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CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION PART TWO COMMUNIST PARTY MILITARY ORGANIZATION

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CREST
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General CIA Records
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CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3
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RIPPUB
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S
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197
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December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 21, 2012
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2
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REPORT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL / U. S. Officials Only SECURITY INFORMATION COMMUNISM Clandestine Communist Organization Part Two Communist Party Military Organization Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 1w. SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY 'urity Information Nate: This is an interim study. Statements herein should be considered in many places to be open to question and conclusions, to be tentative. Comments, criticisms, additions and suggestions are earnestly solicited. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 NOW N SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION PART TWO: COMMUNIST PARTY MILITARY ORGANIZATION CONTENTS I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY "Periods" of Communist Military Activity Types of Communist Military Effort Military Resistance Colonial Revolution City Insurrection Para. 8 -10 11 11 12 13 IL COMMUNIST COLONIAL UPRISINGS A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 15 - 29 Basis of the post-war insurrections 15 "Objective Conditions"' 16 Party Strength 17 Lessons of the Chinese Communist Revolution 18 The Safe-Base 19 Combination of Military and Political Action 20 General 'Role of Party Apparatus 21 "Phasing" of the Insurrection 22 Main Periods of the Insurrection 23 Period of the Military Defensive 24 Period of the Military Offensive 25 Adjustment of the Party to "Phasing" 26 Role of Party Underground 27 B. PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE 30 - 38 Ideal Features Compromise of ideal features Advantages of base on national frontier Effect of Communications Military utility Political utility The. "Liberation Government" Disadvantages of Safe-base C. THE POLICY DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION Who makes it Policy preliminaries Influence of CPSU and other CP's Evidence of 2 decisions Content of the decision Importance of the "Objective Situation" D. ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS , Necessity bor adjustment Time Lapse 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 40 41 42 43 44 45 47 48 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL / U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information Main Changes Decentralization Reassignment of Cadres Discipline and Security Purges Control Mechanism Qualifications for Jobs Underground Organization Removal of Headquarters to Safe Base New Organizations Created Other Organizations Strengthened Some Functions Dropped Emphasis on Schooling Communications System. Vulnerability 50 E. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY 51 - 66 Initial Recruits 51 Size and Structure of Regular Units 52 Regular and Irregular Forces 53 Conditions Affecting Size of Units 54 Special Units 55 Organization and Functions of Staffs: Development 56 General Staff 58 Role of the "Liberation Government" 59 Overlapping and Separation of Local and Military Organizations 60 Party Control 61 Political Commissar System 64 Party Organization in the Military Force 66 F. ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT 67 - 90 Necessity 67 Organization in Safe Base Area 68 Manpower 72 Intelligence 76 Communications 80 Supply 86 Armaments 88 III. THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION A. OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS 91 - 96 Aims Types of Resistance 91 93 B. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE 97 - 103 Party Reorientation Initial Forces 97 100 C. STAFFS 104 - 105 Origins Composition 104 105 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information Para. D. TACTICAL FORMATIONS Size 106 Types 107 Party Control 108 E. ORGANIZATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS F. SERVICE FUNCTIONS Intelligence 116 Tactical Intelligence 117 Non-Tactical Intelligence 118 Communications 122 Supplies 123 G. POST-LIBERATION DISPOSITION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE 125 - 129 STRENGTH H USE OF RESISTANCE BANDS IN KOREAN WAR 130 - 134 IV. THE COMMUNIST CITY INSURRECTION 135 A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION 135 - 139 Differences between the Proletarian and Colonial Revolution Factors in Success of Proletarian Revolution 136 Party control 143 Propaganda support 144 Slogans 145 Testing the Mass Temper 146 The General Strike 147 The General Task 149 C. SUBVERTING THE DEFENSES OF THE GOVERNMENT 150 - 152 "Military Work" 151 D. MILITARY PREPARATIONS 153 - 173 Planning organs 154 Service Organization 156 The Arms Problem 157 Communications 165 Intelligence 171 Transportation 172 E. THE INSURRECTION Timing 175 .Mobilization of the Party 176 Establishment of Coordinating Headquarters 177 Composition of Headquarters 178 Fighting Formations 182 Size of Formations 185 Activation and Utilization of the Subversion Apparatus 186 Current Preparedness 187 Conclusions 190 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL / U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information Para. V. PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION OF ARMED FORCES Purpose of Penetration Party Organization for Penetration 192 The Bolshevik Penetration Operations 193 Conditions for Membership in the Comintern 195 Early Penetrations by the CP Italy 196 The CP Germany Apparatus for Penetration 197 Anti-Military Committees 199 A Small Party, Penetration Operation 200 Penetration During World War II and Later 205 Greece 206 Denmark 209 Czechoslovakia 212 APPENDICES MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP CHINA. MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP GREECE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP MALAYA MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF CP PHILIPPINES MILITARY RESISTANCE OF CP FRANCE THE ORGANIZATION OF CP ITALY FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917 THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION OF 1935 IN BRAZIL SOVIET PARTISANS DURING WORLD WAR II Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information ' 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY 1. There has long been a need for a survey analysis of the way the Communist Party organizes for military action. There are many places where the Party is already engaged in armed rebellion. Existing world tensions and unstable internal conditions may encourage re- bellion in other areas in the near future. Non-Communist governments may have to face such action directly: it is important to know how the action is begun and directed and to know something of the problems that the Communists themselves face in raising, maintaining and controlling an armed force. 2. For these reasons the present paper has been prepared. It deals with the Commu- nist armed insurrection in advanced capitalist countries and in "backward", agrarian ("colonial") countries. A section also has been included on Communist armed resistance to foreign military occupation. This is of interest for two reasons: (a) it supplements the infor- mation on military organization for Communist insurrection; and (b) it shows what might be expected to follow should non-Communist forces be obliged to occupy a foreign country in which the Communist following is significant. 3. The conclusions developed in the survey are tentative. In many cases there is not sufficient information to draw reliable conclusions: for obvious reasons the Communist Party does not publish details on the techniques and organization of its military effort. In the case of city insurrections in the manner of the Russian Revolution of November 1917, they have been unsuccessful; and failures are not generally recorded in objective detail by the Commu- nists. Much more information is available on the 'Communist revolution in colonial countries because they have occurred at a time of general public awareness and interest in Commu- nist activities, and because, by their very nature, they cannot be kept secret. 4. Such shortcomings aside, it is believed that the present paper will enable its readers to foresee more clearly what the Communists may be expected to do by way of pre- paring and carrying out armed action. The "pattern" of organization and action cannot, of course, be rigidly applied in every conceivable detail and there are many places where details have been set forth to cover the actual situation in a particular country. It is hoped, however, that alternative variations have been furnished that will suggest to the reader what he may ex- pect in a given place, time, and set of conditions. There are natural limits to the variations possible at any point in the pattern. The Communists are bound by conditions beyond their control: their doctrine prescribes adherence to certain standards of organization (Parties are modelled after the CPSU); they exchange experiences and thereby develop certain "school solutions." 5. Two limitations have been imposed on this interim study: (a) no attention is given to the organization of state armies in Communist countries; (b) military tactics are treated only so far as they affect organization. The study is focused on the military organizations of Parties not yet in power. 6. While this paper is primarily concerned with the efforts of the Communists to organize a military force of their own, a section is devoted to penetration and subversion of "enemy" armed services (i.e. the existing army, police force, etc. of the state). Penetration and subversion operations of Communist Parties, especially in the city insurrection, contri- bute directly and in a large proportion to their military potential. The organization for this activity is discussed in greater detail, paragraph 176. 7. Several "case histories" of particular Communist military actions are appended to the study. They should be referred to when illustrations are wanted on the application of a "principle" as set out in the three general analyses of -- Organization for colonial revolution, Organization for armed resistance, and Organization for proletarian revolution.) 1 Communist military operations in. conjunction with an invading Communist army have not been considered separately in this study. It is believed that in the event of invasion by the Soviet Union or its satellites, CP military action would fall into one of the categories dealt with in the paper. It would, perhaps, range from resistance type operations to isolated sei- zures of power in cities in the advanced countries. An example of such aid already exists in the colonial areas: the help of the South Korean guerrillas to the North Korean and Chinese Communist armies, which is discussed in paragraph 130. -1- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 ---mow=may= ~_11 .LL4VL V.U. vrrtL,1ttL-7 VIVLI Security Information 8. These three types of Communist armed actions have characterized three histori- cal periods of Communist strategy. They are -- a) The period of unsuccessful city insurrections based on the Bolshevik model, roughly from 1917 to 1935, with a rash of attempts immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, Insurrections were attempted in,Germany in 1921 and 1923; in Bulgaria in 1923; in Hungary in 1919; in Lativa in 1924; in Finland in 1918; in China, repeated attempts until 1928; and in Brazil, in 1935. b) The period of armed resistance to Axis occupation: in occupied Europe from 1941 to 1944; in China, from 1937 to 1945; and in Southeast Asia, from 1942 to :1945. c) The period of armed rebellion in colonial Southeast Asia and Greece. Al- though the principles employed in these revolutions had been applied as early as 1928 in China, it was not until World War II that their development had reached its height and their validity had been proved. The CP's of Indochina, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia and India following the war adopted them. 9. The breaking of the Communist strategy into three historical periods has largely been the result of "objective conditions", i.e. social-political-economic factors outside the control of the Communists, but providing them exploitable situations. The success of the Bolsheviks in 1917 was achieved by a combination of factors that is not likely to be repeated again in any other country. Nevertheless, Communists in other "advanced" countries have long been taught the "lessons" of the Bolshevik Revolution, and they include some military tactics that would appear to be applicable to a city uprising anywhere. The special conditions required for resistance operations are evident: the presence of enemy military force.&and "`a"' - T general patriotic hatred for them. There are many similarities between military resistance and colonial insurrection. The application of the "lessons" of the Chinese Communist ttevolu- tion in colonial countries has been the main feature of the post-war period. It cannot be said at this time that the :lessons are more, or less, likely to succeed than the application of the techniques of the Bolshevik Revolution. In Greece, the attempt failed; in Malaya, Burma, Philippines and Indochina the attempts are apparently at stalemates. In Indonesia and India, they have failed. 10. It is interesting to note that CP India, having unsuccessfully tried both the tactics of the Bolshevik revolution and the tactics of the Chinese Revolution, now attempts to formu- late a program which calls for a combination of the two. If it succeeds (and it seems doubtful if the two types of revolution can be combined) it will be another major contribution to Commu- nist revolutionary practice. 11. The three types of Communist military effort defined. The principles for the re- sistance organization were develop during World War II, mainly to help the USSR in the war with the Axis. They had limited objectives: to harass the occupying Axis-armies, to collect intelligence for Allied use and to deny the economic potential of the country to the Axis. The organizational structure reflected these missions. Communist resistance formations were generally small and mobile and only in rare instances did they engage Axis military formations head on. In two cases (Greece and Yugoslavia) the resistance military formations went beyond these objectives and during the resistance laid the groundwork for a later attempt to seize power. The cases examined were the Communist resistance operations of the USSR, France, Italy and Greece. The tactics developed by the Communists would be applicable by any Com- munist Party fighting a non-Communist occupation army.l 12. The techniques of the Communist revolution in colonial areas have developed over the past twenty years, largely as a result of the experiences of the Chinese Communists. The distinguishing features of the colonial revolution are: a) the creation of a large army based on the peasantry. The army is first cre- ated from. isolated detachments of armed peasantry, but as the revolution succeeds the number of troops increases. 1 A current example being the utilization of Communist guerrilla forces behind UN' lines in Korea in direct support of the North Korean forces. See paragraph 130. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 w % SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY . Security Information b) the occupation and protection by this army of a safe base or bases, which be- comes the headquarters for the Party political. and military campaign, and which is gradually expanded as the power of the Communist forces increases. c) a long-term, sustained effort, with a slow and gradual accumulation of mili- tary strength. The Chinese effort took over 20 years. Case histories for the preparation and conduct of a colonial revolution by the Chinese, Malayan, Philippine and Greek Communist Parties have been included in this study. The tactics appear to be applicable to all Southeast Asian countries, some areas in Latin America, the Near East and Africa. 13. The model for the city insurrection, which takes place in "advanced" capitalist countries, is the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The highly centralized communications of an advanced country with strong, mobile coercive forces call for tactics very different from a resistance operation or a colonial revolution. The main features of a city insurrection are: a) the necessity to penetrate and subvert the state coercive forces, to win them over to the support of the Communists or to neutralize them during the seizure of power. b) the creation of armed detachments of workers, and obtaining the support of the proletariat for strike action and demonstrations. c) The close timing and coordination of the forces of the Communists. The in- surrection must be completed in a few days, before the opposing forces have time to rally, although the political preparation for the insurrection precedes it for years. The Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd in 1917 was examined in detail for this study. An account of the Brazilian Communist Revolution of 1935, which bears many similarities to the Bolshevik model, is also included. Similar tactics would probably be employed by Com- munists staging an insurrection in any "advanced, capitalist country", particularly in Western Europe. 14. The general patterns of the colonial revolution, the resistance operation, and the city insurrection are set forth In detail below. A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 15. Basis of the post-war insurrections. The numerous Communist military uprisings in the countries of Southeast Asia following the war were undertaken on the basis of several complex factors: (a) events and conditions at home and abroad which the Parties considered favorable for revolution (i.e., the "objective situation". in Communist parlance); (b) enhanced political strength of the Parties and the existence of at least the nucleus of a Party military force (i.e., the "subjective" conditions); (c) existence of a body of practical doctrine about strategy and tactics in "colonial and semi-colonial" countries developed during the Chinese Communist Revolution. 16. "Objective Conditions." In the eyes of the Communists the war had a profound effect on the political and social stability and economies of the countries of Asia, on their relations with the "imperialist" homelands in Europe, and on the world balance of power be- tween the democratic "imperialist" countries and the Soviet-satellite "camp.' The Commu- nists thought that these effects worked in their favor, as was stated by Andrei Zhdanov at the inaugural session of the Cominform in 1947, and they believed that the favorable trend would go on indefinitely, eventually leading to crises in which the Parties could seize total power. The strongest manifestation of the changed situation in Asia was the rise of nationalism, upon which the Communists had long tried to capitalize. Not until the end of the war, however, did they consider the ferment strong enough and the colonial governments (and their principles) weakened enough to capitalize fully on it. -3- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21: CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 "" 111VL i u. 0. Ur r 1t;111 L6 UNLY Security Information 17. Party Strength. The Communist Parties participated actively in the anti-Japanese resistance during hccupation. By doing so, they developed military forces, which they were able to carry over in one form or another into the post-war period and which provided them with the nucleus Qf an insurrectionary army. The Party leadership had gained valuable experience from underground operations during the occupation, and from the military opera- tions. Many of the Parties also emerged from the resistance with stores of arms, ammuni- tion, and other supplies. 18. Lessons of the Chinese Communist Revolution Out of necessity by way of his- torical accident, the Chinese Communists hit upon a formula for revolution that was radically different from the "classic" Bolshevik tradition and that, by extension, seems applicable to other Asian countries. Following an abortive uprising in the cities, they organized an army of peasants to protect themselves against the military forces of the Nationalists; they used the army to seize and hold an inaccessible region in the far Northwest (Shensi Province); after consolidating their position there -- aided by the neighboring USSR--they used the army to "politicalize" the peasantry in adjoining areas particularly through land redistribution and, gradually, to expand their base, finally accumulating enough strength and resources to engage and defeat the forces of the Government and to take over complete state power. From their experiences, a formula for revolution in what the Communist call the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries was developed with the following terms: a) The most immediately revolutionary section of the population is not the city proletariat, but the peasantry; b) By raising a military. force, and seizing a safe base in the countryside, the Communist Party can begin a political-military struggle aimed principally at the enlistment of the peasantry for the armed struggle: the principal means of, in-, ducement is the distribution of and among the poor peasants; c) The Communist Party can begin a military struggle with limited military and political resources because communications difficulties will impede counter- measures by the government;1. d) By a combination of military action and political organizing among the peas- ant masses, the Party can gradually accumulate forces large enough and suffi- ciently seasoned to engage eventually the forces of the enemy; e) Even a limited military struggle will tax the strength of the government, throw its economy out of balance and, consequently, cause frictions to grow among the social groups supporting the government and thus lead to a crisis. 19. The Safe-base, Rough terrain, dense vegetation, and primitive roads common in "colonial and semi-colonial" countries of Asia make it possible for Communist Parties to do what the Chinese Communists did when they seized part of Shensi -- capture a defensible area where the military- force can be built up, trained, and sustained. Having an armed force, the Communists can relinquish an area that proves untenable and seize another. Several small bases can be taken simultaneously, later to be consolidated into one, or given up as conditions and strategy dictate. It is essential, however, that some kind of a safe area be secured. 20. Combination of Military and Political Action. The main functions of the Commu- nist military force are - a) capture a defensible area; defend it; b) aid in the expansion of the political basis of the revolution: facilitate land distribution; protect organizers; attract or coerce peasants to support the insur- rection by show of force; 1 Conversely the existence of an effective communications system will impede the efforts of a "colonial or semi-colonial" CP to begin and sustain military operations. See the recent complaints of CP India to- that effect. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information c) damage the resources of the enemy; make him operate a security force be- yond his capacity to do so; weaken the morale of his troops by constant harassing actions; disrupt his lines of communication and transport of commodities by am- bushes, destroying roads, railroads, power and telephone lines, etc. d) expand the safebase(s) until the opposing government is sufficiently weakened and can be overthrown. 21. The political apparatus of the Party is largely stripped down to provide cadres for the military force and the supporting mass organizations. It becomes a control and servicing apparatus for the military force: it posts cadres in key military commands, forms mass organizations among the peasants to provide food, intelligence, and recruits for the military force; and creates special directing organs (staffs) and servicing elements (intelligence, courier communications, weapons and ammunition production, supply, etc.). 22. "Phasing" of the Insurrection. Because colonial Communist Parties begin their insurrections before they have gather-eU preponderant political strength, and use military action as a political:izing instrument, they expect the struggle to be long. (The Chinese Com- munists fought for over twenty years.) Military forces will be accumulated gradually; the enemy is reduced by political, economic, and military attrition. Communist military opera- tions are adjusted to tactical and political conditions prevailing at any given time. If neces- sary, the force can be withdrawn to the safe area for long periods and confine itself to de- fensive actions. Communist military tactics in colonial countries can be much more flexible than in "advanced" countries, where the military effort must be quick and overwhelming, or be crushed. 23. There are two main phases in the colonial insurrection: the military defensive, when the Communists are trying to accumulate forces and establish productive and military strategic safe-bases; and the military offensive when sufficient forces have been accumulated to launch the by-then developed regular army in powerful attacks on the main body of enemy forces. 24. The period of the military defensive is marked by the use of guerrilla tactics. It is divided, according to a document issued by the CP Brazil entitled "Guerrilla, Arm of the People," into three phases: a) "Acts of sabotage and terrorism, performed by individuals or small groups native to the region, who usually work under the very eyes of the enemy." During this phase, the Party must organize numerous small secret groups, whose duties consist of "sabotage of transportation, communications and supplies; the collection of information for. friendly troops or for the guerrilla organization; and finall j ---.__ propaganda aiming at the complete revelation of the true character of the enemy- and the preparation of the people for the fight." "Little by little, the enemy avoids the most warlike regions, moves its troops and sup- plies over other routes, changes its depots to other places, begins to leave behind only key garrisons or send punitive expeditions from time to time. Then the guerrillas become more and more masters of the region, progressively armed and organized into military-type bands, attack the remaining enemy bands, attack the remaining enemy soldiers, and finally launch more energetic attacks on neighboring areas." b) "Next, larger groups are formed which have a military organization and are generally based in mountains, forests, or other relatively inaccessible regions, whence they can launch constant attacks on the enemy." c) "Finally, the groups of guerrilla warriors, now having available considerable resources, are organized into a regular army and establish a definite front and begin the occupation of the territory." Progress from one "phase" to another is not sharply defined: irregular guerrilla bands continue to exist right up to the final, all-out offensive; the forces of the Communists through- out these phases are of varying sizes and shapes; small-scale harassing operations are car- ried on even when the military force has begun to be reorganized into a "regular army;" the first "phase" is skipped over in some cases. -5- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 %.vl1W116vLJ / V. L. J.L 1' LI..Lr1.U0 J1NL1 Security Information The Brazilian document has this to say about centralized control of military operation: "Coordination is relatively easy in the third phase of the fight, when the existence of the regular army and of a territory dominated by it allow the full development of a central command. In the first two phases, however, such coordination and the establishment of the central command are extremely hard: this can, never- theless, be greatly aided through the previous existence of an organized..Commu- nist Party." 25. The period of the military offensive consists in (a) consolidation of Party-military control within the safe-base area; (b) completion of the reorganization of the Communist forces into a "regular army;" (c) expansion of the safe-base in the surrounding countryside; (d) attacks in force on individual enemy strongholds, then on major provincial cities, then on the national capital; (e) creation of a national Communist government and consolidation of political and territorial control over the entire country. 26. Adjustment of the Party to "Phasing.", The role of the political apparatus of the Communist Party and its ancillary ("mass" or front) organizations is adjusted to the stages of the military strategy. In the early stages, the Party mobilizes its military elements, organizes them into tactical units, makes plans for the initial operations, and turns its regular committees into military staffs. Later, when the military forces have grown sufficiently and conditions afford an oppor- tunity for major operations, they are organized as a separate military auxiliary, divorced from the control of local Party committees, but still, however, under the control of the central Party headquarters. When this happens, the political apparatus becomes primarily a serv- icing organization for the Communist army and its operations. The civil administrations that are set up in "liberated" areas under Party control are also aimed at supporting the military effort. 27. In cities under enemy control, the basic function of the (underground) political apparatus of the Party is to penetrate governmental agencies, trade unions, and other social and political groups to agitate within them, subvert as many city dwellers as possible with a view to raising insurrections in the cities when the final, all-out clash is feasible. The extent to which cadres are pulled out of city organizations and sent to the field depends upon the military requirements and priorities at any given time. 28. In organizational terms, the insurrectionary colonial Communist Party must pro- vide for the creation and equipping of an armed force, coordination of the political and mili- tary programs (and organizations), and constant supervision of all organizations and opera- tions, revising plans and organizational forms in the light of "phase" requirements. The in- surrection is organizationally fluid and complex, maturing, in case of success, into a Party government and dictatorship. 29. The discussion which follows treats the problems faced by the insurrectionary colonial Communist :Parties in organizing and carrying on their revolutions under the follow- ing headings: PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE THE DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT The discussion is based upon a study of Communist insurrections in China, Malaya, Philippines, and Greece, and upon partial examination of the uprisings in Indochina, Indonesia, Burma, and India. The rebellion in Greece does not fall in all details into the colonial pattern. However, it is decidely closer to the colonial formula than to the "classic" Bolshevik pattern of a city insurrection based on the proletariat. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 1r SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information B. PROBLEMS OF THE SAFE BASE. 30. The Party's choice of an area to capture and hold for the building up of its mili- tary force depends upon chance, balance of forces, and only partly upon calculation. A base may combine several desirable features or it may be simply the only area the insurgents are capable of taking at the time. 31. Ideally, from the Communist point of view, a safe area would have the following features: a) Political value: large population, generally susceptible to the revolutionary appeal, to be drawn en masse into the Communist army and into support activities; b) Economic productivity: food production in appreciable excess of the basic needs of the population; any manufacturing industry is desirable; it is also desir- able that the economy of areas under Government control depend upon the pro- duction of the Communist base area; c) Military defensibility with minimum effort: a matter of immediate and neigh- boring terrain and character of approaches; d) Strategic location within the country: located so as to threaten enemy econ- omy, communications lines, political resources, and military security; at the same time, give the Communist maximum advantages for expansion into surround- ing areas and cover for more distant expeditions. 32. The Communists are seldom able to take an area that combines all these features Ideally. They must usually be content in the early and intermediate stages of the insurrection, with securing an area that is merely defensible and reasonable adequate in food production, hoping to improve their position later. 33. In many cases, the Communist forces have taken areas close by a foreign country to secure their rear. Preferably, of course, the area will be adjacent to a friendly state in order to facilitate outside support. Thus, the Indochinese Communists concentrated in areas adjoining neutral countries (Thailand and China), and are expected to obtain substantial assist- ance from Communist China, as soon as possible. The Greek Communists established their safe-base in Yugoslavia, Albania, and immediately adjacent Greek territories; one of the rea- sons why they gave up their attempted revolution was the defection of Tito, which left their rear exposed and deprived them of a substantial part of their logistical support. There have been recent indications that the Communist insurgents in Burma are moving to the Northeast, so as to be close to friendly China. The capture of Tibet by the Chinese Communists may eventually enable CP India to set up a safe-base there. 34. An important element in the defensibility of the base area, aside from the military strength of the enemy, is the condition of communications in the surrounding countryside. If they are primitive (as in China), the forces opposing the Communists will find it difficult to maneuver for effective attacks, and to coordinate operations of separated forces. 35. Uses of the safe base. The military usefulness of the safe base is that -- a) It provides a place where a military force can be built up and maintained -- recruited, equipped, trained, and indoctrinated; b) It provides a center for the coordination of military operations: a planning, reporting, communications, and administrative center. Schools, hospitals and convalescent facilities; storage places for all kinds of supplies; shops for the manufacture and repair of weapons and ammunition and other equipment are estab- lished in the safe area. Food-is raised there on Party-controlled farms. By controlling a share of the national food supply, the Party is able to interfere with the economy and thereby disturb the political equilibrium of the state and the government's staying power. If the safe base adjoins a friendly foreign country, the Communists will have access to its productive resources and military supplies. -7- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 / U.0. V1' 1' 1V LI1 L.) Vl`I L1 Security Information 36. The political utility of the safe base is that -- a) It provides a center for the establishment of a "democratic," "people's" or "liberation" government; b) It provides a jumping-off place for military-political expansion into sur- rounding areas (politicalization of the peasants). 37. The "Liberation Government." The "Government" set up by the Communists in the safe base area.has bpth a political and a practical organizational purpose. Politically, it serves as a rallying-point for non-Communist elements opposed to the regime for various reasons and it lends prestige and an aura of legality to the insurrection -- a distinct propa- ganda asset. There is no question but that such a'facade is useful in winning favor with non- Communist, nationalist elements: it was amply demonstrated in China. Practically, the setting up of a pseudo-national government. relieves the Party of a large part of the burden and the onus of civil administration in "liberated" areas: administrative posts can be given to non-Communists, thereby relieving Party cadres for more important work. The practice of creating a "government" seems confined to Parties with substantial forces and a proven territorial base (Greece, China, Indo-china). Some insurrectionary Parties have not yet attempted it (Philippines, Malaya). 38. There are some disadvantages to the strategy of the safe-base. (1) The base is, perforce, unstrategically located in an area remote from the centers of power which must finally be seized. (2) The base is far from the centers of industrial production (arms, clothing, other equipment). (3) Its distance from population centers deprives the Communists of a large section of the potentially revolutionary population, and of the services of technicians (medicos, mechanics, communications personnel, etc.). C. THE POLICY DECISION TO BEGIN MILITARY ACTION. 39. The decision to take the Party into a military revolt is serious: it means a- con- siderable structural reorKanization of the Party, a painful readjustment in the way of living of Party cadres and ranks, and thorny problems of raising and maintaining a military force. 40. The decision is made, of course, by the top Party leadership. For example, it was made by the. Secretariat of the CP Philippines and then endorsed by, and put out in the name of, the Political Bureau. 41. The Chinese Communists were forced into an insurrection by enemy action (pro- voked by their own action, of course). In the post-war period, however, the decision has been deliberately made on the basis of calculated prospects, and has not been forced upon the colonial Communist Parties. In some cases, the Party leadership has simply reversed its previous policy and has stayed in office to carry out the new policy (Greece, Malaya). In the Philippines a bitter factional division arose between Party leaders favoring armed insurrec- tion and those favoring continuation of "legal" methods, with the former finally prevailing and suppressing or expelling from the Party the advocates of "legal" struggle. 42. The influence of more authoritative or stronger fraternal Communist Parties may be a powerful stimulant to the decision in favor of armed uprising. Thus, the leaders of the CP Greece sounded foreign Communist leaders before beginning the insurrectionof.1947-1949. The leaders of the CP Mayala canvassed Communist spokesmen of China, Great Britain, andthe USSR during 1945-1946, and, receiving no encouragement, postponed their uprising until later. The Zhdanov statement to the Cominform in October 1947 (see above, ara'2) was a striking example of the leadership role of the CP Soviet Union. It Was elaborated at the Second Congress of the CP India and the Southeast Asia Youth Conference. The CP's India, Burma, and Malaya, all adopted resolutions in favor of a more militant policy. In the Philippines, the faction of Party leaders favoring armed action got control of the leading Party offices in May 1948., just a few months after the Zhdanov thesis had been given general circulation. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 -- SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information _ 43. There are indications that two decisions are actually made by the Party: the first, a preliminary decision that a "revolutionary'situation" is developing and that the Party should prepare itself to begin fighting in the' not too-distant future; and a later decision to actually begin fighting. The CP Philippines decided in May 1948 that there was a "heightening of the revolutionary flow" and shortly thereafter carried out some reforms in the Party organiza- tion: the decision to take to the field was not made until January 1950, when it was estimated that a "revolutionary situation" already existed. The CP Greece, when it accepted the Varkiza Agreement in February 1945, must have decided that a Revolutionary situation was not too far off, for it sent most of its military cadres into camps in Albania and Yugoslavia in 1945, and made anumber of personnel and structural changes in the Party organization during the next two years. It gave some indication of having reached a decision to begin fighting in September 1946, but did not undertake serious military operations until the summer of 1947. 44. Content of the Policy Decision. It would be reasonable to suppose that the Party leadership would make a thorough assessment of its own capabilities and resources as part of the basis for the decision. It is surprising, then, to discover that such is not always the case. In its resolution of January 1950, for example, the CP Philippines treats the "objective situ- ation" in some detail, and from the document itself, it appears that the decision was made entirely on the basis of an evaluation of external conditions: the condition of the Party itself is not even mentioned. Again, the CP India, during its recent crisis, issued resolutions and discussions in which the "situation" is described as being "revolutionary," and the task of the Party to be one of setting the masses "on the rails" of an armed uprising, but in which the resources of the Party are not merely glossed over as being good, but actually admitted to be at low ebb. 45. In any event, the colonial Communist Party puts more stock in the external politi- cal, economic, and social trends than it does in its immediate resources: provided the trends appear to be revolutionary, the Party will be ready to go ahead with an armed uprising on quite limited political and military resources. As is shown in the resolution of the CP Philippines of January 1950, a "revolutionary situation" has two main features: (a) conditions are not merely bad, but (b) will continue to get worse, because the "bourgeoisie" are divided and per- manently unable to unite and solve the crucial economic and social problems. With the "situation" already developing towards a crisis, the best the Communist Party can do is to aggravate the ills of the country by carrying on an armed struggle and to prepare itself mili- tarily and politically to stage an all-out campaign when the crisis arrives. 46. The major portion of the resolution of the CP Philippines is devoted to a discussion of the existing social, economic, and political conditions, including an estimate as to what each of the major enemy political parties will be able to do to remedy them (conclusion, negative). The last part of the resolution sets forth the "concrete tasks" for the Party to improve its own organization. These "organizational, military and educational tasks" are included in the Philippine Appendix. Briefly, they consisted of strengthening internal discipline and control, raising the level of political understanding within the Party and its armed force, improving the work of the Party among the peasants, and reforming the supporting services (finances, communications, publications). D. ADJUSTMENT OF THE PARTY APPARATUS 47. In addition to'the arguments bolstering the decision to begin military action, the Party also formulates a strategy and prescribes the "concrete tasks" for the implementation of the decision. It takes time to get the Party in shape for a military insurrection. The military force has to be mobilized, Party cadres have to be given definite assignments, new organizations have to be created to handle problems peculiar to military operations, old offices of no use when the Party takes to the field have to be closed down or be put underground for "stay- behind" operations. Security measures must be put into effect in anticipation of police sup- pression. If a preliminary decision had been made, the Party would already have accom- plished some of these things, and need only wind them up after making the final decision. 48. Nevertheless, there is always a "time lapse" between the making of the decision and the beginning of major operations. The duration of the time lapse in each case studied was a matter of months: from January to 29 March 1950 in the Philippines; from September 1946 (?) to mid-summer 1947 in Greece; and, in Malaya, from mid-March to late July 1948, - 9 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 - i %1. 1. .L ?_ U / U. 0 yr r t%_lti LO VJV L I Security Information To some extent, the Party may be able to pick the time for beginning its major opera- tions: the CP Philippines picked the date of the eighth anniversary of the founding of its resistance-born army; the CP Greece seems also to have begun operations at what it consid- ered to be the most propitious time. The CP Malaya, however, with its army in "moth-balls" hit upon the idea of a campaign of terrorism as a means of shocking its people into action, and is believed to have counted on having a longer preparatory period and to have been caught short when the Government took vigorous countermeasures. 49. The main changes which the Party makes in its organization immediately prior to the insurrection are: Decentralization of authority to lower (Regional or District Party) organs. This usually occurs early, in some cases (Greece and Malaya) before the making of the final de- cision, possible as a result of a preliminary decision. In Malaya, Regional Bureaus were cre- ated to direct all Party operations in prescribed areas, later, direction of operations passed progressively into the hands of lower Party committees (State Committees, then District Committees), this latter development probably resulting from increasing communications dif- ficulties. In Greece, City Committees were given greater authority, under the supervision of an "Instructor" from the Politburo, which had removed to the safe base. Regional Committees in the countryside were dissolved. Military operations were directed by "area" or "regional" commands in seven prescribed areas in "liberated" country until October 1947 when they were replaced by Division Headquarters, presumably under a more centralized direction exercised by General Headquarters through three regional Headquarters. In the Philippines, several members of the Politburo were individually assigned to act as "supervisors" of the most important of the newly created Regional Committees. Also, she General Headquarters of the army was dissolved. Later, it was re-established when conditions made it feasible to begin the reorganization of the guerrilla army into a "regular army." Reassignment of cadres from political to military work takes place Colonial CP's are generally small numerically and short of completely reliable cadres. Many of them had cadres with experience in guerrilla fighting during the resistance. But a Communist uprising is a different matter: it lacks the unifying and disciplining appeal of patriotic resistance and it may last a very long time. Consequently, the shortage of absolutely politically reliable cadres means that those who are available must be carefully conserved and utilized with maxi- mum efficiency. The "best" cadres are sent into the field and only skeleton organization are left behind to do what they can in "enemy" areas and these are put deep underground. (A fre- quent complaint of the CP Philippines was that its "stay behind" organizations were so far underground that they were practically worthless; the same difficulty afflicted the city organi- zations of the CP Greece, which were completely paralyzed by Greek police action.) Discipline and security are greatly increased, even before the formal decision to begin military action is made. In a period when the Party is fighting for its life, it can tolerate as cadres only those individuals who are reliable and efficient. All others become a liability and while they might be allowed to hang on in a less critical period, they must be purged in anti- cipation of military action. The decision to take to the field inevitably throws up numbers of previously satisfactory cadres who oppose the decision for one reason or another. These are disciplined by suspension or expulsion: they are rehabilitated if possible, but are always under a cloud. Purges are undertaken, in extreme cases, to rid the Party of those opposed.to the de- cision to take military action. The National Control Commission, the central disciplinary organization, is strengthen- ed and control commissions are set up on local levels. In Greece, the Party instituted a sys- tem of "vigilantes" to spot indications of back-sliding and inefficiency in its cadres. Stricter qualifications for positions of leadership are instituted and readmission to the Party or to committee positions is made more difficult. cipation of repressive measures which wi come as a res t o the CP military operations. In some cases the Party is forced underground as a result of government action, as in Greece. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information The Politburo and other central executive organs are moved from the city to the safe- base, and many of the members are reassigned'to the various regional organizations. New Party organs are created, such as military staffs and support sections to direct and control t e military operations. In Malaya, Armed Forces Departments were established in each State Committee. The Min Yuen (People's Movement) was organized. In the Philip- pines various technical sections were created. Other Party organs are strengthened and increased in size. In the Philippines the National Finance_ Committee and the Regional Finance Committees were placed under close cadre control. The Organizational Bureau was expanded. Some Party functional sections are dissolved to release cadres assigned to these sections for reassignment to more important functions. Increased emphasis is placed on Part schools. The cadres have to be trained for their new tasks. (Cl) CPhilippines began-training of special cadres to secure the cooperation of other armed groups who were non-Communist.) The communications system is strengthened. Courier service is better organized on a more regular basis. More peop a are assigned courier duties and regular message centers and lay-over places are established along courier routes. Plans are sometimes made (Philip- pines) for getting communications equipment and trained personnel and for establishing a wireless or land-line net. 50. Vulnerability during transition period. The Party is particularly vulnerable to counteraction in the perio etween t 15 e m ing o the decision and the time when its forces have been mobilized sufficiently for it to undertake a major military operation. The apparatus of the Party is in flux and its personnel often at loose ends, doing things at which they are still relative amateurs, and undergoing in most cases severe emotional and/or ideological crises. The machinery for conducting and supporting military operations is still imcomplete. Its supplies, particularly, of weapons and ammunition, are likely to be limited. The, propaganda build-up and the act of recruiting are necessarily semi-overt, at least locally. Party offices are physically being moved into the field or to safe-places for underground stay-behind opera- tions. Party records are destroyed or moved, and are subject to capture or loss in the pro- cess: it may be difficult for the Party's security apparatus to check the bona fides of new re- cruits. All these factors provide opportunities for surveillance of functionaries, seizure of records, penetration, defection, and provocation;. An alert security force might very well be able to squash a colonial insurrection before it had developed, but any action would have to be thorough and ruthless. E. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY. 51. Recruitment of Communist military forces was simplified for Communist Parties beginning revolutions after World War II. The nucleus of their military organization was the wartime resistance movements which had been sponsored by them and equipped and supplied by the Allies. As new recruits were channelled to the military forces, the Party was able to seize and maintain a base of operations from which further political-military expansion could be launched. Thus, there has been first_an army, and then a safe-base. The Chinese Commu- nists learned their lesson the hard way, by experience. They organized an area by political means alone and then organized a military force. Not until the experience of the Long March and the establishment of the safe-base in Shensi did they begin to utilize systematically their military force in expansion. 52. The size and structure of the regular units of the Communist Army depends, on the stage of development of the safe-base and the type of operations being carried out. In the be- ginning, squads and platoons undertake guerrilla operations on a small, loosely coordinated scale. At that time, they live entirely off the countryside with infrequent communications with each other. As the scale of operations grows, these small units are incorporated into larger formations, (e.g., regiments and divisions) with regular service elements, coordinating staffs, and comprehensive communications. As a rule, however, units are kept small, to simplify supply and to reduce vulnerability to enemy attack. - 11 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 uu. ill, 1 t V1911LVL / U. 0. Vl C LL1iL~J VLVLZ Security Information Three available examples of post-war colonial Communist armies--Greece, Philip- pines, Malaya--show how resources and events influence the general organization of the army: a. Greece. Began with rather large forces (about 10,000), well-equipped, well led, and safely based. Conversion from small-scale operations by small bands to tactical employment of Brigades and Divisions early in the struggle. Regression to guerrilla operations* with unfavorable conditions. b. Philippines. Began with relatively large forces (about 10,000), already in the field and presumably adequately equipped. Passed to impressive seizures 'of towns in apparently battalion strength within seven months of decision and planned conversion to orthodox ("regular army") operations in near future. c. Malaya. Began with few forces, not adequately equipped, not fully mobilized, and with little actual combat experience. Apparently, contemplated ambitious operations in at least regimental strength at early date. However, unfavorable conditions forced progressive disintegration of tactical organization and diminish- ing operations. 53. The troops of the colonial Communist force in the beginning are "regulars" --that is, they are full-time fighters and are, on the whole, politically "reliable.". As soon as opera- tions are begun, efforts are made to dxaw in non-Communist peasants--first, into political and support activities, then into part-time or "irregular" fighting formations, and eventually, into the full-time, "regular" army. Even when the build-up consists of a campaign of terror- ism, as in Malaya, the first fighting unfits are select military'cadres, and in every case stud- ied, some kind of irregular fightin .groups were formed later. 54. The most important general conditions limiting the size of regular formations used tactically, and consequently, the organization. of the army are: a. Supplies. If inadequate, operations must be small and aimed at obtaining (small raids and ambushes). If no supply organization exists, then forces must spend time foraging and will not be able to concentrate for the time necessary for careful planning, briefing, and rehearsal of large operations. Heterogeneous weapons and necessity to refit ammunition limit firepower and feasibility of large operations. b. Enemy tactics. Until final stage (full-scale engagement of enemy), Commu- nist tactics are in direct response to enemy tactics; flight and temporary disin- tegration at advance of superior enemy; concentration and larger tactical opera- tions against small enemy forces and areas temporarily free from enemy. c. Condition of leadership, extent of training; morale of ranks. For example, the Chinese Communists had great difficulty in solving ogis is problems of large tactical deployment because leaders had been trained in small operations. d. Terrain. Particularly difficult terrain makes use of large units impossible or unprofitable. 55. Special and irregular units in the Communist Army are organized for two main purposes: to serve as training organizat],ons for combat-able men who will eventually be ab- sorbed by the regular units and to organize non-combatants to give support to the regular forces, In China, for example, the combat-able persons were organized in Youth Vanguards and in Model Detachments, and many of them, when trained, were placed in units of the Field Forces. Self Defense Detachments, made up of older men, and Women's Detachments per- formed intelligence, medical and protective functions. In general, the first responsibility of the special and irregular units is to aid the reg- ular forces in military operations, engaging. in small battles, diversionary moves, supplying food, caring for wounded, etc. They also protect Communist Party and front organizations and installations (Malaya), not only in the safe area, but in areas which have not yet been secured. They are called upon to carry out occasional acts of terror, such as assassinations, sabotage and intimidation. They take over local police authority in the early stages of consol- idation of newly won areas. They also serve to militarize those segments of the population Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information which are unqualified for regular military service, thus exerting military control over them, and insuring their complicity in the Communist operation should there be any doubts concern- ing their loyalty to the cause. Formation and control of irregular units is often the responsibility of the local Party organization in its own name (e.g., the "wide self-defense" groups in Greece), or in the name of a controlled mass organization (e.g., "Self-Protection" squads of the People's Movement in Malaya). Sometimes (China), the Party organization in the regular army units organizes such units. 56. Organization and functions of staffs. The Communist military force consists of tactical formations performing military operations; and various staffs for planning, coordination and control, and the management of special support and technical services required for operations. The character of the military staff--their competence, composition, and relations with the Party political apparatus varies with the actual situation as it is reflected in the "phases" of the insurrection. In the early stages, when the military force is being accumulated and is carrying on operations of a purely guerrilla nature, local staffs, responsible for tactical formations in a relatively small area and closely connected with corresponding organs of the Party's political apparatus, are most essential. At this time, whatever central direction may be given to the military forces is likely to be quite general, and exercised through the chan- nels of the political apparatus. The Secretariat of the CP Philippines, for example, took over the problems of centralized direction of HMB formations, serving as a General Headquarters for several months after the decision had been made to begin fighting. HMB units were direc- ted by the Regional Committees of the political apparatus, and the general control over them exercised by the Secretariat was achieved by courier correspondence and by posting members of the Political Bureau with the Regional Committees. Similarly, the Political Bureau of the CP Malaya is believed to have constituted itself as a "Military High Command," while the State Committees of the political apparatus (through their Armed Forces Departments) took over the functions of area military staffs. 57. When conditions have permitted the numerical expansion of the military force and. the acquisition of a safe base, or at least, prospects of one, it will be necessary to establish a firm central directing staff if operations are to progress beyond the guerrilla stage and the army to be satisfactorily serviced. Then, military operations become more technical and the military force will have to be reconstituted as a centralized auxiliary of the Party and its di- rection divorced to a large extent from local organs of the political apparatus. Conversely, if conditions prevent the expansion of the military force and its utilization in large-scale operations, direction may remain indefinitely in the hands of local organs of.the political apparatus (cf. Malaya). 58. Central direction of a (military) technical nature is achieved by the creation of a General Headquarters, comprising a commander-in-chief, chief of staff, and varying numbers of chiefs for particular staff functions (intelligence, supply, communications, etc.), the estab- lishment of regular communications, and the regularizing of command channels through the military service (from General Headquarters through area headquarters to the tactical com- mand staffs). The Party may also organize a Military Committee or Commission, or similar body, at national Party headquarters for political control and coordination between the political and military (GHQ) programs. Thus the CP Philippines organized a Military Committee of 15 members to coordinate political and military work and to plan for the future reorganization of the HMB and the creation of its GHQ. There was a substantial overlapping of personnel be- tween the Military Committee and the GHQ, both being manned by top leaders of the political apparatus. 59. When a "liberation" government is created, the Communist military force oper- ates as a nominal agency of the Communist government. Thus the CP Greece organized a "Supreme War Council of the Democratic Army" in August 1948 to supervise the army's Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 -----=-' ~. AA%,vt.i U.0. yr r l' !ttL0 %JJNLX Security Information General Headquarters. It consisted of ranking Party leaders, and its purpose has been de- scribed as an effort by the Party to water down the authority of General Markos, who was Commander in chief of the. army, Minister of War in the "Democratic Government" and head of the General Headquarters, and who was suspected of Titoist nationalist deviationism. As first constituted, however, the President of the Supreme War Council was none other than Markos. 60. The same kind of overlapping of cadres between political and military organs occurs in the area staffs. It is sometimes difficult to tell where one leaves off and the other begins. Thus, even in the internal correspondence of the CP Philippines, no consistent at- tempt was made to distinguish between the (political) Regional Committees and the (military) Regional Commands, both being designated RECO's. Such a condition is most likely to be en- countered in the earlier stages of a colonial insurrection, when the military and political programs are practically one. Later, as conditions make it feasible to organize the military forces into a separate and centralized auxiliary, there will be a more clearly defined sep- aration between area military staffs and local organizations of the political apparatus. The reversal of this is to be seen in Malaya, where many units of the "regular" MRLA gradually were detached from any kind of central military direction and put under the local (District) committees of the political apparatus. Members of local Party committees are often given military command positions. They may continue to hold both jobs as long as the military unit stays in the home area. 61. Party Control of the Military Organization. The establishment of firm control over the actions and loyalties of Communist troops in colonial insurrections is a difficult task. If the object of military operations is to facilitate political work in these insurrections, it is also a fact that military operations tend to defeat the political efforts. A guerrilla force must live off the countryside to a large extent and must have general public sympathy with it to do so. However, the force is a natural haven for mere brigands, whose activities, if not controlled with an "iron discipline," will bring discredit to the Communist movement as a whole, and make it increasingly difficult for the force to obtain supplies, intelligence, and recruits from the people. The guerrilla life itself tends to breed indiscipline--laziness, arrogance, immorality, greed, and disregard not only for life, but also for property that the Communists may greatly need at a later point in the struggle. It tends to develop political independence on the part of leaders, and to encourage personal, rather than organizational loyalties. The meanness of guerrilla life and its dangers; its long periods of inaction, and the remoteness of victory--all make for unrest in the ranks. This is partly the reason for the exhortations the Parties make for some kind of operation, no matter how small, every day. In addition to the above, and numerous other factors, the Party must establish effective controls and constantly strive to maintain morale to prevent treachery and suppress dissent- ers. It must prevent hostile penetration and defections, and cope with cadres who opposed the policy decision or accepted it with reservations. 62. Cultivation of discipline takes two lines: raising the political loyalty of the`-troops through Marxist study and propaganda; and organizing a control-supervisory-tale-bearing apparatus within the army. The task is the more difficult for the fact that colonial CP's consist of a mass of political semi-literates and a very small number of fully indoctrinated cadres. The control and indoctrination organization must make maximum economical use of the reliable .cadres. 63. It is necessary, of course, to have military specialists in charge of military oper- ations. But military men are often shaky in their political convictions. The Party tries to overcome this by indoctrination, but has another solution: the Political Commissar. 64. The Political Commissar is an agent of the Party's political apparatus, assigned to a military command to ensure the political reliability of the military commander and su- pervise the political indoctrination of the troops.1 He sees to the proper application of orders 1 The institution of the Political Commissar was originated by the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917 for the October Revolution and the ensuing civil war. It was used by the Red Army during World War II. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 -SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information from higher authorities, reports on the military efficiency of the commander and his political tendencies, and on local conditions affecting the Party's standing and operations, and super- vises (at least) personnel assignments within the command. He may also be responsible for local civilian Party organizations in the section of operations of the command, and for mili- tary security and counter-intelligence. The Political Commissar has authority superior to that of the military commander in all political matters, and may even interfere in purely military matters. The CP Philippines suggested that, in the final, all-out battle, the Military Commander may take over full control, but presumably by then the political preparation will have been completed and the military campaign will be crucial. According to the size and-shape of the command and availability of cadres, the Politi- cal Commissar may work alone or with assistants. In Greece and in China, the Political Commissar had his own staff organization. In the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, for example, this staff was called a "Politic al. Department" and consisted of five sections-- Organization Education People's Movement Enemy Services (POW's) Work Against Traitors (Counter-espionage) The functions of each of the above are described in more detail in China Appendix. 47' The development of a Political Commissar System is illustrated in the case of the CP Philippines (q.v.): Political Bureau members were assigned to supervise the most important Regional Committees and key headquarters sections (Education, Finance) with the making of the policy decision. As the struggle developed and Regional cadres became more competent, it was decided to recall the PB members to staff national headquarters and to "advance promising personnel boldly." Political Commissars, however, were to continue to be assigned to military commands until the final battle. 65. When the situation and condition of the army impose a decentralization, the local Party organization may be expected to assume the control function over a Communist mili- tary force in the area. This is the reversal of the practice of the Chinese Communists after the Long March, but it is what seems-to have happened in Malaya. It may be expected in the beginnings of resistance struggle or insurrection, but if it happens later in the struggle after a greater centralization had been instituted, it is probably retrograde: the military force is not being utilized to maximum advantage. 66. Another control practice is the creation of a Party organization within the mili- tary force. It consists of cells in the lowest units, and is directed through a normal system of committees (company, battalion, regimental, etc.), in each case probably responsible to the Political Commissar. F. ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT 67. The Communist military effort in colonial countries can grow only by drawing to itself popular support: In adverse circumstances, the rebel forces can break down into small bands capable of foraging for themselves, carrying on operations that require neither commu- nications with each other nor more intelligence than can be obtained from immediate recon- naissance. However, such defensive military tactics are politically sterile. For any advance to be made, the Communists must produce larger operations by larger units, whereupon problems of supply, manpower, communications, and intelligence will have to be met by organizations out- side the military. Therefore the Party must organize the civilian population (usually peasants and villagers) to fulfill these needs, and also, to bring more and more people into the revolu- tionary movement. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 AJL U1'. J 1 vVl\ L J '.JU , V.I.J. V1 1 1%-i1Z L.JIJ VL\L1 Security Information 68. In the safe-base area, practically the entire non-combat population is mobilized into the fighting force itself, or into support organizations. CP China is probably the best example of the extensive organization of civilian support groups. The support units of the Chinese revolution were so well organized that often one individual was a member of more than one organization. Support functions were concentrated in the Peoples' Militia (although this organization was also responsible for some combat duties), and included Women's Groups, Youth Groups, Self Defense Detachments (made up of older--though able-bodied-- men) and were assigned tasks commensurate with their abilities. Specialized groups growing out of these units were formed, such as the Model Detachments, which were especially capa- ble members of the youth groups. All of the civilian groups performed many different sup- port functions: supply, communications, intelligence, medical work, etc. During the Japan-. ese resistance period, the activities of these groups and of the Peoples' Militia were directed by local People's Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. 69. In Malaya, the various civilian support organizations were grouped under the Min Yuen (People's Movement). These included the Races Liberation Alliance, Village and Squatter Area Committees, Peasants Union, Women's Union, and various Anti-British Leagues and Associations. Organizationally, they were similar to the MCP. The type of support function expected of each group was, as in China, according to their abilities. The success of the organizations outside the safe base was, of course, considerably less because the Communists lacked the coercive hold,-on the civilian groups. 70. Most of these organizations existed within the safe base area. In areas outside the safe-base, organization of "mass" support was achieved by local organs of the political apparatus, by the political organizers attached to the military force, or by mixed teams, such as the "expansion" teams of the CP Philippines (political organizers assisted by small armed detachments). 71. In some cases, it may be profitable for the Party to organize an apparatus for collecting and bringing money and other supplies from abroad, as the CP Greece did through its Mutual Aid (EA) and seamen's union (OENO). 72. Manpower. The original military complement is obtained by a mobilization of the members of the Party, from such still active guerrilla forces as it may have from resistance warfare (e.g., the Huk in the Philippines), and/or from mobilization of controlled veterans organizations (Malaya, Greece). The Chinese Communists obtained their original force by drafting peasants in the name of the soviets which the Party had set up by political means. 73. Later recruits for reinforcement and replacement are obtained by forced mobili- zation in the safe-base area, by propaganda-recruiting drives in other areas, and by transfer from the "mass" support organizations. "mobilization" proclamations issued by the Greek Communist "Democratic Army" promising punishment for failure to respond). In areas outside the safe-base, roving guerrilla bands often impress civilian youths or threaten reprisals to villages if the young men refuse to come out for the insurrection. The Communists also try to get neutral civilians involved in the movement by degrees, threatening to expose them should they balk at any step. The pea- sant is forced or awed into giving a little food or making a small money contribution or giving information on the movements of an enemy troop, and is then drawn more closely into the work of local "mass" organizations, eventually passing into part-time "self -defense" actions, cations men, medical personnel, automatic and heavy-weapons technicians, etc. 76. Intelligence. The Communist force needs information on enemy movements, iden- tities of enemy agents, terrain, and popular sentiments for its own defense. It needs infor- mation on, the disposition of enemy forces, character of defenses of enemy installations, lo- cation of assailable convoys, etc. for its offensive operations. (See Malaya, paragraph 65, for items considered by the MRLA in planning an attack.) and finally, into full-time fighting. 75. The main recruiting function of underground city organizations in enemy areas is apparently (cf. Philippines) to recruit technical, personnel -- mechanics, drivers, communi- 74. Coercion is common practice. In the safe-base area, it is automatic (see the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 77. All members of the Party and its mass organizations act as informants. Their product is channeled through whatever organizational channel may be available. Local "mass" organizations may even have a particular person charged with collecting and trans- mitting .intelligence items. 78. Secret reporting points may be established into which information obtained by all sources in a given area is funneled for collation and further transmission. In Greece, such "Intelligence Centers" were organized and manned by intelligence specialists of the regular Communist army. In Malaya, "District Information Centers" appear to have been established by the District Committees of the political apparatus, but a military representative was stationed at them to transmit information to the nearest Communist army unit. 79. The military force itself produces intelligence by reconnaissance, command ob- servation, and prisoner interrogation. The extent to which military intelligence is special- ized depends upon the organizational condition of the Communistforce and the magnitude of its operations. In a centralized army, such as that of the CP Greece, the intelligence function may be performed by a special service, with intelligence sections an integral feature of the military staffs, and with intelligence teams attached to combat units (for reconaissance and prisoner-interrogation). 80. Communications. For lack of technical equipment and trained personnel, the colonial Communist military force is usually reduced to courier communications. 81. Couriers are frequently recruited from the "mass" organizations, women and children being favored because they are less likely to excite suspicion. 82. Each political and military organization has its own courier pool. High-ranking functionaries frequently have their own personal couriers. 83. In Malaya, and probably elsewhere, regular courier runs were organized, with a chain of safe-resting places and message centers where messages could be delivered or picked up. 84. Special courier services are frequently organized. The Communist military staffs in Philippines and Greece included communications sections. In the Philippines, a special Communications Department of the Party existed before the current uprising and needed only expansion to make it usable for military operations. 85. Radio and telephone communications are normally beyond the capabilities of Communist colonial forces. The CP Greece had fairly comprehensive W/T nets (W/T issued to units down to brigades, and to battalions on special missions). The Chinese Communists gradually developed extensive W/T and land-line systems. In the beginning of their revolu- tion, they. had-only occasional wireless communications between Juichin and the Central Committee in Shanghai. The CP Philippines considered the establishment of a wireless net in 1950, one feature of which was a proposal to plant a Communist in a standard broadcasting station in Manila: he would broadcast carefully camouflaged coded messages in the course of his regular announcements. 86. Supply. Supply of food is no great problem in a period of decentralized military operations. Interdiction of the regular food supply can hamper the expansion of a Communist force, but need not mean its defeat, for the guerrillas can live off the countryside to a large extent. When the tactical formations have been enlarged and are operating away from home, a regular food supply service becomes essential. 87. Local "mass" organizations furnish supplies of food. See, for example, the People's Movement in Malaya. Special production, storing, and distribution services may be organized by the Party or the military force, usually on a local basis. The CP Philippines planned to create "Production Departments" on a Regional Committee level and it was pro- posed to organize "Harvest Struggle Committees" in military commands. The Greek Commu- nists had a regular quartermaster corps, with supply trains running down from Yugoslavia and supply service elements in tactical formations and a transport service. One of the rea- sons for the defeat of the Greek uprising was the inability of the Communists to supply their forces at some distance from the safe base. -17- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Orr %_Kx I L1V1V I 'i i / 4. ". va a avaaia+ v.. a Security Information 88. Armaments. An adequate supply of arms and ammunition is a more difficult pro- blem for the colonial Communists. They depend to a large extent on what they can capture from the enemy. As the CP Philippines put it, "our main source of weapons ultimately is Washington. . . ." In some cases the Party may have appreciable quantities of arms left over from the anti-Japanese resistance. In Greece, the Party had free access for some time to weapons produced in the neighboring satellites. The CP China is expected to provide arms and ammunition in quantity to the insurgents in Indochina when it can afford to do so, and may do the same for the Communists in Burma. 89. The Party may be able to buy some arms in the general black market and from corrupt Government troops. Communists in the Greek Army in the early stages of the in- surrection there furnished some arms to the guerrillas by deserting with as many weapons as they could carry. The CP Philippines hoped in the final stages of its revolution to be able to subvert Government troops and get them to bring over their heavy weapons for the Party. 90. One difficulty is that the colonial Party's arms are of many different sizes and types.. This means that ammunition supply is complicated and Communist fire-power often very limited. The CP Malaya set up armorers' shops in safe areas where disparate ammuni- tion could be refitted and weapons repaired. Bombs, mines, and general explosives are also manufactured by the Communists in safe areas. (The CP Philippines had a Technological Group of specialists at its headquarters for the production of such weapons.) The Party is sometimes able to establish arsenals across the frontier: for example, the Buljkes camp of the CP Greece; the Viet Minh forces in Indo-China were at one time reported to have had shops in Thailand. III. THE COMMUNIST RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION A. OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS 91. Communist Parties in countries overrun by the Axis during the last War carried on military and political resistance to the occupation forces. The Communist aims were-- (a) to render maximum assistance to the USSR by harassing her Axis enemies; (b) to strength- en the Party for the resumption of the class struggle in the postwar period. Tactically and organizationally, the Communist military resistance was similar to the Communist armed uprising in colonial countries. The Parties began fighting with limited Party membership and limited mass support. The Communist aim was to harass the enemy, not to overwhelm him, or even, in the first stages, to attack his forces directly. Fighting formations were generally small and were not closely controlled by a central headquarters in their operations. Guerrilla tactics.were used, and safe bases were established where possible. 92. The fighting resistance, begun by small forces, attracted numerous non-Commu- nists who were moved by patriotism. In some countries, the Communist Party rallied so many supporters and built up such a good military force that it was able to turn the resistance struggle into an armed insurrection after the Axis forces had been driven out. In other coun- tries, although unable to turn immediately to an insurrectionary effort, the Parties emerged from the resistance with greatly enhanced political prestige and with reserves of trained fighters who could be used in an insurrection when conditions became favorable. 93. Communist resistance was not exclusively military. The Parties also carried on political resistance and economic sabotage: Political resistance: agitation against the enemy; encouraging sabotage of occupation administration by passive non-cooperation and inhibiting cooperation on the part of those inclined to submit; stimulating minor political unrest--protest demonstrations, slow-down movements in production, violation of commodity control procedures. Economic Sabotage: organization of secret sabotage groups in productive centers, utilities, etc. to damage equipment, waste materials, cause snarls in production traffic, produce faulty materials, etc. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information Military Resistance: creation of a military force to make attacks on enemy forces, insta ations, and supply lines for purposes of weakening morale of occupation troops; to make it more difficult to realize full economic and military value of the occupation; to make it necessary for the enemy to divert forces to militarily unproductive duties, etc.; aid Allied armies by providing intelligence and limited tactical support. 94. In non-industrial countries, the Parties concentrated largely on military resist- ance. It was more profitable for them to do so, and terrain and other factors made it possi- ble to establish and hold the safe-bases necessary to substantial military operations. 95. In industrial countries the Communists divided their efforts among military, political, and economic resistance, not only because it was most profitable in political terms and in terms of how much it benefited the USSR, but also, because it was practically impos- sible to build up and hold areas safe enough and large enough for serious military operations. 96. It is difficult to gauge the actual effectiveness of Communist military resistance. There is no question but that the military and economic resistance carried out in France was of considerable help to the Western Allies, but it is impossible to say how much of this was owing to the Communists. The military resistance of the Soviet Partisans was probably of even more help to the Red Army: it kept large numbers of German troops busy in protecting duties, deprived the Germans of a large share of needed agricultural produce, interfered with German military communications, assisted the intelligence work of the Red Army and other Soviet agencies, and was of some use in direct tactical support of advancing Red Army forces when the Germans retreated. B. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE 97. In the countries where the Party concentrated on military resistance, the bulk of the Party was put on a military footing and a single or several safe-bases were organized. Offices of the political apparatus of the Party were transformed into central and area (mili- tary) staffs. Most of the fighting formations were composed of "regulars" (i.e., full-time guerrillas). 98. In occupied industrial countries, where military resistance was less exclusively the form of resistance engaged in, only a portion of the Party was put on a military footing and the remainder was employed in other forms of resistance action (political action, econo- mic sabotage). Fighting units were more often made up of "irregulars" (i.e., part-time fighters). 99. The =Party often carried on military resistance in the name of a "roof" organi- zation ("liberation front," etc.) which included forces of non-Communist organizations. The Party tried to get full control of such fronts. When it could not, it was sometimes obliged to accept general direction from the (non-Communist) headquarters of the organization (Italy), or it accepted only nominal direction, actually retaining full organizational and operational independence (e.g., the relationship of the FTPF of the CP France to the National Council of Resistance). 100. Initial military resistance complements were obtained in the following ways: a. The Party set up organizing committees in the offices of the political apparatus to mobilize able Party members: assigned cadres to take command of military groups, arranged for arming them and sending them into military opera- tonal bases in the countryside (e.g., the "War Commissions" set up by the CP Yugoslavia on a national and on Regional and District levels). b. The Party dispatched individual organizers and organizing teams to the field to take over already existing resistance formations (Greece, Italy). c. Outside agencies sometimes assisted the Parties to set up and maintain mili- tary resistance forces: In the USSR, agents of the Party, Red Army, and State Security services stayed behind or were sent into occupied areas to organize fighting resistance units. - 19 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information In Malaya, the British and the Party cooperated to organize forces prior to the Japanese invasion, and the British Army later sent organizing iiTf 1 nical advisory teams to aid the Communist guerrillas. 101. Some Parties (Yugoslavia, France, Italy) had a mobilizable nucleus of men who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. Considerable numbers of soldiers and officers of the state army defeated by the Axis also joined the Communist guerrilla forces in some countries (Yugoslavia in particular). 102. Parties that had had considerable experience in underground operations (France, Yugoslavia, Greece) had some advantage over non-Communist organizations in establishing their first resistance bands. The non-Communists, particularly in France, were more dis- turbed by the repressive measures taken by the occupying forces. The Communist Party, which already had workable secret communications lines, contacts, safehouses, and cadres who know how to work effectively and still preserve their own freedom, was able to establish active guerrilla bands as soon as its policy made it profitable to do so. On the other hand, in Italy, where the Party had been thoroughly repressed for years, it had not been able to preserve its cadres and may have been unable to organize a central resistance staff independ- ent of non-Communist organizations. 103. Additional recruits were obtained by the organizational and propaganda efforts of underground political organs of the Party and the political resistance fronts established by it; by the actions of the fighting units themselves; and by getting control of spontaneously formed groups and of those organized by non-Communists. The CP France, for example, published instructions to patriotic youths to form their own groups and carry on actions that would quickly get the attention of regular FTPF cadres, who would then get in touch with the new bands. One strong reason why the Party was always anxious to obtain supplies from the Allies was the fact that deguate ar a jpents and other_ supplies were a good recruitirng_a - ment. C. STAFFS 104. The Party created staffs to control and give technical support to the combat for- mations. Tactical formations had their own command staffs, and staffs were organized on an area basis also, to coordinate the operations of tactical formation's within the area. Staffs were manned by Party members as far as possible, but non-Communists were also utilized in tactical command positions, under close political supervision of Party cadres. In countries where the Party concentrated rather exclusively on military resistance, regular organs (com- mittees and working offices of committees) of the political apparatus were converted into military staffs; for example, the Political Bureau, or a part of it, became a General Head- quarters, while a Regional Committee would transform itself into a regional military staff. In France, a central Staff and various lower area staffs were organized parallel to the politi- cal apparatus, which was retained, but independent of it below the Inter-Region (7) level. It is possible that a similar practice was followed by the Party in other countries where the re- sistance effort was divided among political, military, and economic resistance activities. The organizational pattern should not be viewed as having been mechanically applied by the Party. The political apparatus of the Party continued to exist, trimmed down to underground operations, in areas held by the enemy even in countries where the military resistance was by far the most important effort of the Party. Committees of the political apparatus that were converted to military staff duties were sometimes revamped prior to the conversion, with a view. to the most efficient utilization of specialist cadres: men were assigned and reassigned according to their talents and the military needs of the moment. Special organizing commit- tees were sometimes created by higher headquarters of the Party's political apparatus to go to an area and instruct the area committee in the setting up of military staffs and to super- vise personnel selections made by the area committee. In at least one case (Philippines), the headquarters of the military resistance was set up and manned by a regional committee of the Party, the reason being that that particular regional committee (Central Luzon Committee) had assumed the leadership of the whole Party when the members of the normal headquarters organ were arrested by the Japanese. 105. Communist resistance staffs had approximately the same composition as Commu- nist insurrectionary staffs in colonial countries. Technical services were represented in the General Headquarters and in lower area staffs, and in the case of large, safely-based forces, -20- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information in higher tactical command staffs (Division, Brigade) as well. Political Commissars were customarily attached to area and larger tactical command staffs. A typical General Head- quarters, duplicated in most respects by higher area staffs, would have the following com- positon: Commander Political Commissar Vice-Commander Supply Officer Communications Officer Intelligence Officer Ordnance Officer Administrative Officer Medical Officer D. TACTICAL FORMATIONS 106. The size, shape, and articulation of military units used tactically depended upon particular missions, capabilities of the military resistance as a whole, and the degree to which the Party concentrated its efforts on the military resistance form. In countries where military resistance was most important and safe bases had been established, Brigades and even Divisions were employed. In France, on the other hand, most attacks were made by squads and platoons. In general, enemy strength being what it was, it was found impractical to try to use elements larger than a Brigade in a tactical operation. The Hualahaps of the CP Philippines, for example, suffered a devastating loss when they concentrated large numbers in a single area where the Japanese found it profitable to attack in force and to em- ploy aircraft against them. Even when relatively large units were used in an operation, it was customary to stick to guerrilla tactics, and the effect was more that of a number of small .units taking part in the operation under fairly loose control, rather than of a closely coordi- nated action of an orthodox large unit. 107. As in the Communist colonial insurrection, there were both "regular" (full-time) and "irregular" (part-time) units in the Communist resistance armies. In the FTPF in France, for example, the "francs-tireurs" were people who lived outwardly peaceful lives in the villages and towns and who came together on call to carry out operations, returning to their homes when the mission was completed. The "partisans," on the other hand, were people who lived in small camps in the woods and who were full-time guerrillas. The Chi- nese Communists organized both full-time resistance forces and "irregulars" (the People's Militia, which furnished intelligence to the regular units, did sentry duty, acted as guides and stretcher bearers for the regulars, and carried out harassing operations against isolated Japanese strong-points). The seizure and maintenance of a safe base does not mean the end of recruitment and utilization of irregular forces in areas under full or partial enemy control: the Yugoslav Partisans continued to raise part-time detachments outside the safe-base area for harassing operations at the same time that their regular units were making larger attacks out of the safe base. Irregular units were often organized for defense, as well as support functions: the SAP's in Italy and the People's Militia in China stood guard while farmers brought in their crops for the resistance; the Soviet Partisans also organized self-defense groups among the peasants for the same purpose. In France, the Party organized armed de- fense groups within the organizations of the political apparatus itself to protect demonstrators. secret installations (headquarters, safe houses, printing plants, etc.) in an attempt to relieve the FTPF military formations of such tasks. 108. Party Control of Tactical Units. The Communists tried to draw as many people as possible into t eir military resistance 1n-many cases this meant that the ranks of the tactical formations were predominantly non-Communist. A control problem existed. Even in coun- tries where the Party was large, as in France, it has difficulty finding sufficient reliable cadres to take command assignments. In some countries it was necessary to put non- Communists in charge of large tactical formations and even on important staffs. Wherever possible, Communists with military talents or experience were given command assignments, but sheer military necessity dictated the utilization of able non-Communist military personnel to the fullest extent. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 109. Control was exercised in the resistance force by the same methods as in the Communist colonial insurrection: reliable Party members were put in charge of central and area staffs which perforce? often contained some non-Communists; Political Commissars were assigned to tactical formations as a check on the military commanders; an effort was made to indoctrinate the non-Communists in Communist principles. It is interesting to note that the Communist revolutionary line was deliberately played down in the Soviet Partisans, while patriotism was played up: this may have been the case in other Communist military resistance forces also, but probably to a lesser extent.l 110. Local committees of the underground political apparatus of the Party in areas of resistance-fighting had a share in the direction of resistance formations. Details on this relationship are lacking, but It is believed that underground political functionaries often as- signed tactical missions to the resistance formations, took part in operational planning with the military staffs, and when communications between the latter and higher military head- quarters were broken, exercised general control over the units (see Soviet Partisans). 111. The tightness of centralized control varied from one country to another. Commu- nications, availability of Party cadres, and the existence of an underground political apparatus determined the extent of centralization of control. The development of the Soviet Partisans, for example, illustrates the variations: they began with small isolated units under the in- dependent control of individual commanders (Red Army stragglers, "stay-behind" or infil-. trated agents of the Soviet Government or CP); gradually banded together into "Partisan Unions," which established communications with other groups and with the Soviet authorities in unoccupied countries, but which did not act as tactical units; eventually came under the control of a central staff for the Partisan forces, through area staffs set up in unoccupied sectors of the front; and in the final stages, during the Red Army offensive, were utilized in direct support of Red Army commands and then incorporated into the Red Army as it swept forward. 112. Conversely, in Italy, where cadres were scarce and the political apparatus of the Party within the country sketchy at best, the Communist resistance forces appear to have been unable to establish a centralized direction under strict Party control and were dependent upon Allied command-communications nets for their direction. 113. Some provision was undoubtedly made for the coordinated direction of formations created, to handle special assignments (intelligence squads and nets, terror squads, industrial sabotage groups, etc.). In the FTPF, control of these groups was in the hands of the Political Commissar of the Inter-Regional FTPF staff. In the Yugoslav Partisans, the underground organs of the political apparatus in German-held areas controlled such special groups, while others were directed by the intelligence service of the Partisan organization. In the USSR, headquarters of several governmental agencies (NKVD, NKGB, NKO) controlled some of them, while the political apparatus of the Party may have controlled others. E. ORGANIZATION OF SPECIALIZED UNITS 114. The groups organized for special duties were created and controlled by the Com- munist military resistance organization directly, by underground organs of the political ap- paratus in enemy-held areas, by auxiliaries and fronts of the Party, and, in the case of the USSR, by agencies of the government. The FTPF in France had its own specialist squads (Grow es Speciaux for documenta- tion, sabotage, assassinations, reinforcements) and services (a service for receiving and caching materiel parachuted by the Allies, an intelligence service, and a technical apparatus for making and caching materiel). In Yugoslavia, an intelligence service was set up under the Central Committee of the Party. It operated in liberated areas as a security service independent of the military formation, "information centers" within the formations, and sent intelligence teams behind enemy lines. 1 The Vichy Police remarked that many people were involved in Front National activities without knowing that it was a Communist organization: the same situation may have existed in the FTPF. - 22 - SECRET - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information The Partisan commands also sent reconnaissance teams (five-man groups called "petorkas") across the lines for tactical intelligence. The underground political apparatus of the Party in German-held areas also organized small sabotage and terror squads. In Italy, the terror squads called GAPS's (r_ uppo Azione Patriotico) were organ- ized, ized, but it is not known whether they were under the control of nearby partisan (Garibaldi) formations or some other directing apparatus. The CP Malaya organized Mobile Killer Squads (LTT's) during the Japanese occupa- tion, but, as in the case of Italy, it is not known exactly how these terror groups were con- trolled. (It may be guessed that the underground organizations of the political apparatus con- trolled them, for the Party had not been suppressed in Malaya to the extent that it had in Italy, and it had a considerable network of underground Party organizations and fronts from which to draw recruits and maintain coordinating communications.) F. SERVICE FUNCTIONS 115. The Communists organized supporting functions for their military resistance formations; Intelligence, Communications, Supply. 116. Intelligence. The Communist resistance forces needed tactical information on the enemy for their own defense and for tactical planning, just as do the insurrectionary forces in colonial countries. In the case of resistance, however, two additional factors in- fluenced the extent to which the Communists engaged in and organized intelligence services: (a) information of no immediate. tactical value to the resistance was valuable to the Allies during the war, and to a certain extent, was systematically obtained and transmitted to them, (b) in industrial countries, such-as France, the Communist resistance needed economic, political, administrative, and technological information to carry on rational political and eco- nomic resistance operations. For these reasons, extensive intelligence systems were organ- ized by the resistance armies or other Communist organizations. The Allies sent liaison teams into many countries to assist the Communist resistance and to receive its intelligence product. 117. Tactical Intelligence. For the production of purely military tactical intelligence, the Communist forces organized. reconnaissance teams and set up chains of informants in the countryside and a system of reporting places. The Party tried to "saturate" the area of op- erations with civilian reporters, utilizing all political organizations at its disposal. For practical purposes, this sort of intelligence collection for resistance operations was similar to that in postwar colonial insurrections. 118. Non-tactical Intelligence. For the production of industrial, economic, political, and strategic military intelligence, the Communists often organized special intelligence serv- ices, consisting of secret agents and informants in key places. Thus, the People's Commis- sariat for State Security (NKGB) of the USSR dispatched agents into enemy-occupied areas to set up networks for the collection of strategic intelligence. This was in addition to the regu- lar intelligence service of the Partisan military forces, the "Intelligence Administration" (RU) of the central Partisan staff and the "Intelligence Sections" (RO's) of lower Partisan staffs down to Brigade level. The latter produced intelligence of immediate utility, but also furnish- ed information of value to the higher agencies of the Soviet Government, and this was trans- mitted by radio and other means across enemy lines to the interested agency. 119. It has been alleged by the French Communists that their resistance intelligence service ("Service B") furnished strategic intelligence of considerable value to the Allies. The validity of this claim may be questioned, but it is certainly true that the French Party had numerous channels open to it for the obtaining of such information. For example, a detailed "Questionnaire" was prepared by the CP France for information on production and lay-out of French chemical factories. Party members, sympathizers, members of the political resist- ance organizations collected such information directly or from their friends, and put it into Party channels. 120. The Communists had especially favorable opportunities for penetration of state and enemy agencies during the resistance period, because the Germans had to employ large numbers of the local people as interpreters and to carry on administrative and policing work. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information The Soviets made considerable use of this situation, sending agents disguised as anti-Soviets into the various offices of the occupation authority, labor services, production control offices, etc. The French Communists also achieved some success in this regard: Vichy police re- cords contain many cases of policemen arrested for Communist activities. 121. In Yugoslavia, the Partisan intelligence service gradually took over political se- curity functions in liberated areas, and even beofr-ethe Germans had evacuated the country, was transformed into a state secret political police organization, later known as OZNA. 122. Communications. Communist resistance forces relied heavily upon couriers for communications. Regular courier services were organized, either by the political apparatus or the military force itself. The best supplied organizations had extensive radio and some- times telephone nets. The Allies provided the equipment for communications abroad with the liaison teams they despatched to the resistance organizations. The Soviet Partisans had reg- ular radio communications with each other and with the Partisan staffs on the Soviet side of the lines. They also sent messages across the line by dog, pigeon, courier, and airplane. The Communists were sometimes able to capture enemy communications equipment and put it to use: the Chinese, for example, had radio and land-line networks consisting largely of captured equipment. 123. Supplies. In "backward" countries, where the Communists concentrated on mili- tary resistance, they supplied their units in much the same way as they have been doing in the colonial insurrections: by foraging and contributions (voluntary or extorted) by civilians, and by capture of enemy supplies. The Allies furnished several of the Communist resistance organizations by parachute drops and coastal smuggling. The Soviet government even landed planes loaded with all sorts of supplies (ordnance, technical equipment, clothing, morale- building items) in Partisan-held areas in the USSR. In some cases, the resistance forces obtained weapons and other supplies abandoned by the defeated state armies (the British in Malaya, the Americans in the Philippines). 124. It was customary for the Communists to set up secret weapons - producing and repair shops. In backward countries, these were located within the safe-base area. In France, the FTPF had special groups responsible for making arms, explosives, etc. in safe houses and for caching them. The French Communists were also able to get civilian labora- tories to secretly manufacture explosives, mines, booby-traps, etc. G. POST-LIBERATION DISPOSITION OF MILITARY RESISTANCE STRENGTH 125. The Communist Parties did not neglect to consider the possibilities their resist- ance forces offered for action when the enemy should be defeated. In Yugoslavia, Greece, Philippines, and the USSR, the Communist forces began military attacks on anti-Communist resistance forces even before the Axis troops had been driven out of the country. In some cases, these operations were comparatively small; in others, they represented clear attempts by the Party to leave itself an open field for a revolution, and were quite bloody. The Yugo- slav Partisans, backed up by the Soviet Army, were able to complete this monopolization of military power and to take over the government. The Greek resistance force (ELAS) also systematically began to attack rival resistance organizations before the liberation, and was in an excellent position to seize the government power when the Germans evacuated: such an attempt was made shortly after the liberation, but was frustrated by the forceful presence and action of British troops. 126. During the liberation campaign, many of the Parties tried to complement their regular military resistance operations by creating "people's militia" which were intended to seize local civil administrations as soon as the enemy had abandoned them. In most countries these Party-inspired, self-appointed police carried on brutal reprisals against people who had collaborated with the enemy, or whom the Communists considered dangerous and therefore liquidated under the pretex of "collaborationism." In some countries, the Communist attempts were quickly frustrated as Allied forces moved in in strength and liquidated the local admini- strations. The forces liberating Paris encountered difficulties with the Communist "militia" that would have been much more serious had it not been for the fact that the Allied military campaign had been so rapid and the Communist unable to make adequate preparations, and that the non-Communist resistance organizations managed to command sufficient public sup- port. ~W %M01 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 w SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information As in Yugoslavia, the Chinese Communists resumed their revolutionary campaign ccessfully when the enemy had been driven out. In China, the occupation of Manchuria by oviet forces checked the possibility of the Nationalist Government's re-occupying that area and gave the Communists a decisive material advantage in the ensuing revolutionary cam- paign. 128. In countries where the Communist resistance forces were faced with Allied oc- cupation, rather than Soviet, the Parties did what they could to preserve their military strength for possible future use in revolution. The CP Philippines managed to retain the cadres of its Hukbalahap in small guerrilla bands in the mountains. The CP Greece, having failed in its insurrection following the liberation, began shipping as many of its resistance fighters as possible to camps established in the mountains and in the neighboring "New De- mocracies." In France, Italy, and Malaya, the Parties enrolled as many of its fighters as possible in controlled veterans' associations. Wherever possible, the Communists hid their best arms away for future use. 129. The resistance veterans' associations represent a major portion of the Commu- nist military reserves. In Malaya, the association was utilized by the Party to mobilize the forces for the insurrection that began in 1948. In Italy, the Party-controlled veterans asso- ciation, ANPI, has been a major factor in the general political strength of the Party; has been utilized to spark Communist demonstrations, and its offices have been used as contact places for Communist strong-arm elements. The local para-military organizations, such as the Garibaldi Clubs, that made their existence felt during the unrest following the elections of 1948 and the attempted assassination of Togliatti, were recruited from ANPI members, and ANPI may be used systema1icahy"as cover -for their activities. H. USE OF RESISTANCE BANDS IN KOREAN WAR. 130. The pattern of organization for Communist resistance forces has been followed in the use of Communist guerrilla units in South Korea. To their use, however, has been added another function: support of an invading Communist army. In deployment they most closely resemble the resistance operations of the Chinese Communist Party, which is natural, in view of the probable training of Korean Communists with the CCP forces. It has been estimated that a_cadre of 1700 trained2ersonnel provided the hard core for the South Korean Guerrilla forces, which in January 1951 reached a peak of 37,500. South Korean guerrilla units can be classified into four broad categories, according to their functions: a. specially organized and trained personnel infiltrated individually or as small units; b. irregular county and other local volunteer groups; c. stragglers and remnants of the North Korean Army cut off from the main body and forced to resort to guerrilla tactics for self-preservation. d. professional bandit groups. 131. The organization) structure of the guerrilla units is not known in any detail, al- though, as in all Communist resistance forces, it is probably very flexible. There is some evidence which indicates the possible existence of a 1st North Korean Guerrilla Corps of 5-10 brigades, each with 10-20 battalions of approximately 100 men each. Other reports iden- tify three guerrilla brigades (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd). 132. The guerrilla units appear to be subordinated to the regular North Korean Army units when the latter is in an area in which the guerrillas exist. This is also similar to the Chinese pattern. Communications are believed to pass from the General Headquarters Staff of the North Korean People's Army, through the regular North Korean units and to the guer- rilla groups, although direct communication between the General Headquarters and the guer- rilla formation is not unusual. 133. In most other respects, the guerrilla operations in South Korea were standard -- their missions and tactics were similar to those in other colonial resistance operations, their arms supply depended on capture of enemy equipment: as could be expected, only 30-40% of the forces were equipped with arms, and supplies were either, captured, requisitioned or plundered. - 25 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 134. It is significant that immediately prior to the North Korean invasion the activity of the South Korean guerrillas showed a marked decrease, possibly the result of a "lie-low" signal from North Korean General Headquarters. IV. COMMUNIST CITY INSURRECTION A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION 135. Differences between the Proletarian and Colonial Revolutions. The Communist revolution in an advanced industrial country differs radically from the revolution in a colonial country: a. The class on which the Party depends for the mass of the revolution is the class of city workers (proletariat). b. The regime in industrial countries is technically much stronger than in colo- nial countries: it possesses strong, maneuverable, and experienced military forces and a comprehensive police system; it commands transport and communi- cations facilities and can swiftly shift its forces about to squash uprisings as they occur. c. For these reasons, the Qtrate y of the Communists in advanced countries is the verse of the colonial strategy: armed action is not undertaken in the be- ginning of the revolution as a means of expanding the limited political basis, and weakening the enemy by attrition, but is rather, the climax of a period of political and organizational preparation. d. The proletarian revolution consists of, first, the maximal organizational build-up of the Communist Party and the accumulation of preponderant mass sup- port; and then, the conversion of this support to an armed uprising in which the places and institutions of power are seized and the regime defeated at once. 136. Success in the armed insurrection depends upon many factors, the most important being -- a. Favorable "objective conditions;" producing mass support for the Party and weakening the authority and power of the regime: economic dislocations (unem- ployment, inflation, disruption of supply system), political frictions (inability of non-Communist parties to agree on remedies of problems, factionalism within parties and government), break down of general morale (cynicism, corruption, defeats in war, continual pressures from abroad). b. Preponderant political strength of the Communist Party: numerically strong mass following; or relatively small following, but neutralization of regime's political support. c. Extent to which masses are convinced that a real revolution is possible and are willing to support it (not merely general discontent which could be satisfied by reforms). This is the measure of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda. It involves "isolating" and "discrediting" the previously accepted leaders of the regime and its parties and workers organizations supporting it; "exposing" all of them as enemies of the workers and as plotting to deprive the workers of their just rewards; setting up the Party as the only true and consistent champion of the class; and convincing the workers that only through a revolution can the evils be abolished. d. Extent to which the secret Party organization within the government's defen- sive forces has succeeded in subverting them--in neutralizing them or getting them to come out in active support of the uprising. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 (POWERO STAr/oN SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information e. The large number of places (targets of the insurrection) that the Party is capable of taking in a present-day advanced country. In addition to the above pri- mary operations, armed groups will have also to carry out many secondary op- erations in order to get into position to take, and then to hold, the critical objec- tives (e.g., bridges, key buildings, intersections, etc.). Schematically, the targets of military insurrectionary operations might be shown as follows: 0 ARMY Pos r y R w CcAtK O GENDARMERIE. ? 0 POST =.feconc~4vy 06. ecti/e~ 0 ^ 0 U Offices M o 0 0 t O o 0 ? P.01 + Railway cenie/ 0 00 0 0 W POST 0 0 0 0 0 0 f. The ability of the Party to activate, deploy and coordinate the hundreds of operational actions necessary to take and hold all of these objectives. This re- quires the establishment of a central and many subordinate insurrectionary head- quarters, involving the services of a large number of well grounded and politically reliable cadres. -27- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 0 t O AIRf /E12D 00 CAPITAL Cl TY POST Go~crnmeht -I- MOTOR POo' 0 ^ - ?_s aANX ? 0 O 0 ^ o ^ 0 0#O 0 0 o0f? 5 0 0 o POLICE 0 - NEWS- + ^PAPE 0 0 POWER STATION ^ a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 137. It is difficult to say how the CP weighs these factors relative to each other when it is making the decision for an insurrection. Outstanding advantage in one respect may per- mit the Party to go ahead when other advantages are lacking. However, the numerical strength of the Party is seemingly considered less important than the others: if this were not so, the CP's France and Italy would probably have carried out insurrectionary attempts in the postwar period. It is also unlikely that a Party would begin an uprising in these times without having gone far in the work of subverting the government's defensive forces. If any generalized conclusion can be drawn, it is that the Party is probably more influenced by the weakness it sees in the regime (including the effects of systematic subversion by the Com- munists) than it is by the "revolutionary fervor of the masses" or by the number. of armed units it is able to muster. The Party has no magic calculator to produce completely accurate estimates of any of these factors. Its success rests upon the ability of the top leadership, which makes the de- cision, which is just as prone to miscalculation as are non-Marxists, and which can fumble a revolution when the odds are in the Party's favor, or can achieve success against adverse conditions. 138. The degree to which the Party is able to meet these requirements for success depends upon the preparations it makes prior to the insurrection. In periods of social stabil- ity the Party makes long-range general preparations by way of developing its organizational discipline, giving its cadres practical experience in general mass political and organizing work (including the handling of large groups of people in demonstrations, etc.), training specialists in insurrectionary tactics, etc., and by way of planting its organization in places of strategic and tactical importance to the insurrection (key factories and plants, arsenals, warehouses, communications centers and facilities, -etc.). When social conditions become unstable, these long-range preparations begin to pay off: the disciplined apparatus is in a position to exploit difficulties to best advantage and to organize the workers into revolutionary formations. 139. Specific practical preparations for the insurrection are made also during the period of "revolutionary calm" and are stepped up In the period of instability. These include the selection and assignment of cadres to secret insurrectionary planning and subversion staffs and to skeleton military formations. Practical preparations will be discussed in further detail. B. ORGANIZATION OF MASS SUPPORT 140. Accumulation of mass support, with emphasis on the workers, is the continuing occupation of the Party. In a "revolutionary situation, " the organizational groundwork laid down begins to pay off--the Party organizations in factories and trade unions are able - to win additional workers and are able to get control of workers' organizations. This, however, is not enough. The success of the insurrection hinges upon the organization of political support for the CP on the. broadest possible basis. 141. To secure maximum support for the uprising, therefore, the Party will make use of some broad outside (front) organization- -one that musters other classes (peasants, lower middle class) and that provides the Party with a headquarters that can be set up as a revolu- tionary government if necessary. It may be an organization already in existence that the Party has penetrated and got under its control (e.g., the Soviets in Russia), or a front organi- zation created by the Party in non-revolutionary times, or one especially inverted for the in- surrection (e.g., the A.N.L. in Brazil, 1935). Through such an organization the CP can at once broaden and conceal its revolutionary appeal. The ultimate is the seizure of power in the name .of government itself, which is what happened in Czechoslovakia. (The Party and its controlled central labor union demanded nationalization of all industries and direct labor participation in the Government. Non- Communist Ministers made the terrible blunder of resigning in protest, and the Communist Ministers simply prevented their return and forced substitution of dupes and fellow-travellers.) -28- SECRET . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 `1r' *me SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 142. Ideally, a usable extra-Party mass organization for the uprising would have these characteristics: a. Broad appeal: capable of assimilating wide sections of the population, cutting across local and class partitions; b. Appearance of legitimacy: the workers can be convinced that. the front is the rightful authority (e.g., the position of the soviets in Russia in 1917); c. Strategic coverage: the front commands support in the main cities,. parti- cularly in the capital; d. Effective Party control over the headquarters and lower organs of the front; e. Revolutionary aura: the front orginated in a revolutionary movement (e.g., the soviets arose during the February Revolution). 143. Party Control. Establishment of effective Party control over the mass revolu- tionary.organization is done from below or from above; the Party wins control over an al- ready existing organization or creates one under its initial control. The Bolsheviks, for ex- ample, got control of the workers', soviets by winning individual factories and being elected by the workers as representatives to the soviet, first in the workers' districts, and then in the major cities. The role of the Party during the resistance was very important in many countries in securing for it control of the workers' organizations (particularly, of the leading trade union federations in Italy and France). 144. Propaganda Support. The campaign to get control of the mass organizatio supported by the propaganda tactics of the Party. In the period of instability the pro gan a line is revolutionary in two respects; (a) it is fundamentally and clearly hostile to th ing social system and its government; (b) it is distinctly hostile to the parties and organi- zations competing with the CP for the workers' allegiance. The attack on the regime consists of setting up the utopian program of the Party; making demands for "reforms" that are im- possible under existing conditions or that would lead to the weakening or dereliction of power by the government, making open -demands for a revolution. The attack on individual rival political parties and their leaders and policies are aimed at (a) causing them to break with the regime; or (b) to go further to the Right, thereby "exposing" their "real" anti-labor sentiments; or (c) to make concessions further destructive of the economy and political stability of the country. 145. Slogans. The propaganda campaign is carried on by the Communist press, by agitation teams, calling of meetings, demonstrations, strikes, etc. The appeal is put out in slogans that have vital appeal to fundamental desires of the workers ("peace," higher wages, privileges for the workers, lower prices, abolition of wage controls, workers control of in- dustry, production and distribution, or a greater share in economic decisions etc.) 146. Testing the Mass Temper. During the developing revolutionary situation the temper of the masses is tested and raised by leading the workers into actions progressively more challenging to the regime: demonstrations, small strikes, larger strikes, particularly sit-down strikes, which give the workers a taste of taking a portion of power (property); armed demonstrations and riots; finally, the general strike. 147. The General Strike. The Party need not specifically call for a general strike, but it will always produce an equivalent when it tries an insurrection. (The Bolsheviks did not call a general strike, in 1917, but the effect was the same: the insurrection itself closed down all the factories). The leader of the CP Germany, Brandler, called off the projected 1923 revolution when he failed to get socialist support for a general strike. The CP Brazil failed in its 1935 attempt partly because it was unable to produce a widestrike movement. In tactical terms, a general strike or its equivalent has the following effects: a. It brings workers out of plants and into streets: causes confusion, impedes police action, etc.; -29- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information b. Organized insurrectionary forces are given an opportunity to act on the un- organized workers, who are at loose ends; c. Strike action at key plants is used to spark insurrectionary seizure of plants; d. Strikes give Party a chance to observe government countermeasures (effec- tiveness and weak spots) in action and make appropriate changes in plans and organization and in tactics; 148. A general strike movement may be undertaken without positive preponderant workers control. (See,, for example, the October 1950 strike movement of the CP Austria.) In some cases, a general strike may be called primarily as a test, but with the idea that if it goes well, the movement will be carried forward to an insurrection. The ability of the Party to carry the movement just so far, without going over into a premature uprising or without causing serious setbacks for the revolutionary temper, is dependent upon a variety of factors (extent of control, general temper, astuteness of CP strike leaders, capabilities of govern- ment, etc.) 149. The General Task. It is necessary at the time of the uprising to translate the general mass political support- -expressed in elections, strike movements, demonstrations, etc.--into military form: the conversion of political organizations into military organizations, the integration of masses into the skeleton military apparatus of the Party, and arming them. The process will be described in more detail below. C. SUBVERTING THE DEFENSES OF THE GOVERNMENT 150. The armed security services of the government are not insulated from the general situation. The political and organizing work carried on by the Party among the workers is supplemented by work carried on to defect the soldiers, police, sailors, genarmerie, etc. from support of the government. It has long been understood by Communist theorists that the armed. state services will have to be neutralized before the insurrection begins, for the forces of the workers will be numerically and technically much inferior to those of the state. The work of neutralizing- -either achieving an actual neutrality of the state arms, or winning them over to active participation in the insurrection- -is achieved by: building up a Party organization within the services (as in Russia and Brazil) or getting control of the government offices in charge of them (as in Czechoslovakia). 151. "Military Work." The building up of a Party organization in the armed and secu- rity services has been a requirement for all Parties for many years. One of the "21 Condi- tions" for admission to the Comintern specified that the Parties do this work, and later i - national resolutions and writings emphasized its importance. It is called "Military work is discussed in some detail in Section V below. The following are, briefly, the essentials. a. CP's establish an organ to direct penetration and subsequent organization in the state forces as part of the long-range preparations (i.e., in quite stable times). This organ is a small, secret body under top Party control and is often called the "military" or "anti-military committee," "commission," "section," or "depart- ment." The Communist youth organization is sometimes given responsibility for military work, and always plays some part in it. b. Organizing work in particular military commands is carried out by Commu- nists who form secret cells and receive instructions from a responsible for the work connected with a lower civilian Party committee (i.e., state, regional, city, etc.); c. The work of the organization consists of agitation and propaganda aimed at subverting the loyalty or confidence in the state of maximum numbers of troops. At the time of the insurrection, where the work has been effective, the Party organization will seize command of the unit and hold it to the insurrectionary con- trol or cause mutinies and partial refusals to obey or to carry out anti-revolu- tionary operations effectively; - 30 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information d. the military organization may also furnish operational intelligence and arms to the insurrection and, conversely, deprive loyal defensive forces of their arms. e. In special circumstances, special non-Communist organizations may already exist, facilitating the defection of armed services masses in the same way as they do in the workers' centers (e.g., the fortuitous existence of the unit committees and soldiers' soviets in Russia.) These special organizations need only be cap- tured by the CP to become effective instruments of subversion. f . In periods of enhanced CP prestige and political strength CP France in the immediate post-liberation period) the "subversion" can e( carried out openly through the activities of CP nuclei in armed and security forces, which may be organized into thinly disguised fronts. The effectiveness of military work in an insurrection was demonstrated in the Bol- shevik revolution in Petrograd, where all but 1-2,000 of the city army garrison was neutral- ize Inadequate work was demonstrated in the Brazilian uprising of 1935. 152. The effect of penetration and subversion from above was clear in the Prague coup of 1948: the Army was neutralized by the Minister of Defense, a fellow-traveler; the bulk of the state police was neutralized, and some units were actually put at the service of the Party, by the Communist Minister of the Interior. D. MILITARY PREPARATIONS 153. Preparations for the military conduct of the insurrection consist of- of planning, tactical coordinating, and service organs; (b) creation, arming, and mobilizing ian insurrectionary force. The latter is discussed further below. 154. Planning Organs. The Party established an organ to make concrete plans for the insurrectionary operations--for assessing target installations and considering tactical ap- proaches and requirements for each; for locating assembly places, communications and staff centers; arms, ammunition, and transport centers, etc. In the early days, this was not done until a revolutionary situation had already developed and a decision had been made for the uprising. For example, the plans for the Petrograd insurrection of 1917 were not even begun to be made until less than a week beforehand; plans for operations in the 1923 German project were made during the summer, several weeks prior to the target date. From what evidence is available, it would appear that during recent years plans for uprisings are. being made well in advance. (See, for example, the premature operations car- ried out in Italy in 1948). Obviously, such plans could not be complete, for the course of actual events would determine many details; however, the main outlines could easily be worked out. 155. It appears that insurrectionary plans are made by, or in close connection with, the organ responsible for "military work" (subversion in the state services). Each major city would require an individual operational plan; what agency of the city Party organization is re- sponsible for'it is not known. As an h otheis, the following is offered: a. A specialist is designated or sent out to each major Party organization to col- lect data and draw up a tentative operational plan. This would undoubtedly entail discussions with certain functionaries, such as cadre (personnel) men, leaders of the city strong-arm squads and veterans' organizations, and leaders of city dis- trict organizations and trade union functionaries (particularly in industries im- portant to the success of the insurrection); b. The tentative plans are sent to national Party headquarters, where they are considered, compared, criticized, modified by the Military Committee or com- parable body, and probably sent to the CP Soviet Union for approval of comment. c. Final approved plans form the basis for stand-by assignment of cadre per- sonnel to various tactical and support staffs to be mobilized at the time of the up- rising. -31- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 156. Service Organization. A number of important functions must be provided for in the operational and organizational planning for the armed uprising: arms procurement, stor- age, and distribution; communications; transportation; intelligence. 157. The Arms Problem. Procurement, storage, and distribution of weapons in a country with an effective police force, is a complicated problem. The number and types of weapons needed depends upon so many factors (number of cities considered vital; number of target installations in each; size and character of defenses, etc.) that it is impossible to generalize. Obviously, the Party will want to arm every one of its fighters, but how many members of a fighting formation must be armed? Can the Party depend upon every man's furnishing his own weapon? Since this would probably be hazardous, how many weapons must be cached away for distribution at the beginning of the uprising? Is it better to have small caches or to have caches large enough to equip a given formation? These are some of the problems which the CP must consider. 158. Sources of arms are -- a. weapons belonging to individuals; b. hand-made weapons (demolitions, Molotov Cocktails, etc.); c. government and commercial stocks seized in the first stages of the uprising (by assault or from within); d. disarming of enemy captured in the course of fighting; e. distribution of weapons from secret Party caches (large quantities were ac- quired by many CP's during the resistance and were hidden away for future use); f . theft of weapons by Communist workmen (in warehouses, railroads, arsenals) and by Communist soldiers. 159. The Italian services have been turning up Communist arms deposits for some years. Most of the caches have been small (5-20 weapons); others have been large. In several cases, weapons and ammunition sufficient to equip over a hundred men have been discovered; many included automatic weapons, and small mortars, and some included disassembled can- nons'. 160. Choice of location of caches depends upon considerations of safety and convenience of control on the one hand, and of the use to which the weapons will be put on the other. For example, some of the Italian caches were in factories, for the use of the insurrectionary force eventually to seize the factory. Other caches have been in various places of safety and con- venience--in abandoned buildings in the country; in the grounds of a railroad station where the Communist station master hid them after stealing them from trains passing through. 161. Tactical considerations are undoubtedly important. The Italian authorities, for example, believe that caches were systematically made in factory grounds in the industrial areas of the North on the theory that the factories would serve as defensible bastions in an insurrection; whereas Party military strategists in other areas did not consider it possible to hold out in the factories and therefore did not establish large factory caches. 162. The CP Germany is the only Party known to have organized arms procurement and storage on a systematic basis. Plans for the 1923 uprising there included the organization of special weapons procurement committees in each of the regions of the country. Details of the implementation of this plan are lacking, but the project sounds very much like the "WUMBO' (Weapons and Munitions Procurement Office) which existed in the 1920's as a part of the I, g- ~eh,-r-r "Apparat." It is believed to have had a national chief, a number of regional chiefs, and under them, local groups in charge of collection and hiding arms. 163. It is generally believed on the basis of evidence so far available, that the arms problem in the period following the second war is handled locally: small caches entrusted to reliable Party men in a position to take care of them. If no individual functionary of the re- gional and national Party headquarters is specifically responsible for arms, it is, however, %od *MV Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information inconceivable that military planners at all levels of the Party would not take a close interest in data on weapons that will be immediately available from the secret caches. 164. There is always the possibility that arms may be smuggled into the country by sea or air drop from the USSR or satellites for a Party about to begin an insurrection. There have always been rumors about such smuggling, and they may be believed by rank and file Party members--may even be floated by the Party leaders to raise the temperature. Ruth Fischer (Stalin and German Communism) writes that the ranks of the _QP Germany.believed firmly that the Partvpossessed_lare hidden storesof arms and_t_hat large quantities would be sent in from Russia for the 1923uprisina. The rumors in this case were empty, and the more current ones have had no more demonstrated substance: the possibility cannot be en- tirely dismissed, however. As a tentative conclusion it appears that the USSR would supply arms only to CP's in adjacent territories, and would supply other CP's only in case of war. 165. Communications. An adequate communications system is essential to the success of the insurrection: to give the signal for the simultaneous uprising in all of the key cities and to coordinate operations thereafter. 166. The insurrectionary plan calls for the seizure in the first moments of the uprising of the principal existing communications--either by assault from outside, or by armed Com- munists working within them. First targets of attack are telephone exchanges, telegraph offices, radio transmitters, teletype lines: possession of these will provide the insurrection- ary headquarters with the means of coordinating all subsequent operations and will also de- prive the regime of vital service. (Extensive use of radio in present day police and army would lessen the effect of this to some extent: the government would not be so helpless as it was in Russia in 1917.) 167. Past failures (Brazil, Germany, and to a certain extent, in Russia) of preparations for communicating initial operational instructions by couriers and seized facilities show the importance of having a reliable Party communications system organized ahead of time. At least, there is some evidence that a CP would organize a W/T network in advance, consisting, for example, of a headquarters transmitter and a number of regional nets -- Given the current availability of personnel with technical experience and easy access to radio equipment, such a network would not be difficult for a Party to establish. It would have to be tested occasionally, but not often and then, for periods short enough to escape locating efforts by the authorities. Such a network would be of particular value in giving the initial operational orders and would lessen difficulties arising from delay in seizing existing land-line and radio centers. It may be questioned, however, that all operations could be adequately handled by a pre-organized W/T system alone: other facilities would have to be captured. 168. The taking over of standard broadcasting stations and their utilization in issuing instructions and propaganda was an important factor in the Prague coup of 1948 and was easily accomplished by the Communist Minister of Information, who controlled them in the name of the government. A Communist high up in the post-telegraph-telephone administration (ordi- narily government-run in Europe) could perform a similar service for the Party. 169. The radio system of air fields would probably be an important target for the in- surrection. Party members infiltrated into the system could set up a nation-wide communi- cations network at the service of the Party and could work havoc with air transport by SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information sabotaging electronic navigation systems. This could be particularly dangerous in countries where the government air force uses commercial fields and facilities. 170. It has been reported that one Party has considered the possibility of jamming government radio nets. It is not known whether the idea has been implemented, or even if it is feasible. 171. Intelligence. The regular Party organization as a whole is an information- producing network, and at the time of an uprising all Party members would furnish military intelligence from direct observation. In addition, various staff headquarters and fighting units would send out individuals on scouting missions. Also, more "professional" espionage sys- tems, consisting of secret penetration agents and informants, secure reporting facilities, and intelligence specialists are organized by many CP's in advanced countries in non-revolutionary times. These facilities would be of considerable value in an insurrection. Finally, there is some evidence that the Party at this time makes room in its insurrection plan for the assign- ment of military intelligence men to the insurrectionary staffs. It is possible that individuals in key installations are given stand-by assignments to constitute a comprehensive military intelligence network when the proper time arrives. 172. Transportation will be needed In the uprising. The revolutionary forces will com- mandeer whatever vehicles they can, and this is one reason why efforts are made to get con- trol of railroad workers' organizations, street car and bus unions. Advance preparations may consist of locating and planning the seizure of garages and motor pools, establishing Party transport services during non-revolutionary times, and convassing Party members to deter- mine how many vehicles of all types will be available at the time of the insurrection and making plans for their maximum utilization. The CP Italy, for one, has bought quantities of i t u ycles and registered them in the name of individuals. During the period between the wars, many European CP's had bicycle and motorcycle clubs, which would be definite assets in an insurrec--lion. _ 173. The CP Brazil in 1935 included plans for the seizure of government airplanes, and even in the more current theories of revolution in that country, now based on the colonial pattern, importance is laid on the capture of planes--a natural emphasis considering the over- land transport difficulties in Brazil. E.. THE INSURRECTION 174. In organizational terms, the tasks of the Party are-- a. to mobilize, arm, and deploy the insurrectionary formations at the optimum time; b. to establish headquarters where needed for the coordination of operations; c. to activate the subversion apparatus within the state services. 175. Timing. There is little that can be said about timing beyond the fact that the up- rising should be begun when Party forces are at peak strength, the workers are most ready to come out, and the strength and morale of the regime are at low ebb. The CP cannot achieve a "surprise" insurrection, but it can achieve partial surprise in the matter of the exact date. A recognizable crisis is desirable, particularly if the Party can wring a claim of self-defense out of it. Therefore, in both Czechoslovakia and Russia, first action followed a crisis pre- cipitated by the Party itself. In Czechoslovakia, it was simply a cabinet crisis, provoked by the Party. In Russia, there were several crises, the most important being: first, the engi- neered refusal of the Petrograd soviet to permit the Government to send garrison troops to the Front; second, the systematic usurpation of authority by Bolshevik Commissars sent to garrison commands and government agencies (utilities, bank, etc.). The latter finally pro- duced government countermeasures, which the Party was able to seize upon. as "proof' of a "plot" to overthrow the workers' soviets. The call was made for general mobilization to "defend" the revolution. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 176. Mobilization of the Party. Party members capable of bearing arms are organized into fighting formations, with the exception of the cadres posted to various tactical head- quarters. Women and others not fit for combat in the streets are assigned to support func- tions--courier, scouting, driving, distributing weapons, agitating, answering telephones, first aid, etc. Leaders will have been given specific posts--to take command of a fighting unit, to lead the workers in a railroad station in its seizure, to work on the staffs, etc. Assembly points will have been previously designated for the mustering of military formations and they will be given missions by their commanders upon assembling. (In some cases, it will have been possible for certain units to have rehearsed their individual operation unobtrusively beforehand). The signal for the uprising is given in various ways--a radio broadcast, des- patching of couriers, a telephone call, a pre-arranged signal (e.g., calling of a general strike; anticipated action of the government; a given date and time). 177. Establishment of Coordinating Headquarters. It is probable that following the pattern of the Bolshevik Revolution, selected cadres are assigned in advance of the uprising to establish various headquarters. The national Military Committee or its equivalent is be- lieved to be the organ that will establish itself as the national "general staff." If a different organ is created, it will probably include some of the members of the Military Committee, along with the top political leaders of the Party. In the capital city, the national insurrection- ary headquarters will probably take over local operations, either working through the Party's city committee or utilizing it. Comparable headquarters will be set up in every city in which it is planned to raise a rebellion, and insurrectionary centers will be established in the var- ious sections of each city, particularly in the workers' districts. These lower headquarters may consist simply of the city district committees of the Party on a military footing, or a section of it, and special persons may have been previously designated to take command as is the case in the national headquarters. Reserve headquarters may be organized to take over in case the regular headquarters are captured, and field headquarters may be established to direct particular important operations. 178. Composition of Headquarters. The official account of the Bolshevik Revolution, which was the model for Communist Revolutions, states that the insurrection in Petrograd was controlled by a "Party Center" supervising the work of a military general staff embedded in the revolutionary headquarters of the mass organization (i.e., in the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd soviet). It is said that individuals were assigned the following functions: "defense, supply, communications, intelligence, etc." The "general staff" of the insurrectionary forces of one present-day CP is reported to consist of - - Chief of Staff Coordination and Action Intelligence Tactics Materiel Discipline and Morale 179. Personnel posted to various headquarters will be those most experienced in mili- tary matters--graduates of schools in the USSR or at home, ex-resistance leaders and veteran of the International Brigades in Spain, and Communists with experience in state armies. Spec- ialists from the USSR may be attached to the "general staff." 180. Representatives of Party headquarters will be posted to tactical formations in the role of political commissars to supervise the unit commanders. 181. Insurrectionary staffs will be flexible in composition and function, whatever the formal organization: personnel will be called into carry out duties generated by events, indi- viduals will be shifted from one job to another and around the various headquarters as need- ed, casuals will be utilized as they become available. - 35 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 182. Fighting Formations. It is accepted Communist doctrine that a full-scale armed organization is impossible to maintain for a long period in a highly industrialized area. How- ever, the Party will have at least a skeleton army (commanders and staffs) and in unstable times may be able to maintain a police force. Insurrectionary-CP's have made use of three types of military forces: the armed fighting groups of workers and others drawn into the uprising -- that is, military mass for- mations -- formations of Party members, and subverted units of armed forces and police. The ability of the Party to organize formations from among the masses depends mostly upon the degree to which the "objective situation" has deteriorated. In non-revolutionary periods, the government will be strong enough to prevent or break up any considerable armed groups. In a developing revolutionary situation, however, it may not be able to do so. In Russia, the Party found already at hand primitively organized bands of factory militia, which had grown up on the workers' initiative during the February "bourgeois" revolution. By its organizing and propaganda work in the factories, the Bolshevik Party gradually got control of the factory detachments, which had a semi-official position, and developed them into a formidable fight- ing organization under reasonably good central control. In addition to these "Red Guards" of the Party controlled soviet, in some places, the Bolshevik Party organized detachments of Party members. Finally, in the uprising in Petrograd, the Bolshevised units of the garrison and the Baltic fleet joined with the workers' Red Guard. 183. The CP Germany also had made factory detachments (ned Hundr s and "shock troops" made up of Party members for the uprising of 1923. The CP Czechoslovakia had factory detachments (workers' militia) and also, controlled units of the state police for the 1948 coup. 184. Communist Parties customarily have a semi-military organization for routine defensive and occasional strong-arm duties even in non-revolutionary times. It consists of small, partially armed groups of militants, in most cases under the control of local Party committees (city or city district). Such groups can be the nucleus for the formation of an ex- panding fighting organization in a developing revolutionary situation. 185. Size of formations. The R?d Guard of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd was organized on a factory basis, with "tens", squads (4"tens"), companies, (3 squads), battalions (3 com- panies), and divisions (all the battalions in a district of the city). Most operations were car- ried out by squads and companies, that is, by units of from 40 to 120 men. The final, big' operation, seizure of the government headquarters, was carried out by all available forces. The Red Hundreds of the CP Germany in 1923 were also organized on a factory basis and consisted of tens and the Hundred. Each Hundred took the name of the factory in which it was based. 186. Activation and Utilization of the Subversion Apparatus. Subverted sections of the state armed services are held in neutrality by their Communist organizers or are drawn actively into the insurrection on the Communist side. The signal to act is given them by whichever organ of the Party is responsible for military work. In Russia units were formed out of subverted garrison regiments; the night before fighting began, the Party Organizer called upon the Bolshevik leader of the Baltic sailors to pick 1500 reliable men and send them to Petrograd to help the insurrection. Mobilizing orders may be taken to the units by special .representatives of the Party headquarters (e.g., Political Commissars), who then supervise operations undertaken by the subverted units. It was declared by the Bolsheviks that such units were most effective when used in conjunction with workers' detachments. Mobilization may also be achieved by direct orders from Communist agents in the command ranks of the army or police (e.g., in Czechoslovakia, the Communist Minister of Interior despatched sev- eral police regiments to Prague to help the insurrectionary coup there.) 187. Current Preparedness. It is difficult to judge how much of a paramilitary organi- zation the CP's of Western Europe, particularly of France and Italy, have at this time. Following the war, the press was full of stories about the existence in Italy of a great Communist military organization, ready to go and with immediate access to adequate arms`. It appears now that these stories were based simply on the overt existence of former Commu- nist resistance formations (Garibaldi formations) throughout the country and affiliated with the - 36 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information general Partisans Association, ANPI. Undoubtedly, however, the Communist veterans move- ment is a pool of experienced fighters, many of whom could be recruited into Communist in- surrectionary forces, and a cover for secret skeleton staffs. In addition to the resistance veterans organizations, the CP Italy had actually.organi- ized in many places small strong-arm formations, with access to arms and under the control of local Party committees. These were actually the nearest thing the Party had to a going military apparatus, so far as concrete evidence goes. 188. Similar stories were circulated in France, based on the existence of the Commu- nist resistance veterans and some other veterans groups under Party influence. Again, evidence points merely toward the existence of skeleton staffs. 189. It is probable that skeleton military organizations for insurrection (with or with- out concurrent Soviet military aggression) exists in both Italy and France and perhaps also in other countries in Western Europe on the following lines: a) secret military committees at national and federation levels of the Party and of lower tactical command staffs (battalion, company, platoon); b) individual Communists given assignments to take command of forces raised in various places at the time of an uprising; c) nuclei of special Party formations within the framework of the veterans or- ganizations: these to mobilize and lead as many individual members of the or- ganizations as possible at the proper time; d) secret weapons caches to be put at the disposal of the formations; e) local mobilization plans (designation of assembly, points, assignment of missions to select, reliable, future unit commanders); f) plans for expansion of strong-arm "self-defense" groups. 190. City revolutions on the Bolshevik model have become increasingly difficult to execute. The complexities of the modern bureaucratic state makes seizure of power by a small group of militants difficult. The technological advances of the coercive forces of the state in firepower, mobility, and communications make it difficult to defeat detachments of the police and the army. Furthermore, simultaneous uprisings in all major cities is a neceS sity -- any city left in the hands of the government can be turned into a seat of government in a relatively short time. In effect, Communist strength in all areas will have to be much greater than the Bolshevik strength in 1917, with correspondingly high capabilities for simul- taneous and coordinated action. To what extent the military potential of Western European Parties may be nurtured for the contingencies of an East-West war rather than for an in- surrection, is an open question at this time. V. PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION OF ARMED FORCES. 191. Purpose of Penetration. The military forces created by the Communists in re- volutionary operations are augmented by attempts to neutralize and win over elements of the armed forces opposing them. The coercive forces of the state represent the most powerful potential enemy of the CP in a revolutionary situation. It is from the beginning the most im- portant target for penetration and subversion, even in periods of revolutionary calm. Pene- tration operations are carried out by the Party whether it is a colonial revolution, a resistance operation or a city insurrection. The character of the city insurrection, however, makes It absolutely essential that the penetration and subversion be successful, which means a greater preoccupation of the Party apparatus with this task. 192. Party Organization for Penetration. When the Party is small and the penetrations are few, such work may be conducted on a decentralized basis -- local Party, organizations such as District and Regional Committees have control of the penetrations as a routine matter. - 37 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information However, as the size of the operation increases or as the chances of revolution or war in- crease, the operation is centralized in a Military Committee, an organ of the Central Com- mittee of the Party (see above para. 151.). Broadly, the work of the Military Committee (or Commission) is as follows: a. Secret, high level penetrations of the armed forces and police and the govern- ment organs controlling them. Direction of Party members making the pene- trations. b. Recruitment of members of the armed forces and police, sometimes secretly, sometimes openly, depending on the local conditions. This is supported by a propaganda campaign aimed at attracting supporters. c. Organization of veterans groups, sporting clubs, etc. as para-military re- serves of the Party. Attempts to gain control of non-Communist organizations with military potential. d. Creation of armed detachments of Party members and supporters insofar as security will allow. e. Study of military questions in general for use of other sections of the Party. f . Planning of military operations for the Party, including long range plans for insurrection. g. Formulation of the Party line and advice to the Party press on military matters. While the penetration operations mounted by the Communist Party against the coercive force of the state are primarily designed to increase the military potential of the Party either by winning over whole units of the armed forces or by so demoralizing the members of the forces so that they are incapable of taking strong action against the Party-instigated insurrection, the Party also utilitizes its penetrations for intelligence purposes, both for itself and the USSR. A summary of some of the cases of Communist penetration and subversion of the armed forces will illustrate these points. 193. The Bolshevik Penetration Operations. The classical example of the penetration and mass subversion of the coercive forces of the state is, of course, the Bolshevik Revolu- tion of 1917. The subversion of one Petrograd garrison (depriving the Government of all but 1-2,000 garrison troops) was largely responsible for the success of the. Revolution. The basic units of the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks were the Party cells in garrison and front line Army units and in the Russian fleets. The directing organization for penetration was first the Petrograd City Committee but after the March 1917 Revolution, this function was trans- ferred to the national headquarters. The Party organization for penetration and subversion is described in more detail in the case study of the Bolshevik Revolution. 194. The pattern of penetration operations of the Bolshevik Revolution, being the com- pulsory pattern for Communist city insurrections, was followed in every attempted revolution from that timel, and CP's which were not in advanced revolutionary situations also made con- stant efforts to penetrate the armed forces and police services, in preparation for an eventual revolutionary situation. 195. Conditions of membership of the Comintern. Recognition that penetration and sub- version of the armed forces of the state are a primary task of all Communist parties was 1 The Brazilian Revolution of 1935 relied almost entirely on the Communist ability to pene- trate and subvert key Army units - a method which proved disastrous. This is discussed in the Brazilian case study. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information indicated in the 21 Conditions for membership in the Communist International drawn up at the Second World Congress in 1920. The fourth condition states: "Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization.--y'? Wherever owing to repressive legislation agitation becomes impossible, it is net-c' essary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause, and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International. 196. Early Penetrations by the CP Italy. The illegal CP Italy in 1923 has as one of its primary targets the penetration of the Fascist Army and Navy. The methods used and the success of the penetration are not known in detail. The organization of the military forces of the CP was suspended during the illegal period; however, Party records refer to the necessity to keep alive and functioning the "directive part of the organization" (the Regional, District, etc. Committees for military work). A circular dated 7 December 1922 outlines the tasks and methods for the Communist penetration operation against the Italian Army: "1. Obtain the entry of able and secure soldiers in places of great confidence. There they must become masters of every information and data of their immediate and superior commands in order to refer them to us. "2. Charge others to lift the exact plans of all the buildings and areas, depots, which are of military interest. The same must be done for the barracks and buildings of the public safety, profiting from the fact that often soldiers are assign- ed for reasons of public safety in the said buildings. "3. Disseminate the local Communist printed matter, and daily writings and those leaflets which we will transmit, thus arriving at all the strata of the Army. "4. Soldier sympathizers must fraternize efficiently with the Royal Guard and the Carabinieri to knock holes in that sphere, letting our propaganda enter, especially giving it an economic character. "5. Take over arms, munitions, explosives, consigning them to our fiduciaries; favor outside transactions in contraband arms, etc., etc." 197. The CP Germany Apparatus for Penetration. In 1925 when the German Commu- nist Party (KPD) set up an extensive illegal apparat, they created the "ZER" (for ZERSETZUNG "subversion") Section. It was one of the principle sections of the Apparat from 1925 to 1937 although two groups were created as early as 1920, according to Ruth Fischer. The ZER Section was responsible for neutralization and subversion of the police. Later (in 1932) the ZER Section was combined with the "Army Section" which up to that time had had similar re- sponsibilities for the Army. The ZER Section of the German CP Illegal Apparat carried on a steady propaganda campaign among the police by written and oral means, made detailed intelligence studies of their organization and established secret Communist cells within the police forces, constantly seeking to recruit new policemen for the Party. The "ZER" Section was organized at the local level into activist groups of from three to six persons, each group being assigned to work ex- clusively on a single limited target - - a specific police station or dormitory. These groups worked under strict discipline, and on a clandestine basis, all their members being normal remol d from P m, be shij on their entrance into this work. It was apparently a rule that an activist group should be set up for every physical installation normally used by the police. 198. The methods used by members of th?ZER section are typical of penetration opera- tions by Communist Parties. Police officials were ordinarily first approached through suitable intermediaries, persons with whom the officials were known to associate. Having inconspicu- ously obtained an introduction to the target official, the agent then planned his recruitment on the basis of his personality and political complexion. Sometimes plain talk, sometimes a slow program of social activity and political discussion, would be needed to convert the prospect. Amenable officials were guaranteed Party support if they should be discharged or encounter -39- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information any difficulties as a result of their new activities, but at the same time they were firmly warned of consequences of betraying their mission. As a further precaution, such converted police officers were usually required to divulge classified police information to tighten the Party's control over them, and the cultivation of dissipation via drink or prostitutes often provided the Party with another source of control through threat of blackmail. 199. Anti-Military Committees. As the threat of war increased in the interwar years and as the military establishments of the capitalist powers grew, the Communists found in- creasing need to step up their campaign of penetration of the armed forces and the supporting industrial enterprises. Consequently, at the meeting of the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, one of the Resolutions passed concerned "The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists." Organizationally, the resolution resulted in the establishment of "Anti- Military Committees" in Parties where no Military Committees existed, and an increase in the scope of military work where Military Committees had been formed. The functions of the Anti-Military Committees as outlined by the resolution were: 1. Concentration on factory and trade union activity in war industries. 2. Anti-war work among the peasantry, who would comprise the bulk of the military force in a conscription program. 3. Anti-war work among the industrial youth. 4. Anti-war work among women and workingmen's wives. 5. Anti-militarist activity; work in the Army and Navy; work among the re- cruits and reservists and in bourgeois defense organizations, i.e., penetration and subversion. 200. A Small Party Penetration Operation. Communist military penetrations are the most secret of Communist activities. Therefore, details of such operations are not obtainable in large quantity. However, from evidence obtained from several CP's, it has been possible to construct a hypothetical case of a small Party penetration operation in the inter-war years. 201. A Comintern agent designated a Party functionary to be responsible for the mili- tary penetration. He was to set up a Military Committee, with advice from the Youth organi- zation and the Organization Committee, and was to run the initial penetration. Priority tar- gets Were also designated by the Comintern agent, selected in consultation with staff members of the Red Army. The Comintern also supplied secret instructions concerning methods of penetration, security, communications, etc. The national Party functionary then picked sev- eral Communists who were eligible for military service and instructed them to join the regu- lar military units: the army, navy and air force; and if possible, to volunteer for service at one of the three or four priority geographic targets which had been selected by the Comintern. Targets were strategic military centers, such as port cities, and key industries, shipyards, etc. The Communist penetration agents were instructed to soft-pedal or to conceal their Com- munist affiliations and views to prevent detection. Communications was not to be maintained openly with any Communist headquarters; the soldiers wrote letters to girls. with no known Party affiliation and the girls forwarded the information to the Party. In some cases pseu- donymns were assigned and information sent directly to a Party address, but in plain envelopes. 202. The first penetrations run by the Party were closely controlled by the Central Committee. The Party enlistee was given a Party address near the military installation to which he was to be assigned. This address was to be used only in case of emergency, such as loss of contact. The Party member was given detailed instructions concerning his objectives and his conduct, and if more than one Communist were in the same military units, a responsi- ble would be designated. Agents forwarded intelligence material to headquarters; suggestions for propaganda capitalizing on soldier grievances were sent and mailing lists compiled for Party headquarters, which in turn mailed propaganda without revealing how the Party obtained possession of the name. 203. More open penetrations of the reserve and auxiliary para-military units were mounted by the Communists. In these, Communists would openly propagandize for the Party.. program. They would capitalize on the hardships and inequalities of military service and Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information attempt in every way to stir up trouble in the unit and demoralize both officers and men. Here, recruitment for the Party was an open objective of the Communist agents, i contra to the secret penetrations in the regular military orIa,nizations. -- 204. A typical penetration operation was set up as follows: National -~ Level Agit Prop Commission Military Commission ~-T Advisory Panel District Directors Chiefs,, Women's Auxiliaries Youth Auxiliaries Mails Corps Propaganda of Direct To Girls Non-communists in Services t 0 c u t as) Recruiters Open Recruitment of Military Reserve and Auxiliary Para- Military Units Secret J 000 000 000 Penetration Army Navy Air Force Youth Organi- zations 205. Penetration during World War II and Later. The rapid increase in the size of arm- ies immediately preceeding and following the outbreak of World War II offered the Communists a good opportunity to increase their penetration operations. However, the suddenness with which the Parties found themselves engaged in military operations in the case of occupied coun- tries and the twists and turns of the Party line prior to-the war prevented full exploitation of their wartime penetration opportunities. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 206. KOSSA. One example of a Party which not only maintained its organization for penetration and subversion of the armed forces, but expanded it during the war was the Greek Communist Party. The organization, KOSSA, was of considerable aid to the Greek Party when it launched its insurrection immediately following the war. 207. KOSSA had its roots in the "Anti-Military Bureau" formed in the mid-1920's under the Central Committee of OKNE (Communist Youth). It underwent some reorganization prior to the war, and followed the Greek army-in-exile to Egypt during the Nazi occupation of Greece although its work then was relegated to second place -- military resistance became more im- portant. 208. Immediately following the war KOSSA was reorganized and contributed substantially to the Greek Communist Revolution? Details of its organization during this period can be found in the Greek case study. 209. In all cases penetration and sub ion of the armed forces, the Communist Youth organizationh~ played an important role. In?-Denmark, in 1948, the military activities of the ANJV (Dutc"eneral Youth Movement) were centralized in a National Military Bureau. The Military Bureau was assisted by district and sub-district leaders specifically charged with military work. The Bureau published a newspaper and registered those ANN members who were called up for military service. In statements drawn up by sub-district officials, each name was marked with a figure indicating the extent the member in question was deemed fit for any future political action. The said registration was used to establish relations among the members being in military service and was the first step towards the formation of cells. 210. The original plan was to make the ANJV members who were to be called up for military service take a training course beforehand specially arranged to turn them out as "politically" fit. Owing to lack of trainers, however, this plan had to be abandoned. 211. A National Soldiers Committee also exists in the Danish CP and has as its func- tions maintaining contact with Party members who are conscripted, and through them to prop- agandize among non-Communist personnel. This committee has local sub-committees in various towns. 212. The most successful example of penetration and subversion of not only the armed forces and police, but of key governmental organs as well, is the Czech coup of 1948. Com- munist penetration of labor, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Information, and the Army proved to be of decisive value for the execution of the coup. The organization of the CP Czechoslovakia to carry out the penetration and subversion is not known, although it is of major importance as a model for the subversion of the state apparatus of an advanced capital- ist country. 213. While it is presumed that the CP's in other advanced countries, especially France and Italy, have well organized and functioning sections to carry out penetrations of the coer- cive apparatus of the state, few of the details have come to light. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 ,qw NEW SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE CP CHINA CONTENTS A. Introduction B. Early Communist Organization for Military Activities C. Kiangsi D. The Anti-Japanese Operations E. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces During the Ant-Japanese Resistance F. Party Organization for Military Activities During the Period of Anti-Japanese Resistance G. Service Organizations H. Tactics 1. The Post-War Period J. Chart of the Structure for Chinese Communist Party Control of the Chinese Regular and Irregular Armed Forces Prior to 1944. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information A. INTRODUCTION 1. The Chinese Communist Party was formally organized in 1921. In 1923 negotia- tions were begun for a Chinese Communist-Kuomintang alliance and were successfully con- cluded in January 1924. In the autumn of 1923, Soviet advisers, headed by Michael Borodin, began the work of refashioning the KMT organization and the Cantonese armies after the Soviet pattern. The KMT was constituted with a Central Committee, a Politbureau, a Secre- tariat and various Commissions. It also had a Military Commission (corresponding to the present CCP Central Military Council), which functioned as a directing unit for the Kuomin- tang armed forces. During this period, the Communists maintained organizational distinction between their Party and the KMT. As a result, there were identical organs (such as an Agricultural Commission) in both the CCP and KMT, sometimes headed by the same indivi- dual (if he happened to be a Communist) with the same staff. However, it was not until early 1925 that the Communists organized their own Military Commission, previously having been content to advance their aims through the Military Commission of the KMT, in which they held membership. 2. In July 1927 the alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintang ended. The Communists established themselves in a small area in Kiangsi province and began recruiting and training their army. Their armed forces were made up of the defected soldiers, units and commanders of the Kuomintang and the local peasantry, which had been rather successfully organized by Mao Tse-tung. Scattered peasant-workers' detachments from the Kuomintang labor corps had fled to the hills and had independently organized partisan bands. Many of these elements were fused in 1927 and 1928 and there emerged a number of Red Armies, the most important being the First Peasants' and Workers' Army formed by Mao Tse-tung. From 1928 to 1930 the Communists gathered strength. Their army numbered 10,000 in 1928; by 1930 it had grown to 62,000. 3. A series of annihilation campaigns was begun against the Communists by the Kuomintang in 1930. After successfully beating off five attempts to exterminate them in Kiangsi, the Communists succeeded in escaping and after the Long March bf 60,00'miles (August 1934 to October 1935), arrived decimated, though not disorganized, in Shensi province in the northwest. They set up headquarters in Yenan and remained there recouping their strength until they began their resistance against the Japanese in 1937. 4. The decision of the Chinese Communists to form a Red Army and establish it in a safe base in the rural areas was not a decision which was made voluntarily. It grew out of a number of complex factors, including the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang Party, the Trotsky-Stalin feud, the inability of the Communists to organize the urban prole- tariat and the success of Mao Tse-tung in establishing support among the peasantry. Com- munist strength waned from 1927 to 1930 as a result of successive failures: (1) to seize power in the cities with an organization based on the urban proletariat (Canton, 1927), (2) to form peasant-based Red armies to take the cities in the name of the proletariat (Changsha, 1930) and (3) to realize that continued alliance with the bourgeois elements in the Kuomintang spelled disaster for the Chinese Communist Party. The minor activities which were carried out by Mao Tse-tung in the hinterland were at this time the only positive development in the whole bleak landscape of Chinese Communism. The now highly-touted doctrine of peasant- protected liberated areas (nearly identical with the heretical recommendations of Trotsky) developed as a result of the failure of the orthodox (i.e., Stalinist) doctrine. 5. The peasant-based Communist insurrectionary army, a feature which the Chinese Communists were forced to accept out of necessity and desperation, has now become the model for colonial areas. It represents a sharp contrast (though by no means a contradiction) to the doctrine which was being applied in advanced countries (e.g., Germany) at about the same time. It can be expected that if colonial revolutions in other areas achieve greater success than they presently have, they will follow rather scrupulously the insurrectionary strategy and organization of the Chinese Communist Party. B. EARLY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES 6. Within a short time after Kuomintang and Chinese Communist collaboration was effected, a two-pronged penetration attempt was launched to gain control of the Kuomintang err/' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 NW SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information S for Soviet and Communist purposes. Penetration at the highest levels was achieved by the influx of Soviet advisers who remodelled the Kuomintang after the CPSU. The Communists, a short time later, launched their own efforts to penetrate and influence the Kuomintang armed 'forces from below. In March 1925 a Military Committee was set up by the Chinese Communist Party, primarily to extend penetration of the Kuomintang. A member of the Central Commit- tee in Shanghai was designated to be responsible for military matters. His chief duty was control and expansion of Communist cells in the Kuomintang and guidance of their work among the non-Communist troops. 7. Although several references have been found indicating the existence of a Military Section of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Secretary of the informal Military Commit- tee, Chang Kuo-tao, claims that it was not formalized until after 1931. Whether this is true is immaterial for this discussion; a portion of the Central Committee was charged with responsibility for military activities (penetration) in the Kuomintang as early as 1925. 8. Some idea of the early activities of the Military Committee can be obtained from the documents of the Soviet Military Attache seized by the Shanghai police in April, 1927. One of these documents gives January 1927 as the date a "Military Section attached to the Provi- sional Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP" was created. The tasks of the Section were outlined only generally, falling roughly into two categories: organization of a Communist Army ?-- with peasant and worker detachments ,-- and penetration of the Kuomin- tang military establishment. Another document dated 3 March 1927, purportedly a transcript of a meeting of the Military Section, lists eight.persons as attending, although all eight may not have been permanent members. Five appear to have been Russians. Chou En-lai was probably one of the Chinese present. At the meeting it was decided to dispatch a request to the USSR for arms for 3,000 soldiers. 9. Earlier in the year (in January 1927) a meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP had outlined a program for subversion of the Kuomintang forces. This program not only indicated the manner of organization of Communists in the "People's Revolutionary Army" (Kuomintang) but also set up conditions for recruiting soldiers into the Communist ranks. The pertinent portions of the resolution follow: "In each corps or separate division, brigade or regiment where there are 10 or mere Communists a separate nucleus may be organized. In small nuclei, the office of a secretary and in large ones a bureau of three or five members for conducting the work should be established. Small associations subordinated to the nucleus may be formed, the number of whose members is not limited. "Each small association is directly subordinated to the nucleus, and the associations have no connection among themselves. "Each nucleus shall establish cbnnection only with the secretary of the local Party organization and with the section to which it belongs; in relations with other comrades and committees of the Party strict secrecy is to be observed. "With regard to the training of Communists in the army, special attention must be paid to separate individual instruction and to instruction of small associations. Meetings of the nuclei and of the small associations must not be disclosed in advance. "The question of recruiting Communists in the army: If possible, the com- rades in the army must pay due attention to the recruiting of new members. But the greatest caution is to be observed in this respect. Besides, the increase of the num- ber of members of the Party is temporarily limited to the intermediate and lower ranks of commanders and to the most -conscious among them. As regards organization and instruction in this period of secret work the comrades must have in view only Party organizations but not organizations of Communist youth." 10. Since the Kuomintang up to 1927 was in organizational appearances essentially a Communist Party, it is useful to examine what information is available concerning Soviet groups in the Kuomintang military organization. -3- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 11. Russians from the outset dominated the Kuomintang army. This caused frequent Chinese expressions of dissatisfaction, mostly because of the type of advice (usually more political than military) and the incompetence of the Russians in military specialties. When General Galen was sent from the USSR as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek he reorganized the Whampoa Military Academy. The chief feature in the reorganization was the introduction of the political-military system which included the establishment of a Political Committee, Political Bureau, and political professors. This system afterwards was applied to the Chinese Communist army. In general it followed the Soviet Manual for Political Work among Troops. 12. The paper organization of a Soviet Advisory Group in the People's Army (Kuomintang) in 1925 is shown in the following chart. This scheme was submitted to the Chief of the Soviet Group (Sinani) and bears an "approved" notation. Chief of the Group (Sinani) Political Assistant (Klimoff) Secretariat Interpreters Copyist Military Assistant (Seifulin) Work Work in Bureau for among the the Army Studies population (Schools) Operation & Intelligence Organization Supplies Sanitation Inf antry Artillery Cavalry Armored Train Communications Others Aviation (Paper organization of one Soviet Advisory Group in the People's Army. First scheme 3rd July 1925. "Approved, Sinani. ") 13. The following document (of about 1927) indicates that the organization of Soviet groups in the Kuomintang had not changed substantially from 1925 to 1927. This document goes into greater detail concerning the placement of Soviet advisers in smaller military units and generally indicates the chain of command for the Soviet Military Political workers (the South China Group) in Canton. "1. The Chief (Soviet) Military Adviser is attached to the National Revolutionary government and to the Commander in Chief of the National Revolutionary Army. He is at the same time the Chief of the South China group who directs the whole work of the group and is responsible for it. "2. The Chief of the group has two assistants, one of whom is his regular substitute and at the same time the senior Adviser of the General Staff. The other is the assistant for political matters and the Senior Adviser of the Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 , w SECRET CONTROL /U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information "3. Each corps has a Senior Adviser who works according to the instructions which he receives from the Chief Adviser and who directs the work of the Junior Advisers of the army and of the Political Advisers, all of whom are subordinate to him. "4. In political matters the Senior Advisers of the corps receive instructions from the Senior Adviser of the Political Intelligence Department and carry them out through the services of the Political Advisers who are subordinated to them. "5. Divisions belonging to a corps have advisers directly subordinated to the Senior Adviser of the Corps and they carry out the latter's instructions in their units. "6. The adviser of a division has under him an assistant and an adviser for political 7 matters." 14. he activity of these groups was apparently directed by the Soviet Military Attache in Pek ng. For this purpose the Military Attache set up a Peking Military Center which, in addition to the Attache, consisted of a representative of the Intelligence Section of the Soviet Mission to China and a representative of the Military Section of the Central Committee of the CCP. 15. Soon after the Kuomintang-Communist break, Soviet activities and influence in the Kuomintang were curtailed. However, Soviet efforts were then more intensively directed toward the Chinese Communist Party and the USSR continued to be highly influential until the Central Committee of the CCP moved to Kiangst. Soviet viser.s re__n_ot known to have been with the Chinese Communists during the stay in Yenan. C. KIANGSI 16. While the Chinese Communist leadership in Shanghai was attempting to bolster its waning influence in urban areas, Mao Tse-tung was building up Communist influence in the peasant areas of Kiangsi. Although soviet areasl of short duration began to emerge in South China as early as 1927, it was not until November 1931 that the first soviet (at Juichin, Kiangsi) was proclaimed. Chou En-lat came from Shanghai for the first meeting which elected Mao chairman. The Central Committee, which was still in Shanghai in 1931, decided that the establishment of soviet areas was its most important work. It set up military com- mittees in every important soviet area. The Secretary of the Politburo of the local Party organization, two or three of its important members; the provincial secretary, the top mili- tary commander, the highest commissar and the chief of staff were to form each military committee. In the Central Soviet, Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Hsiang Ying, Ch'in Po-ku, Liu Po-ch'eng, Wang Chia-hsiang were members and at one time Chou En-lai was Chairman. Later, Mao was Chairman, while Chu Teh and Chou En-lai were vice-chairmen. Chang Kuo-t'ao was Chairman of the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet Military Committee and Hsia Hsi was Chairman of the Hunan-West Hupeh. These committees had free and independent power, except for orders from the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee, and appear to have concentrated on measures to strengthen the Chinese Communist armed, forces. 17. Liaison between the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai and the Kiangsi Soviets was sporadic because of the difficulties in communications. The Central Committee transmitted only general resolutions to the Soviet regime -- no detailed directives. Some time later (the exact date is not known) the Central Committee moved to Juichin, but its membership dispersed throughout the Communist-held areas in South China. The real power of the Communist Party was in the hands of Chen Po-ku who was then Secretary of the Party and Chou En-lai who was chairman of the Military Committee. 1 Chinese soviet areas were regions controlled by Communist forces where the Communists had attempted to set up governments patterned after the Soviet Union. Except for advice given by USSR representatives attached to the Chinese Communis Party in these areas, Chinese soviets had-no coring i-dn wiffi-ie -Soie nion.~LL SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/21 : CIA-RDP83-00415R009800170002-3 SECRET CONTROL /U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY Security Information 18. The nucleus of the Communist army in the Kiangsi days was the peasant organi- zation Mao had created in the rural areas. In May 1927 Mao had been elected the first , president of the National Peasant Federation (and dismissed from the Politburo of the CCP in November 1927 for this activity, regarded as a "deviation"). The Kiangsi Army was composed of many diverse and unorganized elements. So little information during this period is available concerning the specific organization of the military and its relationship to the Party, that even tentative conclusions probably are not justified. While the early experiences and mistakes made by the Communist leadership in its military operations during this period would shed light on Communist military operations generally, the Kiangsi army should not be considered as the prototype for the Chinese Communist army during the anti-Japanese period or later. The army organization developed as a result of trial and error -- and there were many errors. D. THE ANTI-JAPANESE OPERATIONS 19. Next to nothing is known about the Chinese Communist Party development for military activities during the Yenan Period. The Communists went into Ycn.-1 in 1935 a badly mauled and decimated organization with little or no military potential. Sheer will
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