions, moves its troops and sup-
plies over other routes, changes its depots to other places, begins to leave behind only key
garrisons or send punitive expeditions from time to time. Then the guerrillas become more
and more masters of the region, progressively armed and organized into military-type bands,
attack the remaining enemy bands, attack the remaining enemy soldiers, and finally launch
more energetic attacks on neighboring areas."
b) "Next, larger groups are formed which have a military organization and are
generally based in mountains, forests, or other relatively inaccessible regions,
whence they can launch constant attacks on the enemy."
c) "Finally, the groups of guerrilla warriors, now having available considerable
resources, are organized into a regular army and establish a definite front and
begin the occupation of the territory."
Progress from one "phase" to another is not sharply defined: irregular guerrilla bands
continue to exist right up to the final, all-out offensive; the forces of the Communists through-
out these phases are of varying sizes and shapes; small-scale harassing operations are car-
ried on even when the military force has begun to be reorganized into a "regular army;" the
first "phase" is skipped over in some cases.
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The Brazilian document has this to say about centralized control of military operation:
"Coordination is relatively easy in the third phase of the fight, when the existence
of the regular army and of a territory dominated by it allow the full development
of a central command. In the first two phases, however, such coordination and
the establishment of the central command are extremely hard: this can, never-
theless, be greatly aided through the previous existence of an organized..Commu-
nist Party."
25. The period of the military offensive consists in (a) consolidation of Party-military
control within the safe-base area; (b) completion of the reorganization of the Communist
forces into a "regular army;" (c) expansion of the safe-base in the surrounding countryside;
(d) attacks in force on individual enemy strongholds, then on major provincial cities, then on
the national capital; (e) creation of a national Communist government and consolidation of
political and territorial control over the entire country.
26. Adjustment of the Party to "Phasing." The role of the political apparatus of the
Communist Party and its ancillary ("mass" or front) organizations is adjusted to the stages
of the military strategy.
In the early stages, the Party mobilizes its military elements, organizes them into
tactical units, makes plans for the initial operations, and turns its regular committees into
military staffs.
Later, when the military forces have grown sufficiently and conditions afford an oppor-
tunity for major operations, they are organized as a separate military auxiliary, divorced
from the control of local Party committees, but still, however, under the control of the central
Party headquarters. When this happens, the political apparatus becomes primarily a serv-
icing organization for the Communist army and its operations. The civil administrations that
are set up in "liberated" areas under Party control are also aimed at supporting the military
effort.
27. In cities under enemy control, the basic function of the (underground) political
apparatus of the Party is to penetrate governmental agencies, trade unions, and other social
and political groups to agitate within them, subvert as many city dwellers as possible with a
view to raising insurrections in the cities when the final, all-out clash is feasible. The extent
to which cadres are pulled out of city organizations and sent to the field depends upon the
military requirements and priorities at any given time.
28. In organizational terms, the insurrectionary colonial Communist Party must pro-
vide for the creation and equipping of an armed force, coordination of the political and mili-
tary programs (and organizations), and constant supervision of all organizations and opera-
tions, revising plans and organizational forms in the light of "phase" requirements. The in-
surrection is organizationally fluid and complex, maturing, in case of success, into a Party
government and dictatorship.
29. The discussion which follows treats the problems faced by the insurrectionary
colonial Communist Parties in organizing and carrying on their revolutions under the follow-
ing headings:
PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE
THE DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION
ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY
ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT
The discussion is based upon a study of Communist insurrections in China, Malaya,
Philippines, and Greece, and upon partial examination of the uprisings in Indochina, Indonesia,
Burma, and India. The rebellion in Greece does not fall in all details into the colonial pattern.
However, it is decidely closer to the colonial formula than to the "classic" Bolshevik pattern
of a city insurrection based on the proletariat.
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B. PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE.
30. The Party's choice of an area to capture and hold for the building up of its mili-
tary force depends upon chance, balance of forces, and only partly upon calculation. A base
may combine several desirable features or it may be simply the only area the insurgents are
capable of taking at the time.
31. Ideally, from the Communist point of view, a safe area would have the following
features:
a) Political value: large population, generally susceptible to the revolutionary
appeal, to be drawn en masse into the Communist army and into support activities;
b) Economic productivity: food production in appreciable excess of the basic
needs of the population; any manufacturing industry is desirable; it is also desir-
able that the economy of areas under Government control depend upon the pro-
duction of the Communist base area;
c) Military defensibility with minimum effort: a matter of immediate and neigh-
boring terrain and character of approaches;
d) Strategic location within the country: located so as to threaten enemy econ-
omy, communications lines, political resources, and military security; at the
same time, give the Communist maximum advantages for expansion into surround-
ing areas and cover for more distant expeditions.
32. The Communists are seldom able to take an area that combines all these features
ideally. They must usually be content in the early and intermediate stages of the insurrection,
with securing an area that is merely defensible and reasonable adequate in food production,
hoping to improve their position later.
33. In many cases, the Communist forces have taken areas close by a foreign country
to secure their rear. Preferably, of course, the area will be adjacent to a friendly state in
order to facilitate outside support. Thus, the Indochinese Communists concentrated in areas
adjoining neutral countries (Thailand and China), and are expected to obtain substantial assist-
ance from Communist China, as soon as possible. The Greek Communists established their
safe-base in Yugoslavia, Albania, and immediately adjacent Greek territories; one of the rea-
sons why they gave up their attempted revolution was the defection of Tito, which left their
rear exposed and deprived them of a substantial part of their logistical support. There have
been recent indications that the Communist insurgents in Burma are moving to the Northeast,
so as to be close to friendly China. The capture of Tibet by the Chinese Communists may
eventually enable CP India to set up a safe-base there.
34. An important element in the defensibility of the base area, aside from the military
strength of the enemy, is the condition of communications in the surrounding countryside. If
they are primitive (as in China), the forces opposing the Communists will find it difficult to
maneuver for effective attacks, and to coordinate operations of separated forces.
35. Uses of the safe base. The military usefulness of the safe base is that --
a) It provides a place where a military force can be built up and maintained --
recruited, equipped, trained, and indoctrinated;
b) It provides a center for the coordination of military operations: a planning,
reporting, communications, and administrative center.
Schools, hospitals and convalescent facilities; storage places for all kinds of supplies; shops
for the manufacture and repair of weapons and ammunition and other equipment are estab-
lished in the safe area. Food is raised there on Party-controlled farms. By controlling a
share of the national food supply, the Party is able to interfere with the economy and thereby
disturb the political equilibrium of the state and the government's staying power. If the safe
base adjoins a friendly foreign country, the Communists will have access to its productive
resources and military supplies.
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36. The political utility of the safe base is that --
a) It provides a center for the establishment of a "democratic," "people's" or
"liberation" government;
b) It provides a jumping-off place for military-political expansion into sur-
rounding areas (politicalization of the peasants).
37. The "Liberation Government." The "Government" set up by the Communists in
the safe base area,has bpth a political and a practical organizational purpose., Politically, it
serves as a rallying-point for non-Communist elements opposed to the regime for various
reasons and it lends prestige and an aura of legality to the insurrection -- a distinct propa-
ganda asset. There is no question but that such a!kcade is useful in winning favor with non-
Communist, nationalist elements: it was amply demonstrated in China. Practically, the
setting up of a pseudo-national government,-relieves the Party of a large part of the burden
and the onus of civil administration in "liberated" areas: administrative posts can be given
to non-Communists, thereby relieving Party cadres for more important work.
The practice of creating a "government" seems confined to Parties with substantial
forces and a proven territorial base (Greece, China, Indo-china). Some insurrectionary
Parties have not yet attempted it (Philippines, Malaya).
38. There are some disadvantages to the strategy of the safe-base.
(1) The base is, perforce, unstrategically located in an area remote from the
centers of power which must finally be seized.
(2) The base is far from the centers of industrial production (arms, clothing,
other equipment).
(3) Its distance from population centers deprives the Communists of a large
section of the potentially revolutionary population, and of the services of
technicians (medicos, mechanics, communications personnel, etc.).
C. THE POLICY DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION.
39. The decision to take the Party into a military revolt is serious: it means a con-
siderable structural reorKanization of the Party, a painful readjustment in the way of living of
Party cadres and ranks, and thorny problems of raising and maintaining a military force.
40. The decision is made, of course, by the top Party leadership. For example, it was
made by the. Secretariat of the CP Philippines and then endorsed by, and put out in the name of,
the Political Bureau.
41. The Chinese Communists were forced into an insurrection by enemy action (pro-
voked by their own action, of course). In the post-war period, however, the decision has been
deliberately made on the basis of calculated prospects, and has not been forced upon the
colonial Communist Parties. In some cases, the Party leadership has simply reversed its
previous policy and has stayed in office to carry out the new policy (Greece, Malaya). In the
Philippines a bitter factional division arose between Party leaders favoring armed insurrec-
tion and those favoring continuation of "legal" methods, with the former finally prevailing and
suppressing or expelling from the Party the advocates of "legal" struggle.
42. The influence of more authoritative or stronger fraternal Communist Parties may
be a powerful stimulant to the decision in favor of armed uprising. Thus, the leaders of the
CP Greece sounded foreign Communist leaders before beginning the insurrection of.1947-1949.
The leaders of the CP Mayala canvassed Communist spokesmen of China, Great Britain, andthe
USSR during 1945-1946, and, receiving no encouragement, postponed their uprising until later.
The Zhdanov statement to the Cominform in October 1947 (see above, para 2) was a striking
example of the leadership role of the CP Soviet Union. It was elaborated at the Second
Congress of the CP India and the Southeast Asia Youth Conference. The CP's India, Burma,
and Malaya, all adopted resolutions in favor of a more militant policy. In the Philippines, the
faction of Party leaders favoring armed action got control of the leading Party offices in May
1948., just a few months after the Zhdanov thesis had been given general circulation.
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43. There are indications that two decisions are actually made by the Party: the first,
a preliminary decision that a "revolutionary situation" is developing and that the Party should
prepare itself to begin fighting in the not too-distant future; and a later decision to actually
begin fighting. The CP Philippines decided in May 1948 that there was a "heightening of the
revolutionary flow" and shortly thereafter carried out some reforms in the Party organiza-
tion: the decision to take to the field was not made until January 1950, when it was estimated
that a "revolutionary situation" already existed. The CP Greece, when it accepted the Varkiza
Agreement in February 1945, must have decided that a Revolutionary situation was not too far
off, for it sent most of its military cadres into camps in Albania and Yugoslavia in 1945, and
made a number of personnel and structural changes in the Party organization during the next
two years. It gave some indication of having reached a decision to begin fighting in September
1946, but did not undertake serious military operations until the summer of 1947.
44. Content of the Policy Decision. It would be reasonable to suppose that the Party
leadership would make a thorough assessment of its own capabilities and resources as part of
the basis for the decision. It is surprising, then, to discover that such is not always the case.
In its resolution of January 1950, for example, the CP Philippines treats the "objective situ-
ation" in some detail, and from the document itself, it appears that the decision was made
entirely on the basis of an evaluation of external conditions: the condition of the Party itself
is not even mentioned. Again, the CP India, during its recent crisis, issued resolutions and
discussions in which the "situation" is described as being "revolutionary," and the task of the
Party to be one of setting the masses "on the rails" of an armed uprising, but in which the
resources of the Party are not merely glossed over as being good, but actually admitted to be
at low ebb.
45. In any event, the colonial Communist Party puts more stock in the external politi-
cal, economic, and social trends than it does in its immediate resources: provided the trends
appear to be revolutionary, the Party will be ready to go ahead with an armed uprising on quite
limited political and military resources. As is shown in the resolution of the CP Philippines
of January 1950, a "revolutionary situation" has two main features: (a) conditions are not
merely bad, but (b) will continue to get worse, because the "bourgeoisie" are divided and per-
manently unable to unite and solve the crucial economic and social problems. With the
"situation" already developing towards a crisis, the best the Communist Party can do is to
aggravate the ills of the country by carrying on an armed struggle and to prepare itself mili-
tarily and politically to stage an all-out campaign when the crisis arrives.
46. The major portion of the resolution of the CP Philippines is devoted to a discussion
of the existing social, economic, and political conditions, including an estimate as to what each
of the major enemy political parties will be able to do to remedy them (conclusion, negative).
The last part of the resolution sets forth the "concrete tasks" for the Party to improve its
own organization. These "organizational, military and educational tasks" are included in the
Philippine Appendix. Briefly, they consisted of strengthening internal discipline and control,
raising the level of political understanding within the Party and its armed force, improving
the work of the Party among the peasants, and reforming the supporting services (finances,
communications, publications).
D. ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS
47. In addition to the arguments bolstering the decision to begin military action, the
Party also formulates a strategy and prescribes the "concrete tasks" for the implementation
of the decision.
It takes time to get the Party in shape for a military insurrection. The military force
has to be mobilized, Party cadres have to be given definite assignments, new organizations
have to be created to handle problems peculiar to military operations, old offices of no use
when the Party takes to the field have to be closed down or be put underground for "stay-
behind" operations. Security measures must be put into effect in anticipation of police sup-
pression. If a preliminary decision had been made, the Party would already have accom-
plished some of these things, and need only wind them up after making the final decision.
48. Nevertheless, there is always a "time lapse" between the making of the decision
and the beginning of major operations. The duration of the time lapse in each case studied
was a matter of months: from January to 29 March 1950 in the Philippines; from September
1946 (?) to mid-summer 1947 in Greece; and, in Malaya, from mid-March to late July 1948.
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To some extent, the Party may be able to pick the time for beginning its major opera-
tions: the CP Philippines picked the date of the eighth anniversary of the founding of its
resistance-born army; the CP Greece seems also to have begun operations at what it consid-
ered to be the most propitious time. The CP Malaya, however, with its army in "moth-balls"
hit upon the idea of a campaign of terrorism as a means of shocking its people into action, and
is believed to have counted on having a longer preparatory period and to have been caught
short when the Government took vigorous countermeasures.
49. The main changes which the Party makes in its organization immediately prior to
the insurrection are:
Decentralization of authority to lower (Regional or District Party) organs. This
usually occurs early, in some cases (Greece and Malaya) before the making of the final de-
cision, possible as a result of a preliminary decision. In Malaya, Regional Bureaus were cre-
ated to direct all Party operations in prescribed areas, later, direction of operations passed
progressively into the hands of lower Party committees (State Committees, then District
Committees), this latter development probably resulting from increasing communications dif-
ficulties. In Greece, City Committees were given greater authority, under the supervision of
an "Instructor" from the Politburo, which had removed to the safe base. Regional Committees
in the countryside were dissolved. Military operations were directed by "area" or "regional"
commands in seven prescribed areas in "liberated" country until October 1947 when they were
replaced by Division Headquarters, presumably under a more centralized direction exercised
by General Headquarters through three regional Headquarters. In the Philippines, several
members of the Politburo were individually assigned to act as "supervisors" of the most
important of the newly created Regional Committees. Also, the General Headquarters of the
army was dissolved. Later, it was re-established when conditions made it feasible to begin
the reorganization of the guerrilla army into a "regular army."
Reassignment of cadres from political to military work takes place. Colonial CP's
are generally small numerically and short of completely reliable cadres. Many of them had
cadres with experience in guerrilla fighting during the resistance. But a Communist uprising
is a different matter: it lacks the unifying and disciplining appeal of patriotic resistance and
it may last a very long time. Consequently, the shortage of absolutely politically reliable
cadres means that those who are available must be carefully conserved and utilized with maxi-
mum efficiency. The "best" cadres are sent into the field and only skeleton organization are
left behind to do what they can in "enemy" areas and these are put deep underground. (A fre-
quent complaint of the CP Philippines was that its "stay behind" organizations were so far
underground that they were practically worthless; the same difficulty afflicted the city organi-
zations of the CP Greece, which were completely paralyzed by Greek police action.)
Discipline and security are greatly increased, even before the formal decision to begin
military action is made. In a period when the Party is fighting for its life, it can tolerate as
cadres only those individuals who are reliable and efficient. All others become a liability and
while they might be allowed to hang on in a less critical period, they must be purged in anti-
cipation of military action. The decision to take to the field inevitably throws up numbers of
previously satisfactory cadres who oppose the decision for one reason or another. These are
disciplined by suspension or expulsion: they are rehabilitated if possible, but are always
under a cloud.
Purges are undertaken, in extreme cases, to rid the Party of those opposed to the de-
cision to take military action.
The National Control Commission, the central disciplinary organization, is strengthen-
ed and control commissions are set up on local levels. In Greece, the Party instituted a sys-
tem of "vigilantes" to spot indications of back-sliding and inefficiency in its cadres.
Stricter qualifications for positions of leadership are instituted and readmission to the
Party or to committee positions is made more difficult.
All or part of the Party apparatus is placed underground. This move is made in anti-
cipation repressive measures which will come as a result of the CP military operations.
In some cases the Party is forced underground as a result of government action, as in Greece.
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The Politburo and other central executive organs are moved from the city to the safe-
base, and many of the members are reassigned to the various regional organizations.
New Party organs are created, such as military staffs and support sections to direct
and control the military operations. In Malaya, Armed Forces Departments were established
in each State Committee. The Min Yuen (People's Movement) was organized. In the Philip-
pines various technical sections were created.
Other Party organs are strengthened and increased in size. In the Philippines the
National Finance Committee and the Regional Finance Committees were placed under close
cadre control. The Organizational Bureau was expanded.
Some Party functional sections are dissolved to release cadres assigned to these
sections for reassignment to more important functions.
Increased emphasis is placed on Part schools. The cadres have to be trained for
their new tasks. (CP Philippines began training of special cadres to secure the cooperation
of other armed groups who were non-Communist.)
The communications system is strengthened. Courier service is better organized on a
more regular basis. More people are assigned courier duties and regular message centers
and lay-over places are established along courier routes. Plans are sometimes made (Philip-
pines) for getting communications equipment and trained personnel and for establishing a
wireless or land-line net.
50. Vulnerability during transition period. The Party is particularly vulnerable to
counteraction In the period between the mai ing of the decision and the time when its forces
have been mobilized sufficiently for it to undertake a major military operation. The apparatus
of the Party is in flux and its personnel often at loose ends, doing things at which they are still
relative amateurs, and undergoing in most cases severe emotional and/or ideological crises.
The machinery for conducting and supporting military operations is still imcomplete. Its
supplies, particularly of weapons and ammunition, are likely to be limited. The propaganda
build-up and the act of recruiting are necessarily semi-overt, at least locally. Party offices
are physically being moved into the field or to safe-places for underground stay-behind opera-
tions. Party records are destroyed or moved, and are subject to capture or loss in the pro-
cess: it may be difficult for the Party's security apparatus to check the bona fides of new re-
cruits. All these factors provide opportunities for surveillance of functionaries, seizure of
records, penetration, defection, and provocation; An alert security force might very well be
able to squash a colonial insurrection before it had developed, but any action would have to be
thorough and ruthless.
E. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY.
51. Recruitment of Communist military forces was simplified for Communist Parties
beginning revolutions after World War H. The nucleus of their military organization was the
wartime resistance movements which had been sponsored by them and equipped and supplied
by the Allies. As new recruits were channelled to the military forces, the Party was able to
seize and maintain a base of operations from which further political-military expansion could
be launched. Thus, there has been first an army, and then a safe-base. The Chinese Commu-
nists learned their lesson the hard way, by experience. They organized an area by political
means alone and then organized a military force. Not until the experience of the Long March
and the establishment of the safe-base in Shensi did they begin to utilize systematically their
military force in expansion.
52. The size and structure of the regular units of the Communist Army depends, on the
stage of development of the safe-base and the type of operations being carried out. In the be-
ginning, squads and platoons undertake guerrilla operations on a small, loosely coordinated
scale. At that time, they live entirely off the countryside with infrequent communications with
each other. As the scale of operations grows, these small units are incorporated into larger
formations, (e.g., regiments and divisions) with regular service elements, coordinating staffs,
and comprehensive communications. As a rule, however, units are kept small, to simplify
supply and to reduce vulnerability to enemy attack.
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Three available examples of post-war colonial Communist armies--Greece, Philip-
pines, Malaya--show how resources and events influence the general organization of the army:
a. Greece. Began with rather large forces about 10,000), well-equipped, well
led, and safely based. Conversion from small-scale operations by small bands to
tactical employment of Brigade-s and Divisions early in the struggle. Regression
to guerrilla operations with unfavorable conditions.
b. Philippines. Began with relatively large forces (about- 10,000), already in the
field and presumably adequately equipped. Passed to impressive seizures of
towns in apparently battalion strength within seven months of decision and planned
conversion to orthodox ("regular armq") operations in near future.
c. Malaya. Began with few forces, not adequately equipped, not fully mobilized,
and with little actual combat experience. Apparently contemplated ambitious
operations in at least regimental strength at early date. However, unfavorable
conditions forced progressive disintegration of tactical organization and diminish-
ing operations.
53. The troops of the colonial Communist-force in the beginning are "regulars" --that
is, they are full-time fighters and are, on the whole, politically "reliable.". As soon as opera-
tions are begun, efforts are made to draw in non-Communist peasants--first, into political
and support activities, then into part-time or "irregular" fighting formations, and eventually,
into the full-time, "regular" army. Even when the build-up consists of a campaign of terror-
ism, as in Malaya, the first fighting unfits are select military cadres, and in every case stud-
ied, some kind of irregular fighting groups were formed later.
54. The most important general conditions limiting the size of regular formations
used tactically, and consequently, the organization of the army are:
a. Supplies. If inadequate, operations must be small and aimed at obtaining
(smal raids-and ambushes). If no supply organization exists, then forces must
spend time foraging and will not be able to concentrate for the time necessary for
careful planning, briefing, and rehearsal of large operations. Heterogeneous
weapons and necessity to refit ammunition limit firepower and feasibility of large
operations.
b. Enemy tactics. Until final stage (full-scale engagement of enemy), Commu-
nist tactics are in direct response to enemy tactics; flight and temporary disin-
tegration at advance of superior enemy; concentration and larger tactical opera-
tions against small enemy forces and areas temporarily free from enemy.
c. Condition of leadership, extent of training; morale of ranks. For example,
the Chinese Communists had great difficulty in solving logistical problems of
large tactical deployment because leaders had been trained in small operations.
d. Terrain. Particularly difficult terrain makes use of large units impossible
or unprofitable.
55. Special and irregular units in the Communist Army are organized for two main
purposes: to serve as training organizations for combat-able men who will eventually be ab-
sorbed by the regular units and to organize non-combatants to give support to the regular
forces, In China, for example, the combat-able persons were organized in Youth Vanguards
and in Model Detachments, and many of them, when trained, were placed in units of the Field
Forces. Self Defense Detachments, made up of older men, and Women's Detachments per-
formed intelligence, medical and protective functions.
In general, the first responsibility of the special and irregular units is to aid the reg-
ular forces in military operations, engaging. in small battles, diversionary moves, supplying
food, caring for wounded, etc. They also protect Communist Party and front organizations
and installations (Malaya), not only in the safe area, but in areas which have not yet been
secured. They are called upon to carry out occasional acts of terror, such as assassinations,
sabotage and intimidation. They take over local police authority in the early stages of consol-
idation of newly won areas. They also serve to militarize those segments of the population
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which are unqualified for regular military service, thus exerting military control over them,
and insuring their complicity in the Communist operation should there be any doubts concern-
ing their loyalty to the cause.
Formation and control of irregular units is often the responsibility of the local Party
organization in its own name (e.g., the "wide self-defense" groups in Greece), or in the name
of a controlled mass organization (e.g., "Self-Protection" squads of the People's Movement
in Malaya). Sometimes (China), the Party organization in the regular army units organizes
such units.
56. Organization and functions of staffs.
The Communist military force consists of tactical formations performing military
operations; and various staffs for planning, coordination and control, and the management of
special support and technical services required for operations.
The character of the military staff--their competence, composition,. and relations with
the Party political apparatus--varies with the actual situation as it is reflected in the "phases"
of the insurrection. In the early stages, when the military force is being accumulated and is
carrying on operations of a purely guerrilla nature, local staffs, responsible for tactical
formations in a relatively small area and closely connected with corresponding organs of the
Party's political apparatus, are most essential. At this time, whatever central direction may
be given to the military forces is likely to be quite general, and exercised through the chan-
nels of the political apparatus. The Secretariat of the CP Philippines, for example, took over
the problems of centralized direction of HMB formations, serving as a General Headquarters
for several months after the decision had been made to begin fighting. HMB units were direc-
ted by the Regional Committees of the political apparatus, and the general control over them
exercised by the Secretariat was achieved by courier correspondence and by posting members
of the Political Bureau with the Regional Committees.
Similarly, the Political Bureau of the CP Malaya is believed to have constituted itself
as a "Military High Command," while the State Committees of the political apparatus (through
their Armed Forces Departments) took over the functions of area military staffs.
57. When conditions have permitted the numerical expansion of the military force and
the acquisition of a safe base, or at least, prospects of one, it will be necessary to establish
a firm central directing staff if operations are to progress beyond the guerrilla stage and the
army to be satisfactorily serviced. Then, military operations become more technical and the
military force will have to be reconstituted as a centralized auxiliary of the Party and its di-
rection divorced to a large extent from local organs of the political apparatus.
Conversely, if conditions prevent the expansion of the military force and its utilization
in large-scale operations, direction may remain indefinitely in the hands of local organs of the
political apparatus (cf. Malaya).
58. Central direction of a (military) technical nature is achieved by the creation of a
General Headquarters, comprising a commander-in-chief, chief of staff, and varying numbers
of chiefs for particular staff functions (intelligence, supply, communications, etc.), the estab-
lishment of regular communications, and the regularizing of command channels through the
military service (from General Headquarters through area headquarters to the tactical com-
mand staffs).
The Party may also organize a Military Committee or Commission, or similar body,
at national Party headquarters for political control and coordination between the political and
military (GHQ) programs. Thus the CP Philippines organized a Military Committee of 15
members to coordinate political and military work and to plan for the future reorganization of
the HMB and the creation of its GHQ. There was a substantial overlapping of personnel be-
tween the Military Committee and the GHQ, both being manned by top leaders of the political
apparatus.
59. When a "liberation" government is created, the Communist military force oper-
ates as a nominal agency of the Communist government. Thus the CP Greece organized a
"Supreme War Council of the Democratic Army" in August 1948 to supervise the army's
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General Headquarters. It consisted of ranking Party leaders, and its purpose has been de-
scribed as an effort by the Party to water down the authority of General Markos, who was
Commander in chief of the army, Minister of War in the "Democratic Government" and head
of the General Headquarters, and who was suspected of Titoist nationalist deviationism. As
first constituted, however, the President of the Supreme War Council was none other than
Markos.
60. The same kind of overlapping of cadres between political and military organs
occurs in the area staffs. It is sometimes difficult to tell where one leaves off and the other
begins. Thus, even in the internal correspondence of the CP Philippines, no consistent at-
tempt was made to distinguish between the (political) Regional Committees and the (military)
Regional Commands, both being designated RECO's. Such a condition is most likely to be en-
countered in the earlier stages of a colonial insurrection, when the military and political
programs are practically one. Later, as conditions make it feasible to organize the military
forces into a separate and centralized auxiliary, there will be a more clearly defined sep-
aration between area military staffs and local organizations of the political apparatus. The
reversal of this is to be seen in Malaya, where many units of the "regular" MRLA gradually
were detached from any kind of central military direction and put under the local (District)
committees of the political apparatus.
Members of local Party committees are often given military command positions. They
may continue to hold both jobs as long as the military unit stays in the home area.
61. Party Control of the Military Organization.
The establishment of firm control over the actions and loyalties of Communist troops
in colonial insurrections is a difficult task. If the object of military operations is to facilitate
political work in these insurrections, it is also a fact that military operations tend to defeat
the political efforts. A guerrilla force must live off the countryside to a large extent and must
have general public sympathy with it to do so. However, the force is a natural haven for mere
brigands, whose activities, if not controlled with an "iron discipline," will bring discredit to
the Communist movement as a whole, and make it increasingly difficult for the force to obtain
supplies, intelligence, and recruits from the people. The guerrilla life itself tends to breed
indiscipline--laziness, arrogance, immorality, greed, and disregard not only for life, but also
for property that the Communists may greatly need at a later point in the struggle. It tends
to develop political independence on the part of leaders, and to encourage Personal, rather
than organizational loyalties. The meanness of guerrilla life and its dangers; its long periods
of inaction, and the remoteness of victory--all make for unrest in the ranks. This is partly
the reason for the exhortations the Parties make for some kind of operation, no matter how
small, every day.
In addition to the above, and numerous other factors, the Party must establish effective
controls and constantly strive to maintain morale to prevent treachery and suppress, dissent-
ers. It must prevent hostile penetration and defections, and cope with cadres who opposed the
policy decision or accepted it with reservations.
62. Cultivation of discipline takes two lines: raising the political loyalty of the troops
through Marxist study and propaganda; and organizing a control-supervisory-tale-bearing
apparatus within the army. The task is the more difficult for the fact that colonial CP's.
consist of a mass of political semi-literates and a very small number of fully indoctrinated
cadres. The control and indoctrination organization must make maximum economical use of
the reliable cadres.
63. It is necessary, of course, to have military specialists in charge of military oper-
ations. But military men are often shaxy in their political convictions. The Party tries to
overcome this by indoctrination, but has another solution: the Political Commissar.
64. The Political Commissar is an agent of the Party's political apparatus, assigned
to a military command to ensure the political reliability of the military commander and su-
pervise the political indoctrination of the troops.' He sees to the proper application of orders
1 The institution of the Political Commissar was originated by the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917
for the October Revolution and the ensuing civil war. It was used by the Red Army during
World War II.
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from higher authorities, reports on the military efficiency of the commander and his political
tendencies, and on local conditions affecting the Party's standing and operations, and super-
vises (at least) personnel assignments within the command. He may also be responsible for
local civilian Party organizations in the section of operations of the command, and for mili-
tary security and counter-intelligence.
The Political Commissar has authority superior to that of the military commander in
all political matters, and may even interfere in purely military matters. The CP Philippines
suggested that, in the final, all-out battle, the Military Commander may take over full control,
but presumably by then the political preparation will have been completed and the military
campaign will be crucial.
According to the size and-shape of the command and availability of cadres, the Politi-
cal Commissar may work alone or with assistants. In Greece and in China, the Political
Commissar had his own staff organization. In the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, for
example, this staff was called a "Political Department" and consisted of five sections--
Organization
Education
People's Movement
Enemy Services (POW's)
Work Against Traitors (Counter-espionage)
The functions of each of the above are described in more detail in China Appendix.
The development of a Political Commissar System is illustrated in the case of the CP
Philippines (q.v.):
Political Bureau members were assigned to supervise the most important Regional
Committees and key headquarters sections (Education, Finance) with the making of
the policy decision. As the struggle developed and Regional cadres became more
competent, it was decided to recall the PB members to staff national headquarters
and to "advance promising personnel boldly." Political Commissars, however,
were to continue to be assigned to military commands until the final battle.
65. When the situation and condition of the army impose a decentralization, the local
Party organization may be expected to assume the control function over a Communist mili-
tary force in the area. This is the reversal of the practice of the Chinese Communists after
the Long March, but it is what seems-to have happened in Malaya. It may be expected in the
beginnings of resistance struggle or insurrection, but if it happens later in the struggle after
a greater centralization had been instituted, it is probably retrograde: the military force is
not being utilized to maximum advantage.
66. Another control practice is the creation of a Party organization within the mili-
tary force. It consists of cells in the lowest units, and is directed through a normal system of
committees (company, battalion, regimental, etc.), in each case probably responsible to the
Political Commissar.
F. ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT
67. The Communist military effort in colonial countries can grow only by drawing to
itself popular support. In adverse circumstances, the rebel forces can break down into small
bands capable of foraging for themselves, carrying on operations that require neither commu-
nications with each other nor more intelligence than can be obtained from immediate recon-
naissance.
However, such defensive military tactics are politically sterile. For any advance to be
made, the Communists must produce larger operations by larger units, whereupon problems of
supply, manpower, communications, and intelligence will have to be met by organizations out-
side the military. Therefore the Party must organize the civilian population (usually peasants
and villagers) to fulfill these needs, and also, to bring more and more people into the revolu-
tionary movement.
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68. In the safe-base area, practically the entire non-combat population is mobilized
into the fighting force itself, or into support organizations. CP China is probably the best
example of the extensive organization of civilian support groups. The support units of the
Chinese revolution were so well organized that often one individual was a member of more
than one organization. Support functions were concentrated in the Peoples' Militia (although
this organization was also responsible for some combat duties), and included Women's
Groups, Youth Groups, Self Defense Detachments (made up of older--though able-bodied--
men) and were assigned tasks commensurate with their abilities. Specialized groups growing
out of these units were formed, such as the Model Detachments, which were especially capa-
ble members of the youth groups. All of the civilian groups performed many different sup-
port functions: supply, communications, intelligence, medical work, etc. During the Japan-
ese resistance period, the activities of these groups and of the Peoples' Militia were directed
by local People's Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance.
69. In Malaya, the various civilian support organizations were grouped under the
Min Yuen (People's Movement). These included the Races Liberation Alliance, Village and
Squatter Area Committees, Peasants Union, Women's Union, and various Anti-British
Leagues and Associations. Organizationally, they were similar to the MCP. The type of
support function expected of each group was, as in China, according to their abilities. The
success of the organizations outside the safe base was, of course, considerably less because
the Communists lacked the coercive hold-on the civilian groups.
70. Most of these organizations existed within the safe base area. In areas outside
the safe-base, organization of "mass" support was achieved by local organs of the political
apparatus, by the political organizers attached to the military force, or by mixed teams, such
as the "expansion" teams of the CP Philippines (political organizers assisted by small armed
detachments).
71. In some cases, it may be profitable for the Party to organize an apparatus for
collecting and bringing money and other supplies from abroad, as the CP Greece did through
its Mutual Aid (EA) and seamen's union (OENO).
"72. Manpower. The original military complement is obtained by a mobilization of the
members of the Party, from such still active guerrilla forces as it may have from resistance
warfare (e.g., the Huk in the Philippines), and/or from mobilization of controlled veterans
organizations (Malaya, Greece). The Chinese Communists obtained their original force by
drafting peasants in the name of the soviets which the Party had set up by political means.
73. Later recruits for reinforcement and replacement are obtained by forced mobili-
zation in the safe-base area, by propaganda-recruiting drives in other areas, and by transfer
from the "mass" support organizations.
"mobilization" proclamations issued by the Greek Communist "Democratic Army" promising
punishment for failure to respond). In areas outside the safe-base, roving guerrilla bands
often impress civilian youths or threaten reprisals to villages if the young men refuse to
come out for the insurrection. The Communists also try to get neutral civilians involved in
the movement by degrees, threatening to expose them should they balk at any step. The pea-
sant is forced or awed into giving a little food or making a small money contribution or giving
information on the movements of an enemy troop, and is then drawn more closely into the
work of local "mass" organizations, eventually passing into part-time "self-defense"actions,
and finally, into full-time fighting.
75. The main recruiting function of underground city organizations in enemy areas is
apparently (cf. Philippines) to recruit technical. personnel -- mechanics, drivers, communi-
cations men, medical personnel, automatic and heavy-weapons technicians, etc.
76. Intelligence. The Communist force needs information on enemy movements, iden-
tities of enemy agents, terrain, and popular sentiments for its own defense. It needs infor-
mation on the disposition of enemy forces, character of defenses of enemy installations, lo-
cation of assailable convoys, etc. for its offensive operations. (See Malaya, paragraph 65,
for items considered by the MRLA in planning an attack.)
74. Coercion is common practice. In the safe-base area, it is automatic (see the
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77. All members of the Party and its mass organizations act as informants. Their
product is channeled through whatever organizational channel may be available. Local
"mass" organizations may even have a particular person charged with collecting and trans-
mitting intelligence items.
78. Secret reporting points may be established into which information obtained by all
sources in a given area is funneled for collation and further transmission. In Greece, such
"Intelligence Centers" were organized and manned by intelligence specialists of the regular
Communist army. In Malaya, "District Information Centers" appear to have been established
by the District Committees of the political apparatus, but a military representative was
stationed at them to transmit information to the nearest Communist army unit.
79. The military force itself produces intelligence by reconnaissance, command ob-
servation, and prisoner interrogation. The extent to which military intelligence is special-
ized depends upon the organizational condition of the Communistforce and the magnitude of its
operations. In a centralized army, such as that of the CP Greece, the intelligence function
may be performed by a special service, with intelligence sections an integral feature of the
military staffs, and with intelligence teams attached to combat units (for reconaissance and
prisoner- interrogation).
80. Communications. For lack of technical equipment and trained personnel, the
colonial Communist military force is usually reduced to courier communications.
81. Couriers are frequently recruited from the "mass" organizations, women and
children being favored because they are less likely to excite suspicion.
82. Each political and military organization has its own courier pool. High-ranking
functionaries frequently have their own personal couriers.
83. In Malaya, and probably elsewhere, regular courier runs were organized, with a
chain of safe-resting places and message centers where messages could be delivered or
picked up.
84. Special courier services are frequently organized. The Communist military
staffs in Philippines and Greece included communications sections. In the Philippines, a
special Communications Department of the Party existed before the current uprising and
needed only expansion to make it usable for military operations.
85. Radio and telephone communications are normally beyond the capabilities of
Communist colonial forces. The CP Greece had fairly comprehensive W/T nets (W/T issued
to units down to brigades, and to battalions on special missions). The Chinese Communists
gradually developed extensive W/T and land-line systems. In the beginning of their revolu-
tion, they had only occasional wireless communications between Juichin and the Central
Committee in Shanghai. The CP Philippines considered the establishment of a wireless net in
1950, one feature of which was a proposal to plant a Communist in a standard broadcasting
station in Manila: he would broadcast carefully camouflaged coded messages in the course of
his regular announcements.
86. Supply. Supply of food is no great problem in a period of decentralized military
operations. Interdiction of the regular food supply can hamper the expansion of a Communist
force, but need not mean its defeat, for the guerrillas can live off the countryside to a large
extent. When the tactical formations have been enlarged and are operating away from home,
a regular food supply service becomes essential.
87. Local "mass" organizations furnish supplies of food. See, for example, the
People's Movement in Malaya. Special production, storing, and distribution services may be
organized by the Party or the military force, usually on a local basis. The CP Philippines
planned to create "Production Departments" on a Regional Committee level and it was pro-
posed to organize "Harvest Struggle Committees" in military commands. The Greek Commu-
nists had a regular quartermaster corps, with supply trains running down from Yugoslavia
and supply service elements in tactical formations and a transport service. One of the rea-
sons for the defeat of the Greek uprising was the inability of the Communists to supply their
forces at some distance from the safe base.
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88. Armaments. An adequate supply of arms and ammunition is a more difficult pro-
blem for the colonial Communists. They depend to a large extent on what they can capture
from the enemy. As the CP Philippines put it, "our main source of weapons ultimately is
Washington.... In some cases the Party may have appreciable quantities of arms left over
from the anti-Japanese resistance. In Greece, the Party had free access for some time to
weapons produced in the neighboring satellites. The CP China is expected to provide arms
and ammunition in quantity to the insurgents in Indochina when it can afford to do so, and may
do the same for the Communists in Burma.
89. The Party may be able to buy some arms in the general black market and from
corrupt Government troops. Communists in the Greek Army in the early stages of the in-
surrection there furnished some arms to the guerrillas by deserting with as many weapons as
they could carry. The CP' Philippines hoped in the final stages of its revolution to be able to
subvert Government troops and get them to bring over their heavy weapons for the Party.
90. One difficulty is that the colonial Party's arms are of many different sizes and
types. This means that ammunition supply is complicated and Communist fire-power often
very limited. The CP Malaya set up armorers' shops in safe areas where disparate ammuni-
tion could be refitted and weapons repaired. Bombs, mines, and general explosives are also
manufactured by the Communists in safe areas. (The CP Philippines had a Technological
Group of specialists at its headquarters for the production of such weapons.) The Party is
sometimes able to establish arsenals across the frontier: for example, the Buljkes camp of
the CP Greece; the Viet Minh forces in Indo-China were at one time reported to have had
shops in Thailand.
III. THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION
A. OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS
91. Communist Parties in countries overrun by the Axis during the last War carried
on military and political resistance to the occupation forces. The Communist aims were--
(a) to render maximum assistance to the USSR by harassing her Axis enemies; (b) to strength-
en the Party for the resumption of the class struggle in the postwar period. Tactically and
organizationally, the Communist military resistance was similar to the Communist armed
uprising in colonial countries. The Parties began fighting with limited Party membership and
limited mass support. The Communist aim was to harass the enemy, not to overwhelm him,
or even, in the first stages, to attack his forces directly. Fighting formations were generally
small and were not closely controlled by a central headquarters in their operations. Guerrilla
tactics were used, and safe bases were established where possible.
92. The fighting resistance, begun by small forces, attracted numerous non-Commu-
nists who were moved by patriotism. In some countries, the Communist Party rallied so
many supporters and built up such a good military force that it was able to turn the resistance
struggle into an armed insurrection after the Axis forces had been driven out. In other coun-
tries, although unable to turn immediately to an insurrectionary effort, the Parties emerged
from the resistance with greatly enhanced political prestige and with reserves of trained
fighters who could be used in. an insurrection when conditions became favorable.
93. Communist resistance was not exclusively military. The Parties also carried on
political resistance and economic sabotage:
Political resistance: agitation against the enemy; encouraging sabotage of occupation
administration by passive non-cooperation and inhibiting cooperation on the part of
those inclined to submit; stimulating minor political unrest--protest demonstrations,
slow-down movements in production, violation of commodity control procedures.
Economic Sabotage: organization of secret sabotage groups in productive centers,
utilities, etc. to damage equipment, waste materials, cause snarls in production traffic,
produce faulty materials, etc.
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Military Resistance: creation of a military force to make attacks on enemy forces,
installations, and supply lines for purposes of weakening morale of occupation troops;
to make it more difficult to realize full economic and military value of the occupation;
to make it necessary for the enemy to divert forces to militarily unproductive duties,
etc.; aid Allied armies by providing intelligence and limited tactical support.
94. In non-industrial countries, the Parties concentrated largely on military resist-
ance. It was more profitable for them to do so, and terrain and other factors made it possi-
ble to establish and hold the safe-bases necessary to substantial military operations.
95. In industrial countries the Communists divided their efforts among military,
political, and economic resistance, not only because it was most profitable in political terms
and in terms of how much it benefited the USSR, but also, because it was practically impos-
sible to build up and hold areas safe enough and large enough for serious military operations.
96. It is difficult to gauge the actual effectiveness of Communist military resistance.
There is no question but that the military and economic resistance carried out in France was
of considerable help to the Western Allies, but it is impossible to say how much of this was
owing to the Communists. The military resistance of the Soviet Partisans was probably of
even more help to the Red Army: it kept large numbers of German troops busy in protecting
duties, deprived the Germans of a large share of needed agricultural produce, interfered with
German military communications, assisted the intelligence work of the Red Army and other
Soviet agencies, and was of some use in direct tactical support of advancing Red Army forces
when the Germans retreated.
B. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE
97. In the countries where the Party concentrated on military resistance, the bulk of
the Party was put on a military footing and a single or several safe-bases were organized.
Offices of the political apparatus of the Party were transformed into central and area (mili-
tary) staffs. Most of the fighting formations were composed of "regulars" (i.e., full-time
guerrillas).
98. In occupied industrial countries, where military resistance was less exclusively
the form of resistance engaged in, only a portion of the Party was put on a military footing
and the remainder was employed in other forms of resistance action (political action, econo-
mic sabotage). Fighting units were more often made up of "irregulars" (i.e., part-time
fighters).
99. The -Party often carried on military resistance in the name of a "roof" organi-
zation ("liberation front," etc.) which included forces of non-Communist organizations. The
Party tried to get full control of such fronts. When it could not, it was sometimes obliged to
accept general direction from the (non-Communist) headquarters of the organization (Italy),
or it accepted only nominal direction, actually retaining full organizational and operational
independence (e.g., the relationship of the FTPF of the CP France to the National Council of
Resistance).
100. Initial military resistance complements were obtained in the following ways:
a. The Party set up organizing committees in the offices of the political
apparatus to mobilize able Party members: assigned cadres to take command of
military groups, arranged for arming them and sending them into military opera-
tional bases in the countryside (e.g., the "War Commissions" set up by the CP
Yugoslavia on a national and on Regional and District levels).
b. The Party dispatched individual organizers and organizing teams to the field
to take over already existing resistance formations (Greece, Italy).
c. Outside agencies sometimes assisted the Parties to set up and maintain mili-
tary resistance forces:
In the USSR, agents of the Party, Red Army, and State Security services
stayed behind or were sent into occupied areas to organize fighting resistance
units.
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In Malaya, the British and the Party cooperated to organize forces prior to
the Japanese invasion, and the British Army later sent organizing and tech-
nical advisory teams to aid the Communist guerrillas.
101. Some Parties (Yugoslavia, France, Italy) had a mobilizable nucleus of men who
had fought in the Spanish Civil War. Considerable numbers of soldiers and officers of the
state army defeated by the Axis also joined the Communist guerrilla forces in some countries
(Yugoslavia in particular).
102. Parties that had had considerable experience in underground operations (France,
Yugoslavia, Greece) had some advantage over non-Communist organizations in establishing
their first resistance bands. The non-Communists, particularly in France, were more dis-
turbed by the repressive measures taken by the occupying forces. The Communist Party,
which already had workable secret communications lines, contacts, safehouses, and cadres
who know how to work effectively and still preserve their own freedom, was able to establish
active guerrilla bands as soon as its policy made it profitable to do so. On the other hand,
in Italy, where the Party had been thoroughly repressed for years, it had not been able to
preserve its cadres and may have been unable to organize a central resistance staff independ-
ent of non-Communist organizations.
103. Additional recruits were obtained by the organizational and propaganda efforts of
underground political organs of the Party and the political resistance fronts established by it;
by the actions of the fighting units themselves; and by getting control of spontaneously formed
groups and of those organized by non-Communists. The CP France, for example, published
instructions to patriotic youths to form their own groups and carry on actions that would
quickly get the attention of regular FTPF cadres, who would then get in touch with the new
bands. One strong reason why the Party was always anxious to obtain supplies from the
Allies was the fact that adequate armaments and other supplies were a good recruiting argu-
ment.
C. STAFFS
104. The Party created staffs to control and give technical support to the combat for-
mations. Tactical formations had their own command staffs, and staffs were organized on an
area basis also, to coordinate the operations of tactical formations within the area. Staffs
were manned by Party members as far as possible, but non-Communists were also utilized in
tactical command positions, under close political supervision of Party cadres. In countries
where the Party concentrated rather exclusively on military resistance, regular organs (com-
mittees and working offices of committees) of the political apparatus were converted Into
military staffs; for example, the Political Bureau, or a part of it, became a General Head-
quarters, while a Regional Committee would transform itself into a regional military staff.
In France, a central Staff and various lower area staffs were organized parallel to the politi-
cal apparatus, which was retained, but independent of it below the Inter-Region (?) level. It Is
possible that a similar practice was followed by the Party In other countries where the re-
sistance effort was divided among political, military, and economic resistance activities.
The organizational pattern should not be viewed as having been mechanically applied by the
Party. The political apparatus of the Party continued to exist, trimmed down to underground
operations, in areas held by the enemy even in countries where the military resistance was by
far the most important effort of the Party. Committees of the political apparatus that were
converted to military staff duties were sometimes revamped prior to the conversion, with a
view to the most efficient utilization of specialist cadres: men were assigned and reassigned
according to their talents and the military needs of the moment. Special organizing commit-
tees were sometimes created by higher headquarters of the Party's political apparatus to go
to an area and instruct the area committee in the setting up of military staffs and to super-
vise personnel selections made by the area committee. In at least one case (Philippines), the
headquarters of the military resistance was set up and manned by a regional committee of the
Party, the reason being that that particular regional committee (Central Luzon Committee)
had assumed the leadership of the whole Party when the members of the normal headquarters
organ were arrested by the Japanese.
105. Communist resistance staffs had approximately the same composition as Commu-
nist insurrectionary staffs in colonial countries. Technical services were represented in the
General Headquarters and in lower area staffs, and in the case of large, safely-based forces,
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in higher tactical command staffs (Division, Brigade) as well. Political Commissars were
customarily attached to area and larger tactical command staffs. A typical General Head-
quarters, duplicated in most respects by higher area staffs, would have the following com-
positon:
Commander
Political Commissar
Vice-Commander
Supply Officer
Communications Officer
Intelligence Officer
Ordnance Officer
Administrative Officer
Medical Officer
D. TACTICAL FORMATIONS
106. The size, shape, and articulation of military units used tactically depended upon
particular missions, capabilities of the military resistance as a whole, and the degree to
which the Party concentrated its efforts on the military resistance form. In countries where
military resistance was most important and safe bases had been established, Brigades and
even Divisions were employed. In France, on the other hand, most attacks were made by
squads and platoons. In general, enemy strength being what it was, it was found impractical
to try to use elements larger than a Brigade in a tactical operation. The Hubalahaps of the
CP Philippines, for example, suffered a devastating loss when they concentrated large
numbers in a single area where the Japanese found it profitable to attack in force and to em-
ploy aircraft against them. Even when relatively large units were used in an operation, it was
customary to stick to guerrilla tactics, and the effect was more that of a number of small
units taking part in the operation under fairly loose control, rather than of a closely coordi-
nated action of an orthodox large unit.
107. As in the Communist colonial insurrection, there were both "regular" (full-time)
and "irregular" (part-time) units in the Communist resistance armies. In the FTPF in
France, for example, the "francs-tireurs" were people who lived outwardly peaceful lives in
the villages and towns and who came together on call to carry out operations, returning to
their homes when the mission was completed. The "partisans," on the other hand, were
people who lived in small camps in the woods and who were full-time guerrillas. The Chi-
nese Communists organized both full-time resistance forces and "irregulars" (the People's
Militia, which furnished intelligence to the regular units, did sentry duty, acted as guides and
stretcher bearers for the regulars, and carried out harassing operations against isolated
Japanese strong-points). The seizure and maintenance of a safe base does not mean the end
of recruitment and utilization of irregular forces in areas under full or partial enemy control:
the Yugoslav Partisans continued to raise part-time detachments outside the safe-base area
for harassing operations at the same time that their regular units were making larger attacks
out of the safe base. Irregular units were often organized for defense, as well as support
functions: the SAP's in Italy and the People's Militia in China stood guard while farmers
brought in their crops for the resistance; the Soviet Partisans also organized self-defense
groups among the peasants for the same purpose. In France, the Party organized armed de-
fense groups within the organizations of the political apparatus itself to protect demonstrators.
secret installations (headquarters, safe houses, printing plants, etc.) in an attempt to relieve
the FTPF military formations of such tasks.
108. Party Control of Tactical Units. The Communists tried to draw as many people as
possible into their military resistance. In-m-any cases this meant that the ranks of the tactical
formations were predominantly non-Communist. A control problem existed. Even in coun-
tries where the Party was large, as in France, it has difficulty finding sufficient reliable
cadres to take command assignments. In some countries it was necessary to put non-
Communists in charge of large tactical formations and even on important staffs. Wherever
possible, Communists with military talents or experience were given command assignments,
but sheer military necessity dictated the utilization of able non-Communist military personnel
to the fullest extent.
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109. Control was exercised in the resistance force by the same methods as in the
Communist colonial insurrection: reliable Party members were put in charge of central and
area staffs which perforce, often contained some non-Communists; Political Commissars
were assigned to tactical formations as a check on the military commanders; an effort was
made to indoctrinate the non-Communists in Communist principles. It is interesting to note
that the Communist revolutionary line was deliberately played down in the Soviet Partisans,
while patriotism was played up: this may have been the case in other Communist military
resistance forces also, but probably to a lesser extent.l
110. Local committees of the underground political apparatus of the Party in areas of
resistance-fighting had a share in the direction of resistance formations. Details on this
relationship are lacking, but it is believed that underground political functionaries often as-
signed tactical missions to the resistance formations, took part in operational planning with
the military staffs, and when communications between the latter and higher military head-
quarters were broken, exercised general control over the units (see Soviet Partisans).
111. The tightness of centralized control varied from one country to another. Commu-
nications, availability of Party cadres, and the existence of an underground political apparatus
determined the extent of centralization of control. The development of the Soviet Partisans,
for example, illustrates the variations: they began with small isolated units under the in-
dependent control of individual commanders (Red Army stragglers, "stay-behind" or infil-
trated agents of the Soviet Government or CP); gradually banded together into "Partisan
Unions," which established communications with other groups and with the Soviet authorities
in unoccupied countries, but which did not act as tactical units; eventually came under the
control of a central staff for the Partisan forces, through area staffs set up in unoccupied
sectors of the front; and in the final stages, during the Red Army offensive, were utilized in
direct support of Red Army commands and then incorporated into the Red Army as it swept
forward.
112. Conversely, in Italy, where cadres were scarce and the political apparatus of the
Party within the country sketchy at best, the Communist resistance forces appear to have
been unable to establish a centralized direction under strict Party control and were dependent
upon Allied command-communications nets for their direction.
113. Some provision was undoubtedly made for the coordinated direction of formations
created to handle special assignments (intelligence squads and nets, terror squads, industrial
sabotage groups, etc.). In the FTPF, control of these groups was in the hands of the Political
Commissar of the Inter-Regional FTPF staff. In the Yugoslav Partisans, the underground
organs of the political apparatus in German-hold areas controlled such special groups, while
others were directed by the intelligence service of the Partisan organization. In the USSR,
headquarters of several governmental agencies (NKVD, NKGB, NKO) controlled some of them,
while the political apparatus of the Party may have controlled others.
E. ORGANIZATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS
114. The groups organized for special duties were created and controlled by the Com-
munist military resistance organization directly, by underground organs of the political ap-
paratus in enemy-held areas, by auxiliaries and fronts of the Party, and, in the case of the
USSR, by agencies of the government.
The FTPF in France had its own specialist squads (Grow es Speciaux for documenta-
tion, sabotage, assassinations, reinforcements) and services (a service for receiving and
caching materiel parachuted by the Allies, an intelligence service, and a technical apparatus
for making and caching materiel).
In Yugoslavia, an intelligence service was set up under the Central Committee of the
Party. It operated in liberated areas as a security service independent of the military formation,
"information centers" within the formations, and sent intelligence teams behind enemy lines.
1 The Vichy Police remarked that many people were involved in Front National activities
without knowing that it was a Communist organization: the same situation may have existed
in the FTPF.
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The Partisan commands also sent reconnaissance teams (five-man groups called "petorkas")
across the lines for tactical intelligence. The underground political apparatus of the Party in
German-held areas also organized small sabotage and terror squads.
In Italy, the terror squads called GAPS's (Grupp Azione Patriotico) were organ-
ized, but it is not known whether they were under the control of nearby partisan (Garibaldi)
formations or some other directing apparatus.
The CP Malaya organized Mobile Killer Squads (LTT's) during the Japanese occupa-
tion, but, as in the case of Italy, it is not known exactly how these terror groups were con-
trolled. (It may be guessed that the underground organizations of the political apparatus con-
trolled them, for the Party had not been suppressed in Malaya to the extent that it had in
Italy, and it had a considerable network of underground Party organizations and fronts from
which to draw recruits and maintain coordinating communications.)
F. SERVICE FUNCTIONS
115. The Communists organized supporting functions for their military resistance
formations; Intelligence, Communications, Supply.
116. Intelligence. The Communist resistance forces needed tactical information on
the enemy for their own defense and for tactical planning, just as do the insurrectionary
forces in colonial countries. In the case of resistance, however, two additional factors in-
fluenced the extent to which the Communists engaged in and organized intelligence services:
(a) information of no immediate tactical value to the resistance was valuable to the Allies
during the war, and to a certain extent, was systematically obtained and transmitted to them,
(b) in industrial countries, such-as France, the Communist resistance needed economic,
political, administrative, and technological information to carry on rational political and eco-
nomic resistance operations. For these reasons, extensive intelligence systems were organ-
ized by the resistance armies or other Communist organizations. The Allies sent liaison
teams into many countries to assist the Communist resistance and to receive its intelligence
product.
117. Tactical Intelligence. For the production of purely military tactical intelligence,
the Communist forces organized. reconnaissance teams and set up chains of informants in the
countryside and a system of reporting places. The Party tried to "saturate" the area of op-
erations with civilian reporters, utilizing all political organizations at its disposal. For
practical purposes, this sort of intelligence collection for resistance operations was similar
to that in postwar colonial insurrections.
118. Non-tactical Intelligence. For the production of industrial, economic, political,
and strategic military intelligence, the Communists often organized special intelligence serv-
ices, consisting of secret agents and informants in key places. Thus, the People's Commis-
sariat for State Security (NKGB) of the USSR dispatched agents into enemy-occupied areas to
set up networks for the collection of strategic intelligence. This was in addition to the regu-
lar intelligence service of the Partisan military forces, the "Intelligence Administration" (RU)
of the central Partisan staff and the "Intelligence Sections" (RO's) of lower Partisan staffs
down to Brigade level. The latter produced intelligence of immediate utility, but also furnish-
ed information of value to the higher agencies of the Soviet Government, and this was trans-
mitted by radio and other means across enemy lines to the interested agency.
119. It has been alleged by the French Communists that their resistance intelligence
service ("Service B") furnished strategic intelligence of considerable value to the Allies.
The validity of this claim may be questioned, but it is certainly true that the French Party had
numerous channels open to it for the obtaining of such information. For example, a detailed
"Questionnaire" was prepared by the CP France for information on production and lay-out of
French chemical factories. Party members, sympathizers, members of the political resist-
ance organizations collected such information directly or from their friends, and put it into
Party channels.
120. The Communists had especially favorable opportunities for penetration of state
and enemy agencies during the resistance period, because the Germans had to employ large
numbers of the local people as interpreters and to carry on administrative and policing work.
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The Soviets made considerable use of this situation, sending agents disguised as anti-Soviets
into the various offices of the occupation authority, labor services, production control offices,
etc. The French Communists also achieved some success in this regard: Vichy police re-
cords contain many cases of policemen arrested for Communist activities.
121. In Yugoslavia, the Partisan intelligence service gradually took over political se-
curity functions in liberated areas, and even beofrethe Germans had evacuated the country,
was transformed into a state secret political police organization, later known as OZNA.
122. Communications. Communist resistance forces relied heavily upon couriers for
communications. Regular courier services were organized, either by the political apparatus
or the military force itself. The best supplied organizations had extensive radio and some-
times telephone nets. The Allies provided the equipment for communications abroad with the
liaison teams they despatched to the resistance organizations. The Soviet Partisans had reg-
ular radio communications with each other and with the Partisan staffs on the Soviet side of
the lines. They also sent messages across the line by dog, pigeon, courier, and airplane.
The Communists were sometimes able to capture enemy communications equipment and put
it to use: the Chinese, for example, had radio and land-line networks consisting largely of
captured equipment.
123. Supplies. In "backward" countries, where the Communists concentrated on mili-
tary resistance, they supplied their units in much the same way as they have been doing in
the colonial insurrections: by foraging and contributions (voluntary or extorted) by civilians,
and by capture of enemy supplies. The Allies furnished several of the Communist resistance
organizations by parachute drops and coastal smuggling. The Soviet government even landed
planes loaded with all sorts of supplies (ordnance, technical equipment, clothing, morale-
building items) in Partisan-held areas in the USSR. In some cases, the resistance forces
obtained weapons and other supplies abandoned by the defeated state armies (the British in
Malaya, the Americans in the Philippines).
124. It was customary for the Communists to set up secret weapons - producing and
repair shops. In backward countries, these were located within the safe-base area. In
France, the FTPF had special groups responsible for making arms, explosives, etc. in safe
houses and for caching them. The French Communists were also able to get civilian labora-
tories to secretly manufacture explosives, mines, booby-traps, etc.
G. POST-LIBERATION DISPOSITION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE STRENGTH
125. The Communist Parties did not neglect to consider the possibilities their resist-
ance forces offered for action when the enemy should be defeated. In Yugoslavia, Greece,
Philippines, and the USSR, the Communist forces began military attacks on anti-Communist
resistance forces even before the Axis troops had been driven out of the country. In some
cases, these operations were comparatively small; in others, they represented clear attempts
by the Party to leave itself an open field for a revolution, and were quite bloody. The Yugo-
slav Partisans, backed up by the Soviet Army, were able to complete this monopolization of
military power and to take over the government. The Greek resistance force (ELAS) also
systematically began to attack rival resistance organizations before the liberation, and,was in
an excellent position to seize the government power when the Germans evacuated: such an
attempt was made shortly after the liberation, but was frustrated by the forceful presence
and action of British troops.
126. During the liberation campaign, many of the Parties tried to complement their
regular military resistance operations by creating "people's militia" which were intended to
seize local civil administrations as soon as the enemy had abandoned them. In most countries
these Party-inspired, self-appointed police carried on brutal reprisals against people who had
collaborated with the enemy, or whom the Communists considered dangerous and therefore
liquidated under the pretex of "collaborationism." In some countries, the Communist attempts
were quickly frustrated as Allied forces moved in in strength and liquidated the local admini-
strations. The forces liberating Paris encountered difficulties with the Communist "militia'
that would have been much more serious had it not been for the fact that the Allied military
campaign had been so rapid and the Communist unable to make adequate preparations, and
that the non-Communist resistance organizations managed to command sufficient public sup-
port.
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127. As in Yugoslavia, the Chinese Communists resumed their revolutionary campaign
successfully when the enemy had been driven out. In China, the occupation of Manchuria by
Soviet forces checked the possibility of the Nationalist Government's re-occupying that area
and gave the Communists a decisive material advantage in the ensuing revolutionary cam-
paign.
128. In countries where the Communist resistance forces were faced with Allied oc-
cupation, rather than Soviet, the Parties did what they could to preserve their military
strength for possible future use in revolution. The CP Philippines managed to retain the
cadres of its Hukbalahap in small guerrilla bands in the mountains. The CP Greece, having
failed in its insurrection following the liberation, began shipping as many of its resistance
fighters as possible to camps established in the mountains and in the neighboring "New De-
mocracies." In France, Italy, and Malaya, the Parties enrolled as many of its fighters as
possible in controlled veterans' associations. Wherever possible, the Communists hid their
best arms away for future use.
129. The resistance veterans' associations represent a major portion of the Commu-
nist military reserves. In Malaya, the association was utilized by the Party to mobilize the
forces for the insurrection that began in 1948. In Italy, the Party-controlled veterans asso-
ciation, ANPI, has been a major factor in the general political strength of the Party; has been
utilized to spark Communist demonstrations, and its offices have been used as contact places
for Communist strong-arm elements. The local para-military organizations, such as the
Garibaldi Clubs, that made their existence felt during the unrest following the elections of
1948 and the attempted assassination of Togliatti, were recruited from ANPI members, and
ANPI may be used systematically as cover for their activities.
H. USE OF RESISTANCE BANDS IN KOREAN WAR.
130. The pattern of organization for Communist resistance forces has been followed in
the use of Communist guerrilla units in South Korea. To their use, however, has been added
another function: support of an invading Communist army. In deployment they most closely
resemble the resistance operations of the Chinese Communist Party, which is natural, in view
of the probable training of Korean Communists with the CCP forces. It has been estimated
that a cadre of 1700 trained personnel provided the hard core for the South Korean Guerrilla
forces, which in January 1951 reached a peak of 37,500. South Korean guerrilla units can be
classified into four broad categories, according to their functions:
a. specially organized and trained personnel infiltrated individually or as small
units;
b. irregular county and other local volunteer groups;
c. stragglers and remnants of the North Korean Army cut off from the main
body and forced to resort to guerrilla tactics for self-preservation.
d. professional bandit groups.
131. The organization) structure of the guerrilla units is not known in any detail, al-
though, as in all Communist resistance forces, it is probably very flexible. There is some
evidence which indicates the possible existence of a 1st North Korean Guerrilla Corps of
5-10 brigades, each with 10-20 battalions of approximately 100 men each. Other reports iden-
tify three guerrilla brigades (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd).
132. The guerrilla units appear to be subordinated to the regular North Korean Army
units when the latter is in an area in which the guerrillas exist. This is also similar to the
Chinese pattern. Communications are believed to pass from the General Headquarters Staff
of the North Korean People's Army, through the regular North Korean units and to the guer-
rilla groups, although direct communication between the General Headquarters and the guer-
rilla formation is not unusual.
133. In most other respects, the guerrilla operations in South Korea were standard --
their missions and tactics were similar to those in other colonial resistance operations, their
arms supply depended on capture of enemy equipment: as could be expected, only 30-40% of the
forces were equipped with arms, and supplies were either, captured, requisitioned or plundered.
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134. It is significant that immediately prior to the North Korean invasion the activity
of the South Korean guerrillas showed.a marked decrease, possibly the result of a "lie-low'
signal from North Korean General Headquarters.
IV. COMMUNIST CITY INSURRECTION
A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION
135. Differences between the Proletarian and Colonial Revolutions. The Communist
revolution in an advanced industrial country differs radically from the revolution in a colonial
country:
a. The class on which the Party depends for the mass of the revolution is the
class of city workers (proletariat).
b. The regime in industrial countries is technically much stronger than in colo-
nial countries: it possesses strong, maneuverable, and experienced military
forces and a comprehensive police system; it commands transport and communi-
cations facilities and can swiftly shift its forces about to squash uprisings as they
occur.
136.
being --
c. For these reasons, the strategy of the Communists in advanced countries is
the reverse of the colonial strategy: armed action is not undertaken in the be-
ginning of the revolution as a means of expanding the limited political basis, and
weakening the enemy by attrition, but is rather, the climax of a period of political
and organizational preparation.
d. The proletarian revolution consists of, first, the maximal organizational
build-up of the Communist Party and the accumulation of preponderant mass sup-
port; and then, the conversion of this support to an armed uprising, in which the
places and institutions of power are seized and the regime defeated at once.
Success in the armed insurrection depends upon many factors, the most important
a. Favorable "objective conditions;" producing mass support for the Party and
weakening the authority and power of the regime: economic dislocations (unem-
ployment, inflation, disruption of supply system), political frictions (inability of
non-Communist parties to agree on remedies of problems, factionalism within
parties and government), break down of general morale (cynicism, corruption,
defeats in war, continual pressures from abroad).
b. Preponderant political strength of the Communist Party: numerically strong
mass following; or relatively small following, but neutralization of regime's
political support.
c. Extent to which masses are convinced that a real revolution is possible and
are willing to support it (not merely general discontent which could be satisfied
by reforms). This is the measure of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda.
It involves "isolating" and "discrediting" the previously accepted leaders of the
regime and its parties and workers organizations supporting it; "exposing' all of
them as enemies of the workers and as plotting to deprive the workers of their
just rewards; setting up the Party as the only true and consistent champion of the
class; and convincing the workers that only through a revolution can the evils be
abolished.
d.' Extent to which the secret Party organization within the government's defen-
sive forces has succeeded in subverting them--in neutralizing them or getting
them to come out in active support of the uprising.
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e. The large number of places (targets of the insurrection) that the Party is
capable of taking in a present-day advanced country. In addition to the above pri-
mary operations, armed groups will have also to carry out many secondary op-
erations in order to get into position to take, and then to hold, the critical objec-
tives (e.g., bridges, key buildings, intersections, etc.). Schematically, the targets
of military insurrectionary operations might be shown as follows:,
? Posy
ARMY
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0 0
POWER0 C/ Ty
G E.NDARMERIE
7srtr/oN
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f The ability of the Party to activate, deploy and coordinate the hundreds of
operational actions necessary to take and hold all of these objectives. This re-
quires the establishment of a central and many subordinate insurrectionary head-
quarters, involving the services of a large number of well grounded and politically
reliable cadres.
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137. It is difficult to say how the CP weighs these factors relative to each other when
it is making the decision for an insurrection. Outstanding advantage in one respect may per-
mit the Party to go ahead when other advantages are lacking. However, the numerical
strength of the Party is seemingly considered less important than the others: if this were not
so, the CP's France and Italy would probably have carried out insurrectionary attempts in
the postwar period. It is also unlikely that a Party would begin an uprising in these times
without having gone far in the work of subverting the government's defensive forces. If any
generalized conclusion can be drawn, it is that the Party is probably more influenced by the
weakness it sees in the regime (including the effects of systematic subversion by the Com-
munists) than it is by the "revolutionary fervor of the masses" or by the number, of armed
units it is able to muster.
The Party has no magic calculator to produce completely accurate estimates of any of
these factors. Its success rests upon the ability of the top leadership, which makes the de-
cision, which is just as prone to miscalculation as are non-Marxists, and which can fumble a
revolution when the odds are in the Party's favor, or can achieve success against adverse
conditions.
138. The degree to which the Party is able to meet these requirements for success
depends upon the preparations it makes prior to the insurrection. In periods of social stabil-
ity the Party makes long-range general preparations by way of developing its organizational
discipline, giving its cadres practical experience in general mass political and organizing
work (including the handling of large groups of people in demonstrations, etc.), training
specialists in insurrectionary tactics, etc., and by way of planting its organization in places
of strategic and tactical importance to the insurrection (key factories and plants, arsenals,
warehouses, communications centers and facilities, -etc.). When social conditions become
unstable, these long-range preparations begin to pay off: the disciplined apparatus is in a
position to exploit difficulties to best advantage and to organize the workers into revolutionary
formations.
139. Specific practical preparations for the insurrection are made also during the
period of "revolutionary calm" and are stepped up in the period of instability. These include
the selection and assignment of cadres to secret insurrectionary planning and subversion
staffs and to skeleton military formations. Practical preparations will be discussed in
further detail.
B. ORGANIZATION OF MASS SUPPORT
140. Accumulation of mass support, with emphasis on the workers, is the continuing
occupation of the Party. In a "revolutionary situation, " the organizational groundwork laid
down begins to pay off--the Party organizations in factories and trade unions are able to win
additional workers and are able to get control of workers' organizations. This, however, is
not enough. The success of the insurrection hinges upon the organization of political support
for the CP on the broadest possible basis.
141. To secure maximum support for the uprising, therefore, the Party will make use
of some broad outside (front) organization--one that musters other classes (peasants, lower
middle class) and that provides the Party with a headquarters that can be set up as a revolu-
tionary government if necessary. It may be an organization already in existence that the
Party has penetrated and got under its control (e.g., the Soviets in Russia), or a front organi-
zation created by the Party in non-revolutionary times, or one especially inverted for the in-
surrection (e.g., the A.N.L. in Brazil, 1935). Through such an organization the CP can at
once broaden and conceal its revolutionary appeal.
The ultimate is the seizure of power in the name.of government itself, which is what
happened in Czechoslovakia. (The Party and its controlled central labor union demanded
nationalization of all industries and direct labor participation in the Government. Non-
Communist Ministers made the terrible blunder of resigning in protest, and the Communist
Ministers simply prevented their return and forced substitution of dupes and fellow-travellers.)
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142. Ideally, a usable extra-Party mass organization for the uprising would have these
characteristics:
a. Broad appeal: capable of assimilating wide sections of the population, cutting
across local and class partitions;
b. Appearance of legitimacy: the workers can be convinced that the front is the
rightful authority (e.g., the position of the soviets in Russia in 1917);
c. Strategic coverage: the front commands support in the main cities,.'parti-
cularly in the capital;
d. Effective Party control over the headquarters and lower organs of the front;
e. Revolutionary aura: the front orginated in a revolutionary movement (e.g.,
the soviets arose during the February Revolution).
143. Party Control. Establishment of effective Party control over the mass revolu-
tionary organization is done from below or from above; the Party wins control over an al-
ready existing organization or creates one under its initial control. The Bolsheviks, for ex-
ample, got control of the workers' soviets by winning individual factories and being elected
by the workers as representatives to the soviet, first in the workers' districts, and then in
the major cities. The role of the Party during the resistance was very important in many
countries in securing for it control of the workers' organizations (particularly, of the leading
trade union federations in Italy and France).
144. Propaganda Support. The campaign to get control of the mass organization is
supported by the propaganda tactics of the Party. In the period of instability the propaganda
line is revolutionary in two respects; (a) it is fundamentally and clearly hostile to the exist-
ing social system and its government; (b) it is distinctly hostile to the parties and organi-
zations competing with the CP for the workers' allegiance. The attack on the regime consists
of setting up the utopian program of the Party; making demands for "reforms" that are im-
possible under existing conditions or that would lead to the weakening or dereliction of power
by the government, making open demands for a revolution.
The attack on individual rival political parties and their leaders and policies are
aimed at (a) causing them to break with the regime; or (b) to go further to the Right, thereby
"exposing" their "real" anti-labor sentiments; or (c) to make concessions further destructive
of the economy and political stability of the country.
145. Slogans. The propaganda campaign is carried on by the Communist press, by
agitation teams, calling of meetings, demonstrations, strikes, etc. The appeal is put out in
slogans that have vital appeal to fundamental desires of the workers ("peace," higher wages,
privileges for the workers, lower prices, abolition of wage controls, workers control of in-
dustry, production and distribution, or a greater share in economic decisions etc.)
146. Testing the Mass Temper. During the developing revolutionary situation the
temper of the masses is tested and raised by leading the workers into actions progressively
more challenging to the regime: demonstrations, small strikes, larger strikes, particularly
sit-down strikes, which give the workers a taste of taking a portion of power (property);
armed demonstrations and riots; finally, the general strike.
147. The General Strike. The Party need not specifically call for a general strike, but
it will always produce an equivalent when it tries an insurrection. (The Bolsheviks did not
call a general strike, in 1917, but the effect was the same: the insurrection itself closed
down all the factories). The leader of the CP Germany, Brandler, called off the projected
1923 revolution when he failed to get socialist support for a general strike. The CP Brazil
failed in its 1935 attempt partly because it was unable to produce a widestrike movement.
In tactical terms, a general 'strike or its equivalent has the following effects:
a. It brings workers out of plants and into streets: causes confusion, impedes
police action, etc.;
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b. Organized insurrectionary forces are given an opportunity to act on the un-
organized workers, who are at loose ends;
c. Strike action at key plants is used to spark insurrectionary seizure of plants;
d. Strikes give Party a chance to observe government countermeasures (effec-
tiveness and weak spots) in action and make appropriate changes in plans and
organization and in tactics;
148. A general strike movement may be undertaken without positive preponderant
workers control. (See, for example, the October 1950 strike movement of the CP Austria.)
In some cases, a general strike may be called primarily as a test, but with the idea that if it
goes well, the movement will be carried forward to an insurrection. The ability of the Party
to carry the movement just so far, without going over into a premature uprising or without
causing serious setbacks for the revolutionary temper, is dependent upon a variety of factors
(extent of control, general temper, astuteness of CP strike leaders, capabilities of govern-
ment, etc.)
149. The General Task. It is necessary at the time of the uprising to translate the
general mass political support- -expressed in elections, strike movements, demonstrations,
etc.--into military form: the conversion of political organizations into military organizations,
the integration of masses into the skeleton military apparatus of the Party, and arming them.
The process will be described in more detail below.
C. SUBVERTING THE DEFENSES OF THE GOVERNMENT
150. The armed security services of the government are not insulated from the general
situation. The political and organizing work carried on by the Party among the workers is
supplemented by work carried on to defect the soldiers, police, sailors, genarmerie, etc.
from support of the government. It has long been understood by Communist theorists that the
armed. state services will have to be neutralized before the insurrection begins, for the
forces of the workers will be numerically and technically much inferior to those of the state.
The work of neutralizing- -either achieving an actual neutrality of the state arms, or winning
them over to active participation in the insurrection- -is achieved by: building up a Party
organization within the services (as in Russia and Brazil) or getting control of the government
offices in charge of them (as in Czechoslovakia).
151. "Military Work." The building up of a Party organization in the armed and secu-
rity services has been a requirement for all Parties for many years. One of the "21 Condi-
tions" for admission to the Comintern specified that the Parties do this work, and later inter-
national res9lutions and writings emphasized its importance. It is called "Military work" and
is discussed in some detail in Section V below. The following are, briefly, the essentials:
a. CP's establish an organ to direct penetration and subsequent organization in
the state forces as part of the long-range preparations (i.e., in quite stable times).
This organ is a small, secret body under top Party control and is often called the
"military" or "anti-military committee," "commission," "section," or "depart-
ment." The Communist youth organization is sometimes given responsibility for
military work, and always plays some part in it.
b. Organizing work in particular military commands is carried out by Commu-
nists who form secret cells and receive instructions from a responsible for the
work connected with a lower civilian Party committee (i.e., state, regional, city,
etc.);
c. The work of the organization consists of agitation and propaganda aimed at
subverting the loyalty or confidence in the state of maximum numbers of troops.
At the time of the insurrection, where the work has been effective, the Party
organization will seize command of the unit and hold it to the insurrectionary con-
trol or cause mutinies and partial refusals to obey or to carry out anti-revolu-
tionary operations effectively;
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d. the military organization may also furnish operational intelligence and arms
to the insurrection and, conversely, deprive loyal defensive forces of their arms.
e. In special circumstances, special non-Communist organizations may already
exist, facilitating the defection of armed services masses in the same way as they
do in the workers' centers (e.g., the fortuitous existence of the unit committees
and soldiers' soviets in Russia.) These special organizations need only be cap-
tured by the CP to become effective instruments of subversion.
f . In periods of enhanced CP prestige and political strength (e.g. CP France in
the immediate post-liberation period) the "subversion" can be carried out openly
through the activities of CP nuclei in armed and security forces, which may be
organized into thinly disguised fronts.
The effectiveness of military work in an insurrection was demonstrated in the Bol-
shevik revolution in Petrograd, where all but 1-2,000 of the city army garrison was neutral-
ized. Inadequate work was demonstrated in the Brazilian uprising of 1935.
152. The effect of penetration and subversion from above was clear in the Prague coup
of 1948: the Army was neutralized by the Minister of Defense, a fellow-traveler; the bulk of
the state police was neutralized, and some units were actually put at the service of the Party,
by the Communist Minister of the Interior.
D. MILITARY PREPARATIONS
153. Preparations for the military conduct of the insurrection consist of-- (a) creation
of planning, tactical coordinating, and service organs; (b) creation, arming, and mobilizing an
insurrectionary force. The latter is discussed further below.
154. Planning Organs. The Party established an organ to make concrete plans for the
insurrectionary operations--for assessing target installations and considering tactical ap-
proaches and requirements for each; for locating assembly places, communications and staff
centers; arms, ammunition, and transport centers, etc. In the early days, this was not done
until a revolutionary situation had already developed and a decision had been made for the
uprising. For example, the plans for the Petrograd insurrection of 1917 were not even begun
to be made until less than a week beforehand; plans for operations in the 1923 German project
were made during the summer, several weeks prior to the target date.
From what evidence is available, it would appear that during recent years plans for
uprisings are: being made well in advance. (See, for example, the premature operations car-
ried out in Italy in 1948). Obviously, such plans could not be complete, for the course of actual
events would determine many details; however, the main outlines could easily be worked out.
155. It appears that insurrectionary plans are made by, or in close connection with,
the organ responsible for "military work" (subversion in the state services). Each major city
would require an individual operational plan; what agency of the city Party organization is re-
sponsible for-it is not known. As an hypothesis, the following is offered:
a. A specialist is designated or sent out to each major Party organization to col-
lect data and draw up a tentative operational plan. This would undoubtedly entail
discussions with certain functionaries, such as cadre (personnel) men, leaders of
the city strong-arm squads and veterans' organizations, and leaders of city dis-
trict organizations and trade union functionaries (particularly in industries im-
portant to the success of the insurrection);
b. The tentative plans are sent to national Party headquarters, where they are
considered, compared, criticized, modified by the Military Committee or com-
parable body, and probably sent to the CP Soviet Union for approval of comment.
c. Final approved plans form the basis for stand-by assignment of cadre per-
sonnel to various tactical and support staffs to be mobilized at the time of the up-
rising.
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156. Service Organization. A number of important functions must be provided for in
the operational and organizational planning for the armed uprising: arms .procurement, stor-
age, and distribution; communications; transportation; intelligence.
157. The Arms Problem. Procurement, storage, and distribution of weapons in a
country with an effective police force, is a complicated problem. The number and types of
weapons needed depends upon so many factors (number of cities considered vital; number of
target installations in each; size and character of defenses, etc.) that it is impossible to
generalize. Obviously, the Party will want to arm every one of its fighters, but how many
members of a fighting formation must be armed? Can the Party depend upon every man's
furnishing his own weapon? Since this would probably be hazardous, how many weapons must
be cached away for distribution at the beginning of the uprising? Is it better to have small
caches or to have caches large enough to equip a given formation? These are some of the
problems which the CP must consider.
158. Sources of arms are --
a. weapons belonging to individuals;
b. hand-made weapons (demolitions, Molotov Cocktails, etc.);
c. government and commercial stocks seized in the first stages of the uprising
(by assault or from within);
d. disarming of enemy captured in the course of fighting;
e. distribution of weapons from secret Party caches (large quantities were ac-
quired by many CP's during the resistance and were hidden away for future use);
f . theft of weapons by Communist workmen (in warehouses, railroads, arsenals)
and by Communist soldiers.
159. The Italian services have been turning up Communist arms deposits for some
years. Most of the caches have been small (5-20 weapons); others have been large. In several
cases, weapons and ammunition sufficient to equip over a hundred men have been discovered;
many included automatic weapons, and small mortars, and some included disassembled can-
nons.
160. Choice of location of caches depends upon considerations of safety and convenience
of control on the one hand, and of the use to which the weapons will be put on the other. For
example, some of the Italian caches were in factories, for the use of the insurrectionary force
eventually to seize the factory. Other caches have been in various places of safety and con-
venience--in abandoned buildings in the country; in the grounds of a railroad station where the
Communist station master hid them after stealing them from trains passing through.
161. Tactical considerations are undoubtedly important. The Italian authorities, for
example, believe that caches were systematically made in factory grounds in the industrial
areas of the North on the theory that the factories would serve as defensible bastions in an
insurrection; whereas Party military strategists in other areas did not consider it possible
to holdout in the factories and therefore did not establish large factory caches.
162. The CP Germany is the only Party known to have organized arms procurement and
storage on a systematic basis. Plans for the 1923 uprising there included the organization of
special weapons procurement committees in each of the regions of the country. Details of the
implementation of this plan are lacking, but the project sounds very much like the "WUMBO'
(Weapons and Munitions Procurement Office) which existed in the 1920's as a part of the Kip-
penberger "Apparat." It is believed to have had a national chief, a number of regional chiefs,
and under them, local groups in charge of collection and hiding arms.
163. It is generally believed on the basis of evidence so far available, that the arms
problem in the period following the second war is handled locally: small caches entrusted to
reliable Party men in a position to take care of them. If no individual functionary of the re-
gional and national Party headquarters is specifically responsible for arms, it is, however,
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inconceivable that military planners at all levels of the Party would not take a close interest
in data on weapons that will be immediately available from the secret caches.
164. There is always the possibility that arms may be smuggled into the country by
sea or air drop from the USSR or satellites for a Party about to begin an insurrection. There
have always been rumors about such smuggling, and they may be believed by rank and file
Party members--may even be floated by the Party leaders to raise the temperature. Ruth
Fischer (Stalin and German Communism) writes that the ranks of the CP Germany believed
firmly that the Party possessed large hidden stores of arms and that large quantities would
be sent in from Russia for the 1923 uprising. The rumors in this case were empty, and the
more current ones have had no more demonstrated substance: the possibility cannot be en-
tirely dismissed, however. As a tentative conclusion it appears that the USSR would supply
arms only to CP's in adjacent territories, and would supply other CP's only in case of war.
165. Communications. An adequate communications system is essential to the success
of the insurrection: to give the signal for the simultaneous uprising in all of the key cities
and to coordinate operations thereafter.
166. The insurrectionary plan calls for the seizure in the first moments of the uprising
of the principal existing communications--either by assault from outside, or by armed Com-
munists working within them. First targets of attack are telephone exchanges, telegraph
offices, radio transmitters, teletype lines: possession of these will provide the insurrection-
ary headquarters with the means of coordinating all subsequent operations and will also de-
prive the regime of vital service. (Extensive use of radio in present day police and army
would lessen the effect of this to some extent: the government would not be so helpless as it
was in Russia in 1917.)
167. Past failures (Brazil, Germany, and to a certain extent, in Russia) of preparations
for communicating initial operational instructions by couriers and seized facilities show the
importance of having a reliable Party communications system organized ahead of time. At
least, there is some evidence that a CP would organize a W/T network in advance, consisting,
for example, of a headquarters transmitter and a number of regional nets --
Given the current availability of personnel with technical experience and easy access to radio
equipment, such a network would not be difficult for a Party to establish. It would have to be
tested occasionally, but not often and then, for periods short enough to escape locating efforts
by the authorities. Such a network would be of particular value in giving the initial operational
orders and would lessen difficulties arising from delay in seizing existing land-line and radio
centers. It may be questioned, however, that all operations could be adequately handled by a
pre-organized W/T system alone: other facilities would have to be captured.
168. The taking over of standard broadcasting stations and their utilization in issuing
instructions and propaganda was an important factor in the Prague coup of 1948 and was easily
accomplished by the Communist Minister of Information, who controlled them in the name of
the government. A Communist high up in the post-telegraph-telephone administration (ordi-
narily government-run in Europe) could perform a similar service for the Party.
169. The radio system of air fields would probably be an important target for the in-
surrection. Party members infiltrated into the system could set up a nation-wide communi-
cations network at the service of the Party and could work havoc with air transport by
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sabotaging electronic navigation systems. This could be particularly dangerous in countries
where the government air force uses commercial fields and facilities.
170. It has been reported that one Party has considered the possibility of jamming
government radio nets. It is not known whether the idea has been implemented, or even if it is
feasible.
171. Intelligence. The regular Party organization as a whole is an information-
producing network, and at the time of an uprising all Party members would furnish military
intelligence from direct observation. In addition, various staff headquarters and fighting units
would send out individuals on scouting missions. Also, more "professional" espionage sys-
tems, consisting of secret penetration agents and informants, secure reporting facilities, and
intelligence specialists are organized by many CP's in advanced countries in non-revolutionary
times. These facilities would be of considerable value in an insurrection. Finally, there is
some evidence that the Party at this time makes room in its insurrection plan for the assign-
ment of military intelligence men to the insurrectionary staffs. It is possible that individuals
in key installations are given stand-by assignments to constitute a comprehensive military
intelligence network when the proper time arrives.
172. Transportation will be needed in the uprising. The revolutionary forces will com-
mandeer whatever vehicles they can, and this is one reason why efforts are made to get con-
trol of railroad workers' organizations, street car and bus unions. Advance preparations may
consist of locating and planning the seizure of garages and motor pools, establishing Party
transport services during non-revolutionary times, and convassing Party members to deter-
mine how many vehicles of all types will be available at the time of the insurrection and
making plans for their maximum utilization. The CP Italy, for one, has bought quantities of
motorcycles and registered them in the name of individuals. During the period between the
wars, many European CP's had bicycle and motorcycle clubs, which would be definite assets
in an insurrection.
173. The CP Brazil in 1935 included plans for the seizure of government airplanes, and
even in the more current theories of revolution in that country, now based on the colonial
pattern, importance is laid on the capture of planes--a natural emphasis considering the over-
land transport difficulties in Brazil.
E. THE INSURRECTION
174. In organizational terms, the tasks of the Party are-
a, to mobilize, arm, and deploy the insurrectionary formations at the optimum
time;
b. to establish headquarters where needed for the coordination of operations;
c. to activate the subversion apparatus within the state services.
175. Timing. There is little that can be said about timing beyond the fact that the up-
rising should be begun when Party forces are at peak strength, the workers are most ready
to come out, and the strength and morale of the regime are at low ebb. The CP cannot achieve
a "surprise" insurrection, but it can achieve partial surprise in the matter of the exact date.
A recognizable crisis is desirable, particularly if the Party can wring a claim of self-defense
out of it. Therefore, in both Czechoslovakia and Russia, first action followed a crisis pre-
cipitated by the Party itself. In Czechoslovakia, it was simply a cabinet crisis, provoked by
the Party. In Russia, there were several crises, the most important being: first, the engi-
neered refusal of the Petrograd soviet to permit the Government to send garrison troops to
the Front; second, the systematic usurpation of authority by Bolshevik Commissars sent to
garrison commands and government agencies (utilities, bank, etc.). The latter finally pro-
duced government countermeasures, which the Party was able to seize upon` as "proof" of a
'plot" to overthrow the workers' soviets. The call was made for general mobilization to
"defend" the revolution.
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176. Mobilization of the Party. Party members capable of bearing arms are organized
into fighting formations, with the exception of the cadres posted to various tactical head-
quarters. Women and others not fit for combat in the streets are assigned to support func-
tions--courier, scouting, driving, distributing weapons, agitating, answering telephones, first
aid, etc. Leaders will have been given specific posts--to take command of a fighting unit, to
lead the workers in a railroad station in its seizure, to work on the staffs, etc. Assembly
points will have been previously designated for the mustering of military formations and they
will be given missions by their commanders upon assembling. (In some cases, it will have
been possible for certain units to have rehearsed their individual operation unobtrusively
beforehand). The signal for the uprising is given in various ways--a radio broadcast, des-
patching of couriers, a telephone call, a pre-arranged signal (e.g., calling of a general strike;
anticipated action of the government; a given date and time).
177. Establishment of Coordinating Headquarters. It is probable that following the
pattern of the Bolshevik Revolution, selected cadres are assigned in advance of the uprising
to establish various headquarters. The national Military Committee or its equivalent is be-
lieved to be the organ that will establish itself as the national "general staff." If a different
organ is created, it will probably include some of the members of the Military Committee,
along with the top political leaders of the Party. In the capital city, the national insurrection-
ary headquarters will probably take over local operations, either working through the Party's
city committee or utilizing it. Comparable headquarters will be set up in every city in which
it is planned to raise a rebellion, and insurrectionary centers will be established in the var-
ious sections of each city, particularly in the workers' districts. These lower headquarters
may consist simply of the city district committees of the Party on a military footing, or a
section of it, and special persons may have been previously designated to take command as is
the case in the national headquarters. Reserve headquarters may be organized to take over
in case the regular headquarters are captured, and field headquarters may be established to
direct particular important operations.
178. Composition of Headquarters. The official account of the Bolshevik Revolution,
which was the model for Communist Revolutions, states that the insurrection in Petrograd
was controlled by a "Party Center" supervising the work of a military general staff embedded
in the revolutionary headquarters of the mass organization (i.e., in the Military Revolutionary
Committee of the Petrograd soviet). It is said that individuals were assigned the following
functions:
"defense,
supply,
communications,
intelligence,
etc."
The "general staff" of the insurrectionary forces of one present-day CP is reported to consist
of - -
Chief of Staff
Coordination and Action
Intelligence
Tactics
Materiel
Discipline and Morale
179. Personnel posted to various headquarters will be those most experienced in mili-
tary matters--graduates of schools in the USSR or at home, ex-resistance leaders and veteran
of the International Brigades in Spain, and Communists with experience in state armies. Spec-
ialists from the USSR may be attached to the "general staff."
180. Representatives of Party headquarters will be posted to tactical formations in the
role of political commissars to supervise the unit commanders.
181. Insurrectionary staffs will be flexible in composition and function, whatever the
formal organization: personnel will be called into carry out duties generated by events, indi-
viduals will be shifted from one job to another and around the various headquarters as need-
ed, casuals will be utilized as they become available.
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182. Fighting Formations. It is accepted Communist doctrine that a full-scale armed
organization is impossible to maintain for a long period in a highly industrialized area. How-
ever, the Party will have at least a skeleton army (commanders and staffs) and in unstable
times may be able to maintain a police force.
Insurrectionary CP's have made use of three types of military forces: the armed
fighting groups of workers and others drawn into the uprising -- that is, military mass for-
mations -- formations of Party members, and subverted units of armed forces and police.
The ability of the Party to organize formations from among the masses depends mostly upon
the degree to which the "objective situation" has deteriorated. In non-revolutionary periods,
the government will be strong enough to prevent or break up any considerable armed groups.
In a developing revolutionary situation, however, it may not be able to do so. In Russia, the
Party found already at hand primitively organized bands of factory militia, which had grown
up on the workers' initiative during the February "bourgeois" revolution. By its organizing
and propaganda work in the factories, the Bolshevik Party gradually got control of the factory
detachments, which had a semi-official position, and developed them into a formidable fight-
ing organization under reasonably good central control. In addition to these "Red Guards" of
the Party controlled soviet, in some places, the Bolshevik Party organized detachments of
Party members. Finally, in the uprising in Petrograd, the Bolshevised units of the garrison
and the Baltic fleet joined with the workers' Red Guard.
183. The CP Germany also had made factory detachments (Red Hundreds) and "shock
troops' made up of Party members for the uprising of 1923. The CP Czechoslovakia had
factory detachments (workers' militia) and also, controlled units of the state police for the
1948 coup.
184. Communist Parties customarily have a semi-military organization for routine
defensive and occasional strong-arm duties even in non-revolutionary times. It consists of
small, partially armed groups of militants, in most cases under the control of local Party
committees (city or city district). Such groups can be the nucleus for the formation of an ex-
panding fighting organization in a developing revolutionary situation.
185. Size of formations. The Red Guard of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd was organized
on a factory basis, with "tens", squads (4"tens"), companies, (3 squads), battalions (3 com-
panies), and divisions (all the battalions in a district of the city). Most operations were car-
ried out by squads and companies, that is, by units of from 40 to 120 men. The final, big
operation, seizure of the government headquarters, was carried out by all available forces.
The Red Hundreds of the CP Germany in 1923 were also organized on a factory basis
and consisted of tens and the Hundred. Each Hundred took the name of the factory in which it
was based.
186. Activation and Utilization of the Subversion Apparatus. Subverted sections of the
state armed services are held in neutrality by their Communist organizers or are drawn
actively into the insurrection on the Communist side. The signal to act is given them by
whichever organ of the Party is responsible for military work. In Russia units were formed
out of subverted garrison regiments; the night before fighting began, the Party Organizer
called upon the Bolshevik leader of the Baltic sailors to pick 1500 reliable men and send them
to Petrograd to help the insurrection. Mobilizing orders may be taken to the units by special
.representatives of the Party headquarters (e.g., Political Commissars), who then supervise
operations undertaken by the subverted units. It was declared by the Bolsheviks that such
units were most effective when used in conjunction with workers' detachments. Mobilization
may also be achieved by direct orders from Communist agents in the command ranks of the
army or police (e.g., in Czechoslovakia, the Communist Minister of Interior despatched sev-
eral police regiments to Prague to help the insurrectionary coup there.)
187. Current Preparedness. It is difficult to judge how much of a paramilitary organi-
zation the CP's of Western Europe, particularly of France and Italy, have at this time.
Following the war, the press was full of stories about the existence in Italy of a great
Communist military organization, ready to go and with immediate access to adequate arms.
It appears now that these stories were based simply on the overt existence of former Commu-
nist resistance formations (Garibaldi formations) throughout the country and affiliated with the
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general Partisans Association, ANPI. UndoubtOlly, however, the Communist veterans move-
ment is a pool of experienced fighters, many of whom could be recruited into Communist in-
surrectionary forces, and a cover for secret skeleton staffs.
In addition to the resistance veterans organizations, the CP Italy had actually organi-
ized in many places small strong-arm formations, with access to arms and under the control
of local Party committees. These were actually the nearest thing the Party had to a going
military apparatus, so far as concrete evidence goes.
188. Similar stories were circulated in France, based on the existence of the Commu-
nist resistance veterans and some other veterans groups under Party influence. Again,
evidence points merely toward the existence of skeleton staffs.
189. It is probable that skeleton military organizations for insurrection (with or with-
out concurrent Soviet military aggression) exists in both Italy and France and perhaps also in
other countries in Western Europe on the following lines:
a) secret military committees at national and federation levels of the Party and
of lower tactical command staffs (battalion, company, platoon);
b) individual Communists given assignments to take command of forces raised
in various places at the time of an uprising;
c) nuclei of special Party formations within the framework of the veterans or-
ganizations: these to mobilize and lead as many individual members of the or-
ganizations as possible at the proper time;
d) secret weapons caches to be put at the disposal of the formations;
e) local mobilization plans (designation of assembly, points, assignment of
missions to select, reliable, future unit commanders);
f) plans for expansion of strong-arm "self-defense" groups.
190. City revolutions on the Bolshevik model have become increasingly difficult to
execute. The complexities of the modern bureaucratic state makes seizure of power by a
small group of militants difficult. The technological advances of the coercive forces of the
state in firepower, mobility, and communications make it difficult to defeat detachments of
the police and the army. Furthermore, simultaneous uprisings in all major cities is a neces-
sity -- any city left in the hands of the government can be turned into a seat of government in
a relatively short time. In effect, Communist strength In all areas will have to be much
greater than the Bolshevik strength in 1917, with correspondingly high capabilities- for simul-
taneous and coordinated action. To what extent the military potential of Western European
Parties may be nurtured for the contingencies of an East-West war rather than for an in-
surrection, is an open question at this time.
V. PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION OF ARMED FORCES.
191. Purpose of Penetration. The military forces created by the Communists in re-
volutionary operations are augmented by attempts to neutralize and win over elements of the
armed forces opposing them. The coercive forces of the state represent the most powerful
potential enemy of the CP in a revolutionary situation. It is from the beginning the most im-
portant target for penetration and subversion, even in periods of revolutionary calm. Pene-
tration operations are carried out by the Party whether it is a colonial revolution, a resistance
operation or a city insurrection. The character of the city insurrection, however, makes it
absolutely essential that the penetration and subversion be successful, which means a greater
preoccupation of the Party apparatus with this task.
192. Party Organization for Penetration. When the Party is small and the penetrations
are few, such work may be conducted on a decentralized basis -- local Party, organizations
such as District and Regional Committees have control of the penetrations as a routine matter.
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However, as the size of the operation increases or as the chances of revolution or war in-
crease, the operation is centralized in a Military Committee, an organ of the Central Com-
mittee of the Party (see above para. 151.). Broadly, the work of the Military Committee (or
Commission) is as follows:
a. Secret, high level penetrations of the armed forces and police and the govern-
ment organs controlling them. Direction of Party members making the pene-
trations.
b. Recruitment of members of the armed forces and police, sometimes secretly,
sometimes openly, depending on the local conditions. This is supported by a
propaganda campaign aimed at attracting supporters.
c. Organization of veterans groups, sporting clubs, etc. as para-military re-
serves of the Party. Attempts to gain control of non-Communist organizations
with military potential.
d. Creation of armed detachments of Party members and supporters insofar as
security will allow.
e. Study of military questions in general for use of other sections of the Party.
f . Planning of military operations for the Party, including long range plans for
insurrection.
g. Formulation of the Party line and advice to the Party press on military
matters.
While the penetration operations mounted by the Communist Party against the coercive force
of the state are primarily designed to increase the military potential of the Party either by
winning over whole units of the armed forces or by so demoralizing the members of the forces
so that they are incapable of taking strong action against the Party-instigated insurrection,
the Party also utilitizes its penetrations for intelligence purposes, both for itself and the USSR.
A summary of some of the cases of Communist penetration and subversion of the armedforces
will illustrate these points.
193. The Bolshevik Penetration Operations. The classical example of the penetration
and mass subversion of the coercive forces of the state is, of course, the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion of 1917. The subversion of one Petrograd garrison (depriving the Government of all but
1-2,0t0garrison troops) was largely responsible for the success of the.Revolution. The basic
units of the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks were the Party cells in garrison and front
line Army units and in the Russian fleets. The directing organization for penetration was first
the Petrograd City Committee but after the March 1917 Revolution, this function was trans-
ferred to the national headquarters. The Party organization for penetration and subversion is
described in more detail in the case study of the Bolshevik Revolution.
194. The pattern of penetration operations of the Bolshevik Revolution, being the com-
pulsory pattern for Communist city insurrections, was followed in every attempted revolution
from that timel, and CP's which were not in advanced revolutionary situations also made con-
stant efforts to penetrate the armed forces and police services, in preparation for an eventual
revolutionary situation.
195. Conditions of membership of the Comintern. Recognition that penetration and sub-
version of the armed forces of the state are a primary task of all Communist parties was
1 The Brazilian Revolution of 1935 relied almost entirely on the Communist ability to pene-
trate and subvert key Army units - a method which proved disastrous. This is discussed
in the Brazilian case study.
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indicated in the 21 Conditions for membership in the Communist International drawn up at the
Second World Congress in 1920. The fourth condition states:
"Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the
army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization.
Wherever owing to repressive legislation agitation becomes impossible, it is nec-
essary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate
in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause,
and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.
196. Early Penetrations by the CP Italy. The illegal CP Italy in 1923 has as one of its
primary targets the penetration of the Fascist Army and Navy. The methods used and the
success of the penetration are not known in detail. The organization of the military forces of
the CP was suspended during the illegal period; however, Party records refer to the necessity
to keep alive and functioning the "directive part of the organization" (the Regional, District,
etc. Committees for military work). A circular dated 7 December 1922 outlines the tasks
and methods for the Communist penetration operation against the Italian Army:
"1. Obtain the entry of able and secure soldiers in places of great confidence.
There they must become masters of every information and data of their immediate
and superior commands in order to refer them to us.
"2. Charge others to lift the exact plans of all the buildings and areas, depots,
which are of military interest. The same must be done for the barracks and
buildings of the public safety, profiting from the fact that often soldiers are assign-
ed for reasons of public safety in the said buildings.
"3. Disseminate the local Communist printed matter, and daily writings and
those leaflets which we will transmit, thus arriving at all the strata of the Army.
"4. Soldier sympathizers must fraternize efficiently with the Royal Guard and the
Carabinieri to knock holes in that sphere, letting our propaganda enter, especially
giving it an economic character.
"5. Take over arms, munitions, explosives, consigning them to our fiduciaries;
favor outside transactions in contraband arms, etc., etc."
197. The CP Germany Apparatus for Penetration. In 1925 when the German Commu-
nist Party (KPD) set up an extensive illegal apparat, they created the "ZER" (for ZERSETZUNG
"subversion") Section. It was one of the principle sections of the Apparat from 1925 to 1937
although two groups were created as early as 1920, according to Ruth Fischer. The ZER
Section was responsible for neutralization and subversion of the police. Later (in 1932) the
ZER Section was combined with the "Army Section" which up to that time had had similar re-
sponsibilities for the Army.
The ZER Section of the German CP Illegal Apparat carried on a steady propaganda
campaign among the police by written and oral means, made detailed intelligence studies of
their organization and established secret Communist cells within the police forces, constantly
seeking to recruit new policemen for the Party. The "ZER" Section was organized at the local
level into activist groups of from three to six persons, each group being assigned to work ex-
clusively on a single limited target -- a specific police station or dormitory. These groups
worked under strict discipline, and on a clandestine basis, all their members being normally
removed from Party membership on their entrance into this work. It was apparently a rule
that an activist group should be set up for every physical installation normally used by the
police.
198. The methods used by members of the ZER section are typical of penetration opera-
tions by Communist Parties. Police officials were ordinarily first approached through suitable
intermediaries, persons with whom the officials were known to associate. Having inconspicu-
ously obtained an introduction to the target official, the agent then planned his recruitment on
the basis of his personality and political complexion. Sometimes plain talk, sometimes a slow
program of social activity and political discussion, would be needed to convert the prospect.
Amenable officials were guaranteed Party support if they should be discharged or encounter
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any difficulties as a result of their new activities, but at the same time they were firmly
warned of consequences of betraying their mission. As a further precaution, such converted
police officers were usually required to divulge classified police information to tighten the
Party's control over them, and the cultivation of dissipation via drink or prostitutes often
provided the Party with another source of control through threat of blackmail.
199. Anti-Military Committees. As the threat of war increased in the interwar years
and as the military establishments of the capitalist powers grew, the Communists found in-
creasing need to step up their campaign of penetration of the armed forces and the supporting
industrial enterprises. Consequently, at the meeting of the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928,
one of the Resolutions passed concerned "The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks
of the Communists." Organizationally, the resolution resulted in the establishment of "Anti-
Military Committees" in Parties where no Military Committees existed, and an increase in
the scope of military work where Military Committees had been formed. The functions of the
Anti-Military Committees as outlined by the resolution were:
1. Concentration on factory and trade union activity in war industries.
2. Anti-war work among the peasantry, who would comprise the bulk of the
military force in a conscription program.
3. Anti-war work among the industrial youth.
4. Anti-war work among women and workingmen's wives.
5. Anti-militarist activity; work in the Army and Navy; work among the re-
cruits and reservists and in bourgeois defense organizations, i.e., penetration and
subversion.
200. A Small Party Penetration Operation. Communist military penetrations are the
most secret of Communist activities. Therefore, details of such operations are not obtainable
in large quantity. However, from evidence obtained from several CP's, it has been possible
to construct a hypothetical case of a small Party penetration operation in the inter-war years.
201. A Comintern agent designated a Party functionary to be responsible for the mili-
tary penetration. He was to set up a Military Committee, with advice from the Youth organi-
zation- and the Organization Committee, and was to run the initial penetration. Priority tar-
gets ere also designated by the Comintern agent, selected in consultation with staff members
of the Red Army. The Comintern also supplied secret instructions concerning methods of
penetration, security, communications, etc. The national Party functionary then picked sev-
eral Communists who were eligible for military service and instructed them to join the regu-
lar military units: the army, navy and air force; and if possible, to volunteer for service at
one of the three or four priority geographic targets which had been selected by the Comintern.
Targets were strategic military centers, such as port cities, and key industries, shipyards,
etc. The Communist penetration agents were instructed to soft-pedal or to conceal their Com-
munist affiliations and views to prevent detection. Communications was not to be maintained
openly with any Communist headquarters; the soldiers wrote letters to girls with no known
Party affiliation and the girls forwarded the information to the Party. In some cases pseu-
donymns were assigned and information sent directly to a Party address, but in plain envelopes.
202. The first penetrations run by the Party were closely controlled by the Central
Committee. The Party enlistee was given a Party address near the military installation to
which he was to be assigned. This address was to be used only in case of emergency, such as
loss of contact. The Party member was given detailed instructions concerning his objectives
and his conduct, and if more than one Communist were in the same military units, a responsi-
ble would be designated. Agents forwarded intelligence material to headquarters; suggestions
for propaganda capitalizing on soldier grievances were sent and mailing lists compiled for
Party headquarters, which in turn mailed propaganda without revealing how the Party obtained
possession of the name.
203. More open penetrations of the reserve and auxiliary para-military units were
mounted by the Communists. In these, Communists would openly propagandize for the Party
program. They would capitalize on the hardships and inequalities of military service and
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attempt in every way to stir up trouble in the unit and demoralize both officers and men.
Here, recruitment for the Party was an open objective of the Communist agents, in contrast
to the secret penetrations in the regular military organizations.
204. A typical penetration operation was set up as follows:
National
Level
Agit Prop
Commission
Youth
Organi-
zations
V
Mails
Propaganda
Direct To
Non-communists
in
Services
Corps
of
Girls
Military
Commission
Chiefs, Women's Auxiliaries
Youth Auxiliaries
Advisory Panel
District Directors
0
u
t
s
Secret 1 000 000 000
Penetration Army Navy Air Force
p Open
Recruitment
of
Military Reserve
and
Auxiliary Para-
Military Units
205. Penetration during World War II and Later. The rapid increase in the size of arm-
ies immediately proceeding and following the outbreak of World War II offered the Communists
a good opportunity to increase their penetration operations. However, the suddenness with
which the Parties found themselves engaged in military operations in the case of occupied coun-
tries and the twists and turns of the Party line prior to. the war prevented full exploitation of
their wartime penetration opportunities.
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206. KOSSA. One example of a Party which not only maintained its organization for
penetration and subversion of the armed forces, but expanded it during the war was the Greek
Communist Party. The organization, KOSSA, was of considerable aid to the Greek Party when
it launched its insurrection immediately following the war.
207. KOSSA had its roots in the "Anti-Military Bureau" formed in the mid-1920's under
the Central Committee of OKNE (Communist Youth). It underwent some reorganization prior
to the war, and followed the Greek army-in-exile to Egypt during the Nazi occupation of Greece
although its work then was relegated to second place -- military resistance became more im-
portant.
208. Immediately following the war KOSSA was reorganized and contributed substantially
to the Greek Communist Revolution. Details of its organization during this period can be
found in the Greek case study.
209. In all cases of penetration and subversion of the armed forces, the Communist
Youth organization has played an important role. In Denmark, in 1948, the military activities
of the ANJV (Dutch General Youth Movement) were centralized in a National Military Bureau.
The Military Bureau was assisted by district and sub-district leaders specifically charged
with military work. The Bureau published a newspaper and registered those ANJV members
who were called up for military service. In statements drawn up by sub-district officials,
each name was marked with a figure indicating the extent the member in question was deemed
fit for any future political action. The said registration was used to establish relations among
the members being in military service and was the first step towards the formation of cells.
210. The original plan was to make the ANJV members who were to be called up for
military service take a training course beforehand specially arranged to turn them out as
"politically" fit. Owing to lack of trainers, however, this plan had to be abandoned.
211. A National Soldiers Committee also exists in the Danish CP and has as its func-
tions maintaining contact with Party members who are conscripted, and through them to prop-
agandize among non-Communist personnel. This committee has local sub-committees in
various towns.
212. The most successful example of penetration and subversion of not only the armed
forces and police, but of key governmental organs as well, is the Czech coup of 1948. Com-
munist penetration of labor, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Information, and the
Army proved to be of decisive value for the execution of the coup. The organization of the CP
Czechoslovakia to carry out the penetration and subversion is not known, although it is of
major importance as a model for the subversion of the state apparatus of an advanced capital-
ist country.
213. While it is presumed that the CP's in other advanced countries, especially France
and Italy, have well organized and functioning sections to carry out penetrations of the coer-
cive apparatus of the state, few of the details have come to light.
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE CP CHINA
CONTENTS
A. Introduction
B. Early Communist Organization for Military Activities
C. Kiangsi
D. The Anti-Japanese Operations
E. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces During the Ant-Japanese
Resistance
F. Party Organization for Military Activities During the Period of
Anti-Japanese Resistance
G. Service Organizations
H. Tactics
I. The Post-War Period
J. Chart of the Structure for Chinese Communist Party Control of
the Chinese Regular and Irregular Armed Forces Prior to 1944.
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1. The Chinese Communist Party was formally organized in 1921. In 1923 negotia-
tions were begun for a Chinese Communist-Kuomintang alliance and were successfully con-
cluded in January 1924. In the autumn of 1923, Soviet advisers, headed by Michael Borodin,
began the work of refashioning the KMT organization and the Cantonese armies after the
Soviet pattern. The KMT was constituted with a Central Committee, a Politbureau, a Secre-
tariat and various Commissions. It also had a Military Commission (corresponding to the
present CCP Central Military Council), which functioned as a directing unit for the Kuomin-
tang armed forces. During this period, the Communists maintained organizational distinction
between their Party and the KMT. As a result, there were identical organs (such as an
Agricultural Commission) in both the CCP and KMT, sometimes headed by the same indivi-
dual (if he happened to be a Communist) with the same staff. However, it was not until early
1925 that the Communists organized their own Military Commission, previously having been
content to advance their aims through the Military Commission of the KMT, in which they
held membership. '
2. -In July 1927 the alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintang ended. The
Communists established themselves in a small area in Kiangsi province and began recruiting
and training their army. Their armed forces were made up of the defected soldiers, units and
commanders of the Kuomintang and the local peasantry, which had been rather successfully
organized by Mao Tse-tung. Scattered peasant-workers' detachments from the Kuomintang
labor corps had fled to the hills and had independently organized partisan bands. Many of
these elements were fused in 1927 and 1928 and there emerged a number of Red Armies, the
most important being the First Peasants' and Workers' Army formed by Mao Tse-tung. From
1928 to 1930 the Communists gathered strength. Their army numbered 10,000 in 1928; by
1930 it had grown to 62,000.
3. A series of annihilation campaigns was begun against the Communists by the
Kuomintang in 1930. After successfully beating off five attempts to exterminate them in
Kiangsi, the Communists succeeded in escaping and after the Long March bf 6(,000 miles
(August 1934 to October 1935), arrived decimated, though not disorganized, in Shensi province
in the northwest. They set up headquarters in Yenan and remained there recouping their
strength until they began their resistance against the Japanese in 1937.
4. The decision of the Chinese Communists to form a Red Army and establish it in a
safe base in the rural areas was not a decision which was made voluntarily. It grew out of a
number of complex factors, including the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang
Party, the Trotsky-Stalin feud, the inability of the Communists to organize the urban prole-
tariat and the success of Mao Tse-tung in establishing support among the peasantry. Com-
munist strength waned from 1927 to 1930 as a result of successive failures: (1) to seize
power in the cities with an organization based on the urban proletariat (Canton, 1927), (2) to
form peasant-based Red armies to take the cities in the name of the proletariat (Changsha,
1930) and ?(3) to realize that continued alliance with the bourgeois elements in the Kuomintang
spelled disaster for the Chinese Communist Party. The minor activities which were carried
out by Mao Tse-tung in the hinterland were at this time the only positive development in the
whole bleak landscape of Chinese Communism. The now highly-touted doctrine of peasant-
protected liberated areas (nearly identical with the heretical recommendations of Trotsky)
developed as a result of the failure of the orthodox (i.e., Stalinist) doctrine.
5. The peasant-based Communist insurrectionary army, a feature which the Chinese
Communists were forced to accept out of necessity and desperation, has now become the
model for colonial areas. It represents a sharp contrast (though by no means a contradiction)
to the. doctrine which was being applied in advanced countries (e.g., Germany) at about the
same time. It can be expected that if colonial revolutions in other areas achieve greater
success than they presently have, they will follow rather scrupulously the insurrectionary
strategy and organization of the Chinese Communist Party.
B. EARLY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
6. Within a short time after Kuomintang and Chinese Communist collaboration was
effected, a two-pronged penetration attempt was launched to gain control of the Kuomintang
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for Soviet and Communist purposes. Penetration at the highest levels was achieved by the
influx of Soviet advisers who remodelled the Kuomintang after the CPSU. The Communists,
a short time later, launched their own efforts to penetrate and influence the Kuomintang armed
'forces from below. In March 1925 a Military Committee was set up by the Chinese Communist
Party, primarily to extend penetration of the Kuomintang. A member of the Central Commit-
tee in Shanghai was designated to be responsible for military matters. His chief duty was
control and expansion of Communist cells in the Kuomintang and guidance of their work among
the non-Communist troops.
7. Although several references have been found indicating the existence of a Military
Section of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Secretary of the informal Military Commit-
tee, Chang Kuo-tao, claims that it was not formalized until after 1931. Whether this is true
is immaterial for this discussion; a portion of the Central Committee was charged with
responsibility for military activities (penetration) in the Kuomintang as early as 1925.
8. Some idea of the early activities of the Military Committee can be obtained from
the documents of the Soviet Military Attache seized by the Shanghai police in April, 1927. One
of these documents gives January 1927 as the date a "Military Section attached to the Provi-
sional Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP" was created. The tasks of the
Section were outlined only generally, falling roughly into two categories: organization of a
Communist Army -- with peasant and worker detachments and penetration of the Kuomin-
tang military establishment. Another document dated 3 March 1927, purportedly a transcript
of a meeting of the Military Section, lists eight.persons as attending, although all eight may
not have been permanent members. Five appear to have been Russians. Chou En-lai was
probably one of the Chinese present. At the meeting it was decided to dispatch a request to
the USSR for arms for 3,000 soldiers.
9. Earlier in the year (in January 1927) a meeting of the Central Committee of the
CCP had outlined a program for subversion of the Kuomintang forces. This program not only
indicated the manner of organization of Communists in the "People's Revolutionary Army"
(Kuomintang) but also set up conditions for recruiting soldiers into the Communist ranks.
The pertinent portions of the resolution follow:
"In each corps or separate division, brigade or regiment where there are 10
or more Communists a separate nucleus may be organized. In small nuclei, the office
of a secretary and in large ones a bureau of three or five members for conducting the
work should be established. Small associations subordinated to the nucleus may be
formed, the number of whose members is not limited.
"Each small association is directly subordinated to the nucleus, and the
associations have no connection among themselves.
"Each nucleus shall establish cbnnection only with the secretary of the local
Party organization and with the section to which it belongs; in relations with other
comrades and committees of the Party strict secrecy is to be observed.
"With regard to the training of Communists in the army, special attention must
be paid to separate individual instruction and to instruction of small associations.
Meetings of the nuclei and of the small associations must not be disclosed in advance.
"The question of recruiting Communists in the army: If possible, the com-
rades in the army must pay due attention to the recruiting of new members. But the
greatest caution is to be observed in this respect. , Besides, the increase of the num-
ber of members of the Party is temporarily limited to the intermediate and lower
ranks of commanders and to the most- -conscious among them. As regards organization
and instruction in this period of secret work the comrades must have in view only
Party organizations but not organizations of Communist youth."
10. Since the Kuomintang up to 1927 was in organizational appearances essentially a
Communist Party, it is useful to examine what information is available concerning Soviet
groups in the Kuomintang military organization.
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11. Russians from the outset dominated the Kuomintang army. This caused frequent
Chinese expressions of dissatisfaction, mostly because of the type of advice (usually more
political than military) and the incompetence of the Russians in military specialties. When
General.Galen was sent from the USSR as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek he reorganized the
Whampoa Military Academy. The chief feature in the reorganization was the introduction of
the political-military system which included the establishment of a Political Committee,
Political Bureau, and political professors. This system afterwards was applied to the
Chinese Communist army. In general it followed the Soviet Manual for Political Work among
Troops.
12. The paper organization of a Soviet Advisory Group in the People's Army
(Kuomintang) in 1925 is shown in the following chart. This scheme was submitted to the
Chief of the Soviet Group (Sinani) and bears an "approved" notation.
Political Assistant
(Klimoff )
Work Work in Bureau for
among the the Army Studies
population (Schools)
Chief of the Group
(Sinani)
Secretariat
Interpreters
Copyist
Military Assistant
(Seifulin)
J
Operation & Intelligence
Organization
Supplies
Sanitation
Infantry
,Artillery
Cavalry
Armored Train
Communications
Others
Aviation
(Paper organization of one Soviet Advisory Group in the
People's Army. First scheme; 3rd July 1925. "Approved,
Sinani.")
13. The following document (of about 1927) indicates that the organization of Soviet
groups in the Kuomintang had not changed substantially from 1925 to 1927. This document
goes into greater detail concerning the placement of Soviet advisers in smaller military units
and generally indicates the chain of command for the Soviet Military Political workers (the
South China Group) in Canton.
"1. The Chief (Soviet) Military Adviser is attached to the National Revolutionary
government and to the Commander in Chief of the National Revolutionary Army. He
is at the same time the Chief of the South China group who directs the whole work of
the group and is responsible for it.
"2. The Chief of the group has two assistants, one of whom is his regular substitute
and at the same time the senior Adviser of the General Staff. The other is the
assistant for political matters and the Senior Adviser of the Political Department of
the National Revolutionary Army.
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"3. Each corps has a Senior Adviser who works according to the instructions which he
receives from the Chief Adviser and who directs the work of the Junior Advisers of
the army and of the Political Advisers, all of whom are subordinate to him.
"4. In political matters the Senior Advisers of the corps receive instructions from
the Senior Adviser of the Political Intelligence Department and carry them out
through the services of the Political Advisers who are subordinated to them.
"5. Divisions belonging to a corps have advisers directly subordinated to the Senior
Adviser of the Corps and they carry out the tatter's instructions in their units.
"6. The adviser of a division has under him an assistant and an adviser for political
matters."
14. The activity of these groups was apparently directed by the Soviet Military Attache in
Peking. For this purpose the Military Attache set up a Peking Military Center which, in
addition to the Attache, consisted of a representative of the Intelligence Section of the Soviet
Mission to China and a representative of the Military Section of the Central Committee of the
CCP.
15. Soon after the Kuomintang-Communist break, Soviet activities and influence in the
Kuomintang were curtailed. However, Soviet efforts were then more intensively directed
toward the Chinese Communist Party and the USSR continued to be highly influential until the
Central Committee of the CCP moved to Kiangsi. Soviet advisers are not known to have been
with the Chinese Communists during the stay in Yenan.
C. KIANGSI
16. While the Chinese Communist leadership in Shanghai was attempting to bolster its
waning influence in urban areas, Mao Tse-tung was building up Communist influence in the
peasant areas of Kiangsi. Although soviet areasl of short duration began to emerge in South
China as early as 1927, it was not until November 1931 that the first Soviet (at Juichin,
Kiangsi) was proclaimed. Chou En-lai came from Shanghai for the first meeting which
elected Mao chairman. The Central Committee, which was still in Shanghai in 1931, decided
that the establishment of soviet areas was its most important work. It set up military com-
mittees in every important soviet area. The Secretary of the Politburo of the local Party
organization, two or three of its important members, the provincial secretary, the top mili-
tary commander, the highest commissar and the chief of staff were to form each military
committee. In the Central Soviet, Chou En-lat, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Hsiang Yang, Ch'in
Po-ku, Liu Po-ch'eng, Wang Chia-hsiang were members and at one time Chou En-lai was
Chairman. Later, Mao was Chairman, while Chu Teh and Chou En-lat were vice-chairmen.
Chang Kuo-t'ao was Chairman of the Hupeh -Honan -Anhwei Soviet Military Committee and
Hsia Hsi was Chairman of the Hunan-West Hupeh. These committees had free and independent
power, except for orders from the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee,
and appear to have concentrated on measures to strengthen the Chinese Communist armed
forces.
17. Liaison between the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in
Shanghai and the Kiangsi Soviets was sporadic because of the difficulties in communications.
The Central Committee transmitted only general resolutions to the Soviet regime -- no
detailed directives. Some time later (the exact date is not known) the Central Committee
moved to Juichin, but its membership dispersed throughout the Communist-held areas in
South China. The real power of the Communist Party was in the hands of Chen Po-ku who
was then Secretary of the Party and Chou En-lai who was chairman of the Military Committee.
1 Chinese soviet areas were regions controlled by Communist forces where the Communists
had attempted to set up governments patterned after the Soviet Union. Except for advice
given by USSR representatives attached to the Chinese Communist Party in these areas,
Chinese soviets had no connection with the Soviet Union.
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18. The nucleus of the Communist army in the Kiangsi days was the peasant organi-
zation Mao had created in the rural areas. In May 1927 Mao had been elected the first
president of the National Peasant Federation (and dismissed from the Politburo of the CCP
in November 1927 for this activity, regarded as a "deviation"). The Kiangsi Army was
composed of many diverse and unorganized elements. 'So little information during this period
is available concerning the specific organization of the military and its relationship to the
Party, that even tentative conclusions probably are not justified. While the early experiences
and mistakes made by the Communist leadership in its military operations during this period
would shed light on Communist military operations generally, the Kiangsi army should not be
considered as the prototype for the Chinese Communist army during the anti-Japanese period
or later. The army organization developed as a result of trial and error -- and there were
many errors.
19. Next to nothing is known about the Chinese Communist Party development for
military activities during the Yenan Period. The Communists went into Yenan in 1935 a
badly mauled and decimated organization with little or no military potential. Sheer will
power kept them from disintegrating completely. Their forces numbered about 20,000. In
two years of recuperation they became a formidable force and in 1937 by agreement with
Chiang Kai-shek the Red Army was absorbed into the National Army. Only 45,000 Communist
troops were recognized, however, and designations for only three divisions. (115th, 120th and
129th) were given them. Collectively these three divisions formed the Eighth Route Army.
When "Route Army" formations were abolished something like a year later, the Eighth
Route was incorporated into the Eighteenth Group Army.
20. The remainder of the-Red partisan detachments formed the Communist New.
Fourth Army, In 1937 this army totalled 12,000 comprising four detachments. In addition,
it has been estimated that the Communist forces were augmented by the People's Militia
(Min Ping) numbering about 2,200,000. The, Central Committee -of the Party remained in
Yenan and directed the operations of the armed -forces, which were organized along the fol-
lowing lines.
E. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES DURING THE ANTI-JAPANESE
RESISTANCE
21. The armed forces of the Chinese Communists fell into three general categories:.
The Field Forces, The Local Forces (Guerrilla Army) and the People's Militia.
22. The unit designations of the Chinese Communist armies were fairly orthodox,
although strict standards were not observed for the size or functions of army units. The
squad was the smallest unit. These were organized into platoons, then companies, battalions,
regiments, brigades, divisions, and army or group army directly responsible to General
Headquarters. The command channels of the army were often enmeshed with the govern-
mental and Party organizations (see chart .~_._ ,._). Border Region Governments were set up
in liberated areas very often by the Military Committees of the local-Party organizations
with subdivisions of Sub-region, Hsien (County), ChU (township) and Village. The provincial.
Party organization followed this breakdown.
23. The Field Forces and the Local Forces made up the so-called regular troops of
the Communist army and may be considered the combat troops. The Field Forces were
usually slightly better equipped and trained than the Local Forces. The Field Forces were
moved about from one area to another as the military situation demanded and they generally
wore uniforms.
24. The Local Forces or Guerrilla Army usually confined their operations to particu-
lar (home) areas and wore plain clothes. The Local Forces as well as the Field Forces
received their orders through regular channels of command and both were supplied by regular
supply organs. The personnel of the Local Forces were drawn from the local inhabitants.
These men received the same military and political training as did the members of the field
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forces. They did not regularly engage in civilian productive work.1 The guerrilla forces
were controlled by the commander of a Region. The Commanders of separate guerrilla
detachments besides being responsible to the regional commander were, during the Japanese
War, also accountable to the local People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance.
The tasks of the Local Forces were threefold: First, to protect the local government person-
nel and assist the civil government in the execution of its duties; second, to protect the
"people's interests" and fight with them when the enemy entered the district; third, to co-
operate with the regulars in local operations.
25. The forms of organization of the guerrillas varied depending upon local conditions
and the tasks to be performed. The units were large or small, and there was no uniformity in
their weapons.. Guerrilla units sometimes operated independently of the regulars; but for any
sizeable operation -- such as a frontal attack upon a strong point -- they were required first
to obtain the consent of the local army commander. If an opportunity for surprise action
against a strong point presented itself, they were authorized to attack without orders. The
guerrilla military organization, while based on that of the Field Army, was not quite so rigid.
Their leaders were from their own ranks, subject to the approval of the Field Army. Except
in moments of emergency, these leaders discussed all plans with the others before orders
were issued.
26. The People's Militia (Min Ping) was composed of men and women throughout
Communist-controlled areas, selected on the basis of courage, physical condition, endurance
and initiative. Unlike the two groups of regular forces, they engaged regularly in production
and performed their military duties as the occasion demanded. Every able-bodied Chinese
Communist of either sex between the ages of 16 and 45, who was not a member of the regular
army Field Forces or Local Forces (guerrilla) was a member of the People's Militia. (Most
of the members of the People's Militia were, however, non-Communist volunteers.) During
the Japanese war, there was at each level of administration (region, district, sub-district,
county, township and village) a People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance.
This body, including an Anti-Japanese Service Section, Demolitions Section, Training Section
and Operations Section, was subordinate to the Communist military commander and the
Political Commissar of the Communist army in the region, district, etc. The People's Com-
mittee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance trained and directed the operations of the follow-
ing four groups which comprised the People's Militia:
27. The Youth Vanguards were made up of inhabitants between 16 and 23 years of age.
Their training consisted of military drill, use of weapons and first aid, as well as political
indoctrination and intelligence work.
28. The Model Detachments were male graduates of the Youth Vanguards. This group
supplied replacements to both the regular army Field Forces and Local Forces. The "local
guerrilla groups," formed within the Model Detachments from those who desired particularly
active service, should not be confused with the Local (Guerrilla) Forces above, which were
composed of full-time guerrillas. These groups, as all members of the People's Militia,
engaged in production in addition to their military duties.
29. Self Defense Detachments were able-bodied, though usually older men who were
not members of any of the other groups. They were organized into small groups whose function
was to protect the homes and fields in event of raids by small Japanese parties and sabotage
in the event of Japanese occupations. Other functions included (1) gathering information about
the enemy; (2) employing measures to prevent the enemy from gaining information of their
troops, such as stationing sentries at strategic points on the roads and requiring all travellers
In Chinese Communist held areas, where nearly every inhabitant was a member of one or
more organizations of a para-military nature, the distinction between those who followed
their regular civilian pursuits andengaged in military operations only in their spare time
or as the occasion warranted, and those who were full time soldiers is important. The
People's Militia were in the former category, the Field and Local Forces in the latter.
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to present passports signed by competent authority; (3) relaying the wounded from the battle-
field back to the nearest hospital.
30. Women's Detachments consisted of able-bodied women who did not belong to the
Youth Vanguards. Their organization and functions were similar to those of the Self Defense
Detachments.
31. The People's Militia were generally considered as part-time fighters, going into
action only when their own homes and villages were threatened'or -attacked. They provided
the regulars with intelligence and supplied transport and stretcher-bearing services during
action in the vicinity of their own villages. They also acted as guides or messengers when
necessary, although their principal duty during times of inaction was the protection of the
roads and trails. They mounted a sentry service twenty-four hours a day. When the People's
Militia did participate in battle their wounded were given the same treatment as regulars and
the dependents of casualties were given the same benefits. Special labor exchanges -- some-
times with whole villages as units -- were organized to care for the crops and the fields of
the People's Militia during large-scale Operations requiring their absence for long periods.
32. During the period of resistance against the Japanese, the CCP employed the
People's Militia in active support of the regular forces to protect supply lines, for evacuation
of the wounded and in harrassing operations. As a means of escape from Japanese raiding
forces, village inhabitants and members of the People's Militia constructed elaborate nets
of caves and tunnels. The tunnels, originally devised by individual households to escape
Japanese detection, eventually became elaborate networks within the village and later served
as underground links between villages. They were built with numerous narrow twists and
turns both on the horizontal and vertical planes, making defense a fairly easy matter. The
People's Militia used mine war effectively against the Japanese. In many areas the Japanese
were reluctant to leave their blockhouses and garrisons, since roads and paths were mined
nightly. Mine casings were received from local, primitive ordnance factories and were often
improvised from household utensils or hollowed-out stones. The Militia was also deployed
to tear down and destroy blockade walls, and to fill ditches and moats surrounding Japanese
garrisoned villages. They were instructed to waylay individuals and small groups of
Japanese. They developed special waylaying techniques, such as "sparrow warfare" whereby
they lured Japanese detachments away from their strongpoints attempting to force the detach-
ment to separate, making the smaller groups vulnerable to Communist attacks. They were
often utilized in intelligence operations, planting intelligence agents in Japanese occupied
villages and in many Japanese units.
33. A typical and perhaps theoretical table of organization of a Chinese Communist
Guerrilla Company is shown on the Chart below. It was taken from "Guerrilla Warfare" by
Mao Tse Tung published in 1937.
Organization of an Independent Guerrilla Company
Company Comdr.
Mobile Propaganda
Unit
Company Headquarters
Message Section
Administrative Section
1st Aid & Hospital Sec.
Intelligence Section
1st
2nd
3rd
Plat
Plat
Plat
Sq ad
Squad
Squad
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TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, GUERRILLA COMPANY
RANK
Personnel:
Arm
Company Leader
Political Officer
1
1
pistol
pistol
Executive Officer'
1
pistol
Company Headquarters
Message Section Chief
1
- _ -
gnal
Administrative Sec. Ch.
1
rifle
Public Relations
3
rifle
Duty Personnel
2
- - -
Barber
1
Cooks
10
- - -
Medical Section Chief
1
- - -
Asst.
1
1st Nursing
4
Intelligence sec. Ch.
1
rifle
In a Bence
9
rifle
Platoon Leaders
3
rifle
Squad Leaders
9
rifle
Nine Squads of eight
_
72
rifle
Total
122
3 Pistols, 96 rifles
NOTES
1. Each squad consists of from nine to eleven men. In case men or arms are not sufficient
the third Platoon may be dispensed with, or one squad organized as company headquarters.
2. The mobile propaganda unit consists of members of the company who are not relieved of
primary duties except to carry out propaganda when they are not fighting.
3. If there. is insufficient personnel the medical section is not separately organized. If there
are only two or three medical personnel they may be attached to the administrative section.
4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If there is an insufficient number of cooks any
member of the company may be designated to prepare food.
5. Each combatant soldier should be armed with the rifles. If there are not enough rifles,
each squad should have two or three. Shotguns, lances and big swords can also be furnished.
The distribution of rifles does not have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions
may be assigned platoons it might be necessary to give one platoon more rifles than the others.
6. The strength of a company at the most may be 180, divided into twelve squads of 11 men
each. The'minimum strength of a company may be 82 men divided into six squads of 9 men
each.
F. PARTY ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD OF
ANTI-JAPANESE RESISTANCE
34. During the period of anti-Japanese resistance, the Central Revolutionary Military
Council (sometimes called the Central Military Council, or just Military Council) was consti-
tuted as an organ of the Central Committee charged with responsibility for general, overall
direction of Communist military operations. An interlocking relationship was set up between
the Central Military Council, the Politburo and the Central Committee through the assignment
of several individuals to sit on all three organs. [Today, for example, of the 80-man Central
Committee (members and alternates) four hold positions on both the Politburo and the Central
Military Council. Mao Tse-tung heads all three] At least three channels were utilized for
Party control of the military. All three channels were not always employed simultaneously,
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or were they always kept separate and distinct. In the loosely organized guerrilla units, very
often a strong Party man would perform functions which in another area would be allocated to
two or three individuals.
35. Control of strictly military activities originated in the Central Military Council
and went through the general headquarters of either the Communist Army or the People's
Militia to the unit commanders in the field. A good deal of autonomy in military matters was
allowed.
36. High level political control of military units was exercised through the Political
Commissar system, which was employed in all types of forces, regular or irregular. The
Political Commissar (or Political Instructor in the smaller units) headed the Political Work
Organization. Theoretically, his authority was equal to the Commander of the military unit
on each level. In practice his authority usually exceeded that of the Commander. Generally
speaking, the authority of the Political Commissar was not limited, while the military com-
mander of a unit could not interfere in strictly political matters. According to one source
the delineation of responsibilities was as follows:
(1) All military orders were countersigned by the Political Commissar. Orders of
the Political Departments (probably Political Affairs Committees) were issued inde-
pendently and were not countersigned by the military commander.
(2) Work among the masses, such as propaganda, organization and reconstruction,
was the duty of the political department.
(3) Helping in the establishment and expansion of armed partisan organizations was
the duty of the political department.
(4) In matters of personnel the two branches were independent in operation.
(5) Party expenses were paid by the political department.
(6) The Political Work Organization under the Political Commissar was responsible
for propagandizing, organizing and arming the masses. It was its responsibility to
insure cooperation between the armed forces and the people.
Generally, the work of the Political Commissar and his organization was along three main
lines: (1) political work among the troops themselves; (2) work of the troops among the
people; (3) work among enemy troops and in enemy-occupied areas. These are discussed
below:
(1) Political work among the troops themselves. In existing companies, schools, and
military organs, they set up political organs to carry on normal political work. In
battalions they set up political guides to direct Party branches in the companies and
political soldiers.
(2) Work among the people. Political work among the people was likewise very broad.
In regions under military control, the Political Commissar first acted for the soviet
governments, mass organizations, local armed forces, etc. After a local government
was set up, all work was carried on in close connection with it, such as cooperation
between civil and military, military supply, recruiting, etc.
(3) Work among enemy troops in enemy-occupied areas. Ordinarily there was an
Enemy Troop Operations Section or Committee. Its work was to disintegrate enemy
troops, propaganda, and secret organizations as well as infiltration and fifth column
activity; it was charged with care of prisoners and secret work among the people and
people's groups in enemy-held areas.
37. The Party maintained its own organization in the military establishment, organiz-
ing Party cells and committees on all levels. In this way it directly controlled the basic
personnel and cadres of the military. Party Affairs Committees existed in the General Head-
quarters of the Field Army as well as in the headquarters of the Military District Forces (the
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local forces) and in the People's Militia. At the head of the Party Affairs Committee was a
secretary with one or two deputies. Party Affairs Committees generally numbered between
seven and fifteen members; the size of the military unit in which they operated was the deter-
mining factor. The Committee's main objective in military units was to expand its member-
ship among the enlisted men of the combat force. The Party Affairs Committees in the armed
forces could control only Party members. They could not directly influence officers and men
who were not Party members.
38. Interlocking control between the Political Work Organization (the Political Corn-
missar and staff) and the Party Affairs Committees was usually achieved through appointment
of one individual as Political Commissar and as Secretary of the Party Affairs Committee.
In most military units the high ranking Political Work Organization personnel were largely
Party Affairs Committee members also.
39. The type of political work organization in various Chinese Communist Army units
depended upon the size, composition and activities of the unit concerned. In the most regular
armed force of the Chinese Communists, the 8th Route Army, a fairly formalized political
department existed by 1938. The Political Department of the 8th Route Army (then located in
Shansi province) was headed by Chou En-lat and contained five sections:
Organization
Education
People's Movement
Enemy Service (POW's)
Work Against Traitors (Counter -espionage).
The general functions of the various sections was probably as follows:
40. The Organization Section was apparently largely responsible for political
personnel and the selection and training of cadres. It sent organizers into rural areas, and
had some (although how much is not clear) control over the Political instructors in subordi-
nate army units.
41. The Education Section operated political indoctrination schools and classes as
well as formal schools to teach the illiterate soldiers to read and write. Most of the political
indoctrination was centered in the Anti-Japanese Clubs, which were organized in every army
company.
42. The People's Movement Section was responsible for the. organization of civilians
into semi-military groups to give aid and support to the armed forces. The exact relationship
and delineation of responsibility between this section and the Political Department of the
Headquarters of the People's Militia is not clear. There may have been considerable over-
lapping of activities, in which case the decisions of this Section would take precedence over
those of any section in the People's Militia. The People's Movement Section directed such
groups as the People's Self Defense Corps; the Farmer Partisans; the Farmer, Workers,
Student and Teachers Union.
43. The Enemy Services Section was responsible for the housing, feeding and
Indoctrination of enemy (Japanese and Kuomintang) POW's. The Chinese Communist practice
was to treat the prisoners well, often providing them with better food than their own soldiers,
to indoctrinate them and, if the POW's desired, to allow them to return to their own lines.
They hoped (and were very often successful) that the well-treated prisoners would encourage
other enemy soldiers to defect.1 If the enemy prisoner did not want to return to his own lines,
A NEW YORK TIMES dispatch from Korea, 15 February 1951, tells of one case of similar
treatment of UN soldiers by Chinese Communists. Thirty-seven American, British and
South Korean prisoners were allowed to return to their own lines after they had been given
a twenty-day course in Communism, good treatment, good food -- the prisoners got better
food than the Chinese troops themselves -- and instructions to spread a kind word about
Chinese and North Korean intentions in Korea. A few minutes before the released prisoners
took off from enemy positions, they were loaded down with propaganda literature written in
English and Korean.
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he was allowed to remain with the Chinese Communists. He was required to help the Com-
munists in.propaganda work, such as by becoming a "shouter" (one who in battle shouts to
the enemy to defect) and in various organizations, such as the Japanese People's Anti-war
Leagues.
44. The Work Against Traitors Section was the counter-espionage organization. No
detailed information concerning its activities has been found.
45. Local governments were set up by the Military Committee and were responsible
to the Military Committee for supplies, health, and for the employing and directing of most
of the men. The basic military organization of the local governments was a self-defense
corps, also known as red guards, which was organized locally; neither officers nor men left
production to assume these duties. From the self-defense corps was chosen a portion to
constitute main body troops. These main body troops on the one hand gradually became
regulars; on the other, they undertook the duty of local fighting and, in large part, the re-
plenishing of the Red Army. They gradually got away from production. In normal times,
the main body of local armed forces undertook defense of soviet areas and relevant border
activities.
G. SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
46. The service functions of the Chinese Army were organized casually and informally,
the type and extent of the organization being determined by the needs of the moment. Service
activities were generally oriented to the requirements of the Field Armies with the needs of
the Guerrilla Forces and the People's Militia receiving lower priorities.
47. Communications between units of the Chinese Communist forces were usually
severely limited by a shortage of equipment and trained operating and maintenance personnel.
At the end of the Long March in 1935 the only means of contact the Communist forces had
with the outside world was allegedly a pedal-operated radio transmitter. Previous to that,
sporadic telegraphic contact existed between the Soviets in Kiangsi and between the
Federated Soviet and the Central Committee in Shanghai before the CC moved to Juichin,
Kiangsi. Radio contact also existed between the Soviet Union and Kiangsi Soviet. With the
capture of enemy radio equipment, the Communists gradually built up a communications net,
until in 1944 the 18th Group Army Headquarters in Yenan was in communication with the
various military regional headquarters by radio at least once a day, and radio communications
existed between the Regional Headquarters and the Military Districts, and in some instances
to local regimental headquarters and intelligence stations. In addition to radio, wire com-
munications were used by the army. Field telephones and telephone wire, mostly used for
operational communication, were considered priority materials to be captured from the
Japanese and the Kuomintang.
48. One of the most important factors contributing to the victories of the Chinese
Communists was the completeness of their intelligence. The positions of the Kuomintang
were usually known, the positions of the Red Army, hiding in the hills, were nearly always
unknown. Their success in intelligence was largely the result of wholesale coverage of the
target, rather than skill in methods. Nearly every village inhabitant was a low level inform-
ant of one kind or another, reporting on enemy movements and preparedness. Agents often
penetrated enemy army units and passed information concerning enemy intentions to the
Communists. Peddlers and servants were used by the Communists to obtain access to
Japanese block houses in order to determine the number of soldiers in the fortress, the type
and location of arms -- information required before an attack could be planned. In high
level penetrations especially in the cities, the lack of portable radio equipment often pre-
vented agents from getting timely information back to Chinese Communist Army Headquarters.
49. Supplies during the early years of Japanese occupation were augmented by the
Chinese Central Government, who furnished the Communists with some explosives, rifles,
ammunition and grain. This flow was curtailed in 1940 and halted in 1941. Thereafter, the
Communists had to provide supplies and maintenance exclusively through their own efforts.
They fared best with food and clothing, while the quantity of arms, ammunition, medical sup-
plies and other important manufactured and imported supplies was meager. Much of the latter
was obtained as loot from defeated Japanese and Kuomintang units.
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50. There are few other historical examples of guerrilla hostilities as thoroughly
organized from the military, political and economic point of view as those of the Chinese
Communists. The guerrilla forces of the Communists were clever and adaptable -- quick
to take advantage of any weakness in the enemy military position.
51. Shortage of ammunition had a noticeable effect on Chinese Communist operations.
While the Chinese Communist armies existed as a guerrilla force fighting the Japanese and
the Kuomintang, they fought small engagements of short duration. They avoided use of long
range fire and made extensive use of land mines and grenades.
52. The Staff Procedure when later applied to larger Chinese Communist units was
influenced by the early emphasis on small scale operations. Communist forces had little
experience in logistics. As a result, they were least effective in large-scale, coordinated
action. They attained a high degree of efficiency in independent operations. Their leaders
had courage, initiative and self-reliance. Their troops were highly mobile. They knew the
terrain intimately and used it to best advantage. They were able to improvise with limited
forces and equipment,
53. The Chinese Communist tactics in guerrilla warfare developed primarily as the
result of experience. Few precedents 'existed for this type of operation and none was directly
applicable to China. Lenin's writings on guerrilla warfare were used as a reference, as well
as. T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) and an early Chinese guerrilla tactician, Sun Tzu. Largely
from experience, partly from study, Mao formulated the general principles for guerrilla
fighting and published some of the conclusions in "The Strategic Problems of Guerrilla War-
fare" in 1937. In this book Mao outlines his strategy for defeating superior enemy forces.
Mobility, he concludes, is the most important attribute of successful guerrilla forces. The
quick thrust, disguise, physical annihilation of enemy troops and the capture of spoils are the
aims of guerrillas. They must be prepared to fight a protracted war, avoiding the enemy if
possible, never engaging him unless it can be made certain in advance that the engagement is
to the guerrillas' advantage. Mao formulated four slogans:
When the enemy advances, we retreat.
When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them.
When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.
When the enemy retreats, we pursue.
54. The objective of the Chinese Communist guerrillas was to pin down as many enemy
troops as possible in. areas of minor military importance. The Japanese tried many counter-
measures against the guerrillas, but none succeeded in stopping the constant harrassment.
Primary targets of the Communist guerrillas were supply lines, supply dumps (to obtain
weapons and ammunition) and weak and isolated enemy garrisons.
55. One account of Communist train-wrecking activities is typical of their operations.
The usual method of placing the explosive charge under the rail was used on a Japanese-
controlled rail line. When the Communists ran out of explosives, they developed a system of
pulling the,inner rail spikes, especially where the train tracks curved. The Japanese then
countered by running a light train over the road ahead of the supply train, in an attempt to
locate possible sabotaged areas. The Communists, to conceal the sabotage, carved wooden
spikes, painted them iron color and inserted them in place of the removed spikes. As addi-
tional harrassment, the guerrillas organized "thieving parties." In one case two hundred
farmers were organized to devote two nights a week to anti-Japanese activities. They would,
for example, tear up and hide 10 rails and chop down 28 telegraph poles a night. The Japanese
very often offered rewards for the return of the rails. Those Chinese who earned the rewards
were executed when they returned home.
56. Many more examples of harrassment and weakening of the enemy forces by
Communist irregulars could be cited. Each case, however, was peculiar to local conditions.
-13-
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Each represented ingenuity and each was successful because the guerrillas had the organized
support of the local population. The anti-guerrilla measures employed by the Japanese and
Kuomintang -- additional security, mass reprisals, taking of hostages, etc. -- were in most
cases unsuccessful because the Communists had succeeded in enlisting the active support of
the local inhabitants.
I. THE POST-WAR PERIOD
57. After the defeat of the Japanese the Chinese. Communists applied the same tactics
against the Kuomintang. As the size of their controlled areas and the strength of their mili-
tary forces increased, their military operations took on a more regular and formal appearance.
To be sure, militia and guerrilla forces were still retained, but the emphasis shifted to the
regular armed forces. Since it was not the intention of this paper to examine the organiza-
tional structure of the regular armies of Communist states (all, of course, more or less
patterned after the Soviet model), this phase of Chinese Communist. military organization has
not been investigated.
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SECRET/CONTROL
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PARTY CONTROL OF COMMUNIST FORCE
PRIOR TO 1944
CENTRAL MILITARY
COUNCIL
L
GHO
PEOPLE'S MILITIA
SUB-MILITARY
REGION COM-
MITTEE FOR
RESISTANCE
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VILLAGE
COMMAND
PEOPLES
MILITIA
UNIT
Lj- WOMEN'S
DETACHMENT
SELF DEFENSE
DETACHMENT
LITTLE
1 VANGUARDS
Lj- YOUTH
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Lj- MODE L
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GHO
COMMUNIST FORCES
GOVERNMENTAL
STRUCTURE
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4 th ARMY
PARTY
SECRETARY
PARTY
AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
MILITARY
CELLS
PARTY
SECRETARY
PARTY AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
CELLS
SOLDIER'S
MEETING
SOLDIER'S
CLUB
YOUTH
DETACHMENT
SIMILAR POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION AS
FOR DIVISION
BORDER AREA
COUNCIL
BORDER AREA
GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE
SUPERVISOR'S
OFFICE
HSIEN
COUNCIL
CHU
(TOWNSHIP)
OFFICE
VILLAGE CITIZEN'S
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
VILLAGE
GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE
SECRET/CONTROL U. S. Officials Only
POLITICAL
WORK
ORGANIZATION
POLITICAL
COMMISSAR
POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION
EDUCATION
PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENT
ENEMY
SERVICE
WORK
AGAINST
TRAITORS
POLITICAL
COMMISSAR
H ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE
PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE
HSIEN
COMMITTEE
LIAISON
OFFICERS
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP GREECE
A. Introduction
B. Resistance Period
C. Uprising of December 1944
D. Truce: February 1945 - 1947
E. Uprising of 1947 - 1949
The "Democratic Army"
Origins
The Buljkes Camp
The Rubig Camp
Recruiting
Organizatiou
Strength
Staffs
Supreme War Council
General Headquarters
Disposition
Party Control of the Democratic Army
Organization of Tactical Units
Service Elements and Other Arms
Propaganda
Intelligence
Supply
Role of the Underground Political Apparatus
KKE Organization for Subversion
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE CP GREECE
A. INTRODUCTION
1. During the German occupation of Greece, the CP Greece (KKE) built up a political
and military resistance force. It has twice tried to seize power by force utilizing its resist-
ance army. The attempts were essentially on the pattern of post-war Communist revolutions
in colonial areas of Southeast Asia, but with a number of differences. The most important of
the features that set the attempts of the CP Greece apart from those of the CP's in Southeast
Asia are these:
a. The CP Greece had a larger number of experienced cadres and a more widely
spread organization. Politically, its social basis was not so narrow as that of the CP
Philippines, for example. This may have led to a miscalculation in strategy: an over-
estimate of the "ripeness" of the city proletariat and the consequent adoption of a mili-
tary strategy that was offensive at a time when it should have been primarily defensive.
b. Its military force was more experienced in actual combat than some of the
resistance-born armies in SEA (Philippines and Malaya), which had had little actual
fighting experience.
c. The first attempt, in December 1944, was made against British forces that had
immensely greater, immediately available resources to draw upon than the defense
forces of a typical colonial country in the postwar period.
d. In the second attempt, beginning in 1947, the CP's army was securely anchored on
satellite bases and received generous material support from the satellites (particular-
ly, Yugoslavia and Albania).
e. In both attempts, the CP had to face the consequences of Soviet priority of interest
in its own national welfare at the expense of Communist revolution: in 1945, the Soviets
refused to aid the CP Greece because of (temporary) unreadiness to antagonize Great
Britain; in 1948, they precipitated the break with Tito and thereby deprived the CP
Greece of needed supplies and geographic security.
f. The material and moral resources of the Greek Government were greater than
those of (at- least the native) governments of SEA. The tradition of democracy was
strong in Greece; hardly exists in SEA.
g. To this was added the stabilizing effect of direct U.S. aid (Truman Plan), which not
only neutralized the disrupting effects implicit in the strategy of guerrilla campaigns
in colonial countries, but directly enabled the Government to increase the force of its
anti-Communist campaign.
B. RESISTANCE PERIOD
2. When Italian forces invaded Greece on 28 October 1940, the CP Greece (KKE) was
illegal, unpopular, and disorganized. Its leaders were in jail or in exile, and authority rested
with a "Temporary Administration" which was a tool of the Greek Police. The Party's policy
stood at first for resistance to the Italians, but from the beginning of 1941, for non-resistance,
in accord with the international Communist line of the moment.
3. The Italians were driven back, but the Germans came to their aid and occupied
Athens on 27 April 1941. They freed about 300 Communists from prison. One of them,
Georgios Siantos, proceeded to organize a Central Committee.
4. On 21 September, following the German attack on the USSR in June, the KKE
sponsored the formation of a resistance bloc of several political parties and groups called
the National Liberation Front (EAM). The EAM moved progressively under the control of the
KKE. In February 1942, the EAM announced the formation of its own military force, National
Liberation Army (ELAS).
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5. ELAS undertook to gather under its leadership a number of independent guerrilla
bands. It'was led by a Communist named Velouchiotes, commonly called "Ares." Later, when
ELAS had expanded, command was turned over to Col. Stephanos Seraphes, a regular Greek
Army officer. At peak strength, ELAS is believed to have totaled 133,000, of which 83,000
were under arms, and the remaining 50,000 enrolled in the reserves.
6. The KKE planned to use EAM and its army to establish Communist control over the
country when the Germans had been driven out. This purpose was probably already decided
upon when, in December 1942, a secret "Panhellenic Conference" of the Party declared that
the Party's aim was "to struggle for the liberation of Greece from its slavery;"called for the
formation of a Provisional Government of the EAM groups; and agitated against the aati-
Communist groups "masquerading as resistance organizations."
7. To this end, during 1942, the KKE had consolidated its control over the EAM, and
in 1943, it used ELAS in a campaign against several anti-Communist resistance forces (most
important, EKES; EAO; PAO; EKKA), which it effectively destroyed.
8. On 10 March 1944, EAM created a "Political Committee of National Liberation"
(PEEA), which the KKE planned to have in control of the country when the British arrived.
The "ministers" of PEEA were members of non-Communist EAM organizations, except for
G. Siantos, who was Secretary General of the KKE and was slated for the Ministry of Interior.
The others, while technically non-Communists, were clearly controlled by the Party.
The PEEA was to have capped the organization already begun by the EAM in "liberated
areas," where local EAM committees had formed controlled local governments ("self-
governing committees," "People's Courts," and "National Civil Guard"). However, military
and political exigencies led to the abandonment of PEEA and qualified EAM adherence to the
Government in Exile.
9. The Germans began evacuating Greece on 11 September 1944. Inasmuch as the
KKE wanted to preserve ELAS intact, it made no serious effort to interfere with the evacua-
tion.
10. For two days, from 12 October, when the Germans left Athens, until the 14th,
when the first British contingents arrived, the KKE was in a position to seize power. The
EAM was generally popular and its rivals had been neutralized militarily. Why the Party
failed to seize the opportunity is still not known. Possible reasons are -- (a) it thought the
British forces would be larger than they were and would arrive earlier than they did; (b)
uncertainty, of public opinion in Greece and abroad; (c) uncertainty of the reliability of non-
Communists in EAM and- ELAS.
11. Following the liberation, the EAM refused to disband ELAS, and on 5 December
1944, began fighting the British in Athens. The rebels were quickly driven out of the city.
On 10 January 1945, a KKE conference decided by a large majority to ask for an armistice.
Fighting ceased on 15 January, and the Varkiza Agreement, providing for a general amnesty,
liquidation of ELAS, and the holding of elections, was signed on 12 February.
12. The Party's defeat in this first attempt to seize power by force of arms has been
attributed to the following:
a. failure to get Soviet support;
b. underestimation of the strength and determination of the British forces;
c. alienation of public sympathy by acts of brutality and the taking of hostages;
d. tactical error of beginning the uprising in Athens, where the Party was relatively
weak, rather than in the North, where it was strong (this due to fear of Yugoslav inter-
vention in Macedonia, using the uprising as an excuse to "assist.")
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D. TRUCE: FEBRUARY 1945 - 1947
13. The KKE undertook to rehabilitate itself politically and organizationally. ELAS
was officially dissolved and large.supplies of weapons were surrendered, but other large
arms stocks were concealed in the mountains and cities. During 1945 and 1946 as many
ELASites as possible were sent into camps in the neighboring satellites. Other military
cadres were enrolled in a veterans' organization ("Panhellenic Union of Fighters of the Na-
tional Campaign of Liberation 1941-1945"), the object of which was to ensure at least partial
political control over the ELAS veterans and to serve as a recruiting agency for a future rev-
olutionary army. ELAS veterans who went into the new Greek military, naval, and security
services were encouraged to join a secret Communist auxiliary (KOSSA). Still other military
cadres were enrolled in strong-arm "self-defense" organizations (MLA) of the Party's city
organizations.
14. The decision to engage in peaceful political activities met with resistance on the
part of some of the ELASites. It was necessary to purge a number of them who, like "Ares,"
preferred to continue the armed fight. The 7th Party Congress of October 1945 approved a
number of organizational changes designed to improve discipline. Control Committees were
to be set up at all levels down to the most important city organizations; cadres were instructed
to improve their "vigilance" against back-sliding and penetration by hostile elements; there
was a general weeding-out of incompetent and suspect cadres and stricter membership re-
quirements were laid down for Party committees; many younger cadres who had come up
during the resistance were replaced by pre-war members.
E. UPRISING OF 1947 - 1949
15. The making of the decision to resume fighting, and the events leading up to it are
obscure. It is possible that the preparatory formulations were not themselves precise, and
also, that the decision to fight was drifted into. It is even possible that the strategy to be
adopted -- whether the uprising should be on the pattern of a colonial revolution, a city in-
surrection, or a combination of the two -- was never precisely thought through.
16. During 1945 and 1946, as has been mentioned, a clear attempt was made to pre-
serve as many military cadres as possible. A number of organizational changes were made
late in 1945: lateral contact between organizations at the same level was curtailed; a "vigi-
lante" responsible for security was appointed by each Party headquarters; KKE organizations
in the countryside were dissolved and their members instructed to join the Agrarian Party
(AKE), which was intended to become the Communists' "legal and open" organization should
the KKE be forced completely underground. Preparation for illegality occurs when the Party
expects either a violent swing to the right in the regime, or when it expects to provoke re-
pression by its own violence. It is impossible at this time to say which of these the KKE ex-
pected in late 1945.
17. In March 1946, the Communists in camps in Yugoslavia began to get regular mili-
tary instruction: they had previously been engaged in labor for the state and their instruction
had been political. Guerrilla bands began operating in the mountains of Greece. The KKE
denied any connection with them, but all during 1946 the MLA ("Self-defense") and other KKE
organizations in the cities recruited for these bands, and Party leaders referred to them with
increasing frequency, as if they were spontaneous uprisings of the people against the intoler-
able oppressions of the "monarchofascist government."
18. It may have been that the KKE hoped to seize power with the advent of a general
political crisis. To Communist eyes there were definite signs of an approaching crisis and
the decision to take to the field may simply have waited upon events. In September 1946,
despite Communist boycott appeals, a plebiscite returned in favor of the restoration of the
Monarchy. During 1946, despite a number of cabinet crises, the regime did not.fall`apart.
On 12 March 1947, President Truman appealed for aid to Greece and Turkey, and the KKE
saw the chances of economic and political ruin in Greece go flickering. The speeches and
writings of Party leaders began to refer to the necessity of forming a "free and democratic
Greece with its own government and its own status, as a state" (Porphyrogenis at a Congress
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of the CP France, 27 June 1947.) During the summer of 1947 the Government arrested
thousands of Communists. By the end of July, the Party declared itself de 'lure illegal and
began to pull its as yet unexposed cadres underground. The hitherto disavowed guerrilla bands
became the "Democratic Army," and on 16 July began broadcasting over the "Voice of Free
Greece." The two principal party newspapers were suppressed on 18 October, following an
editorial in favor of establishing a "free Greece with its own government" as the only way out
of the intolerable "monarchofascist domination."
19. Meanwhile, what were probably vague promises of assistance by Yugoslavia in the
spring of 1946, were made more definite during the winter of 1946. On 24 December 1947, the
Communist radio, broadcasting from Yugoslavia, announced the formation of a "Provisional
Democratic Government of Greece" with a full cabinet, all Communists. Markos Vafiades
was Premier and Minister of War. This "Government" probably had its seat at Skoplje in
Yugoslavia, although an unsuccessful attempt was made the next day (25 December) to take
Konitsa, possibly with a view to making it the capital of the insurrectionary regime.
20. The KKE began its second insurrection with an army of about 20,000. Its forces
were well-armed and well-equipped, and they were based safely in the neighboring satellites
and "liberated areas" in the mountains of Macedonia. The KKE also had a secret auxiliary
organization (KOSSA) in the forces of the Government; an extensive underground political
organization in areas controlled by the enemy, and a terrorist organization (MLA) in the main
cities; and mass political organizations (EAM, EA, AKE) and a maritime union (OENO) which
helped to supply it with materials and recruits for the "Democratic Army."
The "Democratic Army"
21. The Democratic Army was built up largely from ex-ELASites sent into camps in
neighboring Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria during 1945 and 1946. Early in 1946, military
organizers were sent into the Greek mountains from these camps, and from Party organiza-
tions in the cities. Guerrilla bands appeared in the spring and summer. General recruiting
began in December 1947, following a mobilization proclamation issued by the Democratic
Army General Headquarters on 30 November. During the summer of 1948, although a rebel
force of about 10,000 men was defeated in the Grammos area and its remnants forced to flee
into Albania, over 15,000 guerrillas continued operations in Greece. In December 1948, the
Greek Army began a campaign which reduced the Democratic Army to scattered units. In
August 1949, a full scale attack was made on the guerrilla stronghold in Vitsi. On the 16th,
the Greek General Staff announced that all organized resistance there had been broken. Two
weeks later, Government forces launched an attack on the Grammos concentrations. By mid-
October, there were fewer than 2,000 guerrillas remaining in Greece, most of the Democratic
Army having fled into Albania and Bulgaria. The 6th Plenum of the CC/KKE decided on 9
October to abandon the military struggle, announcing this decision on the 16th.
22. Origins. The cadre of the Democratic Army consisted of proven KKE and EPON
(Communist youth members, most of them with experience in ELAS during the resistance.
Most of these, and the reserves who were recruited later by local Party and front organiza-
tions, made their way to reception centers and then, to training camps set up in the neighbor-
ing satellite countries, particularly in Yugoslavia. There they were indoctrinated, given mili-
tary training, and equipped, and assigned to temporary formations that later were sent back
into Greece. Later, in 1947, regular recruit-forwarding systems were set up to channel re-
cruits into the satellite camps or directly to guerrilla bands already operating in the moun-
tains of Greece. During the summer of 1948, general instructions were repeatedly given over
the "Free Greece Radio" to all able Communists and sympathizers to leave the cities for the
guerrilla concentrations.
23. The Buljkes Camp. The main training camp was at Buljkes, in Yugoslavia, a few
miles above Novi Sad. The Buljkes Camp was fed by a number of reception centers close by
the frontiers in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. As early as May 1945, the reception center
at Koumanovo hair.4about 1200 persons in it. Recruits were sent from Kuomanovo to Novi Sad,
where they were joined by others from reception centers at Tetova and elsewhere. When about
4500 recruits had gathered at Novi Sad, they were sent to the main camp at Buljkes.
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24. During 1945, the Buljkes camp served simply as a center where recruits were
assembled, housed, and given political instruction. For purposes of administrative control
and political instruction, the inmates were organized into groups of 130-200. Labor brigades
were organized for work on the Yugoslav railroads, shops, and state farms. Foreign volun-
teers were put into separate brigades. Reported were a Scandinavian brigade of 120 men, an
Italian brigade of 200-300, and a mixed brigade of 150 French, English, Dutch, Swiss, Ameri-
can, and Indo-Chinese volunteers.
25. Military instruction began in March 1946. A military training school was estab-
lished and the work brigades were given a few weapons for target practice an hour or two each
day. Some of the Greeks were attached to Yugoslav Army units for training.
26. A large number of women passed through the Buljkes camp. They were put to
work in the farms supplying the camp, and in the cordage factories, shoeshops, print shops,
etc. that supplied the camp and guerrilla units across the frontier.
27. The Rubig Camp, Albania. According to a complaint made by Greece to the
United Nations, a guerrilla training camp was set up in the spring of 1945 at Rubig in Albania,
50 miles north of Tirana near the town of Lesh, and this camp was used as a "preparatory
military training center for the higher school of partisan warfare at Buljkes." The complaint
,specified that the Albanian Government loaned the camp a 50 mm trench mortar and an
Italian machine gun for training. About 50 men received instruction in these weapons for a
two-week period during August 1945. The 300-400 inmates of the camp received 1-2 hours'
political training every morning. Practical and theoretical military instruction was given at
Rubig. A committee of former ELAS officers at Rubig was alleged to have written a military
training manual, which was mimeographed on paper furnished by the Albanian Government.
The Rubig camp was closed in October 1945, the trainees being sent to Buljkes.
28. Recruits for the Democratic Army were sent back into Greece singly and in
groups. One group, consisting of 235 men, left in closed railroad cars on 28 January 1948.
The men had been given new underwear and wool uniforms made in a shop at Buljkes. The
men were loaded into trucks at Skoplje and taken into Albania, where all equipment bearing
ineradicable Yugoslav markings was confiscated. They then walked across the frontier into
Macedonia.
29. Small replacement camps were established in Macedonia, close to the satellite
frontiers. Trainees from Buljkes and other camps were sent to these replacement centers
where they were armed and eventually reassigned to permanent Democratic Army units.
30. Recruiting. During 1945 and 1946 KKE and front organizations in the cities and
villages exerted strong pressure on local ex-ELAS fighters to join the mobilization of the
Democratic Army. The Government was pictured as being about to persecute all ex-ELAS
and EAM members as part of the "monarchofascist plot" against all "democratic" elements.
Captured guerrillas generally claimed they had been forcibly recruited. Provocation was
used in the propaganda campaign. The guerrillas would raid a village, and in the reaction
that naturally followed, young men with Communist connections or former membership in
Communist mass organizations would be convinced that their only safety lay in fleeing to the
mountains, where they were "Sitting-ducks" for guerrilla recruiters.
31. Systems of safe houses and guides were organized to lead men recruited in
Salonika and other places to the guerrilla encampments.
32. Late in 1947 the Democratic Army began an intensive mobilization drive. Copies
are available of two mobilization proclamations that are supposed to have been issued at this
time, one by the "Democratic Army General Headquarters" dated 30 November 1947, the other
by the provincial "Democratic Army Headquarters of Eastern Macedonia-Thrace" dated 1
December 1947. These called up three "classes" of recruits -- ex-members of ELAS, the
National Civil Guard, and ETA (former ELAS supply corps) -- who were told to make their
own way to the nearest guerrilla headquarters. It was declared that guerrilla " divisions
will make a circuit of the villages and towns near the cities in order to safeguard the de-
parture of the recruits and their travel to recruiting centers." "Draft evaders" were
threatened with "proper penalties."
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33. Recruiting efforts after the outbreak of serious hostilities were largely unsuccess-
ful. Party organizations in the cities were unable to attract many reserves, and the police
interfered with the operation of the forwarding systems. During the summer of 1948, Free
Greece Radio threatened and cajoled in vain. In March the Politburo broadcast an "open
letter" to all city organizations criticising them for "vacillations and hesitations" and calling
for a "mass exodus" of recruits from the towns to the mountains. In October the City Com-
mittee of Athens (KOA) was ordered to disband and its members to report to guerrilla head-
quarters.
Organization of the Democratic Army.
34. The first guerrilla units, formed before the all-out fighting began were small
(10-25 men). In March 1946 it is believed that combat teams of 50-80 men each were organ-
ized in the areas adjoining the frontiers. These teams were divided into platoons, and the
platoons, into 2 groups each. With the arrival in Greece and Macedonia of the Buljkes cadres,
the combat teams were organized into combat commands of 2-3 teams each. Later, more
regular formations were organized: divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and
sections. The growth of the guerrilla bands was made possible by the arrival of men from the
satellite camps, and by forced mobilization in "liberated areas" established near the satellite
frontiers. Between 29 August 1946 and 18 March 1947, seven "Area" or "Regional" Commands
were replaced by Division Headquarters. In addition to regular tactical formations, a large
number of irregular formations, called "area units" or "village units" were organized to
furnish support to the regular units of the Democratic Army. Many Democratic Army units
("independent companies" and possibly platoons) operated in areas detached from larger
commands.
35. Strength. The Democratic Army reached its peak combat strength during the
second half of 1948. Official Greek estimates of guerrilla strength follow:
June 1946
3,000
Jan. 1947
11,000
Jan. 1948
22,500
Nov. 1948
25,000
June 1949
17,490
Dec. 1949
1,130
Jan 1950
780
Dec.1950
245
The breakup of guerrilla units is shown in the figures for November 1948, when the total of
25,000 was believed to constitute 71 battalions and 24 independent companies, in comparison
with which the total for June 1949 was distributed through 37 battalions, 18 double companies,
and 17 independent companies. Government forces always held a very large numerical supe-
riority over the Communists. They were, however, tied down to guarding utilities, property,
and maintaining public order and their own supply lines, whereas the mission of the guerrilla
units was destruction and disruption; the latter plundered the country and kept supply lines
into neighboring satellites short. Furthermore, guerrilla supplies from abroad were backed
up by large officially controlled resources. They were also supported by numbers of Party
members and sympathizers within Government territory.
36. Staffs-. On 27 August 1948 there was published a law of the Democratic Govern-
ment creating a "Supreme War Council of the Democratic Army" to deal with "organization
and direction of the army and... decide the conduct of the war." As first appointed, it consisted
of eight members, with Markos as President. When Markos, charged with Titoism and made
the scapegoat for the defeat of Grammos, was relieved, Zachariades, the Secretary General
of the Party, became head of the Supreme War Council. In April 1949 the Council had eleven
members.
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37. The General Headquarters consisted of Gousias as Military Director (after Markos
was ousted) and Bartziotas as Political Commissar. It had the following staff sections:
Operations
Headed by Kikitsas (Protopapas Sarantis) until he was replaced following Grammos
defeat of 1948.
Intelligence
3 Intelligence Centers
Organization and Armament
a. Commissioned and assigned officers
b. 3 basic armament and ammunition "echelons" (detachments?); repair shops
Medical Service
Field ambulance, hospitals, dressing stations, a battalion of 200 doctors, nurses, and
stretcher bearers, 70% women.
Personnel (Vigilance) or Army Security
All aspects of military security. Kept personnel records. Also in charge of operations
of supply systems in satellites.
Fortifications.
Trenches, other works, bridge repair.
Engineers
Special sabotage teams, for which a pool of 30 officer specialists available. Sabotage
officers attached to divisions, brigades, battalions. Mine-laying.
Transport
2 Transport battalions (mules)
2 Motor transport companies
Enlightenment
In charge of "war correspondents." Enlightenment committees in Division and
District headquarters. Published daily news bulletin, fortnightly newspaper, monthly
magazine. Programming for Free Greece Radio.
Supply
Communications
Cryptography
39. Disposition. The General Headquarters had under its immediate control 4
Divisions, 9 Field Artillery Battalions, an Officers' School, and a Cavalry Brigade. General
Staff Headquarters were also organized for Northern Greece and Eastern Macedonia-Thrace,
and each of these had two or more divisions under its command:
General Headquarters (Vitsi-Grammos- Epirus area)
VIII Division (137, 139, 157, 159 Brigades)
IX Division (16, 108 Brigades)
X Division (14, 105 Brigades)
XI Division (18, 103 Brigades)
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General Staff/Northern Greece
I Division (138, 192, 77 Brigades)
II Division (144, 172, 126 Brigades)
III Division (22, 55 Brigades)
General Staff/Eastern Macedonia and Thrace
VI Division (20, 132 Brigades)
VII Division (350, 355 Brigades)
40. Party Control of the Democratic Army. Party control was exercised through the
channels of the military command itself, and by a system of political commissars, who
represented the Political Bureau of the- Party. The Political Commissar in each tactical unit
worked through the office of the Personnel Directorate ("Ha"), which was responsible for
special intelligence, and also, for supervising policies, personnel, and orders of the units.
Beginning with the spring of 1948,.the Political Commissars also controlled local Party
organizations in areas in which a unit of the.Democratic Army operated.
41. Organization of Tactical Units. "Normal" organization of a Division was as
follows:
Division: 2 Brigades
Brigade: 3 Battalions.
Battalion: 3 Rifle Companies, 1 Engineer Company
Company: 3 Platoons
Platoon: 3 Squads
Squad: 10 men
Actually, organization was seldom "normal," and numerous "double companies" counted as
battalions. Normal strength of a Company was 432, but averaged 50. Division Staffs were
similar to the General Staff in composition.
42. Service Elements and Other Arms.
a. Artillery. Six battalions of two batteries each in the area of General Headquarters.
Elsewhere, in platoons of two pieces each. At its peak, Democratic Army artillery
consisted of --
45 75mm guns
15 105mm guns
31 20mm and 37mm AA
38 20mm and 37mm AT
3 75mm AT
12 120mm mortars
b. Cavalry. Shortage of animals. Cavalry Brigade in Thessaly, consisting of about
200 men in two squadrons. 200-man Brigade in Vitsi. Other small troops.
c. Anti-Aircraft. Special AA troops attached to permanent headquarters, using mostly
German machine guns.
d. Transport. Mostly mule-pack. Two battalions of mountain transport and two
battalions of motor transport (total of about 100 trucks) in Vitsi. Possibly, a battalion
In Grammos.
e. Communications. Communications Battalion with about 280 messengers (couriers).
W/T provided only to brigades and higher eommands, and to battalions on special
missions.
f. Engineers. One Battalion in Grammos; one in Vitsi.
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g. Medical. Shortage of doctors. Dressing stations and field hospitals near satellite
frontiers. Convalescent stations in safe places in mountains. Stretcher-bearers
battalion with strength of about 200 at Vitsi: apparently units detached for service
with combat brigades and battalions.
43. Propaganda. "Enlightenment" of Democratic Army troops was the responsibility
of the Political Commissars. Divisions had Enlightenment Committees; Political Commissars
of Brigades, Battalions, and Companies carried out propaganda personally or through assist-
ants. General Headquarters published daily information reports, a fortnightly bulletin, and a
monthly. Divisions and Brigades also printed propaganda. Free Greece Radio was also a
propaganda instrument.
44. Intelligence. In effect, the entire Party organization was an information-
collecting network. Systematic intelligence work was performed by --
a. Networks of informants in the Greek Government, controlled by agents who were
responsible directly to Party Headquarters (possibly, to the Agitprop Department of
the Central Committee and KOSSA);
b. Combat intelligence elements of the Democratic Army;
c. Counter-intelligence elements of the Democratic Army.
45. Combat Intelligence. Prior to the reorganization of the Democratic Army into
Divisions, (October 1947) the "Area Headquarters" set up Intelligence Centers in the country-
side to organize nets of civilian informants who reported on enemy movements and to set up
observation posts. The Intelligence Centers were manned by an officer and 7-8 men. Infor-
mation collected by direct observation and from the informant networks was sent to guerrilla
headquarters in daily situation reports. Advanced Intelligence Centers, manned by 2-3 men,
were organized in areas controlled by Government forces.
46. When the "Area Headquarters" were replaced by the Division organization, a
regular combat intelligence service called the "II Bureau" was established. It was respon-
sible for reconnaissance (observation, raids to get prisoners, road checks of travellers),
prisoner-interrogation, and the operation of the Intelligence Centers. It was organized as
follows:
Division.: Intelligence Company, consisting of a staff of 3 officers and 3 Intelligence
Platoons.
Brigade: Intelligence Platoon, consisting of a staff of 2 officers, and 3 Intelligence
Sections.
Battalion: Intelligence Section, consisting of 507 men, directly under the Battalion'
Commander and Political Commissar.
Combat Intelligence personnel were armed with automatic weapons and the units were
furnished binoculars.
47. Counter-Intelligence. A special security service called YSA was organized at
Buljkes in October 1947. It posted representatives with tactical units. These representatives,
who were beyond the control of unit commanders, reported on the military and political ef-
ficiency of the commanders and organized counter-intelligence networks among the troops
and the civilians in the unit's area of operation.
48. The chief of the YSA, Michael Terzis, apparently tried to usurp excessive politi-
cal functions, going so far as to challenge the loyalty of Bartziotas, for which lie was rewarded
by, being imprisoned as an "enemy of the people" and his organization dissolved. Its counter-
intelligence functions were taken over by the apparatus of the Personnel Directorate (IIa-
Bureau), which was a part of the II Bureau and which was expanded from mere record-
keeping to become the staff organization through which the Political Commissars operated
in tactical formations of the Democratic Army. a The intelligence functions of the II and Ha
NEW
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Bureaus overlapped to some extent: the latter, however, was primarily responsible for
economic and political intelligence and counter-intelligence, whereas the II Bureau was the
combat intelligence organization.
49. Supply. Most of the food, clothing, arms and ammunition, and technical equip-
ment of the Democratic Army came from supply dumps in the neighboring satellites.
Yugoslavia was the chief supply center. Animal and motor supply trains made regular trips
across the frontiers.
Some supplies were produced in the shops of the Democratic Army camp at Buljkes.
Some were furnished by the Yugoslav Government. Some were sent by other satellite govern-
ments and by front organizations ("Aid to Democratic Greece Committees") in the satellites
and other countries to Yugoslavia and transhipped to the Democratic Army in Macedonia.
Democratic Army units in frontier areas freely sent foraging units across the borders
for water and wood as needed.
50. A mass relief organization called "Mutual Aid" (EA) was established by the Party.
"Responsibies" for EA were attached to the city committees of the Party underground and
were in charge of collecting food, clothing, weapons, and money from Party sympathizers.
EA branches were also set up abroad to collect from Greek expatriates. The Committees of
"Aid for Democratic Greece" were organized by fraternal CP's, which lent their own propa-
ganda and collecting facilities to the cause. Large sums of money and supplies were carried
by Communist seamen of the Party-controlled maritime union, OENO. Some was smuggled
through Greek ports, then overland to guerrilla headquarters by courier. Some was passed
into overland routes through the satellites. Communist agents at neutral ports, such as
Venice and Trieste, received money and goods brought from the United States and elsewhere
and transhipped it overland or by sea to satellite or Greek ports.
Role of Underground Political Apparatus in the Cities
51. The City organizations of the KKE went underground in July 1947. Their role in
the insurrection was to carry on propaganda, furnish recruits, supplies, money, and intel-
ligence to the Democratic Army. They also organized terror squads. The propaganda-
financial support has already been discussed in Part One of the present study ("The Com-
munist Party Underground).
52. Terror Organizations. There were two "Self-defense" organizations created in
Athens: the "Wide Self-Defense" (Mass Self-Defense -- MLA) and the "Narrow Self Defense."
The latter was under the control of the Politburo of the Party until early 1948, when it was
put under the Democratic Army. The "Wide Self Defense" was under the control of the City
Committee (KOA) of the KKE. B~th organizations progressed from defensive operations to
terror work. Each had its own weapons cache.
53." Wide Self-Defense." It was originally planned that the Wide Self-Defense should
be organized by Sectors, corresponding to the areas covered by the Achtidas of the political
apparatus, and that each Sector should have two or more Sections under it, each of these with
a number of "Squares" or "Decemvirates." As it turned out, recruiting difficulties and, more
importantly, vigorous police action., ruined the plan. Of the ten proposed Sectors, the Second
never existed, the Ninth consisted solely of its chief, the First seems also to have had only
one member; the Seventh was "isolated" until the autumn of 1947, when it was combined with
the Eighth; and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth were so disorganized by police arrests that their
remnants were combined into one organization in the spring of 1948. None of the Sectors ever
had more than a handful of "boys." After May 1948, only Sectors Three and Six had any mem-
bers.
54. The Wide Self-Defense was responsible to the KKE City Committee (KOA). A
Responsible for the Wide Self-Defense was a member of the KOA, or attached to it. In the
summer of 1947 he had a staff of four. The personnel turn-over in the headquarters and the
Sectors was considerable. One Sector chief was dismissed when his ideas for action were
deemed too reckless, one was killed by the police, one joined the rebel army, two were trans-
ferred to other organizations, many were arrested. In general, few of the Sector Secretaries
held their jobs for more than three months.
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55. Prior to the general crack-down on all Party activities in July 1947, Wide Self-
Defense groups took part in strikes, acting to protect picket lines and to beat up strike-
breakers. They also served as guards at Party installations and functions, accompanied
protest delegations, agitators, and propaganda distributors. Later, they also made plans for
beatings and assassinations of Government officials and dangerous anti-Communists (par-
ticularly, leaders of the "X" organization, a right-wing group). Few of these plans matured.
56. Narrow Self-Defense. The Narrow Self -Defense was organized by a group of men
picked at the Democratic Army camp at Buljkes for their experience in the wartime terrorist
organization, OPLA, and sent to Athens in March 1946. Each of them was assigned a sector
of the city in which a "Narrow Self-Defense" group was to be organized from members of the
Wide Self-Defense. Each sector unit was to comprise two groups, a "Surveillance-Squad" and
an "Action Squad." It was their job to carry out difficult liquidations, robberies, and other
attacks of violence. The head of the Narrow Self-Defense was responsible to the Politburo
through the "Paralegal Mechanism," which was also responsible for the "Productive
Mechanism" (production of propaganda). Early in 1948 the organization was put under the
Democratic Army, and in October of that year, owing to devastating police action, the rem-
nants of the Narrow Self-Defense were collected into one group.
KKE Organization for Subversion
57. The KKE organization within the Greek Government's services was called KOSSA
("Communist Organization of the Army and Security Corps"). Its purpose was to subvert and
thereby wreck the defenses of the state. It also produced some weapons and intelligence. It
was first organized following the CC Plenum of April 1945.
58. KOSSA was, of course, a very secret organization, and the details of its organiza-
tion are obscure. It consisted of cells, organized by service unit or locality (e.g., army
camp, gendarmerie post, etc.) and directed through a system of functionaries and small com-
mittees parallel to, but separate from, the underground political apparatus of the KKE. Its
headquarters organization is not surely known. At one time, it is said to have had its own
Central Committee; later, to have shed this and to have been under the control of its own
"Politburo" -- a directing triad responsible to the General Secretary of the KKE, Zachariades,
and consisting of --
Mandakis for "military instruction"
Ioannides for "organization"
Hadjivassiliou : for "intelligence matters"
Furthermore, KOSSA has frequently been reported to have been divided into a number of
branches for work in each of the Greek services:
KOVN: Navy
KOX: Gendarmerie
SKO: Army
KOAP: Police
KOA: Air Force
KOLS: Port Authorities
The necessity for such a break-down is far from obvious. It is believed that the KOSSA
organization in the Royal Navy was run by a "Responsible" on the city committee (KOP) for
the port of Piraeus, and the KOSSA organization in the Army was linked, through cut-outs,
with the KKE Regional and City Committees wherever troops were stationed which had KOSSA
members among them.
59. The KKE Regional and City Committees had KOSSA "Responsibles" as Committee
members, or attached to the Committees. The Responsible for a Region directed the work of
KOSSA members in service units stationed in the Region. For this purpose, there was organ-
ized in the Region a KOSSA committee, with a Secretary and a variable number of "Instruc-
tors," each of whom was responsible for KOSSA in one or more service units. The KOSSA
members of a service unit were organized into cells of 3-10 men each. The secretaries of
the cells constituted the Committee of the next higher service command. How far up the
~rwl `8 rr
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military command echelons this organization was carried depended on the number of Com-
munists present, and the organization of the service command. It appears, however, that
there were no KOSSA Committees in units larger than the Regiment. Thus, for example,
there might be two cells in a Company. Their secretaries would constitute the Company
Committee, and the Secretaries of the Company Committees in the Battalion would constitute
the Battalion KOSSA Committee. The KOSSA Regional Committee, through its Instructors,
controlled whatever KOSSA organization existed in the Battalions, Regiments, Independent
Companies and Batteries, etc., in the Region. Lateral contact between organizations at the
same level was restricted, and contact with civilian KKE organizations (i.e., the Instructors)
was handled through couriers and cut-outs, utilizing safe-houses.
60. Party members called up for service were transferred from the political appara-
tus to the KOSSA organization in the area in which each was to serve. Letters of introduction
and other identifications were furnished transferees to enable them to join the KOSSA organi-
zation. In some cases, transfers or revival of Party membership were effected personally:
a soldier would be vouched for by a KOSSA member of the unit who had known him before, or
investigation would be made through KKE organizations in his home.
61. KOSSA was able, in the early stage of the fighting, to engineer individual and
mass desertions (in one case, that of a whole company), partial mutinies, fake surrenders to
the rebels and subsequent "escapes" sans equipment; and to generate discontent and de-
moralization of units engaged in combat with the insurrectionaries.
A KOSSA network in the Navy was discovered in 1948 and the following acts were
attributed to it by the Greek Government:
Intelligence
Information on personnel, armament, organization, etc., of the College of Naval
Cadets.
Plans for the war emergency organization and operation of the naval mine service.
Information on the personnel, armament, operations, etc., of the LST Chios.
Secret organization and operations of the Intelligence Bureau.
Information on the organization of the Ministry of Marine.
Information on the personnel, armament of security organization of the Greek
Navy in Piraeus and the South Aegean.
Information on fleet locations and operations.
Information and plans for actual fortification of the Northern end of Aegena.
Information on personnel, armament, operations of the radio service of the Navy.
Information on the organizations of the Harbormasters in Piraeus and other ports.
Secret plans of armament and installations at Skaramanga and Palaskus.
Information on plans for defense of the Royal Arsenal at Salamis.
Defense organization of the Ministry of Marine. I
Movement and operations of the destroyer Hastings in anti-bandit operations, Gulf
of Corinth.
Information on the technical equipment of the Combined Operation Headquarters Volos.
Details of the supply system of the Greek Navy and its morale.
Information and plans on installation of the Greek Navy fuel -oil storage tanks.
Organization of the work, and details of repairs made at the Royal Dockyard, Salamis.
Information and plans on installation of the Greek Navy fuel oil storage tanks.
Information and description of living conditions of the navy crews.
Secret orders and reports of operations, motor launch #483.
Details of the operations of the naval group at Volos in the Pelson mountain area.
Secret orders, situation reports of motor launch Kalambaka.
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Secret reports of operations from the staff of destroyer flotilla.
Operations orders, destroyer Crete.
Reports from cruiser Averoff.
Information of the anti-Communist precautions of the Navy.
Report of operations and patrols of several other vessels.
Sabotage
Plans for the destruction of the machinery of the cruiser Averoff.
Plans for the destruction of the machinery of the destroyer Adrias.
Plans for the destruction of the cruiser Averoff by explosives.
Plans for the sabotage of the minesweeping squadron.
Plans for the sabotage of the school of electricians.
Plans for the sabotage of the destroyed Niaoulis by explosives.
Plans for the sabotage of the Royal Dockyard, Salamis.
Plans for the destruction by fire of two motor launches.
Plans for the destruction of machinery and equipment of the radio service.
Plans for the destruction by explosives of the floating drydock, electrical supply,
ammunition storage of the Royal Arsenal, Salamis.
Plans and execution of operation to blow up LST Alfios when she was loading ammuni-
tion (failed because the explosive was discovered prior to the explosion).
Plans and execution of the plot to destroy the destroyer Kiaoulis by explosives (failed
because the saboteur lost his nerve and failed to ignite the charges.)
Actual temporary immobilization of the destroyer Crete by placing emery in the
lubricating oil while ship was engaged in operations against the bandits in the
island of Samos.
Immobilization of the destroyer Kanaris in August 1947 due to scrap iron in the
machinery (not proved sabotage; may have been accidental).
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COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN GREECE 1947-1949
A Guerrilla Headquarters, Bases and aca 0
Training camps reported February 1947. Il ,r
Guerrilla Groups, June 1949.
Guerrilla Reserves outside Greece
reported as of 29 August 1949
Grammos Area: cleared August 1948.
SECRET/ CONTROL
U. S. Officials Only
50
'All IS
0 50 100
KILOMETERS
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ORGANIZATION OF THE CP GREECE
DURING THE INSURRECTION OF 194701949
CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
POLITICAL
BUREAU
PROVISIONAL
DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT
KOSSA
SUPREME
WAR
COUNCIL
GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS
DEMOCRATIC ARMY
I REGIONAL i
COMMITTEES?
Para-legal
Mechanism
Productive
Mechanism
Narrow
Self -Defense
Squads
City Committees
Piraeus I Athens Salonika
Wide
Self -Defense
Cells
(KOB'S)
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*00
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP MALAYA
A. INTRODUCTION
B. MCP RESISTANCE, 1941 - 1945
C. MCP INSURRECTION, 1948
The Policy Decision
Implementation of the Decision
Three-Stage Strategy
Militarization of Party
Military Mobilization
Re-organization of Party
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA)
Armed Forces Department
Tactical Units
Disposition of MRLA Units
MCP Control
MCP Organizational Channels
MCP Organization within the MRLA
Auxiliary Organizations
Support and Technical Services
Supply
Arms and Ammunition
Intelligence
Courier Communications
Training
Operations
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A. INTRODUCTION
1. The CP Malaya (MCP) carried on resistance to the Japanese occupation during the
war and, since the summer of 1948, has been engaged in an armed insurrection. The follow-
ing analysis shows, in some detail how a relatively small CP in a colonial area decided to
launch an insurrection after the Chinese model (acquisition of safe base and gradual build-up
of strength), how it prepared for it, and how it has organized a fighting force and an extensive
civilian support organization to provide the fighting force with food, intelligence, recruits,
,and tactical support.
B. MCP RESISTANCE, 1941 - 1945
2. The MCP was not formally constituted until April 1930. It has always been com-
posed largely of Chinese residents of Malaya. It dominated the Malayan General Labor Union
and had numerous youth, women's, and cultural fronts and auxiliaries.
3. The MCP patterned its line of action against the Japanese after the example set by
the CP China. It formed political resistance organizations and guerrilla bands that became
known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The latter never put up much
of a fight against the Japanese occupation, but it had a certain nuisance value and tied up
Japanese forces in police duty.
4. The British undertook to assist the MPAJA with technical advice and materiel.
Quantities of arms and ammunition were dropped by parachute to MPAJA units, and several
teams of specialists were sent in to train and advise them.
5. The Communists exposed only a part of the MPAJA to the British. Some of their
best units and cadres stayed hidden in the jungles in "secret" formations.
6. Following the Liberation, the MPAJA was dissolved and slightly more than the
number of arms for which the British held signed receipts were turned over. Large stocks,
however, were cached away from those captured from the Japanese and from parachute drops
that the Communists claimed had been lost. The MCP organized the Malayan People's Anti-
Japanese Army Ex-Service Comrades' Association (MPAJA ESCA) to keep together as many
of the resistance veterans as it could.
C. MCP INSURRECTION, 1948
The Policy Decision
7. Following the Liberation, the MCP concentrated on political and organizational
work, strengthening its hold on labor and other mass elements. Its resolutions were strongly
anti-British and the hope for an eventual revolution was implicit in them, as it was in the
fact that arms had been hidden away from the resistance and that resistance veterans had
been pulled into the MPAJA ESCA. There did not appear to be any immediate prospects for
revolution, however. Indeed, when MCP leaders sounded out Soviet, Chinese, and British
Communists on several occasions during 1946 and 1947, they were advised not to take im-
mediate action.
8. In September 1947, however, a new line for Communist Parties in "colonial and
semi-colonial" areas was put out in a speech made to the first meeting of the Cominform by
the Soviet leader Zhdanov. He postulated a new, and very promising, "co-relation of forces"
in these areas as a result of the war: The "imperialist" powers had been weakened economi-
cally and politically at home, and were in poor shape to keep their hold on their colonies.
Furthermore, their international preeminence had been destroyed by the rise of a bloc of
Communist states, particularly, China. Meanwhile, the colonial populations had been consid-
erably "politicalized" by active participation in the resistance and the Communist Parties had
received valuable technical experience. Finally, the CP China had demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of guerrilla tactics as a political device and the possibility of building up military
force and mass strength by the correct use of relatively small initial forces.
2
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9. The Zhdanov thesis was taken up by CP's of Southeast Asia. Numerous Russian
and colonial CP leaders were present at the Second Congress of the CP India (28 February -
7 March 1948), where the new line was endorsed The MCP had on the spot at Calcutta a
delegate to the SEA Youth Conference, which had been held there just prior to the Indian
Party Congress. On 9 March, Lawrence Sharkey, President of the CP Australia, who had
attended the Congress, arrived at Singapore. He stayed there until the 20th and was in close
touch with MCP Waders.
10. The C
March 1948. The
decision was imp:
Situation," which
issued by the CP'
press in May.
entral Committee of the MCP held its Fourth Plenary Conference 17 - 21
decision to undertake armed insurrection was made at that time. The
icit in a document produced by the Conference entitled "The Present
yore strong marks of the Zhdanov thesis and was very similar to documents
f India and Burma earlier in the year. It was reprinted in full in the MCP
Implementat
on of the Decision.
11. The build-up to armed insurrection was to consist of --
a) intensified labor action;
b) a campaign of terrorism;
c) armed uprising by strong guerrilla forces gathered in hills.
12. The MCP-controlled Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions rejected official
mediation offers in April. Numerous strikes were called during April and May. There were
many acts of terrorism: bombs were thrown; factories were burned, strike-breakers were
attacked and intimidated, managers were attacked, rubber trees were slashed. It was
planned to generate a general strike in July, but this was thwarted by Government action.
13. Militarization of the Party. In organizational terms, the transition from the
build-up campaign to the insurrection involved the creation of a military (guerrilla) force to
seize and hold operational bases, and a readjustment of the Party's political apparatus for
the support of and integration with a military campaign, and also to ensure existence under
the condition of illegality and government counter-measures which the campaign of
terrorism was bound to provoke. (See chart .)
14. Military mobilization. Carefully selected members of the wartime "secret"
MPAJA were organized into "Mobile Corps" groups (also called "killer squads"), which
carried out many of the acts of terrorism during the first stage. The groups had 8 - 10
members each, under the control of a local (District) MCP functionary. The identity of the
men was a closely-guarded secret.
15. The MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades' Association (MPAJA ESCA) was used to
mobilize the rest of the former resistance fighters. A meeting of the council of the Associa-
tion was held on 5 May, and District associations were instructed to re-register their
members. This was to be completed in June. On 26 June, it was estimated that 2,000 men
would accept mobilization, including 30% of the "secret" MPAJA and 10% of the "open MPAJA."
On 11 June MPAJA ESCA leaders of Selanger, Pahang, Perak, and Negri Sembilan met and
were instructed to sell their property, destroy all records, and prepare to go to the hills.
The signal for all-out mobilization was to be the anticipated outlawing of the MCP.
16. Re-organization of the Party. Internally, the MCP prepared for the insurrection
by a clean-up of its cadres and by making certain re-adjustments in its apparatus. Security
measures were also instituted in preparation for illegality.
17. On 10 May the Central Committee held its Fifth Plenary Session. A document
was issued calling for an examination of all functionaries, the expulsion of all inefficient and
"extreme democratic" elements (i.e., those who opposed the policy decision), and a tightening
up of requirements for Party jobs. Stricter qualifications were set forth for membership in
Party Committees and for re-admission to active work of cadres who had been expelled or
suspended.
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18. It is interesting to note that changes in the territorial structure of the Party which
lent themselves to guerrilla operations had been made during the summer of 1947, prior to
the policy decision. The country had been divided into three regions, each supervised by a
Regional Bureau: South Malayan Bureau, 2 members; North Malayan Bureau, 2 members;
Central Malayan Bureau, 4 members. The regional Bureaus represent a break down of the
Central Committee. They have no permanent headquarters and meet only for important
discussions. The members of a Regional Bureau are posted throughout the area to lower
Party organizations. This condition is quite similar to that in the Philippines (q. v.).
19. In the national apparatus, the following changes were made:
a. The Organization Committee ceased to exist, its functions being assumed by
the 3 Regional Bureaus;
b. A "Military High Command" was established within the Central Committee.
(It is believed that the Political Bureau transformed itself into the MHC.)
c. The Labor and Trade Union Department was dissolved.
20. Similar changes took place in lower Party Committees (State and District), with
functional offices for "legal" work being abolished and assignments being made for military
work. An "Armed Forces Department" was established early in the insurrection in each
State or Regional Committee. They constituted the staff of the MCP military organization
in their respective areas.
21. The charts at the end of the text show the territorial and functional changes that
were made in the MCP structure during the insurrection.
22. There are indications that the MCP expected to have until August or September
1948 to prepare for its uprising, and that it was stampeded into military action by Govern-
ment reprisals before it had fully mobilized or had made provision for necessary support serv-
ices. The Government declared a state of emergency in June, raided various MCP offices, and
made numerous arrests. This action made it impossible to use legal organizations to con-
tinue the campaign of labor unrest and terrorism. It did not, however, break up the Party
organization itself, for most. of the best cadres. had gone underground and escaped arrest.
23. MCP Military Strategy. An attempt was made in late July 1948 to establish a
"liberated" area in Kelantan, but it was quickly defeated by Government Forces. In December
1948 a plan was endorsed calling for the concentration of guerrilla forces in three main
areas: Pahang-Kelantan border; Southern Selangor; Kedah-Thailand border. From these
safe bases, the Communists were to carry out a war of movement. The rest of the country
was divided into. three zones, each under one of the Regional Bureaus. Here, bases would be
temporary and operations would be small-scale.
24. The above plan having failed, a new plan of three "phases" was produced in
December 1949:
Phase 1: guerrilla warfare waged from temporary bases with the purpose of
wearing down Government strength and building up the strength of the Com-
munist forces (Malayan Races Liberation Army -- MRLA) and their mass
organization (People's Movement -- Min Yuen).
Phase 2: expansion of the Min Yuen; intensified attacks on "enemy" com-
munications and occupation of most vulnerable enemy bases (smaller
villages and production centers).
Phase 3: gradual assumption by Min Yuen groups of governmental control
of areas abandoned by Security Forces; establishment of permanent bases;
substitution by "war of movement" of guerrilla warfare.
25. The MCP has never been able to go beyond the first stage: no strong safe-bases
have been established and held.
Mao,
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Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA)
26. A variety of titles were taken by MCP State Committees for their guerrilla
forces. In February 1949 the CC adopted the official name, Malayan Races Liberation Army
(MRLA).
27. The MRLA is composed mostly of Chinese (as is the MCP), with only a sprinkling
(about 5%) of Malays, Indians, and Japanese deserters. It is believed that about one-half of
the MPAJA has joined the MRLA, but of these only about 35% received any formal or prac-
tical training during the Japanese occupation. There is a shortage of specialist personnel,
but the Chinese are naturally good mechanics and craftsmen.
28. The MRLA, headed by a "Military High Command," which is theoretically a
department of the Central Committee/MCP, comprises a number of Regimental Commands,
and smaller tactical units, loosely organized and loosely employed according to traditional
guerrilla practices. It is believed that the "Military High Command" is simply the Political
Bureau/MCP acting in a military capacity. The Regimental Commands are, similarly, the
Armed Forces Departments of the State Committees/MCP.
29. Armed Forces Department. The Armed Forces Departments, which were
established in the State Committees MCP early in the insurrectionary period (see above),
were known as State or Regional Military or Regimental Commands. The Armed Forces
Department consists of - -
Party Representative
Commander
Vice-Commander.
Members SArmed Forces Department may alsocincl de a Chief Where
adequate, the Staff and a Chief of the
Party Education Department.
30. Tactical Units. The MRLA has a theoretically triangular organization, with
three each of battalions per regiment, companies per battalion, platoons per company,
and sections per platoon. It is probable, -however, that this theoretical organization has
never existed in fact. "Regiments" vary in strength between 100 and 740 men. A battalion
frequently consists of 2 companies, with or without separate additional platoons. Most
operations are carried out by platoons. There are many Independent Platoons and Companies,
and Composite Units, and their strength varies widely. Units are far from stable, being
broken down into smaller groups. for operations. One company, for example, made it a
practice to operate in sections for a tnonth,, and then to re-group for a month's training.
More recently, the Sections sent out to various areas have been broken down into groups of
three or four. This eases the food problem, which has become increasingly difficult. This
looseness of organization is, of course, dictated by conditions of guerrilla warfare inin alaya
and by the inability of the MCP to establish large bases and to recruit, equip, and large enough force to make serious attacks on Government forces.
31. Disposition of MRLA Units. In March 1950, it was estimated that the total
strength of the MRLA was 3-4,000 deployed as follows:
a. Under the North Malaya Bureau:
(1) 8th Regiment, consisting of 3 companies (4,3,3, platoons respectively), under
the Armed Forces Department of the Penang-Keda Joint Committee.
mwere lunde eft r
(2) Until Summer 1949, when it was number moved
oto Kelantan, f independenthformations
the Perak State Committee. A
behind.
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b. Under the Central Malaya Bureau:
(1) 2nd Regiment, consisting of 4 companies and possibly an Independent Platoon,
under the Negri Sembilan State. Committee.
(2) 1st Regiment, consisting of 2 battalions, under the Selangor State Committee.
(3) 6th, 7th, 10th Regiments under Committees for North Pahang, South Pahang,
and East Coast States.
Under the South Malaya Bureau:
(1) 3d Regiment, consisting of an Independent Company and the "North Johore
Brigade," under the Armed Forces Department of the North Johore Regional
Committee.
(2) 9th Regiment in Central Johore area
(3) 4th Regiment in South Johore area
Estimated numerical strength as of 31 May 1950 was distributed as shown on the attached
map.
32. MCP Control. The MRLA Is openly under full MCP control. Maximal integra-
tion of the political and military MCP apparatus' has been achieved. The control is exercised
through (a) military command channels, with the Political Bureau serving, it is believed, as
a "Military High Command;" (b)? MCP organizational channels, with Armed Forces Depart-
ments of MCP State Committees directly responsible for military operations in their partic-
ular areas; (c) Party organization within the MRLA.
33. MCP Organizational Channels. The line of control by MCP offices lies through
the Political Bureau, the three Regional Bureaus, the State Committees, and District and
Branch Committees. The area military command is actually a part of the State Committee.
As the Armed Forces Department of the State Committee, it is responsible primarily for
military operations and the MCP organization within the State's Regiment (or other MRLA
units); while the State Committee is responsible for these matters in general, and also, for
all other Party interests in the area, including the Min Yuen, secret labor work, terrorist
groups, etc. MCP District Committee members are also brought in for planning of military
operations in their areas. Thus, the following steps were taken in the planning of an attack
on a police station in Johore:
(1) Target for attack chosen at Regimental Headquarters;
(2) Representative of Regimental Command assigned to work with the company
selected to make the attack;
(3) Conference held, with the Regimental Representative, 5 leaders of the company,
and 5 members of the District Committee where the attack was to take place,
attending. District Committee members assigned task of providing food and
keeping the company informed of all relevant intelligence.
(4) Section leaders briefed.
34. MCP Organization within the MRLA. The basic Party unit in the MRLA is the
Branch, comprising the Party members within a Company or Platoon. The members of the
Branch elect two to four persons from a list nominated by the Company or Platoon Com-
mander, to form, with the unit Commander and Vice-Commander and Party Representative
(in the case of a Company), the Branch Committee/MCP. The other members of the Branch
form 3 - 5 man cells, each with a cell leader. The cells carry out political work among the
non-Party ranks, and recruit likely candidates for provisional membership in the Party.
Branches meet once a month to discuss Party activities -- indoctrination, discipline, re-
cruitment, etc.
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Auxiliary Organizations. ?
35. The MCP, basing its insurrection on the peasantry, has made strenuous efforts to
organize mass (front) organizations in villages and countryside for the support of MRLA
operations. These mass organizations are known collectively as the Min Yuen (People's
Movement). The civilian groups, organized on a local basis and controlled by the MCP
District Committees, are known variously as "Anti-British Backing-Up Society," "Racial
Liberation Alliance," "Youth Corps," "Peasants' Union," "Women's Union."
36. The functions of the Min Yuen organizations are to collect food and other supplies
and intelligence for the MRLA, to furnish recruits for MRLA units, and couriers; to carry on
agitation and propaganda; to commit sabotage and assassination of collaborators with the
Government.
37. The Min Yuen has been increasingly militarized, to expand
Min Yuen armed military
and to render direct military support to the MRLA. the
capacity in general
units have been created --
Defense Corps: full-time fighting groups;
Self-Protection Corps: part-time groups;
Armed Work Force: MRLA elements detached for service with a Min Yuen
Organization.
38. Defense Corps are armed as
control over them. They are are, formed by the MC1~
District Comm ttees, which exercise general Sections of 6 to 10 members each. MCP District Committeemen sometimes serve as
Section Commanders according to one report. The staff of the Defense Corps consists of ---
Political Section
Intelligence Section
General Affairs
Main duties of Defense Corps are:
Ambush, arson on estates, cutting power and telegraph lines, sabotaging rail lines;
buying, manufacturing and repairing arms and ammunition. They also post hand-
bills and carry out other acts of propaganda.
39. Self-Protection Corps comprise Sections organized into Platoons. A Section
are live,
Counft operates mmittee. Its whereits
an MCP Self -Protection
consists of men.
u --
District or Branch Corps
obtaining the control
obtaining and raising food, and other supplies; sabotage of power, telegraph, and
railway lines; destroying rubber trees and plantation buildings; posting handbills,
etc.
40. The Armed Work Force, which is either a Min Yuen unit reinforced by MRLA
personnel, 6-r -a unit of MRLA personnel posted to the Min Yuen, is a fairly new development;
part of the increasing militarization of the civilian mass organizations. It also represents a
decentralization of the formal military force (MRLA). Armed Work Force units operate
closely with the Defense Corps under the MCP District Committee (in and State/Regimental Headquarters),rare cases,
under joint MCP District Committee
41. District Unit. In Negri Sembilan, there has reportedly been a complete fusion at
District level of Party 'and Min Yuen under a "District Unit." The Political Adviser, who is
the MCP District Secretary, directs the District Unit. Under him is an Administrative
Department and an Armed Unit.
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42. The Armed Unit is headed by a Board of Command, with a Commander and Vice-
Commander. It is organized into Sections.
43. The Administrative Department is composed of MCP District Committee members,
with one each in control of one of five sections:
Racial Section
Organization Section
Propaganda Section
Treasury Section
Communication Section.
44. The Administrative Department is responsible for purchase, allocation, and
storage of food, medical and military supplies; for intelligence; and for the creation and
operation of a courier net.
45. Organizational control of various MCP military units is shown an the chart at
the end of the text.
Support and Technical Services.
46. Supply. MRLA and other full-time guerrilla units are supplied (a) by their own
actions (raids, forced requisitions, theft); and (b) by the Min Yuen. MCP fighting units are
probably too small and too loosely connected to have had to organize much of an internal
supply system: they probably depend upon their own actions or are directly and individually
supplied by local Min Yuen organizations.
47. All the members of Min Yuen groups are, to a certain extent, collectors of food
and other supplies for guerrilla bands. A Min Yuen organization may designate a particular
person to be responsible for collections and storage. For example, the Branch Committee
of the Batang Malacca District of the Women's Anti-British Association (a Min Yuen group)
consisted of a Director, a Responsible for Information, and a person responsible for General
Services -- recruitment, finances, food supply. Similarly, Min Yuen groups set up on an
area basis, such as the Village or Squatter Area Committees, usually have had one person on
the committee staff responsible for food supply.
48. A food procurement system of a District Unit in Negri Sembilan included the em-
ployment of at least two "middlemen," who carried orders for supplies from the "buyer" of
the District Unit to the purchasing agent of a nearby estate. The latter made purchases as
ordered, presumably concealing them in the bulk of his normal transaction, and delivered
them to a pre-selected point where the District Unit picked them up.
49. Food has also been reported to have been smuggled out of a Government re-
settlement camp in tightly sealed containers hidden in pig swill, to which the camp guards
gave understandably cursory attention. At the same camp, food has also been thrown over
the fence at selected points at night, and collected by guerrilla personnel.
50. Cultivators have also systematically been set to work by MCP District Committees
in squatter areas and in jungle clearings to grow food for MRLA and other guerrilla units.
One cultivation unit set up by a District Committee consisted of 16 men. The cooperation
of local peasants is essential for the initial maintenance of such units until a crop has been
harvested, and for their physical security. Emergency food storage dumps are sometimes
established near guerrilla camps. Large stocks have been built up; considerable amounts
have been destroyed by Security Forces in the last six months. A large rice dump was
discovered in the fall of 1950 in the Bentong area. A latex tank large enough to hold 3 - 4
tons of rice had been buried with only its turret above ground, and this had been carefully
camouflaged with debris.
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51. The Government's resettlement policy aimed at clearing the squatter areas has,
seriously interfered with the guerrillas' supply system in some cases. Even more serious
has been the application (June 1950) of the death penalty to persons caught giving food or
money to the MRLA.
52. Arms and Ammunition. The MRLA has used only small arms -- Bren guns, Sten
Guns, American carbines, pistols, shot guns, hand grenades, and rifles; a few small-caliber
mortars. Most of these weapons date from the British evacuation, the Japanese surrender,
and from the resistance period when the British parachuted arms to the guerrillas, who
conveniently "lost" some of them. Smaller quantities have been captured or stolen in the
course of the present insurrection. There is no evidence that the MRLA has received any
materiel from China or any other foreign country.
53. Secret MPAJA units concealed large stocks of weapons in 1945. It was calculated
by ex-MPAJA leaders in 1946 that about 6,000 weapons and quantities of ammunition. had been
cached. About half of these have been worn out or ruined by neglect; some have been
captured by Government forces.
54. Some MRLA units have organized specialists to make weapons and ammunition
and to refit cartridges. The Secretariat of the Johore State Committee/MCP issued instruc-
tions in July 1950 for the formation of a "Weapons Repairing Group" and a "Sabotage" or
demolitions group in each company. Increasing use was reportedly being made of mines
and hand-made bombs late in 1950. Mines are frequently made from old artillery shells.
Ammunition has been made utilizing match heads for primers, gunpowder, and locally mined
lead, with nail polish for weatherproofing. Improved techniques have been demonstrated in
refitting ammunition (use of washers, rather than tamping, to build up under-sized cartridges).
Earlier in the year, an armorer's kit was captured in Negri Sembilan. The kit would
fit into a haversack. The armorer had been renewing old ammunition and detonator caps on
grenade fuses.
55. Substantial cash rewards are offered for weapons and ammunition turned in to
MCP organizations.
56. Intelligence. The need for extensive tactical intelligence is a particularly com-
pelling one for a guerrilla force: first, to avoid contact with superior enemy forces (and they
are almost always superior in Malaya); and secondly, for the selection of suitable targets
and development of an operational plan that makes full use of the surprise element that is
the key to guerrilla tactics. Guerrillas cannot afford to be surprised, either in the attack or
on the run. They cannot stand long on the defensive. A major premise of successful guerrilla
operation is that the guerrillas know more about local conditions than the enemy does. When
.the guerrilla force is recruited from the local population, such knowledge is automatic. When
they operate away from home, they must organize an intelligence system.
57. MCP military forces are furnished information on local conditions and enemy
movements by physical reconnaisance (scouts and local guides) and informant networks set
up in village and countryside. Min Yuen and local MCP organizations are key intelligence-
producing agencies. The operation mentioned above (para. 32) in which the District MCP
and Min Yuen took part, was only partially successful, owing to "faulty intelligence" provided
by one of the MCP Branches in the area of attack.
58. An MCP document setting forth conclusions adopted in October 1950 stresses the
need for developing a comprehensive intelligence network during the period of guerrilla
warfare and also, for raising the quality of information produced and of its assessment. Im-
provement rests upon --
a) a general recognition of the importance of intelligence;
b) a program of critical study of existing methods;
c) training of professional intelligence officers and staff;
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d) development of "an intelligence network based on the foundation of people's
organizations;" "establish intelligence cells systematically and arrange work
for special intelligence personnel."
59. Information collecting is organized as follows:
a) appointment of an intelligence officer in the executive committee of a local
mass organization: he will build up "intelligence cells" and may recruit indivi-
duals as informants;
b) assignments and instructions for intelligence given to individuals by Party
personnel in areas where there is no formal mass organization;
c) agent nets: "special intelligence teams" set up by "district committee, by
state or regimental headquarters, by an independent subdirectorate, or by the
central directorate." ' The teams will consist of 3 - 5 men each, under a "head"
"Members of the team should be assigned to various productive centers and
enemy organs in different towns;
d) reconnaissance teams ("military affairs detection teams") set up by armed
units as needed.
60. The document stresses the security required for intelligence:
"Strict secrecy of organization must be maintained. The collection of intelligence
is comparatively complex. Hence constant vigilance and improvement of strict,
secret, organized and workable efficiency. are absolutely necessary. Information
such as names, addresses, techniques, connections, variegations and other secret
data should be strictly guarded. If this is not accomplished, despite good
appearances, our work will not be effective. More stringent secrecy should be
exercised by personnel working in the midst of our enemies' camp, for example
in Government departments, military reservations and in similar locations.
Personnel working in this capacity should be given more effective orientation
in order to prevent negative results. Methods of contact between informers and
intelligence teams, intelligence liaison centers, and the general intelligence
center should be simple and uniform."
61. Reporting.
"Each independent working unit, including state headquarters, Min Yuen working
cells and working corps which are responsible only for small districts, should
keep daily records of events happening within their territory, and in the neighbor-
hood of their district. A weekly summary, written in the form of a report, should
be rendered by the cadre of each such unit, by the secretary of state headquarters,
the leader of the MCP cell and by the leader of the Min Yuen working corps or
working cell. Such reports should be submitted regularly to district committees
of their territories or to the directorates of their units. A i-mont y report
summarizing local intelligence should be submitted by the district directorates
to their respective state committees or state headquarters.
62. Everyone connected with the MCP in any way should collect and report informa-
tion as a matter of course.
63. Requirements. The following are the items of "normal daily intelligence" re-
quired in addition to "special intelligence":
"a) The pronouncement and enforcement of the reactionary orders of the British
imperialists, as well as their sinful conduct in ruining the people, and their
criminal acts which exploit the people.
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b) Activities of British `running-dogs' and `running-dog' organizations such as
the Malayan Chinese Association and its ring leaders, Dato Onn's Party and its
satellites, the Malayan Indian Associations and their adherents, reactionary
trade unions, detectives, and traitors, including spies who are working within
our midst.
It is necessary to make a thorough investigation of the spheres of activities of
such persons and organizations. We must know their names, addresses, normal
routes of travel, neighborhoods which they frequently inhabit, their habits, and
their distinctive characteristics. Clear and timely reports should be made of
such observations.
c) Peoples' reactions to British imperialists' activities.
d) The peoples' (workers, farmers and petty bourgeoisie) livelihood, their
demands and their views on the Liberation Army.
e) Manifestations of the capitalist and propertied class, their attitude toward the
British imperialists, towards the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) and
toward the masses in general.
f) Movements of British imperialist military police forces, including British
troops, Gurkhas, the Malay Regiment, regular police, special police, auxiliary
police and kampong guards.
g) Enemy operations:
Encampments. Sites, size, construction underway, manpower, equipment;
regimental numbers and colors, officers in charge and similar information.
Transfers of enemy troops. Schedule, number of persons involved, and means
of transport.
Enemy patrols. Routes, numerical strength, number of vehicles, equipment,
schedule, if routine, special or impromptu.
Enemy ambushes. Sites, numerical strength, equipment, time, reason, objec-
ve.
Enemy raids. Where, when, numerical strength, equipment, reason, objective,
identification of regiments involved, and result.
Enemy checkpoints. Where, when, numerical strength and regiment involved,
equipment, objective, and result.
Enemy convoys. Inspections by estate managers and detectives. Assignments
to 'running dogs'. Transportation of foodstuffs and other supplies with armed
escort.
h) Internal sentiments and manifestations of the enemy force:
Treatment of British soldiers and Malay constables, their rations and pay, and
the methods used by superior officers in dealing with their men.
Discipline of troops and their attitude towards the masses.
Relationship between. officers and men, and the reaction of the force toward
officers.
The general sentiments of the enemy force regarding the war, their attitude
towards fighting, and their morale following engagements with the Liberation
Army.
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Enemy arms stores:
Classification of weapons into types and grades of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives.
Sites of storehouses, including types of buildings, whether timber or concrete,
conditions of windows and doors, protective measures utilized such as barb
wire fencing, wire netting and so on, whether soldiers are on guard, and if so
the number of sentries, times of changing guards, and similar information."
64. Development of professional competence. This consists of --
a) systematic organization of intelligence sources: regular meetings, study of
periodic summaries for lessons to be learned and improvement of reporting;
b) systematic verification of reports;
c) training specialized intelligence personnel to penetrate Government organs or
to establish contact with "persons who have access to information within these
enemy organs."
65. Example of an MCP penetration operation. A man got a job with the Security
Forces providing guides. He collected i ormation on their plans and movements and sent
it through a relative to the MCP. It was passed up channels through the North Malayan 'Bureau
to the Secretary General of the Party.
66. Use of intelligence in military operations. The first item in the advance planning
of a military opera ion is intelligence, as is shown in the following portions of a document
outlining the plan of an attack in 1950 on a police station:
"A) The information about the enemy received thus. far and the geographical conditions
of the place."
There follows a summary of information already available on the following points:
a. Number of police posted at the station
b. Types of weapons in police hands
c. Lay-out and physical security at the Station
(1) obstacles (description of barbed wire, fences, ditches)
(2) arrangement of buildings
(3) approaches
(4) patrols: schedule, strength, arms
(5) location and arms of possible police reinforcements
d. Adjacent terrain features
(1) natural (location high ground, river); vegetation
(2) buildings
(3) roads
e. Police motor launches spotted in river.
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On the basis of an analysis of the above, additional information required to bring the
intelligence, up to date was itemized and a scouting party of three men sent out to make a
physical reconnaissance.
The operational plan for the attack was detailed and will be discussed further in the
paragraphs on "Operations" below.
For the march to the attack area, a three-man reconnaissance team was sent ahead
and provision was made for a command reconnaissance when the area had been reached.
In the review of the operation, "good points" and "weak points" of the tactical intel-
ligence were discussed. Among the latter were these:
a. inaccuracy of information on enemy arms
b. inaccuracy of information on physical defenses at the police station. Improvement
of reconnaissance was decided to be a "must."
67. Communications. The MCP has a well developed system of courier communica-
tions. The regular mail has been used to transmit propaganda, but no case has been dis-
covered of its use for secret or important messages. Several transmittin sets have been
captured, but there is no evidence that the guerrillas actually have any W/T communication.
Codes and secret inks are used in courier-handled mail. There is no indication that a regu-
lar code is used country-wide. Simple letter, number, and word substitutions are the usual
types.
68. It is believed that each MCP Committee and armed unit selects and controls its
own couriers. The Min Yuen organizations are valuable courier pools. Courier systems are
well. organized and highly secure. Cut-outs are used and couriers know nothing of the courier
system in areas outside their own. Couriers have been known to travel in groups of three or
four, with a group having at least one weapon. Long runs are broken down into stages, ter-
minating at message centers. A message center has its own staff of couriers under a Com-
munications Officer, and detailed logs are kept there. Messages to and from important
leaders are delivered or called for at message centers by the leader's personal courier, who
alone knows the leader's exact whereabouts. High-level couriers are frequently shadowed
by the leader's body-guard to prevent treachery.
69. Training. The initial cadre of the MRLA had been trained by the British just
before the Japanese occupation. Others received some training in the MPAJA. More
practical instruction has been obtained by participation in the current fighting. Training;
manuals -- reprints of Chinese and British manuals -- have been captured. Training camps
for raw recruits have been operated. It is believed that the bulk of the training given at the
present time is unit training, recruits being given daily instruction and practical experience
through guard duty and perimeter patrol duty in their own units. Some firing practice may,.
be given, but the shortage of ammunition makes it likely that it is quite sketchy. Political
instruction is, of course, a continuing occupation.
Operations
70. The MCP has not been able to go beyond the first "phase" of its strategy --the
stage of terrorism, sabotage, and small actions by small, irregular forces. Its military
operations. have the following objectives:
a. To exhaust and demoralize the enemy's military force by continual harassing
operations (sniping, ambushes, raids).
b. To damage the enemy's military efficiency by cutting his communications.
c. To weaken the enemy's economic base by destroying his productive centers
(sabotage, raids).
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d. To destroy the enemy's political base by terrorism (beatings, threats, murder,
arson, bombings); to shake popular confidence in the Government's ability to keep
order and protect its supporters (terrorism and spectacular raids).
e. To enlist active popular participation in the insurrection: drawing civilians into
small acts of violence, such as sabotage, and progressing gradually to out-and-out
guerrilla fighting.
f. To give the fighters experience in tactics and handling of arms.
g. To get additional arms.
71. In brief, the military operations of the MCP at the present time are aimed at
weakening the enemy militarily, economically, and politically, and at the gradual development
of an experienced armed force. They are not yet aimed at engaging and defeating the enemy
in orthodox combat. As recently as June 1950, a State Committee directive stated that units
of platoon strength would normally be used in operations. Larger concentrations were to be
avoided to prevent encirclement by superior Government forces. The Company should be
used only in very carefully planned attacks on considerably inferior or off-balance enemy
forces for the purpose of (a) impressing the people, or (b) giving commanders experience
in handling larger units. Attacks in Company strength have been rare.
72. The political -- i.e., propaganda -- side of MCP guerrilla operations should not
be overlooked. Attacks are planned with a view to what effect they will have on civilian atti-
tudes, and literature and verbal propaganda is customarily included in the execution of opera-
tions to impress the people with the strength and morale of the guerrillas, to make them
afraid to support Government policies for the retaliation that is promised to "running dogs,"
and to convince them that the Government forces are not only corrupt, brutal, and cowardly,
but also, bound to lose in the end.
73. MCP military actions include the following:
a. Ambushes: of civilian and enemy vehicles, trains, convoys; enemy patrols
and small forces
b. Raids and surprise attacks: on enemy military and police posts, railways
and roads, plantations, mines, stores.
c. Sniping: at individuals and passing vehicles and trains
d. Sabotage: destruction of rubber trees, buildings, plants, vehicles, telephone
and power lines, bridges, roads, railways.
e. Murder, beatings, bombings, booby-trapping and mine-planting.
74. Such actions are carried out by MRLA units, and the smaller ones, by Self-
Protection Corps and Defense Corps, etc., groups. The latter are called upon to reinforce
MRLA units in attacks and to serve in side-actions, as covering force and communications
guards.
75. Plans for military actions, such as raids, are usually made by MRLA unit com-
manders and local MCP and Min Yuen leaders together. The latter provide local intelligence,
guides, armed couriers, scouts; and supplies.
76. Detailed operational planning goes into relatively ambitious attacks, as is shown
in the following summary of details considered in the attack on the police station that was
mentioned above, para 66:
A. Plan drawn up 17 February 1950 by the "Operational (i.e. Unit?) Command."
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(1) Intelligence. Consideration of information already available; specification
of information still to be gathered; collation of all available information on
enemy strength, terrain, etc. (Previously described above, para.; 66.)
(2) Supply and bivouac.
(a) Break-down of individual rations.
(b) Provision made for obtaining additional necessary supplies.
(c) March
1) Time of departure; estimation of duration of march
2) Schedule; march order
a) spacing of units
b) rest stops
c) route markers
3) March defense.
(d) Bivouac: lay-out, defense.
(3) Attack plan
(a) Assignment of units to specific jobs: "charging units," "assault units,"
guard units, first-aid teams.
(b) Distribution of arms and ammunition: break-down by type of weapon
and function of unit.
(c) Operational map and time of attack.
(d) Command posts: designation of commanders and locations of command
posts.
(e) Communications, signals.
(f) Discipline.
(4) Booty: targets, assignments, storage.
(5) Health and Food.
(6) Withdrawal.
(7) Political Mobilization.
(a) Internal
1) Assignments;
2) Subjects (points to be made).
(b) External
1) Distribution of literature and verbal propaganda;
2) Shouting to enemy (slogans to be used);
3) Propaganda for prisoners.
B. Review held after the operation, 5 March.
(1) Operation closely and systematically analyzed in all of above aspects:
commendations and criticisms.
(2) Significance of operation
(a) Effect of enemy military operations;
(b) Effect on people;
(c) Effect on MRLA morale;
(d) Lessons: tactical and technical.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE MCP AFTER JUNE 1948
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
11-15 members
SECRETARY
GENERAL
MILITARY
HIGH COMMAND
NORTH
MALAYAN
BUREAU
3 members
P E NANG AND KEDAH
STATE JOINT
COMMITTEE
5-7 members
PERAK STATE
COMMITTEE
ARMED
FORCES
DEPT
DISTRICT
COMMITTEE
SOUTH JOHORE
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
NORTH JOHORE
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
SOUTH
MALAYAN
BUREAU
2 members
J NEGRI SEMBILAN
1 STATE COMMITTEE
SELANGOR
1STATE COMMITTEE
EAST COAST
1 STATES COMMITTEE
ORGANIZATION
DEPT
PROPAGANDA
DEPT
POLITICAL
BUREAU
2 members
CENTRAL
MALAYAN
BUREAU
4 members
SINGAPORE
TOWN COMMITTEE
DISTRICT I I COMMITTEE I I I
BRANCH BRANCH
CELL
CELL r
I I
SECRET/ CONTROL
KELANTAN
STATE COMMITTEE
y
NORTH PAHANG
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
SOUTH PAHANG
REGIONAL
COMMITTEE
U. S. Officials Only
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M C P MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
POLITICAL
BUREAU
NORTH, SOUTH,
AND CENTRAL
MALAYAN BUREAUS
STATE COMMITTEE
DISTRICT COMMITTEE
BRANCH
CELL
U. S. Officials Only
MILITARY
HIGH COMMAND
ARMED FORCES
DEPT.
4 "PARTY CORPS "
MIN YUEN
Civilian
Organizations
I Peasants I
L.------- j
Women's
j Squatter
I Area
L-------j
Others
Military
Organizations
I District I
Unit I
j -
Defense
Corps
Self---
I Protection I
L - Corps--I
REGIMENTAL
COMMAND
BATTALIONS
COMPANIES
PLATOONS
SECTIONS
SQUADS
G R 1029 CIA, 10-51 SECRET /CONTROL U. S. Officials Only
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TW MW
0
Batu Arang
350 ?Kuala `~
oKlang Lumpur
NEGRI SEMBILAN
I 0
Seremban
Distribution of Communist Guerrillas - 31 May 1950
regarded as the result of the roughness of reported figures or, possibly, of
the inclusion of non-MBLA units, such as the part-time "Self-prolectian"
and other local bonds.
NOTE: The total number of guerrillas as shown-4,517-.needs other
estimates, which range from 3,000 to 3,700. This discrepancy may be
U. S. Officials Only
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MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP PHILIPPINES
A. INTRODUCTION
B. OUTLINE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CPP PRIOR TO 1950
C. THE DECISION OF JANUARY 1950
Development of the Ideological Struggle
Terms of the Policy Decision
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION
Reorganization of the Party
Use of the HMB in the Political Program: "Expansion."
E. PLANS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE HMB
Taruc's Plan
Rejection of Taruc's Plan
Subsequent Developments
THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF CP PHILIPPINES
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A. INTRODUCTION
1. A large and varied collection of documents of the CP Philippines (CPP) was seized
in raids made on Party headquarters in October 1950. Several of these documents show in
unusually close detail matters of interest to the present study:
a. The theory on which the CP Philippines based its decision for armed insurrection;
b. The maneuvering between a CP faction advocating armed insurrection and the
opposing faction;
c. The terms in which the policy decision for armed insurrection was finally
formulated;
d. The way plans were made for the organizational implementation of the policy
decision.
2. Many interesting details of Party administration, organization, activities, etc.
are also revealed in the documents, but for current purposes emphasis is placed on the
matters listed in paragraph 1.
3. Background. The CPP is a small Party (5 - 10,000 members) in what Communist
doctrine has designated a "colonial or semi-colonial" country. Its social basis in the poor
(mostly landless) peasantry, with only a small number of city workers. Only a handful of its
leaders is at all conversant with Communist theory, and one of these, the General Secretary,
Jose Lava, seems practically to have dictated the present policy of the Party by himself.
The CPP raised a military force called the HUKBALAHAP (from a contraction of
native words meaning "People's Army to Fight Japan") soon after the Japanese invasion of
December 1941. The Huk was composed mostly of patriotic peasants under effective, but
camouflaged, CPP control. It made guerrilla attacks on the Japanese and their collaborators,
and on non-Communist resistance forces, particularly those sponsored by the American
Army (the "USAFFE Guerrillas"). The Huk helped a Party-controlled civilian resistance
organization (United Front Movement) take control of a large number of local governments
towards the end of the Liberation campaign. They were quickly ousted by US and Philippine
authorities.
Many of the Huk formations dissolved following the Liberation (1945). Some of them,
however, managed to hold out in mountain bases in Central Luzon. For a period of about 18
months, until September 1946, the Huk was quiescent. A struggle arose within the Party be-
tween the Huk leaders and some of the political cadres who favored the resumption of mili-
tary action on the one hand, and the dominant Party leadership that advocated "legal, consti-
tutional, parliamentary form of struggle" on the other. This conflict was resolved when the
"armed struggle" advocates got control of the official leadership in May 1948. The adoption
of "armed struggle as the main form of struggle" was not achieved until January 1950, at
which time it was decided that a "revolutionary situation" existed, the Huk was renamed
"People's Liberation Army" (HMB) and definite plans were made to push the development of
the "armed struggle" towards the ultimate full-scale engagement and defeat of the armed
forces of the regime.
4. Theory of "Armed Struggle." The adoption of "armed struggle" as the "main form
of struggle" did not mean that those who advocated it believed that the time was ripe for an
all-out military insurrection. What they did believe was that social, economic, and political
conditions in the Philippines and in the world were developing, by themselves, towards a
blowup, and that maximum advantage for the Party lay in using the method of armed struggle,
rather than "legal, constitutional, parliamentary" methods, toward the build-up of an armed
force capable of overthrowing the regime eventually.
This reasoning turned on two problems: (1) the assessment of the "objective situa-
tion" -- was it really headed towards a crisis? (2) the relative advantages of the "armed
struggle" versis "legal" struggle.
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The first problem was answered to the satisfaction of the CPP by the decision of
January 1950. The second caused much more difficulty. A long and extremely technical
analysis of the advantages of gradually increasing "armed struggle" as a method in colonial
and semi-colonial countries in the post-war period was prepared in the summer of 1950
(probably by the General Secretary, Jose Lava).
Any consideration of the supposed merits of "armed struggle" rested on the question
of whether or not it would be successful. This question had already been answered by the
Chinese Communist Revolution and the formulations of strategy and tactics set out by Zhdanov
at the September 1947 Cominform meeting. "Armed struggle" is not possible in advanced
countries before the revolutionary crisis has been reached. In the Bolshevik Revolution, the
armed uprising was the culmination of an intensive legal struggle. In colonial countries, the
CPP document on "Strategy and Tactics" observes, "armed struggle" is not only possible,
but necessary in the presence of a "revolutionary situation" prior to the coming of the
"revolutionary crisis."
What makes it possible is terrain, lack of big armies on the side of the regime, and
the peasant basis of the revolutionary movement. The last is particularly important because
the landless peasant can be most effectively committed to the revolution by forcibly seizing
land and giving it to him. When the forces of the government drive out the revolutionary
forces and restore the land to the landlords, the peasants realize that their only hope of
permanent gain is in permanent Communist control of the land. When the regime punishes
the peasants who, often involuntarily, have given support to the revolutionary forces, they are
driven by self-preservation to more active support of the Communist forces.
In CPP terms, other reasons for "armed struggle" as the most effective method of
struggle are that it is most costly to the regime, not only in terms of money, but also in
terms of the political frictions and consequent weakening that a long guerrilla-hunting cam-
paign produces. Also, engagement in armed struggle before the maturation of the crisis puts
the Party in command of an army for use when the revolutionary crisis finally arrives.
5. National Organs. The Central Committee has probably had 35 members and
candidate members for several years. Nine CC members constituted the Political Bureau
(PB), the top policy-making organ, in 1950. There is some evidence indirectly indicating
that the PB was smaller in 1947. Three members of the PB constituted the Secretariat
(SEC). The SEC was ordinarily headed by a General Secretary (GS), an exception being the
SEC elected in September 1944, which did not have a GS. The SEC has been the top executive
organ of the CPP and has also been its leading policy-formulating organ. Major policy de-
cisions were formulated by the SEC and officially made by the PB majority. For several
months after the decision of January 1950, the SEC arso served as a General Headquarters
(GHQ) for the HMB.
A member of the SEC supervised the work of the Organizational Bureau (OB). The OB
had under it a National Communications Department (NCD , which ran a courier service. The
NCD was supervised by another member of the SEC. Also under the OB was a Trade Union
Department (TUD), headed by two of the three members of the SEC, and responsible for CPP
work in Philippines labor unions. The TUD was also in charge of a "Women's Department
and a Youth Department, neither of which was very active.
6. A National Education Department of twelve members functioned under the super-
vision of a PB member. It had a number of sub-divisions as shown on chart.
7. Territorial Organization. In 1947 the Philippines were divided for CPP purposes
into three Regions, under Regional Committees: (1) Central Luzon; (2) Southern Luzon;
(3) Manila-Rizal. Under the Regional Committees there were Provincial Committees whose
competence corresponded to the civil divisions of the Islands. The Provinces were divided
into variously defined areas and cities, in which CPP Section Committees ran Communist
affairs. The basic organizations of the Party were shop and neighborhood cells, called
Branches by the 1949 Statutes of the CPP.
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8. Military Organization. The CPP military organization was the Huk until January
1950, when it was renamed HMB. The Huk was raised by the Central Luzon Bureau (CLB),
which was formed early in February 1942 after the "first front leadership" (i.e., the politi-
cally prominent, official officers) of the Party had been arrested by the Japanese. A Mili-
tary Committee, consisting of three members (Luis Taruc, Casto Alejandrino, Silveria
Guina) directed the Huk. Eventually, the Military Committee was expanded to five members
and had the following organization:
1. Military Department
a. Warfare Department
b. Economics or Supply Department
2. Intelligence Division
3. Communications Division
Huk tactical formations were Squads (12 men), Platoons (2 or more Squads), Squadrons (2 or
more Platoons).
Following devastating attacks by the Japanese in March 1943 the Huk command system
was decentralized: a 5-man Regional Command was organized for each of the four Provinces
of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija. Centralized control was re-established in
the fall of 1944, when the Military Committee was made into the Huk GHQ, with a Commander-
in-Chief (Taruc), Vice-Commander (Alejandrino) and 16 others.
9. Changes. The changes that took place in post-war CPP organization in response
to the "armed struggle" policy will be discussed further below from the planning point of
view. Briefly, they consisted of the following:
(1) The SEC temporarily took over the duties of the GHQ for the HMB.
(2) A number of special offices were created under the SEC to handle technical
military problems.
(3) Some of the offices which had been given peacetime political assignments were
apparently allowed to disappear; some of them simply recast their operations along
military lines.
(4) The Philippines were divided into several regions, in which Regional Committees
supervised all work in several provinces or sections of provinces, and Regional Com-
mands were set up to direct military operations in the same area. Members of the
PB were assigned to the Regional Committee to supervise their work.
10. The decision to launch the "armed struggle" was preceded by an intense prolonged
struggle between two opposing factions. The tension between the "armed struggle" men and
the advocates of "legal" struggle was, at first, one between the wartime military leaders of
the Party and its political leaders. The former (Taruc, Alejandrino, Guina) were very weak
in theory and were unable to make a convincing case for themselves until they were champi-
oned by a skilled theoretician, Jose Lava, who came up from obscruity to become General
Secretary (apparently in January 1950).1 Most of the information on the origins and course
of the policy split comes from a paper prepared by him entitled "Milestones in the History
of the CPP."
1 Jose Lava apparently joined the Party during the Japanese occupation. Reports of 1947
dealing with known` Party leaders do not even mention him, although he was a member of
the PB elected in 1944. The reason for his comparative obscurity seems to be that his
career has been entirely concerned with work inside the Party. He took no part in "mass"
work or "organizational work" following the Liberation. There is some question about
Lava's title: he may have simply usurped the position of General Secretary.
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11. The "appeasers" as they were called by Lava, were the CPP leaders who failed
to see the "new relations of forces" in the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries of Asia
following the war. It is impossible to say whether Lava and the armed struggle advocates
of 1948-1950 saw the consequences of the "new situation" before they were analyzed by
Zhdanov in his speech at the opening conference of the Cominform in September 1947, and
subsequently elaborated by the CP's India, Malaya, Burma in early 1948. If they did, their
ideas were probably still quite confused. Lava's "Milestones" attempts to project the
ideological struggle back to the early days of the resistance, when the Party leaders who
became the "appeasers" in the post-war period are supposed to have been responsible for,
first, an "adventurist" policy of all-out attack on the Japanese, and then, when the Japanese
cracked down hard, on a policy of "retreat for defense," under which the Huks went deep into
the mountains and contented themselves with snail-scale operations against the Japanese or
attacks on non-Communist guerrilla forces. (There were forceful reasons for the adoption
of the second policy, aside from Lava's charges of "appeasement" and "lack of Bolshevik
understanding." The first, "adventurist" policy, also seems to have been forced on the CPP
by those whom Lava calls simply "our Chinese comrades." The struggle against the Japanese
was, of course, of primary importance to all the CP's of Asia at this time, and Lava's hind-
sight argument against the CPP leaders who favored it is no proof that he, or anyone else in
the CPP, had begun to plan for an armed uprising after the war.)
12. The main grounds on which Lava later criticized the policy of "retreat for de-
fense" was that it led to stagnation. By avoiding clashes with the Japanese, the Party com-
mitted itself to a static size and influence. "If the laps and their puppets" had been provoked
into making serious attacks on the Huk, Lava says, "we would have expanded our organization
to other areas" aside from Central Luzon. Particularly serious was the fact that the Party
organizations in Manila went so deep underground that they couldn't possibly achieve any-
thing with the laborers there.
13. In September 1944, by which time American bombing attacks on the Philippines
had made it apparent that a Liberation campaign was imminent, a CC Conference declared
the policy of "retreat for defense" erroneous and removed from office those who had been
responsible for it, except for Vicente Lava, Jose's elder brother.' The new PB consisted of:
Indo
Eric (Gerencio Lacuesta? Jorge Frianeza?)
C. (Pedro Castro?)
Eto (Federico Maclang)
Enteng (Taruc)
Torres (Casto Alejandrino)
Rene (Celia Mariano)
Amor (Peregrino Taruc ?)
Rita (Emma Arce?)
VY (Vicente Lava)
The first three constituted the SEC, but there was no General Secretary. Jose Lava
("Milestones") called this "one of the weakest leaderships of the Party."
The policy adopted by the September 1944 Conference was based on pre-war ideas:
the Party would help the Americans in the Liberation and would concentrate on peaceful
"forms of struggle" afterwards. Actually, the policy was one of "vacillation." It was decided
to try to establish local governments under Party control, but there was no decision to hold
theoe governments by force of arms if the Americans and the Filipino bourgeoisie challenged
them. Many such governments were set up, but were quickly replaced by officials of the
restored regime.
' Vincente Lava's .position, both in the Party and policy-wise are not know. He may have been
head of the OB. He died of pneumonia in September 1947.
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14. The CPP was definitely not ready to attempt an armed uprising after the Libera-
tion. Lava has said that the conference and the Party tactics during and immediately after
the liberation marked the "beginning of real ideological struggle within the Party," but that
the dominant leadership was definitely moving away from any thought of armed insurrection.
He said that there was both naivete and "evasion of struggle" on the part of the leaders. No
steps were taken to prevent the arrest of Taruc, Alejandrino, de Leon, "and others." The
Party leaders "placed undue trust" in the Party's "erstwhile temporary allies," the Americans
and their "puppets." They permitted the Huk to be dissolved and "failed to orient the Party
membership concerning the inevitability of the Party's early resumption of the armed strug-
gle." This failure was, Lava wrote, simply a continuation of an error that emerged during
the resistance, when the Party failed to see that the ultimate enemy was the American-
controlled regime and its supporters. His post-mortem view on what the Party policy should
have been during the resistance was that the Huk should have been simply a means of getting
as many people as possible under Party control -- resistance to attract patriots for Com-,
munist propaganda.
15. The position of the Huk in the period following the liberation is actually not clear.
It was not "completely dissolved" as Lava said. In the fall of 1946, Huk bands raided
American Army installations and ambushed convoys. They also engaged in attacks on Gov-
ernment troops and civilian guards on estates. Following a futile effort on the part of the
Government to achieve peace by offering amnesty, the Philippine Army was given orders to
put the Huk down by force. This campaign resulted in widespread Huk surrenders in the fall
of 1946.
16. During this time the split between the "appeasers" who were in control of the
Party organization and the military cadres became serious. Lava has described this as
follows:
"Criminal neglect in the leadership of the armed forces. Actually, there existed two
Party leaderships, the majority leadership already affected by conscious or uncon-
scious appeasement, concentrating on the legal struggles to the utter neglect of the
armed struggle, and minority leadership led by Com. Taruc, in consultation with
Com. VY (Vicente Lava), to which the bulk of the armed forces looked for guidance.
Crisis within the Party leadership leading to the calling of enlarged PB conference in
January 1947, which the appeasers wanted to call a CC conference."
17. The Enlarged PB Conference of January 1947 ended with a tactical victory for the
"appeasers" -- they managed to stay in power -- but also, in an alignment of the "armed
struggle" men behind a definite program of action.
Between the election of the SEC without a General Secretary in 1944
according 194 B
Conference, Pedro Castro had become General Secretary. The "appeasers," to
Lava, tried to pack the conference and to give it the authority of a full CC Conference. They
did not even invite the Lava brothers (Vicente, Jose and Jesus), who were "known" to be in
favor of "an early resumption of the armed struggle." The majority at the conference voted
in favor of an "`open mass party,'" a principle opposed by the "armed struggle" advocates
on the ground that it invited Government suppression. Instead of taking a clear policy, the
Conference decided on an ambiguous formula calling for a "skillful combination of legal and
armed struggle."
A new leadership was elected. The "appeasers" had a majority in the PB and the new
General Secretary Jorge Frianeza, was one of them.
A lengthy policy statement prepared by Frianeza about this time declared that "the car
rying out of the bourgeois democratic revolution - - establishment of a democratic republic - - is
thetasktobe accomplished..." He connected the "struggle" in the Philippines with "thefightfor
democracy and a higher standard of living," and he stressed the importance of mass recruiting.
The composition of this new PB is unknown. Frianeza, Lacuesta, and Castro were among
the appeasers in it, and Mariano Balgos and Mateo del Castillo were among the advocates
of the "armed struggle."
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18. The ambiguous policy was indeed impossible: so long as the Huk leaders carried
on even small military operations and refused to turn their arms over to the Government,
they and the Party were bound to encounter severe measures on the part of the Government.
Several Important Party leaders were arrested, including Frianeza.
19. In September 1947 the PB Minority (i.e., the "armed struggle" men) called to-
gether a meeting of Party and Huk leaders in Central Luzon. This conference, packed with
advocates of "armed struggle," had an uncertain "legal" standing, but it was a demonstration
of the strength of the "armed struggle" faction. It endorsed that policy and condemned the
"exposure" of Party leaders in the "mass open party" principle. It accused Frianeza, Castro,
and Lacuesta of "conscious appeasement." It also engineered the creation of ap "Interim
Secretariat" of three members, two of them its own (probably, Balgos and del Castillo). This
was done in the following way: the OB was under the control of the "armed struggles' men'
and it refused to accept the authority of the Majority of the PB so long as the "appeasers"
were in the majority. The Interim Secretariat was set up as a stop-gap measure and was
acquiesced in by the PB Majority only under this threat of outright revolt by the Minority.
20. In May 1948 there was held an Enlarged CC Conference at which the "armed
struggle". partisans got formal control of the Party Headquarters. Frianeza, Castro, and
Lacuesta were suspended from Party membership. Frianeza was later reinstated, but
Castro and Lacuesta were later expelled. A new leadership was elected, with Mariano Balgos
as General Secretary. The full composition of this PB is not known, but included:
Balgos
Jose Lava (Harry)
Mateo del Castillo (Pando)
Cesario Torres (Leo)
Rosario de Santos (Charing)
Jesus Lava and Luis Taruc were probably also in the PB.
The Conference decided in favor of a policy of preparing for an armed uprising at an
unspecified time in the future, It is not known exactly how the preparations were to be made:
it is possible that the steps were not precisely stated. Principally, the Conference established
its orientation to the course of "objective" events and decided to purge its leadership of those
who wanted to pursue a "legal, peaceful, parliamentary" form of struggle indefinitely.
The aims of the CPP were stated by Balgos in December 1948 to be the "overthrow of
the imperialist-feudal-fascist domination" for the achievement of a "minimum program" of a
"People's Democracy," in which the Party would share, its power to a certain extent, and in
which the economic program would be mixed, for the immediate. accumulation of production
capital. The statement declared that the Party was ready to "exhaust' all legal and peaceful
means, but would not hesitate to "use force and violence" if opposed. Thus, armed struggle
was inevitable, and would break out when the Party decided the time was ripe for it.
In this connection, the Conference found itself unable to decide what the "objective"
situation actually was. It was agreed, says Lava, that there was no "revolutionary crisis,"
but no agreement could be reached on whether the situation was "revolutionary" or simply 'a
"heightening flow in the tide of revolution." These questions were of real importance to the
question of timing and of work to be done at the moment. A "revolutionary crisis" would have
called for an immediate "declaration of war," a declaration that was specifically rejected when
it was proposed by Lacuesta. Lava writes that "it is obvious now (i.e., summer 1950) that the
situation that existed then was merely a heightened flow in the tide of the revolution" and that
a "revolutionary situation" did not develop until after the November 1949 elections, when the
Party began to mobilize for immediate military operations.
1 The fact that the OB was closely connected with the Huk, offers the reason for its support of
the "armed struggle" proposal. No information is available on the composition of the OB at
that time. The standing of the "Interim Secretariat" and what work it actually did are not
known.
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"On the question of the main link of the Party's weakness," Lava said, "the conference
was unanimous in its conclusion that it is the weakness of open educational work..." The
"consciousness of the masses concerning the necessity and the inevitability of the armed
struggle for national liberation was limited only to the peasants of Central Luzon and some
parts of Manila and other industrial centers." Educational work inside the Party itself was
also weak. Despite this appraisal, little was done at this time to remedy the weakness.
"Open educational work" suffered from the "reluctance of Party cadres in accepting expansion
assignments (i.e., propaganda-organizing assignments in areas where the Party's influence
had not been established) and in the leniency of the Party leadership in imposing discipline
on those who refused expansion assignments."
? Terms of the Policy Decision
21. With the Party pointed definitely towards an armed uprising, it remained for
"objective" events to determine the time of its beginning.
22. A ticklish tactical problem arose when the new President of the Philippines,
Quirino, offered to negotiate a peace with the Huk and that t to
cauld not afford to refuse outright to
towards the CPP. The new leadership realized
negotiate: "failure to do so would place the Huk on the defensive" in the popular view. Lava
described two errors committed by the Party, errors that led to a strong popular belief that
the Communists had been entirely cynical about the Quirino offer and had not intended to
fulfill the terms of the negotiations at all:
a. In preliminary negotiations between Taruc and Antonio Quirino, Taruc had agreed
specifically to a surrender of Huk arms. He should have insisted that this be made
an issue in the basic agreement;
b. Acceptance of the term "amnesty" by the Huk was equal to acknowledgment of past
guilt.
As late as the summer of 1950, when Lava wrote Milestones, the PB had not been able to
make up its mind whether the peace negotiations had been good, bad, or indifferent for the
Party.
23. During the summer of 1948 the new leadership frustrated attempts of the suspend-
ed "appeasers," Castro and Lacuesta, to intrigue among the Party organizations in Manila
and some of the Huk units. Soiree dissident Communists drew their labor unions out of the
CLO and were expelled.
24. To "raise the political quality" of the Huk and its organizational efficiency, a
GHQ was created and the "GHQ members were (kept) together in one place."
25. The tactics to be followed in the November 1949 elections were discussed by a
CC Conference held in Manila (date unknown). It was decided that the Party would profit by
supporting the Nacionalista Party (NP) of Laurel against the Liberal Party (LP) of Quirino
for these reasons:
a. By strengthening the NP, the division between the two wings of the bourgeoisie
would be widened, even if only temporarily;
b. By working with the "top NP leadership" the Party would have a chance to
"approach the Nationalist masses," who believed that their leaders would begin an
"armed revolt should they be defeated by fraud and terror," and who could be brought
over to the CPP when they realized that the NP leaders had no intention of carrying
out this threat.
26. The 1949 elections, characterized by "wholesale fraud and terror," and this,
"during a period of developing economic crisis," represented in the Party's eyes a "quali-:
tative leap from the heightened flow of the tide of the revolution to the beginning of a revolu-
tionary situation."
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This analysis, which was probably made by the SEC in December 1949, was the signal
for concrete preparations for an uprising:
a. A public appeal was issued for the overthrow of the regime;
b. The Party went "strictly underground;-*
c. The General Secretary, Mariano Balgos, and several other Party leaders (Espiritu
and Capadocia among them) went into "the field to direct the armed struggle."
27. The decision was formalized by an enlarged PB Conference held in January 1950,
at which various implementing decisions were also made.
The "Resolution Adopted in the Enlarged Conference of the Political Bureau" is
among the documents seized in October 1950. It consists of four parts:
a. Analysis of the "Objective Situation."
b. "Tactics of the Various Parties"
c. "Our Own Tactics"
d. "Concrete Tasks"
The discussion of the "Objective Situation" is a Marxist analysis of the "Deteriorating
Economic Situation" in the Philippines and its "Political' Consequences." It concludes that --
"The beginnings of a revolutionary situation already exist in our country, requiring
only the total mobilization of the entire Party membership and the mass movement
it is leading, to render irreversible the tendencies and processes now at work and
thereby hasten the crisis of imperialist-puppet rule in our country, leading to its
overthrow."
The "tendencies and processes which need further development to hasten the maturity of the
revolutionary situation into a revolutionary crisis" were the following:
a. the "developing monetary crisis" arising from a depleting Dollar reserve behind
the Peso caused by an unfavorable balance of trade and leading to inflation on the one
hand and to attempted controls on the other, the latter producing unemployment in
businesses connected with foreign imported goods;
b. "sharpening of the struggle of peasants, workers and other salary earners to
preserve their living standards" -- "petitions and strikes for higher wages," "demon-
strations for lower prices," "demonstrations of unemployed workers," "peasant strikes
for larger shares in the harvests;"
c. "growing demoralization of both government armed forces and government employ-
ees" caused by inflation and the spectacle of corruption in high places in the Govern-
ment;
d. "deep cleavages and antagonisms among the various bourgeois political parties"
as evidenced in the 1949 elections;
e. "potential rifts and antagonisms within the QLP administration itself;"
f. "present reluctance of the American imperialists to come to the aid of the QLP
administration," this arising from (1) economic "recession" in the U.S.; (2) lack of
faith in the Philippines Government; (3) American pre-occupation with other areas
"more important" to the "imperialist" program of "containing communism all over
the world."
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28. Part IV of the Resolution, entitled "Concrete Tasks," defines the objectives which
the Party itself must accomplish to furnish "decisive and competent leadership" to the mass
unrest that is being produced by the "objective" situation. It was estimated that the develop-
ing revolutionary situation would take two years to either be resolved by the bourgeoisie or
by a crisis in which the CPP would take over. "Immediate attention and concentration" should
be given to "the following organizational, military and educational tasks":
Organizational Tasks:
1. "Place the entire Party and its membership under military discipline."
2. "Divide the entire country into seven regions, with each region under a Party'
Regional Committee, directly under the supervision of a member of the Political
Bureau. Distribute the members of the Central Committee among the various regions,
taking into consideration the strategic importance of each region."
3. "Intensify further the ideological struggle against tendencies towards evasion of
sharp struggle, awaitisml and similar tendencies. Remove from responsible positions
those found :affected by such tendencies. Test whether or not our cadres are affected
by conscious or unconscious evasion of struggle by changing assignments and terri-
tories. Do not allow the common excuse that `the masses are not yet ready' to screen
the fact that it is our cadres who are not ready to lead the masses in sharp struggles
with the class enemy and its state."
4. "Intensify manyfold our present work on expansion. Make the next two years as
the target date within which our Party and its mass movements are pushed to all
corners of the country ... Select the best and most self-sacrificing cadres to lead
our expansion work in the various regions. Create a `Committee on Family of Ex-
pansion Cadres' under the Organizational Bureau and the various Regional Commit-
tees, to take exclusive charge of families of expansion cadres, to help such expansion
cadres in removing all their worries about their families. Give extensive and in-
tensive briefing to all expansion cadres, before they are sent out in their assignment,
so that they feel confident to tackle their work even without very close and detailed
supervision by their next higher organ. By all means preserve intact communications
between the RECO and the expansion cadres under the RECO, for purposes of report
and supervision."
5. "Struggle against all forms of regionalism and its related weaknesses of nepotism
and favoritism. All cadres who show reluctance to leave their places of birth should
be shifted to other territories, to give them a more national outlook of the entire
struggle. The SEC shall have the right to draw cadres for expansion from any region,
subject only to the right of PB members leading the RECO to protest first before
finally implementing the SEC decision. If the SEC insists on the execution of its de-
cision, then the RECO and the PB Member leading the RECO should immediately send
the cadre being asked for. "2
6. "Decisively strengthen our system of raising, keeping, recording, reporting and
allocation of our finance." Organize a National Finance Committee, under the chair-
manship of a PB member, and with two CC members. Regional Finance Committees
similarly to have a chairman from the Regional Committee. "Under the RECOS there
shall be finance committees in various districts, composed of a representative of the
Party District Committee, a representative of the Field Command, and a representa-
tive of the local mass organization. These District Finance Committees under the
1 "Awaitism" is the tendency to wait for help from friendly foreign countries (China) to inter-
vene in force in favor of the CPP insurrection, or to wait for a general war to raise the
"revolutionary situation" to a "crisis" stage.
2 ,See below, paras. 31ff. for an example of how expansion assignments were actually worked
out by this procedure.
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RFC, shall select and appoint finance cadres in the various towns under the District.
All finance organs shall keep books of accounts and the corresponding receipts for
cash receipts and disbursements... There shall be a quarterly audit of books. All
finance organs shall make a monthly report to their higher finance organ. The NFC
shall make a quarterly report to the OB, while the Military Treasurer shall disburse
funds subject to the approval of the Vice-C-I-C. The GS shall appoint the auditor to
audit the books o the NFC, while the C-I-C shall appoint the auditor to audit the books
of the MT. There shall be an upward assessment of dues among the entire Party
membership, except Party members within the armed forces, who shall pay the former
rate of dues." Allocation of receipts from dues:
PB - 35%
RECO-25%
District Committee - 20%
Section Committee - 15%
Nucleus - 5%
Allocation of contributions:
PB - 25%
RECO - 75%
"Proceeds from production bases shall also be divided 25% for the PB and 75% for
the RECO. All proceeds from the public domain or private properties administered
by the Party shall go to the NFC or the PB. Both the PB and all RECOs shall set
aside 20% of all their incomes for the purchase of arms." The NFC will adjust sur-
pluses and deficits arising from discrepancies between budgets and income from
percentage shares.
7. "Improve decisively our communication system. Strengthen the CD (Communica-
tions Department) by appointing a member of the CC as its chairman, and recruit
two members of its staff from cadres of provincial calibre. Improve the organiza-
tional life of our couriers and posts, as well as special underground techniques of
carrying and transporting cadres, messages and supplies.. Train many reserve
couriers, and establish many reserve posts, to avoid frequent use of the same
courier or post, which leads to quick exposure. Train political couriers from the
SEC down to the RECO, and from the RECO up to the SEC.1 Develop various com-
munication routes... For. the time being, maintain only one line of communication
(organizational and military) between the SEC and the various RECOs."2
8. "Concentrate organizational-political work among the workers of strategic in-
dustries... All RECOs shall be charged with the task of organizing the workers in
industries and factories located within their territories... Lead the workers in mili-
tant struggles to defend their living standards. Utilize such economic struggles to
train the workers in actual clashes with the forces of the government and the class
enemy, and thus give them revolutionary experience."
9. Strengthen "the women's mass movement... Place women cadres in the various
organs of the Party, instead of having a separate women's group. . ."
10. "Give greater concentration on the organization of the youth, particularly the
students... Prepare the youth organizations as recruiting grounds for militant and
1 This apparently means that the PB will eventually have its own pool of couriers, and each
of the RECOs will have its own.
2 Inasmuch as the Regional Committee of PCC and the Regional Command of the HMB were
practically inseparable during the first few months of the insurrection, a separate courier
system for,each branch of the Party, political and military, would have been wasteful, as
well as unnecessary.
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heroic fighters for liberation. Send out to the field youth Party members who can no
longer actively work in legal youth organizations..."
11. "Struggle against the tendencies towards evasion of struggle among members
working among government employees. Launch the government employees in mass
struggles involving issues which vitally affect their livelihood:.."
Military Tasks:
1. "Launch a decisive struggle to achieve complete unanimity in concept and practice
of military discipline ...Strengthen organizational life within the armed forces by
strict implementation of practical and study meetings and military drill, and by con-
tinuous and regular check-up on organizational life, through submission of organ!-
zational data, other reports, minutes of meetings and even daily, record of activities.
Intensify educational work within the armed forces..."
2. "Struggle against anarchy in organization within the armed forces. . ." (Put a stop
to soft fraternization between officers and men; favoritism.)
3. "Exert all efforts to recruit cadres to teach in military tactical schools for
specialized military training in military bases. In these schools, special emphasis
shall be given to both individual and collective fighting efficiency."
4. "Intensify recruiting through selective service system. Members of peasants,
workers' and youth organizations shall be given preference in recruiting. Mass
organizations shall be given their quotas of recruits, and the RECO's should see to
it that such quotas are fulfilled on time. Those elements who volunteer to join the
armed forces, but are not within the quotas under the selective service system shall
first be screened in orientation camps (special production bases) for the dual purpose
of ideological orientation and investigation to test political reliability."
5. "Fill up all vacancies on such services as communication, intelligence, ordnance,
medical service, first aid, inter-AF (armed forces) cultural propaganda. Struggle
against the former practice of not filling vacancies, simply because the best men are
not available and stop.the practice of assigning to these services, cadres who already
have other equally important assignments. Promote even relatively weaker cadres
boldly, and intensify their training in their new assignments."
6. "Convert our present guerrilla forces into a regular army. Intensify military and
political training of our present guerrilla forces, with the aim . . . of building a com-
petent officer corps adequate to the task, of leading the armed struggle for national
seizure of power. Instruct all Field Commands to organize part-time groups, give
them training in partisan fighting, and actually supervise their activities. In areas al-
ready organized, where the loyalties of the masses are already assured, instruct all
FC's to organize maintenance forces divided into units of from three to five to main-
tain the stability of our organizations and the morale of our masses. All other forces
in these areas should be sent out for expansion to undeveloped areas."
7. "Supplement arms collection through actual struggle, by purchase and exchange."
8. "Instruct all FC's (Field Commands) to collect their combat experience for sub-
mission to the RHQ (Regional Headquarters) and GHQ for analysis to serve as further
basis for enriching our techniques of armed struggle."
9. "Intensify our political and organizational infiltration within the government
armed forces."
10. "Train special cadres, political and military, to establish relations with other
armed groups. Encourage direct affiliation with the HMB of such armed groups. Care
should be taken that in our enthusiasm to have them affiliate with the HMB, they are
not alienated against the HMB, through, any suspicions. . that the HMB intends to
wrest leadership of such forces from their local leaders. Make it plain in all such
relations that the HMB is only interested in national liberation, and that it is its policy
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to entrust leadership of local forces to its local leadership. If resistance or reluc-
tance is shown to affiliation to the HMB, at least establish close coordination of
struggle, through exchange of experiences, information, officers and men, and through
actual joint armed struggles against a common enemy. At this stage of our struggle
for national liberation, our basic orientation on military struggle is still placing em-
phasis on small scale ambushing, barrio raids, dukot, etc. to continually harass the
enemy and give it no peace of mind, and at the same time, raise the morale of
struggle of our masses. In addition, occasionally, we should launch large scale and
coordinated operations for political and organizational purposes."
C. Educational Tasks:
(Plans for Party publications and schools):
1. Titis: "mass propaganda-agitational paper." SEC to publish. RECO's to repro-
duce it in their areas in prevailing dialect.
2. OB will circulate to RECO's regular news round-up.
3. Ang Komunista: theoretical paper under supervision of the Educational Department.
PB members required to contribute an article at least quarterly; CC members, at
least annually. All articles to be approved by the ED and the SEC. To be published
quarterly at first; monthly eventually.
4. Mapagpalaya: weekly paper to be put out by RECO's for the HMB. "It shall
emphasize the military significance of events, local and international glamourize
guerrilla life, and popularize the aims and objectives of struggle..."
5. "The HMB shall publish another organ or bulletin for exclusive circulation among
its officers and men. Articles shall deal with the experiences, theory and tactics of
warfare, cultural work and other phases of army life. ."
6. "Every RECO must have at least two instructors for Party schools each. For this
purpose, the ED should train at least 14 national instructors for a period of three
months, at least. Each region should open regular Party schools, which should
conduct classes for a period of one month. The curriculum for advanced Party
schools for both PB and CC members and non-CC cadres of theoretical competence
shall be prepared by the ED groups in CL and SL (Central and Southern Luzon), in
coordination with the ED group in Manila and the SEC."
7. "The ED must prepare also practical reading materials, such as guidance to new
cadres on organizational and educational work and activities. In this work, the OB
should closely coordinate with the ED, to give practical content to the reading
materials"1
8. "PB or SEC documents, instructions and other reading materials must be popu-
larized by the RECO's among the lower organs, PB documents shall be aimed at the
level of understanding of CC and RECO cadres, and the RECO popularizations shall
be aimed at the level of understanding of the rank and file members. . . ."
9. "Basic Marxist books. ..should be translated into the various dialects. All trans-
lations should be passed over by the ED Chairman, before they are finally published.
The ED should train translators in various dialects, particularly Visayan and Bicolano
dialects."
1 In this connection, it is interesting to note that an earlier document, possibly written in the
fall of 1949, contained a decision to turn over the publication and distribution of the Party
newspaper, Katubusan, to the OB (then, OD) because this was considered to be organizational
work, primarily.
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10. "All RECO's and the lower organs under them must provide themselves with
complete equipment and facilities for publication, such as printing press, mimeo-
graphs, typewriters, etc. We should prepare for decentralization of publication,
when, because of strict enemy vigilance, it becomes dangerous to transport bulky
reading materials. Broadcasting equipment and facilities, both receiving and trans-
mitting, should be prepared within this year."
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION -
29. There were three main practical points to the decision of January 1950: (1) re-
organization of the Party to fit the new requirements; (2) use of the HMB in the political pro-
gram; (3) the project for the reorganization of the HMB from a guerrilla force into a "regu-
lar army" when the political program had progressed far enough.
30. Reorganization of the Party. The CPP apparatus was reorganized substantially
as outlined in the January Resolution. The GHQ was temporarily dissolved, the SEC taking
over all functions, both military and political. PB members were assigned as supervisors to
the most important Regional Committees; one was assigned to the National Education Depart-
ment. Several special offices were set up to handle technical problems:
National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Organized ca. April 1950 under Fred Payat.1
Primary function: military intelligence. Secondary: political and economic.
Technological Group (TG). Organized Spring 1950.
Hospital Group. Organized ca. September 1950 to arrange for medical care for
wounded.
PEIRA. Formerly Political and Economic Intelligence Group under the ED (IN) (the
Manila branch of National Educational Department). Initials may stand for Political
and Economic Intelligence Research and Analysis.
Production Department. May have not existed above RECO level. Food production.
31. Use of the HMB in the Political Program: "Expansion." The political-organizing l
program consisted of "expansion," (i.e., the "decisive accumulation of main force and
reserves" proper to the period of the "political strategic offensive"):2 (a) increasing the size
of the CPP, HMB, and "mass organizations" where they were already in existence; (b) creat-
ing organizations in new areas.
Quotas were set up for numerical expansion. A directive in July set up five quarterly
goals ending in September 1951. During each quarter, each Party member in the HMB was to
recruit one non-Party member in the HMB into the Party, and one member of a "mass organi-
zation" into the HMB. Each non-Party member of the HMB was to recruit one person from
outside into the HMB. By the end of the drive, it was hoped to have 172,800 people in the HMB.
32. In Central Luzon, a number of carefully organized demonstrations of strength were
made'by the HMB in August. They took the form of raids in full force, the HMB units moving
into and taking complete control of cities, and then making the inhabitants listen to speeches.
In addition to showing the people how serious, well-led, well-equipped and how strong the
HMB was, and how ineffectual the local authorities were, the raids were also excellent tactical
exercises.
1 Real name Federica Bautista. In many of the documentary lists of CC members and func-
tionaries, Fred appears immediately following the names of the PB members. He was evi-
dently considered the ranking member of the CC who was not in the PB. He may have been
an alternate member of the PB.
2 The "political strategic offensive" was the "stage of struggle" upon which the CPP embarked
with the January 1950 decision. The movement was still, however, in a period of "military
strategic defensive."
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On 25 August, for example, about 200 HMB troops took over the city of Tarlac. As
they advanced towards the city they carefully cut its communications, set up road-blocks at
all exits, and manned defensive positions abandoned by the Philippine Constabularly. Some
of the invaders infiltrated the city dressed as civilians; quietly occupied the churches
where
prevent the bells' being used as an alarm; others infiltrated a Constabulary camp,
they occupied the fox holes and commandeered several armored vehicles. After the HMB
units that had waited outside the town until the preparations inside it had been completed,
entered it on a pre-arranged signal, occupied the railroad, telephone and telegraph stations,
they looted stores for medical supplies. HMB military police were posted at strategic places
to keep order, even making their men pay for food and other items bought at places that were
not designated anti-HMB. An hour later, a parade was held, speeches made, and a demon-
stration given of the handling of a 50-caliber machine gun by its crew. The whole operation
was entirely orderly and must have been impressive.
33. Expansion into undeveloped areas. Reliable organizers and propagandists were
sent into areas where Party influence was small or non-existent. They were often accom-
panied by small HMB detachments to protect the organizing teams and to serve as nuclei for
the organization of larger armed units.
According to the minutes of the SEC for 13 March, was decided that
and 4 RECO's
2
not to
(see map) were to furnish cadres for expansion to other areas. 7 were
be required to furnish. cadres, but neither were they to be reinforced. RECO's 5, 6,
to be reinforced by cadres from RECO's 1 and 2.
Actually, RECO 7 (Mindanao) hardly existed at that time. The SEC minutes for 10 May
noted that, "considered from a strategic standpoint, it already becomes necessary to open a
front of the armed struggle in Mindanao, to serve as a rallying center of the discontented
elements there who are forced to be awaitists because they have no where to turn to." The
OB, acting under SEC instructions, carried on the direction of the expansion program to
Mindanao: sent orders to the OB Supervisors of RECO's 1 and 2 to furnish the key cadres
and for the reshuffling of other personnel needed to fill the positions vacated by the cadres
sent on the expansion mission. On 29 September the SEC approved the following work play
for RECO 7:
"Plan is for four months from October to January. Basic core of plan is prepare all
the organizational and propaganda groundwork, including schooling of native talents,
so that by the end of the four months' period the necessary AF (armed force) can be
assembled, properly off icered and equipped with sufficient arms, and supported by
the masses, with only little help from the NFC. AF will start in one province where
prospects are brightest now, although it is not the most strategic."
The SEC agreed to furnish the following funds in support of RECO7: "October 'P200, Novem-
ber P300, December P300, January P400 plus the transportation expenses of cadres coming
from Manila for the RECO." The initial organization of "R-7" was to be:
"Carling - SEC
Toledo - OD
Cente - ED and G-3
Tag or someone from the north ...and to send 3 more cadres to be designated as
financial man, communication man and helper."
34. The decision of 13 March not to deplete RECO's 3 and 4 was later changed. A
SEC minute for 16 September reads: "Asking RECO balanced arms to help hasten 50
ex-
officers and men, including Com. William, equipped with
pansion there, which according to reports, accepted by SEC, is very fertile for such expansion.
RECO 4 is given up to Oct. 15 for such force to leave RECO 4."
35. Expansion in Northern Luzon also involved much shifting of personnel. It was
arranged to form two new RECO's (8 and 9) from areas previously under RECO 1. Cadres
for the new RECO's were furnished by RECO's 1 and 2. Letters were written by the OB
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Chief to the PB Supervisors and other individuals connected with the encadrement of the new
RECO's. One of the letters, to Flor, who was to be the chief of RE CO 8, specifies his functions:
"l. Connect and meet Com. Basa, R-1 secretary and immediately ask for 6 leading
comrades to be assigned with you as Corn. Pacing (PB Supervisor RECO 1) instructed
him before the latter's departure.
2. Arrangement of cadres in AF should be made between you and Com. Basa. As I
had been informed by Com. Pacing, your region will be called R-8. They have estab-
lished one FC and in the immediate future, we can have 2.1 Ask Com. Basa to explain
to you all these things. Before proceeding to your destination, you have to be sure
that cadres from B-1 are with you.
3. You will be secretary of R-8 and at the same time the PB supervisor. The dif-
ference between these 2 posts are: while you are the secretary you will also be the
leader of the RECO politically as you know and you share with the collective responsi-
bility of the RECO. On the other hand, as PB supervisor, you have the power and
responsibility of the PB to impose all the decisions of the SEC of the PB. You have to
report all individual opinions as PB supervisor regarding all matters within your
jurisdiction.
4. Establish your close connections with the SEC, and in doing so you have to have a
special courier direct to the SEC or the OB aside from the RECO regular comcas
(communications comrades) to the NCD. The expenses of your personal courier will
be provided by the OB or in other words, from our national share of finances for the
lower organs.
So we expect that your communications will not be cut if the only problem is finance.
Reminding you that although you have to proceed to your territory you must not forget
that you should prepare at the same time that you are out of the RECO on January
next year, up to a certain date for the coming CC conference, that is if you cannot
take the travel from your place to R-3 for a month's time. "2
5. You can make your connection with us through R-1 couriers. Let me know when
you reach R-1 and from there we can advise you on the thing to do from time to time."
Similar instructions were given to the man who was sent out to be Secretary and PB
Supervisor of the new RECO 9.
36. Personnel Problems. The CPP has had considerable difficulties with its cadres
in assignment to expansion missions, and with the demands of the "armed struggle" in general.
The life of a guerrilla is a hard one: the natural reluctance to give up family associations
and the pleasures of a peaceful life is inherent in even devoted Communists. Many Party
functionaries, even some on the PB level, have been severely criticized or expelled for refus-
ing to accept expansion of military assignments.
Jose Lava wrote a paper on the subject, entitled "Struggle against Awaitism," awaitism
being the term the CPP has applied to all forms of hesitation, lack of confidence, laziness,
irresponsibility, lack or revolutionary self-discipline, etc.3 Among the "unorganized masses
1 This appears to mean that it had been decided to set up one Field Command immediately
with the men available; not that an FC already existed in the area.
2 The meaning of this is obscure. It may mean that Flor should not lose touch with Head-
quarters and thereby miss the CC meeting.
3 In the ranks of the HMB, personnel difficulties were more crudely expressed. A letter
from the Visayan-Mindanao Regional Command to the Panay Command Staff criticizes the
latter for the condition of its troops, who were practicing extortion, rape, bigamy, em-
bezzlement, gambling, selling their equipment, and observing bourgeois military courtesies.
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who already believe in the armed struggle," awaitism is expressed by failure to join actively
in the "liberation movement." Among the organized masses, it is expressed by "evasion of
sharp struggle" in the hope that external developments - - a war, or Russian or Chinese mili-
tary assistance -- will bring victory without sacrifice. In the Party itself, awaitism is mani-
fested by excessive security practices that make effective work impossible, and by avoidance
of difficult assignments, particularly expansion assignments. The causes of awaitism, as
described by Lava, amount to lack of firm conviction in the righteousness of the cause, un-
certainty of victory, liking for the easier life, "opportunism" or waiting until victory is sure
before climbing aboard the bandwagon, and any type of fear.
Having classified practically all human failings under the heading of "awaitism," Lava
exposes the "screens" behind which awaitism hides: the plea that family responsibilities
make "sharp struggle" impossible, the argument that "the masses are not yet ready" for
revolution, disagreement with the Party's political line or its personnel policies, excuses
that peaceful methods have not been fully "exhausted," etc. This exposure makes it easy to
criticize almost any failure as "awaitism."
The cures of the "disease" are education, example, and rigid discipline. The leaders
must be educated to "complete selflessness and single-minded devotion to the cause" by way
of relentless "criticism and self-criticism," purges and struggle against all forms of "devia-
tionism." The entire Party membership must be placed on a "professional revolutionary
basis." This must not hamper the mass recruitment policy: men must be brought into the
Party and the HM13 as fast as possible, even if their "understanding of Marxism is still in-
complete," but they must be brought to the level of "professional revolutionaries within the
shortest time possible," and the members of longer standing must demonstrate their sincere
desire to be professional revolutionaries or face reduction to the "status of sympathizers."
The "highest leadership of the Party should be a model of complete selflessness, intellectual
integrity, self-sacrifice, moral and physical courage, sense of responsibility, industry ef-
ficiency and discipline."
Special consideration must be given the cadres who must keep up a more ordinary
life in order to work with the legal mass organizations or to do underground work, but they
must be very carefully selected and carefully supervised.
The intensification of the "armed struggle" itself is a weapon against awaitism, Lava
says: the busier the cadres, the better. Furthermore, demonstrations of strength and confi-
dence by the HMB will impress the masses and help to overcome awaitism stemming from
"opportunism" and lack of faith in the Communist victory. It is also necessary to carry on
"intensive and extensive mass propaganda" against bourgeois parliamentarianism and re-
formism.
Another difficulty in the way of vigorous expansion is "regionalism," which is nothing
more than the reluctance of cadres to leave their own areas for undeveloped areas, where they
have few friends and do not even understand the local dialect. One of the top HMB leaders,
Luis Taruc, has been suspected of suffering from "regionalism." He tried hard in the summer
of 1950 to stay in his native province, at the head of his old Huk troops, rather than go to
another province and serve with the GHQ to be established there.. Lava summarily rejected
his reasons on ideological grounds.
37. For several months, the SEC felt that expansion ("battle for the reserves") was
the primary problem and that only tentative plans could be made for the reorganization of the
HMB from a guerrilla force to a "regular army." On 29 April it decided to canvass the PB
members on their views as to how the reorganization might be accomplished. A "Technolo-
gical Group" had shortly before been created at SEC Headquarters to study the proposals and
to make recommendations. It was decided to hold a military conference to discuss the pro-
blems after the Party leaders had had time to think about them.
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Two questionnaires were prepared. The first was to be used as a basis for discussion
in the Regions and was sent to both "PB members and lower organs" shortly after 10 May.
It asked for recommendations on the following points:
1. training
2. table of organization
3. arms and ammunition
4. missions
5. security
6. identification
7. intelligence
8. communications
The second questionnaire was drawn up between 10 May and 2 June and was sent only
to PB Supervisors of RECO's 1 4. It dealt with questions on "actual combat experiences
under different conditions."
Both questionnaires were to be used at Regional military conferences, which were to
meet and prepare consolidated replies to the questionnaires and recommendations for the
"ways and means of converting guerrilla forces into a regular army." The Regional
conferences were to be attended by the "whole staff of the RECOM, and one representative
from every FC (Field Command) under the RECOM."
38. The SEC decided in mid-August that the expansion program was going well enough
to concentrate on the reorganization of the HMB. A Military Committee of 15 members was
appointed, "subject only to final decision of the proposed CC conference that was also decided
to hold early next year." The MC was to control the HMB through a GHQ and was to have
"final authority on minor political questions connected with the basic military aim. . . subject
only to the political leadership of, the SEC."
The composition of the GHQ for the HMB was subject to the approval of the MC, and
later, by the CC. The SEC proposal was as follows:
Chief of Staff -- Pacing (Jesus Lava)
Deputy Chief of Staff -- Enteng (Luis Taruc)
Chief, War Plans -- Torres (Casto Alejandrino)
Chief, Intelligence -- Payat (Federica Bautista)
Chief, Plans and Training -- Dim (Porfirio Discaya)
Chief, Finance and Supply -- Fabian (Ponciano Lina)
Chief, Personnel and Administration -- Ramson (Juanito Ortiz)
(Note: see para. 8 above for the similarily between this and the composition of the Military
Committee of the Huk in the resistance.)
39. It was decided by the SEC on 11 August to hold a meeting of the MC in the area of
RECO 3 (OUT) (i.e., outside Manila) on 15 October. The PB Supervisor of the host RECO was
told to prepare for the meeting, which, it was thought, might "last two weeks and involve at
least 50 people, including security and help." Substitutes were named to act as PB Super-
visors of RECO's 1, 2, and 4, while the regulars were at the MC Meeting.
40. The Regional military conferences were apparently held, but there is on hand only
one filled-out questionnaire, that of RECO 4. Taruc prepared answers to the questionnaire
for RECO 2 but a copy is not available.
41. On 26 August the SEC decided to postpone the MC meeting to 1 November because
Taruc had been having personnel difficulties (not explained) and had had to call an "enlarged
Regional Committee/Command Conference to settle" them, and it would have been impossible
for him to get to the site of the MC meeting before the end of October.
The following agenda was approved for the MC meeting by the SEC:
"a. detailed report on our armed forces and equally detailed report on enemy armed
forces, with a view to comparison of present and potential strengths;
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b. determination of what phase of military strategy we are in. Obviously, we are
still on the strategic defensive phase. We want to know what sub-phase of the strategic
defensive we are in;
c. basic military strategic conceptions as outlined in document already released, in
addition to other strategic conceptions that may be submitted before the -meet, includ-
ing correct combination of positional, guerrilla, and partisan types of warfare as
demonstrated in China and Korea;
d. basic military training of our officers and men, as the key task among our many
military tasks, as outlined in our document already released, with very specific
implementations;
e. confirmation. by the Military Committee of Secretariat decision on the General
Headquarters and actual organization of the General Headquarters and its various
divisions and special services."
42. The document mentioned in paragraph "e" above was among those seized in the
October raids. it was approved on 14 July 1950. It is here reproduced in full.
BASIC MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTIONS
(TOP CONFIDENTIAL-FOR PB ONLY)
In any strategic military planning, it is necessary to know the basic limitations to our
own potential strength as well as the maximum limits of the enemy's potential strength, both
in man-power and weapons.
Our Own Potentialities: As far as man power is concerned, it can be said literally that
there is no limit to our mobilization of power. The exploited peasants, workers and low in-
come petty bourgeoise, under conditions of rapidly deteriorating living conditions, should not
be difficult to rally under the HMB. Our basic limitation is weapons. We have no factories
to manufacture even small arms, although home made weapons, with proper technological
research, can be made locally. Our main source of weapons ultimately is Washington, through
its arms aid to its puppets. We may also be able to obtain small arms from our allies
beyond the seas, but heavy weapons, we cannot, as long as the U.S. Navy and Airforce com-
mand the seas separating our country from the Asian mainland.
Our Enemy's Potentialities: Man power which our enemy can mobilize ultimately
depends both upon our politicalization of the masses, but more important still, upon the state
of the finances of the puppet government, as well as the maximum aid it can obtain from the
U.S. Considering that the forces of the enemy is mercenary, finance is very decisive in its
ability to mobilize man power. Considering also that the rank and file of the enemy's force
must perforce come from the exploited peasantry and workers, the enemy rank and file is
easily susceptible to our propaganda.. We can determine to a safe degree of accuracy the
capacity of the enemy to mobilize man power because it is not difficult to know the state of
the enemy's finances and the probable trend of such finances for the next two years, and
neither is it difficult to know the cost to the enemy of training, maintaining, feeding, equip-
ping and sending to the field of combat say a battalion or a regiment. What is more difficult
is to forecast the probable U.S. military aid for its puppets in our country. However, this
can better be estimated later, when we see better the developments of U.S. Asia Pacific
policy. Up to recently, the proportion between the military expenditures and the total budget
appropriations is approximately one third. However, as the enemy becomes desperate, it in-
creases the proportion of its expenditures for the armed forces, even at the expense of es-
sential services, as is already being done by the Quirino puppet administration. However,
there is a limit to such expenditures for the armed forces, and even the most desperate
governments have not gone beyond eighty per cent of its total revenues. These are the maxi-
mum limits to the capacity of the enemy to mobilize man power. Whatever the enemy will
lack in man power, it may make up in superiority of weapons, like planes, tanks, heavy
artillery and other heavy weapons which the U.S. can send to its puppets.
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Our Primary Military Strategic Problem: Based on the above appraisal of the limi-
tations to ours and the enemy's potential in both man power and weapons, our primary mili-
tary strategic problem can be formulated thus: How to counteract or overcome the certain
superiority in our aims in struggle, from which flows our superiority in the ability to mobi-
lize man power.
Based on this formulation of the strategic problem, the following measures should be
adopted:
1. Aggressive mobilization of man power for the HMB, based on the tempo of doubling
every three months. The entire officer corps and the rank and file of the HMB must
be given basic military training necessary and common to both guerrilla and positional
fighting. Considering our certain inferiority in weapons, we should overcome such
inferiority by a good basic military training of both men and officers. At the same
time, deep indoctrination of the aims of the struggle should be given to both men and
officers, not only to make them dogged and resourceful fighters, but also to make
them mass organizers. They should be taught both tactics in guerrilla as well as
positional fighting. We should aim to at least 2-to-1 superiority over the enemy in
the number of regular forces. Our guerrilla forces should at least equal the number
of our regular forces. Armed partisans among the organized masses should be
trained in street and close fighting and trained to capture limited objectives. There
should be no limit in the number of armed partisans that should be organized and
trained. Armed partisans will operate only when the decisive moment comes in their
respective territories, to give the enemy no chance to annihilate them.
2. Aggressive politicalization of the armed forces of the enemy particularly the rank
and file foot soldier. If the rank and file soldier is not willing to fight, there is nothing
which the top officers can do. At the proper time, these foot soldiers can be made to
desert to us or even turn their guns against their officers. Political and recruiting
work among strategic officers, and men handling heavy weapons should also be made.
At the proper time, these men can be made to join our ranks with their weapons.
3. Aggressive struggle to capture arms from the enemy, and either organize or
establish contact with arms smugglers to siphon into the HMB arms aid coming from
the U. S.
4. Political and organizational offensive to campaign for the non-payment of taxes to
the puppet government, and instead contribute to the HMB. Bourgeoisie and landlords
who profess sympathy for the HMB must be tested in their loyalties by asking them
to contribute to the HMB in an amount at least equal to the total direct taxes they are
paying to the puppet government. As we grow stronger, we will ask for more. 'Those
who refuse to contribute any amount should be considered as enemies and dealt with
as such. Those who contribute less than what we reasonably ask them as mentioned'
above, should be considered as opportunist allies and treated accordingly. Recruit
government revenue collectors, show them their. role under the NEW DEMOCRACY,
show why they are forced to commit graft under the present setup and why they do not
have to do so under the NEW DEMOCRACY, and give them assignments to make money
for the HMB, giving them decent allowances, and assuring them protection should
they be discovered by the puppet authorities. All these measures will severely weaken
the government finances and force them either to curtail their military expenditures
or else cut on essential services, or engage in deficit financing to maintain both es-
sential services and military expenditure. Needless to say, deficit financing will
mean uncontrolled inflation.
5. Aggressive recruiting work among technological people to conduct researches on
the manufacture of home made weapons, and based on these researches, actually
manufacture them. Send out to the field more technological cadres to advise the mili-
tary technological problems of the armed struggle. Start training strategic and key
workers in the art of industrial sabotage.
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6. Make the Party military-conscious. This means that our cadres and even rank
and file within the HMB should study, observe and put into practice ever new.tactics
developed from actual struggle. Learn from lessons derived from other armed
struggles for liberation in other countries, but always careful to vary the practice
based on differences in condition. Leading Party cadres should study bourgeoisie
military strategy and tactics so they can formulate strategy and tactics adequate to
defeat the enemy. These are also necessary to learn so that when we ask our recruits
from the enemy armed forces to train our men militarily, we will know whether they
are sabotaging us or not.
43. Taruc's Proposals. Aside from the proposals put forward by the PB members of
the SEC, the only other definite proposals known to have been made in response to the SEC
request for them were those offered by Luis Taruc and Casto Alejandrino. Taruc's ideas
were rather complete and were embodied in a document entitled "Over-all Military Plan,"
dated 26 August 1950. Significant points in "Part I; Intensive Preparations, October 1950 -
November 1951" follow. Part II: "All-Out Offensive" was not among the documents seized
in the October 1950 raids.
"A. Prevailing Conditions and Our Tactics:
1. We cannot have `Liberated Areas' and maintain a `Yenan' as in China.
2. We must, instead, have all strategic regions of the country politically (ideologically)
liberated to serve as our impregnable Mass Bases to support many secret regional `Yenans'
wherein we must conduct our secret Intensive Preparations.
5. We must concentrate our initiative in getting strong by struggle through well
planned systematic wide-spread small-scale missions -- of liquidations, dukots, ambushes,
and occasional attacks. We must always take into consideration in our planning of such
actions that the strategic RC bases are not jeopardized. Big plans of attack must only be
done during this period as a vital necessity to capitalize on its political significance and
effect on the people. Strike when and where the enemy least expect us.
B. Strategic Regions and Bases:
1. The HMB and the OB must make a very close coordination in organizing the
masses in all strategic regions.
2. All strategic regions must be put to maximum utility .... Our Army must be
distributed to facilitate our intensive training, lessen food problems, disperse the concentra-
tion of our enemy troops now guarding tight our decisive mass bases, keep the enemy always
guessing and thereby complacent and napping.
3. Our troops must be so distributed in every strategic region to enable them to use
to decisive advantage the combination of guerrilla tactics -- positional warfare -- and infil-
tration as demonstrated in China and Korea.
4. Our HMB and the OB must have close coordination in organizing guerrilla partisan
units and secret local free governments in all strategic regions which we will entrust with the
power of administering all liberated areas -- thus relieve the regular forces of this encum-
brous job and permit them to push swiftly to all fronts where they will be decisively needed
during the offensive.
5. Taking into consideration the actual geographical-political-economic map of the
country, we can only organize 35 Combat Divisions, of 3,329 manpower strength each, and to
be supervised by 10 Regional Commands. Of these 35 divisions, 3 will lie low in their
respective areas, sending only their key officers and men for political-military training to
other areas....
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(A list of the proposed divisions, by Region was attached, and to it, the following
notes:)
RC I (Cagayan, Isabela, North Nueava Viscaya) should be thoroughly explored and is
potentialities fully harnessed. Excess volunteers joining the HMB in RC III (East Pangasinan,
Nueva Ecija, South Nueva Viscaya, North Quezon) should be sent there for training and ex-
pansion work. RC I should be developed as a spring board, reserve base, and source of food
supplies.
The 18th and 19th Divisions (vicinity of Manila, under RC V) should lie low, mobilizing
only a few select units to counteract the enemy spies and puppet snoopers. RC V :.hould send
officers and men of this group... to other areas for training. The 24th (`.'Vest Batangas, We-
Cavite) should only partially mobilize due to its geographical location.
APPROXIMATE MANPOWER STRENGTH OF OUR ARMY
1 Squad = 10 men (1 Pol. Guide, 1 corporal-squad leader and 8 privates.)
(10 men)
1 Platoon = 3 squads (30 men), plus Political Instructor, Platoon Leader, Platoon X-0,
(35 men) 2 first alders, or 35 men.
1 Company = 3 platoons (105 men), plus 5 members of Company Staff, plus 2 runners, plus 1
(113 men) first aider, or 113 men.
1 Battalion - 3 companies (339 men), plus 5 members of Battalion Staff, 3 runners, 2 first
(349 men) alders, or 349 men.
1 Regiment = 3 Battalions (1047 men), plus 5 members of Regimental Staff, 4 runners, 12
(1084 men) G-2, 3 Med. officers, 6 first alders, 10 cultural workers,
or 1084 men.
1 Division = 3 Regiments (3252 men), plus 6 members of Division Staff, 3 medical officers,
(3329 men) 12 first alders, 8 runners, 3 supply officer's assistants,
24 G-2 and 20 cultural workers, or 3,329 men.
PROPOSED 35 DIVISIONS WILL TOTAL - 116,480 MEN
This excludes the men to compose the future engineering corps, and other branches of the
service which future necessity will create.
C. Organization
1. Local experiences, lessons from abroad, and necessity demand that we must make
both our HMB and OB organizations as simple as possible.
2. Also, we must see to it that the basic units (squads and platoons) must be of re-
liable standards and solidly organized and efficiently controlled by their respective higher
commands. to
b
be taugt asic The basic militarY science immediately, aside from other courses and advanced combat
principles.
* 3. All regional commands must be reinforced with capable officers and cadres to
enable them to produce the desired results in any given region.
We utilize RC-DC-FC cadres to supervise intensive training and political work in FC
Companies and DComs - Seccoms
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* 4. Now that we see in the (cadres of RO-FC-DC), a satisfactory conscious loyalty
and observance of Party and Military Discipline - we must not concentrate so many capable
officers in the GHQ, and instead assign them temporarily during this period of intensive
preparation to different regions - as regional commanders or PB-GHQ Supervisors.
5., The GHQ itself must be strategically located, to be composed of select cadres and
officers vitally necessary to attend efficiently to all the urgent tasks during this period. You
will notice from the attached diagram that Political Officers are indispensable parts of the
Army life (even up to the battle of Stalingrad the Red Army maintained its political commis-
sars - see "Days and Nights" by Simonov.)
I proposed the following table of organization - and subsequent ranks, authority acid
responsibilities in the command:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
COMMANDING OFFICER: Torres -- Military Science, Intelligence
POLITICAL. COMMISSAR: Pacing Political Work and Party, Training Schools
EXECUTIVE OFFICER : Dimasalang -- Communication, Finance and Supply
1. Political Schools
2. Military Science
3. Intelligence
4. Communication
5. Technological
6. Medical
7. Finance
* We utilize RC-DC-FC cadres to supervise intensive training and political work in FC
Companies and DComs - Seccoms
Explanations:
1. The whole Party must be military-conscious, but, nonetheless, the whole Army
must always be solidly Party-led and Party-controlled. Thus, I earnestly propose that during
this preparatory period the political commissariat and all political posts be retained, and the
RECO must be maintained as it is now. We will only reorganize in the future, to make the
Political Officers act as advisory, giving full authority of command to the Military Commander
(C:O.) -- when the All-out Offensive will begin....
2. ...PB-GHQ supervisors in every RECO-RC (should) be continued -- recalling only
those that are indispensable to PB-GHQ on the eve of the decisive day.
3. GHQ can be capably manned by...Pacing, Torres and Dim to be assisted by other
comrades who can help teach in the training schools or can easily be sent out on inspection,
transmission, or other such work.
4. RECO 3 now (proposed RC V) should be the site for GHQ, to facilitate the sending
of student-officers and technicians to our GHQ advance training schools....
......................................................
D. Basic Training for the HMB
1. Political work ...is still unsatisfactory...
2. Basic military training must be given immediately. A commission to write down
in lesson form all the basic prerequisites for this job must be created immediately. In-
structors to teach it in every RC must be called for training....
3. Technological knowledge is very vital for our future offensive and also to our
front-line infiltrators, saboteurs and snipers. It must be taught on time. Radio technicians...
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must be produced without delay. A commission to write down in lesson form all the basic
prerequisites...must be created immediately. Instructors... must be called for training...
OB and GHQ must make a close follow-up of these tasks.
4. A Superior Military Strategy and Tactics... must be compiled and taught . .
5. All RC's must synchronize their organization and activities to the pattern set by
the GHQ. All bureaucratic, unsystematic, and complicated methods of work and movements
in the army must be swept aside.
E. Urgent Special Services:
1. Harvest Struggle Plans and Harvest Struggle Committees must be prepared early
to get the most out of the 1950-51 Harvest. Food reserves we must store during this harvest
season will play a decisive part in all our plans. Every RC -- down to the platoon, must
have a special unit given with the task of harvest struggle. The HMB and OB must coordinate
their plans....
2. Production must be stepped up to a maximum... open big clearings in every
strategic corner of every RC....
3. Special attention, through a special committee, must be given to the mountain
people (to serve as food suppliers and guides)....
4. Special committees to procure arms and ammunition through various means must
be organized. Every RC with ideal coastal lines must create special units to be ready at any
time for any assignment `outside'. Comrades assigned in these units must first befriend
closely the sea-faring people of the area and join `practice trips' to the sea at every oppor-
tunity. Work as deck-hands in any sea-going fishing boat if possible, strictly avoiding expo-
sure. We must recruit or ask CB (Chinese Board or Bureau: the leading organ of the
Chinese Communists in the Philippines) for Chinese comrades who can serve as guide-
interpreters. We must do this before end of December 1950. Infiltration work and mass
work must always be given emphasis on the procurement of firearms and ammunition --
second only to political work.
5. Earnest recruiting this year of various technical and skilled workers and profes-
sionals, like radio operators and mechanics, medical personnel and nurses, drivers and
mechanics, electricians, explosives experts, and others. We must also recruit high school
graduates or students of higher education for training in various technical and technological
fields this year and have them ready in sufficient numbers in every RC before November
1951."
44. Rejection of Taruc's plan. Taruc's proposals were rejected by the SEC on two
counts: (a) his proposed GHQ was "inadequate for the regular army which we are proposing
to create;" (b) his theory of "liberated areas" was too mechanical. The SEC minutes for 1
September record agreement with Taruc's idea of retaining Political Commissars in HMB
units "until the arrival of final national seizure of power," and there seems to have been no
objection to his proposed table of organization of tactical formations at this time, or later.
45. The argument against the Taruc proposed GHQ is actually not entirely clear.
The SEC minutes for 1 September declare that "while SEC considers that political battle
of reserves is still an important problem, this no longer occupies top priority which is now
held by the military task of preparing, accumulating and training armed forces superior to
the enemy...." For this reason, the "best military cadres should be placed together within
GHQ." The SEC "reiterates correctness of its proposed structure of GHQ and its personnel.
Function of Political Commissar within GITQ to be assumed by SEC (especially OB and ED)
working through the Chief of Plans and Training who will at same time be deputy Pol. Com."
There seem to have been two reasons for objection to the GHQ as proposed by Taruc: (a) it
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was too small for the technical requirements of the projected regular army;. (b) the SEC
wanted to pull all the best men together in order to control them better.
46. The priority of the military reorganization rested upon a revision of the esti-
mate of the situation. A document entitled "Aggressively Project the Party Leadership over
the Struggle for National Liberation," written some time between 29 March and 25 June,
states that the analysis of the situation by the PB in its resolution of January, "underesti-
mated the tempo of development of the revolutionary situation." The solidarity of the
bourgeoisie was actually disintegrating faster than had been expected; the Quirino adminis-
tration had been thoroughly discredited before the "masses" and the Liberal Party was
threatened by an internal split (the Fernando Lopez faction); the Nationalist Party was on
the verge of exposing itself before the masses; the U.S. had given up hope for the Quirino
Government; etc. This quickening of the revolutionary flow required the presence of maxi-
mum planning and executive talent at the headquarters of the insurrection. It meant that,
as the expansion program was intensively implemented, "promising," but as yet unproven
men, would have to be given responsible jobs and pushed up the ladder as fast as possible.
One of the "specific tasks" set forth in the document was to "implement a bold policy of
cadre development," which meant giving responsibil 1.y, fast promotion, and division of
labor: "struggle against the present practice of good cadres being burdened with numerous
tasks, while less experienced cadres are not being entrusted with responsibilities."
47. Another document, entitled "Additional Political-Military Strategic Conceptions --
Clarification of the Enlarged PB Conference Resolution," which was written sometime after
Taruc's proposals of 26 August and probably prior to the end of September, undertook to
clear up some of the "confusions" in the minds of Party leaders (meaning Taruc in particu-
lar) on the nature of the development of the "revolutionary situation." The reason for going
ahead with the plans to reorganize the HMB into a "regular army" was that the "coming
decisive struggle for the reserves" would surely end in Communist victory if the Party
simply continued the expansion program already under way. "However," the paper stated,
"it would still be necessary that the Party should achieve superiority of military forces
over the enemy, capable of overthrowing the enemy rule and maintaining the power of the
NEW DEMOCRACY." Central planning, direction, and intensive education of the military
cadres would be necessary to achieve the required efficiency of organization - - tasks re-
quiring a well-manned central staff, a GHQ.
48. Important strategic formulations were taken up in this document. In the first
place, the mechanical application of the principle of "liberated areas" was challenged. "We
can have liberated areas," the document begins, in direct contradiction with Taruc's state-
ment. The concept of a large, expanding "Yenan" should not be rigidly applied, particularly
in the Philippines. The strategy of the CPP should be to develop many liberated areas on the
theory that the Government did not have enough forces to clean them all out. This plan "will
finally force the enemy to adopt a policy of concentration, guarding only the cities and lines
of communication, leaving the entire countryside to us, as happened in China, and is now
happening in Indochina." The many liberated areas, arising from local military actions and
peasant uprisings, cannot all be defended against the Government, but the political advantages
for the CPP will remain. If the Party can seize areas, "confiscate big landholdings and dis-
tribute same to the poor peasants through revolutionary peasant committees, arm such
peasants to defend their gains, establish local barrio and town governments, collect taxes
from the people, etc.," it will have "won already the basic political allegiance of the poor
peasantry ...and at the same time,. . , would be giving them revolutionary consciousness
and experience in defending their newly-won lands."
"Liberation of local areas has a two-fold purpose: to win over and consolidate the
people's allegiance around our leadership, and to weaken the enemy armed forces by drawing
them (out of the cities) to fight our forces in the liberated areas, thereby weakening their
defenses in cities and lines of commtnication and supply." When this process has advanced
far enough, the CPP will be "prepared to deal the knock-out blow and seize power on a na-
tional scale."
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The "military strategic,value of Manila, Central Luzon and Southern Luzon" will be
great at that time, but is secondary at the present time: "there should be. . .greater empha-
sis, for the time being, on the areas remote from the military strategic centers, in order to
guarantee the success of the first stage of our struggle (liberation of local areas)...." This
is why considerable effort has been put into the expansion campaign to the southern islands
and to the northern provinces.
On the question of possible U. S. intervention in favor of the "puppet" regime, the
CPP should avoid doing anything that will give intervention a justifiable cause. Intervention
without such cause would help the Party by "exposing" American "imperialism."
The document argues that the situation is definitely developing in the direction of Com-
munist victory in the "struggle for the reserves" and that the program already under way, if
continued, will clinch the victory:
"...considering the developing economic crisis in our country and the consequent
developing crisis within the ruling LP,. . the PB conference was certain that if we
implement our expansion plans, overcome awaitism within the Party and hasten the
tempo of our activities, the Party will, within the next two years, achieve victory in
the coming decisive struggle for the reserves of the revolution as against the ruling
LP and other forces of counter-revolution."
The task that has not yet been begun is that of building up the HMB as an integrated fighting
organization. That is why that task now "occupies the highest priority among our many
problems." "Hence the recall of PB supervisors of some RECO's and their assignment to
the newly-organized GHQ under the Military Committee of the Party...."
It is particularly urgent that infiltration of the government's armed forces be stepped
"We cannot train our own men to handle these weapons (tanks, heavy artillery and
planes) because we do not have them ...and even if we attempt to capture these
weapons before the final offensive, we cannot hope to keep them because the enemy
will surely concentrate sufficient forces to recoup these weapons and we cannot yet
use them against the enemy because we do not yet know how. The only alternative is
for us to concentrate our political and organizational infiltration work among such
officers and men who are already trained to operate and handle such heavy weapons,
making them turn their weapons against the enemy only after we have already assumed
the military strategic offensive and when we are already in a position to give them the
minimum assurance that they have an even chance of fighting."
49. Subsequent developments. The plans for the construction of a GHQ went ahead,
but slowly. On 29 September, a SEC notation reads as follows:
"Approved Com. Boris for assignment to head Special Warfare Division under GHQ,
same to direct under the GHQ, technological warfare against enemy, such as use of
home-made bombs, molotov cocktails, land mines, booby traps and the like. Discussed
his attendance in proposed MC meet. Majority rejected. Greg (Jose Lava) dissenting."
On 6 October, the SEC disapproved Taruc's request not to serve with the GHQ: "SEC
reiterates its former decision, subject however to any final decision which CC may make.
Consequently Com. Enteng (Taruc) must prepare himself to work with the GHQ at least during
the interim between MC and CC meet. Whatever the CC decision, Com. Enteng can contribute
much in the early deliberations of the GHQ during its organization process."
50.. Beginning on 18 October and continuing through November 1950, raids were made
on Party installations. Many of the leaders of the Party were arrested and have since been
tried. Key leaders arrested were: Jose Lava, Federica Bautista, Simeon Rodriguez, Federico
Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Angel Baking, Arturo Baking.
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51. The MC finally met from 8 to 13 November 1950 with Jesus. Lava presiding. A
copy of the minutes has been captured, but they are very sketchy. The following points emerge
from them:
(1) The reorganization of the central Hq of the HMB had not yet been begun, but plans
for it were under way. Two proposals were offered for the composition of G-1, but
the vote resulted in a tie, and there is no indication how it was resolved:
(a) Jesus Lava proposal:
Chief of Staff
2 Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Secretary to serve as Commander-in-chief
(b) Taruc proposal:
Chief of Staff
Political Commissar
1 Deputy Chief of Staff
(2) "Infiltration" work in RECO 2 "is under the direction of MD (Military. Department)."
This work had been under the G-2, but the latter had been "unsuccessful" and was dis-
solved by the authority of the PB Supervisor of the RECO because its leadership was
"weak".
(3) Reorganization in RECO 4 had apparently progressed, with the formation of a
"Medical Corps," a "Staff of Ordnance," and a "Staff of Partisans." It was noted that
"there is no clear report of activities of `Partisans'."
(4) Strategy. A vote of 6 to 5 favored the definition of the (then) current military
position as still "defensive," possibly meaning, as Taruc put it, the "Strategic offen-
sive defensive," the "initiative" being on the side of the CPP, but current weakness
making it necessary to "be on the defensive on many occasions."
(5) Radio communications were being planned, but had not yet been begun.
(6) A 3-man committee was organized to set up a school for the training of instructors
in military matters.
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THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF CP PHILIPPINES
1. Among the documents seized in the October 1950 raids was one entitled "Strategy
and Tactics." It offers a theoretical justification for the decision in favor of the "armed
struggle" and presents the rationale for a general program of action. The document is un-
dated, but was written after the outbreak of the Korean war. It was probably written by
Jose Lava, the General Secretary of the CPP. It is divided into seven chapters. The first
three discuss general concepts, history of Communist and bourgeois strategy and tactics,
and analyze the effect of the two world wars on the relative strengths of the opposing ideo-
logies. The remaining chapters bring the analysis down to the actual situation in the
Philippines. None of the general concepts is actually novel. What is of particular interest
is the way they have been systematized to produce a complete theory of strategy for the
CPP. The most interesting of them follow.
A. "Political strategy is the determination of the aims of a class striving to perpet-
uate its domination, or a class seeking to overthrow the rule of another class, the obstacles
in the attainment of such aims, the forces available to facilitate the achievement of such
aims, and a plan of disposition of such forces available to facilitate the attainment of such
aims."
(Determination of available forces:)
1. Class basis of the "national liberation movement." The classes that control
Philippine economy and government constitute about 10% of the population. They are: rich
peasants (5%), feudal landlords (3%), compradores (1%,), bureaucratic car italists, most of
the national bourgeoisis (1%), and the foreign monopolists. The classes that have either
deep and irreconcilable conflicts with the ruling classes or that are at odds with the system
for lesser reasons make up the other 90%: poor peasants (50%0), middle peasants (25%),
proletariat and other workers (10%), and a small section of the national bourgeoisie.
2. Relation of classes to the forces of the "new democratic stage" of the proletarian
revolution. The "gain force" is an alliance between the poor peasantry and the proletariat
under the leadership of the proletariat (i.e., the CPP). The intermediate classes between the
"main force" and the ruling classes are potential supporters of the "main force" and are
called "direct reserves." "Primary direct reserves" are nearest to the "main force" in that
they are being squeezed by the present system: the middle peasants are forced to split their
small land-holdings as their families grow and are thus being "reduced to the status of poor
peasants;" the urban petty bourgeoisie (small artisans, traders, white-collar workers, etc.)
are similarly being reduced to the "status of hired employees or workers." Secondary direct
reserves ("anti-imperialist national bourgeosie" and "anti-feudal rich peasants") are opposed
both to the main force and to the ruling classes. They also might welcome a revolution, but in
in their own interest, rather than in the interest of the poor peasants and the proletariat.
They are the "pseudo revolutionary forces that compete with the proletariat" for the "pri-
mary direct reserves" and "leadership of the revolution."
3. The existence of the "secondary direct reserves" in the Philippines gives rise to
a "new" strategic concept: that. of "the object of the directic- a? the inu::ri 'i:>w," which is
aimed against the "factions" of the "anti-imperialist national bourgeoisie and the anti-feudal
rich peasants" within the non-Communist parties, and "their ideology of parliamentarianism
and awaitism." "Until these classes, their political factions, and their ideologies, are exposed
and isolated from the reserves, there is danger that they would lead the masses not yet fol-
lowing CP leadership in a counter-revolution against not only the enemy in power, but also
against the national liberation movement following CP leadership.'
4. In addition to class "reserves," there are "indirect reserves," which are "all
conflicts or contradictions among the non-proletarian classes, at home and abroad."
1 The concept is not new. It is the strategy pursued by the Bolsheviks in discrediting and
isolating the "compromists" Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries in 1917.
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5. With the achievement of the "new democracy" and the shift to the "socialist or
proletarian" stage of the revolution, the classes will be redenominated, with the proletariat
alone as the "main force," etc.
("Disposition of forces:")
6. There are two stages of any political struggle: the "strategic defensive" and the
"strategic offensive." The strategic defensive is the stage during which the "main forces are
conserved and accumulated and the reserves begun to be brought to a revolutionary position
preparatory to their being brought to the revolutionary front, and preparatory to a shift to the
strategic offensive phase." There are several sub-phases: (a) retreat or withdrawal to
conserve the main forces; (b) advance to accumulate and increase the main forces; (c)
counter-offensive to further accumulate main forces and begin to rally the reserves to take
a revolutionary position. The strategic offensive is the period of maximum accumulation of
both main forces and reserves: the "proletariat accumulates more decisively its main
forces and with equal decisiveness rallies the reserves to take a revolutionary position, and
brings them to the revolutionary front. The strategic offensive hastens the maturity of the
revolutionary situation to its crisis."
7. During the resistance period, the CPP was in the stage of the strategic counter-
offensive: the "Huks grew strong and succeeded in rallying the peasants of Central Luzon
around it and following CP leadership."
8. Since the elections of November 1949, the CPP has been in the period of the
"political strategic offensive." "The main political task during this period is to hasten the
maturity of the revolutionary situation towards a revolutionary crisis. The principal mili-
tary task is to recruit, train, arm, and supply sufficient military forces superior to the
enemy forces, notwithstanding the enemy's superiority in weapons...." (The tactics proper
to this period are given below, para. D.)
9. However, the movement is still in the period of a "military strategic defensive."
This is possible only.in ,"colonial or semi-colonial" countries:
"The reason for this deviation is due to the differences between the Russian revolu-
tion on. one hand, and the Chinese and our revolution on the other, necessitating
certain differences in strategic conceptions. In Russia, where the main force of the
revolution was the proletariat in the factories, it was impossible to form them into a
regular army long before the arrival of the revolutionary crisis. This was not so in
China and it will not be so in the Philippines. In China as well as in the Philippines,
even before the existence of the revolutionary situation, the armed peasants were al-
ready conducting armed struggles against the enemy, and their is enough time to
develop a regular army, supported by guerrillas and the armed partisans of the
people. In China and in the Philippines, the role of the workers is essentially one of
sabotage of enemy industries during the period of preparation and seizure of such in-
dustries at the decisive moment. In Russia, Lenin was correct in insisting that at the
decisive moment it was imperative to concentrate the.main force of the revolution at
the weakest point of the enemy and to assume the military offensive at the very begin-
ning, because of the superiority of armed power of the enemy. This was correct
because the revolution in Russia did not start from mountain bases and hence it had
no time to prepare militarily, to cope with the enemy. Hence, the importance of sur-
prise, initiative and daring to demoralize the enemy to the point of defection, and
arouse the fighting morale of the reserves for the achievement of a quick military
victory. This is not the case in China and in the Philippines. The determination of
whether to take the military strategic defensive or offensive, when the revolutionary
crisis arrives and when over-all insurrection is launched, is essentially a military
problem, not a political necessity, as it was in Russia."
B. "Tactics deal with correct methods of a struggle, forms of organization of strug-
gle, issues for struggle, and slogans to project those issues, with a view to continuously
giving the exploited masses practical political experience arising from struggle, and there-
by raising their political and class consciousness to the point where they realize that only
through revolutionary struggle can they achieve their basic aims." "The ebb and flow of a
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revolutionary movement determines not only the various subphases of strategy but also the
tactics of offense and defense... The ebb or flow of a revolutionary movement depends on
two factors: (a) the existing objective situation including the economic, political situation and
the consciousness of the masses; and (b) the subjective strength of the revolutionary move-
ment vis-a-vis the strength of the enemy."
("Methods of Struggle")
10. "Under the present political set-up there are two basic methods of struggle: the
legal, constitutional, parliamentary method of struggle; and the armed struggle. The question
which of these two methods should be adopted as the main form of struggle does not depend on
the actual and present consciousness of the exploited masses. At the time the Party adopted
the armed struggle as the main form of struggle, the great majority of the exploited masses
did not yet believe then in the armed struggle'as the only solution to their problems. Yet it
was correct for the Party to have adopted the armed struggle as the main form of struggle
because only through the Party's concentration in the conduct and leadership of the armed
struggle can the exploited peasants and workers be hastened to finally believe that only the
armed struggle can achieve their basic aims. If quantitatively, those who believe in legal,
parliamentary methods of struggle as against the armed struggle are in the majority, it was
only because they have not yet been convinced about the probable success of the armed strug-
gle. The most effective way of convincing them about the certain success of the armed
struggle is by concentrating on the strengthening of the HMB led by the Party. This we have
now done, and the results show that, because we have not been crushed by the enemy, and on
the contrary the HMB grew stronger notwithstanding enemy suppression, the exploited masses
now are rallying faster around the armed struggle, than they did three or four years ago.
The basic truth must be grasped that as far as the most exploited peasants and workers are
concerned, their failure to rally around the armed struggle is not due to their faith in the
legal, parliamentary methods of struggle, but more to their skepticism about the probable
success of any armed struggle against an admitted powerful enemy."
("Forms of Organization of Struggle:")
11. "Organizations to conduct mass struggles may be legal or illegal, open or under-
round, depending on the objective situation and the subjective strength of the revolutionary
movement in different places" and the policies of the regime. Trade unions, youth, and
women's organizations are legal.. The CPP and HMB are both illegal. The CPP within the
trade unions is underground, but within the HMB it is open. "With the existence of a revolu-
tionary situation, legal organizations are important not so much in order to lead the masses
in legal struggles as to. serve as a screen for underground activities and struggle in aid of
the armed struggle."
C. Tactical Leadership
12. "Tactical leadership consists of the scientific utilization of main (i.e., armed
struggle) and secondary (legal struggle) methods of struggle, various forms of organization
of these methods of struggle, issues to rally the masses around the struggle, and slogans to
project clearly such issues and to call the masses to action" -- to a realization that only
through armed struggle can they achieve their aims. "To achieve this it is necessary to
make a correct appraisal of the following: (a) the existing political and class consciousness
of the exploited masses; (b) practical experience in the struggle of these masses; (c) the
relation of forces in any given region or place; (d) the impact of the international situation
upon local developments; (e) the objective local situation and (f) the main link in the chain of
tasks which if tackled successfully would result in the hastening of the achievement of other
tasks."
13. Appraisal of the existing class andpolitical consciousness of the exploited masses.
Consciousness varies from place to place for a number of reasons. The peasants of Central
Luzon have historically been "more militant than those in other regions. . . because of the
existence of big feudal ' landholdings... resulting in the creating of a large group of landless
peasants." The workers in Manila are more militant than those in other cities because
Manila has long been "much more advanced industrially and commercially. . ."
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14. Relation of -tactical leadership to main force and to reserves. "Correct tactical
leadership consists in the Party leading the main forces, and the main forces, following Party
guidance, leading the reserves." "The Party need not worry that its declared policies are not
yet understood or acceptable to the reserves. It should concern itself chiefly with the. accept-
ability of its declared policies, whether it be its aims or methods of struggle, to the main
forces of the revolution."
15. Effect of political experience on class consciousness. The peasants of Central
Luzon have had considerable political experience: abortive uprisings before the war; resist-
ance to the Japanese; prevented from having their elected representatives to Congress seated
after the war. These experiences convinced them "that parliamentary methods of struggle
are bankrupt and that only the armed struggle can achieve their aims." Election "frauds" and
"terrorism" in the 1947 and 1949 elections led also to a growing conviction on the part of
"great masses of the population, not only among the Nationalista Party but also among the
Liberal Party," that parliamentary struggle is futile and that armed struggle is not only
necessary but inevitable.
16. Relation of forces: effect of geography. "In barrios and fields closest to our
mountain bases, the forms of armed struggle are different from those in the cities and towns.
Our armed forces are near to bases of retreat in the former, while in the latter, because of
the inaccessibility of mountain bases, our armed forces are forced to stay in such towns and
cities."
17. Appraisal of the objective local situation: effect of short-range economic factors.
"Needless to say, prosperity gives illusions to the exploited masses and makes it hard for
the Party to lead them to struggle, while economic crisis produces widespread discontent and
makes it relatively easier for the Party to agitate the masses into launching militant struggles.
It is also necessary to appraise the contradictions existing among the ruling classes... be-
cause it is much easier to lead the classes into militant struggle when they see deep contra-
dictions among the ruling classes than when the ruling classes are united."
18. Effect of international events. The United States will probably not be able to inter-
vene effectively on the side of the Philippines Government because it is overextended already
in Europe.
19. Main link in the chain of tasks. "The key to all other tasks. . .once determined
. must be given the highest priority and concentration. . .In the May 1948 conference of
the CC we singled out the strengthening of our educational and propaganda work as the main
link in our chain of tasks .... Our error lies in our failure to implement such correct ap-
praisal."
D. "Necessary revolutionary actions under a period of political strategic offensive:"
"a. open an aggressive propaganda of armed overthrow of the imperialist-feudal
puppet state and the establishment of the New Democracy;
b. aggressive projection of the leadership of the CPP over the armed struggle for
national liberation, and the corresponding aggressive isolation from the reserves of
the revolution of all non-Communist parties and leaders;
c. confiscation of enemy properties starting from enemy harvests and leading to
confiscation of enemy lands;
d. organization of underground local governments starting on the barrio and town
levels, then on the provincial or regional level, finally culminating on a national level;
e. liberation of local areas, confiscation of enemy landlords' properties in the
liberated areas, collection of taxes, issuance of our own currency;
f. boycott of bourgeois elections;
g. coordinated military actions on a wide-scale for organizational political purposes."
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,11111or 111111111W
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COMMUNIST PARTY
Regional Commands/Committees
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in the Philippines have been
so identified on this map.
SECRET/CONTROL
1 /'
Boundary of Regional
Command /Committee
C K A R AKEL0NG
I a 4~ i tt
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MILITARY RESISTANCE OF CP FRANCE
A. Introduction
B. Organization of the FTPF
C. Operations
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A. INTRODUCTION -
1. The CP France (PCF), underground since the beginning of the war (a consequence
of its defeatist policy in the period of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact), organized a
political resistance organization called the Front National (FN) in July 1941, shortly after the
German attack on the USSR. Then the Party created an organization of fighting resistance
groups called the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Francais (FTPF). The FTPF was nominally
an organization of the FN, but it was completely controlled by the PCF: PCF organizations
in towns and cities furnished its cadres, equipment, and direction. The FN was a "roof"
organization comprising a large number of groupings (National Fronts of lawyers, peasants,
physicians, police, merchants, etc.). Local FN organizations carried on propaganda and pro-
vided recruits for the FTPF, but it was the PCF that controlled the FTPF in all sectors.
2. The first FTPF group was formed in September 1941 and was called "Jean
Catelas," in honor of a Communist Deputy who had just been executed by the Germans. Its
first act was to blow up a German troop train.
3. The FTPF operated mostly in the occupied zone until the end of 1942. When the
Germans extended the occupation to the southern zone, the FTPF began operating there also.
4. At first, most of the FTPF groups consisted of people who lived outwardly law-
abiding lives and who carried out small acts of sabotage or came together at night for oc-
casional attacks on German Vichy installations. These were technically "francs-tireurs."
Others were small guerrilla bands operating on a full-time basis out of hiding places in the
woods (the inaccessible scrub areas called Maquis). The full-time bands were technically
"partisans." The number of partisan bands increased considerably during 1943 as more and
more men fled their homes to avoid the German labor conscription. In 1943 it was estimated
that the strength of the FTPF was about 30,000, and that less than 20% of these were members
of the Party. The rest had been drawn into the movement by the effectiveness of the Com-
munist propaganda machinery (Party organizations, FN groups, other organizations under
Party influence) and by the fact that the FTPF was initially the most militant and best organ-
ized of all the resistance formations.
5. Relation of FTPF with other resistance organizations. Meanwhile, other political
and military resistance groups had been organized by non-Communists. General de Gaulle
had opened an office in London on 23 June 1940, and immediately obtained recognition from
the British Government, which, along with the United States, sent teams into France to help
organize the resistance-and to establish contact with those that had sprung up on local initia-
tive. The FTPF applied to de Gaulle for recognition in November 1942. Fernand Grenier
went to London in January 1943, as the representative of the PCF central Committees, and in
February, the FTPF was recognized as a part of the "Fighting French" under de Gaulle. The
object of the Communists in this project was to get some of the supplies that the Allies were
sending into France for the resistance.
On 3 June 1943 there was organized in Algiers the French Committee of National
Liberation (CFLN) which, with De Gaulle as its President, constituted a provisional
government-in-exile. Political authority of the CFLN was vested in a National Council of the
Resistance (CNR), which had 40 members, three each for the eight major resistance organi-
zations, and sixteen representing political parties and trade unions.1
1 The resistance organizations were -- Northern Zone: Organisation Civile et Militaire
(OCM), Ceux de la Resistance (CR), Ceux de la Liberation (CL) Liberation Zone Nord LIB);
Southern Zone: the three organizations of the Mouvements' Unis de la Resistance (MUR),
Combat, Liberation, and Franc-Tireur (a non-Communist organization built around the news-
paper of the same name, and not to be confused with the FTPF). The representation for
political parties and trade unions was as follows: Socialist Party (3), Communist Party (3),
Radical Socialists (2), Democrats Populaire (1), URD (1), Groupe Marin (1), CGT (3),
Federation of Christian Trade Unions (2). At the first meeting of the CNR, held secretly
in Paris 5 May 1943, Pierre Villon represented the FN.
SECRET
*.Me -low
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In 1944 it was estimated that the resistance forces totaled 160,000. The strongest
military force was the Organisation de la Resistance de l'Armee (ORA), composed of about
60,000 ex-Army personnel. ORA did not adhere to de Gaulle until early 1944.
Shortly after D-Day (6 June 1944), the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (FFI) were
organized under the CNR. It had a national and regional and departmental staffs under the
over-all command of General Koenig. It was intended to use the FFI to centralize control
over all the military resistance forces to realize their support potential during the Allied
campaign. Although the FTPF joined the FFI, it never gave up its independence of command
over its own forces.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE FTPF
6. The FTPF consisted of small tactical formations and a network of command
staffs organized on an area basis. The whole organization was directed by the National
Military Committee (CMN) which was controlled by the PCF through dual membership of
leaders in both organizations and which had a number of special support organizations.
Available information does not clearly define the relationship between directing organs of
the political apparatus of the Party and the FTPF staffs.
7. The first FTPF groups were probably organized by local, underground committees
of the PCF political apparatus. The latter furnished the organizing cadres,and, when groups
.had been formed in an area, the personnel for the area FTPF staff. Recruitment during the
occupation was a continuing concern of the political apparatus and its various front organi-
zations (FN). Late in 1942 a PCF circular directed all its organizations to organize "combat
groups" of 3-4 men each. Once formed and oriented, these groups were to pass into the
FTPF. In 1944 it was reported that each Regional organization of the Party had been in-
structed to appoint a "responsable aux refractaires et a la milice" to recruit men for the
FTP.F and to organize a patriotic militia.Z
8. The FTPF was organizationally distinct from the political apparatus of the PCF:
it had its own network of command. The two organizations worked hand-in-glove, however.
The political apparatus recruited for the FTPF, and its leading functionaries were responsi-
ble for exercising general political control over FTPF operations in a given area. Local
FTPF staffs furnished armed men to guard demonstrations and strikes organized by the
political apparatus.2
9. The PCF exercised control over the FTPF through the following channels:
a. FTPF staffs were manned by reliable Communist cadres: the chief of the FTPF
(Charles Tillon) was a member of the Politburo of the Party;
b. Representatives of the PCF (Political Commissars) were attached to FTPF staffs
and tactical formations;
c. Connections between responsible organs of the political apparatus and the FTPF
staffs: this is the line that is not clearly understood on the basis of. available infor-
mation.
1 "Refractaires" were men who had dodged the German.labor conscription and had been
obliged to go underground.
2 The circular of late 1942 already referred to, implied an attempt to get away from this
loaning of armed men by the FTPF, stating that the underground Party organizations them-
selves should organize self-defense groups to protect their agitation and propaganda work.
Late in 1943, a Party directive specified a strict separation of the different "services,"
such as the political apparatus and the FTPF, prohibiting contact between the two below the
Regional level without special authorization. The members of the FTPF were warned to
treat any unauthorized approach by someone else as a possible enemy "feeler," and to
report the attempt immediately.
-3-
SECRET
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10. The Political apparatus of the PCF consisted of the following echelons:
a. The "Center," or "National Direction," which was probably a triad, consisting of
"Responsibles" for Cadres (personnel) and Propaganda, under the National Political
Responsible. The Center had Responsibles for other work -- "technical" (publication
and distribution of printed matter), youth, internees, etc.
b. Inter-Region, comprising Party organization within several Departments (civil
division of France, roughly comparable in size to a county in the U.S.) and constituted
like the national Center.
c. Region, corresponding to a Department or, in Paris, to several arrondissements
(sections of city), and with a directing staff similar to that of the Inter-Region.
d. Sector: subdivision of a Region.
e. Section: subdivision of Sector, corresponding in Paris to an arrondissement.
f. Cell: basic organization, with 3-5 members each.
11. The FTPF was also organized on an area basis, with National, Inter-Regional
and Regional staffs carrying the direction down to the tactical formations. During 1942, the
area of Paris and its environs was divided, for FTPF purposes, into two Inter-Regions, each
headed by an Inter-Regional Military Committee (CMIR) and each comprising three Sectors.
The Sector divisions were generally marked by the National Highways from the city gates
and extending into the surrounding countryside. The following diagram shows how the city
and its environs were divided for both the FTPF and the Party organizations:
Numbers are FTPF Sectors
Letters are PCF Regions
Ns
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Late in 1942 a reorganization of the FTPF was effected making the entire Paris area
a single Inter-Region, comprising eight Regions designated "P1" through "P8".
The rest of the country was divided among Inter-Regional and Regional staffs ill a
similar manner.
12. The National Military Committee (CMN) of the FTPF consisted of five men and
had a staff of about twenty others, plus a courier pool. The President (or Chairman) of the
CMN was Charles Tillon, who had been a member of the Politburo of the PCF since 1936.
He was the National Responsible FTPF in the PCF Center. Associated with him in the CMN
were Laurent Casanova, Eugene Henaff, Marcel Prenant, Georges Beyer, Albert Ouzoulias,
and Rene Camphin.
13. The break-down of the CMN into staff functions is not known. B. Nardain was in
charge of what a Party account of the FTPF called the "4th Bureau," concerned with arms,
ammunition, explosives, and technical devices. He was also in charge of the "2nd Bureau,"
for intelligence. The CMN also had a medical service utilizing Communist physicians and
their clinics and hospitals, probably through the Front National of physicians.
14. The CMIR. The organization of the Inter-Regional Military Committee of the
FTPF is known in more detail. It was a directing triad (Political Commissar, Technical
Responsible, and Military Responsible). The CMIR was in charge of the tactical formations
of the FTPF in the Inter-Regional area and of a number of special groups. The special
groups, under the direction of the Political Commissar, were the following:
GSR (Groupe Special de Recuperation): responsible for obtaining documentation and
supplies for the underground;, especially charged with burgling town halls, mail trains,
etc.
GSE (Groupe Special d'Executions): responsible for assassinating Party traitors and
selected police officials.
GSD (Groupe Special Mobile): for reinforcement of the actions of the other special
groups on call.
"F" Service: responsible, for the reception and storage of material parachuted by the
Allies. Working personnel furnished by the Political Responsibles of the Inter-Region
political apparatus. .
Technical apparatus: responsible for making arms and munitions. The Technical
Responsible controlled several depots where materiel was stored.
15. Tactical formations. The FTPF were tactically employed in squads and detach-
ments.. Companies and battalions also existed, but how extensively these larger units were
employed as such in tactical operations is not known.
Squad . Consisted of 2 groups of 3 men each, with a leader. The leader had 2 deputies
(the leaders of the groups ?). One deputy was in charge of materiel (weapons, ammuni-
tion, explosives, special supplies). The other was responsible for intelligence (data
on target individuals and installations).
Detachment. Consisted of 3 to 4 squads, with a leader, 2 deputies (with duties as in
the squad), and a political-propaganda man.
By the time of the Liberation, the formations had been reorganized into the following:
Groupe: 8-?20 men
Main: several groupes
Camaraderie: 50 men
Centaine: 100 men
Groupe A: 800 men
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C. OPERATIONS.
16. The objectives of the FTPF were to make collaboration with the Germans as
dangerous to the collaborators as possible, to undermine enemy morale, and to inflict maxi-
mum damage to the German war machine. These aims were put into effect by the following
actions:
a) attacks on traitors and notorious collaborators, destruction of premises of pro-
German organizations and of recruiting centers for French laborers for German in-
dustry, armed protection for strikes and anti-German demonstrations.
b) attacks on small enemy detachments and individuals, on places of entertainment,
on ranking German officers, enemy barracks; sniping and ambushes.
c) constant attacks on rail and water transport facilities, damage being directed at
points most difficult to repair (locomotives, brake couplings, power transmission
lines and stations).
17. Operations were generally carried out by tactical formations on their own initia-
tive, central direction being usually generalized. The CMN sometimes set particular days
for attacks on many points to capitalize on the patriotic appeal of holidays, etc.
18. Precise techniques were worked out for sabotage attacks and ambushes and were
treated in manuals put out under deceptive cover, with such titles as "Aunt Lucy's Recipes"
and "Do You Like to Travel Comfortably ?" A directive addressed to both the Party and
FTPF Inter-Regions in early 1943, for example, outlines the places in various chemical
factories most vulnerable to sabotage and suggests in considerable detail how the most
damage could be done to them.
19. Ambush played an important part in the FTPF operations. The following account
by a Communist (Fernand Grenier) shows how a small FTPF group ambushed a German
train.
"A German leave-train was due to pass at 11 p.m. Two men were sent off on a
reconnaissance to verify the information which had been received and the attack was
decided on. The rallying-point was at a place which would give maximum cover for
the men engaged and material needed. The rendezvous was for 8 p.m., and strict
punctuality was compulsory. From the rallying-point, the first unit set off carrying
necessary supplies, followed at a distance of about 220 yards by the second unit
consisting of a franc-tireur with an automatic rifle, another carrying individual weap-
ons, and a third with ammunition. The whole party crossed the fields, avoiding any
inhabited locality, and reached the railway track. ?
One man left the first unit to take up position as look-out some 100 yards from the
point selected for the attack. The others remained in hiding on each side of the line.
At 9:30 p.m. we watched the last passenger train go by, and soon afterwards a patrol
passed. At 10:15 p.m. we got to work. Four men wrenched out the bolts securing
the lines to the sleepers so that the rails could be twisted outwards. Some of the bolts
were then replaced. By 10:45 p.m. the track was ready and the franc-tireur with the
automatic rifle was in position level with the sabotaged section of the track. The rest
of us were deployed as riflemen alongside the track in the direction from which the
train would come. At 11 p.m. the derailment took place as planned, and the survivors,
wounded or not, endeavoured to get away from the train. A well-sustained and rapid
fusillade mowed them down. Then, on the signal, "Cease fire " the men engaged
slipped off one by one in a direction which had been chosen in advance. They withdrew
in prearranged order, by fixed roads and across fields, till they reached the starting
place again."
19. An alleged "special execution group" rounded up in the summer of 1943 was active
in the area North of Paris designated as Region "H2" in the political apparatus and "146"
(later, "P3") in the FTPF. The actual size of the group is not known, but at least eight men
were connected with it in one way or another, either as active participants in its operations
%..W Nftva~
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or as cut-outs and guardians of weapons caches. Most of the operations were carried out by
two or three men. Over a six months' period, the group made three attacks on personnel,
three attacks on ration card offices, and on four occasions planted bombs on railways. In
addition, an attack on a German detachment stationed in St. Denis was planned, but was not
carried through.
20. Arms. In the course of the investigation of this group a large cache of weapons
was discovered hidden in caves in the woods of the Isle Adam in the Oise River. The weapons
were in metal drums, such as were used for parachute drops. The cache was believed to be
a central source of supply for the weapons depots of various FTPF regional depots in the
area around Paris. It consisted of the following items:
178 Mills bombs
25 Sten guns
3 Colts
5,500 cartridges
27 incendiary. bombs
1 carbine
29 magnetic mines for use on railways
a large supply of explosives, detonators, fuses, etc.
a quantity of abrasive paste for sabotage of machinery
1500 boxes; of canned food for people living illegally
21. It had been commonly thought that the PCF had a large supply of arms and am-
munition before the occupation. It turned out that this assumption was wrong. The FTPF
at first had few arms. They gradually accumulated what was needed by raids on individuals,
theft of stores, home-manufacture (civilian laboratories cooperated to furnish explosives
and materials for sabotage), black-market purchases, and parachute drops made by the Allies.
(The Communists later complained that their FTPF received only six out of hundreds of such
drops, a charge of dubious merit.)
22. It is virtually impossible to estimate how many operations the FTPF carried out
itself, or their effectiveness, for the Communists claimed credit for many attacks that had
actually been carried out by other resistance groups or jointly with them. For the period
January - April 1943, Grenier claimed that the FTPF had achieved the following:
"180 locomotives destroyed and 110 damaged; more than 2000 railroad cars damaged
or destroyed; 15 German units or shipments, 5 trucks with German troops, 15 sentries,
4 training grounds, 46 billets and messes, 12 clubs and movies for the German army
attacked; 9 German anti-aircraft stations attacked; 850 German soldiers and officers
killed, 2500 wounded; 8 Gestapo agents executed."
23. Organization of labor-draft evaders. The Communists made' a strong effort to
organize the "refractaires," or dodgers of the German labor draft. A document issued in the
summer of 1943 (probably) shows how they envisaged the organization. It was issued in the
name of the "Headquarters of the FTPF" and addressed to "Commanders of Subdivisions,"
and to the Inter-Regional and Regional Military Committees of the FTPF. The substance of
the directive follows:
a.. Enemy measures are making it increasingly difficult for refractaires to hide safely
in the towns. The best thing is for them to go into hiding in the countryside in inacces-
sible areas and to organize partisan groups.
b. Groups must avoid concentration. The enemy will not hesitate to muster forces
sufficient to attack a worthwhile concentration of, say, several hundred men. Small
widely separated groups, on the other hand, are much more difficult to round up, and
will force the enemy to disperse his forces.
c. Security, Keep hiding places secret and move frequently. Use camouflage against
air and ground observation where necessary. Defenses of several groups should be
coordinated by the unit commander (detachment or company). Approaches to encamp-
ments should be covered. Establish a look-out system.
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d. Organization. Groups should be formed on the 8-man model of the FTPF groups,
with a chief and an assistant. Two to five neighboring groups should form a detach-
ment with the chief living with one of the groups.
e. A detachment commander should not try to control a group more than 10 kilometers
distant, nor a company commander, a group more than 15-20 kms. distant. These are
maximum distances for exercise of efficient control.
f. Each unit commander will be responsible for supply, security, instruction, and
actions of the men under his command.
g. Supply. Two main sources: donations by patriotic civilians; attacks on depots,
convoys, etc. of German forces, of Vichy, or of collaborators.
h. In return for civilian aid, the groups should assist in work in the fields and should
drive away enemy requisition agents. Requests of civilians should never be in the
form of demand.
i. To prevent excessive drains on a single community by several groups, the detach-
ment or company commander will regulate relations between civilians and groups
under his command. This is also a security matter.
j. Foraging raids are acts of war, and will be coordinated by detachment or company
commanders.
k. Responsibles of the FTPF Regional staffs will assist the units in supply. They
will inform the unit responsible for supply of the general sentiment of the people and
will designate localities for supply missions that will not embarrass neighboring
groups. They will put the unit in touch with civilians who can assist. They will also
furnish information on location of enemy depots, etc.
1. Unit commanders will arrange for the proper distribution of provisions among
groups and will, if supplies are adequate, prescribe for the setting up of reserve
stores.
m. The group commander is responsible for proper utilization of provisions, proper
messing, and procurement of water and wood. He must report to the unit commander
if circumstances make it necessary to break into reserve stores. (A detailed break
down of individual and unit ration requirements was included here.)
n. Action. Units must not confine themselves to defense. The FTPF Regional staff
will furnish enough arms to the units to enable them to obtain additional arms by raids.
o. First operations will be by isolated groups. Later, operations will be carried out
by detachments and companies. However, after operations have been completed, the
larger units should be broken up into component groups and should not be permitted
to stay together.
p. Unit commanders may carry out actions on their own initiative, but may also be
assigned particular missions by the FTPF Regional staff, and these latter will have
priority.
q. In spare time, partisans will be instructed in the use of arms, topography, utiliza-
tion of terrain, etc., for which purpose manuals and courses have already been pro-
vided.
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THE ORGANIZATION OF CP ITALY FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
CONTENTS
A. Introduction
B. Communist Partisan Activities During World War II
C. Centralized Direction of Partisans
D. The Garibaldi Division
E. The Garibaldi Brigade
F. Special Partisan Units (SAP and GAP)
G. Partisan Support Services
H. Use of Partisans After War
I. Garibaldi Clubs in Cremona
7. Existence of Communist Partisan-type Terror Organizations
K. Coordination of Various Local Units
L. Conclusions
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THE ORGANIZATION OF CP ITALY FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
1. When Mussolini outlawed the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1926, the Fascist
police were successful in discovering and breaking up most of the underground organization
of the PCI and arrested and imprisoned many of the PCI leaders.
2. Those Italian Communists who escaped arrest set up headquarters in exile in
Paris soon after the crackdown. From here they ran operations into Italy, and upon the out-
break of the Spanish Civil War, played a large part in creating the International Brigades
which fought in Spain. Eventually the Italian Communist activity in Spain centered in the
Garibaldi Brigades.1 Many of PCI leaders fought in the Garibaldi Brigades as officers or
political commissars and after the war they received sanctuary in the Soviet Union, where
they attended schools and worked in the Comintern. Participation in the Spanish Civil War
provided the first actual guerrilla experience for most of the PCI leaders. Meanwhile, in
Italy this period (1926 to 1943) saw the `decline of the Communist Party apparatus although
very little is known about the extent of the underground organization during this period.
Outside Italy, however, PCI leaders continued their preparation for the day they would return
and at the time of the Italian Armistice in 1943, Togliatti was able to send to Italy a fairly
large and well trained nucleus of Communist Party leaders, with aims, propaganda and tactics
planned in advance.
3. Groups of Communist-led partisans sprang up in Italy in 1943 prior to the return
of the emigre leaders and were variously called Garibaldi Brigades, Divisions and Detach-
ments. The exiled Communist leadership gradually returned to Italy. The first three
leaders who returned from Moscow were Girolamo Li Causi, Velio Spano (Tedechi) and
Eugenio Reale. Togliatti did not arrive until April 1944. Prior to his arrival Reale and
Spano called a Communist conference in Bari and a program to support the Allied war effort
and to oppose the Badoglio government (later reversed) was agreed upon.
4. There is no information as to how the Italian Communist Party organization
directed the activities of the partisans. Reliable. and experienced Communists were placed
in command of the major Communist partisan organizations, which assured a general ad-
herence to Communist objectives. Whether a central PCI office or section was set up, either
in the Central Committee or informally among those CP leaders who first returned to Italy,
to handle specific problems of partisan organization and operations is not known. The PCI
leader Luigi Longo represented the Communist partisans in the central Allied command,
and is generally believed to have been the effective military leader of the PCI partisan
movement, No evidence is available showing that the PCI partisans intended to transform
their military operations into an insurrectionary movement during the war.
B. COMMUNIST PARTISAN'ACTIVITIES
5. Italian Partisans bands came into being in the autumn of 1943 after the US Forces
had invaded Sicily (July 19th) and at about the same time as the landing at Salerno and the
surrender of the Badoglio government.
6. The partisan bands at first were small, uncoordinated units that hit at targets of
opportunity with little or no regard for the tactical or strategic significance of their actions.
1 Luigi Longo and Palmiro Togliatti were members of the Paris Organizing Committee of
the International Brigades in 1936. In 1937, the Brigades were reorganized into nationality
units, the XII International Brigade was renamed the Garibaldi Brigade and included most
Italians fighting in Spain.
2 Among those in Spain were Pal'miro Togliatti, Luigi Longo, Velio Spano, Francesco Scotti,
Guliano Pajetta, Francesco Leone, Edoardo D'Onofrio, Giuseppe DiVittorio, Agostino Novella,
Guiseppe Alberganti, Ilio Barotini and Giacomo Pellegrini.
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Later their operations became coordinated and developed along the following lines of activi-
ties: 1. military operations; 2. sabotage and seizure of enemy material; 3. military intel-
ligence for Allies; 4. political action - strikes and slowdowns.
7. The Communists because of their experience, their zeal and their discipline
organized partisan units with the most speed and success. Most partisan detachments in
Italy were organized along political lines -- each political party created its own organization
and determined its own objectives. The Allies soon realized that this haphazard operation
would contribute little to the war effort and in an attempt to coordinate the partisan opera-
tions, teams of British, French and Americans were infiltrated (usually by air) to the :larger
partisan bands. The task of these teams was to establish communications between the parti-
sans and army headquarters, to arrange for air drops of arms and supplies, and to discipline
and in some cases reorganize the partisan bands to realize maximum effectiveness of their
forces. A unified command was created in 1944 under military direction of General Cadorna,
assisted by Feruccio Parri (Action Party) and Luigi Longo (PCI).
C. CENTRALIZED DIRECTION OF PARTISANS
8. The PCI partisans operated under the direction and coordination of a unified non-
Party Partisan command. However, it may be assumed that the PCI partisan organization
maintained its organizational independence and integrity within the framework of the over-all
organization.
9. Centralized direction of Italian partisans of all political hues was brought about
through the establishment of the CLNAI (National Committee for the Liberation of North Italy)
and the CVL (the Voluntary Corps of Liberty). The former was responsible for the political.
and economic aspects of the resistance movement; the latter for direction of military operations of the partisans in North Italy. The General Command was CVL headquarters. There
were also Regional headquarters and Zonal headquarters.
10. Zone headquarters. In addition to maintaining close liaison with the civil side of
the movement through the CLNAI and the general supervision of affairs in the zone, Zone
Headquarters dealt with higher appointments, discipline and the boundaries of brigade areas
The Intelligence Branch at headquarters, as well as collating information received from the
divisions under its command, had its own agents and often infiltrated into German security
units. Contact was maintained with divisions by daily courier service (very often the couriers
were women and girls) and less frequently with the Regional Command. The Regional
Command sent its own inspector into the field once a month.
11. Funds were received from the Central Committee of the CLNAI at Milan through
Regional Headquarters. Zone Headquarters re-allocated the money to the divisions and the
independent brigades.
Usually, only general directives were issued by Zone and Regional Headquarters to the
divisions. Each division probably had already made and submitted its own plan of action.
Zone Headquarters often had no partisans for its own protection, but relied on early warnings
of impending trouble and fleetness of foot.
12. The PCI partisans within the unified command were grouped into Garibaldi
Divisions, Brigades and Detachments. The units were well organized and proved effective.
Their organizational structure was influenced by the early experience of the PCI leaders in
Spain and by their later training in guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union. Other Communist
organizations in addition to t he Garibaldi units were formed for special purposes, such as the
GAP (Gruppe Azione Patriotico) and SAP (Squadre Azione Patriotico), (Groups and Squads of
Patriotic Action).
13. Local conditions dictated many variations in the organizational structure of a
Garibaldi Division. Even the terms division and brigade were loosely used and apparently
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no standard table of organization was ever drawn up. A fairly typical Garibaldi Division
(the IIIrd) at one time had 2500 men and was divided into 5 Brigades and two special detach-
ments.
14. Divisional headquarters had a Commanding Officer and a Political Commissar.
The leadership of the Garibaldi units was almost entirely Communist but the rank and file
were individuals of many political colorings, averaging, according to several estimates,
10 - 30% Communist. In one case a Communist Brigade was attached to a non-Communist
division.
15. The termerament, character and experience of the leaders were influential de-
terminants in the organizational structure even in Communist partisan units. Without excep-
tion, however, the Communist organizations had a Political Commissar system and great
emphasis was placed on political education of the partisans (along Communist lines), some-
times to the detriment of the unit's fighting efficiency.
The Political Commissar was particularly responsible for relations between partisans
and the civil population, for the maintenance of morale and for political instruction. He
worked in the closest contact with the Commandant and all orders were invariably signed by
both. The "political hour" was strictly observed. At this time the Commander or Commissar
addressed the men on questions of discipline, organization and current political and economic
problems. Free discussion was encouraged and, according to one observer, any man could
get up and raise any question, not excluding the behaviour of his leaders.
E. THE GARIBALDI BRIGADE
16. The average strength of a Garibaldi Brigade was about 1,000 men sub-divided into
three or four battalions each with about 250-300 men. The battalions were usually divided
into companies of not more than 100 men. Each Brigade had its own center of supplies in the
zone it controlled. The farmers were obliged to furnish food and supplies if necessary.
17. The Commander of each brigade kept a complete record of all his men, which
probably required extensive personnel files and a personnel section most likely under the
Organizational Chief (see below). This information was made up of material regarding the
number of operations the individual had carried out, the number of times he had been wounded,
and if disciplinary action had ever been taken against him. The punishment in the Communist
units was severe. It was common practice to tie the individual to a pole and then to flog him
with chains. Inefficient commanders were shot. They could not leave the unit once they knew
its military secrets.
18. A brigade Staff consisted of (1) a Section Chief of Organization. He was to handle
the administrative organization, military schooling and armament. (2) A Section Chief of
Information and Liaison. He was to handle liaison with the Group Command of Brigades or
Divisions, to channel information to the public and to direct counter espionage operations.
Penetration of enemy units and espionage were important functions of the Partisan organiza-
tions. Cases are known of penetration of German SS units; the TODT (Civilian Labor Corps)
was honeycombed with partisan agents and sympathizers. These agents performed minor
sabotage operations, such as destroying the tax list for a village, and passed on vital infor-
mation to partisan intelligence networks. (3) A Section Chief of Quartermaster to control
transportation, depots, food and clothing. (4) A Section Chief of Medical Services to obtain
supplies for the sick and the wounded and to organize facilities for the care of the wounded.
F. SPECIAL PARTISAN UNITS (SAP and GAP)
19. In addition to the regular Garibaldi fighting units, the Divisions and Brigades,
there were partisan organized bands for terroristic and protective purposes. These were
called GAP and SAP (Groups and Squads of Patriotic Action). The GAPs were made up mostly
of youths. Each GAP was composed of 3-4 men, whose Commander was in contact with the
General Command which directed the activities of a number of GAPs. The GAP's operated in
the cities. They did odd sabotage jobs, carried out assassinations, and helped the regular
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partisan formations living in the hills by setting-up supply routes. They remained in hiding
when not in action, often returning to civilian jobs by day as an aid in concealment.
20. SAPs existed in the smaller villages and in the rural areas. They were created
as security units to protect the vital civilian activities in these sections. They protected the
farmers who were producing foodstuffs for supply to the partisan units. The SAPs received
their orders from the Farmers (or Peasants) Committees or from the local CLN. Generally,
aside from the protective duties, they were used for agitation and propaganda; they wrote on
walls, distributed leaflets and propaganda in the villages and schools -- activities which were
less violent than the GAP functions.
G. PARTISAN TACTICS AND SUPPORT SERVICES.
21. The great strength of any partisan unit is its tactical adaptability and organiza-
tional flexibility. The Italian partisans were no exception. Early in their existence then
tended to form large bands, a tactic which had proved successful in guerrilla operations in
the Spanish Civil War. However, the good network of roads in Italy made large bands vul-
nerable to enemy counteraction. The partisans soon found it necessary to modify their tactics
and limited their organizations to small groups which were capable of swift, evasive action.
This required a larger commitment of enemy resources and resulted in even fewer partisan
casualties.
22. The Garibaldi units developed effective techniques of concealment and evasion.
They would establish headquarters usually in the mountains and post guards on all roads.
They were usually not caught by surprise as their intelligence networks into the countryside
warned of the approach of enemy troops. They had substitute headquarters areas prepared
and, unless they felt they could inflict heavy losses on the enemy, would, after a warning,
break camp and retire to a new headquarters installation. When the enemy had left, they
would return. In some more vulnerable areas they utilized a farm house for a headquarters.
In order to protect the installation, they built "bunkers" in the surrounding areas. These were
well-concealed caves and dugouts (such as cave below a field which could only be reached
through a concealed hole in the retaining wall). The partisan headquarters staff lived in these
during the day or when there appeared to be danger of an enemy raid. The most difficult task
for the enemy forces was identification of a partisan as such. Many partisans worked at
civilian occupations by day; even if not holding regular jobs they operated under reasonable
civilian cover, sometimes with false papers.
23. The Italian partisan tactics against the enemy differed in no significant way from
other partisan and guerrilla operations. They attacked targets of opportunity with a view to
harrassing the enemy, inflicting the heaviest possible casualties and never taking the initia-
tive unless they were certain of comparatively small losses. The Italian partisans did not
organize the villages and cities with extreme thoroughness, mainly because of the effective-
ness of German security forces in the cities. The partisans relied on control of key indivi-
duals rather than on all inclusive mass organizations which meant that the risk of the parti-
san organization being discovered by the authorities was reduced.
24. In the first phase of the partisan operations in Italy, arms and ammunition came
mostly from stocks captured from the Italian or German armies. In many units there was
less than one gun per man. Clothing was also in extremely short supply. Once Allied liaison
teams reached the partisans, parachute drops were arranged and the supply situation im-
proved.
25. Communication by radio did not, come into general use by the partisans until
Allied radio operators with radio sets were parachuted to the detachments. Partisan units
relied mainly on couriers for communication (very often women on bicycles) and for shorter
distances they had field telephones. Radio sets and batteries were at a premium and were
often out of commission because of the rough treatment they received. In the later stages
of the war, units were sometimes out of contact with Allied headquarters over considerable
periods of time because of the malfunctioning of signal communications equipment.
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26. Medical services were scanty. Wounded partisans were often cared for in homes
of sympathizers. In extreme cases, partisans would be moved to improvised hospitals where
surgery and, emergency treatment would be performed at night and the partisan returned to a
home as soon as possible.
H. USE OF PARTISANS AFTER THE WAR
27. Immediately after the collapse of the military forces of the Axis, the partisan
formations which were now well organized and adequately equipped became a formidable
political, as well as military force. In many areas, they were responsible for maintaining
order, they counteracted the scorched earth practices of the retreating Nazis (operation Anti-
Scorch) and in some instances they set up local governments prior to the arrival of Allied
troops.
28. To retain the full potential of the partisan units presented an organizational
problem of some complexity for all political parties which maintained partisan units. For
the Communists, this question became of primary concern. Basically the problems were:
a. To retain the support of those non-Communist elements in the Communist Garibaldi
units. (Communist party membership ran between 10 - 30% in the Garibaldi organiza-
tions.)
b. To retain some organizational continuity from partisan work to peace time activi-
ty, which would keep the ex-partisans in a state of readiness; at least to avoid com-
plete detioration of morale and organizational ties.
c. To preserve the arms and supplies which the Allies had given the partisans, or
which had been acquired from the enemy.
29. These problems in many instances were not successfully solved by the Commu-
nists and in the months following the Armistice the Communist partisan organization fell
apart, perhaps because of the inadequacy of the PCI organization itself.
30. Many ex-partisan organizations sprang up in Italy immediately following the war.
ANPI (Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia -- National Association of Italian Partisans)
became the largest and most influential, and the Communists began a campaign to capture
the leadership, which they succeeded in doing.
31. During the period of Communist collaboration to the Italian government, many
left-wing ex-partisans gravitated toward ANPI, and of course, the Communist ex-partisans
enrolled in great numbers. In 1949 it was reported that 80% of the ANPI membership in the
Rome area was Communist. ANPI was also flooded with individuals who managed to obtain
false partisan credentials, and among the Communists in. ANPI it has been estimated that only
a small percentage actually had had partisan experience. ANPI is today a significant reser-
voir of trained military personnel available to the Communists when the need arises.
32. In some cases, apparently, partisan leaders were able to preserve their organiza-
tions as they had existed during the War, especially if these units were relatively small. In
other instances, partisan leaders organized new units from the ex-partisan ranks. This
practice was especially encouraged by the PCI, and in years following the war the Italian
police have discovered a few Communist-led bands of ex-partisans who performed protective
and terroristic functions for the PCI. The development of one such band was brought to light
in a police investigation in Cremona of the murder of an unsavory Communist named
PICOLETTI on 3 April 1948.
I. THE GARIBALDI CLUBS IN CREMONA
33. In the Fall of 1946 a Communist ex-partisan, Guido Acerbi, organized a "sport-
ing and cultural" club called "Spagna Libera" at Cremona on his own initiative. The Secre-
tary of the Cremona PCI Federation soon took an interest in the organization and its name
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was changed to "Garibaldi" at his suggestion. In its early days, the club seems to have con-
centrated on activities of a general propaganda nature in support of the Party -- holding
meetings, maintaining a Marxist library, and attracting recruits through its sports program.
The club's membership provided a convenient recruiting pool for defense and other direct
action groups organized from time to time by the Party on an informal, temporary bases.
34. In October 1947 each Section of the Cremona PCI Federation was instructed to
organize action groups on an informal basis for the protection of Party installations and
personnel against possible right-wing assaults on the Anniversary of October 28th. These
groups were made up hastily and confined their defense work to their respective Section
headquarters. They were not organized under centralized Federation control at this time.
35. During the Winter of 1947-1948, permanent groups were organized on a central-
ized scheme within the Federation. Each Section of the Federation organized a Garibaldi
"Brigade" (i.e., a squad on the old SAP model). Some of these, like Acerbi's, were drawn
from the membership lists of the "sporting" clubs. Duties of the "Brigades" included the
following:
Protection of Party installations
Maintenance of order during demonstrations
Agitating and arousing mass support at demonstrations
Surveillance of opposition elements dangerous to the Party
36. The first demonstration in which the Brigades took an active part was on 21
January 1948, when they helped to organize and marched in a parade of ex-Garibaldini of the
"Ferruccio Ghinaglia Division." The Federation Secretary marched at the head of the column.
37. A legislative decree prohibited military organizations of a subversive nature in `
February 1948, and in order to circumvent this restriction, the "Brigades" were reorganized
as "Garibaldi Clubs." They continued to fill defensive and other strong-arm needs, and
maintained the Federation-wise structure which had characterized the "Brigades."
38. Each "Brigade" was replaced by a "Club," in each of the Federation's Sections,
and the "Division" Commander was replaced by a supervisor or president of the Garibaldi
Clubs. Ugo Bonali, the clubs' president, was appointed by Bera, the Secretary of the Cremona
PCI Federation. Bonali worked through a "directing committee of the Garibaldi Association
of Cremona." His immediate superior was Guido Perducani, Organization Secretary of the
Federation. At least part of the liaison between Perducani and Bonali, and between Bonali.
and the secretaries of the clubs, was effected through couriers and "cut-outs." There is
reason to believe that certain members of a club were occasionally recruited into small, hi
highly secret squads for particular jobs. Furthermore, identities of club members seem to
have gradually become a rather more closely guarded secret than in the early days.
39. The Garibaldi Clubs were closely tied to the PCI Federation leadership through
the Organization Secretary. Below that level, however, they represented a more or less in-
dependent organization. While each PCI Section had a club (with the exception of the 7th
Bruno Ghidetti and the 3d Tranquinio Pozzoli Sections, which shared Acerbi's unusually large
club between them), the clubs took their orders from Bonali, rather than from Section Secre-
taries, at least, so far as direct-action duties were concerned. On the other hand, it does
not appear that club members dissociated themselves from regular Party formations. On the
contrary, with the exception of some of leading club functionaries and those handling arms
caches, acting as couriers, and serving as guards at Federation Headquarters, who were
probably relieved of routine political work, the rank and file kept up their old cell duties,
being called out as members of direst-action squads whenever the Section or Federation
required strong-armed services.
40. One such occasion came when Bonali ordered a "mobilization" of all clubs for
election duty in April 1948. Each club was split into several squads, each with a specific
assignment, such as the following:
Prevent wall posters from being torn down before the elections.
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Guard Party Headquarters, cooperatives, and polling places. A squad was kept at
Federation headquarters and at cooperatives on 24-hour duty.
Report all police movements.
Maintain a courier at Federation Headquarters to carry orders to the Garibaldi (Club)
Committee. Run couriers between Bonali and the clubs.
Be on the alert for any special tasks.
41. At least until the Picoletti murder on 3 April 1948, the clubs do not seem to have
been given terroristic assignments regularly. This assassination of a Party "traitor" was
handled by Acerbi in a most informal way. He received instructions to carry it out and did
so himself, with the help of a club member whom he recruited quite informally.
42. The club had large arms caches in good condition. Acerbi had enough arms to
equip a "company". Immediately prior to the April 1948 elections, he was instructed to keep
these arms in readiness in the expectation that a great Popular Front victory would bring a
clash which the PCI could turn into a revolution. Perducani told Acerbi that the arms "will
be used at the time when after a victory of the Front it will be necessary to neutralize the
police forces, the armed forces of the state, and those of the parties opposed to the front
which would certainly try to carry out a Coup." The clubs were envisaged as the nuclei
around which a Revolutionary Army could be built, at least at this level of the PCI. The
arms would be distributed quickly when the time came.
43. Most of the Garibaldi clubs' weapons were held-out from the general confiscation
following the German evacuation. Communists of the Garibaldi formations collected and con-
cealed the best equipment, turning in only as many worn and damaged pieces as they could
not safely conceal. The caches were inherited by trusted functionaries who moved them when
necessary to prevent confiscation and who kept them in good condition.
44. One such cache, that maintained by Acerbi for his Garibaldi Club, consisted of the
following items:
2 heavy 8mm. machine guns, of the "Breda" type
1 "Breda" automatic rifle, 6.5 caliber
1 German machine gun, 8mm.
2 spare barrels for the 8mm Breda gun
4 spare barrels for 6.5 mm Breda machine guns
2 Italian rifles, 6.5 mm, 1891 type
6 German 8mm, rifles
1 American carbine
2 Italian muskets, 6.5 mm, cavalry type
4 "Balilla" automatic rifles, 9 mm. (short)
1 "Beretta" automatic rifle, 9 mm, (long)
1 Machine pistol (German make)
1 Pistol, 12 mm., 1889 type
1 spare barrel for German machine gun
40 magazines for automatic rifles
11 magazines for "Breda" automatic rifles
5 hand grenades (Italian make)
1 hand grenade (German make)
Ammunition
7500 rounds for 8mm. machine guns
3350 rounds for 9mm. automatic rifles
895 rounds for "Breda" automatic rifles and relative magazines
1000 rounds for rifles, 1891 type
100 rounds for American carbines
100 mine detonators
15 hand grenade detonators
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Various accessories for arms and ammunition: Ammunition boxes, cans of lubricat-
ing oil, ammunition pouches.
All the arms were kept in boxes, well-lubricated, and were in excellent condition. They were
cached in a concealed masonry shed at a locality near the Po River.
45. The whole Garibaldi-club affair came to light as a by-product of interrogations of
Acerbi when he was arrested for the murder of Picooletti, who had demanded 20,000 Lire for
keeping and servicing a quantity of arms for two years.
46. Another cache, belonging to another club, included a Brixia-type 45 mm. assault
mortar, with abundant ammunition, all well-greased. This cache had been collected and
maintained by Antonio Assumma who, as head of a depot at the Cremona Railroad station,
had been able to pilfer arms and ammunition from trains passing through the station. One
batch he had boarded up in a dry well used by the station for storage; a second cache was
discovered in a pit, also in the station area.
J. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
47. Another police investigation revealed that a terrorist organization composed of
Communists operated in the city of Verona from the end of the war to 1949. These details
came to light as a result of the trial of 22 members of a "Volante Rossa" (Red Flying Squad)
in February 1951. The reports are unclear as to the exact affiliation of the Volante Rossa
with the PCI. Some information is available on the squad's activities and organization. The
squad members were assigned assassination jobs and terroristic acts against selected indi-
viduals and business firms, usually with fascistic tendencies. The police report said that the
Volante Rossa members did not always recognize the victims against whom they were to com-
mit their crimes, nor did they know of what crimes, if any, the victims had been guilty. Some-
times mistaken identity created hardship on the wrong individuals but none of the perpetrators
regarded such an error as serious. Another task of the squad was to guard, in shifts,
Communist Party headquarters. They were also detailed as security units when the Sixth PCI
Congress convened in Milan. Many of the youths in the organization claimed to have served
with the partisans in World War II, although some of them had false partisan credentials. The
leader of the Cremona Volante Rossa was a 25-year old, Lt. Alvaro.
48. A similar organization was discovered in Milan in February and March.of 1949
when the police conducted an investigation of two murders and various other acts of violence.
They found that there existed several groups (possibly 20) of Communists organized for
terrorist activities.
49. According to conclusions reached by the police these groups, generally known as
"activists", operated in the various suburbs of Milan. Each of these groups was under orders
of a commander who received orders from a "Provincial Command" (probably a central head-
quarters for all such units) which in Milan operated under the direction of the Provincial
Section of ANPI. Of the various formations identified were the 6th Garibaldi Division com-
posed of the 116, 117, 118, 123, 194, and 195 Garibaldi Brigades and a Volante Rossa Group.
Many of the above units were reported to have the same commander (Giulio Paggio).
50. The organizational connection of these groups with the PCI is unclear. The report
of the interrogation of the prisoners made reference to Giulo Cimbellini as being in liaison
with the "Executive of the CP". ANPI was also mentioned as a liaison channel, but no indica-
tion of the exact contacts, the frequency or the extent of liaison was given.
51. The Volante Rossa was apparently a special organization apart from and, in the
chain of command, above the Garibaldi units and was entrusted with missions of greater im-
portance ahd enjoyed more autonomy. The Volante Rossa was believed to have comprised
about 50 "elements" (one informant claimed it consisted of 6 "groups") and took part with
the ANPI formations in all demonstrations organized by the PCI.
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K. COORDINATION OF VARIOUS LOCAL UNITStion
52. The above cases constitute the only detailed evidence of the existence of active
paramilitary tactical units of the PCI. While these organizations were utilized primarily to
further local Party objectives, it has been demonstrated that they have been briefed on their
role in the event of a nationwide crisis. This was illustrated during the disturbances in
northern Italy immediately following the attempted assassination of Togliatti in July 1948.
Within an hour after the assassination attempt, disturbances were begun by Communist
organizations in widely separated areas of Northern Italy. Observers believe that the action
was begun without an order issued by a central Party authority and that each operation was
started on the initiative of local Party functionaries. It is a safe conclusion that detailed
military plans on a local level had been made beforehand by the Communists for these cities.
52. Assuming that "X" hour had arrived following the assassination attempt and the
calling of a general strike by the CGIL, PCI Genoa hastened to the barricades. Eighty
strategically-placed road blocks were thrown up, supported by machine-gun posts, with the
objectives of preventing the entry of Government reinforcements into the city and of reduc-
ing government offices, key utilities installations and other important point by direct seige.
In Milan, the local insurrectionary plan was revealed when squads manned the key switchlocks
on the rail lines with a view to isolating major factories inside a defensible area and to their
eventual reduction. In Venice, a radio station was stormed by a squad of 150 persons, who
forced the station to make an announcement that the city was in the hands of a committee of
.public safety and that the police had joined the strikers. The statement did not actually go
out over the air, thanks to a technical trick played by station personnel. In none of these
incidents did a regular Party army show itself. All the actions can be laid to the local Party
organization, mobilized generally, and to a few small groups set up, apparently, on a quasi-
military basis.
L. CONCLUSIONS
54. In view of the numerous and often conflicting reports concerning the post-war
existence of a complex military apparatus ("Apparato") under control of PCI, certain tenta-
tive conclusions on this subject are set out below.l From these it would appear that the over-
all organizational pattern of PCI post-war military work does not yet indicate any activity
directed at the immediate organization of an insurrection. The pattern discloses, however,
long range preparatory activity.
a. According to available evidence, the PCI has not yet arrived at a policy decision
according to which seizure of power by force should be undertaken in the immediate
future.
b. Pending such a policy decision, PCI has a) maintained the best possible controls
over its trained fighters (ex-partisans) through ANPI, and b) made continuous efforts
at weakening the potential of the Italian armed forces through penetration (organization
of PCI nuclei within the armed force).
c. While ANPI is not in a state. of military readiness, nevertheless it represents an
important reserve which, in conjunction with others (e.g., trade unions, youth auxil-
iaries) could be mobilized with relative speed should conditions require it.
d. The national headquarters of PCI probably include personnel charged with:
planning; of insurrectionary activities;
b) administering of maintenance of available arms and ammunition;
c) administering and co-ordinating of the penetration work in the armed
and security forces.
1 Lacking firm evidence on the postwar para-military organization, these conclusions are
subject to future adjustments.
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The exact extent and organization of each national (presumably secret) offices is unknown.
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that they exist.
Automatic plans for the employment of at least part of the Party's paramilitary poten-
tial apparently exist in some areas. This was seen in the disturbances following the attempted
assassination of Togliatti.
The number of well-maintained arms caches discovered by the Italian police points
toward the existence of a functioning organization. on PCI local level charged with preserving
and hiding arms and military supplies. This activity is probably coordinated and directed by
National Headquarters.
The existence of a national office to direct penetration in the armed and security
services would correspond to standard practices known to have been employed by other Com-
munist Parties. Obviously lower Party organizations and Party auxiliaries (e.g., youth
organization) can be assumed to participate in this penetration program.
e. The current incidence, distribution and strength of "defensive" terror or activists
squads is unknown. Nevertheless, these must be considered as a contributing factor
toward the potential insurrectionary strength of PCI.
f. PCI is in a position to transform fairly rapidly its para-military reserves into the
nucleus of an insurrectionary organization. However, no reliable evidence has been
seen showing that a complex insurrectionary organization exists secretly. Numerous
reports of elaborate para-military Command structures, but with no detail of the
actual working relationships of the units or their relation to the PCI structure, may
possibly reflect a "paper organization", or more likely, hypothetical estimates of
mobilizable PCI reserves, drawn from data on ANPI membership and other sources.
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THE GARIBALDI CLUBS IN CREMONA PROVINCE
PCI Federation Directing
Committee PERDUCANI:
Organization Secretary
Directing Committee of the
Garibaldi Association of
Cermona Province
7th Bruno
Ghidetti
3rd Tranquinio
Pozzoli
Acerbi's Club I- - - - -4 Others
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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917
CONTENTS
A. Introduction
B. From "February" to "October"
C. The October Revolution
D. The Bolshevik Military Organization
E. The Staff of the Insurrection
F. The Red Guard
G. "The Party Center"
H. Operations in Petrograd
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ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917
A. INTRODUCTION.
1. The "October Revolution" 1 in which the Bolshevik Party seized power in Russia
in 1917 was for many years studied carefully by Communists as the model for a revolution
based on the city proletariat. The Bolsheviks succeeded because they skillfully exploited a
situation that was rich in revolutionary possibilities: their tactics were shrewdly improvised
to meet the realities of the situation. Other Communist Parties in "advanced countries" have,
tried to employ the same tactics with less realistic regard to the situation, and they have
failed largely because the conditions existing in Russia in 1917 have never been duplicated
elsewhere.
2. The "October Revolution" was essentially only the climax of a revolution that had
already taken place. The Bolshevik Party rose in a period of about eight months from illegal-
ity and political inconsequence to a position of control over the two sections of the population-
-the city workers, particularly in Petrograd, and the peasant-soldiers--that were potentially
strong enough to overthrow the Government. The vast majority of the Russian people (pea-
sants, middle classes, aristocracy), were neutralized in the struggle. They were divided
among themselves, lacked any coherent organization outside that of the Government, and
lacked strong faith in the Government.
3. The Bolshevik Party got organizational control of the workers, and led them to a
revolutionary position. It also got control of the army where it counted most--in the capital.
When the revolutionary workers were led by the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Government, the
latter found itself without effective defenses. The garrison had been subverted and either
stood aside from the struggle or took the part of the workers. Bolshevik control over the
workers was obtained through its normal Party apparatus: factory cells, neighborhood and
city directing organs. Control over the garrison, however, was achieved by a special, secret
auxiliary Party apparatus in the army and navy, the "military organization" of the Bolshevik
Party.
4. The uprising in Petrograd was a military operation: armed workers (Red Guard)
under Party direction attacked the physical installations of the Government (offices, utilities,
warehouses) and took them over. There was little actual fighting in the capital, because the
political-organizing work had put the mass of armed effectives all on one side. The military
insurrection itself, therefore, was less important than the preceeding political-organizing
struggle. For this reason, relatively large space is given in the following discussion to the
preliminaries.
5. There were theoretically two ways in which the Party could have organized the
potentially revolutionary elements. First, it could take the workers directly into the Party,
and convert itself into a "mass" Party on the order of some of the CP's of Western Europe
following the last war. Or, it could continue to be a relatively small "cadre" Party, an appa-
ratus controlling the work of its members in strategic organizations outside the Party itself.
It chose the latter way. It remained comparatively small with a total of 400,000 members on
the eve of the insurrection--50,000 in the Petrograd area, 70,000 in the Moscow region--but
its members controlled large numbers of workers, soldiers, and sailors through their extra-
Party organizations.
6. This is the striking organizational feature of the Bolshevik Revolution: it was
prepared for by organized penetration and manipulation of non-Bolshevik organizations:
factory committees of workers, soldiers' committees in army units (both front-line and garri-
son), sailors'- committees in the fleets, and the semi-official political assemblies of workers'
and soldiers' representatives called "soviets." By skillfull exploitation of every cause and
sympton of unrest (war-weariness, unemployment, high prices, etc.) the Party got the workers,
soldiers, and sailors to vote Party members into positions of leadership in these organizations.
1 The Russian Calendar then in use, was 13 days behind the Western Calendar. Therefore,
the "October Revolution" was, by Western dating, in November; similarly, the "bourgeois
February Revolution" was in March.
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When this was done, the Party apparatus led the organizations to take stands increasingly
challenging to the authority of the Government. Finally, it led them to challenge directly the
Government over a crucial issue--control of the Army-.-and deliberately provoked the Govern-
ment to take countermeasures in sheer self-defense. By then, it was too late. The Govern-
ment had already been shorn of its power of defense.
7. The military uprising in Petrograd was carried out in the name of the Soviet,
through an official agency of the Soviet--the Military Revolutionary Committee--and not in
the name of the Bolshevik Party. As a piece of military technique, it was far from masterful.
Just as the Party improvised its political preparations to take maximum advantage of the drift
in external conditions, so did it improvise the military action in the final stage. Tactical
planning was primitive. A handful of military amateurs gave extemporized orders to other
handsful of amateurs in important sections of the city. Party members were given command
assignments as they became available. The essentials were that the Bolsheviks had the mass
force and the Government had none; the Bolsheviks seized communications facilities intact
and thereby deprived the Government of them.
B. FROM "FEBRUARY" TO "OCTOBER".
8. In March 1917 the workers of Petrograd overthrew the Monarchy. The uprising
was spontaneous in the sense that it was not called or directed by any political organization.
It began with strikes in several Petrograd factories on 8 March and progressed to mass de-
monstrations, more strikes, mutinies in units of the Petrograd army garrison, and armed
clashes between revolutionaries and police. There were no struggles outside the capital city.
The garrison refused to defend the Monarchy and it collapsed.
9. The Bolshevik Party had little to do with the uprising. It had been illegal since
the beginning of the war. Thereafter, Trotsky says,
"the Bolsheviks had no centralized party organization at all. The local
committees had an episodic existence, and often had no connections with
the workers districts. Only scattered groups, circles and solitary indi-
viduals did anything."
Most of its leaders were in exile or in jail--Lenin, Radek, Safarov in Switzerland;
Stalin, Ordjonikidze, Sverdlov, Kamenev in Siberia; Trotsky, soon to join a non-Party group-
ing called the "Inter-District" Group and in July,. to join the Bolshevik Party, was in Canada.
The Central Committee of the Party had two "bureaus," one under Lenin abroad, and the other
inside Russia and consisting of Molotov, Shlyapnikov, and Zalutsky. The Russian Bureau had
some connections with underground Party organizations in Tver, Nizhni-Novgorod, Kazan,
Ekaterinoslav, and the Urals, but the organizations in the South and East acted independently,
having no contact with the Russian Bureau in Petrograd, The Russian Bureau played no part
in the February Revolution.
10. The Petrograd Committee of the Party was arrested on 11 March, the day before
the decisive blow. The center of revolutionary unrest was the proletarian suburb of Vyborg,
across the River Neva from Petrograd. So far as Bolshevik Party participation in the re-
volution was concerned, the Vyborg Committee directed it. Trotsky says that "maybe this was
just as well. The upper leadership in the Party was hopelessly slow." For that matter, even
the Vyborg Committee had opposed the calling of strikes for the 8th, and only decided to go
along when the workers called the strikes themselves in individual factories,.
11. The Revolution legalized the Bolshevik Party. Stalin came out of his Siberianexile
and, by virtue of his seniority in the Central Committee, took over from Molotov the editing
of the Party newspaper, Pravda. Molotov's policy had been relatively strongly to the left.
Stalin's was equivocal, but generally more to the right (advocating cooperation with the new
Provisional Government), a fact that brought him sharp criticism from Lenin.
12. The regime that replaced the Monarchy consisted of two opposing parts with no
clear definition of power between them. Following a tradition dating from the abortive Re-
volution of 1905, when the striking workers of Petrograd had organized a strike committee
called the "Soviet of Workingmen's Deputies," the workers in 1917 also established their Soviet
(council) during the February Revolution. Workers in the factories elected delegates to the
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Soviet. Meanwhile, a number of Duma Deputies organized a "Provisional Committee," and a
group of liberal and socialist trade union and other persons organized a "Provisional Execu-
tive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." The Soviet endorsed the latter, and on
its recommendation, approved the composition of the Duma organization as a "Provisional
Government," A Soldiers' Soviet was also organized, but in Petrograd, it immediately merged
with the Workers' Soviet. Soviets were organized in other cities. Later, in June, a congress
of Soviets from all over Russia was held. It organized an "All-Russian Central Executive
Committee" of Soviets. Its decisions were to be binding on all the soviets in intervals be-
tween congresses, which were to be held every three months.
13. Frictions arose between the Provisional Government on the one hand and the
Petrograd Soviet on the other. Division of authority was never clearly decided upon. The
Bolshevik Party gradually got control of increasing numbers of factory and soldiers' com-
mittees, which elected the members of the Soviet, and thereby got control of Soviets in the
Districts of the city, and finally, of the Executive Committees of the Soviets in Petrograd,
Moscow, and several other cities. The Party never won control of the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee, which continued to support the Provisional Government up to the time
of the October Revolution.
14. Lenin set the Party on the road to revolution. While still in Switzerland he wrote
to Russia demanding a policy of non-cooperation with the Provisional Government:
"Refuse to show any shadow of confidence in or support of the new government....
and observe a state of armed waiting, of armed preparation to secure a wider basis
for a higher stage."
Prior to his return from exile, Bolshevik leaders in Russia generally believed that a "pro-
letarian revolution" was for the relatively distant future--that the bourgeoisie would be a long
time "exhausting its capabilities." They "regarded the February Revolution, notwithstanding
its obvious establishment of two incompatible regimes (i.e., Provisional Government and
Soviets), merely as the first stage of a bourgeois revolution." (Trotsky). The Bolshevik
Central Committee and the Moscow Committee published resolutions in favor of cooperation
with the regime, and when the Vyborg Committee resolved in favor of a seizure of power by
the Soviets, the Petrograd Committee countermanded the resolution.
From the day he arrived at Petrograd, 13 April, Lenin campaigned for work towards
a Bolshevik revolution: to "Bolshevize" the workers, get control of the Soviets, and have the
Soviets overthrow the Government.
15. Lenin's proposition, embodied in the "April Theses," met with strong and imme-
diate opposition in the upper ranks of the Party. A member of the Petrograd Committee said
that "Comrade Lenin could not find open sympathy even in our own ranks." Pravda declared
the proposals "unacceptable." The opposition was shortlived, however. The lower ranks of
the Party supported Lenin. An All-Russian Party Conference was held in Petrograd 7 - 12
May and adopted a slogan, "All Power to the Soviets."
16. The Conference showed the growth of the Party. Its membership totaled 80,000.
The Petrograd organization had grown to 16,000 from about 2,000 dues-paying members prior
to the February Revolution. There were now 3,000 members in Kronstadt, 3,000 in Helsingfors,
7,000 in the city of Moscow, 13,000 in the Moscow region as a whole, 1,500 in Saratov, 2,700
in Samara, 43 branches with 16,000 members in the Urals. In Moscow, the Bolshevik paper,
Sotsial-Demokrat, had a circulation of 60,000.1
17. The growth of the Party, and more importantly, the growth of its influence, was
due to its skillful exploitation of social and economic discontent growing out of the war. The
railway transport system had all but broken down and made the already bad food situation even
worse. Prices were high. There was a general decline in industrial productivity--.and con-
sequently, in workers' incomes--owing to the wearing out of machinery, personnel turn-over,
1 These figures are according to Maxim Gorky, et al., The History of the Civil War.
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unionization of technical and administrative personnel, declining profits, and a general closing-
down of factories by owners unwilling to risk their capital to increasing worker unrest. Con-
tinuing military defeats ate into morale. The Bolsheviks sent agitators into the plants and
army units and organised the discontent around their slogans for "peace" and "land" and
workers' control of production. The regime could not offer what the Bolsheviks demanded
and promised. The Bolsheviks harped on these matters and made the regime and the parties
supporting it appear both unwilling and unable to better conditions.
18. Peace demonstrations reached violent proportions in Petrograd early in May.
The Petrograd Committee of the Party was responsible for at least one of these.
19. Committees in the factories and lower army units began to pass Bolshevik slogans
(against the Government, etc.) and to elect Bolshevik delegates to the soviets. Party repre-
sentation in the soviets grew.
20. The "July Days." The extent of discontent among the Petrograd workers and
soldiers was made glaringly apparent in July. On the first the regime sponsored a "patriotic
manifestation" with a view to arousing support for a military offensive in Galicia. It back-
fired: the placards carried by the 400,000 demonstrators were overwhelmingly Bolshevik in
spirit- -"Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists!" "Down with the Offensive'." "All Power to
the Soviets!"
21. On 16 July several thousand machine-gunners threw out their regimental commit-
tees, elected a Bolshevik chairman, and discussed the feasibility of an armed demonstration.
They organised a provisional revolutionary committee, consisting of two men from each com-
pany, to replace the old regimental committee. They sent delegates to other units of the
Petrograd garrison, to Kronstadt, and into the factories asking for support for an armed de-
monstration. One of the principal leaders of the machine-gunners commandeered vehicles
from the factories, armed them with machine-guns, posted them at strategic points along the
proposed line of march, got promises from other units that they would go with the machine-
gunners. He kept the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party informed of all his activ-
ities and sent sentries to guard Kshesinskaya Palace, where the Party had headquarters.
Factories organized and armed detachments of workers (Red Guards) to take part in
the demonstration.
Seven garrison regiments joined with the machine-gunners and workers' detachments
in the march to the Tauride Palace (then the headquarters of the Soviet), carrying the slogan
"All Power to the Soviet!"
22. The armed demonstration was not prepared by the Bolshevik Party, but the Party
assumed its leadership when it proved impossible to prevent. The Central Committee met on
the night of the 16th and decided to continue the demonstration the next day, but to ensure that
it not go on to insurrection, for which the Party was not yet ready. The Petrograd Committee
took charge of the movement. An ad hoc staff was formed under Podvoisky and Nevsky, lead-
ers of the Bolshevik Military Organization.
"Brief appeals and instructions were issued to all the troops of the garrison. In
order to protect the demonstration from attack, armored cars were to be placed
at the bridges leading from the suburbs to the capital and at the central crossings
of the chief streets. The machine-gunners had already, during that night, estab-
lished their own sentries at the Peter and Paul fortress. The garrisons of Oranien-
baum, Peterhoff, Krasnoe Selo and other points near the capital, were informed of
tomorrow's demonstration by telephone and special messenger. The general polit-
ical leadership, of course, remained in the hands of the Central Committee of the
party." (Trotsky)
23. The demonstration the next day was even bigger than before. The workers, led by
Bolsheviks, played the leading role, rather than the soldiers. Clashes resulted in about 29
killed and 114 wounded, about equal numbers on both sides.
24. Trotsky raises the question whether the Bolsheviks could have seizedpower during
the "July Days." He is convinced they could, but that they could not have held it. Neither the
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workers nor the "peasant army" were "politically homogeneous" and "sufficiently resolute."
Particularly in the army, there was enough wavering to have swung towards the regime suf-
ficient units to defend it. The Petrograd garrison was largely Bolshevik in sympathy, but ir-
resolute. The front units were still more undependable, from the Bolshevik point of view.
Many of the front troops were on the side of Bolshevik "slogans," but they were not yet com-
mitted to the Party:
"The discontented, rebellious, easily excitable army was still formless politically.
It still contained too few compact Bolshevik nuclei capable of giving a single direc-
tion to the thought and activity of the crumbly soldier mass."
Furthermore, if Petrograd was uncertain, the provinces were more so:
"The provinces, having received the February revolution from the hands of
Petrograd without a struggle, were far slower than the capital in digesting new
facts and ideas."
25. Lenin characterized the "July Days" as "something considerably more than a de-
monstration and less than a revolution." The demonstrators wanted the Soviet to take power,
but the Soviet, being in the hands of moderate socialist parties ("compromisers"), refused to
take it.
"Running into this armed resistance from the very institution to which they wished
to turn over the power, the workers and soldiers lost a clear sense of their goal.
From their mighty mass movement the political axis has been torn out. The July
campaign was thus reduced to a demonstration partially carried out with the in-
struments of armed insurrection." (Trotsky)
This "semi-insurrection" was politically and technically a dress-rehearsal for
October. For the Bolsheviks, "the experience was . . . undoubtedly of extraordinary value,"
wrote Miliukov, the leader of the Constitutional Democrats. "It showed them with what ele-
ments they had to deal, how to organize these elements, and finally what resistance could be
put up by the government, the Soviet and the military units ... It was evident that when the
time came for repeating the experiment, they would carry it out more systematically and con-
sciously."
26. Reaction. The regime moved sharply to the right after the July demonstrations.
On the 19th, the Government moved to try the leaders of the "insurrection" and to disband the
regiments that had participated in it. Meanwhile, the charge that the Bolsheviks were
"German Agents" because of the fact that Lenin's group had passed through Germany en route
to Russia with the cooperation of the German General Staff, was played up in the anti-
Bolshevik press. The editorial offices of Pravda were occupied and the presses wrecked.
Many Bolsheviks were arrested, including Trotsky and Kamenev. The Party went underground.
The Petrograd Committee moved over to Vyborg, along with hunted members of the Central
Committee. Lenin and Zinoviev went into hiding in the forests near Petrograd, later removing
to Finland, where they were sheltered by the Helsingfors police chief, who was a Bolshevik.
27. The workers and soldiers recoiled from the Party. In one factory the workers
threatened to strike if the Bolshevik paper were printed there. The Bolsheviks in the army
retreated. The Military Organization was forced to lay low. One Bolshevik declared that he
did not go back to his regiment for fear of being killed. About 250 members resigned from
the Party in Kronstadt. A member of the Central Committee wrote:
"After the July Days, all the reports from the localities described with one voice
not only a sharp decline in the mood of the masses, but even a definite hostility to
our party. In a good number of cases our speakers were beaten up. The member-
ship fell off rapidly, and several organizations, especially in the southern provinces,
even ceased to exist entirely."
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Other signs of loss of popularity were these:
Nizhni-Novgorod: only four Bolshevik deputies elected to city duma.
Moscow region: Bolsheviks obliged to withdraw from soviets and trade unions in a
number of places.
Saratov: soldiers broke up Bolshevik election campaign meetings.
Kiev: Bolshevik candidates for city duma received only 6% of the votes; Party
newspaper forced to go from daily to weekly publication.
Yaroslav: Bolsheviks crowded out of workers' soviet, but continued to dominate
soldiers' soviet.
One useful result of this movement was the weeding out of fainthearts:
"This sharp turn in the mood of the masses produced an automatic, and more-
over an unerring, selection within the cadres of the party. Those who did not
tremble in those days could be relied on absolutely in what was to come. They
constituted a nucleus in the shops, in the factories, in the districts. On the eve
of October in making appointments and allotting tasks, the organizers would
glance round many a time calling to mind who bore himself how in the July Days."
(Trotsky)
28. Moreover, the recoil was "psychological rather than physical," and it was tem-
porary. By mid-August the workers of Petrograd were once more pro-Bolshevik. Govern-
ment reprisals did not cease--arrests and propaganda against the Party continued--but they
did not interfere with the political progress of the Bolsheviks. Soldier delegations arrived in
Petrograd to protest against the "counterrevolutionary" policies of the Government. The
Military Organization revived, but under closer supervision by the Central Committee, through
Sverdlov and Dzerzhinsky.
"As always after a defeat, they looked unfavorably in party circles on the leaders
of the military work, laying up against them both actual and imaginary mistakes
and deviations." (Trotsky)
In the elections for the Petrograd city duma, Bolshevik candidates polled an unexpected third
of the total vote. Elsewhere, in the Urals, Kronstadt, Kiev, soviets or trade unions passed
Bolshevik resolutions or elected Bolshevik majorities and chairmen.
29. Kornilov Rebellion. In August and early September, the Commander in chief of
the Army, General Kornilov, organized an abortive military uprising against the Provisional
Government. The Bolshevik Party got heavy political and technical benefits from its part in
the resistance to this attempted coup.
30. On 9 September, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet created a
"Committee of Struggle against Counterrevolution" to resist Kornilov. The Bolsheviks enter-
ed this committee, which was also known as the "Military Revolutionary Committee,"1 as a
dominant minority. The district soviets passed resolutions in favor of sending representatives
to the committee, establishing control over the commissars of the Government, and of organ-
izing mobile fighting squads to arrest Kornilov's agitators. The Military Organization met
with representatives from numerous army units and decided to demand the arrest of the
Kornilovites, to "arm the workers, to supply them with soldier instructors, to guarantee the
defense of the capitol from below, and at the same time to prepare for the creation of a re-
volutionary government of workers and soldiers." (Trotsky, II 229). District Committees
organized a system of guard duty at the big factories and called in Party representatives from
the small plants for continuous duty.
1 This first Military Revolutionary Committee apparently was allowed to lapse after the
Kornilov affair had blown over. It furnished a precedent for the Military Revolutionary
Committee organized on 22 October.
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In the Military Revolutionary Committee, the Bolsheviks obtained sanction for the
organizing and arming of workers' groups. Thousands of workers joined the Red Guard:
"Drilling began in marksmanship and the handling of weapons. Experienced
soldiers were brought in as teachers. By the 29th (11 September), Guards
had been formed in almost all the districts. The Red Guard announced its
readiness to put in the field a force of 40,000 rifles. The unarmed workers
formed companies for trench-digging, sheet-metal fortification, barbed-wire
fencing."
(Trotsky, H, 230)
At the great Putilov works about 100 cannon were gathered together for a workers'
artillery. Railway workers tore up and barricaded tracks. Postal and telegraph clerks de-
layed messages of the Kornilovite officers, and sent copies of them of the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee.
"The generals had been accustomed during the years of war to think of transport
and communications as technical questions. They found out now that these were
political questions."
(Trotsky, II, 231)
Trade unions, as well as factory committees, began to arm, and organize their mem-
In Helsingfors the soviets created a revolutionary committee that took over all govern-
mental institutions. Kronstadt and Vyborg sent troops to the defense of the capitol, but the
order of the Executive Committee of the Soviet for their dispatch had to be confirmed by the
Central Committee of the Party, for they were mostly Bolshevik units. The crew of the
cruiser Aurora undertook the defense of the Winter Palace.
31. The Kornilov attempt was a fiasco, but it had great and lasting effects on the po-
litical "co-relation" of forces and the organizational side of the revolutionary force:
a. The "compromisers" were weakened by their failure to take a strong stand;
the Bolsheviks were strengthened by their open resistance to the Kornilov
attempt;
b. The workers gained in experience and confidence;
c. The Bolshevik Party got a lesson in military organizations
d. The soviets ignored their executive committees and organized special staffs
and committees for defense.
32. In some places, the "defense" and "revolutionary" staffs of the soviets took over
all real powers.
33. Although its membership did not greatly expand following the Kornilov conspiracy,
the Bolshevik Party increased its "mass" influence greatly.
34. The Petrograd Soviet passed a Bolshevik resolution in favor of a government of
workers and peasants, 14 September. A week later it voted to oust its "compromisist" pre-
sidum. On 18 September the Moscow Soviet condemned the Provisional Government and the
policies of the Executive Committee. Trotsky was elected President of the Soviet.
35. In elections for district dumas in Moscow, the Party more than doubled its vote,
winning about 52% of the total. The "compromisists" Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary
Parties lost enormous chunks of their previous vote. Whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary
candidates had won 375,000 votes in June, they got only 54,000 in October. Mensheviks drop-
ped from 76,000 to 16,000. Significantly, the bourgeois Constitutional Democrats lost only
8,000 votes. The lower middle class stayed away from the polls, and this accounted for much
of the decline of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary votes. Evidently, considerable
numbers in Moscow were either moving to the left or being- politically "neutralized." It is also
significant that in the Moscow garrison, Bolsheviks won 90% of the vote.
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36. The Party chalked up appreciable gains in factory, trade union, soviet, and munic-
ipal elections elsewhere: Finland, Kiev, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kronstadt, Urals; Baltic and
Black Sea Fleets.
37. The soviets themselves more than regained the power they had lost following the
"July Days." The soviet of Krasnoarsk set up a rationing-card system on its own authority.
In Saratov, even the "compromisists" soviet
"was compelled to interfere in economic conflicts, to arrest manufacturers, con-
fiscate the tramway belonging to Belgians, introduce workers' control, and organ-
ize production in the abandoned factories."
(Trotsky, II, 292)
"frequently instituted courts of justice for the trial of citizens, created their
own militia in several factories, paying for its equipment out of the factory
cash-box, organized a workers' inspection which assembled raw materials
and fuel for the factories, superintended the sale of manufactured goods and
established a wage scale. In certain districts of the Urals the soviets took the
land from the landlords and put it under social cultivation."
38. The Bolshevik Party, in addition to capturing control of many soviets, was able to
put considerable pressure on non-Bolshevik soviets--by getting control of factory committees
and having them refuse to support the soviet financially. The Bolshevik soviets similarly re-
fused to support the "compromisist" Central Executive Committee.
.39. During the summer a great number of strikes were carried out throughout the
country, an increasing proportion of these were engineered by Bolshevik controlled factory
committees. In most cases the strikes were local and were called in opposition to trade union
leadership, which in many unions remained loyal to the regime right up to the Revolution.
40. The slogan "All Power to the Soviets" began to mean all power to the Bolshevik
Party. It "decisively ceased to be a slogan peaceful development. The party was launched on
the road of armed insurrection through the soviets and in the name of the soviets."
(Trotsky, II, 320)
C. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION.
41. The opportunity to put the new meaning of the slogan into effect came when the
Government proposed to transfer a large part of the Petrograd garrison to the Front, where
the Germans were making threatening advances. This would not only bolster the Front, but
would rid the capitol of Bolshevized army units. The Bolsheviks seized upon this plan as ,
proof that the regime had made a conspiracy to act against the revolution and to suppress the
workers. When the "Compromisers" proposed to the Soviet on 22 October that a "Committee
of Revolutionary Defense" be established to work for the defense of the city against the Ger-
mans, the Bolsheviks agreed wholeheartedly, with the proviso that the Committee examine the
whole question of the defense of the city, including, of course, the question of the transfer of
the garrison to the Front.
42. The creation of the committee, which became known as the "Military Revolutionary
Committee" (hereafter abbreviated as MRC) provided the Party with a legalised staff for an
insurrection. The next day, 23 October, the Central Committee adopted a resolution in favor
of immediate insurrection.
43. The strategy of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution was to utilize the soviets
to seize and to hold state power. It was necessary to build up the strength of the soviets and
to enlist their support for the Bolshevik program. It was also necessary, if they were to move
decisively and consciously to a seizure of power, to put over them the conscious leadership of
the Bolshevik Party. This was done politically, from below, by systematically getting Party
members elected to the soviets and, where possible, to their committees. Effective control of
the armed insurrection was obtained by making the MRC an instrument of the Party.
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44. The question of timing was important: in the long run because the necessary re-
volutionary "pitch" could be maintained for a limited period. This involved, not only the re-
volutionary aspirations of the workers, but also, the unstable sentiments of the lower middle
class, which had come to dislike the vacillating provisional coalition regime, but which could
be expected to swing back towards the right if the regime could make a peace with Germany
and otherwise stabilize conditions. Trotsky has estimated that the "ripe" period in Russia
Secondly, lt
was only about 3 - 4 months long, from mid-September to mid-December 1917.
was considered of tactical importance to get the insurrection mainly achieved before the con-,
gress of Soviets met on 2 November, the date originally scheduled: to present the Congress
with an accomplished fact which would force it to legalize the possession of power by the
soviets.
45. Both questions- -timing and the instrument to be used--went through changes in
Lenin's thinking. After the July Days, he thought that the soviets could not be used because
they were at that time" demoralized by the compromisers.' Instead, the insurrection should
be carried out by the Bolshevized factory committees. When the Party won over the Petrograd
and Moscow soviets, however, he changed his mind in favor of using the soviets.
"We ought to draw up a short declaration of the Bolsheviks... We ought to
move our whole faction to the factories and barracks. At the same time with-
out losing a minute we ought to organize a staff of insurrectionary detachments,
deploy our forces, move the loyal regiments into the most important positions,
surround the Alexandrinka (where the Democratic Conference) was sitting),
occupy Peter and Paul, arrest the General Staff and the government, send
against the junkers and the Savage Division those detachments which are ready
to die fighting, but not let the enemy advance to the center of the city. We
ought to mobilize the armed workers, summon them to a desperate, final battle,
occupy the telegraph and telephone stations at once, install our insurrectionary
staff at the central telephone station, placing in contact with it by telephone all
the factories, all the regiments, all the chief points of armed struggle, etc."
(Trotsky, III, 132)
The Central Committee of the Party voted to destroy the letter. Bukharin writes--
"Although we believed unconditionally that in Petersburg and Moscow we should
succeed in seizing the power, we assumed that in the provinces we could not yet
hold out, that having seized the power and dispersed the Democratic Conference,
we could not fortify ourselves in the rest of Russia."
47. Then Lenin had a new idea: to raise a revolutionary force from among bolshevized
soldiers in Finland and lead them in an attack on the capitol.
48. In fact, Lenin was not sure for some time whether the insurrection should begin in
Moscow or Petrograd.
49. On 11 October, Lenin "resigned" from the Central Committee in protest against
its "tendency" to "waver." He circulated his demands for immediate action among reliable
cadres in lower Party organizations- -Petrograd and Moscow Committees, district commit-
tees--with the object of having them exert pressure on the "wavering" Central Committee.
The "resignation," of course, was not accepted. The Moscow Bureau of the Party demanded
that the Central Committee "take a clear and definite course toward insurrection."
50. On 23 October, Lenin forced the Central Committee to take a definite stand. Only
two members, Zinoviev and Kamenev, voted against the resolution which made "armed in-
surrection .... the order of the day," and called upon all Party organizations to "consider and
decide all practical questions" on the basis of this decision.
51. The Petrograd Committee, the Military Organization, and the Moscow City Com-
mittee were even yet divided over the matter. At a meeting of the Petrograd Committee on
28 October, Kalinin "adhered" to the Central Committee's resolution, but his idea of the im-
mediacy of the insurrection was that it might "be possible--perhaps a year from now."
1 The Democratic Conference was a Menshevik-Socialist Revolutionary affair.
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52. Nevertheless, the resolution of 23 October established a rally post for the
"genuine advocates of insurrection." It put them
"on the firm ground of party right. In all the party organizations, in all its nuclei,
the most resolute elements began to be advanced to the responsible posts, The
party organizations, beginning with Petrograd, pulled themselves together, made
an inventory of their forces and material resources, strengthened their commu-
nications, and gave a more concentrated character to the campaign for an over-
turn."
53. The resolution had not set a date for the insurrection. It was hoped that it could
be done before the opening of the Congress of Soviets, scheduled for 2 November. Some
members of the Central Committee and other Party committees felt that adequate prepara-
tions could not be made in those five days. Then the Congress was postponed to the 7th,
giving more time for preparing.
54. There appears to have been no actual decision anywhere as to how and precisely
when the insurrection was to begin. The moment came when the regime, driven to the wall,
took overt action in self-defense--closing down the Bolshevik newspaper. This act, however,
was provoked by the Party. Through the MRC, it then 'accused the government in advance of
preparing an attempt against the soviets.'
"The attacking side is almost always interested in seeming on the defensive....
Insofar as the government did not intend to capitulate without a fight it would not
help getting ready to defend itself. But by this very fact it became liable to the
accusation of conspiracy against the highest organ of the workers, soldiers and
peasants."
(Trotsky, III, 279)
"It would be a serious mistake," says Trotsky, "to regard all this as juridical hair-splitting
of no interest to the people." The Party simply took advantage of "natural disinclination of
the soldier to pass from the barracks to the trenches, and in mobilizing the garrison for the
defense of the Soviet Congress," and was not at all committed to a particular moment for
starting the uprising.
When Lenin arrived at the headquarters of the revolution in the Smolny Institute to
learn that Trotsky had sent revolutionary troops to recapture the newspaper offices, Trotsky
recalls, he was jubilant, then after a moment's thought, said, " `Well, well--it can be done
that way too. Just take the power.' "
55. The problem of the chosen instrument- -whether the Party itself should call an
uprising, or do it through the Soviet--was also resolved by events.
As late as 26 October, Lenin appears to have leaned slightly in favor of the Party's
calling up the insurrection- -as he had definitely implied in his letter following the 'July Days'
in which he proposed that the uprising begin in the factories.
On 6 November, he wrote "Who is to seize the power? That is now of no importance.
Let the Military Revolutionary Committee take it, or `some other institution,' " by which he
meant the Central Committee.
The advantages of speed and precision that lay with a Party summons were outweighed
by considerations of strength. Large numbers of workers, and even more of soldiers, were
committed to the soviets, but not necessarily to the Party, and it could not be easily calculated
how strongly they would support a direct Party summons to come out.
The principal objections to the utilization of the soviet--its political unreliability and
cumbersomeness-were overcome, in the first instance, by the Party's capture of control and
in the second, by the creation of the MRC, which was small enough to be efficient, was under
full Bolshevik control, and had been given legal authority by the Soviet. In the MRC, the Party
had what amounted to a special organ operating with immensely greater authority than any
strictly Party office could.
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56. Between the decision of 23 October and the uprising of November, the following
practical steps were taken:
a. The MRC was given a definite composition by vote of the Soviet 29 October.
On 2 November it began to work. On 3 November a "Bureau" of the MRC was
formed.
b. The Soviet turned over its authority to the MRC on 5 November.
c. The Red Guard was given a central headquarters by the Soviet on 26 October,
and this was taken over by the MRC, on 5 November.
d. Representatives of Bolshevized garrison units decided on 31 October to sub-
mit to the authority of the MRC, to have someone on duty at regimental telephones
at all times, and to send two representatives from each regiment for duty at the
Smolny headquarters of the MRC.
e. The MRC sent its own Commissars to all garrison units on 23 October. On
4 November garrison units agreed not to accept any orders from the Government
unless they had been countersigned by the MRC.
f. The Central Committee of the Party made definite personnel assignments on
6 November: CC members to stay at the Smolny, and the Petrograd Committee
to post some of its members there also; individual CC members assigned to keep
in touch with postal and telegraph workers, to observe the actions of the Govern-
ment, and to organize a food supply system; a "reserve headquarters" was set up
at the Peter and Paul fortress.
g. Tactical operational plans were drawn up by members of the Bolshevik Mili-
tary organization for the seizure of installations of the government.
57. The MRC served as a joint Party-Soviet general staff for the insurrection in
Petrograd. It was the operational headquarters for military components of the Soviet--Red
Guard (Workers' detachments) and units of the army garrison. It was also the military head-
quarters of the Party, controlling Bolshevik Party organizations throughout the city and in-
dividual Party cadres having assignments with Soviet organizations. It worked under the
general direction of the Central Committee of the Party. There follows a detailed description
of the character and functions of the military components of the insurrection: Bolshevik
Military Organization, Red Guard, and staffs.
D. THE BOLSHEVIK MILITARY ORGANIZATION.
58. The military success of the October Revolution was largely due to the successful
subversion of the Army, particularly of the Petrograd garrison. Bolshevik political and
organizing work in the Army and Navy was carried on by a Party auxiliary called the Military
Organization of the Bolshevik Party. Its activities deprived the Government of all. but 1 -
2,000 garrison troops during the insurrection; furnished the insurrection with the majority of
about, 10 garrison regiments and about 6,000 sailors; furnished the Red Guard with thousands
of weapons; prevented the reinforcement of the Government's defenses by units from the front;
and carried out seizures of power in many front-line commands and important cities outside
the capital. The Military Organization furnished soldier.-instructors for the training of the
Red Guard detachments. Leaders of the Military Organization took part in drawing up the
operational plan for the insurrection and worked with the MRC in directing,the operations in
Petrograd. Its leaders joined with Party, Soviet, and Red Guard leaders to set up insurrec-
tionary staffs in the districts of Petrograd.
59. The Military Organization consisted of Party cells in garrison and front-line Army
units and in the Russian Fleets. Details on the linkage between the cells and the central and
local Bolshevik Party organizations are not available. In Communist writings, references to
the Military Organization are vague--it did this or that; so-and-so was a "leader of the
Bolshevik Military Organization," etc.--but of its actual working structure little is said. Re-
ferences have been made to a "Military Commission' in Petrograd and to a "Bureau" of the
Military Organization. The Military Commission appears to have been originally an organ
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created by the Petrograd Committee of the Party shortly after the "February Revolution" to
handle Party work in the Petrograd Garrison.' It was shortly thereafter taken over by the
Central Committee of the Party and became the directing headquarters for the entire Mili-
tary Organization. Nothing further is known about it, or about the "Bureau" if the latter was
actually distinct from it.
On the basis of what information is available, the following lines of control have been
hypothesized:
a) Bolsheviks in Army units were controlled by a special section or a military
committee of a local (city, regional, district) committee of the Party when the
unit was close enough for effective control.
b) In front-line units, or in units stationed in areas where the local Party organ-
ization was weak, the Party members were controlled by Party committees organ-
ized in the military chain of command.
In the latter case, the leading organ (Division, Corps, Army, or Army Front Party Committee)
would be directly linked with the Military Commission in Petrograd. In the first case, com-
munications between local military committees and the Military Commission in Petrograd
would be effected through the political apparatus of the Party.
Bolshevik
Central Committee
Military
Commission
Bolshevik
City Committee
City Military
Committee
Bolshevik
Organization
in Garrison
Units (Regiments,
Battalions, etc.)
Bolshevik
Army Front Committee
Bolshevik
Army Committee
Bolshevik
Corps Committee
Bolshevik
Division Committee
Bolshevik
Regimental Committee
Bolshevik
Battalion Committee
Bolshevik
Company Committee
1 Similar bodies had been organized by local Party committees prior to the war. At least as
early as 1905, there was .a. Military Committee in Moscow for work in the Moscow garrison.
It controlled Bolshevik cells in garrison units and was organizationally independent of the
Moscow City Committee of the Party, but maintained close contact with the Secretary of the
City Committee.
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A third control system was exercised through a chain of Bolshevik "fractions" in
extra-Party organizations: "soldiers committees" in army units, soldiers' soviets in garri-
son cities, "sailors' committees" in elements of the fleet, or the fleet soviet.
Bolshevik
Central Committee
F Military
Commission
Bureau
Soldiers' Soviet
(Garrison City)
Bolshevik
Fr action
Bolshevik
Fraction
Fleet
Soviet
Bolshevik
Fraction
Bolshevik
Fraction
Bolshevik
Fraction
Army Front
Committee
Army
Committee
Corps
Committee
The existence of these extra-Party organizations greatly faciliated the work of the
Bolshevik Party in the military services, in the same way as the workers' soviets and factory
committees did in the cities. In both cases, the Party accumulated its revolutionary forces
and gave them definite organization by penetration, subversion, and seizing control of the lead-
ing organs of extra-Party institutions.
60. The Extra-Party Institution.
Soldiers' and sailors' committees were formally constituted by "Order Number 1" of
the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, dated 15 March:
Every company, battalion, regiment, depot, battery, squadron, branch of military
administration and naval vessel shall immediately elect a committee of repre-
sentatives of the lower ranks of the given unit."
Arms of all kinds ... shall be placed at the disposal and under the control of
the company and battalion committees and shall under no circumstances be is-
sued to officers even on the demand of the. latter."
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61. Extension of Party control in army committees proceeded exactly as in the fac-
tories -- by political agitation for Bolshevik slogans resulting in the election of Party men to
committees of lower units; these agitated for new elections to oust "compromisist" commit-
tees of higher units. As committees were won over, more Bolshevik delegates succeeded in
being elected to soldiers' sections of various soviets, and once in the majority there, they
were able to rig elections in military units still more in favor of Party candidates and to push
programs and procedures that drew more of the soldiers into the Bolshevik ring of influence.
62. Bolsheviks in unit committees used the facilities of the committees (printing
presses, clerical help, communications facilities) for Party purposes. Agitators and organ-
izers were sent to work with other units as needed, and even to help out local civilian Party
organizations. In one case, a Party Committee was organized in a regiment. At first it had
only 18 - 20 adherents, but it rapidly expanded and became a "District Committee." Then it
began working in other regiments in the division and even organized a group to work among
the peasants in the division sector.
63. The Bolsheviks in the Baltic Fleet were particularly energetic and effective
organizers. The Party organization at Kronstadt, the Baltic Naval Base, dominated the
Central Executive Committee of Sailors of the Baltic Fleet (Centrobalt). The Centrobalt des-
patched agitators to the Black Sea Fleet and through the countryside. They carried mandates
from the Centrobalt which guaranteed them a friendly reception by soviets wherever they
went, and immunity from arrest.
64. Party work in the army capitalized on the peace and land slogans: the army con-
sisted largely of peasants who, especially since the February Revolution, were easily per-
suaded that they had no real stake in continuation of the "imperialist war," particularly since
they were suffering continual defeats.
The Bolsheviks organized clubs for soldiers and workers coming from a particular
section of the country--even from a single village. Party agitators gave lectures in the clubs
and distributed literature. Special efforts were made to get soldiers on furlough to visit the
clubs.
Party agitators were sent into the countryside to talk to soldiers on leave and deserters.
Peasants were encouraged to seize land and engage in political activities, and to write about it
to soldier relatives at the front. Conversely, Bolshevized soldiers wrote home encouraging
their families to engage in the political struggle.
65. Another factor that worked in the Party's favor was the fact that the Monarchy had
made a practice of drafting worker malcontents for the army. Many of these had taken part in
the 1905 uprising and were generally sympathetic to Bolshevik ideas. The practice also con-
tributed to the further deterioration of economic health and the further expansion of the pro-
letariat: unskilled peasants were brought into industrial centers to replace the drafted work-
ers: they were less productive than the old workers and suffered the more with the economic
decline. The "hereditary proletariat" that was drafted naturally sympathised strongly with the
development of revolutionary sentiment among the workers who remained in the cities. A
large party of the Petrograd garrison consisted of drafted workers.
66. Still another factor contributing on the one hand, to the success of Bolshevik work
in the army and on the other, to the difficulty the regime had in keeping a firm hand over the
army, was the "democratization" of the lower ranks of officers and NCO's. Relatively few of
the commissioned officers went actively over to the Bolshevik side, but large numbers of them
were not resolutely anti-Bolshevik and in a crisis, could not be counted reliable by the regime.
67. The Party published newspapers for soldiers. They were distributed by Bolsheviks
and sympathetic workers- -railway men, postal workers, automobile drivers, field kitchen
staffs.
"These army newspapers were vivid examples of Lenin's description of what a
newspaper should be--a `collective organizer' --the correspondents who wrote
for the papers became organizers of Bolshevik work in the regiments, while the
readers became rank-and-file Bolsheviks."
(Gorky, et al)
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One of the papers (Soldier's Truth), published in Petrograd for the garrison, had a circulation
of 50,000.
68. The extent of Bolshevik organization in the army was demonstrated at an All-
Russian Conference of Military Organizations of the Bolshevik Party, which was sponsored by
the Central Committee and met for ten days at Petrograd beginning 29 June. Itwas attended--
"by delegates from forty-eight organizations at the front and seventeen organi-
zations in the rear. Delegates came from 500 regiments distributed along the
four principal fronts and in thirty of the largest cities in the country. The only
regions not represented were the Caucasus and Eastern Siberia. There were
about 160 delegates representing approximately 26,000 soldiers belonging to
Communist nuclei."
(Gorky, et al)
69. The most thoroughly Bolshevized front-line units were the 12th Army on the
Northern Front and the 2nd Army on the Western Front. The former included the Bolshevized
eight regiments of the Lettish Rifles, which seized power in Latvia. It had a secret Military
Revolutionary Committee that came into the open and seized power when the Petrograd up-
rising became known. It was composed of representatives of the Central Committee of the
Bolshevik Party, the Latvian Social-Democratic organization, the 12th Army Bolshevik mili-
tary organization, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers Deputies of the 12th
Army, and the soviets of nearby towns. The 2nd Army also organized a Military Revolutionary
Committee at the time of the Petrograd uprising to seize power and to send troops to help the
insurrection at Minsk.
70. Wherever Bolsheviks got control of the committee of a military command, they
set up a revolutionary committee, which took control of the command, helped local soviets
seize power, and prevented commanders from sending reinforcements to the aid of the re-
gime during the uprising.
71. On the Southern and Southwestern Fronts, where local nationalisms were strong,
economic conditions generally better, and the populations generally more conservative, the
Bolsheviks were not so successful, either in the armies or among the civilian population.
72. The neutralization of the Petrograd garrison. was an absolute necessity for the
Party. It was able, by intense political work, to get control of the workers' and soldiers'
sections of the Petrograd Soviet. The soldiers' section represented the soldiers politically,
as a social class:
"The composition of the soldiers' section guaranteed to the Bolsheviks the polit-
ical sympathy of the majority of the garrison. But in order to get the practical
disposal of the military units it was necessary to rely directly on the regimental
committees."
(Trotsky, III, 94)
To fill this need- -to achieve the same central control over the soldiers of the garrison that
the Party already had over the workers through its control of individual factory committees
through Party District Committees--a "Permanent Conference of the Garrison" was created.
It consisted of the regimental committees of the garrison and was under the MRC.
73. The Garrison Conference met for the first time on 31 October. The discussion
turned on the question of a "coming-out" and an informal muster-roll took place. The mili-
tary schools in Peterhof and Oranienburg and the 9th Cavalry Regiment took a neutral stand.
The Grenadier Regiment declared that it would come out only at the summons of the Congress
of Soviets. The most important units, however, declared "their readiness to come out at a
word from the Petrograd Soviet"--the I+;gersky, Moscow, Volynsky, Pavlovsky, Keksgolmsky,
Semonovsky, and Izmailovsky regiments; the 1st sharpshooter and 3rd reserve regiments; the
2nd Baltic crew; the electro-technical battalion; and the artillery division of the Guard.
74. Control of the regimental committees was obtained by Bolshevik members of the
Military Organization. Military organizations (which we understand to mean local offices of
the Military Commission) were set up in the districts of Petrograd by the middle of October.
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They recruited soldiers to instruct the Red Guard, obtained arms, and carried out propaganda
in the regiments. The chief of the district military organization, joined by the commander of
the district Red Guard and the chairman of the district soviet- -if he was a Bolshevik- -became
the district Military Revolutionary Committee, in charge of the insurrection in the district.
75. On 31 October, representatives of the garrison regimental and company commit-
tees met at Smolny. (This may have been the first meeting of Garrison Conference referred
to above.) It was decided that the regimental telephones should be manned continuously, that
two representatives from each unit should go on duty at the headquarters of the MRC at
Smolny, and that the MRC should issue daily reports to the regiments.
76. On the night of 2 November, the MRC began appointing its own Commissars to all
garrison units. About 100 were appointed the first day and about 600 more in suceeding days.
The Commissars arranged for the organization in each regiment of "a nucleus of devoted re-
volutionary fighters." (Trotsky) We take this to mean that special staffs were appointed to
take command of the regiment when the insurrection began: the relation of the MRC Com-
missars to these "nuclei" is not clear. Presumably, the Commissar would represent the final
authority and the "nucleus" would be his tactical command staff.
E. THE STAFF OF THE INSURRECTION.
77. The October Revolution was carried out by the Bolshevik Party acting through a
complex network of Party and extra-Party organs. All threads, however, led to Smolny,
where the MRC.had its headquarters. (See chart)
78. The Military Revolutionary Committee. The MRC was an official organ of the
Petrograd Soviet and was empowered to see to the "defense of the revolution" against the
supposed plot of the "compromisers"'--tools of the bourgeoisie--to suppress the workers by
force. It was a legal organ, inasmuch as the Soviet shared in the ambiguous "dual power."
Its creation was proposed to the Soviet (in the shape of a "Committee of Revolutionary De-
fense") by the "compromisers" on 22 October. The next day the Bolshevik Central Commit-
tee decided upon an armed uprising. Not until the 28th did the Soviet approve the MRC, and it
only began work on 2 November, just five days before the insurrection began.
79. The MRC was officially composed of the presidiums of the soldiers' section, re-
presentatives of the Centrobalt, Finland Regional Committee of Soviets, municipal bodies,
factory committees and trade unions, and of Party military organizations and the Red Guard.
The "compromisers" "boycotted" it (--what the Bolsheviks would have done had they insisted
on participating in the MRC, as they did at Moscow, is a moot point), and for practical pur-
poses, it was a purely Bolshevik organ. There were some Left Socialist Revolutionaries in it,
but the only one of them who "did any work," says Trotsky, was Lazimir, who was "already
traveling with the Bolsheviks before the insurrection- -although, to be sure, not always, fore-
seeing whither the course would lead." ; Lazimir "was even placed at the head of the bureau in
order to emphasize the fact that the Committee was a Soviet and not a Party institution." The
full committee "hardly met once in plenary session," according to Trotsky. All its work was
done by the president (Trotsky) and the bureau, which seems to have consisted of Podvoisky,
Antonov-Ovseenko, Lashevich, Sadovsky, and Mekhonoshin--all of them leaders of the Bolshe-
vik Military Organization (None of them except Trotsky was a member of the Bolshevik Cen-
tral Committee elected at Sixth Congress of August, 1917).
80. The draft of the constitution of the MRC included provision for the creation of
several functional departments: "defense, supplies, communications, intelligence, etc." Un-
fortunately, no information is available on exactly what these departments did, if they actually
existed.1 Something like 'the functions assigned to the departments was achieved on 6 November,
when various members of the Central Committee of the Party were given specific jobs:
Dzerzhinsky to establish communications with the postal and telegraph workers, Bubnov with
the railroad workers; Sverdlov "was appointed to watch the Provisional Government; "Miliutin,
who passed as an economist, was appointed to organize the supply of food for the period of the
insurrection;" Kamenev was to keep in touch with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries.
1 Seven such working sections were specifically created after the Petrograd uprising, a fact
which strenthens the suspicion that they did not exist before or during the uprising.
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81. The main link between the MRC and the Party apparatus was Sverdlov, the prin-
cipal Party organizer. He was in constant touch with the MRC at Smolny and was called in
for all important discussions. He knew the cadres of the party as no one else did" and pro-
vided the MRC with workers as needed. Bolshevik delegates arriving for the Congress of
Soviets reported to Sverdlov, and the majority of them (there were 2-300 of them in the city
on 6 November) "were included one way or another in the mechanics of the insurrection."
The leaders of the Petrograd Committee also went on duty at MRC headquarters.
82. The Military Organization and the MRC drew up the plan of operations. The
more conspirative undertakings were carried out through the heads of the Military Organi-
zation .... or through Sverdlov."
83. After the uprising began, Lenin moved into Smolny and became the key figure.
84. In general, the MRC was thus a fairly broad and loose organ that utilized large
numbers of Party leaders and stray functionaries as they became available.
85. In the districts, the same sort of arrangement existed: District Party Commit-
tees, District MRC's, Red Guard staffs, district Military Organizations, and revolutionary
members of the Soviets constituted super insurrectionary staffs. In Vyborg, and in some of
the other districts, all these organs occupied the same premises and there was a considerable
amount of running back and forth and, above all, of confusion.
86. The Petrograd Soviet, working through District Soviets, Red Guards, and MRC's,
was responsible primarily for conducting operations involving factories and workers. Opera-
tions involving soldiers were carried out by the Party Military Organization and by Commis-
sars dispatched by the MRC. MRC Commissars were sent with Red Guard or army detach-
ments to take over installations as soon as they were seized.
87. The MRC kept in touch with all the headquarters of the insurrection and was in-
formed of the progress of the operations by telephone, the central switchboard be-
ing one of the very first objectives seized. The regime was simultanuously cut out of the
telephone system.
88. A reserve staff was set up in the Peter and Paul fortress in case the Smolny were
captured by the Government.
89. For the main tactical operation, the capture of the Winter Palace, a "field head-
quarters" was set up at the Peter and Paul under Lashevich. There were also three subordinate
headquarters for this operation: one on the cruiser Aurora, another in the barracks of the
Pavlovsky Regiment, and another in the sailors' barracks. In addition, two commanders,
Podvoisky and Antonov-Ovseenko, moved about preparing the assault on the Winter Palace-'-
"apparently without any clear order of priority." (Trotsky)
F. THE RED GUARD.
90. The Red Guard was the main fighting force. It cannot be estimated how many Red
Guards took part in the insurrection. Trotsky says that there were "tens and tens of thousands"
and that "reserves were inexhaustible."
The Red Guard developed largely from fighting squads organized in the factories on the
initiative of the workers during the February Revolution. On 13 March, the Executive Com-
mittee of the Petrograd Soviet formalized the organization on the basis of 100 factory militia-
men per 1,000 workers. Immediately following the February Revolution, the Provisional
Government organized a "Peoples' Militia" to replace the old police force and maintain order.
This militia consisted largely of middle class elements and was responsible to the city dumas
and zemstvos. It was separate from the factory militias, which were responsible to individual
factory committees. The Bolshevik Party began a campaign for the "democratization" of the
official People's Militia, demanding that more workers. be included in it. In some places the
People's Militia absorbed large numbers of workers and were incorporated into the Red
Guard at the time of the October uprising. In other places, the Bolsheviks got control of dumas
and were able to convert the bourgeois People's Militia into workers' militia which fought side
by side with the factory Red Guards.
err vt
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91. In Moscow, the Red Guard was organized largely by Mensheviks and Socialist
Revolutionaries. The Bolshevik Party formed its own fighting squads and, at the same time,
instructed all members of Party factory cells to join the "compromisist" Red Guard. The
Party gradually got control of the detachments in most factories.
92. The Red Guard in Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities were greatly expanded,
with the sanction of both the Soviets and the Government, at the time of the Kornilov con-
spiracy.
93. By 27 September Red Guard staffs had been formed in all the districts of Petro-
grad. The Petrograd Soviet created a special "Workers' Guard Department" on 26 October.
District Red Guard staffs were subordinated to district Military Revolutionary Committees
at the time of the October Revolution.
94. Organization.
"The basic military unit was the ten; four tens was a squad, three squads, a company;
three companies, a battalion. With its commanding staff and special units, a battalion num-
bered over 500 men. The battalions of a district constituted a division (Otryad). Big factories
like the Putilov had their own divisions. Special technical commands--sappers, bicyclers,
telegraphers, machine-gunners and artillery men--were recruited in the corresponding fac-
tories, and attached to the riflemen--or else acted independently according to the nature of
the given task. The entire commanding staff was elective. There was no risk in this; all
were volunteers here and knew each other well.
"The working women created Red Cross divisions. At the shops manufacturing surgi-
cal supplies for the army, lectures were announced on the care of the wounded .... The Or-
ganization was extremely poor in money and technical equipment. By degrees, however, the
factory committees sent material for hospital bases and ambulances. During the hours of the
revolution these weak nuclei swiftly developed. An imposing technical equipment was suddenly
found at their disposal. On the 24th (6 Nov) the Vyborg district soviet issued the following
order; `Immediately requisition all automobiles ...Take an inventory of all first-aid supplies,
and have nurses on duty in all clinics.
(Trotsky)
95. The Bolshevik Party controlled the Red Guard from the top--through the Petrograd
and District soviets--and from the bottom: Party members "constituted the nucleus of every
company." Inasmuch as Bolsheviks dominated most of the factory and shop committees, they
also controlled the staff of the factory Red Guard. Only workers at the plant could join its
Red Guard: The Party cadres were thus able to prevent hostile penetration.
96. On 2 November there were about 12,000 registered Red Guards in Petrograd and
its suburbs.' Many of these did not participate actively in the daily routine of the Guard, but
they could be counted on in case of a struggle.
97. Training was understandably sketchy. As many workers as possible were rotated
through the factory detachment, not only to give them some experience in the handling of arms,
but also, to indoctrinate them and to give them a taste of potential power.
98. Party organizations supervised the training of the Red Guard. Members were
sent by District Committees of the Party to inspect and guide factory detachments. The Party
Military Organization sent Bolshevik soldiers of the garrison to instruct the workers.
There were, for example, about 1, 500 Red Guards at the giant Putilov works. They
trained on a definite schedule after work. The factory committee set up a three-man military
committee which enlisted workers into the Guard.
1 This is the number given in Gorky, et al, The History of the Civil War Trotsky gives a
larger figure--20,000.
-19-
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99. Arms. Security Information
Before it was legalized by the Kornilov affair, the Red Guard was armed largely with
weapons seized by the workers and soldiers during the February Revolution. It was estimated
by the Commander of the Petrograd Military District that over 30,000 revolvers and 40,000
rifles disappeared from army stores during the February Revolution. In at least one case
(at Orekhovo-Zuyevo), Bolsheviks obtained arms by cultivating army officers of the local gar-
rison: they gave them a party and obtained 300 rifles and 61,000 cartridges. Following the
"July Days" the regime gathered up as many arms as it could. Large stocks of the best wea-
pons, including machine guns, were hidden by reliable Party members. Substantial numbers
of arms were cached in the factories. The Government issued arms to the workers during
the Kornilov danger. When the Red Guard was legalized, and wherever at any time the Bol-
sheviks dominated the local soviet, the Red Guard was able to purchase arms out of factory
funds. The Military Organization of the Party obtained arms for the Red Guard from the
stores of Bolshevized garrison units.
100. On 5 November, just two days before the insurrection, the Bolsheviks got control,
through the Military Revolutionary Committee, of the garrison of the Peter and Paul fortress.
Adjoining the fortress and guarded by its garrison, was the Kronkversky Arsenal, where there
were 100,000 rifles. The next day, District Red Guard staffs and factory detachments sent
trucks and wagons to pick up and distribute these rifles to the workers. Other large stocks
were obtained by seizure of warehouses and army depots after the insurrection began. In
most cases, they were taken from within, by workers or revolutionary army units. The re-
gime, by the same token, was denied arms by Bolshevized arsenals, etc.
G. "THE PARTY CENTER."
101. There is a fundamental quarrel between Trotsky and Stalin as to the technical
role of the Party in the military side of the Revolution. Stalin, and the official version of the
Revolution, (Gorky, et al, The History of the Civil War) insist that the Central Committee ap-
pointed a "Practical Center" of five members, headed by Stalin, to direct operations. Trotsky
produces substantial evidence (including early post-revolutionary writings of Stalin and other
Bolsheviks) to show that this "Party Center," although it was actually appointed, never had a
real existence. He insists that the MRC, which he headed, was the only real headquarters of
the insurrection and that, not only were the available members of the Party "Center' absorbed
into MRC, but also, that Stalin "did not take upon himself any function in the organization of
the insurrection:"
102. The disagreement is not simply by-play in the Stalin-Trotsky struggle, but arises
from a basic difference over the technical role of the Party apparatus. Trotsky did not by any
means belittle the part Bolshevik leadership played in the "mass" organizations-- the Petro-
grade and district soviets and their Red Guard, MRC's and commissars--but he insists that the
political preparation of the insurrection was so far advanced that it could safely be, and was,
carried out by Bolsheviks embedded in these extra-Party organizations. By superimposing a
Party "Center" and by similarly emphasizing the technical role of Party District Committees,
the Stalinist version suggests a "bureaucratization" of the insurrection- -the picture of a
closely- controlled Party apparatus giving orders to soviet organs in a systematic way.
103. Whatever the facts of history, the fact remains that the Stalinist account is the
"classical example" of practical insurrectionary leadership based on a city proletariat. As
such, it has been taught to all orthodox Communists. Unless the realities of a given "revolu-
tionary situation" should dictate otherwise, it could be expected that a CP in an industrialized
or semi-industrialized country would organize and conduct an armed uprising according to
the Stalinist scheme.
104. For immediate purposes, it would, therefore, be most practical to show how the
Bolshevik machine--Party Center-District Centers-specialist functionaries--is supposed to
have directed the Petrograd uprising. However, practically nothing is known of this. On
28 October, the Petrograd Committee of the Party is supposed to have decided the following
organizational measures:
"1. to set up a small sub-committee;
2. to arrange for members to be on constant duty at the centre and in the localities;
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3. to organize a military information centre at the Headquarters of every
District Committee;
4. that all the districts establish closer connection with the factory committees and
the Secretariat of the Central Committee;
5. to improve communications with the railwaymen, postal workers and all mass
working-class organizations;
6. to intensify agitation' and accelerate the mass training of the workers in the use
of arms.
7. to improve communications between the district Party organizations."
(Gorky, et al)
The "Executive Sub-Committee" is then supposed to have elected an "Insurrection Committee"
of three members and instructed it to inspect the barracks and military schools and to exa-
mine the question of arms and ammunition. Then, a "General Committee of Insurrection"
consisting of members of the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the Military
Organization of the Bolshevik Party, was formed.
105. In the Stalinist version of the Revolution (Gorky), however, there is no further
mention of the things that these Party centers are supposed to have done, nor of the work of
the Party "Center." the MRC takes the stage throughout, with frequent references to Stalin's
having done this or that, or suggested, or instructed something--no mention of Trotsky, of
course. The latter has this to say:
"In those hot times no few episodic institutions were created during the last
moments of a session and immediately drowned in oblivion. At the session
of the Central Committee on October 7th (20th) there was created a `bureau
of information on the struggle with the counterrevolution.' This was the cipher-
designation of the first organ created for working on the problems of the in-
surrection. As to its personnel the minutes read: `Three are elected from
the .Central Committee to the bureau: Trotsky, Sverdlov, Bubnov, and they
are directed to create the bureau.' Did this first `practical center' of the in-
surrection exist? Obviously not, since it has left no traces. The political
bureau created at the session of the 10th also proved unviable and revealed
itself in absolutely nothing: doubtful if it met even once. In order that the
Petrograd organization of the party, the direct leader of the work in the dis-
tricts, should not become separated from the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee, Trotsky,.at the suggestion of Lenin, who liked a system of double or
triple insurance, was included for the critical week in the highest admini-
strative organ of the Petrograd committee. However, this decision also re-
mained only a paper one: never one session was held with Trotsky present.
The so-called `practical center' met the same fate. As an independent institu-
tion it was never intended to exist, but it did not exist even as an auxilary organ."1
H. OPERATIONS IN PETROGRAD.
106. The Revolutionaries seized the power in the capital with practically no fighting:
there was no one to fight on the side of the regime. Only during the seige of the Winter Palace
was there a struggle, and in the opinion of Trotsky, even that could have been minimized but
for the military "amateurishness" of the insurrectionary staffs.
. 170. On the afternoon of 6 November a Commissar of the MRC was sent to take over
the telegraph exchange. This was done peacefully: the exchange was guarded by sentries
from the Keksgolmsky Regiment, which was on the side of the Bolsheviks. A detachment of
1 The "Bureau of Information" was apparently not identical with the "Practical Center." The
latter consisted of Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Vritzky, Dzerzhinsky. Trotsky's argument is
that neither of them, nor the "political bureau," had any real existence.
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about 40 sailors of the marine guard took over the State Bank at about the same time. That
evening an MRC Commissar with a small detachment of sailors occupied the government
news agency.
108. Thus far, there was no official recognition of the beginning of an insurrection.
Things were going so well that Trotsky instructed a Bolshevik delegate from the Kronstadt
Soviet, Flerovsky, to "return immediately to Kronstadt: `events are maturing so fast that
everyone must be at his post.' " A message was sent by the MRC to Kronstadt: "the armed
forces of Kronstadt are to come out at dawn for the defense of the Congress of Soviets." That
night, a telegram was sent by the MRC through Sverdlov to Smilga, president of the Regional
Committee of the Soviets at Helsingfors and a member of the Central Committee of the Bol-
shevik Party, to 11 'send regulations.' That meant: send immediately 1500 chosen Baltic
sailors armed to the teeth," Trotsky explains. This was an example of the utilization of
Sverdlov and his Party apparatus for the "most conspirative" operations mentioned above.
109. The Government must obviously begin to defend itself against further occupation
of its institutions by the soviet. It passed a resolution to arrest the MRC, to shut down the
Bolshevik newspapers, and to call in reliable troops from the city and the front. At five-
thirty on the morning of 7 November a Government commissar with a detachment of junkers
seized the Bolshevik printing plant, smashed the presses, and closed the offices.
110. Two workers rushed with the news to the Smolny. The MRC sent orders to the
Litovsky Regiment and the Sapper Battalion to send forces to the "defense of the workers'
press." An order was sent to the cruiser Aurora standing in the river to refuse to obey
government orders to join the fleet in the Baltic. The Aurora's radio station announced that
"the counterrevolution had taken the offensive," and passed the word to all garrisons at the
approaches to the city to prevent the passage of government reinforcements. The MRC sent
instructions to the district staffs and garrison units to prepare for action.
111. "The tactical plans for the conquest of the capital were worked out chiefly by the
staff of the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks," Trotsky writes:
"Officers of the general staff would have found many faults in them, but military
academicians do not customarily take part in the preparations of a revolutionary
insurrection. The essentials at any rate were taken care of. The city was divided
into military divisions, each subordinate to the nearest headquarters. At the most
important points companies of the Red Guard were concentrated in coordination
with the neighboring military units, where companies on duty were awake and ready.
The goal of each separate operation, and the forces for it, were indicated in ad-
vance. All those taking part in the insurrection from top to bottom--in this lay its
power, in this also at times its Achilles' heel- -were imbued with absolute confi-
dence that the victory was going to be won without casualties.
The main operation began at two o'clock in the morning. Small military parties,
usually with a nucleus of armed workers or sailors under the leadership of com-
missars, occupied simultaneously, or in regular order, the railroad stations,
the lighting plant, the munition and food stores, the waterworks, Dvortsovy bridge,
the Telephone Exchange, the State Bank, the big printing plants. The Telegraph
Station and the Post Office were completely taken over. Reliable guards were
placed everywhere."
112. Two of the railway stations, a power station, and a food warehouse were seized by
detachments of the Sapper Battalion. A detachment of the Semonovsky Regiment took over a
newspaper plant for the printing of the Bolshevik paper. Kresty prison was occupied without
a fight, and the released Bolshevik prisoners were given immediate military assignments.
There was no fighting. The government sent a small force to regain the telephone ex-
change, but revolutionary reinforcements arrived in time to prevent it. Whenever possible,
the enemy was disarmed, but in some cases, there was simply a sizing up and a breaking off
of contact when insurrectionary forces. encountered a detachment of loyalist officers or stu-
dents. "Weapons are still serving merely as an external sign of power. . ." Red Guards set
up control points in the streets and stopped passers-by: they examined papers, carefully, but
usually let them pass, for they did not know what else to do.
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113. By mid-morning of the 7th, the forces of the revolution had got control of all im-
portant points in the city, except the Winter Palace. The MRC announced that the "Provisional
Government is overthrown. The state power has passed into the hands of the Military Re-
volutionary Committee."
114. Capture of the Winter Palace. The announcement of the MRC was premature.
The regime still held the Winter Palace, a huge place with over 1,000 rooms and halls. It
had been planned to take the Palace on the night of 7 November. Podvoisky and Antonov-
Ovseenko had been appointed on the 5th to draw up the plans. Sadovsky, an engineer, was also
included, but he soon dropped out because he was needed more to work with the garrison. The
operation consisted of massing the revolutionary forces in a ring around the Palace, the ring
being closed on the river side by insurrectionary naval vessels. The operation was very slow
in developing. In the early morning of the 8th there were still no Red forces at the approaches
to the Palace. All during the morning individuals were able to pass in and out of the Palace
without trouble. Podvoisky had promised that the operation would be complete by noon, but
when the time came, the force had not been completely rounded up. A new time was promised- -
3.P. M.; then 6 P. M. The Congress of Soviets, before which the Bolsheviks wished to place
a fail accompli, had to be postponed each time.
115. The reason for the delay was that the Bolshevik planners and commanders were
amateurs:
"The plan as a whole was too heavy and complicated for the problem it aimed
to solve. The time allotted for preparation proved inadequate. Small inco-
ordinations and ommissions came to light at every step, as might be expected.
In one place the direction was incorrectly indicated; in another the leader
came late, having misread the instructions; in a third they had to wait for a
rescuing armored car. To call out the military units, unite them with the
Red Guards, occupy the fighting positions, make sure of communications
among them all and with headquarters- -all this demanded a good many hours
more than had been imagined by the leaders quarrelling over their map in
Petrograd."
(Trotsky, III, 248)
The Palace could quite easily have been taken on the night of the 7th or on the morning of the
8th, Trotsky believes. Until the afternoon of the 8th the Palace had almost no forces at hand,
and the question of a defending staff was in poor state. It managed to get a few small detach-
ments of students, Cossacks, and women during the afternoon.
"In the Military Revolutionary Committee, in spite of everything, the military
resources of the government, and particularly the defenses of the Winter Palace,
were overestimated. And even had the direct leaders of the siege known
the inner forces of the palace, they might still have feared the arrival of rein-
forcements at the first alarm: junkers, Cossacks, shock-battal ions. The plan
for capturing the palace was worked out in the style of a large operation. When
civil and semi-civil people undertake the solution of a purely military problem,
they are always inclined to excessive strategic ingenuities. And along with their
superfluous pedantry, they cannot but prove extraordinarily helpless in carrying
them out
None of the planners, - Podvoisky, Antonov-Ovseenko, Chudnovsky--had more than a rudi-
mentary knowledge of military planning.
"No one of them had an eye to detail, if only for the reason that no one of them
had ever learned the secrets of the trade. Feeling their own weakness in matters
of reconnoitering, communications, maneuvering, the Red martials felt obliged
to roll up against the Winter Palace such a superiority of forces as removed the
very possibility of practical leadership. An incongruous grandeur of plan is al-
most equivalent to no plan at all."
(Trotsky, III, 2991
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116. These were the forces of the defenders:
1 armored car
1 battalion of junkers from the engineering school
2 squadrons and 1 machine gun crew of the Cossack Uralsky Regiment
40 disabled veterans of the Cavaliers of St. George
1 shock company of the Women's Battalion
The Government had great difficulty in getting anyone to undertake to command the defense.
Defensive preparations were not even begun until noon of 8 November.
117. On the insurrectionary side, the Kronstadt sailors arrived early in the morning
with 2 cruisers and a destroyer. Five more war ships arrived later. The 5,000 sailors and
soldiers in the first contingent were to receive their orders from the staffs at the Fortress
of Peter and Paul and on the cruiser Aurora.
118. Finally, shortly after 6 P. M., the encirclement was complete and began contract-
ing around the Palace. Armored cars moved into the square in front of the Palace. The de-
fenders had set up machine guns behind piles of firewood. Firing began.
119. The MRC Commissar at the artillery school put pressure on the commandant,
who recalled the artillery students from the defense of the Palace. They took four of their
six guns with them. They were disarmed and taken into custody by a patrol and armored car
from a Bolshevik regiment. The Reds set up two of the captured guns in position to fire on
the Palace.
The Cossack Uralsky Regiment recalled its two squadrons from the defense of the
Palace in the evening. The Women's shock company undertook a "hysterical" sortie, which
ended in the majority of them being captured by the revolutionaries. The defending force fell
from a maximum of 2,000 to about 1,000-- perhaps less.
Bolshevik agitators infiltrated the Palace through obscure and unguarded entrances in
increasing numbers. They spread rumors calculated to demoralize the besieged inmates.
It had been planned to raise a lantern on the flagpole of the Peter and Paul fortress
when the encirclement was complete. This would be the signal for the Aurora to fire a blank
volley. If this failed to frighten the Palace into submission, real shells, in increasing caliber,
were to be fired by the Fortress and the Aurora. There was trouble finding a lantern, then in
getting it up the flagpole where it could be seen. The cannon on the Fortress was rusty. Field
pieces had to be mounted on the walls. Then the gunners, from the politically shaky artillery
company, began to make excuses. Reliable naval gunners were finally sent for. The signal
was given and the Aurora began firing blanks.
120. At last, by sheer weight of numbers and lack of opposition, the attackers swarmed
into the Palace. The Government, discovered inside, was arrested at 2:10 A. M., 9 November.
I. OPERATIONS IN MOSCOW.
121. The uprising in Moscow also began on 7 November, but took several days to com-
plete, and resulted in considerable bloodshed. The Party displayed a number of organizational
and tactical weaknesses. The main difficulties were these:
a. The City Bolshevik Organization had failed to make adequate technical pre-
parations. Staffs were not set up far enough in advance of the insurrection.
b. The Party was unable to exercise the complete control that it did in Petro-
grad: the Workers' soviet and the Soldiers' soviet were two different bodies; the
Party did not have adequate organizational machinery to control the soldiers of
the Moscow garrison; furthermore, the garrison had not been so Bolshevik as it
was in the capital (the garrison troops consisted of a more or less permanent
complement and transient units that didn't stay long enough to be fully won over).
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THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION OF 1935 IN BRAZIL
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
THE INSURRECTION
REASONS FOR FAILURE
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THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION OF 1935 IN BRAZIL
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
1. Even though the Communist Revolution of November 1935 in Brazil failed in its
earliest stages, it is a valuable case study of Communist revolutionary methods. It will be
seen in this study that many of the elements for a successful revolution were present; how-
ever, the revolt suffered most from inadequate organization and coordination.
2. The leaders of the revolution based their plans on their (unfounded) conviction that
the country was ripe for a revolution rather than on an objective analysis of the organizational
strength and capabilities of the CP Brazil. They_ had successfully established Party organiza-
tions in the armed forces; they had gained some control over labor organizations in Rio;
they had established a new mass (front) organization through which they hoped to gain support
for the insurrection. Nevertheless, CP Brazil succeeded only in unleashing several uncoor-
dinated insurrectionary outbreaks within the establishments of the armed forces which were
quickly suppressed; it was not strong enough to throw labor into the fight, and could not en-
list popular support. The leaders of the revolution had apparently estimated that the "revo-
lutionary situation" would work in their favor; they assumed that their isolated insurrection-
ary acts would build up into a general revolution. Their erroneous estimates defeated the
revolution.
3. In March of 1935 the Brazilian Communist Party emerged from many years of
illegality by setting up a front organization called the "Alianca National Libertadora" (ANL
-- National Liberating Alliance), which comprised a variety of groups close to the CP pro-
gram.1 At about the same time, four important Communist leaders arrived in Brazil. They
were "Harry Berger," the alias of the German Communist Ewert, an official representative
of the Comintern; Rudolpho Ghioldi, Secretary General of the Argentine Communist Party;
Leon Vallee, a financial agent of the Comintern; and Luiz Carlos Prestes, acknowledged
leader of the Brazilian Communist Party. Prestes had left Brazil in the early thirties, and
it is believed that he had been in the Soviet Union up to this time, although he travelled on a
Portuguese passport which had been visaed in the United States and in Argentina.
4. Until the arrival of these four individuals, the policies of the Brazilian Communist
Party and the ANL had been directed by a Secretariat comprising four local Communists.
With the arrival of Berger, Ghioldi, Vallee and Prestes the Secretariat accepted their supe-
riority and from that time the Secretariat submitted to their direction. The four individuals
who directed the Revolution arrived in Brazil within two months of each other. This suggests
that the decision to prepare for and to begin the 1935 Revolution was made outside of Brazil,
most likely by the Comintern.
5. From the few detailed accounts of the Revolution, a skeleton of the Communist
plans and preparations can be reconstructed. Enough information is not available to access
with accuracy the relative strength of the Communists in labor, the military or the rural
areas.
a. Apparently the Communist leaders had estimated that a revolutionary situation
existed in Brazil. According to their estimate, therefore, the regime's position was
steadily deteriorating and eventually conditions would favor the Communists. In that
case, close timing of action in the widely scattered areas of Brazil was not necessary.
If the first attempts failed, they would, nevertheless, hasten the development of the
revolutionary situation, generating, as it were, other outbreaks. This is probably
why little dispair was displayed among the Communists when the 1935 insurrectionary
attempts were put down. They believed the Party would ultimately and inevitably be
successful.
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b. The overestimation of the revolutionary situation is further expressed in a docu-
ment prepared by "Harry Berger" several months before the outbreak of the insur-
rection and after the ANL was outlawed. The document "Tactical Objectives" states,
in generalized fashion, major objectives for CP Brazil to be accomplished in actual
preparation for the revolution. These ambitious plans contrast sharply with the
actual capabilities of CP Brazil as displayed in November 1935. They postulate:
9) that CP Brazil must continue to build up the (now illegal) ANL as a pres-
sure and propaganda instrument, under the slogan "All Power to the ANL."
(Note the similarity to the slogan "All Power to the Soviets." employed by the
Bolsheviks in 1917)
2) that CP Brazil must create "a national revolutionary people's government
with Prestes at the helm." To this effect it must
a) organize mass strikes
b) agitate among the "petty bourgeoisie" to create dissatisfaction with
high prices and wages.
c) agitate among the peasants to create dissatisfaction with economic
conditions
d) create and support armed partisan groups among the peasants
e) strengthen its subversive organization within the armed forces
f) create "self defense" organizations against the police
g) increase the organizational strength of CP Brazil
h) exploit and create cleavages among the opposing political parties
i) increase general agitation (meetings, demonstrations)
This ambitious program clearly was not realized. It was beyond the strength
of CP Brazil.
c. The Communist strength was centered in three cities: Rio de Janeiro, Recife, and
Natal. References are made to an attempt to organize guerrilla activities in Mato
Grosso and Minas Gerais. Whether this had any success is not known. There is no
record of guerrilla activities figuring in the revolution.
d. The Communist organization within labor groups in Rio seems to have been fairly
strong. There was a series of political strikes prior to the attempted insurrections.
These were to culminate in a general strike to be coordinated with the revolts in the
military units outside Rio. The general strike did not materialize.
e. The Communists probably intended the revolts in the military units outside Rio to
spark the insurrection. As far as can be determined the Communist organization of
military units was spotty, although it appears to have been more effective than Com-
munist efforts to mobilize labor and guerrilla groups. The revolts in the military
were effectively put down in a few hours.
THE INSURRECTION
6. On the night of 25 November 1935, a little more than 24 hours before the insurrec-
tion was begun in the military units near Rio, a meeting was held in a private residence in
Rio, attended by Berger, Prestes and Antonio Bonfim, Secretary of the Communist Party of
Brazil. Plans were formulated for the outbreak of the revolt among the military units on the
27th of the month. To support the revolt in the military, Bonfim declared that, while he could
not offer an armed mob. he could call for a work ctnnnncrP to rninriric nii+h +hn iQ+n .>f +h-
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Five days earlier, on the 22nd, the military forces in Natal in Rio Grande do Norte and Recife
in Pernambuco staged insurrections. After a 24-hour battle with the military police, the
revolutionists in Natal succeeded in setting up a revolutionary government. They retained
control for four days. No strategic occupation occurred in Recife and eventually the police
forced the insurrectionists of both cities inland. Support for these movements was supposed
to come from Rio. However, the revolution in Rio was not begun until five days after the
insurrections were attempted in the Northeast, and one day after both of them had been ef-
fectively suppressed. The effect of the insurrections in the Northeast was to alert the gov-
ernment authorities for similar Communist action in Rio. When the revolt began in Rio be-
tween 2:30 and 3:00 on the morning of 27 November, both the military bases where major
action occurred were in a state of alert.
8. The majority of the officers of the 3rd Infantry Regiment located just outside of
Rio supported the Communist revolt. The Communists had not succeeded in subverting the
command of two companies and one battalion of the regiment and had considered that it was
not necessary to recruit the men; the subverted officers would lead them. The Communists
led by Agildo Barata, succeeded (although not until four hours after the revolt started) in
arresting the non-Communist officers and placed them in a building which they intended to
blow up, officers included. They were prevented from carrying out their plans by the inter-
vention of outside forces.
9. The revolt flared at about the same moment at the School of Military Aviation. The
Communists had planned that the revolt here should be accomplished quickly. The airplanes
were then to be used as psychological and military support for insurrections in other military
units. In the Aviation School, unlike the 3rd Infantry Regiment, both officers and men had
been recruited by the Communists and organized into cell units.. The failure of the revolt at
the Aviation school was largely due to the quick action of the Commander of the school, who,
upon witnessing the first stages of the revolt, went for help to a nearby military unit and
returned with a force which succeeded in subduing the Communists.
10. Simultaneously other revolts flared in military units around Rio, but all of these
were on a smaller scale than the above two, and were put down within a short time.
11. Even after these attempts at insurrection failed, the Communists continued to
plan for a revolution up until the time the leadership was arrested by the Brazilian police
months later. Prestes in a letter to a member of the Brazilian CP Secretariat, 19 February
1936, wrote, `"We are preparing many new elements who actually are passive and only belong
to the popular fronts but who may be able to take over positions (after the revolution) if they
are really men of prestige and are willing to defend the Popular Government and its program."
REASONS FOR FAILURE
12. There were several reasons for the failure of the Revolution of 1935:
a. The element of surprise was missing. It is not clear why a Communist revolt was
begun in the Northeast four days before an attempt was made in Rio. Certainly, once
news had spread that a revolution was occurring in the Northeast a revolt should have
been ordered in Rio at once. Prestes, however, was probably convinced that timing
was of little consequence; that the revolutionary situation would develop gradually
and inevitably, aided by small uprisings such as these. It is interesting that on the
27th of November (the morning the revolts broke out in the military units) an extra
edition of A Manha, a Communist paper, appeared on the streets of Rio calling for
readiness of the forces of revolution but stating that "the day and hour will be set
later." This article was signed by Prestes.
b. There was insufficient preparation. Clearly, the quick victory was not a sure thing
in either of the two military units where large revolts occurred. In both cases, the
loyal troops held out long enough for reinforcements to arrive. The haphazardness of
the preparation is indicated by nnA rennrt whinh o+o+mo +i.,+ -- +ti.,, -- _r ~L_ nni,_
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unprepared for the revolt in the military establishments, according to police reports.
There had been a series of strikes of nearly all the laboring classes prior to the
revolution (e.g., a stevedore strike on the 20th of November in Antonia and Paranagua)
but on the day of the revolution the strikes failed. One organizer in the maritime
workers, Jose Medina Filho, who was a member of the Central Committee, wrote to
the Party after the revolution: ". . . I have failed. Politically I was not capable of
carrying out the tasks assigned to me. I was responsible for the strike in the mari-
time workers, and I thought they would go on strike, but this did not happen, and it
was a great defeat..."
c. The police were neither demoralized nor subverted. They ruthlessly suppressed
any mass agitation in Rio on the 27th of November. According to police records,
"there was talk of a strike at the Light Company, accompanied by sabotage of their
various services of transportation, light, telephones, etc; of another on the railroads;
of a strike among the bakers; stevedores; and, in the end, a general strike of all
labor. If this had happened, the luck of the government would have been very low."
d. The leadership of the revolution were persons who, for the most part, were not
familiar with Brazil and while in Brazil they isolated themselves from the Brazilian
CP. Three of the four top leaders of the revolution were not Brazilians. Prestes,
the only Brazilian among them, had been out of the country for a number of years.
Prestes, in the main, confined his. contacts to this group.
e. An official Communist account of the insurrection by G. (probably Ghioldi), "The
National Revolutionary Uprising in Brazil" in Inprecorr, the Comintern publication,
attributes the failure to an "over-estimation of the forces still at the disposal of
their opponents, in the capital."
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SOVIET PARTISANS DURING WORLD WAR II
A. Introduction
B. Organization
Pre-war Plans
Initial Partisan Organization
Composition of the Central Staff of the Partisan. Movement
Direction of the Partisan Movement
Tactical Organization
Disposition
Recruits
C. Operations
Attacks, Ambushes, Demolitions
Partisan Psychological Warfare
Military Effect of Partisan Operations
Economic Effect
Partisan Intelligence
Communications
D. Support
Supplies
Soviet Air-lift
E. The German Failure.
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SOVIET PARTISANS DURING WORLD WAR II
A. INTRODUCTION.
1. The best developed and most ambitious Communist resistance organization was
created in the USSR during the German occupation of 1941-1945. The Partisan Movement, as
it was called, took full advantage of all available organizational opportunities, political and
military developments, and geographical and climatic phenomena. The whole network of the
CP, and of the governmental and economic bureaucracy in areas overrun by the Germans,
was utilized to initiate the formation of a resistance organization. CP and Komsomol members
and agents of the civil and. military apparatus were left behind the retreating Red Army to
organize fighting, sabotage, intelligence, and propaganda teams. The Partisans received
substantial material support from the Soviet Government.
2. These organizers took maximum advantage of weaknesses in German policy and
administration of occupied areas and of the bogging down of German armies at Stalingrad to
enlist popular support and participation in the resistance.
3. The invaders, needing all possible military strength at the front, were unable to
occupy and police more than the main communications lines and centers. Large interstitial
areas were left to the Partisans largely by default. Here, in forests and swamps, they built
up safe bases, from which they carried on the various types of resistance operations, and
from which they gradually extended their control over surrounding villages and towns.
4. The Russian and Ukranian people were used to living outdoors and adapted them-
selves easily to conditions in Partisan camps. If at first, particularly in the Ukraine, they
welcomed the Germans enthusiastically, they soon learned to hate them, and joined the Parti-
san Movement in increasing numbers. Even Ukrainian nationalist guerrilla bands that opera-
ted against the Germans managed to avoid clashes with Soviet Partisans for the most part.
5. The size of the Partisan Movement is impossible to estimate. Estimates have
ranged from 100,000 to 600,000. According to German statistics, about 60% of all the Parti-
sans in large units were in Byelorussia and neighboring areas as of 1 May 1943. The Parti-
san Movement in the Ukraine was smaller and seems to have been largely dependent upon the
initiative of the concentrations in Byelorussia. Partisans were also strong in the Crimea.
6. Partisan groups were small at first. Large tactical units -- brigades and divi-
sions -- were built up gradually. A comprehensive communications net linked the Partisan
units together and to military and political direction centers in unoccupied Soviet areas.
7. Partisan activity was a constant and exhausting threat to the Germans and their
allies. Partisan units seldom attacked German military forces or installations, but they seri-
ously hampered German civil administration, military supply and communications, and the
local food production. Thousands of German and allied troops were tied down to guarding rail
and supply dumps, and to chasing elusive Partisan saboteurs and guerrillas. The Partisan
Movement contributed substantially to the flow of military and political intelligence to Soviet
authorities. When the Red Army began pushing the Germans back, Partisan units not only
helped to disorganize the German retreat, but also undertook military operations directly, in
cooperation with the Red Army. As the Germans fell back, Partisan units were integrated
into the Red Army.
B. ORGANIZATION.
8. Pre-War Plans. The Partisan Movement was the result of a combination of care-
ful advance planning and the fortunes of war. A "Partisan Directive", about which no details
are known, is said to have been issued in 1933. A considerable knowledge of guerrilla war-
fare was available tothe Soviets from their experience in the Civil War of 1917-1920, and
from the experiences of the Chinese Revolution and the Spanish Civil War. General Staff
Academy exercises in Byelorussia in 1940 included the use of partisans in a defensive situ-
ation. A few weeks prior to the German attack of 22 June 1941, a program of instruction in
guerrilla methods of fighting was begun for selected groups of Komsomols, Pioneers, and re-
liable non-Party youths in the Western USSR. Apparently, it was intended to expand this pro-
gram considerably; however, the German attack came before it was. expected, and the project
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was caught short. Nevertheless, the fact that the first Partisan bands received effective
training very soon after the fighting had begun indicated that at least large numbers of instruc-
tors had been trained.
9. Initial Partisan Organization. The earliest groups, which began to appear in late
June 1941, consisted largely of Red Army stragglers and units that had been cut off by the
German blitz. Thus, the Commander of a Red Army Corps is reported to have assembled his
staff, commanders, and selected platoons after retreating across the Niemen, to have distri-
buted machine guns and small arms to them, and to have given them the following orders:
"The Army Corps has been cut off. No one of this group must be captured alive.
Therefore, we must strive to attain the following objectives: (1) a breakthrough
of the German lines; (2) if the breakthrough is unsuccessful, ruthless partisan
warfare must be undertaken."
10. In a speech on 3 July 1941, Stalin gave the general order for the formation of
partisan units:
"In areas occupied by the enemy, partisan units, mounted and unmounted, must be
formed, and diversion groups created for the purpose of combating formations of
the enemy army, for carrying on partisan warfare everywhere, blowing up bridges
and roads, damaging telephone and telegraph communications, and setting fire to
woods, dumps, and transports. Unbearable conditions must be created for the
enemy and for all who help him in the occupied areas. They must be hunted fown
and exterminated at every step, and all their efforts must be frustrated."
11. A document captured by the Germans and dated 13 or 14 July 1941, reported that
the Political Administration of the Northwestern Army Front had established a "special de-
partment .... for the direction of partisan movements in the rear of the enemy ....." --
"It handles all work on organization, armament, and leadership of partisan groups.
the department maintains constant contact with local party organs and partisan
groups ..... The Political Administration of the Army Front has sent fifty-two
political workers who are to organize and lead the partisan movement and the
work in the rear of the enemy.
"On July 13, 1941, twenty-two partisan groups were formed in the areas of the
Northwestern Front. These groups are led by Communists, chiefly political
workers from the active ranks of the Red Army.
"Political workers from local organizations or leaders of collective farms also
served as active group leaders. All group leaders were thoroughly instructed.
Principally, a group has a strength of fifty to eighty men and is subdivided into
five or six divisions."
12. Partisan bands were also organized by local CP cadres and NKVD (People's Com-
missariat of the Interior) personnel who had been left behind the Soviet retreat for the purpose.
The 1st Section of the 4th Department of the GUGB/NKVD (Main Administration for State secu-
rity/Commissariat of the Interior) began preparing for partisan organization before June.
The Regional NKVD organizations vetted and trained selected CP and reliable non-Party peo-
ple to undertake the organization of partisan units under the authority of Regional CP Commit-
tees.
13. The expansion of the Partisan Movement by the summer of 1942 was recognized by
the creation of a unified staff. The Central Staff of the Partisan Movement (hereafter abbre-
viated as CSPM) was set up in Moscow under Marshal Vbroshilov. (He was later succeeded
by Ponomarenko, and then, by Machulsky). It drew together the many partisan units that had
been formed by Red Army, CP, and NKVD organizers.
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14. Composition of the CSPM. According to German Army Intelligence, the CSPM
had a headquarters consisting of 13 officers - -
Commander -in-Chief (Voroshilov)
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
Chief Personnel Officer
Deputy Personnel Officer
Chief Transport Officer
Communications Officer
(others, positions unknown)
The Headquarters had 7 service sections --
Section 1: Operations
2: Intelligence
3: Communications
4: Personnel, Organization
5: Supply
6: Cryptographic
7: Records and Miscellaneous
15. Regional Partisan Staffs, with similar organization, were established in various
theaters --
Balkans
Ukraine
Hungary
Slovakia
Poland
Lithuania
16. Direction of the Partisan Movement. (See Chart). The CSPM was responsible to
the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO). It worked closely with the Red Army and the
NKVD and was, of course, controlled by the CPSU. Partisan tactical units were closely linked
to underground committees of the CPSU and to nearby Red Army commands. Partisan leaders
in a locality were also members of the CP organ; the leader of the Partisan Movement in any
given area was also a member of the Red Army staff in that area. Partisan staffs in Soviet-
held areas ensured cooperation of Partisan tactical units in German areas with Red Army
generally, and with a particular Red Army staff for specific joint operations. When commu-
nications across the battle line were broken, Partisan units received instructions from the
Secretary of the local underground CP Committee.
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17. Such multiplicity of control channels is typical of Communist, and particularly, of
Soviet-Communist organization. It was probably not nearly so complex or confusing as it
appears to an outsider. Functionaries accustomed to Soviet bureaucracy were, in all likeli-
hood, quite sure of their places and of the authority of others. In the main, control was exer-
cised on a functional division of labor: the command channels of the Partisan organization
served to pass over-all supervision, general tactical missions, and services administration
(i.e., communications, supply, etc.); NKVD and NKGB channels served for their respective
agents involved in the Partisan organization and ensured the cooperation of Partisan units in
intelligence and counterintelligence missions on call; the CP itself was represented in Parti-
san units and staffs as commissars and political instructors, while local CP functionaries in
the area of Partisan operations undoubtedly exercised considerable influence in the selection
of targets for tactical missions and in political questions involving Partisan units. Organi-
zational competence aside, control of a particular Partisan formation was also subject to
local conditions - - personality of leaders, communications conditions, etc. In the early stages,
the Partisans were closely tied to local CP functionaries. They later established a consider-
able autonomy of their own with the establishment of central control under the CSPM. Finally,
with the Soviet counteroffensive of 1943, they were increasingly subject to Red Army staffs.
18. Tactical Organization. The small groups formed in the first days of the German
occupation were gradually expanded. Some loose "unions" of Partisans were organized as
early as the summer of 1942. Such a "union" was formed in the Bryansk area of more than
80 individual bands in June. It did not function as a tactical unit. It had a headquarters which
received reports from the member groups and relayed them by radio to Soviet territory.
Integration was accelerated with the establishment of wide communications by the spring of
1943. Brigades were organized with strength varying from 400 to 3,000. Brigades had their
own staffs and service elements. Some brigades had special weapons groups, including light
artillery, anti-tank guns, and even tanks. Under the brigade were smaller units, sometimes
called battalions, each of which consisted of several detachments. A "typical" brigade had
4 to 6 battalions, plus special units. A battalion consisted of 3 - 7 detachments, of 75 - 100
persons each. Partisan "divisions" were reported, but the brigade was normally the largest
tactical unit.
19. Disposition. The Germans estimated that, in the spring of 1943, there were about
45 brigades and more than 50 smaller units in Byelorussia, the most heavily infested area.
In the sector of the German Army Group Center (Byelorussia and Northern Ukraine),
the Germans estimated that there were between 55,000 and 75,000 Partisans in large groups
in the period between 1 March and 1 May. The Partisan Movement in this area was particu-
larly favored by the fact that the population was generally loyal and that extensive swamps and
forests made excellent cover for Partisan concentrations and movements.
The Partisan Movement in the Ukraine was smaller and was partly the product of arti-
ficial respiration. It was fostered for quite some time by the main concentration in the north.
The population of the southern Ukraine was intensely nationalistic and supported a number of
guerrilla bands that were both anti-German and anti-Soviet. Had they followed a policy of
"liberation" and cultivated the Ukrainians, the Germans might have stimulated general support
in this area. Instead, they followed exactly the same mistaken policy of conquest and exploi-
tation that they had pursued in 1918, thus alienating great potential support. Increasing
members of Ukrainians joined the Soviet Partisan Movement, and the anti-Soviet, nationalist
partisans avoided hostilities with the Soviet Partisans as much as possible. Soviet Partisan
strength in the Ukraine varied in the period 1 March - 15 May 1943 from a low of 8,500 (15
(15 April) to a high of 18,000 (15 May)
20. Recruits. Initial cadres of the Partisan Movement were depleted by heavy casual-
ties and re-assignment to duty in Soviet areas. When the air-lift (see below, para. 46) was
established, replacements were flown in. Additional Partisans were recruited from the gen-
eral population -- people whose homes had been destroyed or who had been uprooted by other
circumstances of war and foreign occupation. Work and. police units formed by the Germans
were infiltrated by Soviet agents and many of their members subverted. Individually and,
sometimes, in whole units, many of these people went over to the Partisans. In areas control-
led by the Partisans, some civilians were forcibly recruited.
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Teen-agers, boys and girls, were recruited to a remarkable extent. Underground
Communist youth organizations were responsible for such recruiting. Large numbers of
youths were recruited in Soviet areas nand flown into Partisan areas. They were generally
used as couriers and scouts.
C. OPERATIONS.
21. Red Army Field Regulations dated 1944 contain a section on Partisans in which
their "primary objectives" are set forth --
"a. Destruction of garrisons, headquarters, enemy units, individual officers and
men, sentries at depots, installations, convoys, foragers, and unit and individual
food collectors;
b. Destruction of enemy lines of communication (destruction of bridges, rail
lines, and trains, attacks on motor and animal drawn convoys), destruction of
personnel convoys, technical equipment, fuel and ammunition; interfering with the
enemy's attempt to supply his front or his efforts to evacuate plundered goods;
c. Destruction of ordnance, fuel, ration and other depots and bases; destruction
of motor pools and repair shops;
d. Destruction of signal lines of communication-on railroads, highways and
roads (telephone, telegraph and radio), destruction of signal centers and signal
personnel;
e. Attack on airfields, destruction of planes, hangars, bombs, and fuel supplies,
annihilation of flying and technical personnel and guard units;
f . Annihilation or capture of political leaders, generals, key civilian employees
of the enemy and traitors to our country who are in the service of the enemy;
g. Destruction and burning of electric plants, engines (boilers), water systems,
production installations and other objectives of military economic value;
h. Keeping Red Army units informed of the size and movement of the enemy."
22. Attacks, ambushes, demolitions. Operations against the targets outlined above
were characterized by thorough reconnaissance and planning, surprise and deception, rapid
maneuver, use of night cover for movement and attack, and special attention to a ready and
secure route of withdrawal, To be fully effective, such technique necessitated the general use
of rather small units (squads, detachments). As the Field Regulations say, "the size of the
unit will vary with the situation and terrain. If too large it will interfere with mobility and be
readily detectable and difficult to handle. New detachments should be formed where the influx
of volunteers becomes heavy."
23. The Field Service Regulations laid down the following general principles f or attacks
on communications centers:
a. "In organizing the attack the group is divided into three basic groups: combat
group, which removes silently the sentries and destroys the communication
center; the demolition group, which destroys the main objectives; and the re-
serve.."
b. "Destruction of railroad stations must be planned in adhh-arse by the commander
of the detachment who must indicate:
(1) Sections of the station to be attacked;
(2) Composition of the demolition group for each section and the objective of
(3)
the attack;
Location of explosives and other demolition equipment;
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(4) The amount of explosives to be used and points to be mined; phases of
action and the signal for the detonation;
(5) Time of completion, location of the group during the operation, time of
and area for assembly.
When a station is captured, groups are sent out to either side for a distance of
3 kms to destroy rail lines and signal communication lines."
Ambushes of trains comprised (a) wrecking a section of the track or erecting a barri-
cade so that the train was forced to stop at the point of ambush; (b) placing ambush forces so
that main body was opposite the center of the halted train and automatic weapons were at the
end, for maximum enfilading fire.
In addition to stations, railroads were interrupted by attacks on "bridges, culverts,
blocks, switches, frogs, water supply systems, pumps, and turntables."
Principles were also outlined for attacks on other target installations in the Field
Service Regulations.
24. Instructions in techniques of guerrilla fighting, self-defense demolitions, recon-
naissance, bivouac and field expedients, use of Soviet and enemy weapons, etc, were given in a
manual published in 1942 called "The Partisans Handbook." Partisan newspapers also carried
stories of actual operations for the guidance of other Partisan units, and series of articles on
techniques, tactics, use of arms, etc.
25. Partisan psychological warfare. The Partisans carried on extensive and effective
propaganda against the Germans. The following methods were used, with assistance from
local underground organizations of the Communist Party:
a. literature produced by Partisan units and local Party organizations;
b. mass meetings and entertainments (motion pictures, dancing and singing
groups) held for villagers;
c. spreading of rumors;
d. military operations to discourage -collaboration with the Germans and en-
courage sympathy for the Partisan cause.
Some Partisan attack;:? were deliberately made to provoke German countermeasures and there-
by demonstrate the Partisan propaganda about German brutality. Partisans disguised as oc-
cupation troops sometimes made attacks and excessive food levies on the people in order to
generate popular hostility towards the Germans.
Partisan bands terrorised collaborators and, on the other hand, assisted civilians who
had been harshly treated by the Germans.
The dominant theme in Partisan propaganda was patriotism. Communist doctrine was
deliberately played down. The object of the Partisans was to cause as much trouble for the
Germans as possible. Consequently, the propaganda effort was aimed at stimulating hatred
for the invaders and in the inevitability of their defeat.
All Partisan staffs had special propaganda units attached to them a nd writers were
trained by the Central Staff for duty with lower Partisan Staffs and formations.
Specially designed, mobile print-shops were operated by underground Party organi-
zations and Partisan units.
26. Military Effect of Partisan Operations. Partisan operations were very important
in the defeat of the Germans. The failure of the German attack towards Kursk in July 1943
has been called by Major General I.F.C. Fuller "as disastrous to the Germans as had been
their defeat at Stalingrad." It was made possible largely by the fact that Partisans wrecked
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the railroad and wire communications system behind German lines and created what the
German themselves admitted was a "crucial danger, both for supply and troop movements of
all sorts."
In May 1943, for example, the Germans recorded 765 partisan attacks with these con-
sequences: traffic completely interrupted on the damaged rail lines for 3,853 hours, and re-
duced to single track operation for 2,132 hours; 255 locomotives damaged, 123 of them seri-
ously.
27. In addition to the difficulties caused German supply and troop movements, Parti-
san operations had the following effects as well:
a. weakened German morale: troops made very uneasy,
b. disrupted the complex precision of the German military machine,
c. tied combat and reserve troops down to militarily useless work policing and
protecting.
d. encouraged civil disobedience and passive non-cooperation on the part of
civilians.
28. The extent to which Partisan operations tied down occupation forces to protection
duties in rear areas presented a serious military problem. The High Command of the Ger-
man Army Group Center estimated in November 1943 that it would require about 75,000
troops to effect "minimum security" on the highways and railroads in that sector alone. Such
forces could not be spared.
During the summer of 1943, it has been estimated that the Germans were able to pre-
vent only about half of the total number of attacks attempted on the railroads.
29. Economic Effect. The effect of Partisan operations on the civil economy was
serious. Of 967 state farms operated for the Germans in 1942, over 600 passed into Partisan
hands in 1943. Grain and other collections, quotas for which had already set very low, were
reduced by as much as 60% (grain) to 30% (fats). Deliveries per acre of farm land declined
by 74% owing to Partisan activity. The fact that German collections, reduced as they were,
were forcibly made even after the reductions caused by Partisan operations, served further
to fan popular resentment against the Germans.
30. Partisan Intelligence. The Partisan Movement produced valuable tactical and
strategic intelligence and counterintelligence for the Soviets. Partisan units organized nets
of informants in villages and towns and transmitted the information received to higher Parti-
san headquarters, where it was processed and forwarded to the CSPM and Red Army Intel-
ligence. Partisans also operated reconnaissance teams.
31. On the basis of agents identified by the Germans during the winter of 1942-1943,
the Soviet intelligence commitment on one Front was apportioned as follows:
Partisans
38%
NKGB
15%
Red Army and Navy
35%
These figures probably reflect more on the caliber of the agents used--the ability of profes-
sional agents to avoid detection and arrest--rather than the actual relative proportions of in-
telligence operations carried out by the different agencies. They indicate, however, that the
Partisans were very active in this field.
32. The Partisans also assisted agents sent behind German lines by other Soviet in-
telligence agencies. Agents and agent groups were usually landed by plane or parachute in
Partisan-held areas, or made their way across the lines and obtained Partisan hospitality and
protection.
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33. The organization of Partisan intelligence was similar to that of the Red Army.
(See chart.) An Intelligence Administration (RU) existed at the headquarters of the CSPM.
It worked closely with the RU of the Red Army and the Counterintelligence Section (00) of the
NKGB (Commissariat for State Security).
Intelligence sections (RO's) of Red Army Front Staffs at first harbored special Parti-
san sections which established liaison for intelligence between the Red Army and the Parti-
san formations. Later, Regional Partisan Staffs established their own RO's, and counter-
intelligence sections (00's/NKGB) were also attached to each Partisan Staff. The Partisan
sections of the Red Army RO's were then dissolved.
34. The RO of a Partisan Staff was under the 2nd Assistant Chief of (the Partisan)
Staff, but he was guided by the RO of the Red Army Front Staff.
35. In a Partisan Brigade, the Assistant Commander was in charge of intelligence
produced by reconnaissance teams and agent-informant nets.
Agent nets were developed and their product was forwarded as follows: Liaison agents
collected information from individual agents who had penetrated German administrative offices
etc., and from "resident agents" (usually CP members and candidates) who collected from
their own informant nets. Reports were delivered to the intelligence section (presumably,
the RO) of the nearest Partisan unit. The latter sent them by radio or courier to the Brigade
RO, which transmitted them by radio to the Partisan RO on the Red Army Front Staff ! across
the lines. They then went up the lines to the RU/CSPM and/or to the RU/Red Army. The
NKVD and NKGB furnished instructors and agents to Partisan units.
36. Counterintelligence. Partisans were particularly valuable for identifying and
neutralizing German agents and informants. Counterintelligence was handled by special
.sections of the NKVD (00's/NKVD; later, 00's/NKGB) which were attached to each Partisan
Staff down to Brigade headquarters. Representatives ("plenipotentiaries") of the Brigade
OO/NKGB were attached to smaller tactical units of the Brigade.
These persons were responsible for --
a. maintaining discipline and order in Partisan units,
b. detecting and excluding spies and traitors,
c. supervising radio security,
d. establishing propaganda organs.
37. German offices were penetrated to detect agents before they were sent into Soviet
territory. Partisan intelligence obtained names of Soviet agents who had been captured by the
Germans, and lists were forwarded through channels to the 1st Special Section of the NKGB at
Moscow, which kept records on the German Intelligence, its agents, and suspicious persons.
Such information was useful when the Germans turned the Soviet agents or tried to play them
back with fake reports.
38. Blacklists were also compiled of collaborators against the day of Soviet victory.
39. Partisan units were sometimes able to locate secret German intelligence instal-
lations (offices and camps). At least one of these was later attacked by a Partisan unit with
considerable damage to the Germans.
40. In general, Partisan intelligence agents were sent on minor intelligence or sabo-
tage missions, and, since they were already in German-held territory, they usually didn't
have to go far from their bases. Some agents, however, were dispatched from Partisan Staffs
at Army headquarters in Soviet territory. An "Agent Commitment Map" compiled by German
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Intelligence for July 1943, for example, shows the following identified Partisan missions sent
from across the battle line:
a. Partisan Headquarters with Leningrad Army Group: sent 32 agents by plane
which landed at an airport in a Partisan area, 12 March.
b. Partisan Headquarters with the Red Army Group Headquarters in the Volkhov-
Khvionaya area dropped a group of 58 agents by parachute, 28 July - 1 Aug 1943.
c. Partisan Headquarters at Valdai sent out the following:
(1) Group of 9, with radio, parachuted, 12 July.
(2) Group of 6, with radio, parachuted, 14 July.
(3) Group of 7, with radio, parachuted, 20 July.
(4) Group of 5 saboteurs, with radio, parachuted, 16 June.
(5) Single agent, with radio, parachuted (no date given).
41. Soviet intelligence operations against the Germans was successful, less because
of quality, than of the quantity, of agents employed, and also, because of the extensiveness of
the organizational net that produced intelligence in German areas -- underground CP, Parti-
sans, and professional intelligence services (Red Army, NKGB, NKVD). The volume of in-
telligence naturally increased with the growth of anti-German sentiment.
42. Communications. Communications between Partisan groups was at first limited
to couriers. Later, regular radio and wire communications were established. Transmitters
were captured from the Germans and were flown in across the lines.
43. Regular communications were established to the CSPM and to Red Army commands.
Encoded messages were sent by couriers, pigeons, dogs, radio, and plane.
D. SUPPORT.
44. The Partisan Movement was liberally supported by the Soviet Party-Government
from their own side of the line. It also received general popular support after the first few
months of German occupation.
45. Supplies. Some food stores were cached away in the forests before the Germans
moved in. The bulk of the food supply for the Partisans came from raids on civilian stores,
requisitioning and voluntary contribution, and gathering of harvests by Partisans themselves.
Raids on German military supply dumps were infrequent. Arms were obtained by capture and
salvage, and from raids. Some arms and ammunition were flown over German lines by the
Red Air Force.
46. Soviet air-lift. One of the most striking features of the support given by the
Soviets to the Partisan Movement was the extensive use made of air drops. Military leaders,
technicians, weapons, ammunition, medicine, radio equipment, propaganda and morale items,
and all sorts of technical equipment were brought to the Partisans by the Red Air Force.
Some Air Force units were specifically assigned air-lift missions as a continuing responsi-
bility.
Some loads were dropped by parachute. In some areas, the Partisans built air strips,
and even well-developed airports, where planes,, were landed.
In February 1943, the Germans reported a total of 600 supply flights; in the first part
of May, more than 2,000 in the single sector of the Germann_ Army Group Center. "This means,"
a report of the German General Staff stated, --
"an average of 20 supply flights daily in February, and in the first part of May an
average of 150 flights daily. This explains also the continued improvement in the
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equipment of the bandits, such as additional submachine guns, machine guns, light
and heavy mortars, and artillery. Up to now, due to inadequate armament, poor
leadership and insufficient manpower, the military value and fighting power of the
bandits were slight. Their activities were generally limited to sabotage and small-
scale attacks, but now, the possibility of a growing scale of attacks coordinated
with operations at the front must be foreseen. The employment of parachute and
air-borne units might be of particular importance in this case."
47. The effect of the air-lift on Partisan morale and tactical efficiency of Partisan
units was also considerable. Close personal contact was made between Partisan leaders in
the field and the Red Army. Inspection tours were made by higher commanders. Tactical
operations could be discussed on the spot and replacements sent in. The Partisans feltthem-
selves more a part of the "patriotic defense" once the air lift had been established. They
were able to send and receive letters from home. They received phonographs and records,
musical instruments, uniforms, and medals. Reporters and cameramen were flown in to re-
cord the Partisan struggle for Soviet newspapers. Printing equipment was flown in for Parti-
san newspapers. On one occasion, when the outstanding Partisan leader, Kovpak, was having
trouble with his teeth, a prominent dentist was flown in to make him a set of fine false teeth!
E. THE GERMAN FAILURE
The German failure in the USSR was due to a number of political failures, in addition
to the military defeat it suffered: patriotism, habits of obedience to old masters on the part
of the population, fear of Soviet vengeance, coercion, etc. One of the most important reason
for the German political failure was their inability to adopt and apply a consistent policy to-
wards the people. The people were caught between two fires: the Partisans hurt them and
forced them to cooperate; whereupon the Germans inaugurated a policy of "terror against
terror" in August :1941. They took brutal reprisals against whole villages where some indi-
viduals had been forced to help the Partisans. The Partisans also took reprisals against peo-
ple who --voluntarily or being coerced, it made no difference--helped the Germans.
No serious attempt was made by the Germans to cultivate popular sympathy, or even
to retain the sympathy of those who had originally welcomed them as deliverers from Soviet
oppression. There was a clash between German front commanders, who saw that the occu-
pation policy was a loss, and German leaders in Berlin, who believed firmly in ruthless mili-
tary suppression. Military requirements being what they were, the commanders in the field
could not spare the troops necessary for an effective mopping up operation in rear areas.
They were dictated a policy that was militarily impossible and were prevented from following
a policy that might have made military action unnecessary.
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ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET PARTISANS
DURING WORLD WAR II
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
CPSU
CENTRAL
L
COMMITTEE
KOMSOMOL
COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARS
COMMISSARIAT
FOR STATE SECURITY
(NKGB)
I
COMMISSARIAT
FOR DEFENSE
(NKO)
CENTRAL STAFF
PARTISAN MOVEMENT
RED ARMY
GENERAL STAFF
Staff Sections Staff Sections
Operations
Intelligence (RU) Intelligence (RU)
Communications
Personnel, Org.
Supply etc.
Cryptographic
Records & Misc.
SPECIAL CE
SECTION
(OO/NKGB)
REGIONAL PARTISAN
STAFF
L Staff Sections
including Intelligence
(RO)
OO/NKGB
Partisan Tactical Formations
1 Division
Brigade
Battalion 71
Detachment
RED ARMY
FRONT STAFF
Subordinate
Echelons, Red Army
Reconnaisance
Teams
CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
CP/REPUBLIC
L- KOMSOMOL
Subordinate
Echelons, CP
and Komsomol
RAION
SECRET/CONTROL U. S. Officials Only
GR1026 CIA, 10-51
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