SOVIET STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR MULTITHEATER WAR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000300120001-2
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• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Strategy and Capabilities
for Multitheater War
National Intelligence Estimate
NIE 11-19-831D
June 1985
371
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STAT
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NIE 11-19-85/D
SOVIET STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES
FOR MULTITHEATER WAR
Information available as of 3 April 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate,
which was approved by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................. 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
The Primary Theaters ...................................................................... 7
NATO-The Principal Adversary ............................................... 7
China-Enemy Number Two ..................................................... 8
Southwest Asia-A Distant Third ................................................ 8
Soviet Strategy for Theater Warfare ................................................ 9
War in Europe .............................................................................. 9
The Nuclear Question .............................................................. 9
The Campaign in Central Europe ........................................... 10
Operations on NATO's Flanks ................................................. 10
War in East Asia ........................................................................... 10
Operations Against US Forces ................................................. 10
The Campaign Against China ................................................. 11
War in Southwest Asia ................................................................. 12
Multitheater War .......................................................................... 13
Force Deployments ................................................................... 13
The Strategic Reserve ............................................................... 13
Command and Control ............................................................. 14
Prudence Over Preference ....................................................... 14
Soviet Grand Strategy ............................................................... 14
Soviet Capabilities in the Various Theaters .................................... 15
Europe ........................................................................................... 15
Pact Forces ................................................................................ 15
The Military Balance ................................................................ 15
The Role of Nuclear Weapons ................................................ 16
Impact of INF Modernization ................................................. 16
NATO's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent ...................................... 17
Conventional Force Improvements ......................................... 17
Assessing Western Reaction ..................................................... 17
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Page
........................................................................................
East Asia 18
The Military Balance ................................................................ 18
Soviet Capabilities in the Western Pacific .............................. 18
Soviet Capabilities Against Japan ............................................ 18
Soviet Capabilities Against China ............................................ 21
..............................................................................
Southwest Asia 22
The Military Balance ................................................................ 22
Soviet Capabilities ..................................................................... 22
Soviet Capabilities for Multitheater War ........................................ 24
Intertheater Transfer of Forces ................................................... 25
Strategic Mobility 25
Adaptability of Theater Forces ................................................... 26
Risk Taking 26
Transfer of Forces From Europe to the Far East ...................... 27
Transfer of Forces From the Far East to Europe ...................... 28
Transfer of Forces To or From Southwest Asia ......................... 28
Outlook .............................................................................................. 29
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PREFACE
This Estimate assesses the capability of the Soviet Union-together
with its Warsaw Pact allies-to fight a multitheater war over the next
five years. It completes the series of theater threat assessments.'
The term "theater" in this paper reflects conventional usage, such
as the European theater or the Pacific theater in World War II. The
terms "theater" and "region" are used interchangeably throughout this
Estimate. When referring to a specific Soviet theater of military
operations 2 within a given region, such as the Western Theater of
Military Operations, the abbreviation TMO is used. Figure 1 shows the
Soviet TMOs that are addressed in this paper.
This Estimate focuses on the three principal regions in which the
Soviets appear prepared to undertake military operations:
- Europe (the Soviet Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern
TMOs), against NATO.
- East Asia (the Soviet Far Eastern TMO), against China, US
forces in the area, and possibly Japan.
- Southwest Asia (the Soviet Southern TMO), against the Persian
Gulf countries, eastern Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and US
forces in the area.
While the Estimate does not repeat the voluminous data on
Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces already provided in other NIEs or the
forthcoming factbook on Pact theater forces, it does address likely Soviet
wartime objectives in the various theaters as well as the capacity of
Soviet/Pact forces in each theater to accomplish these objectives. In this
regard, the Estimate describes the interrelationship of the three regions
from a Soviet perspective, and the part each plays in overall Soviet
strategy and military planning. Further, it assesses the Soviet capacity to
control and sustain simultaneous military campaigns in three widely
separated areas and to coordinate them toward a common goal.
This Estimate discusses the likelihood that Moscow might transfer
forces from one region to another in accordance with the Kremlin's
overall strategic priorities. This includes judgments regarding the
'Previous issuances were NIE 11-14-81/D, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO; NIE 11-14/40-
81/D, Soviet Military Forces in the Far East; and NIE 11/39-83D, Soviet Forces and Capabilities in the
Southern Theater of Military Operations
'The Soviet term teatr voyennykh deystviy (TVD) translates as "theater of military operations." It
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 Figure 1
Soviet Theaters of Military Operations (TMOs)a
2
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Spain
W, Ger.
E. Ger.
1- -1
Kiev
MD
Saudi
Arabia
P.D.R.Y. Oman
(S. Yemen) n
MOSCOW
North
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hweste
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Mediterranea
Sea
d 0, 'v 1000
Kilometers
a The boundary lines shown for theaters of
military operations on the periphery of the Soviet Union
are, in most cases, only broad approximations.
Sea
of
Japan
The un,ted Stales Govemment as not recognized
ba the mcorporetinn of Estonia, Latvia. and Lithuania
(nn trd :.to the Soviet Um... Otber bovnderyrepresemahon
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strategic mobility of Soviet forces, and the degree of flexibility Soviet
planners would have in committing forces in regions other than their in-
tended areas of employment. As an adjunct, the Estimate discusses our
views of Soviet risk taking during a conflict, and the likelihood that
Moscow might take risks in one region (by economizing forces there) to
improve its chances for success in another. (s)
The focus of the Estimate is on theater forces. The subject of
nuclear escalation-particularly in respect to its likely impact on Soviet
strategy and actions in each theater-is also discussed. (s)
This Estimate was produced under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. The drafter was LTC
USA, of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (u)
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Developments over the last two decades have increased the
likelihood that, in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, the Soviet
Union would have to conduct simultaneous campaigns in several widely
separated theaters. Moscow is evidently prepared for such a contingen-
cy. There are sizable Soviet forces designated for operations in Europe,
the Far East, and Southwest Asia. They are uniquely structured and
equipped for operations in their respective areas, and are designed to
operate independently, without major reinforcement from other
regions. In addition, the Soviet General Staff has shown a concern with
the control of forces waging war in different regions.
Soviet planning for multitheater war is undoubtedly based more on
prudence than on preference. It is doubtful that, given the choice, the
Soviets would opt to conduct simultaneous major offensives in multiple
regions.
In a global war, Moscow's grand strategy would be heavily
conditioned by two main concerns: preventing a nuclear attack against
the Soviet Union and rapidly defeating the adversary that can do it most
harm-NATO. Since the Soviet priority of effort in a global war would
be against NATO, Moscow would attempt to avoid operations in other
theaters that could constrain its capacity for a quick victory in Europe.'
The most likely Soviet course of action during a NATO-Warsaw
Pact war would be to assume a defensive posture opposite both Chin
*and Iran, and to attack US forces in the western Pacific.
The capability of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to
prosecute military operations varies considerably among the three
principal regions, but it is clearly greatest opposite NATO. This is also
the region in which allies of the Soviet Union would make the greatest
I
impac
In the event of a NATO-Pact war, the Soviet objective would be
the rapid and total defeat of NATO forces through offensive operations
by superior forces. The Soviets consider defensive operations against
' The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that Soviet
planning options for operations against NATO in Europe must consider actions to prevent the movement
of forces from the continental United States to the European theater. Such planning could include
strategic intercontinental strikes against the following targets in the United States: general purpose
forces; means of power projection (ports, airports); and command, control, communications, and
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NATO only in the context of their contribution to the. offensive. They
have the necessary forces to undertake a general offensive in Central
Europe, and have deployed these forces to facilitate such an offensive.
In the absence of a Chinese attack-which we consider extremely
unlikely-a Soviet invasion of China makes little sense, especially in the
context of a global war. Since most Chinese main-force units, are
almost certainly be unwilling to make.
If Moscow were unable to persuade Tokyo to deny the United
States access to forward operating bases in Japan, the Soviets would be
likely to attack US forces there, as well as those Japanese military tar ets
whose neutralization would be necessary to support such attacks]
Soviet forces in the Far East have the capability to stop a Chinese
attack against the Soviet Union and to mount a counterattack quickly.
They also have the capability to launch limited offensives into northern
China-both east and west of Mongolia. To take and hold all of
northeastern China, including Beijing, the Soviets would have to either
use nuclear weapons or at least double their forces in the Far East. We
do not believe they would attempt an attack with Beijing as its objective
with fewer than 100 divisions. This would require the movement of an
additional 50 Soviet divisions to the Far East. Many of them would have
to come from the force opposite NAT O, a move that Moscow would
however, is hampered by its limited detection capabilities
The manner in which the Soviets allocate and exercise their forces
indicates that, in a war on the Eurasian landmass, a campaign against
China would be second in importance to the European campaign. The
Soviet Pacific Fleet is capable of launching strategic nuclear strikes
against the United States as well as against regional states, including
China, Japan, and Korea. It is also postured and equipped to oppose in-
cursions into the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk by US and Allied naval
forces. Its capacity for open-ocean antisubmarine warfare (ASW),
than conventional forces
By conceding to the Pact a superiority in conventional forces while
refusing to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, NATO is clearly
implying that its strategy for the defense of Europe is based on the ulti-
mate use of strategic forces. In the final analysis, if both NATO and the
Pact follow through on their strategies and declared policies, a cam-
paign in Central Europe would most likely be decided by nuclear rather
weapons-to stop such an offensive.
It is virtually impossible to assess the Pact's capability to execute its
strategy for a rapid conventional offensive in Central Europe, because
NATO strategy calls for using whatever it takes-including nuclear
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deployed 150 to 300 kilometers from the border, a de facto buffer zone
already separates Soviet and Chinese forces=
A Soviet decision to use nuclear weapons against China would very
likely be conditioned by events in the European Theater, as well as by
Soviet objectives in the war with China. The Soviets would probably be
reluctant to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against China in a
campaign with only limited objectives, since a Chinese nuclear retalia-
tory strike could seriously degrade Moscow's ability to prosecute the
campaign in Europe
In Soviet military planning, Southwest Asia receives much less
attention than either NATO or China. The Soviets have the capability
to conduct a variety of military operations in the region, ranging from
occupation of small areas of Iran or Pakistan to a large-scale attack to
seize a port on the Persian Gulf. A major invasion of Iran, however,
would be extremely difficult for the Soviets to execute. The Soviets
would probably not regard the attainment of strategic objectives in
Southwest Asia as decisive in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. On balance,
we believe the Soviets would regard invasion of Southwest Asia as an
unattractive option during a multitheater war.
Overall, the Soviet Union-together with its Warsaw Pact allies-
has the capability to conduct simultaneous military operations in
Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia. Operations against China,
however, would have to be limited in scope. Campaigns in the three
regions-controlled by TMO high commands-could be conducted
largely independently of one another.
If a war in all three theaters continued beyond two or three
months, offensive operations in the Far East and the Persian Gulf region
would begin to stretch logistic resources. Moscow would have to
consider that continued offensives in these theaters could develop into a
long-term and large-scale commitment of manpower and material that
would compete with and ultimately could weaken the war effort in
Europe.
We cannot envision the circumstance in which Moscow would
conduct a major drawdown of its forces opposite NATO to attack
China. Such a move would jeopardize any chance the Soviets have for a
quick victory in Europe and, in view of China's lack of capacity to
mount and sustain a coordinated attack into Soviet territory, would be
unnecessary.
Given the fact that the Pact already enjoys a superiority in
conventional forces in Europe, Pact planners would probably see no
urgency for a large-scale transfer of forces from the Far East to Europe
during a NATO-Pact war
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It is highly unlikely that, in the context of a global war, the Soviets
would transfer large forces to Southwest Asia. Ground and tactical air
units now in this theater are sufficient to undertake operations up to
and including a full-scale invasion of Iran. The Soviets, however, would
probably adopt a defensive posture opposite Iran, and hold the majority
of their units in the Caucasus for operations against Turkey. During a
global war, rather than reinforcing the Indian Ocean Squadron, the
Soviets probably would recall some units from the Indian Ocean and
South China Sea, particularly if US aircraft carriers were not present.
In sum, the Soviet Union will continue to posture its forces to fight
in three principal theaters on its western, eastern, and southern borders.
The priority of effort, however, will be toward the west. In the event of
a global war, Moscow would subordinate its actions in all other theaters
to the war against NATO. In all likelihood, so long as it were at war
with NATO, the Soviet Union would not undertake major campaigns in
er theaters witho t being forced to do so. but would attack any
US forces in these theaters that threatened the USSR
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DISCUSSION
THE PRIMARY THEATERS
1. Developments over the last two decades have
increased the likelihood that, in the event of a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war, the Soviet Union would
have to conduct simultaneous campaigns in several
widely separated theaters. Earlier in the period follow-
ing World War II, Soviet planners could concentrate
almost exclusively on the United States, Western Eu-
rope, and the developing North Atlantic Alliance. In
the 1960s, however, the Soviet break with China
introduced a new dimension into Soviet military plan-
ning, and Moscow had to consider the possibility of
war with China as well. (s)
2. By the early 1970s it became apparent from the
major buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East that
Moscow's defense planning was developing on the
assumption that the USSR might become involved in a
two-theater land war-against NATO and China.
Moreover, Japan's gradual defense buildup and
strengthening of its ties to the United States have
increased the potential wartime threat to the USSR in
the northwestern Pacific. Finally, the developing Sino-
US relationship has further complicated Soviet strate-
gic calculations in this region. (s)
3. Events in Southwest Asia over the past five years
have added a third dimension to the picture. The fall
of the Shah of Iran, the growth of Shiite fundamental-
ism, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-
Iraq war have destabilized the Persian Gulf region,
increasing the potential for a US-Soviet confrontation
there and raising the specter that the USSR could
conceivably have to fight in three regions. (s)
4. Moscow is evidently prepared for such a contin-
gency. There are sizable Soviet forces in each of the
prospective theaters' (see figure 2). They are uniquely
structured and equipped for operations in their respec-
tive areas, and are designed to operate independently,
without major reinforcement from other regions. (s)
NATO-The Principal Adversary
5. The Soviet Union clearly recognizes the United
States as its primary counterweight in world affairs
' Details on Warsaw Pact theater forces will be provided in a
forthcoming "factbook" Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. (u)
Figure 2
Approximate Distribution of Soviet Forces
Southwest
Asia
and the US-dominated North Atlantic Alliance as its
principal military adversary. The industrialized West-
ern nations and Japan monopolize the world's com-
merce and technology and largely determine its econ-
omy. Their social and economic structures are
essentially antithetical to those of the Soviet Union,
and they are an obstacle to the expansion of Soviet
influence. Most important in the Soviet view, the
NATO nations have the military capacity to destroy
the Soviet Union and its allies. As a result, the
preponderance of Soviet-and all non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact (NSWP)-forces have wartime missions against
NATO. The Soviet intelligence agencies focus their
reporting on the NATO countries, and Soviet military
planning and exercises are directed primarily against
NATO. In addition, Soviet planners probably expect
that US forces in the northwestern Pacific would
engage Soviet forces shortly after the initiation of
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hostilities in Europe, and they cannot exclude the
possibility that Japan might support US military oper-
ations
China-Enemy Number Two
6. The manner in which the Soviets allocate and
exercise their forces indicates that, in a war on the
Eurasian landmass, a Soviet campaign against China
would be second in importance to the European
campaign. For more than a decade, the Soviets have
oriented more than one-fourth of their ground and
tactical air forces toward their eastern frontier. They
also keep one of their four fleets in the Pacific.
Chinese nuclear forces, though not equivalent to those
of the Soviet Union, are a cause of concern to Soviet
leaders
7. Like NATO in the West, China is an obstacle to
the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia. Relations
between the USSR and China have fluctuated since
their split in the 1960s, and last year's bilateral
political negotiations between Moscow and Beijing
have led to improvements only in economic and
cultural affairs. The Chinese leadership continues to
consider the Soviet regime hostile toward China.
There have been recent improvements in the atmo-
sphere of their relations that require our close atten-
tion, however, and China seems to be playing a more
active role in finding areas in which the two sides can
agree to make progress despite the stalemate in securi-
ty issues
Southwest Asia-A Distant Third
8. In Soviet military planning, Southwest Asia re-
ceives much less attention than either NATO or China.
Moscow began to focus on the area as a potential
theater o mi itary operations (TMO in 1980, after the
situation there destabilized. Soviet actions to date,
however, have been more conceptual than real. The
Soviets have not increased the rate of ground forces
modernization. It continues to lag that in other areas,
and the units in this region are still among the least
well equipped of any along the Soviet periphery. The
capability of the Soviet air forces for offensive action,
however, has increased substantially. Soviet naval
forces in the Indian Ocean, meanwhile, have fluctuat-
ed in size, but the Soviets have made no attempt to
challenge US naval supremacy in the region.
9. The reason for the comparatively relaxed Soviet
military posture opposite the Persian Gulf region
(excluding Afghanistan) is clear. While the area is
important to the Soviet Union for political reasons-
increased influence there would provide the Kremlin
some leverage over Western Europe and Japan be-
cause of their dependence on Persian Gulf oil-the
area is not key to the Soviet Union from a security
stanp oint. None of the nations in the region poses a
threat to Soviet territory. None possesses nuclear
weapons (although Pakistan is developing the capabili-
ty). None could prevent Soviet forces from advancing
through Iran or Pakistan to the Gulf. The Kremlin
would undoubtedly welcome a friendly-preferably
subservient-Iran, which would serve as a buffer zone
on the southern flank of the USSR as well as deny US
access to the region. The Soviets have occupied por-
tions of Iran twice in this century (in 1920 to oppose
the British and in 1941 to check German influence).
Still, a buffer zone in Iran would not be comparable to
those the Soviet Union maintains in Eastern Europe
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10. While ou wes sia does not present a mili-
tary threat to the Soviet Union-particularly so long as
there are no US forces or facilities in Iran-the area is
key to Moscow's goal of increased influence in the
Middle East. The Kremlin, however, must balance its
moves in the area to avoid the appearance of directly
threatening the security of the Western nations. The
region is outside the NATO area, and NATO-as an
alliance-shows no inclination to get involved there. In
fact, many European NATO countries are reluctant
even to support an improved US military posture in
the Gulf region, lest it detract from the direct US
military commitment to NATO or involve them in an
unwanted war
11. In contemplating a drive to the Persian Gulf,
the Soviet leadership would have to consider not only
the difficult operational environment and Iran's po-
tential for protracted opposition, but also that the
United States has declared the region vital to its
interests and stated its intent to take all necessary
measures-including the use of force-to protect
Western access to Persian Gulf oil. The Soviets un-
doubtedly recognize that the West has major interests
at stake in the Gulf. As a matter of prudence, they also
must take seriously the US pledge to defend these
interests. They probably assess that the United States
has only a marginal capability to intervene directly in
Iran-especially given the political situation there-
but a relatively strong capacity for air and naval
operations in and over the Persian Gulf and adjacent
areas.
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SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THEATER WARFARE
War in Europe
12. In the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, the
Soviet objective would be the rapid and total defeat of
NATO forces through offensive operations by superior
forces. The Soviets consider defensive operations
against NATO only in the context of their contribution
to the offensive. They have the necessary forces to
undertake a general offensive in Central Europe, and
have deployed these forces to facilitate such an offen-
13. In a war in Europe, time would be of the
essence for the Soviets. They would attempt to seize
quickly their key military, political, and economic
objectives in Central Europe. They probably view
NATO's conventional forces-deployed well forward
in Central Europe to defend territory but lacking in
both reserves and maneuver room-as vulnerable to a
strong air and ground attack. At the same time, the
Soviets probably overestimate NATO's capability to
.reinforce its forces in Europe. They also are impressed
by Western technology and the capacity of the NATO
countries to produce war materials in the longer term.
A quick Soviet victory in Europe would deny these
potential strengths to NATO.I
The Nuclear Question
14. Another factor that drives Soviet strategy for a
quick victory in Europe is the desire of the Soviet
leadership to keen any fighting from going nuclear.
Once the nuclear threshold had been crossed, the
Pact's conventional forces would suffer heavy attrition
and the Soviet homeland would be held at rislcE:]
15. Soviet strategists believe widespread attacks
against NATO nuclear forces would be necessary
during the conventional phase of a war to eliminate or
reduce NATO's capability for escalation. Despite evi-
dence that the Soviets are considering the possibility
that the increase in their nuclear capabilities in Eu-
rope might deter early NATO escalation and allow
them to extend the period of conventional war, they
cannot be certain, and probably expect that NATO
would be forced to use nuclear weapons ultimately to
stave off defeat. All Warsaw Pact planning therefore,
proceeds on the basis that nuclear operations could
begin at any time. Once the Pact determined that
NATO had obtained authorization for widespread use
of nuclear weapons, it wou attempt to preempt such
use. The Soviets consider th t the initial sed use of
nuclear weaponswould a e a decisive j pact on a
NATO-Pact war.
A Historical Perspective
The Kremlin's strategy for war on the Eurasian land-
mass is influenced heavily by its experiences in earlier
campaigns, particularly in World War II. On the
western front, that experience was initially largely
negative. The Red Army was unprepared for a German
attack, was taken by surprise by Operation Barbarossa,
and spent the early period of the war retreating deep
into its own territory. (u)
On the eastern front, the Soviet experience was
essentially positive. As opposed to the long defensive
campaign it fought against Germany, Moscow conduct-
ed only two major actions against the Japanese-the
battle of Khalkhin-Gol (Ha-lo-hsinn Ho), near the Mon-
golian border, in August 1939, on the eve of World War
II, and the Manchurian campaign, at the war's end, six
years later. Both were purely offensive actions. Both
were characterized by:
- Extensive planning and detailed but secret
preparations.
- The marshaling of superior forces at the end of a
4,000-mile supply line.
- The launching of a devastating blitz that not only
inflicted heavy casualties, but also had a severe
psychological effect on the Japanese.
Both operations resulted in decisive Soviet victories and
were decided in less than two weeks. Judged according
to the amount of writing devoted to them, both are still
seen as offering valuable insights into planning and
conducting conventional campaigns.
Several external factors contributed to the Soviet
success in Manchuria-including the fact that the Japa-
nese Army there had been depleted to support Japan's
war effort in other areas, and that the Emperor was
already inclined to surrender as a result of the nuclear
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviet lead-
ership, however, ignores these factors. Soviet planners
emphasize that the key contributors to the success of the
campaign were the secrecy that surrounded the prepa-
rations (allowing the Soviets to gain strategic surprise)
and the speed and strength that characterized the
offensive (allowing Soviet forces to achieve their major
objectives entirely within the initial phase of the cam-
paign). Soviet authorities have studied the campaign
extensively, and have concluded that a deliberate offen-
sive is far preferable to a strategy based on protracted
defensive and counteroffensive operations
16. In public, the Soviet leadership has consistently
rejected the notion of limited nuclear war and empha-
sized that it would be impossible to control escalation
once the nuclear threshold had been crossed. Nonethe-
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less, the Soviets probably regard limited nuclear war in
Europe as a contingency for which they must be
prepared
17. The Soviet leadership's preoccupation with the
West's capacity for nuclear warfare is manifested in
the priority that nuclear issues have been accorded in
recent Soviet foreign policy initiatives. During the
early 1980s, the Kremlin's number-one foreign policy
goal was to prevent the introduction of Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) into Europe.
Concurrent with this effort, Moscow has conducted an
unabated propaganda campaign to force NATO to
renounce the first use of nuclear weapons.
The Campaign in Central Europe
18. In the Soviet view, a war in Europe would be
won or lost in NATO's Central Region, which contains
the bulk of NATO's military forces and most of its
industry. Sixty percent of the Pact's divisions and 70
percent of its tanks opposite NATO are concentrated
in this area. The Soviets plan to conduct a theater
strategic operation against NATO in Central Europe,
an area they describe as the Western TMO. It would
be characterized by multiple, successive front opera-
tions, with few if any pauses, supported by Strategic
Aviation, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Baltic
Fleet. It would be conducted across a width of 700 to
750 kilometers and to a depth of 1,000 to 1,200 km.
The Soviets plan to complete this operation in 20 to 30
days.
Operations on NATO's Flanks
19. Supporting operations on NATO's flanks, on a
much smaller scale, would be initiated almost concur-
rently with the general offensive in Central Europe.
They would be designed to destroy those NATO forces
that could threaten the USSR, to tie down NATO
forces to prevent their transfer to Central Europe, and
to seize key objectives essential to the unhindered
operations of Pact naval forces. On the southern flank
(the Southwestern TMO), early Pact operations would
include attacks on Allied naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean, especially the aircraft carriers and cruise-
missile-armed platforms that could strike the southern
USSR, and a move against the Turkish Straits, which
control access to and from the Black Sea. On the
northern flank (the Northwestern TMO), the Soviets
would probably attack northern Norway from the
USSR and through Finland to seize the NATO bases or
to deny their use, and to facilitate Soviet naval
operations in the Norwegian and Barents Seas.n
20. More extensive Pact operations on the flanks-
which would not be critical to the success of the Pact
main effort, and indeed could detract from it-would
probably not be undertaken until key objectives in
Central Europe had been achieved, or at least until the
Pact campaign there was well developed. If the Soviet
campaign in Central Europe went according to plan
and NATO forces there were defeated in about a
month, larger Pact operations on the flanks might not
be necessary
21. Soviet naval operations in the Norwegian Sea
and Arctic Ocean would be designed largely to deny
the areas to US aircraft carriers, cruise-missile-armed
platforms, submarines, and amphibious assault forces, 25X1
and to preserve the Soviet capacity to launch nuclear
strikes by protecting the Northern Fleet's nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs~
War in East Asia
22. Soviet strategy for a war in the Far East during
a global conflict would be influenced by whether the
fighting there involved only the United States and
possibly Japan, or also included China. While opera-
tions against US forces would take place mainly at sea,
a conflict with China would be primarily a land
campaign involving both ground and air forces. 25X1
23. Although Beijing clearly shows no interest in
formally allying itself with Tokyo or Washington,
China shares with the United States and Japan a
common security interest in curbing Soviet expansion
in the Far East. To Moscow, this translates into the
possibility that a war in Asia could pit the Soviet
Union against not only the United States and perhaps
Japan, but also China. The structure of Soviet forces in
this theater-with land forces aimed primarily at
China, naval forces aimed primarily at US forces
afloat, and air forces aimed at both plus Japan-
reflects this assumption. (s)
Operations Against US Forces
24. If the United States became involved in a war in
the Far East, the primary "focus of a Soviet attack
would be US naval forces in the Pacific. The object
would be to estroy t ose forces t at could attack the
Soviet mainland, deny vital straits, or disrupt Soviet
naval operations in the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean
Fleet would attempt to establish sea control in the
waters contiguous to the USSR-including Soviet bal-
' For a detailed dicussion of Soviet strategy for a war with China,
see NIE 11-14/40-81/D, Soviet Military Forces in the Far EastL
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listic missile submarine bastion areas-and conduct sea
denial operations to a distance of about 1,200 nautical
miles. (s)
25. In developing their contingency plans for war in
the Far East, the Soviets must, therefore, take into
account US naval forces in the Pacific as well as US air
forces based in Korea and Japan. With respect to
Japan, the Soviets are probably most concerned with
its potential for use as a forward operating base for US
forces, because Japan's Self-Defense Forces do not
pose an independent threat to the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, Tokyo's efforts to improve the capabili-
ties of its forces and US prodding to that end are-in
Soviet eyes-disturbing factors, especially in view of
Moscow's perception of a developing US-Sino-Japa-
nese relationship. (s)
The Campaign Against China
26. Moscow's strategy for a war with China differs
substantially from its strategy for a war with NATO.
The primary difference is that Soviet strategists evi-
dently envision only limited-objective attacks into
China, with penetrations to a depth of 300 to 500
kilometers in northeastern China, and about half that
in the area west of Mongolia (see figure 3). The Soviet
military contingent opposite China, although large in
Figure 3
Potential Soviet Invasion Routes Into China
Soviet
Siberian MD 1
Secret.
LaU k~
Balkhash
Urumqi MR
Invasion route
Probable extent
of Soviet advance
without reinforcements
10,00
absolute terms, is small in relation to the size of
Chinese forces and territory. The Soviet units, more-
over, are dispersed along strongpoints close to the
border to protect Soviet territory, but are not eche-
loned in depth to facilitate a deep and sustained
offensive. (s)
27. Northeastern China. In the event of a Sino-
Soviet conflict, the primary Soviet objective would be
to seize northeastern China. The Soviet operation
would be similar to the one in Manchuria in 1945.
Forces from the Far East Military District would
attack to the south and west, while forces from
Mongolia and the Transbaikal MD would attack to the
south and east. The two forces would attempt to
converge and link up, cutting off Chinese forces in the
area, and occupying an area 300 to 500 kilometers
deep. (s)
28. The Soviets would probably conduct a second-
ary attack from the Central Asian Military District
into the Urumqi Military Region west of Mongolia. (s)
29. Soviet attacks in these areas would be designed
to counter a Chinese invasion of the Soviet Union, with
the expulsion of Chinese forces and the establishment
of zones of occupation to protect Soviet cities and lines
of communication (LOCs) near the border, particular-
ly the port of Vladivostok. The latter would be
; ti
Union
China
Mongolia
approximato
alignment
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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essential to the prosecution of maritime operations
against Japan and US forces in the Pacific.
30. In the absence of a Chinese attack-which we
consider extremely unlikely-a Soviet invasion of Chi-
na makes little sense, especially in the context of a
global war. Since most Chinese main-force units are
deployed 150 to 300 kilometers from the border, a de
facto buffer zone already separates Soviet and Chinese
forces. This buffer zone contributes to Soviet security
by reducing the chances of accidental border incidents
that could lead to war. A Soviet move against China
would involve the USSR in a two-front land war and
reduce rather than enhance Soviet security in the Far
East, since Soviet forces there are not adequate to
occupy northern China indefinitely. Prolonged occu-
pation would require substantial reinforcements and
degrade the Soviets' capacity to prosecute the war
with NATO.
31. The Nuclear Question Revisited. The large
reserves of Chinese manpower and the vast expanse of
Chinese territory pose several problems for the Soviets.
One is the nuclear problem. The Soviets might feel
they would have to use nuclear weapons against the
Chinese-presumably to offset the Chinese advantage
in manpower
32. The use of nuclear weapons against the Chinese,
however, would pose enormous risks for the Soviets. In
the first place, they would have to consider the
possibility of Chinese nuclear retaliation, which could
destroy several Soviet cities as well as major military
targets in the Far East. Secondly, they would have to
consider that a nuclear exchange with China could
lead to one with NATO. Any Soviet decision to use
nuclear weapons against China, therefore, would very
likely be conditioned by events in the European
theater, as well as by Soviet objectives in the war with
China. The Soviets would probably be reluctant to
initiate the use of nuclear weapons against China in a
campaign with only limited objectives, because a
Chinese nuclear retaliatory strike could seriously de-
grade Moscow's ability to prosecute the campaign in
Europe. As their technology improves, the Soviets will
probably rely more heavily on improved conventional
munitions against large Chinese troop concentrations.
If Soviet forces were in danger of being overwhelmed
by sheer numbers of Chinese troops, the Soviets would
be ikely to employ chemical weapons, against which
t e Chinese have little capacity to efend themselves
and a limited capability to reply in kind.
33. Although nuclear weapons would have a signifi-
cant impact in a Sino-Soviet war, the total defeat of
China would entail occupation of the country by
conventional forces, and Soviet forces in the Far East
are clearly inadequate for such an undertaking. For
Moscow, a protracted war on the Asian mainland
makes little sense from either a political or mi it
point o view
War in Southwest Asia 1
34. Soviet military strategy for a war in the Persian
Gulf region may not be as well defined as it is for wars
in Europe and China, despite the fact that both the
Soviets and their czarist predecessors have a long
history of intervention in northern Iran. Twice in this
century they occupied parts of the area in response to
what they perceived as threats to their security. In
May 1920 their forces occupied Gilan-the northern-
most province of Persia-in an attempt to rid the area
of British forces that were supporting resistance to the
new Soviet regime. The Soviets withdrew the follow-
ing September. In August 1941 they again occupied
Iranian territory, this time with the help of British
forces, to oppose German influence. British forces
withdrew by March 1946, but Soviet troops, in contra-
vention of an earlier Anglo-Soviet agreement, re-
mained and were subsequently reinforced. Heavy
pressure by the United States and the United Kingdom 25X1
applied through the United Nations over the next two
months compelled the Soviets to remove their troops in
May. Those experiences, however, are not applicable
to the current situation, in which any Soviet move into
Iran would be strongly resisted by the Iranians. The
Soviets would also have to consider the possibility of a
US military reaction.
35. Soviet military literature on the Persian Gulf is
lacking. While much has been written on military
operations in Europe and the Far East, virtually all
recent Soviet literature on the Gulf region is propa-
ganda. It denounces US interference in the area. It
dwells on the "massive" and "aggressive" US naval
buildup in the Indian Ocean. It cites the establishment
of the Rapid Deployment Force and its successor,
USCENTCOM, as examples of American "imperial-
ism." It provides no clue, however, as to the types of
campaigns the Soviets are considering in the region. L] 25X1
36. Soviet military strategy for war in Southwest
Asia is not clear. However, roughly concomitant with
the US decision following the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan to establish a force capable of rapid deploy-
ment to Southwest Asia, the Soviets began to focus on 25X1
the area as a potential theater of military operations.
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37. They have not, however, significantly upgraded
their military posture in the area. Force improve-
ments, on the contrary, have continued at a slow
pace-particularly in relation to the other theaters.
The significant force changes in the region have
resulted primarily from the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan and subsequent operations there. Neither the
invasion nor five years of operations in Afghanistan,
however, have more than marginally enhanced Soviet
prospects for military operations in Southwest Asia
Multitheater War
38. We do not have good evidence on Soviet views
of fighting simultaneous campaigns in widely separat-
ed regions. The Soviet Union has never fought a large-
scale multitheater war. Following the October Revolu-
tion in 1917, and through 1922, however, the Soviets
did have to contend simultaneously with the Germans
in the west; small British, French, and American
contingents in the north near Murmansk and Arkhan-
gel'sk; the Japanese, Americans, and British who land-
ed at Vladivostok in the east; the Czech Legion in the
Volga Basin in the south; and bands of White Russians
across the breadth of the nation. During World War
II, the Kremlin resisted Allied pressur attack
Japan until Germany had surrendered.
Force Deployments
39. Moscow's views on multitheater war are proba-
bly best inferred from the manner in which it deploys
its forces and from the structure it has established to
control them. A strategy of multitheater war implies
readiness for combat in separate geographic regions
simultaneously. It implies adequate forces in the po-
tential theaters, as well as substantial reserves config-
ured both for mobility and flexibility of employment
to respond to setbacks and capitalize on opportunities.
Finally, it implies a system of command and control
that provides for centralized control of independent
operations in each region.
40. Soviet forces meet these criteria. Given our
understanding of Moscow's likely objectives in each of
the three regions, we believe Soviet forces in each
region are adequate for initial operations. The evi-
dence indicates, moreover, that the Soviets would rely
primarily on these forces to accomplish initial objec-
tives (see inset). This is particularly true of ground and
naval forces, whose transfer would be both time
consuming and risky. While frontal air forces could be
transferred more quickly, they are likely to remain
with the combined-arms formations they support.
Overall, the major variations in readiness and combat
Sokolovskiy on Forces Redeployment
Marshal Sokolovskiy, in an article entitled "Preparing
a Country to Repel Aggression," provided some insight
into the Soviet view of the transfer of forces:
During the course of the war it will be impossi-
ble, naturally, to avoid certain transfers of special-
ists from one region to another. But these transfers
under present-day conditions should be reduced
to a minimum. Complex storehouses with all
necessary equipment should be created at the
mobilization center. During the last war the
equipment for manning the units frequently had
to be brought in from dozens of storehouses
located hundreds and even thousands of kilome-
ters from the mobilization points. In a future war
such a situation will be intolerable, since it does
not c~iPT??~d to present-day mobilization time
limits.)
potential of forces in the various theaters suggest that
Soviet/Pact forces in each are uniquely structured,
manned, and equipped to meet contingencies peculiar
to that region, and that major reinforcements from
outside the region are not regarded as essential
The Strategic Reserve
41. Nevertheless, on the basis of their experience in
World War II and analysis of the scale of losses likely
to be experienced in a war under modern conditions
(conventional or nuclear), the Soviets have devoted
considerable attention to the creation and organization
of their strategic reserves. They classify as strategic
reserves those units of the armed forces in direct
subordination to the Supreme High Command
(VGK)-that is, the Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military
Districts, airborne forces, and VGK air armies. They
also include the stores of supplies kept in arsenals,
depots, and bases of central subordination. Such re-
serves are intended for weighting attacks at the outset
of hostilities, for making up losses suffered in battle,
for reinforcing and creating new groupings of forces,
and for accomplishing other missions arising in the
course of a war.
42. For the most part, the ground force units in the
strategic reserve-even those existing in peacetime-
are "not ready" or cadre formations. They would
require large-scale mobilization, preparation, and
training before they could be committed to combat.
Many units would have to be moved thousands of
kilometers by road or rail to their area of employment.
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In theory, these units could be employed in any TMO.
Augmentation of the strategic reserve assets-especial-
ly ground forces-during the past several years under-
scores the Soviets' concern over their ability to rein-
force their forces during a multitheater war
43. Military operations in all regions would also be
supported by KGB Border Guards and Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD) troops, as well as by similar
NSWP paramilitary forces. Border Guards would pro-
vide initial defense of the border and assist in the
collection of tactical intelligence. Many units are
equipped as light infantry, and some have tanks,
armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery. They
would perform such duties as rear area security
Command and Control
44. Soviet strategy evidently does envision largely
independent campaigns in each theater. It apparently
draws on World War II experience, including the
Manchurian campaign in 1945. Because of the remote-
ness of the Far Eastern theater, the great diversity of
forces and equipment assembled there, and the vast-
ness of the area, the Soviets experienced difficulty in
organizing the missions of the fronts and fleet and
preparing them for operations. At first they tried the
approach they had used against Germany, appointing
a representative of the GHQ, Marshal Vasilevskiy, to
coordinate operations in the Far East and providing
him with a small staff. After a few weeks, however,
Vasilevskiy realized that this system was inadequate to
the task he faced in the Far East. He proposed
instituting the post of Far Eastern commander in chief
and providing him with an appropriate staff. His
suggestion was accepted, and, according to Soviet
historians, the resulting organization was an important
prerequisite to the successful execution of the cam-
paign in Manchuria
Prudence Over Preference
45. Judging by the manner in which the Soviets
deploy and exercise their forces, we conclude that they
plan for the contingency of a multitheater war. This
strategy is undoubtedly based more on prudence than
on preference. It is doubtful that-given the choice-
the Soviets would opt for simultaneous operations in
multiple regions. Any advantage they might enjoy in
theory in such a situation-interior lines, for exam-
ple-would largely disappear in practice, because of
the great distances and difficult terrain that separate
the theaters
Soviet Grand Strategy
46. In a global war, Moscow's grand strategy would
be heavily conditioned by two main concerns: pre-
venting a nuclear attack against the Soviet Uni n and
rapi y defeating the adversary that can do it most 25X1
harm-NATO. Because the Soviet priority of effort in
a global war would be against NATO, Moscow would
attempt to avoid operations in other theaters that
could constrain its capacity for a quick victory in
Europe. A Soviet attack into China, for instance, could
develop into a long-term, large-scale commitment of
manpower and material and compete for resources
with the campaign in Europe. A similar situation
would exist if the Soviets were to undertake a major
offensive in Southwest Asia. They would have to
commit some ground and air units that could other-
wise be used in the European campaign. The Soviets,
moreover, would probably not regard the attainment
of strategic objectives in Southwest Asia as decisive in
a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
47. In the context of a global war, the Soviets would
probably see no real urgency for major operations
against China or in Southwest Asia. Compared with
NATO, China poses little threat to the Soviet Union.
The Persian Gulf nations pose none. The Soviets,
therefore, would have little to gain by attacking China
while they were at war with NATO, but much to lose.
By the same token, the Soviets would probably not
attack Japan unless Tokyo permitted US forces to stage
combat operations out of bases in Japan.' Similarly, a
Soviet move toward the Persian Gulf would detract
from the Soviet capacity to conduct operations against
both NATO and US forces in the Pacific. While the
impact on Soviet operations in Europe would not be
pronounced-the primary effect would be to limit
Soviet operations in eastern Turkey, which would not
be critical to the campaign in Central Europe-any
drawdown of Soviet naval forces in the Pacific to
augment the Indian Ocean Squadron would impair
the Soviet capacity to attack US forces in the Pacific,
to protect their SSBN force, and to defend the home-
land against attacks by US, carriers and sea-based land
attack nuclear-armed cruise missiles.0
48. Conceivably, the Soviets might initiate opera-
tions in the Persian Gulf region to deny oil to the
NATO nations. Such operations, if undertaken, would
probably be in the form of strategic air attacks against
the tanker loading facilities in the Gulf ports. Denial of
e See footnote 11, on page 21, for a view of the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.
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Persian Gulf oil, however, would not have an immedi-
ate effect on NATO's fighting ability, as NATO has
about 100 days of crude oil reserves, and its wartime
military requirements would be only a fraction of
peacetime civilian consumption that could be diverted
to military use
49. The most likely Soviet course of action during a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war would be to assume a
defensive posture opposite both China and Iran, and to
attack US forces in the Western Pacific. In addition,
the Soviets would try to dissuade Japan from becoming
an active participant, and would press Tokyo to deny
the United States use of air and naval facilities in
Japan. Failing this, the Soviets would be likely to
attack these facilities, since US combat aircraft based
in Japan would be able to attack military targets in the
Soviet Far East, as well as Soviet naval forces operating
in the Sea of Ja an the Sea of Okhotsk, and the
western Pacific
50. Only one view in the Intelligence Community
holds that the Soviets would undertake a ground
invasion of the Japanese main islands.' All believe,
however, that the Soviets would probably bolster their
defenses on Sakhalin and on the Kuril Islands, includ-
ing the northern territories claimed by Japan. These
areas are key to Soviet strategy both to defend the
homeland and to launch strategic nuclear attacks
against the United States. They guard the Soviet fleet
access to the western Pacific, and are indispensable to
the fleet's capacity to defend its SSBN bastions in the
Seas of Okhotsk and Japan.
51. We do not have good insights into what Soviet
policy toward Korea would be during a multitheater
war. The Soviets might try to complicate US planning
and neutralize US air forces in Korea while conserving
their own forces by encouraging North Korea to
invade the South. We believe P'yongyang would be
tempted to take advantage of the opportunity created
by the absorption of US forces in a worldwide conflict
and would give serious thought to an attack with or
without encouragement from Moscow. It might move
shortly after the opening of hostilities in Europe or
alternatively might wait until US forces earmarked to
reinforce the defense of South Korea had been com-
mitted elsewhere. If P'yongyang failed to act quickly,
however, the Soviets would probably attack US air-
bases in Korea. A North Korean attack, however, could
result in demands by North Korea for increased Soviet
support, both logistic and operational, particularly air
7 The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army. (See paragraphs 74-80 for a
detailed discussion of this subfect.)
support. In essence, if the Soviet leaders believed a
land war in Korea would cause more problems for the
United States than it would for the USSR, they would
probably abet a North Korean attack. If, however,
they concluded that a war in Korea would compete for
resources with their campaign against NATO, they
would probably discourage a North Korean attack.
52. At the outset of a NATO-Pact war, the Soviets
would attack US naval forces in the western Pacific
within about 1,200 nautical miles of the USSR hoping
to prevent their use against the eastern USSR, and to
eliminate any possibility of of tang transferred to
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN THE VARIOUS
THEATERS
53. The capacity of the Soviet Union and its War-
saw Pact allies to prosecute military operations varies
considerably among the three principal regions
Europe
54. That capacity is clearly greatest opposite
NATO. This is also the region in which allies of the
Soviet Union would make the greatest and most direct
contribution. In the other theaters, the Soviets might
use bases in client states to support military opera-
tions-in Afghanistan for operations in the Southern
TMO or in Cam Ranh Bay in the Far East, for
example. There would, however, be little if any direct
involvement by non-Soviet military forces other than
Pact Forces
55. Although Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO
vary considerably in quality and readiness, they are
far superior-both in number and armament-to the
forces the. Soviets maintain opposite both China and
Iran. They include 60 percent of the Pact's maneuver
divisions and tactical air forces (70 percent if units in
the Caucasus are allocated against Turkey rather than
Iran), and three of the four Soviet fleets. Opposite
NATO's center, Pact ground forces are echeloned in
depth to facilitate a sustained offensive campaign,
They are largely mechanized, and heavily outnumber
NATO armies in most key arms, including armor and
The Military Balance
56. Exactly how the Soviets assess the military
balance in the Western TMO is not clear. For years,
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Eastern participants at the negotiations on mutual and
balanced force reductions (MBFR) have insisted that
the forces of the two alliances in Central Europe are
approximately equal. The Soviets, moreover, do not
rate their forces as highly vis-a-vis NATO as Western
analysts do. Nonetheless, there are indications that
Pact planners rate their conventional forces as superior
to those of NATO.
57. The Pact, however, continues to make major
adjustments to its force posture opposite NATO-
especially in those forces opposing NATO's center.
These changes go beyond such routine force modern-
ization as the fielding of new fighters, tanks, artillery
(including nuclear), and a new generation of accurate
and longer range tactical missiles. They include a
general reorganization of air and air defense forces, a
realignment of the Soviet armies in East Germany, the
testing of new operational concepts such as the opera-
tional maneuver group (OMG), and the establishment
of new types of units, presumably to implement that
concept. We believe the Soviets are also considering
the early reinforcement of Eastern Europe, including
the movement of fronts from the western USSR before
D-day. Soviet planners-recognizing that improve-
ments in the NSWP armies (which compose a substan-
tial part of Pact first-echelon forces) are not keeping
pace with those in Soviet first-echelon units-might
want to increase the weight of Soviet forces in the first
echelon to improve its overall combat power. This
would also alleviate any apprehension the Soviet lead-
ership may have concerning the reliability of its allies,
particularly Poland.F__1
The Role of Nuclear Weapons
58. Pact ground and air units have the capacity to
undertake a general offensive in Central Europe,
supported by limited offensives on the flanks. It is
virtually impossible to assess the Pact's capacity to
successfully execute its strategy for a rapid conven-
tional offensive in Central Europe, because NATO
strategy calls for using whatever it takes-including
nuclear weapons-to stop such an offensive. The
success of a Pact attack against NATO would depend
to a large extent on the capacity of Pact air forces to
establish air superiority over the European continent
and to destroy NATO's nuclear forces in the European
theater before they could be employed. At the outset
of fighting, Pact strategy calls for a widespread con-
ventional air operation against NATO's air defenses,
airfields, and nuclear command and control facilities.'
At the same time, the Pact would attempt to overrun
For details, see NIE 11/20-6-84/D, Warsaw Pact Nonnuclear
Threat to NATO Airbases in Central Europe
NATO's forward defenses-including much of its
nuclear artillery and short-range tactical missiles.
Special-purpose forces (Spetsnaz) and OMGs, operat-
ing behind NATO's main defensive area, would have
the mission of locating and destroying NATO's theater
nuclear weapons.
59. This would be a very ambitious undertaking,
however, and, given the potential problems that could
force the Soviets to cancel the air operation, the Pact
must have serious doubts that it could eliminate the
NATO tactical nuclear threat.9 The Pact's problem is
further complicated by the fact that the ground
tactical weapons are dispersed throughout the NATO
corps areas, many of the strike aircraft are based well
to NATO's rear, and submarines capable of launching
nuclear missiles routinely operate in European waters,
where the Soviet capacity for detection is very limited.
Impact of INF Modernization
60. The arrival of Pershing Its and GLCMs in
Europe, moreover, greatly complicates the picture for
the Soviets. Unlike NATO's shorter range tactical
missiles (Lance) and artillery pieces-a large number
of which would be overrun in the event of a successful
Pact offensive in Central Europe-the newer missiles
would not be affected by early Pact ground opera-
tions. The mobile missiles would not be good targets
for Pact short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) using
conventional warheads, and those GLCMs in the
United Kingdom and Sicily would be out of the range 25X1
of Pact SRBMs, with the exception of those SS-12
Mod 2's deployed in Eastern Europe. Inasmuch as the
new US missiles are capable of striking strategic targets
as well as follow-on forces in the Soviet Union,
however, Pact planners would have to include them in
their conventional as well as nuclear target planning.
61. This raises the question of how the Soviets
would handle the rear-based theater nuclear systems
(bombers and GLCMs in the United Kingdom and
GLCMs in Sicily). Given the abundance of high-
priority targets on the continent, and the fact that
bombers attacking Britain would lack fighter cover,
we do not believe the United Kingdom would be an
early target for air attack. The same applies to Sicily
for similar reasons. If the Soviets did not attack US
forces in the United Kingdom and Sicily in the initial
air operation, a substantial part of NATO's ground-
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based and air-launched theater nuclear weapons
would go untouched. These-along with the sea-based
systems-could do severe damage to the USSR.F__1
NATO's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent
62. Even if the Pact's conventional offensive met
with initial success, Pact leaders would have to consid-
er the possibility that-faced with a quick defeat of its
conventional and tactical nuclear forces-NATO, or
one of the three Western nuclear powers acting inde-
pendently, might launch a strategic nuclear attack
against the Soviet Union. NATO's strategic systems
pose a much greater threat to Soviet territory than do
its tactical weapons, because of their greater destruc-
tive power and ability to reach deep into the Soviet
homeland. They are, moreover, not likely to be affect-
ed by any conventional Soviet campaign. Strategic
systems also are assuming an ever-increasing role in
Western Plans. The French nuclear arsenal, for in-
stance, is assuming greater importance in France's
defensive strategy as conventional forces suffer cut-
backs for economic reasons. The same applies to UK
forces, if to a lesser degree. The United States, for its
part, is undertaking a major overhaul of its strategic
.1 1
Conventional Force Improvements
63. None of the NATO nations, on the other hand,
is significantly improving its conventional forces. On
the contrary, all European NATO capitals have resist-
ed entreaties by the major NATO commanders-
principally SACEUR-to strengthen their convention-
al forces, citing the high costs involved. Overall real
growth in non-US NATO defense spending has aver-
aged only 2 percent annually since 1978, the year the
3-percent goal was adopted. The implications for
conventional forces are clear, inasmuch as only two
non-US NATO members have nuclear weapons and
both are dedicating a large portion of any increased
defense expenditures to strategic nuclear forced
64. With respect to conventional forces, many non-
US NATO nations have made major reductions in
personnel, maintenance, current operations, and train-
ing. Several countries-particularly France, the Neth-
erlands, the United Kingdom, and Norway-have
reduced military and civilian manpower and are
relying more heavily on reserves. All European NATO
nations have curtailed training, and many have can-
celed or trimmed field exercises. They have phased
out older weapons to save on maintenance and have
limited replenishment of ammunition and spare parts.
Assessing Western Reaction
65. The disproportionate rate of improvement be-
tween Western strategic and conventional forces un-
doubtedly impacts on Moscow's confidence in its
ability to assess the likely Western response to a
Warsaw Pact conventional attack. The situation is
further complicated by the fact that there are three
Western governments that control nuclear weapons.
The United States is the only nation to ever have
employed such weapons, and the United Kingdom and
France assert that they will continue to maintain a
strategic nuclear capability as a safeguard against the
failure of the US nuclear umbrella. The British and
French strategic assets, by themselves, are no match
for Soviet strategic forces. Nevertheless, they could do
enormous damage to the USSR, and will be signifi-
cantly expanded over the next decade. The Soviets
take them very seriously and-before their walkout
from the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF)-insisted that both the British and French sys-
tems be included in those negotiations.
67. To occupy Central Europe with conventional
forces, the Soviets would have to defeat the ground
forces of the three nuclear powers as well as those of
the other Allies. It is highly questionable that the
Soviets would assume that these three nations would sit
on their strategic nuclear stockpiles if their conven-
tional and tactical nuclear forces were being overrun.
This would be an extremely risky assumption, and the
Soviet leadership characteristically leaves little to risk.
68. In essence, by conceding to the Pact a superior-
ity in conventional forces while refusing to renounce
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the first use of nuclear weapons, NATO is clearly
implying that its strategy for the defense of Europe is
based on the ultimate use of strategic forces. In the
final analysis, if both NATO and the Pact followed
through on their strategies and declared policies, a
campaign in Central Europe would probably be decid-
ed by nuclear rather than conventional forcesF__1
East Asia
69. The Soviets maintain about one-fourth of their
ground forces-some 500,000 troops in over 50 divi-
sion-in the eastern USSR. Except for the four divi-
sions in the Pacific-one on the Kamchatka Peninsula,
two on Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril islands-these
forces are oriented against China. The Soviet Pacific
Fleet, on the other hand, which is the largest fleet in
the Soviet Navy (although it has a smaller ballistic
missile submarine force than the Northern Fleet) is
oriented primarily against US naval forces in the
Pacific. The Soviets also have about 2,000 aircraft in
the Far East which could be used to support the land
campaign in China, or to attack US forces in Japan,
Korea, and the Pacific.
The Military Balance
70. The military balance in the Pacific depends
largely on the status of US air and naval forces in the
region, including the number of US aircraft carriers
deployed to the western Pacific. For their part, the
Soviets have considerably upgraded their Pacific Fleet
over the last decade-both through the allocation of
new ships and aircraft and through transfers of ships
from other fleets. Soviet air forces in Asia are being
modernized at roughly the same pace as those in
Europe
71. Although the gap between the capabilities of
Soviet ground forces in East Asia and those facing
NATO has narrowed somewhat, most ground units
opposite China are still not as well equipped as those
opposite NATO. They are also considerably outnum-
bered by the Chinese, who have roughly a 4-to-1
advantage in manpower and a 2-to-1 advantage in
combat divisions along the border. Despite their small-
er numbers, the Soviets clearly have the advantage
over the Chinese in firepower, mobility, and quality of
equipment. The Chinese Army is not equipped, struc-
tured, or adequately supported to withstand attacks by
mobile armored forces supported by superior air
forces. They also have little capability to defend
against a chemical attack. The Soviets, despite these
advantages, continue to modernize their forces along
the border, and to improve their capacity to support
these forces logistically.
72. The Chinese are also improving their war-
fighting capabilities. In the last four years, for exam-
ple, they have increased their tanks, APCs, and air-
craft in the border region by one-third. Nevertheless,
they continue to fall behind the Soviets in overall force
improvement, and the military balance along the
frontier is tilting more and more in favor of the Soviet
Union. Significantly, the Soviets have made major
improvements to their army in Mongolia, despite
repeated Chinese demands that Soviet forces there be
reduced. As a result, these units are now in a position
to threaten the North China plain and Beijing. Mos-
cow has also established an important air and naval
base at Cam Ranh Bay and augmented its forces in the
South China Sea, actions that are of concern to the
Chinese
Soviet Capabilities in the Western Pacific
73. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is capable of launching
strategic nuclear strikes against the United States as
well as against regional states, including China, Japan,
and Korea. It is also postured and equipped to oppose
incursions into the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk by US
and Allied naval forces. Its capacity for open-ocean
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), however, is hampered
by its limited detection capabilities. Thus, while Soviet
ASW forces cannot detect US submarines in the open
ocean, we believe the Pacific Fleet-together with
Soviet air and air defense forces-would pose a sub-
stantial threat to any force that approached Petropav-
lovsk or the Seas of Japan or Okhotsk
Soviet Capabilities Against Japan
74. If Moscow were unable to persuade Tokyo to
deny the United States access to forward operating
bases in Japan, the Soviets might limit their attacks to
US forces at sea and defend against attacking US
aircraft from Japan while weighing the military and
political risks of attacking US bases in Japan. We
believe it more likely, however, that, failing to achieve
Japanese acquiesence, the Soviets would attack US
forces in Japan as well as those Japanese military
targets whose neutralization would be necessary to
execute such attacks. The Soviets have substantial
bomber forces available in the Far East that are
capable of such missions. Key to the Soviets' capability
to attack these targets will be their ability to obtain air
superiority in the region. The relatively short combat
radii of many Soviet aircraft would limit the area of
major air operations. While Soviet heavy and medium
bombers could strike targets throughout Japan, the
light bomber force would probably be able to attack
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only those targets on Hokkaido and northern Honshu.
In addition, fighter escort would probably be limited
to the approaches over the Sea of Japan and Hokkaido
and perhaps northern Honshu.
75. The Soviet capacity to conduct airstrikes against
Japan, however, must be viewed in the light of Japan's
limited capacity for air defense.'? Japanese ground-
based air defenses-HAWK and Nike surface-to-air
missile (SAM) groups-are not sufficient to defend
against a determined Soviet air attack
The Japanese Defense Agency hopes to purchase some
Patriot SAMs, perhaps as early as 1985, to replace the
Nike system. In addition, Japanese defense firms plan
to acquire production licenses for the Patriot to help
develop their own missile program. In the meantime,
however, the brunt of the attack would have to be
borne by Japan's fighters. They could inflict heavy
casualties on attacking Soviet air forces, but could not
stand up to a sustained Soviet attack
76. The Soviets could not invade the Japanese main
islands without significantly drawing down their
ground and air forces opposite China. In the case of
ground forces, the only available units close to Japan
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are those divisions that border northeastern China (see
figure 5). They are crucial to the defense of Vladivos-
tok in the east and the Trans-Siberian Railroad in the
north, and the Soviets could ill afford to commit any
of them against Japan if there were even a remote
chance that China might enter the war. (s)
77. Even an attack limited to Hokkaido-which is
defended by four Japanese divisions-would require
Figure 5
Key Soviet Forces Opposite Northeastern China
on the order of seven to eight Soviet divisions (given
the Soviets' propensity for absolute force superiority).
They would have to be moved on merchant ships and
landed after the naval infantry and air assault troops
had seized a beachhead. Before undertaking such a
venture, the Soviets would have to attain air superior-
ity in the northwestern Pacific. This would entail the
destruction of any US aircraft carriers and cruise-
Demarcatio
Line
Yellow
Sea
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Sea
of
Okhotsk
Kurd Islands
Snno[ Unwn~ ,
Motorized rifle division
Tank division
Mobilization base/equipment storage
Air assault battalion
Combat helicopter regiment
Airmobile assault brigade
Fighter/fighter-bomber base
Intermediate-range bomber base
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missile-armed platforms in the area, the elimination of
US airbases in Japan and Korea, and the overcoming
of Japanese air defenses
78. An invasion of Hokkaido would entail a major
reallocation of forces and would significantly limit the
Soviet capacity for operations against China. Moscow
would have to consider whether the benefits to be
obtained by occupying Hokkaido would justify the
extensive and risky operations such an undertaking
would entail. As long as they control the Kuril Islands,
the Soviets are virtually guaranteed access to the
northwestern Pacific. Possession of Hokkaido would
improve the Soviet capacity to protect the SSBN
bastions in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, but Mos-
cow's capability for SSBN defense in narrow, confined
waters-especially in this region-is already quite
good and will improve as new fixed underwater
detection systems are fielded
79. Soviet forces opposite Japan-on Sakhalin and
the Kurils-are clearly configured for defensive rather
than offensive missions. They are strong in coastal and
air defense but generally lacking in mobility
80. Except for one opposing view," the intelligence
Community believes that an invasion of Japan-even
one limited to Hokkaido-would entail operations
beyond those the Soviets would want to undertake in
the Far East during a NATO-Pact war.
Soviet Capabilities Against China
81. Soviet forces in the Far Eastern TMO have the
capability to stop a Chinese attack against the Soviet
Union and to mount a counterattack quickly. They
also have the capacity to launch limited offensives into
northern China-both east and west of Mongolia. The
initial Soviet advance would be facilitated somewhat
by the manner in which Chinese forces are deployed.
The Chinese employ a defense in depth in which an
invading force would be confronted with successively
larger and better equipped units. The major ground
force units are organized into a series of defensive
areas well back (150 to 300 km) from the border in the
first terrain suitable for defense, but well forward of
" The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army, believes it is likely that a NATO-Warsaw Pact war
would be global in scale. In that event, the Soviet General Staff
would put high priority on early control of the La Perouse Strait
into the Sea of Japan. To achieve this without seizing Hokkaido is
difficult to envision. Therefore, the Army view holds that Soviet
operations against Hokkaido are very likely.
Beijing and industrial centers in the southern Shen-
yang Military Region (MR). China's major maneuver
forces are located behind the defensive areas in posi-
tion to react to enemy incursions
82. A Limited Attack Into Northeastern China.
Despite the qualitative superiority of Soviet forces, an
attack across the Amur-Ussuri River border into north-
eastern China would not be easy. The Soviets could
probably quickly seize an area to a depth of about 200
kilometers. Beyond that, however, they would have
much greater difficulty as they confronted Chinese
main-force units. The Chinese greatly outnumber the
Soviets in the area, and their lines of communication
(LOCs) are much shorter. The logistic advantages,
therefore, would be on the Chinese side.
83. The Soviets could probably advance to the area
of Harbin (about 400 to 500 km) inside the border. If
they wanted to hold the area, however, they would
require reinforcements. Such reinforcements would
have to come from either the strategic reserve or from
units that have missions against NATO. Chinese rein-
forcements, on the other hand, would be available
from the southern Shenyang and Beijing MRs, and
subsequently from the central reserve units in the
Wuhan MR.
84. Because of the great distance separating north-
eastern China from the western USSR, resupplying
and reinforcing forces operating in the region would
be a major problem for the Soviets. In eastern Siberia,
the Soviets are dependent on the double-track Trans-
Siberian Railroad, which, in following the Amur River,
runs for a long distance in the immediate vicinity of
the Chinese border. It would be vulnerable to interdic-
tion, especially in the winter when the river is frozen.
Russia lost the war with Japan in 1905 in large part
because of the inability of the (then) single-track
railroad to supply and reinforce the Czar's troops in
Manchuria. When the Baikal-Amur Mainline Railroad
becomes operational (see paragraph 105), the situation
will be improved somewhat for Moscow, but logistic
support of units in the Far East will still be a problem.
85. Because of the vulnerability of their land-based
supply lines, the Soviets have made substantial efforts
to develop their logistic base in the Far East. They
have large amounts of combat equipment in storage
depots. Although the Soviets have a large number of
airfields in the Far East, the number of transport
aircraft in the region is low, and a major airlift would
require a transfer of aircraft from the European
theater. Airlift alone, however, could not provide the
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extensive reinforcement that would be required if the
Soviets attempted to occupy northeastern China as far
as Beijing.
in the MDs north of Iran and in Afghanistan, and the
small naval contingent (routinely including about five
combat vessels) in the Indian Ocean
86. A Major Offensive Into China. To take and
hold all northeastern China, including Beijing, the
Soviets would have to either use nuclear weapons or at
least double their forces in the Far East. This judg-
ment is based on an analysis of opposing forces in the
region and historical precedent. As for Soviet views on
conventional force ratios, Soviet strategists, when for-
mulating plans for the Manchurian campaign in 1945
(which provided for an attack to a depth of 600 to 800
kilometers), insisted on both a substantial superiority
over the Japanese in quality of equipment (which they
also have over China) and a numerical force superior-
ity over the Japanese (which they could not achieve
over China). The Soviets assembled a force of about 80
divisions to attack a Japanese force that had been
largely depleted as a result of Japan's war effort
against the United States, Britain, and China=
87. The situation the Soviets face in China today is
much the opposite. The Chinese have prepared a
defense in depth and have ample forces-the world's
largest standing army-to implement it. We do not
believe the Soviets would attempt an attack with
Beijing as its objective with fewer than 100 divisions.
This would require the movement of an additional 50
Soviet divisions to the Far East. Many of them would
have to come from the force opposite NATO, a move
that Moscow would almost certainly be unwilling to
make. (s)
88. An Attack Into Northwestern China. While
Beijing enjoys the advantage in manpower and logis-
tics in the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border, the
opposite applies to the western sector. In the Urumqi
Military Region, Chinese forces are weak and are
linked to China proper by just two secondary roads
and a single-track railway. The Soviets, conversely,
have ample forces in the area, and their LOCs are
comparatively short. The Soviet task west of Mongolia
would, therefore, be far less difficult than that in
northeastern China.
Southwest Asia
89. Soviet forces in the Southern TMO are quite
small in comparison with those in the other two
theaters. The potential indigenous opposition is limit-
ed, however, and there are no indications that Moscow
intends a major expansion of its forces in the region.
The units most likely to be committed in the Southern
TMO include the 30 divisions and 800 tactical aircraft
The Military Balance
90. The balance of forces on the Iranian border
clearly favors Moscow. The Iranian Army was no
match for Soviet forces in the region before the Iran-
Iraq war began, and it is even less of a match now,
with its units depleted and maldeployed. Iranian
regular and paramilitary forces could not by them-
selves stop a Soviet invasion of their country. They
could, however, delay the Soviet advance by occupy-
ing blocking positions in the rugged terrain that
controls the approaches to Tehran and by interdicting
Soviet lines of communication. They could also make
any Soviet occupation long and costly by conducting
guerrilla warfare similar to that which the Soviets face
in Afghanistan.
91. Opposition by other nations in the region would
depend largely on the scenario. Turkey, Iraq, and
Pakistan would probably not come to the aid of Iran,
but would fight if their own borders were threatened.
The same applies to the Gulf Arab states, which are
apparently forming a small rapid deployment force.
Soviet Capabilities
92. The Soviets have the capacity to conduct a
variety of military operations in the Southern TMO.12
These range from small cross-border forays into Iran
or Pakistan in conjunction with operations in Afghani-
stan, to large-scale attacks to the Persian Gulf (see
figure 6). In each case, the Soviets would have to
consider the fact that any military action in the region
could elicit a US response.
93. Occupation of Azarbayjan. The Soviets are
clearly capable of occupying Azarbayjan in northwest-
ern Iran. This is the most feasible Soviet option in the
region from both the political and military points of
view. Politically, the Soviets probably feel that the
United States would be less likely to respond to an
attack that did not clearly threaten Western vital
interests. In addition, an attack limited to Azarbayjan
would not be an immediate threat to Pakistan or the
oil-producing nations south of the Persian Gulf.
94. Militarily, this would be the easiest option for
the Soviets to execute. Force requirements, at least
12 See NIE 11/39-83/D, Soviet Forces and Capabilities in the
Southern Theater of Military Operations. (u)
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Figure 6
Representative Soviet Attack Options in Iran and the Persian Gulf Region
Limited Invasion To Seize Aiarbayjan
...epa Caspian 1
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Z Sea
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Limited Invasion To Seize
the Port of Bandar Beheshti in Baluchistan
Bandar-e UW:IUCn TT;:n
Abbas
` Major axis of advance
Soviet army
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initially, would be small-about five to seven divi-
sions-as the Soviets could avoid most Iranian Army
units. In addition, the attacking force would be within
range of tactical air forces in the Soviet Union. This
operation would be easiest to support logistically,
because LOCs would be comparatively short and easy
to secure. Moreover, this attack could be undertaken
and completed quicker than any other, minimizing
both the potential for organized Iranian opposition
and the chance for the United States to respond. In this
regard, the Soviets undoubtedly recognize that the
United States would have difficulties countering a
Soviet move into Azarbayjan, especially given the
political situation in Iran
95. Although the risks associated with this scenario
are relatively low, so are the immediate gains. Occu-
pation of Azarbayjan would not afford the Soviets any
control over Iranian oil. An invasion restricted to
Azarbayjan, moreover, would not markedly improve
the Soviet capability to execute other limited options
that could threaten NATO's access to Persian Gulf oil,
such as an assault on the Strait of Hormuz, because
Soviet air forces would not be able to provide effective
fighter coverage over the Gulf. To attain such a
capability, the Soviets would have to commit addition-
al forces and extend their operations well into central
and eastern Iran
96. Seizing a Gulf Port. Faced with only indige-
nous opposition, the Soviets have the capacity to
conduct an overland attack with three to five divisions
to seize a port on the Gulf of Oman or on the Arabian
Sea. An attack against the Gulf, however, would be
much more difficult than an invasion of Azarbayjan. It
would probably be launched out of Afghanistan, and
the Soviets would have to at least maintain-and
probably increase-their forces there to provide secu-
rity for the attacking force. Moreover, Soviet LOCs
would extend from the USSR through Afghanistan to
the coast-a distance of almost 2,000 km over very
difficult terrain. They would be vulnerable to interdic-
tion by the Afghan resistance, as well as Iranian or
Pakistani forces
97. Any operation against the Gulf would also
threaten Western interests in the region. The Soviets
probably would assume that their forces would be
subject to attack by US forces, particularly carrier
aircraft. They undoubtedly realize that it would be
easier for the United States to counter rapidly an
attack in this area than one in Azarbayjan and that it
would be extremely difficult for them to take or hold a
Gulf port if their ground units and LOCs were subject
to interdiction by US forces. The Soviets, therefore,
would probably have to prepare a contingency plan to
engage US aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea as part
of any military move against the Gulf. They would
have to weigh the risk of engaging US forces in an area
where they could regard the United States as holding
an air and naval advantage, against the limited short-
term gains afforded by possession of a Gulf port. On
balance, this would be an unattractive option for the
Soviets during a multitheater wai~
98. A Full-Scale Invasion and nd Occupation of
Iran. The Soviets have sufficient ground and tactical
air forces in the Southern TMO to conduct a general
offensive into Iran with the objective of advancing to
the Persian Gulf and occupying the country. A major
invasion of Iran would be an extremely difficult
operation for the Soviets to execute. Constraints would
include determined and protracted Iranian resistance,
the highly constricted terrain, difficulties in providing
logistic support for both ground and air forces, and the
short combat radii of Soviet tactical fighter aircraft[
99. The ground force requirement would be on the
order of 20 to 25 divisions. The campaign would
require at least a month of preparation, and its
execution would be very time consuming, as the forces
moved through difficult terrain with extended LOCs
and with little room to deploy or maneuver. Depend-
ing on the degree of Iranian resistance, it could well
take the Soviets six to 12 weeks to occupy the Khuze-
stan oilfields and seize key oil facilities on the Gulf.
They could probably occupy the western and southern
littoral of the Gulf-from Kuwait to Oman-with an
additional 10 to 15 divisions. This would entail the
transfer of five to 15 divisions to the Southern TMO
from other parts of the USSR, making this a very
unlikely option during a global war.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR MULTITHEATER
WAR
100. The Soviet Union-together with its Warsaw
Pact allies-has the capability to conduct simultaneous
military operations in Europe, East Asia, and South-
west Asia. Operations against China, however, would
have to be limited in scope. Campaigns in the three
regions-controlled by TMO high commands-could
be conducted largely independently of one another.
Operations in the three TMOs opposite NATO would,
of course, have to be coordinated. The TMO high
commands would operate under the general direction
of the General Staff in Moscow, which would retain
control over those forces not specifically assigned to
the theater commanders, including most units in the
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central USSR, several airborne division , and some air
armies and transport aircraft.
101. Logistic stocks in the Western TMO opposite
NATO's center are believed sufficient to sustain Pact
units in combat for at least 90 days. Our data on Soviet
stockpiles on NATO's flanks and in the Far Eastern
and Southern TMOs are not as good as they are on
stocks in the Western TMO. As a result of recent
improvements in logistic infrastructure as well as an
increase in stockpiles, the Soviets probably have suffi-
cient stocks in the eastern USSR to support limited
operations against China (of the type described in this
Estimate) for at least 90 days. Stockpiles in the south-
ern USSR are probably sufficient to support forces
operating in Iran for a like period. If the Soviets
limited their operations in Iran to Azarbayjan, logistic
stocks in the Caucasus would be sufficient to sustain a
force of five to seven divisions in low-intensity com-
bat-the type the Soviets would experience there-for
an indefinite period. The main logistic problem the
Soviets would be likely to face in Iran would be, not a
shortage of supplies, but rather getting those supplies
from the southern USSR to the units as they advanced
deeper into Iran over very primitive and vulnerable
LOCs.
Troop transfers could be made over the nation's
railways, highways, inland waterways, and largely
uncontested airspace. The Soviet Union conducted
major troop redeployments in World War II, and has
the capacity for similar or greater redeployments now.
The largest such move during World War II was the
west-east transfer of about 40 divisions over the Trans-
Siberian Railroad in preparation for the attack into
Manchuria. The process took about three months,
although some equipment had been moved to the Far
East earlier and stockpiled there.
105. The Trans-Siberian Railroad is still the main
east-west rail link in the Soviet Union. When the
Baikal-Amur-Mainline (BAM) Railroad becomes oper-
ational in the late 1980s (the last link was laid in
September 1984), the rail capacity between Lake
Baikal and the Pacific coast will increase by about 50
percent. The BAM will also be less vulnerable to
interdiction than the Trans-Siberian line because it
follows a course 100 to 300 miles north of the Chinese
border (see figure 7). The BAM, however, will not
affect the Soviet capacity to move forces between the
western or central USSR and the Lake Baikal region,
and hence will not significantly increase the Soviet
capa ift forces between Europe and the Far
East.
102. If a war in all three theaters continued beyond
two or three months, the Soviet capacity to conduct
offensive operations in the Far East and the Gulf
region would begin to show strains. Moscow would
have to consider that continued offensives in these
theaters could develop into a long-term and large-scale
commitment of manpower and material that would
compete with and ultimately could weaken the war
effort in Europe
Intertheater Transfer of Forces
103. In a multitheater war, the Soviets could trans-
fer forces from one region to another to enhance their
prospects for success or to respond to actions of their
opponents. Our assessment of how the Soviets would
probably view a transfer of forces among the three
principal regions is based largely on our understanding
of the priority the Soviets would assign to each region
during a multitheater conflict, and the capabilities of
Soviet forces in each theater. The strategic mobility of
Soviet theater forces and their adaptability to fight in
varying environments are also important consider-
ations
Strategic Mobility
104. In fighting a multitheater war, the Soviet
Union would enjoy the advantage of interior lines.
106. Transport aircraft, both military and civil,
could be used to a lesser degree to transport troops and
supplies between the eastern and western USSR. The
primary mission of Soviet Military Transport Aviation
(VTA) is to support airborne forces, but the Soviets also
use VTA to move ordinary troops, minus heavy equip-
ment such as tanks, in exercises. The capacity of VTA
has expanded dramatically over the last decade. How-
ever, this increase has been more than offset by
additional heavy equipment in airborne divisions and
by the establishment of air assault units, which are
prime competitors for VTA aircraft. As a result, the
net capability of VTA for simultaneous airlift contin-
ues to be either the combat and combat support
elements of about six airborne regiments or a full
airborne division. The civil airline, Aeroflot, has a
limited cargo capability and is used chiefly for passen-
ger travel, especially during the semiannual troop
rotation. Since the use of VTA and Aeroflot for
intertheater transfers would severely restrict the con-
duct of airborne and air assault operations, we do not
expect the Soviets to use aircraft to move heavy units,
such as tank or motorized rifle divisionsF~~
107. If the Soviets decided to transfer f-o-rces into or
out of the Southern TMO, they could use the Caspian
Sea as well as transport aircraft, roads, and railroads.
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Figure 7
Baikal-Amur Mainline Railroad (BAM)
Adaptability of Theater Forces
108. Another factor Soviet planners would have to
consider is whether forces designed to fight in one
theater are readily adaptable for fighting in another.
The structure of the Soviet ground units in the Cauca-
sus-many with small complements of tanks and
armored personnel carriers, and with light towed
artillery rather than heavier self-propelled models-is
ideal for employment in the mountainous terrain of
Iran and eastern Turkey. These units could also be
used in the rugged terrain of northeastern China, but
would have to be transported several thousand miles to
fight there. Lacking in armor, firepower, and tactical
mobility, they would be less well suited against
NATO's center.. (s)
109. Soviet ground forces in the Far East use tanks
older than those of the units in the west, and, while
these tanks compare favorably with those of the
Kuril Islands
(admrmstered by y
Sov,et Union)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Chinese, they would be vulnerable to NATO antitank
weapons. Conversely, the modern, heavy frontline
units opposite NATO are more sophisticated than
required for missions against China. (s)
Risk Taking
110. Another factor that would bear heavily on any
Soviet decision to transfer forces from one theater to
another would be the degree of risk the Soviet leader-
ship perceived and was willing to take. Traditionally,
Soviet leaders have not been prone to take major risks
in one area (by economizing their forces there) in
order to maximize their military power in another. (s)
111. Stalin minimized his risks in late 1941 and
early 1942 when he ordered the transfer of units (the
exact number is unknown, but it probably exceeded 25
divisions) from Siberia, including many from opposite
Manchuria, to bolster the defense of Moscow. There is
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good evidence that he had already been informed-by
his agent Sorge-that Japan had decided not to attack
the Soviet Union, despite pressure from Germany to
that end. The Kremlin, moreover, could have reason-
ably inferred that Japan-already at war with the
United States and Britain and still mindful of its
stunning defeat by the Soviets at Khalkhin-Gol-
would be wary of attacking the USSR. Despite these
facts, Moscow kept 40 divisions in the Far East
throughout the war-even when they were desperate-
ly needed in the west, and even after Japanese forces
in Manchuria had been depleted as a result of Japan's
war effort against the Americans, British, and Chinese.
own forces. Soviet planners almost certainly would
calculate that the logistic problems they would face in
such an attack would not be as great as those the
United States would face in moving troops to the
Persian Gulf, or later in simultaneously supporting
operations in the Gulf area and reinforcing Western
Europe. Also in this scenario, the Soviets might elect to
allow time for the United States to deploy its forces,
land them in the area, and move inland. Once the US
forces were firmly committed, the Soviets might well
accept a stalemate in Iran, shifting as much of their air
assets as possible toward NATO. They might also
attempt to close the Suez Canal to further impede the
112. If Pact forces became involved in a protracted
war with NATO, however, the Soviets would have one
option with respect to China that they did not have
with respect to Japan. They could adopt a strategy of
massive retaliation against China-similar to the strat-
egy the United States declared publicly when it
enjoyed nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. By
informing China that any attack against the Soviet
Union would trigger a Soviet nuclear response, the
Soviets might feel that they could transfer some forces
from the Chinese frontier to the European theater.
Such an assumption, however, would entail major risks
for the Soviets, including the chance that Beijing
might call Moscow's bluff, and that the Kremlin might
not be able to contain a nuclear war to one theater
113. Since there is no credible military challenge to
Soviet security from the Persian Gulf countries, the
Soviets could be expected to economize their forces
there to facilitate operations against NATO or even
against China. Such a move would be virtually risk
free
114. A less likely and much riskier move for the
Soviets would be to invade Iran before attacking
Western Europe in the hope of diverting potential US
reinforcements for NATO to the Persian Gulf. Soviet
planners might calculate that they could exchange 10
to 15 of their poorly equipped and trained divisions
from the Caucasus-which have only peripheral mis-
sions against NATO-for more critical US divisions,
and divert US strategic lift assets away from NATO
115. The Soviets know that Washington is con-
cerned that a diversion of US forces to the Persian
Gulf could have serious implications for the collective
defense of Western Europe. They are also aware that,
despite pressures from the United States, the European
NATO nations have taken no meaningful steps to
compensate for such a diversion by improving their
transfer of US forces.
116. This option, however, would entail costs that
the Soviets would not be able to calculate confidently.
In the first place, they could not be assured of how the
United States would respond or if, in fact, any signifi-
cant number of US forces would actually be diverted
to this area. Moreover, such a diversionary attack
would make sense only if the international situation
were such that the Soviets believed war with NATO
were either desirable or inevitable. They would have
to assume, however, that a Soviet attack into Iran
could trigger NATO mobilization and the heightened
readiness of NATO forces. If it did, the advantages of
any diversion of US forces might be more than offset
by the reduced possibility that the Warsaw Pact could
achieve any degree of surprise with regard to its attack
on NATO. Other Soviet uncertainties would include
the degree to which air assets committed to the feint
could suffer attrition, reducing their availability for
operations against NATO and the chance that regional
states such as Pakistan might be drawn into the
conflict
Transfer of Forces From Europe to the Far East
117. We cannot envision the circumstance in which
Moscow would conduct a major drawdown of its
forces opposite NATO to attack China. Such a move
would jeopardize any chance the Soviets have for a
quick victory in Europe and, in view of China's lack of
capacity to mount and sustain a coordinated attack
into Soviet territory, would be unnecessary
118. In the unlikely event of a Chinese attack,
Soviet forces along the border are sufficient to repulse
it and to mount a counterattack to eject Chinese
forces. The Soviets would almost certainly not under-
take larger operations against China until they had
concluded a war in Europe, in view of the extensive
reinforcements that would be required
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Transfer of Forces From the Far East to Europe
119. It is conceivable that before attacking NATO
the Soviets would transfer some of their ground and
air units from the eastern frontier to the western USSR
to beef up their second-echelon forces and reserves in
the western and central MDs. There is precedent for
such a move-the transfer of units from Siberia to
defend Moscow in World War II-although it is not
likely that the circumstances (the Soviet army on
defense) will be repeated. Any future Soviet cam ai n
in Europe would be offensive from the outse
120. Under these circumstances, and given the fact
that the Pact already enjoys a superiority in conven-
tional forces in Europe, Pact planners would probably
see no urgency for a large-scale transfer of forces from
east to west. In fact, such a transfer could do more
harm than good. To influence the Pact's prospects for
a quick victory in Europe, the transfer would have to
get under way several months before the Pact attack,
providing clear warning to NATO, and perhaps trig-
gering mobilization in the West European countries
and the implementation of SACEUR's Rapid Rein-
forcement Plan for the transatlantic reinforcement of
NATO's ground and air forces. Such actions could
more than offset any increased numerical advantage
the Soviets might gain.
121. The Soviets, moreover, obviously do not con-
sider their forces opposite China excessive to their
needs. In numbers, the ground forces are only slightly
larger than the force the Soviets maintained opposite
Manchuria in World War II (considering that several
divisions now on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands could
not participate in a campaign in China). While the
pace of the quantitative buildup in Soviet convention-
al forces along the border has tapered off from that of
the late 1960s and early 1970s, force modernization
continues. In addition, nondivisional ground units such
as attack helicopter regiments and multiple rocket
launcher regiments are being increased
122. The weight of the Soviet strategic nuclear
threat directed against China is also continuing to
grow. The Soviets have more than 150 SS-20 launchers
in Siberia and an additional 50 in the central USSR
that could hit targets in western China. These are in
addition to the considerable array of other Soviet
nuclear weapons-ICBMs, over 200 Backfire and Bad-
ger bombers, shorter range ballistic missiles, tactical
aircraft-and older ballistic missile submarines in the
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123. Soviet leaders evidently consider the mainte-
nance of strong military forces in the eastern USSR not
only indispensable to the security of their borders, but
also as insurance against a two-front war. They proba-
bly believe that a strong military presence along the
border would deter a Chinese attack in the event of a
NATO-Pact war, although we have no reason to
believe the Chinese would attack the Soviet Union,
even under such circumstances. In the event of a
NATO-Pact war, therefore, while a minor shift of
Soviet ground and air units away from China is
feasible, a major transfer of forces is unlikely.F--]
Transfer of Forces To or From Southwest Asia
124. It is highly unlikely that, in the context of a
global war, the Soviets would transfer large forces into
the Southern TMO. Ground and tactical air units now
in this theater are sufficient to undertake operations
up to and including a full-scale invasion of Iran, and-
given the limited maneuver room there-additional
ground units would probably not be desirable, even if
they were available. Ground and tactical air reinforce-
ments would be required if the Soviets were to
continue their attack south of the Persian Gulf.
125. Before the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron
could seriously challenge Western naval forces in the
area, threaten US sea lines of communication, or make
a meaningful contribution to any Soviet land cam-
paign in the Southern TMO, it would require substan-
tial augmentation. Some augmentation could come
from Soviet Pacific Fleet forces deployed to Vietnam
and the South China Sea, normally three to five
general purpose submarines, two to six surface com-
batants, and about 20 auxiliaries. More substantial
augmentation, however, would require that the Soviets
significantly reduce their capabilities in the other,
more vital theaters:
- The Pacific Fleet, which provides the bulk of
forces in the Indian Ocean, has priority missions
in wartime to protect the SSBN force, be pre-
pared to conduct strategic nuclear strikes, and
establish sea control in the Seas of Okhotsk and
Japan and the area adjacent to the Kamchatka
Peninsula and the Kuril Island chain to defend
against aircraft carriers and cruise-missile-
launching platforms.
- The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, which also
contribute ships to the Indian Ocean Squadron,
also have high-priority missions against NATO.
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During a global war, rather than reinforcing the
Indian Ocean Squadron, the Soviets probably would
recall some units from the Indian Ocean and South
China Sea, particularly if US aircraft carriers were not
present
126. If Western forces, particularly aircraft carri-
ers, were operating near the Persian Gulf, however,
the Soviets might rebase some strategic aviation bomb-
ers in the southern USSR to attack them to prevent
their use against the Soviet Union and to preclude
their transfer to another theater. 25X1
127. The Soviets would probably limit their ground
operations in the Southern TMO-probably to the
point of adopting a defensive posture opposite Iran-
and commit the majority of their units in the Caucasus
against NATO's southern flank in Turkey. If addition-
al ground forces were needed in other areas, Moscow
might well limit its operations in eastern Turkey,
assign security missions along the Iranian border to
paramilitary units, and transfer some divisions from
the Caucasus to other theaters. F___1
OUTLOOK
128. The position of primacy that NATO occupies
in Soviet thinking is not likely to change. No other
group of nations outside the Soviet camp has the
potential to achieve the military power of NATO. The
Soviets will continue to judge NATO on its capabili-
ties, not its intentions, and will improve their forces
accordingly."
129. The Soviets will attempt, with little success, to
persuade the East European countries to spend more
money on their armed forces. The result will be a
continually widening gap between the capabilities of
the best Soviet units and those of the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet leadership is likely
to pay increased attention to this problem as NATO's
strategy for attacking follow-on forces evolves, placing
a premium on the capacity of Pact first-echelon units
to overcome NATO defenses quickly
130.. As both East and West experiment with new
concepts for lap war are in Central Europe, nuclear
weapons- o eater an strategic-wi continue to
play an important, per aps dominant, roe in t tie
strategy of of a fiances. This will- resu t partly from
the reluctance of most West European nations to
"A comprehensive discussion of anticipated improvements to
Warsaw Pact Theater Forces will appear in NIE 11-14-85/D,
Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces, 1985-
2000F - - - I
commit themselves to the spending necessary to raise
the nuclear threshold (by improving their conventional
forces at a faster rate than the Soviets improve theirs)
and partly because some European leaders feel strong-
ly that it is precisely nuclear weapons that deter war in
Europe by ultimately tying the United States to the
defense of the continent. They will argue that a
NATO strategy based primarily on conventional forces
would be less of a deterrent, and could result in an
nflict limited to Europe.
Both superpowers are following a simi-
lar course, ensuring that nuclear weapons will contin-
ue to have the potential to resolve any NATO-Pact
conflict in Europe=
131. Ongoing developments indicate that the Far
East will continue to play a major-if secondary-role
in Soviet military strategy. The Soviets will still worry
about the prospect of China's taking advantage of a
Pact-NATO conflict to settle old scores such as territo-
rial claims. There are some signs of progress in Sino-
Soviet relations, but the Soviets are not likely to meet
any of the preconditions the Chinese have set for
improved relations-a reduction of Soviet military
forces along the Chinese frontier, a withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and an end to Soviet
support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.
On the last point, periodic clashes on the Vietnamese-
Chinese border will only serve to focus Chinese atten-
tion on the problem. Nor will Soviet-Japanese relations
improve markedly, as Moscow will refuse to even
discuss with Tokyo the issue of the disputed Northern
Territories. The US-Sino-Japanese relationship, mean-
while, will probably move steadily if slowly forward.
The Chinese clearly regard the Soviet Union as the
principal threat to their security, and they need
Western technology.
132. Moscow's principal objective in East Asia will
be to increase its own influence-by expanding its
military power-while at the same time containing
China and reducing US and Japanese influence. In
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pursuit of this objective, the Soviets will continue to
build toward a force posture that will be viable even
against the combined forces of the United States,
China, and Japan, to hedge against the possibility of a
worst case scenario. These efforts, however, will not be
at the expense of Soviet forces facing NATO
133. The military balance on the Sino-Soviet border
will continue to be a mismatch of superior Chinese
numbers against superior Soviet technology. The Sovi-
ets will make no attempt to match the Chinese
numbers, but they will field military hardware of a
caliber the Chinese cannot duplicate. The Chinese will
continue to press for Western technologies-particu-
larly from the United States, Japan, and West Ger-
many-that have military application. Even if they
acquire such technologies, however, they will have
difficulty absorbing them because of shortcomings in
industry and R&D facilities. In short, the imbalance in
military forces along the Sino-Soviet border will grow
even larger in favor of Moscow, but the Kremlin's
options will still be limited because of China's reserves
of manpower and its vast territory.=
134. Southwest Asia-given its geostrategic posi-
tion-will continue to be a prime arena for super-
power competition as the Soviets seek to expand their
influence in the Middle East, and the United States
looks for ways to ensure Western access to Persian
Gulf oil. Given the instability of the region, the
potential for a superpower confrontation there will
remain high. Nevertheless, Moscow's actions in the
area will be guided more by political than military
concerns. We do not expect a major effort to improve
the Soviet military posture in the region, nor do we
believe that Moscow feels such an effort is necessary.
135. The Soviet position in Afghanistan will weigh
heavily on Moscow's future capacity to conduct mili-
tary operations in the Persian Gulf region. If that
position improves-whether the result of declining
resistance to Soviet occupation or improved capabili-
ties of the Afghan Army-Moscow's capacity to con-
duct operations in the Gulf region will be enhanced.
Some regular Soviet forces tied up in counterinsur-
gency operations in Afghanistan would be freed for
operations elsewhere, and Soviet land LOCs would be
more secure
136. An end to the war between Iran and Iraq
would improve the capacity of both countries to resist
a Soviet invasion-particularly in the longer term as
both Iraqi and Iranian forces recovered from the war.
Any postwar redeployment of Iranian units to north-
ern Iran would also make a Soviet invasion of Azar-
bayjan more costly, although the Iranians, by them-
selves, could not prevent the Soviets from occupying
Azarbayjan
137. In sum, the Soviet Union will continue to
posture its forces to fight in three principal theaters on
its western, eastern, and southern borders. The priority
of effort, however, will be toward the west. In the
event of a global war, Moscow would subordinate its
actions in all other theaters to the war against NATO.
In all likelihood, as long as it were at war with NATO,
the Soviet Union would not undertake major cam-
paigns in the other theaters without being forced to do
so, but would attack any US forces in these theaters
that threatened the USSR
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