SOVIET BLOC AND NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED COUNTRY STATEMENTS AT THE CSCE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) (CDE-VI) 14 MAY - 5 JULY 1985 VOLUME I

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 379
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
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Directorate of
Intelligence
-
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/ Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-VI)
Volume I
14 May - 5 July 1985
CR 85-13401
September 1985
34
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Soviet Bloc and Neutral/ Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-VI)
14 May - 5
Volume I
Secret
CR 85-13401
September 1985
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Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-VI)
14 May - 5 July 1985
FOREWORD
This reference aid contains a chronological history of
topics discussed during the Sixth Round of the Conference
on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which commenced in
Stockholm on 14 May and recessed on 5 July 1985. It is
indexed according to subjects and countries. In the case
of the Soviet Union the individual delegate speaking, if
identified, is also specified. Furthermore, the forum in
which the statement(s) occurred is noted.
The conference record has been retained in straight
chronological order. The index, located at the beginning,
is designed to guide the user to pages for specific
topics, countries, and, in the case of the Soviet Union,
personalities. By using the type of entry key located at
the front of the index, users can determine whether the
references are from cables reporting on plenary,
post-plenary, or working group meetings and limit their
searches by these types of references when desired.
Users interested in statements by a particular country are
directed to the country index where each country has its
own subjext index. In the case of the Soviet Union, an
additional letter code will identify the individual
delegate who made the statement, if noted in the text.
Each Soviet delegate who spoke is also included in the
Statements by the following countries are indexed:
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, German
Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), and Yugoslavia. Please note that there
is also a separate entry for the "East." In this section
are found statements which were attributed to "the East"
in general but to no country in particular. In addition,
when a delegate from one country speaks on behalf of one
or more other countries, his statements are cited in eacn
of the various countries' indexes.
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CONFIDENTIAL
All statements made by participating countries during
plenary and working group AB meetings are summarized in
the "Statement Summaries" section of this reference aid.
Three items of note which might otherwise be
overlooked are brought to the user's attention: "weekly
wrap-up" cables summarizing developments in all COE forums
are included chronologically and can be located by
referring to the subject index; a group of miscellaneous
cables found at the end of the "cables" section and
referenced in the subject index as "miscellaneous cables"
cover such topics as delegation personnel changes,
analyses of delegation and group positions or motives at
CDE, and procedural issues and similar subjects; the three
working documents submitted by the East were introduced in
working group AB. However, the Eastern delegates
requested that the proposals be distributed as working
group B documents. For this reason they have been indexed
"
"b
/c.
with a page number followed by
CONFIDENTIAL
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Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CUE)
(CUE-VI)
14 May - 5 July 1985
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
BACKGROUND PAPERS
Pages
Helsinki Final Act ..............................1-5
Madrid Mandate......... ...
SC.l/Amplified; Stockholm, 8~March.1985........ 11-
33
SC.2; Stockholm, 25 January 1984 .........** 29-33
SC.3; Stockholm, 9 March 1984 ..................29-33
SC.4; Stockholm, 8 May 1984 ....................435-40
1-45
SC.5; Stockholm, 8 November 1984 ...............47-50
SC.6; Stockholm, 29 January 1985 ...............51-53
WGA.l; Stockholm, 7 February 1985 ..............55-56
DELEGATION LISTS
STATEMENT SUMMARIES
Summaries of Plenary Statements ................
Summaries of Working Group AB Statements ....... 13-17
13-11
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SUBJECT INDEX
Pages
....1-8
Main Subject Index ..........................
COUNTRY INDEXES
1-3
..
Austria ........... 5-8
5-8
Bulgaria .................................. .9
Cyprus ....................................
Czechoslovakia ................... .15-16
East ............. .............................-16
Finland ............... ........... 1 15-29
GDR ................ .......... 221
5-23
Hungary ........................................29-30
Malta .......................................... 31-34
Poland ................................ 35-37
Romania ............... ......... ................39-40
Sweden .................... 41-42
....................43-48
Switzerland ................
USSR ...........................................49-50
Yugoslavia ..........................
SESSION CABLES
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CONFERENCE ON SECURITY
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
FINAL ACT
1
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Cwn?inced that the peaceful s tt ement of disputes s a complement to refrain-
ing from the threat or use of f rce, both being esse ,tial though not exclusive
factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace at\d security:
Desiring to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the
peaceful settlement of disputes:
1. Are resolved to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally accep-
table method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing
existing methods. and to continue to this end to work upon the "Draft Convention
on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" submitted by
Switzerland during the second stage of the Conference on Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe, as well as other proposals relating to it and directed towards the
elaboration of such a method.
2. Decide that, on the invitation of Switzerland. a meeting of experts of all the
participating States will be convoked in order to fulfil the mandate described in
paragraph I above within the framework and under the procedures of the follow-
up to the Conference laid down in the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference".
3. This meeting of experts will take place after the meeting of the representatives
appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating States, scheduled
according to the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference" for 1977: the results of
the work of this meeting of experts will be submitted to Governments.
2.
Document on confidence-building measures
and certain aspects of security and disarmament
The participating States,
Desirous of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and
thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world:
Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to
increasing stability and security in Europe:
Determined further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their
international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on
Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in this Final
Act:
Rccogni:ing the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict
and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give
rise to apprehension. particularly in a Situation where the participating States lack
clear and timely information about the nature of such activities:
Taking into account considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening ten-
sion and promoting disarmament:
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Recognizing that the exchange of observers by invitation at military man-
oeuvres will help to promote contacts and mutuaLunderstanding;
Having studied the question of prior notification of major military movements
in the context of confidence-building;
Recognising that there are other ways in which individual States can contrib-
ute further to their common objectives;
Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military
manoeuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of
confidence. stability and security;
Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and
to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities,
as essentials for the realization of these objectives.
Recognizing that this measure deriving from political decision rests upon a
voluntary basis;
Have adopted the Jollowing:
I
Prior notification of major military mantzurres
They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating
States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provi-
sions:
Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of
25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval com-
ponents (in this context the word -troops" includes amphibious and airborne
troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops.
or of combined manoxuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this
total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the
above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of
either amphibious or airborne troops. or both, notification can also be `iven.
Notification will be given of major military mantxuvres which take place on
the territory, in Europe. of any participating State as well its, if applicable, in the
adjoining sea area and air space.
In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe.
prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area
within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European
participating State. the participating State need not, however. give notification in
cases in %%hich that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier
facing or ,hared with a non-European non-participatin121 State.
Notification will he given 21 d;ty, or more in advance of the start of the
mail uyre or in the case of a m:uutuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest
possihic opportunity prior to its starting date.
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Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general
purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numeri-
cal strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its con-
duct. The participating States will also, if possible. provide additional relevant
information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and
the period of involvement of these forces.
Prior notification of other military manoeuvres
The participating States recognize that they can contribute further to streng-
thening confidence and increasing security and stability. and to this end may also
notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States. with special
regard for those near the area of such manceuvres.
To the same end, the participating States also recognize that they may notify
other military manoeuvres conducted by them.
Exchange of observers
The participating States will invite other participating States. voluntarily and
on a bilateral basis. in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating
States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.
The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the
procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which
it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.
The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through
usual diplomatic channels.
Prior notification of major military movements
In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations
the participating States studied the question of prior notification of' major military
movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.
Accordingly. the participating States recognize that they may, at their own
discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building. notify their
major military movements.
In the sane spirit, further consideration will be given by the States participat-
ing in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the question of'
prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular. the
experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this
document.
Outer confidence-building mcastu-es
The participating States recognize that there are other means by which their
common objectives can be promoted.
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1 11
In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to
better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their mili-
tary personnel, including visits by military delegations.
In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confi-
dence-building, the participating States, when conducting their military activities in
the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military
manoeuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.
They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the
provisions set forth above. together with further efforts, could lead to developing
and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.
II
Questions relating to disarmament
The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed
at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed
to complement political detente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They
are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by
their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement
of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international con-
trol. and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the
world.
III
General considerations
Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the
strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting
detente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged in such efforts,
will, in this context. proceed. in particular, from the following essential considera-
tions:
- The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security
- The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security
.in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of
world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area:
- Respect for the security interests of all States participating in the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe inherent in their sovereign eyualit%
- The importance that participants in negotiating tiara see to it that information
about relevant developments. progress and result, is provided on an appropriate
ha-,is to other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in [.urope and, in return. the justified interest of any of those State, in having their
view s considered.
5
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ABSCHLIESSENDES DOKUMENT
DES MADRIDER TREFFENS 1980 DER VERTRETER DER TEILNEHMER-
STAATEN DER KONFERENZ UBER SICHERHEIT UND ZUSAMMENAR-
BEIT IN EUROPA, WELCHES AUF DER GRUNDLAGE DER BESTIM-
MUNGEN DER SCHLUSSAKTE BETREFFEND DIE FOLGEN DER
KONFERENZ ABGEHALTEN WURDE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT
OF THE MADRID MEETING 1980 OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, HELD ON THE BASIS OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE
CONFERENCE
DOCUMENTO DE CLAUSURA
DE LA REUNION DE MADRID DE 1980 DE LOS REPRESENTANTES DE
LOS ESTADOS PARTICIPANT1ES EN LA CONFERENCIA SOBRE LA
SEGURIDAD Y LA COOPERACION EN EUROPA, CONVOCADA SOBRE
LA BASE DE LAS DISPOSICIONES DEL ACTA FINAL RELATIVAS A LA
CONTINUIDAD DE LA CONFERENCIA
DOCUMENT DE CLOTURE
DE LA REUNION DE MADRID 1980 DES REPRESENTANTS DES ETATS
AYANT PARTICIPE A LA CONFERENCE SUR LA SECURITE ET LA
COOPERATION EN EUROPE, TENUE CONFORMEMENT AUX DISPOSI-
TIONS DE L'ACTE FINAL RELATIVES AUX SUITES DE LA
CONFERENCE
DOCUMENTO CONCLUSIVO
DELLA RIUNIONE DI MADRID 1980 DEI RAPPRESENTANTI DEGLI
STATI CHE HANNO PARTECIPATO ALLA CONFERENZA SULLA SICU-
REZZA E LA COOPERAZIONE IN EUROPA CONVOCATA IN BASE ALLE
DISPOSIZIONI DELL'ATTO FINALE RELATIVE Al SEGUITI DELLA
CONFERENZA
HTorOBEIIl JOKYMEHT
MA,3P11ICKOH BCTPELIIH 1980 FOLTA IIPESCTABIITE.'IEII
rOCY'IAPCTB-Y'1ACTH1IK0B COBEHIAHIiA 110
BE3011ACHOCTHI 11 COTPY,3HIIMECTBY B EBPOIIE,
COCTOABWEIICA HA OCHOBE f0J10iKEHIli1
3AK.110'II1TE.1bHOFO AKTA, OTHOCAI111IXCA K
]ZA7bHEIIWIIM WArAM IIOC'IE COBEIIIAHIIA
7 MADRID, 1983
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Upon invitation of the Government of Canada, the meeting of experts
will be held in Ottawa, beginning on 7 May 1985. It will draw up conclusions
and recommendations to be submitted to'the governments of all parti-
cipating States.
The meeting will be preceded by a preparatory meeting which will be
held in Ottawa upon the invitation of the Government of Canada, starting on
23 April 1985.
In conformity with the recommendation contained in the Report of the
Montreux Meeting of Experts, another meeting of experts of the partici-
pating States will be convened, at the invitation of the Government of
Greece. It will take place in Athens and will commence on 21 March 1984,
with the purpose of pursuing, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination
of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes
aimed at complementing existing methods. The meeting will take into
account the common approach set forth in the above-mentioned report.
Recalling the right of any participating State to belong or not to belong
to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or
multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties
of alliance, and also the right to neutrality, the participating States take note
of the declaration of the Government of the Republic of Malta in which it
stated that, as an effective contribution to detente, peace and security in the
Mediterranean region, the Republic of Malta is a neutral State adhering to a
policy of non-alignment. They call upon all , States to respect that
declaration.
Conference on Confidence- and Security- building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe
The participating States,
Recalling the provisions of the Final Act according to which they
recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military
confrontation and promoting disarmament,
Have agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-
building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.
The aim of the Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the
multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the
Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new,.effective and concrete actions
designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in
achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of
States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.
Thus the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be
devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary
confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of
military confrontation in Europe.
8
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The first stage of the Conference will be held in Stockholm commencing
on 17 January 1984.
On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect
for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their
respective obligations concerning confidence- and security building measures
and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures
will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air
space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will
be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their
content.
As far as the adjoining sea area* and air space is concerned, the measures
will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States
taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well
as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as
referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications
will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-
building measures at the Conference.
Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish
obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and
security- building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be
applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act
relating to confidence -building measures and certain aspects of security and
disarmament. V
The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the
forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.
Taking into account the above-mentioned aim of the Conference, the
next follow-up meeting of the participating States of the CSCE, to be held in
Vienna. commencing on 4 November 1986, will assess the progress achieved
during the first stage of the Conference.
Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and having
reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the Conference, and also in
the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament
affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and
appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for
security and disarmament in Europe. including the question of supple-
menting the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on
Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.
A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda. time-table
and other organizational modalities for the first stage of the Conference, will
be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25 October 19S3. Its duration shall not
exceed three weeks.
In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas
adjoining Europe.
9
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The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of
distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, mutatis mutandis, be
applied to the Conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the
preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided
by the host country.
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CSCE Distr.
r
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- RESTRICTED
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
CSCE/SC.1/Amplified-
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE Stockholm, 8 March 1985
The Delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America,
as the sponsors of CSCE/SC.1 wish, in the interest of facilitating
the work of the Conference, to put forward the following compilation
of CSCE/SC.1/Working Documents I-VI amplifying measures 1 - 6 proposed
in CSCE/SC.l.
As submitted by the authors.
11
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- 2 - ', CSCE/SC.l/Amplified
Measure 1: Exchange of Military Information
1. Each participating State will annually exchange information concerning
its military command organization, and its regulations for accredited military
personnel, in the zone. Such information will be provided to all other partici-
pating States and will be exchanged no later than the first day of January of
each calendar year, and will be effective as of that date.
2. For each participating State, such information will be provided in writing,
(a) In chart form, the command organization in the zone, including
designation, normal headquarters location in exact geographic terms,
and composition of its ground and land-based air forces down to:
(i) major ground formations and main combat units; and
(ii) land-based air formations, specifying wing, air regiment or
equivalent formations; and
(b) Its regulations governing the presence and activities in the zone
of military personnel accredited to it from other participating
States.
3. Clarification of such information may be requested through consultation
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- 3 -
CSCE/SC.1/Amplified
Measure 2: Exchange of Forecasts of Activities Notifiable in Advance
1. Each participating State will exchange annual forecasts of its military
activities within the zone for which notification is required by Measure 3
of this document. Such forecasts will be provided to all other participating
States. The forecasts, organized into calendar year quarters, will be exchanged
for each calendar year, and will be issued not later than the fifteenth day
of November for the following calendar year.
2. If a participating State adds a military activity to those that have
been forecast or changes information concerning a military activity from that
which has been forecast, such additions or changes will be provided in the
notification for that activity pursuant to Measure 3.
3. A participating State will present forecasts in writing organized into
calendar year quarters, in the following format, for each military activity
planned:
(a) Designation of the activity, including, if applicable, the name
of the exercise.
(b) The general purpose of the activity.
(c) The thirty-day period during which the activity is planned to
begin.
(d) The names of the participating States that will be engaged in
the activity.
(e) The geographic co-ordinates of the area where the activity is
planned to take place.
(f) The duration of the activity.
(g) The number of troops, to include amphibious and airborne troops,
directing staff, and umpires that will be engaged in the activity.
(h) The type of forces that will be engaged in the activity.
4. Clarification of information contained in an annual forecast may be
requested through consultation by appropriate means.
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Measure 3: Notification of Military Activities
A. General
1. Each participating State that plans to carry out a military activity,
that is, an out-of-garrison land activity, a mobilization activity, or an
amphibious activity, in the zone, will give notification 45 days before such
activity begins. If a military activity is conducted as an alert, notifi-
cation will be given in accordance with Section E of this measure.
Notifications will be provided to all other participating States.
2. A participating State on whose national territory a military activity
is planned to take place will give notification of the entire activity
conducted on its territory even if the forces of that State are not engaged
in the activity. This will not limit the obligation of other participating
States whose participation amounts to a military activity on its own to notify
these activities.
3. Compliance with the provisions of this measure will be evaluated or.
the basis of information exchanged in accordance with Measures 1-3 of this
document and will be subject to verification by appropriate means. Partici-
pating States will be invited to send observers to military activities within
the zone, as provided in Measure 4 of this document. Furthermore, partici-
pating States will be permitted to inspect such military activities or
possible military activities for the purpose of monitoring compliance,
as provided in Measure 5 of this document.
B. Out-of-Garrison Land Activities
1. An "out-of-garrison land activity" is an activity in which:
(a) One or more ground force divisions, equivalent formations, or
formations which are temporarily organized into a structure
comparable to a division formation, are engaged, if:
(i) one-half or more of the major combat elements of the
division or equivalent formation, that is, tank, infantry,
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motorized rifle, airborne brigades or regiments or equiva-
lent-sized formations, and at least one supporting artillery
or engineer or helicopter element are out-of-garrison at
the same time and carrying out a common activity under a
single command; or
(ii) 6,000 or more of the troops of the division or equivalent
formation are out-of-garrison at the same time and carrying
out a common activity under a single command; or
(iii) (X) main battle tanks or (Y) armoured carriers (AC) of the
division or equivalent formation are out-of-garrison at the
same time and carrying out a common activity under a single
command; or F
(b) The combat elements of ground forces not organized into division
formations are engaged, if:
(i) 6,000 or more troops are out-of-garrison at the same time,
and carrying out a common activity under a single direct
operational command; or
(ii) (X) main battle tanks or (Y) armoured carriers (AC) are
out-of-garrison at the same time and engaged in a common
activity under a single direct operational command.
2. Ground forces garrisoned inside of the zone will be considered to be
out-of-garrison when they are away from their normal peacetime locations
and are in the zone. Ground forces normally garrisoned outside of the zone
will be considered to be out-of-garrison when they leave their arrival base
within the zone to engage in a military activity on land within the zone.
3. A participating State will give notification of an out-of-garrison land
activity whether the activity is independent or combined with air or amphibi-
ous support.
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4. A participating State will give notification at the start of ground
force movements in the case of an out-of-garrison land activity to carry
out an activity outside the zone from a point of embarkation inside the zone.
C. Mobilization Activities
1. A "mobilization activity" is an activity involving a recall of
(a) 25,000 or more troops, either reservists or reservists in
combination with regulars, are involved in the same activity
in the zone; or
(b) The majority of the major combat elements, that is, tank, infantry,
motorized rifle, airborne brigades or regiments or equivalent-sized
formations, of each of three or more divisions or equivalent for-
mations are involved in the same recall activity in the zone.
D. Amphibious Activities
1. An "amphibious activity" is any landing from the sea onto the land in
(a) A formation equivalent to three or more battalions, whether
marine, naval infantry or ground forces, lands in the zone; or
2. If the troops engaged in the landing, as defined in paragraph one,
embark in the zone, then the date and place of embarkation will be included
in the notification. If the area of landing is changed or decided upon
after the initial notification, then that additional information will be
given as soon as the area of landing is determined.
E. Alert Activities
1. Each participating State carrying out a military activity as an alert
will give notification at the time its troops are ordered to carry out the
activity.
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2. Except as specifically provided, a military activity conducted as an
alert will be subject to the same provisions as military activities generally.
F. Contents of Notifications
1. A participating State will present notification of a military activity
in writing, in the following format:
(a) Description of the activity in the zone, including, if applicable,
the name of the exercise.
(b) The name of the headquarters conducting the activity.
(c) The general purpose of the activity, including the relation of
the activity to that of any other military activity for which
notification is given;under this Measure.
(d) The dates and duration of the different phases of the activity in
the zone, including the beginning of out-of-garrison deployments,
the active exercise phase if applicable, and the recovery phase
during which troops are returned to normal peacetime locations,
if the recovery phase is to occur immediately after the activity.
(e) The names of the participating States engaged in the activity.
(f) Boundaries of the geographical area in the zone where the activity
will take place, including a map trace or geographic co-ordinates.
(g) The number of troops to include amphibious and airborne troops,
directing staff and umpires engaged. If more than one partici-
pating State engages in the activity, then the number of troops,
staff and umpires for each participating State will be specified.
(h) The designation of the ground force divisions engaged in the
activity.
(i) The type of other forces engaged in the activity, including ground-
based tactical air forces and naval ship-to-shore combat forces,
i.e., those executing amphibious operations, air support of ground
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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified
troops or ship-to-shore gunnery, if part of a military activity
(j) Clarifying information if the activity is one for which no fore-
cast was made pursuant to Measure 2 of this document or if the
activity is one for which a forecast was made but the information
provided in the forecast has been changed.
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Measure 4: Observation of Certain Military Activities
1. Each participating State will be permitted to send observers to
military activities. Observation of a military activity will include
observation of all forces participating in the activity, including the
forces of participating States other than the host State.
2. Invitations. At the time notification of a military activity is given
pursuant to Measure 3 of this document, the host State will invite the other
participating States to send observers to the activity. A host State need
not invite to a military activity observers from a participating State which
has given notice to the host State that it does not desire to receive such
invitations. A participating State which has given such notice should there-
after
receive invitations at any time if it gives notice to the host State
of its desire to receive such invitations. A host State need not invite
observers to a military activity from a participating State which does not
maintain diplomatic relations with the host State.
3. Duration. The host State will permit observers to begin observation
of a military activity at the time that activity commences. The host State
need not permit observation once the end of the activity is reached as indi-
cated in the notification or once the criteria for a military activity pur-
suant to Measure 3 of this document are no longer met, whichever occurs later.
4. Alerts. The participating States need not invite observers to a
military activity carried out as an alert unless the alert has a duration
of more than 48 hours. If an alert activity has a duration of more than
48 hours, the other participating States will be permitted to observe the
alert 36 hours after it begins.
5. Observer personnel. A participating State will be permitted to send
nor more than two observers to a military activity. Each participating
State will provide the names of its observers to the host State at the
earliest possible time. Wherever possible, at least one of these observers
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10 CSCE/SC.1/Amplified
will be from the military personnel of that particpating State accredited
6. Protection and immunities. When in the territory within the zone of
any participating State, observers will be granted those diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities necessary to enable them to perform their tasks fully
and unhindered at all times. (Details to be decided in the course of
negotiations.)
7. Co-ordination and arrangements. Invitations to observe a military
activity will be issued through diplomatic channels at the time of notifi-
cation of the activity. Arrangements for observation will be co-ordinated
between the host State and the observing State through the embassy of the
observing State to the host State, unless those States agree to use another
channel.
8. Co-ordination with other participating States. Host State responsibili-
ties, other than the responsibility to invite observers, may be delegated by
the host State to another particpating State engaged in the military activity
on the territory of the host State, if that other participating State agrees
to assume the responsibility. In such cases, the allocation of responsi-
bilities will be specified in the invitations to observe the activity.
9. Logistics. The host State will provide appropriate facilities and
hospitality for observers at the site of a military activity being observed.
10. Transportation. The host State will provide transportation for observers
in the area of the military activity. If requested by an observing State,
the host State will provide transportation for observers from the embassy
of the observing State or its nearest consulate to the area of the activity.
The observing State may use its consular or diplomatic vehicles to transport
its own observers to a location designated by the host State, where the
observers will transfer to vehicles of the host State. The transfer point
will be near a location suitable for observation of the activity.
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11. Communications. Observers will have access to telecommunication
facilities that will allow timely contact with their embassies or nearest
consulates.
12. Scope of observation.
(a) For each military activity, the host State will:
(i) guide the observers in the area of the activity;
(ii) allow the observers to use personal optical observation
equipment necessary to perform their duties;
(iii) give detailed briefings on exercise scenarios;
(iv) inform the observers of the progress of the activity and
provide an opportunity to view directly all formations
engaged in the activity;
(v) provide other information and observation opportunities
sufficient to allow the observers to form a judgement
as to the non-threatening nature of the activity.
(b) In addition, the host State will:
in the case of out-of-garrison land activities, allow the
observers to observe all phases of the activity, including
associated air landings, and rail, port and road movements,
in the zone between the garrison and the area of out-of-
garrison deployment;
(ii) in the case of an amphibious activity, allow observers to
observe sea landings and associated air landings from a
location on land;
(iii) in the case of a mobilization activity, allow observers to
observe the arrival at garrisons of personnel and vehicles; and
(iv) allow the observing State all the rights of observation pro-
vided for each type of activity when different types of
military activities are combined.
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Measure 5: Compliance and Verification
1. Each participating State will use available national technical means
of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles
of international law.
2. No participating State may interfere with the national technical means
of verification of the other participating States operating in accordance
with paragraph I.
3. Inspections. Each participating State will be permitted to inspect a
military activity or possible military activity within the zone for the
purpose of monitoring compliance with agreed CSBMs. A participating State
requesting such an inspection will cite the circumstances occasioning its
request, and the participating State receiving the request will comply with
the request. Any possible dispute as to the validity of this citation will
not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.
4. Inspection Quota. No more than two per participating State per calendar
year. An inspection will not be counted if, due to force maieure, it cannot
be made or is discontinued.
5. Method of Inspection. A receiving State will permit inspections from
the ground, from the air, or both.
6. Area for Inspection. Except as stipulated in paragraph 7, below, an
inspecting State is permitted to designate any area for inspection within
the territory of a participating State within the zone. Such an area is
referred to as a "designated area". In a designated area, the inspecting
State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey.
7. Exceptions. The receiving State will not be required to permit inspec-
tions of any restricted areas. These areas should, however, be as few in
number and as limited in extent as possible. In particular, the receiving
State will also not be required to permit inspections within:
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(a) defence installations, for example, naval bases, dockyards,
garrisons, military airfields, firing ranges, buildings or defence
research development or production establishments to which access
by the general public is normally restricted or denied;
(b) naval vessels, military vehicles or aircraft.
8. Communication Channels. The participating States will use diplomatic
channels for communications concerning inspections unless the receiving
State and inspecting State agree otherwise.
9. Co-ordination. In its request, the inspecting State will notify the
receiving State of:
(a) the location of the designated area, by giving the geographical
co-ordinates of the area;
(b) the mode of transport to and from the designated area;
(c) whether the inspection will be from the ground, the air, or both;
(d) information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors
entering the receiving State.
10. Timing. An inspection will proceed in the following sequence:
(a) within 12 hours after the issuance of an inspection request, the
receiving State will reply to the inspecting State, make necessary
administrative arrangements for the inspection, and transmit co-
ordinating information, including the points of entry to its
territory. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection
team is able to reach the designated area without delay from the
points of entry;
(b) within not less than 24 hours nor more than 36 hours after the
issuance of an inspection request, unless otherwise mutually
agreed, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the
territory of the receiving State;
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(c) the inspecting State will inform the receiving State of any
delay in its arrival within 36 hours at the points of entry to
the territory of the receiving State and indicate the extra time
needed to arrive at the points of entry;
(d) within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the
designated area, unless otherwise mutually agreed, the inspection
will be terminated.
11. Report of an Inspection. The inspecting State will prepare a report
of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all participating
States.
12. Third Parties. The forces,of participating States other than the receiv-
ing State within the designated area will be included in an inspection at the
discretion of the inspecting State. All participating States will facilitate
the passage of inspection teams through their territory.
13. Inspection Team. An inspection team will consist of no more than four
inspectors, in addition to aircraft crew and one accompanying driver for
each land vehicle supplied by the inspecting State. The personnel of the
inspection team may be brought into the receiving State by the inspecting
State for the purpose of the inspection, or be drawn from the personnel of
the diplomatic and consular facilities of the inspecting State in the
receiving State.
14. Transportation. The inspecting State may provide its own transportation,
or, upon request, the receiving State will provide transportation. The
inspection team is permitted, unless otherwise mutually agreed, one air-
craft and two land vehicles.
15. Logistic Support. Upon request, the receiving State will furnish
adequate food and lodging for the inspection team. The inspection team may
provide their own tents or rations, and may make use of civilian facilities.
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16. Communications. The inspection team will have access to and may
carry telecommunications equipment, the type of which will be subject to
the approval of the receiving State.
17. Equipment. The inspection team will have the unrestricted use of its
own maps, personal optical viewing devices, cameras and tape recorders.
The use of other sensors or information-gathering devices for ground
inspections is prohibited.
18. Protection and Immunities. When in the territory within the zone of
any participating State, inspectors will be granted those diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities necessary to enable them to perform their tasks fully
and unhindered at all times. "(details to be decided in the course of
negotiations.)
19. Travel with Inspectors. The receiving State will be permitted to
accompany the inspection team during the period that the team is in the
designated area. A representative of the receiving State may travel on
each of the vehicles of the inspecting State while the vehicles are moving
on land within the territory of the receiving State, and on the aircraft of
the inspecting State from the time of the first landing of the aircraft on
the territory of the receiving State until the time of the final take-off
of the aircraft from the territory of the receiving State.
20. Modalities for Inspection. (Other modalities for inspection to be
inserted here.)
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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified
Measure 6: Development of Means of Communication
1. The participating States will establish dedicated communications
2. The participating States may use such dedicated communications links
to quickly and directly contact each other for the expeditious handling of
the flow of information required by agreed CSBMs.
3. Under certain circumstances, the participating States may use such
dedicated communications links for communications on matters of urgency
related to agreed CSBMs.
The sixteen sponsors of this document note that this measure should be
agreed insofar as the CSBMs finally agreed at the Conference warrant such
a measure.
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DEFINITIONS
1. The "zone" will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining
sea area* and air space. As far as the adjoining sea area* and air
space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military
activities of all participating States taking place there whenever these
activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of
activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to
above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will
be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-
building measures at the Conference. Nothing in the definition of
the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken
under the Final Act. The^ confidence- and security-building measures
to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all
areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and
disarmament.
2. A "military activity" is an out-of-garrison land activity, mobilization
activity or amphibious activity, in the zone. The definitions of these
activities are set forth in Measure 3 of this document.
3. An "alert" is a particular type of "military activity" undertaken
without advance notice to the troops involved.
4. A "host State" is a participating State upon whose territory a military
activity takes place.
5. An "observer" is a representative designated by an observing State
to observe a military activity under Measure 4 of this document.
* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer
also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.
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6. An "observing State" is a participating State that accepts an invitation
under Measure 4 and sends one or more representatives to observe a mili-
tary activity.
9. An "inspector" is a representative designated by an inspecting State
to inspect a military activity or possible military activity under
Measure 5.
10. Other terms would also have to be defined, including:
"major ground formations and main combat units"
"land-based air formations"
"wing, air regiment or equivalent formations"
"normal peacetime location"
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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
ulti t,r.
RESTRICTED
CSCE/SC.2
Stockholm, 25 January 1984
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF ROMANIA
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)
(Outline)
In accordance with the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as agreed upon by the
second CSCE follow-up meeting, which is for this Conference, "as a
substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation
of all States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new
effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening
confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect
and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of
force in their mutual relations;"
In accordance, also, with the provision of the Concluding Document
of the Madrid Meeting, which states that "the Conference will begin a process
of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a
set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures
designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe;"
In view of the prevailing conditions in Europe;
Romania considers that the goal of the first stage of the Conference
could be achieved by the negotiation and the adoption of effective measures
aimed at:
elimination of suspicions and the sense of insecurity caused by
certain military activities;
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diminution of military activities in the border areas; restraint
of military activities generating mistrust and tension; limitation
of the geographical area of military activities causing the risk
of confrontation;
- extension of information, communication and consultations between
States, especially in critical situations.
Such measures should be so formulated as to respond to the criteria-
provided in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, which, in turn,
are to be so applied as to ensure the attainment of maximum efficiency of
these measures. The negotiations could be conceived as a gradual process,
aimed at the adoption of an increasingly larger set of measures, in keeping
with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document.
Proceeding from these considerations, Romania proposes the following
Notification at least 30 days in advance of military manoeuvres in
which take part:
- land or combined forces in excess of (18,000-20,000) troops;
- special forces, such as paratroops and amphibious, in excess of
(5,000) troops;
- more than (10-12) surface battle-ships having a total displacement
of (50,000-60,000) tons;
- airforce units with more than (45-50) aircraft fighters.
Notification will contain information on the purpose and duration of the
manoeuvre, the type of armed forces engaged, numerical strength, armament,
combat technique and means of transport, the area of deployment, as well as
any other useful information.
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Notification at least 30 days in advance of major military movements
involving:
- two or more divisions or their equivalent;
- major transportation of heavy armaments and other war material with
which two or more divisions or their equivalent could be equipped.
Notification will contain similar information as above.
Prior notification, or as soon as possible in emergency situations, of the
placing in a state of alert of national or foreign armed forces or of imnor--ant
components of such forces.
Limitation of the armed forces participating in military manoeuvres to a
maximum of (40,000-50,000) land troops and establishment of ceilings for the
number of battle-ships and aircraft fighters.
Renunciation of multinational military manoeuvres within a zone alone
each side of the borders between States (width to be determined).
Creation along the borders between States of security zones (width t
determined) in which there would be no manoeuvres, movements or concentrations
of armed forces and armaments and no placing in a state of alert of important
components of such forces; limitation of the armed forces, armaments and
military activities in such regions, as a step towards the establishment of
demilitarized zones.
Establishment along the borders between the countries members of NATO and
the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty of a corridor free o= nuclea:
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (width to be determined) and, in
a longer perspective, of any armaments and military activities, except for
order and.border forces.
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- 4 - CSCE/SC.2
Prohibition of manoeuvres and movements of ships and aircraft with
nuclear weapons on board within a zone along the land and maritime borders
with other States (width to be determined).
Non-stationing of additional troops and non-deployment of additional
military bases on the territory of other States, as well as cessation of the
extension and modernization of the existing ones.
Encouragement of, and support for the establishment of zones of peaceful
co-operation and good neighbourliness, free of nuclear weapons, in the Balkans,
in the North of Europe and in other regions of the continent.
Establishment of a system of information, communication and consultations
among States on problems relating to their security, and prevention and
management of crises. Such a system could include:
- consultations between governmental representatives on regular
setting-up of a standing consultative body which would meet
periodically and in emergency sessions;
establishment of a system of telephone connections for consultations
between the heads of State and government and organization of summit
meetings in emergency situations.
Adoption of measures to prevent nuclear conflict by error or accident,
- creation of a mechanism of rapid communication between governmental
- adoption of emergency procedures and development of technical means.
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Conclusion of an all-European Treaty on the non-use or threat of force,
containing concrete provisions and measures designed to give practical effect
to the duty of States to refrain from the use or threat of force in their
mutual relations. Such a treaty will constitute a corollary of the efforts
being deployed at the Stockholm Conference.
Freezing of the military expenditures of States at the level of 1984
until further agreement is reached on their gradual reduction.
Such measures should be accompanied by the prohibition of war
propaganda and the encouragement'of peaceful relations between States.
Systematic information of the public opinion on the progress achieved in
the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures would also
contribute to the creation of a favourable climate for the work of the
Stockholm Conference.
33
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SECRET I
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
Distr.
RESTRICTED
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CSCE/SC.3
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE Stockholm, 9 March 1984
STOCKHOLM 1984 Original: ENGLISH
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS,
FINLAND, LIECHTENSTEIN, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
The above-mentioned States,
RECALLING that this Conference, which is held within the CSCE process
shall take place outside military alliances,
REAFFIRMING their respective policies of neutrality or non-alignment
which constitute important contributions to stability in Europe,
EMPHASIZING that their military capabilities by their very structure
and organization are solely devoted to national defence purposes and do not
present a threat to other States,
STRESSING the need for the respect of the provisions of the Final Act
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, according to which
the participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as
in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on
Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, in particular from
invasion of or attack on its territory,
ST-0056 SECRET
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2 - CSCE/SC.3
CONSCIOUS of the need for all participating States to give due
attention to the complementary nature of the political and military aspects
of security within the CSCE process and to contribute to the efficient and
successful work of this Conference,
SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:
A) The situation in Europe and the equal respect for the legitimate security
interests of every participating State require determined efforts by all
of them to build mutual confidence, lessen military confrontation,
strengthen security for all and promote disarmament.
B) The measures to be negotiated;and adopted in Stockholm should, with the
added dimension of security, constitute important progress with respect
to the confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act and
thereby promote the subsequent negotiations on disarmament.
C) The aim of this Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of
the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States
signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective
and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening
confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect
and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use
of force in their mutual relations.
D) The Conference has thus begun a process of which the first stage will
be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually
complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to
reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.
E) The negotiations should be conducive to dialogue and the improvement
of communication among the participating States in general, thereby
making the Conference in itself a factor of confidence-building and
reduction of tensions. Common efforts to increase confidence
contribute to achieving security for all, participating States.
36
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3 - CSCE/SC.3
The provision of the Final Act, according to which security in
Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security
and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a
whole, should be borne in mind.
Concrete measures, such as the following, should be actively considered:
1) Prior notification of major military manoeuvres.
Substantially improved parameters as compared to those laid down in
the Final Act, including earlier prior notification, more detailed
information, inter alia on the purpose of the manoeuvres, on the units
involved and on the level of command as well as parameters relating
to the organizational level and/or the number of troops.
2) Prior notification of smaller-scale military manoeuvres which are
carried out close to each other in time and space, if the total forces
engaged exceed the levels agreed upon under item 1.
3) Prior notification of military manoeuvres involving amphibious,
sea-transported, air-borne, air-mobile forces or combinations thereof.
The parameters should be significantly lower than for major military
manoeuvres and relate to the organizational level, the number of troops
and the capacity of their specialized means of transport.
4) Prior notification of major military movements.
The parameters should relate to the organizational level, the number
of troops and/or the capacity of their specialized means of transport.
37
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G) A balanced set of mutually complementary measures to be negotiated and
adopted should - in conformity with the relevant provisions of the mandate
- include the further development and enlargement of the confidence-
building measures contained in the Final Act and their adaptation to
the mandate, as well as qualitatively new confidence- and security-building
measures, including inter alia constraints on certain military activities.
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5) Prior notification of major military activities, including manoeuvres, in
the adjoining sea area and air space, whenever these activities
affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities
taking place within the whole of Europe and within all other areas
covered by any of the provisions of the Final Act relating to
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and
disarmament, which the participating States will agree to notify.
6) Invitation of observers to military manoeuvres and movements subject
to prior notification at levels to be determined; improved and
standardized conditions for observers.
7) Prior notification of redeployment of major military units as well
as of major rotations of military personnel.
The parameters should relate to the organizational level, the number
of troops and/or the capacity of their specialized means of transport.
8) Notification of certain other major military activities.
9) Exchange of annual calendars of preplanned major military activities.
10) Ceiling for the forces engaged in a major military manoeuvre or in
The parameters should relate to the organizational level and/or
11) Ceiling for amphibious, air-borne, air-mobile forces or combinations
thereof engaged in military manoeuvres.
The parameters should be significantly lower than under item _0 and
relate to the organizational level, the number of troops and the
capacity of their specialized means of transport.
units and/or equipment of vital importance for sustained offensive
38
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H) A wide range of confidence- and security-building measures should be
subject to negotiation already from the outset. The measures will include
adequate verification provisions which correspond to their content.
The negotiations could initially focus on a combination of mutually
complementary measures - as illustrated in paragraph G) - on which
early agreement might be reached.
I) Such concrete confidence- and security-building measures serve, by their
very nature, to give effect and expression to the duty of the participating
States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations
as well as in their international relations in general. They thereby
create conditions for considering a reaffirmation, in appropriate ways
and forms, of this obligation and the commitment to the peaceful settlement
of disputes, undertaken in the United Nations Charter and the Final Act.
J) The Conference could also consider other measures, in conformity with the
relevant provisions of the mandate, which are conducive to lessening
the risk of military confrontation and the possibility of surprise
attack, and to exerting genuine efforts towards containing an increasing
arms build-up as well as to strengthening confidence and security and
promoting disarmament.
K) Arrangements for dealing with information, notification and rapid exchange
of views with-regard to measures that may be adopted could be envisaged.
L) The negotiations should take due account of the mandate, according to
which the provisions established by the negotiators will come into force
in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the
Conference.
M) A meaningful contribution to the building of confidence would be the
undertaking by the participating States to apply the standardized
reporting system on military expenditure elaborated by the United Nations.
39
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N) Negotiations should aim at timely and substantial progress in order
to provide the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting with sufficient new
elements when considering the question of supplementing the present
mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in order to
deal also with disarmament.
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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
Distr.
RESTRICED
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CSCE/SC.4
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE Stockholm, 8 May 198=
STOCKHOLM 1984 ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE
The situation in Europe and in the entire world requires a radical
turn in the policies of States away from confrontation to peaceful
co-operation and major practical steps commensurate with the extent
of the existing threat to peace.
Attempts to upset the existing military and strategic balance
result in a sharp aggravation of international tension and an increased
risk of military confrontation, including nuclear confrontation. The
continuing deployment of new United States missiles in some '.Vest European
countries undermines confidence and security in Europe and outside it.
The vital interests of the European peoples and of the whole of
mankind require that the relations between nuclear powers be governed
by certain norms and that the prevention of nuclear war become the main
objective of their foreign policies.
Ac=_ng in accordance with the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe and with the mandate of the present
Conference adopted at the Madrid Meeting, the Soviet delegation submits
the following proposals and suggestions concerning confidence- and
security-building measures in Europe.
41
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The participating States of the Conference possessing nuclear weapons
should assume an obligation not to be the first to use them. Such an
obligation could be assumed unilaterally by each nuclear State which has
not yet done so or it could become the subject of an appropriately drafted
international agreement.
The assumption of such an obligation and strict compliance with it
would equally meetthc interests of all States, both nuclear and non-
nuclear. It would constitute a measure of-paramount importance, leading
to a genuine political breakthrough in the field of confidence-building,
and that not only among the nuclear powers.
In order to preclude the emergence of situations fraught with the
risk of nuclear conflict, provision could be made for the nuclear States
participating in the Conference to hold urgent consultations, seek
clarifications and provide each other with the necessary information in
the event of such a danger arising.
The conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force and the
maintenance of peaceful relations, as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty
member States, would be a major confidence-building measure.
gations in accordance with their constitutional procedures, irrespective
o'' whether they belong to military alliances, axe neutral or non-aligned.
Of course, all States of both the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic
alliance, militar?; confrontation between whom is particularly dangerous
in Europe should become parties to such a treaty.
An obligation not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional
arms against eac:. -ether, and hence, not to use military force against each
other at all, could form the central provision of the treaty.
CPT
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3 - CSCE/SC.4
Such an obligation would cover the territories of all parties to the
treaty, as well as their military and civilian personnel, naval, air and
space craft, and other facilities belonging to them, wherever situated.
Further, the parties to the treaty should undertake not to endanger the
security of international sea, air and space communications passing
through areas not covered by any national jurisdiction.
The treaty could also contain other important provisions, aimed at
creating confidence, developing co-operation and reducing military
confrontation.
The conclusion-of the proposed treaty would have a beneficial effect
on the development of the entire international situation, would radicall;
reinforce the political and legal foundation underlying compliance with
the principle of refraining from the use or threat of force and would
enhance the effectiveness of that principle, thereby creating substantive
guarantees against the outbreak of military conflicts in Europe, and no:
in Europe alone.
Taking into account the fact that the steep rise in military expend-
itures intensifies the arms race and imposes an increasingly heavy burden
on the peoples, the Warsaw Treaty States on 5 March 1984 addressed a
proposal to the NATO member States on the freezing and reduction of military
spending in percentage points or absolute figures. Of course, all the
States represented at the Stockholm Conference, and especially those
possessing major military capabilities, could participate in the efforts
to halt the further growth of military spending and reduce it. The
resources released as a result of a cut in military spending would be
used for the purposes of economic and social development, including
assistance to developing countries.
Agreement on that score would constitute a major contribution to
confidence building and at the same time provide a realistic means of
curbing the arms race. 43
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- 4 - CSCE/SC.4
IV
Ridding Europe of chemical weapons and, above all, not stationing
such weapons where there are none at present, as envisaged in the proposals
of the Warsaw Treaty member States of 10 January 1984 would help to over-
come mistrust between States. The presence of chemical weapons in the
densely populated territory of Europe poses a grave threat to all European
States and peoples. Given the current aggravation of international
tension and the existing risk of the use of chemical weapons, the task of
ridding Europe of chemical weapons has become especially pressing.
Such steps would also facilitate agreement to ban- chemical weapons
and destroy stockpiles of such weapons on a global scale.
The Soviet Union takes a positive view of proposals to create nuclear-
free zones in various parts of Europe, as is advocated by a number of
European States. The creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, the
turning of Northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone. and the establishment
of a zone in Europe free from battlefield nuclear weapons on both sides of
the contact line between the States of the Warsaw Treaty and of NATO, are
directly related to reducing the risk of war and strengthening confidence.
These questions deserve serious attention at the Conference.
VI
Taking into account the useful experience gained in implementing the
confidence-building measures specified in the relevant provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act, it is proposed that a start should now be made on the
elaboration 'of additional confidence-building measures, more significant
in nature and broader in scope, specifically such as:
Limitation to a certain numerical level of the scale of ground-force
military manoeuvres, conducted independently or jointly with air-force or
naval components, including amphibious and airborre,:roops, in Europe as
well as in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.
44
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r
SECRET I
This measure is all the more pressing since it is difficult to
differentiate between modern large-scale military manoeuvres and the
preparatory stages of deployment of armed forces for the purpose of
commencing hostilities in the European theatre.
Prior notification of. major military manoeuvres, exceeding a certain
level, of ground troops, air and naval forces, conducted independently.
jointly in Europe and the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space. In
this context the term "troops" also includes amphibious and airborne
troops.
Prior notification of major movements and transfers, exceeding a
certain level, of qround troops. =d air forces in Europe and in the adjoinincr
sea (ocean) area and air space, as well as into this area and out of it.
In this context the term "troops" also includes amphibious and airbor-?
troops.
Development of the existing practice of inviting observers from
other participating States to attend major military manoeuvres.
In accordance with the mandate, confidence- and security-building
measures will be provided with adequate forms of verification which
correspond to their content and are to be agreed upon at the Conference.
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SECRET I
Distr.
RESTRICTED
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CSCE/SC.5
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE Stockholm, 8 November 1984
STOCKHOLM 1984 Original: ENGLISH
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
Conscious that navigation .on the High Seas and overflight are to be
Deeply aware that the Mediterranean provides important commercial
sea and air routes for participating and non-participating States,
Recognising that the particular nature of an enclosed sea such as
the Mediterranean imposes specific constraints on the otherwise uninhi-
bited exercise of navigation on the high seas,
Recognising further that the riparian Mediterranean states partici-
pating and non-participating alike, have special security interests in
this sea,
Recalling the close linkage between security in Europe and security
in the Mediterranean as expounded in the CSCE Final Act and reiterated
in the Madrid Concluding Document,
Acknowledging the desirability of strengthening confidence and
security in the Mediterranean region even in the interest of security
in Europe itself,
Agree to the following confidence and security building measures:
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- 2 - CSCE/SC.5
A. Measures of information
At the start of each calendar year participating states will
1. Information on the number and structure of armed personnel stationed
in the Mediterranean, whose duties are directly related to Naval Movements.
2. Information on the type and number of amphibious and other troop-
carrying sea-borne units stationed in the Mediterranean.
3. Information on the type and number of major surface combat units
B. Measures of notification {
Participating states agree to give each other notification in
1. Of all instances of the exercise of the right of innocent passage
through the territorial waters of Mediterranean participating states.
2. Of naval movements involving the sea transportation at any one time
across Mediterranean waters of armed personnel in excess of agreed number.
3. Of amphibious activities involving a combined troop transportation
capacity in excess of an agreed number of armed personnel.
4. Of naval manoeuvres involving more than a given number of surface
combat units, having a total displacement of a specified tonnage.
5. Notifications under B3 and B4 will contain information about the
purpose of and the states involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types
and numerical strength of the forces engaged and the naval units involved,
the area and estimated time frame of its conduct, as well as any other
relevant information.
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C. Measures of restraint
Participating states agree
1. To restrict deployment and manoeuvres involving naval units and/or
equipment of vital importance for sustained offensive operations to areas
to be determined in the Mediterranean.
2. To progressively scale down the number of major naval manoeuvres
involving combined amphibious, airborne and surface combat units, in
which they participate each year.
3. Respect a ceiling of an agreed number of armed personnel and an
agreed number of surface combat units for any independent or joint naval
exercise in the Mediterranean.
D. Measures of observation and verification
2. Adequate verification measures corresponding to the restraint
E. Measures of security
1. Participating states undertake not to use their land, sea and/or
air forces in the Mediterranean against riparian states except in self-
defence.
2. Participating states undertake not to allow the utilisation of
foreign armaments, forces, bases and military facilities existing on
their territories against Mediterranean riparian states.
3. They shall also desist from deploying their naval forces in a
manner that constitutes a threat of the use of force against Mediterranean
riparian states.
4. Participating states undertake not to station nuclear weapons in
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SECRET'
F. Final consideration
It is understood that the above measures will also apply vis-a-vis
non-participating Mediterranean states to the extent that these states
accept them.
50
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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
Distr.
RESTRICTED
CSCE/SC.6
Stockholm, 29 January 1985
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
Working Document
of the Delegation of the Soviet Union
BASIC PROVISIONS FOR A TREATY ON THE MUTUAL
NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE
OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS
The objective of an accord on the non-use of military force is to take,
in conditions of a persisting nuclear threat, a large-scale step aimed at
lessening the danger of military confrontation and facilitating a radi=al
turn in the policies of states away from confrontation to peaceful
co-operation.
Reaffirming the obligation they assumed under the United Nations
Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force, the States participating in the Conference consider it nece=-ary
to develop and give concrete form to this principle, and to make it biding
to a maximum extent.
Taking into account the fact that the States represented at the
Conference on r---~1aer.r_-~ ant Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in
tu.rcP_ re?_ogn:zeci in tta_ ',-iels:inki Final Act the necessity to make the
p ..r :c crr. Q51, reirayndng from' thO threat or use of force an effective mr_-
.~'nternationa life a,=,32 undertook to giz-e: e''feo} and express= by
tht, ways and fcrrs v ch they consider approprt to the duty to ref--n
frr-a the threat cr use of force in their relations with one anotb rr,
now consider it very timely to conclude f?r that purpose a treaty on
non-use of military force.
ST-0191 51 4
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1. An obligation not to be the first to use either nuclear or
conventional arms against each other, and hence, not to use military force
against each other at all, would form the central provision of the proposed
treaty.
2. This obligation would mean that the parties to the treaty
- would refrain from any use of military force against another State
party, inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory;
- would not endanger the security of international sea, air and space
communications passing through areas not covered by any national jurisdiction.
3. Such an obligation would cover the territories of all parties to
the treaty as well as their military and civilian personnel, naval, air and
space craft, and other facilities belonging to them, wherever situated.
4. The treaty would bind its parties not to use force against third
countries, whether those countries maintain with them bilateral relations
of alliance, are non-aligned or neutral.
5. The parties to the treaty would make efforts aimed at preventing
a space weapons race, terminating the race in nuclear as well as conventional
arms, limiting and reducing arms and achieving disarmament based on the
principle of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, and equal respect
for security interests.
6. The treaty could include an obligation for its parties to
consider jointly and individually practical measures aimed at preventing
the danger of a surprise attack.
7. The parties to the treaty would co-operate in enhancing the
effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling, in accordance with its
Charter, the tasks of peaceful settlement of international disputes and
situations of conflict, suppressing acts of aggression, and removing the
threat to international peace and security.
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- 3 -11 CSCE/SC.6
8. In the event of the emergence of a risk of war and the use of
military force the parties to the treaty would hold urgent consultations,
seek clarifications and provide one another with necessary information.
9. The treaty would not limit the inalienable right of its parties
to individual and collective defence in accordance with Article 51 .of the
United Nations Charter.
10. Nothing in the treaty would affect the rights and duties of the
participating States under the United Nations Charter, treaties and agreements
previously concluded by them.
11. The parties would assume obligations under the treaty in accordance
with their constitutional procedures, irrespective of whether they belong to
military alliances, are neutral or non-aligned.
12. The treaty would be open for participation in it by all other
States that so desired, and would enter into force upon accession to it by
all States members of the Warsaw Treaty and of the North Atlantic alliance.
SECRET
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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
CSCE/SC/WGA.1
Stockholm, 7 February 1985
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
Working Document
of the Delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,
the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES
With the aim of undertaking new, effective and concrete actions
designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security,
? r
Taking into account the fact that large-scale troop manoeuvres,
which are at present difficult to distinguish from the preparatory stages
of deployment of armed forces for the purpose of commencing hostilities,
represent a grave threat to the security of States as well as a source of
unpredictability, possible miscalculations and misunderstanding of the
purposes of such manoeuvres,
Bearing in mind that limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres
would contribute to reducing military confrontation in Europe,
The following is proposed:
Military manoeuvres involving a total of more than 40,000 troops
should not be conducted, independently or jointly with other participating
States, on the territory of the participating States in Europe including
the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space. This provision applies to
ground-force manoeuvres, conducted independently or jointly with any
possible air or naval components.
SECRET
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In the case of independent manoeuvres1gf amphibious or airborne
troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be
included in the aforementioned total.
In the context of this document the term "forces" ("troops") also
includes amphibious and airborne troops.
SFCRET
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CSCE q i
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
20 May 1985
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(as communicated by Delegations)
The previous edition was printed
on 4 February 1985
cFrPFT
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1
A U S T R I A'
Dr Wolfgang LOIBL Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Anton KOZUSNIK Delegate
Mr Karl LIKO General, Military Adviser
Mr Josef BERNECKER Brigadier, Military Adviser
Ms Gabriele MANDL Administrative Officer
Ms Christine STROBL Administrative Officer
Dr Ferdinand STOLBERG Ambassador
Mr Helmut KREUZHUBER Colonel, Defence Attache
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SECRET
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SECRET I1
B E L G I U/M
Mr Felix STANDAERT
Mr Raymond DU MOULIN
Colonel Franz LEBLANC
Ms E. JANSSENS
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Military Expert
Attache to the Delegation
Mr Louis ENGELEN
Mr Demetrio ORTIGUEIRA
Mr Christian MARNEFFE
First Secretary at the Embassy
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Mr Stephan TODOROV
Mr No PETROV
Colonel Ivan KOCHOVSKY
Mr Ivan KOEDJIKOV
Mr Georgy GOTEV
Mr Todor STOYANOV
SECRET - ~~
B U L G A R L A
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Ambassador of the Peon le's
Republic of Bulgaria in
Stockholm
Mr Dobrin ANASTASOV First Secretary at the
Embassy
Mr Lalo LALOV Second Secretary at the
Embassy
SECRET
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Mr W.T. DELWORTH
Mr C.J. ANSTIS
SECRET
Ambassador, Permanent Head of
Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Colonel C. NAMIESNIOWSKI Military Adviser
Mr R. VANIER Adviser
Administrative and Technical Staff
Miss Sharon MALLOT Administrative Assistant
Miss T. NEWTON Secretary
Miss B. SCHULTZ Communicator
Mr Roy F. SOUTHERN Security Guard
Mr Joakim SUNESON Driver
Mr Brian BAKER Counsellor
Mr D"Arcy THORPE Counsellor
Mr Marc LEPAGE First Secretary
Mr R. MANK Third Secretary
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr J. BERANGER
Mr Sven CLAUG
Mr Joseph Richard PARENT
Mr G. CLERMONT
Miss T. LORRAIN
Mr T. LINDELL
Mr Benny KARLSTROM
Office Manager
Administrative Assistant
Security Guard
Communicator
Secretary
Driver
Driver
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SECkET 'I '- '
C Y P R U S
Dr Andrestinos PAPADOPOULOS Minister-Counsellor,
Head of Delegation
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SECRET 1. 1
1
C Z E C H O S L 0 VGA K I A
Mr Alois REZNfK
Mr Zd6nek KESTL
Lieutenant Colonel
Vladimir MOHYLA
Mr Zdenek SKOBA
Mr Bohumil VACHATA
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Ambassador of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic to the Kingdom
of Sweden, Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Mr Lubomir KOPAJ
Third Secretary, Adviser of
the Delegation
Administrative and Technical Staff
Ms Miroslava JELSNKOVA
Mr Viclav FISER
SECRET
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SECRET
D E N M A R K
Mr Skjold G. MELLBIN
Mr Bent ROSENTHAL
Commander Patrick HOWARD
Mr Peter Michael ZILMER
Ms Grethe #RGENSEN
Mr Lars Gade HANSEN
Mr Berndt JANSSON
Mr Nils JAEGER
Mr Bengt PETERSEN
Ms Kirsten LARSEN
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister-Counsellor, Deputy
Head of Delegation
Military Adviser
Secretary of Embassy
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Chauffeur
Minister-Counsellor, Danish
Embassy
Press Counsellor, Danish Embassy
Administrativ Officer,
Danish Embassy
SECRET
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F E D E R A L R E P U B L I C O F G E R M A N Y
Mr Johann Georg DREHER
Mr Werner SCHMIDBAUER
Mr Jurgen Hans UTTINGER
Mr Gunter KOLBECK
Mr Klaus METSCHER
Mr Detlef WEIGEL
Mr Horst GRZEGORZ
Mr Oliver NOWAK
Mr Gunter KANDLER
Mrs Ines OETLING
Ms Gisela SCHRODER
Ms Corinna PAUL
Mrs Brunhild LARSSON
Mr Herbert KEMPER
Mr Hans JAGER
Mr Dirk FATH
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Read of
Delegation
Brigadier General,
MOD Representative
Colonel
Captain (Navy)
Counsellor
First Secretary
Attache
Attache (Communication Officer)
Senior Master Sergeant
Language Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Administrative Staff
Technical and
Administrative Staff
Technical and
Administrative Staff
Technical and
Administrative Staff
Dr Gerhard RITZEL
Mr Rolf-Eckart ROLFS
Mr Kay SCHUHR
Mr Friedrich Wilhelm CATOIR
Ambassador
Commander S.G.
Political Adviser
Counsellor (Press Affairs)
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Mr Matti KAHILUOTO
Dr Markku REIMAA
Mr Jussi LAHTEINEN
Mr Tuomas PEKKARINEN
Mr Yrjo KUXKO
Mr Seppo PIETINEN
Mr Bjorn-Olof ALHOLM
Mr Jukka VALTASAARI
Mr Pertti TORSTILA
Mr Pasi PATOKALLIO
Dr Pauli JARVENPAA
F I N L A N 'D
Ambassador, Head of Delegation,
Special Mission of Finland
Minister-Counsellor, Delegate,
Special Mission of Finland
Commander, Delegate, Special
Mission of Finland
First Secretary, Delegate,
Special Mission of Finland
Major, Expert,
t ~ Ministry of Defence
Director for Political Affairs,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador of Finland to Sweden
Assistant Director, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
Chief of Section, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
Second Secretary, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs
Expert, Ministry of Defence
Miss Pirjo LEINO
Miss Riitta GUSTAFSSON
Miss Sinikka FLINK
Mr Pertti AIRIKAINEN
Special Mission of Finland
Special Mission of Finland
Special Mission of Finland
Special Mission of Finland
SECRET
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F R A N C E
Mr Paul GASCHIGNARD Amba A
s
sa or. Chief of Delegation
Counsellor, Deputy Chief of
Delegation
Colonel Christian MERIC Military Counsellor
Mr Gerard FAUVEAU First Secretary
Miss Monique GUILLAOUET Secretary
Mr Paul POUDADE
Mr Benoit d"ABOVILLE Deputy Director, Arms Control
and Strategic Affairs Division.
Ministry for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Mr Pierre LE GARS
Mr Serge SMESSOW
Mr Henri ZIPPER
Arms Control and Strategic
Affairs Division, Ministry
for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Arms Control and Strategic
Affairs Division, Ministry
for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Arms Control and Strategic
Affairs Division, Ministry
for External Affairs,
Special Adviser
Mr Pierre-Louis BLANC Ambassador of France to Sweden
Mr Jean-Frangois NOUGAREDE Counsellor at the Embassy
Colonel Yves BLANDIN Military Adviser
Mr Pierre ANDRIEU First Secretary of Embassy
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Mr Gabriel SAUVEZON
Mr Patrick DEDINGER
Mrs Bodil PERSSON
Attache of Embassy
Press Attache of Embassy
Mr Julien QUARTINO Administrative Assistant
Mr Claude QUARTINO Administrative Assistant
Mr Patrick POISSIER Security Guard
Mr Franck BERNAD Security Guard
Mr Serge LECOMTE Security Guard
Mr Francois OLIVE Security Guard
Mr Emile SOULIER Security Guard
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SECRET
G E R M A N D E M O C R A T I C R E P U B L I C
Dr Gunter BUHRING
Mr Manfred GRACZYNSKI
Mr Werner SCHANNER
Mr Thomas GEORGI
Dr Erika BUHRING
Mr Herwig KAISER
Mr Bodo BAUMGARTEN
Mr Manfred SCHMIDT
Mr Eberhard GLOCKNER
Mr Bernd HUBNER
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Captain of the Navy, Member of
Delegation
Commander of the Navy,
Member of Delegation
Second Secretary,
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Technical Staff Member
Technical Staff Member
Ambassador of the German
Democratic Republic to Sweden
First Secretary at the Embassy
Third Secretary at the Embassy
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SECRET 111
G R E E C E
Mr Dimitri PAPADAKIS
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Brigadier General
Theodoros KALYVAS
Mr Louis Alkiviadis AMBATIS
Mr Emmanuel PONIRIDIS
Mr Efthymios PARASHOS
Miss Simerouda GIANNOULI
Mr lasson-Andreas RALLIS
Mr Anastasios TSIAPALIS
Mr Kyriakos GAVRILIDIS
Military Adviser
Administrativa Officer
Ambassador
First Secretary
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
SECRET
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SECRET ' T (
O L Y SE E
Archbishop Luigi BELLOTTI Apostolic Pro-Nuncio to the
Kingdom of Sweden, Head of
Delegation
Monsignor Alberto TRICARICO Counsellor
Monsignor Francesco CANALINI Counsellor
Reverend Jan SMITH Attache
Reverend Raymond CROCHET Attache
SECRET
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SECRET
1~ 1
H U N G A R Y
Mr Karoly SZIGETI Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Istvan KORMENDY Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Colonel Janos KOVACS Military Expert
- Ms Hajnalka VACZI Secretary
Mr Istvan KOMOROCZKI Attache of the Embassy
SECRET
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Ambassador, Permanent Head
of Delegation
Mrs Sigridur Berglind Counsellor, Deputy Head of
ASGEIRSDOTTIR Delegation
Mr Benedikt GRONDAL
Ms Aslaug SKULADOTTIR
Ms Elin OSKARSDOTTIR
Mr Bert HARNELL
I C E L A N D
Administrative Secretary
Administrative Secretary
Administrative Assistant
SECRET
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SECRET
I R E L A N "D
Mr Gearoid 0 BROIN
Ambassador of Ireland to
Sweden and Poland,
Head of Delegation
Mr Philip Mc DONAGH First Secretary, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Mr Thomas HANNEY Third Secretary
Colonel Donal A. O CARROL Military Adviser
Miss Pia ORTMAN
Miss Yvonne ANDERSSON
Mr Bo KLINGBORG
Secretary
Secretary
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II SECRET
I T A L Y
Mr Antonio CIARRAPICO Ambassador, Permanent Head of
Delegation
Mr Giorgio SFARA Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Mr Mauro CARFAGNINI First Secretary
Navy Captain Ettore Military Adviser
DI GIOVANNI
Colonel Giorgio BLAIS Military Adviser
Administrative and Technical Personnel
Mr Giovanni PAPA
Mrs Ambra CHIESI
Mrs Albertina BARBIERI
Miss Maria Pia PAGLINO
Mr Antonio CESARI
Mr Maurizio SASSO
Mr Alessandro PUZIO
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SE~R.T
L I E C H T E N\'SI T E I N
I
Count Mario LEDEBUR Head of'Delegation
Mr Daniel OSPELT Member of Delegation
Mrs Claudia FRITSCHE Member of Delegation
SECRET
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1,nti
X E M B OU R G
Mr Robert BLOES Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Robert KAYSER Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Alphonse BERNS Counsellor of the Embassy
Mr Raymond PETIT Secretary of the Embassy
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Mr Victor CAMILLERI Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Mario BUTTIGIEG Second Secretary
SECRET
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SECRET
M 0 N A CO
Mr Hans Bertil WESTERBERG Consul General of Monaco
in Stockholm
SECRET
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SECRET 1
N /E T H E R L A\N D S
Mr Petrus BUWALDA Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Jan SIZOO Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Brigadier General Delegate
Henny J. van der GRAAF
Mr Laurens V.M. van GORP Delegate
Technical and Administrative Personnel
Mr Gerard SCHROTH
Miss Gwendolyn MACLEOD MANUEL
Miss Dorothy ZWIERS
Mr Willem H. SIMONSZ
Mr H.L.Paul BESSELING
Miss Margaret HELMER
Counsellor, Embassy of the
Netherlands
Accounting Officer, Embassy of
the Netherlands
Secretary, Embassy of the
Netherlands
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 i
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Mr Hans Jacob BION LIAN
Colonel Carl O.S. LANGLIE
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister-Counsellor,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Second Secretary
Deputy Director General,
Ministry of Defence
HQ Defence Command
Secretary-Archivist, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Grenadier, HQ Defence Command
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SECRET
P 0 L A OD
Mr Wlodzimierz KONARSKI Ambassador, Head of the Permanent
Delegation
Colonel Edmund STANIEWSKI Delegate
Mr Marek KASPRZYK Delegate
Dr Maria REGENT-LECHOWICZ Ambassador of the Polish
People's Republic in the
Kingdom of Sweden
Mr Slawomir PETELICKI First Secretary at the
Embassy of the Polish People's
Republic in Stockholm
Ms Grazyna BIERUT Technical Secretary
Mr Maciej PACHELSKI Administrative Secretary
Mr Kazimierz KRAWCZYK Administrative Assistant
Mr Jerzy MOZDZENSKI Administrative Assistant
SECRET
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'SECRET
0 R T U G A L
Mr Jose CUTILEIRO Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Manuel BARREIROS - Counsellor, De=ity Head
of Delegation
Dr Joao de MATOS SEQUEIRA Second Secretary
Lieutenant Colonel Military Adviser
Antonio PINTO GUEDES
Mrs Gloria MORALES DE
LOS RIOS
Administrative Officer
Mrs Luisa Cristina HAMMARBERG Administrative Officer
Mr Carlos Manuel ZACARIAS Administrative Officer
FRANCO
Mr Jose de Noronha GAMITO Ambassador of Portugal
to Sweden
Mr Antonio BOTELHO DE SOUSA Secretary of E--b assy
Ms Arminda Albarran BARATA Administrative Officer
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CRET
R 0 M A N I1 A
Mr loan CETERCHI Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Ovidiu IONESCU Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Mr'Marin BUHOARA First Secretary
Mr Nicolae CORDUNEANU Colonel
Mrs Ana-Mariana MOGOSEANU Secretary of the Delegation
Mr Petre MOGOSEANU Counsellor, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
Mr Petru-Dumitru BORDEA Counsellor, Embassy of the
Socialist Republic of Romania
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A N M A R I N O
Mr Giordano Bruno REFFI Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr Oscar PASQUINI Minister
Mrs Maria Antonietta BONELLI Director, Office for Political
and Diplomatic Affairs
Mr Jose Manuel de MOLLINEDO Member of Delegation
MARTINEZ
Mr Fredrik W. LETTSTROM Consul General of San Marino,
Stockholm
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SECRET I
S P A I N
Mr Jose Manuel Ambassador of Spain in
ALLENDESALAZAR Stockholm, Head of Delegation
Mr Jorge FUENTES Deputy Head of Delegation
Captain Jose Luis RIPOLL Defence International Affairs
Division, Ministry of Defence,
Adviser
Embassy of Spain in Stockholm,
Delegate
Mr Carlos FERNANDEZ-ESPESO
Director General for Inter-
national Security and Dis-
armament in the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs in Madrid,
Adviser
Mr Juan DURAN-LORIGA Ambassador of Spain in Oslo,
Adviser
Mr Jose Maria IPARRAGUIRRE Ambassador attached to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Adviser
Lieutenant Colonel
Juan MARTINEZ-ESPARZA
Military Adviser
Administrative and Technical Staff
Miss Maria Isabel SANZ REGATERO
Mr Jose Manuel GONZALEZ ROSSI
Mr Jose TOLEDANO
Mr Francisco REVUELTA
Mr Mats ERIKSSON
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
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Mr Lennart BODSTROM
Mr Pierre SCHORI
Mr Curt LIDGARD
Mr Bjorn ELMtR
Mr Gustav EKHOLM
Mr Lars-Erik LUNDIN
Mr Arne KALLIN
Mrs Maj Britt THEORIN
Mrs Gunnel JONXNG
Mr Sture ERICSON
Mr Rune ANGSTROM
Mr Stig ALEMYR
Mrs Anita BRAKENHIELM
Mr Jan ELIASSON
Mr Carl-Magnus HYLTENIUS
General Nils SKOLD
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Minister Plenipotentiary,
Deputy Head of Delegation
Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegate
Head of Section, Delegate
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Head of Delegation -
ex officio when in attendance
Permanent Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
First Secretary, Delegate
Chairman of the Swedish
Disarmament Commission,
Ambassador, MP, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Member of Parliament, Delegate
Ambassador, Under-Secretary
for Political Affairs,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Assistant Under-Secretary,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Delegate
Ministry of Defence, Expert
Special Adviser on Disarmament,
Ministry of Defence, Expert
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I~ SECRET C
Colonel Bertil JOHANSSOJ7 Ministry of Defence, Expert
Captain (Navy) Jan AKERHIELM Defence,Staff, Expert
Lieutenant Colonel Ministry, of Defence,
Vulf HESSULF Expert
Mr Johan TUNBERGER Senior Security Policy Analyst,
National Defence Research
Institute, Expert
Mr Lars LONNBACK
Mr Bertil JOBEUS
Mr Johan NORDENFELT
Mr Thomas GANSLANDT
Mr Ove BRING
Ambassador, Assistant Under-
Secretary, Head of Press and
Information Department, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Head of Press Division, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Deputy Director, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, Expert
Counsellor, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, Expert
Doctor of Laws, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, Expert
Ms Britt-Marie HEDIN Senior Administrative Officer
Ms Sophie PIUVA Senior Administrative Officer
SECRET
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I
SECRET
I T Z E R LA N D
Mr Jean-Pierre RITTER Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Benoit JUNOD Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation
Mr Josef SCHARLI Major EMG, Military Adviser
Mr Urs STEMMLER Second Secretary
Miss Susanna JUTZI Secretary of the Delegation
Mr Gerard STOUDMANN Second Secretary
(non-permanent)
Mr Fritz BOHNERT Ambassador of Switzerland to
Sweden
Mr Pierre MONOD Counsellor
Mr Andre MURISET Attache
Colonel Hans STOSSEL Defence Attache
Captain Urs BERGER Deputy Defence Attache
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SECRET tI
T U R K E Y
Mr Haluk OZGUL Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Deniz BOLLIKBASI Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation
Administrative Staff
Mr Duran AYDOGMUS
Mrs Giiner ERCETIN
Mr Mustaf a TUJRKKAN
Mr Hans Eric SUNDELIN
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U N I O N OF S O V I E T
S O C I A L I S T R E P U B L I C S
U.A. GRINEVSKIY
V.M. TATARNIKOV
I.S. ROZANOV
Yu.N. RAKHMANINOV
V.I. YEROFEYEV
I.S. BOGDANOV
B.B. KAZANTSEV
V.V. LEZHEN
I.S. LYAKIN-FROLOV
V.K. NOVOKHATSKIY
E.D. SAITZEV
E.S. VOLK
B.D. PANKIN
N.S. CHAMORTSEV
N.S. SELIVERSTOV
Y.V. KISILEV
P.N. KUGUYENKO
A.V. ZOLOTAREV
V.V. OREKHOVSKIY
G.S. BAKHTIN
V.I. BAYKOV
V.A. DMITRIYEV
V.I. TATARINTSEV
D.V. BONDAR
Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Member of Delegation
Counselor
Counselor
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
Ambassador
Minister-Counselor
Counselor
Counselor
Counselor
Military Attache
First Secretary
Second Secretary
Third Secretary
Attache
Attache
Secretary to the Ambassador
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Administrative and Technical Personnel
V.V. ANDREYEVA
A.P. BUROV
O.V. YEGORCHENKOVA
A.D. FILIPPOV
A.K. KARGAT'YEV
Y.A. KUDRYAVTSEV
M.G. KUTEPOV
V.V. PEREPELKOV
T.A. PLOKHOVA
V.N. SMIRNOV
V.B. STALSKIY
SECRET
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U N I T E D K I N G D O M
Mr J.M. EDES, CMG
Mr I.W. MACKLEY
Colonel R.W. BACK
Dr J.P.G. FREEMAN
Mr J.L. TAYLOR
Mr S.R.H. PEASE
Miss C.M. WRIGHT
Miss S.A. CHURCHLEY
Miss K.E. GILLMORE
Sir Richard PARSONS,
KCMG, HM
Mr R.M. JACKSON, CVO
Mr B.S. ROBERTS
Mr J. WHITE
Mrs M. BRADFIELD, MBE
Mr M. DANIELS
Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Counsellor
Military Adviser
First Secretary
First Secretary
Second Secretary
Personal Assistant
Personal Assistant
Administrative and Technical
Assistant
Counsellor
Counsellor
First Secretary
First Secretary
Attache
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr C. GLASS
Mr J. BENTLEY
Miss L. MOORE
Miss H. DONALDSON
Administrative Officer
Administrative Officer
Personal Assistant
Personal Assistant
ccrDCT
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SECRET ~
U N I T E D S T A T E S OF A M E R I C A
Mr James E. GOODBY Ambassador, Head of
Delegation
Dr Lynn HANSEN Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Franklin S. FORSBERG Ambassador of the United
States to Sweden, Delegate
Major General Jonas BLANK Delegate
Mr Jeremy CURTIN Delegate
Mr John FINNERTY Delegate
Ms Priscilla GALASSI Delegate
Mr Jon GUNDERSEN Delegate
Mr Kenneth HUCK Delegate
Major Carl C. KREHBIEL Delegate
Mr Rolf MOWATT-LARSSEF Delegate
Dr Howard STOFFER Delegate
Mr Harlan STRAUSS Delegate
Commander Howard N. Delegate
THORKILSON
Major Joseph TYO Delegate
Ms Jamie YOUNG Delegate
Administrative and Technical Personnel
Ms Mary CARDOSO
Ms Donna PETRICH
Ms Beverly ROUNDTREE
Ms Nancy WALKER
Ms Sonja WALSH
Ms Marlou WOODWARD
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Mr Sherrod McCALL
Mr John D. DANIELS
Mr Ints SILINS
Mr Jerry KOMISAR
Colonel Leo J. WEEKS
Mr Allen F. SCHEEL
Mr Jan FRIBERG
Mr Karl-Erik STENBXCK
Mr Guy ROSENQVIST
Mr Ake BLIXT
Ms Marie JAGLUND
Mr David L. BLEYLE
Mr Richard G. SIMPSON
Counsellor, American Embassy,
Stockholm
Counsellor for Administrative
Affairs, American Embassy,
Stockholm
Counsellor for Political
Affairs, American Embassy,
Stockholm
First Secretary, American
Embassy, Stockholm
Army Attache
Attache (Security)
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~E RET
Y U G 0 S L A V I A
Mr Aleksandar BOZOVIC Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Colonel Branislav MIHAILOVIC Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr Ljubivoje ACIMOVIC Special Adviser
Miss Branka LATINOVIC Member of Delegation
Mr Marjan OSOLNIK Ambassador to Sweden
Mr Dobrosav VEIZOVIC Counsellor of the Embassy,
Mr Nedzad HADZIMUSIC First Secretary of the
Embassy, Stockholm
Administrative and Technical Staff
Mr Miodrag MARKUS Administrative Secretary to
the Delegation
Mrs Ratomirka DJORDJEVIC Secretary
Mr Vojislav DJORDJEVIC
Mr Vitomir STERNEN
SECRET
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SECRET
SUMMARY OF
PLENARY STATEMENTS
- Expression of importance Spain places on CDE.
- Helsinki, Madrid and CUE goal is reciprocal trust, end
of arms race.
- All proposals including NUF and constraints deserve
study.
- Notation of security concerns in Africa, Middle East and
Latin America.
- Call for "more encouraging results" from CDE than
achieved to date.
AUSTRIA
- Reaffirmation of the importance of NUF but only with
comprehensive set of CSBMs (outlined).
- Call for end of mutual mistrust and the threat or use of
force between states.
- Stress on importance of Helsinki process.
- Reiteration of East's insistence on complementary
"political-military" and "military-technical" measures.
- Call for "intense negotiations" to reach final
agreements.
- Criticism of SDI.
- Support of NNA call for substantive negotiations.
IRELAND
- Call for openness to develop mutual trust.
- Outline of specific positions on notification
(mandatory, standardized, broad, using structural
parameters) and observation.
- Acknowledgement of difficulties in estaolisning
constraints.
- Reaffirmation of NUF could be possible.
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ROMANIA
- Revised "common ground" speech calling for balanced
measures commensurate with security interests of all
participants.
- Focal point a solemn declaration of NUF, framed in
non-treaty form.
- Outline of four concrete measures to ensure NUF.
UNITED STATES
- Using the Helsinki Final Act as a starting point, the
CDE must reduce the possibility of war through detailed
examination of concrete CSBMs in conjunction with
principle of NUF.
- Request for clarification of three Eastern working
documents (i.e., how they differ from past proposals).
- Explanation of US views on NUF.
Observation of relationship between economic, cultural,
humanitarian and security affairs.
- Repetition of importance of COE to President.
- Criticism of USSR for murder of Major Nicholson.
- Attack on US for barbaric plans for chemical warfare in
Europe.
- Response to US complaint concerning Major Nicholson with
complaint that US is introducing a purely bilateral
question into the conference.
- Repetition of standard Soviet views concerning the
incident.
24 MAY 1985
- Statement applauding beginning of rapprochement on
issues.
- Pledge of FRG cooperation.
- Stress on need for adequate verification.
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- Call for conclusion of Stockholm conference by summer of
1986.
- Need for informal working groups especially to discuss
CSBMs and Eastern working papers.
BULGARIA
- Defense against charges that Pact proposals are abstract
and propagandistic.
- Score West for rejection of NFU.
- ROMB better than annual calendars.
- Reiteration of commitment to verification.
UNITED STATES
- Call for further analysis of CSBMs before entering into
intensive negotiations.
- Depiction of Warsaw Pact papers as weak while stating
US willingness to study proposals conforming to the
Mandate.
- Reaffirmation of the interrelationship between all
principles of the Final Act.
- Strong statement on murder of Major Nicholson.
- Attack on US for alleged-buildup of chemical weapons,
which is blocking CW agreements at Geneva and
Stockholm.
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SECRET
31 MAY 1985
- Call for end of arms race, with NUF treaty playing
important role.
- Political and military aspects of security mutually
complementary.
- Applaud "businesslike" statement by US on 20 May but
criticize bypassing of political aspects of CSBMs.
- Chide US for refusing to engage in "constructive
negotiations" concerning Eastern proposals, especially
NUF.
- Accuse US of "double standard" on NUF in public and at
conference.
PORTUGAL
- Attribute greatest risk of war to wrong assessment by
one state of another's intentions due to a lack of
reliable information.
- Declaration that NATO package most viable for providing
this information.
HUNGARY
- Justification of Eastern proposals on notification of
independent air and naval activities, using
non-geographic concept of Europe as potential area of
confrontation.
- Expression of need for "sophistication and flexibility"
in dealing with asymmetry in constraints.
UNITED STATES
- Statement chastising Soviets for introducing bilateral
issues into CDE.
- Rejection of assertion tnat the US is refusing to
discuss non-use of force.
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7 JUNE 1985
UNITED STATES
- Assertion that some participating states fail to
observe Helsinki rules, noting failure of East to
properly provide information on "Druzhba-85" exercise.
- Assertion that CDE must carry out Madrid Mandate to
develop precise specifications for CSBMs, not redefine
the Mandate.
- Rejection of Hungarian attempt to redefine Mandate in
quasi-strategic terms.
- Presentation of verification as an expanded observation
regime.
- Support of structural parameters over "counting
soldiers" while at the same time lending support to
Eastern call for notification of independent air and
naval activities.
- Suggestion of "observation by challenge" during times of
crisis.
- Call for establishment of informal contact groups.
- Reiteration of NUF as a "valid operational projection"
of concrete CSBMs.
- No opposition to constraint measures if they guarantee
equal respect to all states.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
- Discussion of parallel progress, "concrete
negotiations," support for SC.4, etc.
- Claim that the US is seeking "unilateral advantage" in
rejecting notification of independent air and naval
exercises.
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- Caution to Soviet delegate to avoid misuse of mandate
language that occurred in his preceding statement.
15 JUNE 1985
CYPRUS
- Statement concerning 11 June incident in which Turkish
chairman refused to properly recognize Cypriot
representative.
- Reminder of Helsinki Final Act assuring all states equal
participation in the conference.
TURKEY
- Reiteration of Turkish reservation concerning the Final
Act ruling mentioned by the Cypriot representative.
GDR
- Suggestion that a ban on chemical weapons would be of
"special interest" to both Germanys.
- Progress on framework for a chemical weapons free zone
in Central Europe agreed to by West German Social
Democrats and East German Communist Party cited as
evidence of shared interests.
- Rejection of East German implication that their views
are compatible on the issue of regional chemical
weapons.
FRG supports Geneva agreement on a worldwide ban.
BULGARIA
- Argument that a NFU agreement would not be contrary to
the Madrid Mandate or the right of states to
self-defense as contained in the UN Charter.
- Assertion that NATO strategy seeks to reestablish
nuclear superiority.
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NORWAY
- Outline of "elements of a possible agreement" at the
conference including a set of concrete CSBMs conforming
to the Madrid Mandate, a_ reaffirmation of non-use of
force in the framework of CSBMs, and a set of
constraints in accordance with the Mandate.
- Call for more effective working structure at the
conference.
POLAND
- Reply to Norwegian statement questioning importance of
NUF to the West and whether it is to be expressed only
through CSBMs.
- Issue of form and content for NUF.
- Defense of Eastern notification papers.
- Time "has not yet come" to consider verification.
- Constraints should be viewed in the context of the whole
package.
UNITED STATES
- Reaffirmation of the inseparable nature of all
principles of the Helsinki Final Act.
- Results of the Ottawa meeting "will inevitably influence
our evaluation of the achievements and prospects for the
CSCE process as a whole".
- Commitment of US to negotiating substantial concrete and
verifiable measures in Stockholm.
- Expression of disappointment at the lack of a concluding
document in the Ottawa human rights conference.
- Hope and expectation that CDE will achieve meaningful
results.
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HUNGARY
- Introduction on benalf of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and
the Soviet Union of the East's fourth working document
of this session dealing with prior notification of major
military movements and transfers (defined as change in
location of 20,000 troops within, into, or out of the
area covered by CSBMs or transfer of more than 100
aircraft into the area).
- Major military movements in the sea and air space
adjoining Europe to be notified "whenever these
activities affect security in Europe as well as
constitute a part of military activities taking place
within the whole of Europe."
- Details of method and content of notification given.
SWITZERLAND
- Reinforcement of the connection between three baskets of
the Helsinki Final Act.
- "Avowed failure" of Ottawa has serious implications for
the CSCE process.
- Rejection of more than a "brief recall" of NUF
especially while no progress is made in human rights
basket.
- Swiss will present NUF proposal along these lines in
future.
- Statement supporting new Eastern working paper.
- Claim that the West is deviating from the agenda of CUE
in raising "unrelated matters" of human rignts in
contrast to the East's "businesslike" attitude.
- Follow-up on Soviet theme.
- Question of whether West wants extraneous issues (such
as Cruise and Pershing missiles) to be raised at CDE.
- Reading of the EC-10 foreign ministers meeting statement
acknowledging that Ottawa "did not result in progress,"
but was nevertheless necessary and useful.
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- Criticism of Canadian and Swiss statements tying Ottawa
to Stockholm.
- Vienna is the appropriate forum to seek balanced
progress within the CSCE process.
YUGOSLAVIA
- Reaffirmation of Yugoslav government's "strict respect"
for all provisions of the Final Act and its opposition
to all selective approaches.
- Brake (sic) in COE progress because of Ottawa would set
a bad precedent.
- Vienna is the appropriate forum to discuss such matters.
- Outline of some thoughts on NUF, verification and
continuation of the present working structure.
- Outline of Cypriot 8 March "Stockholm declaration of the
non-use of force combining the 'static' principle of NUF
with 'dynamic' CSBMs."
- Expectation that the "Ottawa cloud" would pass.
- Need to begin the drafting process as soon as possible
in the next session.
- Welcome of Eastern notification papers as a contribution
to the "subject of this conference," i.e., concrete
CSBMs.
- Criticism of Eastern independent air and naval papers as
"incompatible with the (CDE) zone."
- Claim that papers will not impact on Soviet activities.
- Western expectations include extension of the
notification period, lower structural threshold, and
more comprehensive "out-of-garrison" concept.
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FINLAND
- General assessment of the state of the conference
including comments on notification/observation,
verification, NUF, and constraints.
GDR
- Praise of the fourth Eastern notification paper as a
"new dynamic element" for dispelling perceptions of
threat.
- GDR especially concerned with troop movements from US.
- Now that the East has been so forthcoming, it is NATO's
turn to compromise.
UNITED KINGDOM
- Query of GDR as to why US and UK movements were
threatening and why GDR did not send observers to "Lion
Heart 84" exercise.
USSR
- Statement disputing FRG contention that Soviet
notification proposals "barely affect" the East.
- Characterization of SC.I/Amplified's inspection
provision as "legalized espionage."
- Contrast of unacceptable NATO proposal with the Soviet
vision of "optimal" verification (which must include air
and naval exercises and the movements and transfers of
troops in addition to ground force activities).
- Proposal to continue present working structure until the
end of the seventh session.
SWITZERLAND
- Interpretive statement on the "cut-off clause."
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- Request that the formal working structure be
supplemented with informal arrangements next session.
- Call for a "more advanced" phase of negotiation next
session through informal working arrangements within the
current working structure.
ROMANIA
- Notation of Romanian concern for rapid results and
readiness to discuss all efforts to initiate concrete
discussion.
UNITED STATES
- Statement assessing progress at CDE VI as disappointing,
lacking tangible results although positions on some key
issues were clarified.
- "Limited vision" of Eastern delegations described using
their working documents as evidence compared to
SC.1/Amplified.
- Reiteration of US position that reaffirmation of NUF
must be accompanied by concrete CSBMs.
- Connection of COE to all aspects of Helsinki Final Act
noted.
- US Congressional delegation headed by Dante Fascell
introduced.
UNITED KINGDOM - FRG
- Accusation that East's notification papers on air, naval
and movements/transfers are inconsistent with the CDE
zone as defined by the Madrid Mandate.
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- Claim that the West ignored Warsaw Pact security
concerns at CDE VI (examples given).
- "Poem" urging the NNA to make their contribution to
substantive discussion as soon as possible.
- Statement defending Eastern interpretation of Madrid
Mandate as valid.
USSR/POLAND
- Statement defending Eastern interpretation of Madrid
Mandate as valid, and hence, their notification papers
are all in accordance with the Mandate.
POLAND
- Statement outlining Eastern "accomplishments" during the
sixth round.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
- Upbeat statement noting the "lively discussion" and
clarification of views in the sixth session.
- Expectation that more intense negotiations in the
beginning of the seventh session will lead to drafting.
ROMANIA
- Suggestions on how to proceed next session in order to
move into intensified negotiations.
CANADA
- Pessimistic evaluation of CDE VI focusing on lack of
real give and take.
LUXEMBOURG
- Assessment of the sixth round noting positive emphasis
on discussion of concrete CSBMs.
- Madrid Mandate, Helsinki Final Act and UN Charter must
remain integral part of CDE.
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SUMMARY OF
WORKING GROUP AB STATEMENTS
CZECHOSLOVAKIA - POLAND - USSR
- Working document presented by Czechoslovakia, Poland and
USSR calling for 30 day prior notification of major
maneuvers of land forces (20,000 or more troops,
including naval and air forces).
- Multinational maneuvers are included as well as transfer
of troops to maneuver area.
- Information required in notification is specified.
GDR - HUNGARY - USSR
- Working document presented on behalf of the GDR, Hungary
and USSR on prior notification of major air force
maneuvers calling for 30 day advance notification of
maneuvers of 200 or more military planes.
- Included is transfer of forces from outside area of
activity.
- Information to be given is listed.
USSR - BULGARIA - POLAND
- Working document calling for prior notification of major
maneuvers of naval forces (30 combat ships and 100
military planes) in the sea and air space adjoining
Europe.
- Notification to be given to all participating states.
- National and joint maneuvers included.
- Information required in notification is listed.
- SDI and US first-strike capability criticized.
UNITED KINGDOM
- Statement welcoming Romanian areas of broad convergence.
- NUF and CSBMs must be linked.
- Outline of areas of convergence, constraints being
excluded from such areas.
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UNITED STATES
- Pledge to study three Eastern proposals with the
reservation that they do not at first appear to solve
problems in differing approaches.
- The following subjects are vital to progress at CDE:
types of military activities to be notified; threshold
levels and unit of account for notification; effective
use of observers; verification/information.
3 JUNE 1985
- Attack on slow evolution of NATO position on NUF.
- Simple reaffirmation of NUF, or its "expression through
measures," no longer acceptable to East.
- Praise of Eastern notification working documents and
criticism of Western package as not in the security
interests of all participants.
- Comments on the existing conference working structure.
- Demand that NATO explain its position on constraints and
on NUF, especially FRG call for an "all-encompassing
reaffirmation" of NUF.
- In response to GDR request, contrast of East's long
awaited "piecemeal" proposals with NATO's fully
developed package introduced early on.
- Clarification of position on NUF: a treaty is not the
appropriate form; language must not undermine UN Charter
or Helsinki Final Act and concrete CSB14s must be
included with reaffirmation of NUF.
PORTUGAL
- Question to Poland asking if the East's evolution on NUF
is expressed by SC.4 and SC.6 or if there is more.
- Is the East willing to replace the formula by another?
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NETHERLANDS
- Justification of Measure 1 (information) and Measure 5
(verification) as separate measures of SC.l.
- Rejection of Eastern argument that information must be
given in the context of notification.
- Verification and inspection part of an integrated
element of the package.
- All states have some form of NTM.
ROMANIA
- Call for a balanced, substantive "common package" in
conformity to the Madrid Mandate that meets the
security concerns of each participant.
- Proposal that the conference draw up elements and
framework of an agreement, concentrate on content of
measures wnich will help reach consensus, proceed toward
final agreement, and guide working groups to bring
positions closer together for wider consensus.
- Explanation of discrepancy between Romanian aide-memoire
and SC.2.
AUSTRIA
- Notation that contents of a common package are not yet
so readily recognizable.
- Suggestions for improvement to working structure.
10 JUNE 1985
UNITED STATES
- Request for the East to explain verification provisions
it contemplates for their proposals on notification of
major maneuvers.
- Detailed explanation of Western approach to verification
as embodied in SC.1/Amplified, specifically such "tools"
of verification as national technical means,
information, observation, consultations and inspections.
- Rebuttal of Soviet claim that FRG official statements on
NUF differ from COE delegation views.
- FRG seeks a "renewed, reiterated political"
strengthening of NUF but only in the context of
concrete CSBMs.
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SECRET
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SECRET
BULGARIA
- Examination of the differences between East and West on
the issue of NUF, i.e., basis in treaty (SC.6) vs.
concrete measures of SC.1.
- Given Soviet willingness to discuss the latter why will
the West not discuss the former?
USSR
- Rejection of the out-of-garrison concept which focuses
on the units leaving the garrison rather than the
threatening nature of the activity.
- Rejection of the structural parameter for notification
because of the differing unit size, organization
structure and equipment of armies as well as its
inapplicability to air and naval forces.
MALTA
- Acknowledgement of two areas of common ground vis-a-vis
constraints: that constraints must be part of a package
of measures agreed on in CDE and that they are in accord
with the Madrid mandate.
- Discussion of annual calendars.
19 JUNE 1985
UNITED STATES
- Acknowledgement that observation is a principle which
all participants agree must be further developed.
- Examples of uneven implementation of observation
principle and the need for any new document to provide
for the same standards of implementation applicable to
all participants.
- Request that the East expand on their views on how to
improve observation of ground activities.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
- Suggestion that the freeze and reducton of military
budgets (FROMB) should be discussed at Stockholm.
- Accusation that US is planning to increase its defense
budget in pursuit of "Star Wars."
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- Assertion that the East has failed to respond to two
Western questions on FROMB.
- UN is the appropriate forum to answer these questions.
- Accusation that FRG Ambassador Citron constantly
provides a "retort or reply" whenever Eastern countries
speak.
- West is using the issue of verification to avoid
discussing FROMB in the working group.
1 JULY 1985
UNITED STATES
- Discussion of critical common ground problems at the
conference: types of military activities to be
notified; threshold levels and unit of account for
notification; effective use of observers;
verification/information.
SWITZERLAND
- Statement that verification must be based on NTMs,
information, observation, consultations and inspection.
- Request for NATO clarification of NTMs envisaged by
Measure 5.
- List of observation questions raised by Measure 5.
- Allegation that the West has created independent
measures for information and verification as an
"obstructive device" in negotiation.
- Exchange of information cannot be an independent CSBM.
- Measure 1 of SC.1/Amplified does not meet the
requirements of the Madrid Mandate.
- The scope of military information exchanged must be
determined by the scale and content of agreed measures
and must reflect the security interests of all
participants.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 20b, 21b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 35b/c,
59b, 105b, 159p, 267b, 322a, 348p, 377d, 388a, 408p, 416p.
ALERTS: 22b/c, 125b, 392a.
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 106b, 270b, 417p.
BOGDANOV, I.S.: 290a, 457a.
CDE-VI:
General references to: 66e, 372a.
Expressions of dissatisfaction: 85p.
CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 20b, 21b/c, 23b/c, 25b/c,
28b/c, 31b/c, 59b, 148p, 158p, 348p, 376d, 377d, 390a, 460b.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 303p.
COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS
COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5 178a. 211p, 322a, 408p.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 3p, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c,
34b/c, 68a,
80e,
101a,
117a,
125b,
137d,
149p,
153P,
158p,
171c,
179a, 204p,
212p,
252c,
266b,
271b,
285a,
290a,
306p,
317a,
318a,
321a, 348p,
363a,
367a,
377d,
393a,
403p,
405p,
411p,
416p,
423c,
438a, 449d,
455a.
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CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 3p, 6p, 18a, 19a, 23b/c, 34b/c,
74a, 117a, 118a, 148p, 157p, 162p, 175d, 189a, 204p, 211p, 233c,
246c, 252c, 288a, 289a, 290a, 306p, 312b, 333a, 347P, 390a, 392a,
393a, 403P, 414p, 416p, 457a, 465d.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
CWFZ: see CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE
DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 7p, 204p, 211p, 317a, 322a, 403p.
DEPLOYMENTS OF US PERSHING II MISSILES AND GLCMS IN EUROPE: 344p.
DISARMAMENT: 162p, 210p, 362a, 370a, 390a.
EQUAL SECURITY: 37b/c, 158p, 171c, 233c, 247c, 287b, 306p, 330a, 377d,
407p, 420p, 423c, 466p.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 21b/c, 23b/c, 29b/c, 31b/c, 43c, 44c, 59b, 106b,
137d, 182b, 215P, 266b, 269b, 312b, 349p, 377d, 419p.
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2
General references to: 6p, 266b, 457a.
Military calendars: 84p, 234c, 248c, 252c, 266b, 270b.
Exercise schedules: 74a, 252c.
Annual forecasts of military activities: 391a, 392a.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1
General references to: 6p, 18a, 67a, 68a, 74a, 117a, 118a, 136d,
211p, 252c, 285a, 302d, 317a, 318a, 322a, 333a, 403P, 421p, 422c,
423c, 430c, 454a.
Locations of major ground formations, main combat units: 455a.
Locations of land-based air formations, wings, regiments: 136d,
455a.
Transparency, openness in military activities: 421p.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FINAL DOCUMENT: 173c, 288a, 289a, 305p, 465d.
FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: 37b/c, 330c, 361a.
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GRINEVSKIY, O.A.: 34b/c, 66e, 80e, 82d, 92p, 149p, 151p, 205p,
234c, 330c, 343p, 435d, 466p.
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 5p, 6p, 18a, 21b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 68a,
102a, 107b, 125b, 136d, 179a, 211p, 252c, 260a, 261a, 264a, 266b,
285a, 308a, 310a, 321a, 336b, 343p, 345p, 347p, 361a, 362a, 364a,
365a, 367a, 372a, 410p, 416p, 423c, 430c, 438a, 449d, 454a, 460b.
IMPLEMENTATION: 68a, 216p, 317a, 321a, 365a, 370a, 454a.
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 18a, 20b, 21b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c,
34b/c, 43c, 44c, 59b, 77b, 126b, 127b, 136d, 148p, 158p, 181b,
182b, 206p, 267b, 286b, 311b, 312b, 335b, 347p, 377d, 388a, 389a,
405p, 416p, 459b.
General references to: 7p, 11d, 18a, 68a, 287b, 377a, 323a, 404p,
406p, 422c.
Areas of inspection: 68a, 406p, 422c.
Quotas: 407p.
Timing of inspections: 18a.
KRASNOYARSK RADAR: 11d, 12d.
MADRID MANDATE: 20b, 21b/c, 51a, 59b, 158p, 173c, 180a, 210p, 233c,
246c, 304p, 321a, 334a, 361a, 362a, 368a, 372a, 376d, 377d, 388a,
390a, 391a, 393a, 403p, 405p, 414p, 423c, 430c, 466p.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 21b/c, 131b, 162p, 181b, 252c, 267b, 268b,
270b, 286b, 288a, 290a, 343p, 347p, 420p.
Of ground forces: 21b/c, 23b/c, 25b/c, 74a, 158p, 286b, 290a, 347p,
388a, 417p.
Of naval forces: 21b/c, 23b/c, 31b/c, 44c, 252c, 286b, 312b, 347p.
Of air forces: 21b/c, 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c, 252c. 286b, 347p, 420p.
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MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 19a, 21b/c, 23b/c, 26b/c, 42c,
106b, 107b, 126b, 215p, 233c, 266b, 267b, 291a, 311a, 312b, 335b,
348p, 418p, 447b, 458b, 459b.
MBFR: see MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
MEASURE 1: see
106b, 285a,
MEASURE 2: see
266b, 336b,
MEASURE 3:
MEASURE 5: see
390a, 422c.
also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION 6p, 66e, 68a,
318a, 423c, 430c, 454a.
also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 18a, 74a, 175d, 234c, 247c,
392a.
also NOTIFICATIONS 376d.
also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION 6p, 17a, 68a, 69a, 318a,
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 10a, 36b/c.
MISCELLANEOUS CABLES:
New faces at CDE: pp. 489-494.
Eastern delegations in Stockholm: pp. 495-505.
NATO study of problems with CDE Secretariat Russian
interpretation: pp. 506-507.
Soviet pamphlet entitled "Stockholm: Two Approaches to
Confidence-Building": p. 508.
Soviet motives and modus operandi: pp. 509-514.
Countering Soviet media on CDE: pp. 515-516.
Analysis of NNA position in CDE: pp. 517-523.
Procedural denouement and Soviet equivocations:
Working structure grid group meeting: p. 526.
CDE end of round: p. 527.
Upcoming CDE issues: pp. 528-529.
524-525.
CSCE notification of military exercise: p. 530.
CODEL Fascell bilateral discussions in Sweden: pp. 531-534.
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MOBILIZATION: 78b, 106b, 376d, 388a, 416p, 458b.
MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS: 19a.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM;
VERIFICATION 7p, 69a, 218p, 285a, 406p, 422c.
NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 10a, 176d, 304p, 365a.
NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM): 17a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 3P, 5p, 6p, 34b/c, 50a, 51a, 67a, 80e,
82d,
149p, 171c, 178a, 179a, 211p, 232c,
234c, 260a,
261a,
289a,
305p,
308a, 309a, 310a, 318a, 344p, 366a,
372a, 402p,
403P,
410p,
435d,
438a, 439a, 448d, 465d.
Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF:
34b/c, 50a,
52a,
103a,
151p,
179a, 232c, 242c, 260a, 361a, 362a.
Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 5p, 6p, 176d, 362a, 366a,
410p.
Reaffirmation of NUF: 171c, 179a, 362a, 365a, 366a, 448d.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 36b/c, 50a, 55a, 102a, 103a, 151p, 232c, 242c,
260a, 262a, 361a, 439a.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 3p, 6p, 18a, 20b, 21b/c, 23b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c,
32b/c, 34b/c, 42c, 68a, 77b, 78b, 83d, 106b, 133b, 148p, 157p, 171c,
181b, 182b, 191b, 204p, 211p, 234c, 252c, 267b, 268b, 269b, 290a,
306p, 318a, 321a, 347p, 377d, 394b, 404p, 418p, 447b, 454a, 459b,
465d.
Designation of the activity: 22b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 42c, 59b,
106b, 107b, 181b, 233c, 267b, 269b, 286b, 447b.
Duration of the activity: 22b/c, 26b/c, 30b/c, 33b/c, 42c, 269b, 349p.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 22b/c, 26b/c,
30b/c, 33b/c, 59b, 107b, 148p, 269b, 349p, 446b.
Names of participating states: 22b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 42c, 348p.
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NOTIFICATIONS (continued):
Purpose of the activity: 22b/c, 42c, 59b, 78b, 269b, 349p.
Type of forces involved: 18a, 20b, 21b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 42c, 59b,
77b, 106b, 158p, 181b, 182b, 233c, 252c, 267b, 349p, 447b.
Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 269b.
Number of regiments or brigades: 252c, 269b.
Number of troops participating: 21b/c, 23b/c, 26b/c, 33b/c, 42c,
252c, 267b, 269b, 311b, 312b, 335b, 348p.
Number of naval vesssels involved: 21b/c, 33b/c, 148p, 252c.
Number of military aircraft involved: 21b/c, 23b/c, 30b/c,_.33b/c, 43c,
137d, 148p, 252c.
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 21b/c, 23b/c,
252c, 446b.
Information to be included: 22b/c, 23b/c, 26b/c, 30b/c, 32b/c, 107b,
107b, 136d, 267b, 269b, 271b, 349p.
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR: 103a.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 37b/c, 103a, 179a, 304p.
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFC: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 3P, 77b, 78b, 83d, 125b, 126b, 127b, 129b,
131b, 161p, 181b, 191b, 204p, 211p, 267b, 285a, 286b, 290a, 306p,
321a, 335b, 347p, 377d, 388a, 389a, 394b, 403P, 420p, 422c, 447b,
458b, 459b.
Duration of observers' stay: 126b, 129b, 191b, 215p.
Host country responsibilities: 125b, 126b, 127b, 129b, 131b, 191b,
394b.
SECRET
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OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES (continued):
Invitations of observers: 6p, 77b, 78b, 125b, 129b, 215p, 252c, 286b,
460b.
Logistical arrangements for observers: 125b, 126b, 127b, 131b, 286b,
335b, 394b.
Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 459b.
Scope of observation: 125b, 126b, 127b, 131b, 191b, 192b, 215p, 286b,
335b, 447b, 459b.
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of
differences): 82d, 106b, 160p, 181b, 233c, 252c, 267b, 446b, 447b.
PHASE II: 361a.
PRENOTIFICATION: 175d, 247c, 269b, 271b, 290a, 347p.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 34b/c, 43c 44c, 252c,
271b, 343p, 409p, 417p.
RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N.: 50a, 179a, 261a, 309a, 364a, 438a.
REDUCTION OF AND FREEZE ON MILITARY BUDGETS AND SPENDING: 84p.
ROMB: see REDUCTION OF AND FREEZE ON MILITARY BUDGETS AND SPENDING
ROZANOV, I.S.: 376d, 423c, 430c.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 6p, 17a, 22b/c, 60b, 68a, 78b, 106b, 171c,
217p, 232c, 233c, 247c, 267b, 317a, 322a, 336b, 376d, 388a, 390a,
392a, 404p, 418p, 422c, 423c, 447b.
SC.2: 6p, 118a, 174c, 217p, 234c, 317a, 322a, 366a.
SC.3: 118a, 213P, 247c, 266b, 267b, 290a, 317a, 323a, 368a, 417p.
SC.4: 16e, 23b/c, 153P, 286b, 308a, 330c, 348p, 368a.
SC.5: 247c.
SC.6: 23b/c, 50a, 51a, 102a, 103a, 178a, 232c, 260a, 261a, 309a, 310a,
317a, 318a, 323a, 362a, 368a.
SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
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SOLEMN DECLARATION: 5p, 6p, 362a, 367a, 410p.
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 4p, 17a, 330c.
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 18a, 77b, 83d, 107b, 126b, 136d, 204p, 215p,
233c, 266b, 267b, 269b, 418p, 447b, 458b.
TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 127b, 131b, 136d, 233c, 252c, 302d, 376d, 393a, 394b,
404p, 405p, 416p.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 21b/c, 23b/c, 26b/c, 29b/c, 136d, 181b,
191b, 267b, 268b, 286b, 343P, 348p, 395b, 403p, 406p, 416p, 446b.
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 20b, 23b/c, 37b/c, 68a, 205p, 305p, 406p, 421p,
423c, 447b.
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 3P, 7p, 18a, 67a, 68a, 84p, 117a, 129b, 136d,
160p, 179a, 309a, 211p, 247c, 267b, 269b, 3o6p, 317a, 318a, 321a,
405p, 420p, 422c, 423c, 430c, 458b.
330c, 388a, 389a, 403P, 404p,
Verification by cadres: 7p, 69a, 77b, 125b, 129b, 215p, 267b, 285a,
414p.
WEEKLY WRAP-UP CABLES: May 14-24, pp. 94-99; May 28-31, Pp. 165-170;
June 3-7, pp. 225-231; June 10-21, pp. 351-355; Final Wrap-Up,
pp. 478-485.
YEROFEYEV, V.I.: 10a, 85p, 101a, 365a.
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE 59b, 148p, 288a.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 270b.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 3p, 271b.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 3p, 189a.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 269b.
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):
Military calendars: 270b.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:
General references to: 68a.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 260a, 2614a, 365a.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IMMUNITIES FOR INSPECTORS AND OBSERVERS: see subheadings under
INSPECTIONS; OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IMPLEMENTATION: 365a.
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MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 270b.
MEASURE 5: see also VERIFICATION 69a.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: 69a.
NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 365a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 3p, 260a.
Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 260a.
Reaffirmation of NUF: 365a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 260a, 262a.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 3p, 269b.
Designation of the activity: 269b.
Duration of the activity: 269b.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 269b.
Purpose of the activity: 269b.
Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 269b.
Number of regiments or brigades: 269b.
Number of troops participating: 269b.
Information to be included: 269b, 271b.
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
-2-
SECRET
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OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 3p, 77b, 129b.
Duration of observers' stay: 129b.
Host country responsibilities: 129b.
Invitations of observers: 129b.
PRENOTIFICATION: 269b, 271b.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 271b.
SC.6: 260a.
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 77b, 269b.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 3p, 68a, 129b, 269b.
Verification by cadres: 69a, 129b.
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BULGARIA SUBJECT INDEX
Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 20b, 31b/c, 35b/c.
CDE-VI:
General references to: 372a.
CDE ZONE: 20b, 31b/c.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 31b/c, 34b/c.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 23b/c, 34b/c, 74a, 333a.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DISARMAMENT: 362a.
EQUAL SECURITY: 37b/c, 287b, 333a.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 31b/c, 44c.
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see
also MEASURE 2
Military calendars: 84p.
Exercise schedules: 74a.
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EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:
General references to: 74a, 333a.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: 37b/c.
FROMB: see FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 31b/c, 362a, 372a.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 20b, 31b/c, 34b/c, 44c, 181b,
286b, 389a.
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 287b.
MADRID MANDATE: 20b, 304p, 362a, 372a.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 286b.
Of ground forces: 74a, 286b.
Of naval forces: 23b/c, 31b/c, 44c, 286b.
Of air forces: 286b.
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 74a.
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 36b/c.
SECRET
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NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 304p.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 34b/c, 232c, 372a.
Legally binding reaffirmation of MUF: 34b/c, 50a, 52a, 232c, 242c,
362a.
Reaffirmation of NUF: 362a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 36b/c, 50a, 232c, 242c.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 20b, 32b/c, 34b/c, 181b.
Designation of the activity: 32b/c, 181b, 286b.
Duration of the activity: 33b/c.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 33b/c.
Names of participating states: 32b/c.
Type of forces involved: 20b, 181b.
Number of troops participating: 33b/c.
Number of naval vesssels involved: 33b/c.
Number of military aircraft involved: 33b/c.
Information to be included: 32b/c.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 37b/c, 179a, 304p.
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
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OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 286b, 389a.
Invitations of observers: 286b.
Logistical arrangements for observers: 286b.
Scope of observation: 286b.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 31b/c, 34b/c, 44c.
REDUCTION OF AND FREEZE ON MILITARY BUDGETS AND SPENDING: 84p.
ROMB: see REDUCTION OF AND FREEZE ON MILITARY BUDGETS AND SPENDING
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 232c.
SC.4: 23b/c, 286b.
SC.6: 23b/c, 50a, 232c, 362a.
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 286b.
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 20b, 23b/c, 37b/c, 305p.
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 84p, 179a, 389a.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 411p.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 414p.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 179a, 410p.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
MADRID MANDATE: 180a, 414p.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 179a, 402p, 410p.
Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 410p.
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
SOLEMN DECLARATION: 410p.
VERIFICATION:
Verification by cadres: 414p.
SECRET
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
.e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 25b/c, 348p.
CDE ZONE: 25b/c, 348p.
COMPLIANCE: 178a.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 25b/c, 117a, 290a, 348p.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 117a, 289a, 347p.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 349p.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:
General references to: 117a.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FINAL DOCUMENT: 289a.
FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: 33Oc, 361a.
FROMB: see FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 25b/c, 343p, 347p.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
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INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 311b, 347p.
MADRID MANDATE: 362a.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 290a, 343P, 347P?
Of ground forces: 23b/c, 25b/c, 290a, 347p, 388a.
Of naval forces: 347p.
Of air forces: 347p.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 23b/c, 26b/c, 42c, 106b, 267b, 311b,
348p, 447b.
MOBILIZATION: 388a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 178a, 289a, 439a?
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 439a.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 23b/c, 25b/c, 42c, 106b, 267b, 290a, 347p,
447b.
Designation of the activity: 25b/c, 42c, 447b.
Duration of the activity: 26b/c, 42c, 349p.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 26b/c, 349p.
Names of participating states: 25b/c, 42c, 348p.
Purpose of the activity: 42c, 349p.
Type of forces involved: 25b/c, 42c, 349p.
Number of troops participating: 23b/c, 26b/c, 42c, 267b, 311b, 348p.
Information to be included: 23b/c, 26b/c, 107b, 349p.
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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 290a, 347p.
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of
differences): 447b.
PHASE II: 361a.
PRENOTIFICATION: 347p.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 25b/c, 290a, 343p.
SC.4: 330c, 348p.
SC.6: 178a.
SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 330c.
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 447b.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 26b/c, 343p, 348p.
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 117a.
-13-
SECRET
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 21b/c.
ALERTS: 22b/c.
CDE ZONE: 21b/c.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 21b/c.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 21b/c.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 21b/c.
MADRID MANDATE: 21b/c.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 21b/c.
Of ground forces: 21b/c.
Of naval forces: 21b/c.
Of air forces: 21b/c.
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MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 21b/c.
NOTIFICATIONS:
General references to: 21b/c.
Designation of the activity: 22b/c.
Duration of the activity: 22b/c.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 22b/c.
Names of participating states: 22b/c.
Purpose of the activity: 22b/c.
Type of forces involved: 21b/c.
Number of troops participating: 21b/c.
Number of naval vesssels involved: 21b/c.
Number of military aircraft involved: 21b/c.
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 21b/c.
Information to be included: 22b/c.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 22b/c.
SC.4: 16e.
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 21b/c.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 322a.
COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS
COMPLIANCE: 322a.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 285a, 317a, 321a, 403p.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 290a, 403p, 465d.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 317a, 322a, 403P.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 266b.
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see
also MEASURE 2
General references to: 261b.
Military calendars: 261b.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1
General references to: 285a, 317a, 322a, 403p.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
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FINAL DOCUMENT: 465d.
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 285a, 321a.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IMPLEMENTATION: 317a, 321a.
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 317a, 323a.
MADRID MANDATE: 321a, 403P.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 266b.
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION 285a.
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 266b.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 285a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 403P.
NOTIFICATIONS:
General references to: 321a, 403P.
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 285a, 321a, 403P.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 317a, 322a.
SC.2: 317a, 322a.
SC.3: 266b, 290a, 317a, 323a.
SC.6: 317a, 323a.
SECRET
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THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.
VERIFICATION: see also NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 317a, 321a, 403p.
Verification by cadres: 285a.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE:
28b/c, 59b.
CDE ZONE: 23b/c, 28b/c.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE:
303p.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 28b/c.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
CWFZ: see CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE
DEPLOYMENTS OF US PERSHING II MISSILES-AND GLCMS IN EUROPE: 344p.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 23b/c, 29b/c, 43c.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 28b/c, 361a.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 28b/c, 43c, 59b, 126b, 335b.
MADRID MANDATE: 361a.
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MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
Of air forces: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c.
MEASURE 5:. 17a.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM
NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM): 17a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 50a.
Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 361a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 50a, 55a, 361a.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 28b/c, 403p.
Designation of the activity: 28b/c.
Duration of the activity: 30b/c.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 30b/c, 446b.
Names of participating states: 28b/c.
Type of forces involved: 28b/c.
Number of military aircraft involved: 23b/c, 30b/c, 43c.
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 23b/c.
Information to be included: 23b/c, 30b/c, 446b.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR: 103a.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 103a.
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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFC: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 126b, 335b.
Host country responsibilities: 126b.
Logistical arrangements for observers: 126b, 335b.
Scope of observation: 126b, 335b.
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of
differences): 446b.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 17a, 447b.
SC.6: 50a.
SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 17a.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 29b/c, 403P, 446b.
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 447b.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
C - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 28b/c, 159p, 348p.
CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 23b/c, 28b/c, 148p, 158p, 348p.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 28b/c, 158p, 348p.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 18a, 148p, 157p, 162p,
189a, 312b, 333a.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DISARMAMENT: 162p.
EQUAL SECURITY: 158p.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 23b/c, 29b/c, 43c, 182b, 349p.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 28b/c, 102a, 308a, 310a, 343p, 347p?
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 28b/c, 43c, 59b, 148p, 158p,
181b, 347p.
MADRID MANDATE: 158p, 334a.
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MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 162p, 343p, 347p.
Of ground forces: 158p, 347p.
Of naval forces: 347p.
Of air forces: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c, 347p.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 312b, 348p.
MEASURE 2: 18a.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 308a, 310a, 465d.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 102a.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 28b/c, 148p, 157p, 181b, 347p, 465d.
Designation of the activity: 28b/c, 181b.
Duration of the activity: 30b/c, 349p.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 30b/c, 148p,
349p.
Names of participating states: 28b/c, 348p?
Purpose of the activity: 349p.
Type of forces involved: 28b/c, 59b, 158p, 181b, 349p.
Number of troops participating: 312b, 348p.
Number of naval vesssels involved: 148p.
Number of military aircraft involved: 23b/c, 30b/c, 43c, 148p.
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 23b/c.
Information to be included: 23b/c, 30b/c, 349p.
SECRET
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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 161p, 347p.
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of
differences): 160p.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c, 343p, 347p.
SC.4: 308a, 348p.
SC.6: 102a, 308a, 310a.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 29b/c, 343p, 348p?
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 160p.
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE 148p.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 105b.
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 106b.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 175d, 233c, 246c.
EQUAL SECURITY: 247c.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 106b.
EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2
Military calendars: 234c, 248c.
Annual forecasts of military activities: 391a.
MADRID MANDATE: 233c, 246c.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 106b.
MEASURE 1: 106b.
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 175d, 234c, 247c.
NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 176d.
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NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 176d.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION
General references to: 106b, 234c.
Designation of the activity: 106b.
Type of forces involved: 106b.
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
PRENOTIFICATION: 175d, 247c.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 106b, 247c.
SC.2: 234c.
SC.3: 247c.
SC.5: 247c.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 247c.
SECRET
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
C.- working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 25b/c, 31b/c, 35b/c.
CDE ZONE: 25b/c, 31b/c.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 25b/c, 31b/c, 34b/c, 171c,
306p.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 23b/c, 34b/c, 306p, 392a.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
EQUAL SECURITY: 37b/c, 171c, 306p.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 31b/c, 44c.
EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2
Annual forecasts of military activities: 392a.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FINAL DOCUMENT: 305p.
FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: 37b/c.
FROMB: see FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS
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HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 25b/c, 31b/c, 336b, 438a.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 31b/c, 34b/c, 44c, 77b.
MADRID MANDATE: 466p.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
Of ground forces: 23b/c, 25b/c.
Of naval forces: 23b/c, 31b/c, 44c.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 23b/c, 26b/c, 42c, 106b,
267b, 335b.
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 336b, 392a.
MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 36b/c.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 34b/c, 171c, 305p, 438a?
Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 34b/c, 103a.
Reaffirmation of NUF: 171c.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 36b/c, 103a, 439a.
SECRET
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NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 23b/c, 25b/c, 32b/c, 34b/c, 42c, 106b, 171c,
191b, 267b, 306p, 447b.
Designation of the activity: 25b/c, 32b/c, 42c.
Duration of the activity: 26b/c, 33b/c, 42c.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 26b/c, 33b/c.
Names of participating states: 25b/c, 32b/c, 42c.
Purpose of the activity: 42c.
Type of forces involved: 25b/c, 42c, 77b, 447b.
Number of troops participating: 23b/c, 26b/c, 33b/c, 42c, 267b, 335b.
Number of naval vesssels involved: 33b/c.
Number of military aircraft involved: 33b/c.
Information to be included: 23b/c, 26b/c, 32b/c.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 37b/c.
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 77b, 191b, 306p, 447b, 459b.
Duration of observers' stay: 191b.
Host country responsibilities: 191b.
Invitations of observers: 77b.
Scope of observation: 191b, 335b, 447b, 459b.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 25b/c, 31b/c, 34b/c, 44c.
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SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 171c, 267b, 336b, 392a?
sC.4: 23b/c.
SC.6: 23b/c, 103a.
SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 4p.
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 267b.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 26b/c, 191b.
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 23b/c, 37b/c.
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 306p.
Verification by cadres: 77b.
_34_
SECRET
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 390a.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 363a, 367a, 393a.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 6p, 118a, 288a. 393a.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 7p.
DISARMAMENT: 370a.
EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):
General references to: 6p.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1
General references to: 6p.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FINAL DOCUMENT: 173c, 288a.
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 5p, 6p, 107b, 362a, 367a.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IMPLEMENTATION: 370a.
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General references to: 7p.
MADRID MANDATE: 173c, 368a, 390a.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 288a.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 107b.
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION 6p.
MEASURE 5: see also VERIFICATION 6p, 390a.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 7p.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 5p, 6p, 366a.
Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 5p, 6p, 362a, 366a.
Reaffirmation of NUF: 366a.
NOTIFICATIONS:
General references to: 6p.
Designation of the activity: 107b.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 107b.
Information to be included: 107b.
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
Invitations of observers: 6p.
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SECRET
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SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 6p, 390a.
SC.2:
6p, 118a, 174c, 366a.
SC.3:
118a, 368a.
SC.4:
368a.
SC.6:
368a.
SOLEMN DECLARATION: 5p, 6p, 362a, 367a.
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 107b.
THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 7p.
Verification by cadres: 7p.
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE 288a.
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ALERTS: 125b.
COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS
COMPLIANCE: 211p.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 125b, 204p, 212p.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 189a, 204p, 211p.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 204p, 211p.
DISARMAMENT: 210p.
EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 215p.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:
General references to: 211p.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 125b, 211p.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IMPLEMENTATION: 216p.
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MADRID MANDATE: 210p.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 126b, 215p, 458b.
MOBILIZATION: 458b.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 218p.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 211p.
NOTIFICATIONS:
General references to: 204p, 2t1p.
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 125b, 204p, 211p, 458b.
Duration of observers' stay: 126b, 215p.
Host country responsibilities: 125b.
Invitations of observers: 125b, 215p.
Logistical arrangements for observers: 125b.
Scope of observation: 125b, 215p.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 217p.
SC.2: 217p.
SC.3: 213p.
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 126b, 204p, 215p, 458b.
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS
VERIFICATION: see also NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 204p, 211p, 458b.
Verification by cadres: 125b, 215p.
SECRET
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 388a.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 449d.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 392a.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:
General references to: 422c.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 343p, 449d.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 388a.
INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 422c
Areas of inspection: 422c.
MADRID MANDATE: 388a.
MEASURE 5: see also VERIFICATION 422c.
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MOBILIZATION: 106b.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 422c.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 344p, 448d.
Reaffirmation of NUF: 448d.
NOTIFICATIONS:
General references to: 77b, 106b,
191b.
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 77b, 191b,
388a, 422c.
Duration of observers' stay: 191b.
Scope of observation: 191b.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 388a, 422c.
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 388a, 422c.
Verification by cadres: 422c.
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SECRET
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other
informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
Speaker Key
A - Bogdanov
B - Grinevskiy
C - Rakhmaninov
D - Rozanov
E - Tatarnikov
F - Yerofeyev
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 35b/cB, 59b, 348p,
377bE, 408pE, 416pE.
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 417pE.
BOGDANOV, I.S.: 290a, 457a.
CDE-VI:
General references to: 66eB.,
Expressions of dissatisfaction: 85pF.
CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 23b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c,
59b, 348p, 376dD, 377dE, 460b.
COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5 408pE.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c,
34b/cB, 68a, 8OeB, 101aF, 137dE, 149pB, 153PB, 179aC, 252cE, 318a,
348p, 377dE, 405pE, 416pE, 423cD, 438aC, 455a.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 19a, 23b/cB, 34b/cB, 117a,
252cE, 290aA, 347p, 393aE, 416pE, 457aA.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
EQUAL SECURITY: 37b/cB, 233cE, 377dD, 407pE, 420pE, 423cD, 466pB.
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EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 23b/c, 29b/c, 31b/c, 43c, 44c, 59b, 137dE, 312b,
349p, 377dE, 419pE.
EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):
General references to: 457aA.
Exercise schedules: 242cE.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1
General references to: 18a, 67a, 136dE, 252cE, 302dE, 318a, 421pE,
423cD, 430cD, 454a.
Locations of major ground formations, main combat units: 252cE, 455a.
Locations of land-based air formations, wings, regiments: 136dE,
455a.
Transparency, openness in military activities: 421pE.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: 37b/cB, 330cB.
FROMB: see FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS
GRINEVSKIY, O.A.: 34b/c, 66e, 80e, 82d, 92p, 149p, 151p, 205p, 234c,
330c, 343P, 435d, 466p.
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 18a, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 68a, 136dE, 179aC,
252cE, 261aC, 343PB, 347p, 364aC, 416pE, 423cD, 430cD, 454a, 460b.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IMPLEMENTATION: 68a, 454a.
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 18a, 28b/c, 31b/c, 34b/cB, 43c,
44c, 59b, 127bE, 136dE, 182b, 205pB, 312b, 347P, 377dE, 406pE, 416pE,
459b.
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INSPECTIONS:
General references to: 11d, 18a, 68a, 404pE, 406pE.
Areas of inspection: 68a, 406pE.
Quotas: 407pE.
Timing of inspections: 18a.
KRASNOYARSK RADAR: 11d, 12d.
MADRID MANDATE: 51aC, 59b, 376dE, 377dE, 393aE, 405pE, 423cD, 430cO,
466pB.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 131bE, 181b, 252cE, 268b, 290aA, 343pB, 347p,
420pE.
Of ground forces: 23b/c, 25b/c, 347p, 417pE.
Of naval forces: 23b/cB, 31b/c, 44c, 252cE, 312b, 347p.
Of air forces: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c, 252cE, 347p, 420pE.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 19a, 23b/c, 26b/c, 42c, 233cE, 291aA,
348p, 418pE, 459b.
MBFR: see MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION 66eB, 68a, 318a,
423cD, 430cD, 454a.
MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS 376dE.
MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION 68a, 318a.
MILITARIZION OF SPACE: 10aF, 36b/cB.
MOBILIZATION: 78b, 376dE, 388a, 416pE.
MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS: 19a.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 406pE.
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NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)
NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 10aF, 365aF.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE:
General references to: 34b/cB, 51aC, 67a, 80eB, 82dB, 149pB, 234cB,
261aC, 309aC, 318a, 435dB, 438aC.
Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 34b/cB, 151pB, 179aC.
Reaffirmation of NUF: 179aC.
NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 36b/cB, 151pB.
NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRIOR NOTIFICATION
General references to: 18a, 23b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 34b/cB, 42c,
68a, 78b, 83dB, 133d, 181b, 182b, 252cE, 268b, 290aA, 318a, 347p,
377dE, 394bE, 404pE, 418pE, 454a, 459b.
Designation of the activity: 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 42c, 59b, 181b,
233cE.
Duration of the activity: 26b/c, 30b/c, 33b/c, 42c, 349p.
Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 26b/c, 30b/c,
33b/c, 59b, 349p.
Names of participating states: 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 42c, 348p.
Purpose of the activity: 42c, 59b, 78b, 349p.
Type of forces involved: 18a, 25b/c, 28b/c, 42c, 59b, 181b, 182b,
233cE, 252cE, 349p.
Number of regiments or brigades: 252cE.
Number of troops participating: 23b/c, 26b/c, 33b/c, 42c, 252cE, 348p.
Number of naval vesssels involved: 33b/c, 252cE.
Number of military aircraft involved: 23b/c, 30b/c, 33b/c, 43c, 137dE,
252cE.
Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 23b/c, 252cE.
Information to be included: 23b/c, 26b/c, 30b/c, 32b/c, 136dE, 349p.
NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 37b/cB.
NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE
NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY
NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 78b, 83dB, 127bE, 131bE, 181b, 290aA, 347p,
377dE, 394bE, 420pE.
Host country responsibilities: 127bE, 131bE, 394bE.
Invitations of observers: 78b, 252cE, 460b.
Logistical arrangements for observers: 127bE, 131bE, 394bE.
Scope of observation: 127bE, 131bE, 192b.
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of
differences): 82dB, 181b, 233cE, 252cE.
PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/cB, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 34b/cB, 43c, 44c,
252cE, 343pB, 347p, 409pE, 417pE.
RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N.: 50a, 179a, 261a, 309a, 364a, 438c.
ROZANOV, I.S.: 376d, 423c, 430c.
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 60b, 68a, 78b, 233cE, 376dE, 404pE, 418pE,
423cD.
SC.3:
417pE.
SC.4:
23b/cB, 153pB, 348p.
SC.6:
23b/cB, 51aC, 261aC, 309aC, 318a.
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 18a, 83dB, 136bE, 233cE, 418pE.
TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 127b, 131b, 136d, 233c, 252c, 302d, 376d, 393a, 394b,
404p, 405p, 416p.
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THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 23b/c, 26b/c, 29b/c, 136dE, 181b, 268b,
343PB, 348p, 395bE, 406pE, 416pE.
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 23b/cB, 37b/c, 68a, 205pB, 406pE, 421pE, 423cD.
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 18a, 67a, 136dE, 318a, 330cB, 404pE, 405pE,
420pE, 423cD, 430cD.
YEROFEYEV, V.: 10a, 85p, 101a, 365a.
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE 59b.
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SECRET
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Type Key
p - plenary meeting
a - working group A
b - working group B
c - working group AB
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
e - NATO caucus
ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 267b.
ALERTS: 392a.
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 266b.
CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 118a, 390a, 392a.
CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
DISARMAMENT: 390a.
EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2
Annual forecasts of military activities: 392a.
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1
General references to: 118a.
FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 266b, 345p.
HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT
IMMUNITIES FOR INSPECTORS AND OBSERVERS: see subheading under
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
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INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 267b, 459b?
MADRID MANDATE: 391a.
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of
differences):
General references to: 267b.
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 459b.
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 392a.
NOTIFICATIONS:
General references to: 267b, 459b.
Designation of the activity: 267b.
Type of forces involved: 267b.
Information to be included: 267b.
OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:
General references to: 267b, 459b.
Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 459b.
OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:
OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of
differences): 267b.
SC.2: 118a.
SC.2: 118a, 267b.
THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS
TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 267b.
VERIFICATION:
General references to: 267b.
Verification by cadres: 267b.
SECRET
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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY OPENING ROUND VI, MAY 14
1. CDE VI - 004
2. C - SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ WAS THE LEAD
SPEAKER FOR TODAY'S PLENARY OPENING ROUND VI OF THE CDE.
NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION SPOKE.
EXCEPT FOR A FEW ANTI-US REMARKS BY THE POLISH DELEGATE,
STATEMENTS WERE GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE.
DETAILS FOLLOW SEPTEL. END
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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, MAY 14, 1985
REF: BUCHAREST 2708
1. CDE VI -003.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE PLENARY OPENING THE SIXTH
SESSION OF CDE, SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ
APPEALED TO THE CONFERENCE TO PRODUCE MORE ENCOURAGING
RESULTS THAN HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED TO DATE. STRESSING THE
"FUNDAMENTALLY EUROPEAN" NATURE OF SPAIN, HE NOTED THAT
THE CDE MUST ESTABLISH RECIPROCAL TRUST BASED ON A
CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE RESULT WHICH MEETS THE SECURITY
INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR
LOIBL ARGUED THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION WAS A FUNCTION OF
CONCRETE CSBM'S. POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI REITERATED
THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON COMPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT ON
"POLITICAL-MILITARY" MEASURES AND "MILITARY-TECHNICAL"
MEASURES. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR ELABORATED HIS COUNTRY'S
POSITION ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND CONSTRAINTS,
SUPPORTING THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION AND
ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFICULTIES OF NEGOTIATING CONSTRAINT
MEASURES. REPEATING THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE OF APRIL
26 (REFTEL), ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR CETERCHI OUTLINED
"COMMON GROUND" EMERGING IN THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING A
"SOLEMN DECLARATION" (AS OPPOSED TO A TREATY) ON NUF;
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION; CONSTRAINTS; AND
COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS. PM GONZALEZ, KONARSKI,
CETERCHI, AND LOIBL URGED THE CONFERENCE TO ENTER INTO
SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END
SUMMARY.
4. CITING SPAIN'S RESOLVE TO "BELONG TO EUROPE IN ALL
DIMENSIONS," PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ DEMONSTRATED
THE EMPHASIS HIS GOVERNMENT PLACES ON CDE. HE REVIEWED
THE HELSINKI PROCESS, ONE IN WHICH 35 STATES PARTICIPATE
ON AN EQUAL FOOTING "BEYOND MILITARY ALLIANCES". FROM
THIS PROCESS, HE ASSERTED, DETENTE HAS EMERGED STRENG-
THENED. TURNING TO MADRID, THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED
THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT WAS CAREFULLY
CRAFTED TO MEET THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ALL PARTICI-
PANTS. THE GOAL OF THIS PROCESS (INCLUDING THE CDE), HE
SAID, IS TO ESTABLISH RECIPROCAL TRUST. ULTIMATELY, HE
OPINED, WE MUST HALT THE ARMS RACE. GONZALEZ REFERRED
TO SC.1 AS AN ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE SECURITY CONCERNS
SHARED BY ALL; OTHER PROPOSALS -- SUCH AS NUF AND CON-
STRAINTS -- DESERVE SERIOUS STUDY AND AN "OPEN" POSITION.
IN THIS CONTEXT, HE EMPHASIZED THAT NO GROUP HAS A MONO-
POLY ON SECURITY CONCERNS AND THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST
THEREFORE BE BASED ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THE
PRIME MINISTER APPEALED TO THE CONFERENCE TO NEGOTIATE
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CONCRETE, TANGIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH WILL NOT DISAPPOINT
THE PUBLIC. IN SO DOING, HE SAID, CDE MUST SEEK "MORE
ENCOURAGING RESULTS" IN THE FUTURE THAN IT HAS ACHIEVED
TO DATE. WHILE CONCENTRATING ON THE EUROPEAN ASPECTS OF
SECURITY, THE SPANISH PM ALSO REFERRED TO "ARABIC AND
AFRICAN COUNTRIES"' RELATIONS WITH SPAIN, AS WELL AS
SPAIN'S FRATERNAL LINKS WITH LATIN AMERICA. HE ALSO
STRESSED THE INDIVISIBLE LINK BETWEEN MEDITERRANEAN AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY IN HIS CLOSING COMMENTS. (BEGIN COM-
MENT: GONZALEZ PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE
CONSENSUS MANDATE FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, WHICH
EMERGED OUT OF THE MADRID CSCE REVIEW MEETING. NOT
SURPRISINGLY, HE HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. WHILE THE SPANISH PM'S STATEMENT
WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF WESTERN POSITIONS, HIS
EMPHASIS ON SPAIN'S OPEN POSITION ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS
MAY CAUSE TROUBLE DOWN THE LINE. END COMMENT)
5. USING THE OCCASION OF THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY, AMBASSADOR LOIBL ELABORATED
AUSTRIA'S POSITION ON NUF. ALLUDING TO AUSTRIA AS THE
FIRST VICTIM OF THE USE OF FORCE IN WORLD WAR II, LOIBL
SAID THAT "THE EXPERIENCE OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
PROVES" THAT THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS -- DESPITE AN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BAN AND NUMEROUS AGREEMENTS -- A
PART OF INTERSTATE EXISTENCE. SUGGESTING THAT THE USE
OF FORCE IS NOT LEGAL OR WORTH THE PRICE, HE SAID THE
PROBLEM IS NOT WHETHER WE SHOULD REINFORCE NUF, BUT HOW
TO DO IT BEST. IN THE PREVAILING CLIMATE OF MUTUAL MIS-
TRUST, HE ARGUED THAT REAFFIRMATION OF NUF MUST BE CON-
SIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON "PRACTICAL
STEPS" WHICH REDUCE MISTRUST. WITHOUT SUCH A COMPREHEN-
SIVE SET OF CSBM'S, HE ADDED, THE MISTRUST WHICH IS A
REALITY OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION WILL NOT BE
ELIMINATED. THUS, ANY REAFFIRMATION OF NUF SHOULD BE A
FUNCTION OF THE CONTENT OF THE CSBM'S NEGOTIATED. AMONG
IMPORTANT CONCRETE MEASURES LOIBL INCLUDED NOTIFICATION,
OBSERVATION, CONSTRAINTS, AND VERIFICATION. THE AUSTRIAN
AMBASSADOR ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STOCKHOLM IS ONLY A
PARTIAL -- ALBEIT IMPORTANT -- PART OF THE LARGER
HELSINKI PROCESS. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF
ENCOURAGING "DEMOCRATIC THINKING" BETWEEN STATES AND OF
THE NEED TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS. (BEGIN COMMENT:
LOIBL'S STATEMENT SUBORDINATES A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF TO
THE MORE URGENT TASK OF DEVELOPING CONCRETE CSBM'S, A
POSITION CONSISTENT WITH OURS. END COMMENT.)
6. AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) REMINDED THE CONFERENCE
OF THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON ADOPTION OF COMPLEMENTARY
"POLITICAL-MILITARY" AND "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" MEASURES.
HE CALLED FOR "INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS" TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY
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ACCEPTABLE FINAL AGREEMENTS (PLURAL) WHICH ARE BASED ON
EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICI-
PANTS. KONARSKI NOTED THE 26 APRIL WARSAW SUMMIT
COMMUNIQUE ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF WORLD WAR II, AND
CITED THE LEGACY OF TEHRAN, YALTA, AND POTSDAM AS THE
BASIS FOR EUROPEAN STABILITY. KONARSKI ALSO CRITICIZED
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AS AN OBSTRUCTION TO
THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IN
CLOSING, HE PRAISED THE "CALL OF THE NNA STATES" FOR
SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO COMMENCE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.
7. THE IRISH DELEGATE PRESENTED AN ELABORATION OF HIS
COUNTRY'S VIEWS ON NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. WHILE
HE IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THE EAST'S UNWILLINGNESS TO
SUPPORT THE WEST'S CALL FOR "OPENNESS," HE NONETHELESS
ASSERTED THAT OPENNESS IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP TRUST AND
TO REASSURE OTHER STATES OF ONE'S OWN PEACEFUL INTEN-
TIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE OUTLINED SPECIFIC IRISH
POSITIONS ON NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION:
A. NOTIFICATION: SHOULD BE MANDATORY, STANDARDIZED,
WITH DETAILED CONTENT, COVERING A RANGE OF ACTIVITIES
BROADER THAN THE FINAL ACT. A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER
SHOULD BE USED TO NOTIFY LAND ACTIVITIES (THE FOCUS OF
THE THREAT). THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER ALLOWS FOR BEST
ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ACTIVITY.
MOREOVER, IT ENHANCES SECURITY THROUGH ITS OPENNESS.
THERE SHOULD BE AN ALTERNATE NUMERICAL "SAFETY NET" TO
CATCH ACTIVITIES WHICH SLIP THROUGH THE UNIT THRESHOLD.
THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE THRESHOLD, E.G., FOR AMPHI-
BIOUS ACTIVITIES, WHICH SHOULD BE LOWER THAN THE LOWEST
DIVISIONAL FIGURES.
B. OBSERVATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND NEED TO INCREASE SUCH CONTACTS IS
EVIDENT. OBSERVERS PLAY A ROLE IN VERIFICATION IN THAT
THEIR WORK MUST BE SHAPED TO ENABLE THEM TO ASCERTAIN
THE NONTHREATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY, AS WELL AS
THE ACCURACY OF NOTIFICATION GIVEN. THE STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION IS AGAIN IMPORTANT DUE TO THE
DIFFICULTY OF COUNTING MEN AND EQUIPMENT.
- AMBASSADOR O'BROIN ALSO INCLUDED AGREEMENT ON
CONSTRAINTS AMONG HIS "HIERARCHY" OF MEASURES WHICH
SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM. HE DID NOT UNDER-
ESTIMATE, HOWEVER, THE "PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS"
OBSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRAINTS, FOR EXAMPLE,
"IMPORTANT ASYMMETRIES" IN GEOGRAPHY AND MILITARY
DOCTRINES. WITH "ALL DUE TENTATIVENESS," HE SUGGESTED A
LIMITATION ON THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF MANEUVERS, TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS TRAINING REQUIRE-
MENTS. HE THEN FURTHER HEDGED ON CONSTRAINTS, ALLOWING
THAT "IN THE FIRST INSTANCE," INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION
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AND OBSERVATION MUST BE ACCEPTED BY THOSE WHO ADVOCATE
ONEROUS CONSTRAINTS. HE NOTED "THE WIDESPREAD VIEW" IN
THE CONFERENCE THAT A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF AS PROPOSED
BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DUBLIN AND REITERATED IN
STRASBOURG COULD BE POSSIBLE.
8. ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR CETERCHI OFFERED A REVISED
"COMMON GROUND" SPEECH WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, SOUGHT TO
CAPTURE A PACKAGE OF BALANCED MEASURES COMMENSURATE WITH
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. AT THE
FOCAL POINT OF THE PACKAGE HE PLACED A "SOLEMN
DECLARATION OF NUF" CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT AND UN CHARTER. (AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROMANIAN
STATEMENT WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.) END
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SUBJECT: CDE ROMANIAN COMMON GROUND INITIATIVE: AN
ANALYSIS
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3610, B) BUCHAREST 2664,
- C) BUCHAREST 2708, D) STOCKHOLM 3611
1. CDE VI - 009
2. SECRET. - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT OF MAY 14 PROPOSED
THAT THE CONFERENCE EXPLOIT EMERGING COMMON GROUND TO
DEVELOP AN AGREED FRAMEWORK WHICH INCLUDES SOME ELEMENTS,
HOWEVER AMBIGUOUS, OF ALL OF THE SIX MEASURES OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED PLUS A SOLEMN DECLARATION ON NUF AND
CONSTRAINTS. THE ROMANIANS CLEARLY MOVE BEYOND THEIR
POSITION IN ROUND V BY FRAMING NON-USE OF FORCE IN
NON-TREATY FORM, BY EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR
FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, AND BY DEFERRING
PARTS OF THEIR SC.2 PROPOSAL ON CONSTRAINTS TO FUTURE
WORK. THEY ARE LEAST FORTHCOMING ON MEASURES 1 AND 5.
ANY PREMATURE WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN RESPONSE WILL ONLY
ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO DEFER SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND DELAY AN AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, THE
DELEGATION INTENDS TO TAKE A LINE WHICH RECOGNIZES THE
POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE ROMANIAN POSITION BUT UNDER-
SCORES ITS INADEQUACY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING. END
SUMMARY.
4. KEY POINTS OF ROMANIAN STATEMENT: THE ROMANIAN
STATEMENT ESTABLISHES THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE OF COMMON
GROUND THAT THEY BELIEVE CONSTITUTES THE BASIS FOR A
FINAL AGREEMENT (REF A):
-- NUF: A SOLEMN DECLARATION CONSISTENT WITH THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND UN CHARTER AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF
AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE: PROVISIONS TO PREVENT
ATTACK BY SURPRISE, ERROR, OR ACCIDENT; PEACEFUL SETTLE-
MENT OF DISPUTES; AND CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH WOULD
EXPRESS THE DUTY OF STATES NOT TO USE FORCE. THESE
CONCRETE MEASURES ARE:
1) COMPULSORY NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVI-
TIES, PLUS EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
NOTIFIABLE IN ADVANCE, PLUS CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERN-
ING MILITARY FORCES WHICH ARE TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE
ACTIVITIES, A FLEDGLING STEP TOWARD MEASURE 1, ALTHOUGH
THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE INDEPENDENT OF
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES IS NOT INCLUDED;
2) INVITATIONS TO OBSERVERS OF ALL PARTICIPATING
STATES TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH BY SIZE AND AREA OF
DEPLOYMENT COULD GENERATE SUSPICIONS AND INSECURITY;
3) CONSTRAINTS TO LIMIT FORCES ENGAGED IN MAJOR
MILITARY MANEUVERS, THEIR DURATION AND THEIR FREQUENCY;
4) FUTURE CONSTRAINTS TO LIMIT MANEUVERS IN
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BORDER AREAS OR IN SENSITIVE ZONES; STATES WOULD SHOW
SELF-RESTRAINT UNTIL SUCH MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED.
-- IMPLEMENTATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF PROCEDURES AND-CHANNELS FOR INFORMATION, COM-
MUNICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS; E.G., SPECIAL TELEPHONE
AND TELEX CONNECTIONS, ENCOURAGEMENT OF EXCHANGE OF MILI-
TARY DELEGATIONS, EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON NATIONAL
REGULATIONS REGARDING ACCREDITED MILITARY PERSONNEL,
ESTABLISHMENT IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES OF FACT-FINDING
MISSIONS;
-- VERIFICATION: CSBM'S AGREED UPON WILL INCLUDE
ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION CORRESPONDING TO THEIR
CONTENT; SUCH AS, NTM AND SOME OF THE COMMUNICATION/
CONSULTATION PROCEDURES MENTIONED ABOVE, INCLUDING THE
UNSPECIFIED OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF "FACT-FINDING
MISSIONS" IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES.
5. DIFFERENCES WITH AIDE-MEMOIRE/ROUND V STATEMENTS:
THERE WERE FEW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MAY 14 STATEMENT
AND THE AIDE-MEMOIRE GIVEN TO AS NEWELL IN BUCHAREST ON
APRIL 26 (REFTELS B AND C). THE MAY 14 STATEMENT
INCLUDES A CALL FOR "MORE DYNAMIC USE" OF THE WORKING
GROUPS AS WELL AS INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO INTENSIFY
DEVELOPMENT OF "COMMON GROUND." MOREOVER, IT CONTAINS A
VAGUE CALL FOR CONSIDERATION OF OTHER EXISTING PROPOSALS
(PERHAPS THE SOVIET NON-STARTERS) IN A FORM WHICH WOULD
ACHIEVE CONSENSUS AS WELL AS COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS
LEADING TO AN ACCORD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- THIS MOST RECENT STATEMENT CLEARLY MOVES BEYOND THE
ROMANIAN POSITION IN ROUND V BY FRAMING NON-USE OF FORCE
IN NON-TREATY FORM, I.E., A SOLEMN DECLARATION, BY
EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR FORECASTS OF NOTIFI-
ABLE ACTIVITIES, AND BY DEFERRING PARTS OF THEIR SC.2
PROPOSAL ON CONSTRAINTS TO FUTURE WORK, I.E., CONSTRAINTS
ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN BORDER AREAS AND SENSITIVE
ZONES.
6. ROMANIAN MOTIVATIONS: THE ROMANIANS MAY BE SEEKING
TO SET THE FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE DRAFTING
ON THEIR OWN TERMS WHICH INCLUDE SOME ELEMENTS OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED PLUS OTHER MEASURES IN SC.3 AND SC.4
(CONSTRAINTS, NUF). HOWEVER, THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE
MAY BE NOTHING MORE THAN A STRAW MAN FOR THE EAST TO
GAUGE WESTERN AND NNA REACTION AND TO INCREASE PRESSURE
ON THOSE MEMBERS OF NATO WHO WANT A WESTERN CONSTRAINTS
MEASURE AS WELL AS OTHER CHANGES TO THE NATO PACKAGE.
NONETHELESS, THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS FROM THE
HUNGARIANS AND THE ROMANIANS THEMSELVES THAT THE LATTER
ARE PLAYING THEIR TRADITIONAL MAVERICK ROLE OUTSIDE OF
THE WARSAW PACT AND FLOATING THIS INITIATIVE, LIKE THEIR
LAST ONE, WITHOUT SUPPORT AND COORDINATION FROM EASTERN
COLLEAGUES. THERE MAY BE TACIT SOVIET APPROVAL FOR SUCH
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INDEPENDENT ACTION, HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO DRAW OUT
WESTERN REACTION, DRIVE WEDGES AMONG THE NATO ALLIES,
AND EVEN TO ELICIT POSSIBLE PREMATURE CONCESSIONS.
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO: THE MAY 14 ROMANIAN STATEMENT
ARGUABLY INCORPORATES SOME ASPECTS OF ALL THE MEASURES
OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, BUT IS LEAST FORTHCOMING ON MEASURES
1 AND 5, AS EXPLAINED IN PARA 4. ON THE ONE HAND, THE
INITIATIVE IS A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD BECAUSE THE
ROMANIANS INCLUDE THE NOTION OF FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES, DROP THE IDEA OF A NUF TREATY, AGREE TO A
SINGLE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT, AND DEFER SOME OF THE MORE
OBJECTIONABLE AND COMPLEX ELEMENTS OF THEIR PROPOSED
CONSTRAINTS MEASURES IN SC.2. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEIR
OUTLINE HARDLY CONSTITUTES A FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING,
SINCE MANY ESSENTIAL DETAILS OF THE NATO PACKAGE ARE NOT
ADDRESSED (E.G., OUT-OF-GARRISON, THRESHOLD PARAMETER,
OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OBSERVATION) AND NUMEROUS CONCEPTS
ARE INCLUDED THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED
(E.G., ROMANIAN TERMS OF REFERENCE ON VERIFICATION,
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, CONSTRAINTS). TO EVEN CONSIDER
THIS AS A FRAMEWORK WOULD BYPASS NECESSARY DISCUSSION ON
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND RISK HAVING ACCEPTANCE OF PRIN-
CIPLES OVERRIDE THE NEED FOR CONCRETE DETAILS IN A FINAL
AGREEMENT.
8. WESTERN REACTIONS: AS REPORTED IN REF D, WESTERN
REACTION HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS BUT OPTIMISTIC. THE FRENCH
AND GERMANS SEE SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE ROMANIAN
STATEMENT, SUCH AS FORECASTS AND TREATMENT OF NUF, BUT
ALSO RECOGNIZE HOW FAR THE ROMANIAN POSITION HAS YET TO
GO BEFORE THE WEST COULD CHARACTERIZE IT AS ANYTHING
MORE THAN A FIRST STEP TOWARD COMMON GROUND. SPAIN AND
PORTUGAL ARE EVEN MORE CAREFUL, SINCE THE INITIATIVE MAY
BE NOTHING MORE THAN A TEMPTING PLOY TO UPSET WESTERN
UNITY. OTHER DELEGATIONS, USUALLY QUICK TO GRASP AT ANY
PROSPECT OF AN EASTERN CONCESSION, HAVE REMAINED CAUTIOUS
AND SILENT SO FAR.
9. DELEGATION APPROACH: THE DELEGATION IS HANDLING THE
ROMANIAN INITIATIVE IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:
- -- PLANNING TO POCKET ROMANIAN CONCESSIONS ON NUF,
FORECASTS, AND A SINGLE INTEGRATED FINAL DOCUMENT;
- -- WELCOMING THE INITIATIVE AS AN EXPLORATORY STEP
FORWARD THAT REPRESENTS MERELY AN INITIAL MOVEMENT TOWARD
COMMON GROUND;
- -- MAKING CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSAL CANNOT AND DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR A RESPONSE FROM THE WEST EITHER
SUBSTANTIVELY OR PROCEDURALLY WITH RESPECT TO DRAFTING;
- -- PREVENTING ANY SHIFT OF FOCUS IN THE CONFERENCE
FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED TO THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE;
- -- MAINTAINING WORKING GROUP ATTENTION ON DETAILED
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DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S AND PLANNING TO DETER ANY
ALLIED EFFORT TO TABLE NEW NATO INITIATIVES (E.G.,
WESTERN CONSTRAINT MEASURES) WHICH THE EAST WOULD POCKET
AS A RESPONSE TO THE ROMANIANS.
- A MEASURED U.S. RESPONSE, WHICH RECOGNIZES SOME
POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE NEW ROMANIAN POSITION, BUT
UNDERSCORES ITS INADEQUACY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING,
WILL PUT THE ONUS ON THE SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN
DELEGATIONS TO MOVE AWAY FROM THEIR NON-STARTERS AND
INTO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY, MAY 14, 1985
1. CDE VI - 007
2. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).
3. IN HIS MAIDEN APPEARANCE AT THE CDE, SOVIET DELEGATE
YEROFEYEV, THE ONLY SPEAKER OF THE DAY, DELIVERED A LOW-
KEY, CONVENTIONAL REITERATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON
THE NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NFU). (BEGIN COM-
MENT: ALTHOUGH THE OFFICIAL CONFERENCE LIST INDICATING
THE PROTOCOL RANKING OF DELEGATES HAS NOT YET BEEN DIS-
TRIBUTED, WE BELIEVE THAT YEROFEYEV IS REPLACING YEVGENIY
KUTOVOY WHO WAS SERIOUSLY HURT LATE LAST ROUND WHEN HE
WAS HIT BY A CAR WHILE JOGGING. END COMMENT) REFERRING
TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF VE
DAY, YEROFEYEV SAID THAT TIME IS NOT/NOT ON OUR SIDE
GIVEN THE ARMS RACE AND PLANS TO MILITARIZE OUTER SPACE;
WE NEED MAJOR PRACTICAL STEPS IN THE POLITICAL AND
MILITARY FIELDS TO REVERSE THESE DANGEROUS TRENDS. A
NFU PLEDGE TAKEN BY THE NUCLEAR STATES AT THE CONFERENCE
WOULD BE SUCH A STEP, THE SOVIET DELEGATE ASSERTED.
4. COMMENT: YEROFEYEV'S TONE AND WHAT HE DID NOT SAY
ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT HE DID SAY: HE REFRAINED
FROM ATTACKING THE U.S. BY NAME WHEN HE MENTIONED
MILITARIZING OUTER SPACE AND HE DID NOT FLESH OUT OR
PRESS FOR WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION OF THE SOVIET NON-
USE OF FORCE (NUF) OR NFU POSITION. WE ARE ALSO PLEASED
THAT NO ONE FELT OBLIGED TO OFFER ANY FURTHER COMMENTS
ON NUF. WE ARE PERFECTLY CONTENT TO BIDE OUR TIME ON
THIS ISSUE WHILE WE TRY TO DRAW OUT THE SOVIETS ON
CONCRETE CBM'S. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT WORKING GROUP
QUIESCENCE ON NUF WILL CONTINUE, GIVEN THE EASTERN
POSITION AND THE PROCLIVITY OF THE NNA AND EVEN SOME OF
OUR ALLIES TO APPEAR FLEXIBLE ON NUF. END COMMENT.
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SUBJECT: SOVIET DISINFORMATION EFFORT
1. CDE VI-008 - SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEANS, AS REPORTED
TO US HERE, THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THAT AFTER DOBRYNIN
OFFERED TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK
RADAR, THE U.S. LOST INTEREST IN THE WHOLE SUBJECT.
ALTHOUGH THIS MAY BE RANDOM CONVERSATION, IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SPREADING THIS WORD AROUND EUROPE
IN ORDER TO CAMOUFLAGE AN UNPLEASANT FACT WHICH UNDERMINES
THEIR EFFORTS TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS CHAMPIONS OF THE
ABM TREATY. AN EFFORT ON OUR PART TO SET THE RECORD
STRAIGHT, IF WE HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, MIGHT BE USEFUL.
END
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SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTS ON DOBRYNIN'S OFFER OF
ON-SITE INSPECTION AT KRASNOYARSK
REFTEL: A. STOCKHOLM 3626 (NOTAL) B. STATE 123655
(NOTAL)
1. REFTEL A REPORTED CDE-RELATED CONVERSATIONS WITH
EASTERN EUROPEANS WHO QUOTED THE SOVIETS TO THE EFFECT
THAT FOLLOWING SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN'S "OFFER" TO
ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK LARGE PHASED
ARRAY RADAR, THE US LOST INTEREST IN THE WHOLE SUBJECT.
2. THE SOVIET CLAIM IS UNTRUE. ADDRESSEES MAY USE
GUIDANCE PROVIDED PARAS 5 AND 6 TO RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE
00 CDE REPRESENTATIVES, HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES REPEATING THIS SOVIET PROPAGANDA
LINE.
3. BEGIN FYI: DOBRYNIN WAS A PARTICIPANT IN A SYMPOSIUM
ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL HELD APRIL
9-13 AT THE CARTER CENTER OF EMORY UNIVERSITY. AN
UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF DOBRYNIN'S RATHER DISJOINTED
REMARKS ABOUT KRASNOYARSK QUOTE HIM AS FOLLOWS:
--"IT'S A RADAR WHICH IS USED -- OR IT'S GOING TO BE
USED, BECAUSE IT'S NOT FINISHED; IT'S JUST IN THE MIDDLE
OF CONSTRUCTION; PROBABLY GENERAL MIKHILOV WHO IS SITTING
THERE MAY HAVE A CHANCE TO TELL YOU A LITTLE BIT MORE --
BUT THIS WOULD LOOK AFTER OUR SPUTNIKS. AND I AM SURE
WHEN IT WILL BE OVER (SIC) IN TWO YEARS...I DON'T KNOW
BUT WE MAY EVEN INVITE YOU -- AT LEAST I KNOW THAT OUR
ACADEMICIANS HAVE THIS IDEA -- MAYBE TO INVITE THE STAFFS
OF YOUR SKEPTICS TO SEE THIS, HOW IT WORKS, BECAUSE IT
WILL BE VERY EASY FOR YOU, FROM THE LENGTHS OF WAVES, TO
(PAUSE) DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF REAL (PAUSE) WHAT IS THE
REAL PURPOSE OF THIS PARTICULAR RADAR INSTALLATION."
14. CONTINUE FYI:
DURING THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN
ON APRIL 18, THE SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE ON-SITE INSPECTION
OF KRASNOYARSK CAME UP. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HIS COMMENTS
IN ATLANTA HAD BEEN IN RESPONSE TO A HYPOTHETICAL
QUESTION, AND THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN SPECULATING ABOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF US SCIENTISTS VISITING THE RADAR AFTER ITS
COMPLETION TWO OR THREE YEARS HENCE, IN THE CONTEXT OF
BETTER RELATIONS THAN NOW. END FYI
5. BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED: THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE ON
DOBRYNIN'S COMMENT WAS USED AT THE APRIL 15 NOON PRESS
BRIEFING:
Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON PROPOSALS MADE AT THE
EMORY UNIVERSITY ARMS CONTROL CONFERENCE SUCH AS...A
POSSIBLE US INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR?
A. WE ARE, OF COURSE, INTERESTED IN ANY SOVIET
RECOGNITION OF OUR CONCERNS FOR STRENGTHENING
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR EXISTING ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS AND WE HAVE RAISED THESE CONCERNS WITH THE
SOVIETS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. AS YOU KNOW, THE
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PRESIDENT DETERMINED, IN HIS FEBRUARY 1, 1985, REPORT TO
CONGRESS, THAT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR VIOLATES THE ABM
TREATY.
THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT FORMALLY PROPOSED US ON-SITE
INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, AND AMBASSADOR
DOBRYNIN'S REMARKS ON THE MATTER AT EMORY UNIVERSITY ARE
UNCLEAR. THERE ARE SEVERAL FORA AVAILABLE FOR THE
SOVIETS TO RAISE THE SUBJECT FORMALLY, AS WELL AS NORMAL
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IF THEY DO, WE WILL OF COURSE STUDY
THE PROPOSAL CAREFULLY IN LIGHT OF OUR COMPLIANCE
CONCERNS. END PRESS GUIDANCE
6. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING PRESS GUIDANCE, POSTS
ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND AS FOLLOWS TO SUGGESTIONS THAT
THE USG HAS "LOST INTEREST" IN KRASNOYARSK:
--"THE CONTINUED CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET LARGE PHASED
ARRAY RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
ABM TREATY. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE
CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS. BY
VIRTUE OF ITS SITING, ORIENTATION AND LOCATION, IT IS NOT
IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS
TYPE OF LPAR. WHILE WE HAVE RAISED KRASNOYARSK WITH THE
SOVIETS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, THEY HAVE YET TO OFFER
ANY CREDIBLE EXPLANATION. EVEN THE WIDELY-REPORTED
"OFFER" BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN FOR AN ON-SITE
INSPECTION OF KRASNOYARSK HAS PROVEN TO BE WITHOUT
SUBSTANCE. RATHER THAN ELABORATE ON THE PROPOSAL, THE
SOVIETS RESPONDED TO OUR FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY WITH AN
OFF-HAND COMMENT THAT THE "OFFER" WAS ONLY A RESPONSE TO
AN HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. END
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 14, 1985
1. CDE VI - 006
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. CAUTIOUS SATISFACTION WAS THE NOTE OF THE
DAY ON THE FIRST 36 HOURS OF ROUND VI. THE UK AND
BELGIUM REPORTED THAT THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING HAD
RESTRAINED EASTERN STATEMENTS IN THE PLENARY WHILE
AMBASSADOR GOODBY LAUDED THE ATTENTION FOCUSED ON
SC.1/AMPLIFIED IN THE INFORMATION VERIFICATION WORKING
GROUPS. THE FRG, DENMARK, AND UK CIRCULATED WORKING
PAPERS ON MEASURES 2 AND 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE UK
ALSO PLUGGED ITS CONSTRAINT PAPER WHICH AMBASSADOR
GOODBY INSISTED MUST BE SUBMITTED TO BRUSSELS. END
SUMMARY.
4. IMPRESSIONS -- THE FIRST 36 HOURS: THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE DAY, KAYSER (LUXEMBOURG), DESCRIBED THE OPENING
PLENARY AND WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AS BUSINESSLIKE AND
INTERESTING. CITRON (FRG), EDES (UK), AND STANDAERT
(BELGIUM) NOTED THAT THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN VIENNA
HAD RESTRAINED EASTERN STATEMENTS. EDES EXPRESSED PARTI-
CULAR SATISFACTION WITH THE IRISH STATEMENT AS HELPFUL
TO NATO'S POSITION. STANDAERT NOTED THAT IRISH EMPHASIS
ON CONSTRAINTS WAS MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM DUBLIN.
GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) CHARACTERIZED THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT
AS AN IMPORTANT OPENING ON SOME POINTS, SUCH AS FORECASTS
AND NUF,.SILENT ON OTHERS (E.G., OUT-OF-GARRISON OR
INFORMATION EXCHANGE), AND NOTHING VERY NEW ON VERIFICA-
TION AND CONSTRAINTS. FUENTES (SPAIN) POINTED OUT THAT
THE ROMANIANS MAY WELL HAVE RAISED A STRAW MAN FOR THE
EAST (ANALYSIS TO FOLLOW SEPTEL). HANSEN (U.S.) POINTED
OUT THAT SOVIET REP ROZANOV'S TACTIC IN WEDNESDAY'S
VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION AND VERIFICA-
TION WAS TO LINK THE SUBJECTS TO THE DISCUSSION IN THE
NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, ALTHOUGH HE APPEARED TO MAKE
A GREATER COMMITMENT TO BOTH THAN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
THE CASE. AMBASSADOR GOODBY ADDED THAT THE FOCUS OF
DISCUSSION WAS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED,
PRECISELY WHAT HAD BEEN DECIDED AT OSLO AND BRUSSELS.
5. DISCUSSION/ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS. THE FRG AND UK
DISTRIBUTED NATIONAL DISCUSSION PAPERS ON MEASURES 2 AND
3 TO BE USED IN THE WORKING GROUPS TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON
SC.1/AMPLIFIED (TEXTS TO BE SENT SEPTEL). EDES (UK),
BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), OZGUL (TURKEY), AND MELLBIN
(DENMARK) EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO INTRODUCE THEM FORMALLY
TO THE CONFERENCE AND HAVE THEM TRANSLATED INTO SIX
LANGUAGES AS WORKING DOCUMENTS. DELWORTH (CANADA),
MEVIK (NORWAY), CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), STANDAERT, AND
FUENTES, ON THE CONTRARY, WERE CONCERNED THAT ELEVATING
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THEM AND OTHERS THAT MAY FOLLOW TO FORMAL CONFERENCE
STATUS MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NATO IS DIVERTING
THE THRUST OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. MOREOVER, THEY ARGUED IT
COULD STIMULATE A RASH OF EASTERN PAPERS ON THEIR NON-
STARTERS. EDES RETORTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD TABLE
PAPERS ON THEIR NON-STARTERS, IF THAT WERE THEIR INTEN-
TION, IRRESPECTIVE OF NATO'S HANDLING OF THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION PAPERS. ALSO, TABLING OF THE FRG AND UK PAPERS
WOULD MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM THE WEST BUILT UP IN THE
LAST ROUND. THE CHAIR REACHED CONSENSUS BY SUGGESTING A
CAUCUS REVIEW OF THE PAPERS NEXT WEEK.
- THE DANES CIRCULATED TWO PAPERS (TEXTS TO BE SENT
SEPTEL) ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED TO ESTAB-
LISH A SPECIAL REGIME WITH MORE VIGOROUS RULES FOR NOTI-
FICATION IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. ONE PAPER IS A BACKGROUND
PIECE NOT TO BE USED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE OTHER A
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR EVENTUAL SUBMISSION IN WORKING
GROUP B. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO POSTPONE FURTHER CONSIDER-
ATION OF THESE PAPERS UNTIL DECISIONS WERE MADE ON THE
FRG AND UK PAPERS REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 ABOVE.
6. UK CONSTRAINTS PAPER: THE UK URGED PROMPT
CONSIDERATION BY THE CAUCUS OF ITS CONSTRAINTS PAPER
(REFTEL). EDES ARGUED THAT NATO IS NOT IN A GOOD
POSITION ON THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS: 1) THE SOVIETS HAVE HINTED THAT THEY MAY
INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINT MEASURES; 2) THE IRISH
STATEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS REFLECTS NEW MOMENTUM ON THE
ISSUE; 3) THE NNA ARE DETERMINED TO PRODUCE A CONSTRAINT
PAPER; 4) THE ALLIANCE MUST BE PREPARED TO TABLE QUICKLY
ONE OF ITS OWN, ALBEIT FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES ALONE; AND
5) PROSPECTS IN BRUSSELS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON A
CONSTRAINT MEASURE APPEAR REMOTE. AMBASSADOR GOODBY
RESPONDED THAT THE YUGOSLAV POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS MAY
ALSO CREATE SOME PRESSURES AS WILL OTHERS. HOWEVER,
THERE IS NO UNIFIED NNA POSITION AND THE ISSUE NEED NOT
BECOME A FOCUS OF THE CONFERENCE. MOREOVER, HE ADDED,
DECISIONS ON INTRODUCING CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE MADE BY
BRUSSELS, NOT STOCKHOLM. SINCE THE ISSUE HAD BEEN
RAISED IN NATO CONSULTATIONS ON MAY 10, THE BRITISH
PAPER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO BRUSSELS SINCE THE
NATO CAUCUS CANNOT REPLACE THE NATO MACHINERY.
CUTILEIRO AND CIARRAPICO PROPOSED HOLDING AN OPEN-ENDED
CAUCUS MEETING TO DISCUSS THE UK PAPER AND TO OFFER
COMMENTS BEFORE ITS POSSIBLE SUBMISSION TO NATO. EDES
MADE CLEAR THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER TO FORWARD
THE PAPER TO BRUSSELS WOULD BE MADE IN LONDON. THE
CHAIR SET THE MEETING FOR WEDNESDAY, MAY 22.
7. CONTACTS: GASCHIGNARD REPORTED ON A MEETING BETWEEN
FRENCH DISARMAMENT EXPERTS (RENOUARD, D'ABOVILLE, ET AL)
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AND THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN MOSCOW OVER THE INTER-
SESSION, NOTING THAT GRINEVSKY HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE
OF THE FRENCH SCHEME FOR INFORMAL GROUPS. THE FRENCH
ALSO INDICATED SOVIET HESITANCY TO INTRODUCE NEW PROPO-
SALS, ALTHOUGH THEY NOTED THEY ARE THINKING OF MEASURES
TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK AND POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL CON-
STRAINTS. CITRON DISCUSSED BILATERALS WITH THE
HUNGARIANS WHO REPORTED THAT, ACCORDING TO THEM, THE
ROMANIAN INITIATIVE DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE EAST'S
THINKING AND GOES FURTHER THAN THE PACT IS WILLING TO GO.
THE HUNGARIANS ALSO SAID THE EAST APPARENTLY WILL OFFER
NOTHING BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF SC.4 EXCEPT POSSIBLY CON-
STRAINT MEASURES. AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON HIS
MAY 15 ROMANIAN LUNCH AND STATED THE ROMANIAN INTENTIONS
TO INITIATE DETAILED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AS A RESULT
OF THEIR STATEMENT AND AIDE-MEMOIRE. GOODBY EMPHASIZED
THAT HIS REPLY TO THE ROMANIANS SPECIFIED THE NEED FOR
MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BEFORE WORK ON DRAFTING
COULD PROCEED. EDES REPORTED ON A CONVERSATION WITH
GRINEVSKY WHO TOLD HIM THAT EVGENY KUTOVOY WOULD BECOME
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE USSR MISSION TO THE UN IN NEW YORK
AFTER HE RECOVERED SUFFICIENTLY FROM INJURIES INCURRED
IN AN ACCIDENT IN STOCKHOLM LAST MARCH.
8. OTHER BUSINESS: BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) RAISED THE
MATTER OF THE "RUMP-SQUEEZING THE PACKAGE." HE NOTED
THAT THE ANOMALIES IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED RANGE FROM EASY
LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS TO QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. BUWALDA
RECOMMENDED THAT A CAUCUS GROUP MADE UP OF DEPUTIES AND
MIL REPS REVIEW THE ANOMALIES IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED FOR CON-
SIDERATION BY THE CAUCUS. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) WELCOMED
THE IDEA AND SAW THE NEED FOR TWO APPROACHES TO THE
PACKAGE. ONE APPROACH WOULD IDENTIFY PROBLEMS THAT
COULD BE SOLVED IN STOCKHOLM; THE OTHER APPROACH WOULD
IDENTIFY ISSUES THAT ONLY BRUSSELS COULD ADDRESS.
NAMIESNIOWSKI (CANADA), CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY ADVISORS
GROUP, DESCRIABED THE WORK OF THE RUMP (FRG, NETHERLANDS,
TURKEY, U.S., UK, AND CANADA) DURING THE INTERSESSION
WHICH WAS REPORTED TO CAPITALS AND DISCUSSED IN
BRUSSELS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY CAUTIONED THAT THE
PRIORITIES OF THE CAUCUS SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT THE
SUBSTANCE OF WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND NOT ON THE
ANOMALIES OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. BUWALDA AGREED, YET URGED
THAT WORK PROCEED IN ORDER TO DEVELOP ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS ALREADY RAISED ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NATO
PACKAGE. THE CHAIR SET FRIDAY, MAY 24, FOR A JOINT
MEETING OF CAUCUS DEPUTIES AND MIL REPS TO REVIEW WHAT
STEPS TO TAKE ON THE ISSUE OF ANOMALIES IN
SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
- THE CAUCUS ALSO AGREED TO HOLD ITS NEXT MEETING ON
TUESDAY, MAY 21.
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, MAY 15
AND 16
REF: STOCKHOLM 3627
1. CDE VI - 011.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY, DIALOGUE
DEVELOPED BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET REPS ON INFORMATION,
WITH SOVIET REP ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IF A STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLD WERE TO BE AGREED FOR NOTIFICATION, INFORMATION
SHOULD BE EXCHANGED REGARDING THE STRUCTURE OF FORCES
PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY. FOR FIRST TIME, EAST
MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SDI, DENOUNCING IT AS RE-
PRESENTING POSSIBLE FUTURE INTERFERENCE WITH NTM.
(SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4 AND 5 BELOW). AT WORKING GROUP B/
THURSDAY, ON OBSERVATION, THE U.S. REP (GEN. BLANK) WAS
THE ONLY SPEAKER, EXPLAINING THE WESTERN POSITION REGARD-
ING OBSERVATION OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. AT WORKING GROOP
A/THURSDAY, THE SOVIETS QUOTED WESTERN STATEMENTS
IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN 1974 ADVOCATING A LIMITATION
ON THE SIZE OF MEASURES TO 50,000 (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 6
BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY. AFTER THE PERFUNCTORY
EASTERN PERFORMANCE THE PREVIOUS DAY IN "THEIR" WORKING
GROUP A/TUESDAY SESSION (REFTEL), WE WERE SURPRISED THAT
THE SOVIETS ENGAGED IN A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE ON
INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. THE UK OPENED THE MEETING
WITH A ROUTINE REBUTTAL OF SOME EASTERN ARGUMENTS
AGAINST MEASURE 1, CHALLENGING, IN PARTICULAR, THE
SOVIET IDEA THAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY
IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT OR CRISIS. U.S. REP (STRAUSS)
ADDRESSED THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF VERIFICATION,
STRESSING THAT WITHOUT VERIFICATION THERE COULD BE NO
AGREEMENT. HE NOTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE CDE'S
FOCUS ON DYNAMIC MILITARY ACTIVITIES REQUIRES
COMPLEMENTARY FORMS OF VERIFICATION; THUS, THE NEED
FOR TIMELY INFORMATION TO CORRECT MISPERCEPTIONS
AND/OR TO PROVIDE WARNING IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.
THE GDR AMBASSADOR USED THE PARAGRAPH IN MEASURE 5 OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED CONCERNING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS AND QUOTATIONS FROM AVERILL HARRIMAN
TO TAKE THE UNITED STATES TO TASK ON SDI. HE ASKED
THE RHETORICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER SDI (HE CALLED IT
"STAR WARS") WOULD POSE THE DANGER OF IMPEDING NTM FOR
COMPLIANCE OF CSBMS. (COMMENT: THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL
AND UNEXPECTED POLEMIC FROM AMB. BUHMING, GIVEN THE
GOOD RECORD OF BUSINESS-LIKE DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING
GROUPS. LATER, DURING HIS INTERCHANGE WITH THE SOVIET
REP, U.S. REP HANSEN RESPONDED TO BUHRING BY SAYING THE
UNITED STATES WILL RESPECT ANY AGREEMENT IT UNDERTAKES
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AND THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE ASAT SYSTEM CURRENTLY IN
EXISTENCE AND THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO THE UNITED
STATES. END COMMENT)
5. THE SOVIET REP THEN MADE A LENGTHY INTERVENTION
WHICH WAS HELPFUL BY BEING SERIOUS, THOUGHTFUL AND CLEAR,
EVEN THOUGH NOT CHANGING THE BASICALLY NEGATIVE
SOVIET POSITION. A DIALOGUE THEN DEVELOPED BETWEEN
THE SOVIET REP AND U.S. REP HANSEN, WHEN HANSEN
FIRST DROVE HOME THE NEED AND RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION
BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE INADEQUATE SOVIET
NOTIFICATION OF ZAPAD-81, AND LATER, USED SOVIET
INSISTENCE THAT INFORMATION EXCHANGE WAS DEPENDENT
ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE TO GET
THE SOVIET REP TO ADMIT THAT IF A STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION WERE TO BE ADOPTED,
INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF FORCES PARTICIPATING
IN NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED. IN
BRIEF, BASIC POINTS MADE BY THE SOVIET REP WERE:
-- INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION REPRESENT
MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTING NOTIFICATION MEASURES.
THUS, THE AMOUNT AND TYPE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED
DEPENDS ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE.
-- TO GO BEYOND THE FINAL ACT'S NOTIFICATION CBM, THE
SOVIETS ARE PROPOSING TO EXTEND NOTIFICATION TO AIR
AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS. "THAT
IS THE WAY TO EXPAND THE VOLUME OF INFORMATION
EXCHANGE."
-- VERIFICATION IS NOT AN AIM IN ITSELF AND CANNOT IN-
TERFERE WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A STATE OR
UNDERMINE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNITY. (COMMENT: THIS
LATTER ARGUMENT SEEMS DIRECTED AT OUR IDEAS OF
INSPECTION "ON DEMAND," WITHOUT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE
CAUSE.)
-- "IF WE AGREE ON THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION REQUIRED
BY THE SPECIFICS OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES, THAT
INFORMATION WOULD BE GIVEN, HOWEVER DETAILED. IF
INSPECTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH
CSBMS, OKAY. BUT INSPECTION PERMITTED IN ADVANCE,
UNRELATED TO THE CSBMS, NO."
6. WORKING GROUP A/THURSDAY. THE HUNGARIAN AND DANISH
REPS GAVE ROUTINE INTERVENTIONS, WITH BOTH ADDRESSING
BOTH MEASURE 2 AND LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF
MANEUVERS. THE HUNGARIAN REP ARGUED THAT MEASURE 2
CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONSTRAINTS. THE DANISH
REP ARGUED THAT IT IS NOT SIZE WHICH IS NECESSARILY THE
MOST SIGNIFICANT OR MOST THREATENING ASPECT OF A
MILITARY ACTIVITY, BUT HOW AND WHEN ACTIVITIES ARE USED,
AND THAT MEASURE 2, BY INHIBITING THE USE OF FORCE
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FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, SERVES THE
PURPOSES OF THE CONFERENCE MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN THE
EASTERN CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL. THE SOVIET REP QUOTED
EXTENSIVELY FROM BELGIAN PLENARY STATEMENTS IN MBFR
IN 1974 JUSTIFYING THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN THAT FORUM
FOR A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF MANEUVERS AT 50,000
MEN. HE ACCUSED THE WEST OF RENEGING ON THIS PREVIOUS
PROPOSAL AND OF NOW WANTING TO PRESERVE ITS FREEDOM
OF ACTION TO INCREASE THE SIZE AND INTENSITY OF NATO
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. (BEGIN COMMENT:
THIS WAS AN EFFECTIVE SOVIET PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY
SINCE THE NNA AND MANY OF OUR ALLIES ARE NOT AWARE
OF THE DETAILS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. U.S. REP
HANSEN SAVED WHAT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN A MOST
EMBARRASSING WESTERN DEFEAT IN OUR DEBATING-POINTS
GAME BY NOTING THAT THAT WESTERN PROPOSAL IN MBFR
WAS MADE IN ASSOCIATION WITH SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS,
INCLUDING THE REDUCTION
OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY OR 5 DIVISIONS. APART FROM
OTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIENNA AND STOCKHOLM
FORUMS, SUCH REDUCTIONS PROVIDED CONFIDENCE FOR
SUCH A CONSTRAINT ON MANEUVERS, WHILE IN CDE NO
SUCH BASE OF CONFIDENCE EXISTS. END COMMENT).
7. (NOTE: THE HUNGARIAN INTERVENTION REFERRED AGAIN
TO THE PREVIOUS HUNGARIAN SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL
CONSTRAINTS ON THE DURATION AND FREQUENCY OF MANEUVERS,
BUT GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE EAST INTENDS TO TABLE
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THESE POINTS. CORRIDOR
INFORMATION NOW IS THAT THE EAST INTENDS TO PRESENT
WORKING PAPERS ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND ON
MOVEMENTS.).
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 17
1. CDE VI - 013. -
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. U.S., FRANCE, BULGARIA AND FRG GAVE
ROUTINE STATEMENTS AT FIRST MEETING OF WORKING GROUP
SESSION ON NOTIFICATION. BULGARIAN STATEMENT
ADDRESSED NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
END SUMMARY.
4. FIRST MEETING ON NOTIFICATION REFLECTED THE SLOW
PACE AND PERFUNCTORY NATURE OF THE FIRST WEEK'S
WORKING GROUP SESSIONS. U.S. (HANSEN) LED OFF WITH
A REVIEW OF THE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
ON NOTIFICATION ISSUES, EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO GO
SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE HELSINKI CBM. THE FRENCH
REP WELCOMED POSITIVE POINTS OF THE ROMANIAN AIDE
MEMOIRE, SUCH AS ACCEPTANCE OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR
AND INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES,
THEN FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR A STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLD. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS HAVE
FEWER TROOPS THAN U.S. AND FRG DIVISIONS, BUT ARGUED
THAT, IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF DIVISIONS,
THE ADVANTAGE LAY WITH THE USSR. MOREOVER, THE DANGER,
FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, WAS FROM NATO DIVISIONS,
NOT FROM NATO TROOPS PER SE. THUS, IN TERMS OF
ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF ALL, A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD
SHOULD BE PREFERABLE TO ALL CONCERNED. THE BULGARIAN
REP NOTED THAT THE MANDATE DEFINES THE ZONE AS COVERING
EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE; THEREFORE,
AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THOSE AREAS SHOULD BE
COVERED BY NOTIFICATION AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES
ON LAND. HE CLAIMED THAT BETWEEN JANUARY AND
AUGUST 1984, NATO HELD 17 NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE NORTH,
BALTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN SEAS AND THE ATLANTIC,
MEANING THAT NOT ONE DAY PASSED DURING THAT TIME
WITHOUT NAVAL MANEUVERS BEING HELD OFF THE COASTS
OF EUROPE. HE ARGUED THAT TO LEAVE SUCH ACTIVITIES
OUTSIDE THE NOTIFICATION REGIME WOULD GIVE SPECIAL
PRIVILEGE TO NATO. THE FRG REP CLOSED THE SESSION
CRITICIZING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO LOWER THE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD TO 20,000 IN FAMILIAR TERMS.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: EAST TABLES WORKING PAPERS ON NOTIFICATION
OF GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS
1. CDE VI - 015.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AT WORKING GROUP AB MEETING TODAY, MAY 20,
EASTERN DELEGATES TABLED THREE WORKING PAPERS
DEALING, IN TURN, WITH NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE
MANEUVERS, AIR FORCE MANEUVERS, AND NAVAL MANEUVERS.
TEXTS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. (COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN
INFORMED BY EASTERN DELEGATES THAT THE ENGLISH
TRANSLATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN PAPERS ARE NOT PRECISE OR
CORRECT IN SOME PLACES. WE WILL REVIEW ENGLISH
TRANSLATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE). DELEGATION'S
ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WILL BE FORWARDED
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
4. IN BRIEF, THE EAST PROPOSES TO NOTIFY MAJOR
GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS OVER 20,000 MEN (I.E., THE
SAME AS PROPOSED LAST SESSION IN PLENARY SESSION);
AIR FORCE MANEUVERS (INDEPENDENT OR COMBINED WITH
GROUND OR NAVAL FORCES) INVOLVING MORE THAN 200
MILITARY AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY OVER THE DECLARED
AREA OF A MANEUVER; AND NAVAL MANEUVERS INVOLVING
MORE THAN 30 VESSELS AND 100 MILITARY AIRCRAFT,
EXECUTED INDEPENDENTLY OR COMBINED WITH GROUND
OR AIR FORCES. ALL SUCH MANEUVERS WOULD BE
NOTIFIED 30 DAYS IN ADVANCE.
5. THE WORKING PAPERS PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS,
OF WHICH THE MOST NOTEWORTHY ARE (BASED ON ENGLISH
INTERPRETATION AT TIME OF DELIVERY):
A. AREA OF APPLICATION. THE EAST DEFINES THE ZONE
AS ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY PART OF THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT (A DEFINITE REFERENCE TO THE EXTRA-
EUROPEAN PARTS OF TURKEY AND THE SOVIET UNION
COVERED EXPLICITLY IN THE FINAL ACT, BUT ONLY
IMPLICITLY IN THE MADRID MANDATE). THE DOCUMENTS
REFER TO THE ZONE AS BEING THE WHOLE OF EUROPE
AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE (AS IN
THE MANDATE). FOR AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE
EASTERN PAPERS REFER TO BOTH CONDITIONS OF THE MANDATE
FOR COVERING THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE.
(THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS REPETITION OF THE MANDATE,
WHICH THE EAST HAS NOT ALWAYS ACCEPTED, HAS YET
TO BE DETERMINED).
B. TRANSFERS. ALL THREE PAPERS INCLUDE THE POINT
THAT IF, BEFORE A MANEUVER TAKES PLACE, A TRANSFER/
MOVEMENT OF TROOPS IS INVOLVED, INCLUDING FROM OUTSIDE
THE ZONE, TO THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER, NOTIFICATION
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SECRET
OF SUCH TRANSFER/MOVEMENT WILL BE GIVEN.
C. INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION
WILL INCLUDE: DESIGNATION/NAME OF THE MANEUVER;
THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MANEUVER; A SHORT
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TROOPS/FORCES
DURING THE MANEUVER; THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE
MANEUVER; THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER WITH APPROXIMATE
GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES; THE TIME-FRAME FOR THE
MANEUVER. FOR GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS, ALSO THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES AND COMPONENTS, AND THE
TIME WHEN TROOPS LEAVE GARRISON. FOR AIR FORCE
MANEUVERS, ALSO INFORMATION REGARDING THE TRANSFER
OF FORCES TO THE MANEUVER, AND THE NUMBER AND TYPES
OF AIRCRAFT. FOR NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE NUMBER AND
TYPES OF AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS. IN ADDITION, IN
ALL THREE WORKING PAPERS, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
SHOULD BE PROVIDED WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
D. THE EAST HAS PURPOSEFULLY PICKED UP LANGUAGE OR
IDEAS FROM SC.1, INCLUDING: CONCEPT OF "UNDER A SINGLE
COMMAND"; CONCEPT THAT THE HOST-COUNTRY SHOULD
NOTIFY THE MANEUVER EVEN IF IT DOES NOT HAVE
FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE MANEUVER; THE CONCEPT
OF ALERTS, OR SHORT-NOTICE MANEUVERS (I.E., THEY
SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.)
END
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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, MAY 20, 1985
1. CDE VI - 020
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE MAY 20 WORKING GROUP AB
MEETING, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES TABLED THREE
WORKING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NOTIFICATION OF GROUND,
AIR, AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. THEY PROPOSED A 30-DAY ADVANCE
NOTIFICATION FOR ALL THREE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES. THEY SET
A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 20,000 MEN FOR GROUND FORCE
MANEUVERS; 30 COMBAT SHIPS AND 100 MILITARY PLANES FOR
NAVAL ACTIVITIES; AND 200 MILITARY PLANES FOR MAJOR AIR
FORCE MANEUVERS. (TEXTS FOLLOW SEPTEL.) AMBASSADOR
GOODBY OUTLINED FOUR AREAS REQUIRING INTENSIFIED DISCUS-
SION PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO NEGOTIATIONS. (COMPLETE TEXT
SENT SEPTEL.) AMBASSADOR EDES (UK) OFFERED HIS ASSESS-
MENT OF COMMON GROUND AND WORK WHICH MUST BE DONE PRIOR
TO MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR REZNIK OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA INTRODUCED THE
FIRST WORKING DOCUMENT, "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR
MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES," ON BEHALF OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
POLAND, AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN FORMALIZING HIS MARCH
15 PLENARY STATEMENT, THE CZECH REPRESENTATIVE CITED A
20,000-MAN THRESHOLD TO TRIGGER 30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICA-
TION. IN ADDITION, THE WORKING DOCUMENT LISTS INFORMA-
TION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION. (TEXT SENT
SEPTEL.)
5. GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING FOLLOWED WITH AN INTRODUCTORY
STATEMENT ON THE SECOND WORKING DOCUMENT, "PRIOR NOTIFI-
CATION OF MAJOR AIR FORCE MANEUVERS," ON BEHALF OF THE
GDR, HUNGARY, AND THE USSR. THE DOCUMENT PROPOSES 30
DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF 200 OR MORE MILITARY PLANS
-- COMBAT, TRANSPORT OR AUXILIARY AVIATION, AS WELL AS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE -- THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IN
ADDITION, THE WORKING DOCUMENT INCLUDES THE TRANSFER OF
SUCH UNITS AND FORMATIONS FROM ANOTHER AREA -- INCLUDING
FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE. INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN IN THE
NOTIFICATION IS LISTED. (TEXT SENT SEPTEL).
6. THE THIRD WORKING DOCUMENT WAS INTRODUCED BY AMBASSA-
DOR GRINEVSKY (USSR), ENTIILED "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF
MAJOR MANEUVERS OF NAVAL FORCES," ON BEHALF OF THE USSR,
BULGARIA, AND POLAND. (TEXT SENT SEPTEL.) GRINEVSKY
NOTED THAT ALL THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE NUMBERED
AS WORKING DOCUMENTS OF GROUP "B." HIS SUBSEQUENT PRE-
PARED REMARKS (SENT SEPTEL) CRITICIZED ALLEGED U.S.
"FIRST-STRIKE" CAPABILITY AS WELL AS THE "DESTABILIZING"
EFFECT OF SDI. IN CONTRAST, HE NOTED THE "BUSINESSLIKE
AND SERIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS" OF THE EAST BLOC TO THE CON-
FERENCE, I.E., SC.4, SC.6, CONSTRAINTS, AND NOW MEASURES
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DESIGNED TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK. HE ALSO REFERRED TO
AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S OFF-SESSION TRAVEL TO OSLO AND
ANKARA, ACCUSING GOODBY OF SPREADING ALLEGATIONS OF THE
DECLARATORY NATURE OF EASTERN PROPOSALS.
7. CITING THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT AND AIDE-MEMOIRE WHICH
ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE AREAS OF EMERGING COMMON GROUND,
AMBASSADOR EDES (UK) OFFERED HIS ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE
ARE AND WHERE WE ARE GOING. HE OPINED THAT THE ROMANIAN
AREAS OF BROAD CONVERGENCE APE A WELCOME EFFORT, ALTHOUGH
WE ARE STILL FAR FROM REAL CONVERGENCE. EDES CITED
GEOFFRY HOWE'S OPENING SPEECH TO CDE REGARDING THE LINK
BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S, TO MAKE HIS POINT THAT A NUF
REAFFIRMATION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE "CONTEXT" OF
CSBM'S. WITH TONGUE IN CHEEK, EDES THEN OUTLINED SIX
OTHER AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, I.E., THE SIX MEASURES OF
SC.1. HE NOTED THAT NO ONE IS OPPOSED TO INFORMATION OR
EXCHANGE OF CALENDARS IN PRINCIPLE. MANDATORY NOTIFICA-
TION, HE SAID, PERHAPS ENJOYS THE GREATEST DEGREE OF CON-
VERGENCE. SIMILARLY, THE PRINCIPLE OF INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS TO CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAS GAINED
GENERAL ACCEPTANCE. FINALLY, EDES SEES "BROAD CONVER-
GENCE" DEVELOPING IN VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
ALTHOUGH, UNLIKE THE OTHER MEASURES, HE OFFERED NO
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR EXCLUDED
CONSTRAINTS FROM THE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, STRESSING
THAT THERE IS NO REAL SIGN OF CONVERGENCE DESPITE A
READINESS TO DISCUSS AND CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS IN LIGHT
OF THE THE MANDATE.
8. WITH A LIGHT TOUCH, AMBASSADOR GOODBY REBUKED
GRINEVSKY'S CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON HIS TRAVELS. HE
INCORPORATED PRELIMINARY COMMENTS REGARDING THE THREE
WORKING DOCUMENTS ON HIS PREPARED STATEMENT. HE SAID WE
WOULD STUDY THEM WITH INTEREST BUT AVOIDED ANY POSITIVE
CHARACTERIZATIONS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONTRASTED THE
EAST'S EFFORT WITH THE "FULLY DEVELOPED" POSITION OF
NATO. HE ALSO RAISED AN EARLY MARKER THAT THE EAST'S
LATEST POSITIONS DO NOT AT FIRST APPEAR TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEMS WE FACE IN RESOLVING OUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES.
(FULL TEXT OF SPEECH SENT SEPTEL.)
END
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SECRET
CSCE Distr.
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- RESTRICTED
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CSCE/SC/WGB.1
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE Stockholm, 20 May 1985
STOCKHOLM 1984 ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
Working Document
of the Delegations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,
the Polish People's Republic and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
For the purposes of reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunde
standing or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to
apprehension,
Having regard to the importance of prior notification of major military
manoeuvres for promoting mutual understanding and confidence-building, stabili
and security,
Taking into account the useful experience of implementing the confidence-
building measures provided for in the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Tina
Act and having in mind the adoption of confidence-measures which will be more
substantial in nature and broader in scope,
The following is proposed:
1. The participating States will notify major manoeuvres of land forces
conducted independently or jointly with other participating States on the
territory of any participating State (participating States) in Europe as well
as in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.
This confidence- and security-building measure will also be applicable i..
all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.
19
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SECRET r
2 - 1' CSCE/SC/WGB.1
Major manoeuvres of land forces mean land-force manoeuvres conducted
independently or in combination with any possible air, naval, as well as
amphibious and airborne troop components under a common intention and plan and
involving forces with a total numerical strength of more than 20,000 troops.
2. Notifications will be given to all participating States through the
usual diplomatic channels by each State which conducts a major military
manoeuvre, 30 days in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or at the earliest
possible opportunity if the manoeuvre is arranged at shorter notice.
In the case of the conduct of multinational manoeuvres notification will
be given by the participating State on the territory of which the conduct of a
manoeuvre is planned even if that State's troops are not involved in the
manoeuvre. This will not restrict the obligation of other participating State
to give notification of these activities if they correspond to the established
level of notification.
3. If prior to the start of a manoeuvre it is planned to move (transfer
troops to the area of the manoeuvre from another area, including one outside t
area covered by confidence-building measures, notification of their movement
(transfer) to the area of manoeuvres and back shall be given in accordance wit
the measure of notification of military movements (transfers).
following information:
- the designation of the manoeuvre, if any;
- the general purpose of the manoeuvre, with a short description of the
forthcoming military activities of the troops in the course of the manoeuvre;
- States engaged in it;
- the numerical strength and components of the forces;
- the area of the conduct of the manoeuvre;
- the time-frame of the conduct of the manoeuvre, and the period during-
which troops will be away from their permanent locations;
26
SECRET
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- on the transfer of troops to the area of the manoeuvre (prior to its
start) from other areas, including those outside the area covered by confidenc
building measures.
Besides, the participating States will, whenever possible, provide
additional information, in particular with regard to the composition of forces
military hardware involved, and other information.
27
SECRET
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Distr.
RESTRICTED
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CSCE/SC/WGB.2
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE Stockholm, 20 May 1985
STOCKHOLM 1984 ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
Working Document
of the Delegations of the German Democratic Republic,
the Hungarian People's Republic and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
i
For the purposes of undertaking new, effective and concrete actions
designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security,
Taking into account the high mobility of air forces, the fact that they
are equipped with highly effective strike weapons and the particularly
dangerous nature of their activities,
Taking into consideration the fact that major manoeuvres of air forces
can be a source of serious threat to the security of States, as well as of
unpredictability, possible miscalculations and misunderstanding of the
purposes of such manoeuvres,
The following is proposed:
1. The participating States will notify major manoeuvres of air
forces on the territory of any participating State(s) in Europe, and
also in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.
This confidence- and security-building measure will also be applicable
in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.
and plan independently or in combination (including those conducted in
28
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SECRET j
combination with land and naval forces), in the course of which it is foreseen
that more than two hundred military aircraft will be in the air space over the
notified area at the same time.
The term "military aircraft" in the context of this measure includes
combat, military transport and auxiliary aircraft of the air forces, naval
forces and air defence forces taking part in the notified manoeuvre.
2. Notifications will be given to all participating States through the
usual diplomatic channels by each State which conducts manoeuvres, 30 days in
advance of the start of the manoeuvre or at the earliest possible opportunity
if the manoeuvre is arranged at shorter notice.
3. In the context of this measure it is understood that notifications
will be given both of national manoeuvres and of those conducted jointly with
other participating States in the area covered by confidence-building measures
In the case of the conduct of multinational manoeuvres notification will
be given by the participating State on whose territory the manoeuvre is
planned to take place or by the State which is the principal organizer
of the manoeuvre, even if that State's air forces and troops are not involved
in the manoeuvre. This will not restrict the obligation of other participatir
States to give notification of these activities if they correspond to the
established level of notification.
As far as the sea (ocean) area and air space adjoining Europe is concern?
notification of major manoeuvres of air forces conducted there will be given
whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a
part of military activities taking place within the whole of Europe, which :he
will agree to notify.
4. If prior to the start of a manoeuvre of air forces it is planned to
transfer air-force, naval-aviation and air-defence formations and units to the
area of the manoeuvre from another area, including one outside the area covere
by confidence-building measures, notification of such transfers shall be giver
in accordance with the measure of notification of military movements (transfer
29
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3 - CSCE/SC/WGB.2
5. Notification of major manoeuvres of air forces shall contain the
following information:
- the designation of the manoeuvre, if any;
- the general purpose of the manoeuvre, with a short description of the
military activities that will take place in the course of it;
- the number of aircraft and the types of aviation involved in the
imate geographic co-ordinates;
- on the transfer of air forces to the area of the manoeuvre (prior to
its start) from other areas, including those outside the area covered by
confidence-building measures.
Besides, the participating States will, whenever possible, provide
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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
Distr.
RESTRICTED
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CSCE/SC/WGB.3
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE Stockholm, 20 May 1985
STOCKHOLM 1984 ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN
Working Document
of the Delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the People's Republic of Bulgaria and
the Polish People's Republic
For the purposes of undertaking new, effective and concrete actions
designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security,
Taking into account the particularly dangerous nature of naval forces
and the fact of their being heavily equipped with modern strike weapons,
Taking into consideration the fact that major manoeuvres of naval forces
can be a source of serious threat to the security of States as well as of
unpredictability, possible miscalculations and misunderstanding of the purpose
of such manoeuvres,
SECRET I
1. The participating States will notify major manoeuvres of naval force
in the sea (ocean) area and air space adjoining Europe.
This confidence- and security-building measure will also be applicable in
all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.
Major manoeuvres of naval forces mean manoeuvres of naval forces,
amphibious troops and aviation conducted under a common intention and plan
independently or in combination (including those conducted in combination
with land and air forces) if over 30 combat ships and 100 military aircraft
are involved'-in the manoeuvres.
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The term "combat ships" in the context of this measure includes ships
of main classes from patrol ships, frigates, destroyers up to multi-purpose
aircraft carriers; submarines (except nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines).
The term "military aircraft" in the context of this measure includes
carrier-based aircraft as well as land-based naval and air-force combat and
patrol aircraft which are involved jointly with combat ships in the naval
manoeuvre.
2. Notifications will be given to all participating States through the
usual diplomatic channels by each State which conducts a manoeuvre, 30 days in
advance of the start of the manoeuvre or at the earliest possible opportunity
i
the manoeuvre is arranged at shorter notice.
3. In the context of this measure it is understood that notifications
will be given both of national manoeuvres and of those conducted jointly with
other participating States in the area covered by confidence-building measures
In the case of the conduct of multinational manoeuvres notification will
given by the participating State which is the principal organizer of the
manoeuvre. This will not restrict the obligation of other participating State:
to give notification of these activities if they correspond to the established
level of notification.
As far as the sea (ocean) area and air space adjoining Europe is concernec
notification of major naval manoeuvres will be given whenever these activities
affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of military activities
taking place within the whole of Europe, which they will agree to notify.
4. Notification of major manoeuvres of naval forces will contain the
following information:
- the designation of the manoeuvre, if any;
- the general purpose of the manoeuvre, with a short description of the
military activities that will take place in the course of it;
32
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SECRET
3 - CSCE/SC/WGB.3
- the numerical strength of the personnel involved;
manoeuvre;
- types of aviation and the number of military airplanes and helicopters;
- the area of the conduct of the manoeuvre with an indication of approx-
- the time-frame of the manoeuvre, and the period during which naval
forces and aviation will be away from their permanent locations (bases).
Besides, the participating States will, whenever possible, give addit.ona
information regarding the composition of the forces involved and other
information.
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SUBJECT: CDE: TEXT OF STATEMENT GIVEN BY OLEG A.
GRINEVSKY, MAY 20, 1985
1. CDE VI - 023.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY
OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, USSR AMBASSADOR AT LARGE IN WORKING
GROUP A & B ON MONDAY, MAY 20, 1985.
4. BEGIN TEXT: DISTINGUISHED MR. CHAIRMAN, ON BEHALF OF
THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, BULGARIA AND POLAND
I WAS ENTRUSTED TO SUBMIT THE WORKING DOCUMENT "PRIOR
NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF NAVAL FORCES" FOR CON-
SIDERATION BY THE CONFERENCE. (BELOW FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF
THE DOCUMENT). I REQUEST THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE
CONFERENCE TO DISTRIBUTE THESE PROPOSALS AS A WORKING DOCU-
MENT OF THE WORKING GROUP B. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES HAVE ARRIVED IN STOCKHOLM WITH A BUSINESSLIKE
SPIRIT. WE ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE EARLIEST ELABORATION
OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE IN BOTH
POLITICAL AND MILITARY AREAS. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN
EXPRESSED NOT IN GENERAL STATEMENTS BUT IN CONCRETE INITIA-
TIVES AIMED AT MAKING PROGRESS IN BOTH AREAS.
LET ME BRIEFLY RECALL THESE INITIATIVES. AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE PREVIOUS SESSION THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, DISPLAY-
ING FLEXIBILITY, SUBMITTED A DOCUMENT ON BASIC PROVISIONS
OF A TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE. THIS INITIA-
TIVE IS AIMED AT ACHIEVING THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE
CONFERENCE AND PAVES THE WAY TOWARDS A REAL REDUCTION OF
THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF MANY NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
THE DELEGATION OF BULGARIA SUBMITTED A WORKING DOCUMENT
ON LIMITING MILITARY MANOEUVRES - ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE
AND MEANINGFUL MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING BECAUSE TO-
DAY'S MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED
FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES WITH A VIEW TO
STARTING COMBAT OPERATIONS. WE HAVE STATED PARAMETERS,
MANY SPECIFIC DETAILS AND PROVISIONS REVEALING THE ESSENCE
OF OUR PROPOSALS.
THIS IS WHY "A TRAVELLER JOURNEYING FROM WASHINGTON TO
OSLO TO ANKARA" STATES TO THE AUDIENCES OF LAYMEN THAT THE
POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION BOILS DOWN TO MERE "DECLARA-
TORY MEASURES", GIVES A BLATENTLY DISTORTED PICTURE OF THE
STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE CONFERENCE.
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BEGIN THE CURRENT SESSION WITH A
NEW CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE LEADING TO DETENTE IN THE MILI-
TARY FIELD IN EUROPE. THESE PROPOSALS CONCERN VERY IMPOR-
TANT AREAS OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING. THEY ARE
INTRINSICALLY INTERRELATED AS THEY EXPRESS THE ESSENCE OF
THE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVERS.
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IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT MODERN LAND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES ARE
EQUIPPED WITH QUALITATIVELY NEW TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, POSSESS
A GREAT STRIKING POWER AND ARE CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING A
BROAD RANGE OF COMBAT TASKS BOTH INDEPENDENTLY AND IN
CLOSE INTERACTION WITH EACH OTHER IN THE SEA (OCEAN) AREA
AND AIR SPACE ADJOINING EUROPE. THEIR INTENSIVE TRAINING
IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THEY PRACTICE TO DELIVER STRIKES
ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN THE AIR BECOMES OF AN EVER GREAT
MAGNITUDE AND SCALE.
LARGE-SCALE AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES INVOLVING MANY HUNDREDS
OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT CARRYING DEADLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAY
POSE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY, THUS LEADING TO SITUATIONS
WHICH, AS OUR WESTERN COLLEGUES ARE FOND OF SAYING,
INCREASE THE DANGER OF "MISCALCULATIONOR MISUNDERSTANDING
OF INTENTIONS". LET US TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NATO
MANOEUVRES "CENTRAL ENTERPRISE-84" HELD IN JUNE 1984 WITH
A VIEW TO PRACTICING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
OF THE AIR FORCE AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF WAR IN EUROPE.
THEY INVOLVED ABOUT ONE THOUSAND COMBAT AIRCRAFT. THREE
MONTHS LATER NATO ONCE MORE STAGED MANOEUVRES OF ITS AIR
FORCE - "COLD FIRE-84" AGAIN INVOLVING ONE THOUSAND AIR-
CRAFT. WOULDN'T EARLY NOTIFICATION OF THIS TYPE OF
MANOEUVRES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER CONFIDENCE?
NAVAL MANOEUVRES ARE HELD IN AN EVER CLOSER PROXIMITY TO
EUROPE, WHICH IN ITSELF CANNOT BUT CAUSE CONCERN AND
INCREASED TENSIONS. THE PERMANENT MODERNIZATION OF THE
NAVY, ITS BEING EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING
LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES AND, LASTLY, THE PRESENCE OF
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING STRIKES BOTH AT
SEA AND ON LAND RIGHTLY GIVE RISE TO ALARM AND APPREHEN-
SIONS PRECISELY IN EUROPE BECAUSE SUCH MANOEUVRES INVOLVE
EUROPE AND AFFECT THE SECURITY OF ITS STATES. THE PURPOSE
OF THE RECENT MANOEUVRES OF THE NATO NAVAL FORCES IN THE
ATLANTIC - "TEAM-WORK-84" - WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SIMULATE
THE TRANSITION OF A WAR-TIME SITUATION AND CONDUCT THE
INITIAL NAVAL, AIR AND LAND OPERATIONS. THESE MANOEUVRES
INVOLVED 120 SHIPS AND 250 COMBAT AIRCRAFT.
ONE SHOULD NOT FORGET YET ANOTHER ASPECT. ALL OF US WERE
WITNESSES TO SITUATIONS WHEN LITERALLY BEFORE THE VERY
EYES OF THE WHOLE WORLD SEEMINGLY ROUTINE OCEAN MANOEUVRES
OF THE MILITARY FLEETS OF CERTAIN POWERS WERE TRANSFORMED
INTO AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE RESUMED ITS WORK IN
THE DAYS WHEN THE ENTIRE WORLD IS SOLEMNLY OBSERVING THE
FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VICTORY OVER FASCISM AND THE
END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT DEVASTA-
TION AND BLOODSHED UNPRECEDENTED IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND.
ITS SEVERE AND EDUCATING LESSONS CANNOT BE FORGOTTEN. THEY
TEACH THAT WAR SHOULD BE FOUGHT AGAINST BEFORE IT BREAKS
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OUT, THAT THE USE OR THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE SHOULD BE
FOREVER RENUNCIATED.
THIS IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN THEPRESENT-DAY COMPLICATED
AND TENSE SITUATION. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT YET SEE ANY REAL
INDICATIONS OF THE READINESS ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO
DETERMINE THE POLICY AND STRATEGY OF THE USA TO RENOUNCE
THE ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVEN-
TIONAL. THE PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW FIRST STRIKE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED IN SOME NATO COUN-
TRIES OF EUROPE AS WELL. THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE AND
ATTEMPTS TO INVOLVE WEST EUROPEAN STATES IN IT WOULD
UNDOUBTEDLY DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION ON THE EUROPEAN
CONTINENT.
TO CURB THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE ON EARTH AND PREVENT IT IN
SPACE, TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES AIMED AT STRENGTHENING
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY, TO IMPROVE RADICALLY THE ENTIRE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION - SUCH IS THE IMPERATIVE REQUIRE-
MENT OF TODAY. THIS WAS STATED WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY
AT THE SUMMIT MEETING OF PARTY AND STATE LEADERS OF THE
WARSAW TREATY MEMBER-COUNTRIES ON APRIL 26, 1985.
AS IT WAS STRESSED IN THE APPEAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPSU, THE PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET AND
THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS "TO THE PEOPLES, PARLIAMENTS
AND GOVERNMENTS OF ALL COUNTRIES, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT
THERE EXISTS NO FATAL INEVITABILITY OF WAR. THERE CAN BE
NO OBJECTIVES THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE UNLEASHING OF NUCLEAR
WAR. THERE EXIST NO INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS WHICH CANNOT
BE SETTLED AT A NEGOTIATING TABLE. DETENTE AND BUSINESS-
LIKE COOPERATION CAN AND MUST BE A NATURAL AND PERMANENT
STATE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. REASON MUST OVERCOME RECK-
LESSNESS AND FOLLY."
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AS WELL CAN AND MUST MAKE ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS GOAL. OUR FORUM
IS FACING SERIOUS TASKS OF VAST MAGNITUDE - WE SHOULD
TACKLE THEM JOINTLY, WITH AN EQUAL SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND REALISM. THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT A
COMBINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES REPRESENTS
THE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN WHICH IS CALLED EUROPEAN
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
THE OBLIGATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THE PRESENT-DAY SITUATION.
SHOULD SUCH AN OBLIGATION - FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF THE
SOVIET UNION - BE ASSUMED BY OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS PARTIC-
IPATING IN THIS CONFERENCE, THIS WOULD ENSURE A RADICAL
TURN IN SECURING CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES AND IN ESTAB-
LISHING REAL GUARANTEES OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN
EUROPE AND IN THE WHOLE WORLD.
THE PROPOSAL TO CONCLUDE A TREATY ON THE MUTUAL NON-USE OF
MILITARY FORCE SUBMITTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CON-
TRIBUTES TO LESSENING TENSIONS. OUR INITIATIVE IS AIMED AT
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CONSOLIDATING, MAKING MORE PRECISE AND CONCRETE THIS FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLE AS APPLIED TO THE REALITIES OF THE PRES-
ENT-DAY DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE.
OTHER INITIATIVES PUT FORWARD BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
ARE ALSO OF NO SMALL POTENTIAL - FREEING EUROPE FROM
CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE NON-INCREASE AND REDUCTION OF MILI-
TARY EXPENDITURES, PROMOTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-
FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE CONTINENT. THOSE WOULD
BE THE REAL STEPS TOWARDS DETENTE, STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE
AND SECURITY AND TOWARDS DISARMAMENT.
THE MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES ALSO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING THE POLITICAL
CLIMATE IN EUROPE. THEY GO BEYOND THE LIMITED STEPS OF
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL NATURE AND ARE NOT AIMED AT GAINING
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. THOSE ARE MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIVE
MEASURES LEADING TO A REDUCED MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN
EUROPE. THEY ARE EQUITABLE IN THEIR NATURE AND FULLY TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES.
THE WORKING DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO-DAY BY THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THAT EFFECT.
THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES STAND FOR HONEST
AND EQUITABLE NEGOTIATIONS, FOR ACHIEVING IN STOCKHOLM
WEIGHTY AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHEN-
ING PEACE IN EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT AT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE IT IS HIGH TIME TO PROCEED FROM WORDS TO
ACTIONS, FROM SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF A GENERAL NATURE
TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. IT DEPENDS ON THE USA AND ITS
ALLIES WHETHER THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE ABLE TO CROSS THIS
LINE. END TEXT.
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SUBJECT: TEXT OF U.S. STATEMENT IN WORKING GROUP AB,
MAY 20, 1985.
1. CDE VI - 022
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR
JAMES E. GOODBY, HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
IN WORKING GROUP AB ON MAY 20, 1985.
4. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, LAST SESSION'S
DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS WERE BUSINESSLIKE AND
CONSTRUCTIVE. ISSUES WERE EXAMINED AND EXPLORED;
POSITIONS WERE EXPLAINED AND QUESTIONED. THESE
DISCUSSIONS REPRESENTED AN ENCOURAGING START TO THE
PROCESS OF DEFINING PROBLEMS AND NARROWING DIFFERENCES.
A TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK OF COMMON GROUND BECAME VISIBLE.
BUT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. THE CONFERENCE MUST PUT SOME
FLESH ON THE BONES OF THAT STILL SKELETAL, AND EVEN
RATHER GHOSTLY, FRAMEWORK. WE ALL MUST WORK TO ENLARGE
AND MAKE MORE TANGIBLE THE AREA OF COMMON GROUND BEFORE
WE CAN CONSIDER MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE OF OUR WORK. I
TAKE NOTE OF THE WORKING PAPERS INTRODUCED TODAY. MY
DELEGATION WILL STUDY THEM CAREFULLY AND WILL COMMENT IN
DUE COURSE. AT FIRST GLANCE, THE ISSUES TO WHICH I WILL
REFER IN A FEW MOMENTS DO NOT SEEM TO BE MADE ANY EASIER
TO RESOLVE BY THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN THESE
DOCUMENTS. I WELCOME, HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO GIVE GREATER
PRECISION TO THE DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND THANK THOSE DELEGATIONS
WHO INTRODUCED THEM. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT MY
DELEGATION JOINED IN THE TABLING DURING THE LAST SESSION
OF THE INDIVIDUAL WESTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS AND THEN OF
DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED, THE FIRST FULLY DEVELOPED
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH WE HOPE
WILL EMERGE FROM THIS CONFERENCE. WE HOPE THAT
DELEGATIONS USED THE RECESS TO ANALYZE THE CONTENTS OF
THAT DOCUMENT AND TO REFLECT UPON ITS FUNDAMENTAL
OBJECTIVES AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES.
IN MY CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT LAST SESSION, MR.
CHAIRMAN, I IDENTIFIED SOME ISSUES WHICH MY DELEGATION
CONSIDERED KEY TO DETERMINING WHETHER THERE IS
SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND TO WARRANT MOVING TO A NEW AND
MORE INTENSE STAGE OF OUR WORK. I SHALL REVIEW THESE
ISSUES TODAY.
(1) TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. IT
SEEMS THAT THERE WE HAVE TWO BASIC PROBLEMS TO WORK OUT,
AND THIS REMAINS THE CASE EVEN AFTER THE TABLING OF
WORKING DOCUMENTS TODAY. FIRST, SHOULD WE MAINTAIN THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN "MANEUVER" AND
"MOVEMENT," OR SHOULD WE ADOPT A MORE COMPREHENSIVE,,
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LESS ARBITRARY DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES
WHICH SHOULD BE NOTIFIED, SUCH AS "OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND
ACTIVITIES?" THE SPONSORS OF SC.1 HAVE PRESENT
SUBSTANTIVE REASONS WHY THE PRESENT DISTINCTION IS
INADEQUATE: IT RAISES SEMANTIC QUESTIONS, SINCE ONE
STATE'S DEFINITIONS MAY NOT BE THE SAME AS ANOTHER'S
AND, THEREFORE, MAY GIVE RISE TO AMBIGUITY AND QUESTIONS
OF COMPLIANCE. IN RETURN, WE HAVE HEARD NO CONVINCING
ARGUMENTS WHY THE PRESENT DISTINCTION IS MORE
ADVANTAGEOUS AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. THE ARGUMENTS WE
DO HEAR SEEM TO BE BASED ON THE SIMPLE PROPOSITION THAT
WHAT WAS "GOOD ENOUGH" THEN SHOULD BE "GOOD ENOUGH"
NOW. FOLLOWING THAT PRINCIPLE WILL LEAD US NOWHERE IF
WE ARE TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF OUR MANDATE TO GO BEYOND
WHAT WAS POSSIBLE TEN YEARS AGO.
A SECOND PROBLEM TO BE WORKED OUT CONCERNS WHAT
ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED.
HERE, ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE SEEM TO BE INVOLVED. THE
WESTERN PROPOSALS FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES BECAUSE WE
BELIEVE THAT THE MOST LIKELY RISKS OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION COME FROM THE
POTENTIAL CLASH OF GROUND FORCES THE SPONSORS OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED THEREFORE EXTEND NOTIFICATION TO
MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES, WHICH COULD BE ONE OF THE FIRST
INDICATORS OF HOSTILITIES; TO AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES,
WHICH REPRESENT THE MEANS FOR PROJECTING FORCE ON TO
LAND; AND TO SHORT-NOTICE ACTIVITIES OR ALERTS, WHICH
ARE THE MOST LIKELY "COVERS" FOR HOSTILE MILITARY
OPERATIONS.
OTHERS SEEM TO BELIEVE, AND WE HAVE HEARD THIS AGAIN
TODAY, THAT THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH
EXTRA-ZONAL MATTERS BY INCLUDING ALL AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION. SUCH
A VAGUE NOTION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THIS CONFERENCE IS
IMPRACTICAL, UNMANAGEABLE, AND, IN ANY CASE, CONTRARY TO
THE AGREED MANDATE. THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE PROPOSED
IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED COVERS AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE
EXTENT THAT THEY SUPPORT GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IN THE
ZONE. THIS IS A PRACTICAL AND CLEAR YARDSTICK WHICH
FULLY REFLECTS THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE MANDATE.
(2) THRESHOLD LEVELS AND UNIT OF ACCOUNT FOR
NOTIFICATION. ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS TO BE WORKED
OUT IS, AGAIN, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE CONTINUE WITH
THE OLD APPROACH BECAUSE "WHAT WAS GOOD THEN IS GOOD
NOW." THIS TIME THE ARGUMENT CENTERS ON HOW TO MEASURE
OR QUANTIFY THE FORCES OF INTEREST FOR NOTIFICATION
PURPOSES AND THIS, TOO, REMAINS AN ISSUE EVEN AFTER
TODAY'S TABLING OF WORKING PAPERS. ALTHOUGH
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SC.1/AMPLIFIED INCLUDES THRESHOLDS MEASURED IN MANPOWER
LEVELS AS A SECONDARY PARAMETER, OR "SAFETY NET," AS THE
DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF IRELAND TERMED IT, THESE
MANPOWER PARAMETERS ARE ADDED AS A BACK-UP TO THE MORE
IMPORTANT STRUCTURAL UNIT OF ACCOUNT. WE BELIEVE
ADOPTION OF A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER IS IMPORTANT FOR TWO
BASIC REASONS. FIRST, IT WOULD ENHANCE THE
VERIFIABILITY OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE, A POINT WHICH
HAS NOT BEEN DISPUTED. SECOND, STRUCTURE IS A MORE
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT PARAMETER SINCE IT GIVES A SENSE
OF TRUER MILITARY POTENTIAL. WE HAVE HEARD SOME OF THE
PROBLEMS OTHERS HAVE WITH THE DIVISIONAL PARAMETER; WE
NEED TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF
THOSE PROBLEMS THIS SESSION.
A SECOND QUESTION CONCERNS THE THRESHOLD LEVEL FOR
TRIGGERING NOTIFICATION. FOR A NOTIFICATION MEASURE TO
BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, THE PRESENT THRESHOLD LEVEL
NEEDS TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERED SO THAT ANY POTENTIAL
PREPARATIONS FOR USE OF FORCE WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AT AN
EARLIER STAGE THAN AT PRESENT. FOR A NOTIFICATION
MEASURE TO BE USEFUL IN ESTABLISHING A PREDICTABLE
PATTERN OF PEACETIME MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE THRESHOLD
NEEDS TO BE LOWERED SO THAT MORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE
NOTIFIED. THE PROPOSAL, REPEATED IN ONE OF THE WORKING
DOCUMENTS INTRODUCED TODAY, TO LOWER THE THRESHOLD TO
20,000 WOULD SERVE NEITHER OF THESE PURPOSES. THE
THRESHOLD LEVEL PROPOSAL IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED -- SPECIFIC
ELEMENTS OF A DIVISION OUT-OF-GARRISON -- IS ONE WHICH
REFLECTS PEACETIME TRAINING PRACTICES AND PROVIDES A
REASONABLE BASIS FOR IDENTIFYING PREPARATIONS WHICH
MIGHT LEAD TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
(3) EFFECTIVE USE OF OBSERVERS. ALL OF US SEEM TO AGREE
THAT CURRENT PRACTICES WITH REGARD TO OBSERVATION OF
NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES SIMPLY ARE INADEQUATE FOR MAKING A
JUDGMENT AS TO THE ROUTINE NATURE OF A MILITARY
ACTIVITY. THE DIALOGUE ON WAYS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE
OBSERVATION REGIME LINKED TO NOTIFICATIONS WAS BARELY
BEGUN LAST SESSION; WE HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO DO ON THIS
ISSUE THIS SESSION. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE REASON FOR
POSTPONING DISCUSSION OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME.
(4) VERFICATION/INFORMATION. THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME
COMMON GROUND ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES, NAMELY, THAT EACH
MEASURE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE
VERIFICATION, AND THAT INFORMATION EXCHANGE IS AN
ESSENTIAL COMPONENT TO ENSURE IMPLEMENTATON OF AN
EFFECTIVE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME. BUT THE
CONFERENCE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE YET TO IDENTIFY MUCH COMMON
GROUND ON SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES.
INFORMATION IS OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CLARIFY
AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS AND PREVENT MISCALCULATION, AND I
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DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE CHALLENGES THIS POINT. IN
TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THIS OBVIOUS FACT,
THE RECIPROCAL AND COOPERATIVE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
ABOUT MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES RELEVANT
FOR THE NOTIFICATION REGIME, IN ADVANCE OF THE ACTUAL
ACTIVITY, AND INDEPENDENT OF INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS,
WOULD PROVIDE EVEN GREATER ABILITY TO CLARIFY AMBIGUOUS
SITUATIONS BEFORE THEY BECOME SOURCES OF CONCERN. IT
WOULD SERVE TO REDUCE THE NEED FOR SPECIAL INQUIRIES,
THUS EASING THE VERIFICATION PROCESS. AS A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE, WE SHOULD COOPERATE IN PROVIDING MEANS
WHEREBY EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY OF ASSURING ITSELF THAT AGREEMENTS ARE
RESPECTED. IN APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE, THE SPONSORS OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED ARE CONVINCED OF THE VALUE OF
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIRECT, ON-THE-SPOT INSPECTION OF
AMBIGUOUS ACTIVITIES, DESIGNED TO CLARIFY SUCH
SITUATIONS TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL CONCERNED. THE
WESTERN PROVISION FOR INSPECTION IS REASONABLE AND
LIMITED. IT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONTENT OF THE
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES PROPOSED AND
IS IN LINE WITH THE SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
WE WISH TO MAKE IN THE REGIME CREATED BY THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE REVIEWED THESE ISSUES BECAUSE I
BELIEVE THAT SERIOUS AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THEM
WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A SOLID AND PROMISING BASIS
FOR PROCEEDING TO THE NEXT STAGE OF OUR WORK. THIS
SESSION WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR OUR CONFERENCE. BY
PRIOR AGREEMENT, THE WORKING STRUCTURE WE HAVE NOW WILL
BE REVIEWED AT THE END OF THIS SESSION. MY DELEGATION'S
POSITION AT THAT TIME WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE QUALITY
OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS DURING THIS SESSION AND
THE FURTHER PROGRESS THE CONFERENCE MAKES IN EXPANDING
THE LIMITED COMMON GROUND WE HAVE BEGUN TO GLIMPSE. WE
WILL REVIEW THE WORKING DOCUMENTS INTRODUCED TODAY IN
THE SPIRIT OF TRYING TO BUILD ON THAT LIMITED COMMON
GROUND.
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT.
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SUBJECT: INITIAL EVALUATION OF EASTERN NOTIFICATION
PAPERS
REF: STATE 152001
1. CDE VI - 035
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. THE EAST TABLED THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL
MANEUVERS AT THE MAY 20 WORKING GROUP A&B MEETING. THE
THREE PAPERS ARE MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING SUBSTANTIVELY,
BUT THEY COULD PRESENT TACTICAL PROBLEMS. EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES WILL ATTEMPT TO TOUT THESE PAPERS AS
MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CALL FOR NEGOTIATION OF
CSBM'S AND THUS CALL FOR DISCUSSION OF NUF PROVISIONS.
THESE PAPERS ARE A CONCRETE FORMALIZATION OF THE VARIOUS
PROPOSALS THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN TOUTING
IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUP MEETINGS. THE PAPER ON
NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES CREATES
ALL OF THE INHERENT DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS THAT THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AVOIDS. THE INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES NOTIFICATION DEALS WITH ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE
THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE; WHILE THE PAPER ON INDEPENDENT
AIR ACTIVITIES IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE IN
THE ADJOINING AIR SPACE AND UNVERIFIABLE WHERE IT
PERTAINS TO ACTIVITY OVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. THE EAST
HAS USED THE DEFINITION FROM THE MADRID MANDATE ON THE
INCLUSION OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND
AIR SPACE, BUT AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY MADE IT CLEAR THAT
THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTERPRETS THE "AS WELL AS"
PORTION TO MEAN "OR". END SUMMARY.
4. SC/WGB 1: PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF
LAND FORCES, WORKING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE
DELEGATIONS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC,
POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. THIS PAPER FORMALIZES THE EASTERN
POSITION SUBMITTED LAST ROUND TO "NOTIFY MAJOR MANEUVERS
OF LAND FORCES OF 20,000 TROOPS OR MORE AT LEAST 30 DAYS
IN ADVANCE." A LINE BY LINE COMPARISON OF THIS PROPOSAL
SHOWS LITTLE IN COMMON BETWEEN SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND THE
EASTERN PAPER.
A. AREAS OF AGREEMENT (SC.1/AMPLIFIED VS EASTERN PAPER)
- -ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION.
- -IN MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES THE HOST STATE MUST
NOTIFY THE ACTIVITY EVEN IF IT HAS NO FORCES
PARTICIPATING.
NO RESTRICTION ON THE OBLIGATION OF STATES OTHER
THAN THE HOST STATE TO NOTIFY ACTIVITIES THAT CORRESPOND
TO THE ESTABLISHED LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION.
- -NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVITY WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR
COMBINED.
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- -DESIGNATION/NAME OF THE ACTIVITY.
- -GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY.
- NAMES OF PARTICIPATING STATES.
B. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT:-(SC.1/AMPLIFIED VS EASTERN
PAPER)
- -STRUCTURAL PARAMETER VS. NUMERICAL PARAMETER.
- -OUT-OF GARRISON CONCEPT VS. MAJOR MANEUVERS OF LAND
FORCES.
- -45 DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION VS. 30 DAYS ADVANCE
NOTIFICATION.
- -EASTERN PAPER MAKES NO MENTION OF MOBILIZATION, OR
ALERT ACTIVITIES.
- -AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES ARE INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL
20,000 TROOP CEILING VS. SEPARATE TREATMENT WITH A LOWER
THRESHOLD IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
- -EASTERN PAPER MAKES NO MENTION OF COMPLIANCE,
VERIFICATION, OR OBSERVATION.
- EASTERN PAPER CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS
WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR BASE, EVEN IF THE BASE IS OUTSIDE
THE ZONE.
- EASTERN PAPER DOES NOT MENTION NOTIFICATION OF
ACTIVITIES OF FORCES DEPARTING THE ZONE TO CARRY OUT AN
ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THE ZONE.
- -EASTERN PAPER DOES NOT REQUIRE DESIGNATION OF THE
HEADQUARTERS CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITY.
- -EASTERN PROPOSAL DOES NOT CALL FOR INDICATING THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WITH ANOTHER
NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY.
- -SC.1/AMPLIFIED CALLS FOR SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON
THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY WHILE THE EASTERN PAPER IS
LESS SPECIFIC.
- -SC.1/AMPLIFIED CALLS FOR THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA WHERE THE ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE TO
INCLUDE A MAP TRACE OR GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES.
- -SC.1/AMPLIFIED IS FAR MORE DEFINITIVE IN THE
REQUIREMENT TO LIST THE PARTICIPATING TROOPS AND THE
NUMBER OF TROOPS FROM VARSOUS PARTICIPATING STATES.
- -EASTERN PAPER MAKES A VAGUE REFERENCE TO
NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF TROOPS TO A MANEUVER AREA
UNDER A MEASURE THAT HAS YET TO BE TABLED ON THE
NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS.
5. A. SC/WGB 2: PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS
OF AIR FORCES, WORKING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE
DELEGATIONS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS. THIS PAPER FORMALIZES THE EAST'S INSISTENCE
IN THE WORKING GROUPS THAT MAJOR INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIV-
ITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. THE EAST HAS STATED THAT
"NOTIFICATION WILL BE MADE WHEN IT IS FORESEEN THAT MORE
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THAN 200 AIRCRAFT WILL BE IN THE AIRSPACE OVER THE NOTI-
FIED AREA AT THE SAME TIME." SINCE THIS PAPER FOCUSES
ON AIR ACTIVITIES THERE IS A NO COMPARISON TO THE PRO-
VISIONS OF MEASURE 3. THIS PROPOSAL IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE WHERE IT DEALS WITH
INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITY IN THE ADJOINING AIR SPACE, AND
IT IS UNVERIFIABLE WHERE IT APPLIES TO INDEPENDENT AIR
ACTIVITY OVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. ADDITIONALLY THIS
PAPER HAS THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES:
- -NO PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION, OBSERVATION, OR
COMPLIANCE.
-SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF THE
TRANSFER OF AIR UNITS FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE INTO THE
ZONE.
-WOULD HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
NATO FORCES THAN ON THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT.
EXERCISE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS OGRANIZATIONS
RESULTS IN LARGER AIR ACTIVITIES FOR NATO FORCES THAN
WARSAW PACT FORCES.
-WORDING IS VAGUE AND EASILY CIRCUMVENTABLE.
-REQUIRES NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES.
6. A. SC/WGB 3: PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS
OF NAVAL FORCES, WORKING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED THE
DELEGATIONS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, AND POLISH PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC. AS WAS STATED IN PARA 4, THIS PAPER
FORMALIZES THE WORKING GROUP COMMENTS OF THE EASTERN
DELEGATIONS, AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
THE MADRID MANDATE. THE THRESHOLD CALLS FOR THE
"NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF NAVAL FORCES,
AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS AND AVIATION CONDUCTED UNDER A COMMON
INTENTION AND PLAN INDEPENDENTLY OR COMBINED (INCLUDING
THOSE COMBINED WITH LAND AND AIR FORCES) IF OVER 30
THE
COMBAT SHIPS AND 100 MILITARY PLANES
LOWING
MANEUVERS." ADDITIONALLY THIS PAPER HAS THE FOLLOWING
DEFICIENCIES:
- -NO PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION, OBSERVATION, OR
COMPLIANCE.
-WOULD HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON NATO FORCES THAN WTO
FORCES. SOVIET CARRIERS HAVE APPROXIMATELY 14 PLANES
ONBOARD THAT WOULD MEET THE DEFINITION FOR A MILITARY
PLANE WHILE THEY HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE HELICOPTERS
THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE DEFINITION.
-WORDING IS VAGUE AND EASILY CIRCUMVENTABLE.
-NEGATES OUR GAIN IN THE ZONE WON AT MADRID.
7. COMPARISON OF SC/WGB1, WGB2, AND WGB3. IN COMPARING
THE EASTERN PAPERS WITH EACH OTHER THERE ARE SOME
DIFFERENCES THAT MAY OR MAY NOT INDICATE FUTURE SOVIET
INTENTIONS.
- -LANGUAGE IN THE LAND PAPER IS BASED ON THE FINAL
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ACT WHEREAS THE AIR AND NAVAL PAPER RELY ON CONCLUDING
DOCUMENT LANGUAGE. WITH THE INCORPORATION OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED LANGUAGE IN THE LAND PAPER IT CAN BE
EXPECTED THAT THE EAST WILL TRY TO REFLECT
SC.1/AMPLIFIED AS OLD, AND AS DEALING WITH OLD CONCEPTS,
THUS GIVING THE AIR AND NAVAL PAPERS THE AIR OF
NEWNESS. THIS APPROACH COULD THEN BE USED FOR
PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.
- -IT IS NOTED THAT THE AIR PAPER DOES NOT INCLUDE
AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS, AND THE NAVAL PAPER DOES
NOT INCLUDE AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE NOTIFICATION
PROVISION. THIS COULD BE JUST AN ADMINISTRATION
OVERSIGHT, OR MIGHT INDICATE AN INTENTION TO
EXCLUDE/PROTECT THESE FORCES FROM NOTIFICATION. IT IS
HARD TO SEE WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT GAIN FROM SUCH A
MOVE.
- -THE AIR PAPER CALLS FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE
WHILE THE NAVAL PAPER ONLY CALLS FOR PARTICIPATION. IN
THE AIR PAPER THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE IS PROBABLY THE
BIGGEST LOOPHOLE IN THE PAPER.
- -THE DEFINITION FOR AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR AND NAVAL
PAPERS EXCLUDES HELICOPTERS WHICH PROVIDES A LARGE BREAK
FOR THE EAST.
- -THE LAND AND AIR PAPER CALL FOR THE EARLY
NOTIFICATION OF REINFORCEMENTS, GENERALLY BEFORE THEY
HAVE LEFT THE UNITED STATES, BUT AS CURRENTLY WRITTEN
WOULD NOT CAPTURE PURE TRANSITS. THE PAPER ON THE
NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) HAS NOT
YET BEEN PUBLISHED AND THIS WILL PROBABLY BE HOW THE
EAST CAPTURES TRANSITS.
- -THE DEFINITION OF THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR
SPACE IS NOT CONSISTENT, BUT AFTER CLOSE SCRUTINY IT
DOES NOT APPEAR THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS.
- -THE EAST INDICATES THEY WILL PROVIDE APPROXIMATE
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES IN AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY BUT
REPORTING IN LAND ACTIVITY, ON THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER,
REMAINS IDENTICAL TO THE FINAL ACT.
- -IN THE VOLUNTARY INFORMATION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN
EACH PAPER THERE ARE VARIATIONS. WORDING IN THE LAND
AND NAVAL PAPER ARE VERY CLOSE WITH THE ADDITION OF
MILITARY HARDWARE IN THE LAND PAPER. THE MILITARY
HARDWARE SECTION WOULD SEEM TO PLAY UP TO THE NEUTRALS
AS THE SWISS, SWEDES AND FINNS HAVE ALL FOCUSED ON
REPORTING OF MILITARY HARDWARE. AS THE EASTERN NATIONS
HAVE NEVER IMPLEMENTED THE VOLUNTARY INFORMATION
PROVISION OF THE FINAL ACT IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT
THEY SUDDENDLY INTEND TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. THIS IS A
POSSIBLE INDICATOR, HOWEVER, THAT THE EAST MAY BE
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WILLING TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION
EXCHANGE, BUT SINCE THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF THE
NOTIFICATION ANNOUNCEMENT ARE SO CLOSE TO THE FINAL ACT
WE SHOULDN'T EXPECT ANYTHING NEW.
8. INITIAL REACTIONS. INITIAL REACTION OF NNA TO THE
PAPERS SUGGESTED THE EASTERN PAPERS HAVE A FATAL
FLAW--THEY VIOLATE THE ZONE AS AGREED IN MADRID. THUS
MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THE EASTERN PAPERS ARE IN FOR
ROUGH TIMES IN DISCUSSION. THE NEUTRALS ARE STUDYING
THE PAPERS NOW. SOME NEUTRALS HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY DO
NOT OPPOSE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A
NOTIFICATION REGIME, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WENT TOO FAR.
AT THE VERY LEAST, THE PAPERS WILL ENCOURAGE THE
MALTESE, BASED ON THEIR PROPOSALS IN SC.5, AND PERHAPS
OTHERS, TO QUESTION THE, WEST'S EXCLUSION OF SUCH FORCES
BASED ON THE MANDATE ARGUMENT. THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE
KEENLY AWARE OF WESTERN AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST
INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR ARID NAVAL ACTIVITIES, PROBABLY
WILL NEED NNA SUPPORT IF THEY HAVE INTENTIONS TO FORCE
THE WEST INTO DISCUSSING THEIR PAPERS. THUS, WE EXPECT
THE EAST TO ACTIVELY WORK TO OBTAIN NNA SUPPORT, AT
LEAST FOR THE PRINCIPLE, OF EXPANDING NOTIFICATION TO
INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
9. CONSIDERATIONS. THE THREE WORKING PAPERS OFFER
NOTHING NEW SUBSTANTIVELY TO THE WORK ON THE
CONFERENCE. THERE IS NOTHING IN THESE PAPERS THAT IS
DIFFERENT FROM THE EASTERN LINE THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN IN
THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS
ADHERENCE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, AND
WILL PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR
ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS STRESS THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE
VERIFICATION; AND WILL CRITICIZE THE SOVIETS AND THEIR
ALLIES ON THIS POINT AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY. ON THE OTHER
HAND, OUR ALLIES WWILL PROBABLY SEARCH FOR COMMON AREAS
IN THESE PAPERS TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR DIALOGUE WITH
THE EAST. WE WILL DISCOURAGE ATTEMPTS TO TAKE A
POSITIVE APPROACH TO THESE PAPERS, AND WILL STRESS THE
NEED TO DOWNPLAY ANY REFERENCE TO PROGRESS RESULTING
FROM THE PRESENTATION OF THESE PAPERS.
10. FINALLY, THESE PROPOSALS MAY HAVE TWO OBJECTIVES
WHICH ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY CLEAR. FIRST, THE EAST WILL
PROBABLY TOUT THESE PROPOSALS AS ITS REPLY TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S 4 JUNE STATEMENT REAFFIRMED AT STRASBOURG ON
8 MAY, EVEN THOUGH THEY CONTAIN LITTLE THAT IS SUB-
STANTIVELY NEW. THE EAST'S LINE WOULD THEN BE THAT THE
BALL IS IN THE U.S. COURT AND THAT IT IS UP TO THE U.S.
AND NATO TO ADDRESS THE SOVIET NUF PROPOSAL IN A MORE
"CONSTRUCTIVE" WAY. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S 31 MAY
PLENARY ADDRESS SUPPORTS THIS THOUGHT (SEE SEPTEL).
ULTIMATELY, WE EXPECT PRESSURE TO BEGIN DRAFTING A
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WESTERN NUF FORMULATION. SECOND, THE PARAMETERS FOR
NOTIFYING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE
SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT
EXPECT MANY ACTUAL NOTIFICATIONS. THEIR PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE, IN OUR VIEW, IS TO ESTABLISH EXTENSIONS OF
THE ZONE SO THAT EUROPE BECOMES A STRATEGIC ENTITY, NOT
A GEOGRAPHICAL ONE, THUS UNDOING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MADRID MANDATE.
END
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0 211425Z MAY 85
JSUBJECT: Q&A ON EASTERN TABLING
1. CDE VI - 012
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE EAST YESTERDAY, MAY 20, TABLED THREE WORKING
DOCUMENTS IN THE CDE DESCRIBING POSITIONS ON PRIOR
NOTIFICATION OF LAND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS.
FOLLOWING ARE Q&A FOR POSSIBLE USE BY THE DEPARTMENT
SPOKESMAN SHOULD THE ISSUE COME UP IN TODAY'S NOON
BRIEFING.
Q: IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE YESTERDAY, THE EAST
TABLED WORKING DOCUMENTS PROPOSING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES CALLING FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR LAND,
AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES
REACTION?
A: THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE PRESENTATION OF MORE
DETAILED IDEAS ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. WE BELIEVE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST
FOCUS ON THIS KIND OF CONCRETE ISSUE, AND NOTIFICATION
IS CERTAINLY AT THE CENTER OF ANY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
REGIME.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST'S TABLING OF WORKING
DOCUMENTS YESTERDAY HAS NOT MADE THE WORK OF THE
CONFERENCE ANY EASIER. INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL
MANEUVERS LIE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE CONFERENCE'S
PRESENT WORK.
AS FOR THE PROPOSAL TO NOTIFY THIRTY DAYS IN ADVANCE
MAJOR LAND MANEUVERS INVOLVING MORE THAN 20,000 TROOPS,
SUCH A PARAMETER IS AN INADEQUATE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE
CURRENT MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OF 1975,
WHICH CALL FOR NOTIFICATION TWENTY-ONE DAYS IN ADVANCE
FOR MANEUVERS OVER 25,000 TROOPS. TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE AND ENHANCE STABILITY
AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
MUST MAKE A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OVER THE HELSINKI
MEASURES. THE EASTERN MEASURE PROBABLY WOULD NOT EVEN
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF EXERCISES NOTIFIED BY EITHER THE
SOVIET UNION OR THE UNITED STATES. IN CONTRAST, THE
MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE SUGGESTED SIX
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY
IMPROVE ON THE HELSINKI REGIME. FOR EXAMPLE, THE
ALLIANCE CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION FORTY-FIVE DAYS IN
ADVANCE OF ALL POTENTIALLY THREATENING MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, THOSE INVOLVING ONE COMBAT DIVISION OR, IN
SOME CASES, EVEN AS FEW AS 6,000 MEN.
Q: DOES THE EAST'S TABLING OF FAIRLY DETAILED WORKING
DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS NOW PREPARED FOR
SERIOUS, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE
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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES?
A: IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID
ON MAY 9, "THE CONFERENCE IS NOW AT A POINT WHERE IT
COULD MOVE INTO A MORE INTENSE NEGOTIATING PHASE, IF THE
SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO JOIN THE REST OF THE
CONFERENCE IN NEGOTIATING MEANINGFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES WHICH GO BEYOND EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS." THE
EASTERN DOCUMENTS OF YESTERDAY DO NOT NECESSARILY
INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS PREPARED FOR DISCUSSION OF
TRULY MEANINGFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. BUT BY
FOCUSSING ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION, THE
EAST COULD BE TAKING A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
Q: PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE
PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IF
THE EAST NEGOTIATED SERIOUSLY ON CONCRETE-CONFIDENCE-
BUILDING MEASURES. WITH THE EAST TABLING ITS WORKING
DOCUMENTS ON CONCRETE MEASURES, IS THE UNITED STATES NOW
PREPARED TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE?
A: WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH THE ISSUE
OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. OUR
POSITION IS CLEAR: WE ARE PREPARED TO REAFFIRM THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT ON
CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. AS I HAVE SAID,
HOWEVER, FULL AND DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES HAS NOT YET TAKEN PLACE.
THE EAST'S TABLING OF WORKING PAPERS YESTERDAY DOES NOT
THE KIND OF DETAILED, CONCRETE IDEAS REQUIRED.
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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY, MAY 21, 1985
1. CDE VI - 028.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. THE EAST (BULGARIA, GDR, USSR) INDICATED
THAT THE WARSAW PACT STILL INTENDS TO FLOG ITS NON-USE
OF FORCE (NUF) TREATY -- AT LEAST PUBLICLY. EASTERN
DELEGATES ALSO INSISTED THAT A NUF TREATY WOULD NOT
AFFECT OTHER OBLIGATIONS. DENMARK ONCE AGAIN REJECTED
THE IDEA OF A NUF TREATY AND CHALLENGED WHAT IT SAW AS
THE "SEQUENTIAL" SOVIET APPROACH WHEREBY A TREATY WOULD
BE CONCLUDED FIRST, FOLLOWED THEN BY CONSIDERATION OF
CSBM'S. THE SOVIETS TRIED TO LURE THE WEST INTO
DISCUSSING CSBMS ON THEIR TERMS, I.E., WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, SC.6. FORTUNATELY, NONE
OF OUR ALLIES ROSE TO THE BAIT. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NEW BULGARIAN DEPUTY (PETROV) OPENED HIS REMARKS
ON NUF BY "ANSWERING" A DANISH QUESTION POSED LAST
SESSION REGARDING THE EFFECT OF A NUF TREATY ON ALREADY
EXISTING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS.
REFERRING TO THE SOVIET UNION'S PROPOSAL (SC.6) TO
"CONCRETIZE THE NUF PRINCIPLE IN TREATY FORM" (IN THE
ORIGINAL RUSSIAN, THE WORD "DOGOVOR" OR "TREATY" WAS
USED; WHEREAS THE WORD WAS TRANSLATED "AGREEMENT" IN
ENGLISH), PETROV ASSERTED THAT A TREATY WOULD NOT AFFECT
EARLIER OBLIGATIONS SUCH AS THOSE CONTAINED IN THE UN
CHARTER. HE CITED ARTICLE 103 OF THE UN CHARTER ("IN
THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE PRESENT CHARTER
AND THEIR OBIGATIONS UNDER ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PRESENT CHARTER
SHALL PREVAIL") TO SUPPORT HIS POINT. PETROV ALSO USED
ARTICLE 52 OF THE UN CHARTER ("NOTHING IN THE PRESENT
CHARTER PRECLUDES THE EXISTENCE OF REGIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS.. .FOR DEALING WITH.. .THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY") TO BUTTRESS EASTERN
ARGUMENT FOR A "REGIONAL" NUF TREATY.
5. THE GDR (GEORGI) INSISTED THAT THE "PRESENT
SITUATION IN EUROPE" MAKES AGREEMENT ON THE RENUNCIATION
OF THE USE OF FORCE IMPERATIVE. THE EAST GERMAN ARGUED
THAT A "TREATY" SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR IMPROVING
COOPERATION WHICH WOULD NOT BE BROKEN EVEN IN TIME OF
CRISIS AND POINTED TO SC.6, PARAS 6 (JOINT AND
INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION OF PRACTICAL WAYS TO PREVENT
SURPRISE ATTACK), 7 (ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
UN), AND 8 (URGENT CONSULTATIONS IN THE EVENT OF THE
"RISK OF WAR") AS OFFERING A "PATH OF PEACE EVEN IN THE
BEGINNING OF A CONFLICT." HE EXPANDED THE EAST'S
DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS (THE
SECOND HALF OF THE TITLE OF THEIR NUF PROPOSAL) TO
INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE NON-USE OF POLITICAL FORCE, BUT
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6. RAHMANINOV (USSR) REJECTED THE IDEA THAT A
CONCESSION WAS BEING MADE BY CERTAIN DELEGATIONS BY
CONSIDERING NUF, NOTING THAT THE MADRID MANDATE CALLS ON
THE CONFERENCE TO EXPRESS THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN
FROM THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE. HE ALSO ACCUSED
"CERTAIN COUNTRIES" OF MAKING "DECLARATORY AFFIRMATIONS"
WITH REGARD TO THEIR READINESS TO DISCUSS NUF, BUT
FAILING TO LAY OUT ANY SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THE SUBSTANCE
OR FORM OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT ("DOGOVORENNOST "').
7. THE DANISH DEPUTY (ROSENTHAL) NOTED THAT THERE WAS
NO DISAGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE NUF
PRINCIPLE, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO REPEAT IT
IN TREATY FORM.- WHILE IT WAS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE
SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED DO NOT OBJECT TO REAFFIRMING
THE NUF PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON
MEANINGFUL AND CONCRETE CSBM'S, HE CHALLENGED THE
"SEQUENTIAL" SOVIET APPROACH, AS CONTAINED IN SC.6,
REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP IN PARA 6 BETWEEN CONCRETE
CSBM'S AND REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE: FIRST A
TREATY SHOULD BE CONCLUDED, THEN CONSIDERATION, WHICH HE
SURMISED MEANT NEGOTIATION, OF CSBM'S WOULD OCCUR. HE
INSISTED, TO THE CONTRARY, THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE
AGREEMENT ON REAFFIRMING THE NUF PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD
HAVE TO OCCUR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON
CONCRETE CSBM'S IN THE CDE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. HE THEN
POINTED OUT THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS THE "WORKLOAD" OF
NEGOTIATING CSBM'S WOULD BE HEAVIER THAN THAT OF A NUF
REAFFIRMATION. HE ALSO CRITICIZED THE REFERENCE IN SC.6
EXPLICITLY AND SOLELY TO MEASURES TO PREVENT SURPRISE
ATTACK, NOTING THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND OTHER CDE
PROPOSALS FOCUS MORE BROADLY ON THE "GREY AREA" OF
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS ON PREVENTION OF SURPRISE
ATTACK.
8. RAHMANINOV RESPONDED ON THE SPOT TO ROSENTHAL'S
INTERVENTION BY ASKING HOW A "NEW REPETITION OR
AFFIRMATION" OF THE NUF COMMITMENT WOULD UNDERMINE
EARLIER OBLIGATIONS TAKEN BY STATES AND BY SUGGESTING
THAT OTHERS PROVIDE NEW ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF
SC.6'S ARTICLE SIX.
9. COMMENT: TODAY'S EASTERN INTERVENTIONS INDICATED
THAT THE WARSAW PACT STILL INTENDS TO FLOG ITS NUF
TREATY -- AT LEAST PUBLICLY. A FINNISH COLLEAGUE
SPECULATED THAT THE AMBIGUITY OVER THE USE OF THE WORDS
"TREATY" AND "AGREEMENT" WAS CALCULATED TO PRESERVE
EASTERN FLEXIBILITY FOR FUTURE NUF DISCUSSIONS. THE
SOVIETS ALSO TRIED TO LURE THE WEST INTO DISCUSSING
CSBM'S ON THEIR TERMS, I.E., WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SC.6,
ARTICLE 6. FORTUNATELY, NONE OF OUR ALLIES ROSE TO THE
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52 SECRET
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SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
Rede DDR in AG - A - , 21. 5. 1985
Im Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion fiber den Vorschlag
zum Abschlu2 eines Gewaltverzichtsvertrages tauchte
verschiedentlich die Frage nach der Bedeutung bzw.
dem Inhalt des Zusatzes "Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher
Beziehungen" auf. Der damalige Leiter der osterrei-
chischen Delegation, Botschafter Torovsky, fragte
beispielsweise am 4. 12. 1984, ob nicht die Beziehungen
friedlich seien, wenn keine Gewalt angewandt wird.
Ich mochte heute eine Antwort auf these Frage geben.
Zunachst ist zu unterstreichen, daB das Hauptziel einer
GV-Vezanbarung darin besteht - ich zitiere aus der
Praambel der Grundbestimmungen -, "angesichts der
andauernden nuklearen Bedrohung einen groBangelegten
'Schritt in Richtung auf die Verringerung der Gefahr
der militarischen Konfrontation zu tun and eine grund-
satzliche Wende in der Politik der Staaten von der
Konfrontation zur friedlichen Zusammenarbeit zu er-
leichtern".
Angesichts der Lage in Europa stellt der eindeutige
Verzicht auf die Androhung and Anwendung militarischer
Gewalt die vordringliche Aufgabe der Sicher_ung des
Friedens and der Erhohung des Vertrauens zwischen Ost
and West dar.
55
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
Die sozialistischen Staaten betrachten eine solche
Verpflichtung jedoch nicht als auf die Sicherung
eines kriegslosen Zustandes beschrankt. Dem Element
des Verbots fiigen sie mit der Formulierung "Auf-
rechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen" bewuBt ein
konstruktives Element hinzu. 1hr Standpunkt, daB
10mal verhandeln besser als 1mal schie2en ist, gilt
auch and gerade fur diesen Zusatz. Dialog and Ver-
handlungen unter alien Umstanden- das ist der Sinn.
Der Vertrag soil die Grundlagen festigen, auf denen
sich - auch in Verwirklichung der anderen Verpflich-
tungen aus der KZSE-SchluBakte - eine prosperierende,
sich zum gegenseitigen Vorteil entwickelnde, umfas-
sende Zusammenarbeit der hier vertretenen Staaten
grdndet, die auch im Fall einer kritischen Situation
nicht unterbrochen werden sollte.
Das wiederum setzt ein MindestmaB an Vertrauen zwi-
schen den Staaten voraus. Die kombinierte Wirkung
von GV-Vereinbarung and MaBnahmen militarischen Cha-
rakters, der Beschrankung and AnkUndigung von mil.
AktivitAten der Land-, Luft- and Seestreitkrafte -
so wie in den gestern von den Delegationen der CSSR,
der UdSSR and der DDR unterbreiteten Arbeitsdokumenten
vorgeschlagen - ware sehr gut ipeignet, dieses notwendig
MaB an Vertrauen zu sichern.
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
Voraussetzungen zur Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher
Beziehungen werden in den Punkten 6, 7 and 8 der
Grundbestimmungen konkret skizziert. Diese Empfehlungen
zu einem konkreten Vertragsinhalt gehen fiber das bloSe
Verbot der Gewaltanwendung deutlich hinaus, indem sie
Wege der Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen
zwischen den Staaten auch unter Bedingungen des Auf-
tretens von Konflikten aufzeigen. Friedliche Beziehunge:
vermogen insofern - ganz im Sinne der am 24. 10. 1970
durch die UN-Vollversammlung im Konsens verabschiedeten
"Deklaration fiber die Prinzipien des Volkerrechts be-
treffend die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen and die
Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Staaten in Ubereinstimmung
mit der Charta der Vereinten Nationen" - in freund-
schaftliche Beziehungen zwischen den Staaten in Ost
and West hinuberzuwachsen. Noch deutlicher: Unter fried.
lichen Beziehungen verstehen wir freundscha?tliche
Beziehungen im Sinne dieser Prinzipiendeklaration.
Natdrlich schlieSt die Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher
Beziehungen auch den Verzicht auf pol., and okonomische
Gewaltanwendung mittels MaSnahmen des Bovkotts,der
Einmischung in innere Angelegenheiten souveraner Staa-
ten oder der MiSachtung nationaler Interessen ein.
57
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
Herr Vorsitzender!
Die DDR pladiert fur das "Machbare" im Rahmen des
der Stockholmer Konferenz zugrunde liegenden Mandats.
Sollte es der Wunsch der bier vertretenen Staaten sein,
die Prazisierung des Gewaltverzichts and der nicht-
militarischen Aspekte der Aufrechterhaltung fried-
licher Beziehungen in einem Vertrag zu bericksichtigen,
wird es die Delegation der DDR nicht an gutem Willen
fehlen lassen, geergnete Formulierungen zu suchem.
Ich danke fur Ihre Aufinerksamkeit.
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
SUBJECT: CDE: SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 21
1. CDE VI- 031.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EASTERN REPS DEALT WITH AIR AND
NAVAL ACTIVITIES (TWO OF THEIR THREE RECENTLY TABLED
WORKING DOCUMENTS), ARGUING THAT INDEPENDENT AIR AND
NAVAL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AND THAT THIS WAS
CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. THEY CITED, IN
PARTICULAR, ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. 2ND AND 6TH FLEETS
AND NATO EXERCISE COLD FIRE AS ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE AT
LEAST STRATEGICALLY LINKED TO THE GROUND SITUATION IN
THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND WHICH REPRESENT A REAL THREAT TO
EUROPE. U.S. REP HANSEN RESPONDED, REPEATING THE TWO
CONDITIONS OF THE MANDATE TO REFUTE THE EASTERN
POSITION, AND QUESTIONED THE EASTERN
APPROACH AS PRESENTED IN THE WORKING DOCUMENTS
(SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4-5 BELOW). THE NETHERLANDS REP
GAVE A FAMILIAR REVIEW OF THE WESTERN POSITION, KEYED TO
QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY ASKED BY THE HUNGARIAN REP. U.S.
REP GALASSI PRESENTED, IN RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH, THE NATO
DEFINITION FOR THE WORD "GARRISON" (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 6
BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. THE HUNGARIAN REP ARGUED THAT ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED IN THEIR INTERACTION, BUT THAT EACH FORCE
COMPONENT HAS ITS INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE. THEREFORE,
ALL ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION;
THERE WAS NO LOGIC IN ADDRESSING ONLY ONE FORCE
COMPONENT. THE GDR REP ARGUED THAT EVEN INDEPENDENT
MANEUVERS OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE WATERS
ADJOINING EUROPE HAVE A STRATEGIC CONNECTION WITH GROUND
FORCE SITUATION. THE SOVIET REP ELABORATED, MAKING
FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- THE ZONE OF APPLICATION ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE WAS
"THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AND
AIR SPACE." ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA/AIR SPACE
WERE OF NO LESS SIGNIFICANCE THAN ACTIVITIES IN THE
WHOLE OF EUROPE.
-- EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT MOST NATO AND WTO AIR AND NAVAL
MANEUVERS ARE PLANNED SIMULTANEOUSLY OVER THE LAND
THEATER, IN THE AIR AND AT SEA, ALL CLOSELY
INTERRELATED, UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND.
-- U.S. FORCES FOR DEALING WITH EUROPE, INCLUDING THE
2ND ATLANTIC FLEET AND 6TH MEDITERRANEAN FLEET, FUNCTION
IN RELATION TO EUROPE AND CARRY OUT THE STRATEGY OF
NATO. THEY MAY BE CONNECTED WITH LAND ACTIVITIES OR
INDEPENDENT, BUT WHENEVER THESE FORCES CARRY OUT
ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA/AIR SPACE THEY MUST BE
NOTIFIED.
-- ALL WTO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH EXCEED THE
PROPOSED THRESHOLD IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NORTH, BALTIC,
BLACK SEAS WOULD LIKEWISE BE NOTIFIED.
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-- IN NATOS AIR EXERCISE COLD FIRE STRATEGIC AIR
OPERATIONS OF THE SORT USED IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF A
WAR IN EUROPE WERE PRACTICED. HE SAID THAT WESTERN REPS
IN THE PAST HAVE STATED THAT UNDER SC.1, SOME ELEMENTS
OF COLD FIRE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF
THE ASSOCIATED GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY; BUT IF THE WEST IS
WILLING TO NOTIFY SOME ELEMENTS, WHY NOT THE ENTIRE
ACTIVITY?
5. LATER IN THE SESSION, U.S. REP HANSEN RESPONDED TO
THE SOVIET INTERVENTION, REPEATING THE TWO CONDITIONS OF
THE MANDATE FOR DETERMINING WHEN AIR/NAVAL ACTIVITIES
SHOULD BE COVERED BY NOTIFICATION THEREBY REJECTING THE
EASTERN ARGUMENT. HANSEN ARGUED THAT THE MANDATE TERMS
ANSWERED THE SOVIET QUESTION ABOUT COLD FIRE: IT WAS
THE LAND ACTIVITY WHICH WAS TO BE NOTIFIED, AND
SUPPORTING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE
NOTIFICATION. HANSEN THEN TOOK THE OFFENSIVE, ASKING
TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EASTERN POSITION: (A)
C 0 R R E C T E D C 0 P Y (DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS)
HOW WOULD NOTIFICATION OF AIR/NAVAL MANEUVERS BE
VERIFIED (HE CITED THE UNRELIABILITY OF DEPENDENCE UPON
RADAR TRACKS TO COUNT NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT); AND (B) HOW
WOULD THE PROPOSED THRESHOLDS FOR INDEPENDENT AIR/NAVAL
ACTIVITIES AFFECT WTO FORCES (HE CITED THE FACT THAT THE
SOVIET KIEV CLASS CARRIERS CARRIED ONLY 14 YAK-36
AIRCRAFT AND PROBABLY WOULDN'T MEET THE THRESHOLD).
6. U.S. REP GALASSI PRESENTED AGREED NATO DEFINITION
FOR "GARRISON" (I.E., THE SOVIET DEFINITION FOR "VOENNYY
GORODOK", BUT WITHOUT MENTIONING THE WORDS "VOENNYY
GORODOK"), BOTH IN RUSSIAN AND IN ENGLISH, TO EXPLAIN
THE WESTERN OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. FOR THE RECORD,
THAT DEFINITION AS GIVEN IS:
"A GARRISON IS AN AREA HAVING BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES
LOCATED IN IT AND DESIGNED FOR ACCOMMODATING ONE OR
SEVERAL MILITARY UNITS, INSTALLATIONS, MILITARY TRAINING
SCHOOLS AND ENTERPRISES. IT CONSISTS OF
OFFICES/BARRACKS, EQUIPMENT AND HOUSING AREAS. THE
STAFFS, BARRACKS, PARADE GROUNDS, TRAINING CLASSROOMS,
GUARD ROOMS, SOLDIERS' MESSES, CLUBS AND DISPENSARIES
ARE LOCATED IN THE OFFICE/BARRACKS AREA. THE PARKS WITH
COMBAT AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, STORAGE FACILITIES, AND
OTHER SPECIAL INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED IN THE EQUIPMENT
AREA. QUARTERS FOR OFFICERS, SHORE-BASED WARRANT
OFFICERS, WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES, AS WELL AS AMENITIES,
ARE LOCATED IN THE HOUSING AREA. TRAINING FIELDS, LIVE
FIRE RANGES, TEST RANGES AND TANK AND VEHICLE DRIVING
RANGES ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE GARRISON."
END
60
SECRET
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SUBJECT: REMARKS BY MEMBER OF USDEL IN WORKING GROUP B
- ON MAY 21, 1985
1. CDE VI - 034
2. TEXT OF U.S. STATEMENT DELIVERED ON MAY 21 BY
PRISCILLA H. GALASSI, MEMBER, USDEL, FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
- THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED ADDRESSES
THREE TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE THE FOCUS
OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE: SPECIFICALLY, OUT-OF-GARRISON
LAND ACTIVITIES, MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES AND AMPHIBIOUS
ACTIVITIES. IN SO DOING, IT GOES SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND
THE LIMITED NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH CALL FOR THE MANDATORY NOTIFICA-
TION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND NONBINDING COMMIT-
MENTS TO NOTIFY SMALLER SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS AND
MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS. THE FINAL ACT'S DISTINCTION
BETWEEN, AND DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF, MAJOR MILITARY
MANEUVERS AND MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AT TIMES HAS
CAUSED UNNECESSARY CONFUSION; FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN BOTH A
MANEUVER AND A MOVEMENT TOGETHER ARE COMPONENTS OF THE
SAME OVERALL MILITARY ACTIVITY. IT ALSO HAS CREATED THE
POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THE AGREEMENT BY ARBITRARILY
DESIGNATING A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATION AS A TYPE
OF ACTIVITY FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS NOT MANDATORY.
AND FINALLY, IT COMPLICATES THE TASK OF QUICKLY DETERMIN-
ING WHETHER OR NOT A STATE HAS COMPLIED WITH THE FINAL
ACT'S REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS
BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING MANEUVERS
FROM MOVEMENTS AND OTHER TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITY
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ON-SITE OBSERVERS OR INSPECTORS.
MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED INCLUDES ALL THESE DIFFERENT
TYPES OF MILITARY ENDEAVORS IN THE BROADER TERM MILITARY
ACTIVITY; THUS, THE THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFYING THEM ARE
IDENTICAL AND THE DIFFICULT TASK OF DISTINGUISHING
BETWEEN THEM IS ELIMINATED.
- THE SIMPLICITY AND EXACTITUDE OF THIS APPROACH IS
COMPLEMENTED BY THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WHICH
ESTABLISHES THE CRITERION FOR DETERMINING WHEN MILITARY
ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME
LOCATIONS AND ARE THEREFORE SUBJECT TO MANDATORY NOTIFI-
CATION. MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED PROVIDES THAT "EACH
PARTICIPATING STATE THAT PLANS TO CARRY OUT A MILITARY
ACTIVITY, THAT IS, AN OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITY, A
MUBILIZATION ACTIVITY, OR AN AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY, IN THE
ZONE, WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION 45 DAYS BEFORE SUCH
ACTIVITY BEGINS."
- AT FIRST GLANCE, THE TERM "OUT-OF-GARRISON" WOULD
APPEAR TO BE SELF-EVIDENT; AND IT IS, ONCE THE TERM
"GARRISON" HAS BEEN DEFINED. AFTER ALL, A MILITARY UNIT
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
IS OUT-OF-GARRISON WHEN IT IS OUT OF GARRISON. THE
CRUCIAL WORD CLEARLY IS "GARRISON." AMERICAN DICTION-
ARIES DEFINE "GARRISON" AS "A MILITARY POST, ESPECIALLY
ONE PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED." THE WORD "GARRISON" THUS
MEANS FACILITIES LOCATED WITHIN A FENCE OR WALL WHERE
TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT ARE HOUSED. IF ENGLISH WERE THE
ONLY OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, THE TASK OF
DEFINING GARRISON WOULD BE STRAIGHTFORWARD. OUR TASK IS
NOT SO SIMPLE, HOWEVER, FOR WE MUST FACE THE REALITY THAT
THERE ARE SIX OFFICIAL LANGUAGES AT THIS CONFERENCE.
ANYONE WHO HAS EVER WORKED WITH TRANSLATIONS KNOWS HOW
DIFFICULT IT CAN BE TO RENDER THE EXACT SHADE OF MEANING
OF A WORD FROM ONE LANGUAGE TO ANOTHER. EVEN WHEN COG-
NATES EXIST, THEY ARE ALL TOO OFTEN MISLEADING. SUCH
COGNATES OFTEN TURN OUT TO BE "FAUXAMIS" ("FALSE
FRIENDS") AS THE FRENCH SO APTLY CALL THEM. THE RUSSIAN
COGNATE FOR "GARRISON" -- "GARNIZON" -- IS SUCH A FAUX
AMI. THE RUSSIAN WORD "GARNIZON" IS COMMONLY USED TO
REFER TO AN AREA BOUNDED BY SEVERAL TOWNS, OR EVEN A
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA DESIGNATED BY A MAJOR MILITARY COMMAN-
DER SUCH AS THE COMMANDER OF A MILITARY DISTRICT. IN
CONTRAST, THE WORD "GARRISON" IN ENGLISH HAS A FAR MORE
PHYSICALLY RESTRICTED MEANING. USUALLY SEPARATED FROM
THE SURROUNDING TOWN OR COUNTRYSIDE BY A FENCE OR WALL,
IT IS THE PLACE WHERE THE TROOPS, OFFICERS AND OTHER
PERSONNEL ARE BILLETED AND FED, AND WHERE CLASSROOMS,
PARADE GROUNDS, EQUIPMENT AND STORAGE FACILITIES ARE
LOCATED. TROOPS, THEREFORE, LEAVE THE GARRISON TO
CONDUCT MANEUVERS.
USING THE RUSSIAN CONCEPT OF "GARNIZON" WITH ITS
ADMINISTRATIVE, AS OPPOSED TO PURELY PHYSICAL, SENSE OF
BOUNDARY, COULD CONCEIVABLY EXTEND TO LARGE AREAS WHICH
WOULD INCLUDE TRAINING AREAS, ASSEMBLY POINTS, ETC.
THIS DEFINITIONAL CONCEPT, IF ADOPTED, WOULD ALLOW LARGE
CONTINGENTS OF TROOPS TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
"OUT-OF-GARRISON" WHICH COULD WELL BE PERCEIVED AS
THREATENING AND YET NOT BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AS
"OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITIES." IN FACT, IF THE
RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATIVE COGNATE WERE PUSHED TO ITS
ULTIMATE, SOVIET TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT COULD MOVE DOZENS
OF MILES FROM THEIR BARRACKS WITHOUT HAVING LEFT THE
"GARNIZON."
- THERE IS A WAY OUT OF THIS DILEMMA, HOWEVER. THAT
IS FOR THE SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED TO PROVIDE A
DEFINITION OF WHAT THEY MEAN BY THE WORD "GARRISON" AND
THEREBY TO GIVE INCREASED MEANING AND PRECISION TO THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. BECAUSE I HAVE EMPHASIZED THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "GARRISON" AND ITS FALSE RUSSIAN
COGNATE "GARNIZON," I NOW WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THIS
DEFINITION FIRST IN RUSSIAN FOR DISCUSSION IN THE
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
WORKING GROUP AND TO SUGGEST THAT IT BE ADOPTED BY THE
RUSSIAN SPEAKING DELEGATIONS AS THE WEST'S INTENDED
MEANING FOR "GARRISON." IT READS AS FOLLOWS: (READ
RUSSIAN DEFINITION).
- FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE NOT RUSSIAN SPEAKERS,
PERMIT ME TO SHARE WITH YOU AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF
WHAT I HAVE JUST READ IN RUSSIAN:
- "A GARRISON IS AN AREA HAVING BUILDINGS AND
STRUCTURES LOCATED IN IT AND DESIGNED FOR ACCOMMODATING
ONE OR SEVERAL MILITARY UNITS, INSTALLATIONS, MILITARY
TRAINING SCHOOLS AND ENTERPRISES. IT CONSISTS OF
OFFICES/BARRACKS, EQUIPMENT AND HOUSING AREAS. THE
STAFFS, BARRACKS, PARADE GROUNDS, TRAINING CLASSROOMS,
GUARD ROOMS, SOLDIERS' MESSES, CLUBS AND DISPENSARIES
ARE LOCATED IN THE OFFICE/BARRACKS AREA. THE PARKS WITH
COMBAT AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, STORAGE FACILITIES, AND
OTHER SPECIAL INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED IN THE EQUIPMENT
AREA. QUARTERS FOR OFFICERS, SHORE-BASED WARRANT OFFI-
CERS, WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES, AS WELL AS AMENITIES, ARE
LOCATED IN THE HOUSING AREA. TRAINING FIELDS, LIVE FIRE
RANGES, TEST RANGES AND TANK AND VEHICLE DRIVING RANGES
ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE GARRISON."
- THIS DEFINITION DESCRIBES OFFICES, TROOP BILLETING
AND FACILITIES FOR HOUSING COMBAT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT --
IN OTHER WORDS, THE GARRISONS, WHERE TROOPS ARE NORMALLY
STATIONED IN THE CDE ZONE IN PEACETIME. AGREEMENT TO
THIS DEFINITION IN ALL SIX LANGUAGES WOULD ENSURE THAT
THERE ARE NO LINGUISTIC AND CONSEQUENTLY FUNCTIONAL
MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE TERM "OUT-OF-GARRISON." WE
BELIEE THAT IF WE COULD REACH A LINGUISTIC ACCORD, THIS
CONFERENCE WILL HAVE TAKEN AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD IN
DEFINING AND ULTIMATELY AGREEING UPON A MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE NOTIFICATION MEASURE
ACCEPTABLE TO ALL 35 PARTICIPANTS.
END TEXT.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 21, 1985
1. CDE VI - 025
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: THE CAUCUS REVIEWED THREE EASTERN NOTIFICA-
TION PROPOSALS AND FOCUSED ATTENTION ON TACTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES. AMBASSADOR GOODBY FRAMED THE
DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THAT THE WEST WELCOME THE
GREATER PRECISION IN THE EASTERN POSITION BUT CRITICIZE
THE VARIOUS OMISSIONS, ERRORS, AND INCONSISTENCIES OF
THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AND COMPARE THE THREE TO THE MORE
SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE CAUCUS
DIVIDED OVER THE QUESTION OF TABLING AS NATIONAL PRESEN-
TATIONS THE FRG AND UK ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS, SINCE THE
CAUCUS HAD NOT REACHED CONSENSUS ON THEIR CONTENTS.
AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO REVIEW THEM AGAIN ALONG WITH
THE DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS PAPER, ALTHOUGH THE MOOD
WAS RELATIVELY DISHARMONIOUS. IN CONTACTS, THE EAST HAS
ALREADY STARTED ASKING FOR A WESTERN RESPONSE ON NUF NOW
THAT THE WARSAW PACT STATES HAVE PROVIDED DETAILS ON
CONCRETE CSBM'S. END SUMMARY.
4. WARSAW PACT NOTIFICATION PAPERS: THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE DAY, BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION
FOCUS ON BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES TO THE
EAST'S TABLING OF THREE WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS ON LAND,
AIR, AND NAVAL NOTIFICATIONS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY ARGUED
THAT ONE SOVIET OBJECTIVE MAY BE TO PUT THE ONUS ON THE
WEST TO PRODUCE PAPERS ON NUF IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST'S
DETAILED PAPERS ON NOTIFICATION. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS
ALSO WOULD LIKE TO COMPLICATE THE WEST'S POSITION ON
NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. NATO COULD USE
THE SOVIET PAPERS TO ITS ADVANTAGE, GOODBY ADDED, BY
FOCUSING DISCUSSION ON NOTIFICATION OF LAND MANEUVERS AND
BY RAISING VARIOUS OMISSIONS, ERRORS, OR INCONSISTENCIES
THAT THE MILREPS AND OTHERS MAY FIND IN THE THREE PAPERS.
GOODBY ADVOCATED THAT THE WEST SHOULD WELCOME THE
INCREASED PRECISION IN THE EAST'S PAPERS, BUT CAUTIONED
THAT THE WARSAW PACT'S PROVISIONS ON NOTIFICATION ARE
NOT A STEP FORWARD. GOODBY RECOMMENDED FOUR AREAS FOR
STUDY: 1) FAILURE OF THE EASTERN PAPERS TO GO MUCH
BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN TERMS OF INFORMATION
REQUIRED TO BE PROVIDED IN NOTIFICATIONS; 2) COMPLEXITY
AND POTENTIAL FOR LOOPHOLES IN THE EASTERN DISTINCTION
BETWEEN MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS, IN CONTRAST TO THE
SIMPLICITY AND COMPREHENSIVENESS OF NATO'S OUT-OF-
GARRISON PROVISIONS; 3) THE PERIOD OF TIME TO PROVIDE
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION (E.G., EAST'S 30-DAY REQUIREMENT
REPRESENTS NO REAL ADVANCE BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT), AS WELL AS LOOPHOLES IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR
LAND NOTIFICATIONS; AND 4) THE TOTAL OMISSION OF VERIFI-
CATION PROVISIONS IN THE EASTERN PAPERS. GOODBY STATED
THAT CRITICAL EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED NOT ONLY
IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, BUT ALSO IN THE
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VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION WORKING GROUPS. GOODBY
RECOMMENDED THAT THE THREE WARSAW PACT PAPERS BE REVIEWED
IN THE MILITARY ADVISORS GROUP ON A PRIORITY BASIS.
FINALLY, HE NOTED THAT THE DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN
PROPOSALS COULD HELP THE CONFERENCE FOCUS ATTENTION ON
CONCRETE CSBM'S, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ALLEVIAT-
ING PRESSURE TO INTRODUCE NATO'S ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS.
CITRON (FRG), EDES (UK), MEVIK (NORWAY), DELWORTH
(CANADA), CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), MELLBIN (DENMARK),
CIARRAPICO (ITALY), GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), OZGUL (TURKEY),
AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) ALL SUPPORTED GOODBY'S ASSESS-
MENT AND SUGGESTED APPROACH. THEIR COMMENTS GENERALLY
REFLECTED A BELIEF THAT COMPARISONS OF THE THREE EASTERN
PAPERS WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED WOULD BE TO THE WEST'S ADVAN-
TAGE AND THAT THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP SHOULD GIVE
THESE PAPERS A HIGH PRIORITY. MOREOVER, IT WAS AGREED
THAT THE MILITARY GROUP'S REVIEW SHOULD DEVELOP THE BEST
ARGUMENTS TO USE AGAINST THE THREE PROPOSALS. CIARRAPICO
AND MELLBIN DIFFERED WITH GOODBY'S TACTICAL RECOMMENDA-
TION TO APPORTION CRITICAL COMMENT AMONG THE NOTIFICA-
TION, VERIFICATION, AND INFORMATION WORKING GROUPS AND
INSTEAD ADVOCATED FOCUSING THEM IN THE NOTIFICATION
WORKING GROUP ALONE. BUWALDA LED GENERAL OPINION IN
OPPOSITION TO THAT VIEW, ARGUING THAT SUCH AN APPROACH
WOULD CONFORM TO SOVIET VIEWS ON REPACKAGING THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE NATO PROPOSALS ON INFORMATION AND VERIFICA-
TION INTO THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES. THIS DISCUSSION
WAS INCONCLUSIVE; THUS, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY CHARGED
THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP WITH CONDUCTING AN URGENT
AND COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE THREE EASTERN PAPERS.
5. CAUCUS PAPERS: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY
ADVISORS' GROUP, NAMIESNIEWSKI (CANADA), INFORMALLY
REPORTED ON THE MILITARY'S REVIEW OF THE FRG MEASURE 2
AND UK MEASURE 3 PAPERS. THE DANISH PAPER ON AMPHIBIOUS
LANDINGS WAS REPORTED AS STILL UNDER MILREP CONSIDERA-
TION. IN PRINCIPLE, THE FRG AND UK PAPERS WERE CLEARED
WITH RESPECT TO CONSISTENCY WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED, EXCEPT
FOR MAJOR DUTCH RESERVATIONS, RAISED AGAIN BY BUWALDA IN
THE CAUCUS. WITH RESPECT TO THE FRG PAPER, HE CRITICIZED
ITS USE OF JUST ONE QUARTER OF A CALENDAR YEAR; REGARDING
THE UK PAPER, HE CRITICIZED ITS USE OF AN EXCEPTIONALLY
LARGE EXERCISE AS AN EXAMPLE OF MEASURE 3, SINCE IT GIVES
TOO MUCH EMPHASIS TO NUMERICAL RATHER THAN STRUCTURAL
INFORMATION. CITRON (FRG) AND EDES (UK) BOTH EXPRESSED A
STRONG INTEREST IN TABLING THEIR RESPECTIVE PAPERS AS
NATIONAL PRESENTATIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. MEVIK (NORWAY), DELWORTH (CANADA), AND
CIARRAPICO (ITALY), ARGUED THAT THE FRG AND UK PAPERS
SHOULD BE TABLED WITHOUT DELAY AS OFFICIAL WORKING GROUP
DOCUMENTS. IN OPPOSITION, BUWALDA AND ALLENDESALAZAR
(SPAIN) ARGUED THAT THE CAUCUS SHOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO
REVIEW THE PAPERS AGAIN, SINCE TABLING THEM, EVEN AS
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SUPPLEMENTS TO NATIONAL INTERVENTIONS, PROVIDES AN INTER-
PRETATION OF A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION (I.E.,
SC.1/AMPLIFIED), WHICH REQUIRES CAUCUS CONSENSUS. MORE-
OVER, THEIR POSITION WAS UNDERSCORED BY DEBATE OVER
WHETHER TO TABLE THE ILLUSTRATIVE CAUCUS PAPERS AS
OFFICIAL WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS WHICH WOULD LEND THEM
GREATER STATUS. MELLBIN AND EDES FAVORED NUMBERING THE
PAPERS AS WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY
SOUGHT TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THIS "CUL DE SAC" BY NOTING
THAT THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS WOULD DEMONSTRATE HOW THE
NATO PROPOSALS ARE MORE SOLID AND SUBSTANTIVE THAN THE
EAST'S POSITION, PARTICULARLY ITS THREE NEW NOTIFICATION
INITIATIVES. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE FRG AND UK PRESEN-
TATIONS BE TABLED AS NATIONAL PAPERS WITHOUT OFFICIAL
STATUS. GOODBY AGREED WITH THE DUTCH ARGUMENTS TO REVIEW
THE PAPERS AGAIN, SINCE HE SAW NO NEED TO TABLE THEM
IMMEDIATELY. ADDITIONALLY, THE CAUCUS HAD YET TO ADDRESS
THE QUESTION OF TACTICS, I.E., WHICH WORKING GROUPS WOULD
BEST SERVE NATO'S INTERESTS AND GIVE THE PAPERS THEIR
GREATEST EFFECT? THE CAUCUS CHAIRMAN SUMMED UP THE RELA-
TIVELY DISHARMONIOUS DEBATE AND STATED THAT THE CAUCUS
WOULD REVIEW THE FRG AND UK PAPERS AGAIN THURSDAY, MAY
23, ON THE BASIS OF BOTH CONTENT AND TACTICS.
6. OTHER BUSINESS: THE CAUCUS AGREED TO ALLOW THE
MILREPS TO COMPLETE THEIR REVIEW OF THE DANISH AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING PAPER AND THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE THREE EASTERN
INITIATIVES AS THEIR PENULTIMATE PRIORITY. WORK ON
ANOMALIES IN THE NATO PACKAGE WAS POSTPONED.
7. CONTACTS: OZGUL (TURKEY) REPORTED THAT THE
ROMANIANS SAID THAT THE NNA WERE PREPARING A JOINT STUDY
OF THE ROMANIAN MAY 14 INITIATIVE; POSITIVE COMMENTS HAD
ALREADY BEEN SOLICITED FROM OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS,
ACCORDING TO THE ROMANIANS. MEVIK (NORWAY) NOTED THAT
GRINEVSKY HAD VOICED THE EXPECTED EASTERN LINE THAT NOW
IT IS UP TO THE WEST TO TABLE SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS ON
NUF. CITRON (FRG) HAD ALSO MET GRINEVSKY AND REPORTED
THAT THE SOVIETS APPEAR HOPEFUL FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME
AT THE CDE. GRINEVSKY HAD SAID HE BELIEVED REAL PROGRESS
WOULD BE MADE WHEN DRAFTING BEGAN, WHICH SHOULD BE SOON,
SINCE ONE COULD NOT "WAIT ENDLESSLY FOR THE NNA'S."
GRINEVSKY ALSO TOLD CITRON THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT GET
EVERYTHING IT WANTS IN MEASURE 1; CITRON WARNED GRINEVSKY
THAT THE CONTINUING EASTERN DENIAL OF THE MADRID MANDATE
WILL HAVE VERY NEGATIVE RAMIFICATIONS IN CAPITALS.
AMBASSADOR GOODBY GAVE A BRIEF READOUT ON THE SHULTZ-
GROMYKO MEETING.
8. THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING WILL BE HELD ON THURSDAY,
MAY 23.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP A, MAY 22
REF: STOCKHOLM 3756
1. CDE VI - 036.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY WAS
HIGHLIGHTED BY THREE WESTERN INTERVENTIONS POCKETING
(AND EXPLOITING TO WESTERN ADVANTAGE) SOVIET ACCEPTANCE
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND
VERIFICATION, AND SOVIET REACTION TO SUCH EXPLOITATION.
THE SOVIET REP FIRMLY REJECTED MEASURE 1 AND 5 OF SC.1
AND MADE CLEAR THAT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION WERE
ACCEPTABLE ONLY AS MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING THE
NOTIFICATION MEASURE. (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4-5 BELOW).
ANOTHER HIGHLIGHT WAS THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR'S HELPFUL
OPENING INTERVENTION SUPPORTING THE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION ON FORCE STRUCTURE, IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER,
AND OF VERIFICATION MEANS AVAILABLE TO ALL 35 STATES.
(SUMMARIZED IN PARA 6 BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. FRENCH REP NOTED THAT WHILE POSITIONS WERE NOT CLOSE
ON THE ISSUE OF INFORMATION, THE PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTED
BY ALL AND THEREFORE OUR TASK IS TO CRYSTALLIZE BASIC
CONCEPTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION OF THE PLACE AND
FORM OF VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION BE SET ASIDE FOR
THE TIME BEING, AND INSTEAD WE SHOULD FOCUS ON
SUBSTANCE. HE ASKED WHAT THE EASTERN AND ROMANIAN
PROPOSALS ENVISAGED WITH REGARD TO INFORMATION. THE
ITALIAN REP NOTED THAT EVEN IF INDICATIONS WERE
FRAGMENTARY AND LIMITED, IT APPEARED THAT CONDITIONS ARE
BEING SET FOR MOVING THE SIDES CLOSER TOGETHER REGARDING
INFORMATION. HE NOTED THAT IT IS AGREED, FOR EXAMPLE,
THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INFORMATION IS NECESSARY TO
RENDER CSBMS EFFECTIVE, AND THAT THE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION MUST BE RELATED TO OTHER CSBMS. HE
SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD NOW TURN TO HOW THE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION SHOULD INTERACT WITH OTHER
CSBMS, LEAVING ASIDE WHAT NAME (I.E., AN INDEPENDENT
MEASURE OR OTHERWISE) TO GIVE SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION.
THE SPANISH REP INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH MANY EASTERN
STATEMENTS REGARDING VERIFICATION (E.G., VERIFICATION IS
NOT AN END IN ITSELF; VERIFICATION IS RELATED TO THE
CONTENT OF THE CSBMS) TO HIGHLIGHT AREAS OF AGREEMENT
AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN POSITIONS.
HE CHALLENGED THE EAST TO PRESENT VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS TO ACCOMPANY THEIR NEW NOTIFICATION PROPOSALS.
5. SOVIET REP TOOK ISSUE WITH APPARENT WESTERN
ASSUMPTIONS THAT EAST AND WEST WERE MOVING CLOSER
TOGETHER REGARDING INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. HE
CRITICIZED IN PARTICULAR AND AT LENGTH THE UK
AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION OF WORKING
GROUP AB (REFTEL) FOR CLAIMING THAT CONSENSUS WAS
EMERGING AROUND AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD COMBINE NUF WITH
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THE SIX MEASURES OF SC.1. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO MAKE
CLEAR THE SOVIET POSITION. IN BRIEF, THE POINTS MADE BY
THE SOVIET REP INCLUDED:
-- REJECTION OF INDEPENDENT MEASURES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION AS EMBODIED IN MEASURES 1
AND 5 OF SC.1. "NATO SAYS THAT INFORMATION AND
VERIFICATION DEMAND A CERTAIN INDEPENDENCE AND
SELF-CONTAINED CHARACTER. WE CATEGORICALLY REJECT THIS."
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT EXCLUDES INFORMATION AND
VERIFICATION FROM THE SET OF CSBMS WHICH WE ARE TO BUILD
UPON AND DEVELOP. THEY ARE ONLY MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTING
CSBMS.
-- THE CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION AS PRESENTED IN SC.1
INFRINGES UPON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY BECAUSE IT FOISTS AN
ARBITRARY VERIFICATION UPON STATES; IT INVOLVES A
CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTROL OVER MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF A
STATE WHETHER OR NOT THOSE ACTIVITIES POSE A THREAT.
-- THE WESTERN SYSTEM OF INSPECTION, FROM LAND VEHICLES
OR BY AIR, OPENS VAST POSSIBILITIES OF BROAD AND
LEGALLY-ESTABLISHED METHODS OF OPENING THE TERRITORY OF
THE USSR TO THE URALS, GIVING A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO
THE U.S. AND CANADA.
-- THE SOVIET APPROACH IS REALISTIC. THE SOVIETS
SUPPORT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR IMPLEMENTING
ADEQUATE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION. THE VOLUME AND SCALE
OF INFORMATION IS DETERMINED BY THE CHARACTER AND
CONTENT OF CSBMS, I.E. NOTIFICATION.
-- INFORMATION MUST BE PART AND PARCEL OF NOTIFICATION.
WE COULD WRITE DOWN A LIST OF SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR
INFORMATION AND MEET THEM.
-- IF WE WERE TO ACCEPT MEASURES 1 AND 5 NOW, BEFORE
AGREEING ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE, HOW
DO WE KNOW THEY WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR THE NOTIFICATION
MEASURE? FOR EXAMPLE, MEASURE 5 EXCLUDES INSPECTORS
FROM NAVAL BASES; SINCE THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES THE
NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE WEST COULD ARGUE
THERE WERE NO MEANS FOR VERIFYING SUCH MANEUVERS.
6. THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR OPENED THE MEETING WITH A
VERY HELPFUL STATEMENT CHALLENGING SEVERAL SOVIET
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND
VERIFICATION. POINTS MADE INCLUDED:
-- THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN
INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE.
-- AUSTRIA PUBLISHES INFORMATION ON ITS FORCE
STRUCTURE. THE LOGIC OF THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT
MILITARILY STRONGER STATES WOULD BE MORE ADVERSELY
AFFECTED BY THE PUBLICATION OF SUCH INFORMATION -- A
LOGIC THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR REJECTED.
-- THERE ARE GOOD ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE
REGARDING WHETHER INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION WERE
INDEPENDENT MEASURES. BUT HIS DELEGATION WAS MORE
INTERESTED IN RESULTS; IF THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
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WERE MORE EASILY ACCEPTABLE IF ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER
MEASURES, SO BE IT.
-- HE DISAGREED THAT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION COULD
BE DISCUSSED ONLY AFTER THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTIFICATION
MEASURES WERE AGREED. IN ANY -CASE, THE GENERAL CONTENT
OF NOTIFICATION WAS ALREADY KNOWN IN SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO
PERMIT DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF INFORMATION AND
VERIFICATION.
-- IF THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DOES
NOT PERMIT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, THEN THE LACK OF
TRUST INTENSIFIES; IN THAT CASE, VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS INCREASE ACCORDINGLY.
-- NTM IMPLIES THE USE OF SATELLITES; THEREFORE PARAS 1
AND 2 OF MEASURE 5 APPLY ONLY TO THE U.S. AND USSR.
THIS IS NOT NECESSARY FOR A CDE AGREEMENT AND EMPHASIZES
THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES AMONG THE 35 STATES. NTM
CANNOT BE PART OF THE NORMAL VERIFICATION PROCESS OF
CSCE. AUSTRIA IS INTERESTED IN OTHER FORMS OF
APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION WHICH WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ALL
STATES.
END
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SECRET
SUBJECT: CDE: SPECIAL NATO CAUCUS -- OPEN-ENDED
MEETING OF MAY 22, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3317, B) STOCKHOLM 3316
1. CDE VI - 030
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. DISCUSSION OF THE UK CONSTRAINT PAPER WAS
DIVIDED INTO TWO SECTIONS: FIRST, ON WHETHER A CON-
STRAINTS MEASURE IS NEEDED FOR THIS SESSION, AND SECOND,
ON THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED MEASURE.
AMBASSADOR GOODBY ARGUED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS IN A GOOD
POSITION AND DOES NOT FACE MOUNTING PRESSURE FROM THE
NNA OR THE SOVIETS TO PRODUCE ONE. MOST ALLIES STRONGLY
DIFFERED WITH THE U.S. AND FELT WORK ON CONSTRAINTS
SHOULD PROCEED IN ORDER TO HAVE A CONSTRAINT MEASURE IN
HAND IF THE NEED ARISES. WHILE THE ALLIES AGREED THAT
THERE IS NO PRESSURE AT PRESENT FROM THE NNA OR THE EAST,
SOME VOICED CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE
QUICKLY. TURNING TO SUBSTANCE, AMBASSADOR GOODBY NOTED,
INTER ALIA, THAT THE UK PAPER PREJUDICES MEASURE 4
(OBSERVATION). OTHER ALLIES ARGUED THAT THE UK PAPER
ALSO WEAKENS MEASURES 1 (INFORMATION), 2 (FORECASTS), AND
5 (VERIFICATION), AND LACKS BOTH A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER
AND PROVISIONS FOR SHORT-NOTICE CRISIS MANAGEMENT,
ALERTS, AND RAPID REINFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES. ALL AGREED
THE PAPER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO BRUSSELS FOR REVIEW.
END SUMMARY.
4. INTRODUCTION: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, VAN GORP
(NETHERLANDS), ASKED EDES (UK) TO SUMMARIZE THE CONTENTS
OF THE UK CONSTRAINTS PAPER. EDES RECOMMENDED THAT THE
DISCUSSION BE HELD IN TWO PARTS: FIRST, WHETHER A CON-
STRAINTS MEASURE IS NEEDED THIS SESSION; AND SECOND, ON
THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTRAINT MEASURE
(REF A).
5. ALLIANCE POSTURE ON CONSTRAINTS -- U.S. POSITION:
AMBASSADOR GOODBY BEGAN THE DEBATE BY REPEATING WHAT HE
HAD SAID IN OSLO ON CONSTRAINTS (REF B). HE NOTED THAT
THE ALLIANCE IS IN A GOOD POSITION AND THAT PRESSURE FOR
A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE HAD DIMINISHED IN THE FIFTH
SESSION. GOODBY ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO SUBSTAN-
TIVE INTEREST IN A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE BUT MAY TABLE A
NEW ONE TO ALIGN THEMSELVES TACTICALLY WITH THE NNA ON
THE ISSUE. THE NNA, HE SAID, HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT
CONSTRAINTS FOR A LONG TIME AND APPEAR TO HAVE NO IMME-
DIATE PROSPECTS FOR PRODUCING A CONSTRAINTS PAPER.
G00DBY ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY FOR THE NNA TO
SWING THEIR SUPPORT TO THE SOVIETS, SINCE CONSTRAINTS
INVOLVE THEIR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS WHICH COULD BE
NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY THE TYPE OF FUTURE CONSTRAINT
MEASURE THE SOVIETS MAY BE LIKELY TO TABLE. THEREFORE,
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GOODBY STATED, NATO IS NOT PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE ON
THE ISSUE. FURTHERMORE, THE ALLIANCE HAS REGULARLY
STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A BALANCED AND EQUIT-
ABLE CONSTRAINT IF ONE COULD BE DEVELOPED. SUCH AN OPEN
ATTITUDE IS A GOOD TACTIC, GOODBY SUGGESTED, BECAUSE TIME
IS ON OUR SIDE. CONSTRAINT MEASURES WILL BE COMPLEX AND
DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND MAY EVEN LEAD TO AN IMPASSE
BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE NNA. AS THE CONFERENCE DRAWS
CLOSER TO VIENNA, THE LACK OF TIME WILL BE A MAJOR
INHIBITING FACTOR TO DEVELOPING CONSTRAINTS. THE END
GAME, GOODBY EMPHASIZED, WOULD BE NO TIME TO DEAL WITH
CONSTRAINT MEASURES. IF THE YUGOSLAVS, FOR EXAMPLE, HOLD
UP AN AGREEMENT A LA MALTESE OVER CONSTRAINTS, IT IS NOT
CLEAR WHETHER THE PRESSURE WOULD BE ON NATO RATHER THAN
ON THEM. MANY WOULD LIKE TO SEE NATO MOVE ON
CONSTRAINTS, AND PRESSURE ON CONSTRAINTS MAY DEVELOP
WHEN WE CONSIDER PROCEDURAL ISSUES. HOWEVER, GOODBY
CONCLUDED, THAT WOULD BE A QUITE DIFFERENT MATTER WHICH
NATO COULD HANDLE WITHOUT HAVING TO TABLE A WESTERN
CONSTRAINTS PAPER. IT WOULD BE FAR WORSE IF NATO WERE
TO TABLE A PAPER AND SUBSEQUENTLY BE OUTMANEUVERED BY
SOVIET TABLING OF A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT.
6. ALLIANCE POSTURE ON CONSTRAINTS -- ALLIED VIEWS:
GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), LIAN (NORWAY), CITRON (FRG),
PAPADAKIS (GREECE), FUENTES (SPAIN), VAN DER GRAAF
(NETHERLANDS), MELLBIN (DENMARK), DU MOULIN (BELGIUM),
AND CIARRAPICO (ITALY) UNIVERSALLY AGREED THAT WORK
SHOULD PROCEED ON CONSTRAINTS IN ORDER TO BE READY IF
AND WHEN NATO MUST STEP UP TO THIS PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH
MOST CONCURRED WITH GOODBY THAT THERE IS NO APPARENT
PRESSURE FROM EITHER THE NNA OR THE EAST AT THE MOMENT,
ALL THE ABOVE AGREED THAT NATO CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT
AVOID STARTING SERIOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS WORK ON AN AGREED
WESTERN POSITION AND TO HAVE A CONSTRAINT MEASURE THAT
NATO CAN ACCEPT AND ULTIMATELY TABLE, IF THIS BECOMES
NECESSARY. MOREOVER, THESE DELEGATIONS ARGUED THAT,
TACTICALLY, NATO NEEDS A POSITIVE POSTURE ON CONSTRAINTS
NOW IN ORDER TO NULLIFY TALK ABOUT CONSTRAINTS AMONG THE
NNA AND THE EASTERN BLOC, SOMEWHAT IN THE SAME WAY THAT
REAGAN'S OFFER ON NUF NEUTRALIZED PRESSURE ON THE ISSUE.
(COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION HOW THEY
ENVISIONED IMPLEMENTING THIS TACTIC. END COMMENT.) EDES
(UK) RHETORICALLY ASKED A CRUCIAL QUESTION REGARDING THE
EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD USE EXISTING AND FUTURE
CUNSTRAINTS MEASURES TO DEVELOP A NEW ONE ALONG SIMILAR
LINES SIMPLY TO EMBARRASS THE WEST. EDES CAUTIONED,
THEREFORE, THAT THE LONGER NATO WAS WITHOUT A POSITION,
THE MORE LIKELY IT WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIETS TO PROPOSE
SUCH A NEW CONSTRAINT MEASURE IN ADDITION TO ONE THEY
HAVE ALREADY TABLED. MOREOVER, IT WOULD NOT BE SENSIBLE
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FOR NATO TO DOEPNEND ON THE NNA TO
REMAIN INDEFINITELY NNA ION
SEE PROGRESS NATO NEEDS THEIR UNIQUE
PREPAREDOIFRTHETNNA
TO THE. CONFERENCE. FCIT COALESCE WHAT PRICE, EDES CONSTRAINT
I THE
ASKED, MWOULDE
F NATO I S UNPREPARED,
GAME
MAINTAINEUNADSUPPORT
SIES ASK RWOULDPTHE WESTCONSTRAINT
AND WHAT PRICE
IN THIS PERIOD? WELL
CONSTRAINTS
AS BRUSSELS TO THE TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE NEED TO ACT
QUICKLY REPLIED DTHANY AT ACCEPTABLE
GOODBY R
COLLUSION ON CONSTRAINTS WERE NOT VERY LIKELY SINCE THE
NNA WERE DEEPLY DIVIDED SUBSTANTIVELY ON THE ISSUE;
ROLE
THEIR NOTED
ADDITIONALLY, THEY
IF THEY JOINED
THAT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO HANDLE THE NNA WITHOUT
FAR
HAVING A NATO CTOSWORKNON IT CONSTRAINTS
MORE EFFECTIVE ARE A PROBLEM
THAN
AND EANTHEM STISW
CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) PROVIDE
NATO (CANADA)
PROPOSAL. O
WERE THE ONLY ALLIES TO STRONGLY SUBSCRIBE TO THE U. S.
VIEW THAT NATO SHOULD DO NO MORE THAN EXPLORE IDEAS.
CUTILEIRO HEARTILY AGREED WITH GOODBY THAT THE WEST
THE MEASURE
SHOULD NOT BCONRAINTS
FUTURE, ESPECIALLY ACT.
7. UK CONSTRAINTS PAPER -- SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS: EDES
(UK) NOTED THAT MOST CAUCUS MEMBERS PROVIDED INITIAL
SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS IN OSLO, MAY 2-3 (SEE REF B).
AMBASSADOR MILITARY G RECOMENDED THAT
B FOR REVIEW
IN E BRUSSELS THE
BE SENT T TO THE H
IN THE USUAL WAY. ON SUBSTANCE, HE STATED THAT THE
UK STILL PAPER'SNUNDERMININGESPECIALLY
CRITICAL COMMENTS
ABOUT THEOSLO
RAISED MADE
HE
THHE C CONCERNS
NOTIFICATIONS SC.1/AMPLIFIED (REF
EFFECT ON MM4 BETWEEN (OBSERVATION)
B). O OBSERVATION,
B). ON TRADE-OFFS GOODBY SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MOVE IN THE
DIRECTION OEPENALTIES
I.E., ADDING OBLIGATIONSLTOGTHEXCONTENT OF
SHHORRT NOTICE; ,
NOTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS INSPECTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE
CHARGED TO THE ANNUAL QUOTA PERMITTED UNDER MEASURE 5.
THE IDEA, GOODBY CONCLUDED, WOULD BE TO ENRICH THE NATO
AS THE CURRENT VERSION OF
PACKAGE RATHER THAN WEAKEN IT,
THE UK PAPER APPARENTLY DOES. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE),
-
ANSTIS (CPARZA,(SLIAN PAIN)r,ODIAGIOVANNID(ITALY~,FANDEMELLBIN
LANDS), ESS A (TAPARAMETER IN CRITICALLY ON THE LACK
MOREOVER,FSOME OF
STRUCTURAL
72
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
THEM NOTED THAT THE PAPER WEAKENS CONSIDERABLY THE EFFECT
OF MEASURE 4 ON MANDATORY OBSERVATION AND LENDS SUPPORT
TO THE EAST'S POSITION THAT OBSERVATION SHOULD BE LINKED
TO THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. OTHERS ADDED
THAT THE UK PAPER COULD ALSO UNDERCUT THE PROVISIONS OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED ON MEASURE 5 (VERIFICATION), AND MEASURE
2 (FORECASTS), AND EVEN MEASURE 1 (INFORMATION).
ESPARZA, LIAN, AND DI GIOVANNI, AMONG OTHERS, NOTED THAT
THE PAPER ALSO LACKS PROVISIONS FOR SHORT-NOTICE CRISIS
MANAGEMENT, ALERTS, AND RAPID REINFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.
THE CHAIR SUMMED UP BY NOTING THAT THERE WAS CONSENSUS
THAT: 1) THE PAPER NEEDS CONSIDERABLE REVISION; 2) THE
MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP IN STOCKHOLM SHOULD NOT REVIEW
THE PAPER; AND 3) THE BRITISH SHOULD SUBMIT THE PAPER TO
THE NATO MACHINERY FOR CONSIDERATION. EDES NOTED THAT
THE UK PAPER WOULD BE REWORKED AND THAT HE WOULD INFORM
THE CAUCUS OF UK VIEWS REGARDING NEXT STEPS.
END
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
SECRET
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
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SECRET 75
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
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SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP92-01168R000100010001-4
 i
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 23
1. CDE VI - 037.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DISCUSSION ON OBSERVATION AT SESSION OF
WORKING GROUP B ON MAY 23 WAS CONSTRUCTIVE. THE SWISS
AND AUSTRIANS INTERVENED TO CHALLENGE EASTERN POSITIONS
THAT NOTIFICATIONS ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST AND
THAT OBSERVATION IS DIFFERENT FROM VERIFICATION. IN THE
END, THE SOVIETS WERE FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY
OWED THE CONFERENCE THEIR VIEWS REGARDING OBSERVATION OF
AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. END SUMMARY.
4. FRG AND SPANISH REPS ADDRESSED THE NEED TO
STRENGTHEN THE OBSERVATION REGIME BY MAKING INVITATIONS
MANDATORY, BY INVITING ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO ALL
NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES AND BY PROVIDING FOR MORE CONCRETE
AND STANDARDIZED CONDITIONS. THE POLISH REP ARGUED THT
THE EAST HAD PROPOSED NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL
MANEUVERS AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS AND UNTIL
THAT QUESTION WAS RESOLVED, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO
WORK OUT ISSUES OF OBSERVATION. REFLECTING AN INHERENT
AMBIGUITY OR DILEMMA IN THE EASTERN POSITION ON
OBSERVATION, THE POLISH REP REITERATED THAT THE PURPOSE
OF OBSERVATION WAS TO FORM A JUDGMENT AS TO THE
NON-THREATENING NATURE OF AN ACTIVITY AND TO VERIFY THAT
THE ACTIVITY WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NOTIFICATION --
BUT THEN POINTED OUT THAT OBSERVERS, AS NOTED IN THE
RECENT EXPERIENCE IN OBSERVING THE SWEDISH EXERCISE
VASTGRANS, HAD DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING THE NUMERICAL
STRENGTH OF TROOPS INVOLVED IN AN ACTIVITY AND IN
DETERMINING THE TYPES OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AND UNITS
INVOLVED. THE POLISH REP CONCLUDED THAT OBSERVATION
COULD NOT PERFORM A VERIFICATION FUNCTION, AND ARGUED
THAT THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS ITELF WAS ONE WAY TO
DEMONSTRATE THE PEACEFUL INTENT OF A STATE. HE
SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE INVITING
STATE TO CONVINCE OBSERVERS OF THE PEACEFUL INTENT OF
THE ACTIVITY.
5. THE FRENCH REP BLUNTLY CRITICIZED THE POLISH REP FOR
THE LATTER'S IMPLIED POSITION THAT SINCE THE WEST
REFUSED TO PROPOSE THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF
AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE EAST WILL NOT DISCUSS
OBSERVATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS. THE FRENCH REP
CHALLENGED THE EAST TO PRESENT THEIR OWN VIEWS ON
OBSERVATION. THE SWISS REP ASKED WHAT CRITERIA THE EAST
PROPOSES THAT OBSERVERS USE IN MAKING A JUDGMENT AS TO
THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF AN ACTIVITY. HE SUGGESTED
IT IS ONLY THROUGH THE PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION
IN THE NOTIFICATION THAT SUCH A JUDGMENT COULD BE MADE,
THAT MERE PRESENCE IN THE FIELD IS NO SUBSTITUTE. THE
AUSTRIAN REP AGREED WITH THE POLISH REP'S COMMENTS
REGARDING THE DIFFICULTY OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE IN
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DETERMINING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES INVOLVED IN
AN ACTIVITY, AND ARGUED THAT THIS DEMONSTRATED THE NEED
FOR STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND INFORMATION.
6. THE SOVIET REP ARGUED THAT THE ISSUE OF WHICH
ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE
DECIDING SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE MANDATORY NATURE OF THE
INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. HE STATED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE,
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS TO MOBILIZATION ACTITIVITIES AS DEFINED IN
SC.1. "THIS WOULD BE A DIRECT THREAT TO THE
SOVIET UNION. WE WILL NOT GIVE A PROMISSORY NOTE
REGARDING THE MANDATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS UNTIL WE
KNOW WHAT ACTIVITIES OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED TO." IN
RESPONSE TO VARIOUS COMMENTS FROM OTHERS, THE SOVIET REP
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS DELEGATION WAS BOUND TO PRESENT
ITS VIEWS REGARDING THE OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 23, 1985
1. CDE VI - 038
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. A DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS PAPER, REVISED
TO REFLECT THE MILITARY ADVISORS GROUP'S CONCERNS, WILL
BE RETURNED TO COPENHAGEN FOR CONSIDERATION. THE FRG AND
UK DIFFERED OVER THE TACTICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER TO
TABLE THEIR OWN TWO PAPERS IMMEDIATELY OR WAIT A COUPLE
OF WEEKS TO EVALUATE THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THREE OTHER
PAPERS IN THE PIPELINE. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO A PROCEDURE
ENCOURAGING THE DELEGATIONS TO PROCEED WITH TABLING THEIR
PAPERS AS NATIONAL PRESENTATIONS AT ANY TIME FOLLOWING
CAUCUS REVIEW. END SUMMARY.
4. DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS PAPER: THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE DAY, MEVIK (NORWAY), ASKED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP, NAMIESNIOWSKI (CANADA), TO
REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DANISH AMPHIBIOUS
LANDINGS PAPER. NAMIESNIOWSKI NOTED THAT THE DANISH
PAPER COULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIVELY CLEARED ON THE BASIS OF
CONFORMITY WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED EVEN IN ITS AMENDED
VERSION. THE PAPER, HE EXPLAINED, GOES BEYOND THE NATO
PACKAGE WITH RESPECT TO NOTIFICATIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS
ACTIVITIES. THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP RECOMMENDED A
DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE DANES, USING FICTITIOUS DATA
FOR U.S., UK, AND EASTERN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES TO
ILLUSTRATE HOW NOTIFICATIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS
WOULD WORK IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. MELLBIN (DENMARK)
RETORTED THAT HE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND IN WHAT WAYS HIS
DELEGATION'S PAPER WENT BEYOND THE NATO PACKAGE,
ESPECIALLY SINCE THE AMENDMENTS THAT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED
EARLIER WERE INCORPORATED, ACCORDING TO MELLBIN'S
RECKONING. HE REPORTED THAT THE PAPER WOULD BE RETURNED
TO COPENHAGEN IN REVISED FORM TO REFLECT THE MILREPS'
RECOMMENDATIONS AS WELL AS THE NEW PROPOSED APPROACH.
MELLBIN CONTENDED THAT THE ORIGINAL PAPER ATTEMPTED TO
DEVELOP A CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE DEFINITION OF AMPHIBIOUS
LANDINGS AND TO DESCRIBE EXACTLY HOW NOTIFICATIONS AND
AND OBSERVATIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WOULD BE
HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF MEASURES 3
AND 4. HE PROMISED TO REPORT COPENHAGEN'S REACTIONS TO
THE CAUCUS. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SUMMARIZED THREE KEY
PROBLEMS WITH THE PAPER. FIRST, THE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON
ONE SMALL SECTION OF NOTIFICATIONS MADE IT INAPPROPRIATE
TO SERVE AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE NATO PAPER. SECOND, THE
PAPER OPENS THE WAY FOR THE EAST TO ASK AWKWARD
QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON TRANSFERS. THIRD, THE MILREPS'
CONCERN THAT THE PAPER GOES BEYOND THE NATO PACKAGE.
BUWALDA EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD NOT CONSIDER STOPPING
THE DANES FROM MAKING A NATIONAL INTERVENTION AND
CIRCULATING COPIES. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE OPPOSED GIVING
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THE PAPER ANY OTHER STATUS AS A FORMAL CAUCUS DOCUMENT.
5. CAUCUS PAPERS -- ACT II: CITRON (FRG) REPORTED THAT
HE INTENDED TO CIRCULATE IN WORKING GROUP A ON
CONSTRAINTS, THURSDAY, MAY 30, FRG WHICH SHOWS
HOW MEASURE 2 (FORECASTS) THE SECOND
QUARTER OF 1985. HE NOTED THAT IF BONN PROVIDES THE
EXERCISE CALENDAR ALSO
CITRON ARGUED THAT
( (NOTIFICATION)
OF APPARENT
3 P
(UK) STATED THAT THE UK PAPER ON MEASURE NOTED THAT
WAS ALSO READY FOR TABLING. HOWEVER, HE
PREPARING THE ILLUSTRATIVE PEOT
FUTURE USING EXAMPLES
FRPROBLEMS MAY NEED TO BE SOLVED BY
TO SHOW HOW WORKS. THE QUESTION PROBLEMS FOR
QWHETHER THE CAUCUS IS CREATING
FUTURE ISKAPAPERS. HE SUGGESTED QUICKLY
THE FRG R
THE FRAND AND U UK
TWO TO STAND BACK AND EVALUATE BOTH TACTICAL AND THA SUBSTANTIVE RAMPAPERSIOHE?ARGUEDONWO(jLDSBE LOWTKEDEA;
THE FRG AND UK
NATIONAL O EWORK. THAT HELP PACKAGE EXPRESSED
IT ON
PKAGE WOULD
SYMPATHY O HTO POSITIONS, BUT THEFTWOEPAPERSAWOULD
DBY
TACTICAL AL GROUNDS
NOT PREJUDICE H DECIIONHTOPIPELINE.
TABLE WAS UPBTOSTHERC~TRY
STATED THAT THE
E PREPARED THE
IMMEDIATELY, SAW NO
THE WORKING
PAPERS PAPER.
URGENCY TATED
THGTO TO
THAT HE COULD ACCEPT THE
AS A NATIONAL PRESENTATION
VIEW. THE A GASCHIGNARD
PAPERS BE INTRODUCED
G00DBY~S WAY.
(FRANCE) THE
(ASUPPORTED P
DAY, MEVIK (NORWAY), REPORTED THAT FIVE OF THE SIX
MEASURES OF SCI/MEASUREED 1 (WERE COVERED BRITISH PAPERYUNDERWAYG,OR
PLANNED PAPERS: MEASURE 4 (FRENCH PAPER
MEASURE 2 (FRG), MEASURE 3 (UK),.
UNDERWAY), AND MEASURE 5 (CANADIAN PAPER UNDERWAY).
MEVIK NOTED THAT THE CONSENSUS WAS TO ALLOW EACH
PESEATBAETIITS ME PAPER AS A NATIONAL
FOLLOWING
PRESENTATION, CAUCUS REVIEW.
6. CONTACTS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY BRIEFLY DESCRIBED HIS
LUNCHEON CONVERSATION OF MAY 23 WITH GRINEVSKY.
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID IN SHORT THAT HIS
HANDS WERE TIED ON AMBASSADOR NUF.
CITRON (FRG) ) DISCUSSED
BURRING, WHO SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST VIEW THE THREE
AS A,REAL GESTURE TOWARD
EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS
EARLIER IN
SC.1. CITRON
SECRET
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THE ROUND, THAT THE EAST'S LATEST DOCUMENTS WENT BEYOND
THE MADRID MANDATE AND WOULD, THEREFORE, GENERATE A VERY
NEGATIVE REACTION IN WESTERN CAPITALS. CUTILEIRO
(PORTUGAL) BROUGHT UP A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH SWISS
AMBASSADOR RITTER WHO REPORTED THAT A TENSE RELATIONSHIP
HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE SWISS AND THE SWEDES AS WELL
AS AMONG THE NNA GENERALLY. RITTER SAID HE DID NOT
EXPECT WORK IN THE FIVE NNA GROUPS TO BE COMPLETED THIS
SESSION. RITTER ALSO TOLD CUTILEIRO THAT THE SWEDES
WERE HOLDING UP THE NNA NOTIFICATION PAPER TO GET SWISS
CONCESSIONS ON CONSTRAINTS. MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED
THAT THE NNA PLAN TO HOLD A SPECIAL MEETING IN STOCKHOLM
THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE LEGAL EXPERTS
FOR A NUF DRAFTING EXERCISE.
7. MEETINGS: THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP WILL HOLD A
JOINT MEETING WITH DEPUTIES TO CONDUCT A FULL "RUMP
SQUEEZING OF THE PACKAGE" EXERCISE ON ANOMALIES IN
SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
8. THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING WILL BE TUESDAY, MAY 28.
END
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SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH GRINEVSKY - MAY 23, 1985
1. CDE VI-0141. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT HIS INVITATION I LUNCHED WITH GRINEVSKY ON THURSDAY,
MAY 24. THIS WAS OUR FIRST SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE
SIXTH SESSION OF THE CDE. HE BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY
NOTING THAT VARIOUS DELEGATIONS WERE SAYING THAT THE
TIMING WOULD NOT BE RIGHT FOR BEGINNING DRAFTING UNTIL
THE FALL. HE ASKED FOR MY VIEWS. I REPLIED THAT I DID
NOT LOOK AT IT AS A MATTER OF THE CALENDAR. THE CONDI-
TIONS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY MOVING ON TO DRAFTING DID NOT
NOW EXIST. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE AGREEMENT ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE DRAFTING BEFORE
DRAFTING WOULD BE JUSTIFIED. UNTIL THE SUBSTANCE BEGAN
TO FALL INTO PLACE I SAW NO REASON TO CONSIDER MOVING
INTO A DRAFTING PHASE.
3. GRINEVSKY ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A CONNECTION WITH
GENEVA IN MY MIND. I SAID THAT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIVE
LINKAGE IN THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO MAKE A CONVENTIONAL WAR
LESS LIKELY BY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCALCULATION
OR SURPRISE ATTACK; THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT EFFORTS IN
GENEVA TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OTHERWISE, I THOUGHT
THAT EACH NEGOTIATION WOULD PROCEED ACCORDING TO ITS
OWN INTERNAL LOGIC.
4. I ASKED HIM WHAT MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE WAS TOWARDS THE
PROPOSALS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MADE IN HIS STRASBOURG
SPEECH. GRINEVSKY THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE MOSCOW A LITTLE
TIME TO THINK IT THROUGH AND WE SHOULDN'T THINK WE HAVE
HEARD THE LAST WORD.
5. GRINEVSKY THEN DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO
SUGGESTING THAT WE DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE ON A NON-
COMMITTAL BASIS. HE SAID THAT MOSCOW WAS VERY SKEPTICAL
OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF
ARMS CONTROL, THAT WE WERE "NOT SERIOUS" IN ANY OF THE
TALKS. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT
CDE HAD A BETTER CHANCE OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT THAN
DID THE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. NON-USE OF FORCE, HE SAID,
WAS SEEN IN MOSCOW AS A SYMBOLIC GESTURE WHICH WOULD
HELP TO DEFINE AND SET A STANDARD FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELA-
TIONS IN THE FUTURE. BUT IF ALL WASHINGTON WAS PREPARED
TO DO WAS TO REPEAT THE WORDS OF THE U.N. CHARTER, THE
U.S. SHOULDN'T BOTHER. I SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF
THE NON-USE OF FORCE ITSELF COULD NOT BE CHANGED, NOR
WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE TO APPLY NON-USE OF FORCE TO
SPECIFIC SITUATIONS AS THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ATTEMPTED
TO DO. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT I COULD VISUALIZE NON-USE
OF FORCE AND PERHAPS OTHER THINGS FITTING INTO ONE PART
OF A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE AS ITS OPERATIVE ELEMENTS
A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS ON CONCRETE CBMS. AFTER MUCH TIME
SPENT ON THIS SUBJECT I TOLD GRINEVSKY THAT HIS TIME WAS
UP AND NOW WE SHOULD DISCUSS CONCRETE CBMS.
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6. TO BEGIN WITH, I ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE OUT-OF-
GARRISON CONCEPT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS TOO BURDENSOME
TO ANNOUNCE EVERY TIME A DIVISION WENT OUT OF ITS
BARRACKS FOR WHATEVER REASON AND THAT NOTIFICATION AT
THIS LEVEL OF DETAIL HAD NO RELEVANCE TO THE PROBLEMS
WITH WHICH THE CONFERENCE WAS DEALING. IF TROOPS WERE
OUT OF THEIR BARRACKS TO TAKE PART IN A MANEUVER OR
MILITARY MOVEMENT, THAT WAS ONE THING, BUT TO ANNOUNCE
EVERY TIME THEY WENT OUT FOR ANY PURPOSE AT ALL WOULD
NOT BE HELPFUL.
7. I ASKED HIM WHY HE HADN'T SAID MORE ABOUT THE SOVIET
POSITION ON OBSERVERS SINCE I WAS NOT AWARE OF MAJOR
DIFFERENCES AT THIS POINT, AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO
UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIETS-SAW THE OBSERVATION REGIME
BEING EXERCISED. I ASKED IF HE ACCEPTED THAT OBSERVERS
WOULD BE MANDATORY FOR EACH NOTIFIED ACTIVITY. HE SAID
THAT WAS POSSIBLE BUT HE COULDN'T AT THIS MOMENT GIVE
SUCH AN UNQUALIFIED REPLY.
8. I THEN ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE STRUCTURAL THRESH-
OLD FOR NOTIFICATIONS. HE REPLIED THAT THE SIZE OF
DIVISIONS WERE SO DIFFERENT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EQUIT-
ABLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ANNOUNCE THEIR DIVISIONS ON THE
SAME BASIS AS THE U.S.
9. GRINEVSKY BROKE OFF THIS LINE OF DISCUSSION AT THIS
POINT BY SAYING THAT UNTIL THE U.S. REVEALED MORE ABOUT
ITS POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE, HIS HANDS WERE TIED.
HE WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY UNABLE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT
HIS POSITIONS. WHEN I SAID THAT IF THAT WAS THE CASE
THERE WOULD BE VERY LITTLE FOR US TO TALK ABOUT, HE
SUGGESTED THAT I SHOULDN'T DRAW THAT CONCLUSION. HE
REFERRED, IN THAT CONNECTION, TO A LUNCHEON WHICH HAS
BEEN ARRANGED FOR MAY 30 BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPUTY AND
JCS REP WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS.
10. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WOULD TABLE ADDITIONAL PAPERS
DURING THIS SESSION. HE NEVER ANSWERED BUT ASKED
RHETORICALLY HOW I WOULD LIKE TO SEE PAPERS ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, ETC. THE PAPERS HE HAD
ALREADY TABLED, HE SAID, WERE RESPONSIVE TO THE WESTERN
INTEREST IN TALKING ABOUT NOTIFICATION.
11. COMMENT: GRINEVSKY SEEMED RECONCILED TO A SLOWER
PACE THAN HE HAD ADVOCATED DURING THE LAST SESSION. HE
SAID NOTHING ABOUT FORMING DRAFTING GROUPS, FOR EXAMPLE,
AND NEVER VOICED ANY IMPATIENCE WITH THE PROCEEDINGS.
HE STRESSED QUITE FIRMLY THE LINKAGE HE IS TRYING TO
ESTABLISH BETWEEN NUF AND CBM AND GAVE LITTLE SIGN OF
BEING READY FOR A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE ON CBM ISSUES.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY, MAY 24, 1985
REF: A. STOCKHOLM 8332 B. STOCKHOLM 3831
1. CDE VI - 040.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE MAY 24 CDE PLENARY WAS CAPPED BY
U.S.-USSR EXCHANGE ON MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON IN GDR.
FRG ADDRESSED PERCEIVED CONVERGENCE ON CDE PROPOSALS.
FRANCE SUGGESTED MOVING INTO PARALLEL "INFORMAL" WORKING
GROUPS AND ESTABLISHING A SUMMER CUT-OFF DATE. BULGARIA
DEFENDED WARSAW PACT POSITIONS. U.S. AMBASSADOR GOODBY
DELIVERED AN INTERVENTION CALLING FOR MORE ATTENTION TO
THE SPECIFICS OF CSBMS TO DETERMINE WHETHER COMMON
GROUND IN FACT DOES EXIST. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR CITRON OF THE FRG ALLUDED TO THE RECENT
NNA FONMIN CONFERENCE AND THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE AS
EFFORTS TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE AND FIND
AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, NOTING THAT A "FURTHER
RAPPROCHEMENT ON ISSUES IS BEGINNING TO TAKE PLACE." HE
PLEDGED HIS DELEGATION'S COOPERATION IN SUCH EFFORTS.
HE MENTIONED, IN PARTICULAR, NOTIFICATION, THRESHOLDS,
AND FUTURE MODALITIES FOR OBSERVERS, AND STRESSED THE
NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF ALL THE MEASURES AS
OPPOSED TO "BLIND CONFIDENCE".
5. FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHINARD CALLED FOR CONCLUSION
OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE BY THE SUMMER OF 1986 AND
SUGGESTED THAT INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS BE ESTABLISHED
PARALLEL TO THE EXISTING GROUPS IN ORDER TO INTENSIFY
NEGOTIATIONS. (BEGIN COMMENT. THIS INTERVENTION WAS
GIVEN WITH ONLY THE BRIEFEST ADVANCE NOTICE, AND WITHOUT
CONSULTATION IN THE NATO CAUCUS. THE SUGGESTION ON
INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS AND SUMMER CUT-OFF DATE IS
CLEARLY AHEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION POSITION AND THAT
OF MOST OF THE OTHER ALLIES. END COMMENT.) THE FRENCH
AMBASSADOR MENTIONED SEVERAL TOPICS FOR "INFORMAL
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION", INCLUDED SEVERAL NATO CSBM
MEASURES, AND CALLED UPON THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS TO
DISCUSS THEIR THREE RECENT WORKING PAPERS VIS-A-VIS THE
MADRID MANDATE.
6. BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR TODOROV ARGUED AGAINST WESTERN
CHARGES THAT THE PACT PROPOSALS ARE ABSTRACT AND
PROPAGANDISTIC. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO CHARGE THE WEST
WITH LACK OF POLITICAL WILL IN REJECTING NO FIRST USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NFU), AND MAINTAINED, THAT ROMB "IS
BETTER THAN ANNUAL CALENDARS". THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR
ALSO REITERATED HIS DELEGATION'S COMMITMENT TO
VERIFICATION, BUT "NOT AS A PURPOSE IN ITSELF." (BEGIN
COMMENT. TODOROV'S DELIVERY WAS RELATIVELY
NON-POLEMICAL COMPARED WITH HIS DELEGATION'S PAST
OFFERINGS. IN ADDITION, HIS PREFERENCE FOR FRENCH, AS
OPPOSED TO HIS PREDECESSOR'S RUSSIAN, MAY HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO A LESS HEAVY-HANDED STYLE. END COMMENT.)
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7. WITH A DETAILED STATEMENT (SEE REF B) WHICH NOTED
THE CONTOURS OF AN AGREEMENT THAT ARE BECOMING VISIBLE
AMBASSADOR GOODBY CALLED FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS OF CSBM
"BUILDING BLOCKS" BEFORE ENTERING INTO INTENSIVE
NEGOTIATIONS. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE WEAKNESS OF
THE RECENTLY-SUBMITTED WARSAW PACT PAPERS ON
NOTIFICATION, AND REMINDED THE ASSEMBLY OF THE
INSUFFICIENT TIME THAT HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO IMPROVING
EXISTING HELSINKI CBMS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY ALSO
COMMENTED ON THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVISING CONSTRAINT
MEASURES THAT DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE REALITIES OF
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION BUT HE EXPRESSED THE
U.S. DELEGATION'S WILLINGNESS TO STUDY PROPOSALS
CONFORMING TO THE MANDATE. IN ADDITION, THE U.S.
AMBASSADOR REFERRED TO THE OTTAWA MEETING AND REAFFIRMED
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS AMONG ALL THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT.
8. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE YEROFEEV THEN CASTIGATED THE
ALLEGED AMERICAN BUILD-UP OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, RECENT
ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS, CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING, ETC.
ACCORDING TO YEROFEEV, THE U.S. HAS A FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO
PRODUCE HUGE STOCKPILES OF CW AND IS THEREFORE BLOCKING
CW AGREEMENTS AT THE GENEVA TALKS AND STOCKHOLM CDE. HE
CLAIMED THAT THE CDE WAS BEGINNING TO RESEMBLE A
SCIENTIFIC SEMINAR AND CLAIMED IT WAS "TIME TO GET DOWN
TO BUSINESS". (BEGIN COMMENT: THE U.S. RESPONDED IN
DETAIL TO THESE CHARGES IN THE MAY 28 SESSION OF WORKING
GROUP A. END COMMENT)
9. AS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE WAS DELIVERING HIS
TIRADE ON THE ALLEGED BARBARIC U.S. POLICIES ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, WASHINGTON INSTRUCTIONS ON THE U.S. STATEMENT
ON THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON ARRIVED AT THE PLENARY
HALL. AMBASSADOR GOODBY EMPLOYED THE RIGHT OF REPLY TO
DELIVER A STRONG STATEMENT ON THE KILLING, NOTING THE
LOW REGARD THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO HUMAN LIFE. HE
SAID THAT SOVIET FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY IN
THIS MATTER HINDERED CREATION OF CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE
AND EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF STOCKHOLM IN PREVENTING
SUCH FUTURE INCIDENTS (TEXT REF A).
10. FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S RIGHT OF REPLY ON THE
SUBJECT OF THE NICHOLSON KILLING, SOVIET AMBASSADOR
GRINEVSKY CALLED THE REMARKS A "STRANGE" REPLY TO THE CW
INTERVENTION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ISSUE WAS A
BI-LATERAL ONE, UNRELATED TO STOCKHOLM, AND REPEATED THE
SOVIET LINE THAT " THE TRAGIC RESULT IS A CAUSE FOR
REGRET", BUT THAT THE U.S. BEARS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE INCIDENT.
END
85
SECRET
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SUBJECT: US PLENARY STATEMENT, MAY 24
1. CDE VI -033
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED BY
AMBASSADOR GOODBY IN THE CDE PLENARY TODAY, MAY 24.
4. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, ON THE EVE OF THE CURRENT
SESSION, PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS "IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO PLAY A
MAJOR ROLE IN IMPROVING EAST-WEST RELATIONS" AND THAT IT
HAS "AN OPPORTUNITY TO WORK IN PRACTICAL WAYS TO REDUCE
TENSION IN EUROPE." THIS CONFERENCE HAS A UNIQUE
OPPORTUNITY TO DEEPEN AND TO BROADEN COOPERATION AMONG
THE THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES BY DEVELOPING
FURTHER THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
THE UNITED STATES JOINED WITH OTHERS IN SUBMITTING
CONCRETE PROPOSALS IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD FOSTER
ENHANCED COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE MILITARY FIELD,
WHICH WOULD RESULT IN STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS OF
PEACEFUL COOPERATION AMONG ALL OUR NATIONS.
. THIS OBJECTIVE OF OUR WORK DESERVES FRESH EMPHASIS IN
THESE DAYS AND AS WE BEGIN THIS NEW SESSION. SPEAKING
LAST MARCH, THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA
SAID THAT THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD "MAKE REAL STEPS ALONG
THE LONG ROAD OF RECONSTRUCTING THE MILITARY-POLITICAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES FROM
CONFRONTATION TO THE REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF MILITARY
CONFLICT." I THINK MANY OF US MIGHT SHARE THAT VISION.
I THEREFORE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A MOMENT TO SUM UP
AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSES OF THIS
CONFERENCE, PUTTING INTO PERSPECTIVE SOME OF THE MORE
DETAILED AND SPECIFIC POINTS WE WILL BE DISCUSSING
THROUGHOUT THIS SESSION.
. NEARLY TEN YEARS AGO OUR NATIONS EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM
OBLIGING EACH OF US TO ACT AS A MATTER OF COURSE IN A
WAY WHICH WOULD SERVE TO EASE CAUSES OF TENSION AND
REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS
MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION. TODAY, WE COULD BE
ABOUT TO EMBARK ON A MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF
ACTIVE AND VERIFIABLE COOPERATION AIMED AT FURNISHING
BETTER REASSURANCE ABOUT THE INTENT OF A SIGNIFICANT
RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE PROPOSALS MANY OF US
ARE NOW SUPPORTING WOULD BUILD OPERATIONAL BARRIERS
AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE; THEY WOULD HAVE THE PRACTICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF REINFORCING THE OBLIGATION OF STATES TO
REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE BY REQUIRING OF
PARTICIPATING STATES TANGIBLE PROOF THAT MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE ARE PEACEFUL IN INTENT AND ARE
NON-THREATENING. BY PROVIDING MEANS TO ENSURE AGAINST
THE ARBITRARY USE OF LETHAL FORCE -- ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF
WHICH WE HAVE WITNESSED BUT RECENTLY -- THEY WOULD HELP
TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE OF TERRIBLE AND TRAGIC EVENTS
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WHICH CAN RESULT FROM THE LACK OF CONTACT AND
COMMUNICATION.
. OUR CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH A SUPREMELY
IMPORTANT BUT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TASK WHICH, AMONG
EXISTING OR PREVIOUS SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS, IS NEARLY
UNIQUE TO OUR CONFERENCE. WE SEEK TO PUT INTO PLACE
PROCEDURES WHICH,WILL ACT DIRECTLY TO ELIMINATE MANY OF
THE CAUSES OF WAR. WHILE IN GENEVA WE SEEK TO REDUCE
THE CAPABILITIES FOR WAR, HERE IN STOCKHOLM WE SHOULD
SEEK TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ANY WAR. THE
COMMEMORATION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR HAS REMINDED US, OFTEN IN ANGUISHING,
PERSONAL WAYS, OF THE PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVASTATION
WHICH WAR, EVEN WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CAN BRING.
. FOR SOME TIME NOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, MANY OF US HAVE BEEN
SAYING THAT THE OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WHICH
IN TIME MIGHT EMERGE FROM THIS CONFERENCE ARE BECOMING
VISIBLE. SOME OF US HAVE EVEN BEEN ABLE TO SKETCH THE
CONTOURS OF CONVERGING POSITIONS, THE LATEST EXAMPLE
BEING THE STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE
OF ROMANIA ON MAY 14. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE CONTOURS AT
THIS TIME ARE NOT TOTALLY CONGRUENT. RATHER DIFFERENT
EMPHASES HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS. BUT
PRESENT AT THE HEART OF ALL OF THESE DESCRIPTIONS OF
POTENTIAL COMMON GROUND HAS BEEN A GROUP OF MEASURES
WHOSE ANTECEDENTS MAY BE FOUND IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
AND WHICH GUIDED THE LIMITED EFFORTS TOWARDS COOPERATION
IN THE SECURITY FIELD IN WHICH ALL OF US ARE NOW ENGAGED
AND WHICH WE SEEK TO IMPROVE. IN PARTICULAR, THESE
MEASURES INCLUDE INFORMATION-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS OF
VARIOUS TYPES, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
ARRANGEMENTS, AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. SOME
DELEGATIONS HAVE URGED THAT SUCH CONCRETE MEASURES AS
THESE SHOULD BE LINKED TO A RE-STATEMENT OF THAT BASIC
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH REQUIRES ALL STATES
TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. AND SEVERAL
DELEGATIONS HAVE URGED THAT THE AGREEMENT TO BE
NEGOTIATED HERE INCLUDE A CATEGORY OF MEASURES WHICH
WOULD PLACE LIMITS OF VARIOUS TYPES ON CERTAIN KINDS OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS.
. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT TODAY ON SOME OF THESE IDEAS
SO THAT MY DELEGATION'S POSITION WILL BE CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD, BUT FIRST ALLOW ME TO SET FORTH WHAT MY
DELEGATION'S GENERAL APPROACH TO THIS SESSION WILL BE.
IN OUR OPINION, IT IS NOW CLEAR ENOUGH WHICH PROPOSALS
ENJOY SOME SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF SUPPORT AND ARE
COMPATIBLE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN TO THIS CONFERENCE AT
MADRID. YET IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT THERE IS ENOUGH
SIMILARITY OF VIEWS ON THE DETAILS OF THESE PROPOSALS.
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THIS BEING THE CASE, I SEE NO "ROYAL ROAD" TO AGREEMENT,
NO POSSIBILITY THAT AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE WOULD
ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR RAPIDLY RESOLVING OUR
DIFFERENCES OF DETAIL. THE SOLUTION TO OUR NEGOTIATING
PROBLEM, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS TO WORK ON THE BASIC
BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE MATERIAL WE HAVE BEFORE US. WE
NEED TO EXAMINE ANALYTICALLY THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF A
NOTIFICATION REGIME, FOR EXAMPLE, IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY
ELEMENTS WE CAN ALL AGREE UPON WHICH WE COULD THEN
DEVELOP INTO AN ACCEPTABLE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE.
. THIS IS WHY, IN MY REMARKS ON MARCH 22 AND AGAIN LAST
MONDAY, AND IN THE COMMENTS THAT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION ARE MAKING IN THE MEETINGS OF THE TWO
WORKING GROUPS, THERE IS AN EMPHASIS ON EXAMINING THE
COMPONENT PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT WE ARE TRYING TO PUT
TOGETHER. WE HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THE
AGREEMENT, UNDER OPTIMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, MIGHT LOOK
GROSSO MODO. WE LACK THE INFORMATION WHICH WOULD GIVE
US THE ASSURANCE THAT THE MODEL WE ARE CONTEMPLATING IS,
IN FACT, FEASIBLE. THIS IS THE GAP THAT WE IN THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION WILL BE SEEKING TO SEE FILLED
DURING THIS SESSION.
. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE ARE CAREFULLY ANALYZING THREE
WORKING DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY EASTERN DELEGATIONS THIS
WEEK. SOME OF MY COMMENTS IN MY STATEMENT OF MAY 20
DEAL WITH MY DELEGATION'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES, AND I WILL NOT REPEAT THEM NOW. BUT I WOULD
LIKE TO HEAR FROM THE SPONSORS WHETHER THE CONTENT OF
THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY WAS INTENDED
BY THEM TO REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP BEYOND THE
CONTENT OF SIMILAR NOTIFICATIONS NOW BEING PROVIDED
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. I NOTE ALSO
THAT THE FINAL ACT'S DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN
PERPETUATED IN THE NEW PROPOSAL AND THAT ONLY MODEST
CHANGES WERE MADE IN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR ADVANCE
NOTIFICATION. AS FOR THE THRESHOLD LEVEL FOR
NOTIFICATION AS COMPARED WITH SIMILAR EXISTING
ARRANGEMENTS, ANY REAL IMPROVEMENT IS DIFFICULT TO
PERCEIVE. FINALLY, I HAD HOPED TO FIND THE ELUSIVE
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS RELATED TO THESE PROPOSALS SINCE
WE HAD REPEATEDLY HEARD THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION
SHOULD BE PROVIDED, CORRESPONDING TO THE CONTENT OF THE
MEASURES TABLED. AND WE HAVE HEARD THIS AGAIN TODAY BUT
WE HAVE FAILED TO FIND ANY VERIFICATION THERE, JUST AS
WE HAVE FAILED TO FIND ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THE
RELEVANT WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. PERHAPS THE EASTERN
SPONSORS WILL INFORM US OF THEIR THINKING IN THE NEAR
FUTURE.
. MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH RESPECT TO THE NON-USE OR THREAT OF
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USE OF FORCE, MY DELEGATION IS ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT
THAT NEARLY EVERY DELEGATION - AND PERHAPS EVEN ALL -
CONSIDER THAT OUR TASK IS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION
TO THIS PRINCIPLE IN WAYS THAT WOULD HAVE A REAL AND
LASTING IMPACT ON THE EVERYDAY WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTED WITH INTEREST THE
STATEMENT MADE BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF
AUSTRIA ON MAY 14, WHO STRESSED THAT THE REAFFIRMATION
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE SHOULD BE A
FUNCTION OF THE CONTENT OF THE CONCRETE MEASURES WE ARE
NOW NEGOTIATING. IN THE SAME MEETING, THE DISTINGUISHED
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRELAND POINTED OUT THAT THE QUESTION
IS NOT WHETHER TO REINFORCE THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF
FORCE, BUT HOW BEST TO DO SO.
. THE POSITION OF MY DELEGATION ON THIS QUESTION IS
CLEAR. PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED IT BEFORE THE IRISH
PARLIAMENT IN DUBLIN LAST YEAR AND BEFORE THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG THIS YEAR. HE MENTIONED IT
AGAIN ON MAY 13, AND ON OTHER OCCASIONS WHEN HE HAS
SPOKEN, AS HE OFTEN HAS, OF THE HIGH IMPORTANCE HE
ATTACHES TO THIS CONFERENCE. MY DELEGATION HAS
REPEATEDLY SUGGESTED THAT WE EXPLORE A COMBINATION OF
THE "STATIC" PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE WITH
"DYNAMIC" CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, OR -- AS OUR
SOVIET COLLEAGUE PUT IT -- AN "ORGANIC FUSION." WE
BELIEVE THIS APPROACH OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO AGREE ON
OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE TANGIBLE, VERIFIABLE
PROOF OF A NATION'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND, THUS, LEND
SUBSTANCE TO A SUITABLE STATEMENT OF OUR INTENTIONS AND
GOALS, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OR THREAT OF
USE OF FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS, WE DO NOT FAVOR THE MERE
RE-AFFIRMATION OF AN EXISTING PRINCIPLE BUT RATHER THE
REINFORCING OF THE PRINCIPLE THROUGH ADDITIONAL
PRACTICAL OBLIGATIONS.
. MY DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON PROPOSALS REGARDING NON-USE
OF FORCE ARE THAT THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE ITSELF
SHOULD NOT DEPART FROM THE PRINCIPLE AS EXPRESSED BY THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; IT
SHOULD DEAL WITH THE THREAT AS WELL AS THE USE OF FORCE,
AND IT SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES
IN THEIR MUTUAL, AS WELL AS IN THEIR THIRD-COUNTRY
RELATIONS. TO SPELL OUT THE APPLICATION OF THE NON-USE
OF FORCE PRINCIPLE TO SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE
REDUNDANT IN TERMS OF EXISTING OBLIGATIONS AND WOULD
IMPINGE ON MANY EXISTING AGREEMENTS WHICH RELATED TO
-SUCH SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. THAT PORTION OF THE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO BE AGREED HERE WHICH CONTAINED
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE COULD BE AN EFFECTIVE
MEANS OF PLACING IN CONTEXT THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT,
CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE THE OPERATIONAL
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CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT.
. IN THE MARCH 22 PLENARY MEETING, I REFERRED TO AN
IMBALANCE IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THIS CONFERENCE WHICH
NEEDS TO BE REDRESSED: THERE STILL HAS BEEN
INSUFFICIENT DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS
DESIGNED TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE PROGRAM OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ADOPTED IN THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT. THIS IS THE INFORMATION GAP TO WHICH I
REFERRED EARLIER AND THIS IS WHAT MY DELEGATION HOPES
CAN BE DEALT WITH DURING THIS SESSION SO THAT THE
CONFERENCE, IN THE WORDS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN "COULD MOVE
INTO A MORE INTENSE NEGOTIATING PHASE."
. MR. CHAIRMAN, MY DELEGATION HAS STUDIED CAREFULLY A
NUMBER OF POTENTIAL CONSTRAINT MEASURES, WHICH HAVE BEEN
OFFERED OR DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS. WE SUPPORT THE
VIEW THAT THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD AIM TOWARD AN AGREEMENT
WHICH IS MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT. UNFORTUNATELY, SO FAR
WE HAVE FOUND THE VARIOUS CONSTRAINT PROPOSALS TO BE
MUCH MORE COMPLEX AND MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE THAN
ANY OF THE RELATIVELY SIMPLE MEASURES CONTAINED IN
SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE SWEDISH
DELEGATION WAS QUITE RIGHT WHEN HE SAID THAT DEVISING AN
EQUITABLE CONSTRAINT WILL BE "NO EASY TASK CONSIDERING
THE DIFFERENCE IN TERRAIN, GEOGRAPHY, FORCE STRUCTURES
AND OTHER REALITIES OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION."
STILL, MY DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSESS CAREFULLY
ALL SERIOUS PROPOSALS WHICH CONFORM TO OUR MANDATE.
. MR. CHAIRMAN, I NOTE IN CLOSING THAT THE HELSINKI
PROCESS, TO WHICH THIS CONFERENCE BELONGS, IS COMMITTED
TU ENCOURAGING COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AS WELL AS IN SECURITY MATTERS.
IMPROVEMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF
ANY OF THE HELSINKI "BASKETS" CAN HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT
IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL, WHICH IS WHY THE OTTAWA MEETING
NOW PROCEEDING IS IMPORTANT TO THE WHOLE HELSINKI
PROCESS. MY GOVERNMENT IS CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE EVENTS
IN OTTAWA. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED BETWEEN
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT -- EACH OF THE BASKETS
-- IS NOT AN INVENTION OF THE AUTHORS OF THAT DOCUMENT
THE 35 NATIONS REPRESENTED HERE -- BUT THE
CODIFICATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REALITY.
. MR. CHAIRMAN, AT OUR CONFERENCE, THE ADOPTION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH GO
WELL BEYOND THE LIMITED MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT WOULD GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS INITIATED BY
THAT ACT ALMOST TEN YEARS AGO. SUCH MEASURES WOULD ALSO
REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO LESSEN
COMMON RISKS AND REDUCE CONFRONTATION IN THE AREA OF
MILITARY AFFAIRS. IF SUCCESSFUL, THE RESULTS OF THIS
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CONFERENCE COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPROVING THE
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND ALL THE
NATIONS REPRESENTED HERE. OUR CONFERENCE, MOREOVER, HAS
THE POTENTIAL TO PROVIDE A FIRM FOUNDATION, NOT ONLY FOR
FUTURE ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS, BUT ALSO
FOR OTHER AREAS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS.
. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS HERE, WE MUST AGREE ON
TANGIBLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL MAKE
THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION MORE OPEN, PREDICTABLE,
AND STABLE, AND WHICH WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION. BY ADDRESSING THE MOST LIKELY PROXIMATE
CAUSES OF WAR -- MISUNDERSTANDING, MISCALCULATION OR
ACCIDENT -- IN CONCERT, WE CAN BEGIN TO DEVELOP THE
HABIT OF COOPERATION ACROSS THE BARRIERS THAT DIVIDE
EUROPE AND, OVER TIME, REMOVE THE MORE PERSISTENT AND
PERNICIOUS DANGERS OF CONFRONTATION INHERENT IN TODAY'S
POLITICAL RELATIONS.
. MR. CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED
TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR ENDEAVORS. AS I HAVE NOTED, ON
MAY 8 BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG, HE
REITERATED HIS PLEDGE MADE LAST JUNE IN DUBLIN TO
DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
NEGOTIATION OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.
HE ALSO CALLED FOR REDUCING TENSIONS IN THE WORLD
THROUGH AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF MEASURES, SOME
BILATERAL, BUT ALSO INCLUDING THE CONCRETE MEASURES
PROPOSED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF SUCH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WOULD LOWER
THE RISK THAT A SMALL INCIDENT MIGHT LEAD TO IRREVERSIBLE
TRAGEDIES THROUGH ERROR, ACCIDENT OR MISUNDERSTANDING.
END
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SUBJECT: STATEMENT ON MAJOR NICHOLSON
1. CDE VI-033. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON MAY 24, AMBASSADOR GOODBY IN A PLENARY MEETING OF
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CON-
CERNING THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON: BEGIN TEXT: "MR.
CHAIRMAN, JUST AFTER OUR CONFERENCE RECESSED THIS PAST
ROUND, WE HAD A TRAGIC EXAMPLE OF THE LACK OF CONFIDENCE
AND OF THE NEED FOR GOOD FAITH IMPLEMENTATION OF PRACTICAL,
CONCRETE MEASURES IF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IS TO BE BUILT. THE
MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON BY A SOVIET GUARD IN THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, AND THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET GOVERN-
MENT TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS MATTER, SERVED AS
A TERRIBLE AND GRAPHIC REMINDER OF THE DIFFICULTY IN
BUILDING A REGIME OF CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE. IT IS THE
VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT, AS STATED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON
MAY 8 IN STRASBOURG, THAT THIS KILLING ILLUSTRATES THE
OBSTACLES POSED BY OUR SO FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT CONCEPTS
OF HUMANITY, OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OF THE VALUE OF A HUMAN
LIFE, THAT IMPEDE OUR EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN A PRODUCTIVE
DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THIS FATAL EVENT UNDER-
LINES THE IMPORTANCE OF WORK HERE AND OF THE NEED FOR
AGREED MULTILATERAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO BUILD CON-
FIDENCE AND ENHANCE SECURITY. THE NICHOLSON KILLING
HELPS EXPLAIN WHY WE ARE SKEPTICAL. OF PROMISES NOT TO
USE FORCE WHICH ARE NOT BACKED UP BY CONCRETE MEASURES
SUCH AS THOSE WE AND OTHERS HAVE PROPOSED AT THIS CON-
FERENCE. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID ON MAY 8 IN STRAS-
BOURG: IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN REDUCING EAST-WEST
TENSIONS, WE MUST FIND MEANS TO INSURE AGAINST THE
ARBITRARY USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE FUTURE." MAJOR
NICHOLSON'S DEATH REMINDS US HOW MUCH NEEDS TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED. END TEXT.
3. THE SOVIET CHIEF DELEGATE, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY,
EXERCISING RIGHT OF REPLY, STATED THAT INTRODUCTION
OF THIS BILATERAL ISSUE IN THIS MULTILATERAL FORUM
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS. THE INCIDENT,
HE SAID, IS BEING CONSIDERED BY COMPETENT MILITARY
AUTHORITIES. HE ALSO REPEATED THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT THAT THE INCIDENT WAS TRAGIC AND A MATTER
OF REGRET. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE INCIDENT RESTS COMPLETELY WITH THE UNITED STATES.
4. THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTES THAT THE ABOVE TEXT (PARA 2)
WAS DICTATED TO US OVER THE TELEPHONE AND THAT AS OF
DISPATCH OF THIS TELEGRAM WE HAVE STILL NOT RECEIVED THE
AUTHORIZED TEXT IN WRITING. DURING AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S
READING OF HIS PREPARED PLENARY STATEMENT, SENT SEPTEL,
WE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM THE NSC STAFF TELL-
ING US THAT A TELEGRAM CONTAINING THE TEXT HAD BEEN
APPROVED FOR DISPATCH. IN VIEW OF NEED FOR TIMELY
ADDRESSAL OF THIS ISSUE, AMBASSADOR GOODBY PROCEEDED
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IMMEDIATELY WITH DELIVERY OF THE TEXT.
5. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT, IN ORDER TO REINFORCE MY
STATEMENT, OTHER U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN FORUMS WHICH
INCLUDE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ALSO
SPEAK OUT ALONG SIMILAR LINES. I THEREFORE URGE THAT,
AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY, AMBASSADORS
SCHIFTER, KAMPELMAN, LOWITZ AND BLACKWILL ALSO USE THE
PRECEDING TEXT, SUITABLY AMENDED TO SUIT THEIR PARTICU-
LAR CIRCUMSTANCES. UNLESS THIS IS DONE, IT WOULD
DIMINISH THE IMPACT WE WANT IT TO HAVE. END COMMENT.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, MAY 14-24
REF: STOCKHOLM 3316
1. CDE VI - 039
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM
CSBM'S SEANCE STARTED AMIDST THE SWEDISH SUMMER SUNSHINE,
EAST AND WEST PLAYED AN ELABORATE GAME OF ALPHONSE AND
GASTON. THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES FIRST PUT OUT THE
WORD THAT THEY WERE ANTICIPATING A READOUT OF THE SHULTZ-
GROMYKO MEETING. THEY THEN CLAIMED THEY AWAITED THE
WESTERN RESPONSE TO THEIR THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS TABLED
ON MAY 20. THE ALLIANCE, TOO, BIDED ITS TIME, FIRST
WAITING FOR THE EXPECTED EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS AND
THEN FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EASTERN CAMP ON
CSBM'S, CONSTRAINTS, AND NUF. WHILE BOTH SIDES WAITED
FOR THE OTHER TO BLINK, THE NNA -- THE INVETERATE BRIDGE-
BUILDERS -- WAITED FOR THE EAST-WEST GAP ON SUBSTANCE TO
NARROW. PUBLIC RETICENCE AT THE CONFERENCE DID NOT MEAN
PRIVATE QUIESCENCE, HOWEVER. EAST, WEST, AND NNA ALL
WORKED FEVERISHLY ON FURTHER WORKING DOCUMENTS TO PRESENT
DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE ROUND. THE QUIET OPENING
PHASE OF THE SESSION ENDED NOT WITH THE EXPECTED WHIMPER,
BUT WITH A BANG, AS THE UNITED STATES SCORED THE SOVIET
UNION ON THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON, DRAWING A
DEFENSIVE SOVIET RESPONSE. END SUMMARY.
4. NATO: SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE'S OPENING SESSION WITH AN APPEAL
TO END THE ARMS RACE AND TO NEGOTIATE A CONCRETE AND
TANGIBLE AGREEMENT BASED ON RECIPROCAL TRUST; IN OTHER
WORDS, ALL MOTHERHOOD AND APPLE PAELLA. WHILE GONZALEZ,
WHO WAS ONE OF THE PRIME MOVERS BEHIND THE CONSENSUS
MANDATE ESTABLISHING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, WAS
GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF WESTERN POSITIONS, HIS EMPHASIS
ON SPAIN'S OPEN POSITION ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS MAY
INDICATE TROUBLE FOR US DOWN THE LINE. (SEE PARA 6).
5. OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR
SILENCE. EVERYONE, INCLUDING MANY OF OUR ALLIES, SEEMS
TO BE PLAYING A WAITING GAME IN PUBLIC WHILE THE SOVIETS
GET THEIR COLLECTIVE ACT TOGETHER. PUBLIC RETICENCE DOES
NOT MEAN PRIVATE QUIESCENCE, HOWEVER. DURING THE FIRST
NATO CAUCUS ON MAY 14, THE FRG AND THE UK DISTRIBUTED
NATIONAL DISCUSSION PAPERS ON MEASURES 2 AND 3 TO BE USED
IN THE WORKING GROUPS TO KEEP THE FOCUS OF THE CONFERENCE
ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE DANES CIRCULATED TWO PAPERS
DEALING WITH AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AND ON THE NEED TO
ESTABLISH A SPECIAL REGIME WITH MORE VIGOROUS RULES FOR
NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. THE U.S., IN THE MEANTIME,
HELD BACK A PAPER ON MEASURE 1 PENDING, FIRST,
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKS AND THEN INSTRUCTIONS FROM
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WASHINGTON. DECISIONS ON TABLING ALL OF THESE WORKING
DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING A U.S. PAPER ON MEASURE 2, SHOULD
BE MADE BY EARLY JUNE IF THEY ARE TO HAVE SOME EFFECT
DURING THIS ROUND.
6. CONSTRAINTS AND NUF: TROUBLE ON THE HORIZON. WHILE
THE ALLIES TEMPORIZED ON HOW TO HANDLE OUR OWN MEASURES,
THEY AGONIZED OVER HOW TO AVOID HANDLING OTHERS'
PROPOSALS. SOME, IN FACT, OPENLY ADVOCATED DEVELOPING
EARLY NATO POSITIONS ON CONSTRAINTS AND NUF. ON
CONSTRAINTS, THE BRITISH, NORMALLY OUR MOST STALWART
ALLIES IN THE CAUCUS, URGED PROMPT CONSIDERATION OF
THEIR CONSTRAINTS PAPER FIRST DISCUSSED AT THE OSLO NATO
MEETING, MAY 2-3 (REFTEL). THE ALLIANCE, THEY ARGUE,
MUST HAVE A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE IN HAND WHEN AND IF THE
NEED ARISES. IN ADDITION, THE DUTCH HAVE TOLD US THEY
ARE CONSIDERING A VARIATION OF NATO CONSTRAINTS OPTION
3, WHICH THEY, TOO, WANT TO INTRODUCE INTO THE NATO
MACHINERY. MOST OF OUR ALLIES NOW ARGUE THAT IF THE
WEST REJECTS CONSTRAINTS OUT OF HAND, THE NNA WILL NOT
HELP OUT WITH NATO'S MEASURES. THEY ALSO FEAR THAT THE
SOVIETS, AS WELL AS THE NNA, SEEM DETERMINED TO PRODUCE
NEW CONSTRAINTS PAPERS. IN THE CAUCUS, WE HAVE TRIED TO
PUT A BRAKE ON THE APPARENT BUILDING MOMENTUM. THE
ALLIANCE, WE CONTEND, IS STILL IN A GOOD POSITION AND
DOES NOT FACE MOUNTING PRESSURE FROM THE NNA OR THE EAST
-- BOTH OF WHICH HAVE YET TO GET THEIR CONSTRAINTS HOUSE
IN ORDER. FURTHERMORE, AS THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE
APPROACHES, IT MAY WELL BECOME CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINT
MEASURE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. TIME, OR THE LACK OF IT, WILL
THEN BE ON OUR SIDE.
7. ON NUF, THE DANES AND THE FRG HAVE BEEN QUIETLY
PUSHING FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF DRAFTING AN
ACCEPTABLE NUF PREAMBLE TO A CSBM'S AGREEMENT. WE HAVE
SO FAR SUCCESSFULLY DISSUADED THEM FROM BEING LURED BY
THE SOVIETS INTO UNEXPLORED NUF AVENUES IN WORKING GROUP
A -- AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. OUR NAY-SAYING ON BOTH
CONSTRAINTS AND NUF HAS LED TO A CERTAIN INCHOATE RESENT-
MENT TOWARD THE U.S. AS WE INTRODUCE WESTERN WORKING
DOCUMENTS AND FOCUS ON SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE
COMING WEEKS, WE HOPE TO RESTORE ALLIANCE HARMONY. WE
HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED TO OUR ALLIES THAT THIS PRETERNATURAL
ACTIVISM ON WHAT ARE, AFTER ALL, PERIPHERAL ISSUES FOR
THE WEST COULD BETTER BE CHANNELED INTO DISCUSSION OF
OUR OWN CSBM'S.
8. THE EAST: THE WARSAW PACT KEPT A CONSCIOUSLY AND
MYSTERIOUSLY LOW.PROFILE DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE
CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS PUT OUT THE WORD THAT. THEY
WOULD AWAIT A SIGNAL FROM THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN
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VIENNA BEFORE SPEAKING. WHILE THE MINISTERIAL SUMMIT
CERTAINLY HAD SOME EFFECT ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR, IT ALONE
DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR EASTERN ACTIVITIES -- OR LACK THEREOF
-- DURING THE FIRST WEEK.
9. THERE WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, AN ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF
EASTERN PARTICIPATION IN INFORMAL BANTER AROUND THE
CONFERENCE COFFEE BAR -- LONG CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE
"NEUTRAL" MEETING PLACE. WHILE ABSENCE DOES NOT
NECESSARILY MAKE THE HEART GROW FONDER, IT CERTAINLY
MAKES THE IMAGINATION RUN WILDER; EAST BLOC NO-SHOWS
NATURALLY HAVE BEEN GRIST FOR THE ACTIVE CDE RUMOR MILL.
THERE ARE AS MANY THEORIES FOR THIS AS THERE ARE NEW NATO
CONSTRAINT MEASURES. ONE THEORY SUGGESTED THAT THE
UNUSUALLY LARGE EASTERN TURNOVER -- FIVE NEW SOVIETS, TWO
NEW BULGARIANS, TWO NEW CZECHS, TWO NEW POLES, ETC. --
HAD CAUSED THE EAST TO CIRCLE THE WAGONS WHILE THE NEW
BOYS GOT ACQUAINTED WITH EACH OTHER. ANOTHER THEORY HAD
IT THAT MOSCOW HAS ISSUED A "NO CONTACT" DIRECTIVE WHILE
THE EAST FORMULATED ITS TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH
FOR THE SESSION. THIS THEORY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
SOVIETS' PENCHANT TO DEVELOP A "CORRIDOR LINE,"
ESPECIALLY BEFORE THEY INTRODUCE ANY OF THEIR PAPERS.
(SEE PARA 11 ON NEW EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS.) SUCH A
"NO CONTACT" UKASE MAY ALSO HAVE STEMMED FROM FEARS OF
PREMATURE (AS OPPOSED TO PREMEDITATED) LEAKS IN EASTERN
POSITIONS. A MORE INTRIGUING THEORY WAS THAT THE CHANGE
HAS BEEN CAUSED BY SCANDALS WITHIN SEVERAL EASTERN
DELEGATIONS. A CONFIRMED STORY HAS BEEN MAKING THE
ROUNDS ABOUT A YOUNG SOVIET DELEGATE WHO BECAME INVOLVED
IN BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES AND ANOTHER ABOUT AN EAST
EUROPEAN DELEGATE WITH A WELL DEVELOPED TASTE FOR THE
PLEASURES OF WESTERN SOCIETY; NEITHER DELEGATE HAS BEEN
SIGHTED THIS ROUND. WHATEVER THE REAL REASONS FOR THE
WARSAW PACT BOYCOTT OF THE "COFFEE BAR," OR COMBINATION
OF REASONS, EASTERN DELEGATES BEGAN TO REAPPEAR THE
SECOND WEEK AS QUICKLY AND MYSTERIOUSLY AS THEY HAD
DISAPPEARED DURING THE FIRST.
10. THE EAST'S AGENT OF INFLUENCE? WHILE HIS EASTERN
BRETHREN STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED WESTERN CONTACTS DURING THE
FIRST WEEK, THE HUNGARIAN DEPUTY, ISTVAN KORMENDY,
BLITHELY AND ACTIVELY MADE THE ROUNDS AMONG WESTERN AND
NNA DELEGATES. KORMENDY IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE NEW
BREED OF EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOMAT: WITTY, URBANE, AND
SEEMINGLY INDEPENDENT. HE WILL HINT, WITH A WINK AND A
NOD, THAT HE, OF COURSE, DOES NOT ASCRIBE TO THE PARTY
LINE DICTATED BY MOSCOW. AND HE WILL ENCOURAGE HIS
FREQUENT WESTERN CONTACTS TO THINK "EQUALLY
INDEPENDENTLY." NO U.S. DELEGATION MEETING OR NATO
CAUCUS IS COMPLETE WITHOUT A REPORT ON A SUGGESTION/IDEA/
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TRIAL BALLOON-FLOATED BY EVERYBODY'S FAVORITE COMMUNIST.
KORMENDY'S AD LIB LINES ARE TOO WELL REHEARSED. WHAT IS
INFORMATION AND WHAT IS DISINFORMATION IS, HOWEVER,
DIFFICULT TO DECIPHER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARRIVAL OF FIVE
NEW SOVIET DELEGATES, MOST OF WHOM SPEAK NO ENGLISH, THE
UNOFFICIAL LINGUA FRANCA OF THE CONFERENCE, OR HAVE ANY
CDE/CSCE EXPERIENCE, NATURALLY ENGENDERED CORRIDOR
SPECULATION, MOST OF IT NEGATIVE I.E., WAS MOSCOW
DOWNGRADING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CDE? AFTER WAITING A
DECENT INTERVAL, IN ORDER TO LISTEN TO THE CONFERENCE
SCUTTLEBUTT, KORMENDY PUT OUT THE WORD -- AS ALWAYS, IN
SUCH A WAY THAT HIS MANY WESTERN AND NNA INTERLOCUTORS
FELT THEY HAD BEEN AFFORDED A UNIQUE PEEK INSIDE EAST
BLOC THINKING -- THAT THE PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE SOVIET
DELEGATION WERE, IN FACT, A SIGN THAT MOSCOW TOOK THE
CONFERENCE MORE SERIOUSLY THESE MEN WERE, ACCORDING TO
KORMENDY, PRAGMATIC TYPES (A LA ANDROPOV, GORBACHEV) YOU
"COULD DO BUSINESS WITH." (THE DELEGATION WILL REPORT,
OF COURSE, THE FIRST SIGHTING OF A HAROLD ROBBINS NOVEL
OR A SCOTCH AND SODA IN THE HANDS OF OUR NEW SOVIET
COMRADES.)
11. EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS: AT THE MAY 20 WORKING
GROUP AB MEETING, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES
TABLED THREE NEW WORKING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. THEY
PROPOSED A 30-DAY ADVANCE NOTIFICATION FOR ALL THREE
TYPES OF ACTIVITIES. THEY SET A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF
2U,000 MEN FOR GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS; 30 COMBAT SHIPS
AND 100 MILITARY PLANES FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES; AND 200
MILITARY PLANES IN THE AIR SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR MAJOR AIR
FORCE MANEUVERS. EASTERN DELEGATES CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE
NOW MET THEIR HALF OF THE BARGAIN PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT
REAGAN IN DUBLIN, I.E., EASTERN NEGOTIATIONS OF CONCRETE
CSBM'S IN EXCHANGE FOR WESTERN DISCUSSION OF NUF. WE
BELIEVE, ON THE CONTRARY, THAT THESE PAPERS REPRESENT NO
SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE OF HELSINKI NOTIFICATION MEASURES
FOR LAND ACTIVITIES, AND RUN CONTRARY TO THE TERMS OF
THE MANDATE ON NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. WHILE WE DEVELOP OUR SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES
TO THESE MEASURES, WE HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC
LINE: THE WEST WELCOMES GREATER PRECISION OF THE CSBM'S
BEFORE US HOWEVER, THE EASTERN PAPERS CONTAIN VARIOUS
OMISSIONS, ERRORS, AND INCONSISTENCIES AND DO NOT ADVANCE
OUR WORK HERE. (COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE PAPERS FOLLOWS
SEPTEL.)
12. THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED. THE NNA REMAIN
INTERESTED SPECTATORS IN THIS EAST-WEST WAITING GAME.
IN PUBLIC, THEY RITUALISTICALLY RECITE THE CSCE THEOLOGY
OF THE NNA AS BRIDGE-BUILDERS; LN PRIVATE, THEY
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RIGOROUSLY REPEAT WELL DEFINED NATIONAL POSITIONS. THE
YUGOSLAVS, AND TO A LESSER DEGREE THE SWEDES, APPEAR
WEDDED TO A FINAL AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDES CONSTRAINTS.
AT THE OTHER END OF THE NNA SPECTRUM, THE SWISS INSIST
THEY ARE PREPARED TO FALL ON THEIR SWORDS TO PRESERVE
THE CSCE LINKAGE BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
PROGRESS AND TO ESCHEW A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE FOR ITS OWN
SAKE. WHILE THE SWISS TALK A TOUGH GAME, WE DOUBT THAT
THEY WILL HOLD UP ANY NNA CONSENSUS IF IT SHOULD DEVELOP
IN STOCKHOLM. THEIR HARD LINE HAS BEEN UNDERMINED BY
NATO CAUCUS LEAKS ON THE ALLIANCE'S "CONSIDERATION" OF
THE BRITISH CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL. IN ANY CASE, THE NNA
ASTUTELY SURMISE THAT THE GAP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IS
STILL TOO WIDE FOR EVEN THE MOST AMBITIOUS BRIDGE-BUILDER
TO CLOSE AT THIS POINT. MEANWHILE, THE NNA DELIVERED
SOME INTERESTING, AND LARGELY HELPFUL STATEMENTS, FROM
THE WEST'S POINT OF VIEW. THE IRISH, IN EFFECT, ACCEPTED
NATO'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND THE AUSTRIANS BOTH
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION WAS NECESSARILY A
COMPONENT OF THE CONCRETE CSBM'S AGREED UPON IN STOCKHOLM
AND CAME OUT SQUARELY IN FAVOR OF INFORMATION AND MEANS
OF VERIFICATION THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ALL
PARTICIPANTS, I.E., NTM'S ARE NOT ENOUGH.
13. FRIDAY'S FIREWORKS: THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THE
CONFERENCE, THUS, HAVE DONE LITTLE TO JUSTIFY THE HOPES
OF MANY -- AND FEARS OF SOME -- FOR RAPID MOVEMENT IN
STOCKHOLM. FRIDAY'S PLENARY (MAY 24), HOWEVER, ADDED A
LITTLE SPICE TO AN OTHERWISE DULL BROTH. THE U.S.
DELEGATION HAD PLANNED TO USE THE OCCASION TO DELIVER
OUR FIRST MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT THIS ROUND, WHICH WOULD
HAVE INCLUDED A STRONG STATEMENT ABOUT SOVIET BEHAVIOR
IN THE KILLING OF MAJOR NICHOLSON, LINKING THE TRAGEDY
TO THE NECESSITY OF AGREEING ON VERIFIABLE CSBM'S IN
STOCKHOLM, WHICH WOULD INHIBIT THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE,
AS PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTED IN HIS MAY 8 STRASBOURG SPEECH.
UNFORTUNATELY, WASHINGTON'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MATTER
ARRIVED AFTER THE PLENARY HAD BEGUN AND WERE RELAYED BY
A USDEL MEMBER DIRECTLY TO THE U.S. DELEGATION IN THE
CONFERENCE HALL, LITERALLY IMMEDIATELY AS AMBASSADOR
GOODBY WAS FINISHING HIS PREPARED REMARKS. (THE U.S.
STATEMENT CONTRASTED THE SOVIET PIE-IN-THE-SKY
DECLARATORY APPROACH WITH THE WEST'S APPROACH OF
PRACTICAL STEPS WITH TANGIBLE RESULTS.) HOWEVER, JUST
AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY WAS ABOUT TO GAVEL THE MEETING
TO A CLOSE, THE SOVIETS INADVERTENTLY, BUT IN THEIR OWN
INIMITABLE STYLE, SAVED THE DAY. THE SOVIET DELEGATE,
YEROFEEV (ONE OF THE NEW SOVIETS WE "CAN DO BUSINESS
WITH") LAUNCHED INTO A VINTAGE ATTACK ON "BARBARIC"
AMERICAN PLANS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE IN EUROPE. (WE WILL
ANSWER HIS ATTACK IN SOME DETAIL ON TUESDAY, MAY 28.)
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SUCH POLEMICS HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM THE CONFERENCE SINCE
THE FALL ROUND. FOR US, ITS REINTRODUCTION COULD NOT
HAVE COME AT A BETTER TIME, FOR IT ENABLED AMBASSADOR
GOODBY TO REQUEST THE FLOOR FOR AN EMINENTLY JUSTIFIABLE
RIGHT OF REPLY. USING YEROFEEV'S ACCUSATION OF U.S.
"BARBARISM" ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS A TAKEOFF POINT,
GOODBY CONDEMNED THE KILLING OF MAJOR NICHOLSON BY A
SOVIET GUARD USING THE JUST-DELIVERED TALKING POINTS FROM
WASHINGTON (SEPTEL). SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY,
APPARENTLY TAKEN OFF GUARD, RETORTED THAT THE U.S. HAD
INTRODUCED A PURELY BILATERAL QUESTION INTO THE
CONFERENCE. THOUGH HE REPEATED THE STANDARD SOVIET LINE
EXPRESSING REGRET FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE, HE PUT THE BLAME
ON U.S. SHOULDERS.
14. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THIS HEATED EXCHANGE CAUSED NO
SMALL DEGREE OF DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME OF OUR MORE
SQUEAMISH WESTERN COLLEAGUES. NEVERTHELESS, MANY
DELEGATES GRUDGINGLY COMPLIMENTED US ON OUR HANDLING OF
THIS CONTENTIOUS SUBJECT. WHILE THE REST OF THE
CONFERENCE MAY SEE MORE METHOD IN AMERICAN "MADNESS"
THAN WARRANTED, WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE AN
ESSENTIAL POINT: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST NOT
MERELY BE AGREED UPON, THEY MUST BE IMPLEMENTED!
END
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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 3933
1. CDE VI - 050
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. DRAWING ON UNCLASSIFIED DATA AND PUBLIC
STATEMENTS, THE U.S. SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. AND
SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICIES FOLLOWING LAST
FRIDAY'S (MAY 24) POLEMICAL STATEMENT BY SOVIET DELEGATE
YEROFEYEV ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH ATTACKED THE RECENT
SENATE ACTION ON BINARY WEAPONS AND IMPLIED U.S. INTEN-
TIONS TO USE CW IN EUROPE (REFTEL). THE U.S.-SOVIET
EXCHANGE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FOLLOWING THE PLENARY
EXCHANGE ON THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON, HAS CAUSED
DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME DELEGATIONS AT THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE WHO ARE INCLINED TO AVOID THE PUBLIC EXPRES-
SION OF ANY STRONG DISAGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, AS THE DUST
HAS BEGUN TO SETTLE, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC SPITTING MATCH ON CW
CHARGES. IN OTHER INTERVENTIONS, THE GDR AND THE FRG
EXCHANGED QUESTIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES
(NWFZ). POLAND AND HUNGARY DELIVERED LEGALISTIC
STATEMENTS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF). END SUMMARY.
4. DRAWING ON UNCLASSIFIED DATA AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS,
THE U.S. (GUNDERSEN) SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. AND
SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICIES FOLLOWING LAST FRIDAY'S
(MAY 24) POLEMICAL STATEMENT BY SOVIET DELEGATE
YEROFEYEV ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH ATTACKED THE RECENT
SENATE ACTION ON BINARY WEAPONS AND IMPLIED U.S. INTEN-
TIONS TO USE CW IN EUROPE (REFTEL). GUNDERSEN STRESSED
THAT THE MANDATED WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE WAS TO NEGO-
TIATE CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THAT THE SOVIET INTRODUCTION
OF TENDENTIOUS CW STATEMENTS DID NOT FURTHER THIS TASK;
HE, THEREFORE, PROPOSED THAT THE WORKING GROUP RETURN TO
ITS APPOINTED TASK. IN ORDER TO SET THE RECORD
STRAIGHT, HOWEVER, GUNDERSEN FIRST NOTED:
-- THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST IN DEVELOPING AND
POSSESSING CAPABILITIES FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE SPANS SEVEN
DECADES, FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS MILITARY CHEMICAL
WARFARE SERVICE IN 1918 TO THE EXPANSION IN RECENT YEARS
OF ITS SHIKHANY CHEMICAL WARFARE PROVING GROUND.
-- THE USSR MAINTAINS THE LARGEST CW STOCKPILES AND
THE LARGEST CORPS OF CHEMICAL OFFICERS IN THE WORLD;
-- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE HAS INTEGRATED THE USE
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DOWN TO THE DIVISION LEVEL;
-- UNLIKE THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
PUBLICIZES ITS MILITARY PROGRAMS AND LEAVES NO DOUBT
ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF THESE PROGRAMS;
-- RECENT USE OF CW, INCLUDING TOXIN WEAPONS, IN
AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN THE IRAN-IRAQ
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CONFLICT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL
WARFARE WILL PERSIST AS LONG AS THESE WEAPONS EXIST IN
THE ARSENALS OF NATIONS. HENCE, FIRST PRIORITY OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT IN THIS AREA IS THE GLOBAL AND VERIFIED
ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES AND MEANS OF
PRODUCTION;
-- U.S. CW DETERRENCE POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN A
LIMITED BUT EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS RETALIATORY
CAPABILITY UNTIL A VERIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL CW BAN IS
ACHIEVED;
-- SINCE 1969 THE U.S. HAS NOT MANUFACTURED ANY
LETHAL OR INCAPACITATING CW. THIS U.S. RESTRAINT HAS
NOT BEEN MATCHED BY THE USSR; DURING THIS SAME 16-YEAR
PERIOD, THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONTINUED ITS PROGRAMS,
STEADILY STRENGTHENING ITS WORLDWIDE MILITARY ADVANTAGE
IN CW CAPABILITY.
-- THE U.S. CW MODERNIZATION EFFORT IS DESIGNED TO
REPLACE OLD AND DETERIORATING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WITH
NEW STOCKS WHICH ARE DESIGNED FOR INCREASED SAFETY; AS
NEW BINARY MUNITIONS ARE PRODUCED, OLDER STOCKS WILL BE
DEMILITARIZED SO THERE WILL BE NO NET INCREASE IN THE
SIZE OF THE EXISTING U.S. RETALIATORY CHEMICAL STOCKPILE;
-- SOVIET CW TRAINING AND STOCKPILES ALONE ARE NOT
THE SOLE REASON FOR OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF
THE U.S. DETERRENT; THE SOVIET UNION HAS SHOWN A
PROPENSITY TO USE THESE WEAPONS BY ITS NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
5. AS EXPECTED, YEROFEYEV RESPONDED WITH A LONG,
PARTIALLY PREPARED TEXT. HE JUSTIFIED HIS MAY 24
INTERVENTION IN THE PLENARY (REFTEL)BY SAYING THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAD FELT COMPELLED TO TAKE THE FLOOR BECAUSE
A CW CSBM WOULD BE "VERY SIGNIFICANT." NOTING THAT THE
SENATE DECISION CAME AFTER "YEARS OF NON-DECISION," HE
CALLED THE SENATE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR BINARY WEAPONS
A "SERIOUS SYMPTOM AND AN ACT WHICH GIVES THE GREEN
LIGHT TO FURTHER CW ARMAMENT."
-- DELVING DEEP INTO THE PAST, HE ACCUSED THE U.S.
OF HAVING DEVELOPED IN THE LATE 50'S-EARLY 60'S THE MOST
EFFECTIVE POISONOUS AGENT (PHOSPHORIC ORGANIC SUBSTANCE),
"ONE KILOGRAM OF WHICH COULD KILL FOUR MILLION PEOPLE."
HE CALLED THIS DEVELOPMENT "BARBARIC" (A TERM HE HAD
USED IN HIS MAY 24 PLENARY STATEMENT) BECAUSE IT WAS
DIRECTED AT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS SINCE THE ARMED FORCES
HAVE THE NECESSARY PROTECTION. THE SOVIET DELEGATE
NOTED THAT 1.3 MILLION PEOPLE WERE INJURED AND 100,000
DIED DURING WWI FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS; YEROFEYEV SAID
THAT MODERN BINARY WEAPONS WERE MUCH MORE LETHAL THAN
THOSE EARLY CW. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS
DEMANDED A BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF BINARY WEAPONS
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DURING THE PAST TWO UNGA MEETINGS: MOST RECENTLY, 152
NATIONS VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET RESOLUTION WITH
ONLY THE U.S. VOTING AGAINST IT.
-- CHARGING THAT THREE MILLION HAD SUFFERED FROM
THE EFFECTS OF U.S. CW USE IN VIETNAM, YEROFEYEV CATE-
GORICALLY DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS USED CW AND
REFERRED TO THE UN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION STUDY WHICH
HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET
USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
-- RETURNING THE FOCUS OF HIS COMMENTS TO EUROPE
HE QUOTED WHAT HE CALLED "A HIGH LEVEL PENTAGON OFFI-
CIAL" AS SAYING THAT "CW REEQUIPMENT IS DESIGNED TO HAVE
THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING LARGE-SCALE CW (ATTACKS)
IN EUROPE AGAINST THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES." HE
REFERRED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF BINARY CW IN EUROPE -- AND
SAID THAT 10,000 TONS WERE BEING STOCKPILED IN ONE
COUNTRY IN EUROPE -- AS EVIDENCE OF THE DANGEROUS
SITUATION IN EUROPE. HE THEN GAVE AN EXHAUSTIVE HISTORY
OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO SECURE A CW BAN, STARTING IN 1928
WHEN THE USSR ACCEDED TO THE 1925 GENEVA CONVENTION ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
6. GUNDERSEN DELIVERED A TERSE RIGHT OF REPLY, NOTING
THAT MANY OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE'S ALLEGATIONS ARE
SUBJECT TO DISPUTE, WHILE FOCUSING ON TWO MISLEADING
STATEMENTS MADE BY YEROFEYEV: 1) WHEN REFERRING TO THE
UN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION'S REPORT TO THE UN FIRST
COMMITTEE ON SOVIET CW USE, THE SOVIET DELEGATE NEGLECTED
TO NOTE THAT THE REASON THE INDEPENDENT UN COMMISSION HAD
BEEN UNABLE TO COME TO ANY CONCLUSIONS WAS THAT IT HAD
BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO AREAS WHERE THERE HAD BEEN REPORTS
OF CW USE; AND 2) DURING A UN VOTE ON BINARY WEAPONS, 62
NATIONS ABSTAINED, AN UNHEARD OF NUMBER IN UN FIRST
COMMITTEE VOTING, WHICH SHOWED A GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO
TAKE SIDES ON THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. MOREOVER,
GUNDERSEN NOTED, VOTES ON TWO OTHER (FRENCH- AND
AMERICAN-SPONSORED) RESOLUTIONS IN THE 39TH UNGA CALLING
FOR CW STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS WERE PASSED BY VAST
MAJORITIES, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION FOUND ITSELF A MEMBER
OF A VERY SMALL MINORITY ON THESE VOTES. GUNDERSEN
CONCLUDED BY INVITING HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART TO DISCUSS
THE CURRENT SOVIET CW PROGRAM AS OPENLY AS HE HAD
DISCUSSED THE U.S. PROGRAM.
7. KORMENDY (HUNGARY) ANSWERED AN AUSTRIAN QUESTION
FROM THE PREVIOUS ROUND REGARDING THE EMPHASIS IN THE
SOVIET PROPOSAL ON BASIC PROVISIONS OF A NUF TREATY
(SC.6) ON "MILITARY FORCE". HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO
INTENTION BY THE EAST TO DIMINISH OR LIMIT THE SCOPE OF
THE GENERAL PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE CONTAINED IN
THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE REFERENCE
IN SC.6'S TITLE TO MILITARY FORCES, ACCORDING TO
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KORMENDY, "RELATES TO THE SPECIFIC MANIFESTATIONS OF THE
USE OF FORCE WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE CSCE STATES."
8. KASPRZYK (POLAND) DISCUSSED NUF AND ITS PRACTICAL
APPLICATION. NOTING THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE CONTAINED IN
ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN CHARTER, ALSO UNIVERSALLY RECOG-
NIZED, WAS FREQUENTLY VIOLATED IN PRACTICE, HE ARGUED
THAT THE NUF TREATY PROPOSED IN SC.6 WOULD SATISFY THE
NEED FOR THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE NUF PROHIBITION
AND WOULD HELP HIGHLIGHT THE INHERENT OBLIGATION OF THE
UN CHARTER PRINCIPLE. KASPRZYK INSISTED THAT THERE WAS
NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SC.6 AND THE UN CHARTER, SINCE
NOTHING FORBIDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUS COGENS AND ITS
CODIFICATION.
9. GDR (GEORGI) ASKED NATO REPS TWO QUESTIONS: 1) WILL
THE IDEA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE CORRIDORS BE PART OF
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND, IF NOT, WHY WAS IT BEING
REJECTED? AND 2) WHAT PROSPECTS DOES NATO ENVISAGE FOR
THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL ON NWFZ IN THE TRANSITION TO
THE SECOND STAGE? HE EXPRESSED HIS DELEGATION'S
SUSPICIONS THAT NATO WAS TRYING TO LET NWFZ "FALL UNDER
THE TABLE." URGING, INSTEAD, THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD
ENCOURAGE THOSE STATES SEEKING TO ESTABLISH NWFZ'S IN
EUROPE, HE SAID THAT THE GDR WAS WAITING FOR OTHER STATES
TO ENABLE THE CONFERENCE TO DEVELOP COMMON GROUND ON THE
USEFULNESS AND IMPLEMENTABILITY OF NWFZ'S.
10. THE FRG, RESPONDING TO THE GDR, RAISED A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED: 1) WHAT CONTRIBUTION WOULD
THE CREATION OF NWFZ, WHICH WOULD ONLY GIVE THE ILLUSION
OF SECURITY, MAKE TO PREVENTING CONFLICT? 2) HOW WOULD
THE GDR PREVENT THE USE OF WEAPONS FROM BEYOND THE NWFZ
OR THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE ZONE SECRETLY IN
TIME OF CRISIS? 3) DOESN'T THE DANGER EXIST THAT A
NUCLEAR-ARMED AGGRESSOR WOULD ATTACK A NWFZ BECAUSE IT
WOULD HAVE NO FEAR OF RETALIATION? THE FRG THEN NOTED
THE DIFFICULTY OF IMPLEMENTING NWFZ AND CALLED FOR MORE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES (TO BE NEGOTIATED, PRESUMABLY, IN
OTHER FORA), SUCH AS THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL INTERMEDIATE-
RANGE AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
11. BEGIN COMMENT. THE U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, FOLLOWING THE PLENARY EXCHANGE ON THE MURDER OF
MAJOR NICHOLSON, HAS CAUSED DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME DELEGA-
TIONS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WHO ARE INCLINED TO
AVOID THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF ANY STRONG DISAGREEMENTS.
HOWEVER, U.S. DELEGATION BELIEVES BOTH INTERVENTIONS HAVE
HAD THEIR INTENDED EFFECT: TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT
AND TO DEFEND FUNDAMENTAL U.S. VALUES AND POLICIES.
FURTHERMORE, THE U.S. STATEMENT MAY HAVE A CERTAIN
DETERRENT EFFECT HERE IN STOCKHOLM. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY
103
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DO NOT WANT TO FOCUS CONFERENCE ATTENTION ON THEIR
EXTENSIVE CW PROGRAM. (SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAVE
APPROACHED US TO EXPRESS SURPRISE -- AND DISMAY -- AT
THE EXTENT OF THE SOVIET CW PROGRAM.) IN FACT, THE
SOVIET REP IN WG A (YEROFEYEV) HAS TOLD US THAT HE DOES
NOT WANT TO ENGAGE US IN FURTHER POLEMICS ON U.S. VS
SOVIET CW PROGRAMS. END COMMENT.
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 28
1. CDE VI - 47.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: MAY 28 SESSION ON NOTIFICATION WAS
HIGHLIGHTED BY MALTESE INTERVENTION ELABORATING ON SC.5,
INCLUDING MALTESE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE TO COVER
ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND CALLING
FOR EXTENSION OF SC.1'S OUT-OF-GARRISION CONCEPT TO AN
"OUT-OF-BASE" APPROACH. (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4-5
BELOW). EASTERN DELEGATES ATTEMPTED TO DEFEND THE
PARAMETERS IN THEIR WORKING DOCUMENTS FOR NOTIFICATION
OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS (20,000 TROOPS, 30 DAYS IN
ADVANCE) WHICH PROMPTED CRITICAL RESPONSES FROM UK AND
SWITZERLAND (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 6-7 BELOW). ROMANIA
ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND REGARDING THE
CONTENTS OF INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION
(SUMMARIZED IN PARA 8 BELOW). THE SOVIETS (AND U.S.)
REMAINED SILENT. NORWAY AND THE FRG DEFENDED MEASURE 3
AND CRITICIZED THE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS. END
SUMMARY.
4. BECAUSE OF ITS POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE
"END-GAME", THE TEXT OF THE MALTESE INTERVENTION IS
BEING REPORTED IN FULL IN SEPTEL. THE MALTESE POSITION
COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME BECAUSE:
-- 1) THE NNA CANNOT BE COUNTED UPON TO STICK FIRMLY
WITH OUR DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EVEN
THOUGH MOST OF THEM NOW SUPPORT THE WESTERN POSITION.
SWEDEN AND YUGOSLAVIA HAVE NATIONAL REASONS FOR DESIRING
A MORE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH, AND AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND, WHILE GENERALLY
STRONG BELIEVERS IN A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE
MANDATE, ARE LAND-LOCKED STATES
-- 2) THE MALTESE POSITION SUPPORTS THE DANISH NATIONAL
POSITION REGARDING AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES (AS REPORTED
PREVIOUSLY).
5. IN BRIEF, THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR:
-- REJECTED THE WESTERN POSITION THAT THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH AND THE "INDEPENDENT APPROACH" ARE INHERENTLY
CONTRADICTORY,
-- REJECTED WHAT HE TERMED TWO ASSUMPTIONS OF NATO'S
DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: 1) THAT
"ADJOINING SEA" REVOLVES AROUND OR IS DEFINED BY THE
COASTLINE OF EUROPE; HE SAID THAT THE "WHOLE OF EUROPE"
MUST INCLUDE TERRITORIAL SEAS AND THEREFORE IS NOT
RESTRICTED TO THE "SOIL" OF EUROPE AND 2) THAT THE
"ORGANIC LINK" (WHICH HE ADMITTED IS REQUIRED BETWEEN
NAVAL AND GROUND ACTIVITIES) MEANS THE ACTIVITIES MOST
OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE ACTIVITIES OF AN AIRCRAFT
CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH HAS AS A
PRIMARY MISSION THE DELIVERY OF STRIKES AGAINST LAND,
ARE BY DEFINITION ORGANICALLY LINKED TO CONFLICT ON LAND
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AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.
-- INDICATED THAT NOTIFICATION OF INNOCENT PASSAGE WOULD
IN EFFECT BE AN EXTENSION, WITH REGARD TO WARSHIPS, TO
THE MULTILATERAL ARENA OF THE 35 OF THE NOTIFICATION
WHICH IS ALREADY DONE BILATERALLY BETWEEN CONCERNED
STATES.
EXPLAINED THAT NOTIFICATION OF THE SEA TRANSPORT OF
ARMED PERSONNEL SHOULD APPLY ONLY TO THE ACTUAL PASSAGE
OF SUCH TRANSPORT THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE POINT
OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION NEED NOT BE NOTIFIED IF
OUTSIDE THE ZONE. IT IS PREMATURE TO SUGGEST A SPECIFIC
PARAMETER, BUT IT REFERS TO "AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER
OF TROOPS." ACCEPTANCE OF AN "OUT-OF-BASE" CONCEPT
ANALOGOUS TO SC.1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT MIGHT
REQUIRE A DIFFERENT PARAMETER. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE
ASKED WHY MEASURE 1 OF SC.1 DOES NOT INCLUDE INFORMATION
ON NAVAL BASES, SINCE EVEN THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WOULD
JUSTIFY THIS.
-- ARGUED THAT THE ENTIRETY (AND INDIVIDUAL PHASES) OF
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED, NOT JUST
AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS. IN PARTICULAR, THE NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD SHOULD BE THE TROOP TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY OF
THE EXERCISE.
6. POLISH AND CZECH REPS DEFENDED THE SPECIFIC
PARAMETERS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF
GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS. THEY ARGUED THAT THE REDUCTION
FROM 25,000 TO 20,000 REPRESENTED A 20 PERCENT
IMPROVEMENT AND THE INCREASE FROM 21 TO 30 DAYS A 33
PERCENT IMPROVEMENT. THE POLISH REP ARGUED THAT 21 DAYS
WAS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN 1975 TO ASSESS THE
CHARACTER OF A NOTIFIED MANEUVER AND TO PREPARE ONE'S
FORCES FOR ACTION IF NECESSARY. HE MAINTAINED THAT HIS
DELEGATION CONTINUED TO BELIEVE 21 DAYS WAS SUFFICIENT,
BUT WAS PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE TO OTHERS' DEMANDS FOR AN
INCREASE TO 30 DAYS. HE CLAIMED THE WEST HAD PRESENTED
NO CONVINCING REASONS FOR A 45-DAY ADVANCE NOTIFICATION,
OTHER THAN "LONGER IS BETTER". THE UK REP CHALLENGED
THE EAST, AGAIN, TO DEFEND THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE 20,000 PROPOSAL IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL
ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE NOTIFIED. HE ALSO CHALLENGED
THE EASTERN CONCEPT THAT THE TIME FOR ADVANCE
NOTIFICATION WAS DICTATED BY THE TIME NEEDED TO PREPARE
FORCES FOR CONTINGENCY ACTION, ARGUING THAT, ON THE
CONTRARY, IT WAS A FUNCTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE
SWISS REP INTERJECTED THAT PERHAPS A LENGTHY TIME FOR
NOTIFICATION WAS NOT A SECURITY ISSUE FOR THOSE STATES
WHICH MAINTAIN FORCES AT NEAR COMBAT STRENGTH, BUT FOR
SUCH STATES AS SWITZERLAND, WHICH DEPENDED ON
MOBILIZATION FOR DEFENSE, THE LONGER THE TIME FOR
ADYANCE NOTIFICATION, THE BETTER.
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7. THE ONLY ITEM OF INTEREST IN THE EASTERN STATEMENTS
WAS THE CZECH COMMENT, REGARDING THE CONTENTS OF
INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATION, THAT "WE ENVISAGE ALSO THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUBMITTING SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
DURING THE COURSE OF THE MANEUVER, A SIGNIFICANT ASPECT."
8. THE ROMANIAN REP CLAIMED THAT POSITIONS WERE NOT AS
FAR APART AS THEY MIGHT SEEM AND NOTED AREAS OF
CONVERGENCE AS REGARDS THE CONTENTS OF INFORMATION IN
NOTIFICATION. NOTING THAT ALL PROPOSALS PROPOSE TO GO
BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, HE
POINTED TO CONVERGENCE REGARDING DESCRIPTION OF THE
ACTIVITY AND GEOGRAPHIC AREA. HE ALSO NOTED SOME
CONSENSUS REGARDING INFORMATION ON MAJOR ARMAMENTS.
FINALLY, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION
WOULD REFLECT THE CONFERENCE'S DECISION REGARDING
WHETHER A STRUCTURAL OR NUMERICAL THRESHOLD -- OR A
COMBINATION -- SHOULD BE ADOPTED.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: TEXT OF MALTESE STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION
1. CDE VI - 48.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. AS NOTED SEPTEL, MALTESE AMBASSADOR
MADE AN INTERVENTION IN WORKING GROUP B ON MAY 28, IN
WHICH HE ELABORATED UPON THE NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS OF
SC.5. BECAUSE THE MALTESE POSITION WILL DEFINE SOME OF
THE END-GAME ISSUES, WE ARE REPORTING THE FULL TEXT OF
THE MALTESE INTERVENTION.
BEGIN TEXT.
THE INCLUSION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN A
NOTIFICATION REGIME HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SOME
DETAILED SCRUTINY IN THIS WORKING GROUP. MY DELEGATION
IS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL
ACTIVITIES, AS IS MORE THAN EVIDENT IN THE PROPOSALS
SUBMITTED IN SC.5. I WISH TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS
REGARDING THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES PROPOSED IN SECTION
B OF SC.5, IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMENTS WHICH HAVE
ALREADY BEEN MADE ON THE SUBJECT.
BEFORE DOING SO I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH VERY BRIEFLY UPON
THE QUESTION OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MADRID MANDATE
IN THIS CONTEXT. I DO SO RELUCTANTLY BECAUSE IT IS
BVIOUS THAT POLITICAL REALITIES CAN NEVER BE
SIDE-STEPPED THROUGH LINGUISTIC NICETIES. AND THE
POLITICAL REALITY IS THAT NAVAL DEPLOYMENT AND
ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND EUROPEAN WATERS ARE VERY MUCH A
VITAL PART OF THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE WHICH
IS A CENTRAL CONCERN TO THIS CONFERENCE.
NEVERTHELESS THE VIRTUOSITY OF SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF
THE MADRID MANDATE IN THIS CONTEXT, INVITE COMMENT. I
AM THINKING IN PARTICULAR OF THE ATTITUDE WHICH
JUXTAPOSES, AS INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY, THE FUNCTIONAL
AND INDEPENDENT APPROACHES IN RELATION TO NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND EUROPEAN WATERS.
WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND, AND FAR LESS DO WE APPRECIATE,
THIS CONTRADICTION. WE SEE THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS HAVE
BEEN ADDED TO THE MEANING OF THE PHRASES IN QUESTION
WHICH, GOING WELL BEYOND THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE
MADRID MANDATE, LEAD TO AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION. THUS
WHEN THE FUNCTIONAL LINKAGE IS BROUGHT UP THIS IS DONE
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TWO ASSUMPTIONS WHICH MY DELEGATION
FINDS RATHER ASTONISHING. THE FIRST IS THAT WHAT MAY BE
CALLED, THE AXIS OF THE LINKAGE, LIES PRECISELY ON THE
SHORELINE. THE SECOND REFERS TO THE TIME DIMENSION: IT
IS ASSUMED THAT SPECIFIC-ACTIVITIES MUST OCCUR
CONTEMPORANEOUSLY IN EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA
AREA FOR THE FUNCTIONAL LINKAGE TO BECOME OPERATIONAL.
MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT BOTH THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE
UNJUSTIFIED. THE MADRID MANDATE DOES NOT SPEAK, AS OUR
COLLEAGUE FROM THE NETHERLANDS DID ON THE 19 FEBRUARY,
OF THE EUROPEAN SOIL. IT SPEAKS OF THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE. WHEN IT IS RECALLED THAT THE FINAL ACT REFERS
TO "THE TERRITORY IN EUROPE OF PARTICIPATING STATES"
PERHAPS THE POINT I WISH TO MAKE BECOMES CLEARER. EVEN
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THE PHRASE "THE TERRITORY IN EUROPE OF PARTICIPATING
STATES" CANNOT BE READ AS REFERRING TO THE SHORELINE BUT
TO THE LIMIT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA. MUCH MORE
THEREFORE MUST THE MADRID PHRASE THE "WHOLE OF EUROPE"
EXTEND BEYOND THE LAND LIMIT - AND THIS EXTENSION DOES
NOT ONLY COVER ANY EUROPEAN 'SOIL' NOT ORIGINALLY
INCLUDED IN THE FINAL ACT, BUT ALSO ALL EUROPEAN WATERS
BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEAS, WHICH AS I NOTED IN MY
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS OF THE 12 NOVEMBER, INCLUDES
EXTENSIVE PARTS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN.
AS REGARDS THE TIME DIMENSION THE ABSOLUTE INSISTENCE
UPON A CONTEMPORANEOUS ELEMENT IN THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH ANY REASONABLE
READING OF THE MADRID MANDATE. ACTIVITIES IN THE
ADJOINING SEA AREA MAY OR MAY NOT BE CONTEMPORANEOUS
WITH ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. THE LINKAGE
DOES NOT HOLD OR BREAK UPON THIS POINT.
SHORN OF THESE TWO, IN OUR VIEW UNJUSTIFIED, ADDITIONAL
ELEMENTS, THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IS NOT INHERENTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE NOTION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL
ACTIVITIES AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE WORKING OF THE FINAL
ACT. A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NOTION OF
INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES MUST RECOGNIZE AN ORGANIC LINKAGE
BETWEEN ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY WHICH SHOULD BE NOTIFIED
AND OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES UNDER A CSBM REGIME.
WHAT IS INCORRECT IS TO ASSERT THAT AS FAR AS NAVAL
ACTIVITIES ARE CONCERNED THE MADRID MANDATE MEANS THAT
THIS ORGANIC LINKAGE MUST INEVITABLY RESIDE IN THOSE
RIGID TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS, WHICH I HAVE
NOTED EARLIER.
IT IS EVIDENT HOWEVER BY NOW THAT HAVING BECOME
EXPLOITED SLOGANS FOR CONTRASTING VIEWPOINTS THE PHRASES
'FUNCTIONAL' AND 'INDEPENDENT' APPROACHES HAVE LOST ALL
UTILITY IN A SEARCH FOR A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT.
IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE
FOUR SPECIFIC MEASURES OF NOTIFICATION INCLUDED IN
SC.5. FIRST OF ALL I WILL RECALL WHAT I SAID WHEN
ORIGINALLY INTRODUCING THE PAPER LAST NOVEMBER. OUR
PROPOSALS DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, BECAUSE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ACTIVITIES
TAKING PLACE THERE UNDOUBTEDLY FORM PART OF THE SECURITY
OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE MADRID
MANDATE. WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THAT OTHER EUROPEAN WATERS
AND THE SEAS ADJOINING THEM ARE ALSO THE LOCATION OF
ACTIVITIES RELATING EQUALLY STRICTLY TO EUROPEAN
SECURITY, IN WHICH CASE WHAT WE PROPOSE IN OUR PAPER IS
ALSO APPLICABLE THERE.
THE FIRST MEASURE WE PROPOSE IN SC. 5 RELATES TO THE
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE. AT THIS
STAGE I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS
ON THIS MEASURE.
IN THE FIRST PLACE AS THE ACTIVITIES ENVISAGED UNDER
THIS MEASURE TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF
PARTICIPATING STATES THE QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF
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THE ZONE DOES NOT ARISE.
IN THE SECOND PLACE WE WISH TO STRESS THAT A
NOTIFICATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT
PASSAGE UNDER A CSBM REGIME IS ENVISAGED IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ON THE SUBJECT. WHERE
THERE ARE DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS REGARDING THE APPLICABLE
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE THESE DIFFERENCES WILL REMAIN
UNTOUCHED BY THIS MEASURE. I AM HERE THINKING IN
PARTICULAR OF THE DIFFERENT POSITIONS WHICH EXIST AMONG
PARTICIPANTS OF THIS CONFERENCE CONCERNING THE EXTENT OF
THE TERRITORIAL SEA.
THE QUESTION MIGHT ARISE AS TO WHETHER OUR PROPOSED
MEASURE ENVISAGES NOTIFICATION OF SHIPPING, INCLUDING
MERCHANT SHIPPING, WHICH IS PROCEEDING THROUGH
TERRITORIAL WATERS TO REACH THE INTERNAL WATERS OF A
PARTICIPATING STATE. IN OUR VIEW THIS SITUATION IS
ALREADY COVERED BY THE FACT THAT EVEN AT PRESENT ALL
MOVEMENTS LEADING TO AN ENTRY IN INTERNAL WATERS ARE
NOTIFIED TO THE STATE INVOLVED. WE INTEND THAT IN THESE
INSTANCES THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF BILATERAL NOTIFICATION
REMAINS UNCHANGED. WHAT IS ADDITIONAL IN OUR PROPOSAL
IS THAT IN ALL INSTANCES WHERE NAVAL WARSHIPS PASS
THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A PARTICIPATING STATE,
WITHOUT PROCEEDING TO ITS INTERNAL WATERS, ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES BE INFORMED. THE NOTIFICATION AND
OBSERVATION REGIMES APPLICABLE IN SUCH CASES COULD BE
ANALOGOUS TO THE ONES ENVISAGED FOR ALERT ACTIVITIES IN
SC.1. AMPLIFIED.
OUR SECOND PROPOSED MEASURE CONCERNS MOVEMENTS INVOLVING
THE SEA TRANSPORTATION OF ARMED PERSONNEL. THERE ARE
TWO WAYS IN WHICH ONE COULD APPROACH THIS QUESTION.
ON THE ONE HAND THERE IS THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN S.C.1.
WHICH DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND OTHER
ACTIVITIES, BUT WHICH CONCENTRATES ON THE
OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WHAT WE WISH TO ASK IN THIS
CONTEXT IS WHAT LINE OF REASONING HAS BEEN USED TO
EXCLUDE, AS IS MANIFESTLY DONE IN SC.1., BOTH ANY
INFORMATION ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF FORCES IN NAVAL BASES
LOCATED IN EUROPE, AS WELL AS THE OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES
OF SUCH FORCES. IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT EVEN THE
REASONING ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOST RIGID
DEFINITION OF A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE
EXCLUSION.
SECTION A OF SC.5. ENVISAGES THE PROVISION OF
INFORMATION ABOUT NAVAL FORCES WHICH, IN THE FRAMEWORK
OF AGREED CONDITIONS FOR THE OUT-OF-GARRISION APPROACH
COULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES, OF
WHICH MOST, THOUGH NOT ALL, OF THE NAVAL MOVEMENTS WE
ENVISAGE IN OUR PROPOSAL COULD FORM PART. ANY QUESTION
WHICH COULD EVENTUALLY ARISE IN THIS CONNECTION, FOR
EXAMPLE THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES FROM A NAVAL BASE IN,
SAY, THE MEDITERRANEAN, TO A LOCATION WELL BEYOND THE
ZONE, FOR EXAMPLE THE INDIAN OCEAN, OR VICE-VERSA, WOULD
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NOT BE DIFFERENT IN SUBSTANCE TO RELATED QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND AND AIR ACTIVITIES AS
INCORPORATED IN SC.1.
ON THE OTHER HAND OUR PROPOSAL AS IT PRESENTLY STANDS
APPROACHES THE QUESTION OF NAVAL MOVEMENTS AS AN
ACTIVITY READILY IDENTIFIABLE FROM OTHER NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. THINKING IN TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT
OF A CLOSED SEA LIKE THE MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH IS ALSO A
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY, WE CONSIDER THAT ANY
POINT-TO-POINT NAVAL MOVEMENT INVOLVING THE TRANSPORT OF
AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF ARMED PERSONNEL IS A MATTER
OF DIRECT SECURITY CONCERN TO PARTICIPATING STATES.
THIS IS THE CASE EVEN IN INSTANCES WHEN THE EVENTUAL
DESTINATION, OR POINT OF ORIGIN, OR BOTH, ARE BY ANY
DEFINITION WELL OUTSIDE THE ZONE. IN THESE INSTANCES WE
ARE PROPOSING THAT ONLY THE ACTUAL PASSAGE THROUGH THE
MEDITERRANEAN WILL BE NOTIFIABLE, WITHOUT ANY DETAILS
REGARDING EITHER POINT OF ORIGIN OR DESTINATION
NECESSARILY BEING GIVEN.
I WISH TO UNDERLINE THE NATURE OF THE PARAMETER WE
ENVISAGE FOR THIS MEASURE - NAMELY THE NUMBER OF ARMED
PERSONNEL BEING TRANSPORTED IN PROXIMITY TO
PARTICIPATING STATES, BECAUSE THIS IN OUR VIEW
CONSTITUTES THE MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE THREAT PERCEPTIONS
OF PARTICIPATING STATES INVOLVED. A NOTIFICATION
MEASURE INTENDED TO ASSURE THAT THE EXPECTED OR SUDDEN
ARRIVAL OF A LARGE NUMBER OF ARMED PERSONNEL IN CLOSE
PROXIMITY TO A PARTICIPATING STATE OR STATES IS BOTH OF
A TEMPORARY NATURE - BECAUSE IT IS IN PASSAGE - AND IS
OF NON-AGGRESSIVE INTENT, IS IN OUR VIEW VERY MUCH
RELATED BOTH TO THE SECURITY OF EUROPE IN GENERAL, AS
INTENDED IN THE MADRID MANDATE, AS WELL AS TO SPECIFIC
ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE BOTH ON LAND AND SEA IN
EUROPE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN RESPONSE TO SUCH
MOVEMENTS.
I HAVE USED IN THIS CONTEXT THE PHRASE "UNUSUALLY LARGE"
NUMBER OF ARMED PERSONNEL AS AN INDICATION OF THE
NUMERICAL PARAMETER WE ENVISAGE IN THIS CONTEXT. WE DO
NOT YET FEEL HOWEVER THAT THIS POINT HAS BEEN
SUFFICIENTLY DISCUSSED FOR A SPECIFIC FIGURE TO BE GIVEN
AT THE PRESENT STAGE. THIS IS EVEN MORE THE CASE IN THE
LIGHT OF THE CONSIDERATION THAT THE OUT-OF-BASE APPROACH
IS ONE WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO STUDY ALSO IN THIS
CONNECTION, IN WHICH CASE THE NATURE OF THE PARAMETER
ITSELF COULD CONCEIVABLY BE DIFFERENT.
THE THIRD PROPOSED NOTIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.5 RELATES
TO AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. ALL PROPOSALS TABLED SO FAR
ENVISAGE THE INCLUSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES IN A
CSBM REGIME. SPECIFIC IDEAS ON NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD
HAVE ALSO BEEN ADVANCED. SC.2 REFERS TO 5000 OR MORE
TROOPS TAKING PART. SC.1 SPEAKS OF THREE OR MORE
BATTALIONS, OR 3000 AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS, CARRYING OUT A
LANDING IN THE ZONE. SC.1 AMPLIFIED ALSO PROPOSES THAT
IF THE AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS INVOLVED EMBARK IN THE ZONE THE
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DATE AND PLACE OF EMBARKATION ARE ALSO NOTIFIABLE. THE
PROPONENTS OF SC. 2 HAVE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT IN
RELATION TO THEIR PROPOSED MEASURE SEA-BASED AIR AND
FIRE SUPPORT TO A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING
OPERATION WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION.
WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ALREADY SUFFICIENT MATERIAL FOR
A FAIRLY DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THIS PROPOSAL. IN THIS
CONTEXT I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH UPON TWO ASPECTS: THE
FIRST CONCERNS THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE TO BE
NOTIFIED AND THE SECOND CONCERNS THE THRESHOLD FOR
NOTIFICATION.
A RECENT STUDY ON NAVAL DEVELOPMENT - A BOOK ENTITLED
"US NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS" BY J. S. BREEMER, HAS THIS TO
SAY IN DEFINING AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION: AN AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATION IS CONDUCTED IN THREE STAGES; LRST THE
ASSAULT ECHELON SECOND THE ASSAULT FOLLOW-ON ECHELON
AND THIRD THE FLY-IN ECHELON. PRECEDING THE ASSAULT
ECHELON'S ASSAULT ITSELF IS THE PRE-ASSAULT PHASE. THIS
IS THE PERIOD OF TIME WHEN THE SUPPORTING NAVAL FORCE
COMBINES WITH THE MARINE AIRCRAFT WING TO PREPARE THE
LANDING AREAS WITH GUN AND AIR BOMBARDEMENT. IF
MINEFIELDS BAR THE WAY, MINE-SWEEPING VESSELS AND
HELICOPTERS MUST FIRST CLEAR A CHANNEL. IN ADDITION THE
SUPPORTING NAVAL FORCE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
ESTABLISHING AN ANTI-SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SURFACE SHIP
PERIMETER AROUND THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. OVERHEAD
PROTECTION WILL, IN MOST CASES, BE SUPPLIED BY THE
AIRCRAFT FROM A NEARBY BATTLE GROUP. FIVE DAYS AFTER
THE ASSAULT ECHELON HAS SECURED THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE
AREA, THE ASSAULT FOLLOW-ON IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE. IF
A SERVICEABLE HARBOR IS AVAILABLE THE TRANSPORT FORCE OF
COMMERCIAL SHIPS CAN UNLOAD SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO
EXTEND THE ASSAULT ECHELON'S THIRTY DAY SUPPLY. THE
THIRD FORCE INCREMENT, THE FLY-IN ECHELON, WILL NOT
ARRIVE UNTIL THE LANDING HAS SECURED AN AIRFIELD CABLE
OF HANDLING THE ARRIVAL OF SUPPLIES AND REPLACEMENTS FOR
A SUSTAINED ADVANCE".
IT IS THIS WHOLE ACTIVITY, FROM THE PRE-ASSAULT STAGE TO
THE FINAL FORCE INCREMENT STAGE, WITH ALL THEIR LOGISTIC
AND TACTICAL SUPPORT THAT WE CONSIDER NOTIFIABLE AS AN
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY, ONCE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS
REACHED. WE ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF
THIS ACTIVITY, ARE INDIVIDUALLY NOTIFIABLE EVEN IF THEY
ARE CONDUCTED SEPARATELY IN TIME OR SPACE.
IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE PROPOSE AS THE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, NOT THE ACTUAL LANDING IN THE
ZONE OF A DEFINED NUMBER OF TROOPS AT ANY GIVEN TIME,
BUT THE TROOP TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY OF THE EXERCISE
ITSELF. TO SPEAK IN TERMS OF SC.1 IF LESS THAN 3000
TROOPS LAND IN THE ZONE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EXERCISE
WHICH INCLUDED EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS A TROOP CARRYING
CAPACITY OF OVER 3UOO TROOPS -- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL
THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE EXERCISES, -- THEN THE WHOLE
ACTIVITY BECOMES NOTIFIABLE.
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THERE IS ONE POINT REGARDING THE OBSERVATION OF
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES WHICH I MIGHT AS WELL BRING UP
HERE. SC.1 AMPLIFIED ENVISAGES THE OBSERVATION OF SEA
LANDINGS AND ASSOCIATED AIR LANDINGS FROM A LOCATION ON
LAND. IT IS NOT OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT OBSERVATION OF
NAVAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES SHOULD
BE RESTRICTED TO "A LOCATION ON LAND". WE WILL RETURN
TO THIS POINT IN ANOTHER MEETING OF THIS WORKING GROUP.
THE FOURTH NOTIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.5 DEALS WITH NAVAL
MANOEUVRES. UNDER THIS WE INTEND TO INCLUDE ALL
ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY THE FIRST THREE
MEASURES, NAMELY INNOCENT PASSAGE, MOVEMENTS AND
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. I SHOULD RECALL AT THIS POINT
THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE CONCEIVED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
ENCLOSED SEA LIKE THE MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH EVEN IN TERMS
OF THE TWO ARMED EUROPEAN ALLIANCES FORMS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DOMAIN.
I MUST ADMIT THAT MY DELEGATION WAS PARTICULARLY
INTRIGUED BY THE EXPLANATION GIVEN BY OUR COLLEAGUE FROM
THE NETHERLANDS OF THE 19 FEBRUARY WHEN HE GAVE THE
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF A SIMULATED SEA BATTLE BETWEEN TWO
OPPOSING NAVAL FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS, IN HIS
OPINION, AN ACTIVITY WHICH NEED NOT BE NOTIFIED. ON THE
CONTRARY THIS IS PRECISELY THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY TAKING
PLACE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WHICH WE CONSIDER EMINENTLY
NOTIFIABLE, BECAUSE IT FORMS VERY MUCH PART, BOTH DIRECT
AND INDIRECT, OF THE SECURITY EQUATION IN THE REST OF
THE CONTINENT.
IT WILL TAKE A LOT OF REASONING TO PERSUADE US TO THE
CONTRARY. NAVAL BATTLES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, GOING
BACK TO ABOUKIR BAY, LEPANTO, EVEN SALAMIS, HAVE
HISTORICALLY BEEN BOTH AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF A CONFLICT
TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE AS WELL AS A MAIN FACTOR IN THE
CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF THAT CONFLICT. THE COMMAND OF
THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, OF
WHICH MALTA WAS A FOCAL POINT, CONSTITUTED ONE OF THE
MAJOR FACTORS DETERMINING THE EVOLUTION OF THAT WAR AT
ITS MOST CRITICAL AND UNCERTAIN PERIODS.
IN DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO THIS QUESTION THERE HAS BEEN
AN ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF A NAVAL
ACTIVITY - NAMELY THE PROVISION OF SEA-BASED, AIR AND
FIRE SUPPORT TO AN ONGOING LAND ACTIVITY--AND TO
IDENTIFY THESE ASPECTS, IN ISOLATION, AS QUALIFYING FOR
INCLUSION IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME. VERY OFTEN THIS
ATTEMPT HAS REMINDED ME OF PAINTINGS BY THE SURREALIST
MAGRITTE, WHERE DOORS AND WINDOWS OPEN INTO NOWHERE,
LIMBS FLOAT AROUND DETACHED FROM BODIES AND SKIES PEER
THROUGH THE BODIES OF BIRDS. WE DO NOT SEE HOW IN THE
REAL CONTEXT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, SUCH AN APPROACH IS
POSSIBLE.
IT IS INCONCEIVABLE TO CONSIDER FOR EXAMPLE THAT IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN A BASIC NAVAL FORMATION SUCH AS AN
AIRCRAFT CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, ONE OF WHOSE PRIMARY
FUNCTIONS IS AIR STRIKES AGAINST LAND TARGETS, OR
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ANOTHER MAJOR FORMATION SUCH AS THE SURFACE ACTION
GROUP, ONE OF WHOSE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS IS STRIKE WARFARE
WITH CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR HEADED MISSILES AGAINST
INLAND TARGETS, COULD UNDERTAKE ANY ACTIVITY WHICH DOES
NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH WHAT
IS HAPPENING ON THE MAINLAND IN EUROPE.
IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED HERE THAT, CERTAINLY IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LAND AND SEA IS NOT ONLY ONE WAY. THERE IS NO REASON TO
DOUBT THAT ANY NAVAL ACTIVITY THERE WILL BE GIVEN
INSTANT AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FROM BASES ON LAND.
IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE PROPOSE A NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLD FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES, CERTAINLY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO THE NUMBER
OF COMBAT UNITS INVOLVED, WITH POSSIBLY THEIR TOTAL
DISPLACEMENT, AND NOT TO ANY FORMALISTIC TEMPORAL
RELATIONSHIP WHICH THEY MAY HAVE WITH ACTIVITIES ON LAND.
IN THIS CONNECTION SPECIFIC PARAMETERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
PROPOSED BOTH IN SC.2 AS WELL AS IN THE RECENT WORKING
DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE USSR,
BULGARIA AND POLAND. THE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS
ALREADY REQUESTED ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS WORKING
DOCUMENT, IN PARTICULAR CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE 30 COMBAT SHIPS AND THE 100 MILITARY PLANES
MENTIONED, WILL HELP US FURTHER IN ANALYSING THIS
PROPOSAL. WE COULD HOWEVER CONSIDER TENTATIVELY THAT
THE FIGURES MENTIONED IN SC.2 AND IN THE WORKING
DOCUMENT PROVIDE BETWEEN THEM ADEQUATE LOW AND HIGH
REFERENCE POINTS WITHIN WHICH A FURTHER DETAILED
DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT COULD TAKE PLACE.
MR. CHAIRMAN,
I HAVE GONE INTO SOME DETAIL ON THE SUBJECT OF NAVAL
ACTIVITIES FOR THREE MAIN REASONS.
FIRST MY DELEGATION WISHES TO UNDERLINE OUR VERY SPECIAL
INTEREST IN THIS ASPECT OF OUR WORK, WITHOUT OF COURSE
IN ANY WAY REDUCING THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHER ASPECTS.
IN THE SECOND PLACE WE WISH TO TAKE STOCK OF WHATEVER
COMMON GROUND HAS ALREADY EMERGED, AND WHERE VIEWS STILL
NEED TO BE RECONCIDED. THIS IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL AT
THIS STAGE WHERE CERTAIN INITIATIVES MAY BE CONTEMPLATED
SEEKING TO IDENTIFY THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH COULD FORM A
PACKAGE OF SUBSTANTIVE AND BALANCED CSBM'S. I AM HERE
THINKING ALSO OF THE RUMANIAN IDEAS CONTAINED IN THEIR
AIDE MEMOIRE OF 11 MAY, WHICH MY DELEGATION WISHES TO
ENCOURAGE.
FINALLY WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT WE ARE MAKING OUR
PROPOSALS IN THE STRONG CONVICTION THAT THEY FORM A
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR WORK AS ENVISAGED IN THE
MADRID MANDATE.
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
END TEXT.
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 28, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 3908
1. CDE VI - 045
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. THE CAUCUS HELD AN UNUSUALLY BRIEF BUT
PLUMBIFEROUS MEETING CHAIRED BY CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL). NO
CONTACTS WERE REPORTED; DISCUSSION FOCUSED SOLELY ON THE
U.S. AND FRG MEASURE 2 PAPERS. THE DUTCH CONTINUED THEIR
CRITICISM OF THE FRG PAPER AND ADDED THAT THE U.S. AND
FRG PAPERS SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL. AMBASSADOR
GOODBY NOTED THAT THE PAPERS COULD BE DIFFERENT IN MINOR
WAYS, PROVIDED THAT THEIR BASIC CONTENTS CONFORMED TO
THE NATO PACKAGE AND ARE SUBSTANTIVELY THE SAME. END
SUMMARY.
4. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL),
PRESIDED OVER AN UNUSUALLY BRIEF BUT PLUMBIFEROUS
MEETING ATTENDED BY A NUMBER OF DEPUTIES IN LIEU OF
AMBASSADORS. FOLLOWING THE LONG THREE-DAY WEEKEND, NO
CONTACTS WERE REPORTED.
5. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY CIRCULATED
COPIES OF THE U.S. MEASURE 2 (FORECASTS) PAPER
DEMONSTRATING HOW A CALENDAR OF ANNUAL FORECASTS WOULD
WORK USING 1984 U.S. EXERCISE DATA, BUT NOTED THAT THERE
WAS NO URGENCY TO CONSIDERATION OF THE U.S. PAPER.
MOREOVER, GOODBY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH AMBASSADOR
EDES' (UK) COMMENTS AT THE LAST NATO CAUCUS MEETING
(REFTEL) CONCERNING THE NEED TO DEVELOP TACTICS ON THE
BEST WAY TO PROCEED WITH ALL OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS
BEFORE THE FIRST IS TABLED. EDES REPEATED HIS CALL FOR
A SHORT DELAY IN TABLING PAPERS. HE NOTED THAT THE
EXPERIENCE GAINED IN PREPARING THE MEASURE 3 (NOTIFICA-
TION) PAPER INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS IN
IMPLEMENTING SC.1/AMPLIFIED, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS
ADDRESSED BY THE "RUMP SQUEEZING THE PACKAGE." EDES
STATED THAT A REVISED BRITISH MEASURE 3 AND A NEW
BRITISH MEASURE 1 PAPER WOULD BE OUT NEXT WEEK, ALTHOUGH
THE MEASURE 1 PAPER STILL POSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS (E.G.,
INFORMATION ON LAND-BASED AIR FORCE STRUCTURES IS
REQUESTED IN WINGS, AN ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT THE RAF DOES
NOT HAVE). BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) STATED THAT ON CURSORY
REVIEW HE SAW NO PROBLEMS WITH THE U.S. PAPER, BUT HE
EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. AND FRG MEASURE 2 PAPERS SHOULD
BE ABSOLUTELY IDENTICAL AS EXAMPLES OF THE SAME MEASURE.
IF NOT COORDINATED, THE PAPERS COULD OPEN SC.1/AMPLIFIED
TO NEW EASTERN CRITICISM, HE SAID. CITRON (FRG), MEVIK
(NORWAY), AND GOODBY EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE
PAPERS COULD BE DIFFERENT IN MINOR WAYS, PROVIDED THAT
THEIR BASIC CONTENTS CONFORM TO THE NATO PACKAGE AND ARE
SUBSTANTIVELY THE SAME. GOODBY ALSO INVITED THE FRG TO
WORK WITH THE U.S. TO COORDINATE THE TWO PAPERS TO THE
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MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. MOREOVER, HE NOTED THAT THE
MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP WOULD BE REVIEWING THE U.S.
PAPER. CITRON REPORTED THAT THE FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER
WOULD BE INCORPORATING 1984 GERMAN EXERCISE DATA AS
SUGGESTED BY BUWALDA AND WOULD BE TABLED, AS AGREED, ON
THURSDAY. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) SAID HE PREFERRED
PRESENTING ONLY ONE PAPER, SINCE TWO COULD UNDERSCORE
DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN NATO AND LEAD TO CONFUSION.
CUTILEIRO POINTED OUT THAT, IF THE CAUCUS ACCEPTS THE
IDEA OF NATIONAL PAPERS, THEN DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRE-
TATION AND POINTS OF VIEW MUST BE EXPECTED AS A CONSE-
QUENCE. CITRON STRESSED, AS HE HAD AT THE MAY 23 CAUCUS,
THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS SHOULD
NOT BE EXAGGERATED. (COMMENT: CITRON WAS QUITE ANNOYED
THAT THE DUTCH CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE THE FRG PAPER AND
CALLED FOR DELAYS IN ITS TABLING, SINCE THE CAUCUS
REACHED A DECISION AT THE MAY 23 MEETING TO ALLOW
NATIONAL PAPERS TO BE TABLED IF THEY CONFORMED TO THE
NATO PACKAGE. END COMMENT.)
6. OTHER BUSINESS: EDES (UK) REPORTED THAT THE
MINISTER OF STATE OF THE MFA, RICHARD LUCE, WOULD BE
VISITING THE CDE ON JUNE 12-13. MEVIK (NORWAY)
REQUESTED THAT THE CAUCUS CONSIDER AT A FUTURE MEETING
THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NATIONAL POSITION BEING STATED IN
PLENARY SESSION ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AS THE FUTURE
WORKING STRUCTURE AND A CDE SUSPENSION DATE. AMBASSADOR
GOODBY STATED FIRMLY THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT WILLING TO
ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS ON A FUTURE WORKING STRUCTURE
UNTIL MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ARE HELD. THAT, HE
SAID, IS ALSO A NATIONAL POSITION. HE POINTED OUT THAT
MID-1986 COULD BE A REASONABLE TARGET DATE FOR ENDING
THIS STAGE OF THE CDE, BUT THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE A
PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. (COMMENT: THE
FRENCH SPEECH IN LAST FRIDAY'S PLENARY APPEARS TO HAVE
RAISED THE IRE OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT ARE A LITTLE
PIQUED AT PARIS' HABIT OF GOING IT ALONE. END COMMENT.)
EDES, DELWORTH (CANADA), BUWALDA AND CUTILEIRO ALSO
JOINED THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS, BUT RESERVED FURTHER
COMMENT FOR THE THURSDAY, MAY 30, MEETING.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP A MEETINGS,
MAY 29 AND 30
1. CDE VI - 58.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP MEETINGS ON
INFORMATION/VERIFICATION AND ON CONSTRAINTS WERE
ROUTINE. ON WEDNESDAY, CZECH REP INDICATED THE EAST
WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATION,
BUT THAT ISSUES OF NOTIFICATION, ESPECIALLY REGARDING
AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST. ON
THURSDAY, THE FRG TABLED ITS NATIONAL PAPER
DEMONSTRATING WHAT MEASURE 2 WOULD LOOK LIKE. THE
SOVIETS INDICATED FLEXIBILITY ON THE DETAILS OF
CONSTRAINTS MEASURES IF THE WEST WOULD AGREE TO DISCUSS
THEM. END SUMMARY.
4. AT WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY, THE NETHERLANDS REP
ARGUED THAT INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATION WAS INSUFFICIENT
SINCE AN OVERALL PICTURE OF FORCE STRUCTURES IS NEEDED.
THE FRG REP CHALLENGED THE EAST TO PRESENT VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS TO ACCOMPANY THEIR NOTIFICATION MEASURES.
THE CZECH REP PICKED UP A PREVIOUS FRENCH QUESTION ABOUT
WHETHER THE EAST WOULD AGREE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION IN
NOTIFICATIONS ON EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURE, ETC. THE CZECH
REP SAID THIS QUESTION WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
AND COULD BE PRODUCTIVELY DISCUSSED ONCE THE
NOTIFICATION ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. HE REPEATED THE
EASTERN POSITION THAT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION ARE
ONLY A COMPONENT OF CSBMS, AND THEREFORE MUST BE
ADDRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREED NOTIFICATION
MEASURES.
5. AT WORKING GROUP A/THURSDAY, FRG REP TABLED ITS
NATIONAL PAPER SHOWING WHAT MEASURE 2 WOULD LOOK LIKE.
THE CZECH REP ARGUED THAT LIMITATIONS ON MANEUVERS WERE
A NECESSARY SUPPLEMENT TO NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
IN ORDER TO REDUCE RISKS OF CONFRONTATION. THE SOVIET
REP ARGUED THAT AN OUTCOME FROM STOCKHOLM SHOULD BE
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND THEREFORE MUST INCLUDE A
LIMITATION ON MANEUVERS. HE AGREED THAT SUCH A
LIMITATION SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE, BUT DID NOT DEVELOP
THAT IDEA. REGARDING THE WESTERN ARGUMENT THAT VARIOUS
ASYMMETRIES REQUIRE SUCH LARGE-SCALE WESTERN MANEUVERS,
THE SOVIET REP ARGUED THAT, LOOKING AT THE WHOLE
PICTURE, ALL THE VARIOUS ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN NATO AND
THE WTO BALANCE OUT. HE ARGUED THAT WE NEED TO DISCUSS
THE ISSUE OF LIMITATIONS; "WE COULD THEN NARROW
DIFFERENCES REGARDING PARAMETERS, SCALE OF MANEUVER, AND
AREA OF MANEUVER AND MAYBE OTHER ASPECTS." U.S. REP
(HANSEN) AND UK REP REGRETTED THE LACK OF ATTENTION PAID
TO FRG NATIONAL PAPER ON MEASURE 2. BOTH REPS ARGUED
THAT IT DEMONSTRATED THE POTENTIAL CONSTRAINING EFFECT
OF MEASURE 2. THE U.S. REP ADDED THAT IT ALSO
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DEMONSTRATED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DETAILED INFORMATION:
IF WE CANNOT AGREE TO PROVIDE THIS DEGREE OF
INFORMATION, HOW CAN WE PROCEED TO CONSTRAINTS? UK REP
REITERATED THE BASIC WESTERN STANCE ON CONSTRAINTS: WE
ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY TABLED PROPOSAL; WE HAVE
EXPLAINED WHY THE ONE TABLED IS UNACCEPTABLE; TRY
AGAIN. THE U.S. REP ACKNOWLEDGED THAT UNDER PROPER
CIRCUMSTANCES, LESS MILITARY ACTIVITY MIGHT BE USEFUL,
BUT THAT WE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH THESE PROPER
CIRCUMSTANCES. HE POINTED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE LACK OF
INFORMATION AND QUESTIONS ABOUT VERIFICATION. THE
ROMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV REPS CHIDED THE U.S. AND UK REPS
FOR REFERRING ONLY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON
CONSTRAINTS, NOTING THAT IN SC.2 AND SC.3 SEVERAL OTHER
IDEAS FOR CONSTRAINTS WERE OFFERED WHICH PROVIDED
SUFFICIENT FOOD FOR THOUGHT FOR CONFERENCE DISCUSSION.
THE YUGOSLAV REP, IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REP'S CALL FOR
MORE INFORMATION, SAID, "THE QUESTION CAN BE TURNED
AROUND: IF YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS,
WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT MEANINGFUL INFORMATION."
END
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SUBJECT: TEXT OF FRG MEASURE 2 PROTOTYPE
1. CDE VI - 051
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT, ADAPTED TO TELEGRAM FORMAT,
OF THE PROTOTYPE PAPER TABLED IN WORKING GROUP A BY THE
FRG ON MAY 30. BEGIN TEXT.
4. ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS--IN MEASURE 2 OF THEIR
PROPOSAL, THE 16 CO-SPONSORS OF DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED
HAVE SUGGESTED AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF
ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE IN ADVANCE. SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF
FORECASTS IS TO SERVE A DOUBLE PURPOSE:
-- IT WOULD, AFTER A PERIOD OF GENERAL APPLICATION,
CREATE A "PATTERN" OF NORMAL MILITARY BEHAVIOUR OF THE
35 PARTICIPATING STATES. MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD THUS
BE MADE PREDICTABLE AND CALCULABLE A LONG TIME IN
ADVANCE.
-- SINCE ANY DEVIATION FROM THAT ROUTINE PATTERN OF
EXERCISES WOULD GIVE RISE TO AN INCREASED ATTENTION OF
OTHERS, PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO
STICK TO THE ANNUAL FORECASTS AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE
WHEN PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT THEIR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. THIS MEASURE WOULD THUS HAVE A CONSTRAINING
EFFECT. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD MAKE IT POLITICALLY
MORE DIFFICULT TO USE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FOR
POLITICALLY THREATENING GESTURES OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF
INTIMIDATION.
5. THE ANNUAL FORECAST DOES NOT ENTAIL:
-- ADDITIONAL PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY
STAFFS. FOR A VARIETY OF ORGANIZATIONAL REASONS, MANY
STATES ARE PLANNING THEIR NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES
A LONG TIME IN ADVANCE, OFTEN MORE THAN TWO YEARS
AHEAD.
-- ANY RESTRICTIONS OF THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY OF
INSTRUCTIVE AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES. CHANGES OR
ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL FORECAST REMAIN POSSIBLE. THEY
NEED TO BE PROVIDED ONLY IN THE INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATION
OF THAT PARTICULAR ACTIVITY.
6. IN ORDER TO ILLUSTRATE THE ABOVE MENTIONED AIMS OF
SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE
REQUIREMENTS ENVISAGED FOR PARTICIPATING STATES, THE
DELEGATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SUBMITS A
LIST OF THOSE MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE ACCORDING
TO THE CRITERIA IN MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMFLIFIED WHICH THE
BUNDESWEHR HAS CARRIED OUT IN 1984 AND CARRIES OUT IN
THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1985. THE FOLLOWING TABLES
(ADAPTED TO NARRATIVE), THEREFORE, PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF A
COMPLETE FORECAST COVERING A WHOLE CALENDER YEAR WHICH
WOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED NOT LATER THAN NOVEMBER 15TH OF
THE PRECEDING YEAR. IN ADDITION, A GENUINE FORECAST
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THOUGH LIMITED TO THE CURRENT QUARTER IS ATTACHED.
7. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, FIRST QUARTER
1984
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. JANUARY 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEC 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 12 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. FEBRUARY 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 14 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. FEBRUARY 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA GRAFENWOHR 49 DEG 40 MIN N 11 DEG
50 MIN E
F. 4 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, ENGINEERS
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. FEBRUARY 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 12 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. MARCH 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
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F. 14 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
8. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, SECOND
QUARTER 1984
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. MAY 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 14 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. JUNE 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 16 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. JUNE 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
1U DEG 7 MIN E
F. 14 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. JULY 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 50 MIN N 9 DEG
58 MIN E
F. 21 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY
9. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, THIRD QUARTER
1984
A. "WEISSE BIRKE"
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B. COMMAND POST EXERCISE IN THE FIELD
C. SEPTEMBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. HAMBURG 53 DEG 36 MIN N 10 DEG 3 MIN E; HANOVER
52 DEG 24 MIN N 9 DEG 44 MIN E; RHEINE 52 DEG 18 MIN N
7 DEG 28 MIN E; BREMEN 53 DEG 4 MIN N 8 DEG 51 MIN E
F. 5 DAYS
G. 10,000 TROOPS
H. GROUND FORCES
A. "FLINKER IGEL"
B. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE
C. SEPTEMBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. NURNBERG 49 DEG 27 MIN N 11 DEG 4 MIN E; PASSAU
48 DEG 34 MIN N 13 DEG 26 MIN E; MUNCHEN 48 DEG 11 MIN N
11 DEG 33 MIN E
F. 9 DAYS
G. 55,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, ENGINEERS, AIR SUPPORT
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. SEPTEMBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 53 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 14 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. SEPTEMBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
1U DEG 7 MIN E
F. 14 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
A. "SICHERE FESTUNG"
B. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE
C. OCTOBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, BELGIUM
E. KASSEL 51 DEG 19 MIN N 9 DEG 30 MIN E;
BAD HERSFELD 52 DEG 52 MIN N 9 DEG 43 MIN E; GIESSEN
50 DEG 35 MIN N 8 DEG 41 MIN E
F. 4 DAYS
G. 10,000 TROOPS
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H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, ENGINEERS, AIR SUPPORT
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. OCTOBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 49 MIN N
9 DEG 58 MIN E
F. 12 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY
10. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, FOURTH
QUARTER 1984
A. "KUHLE BRISE"
B. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE
C. NOVEMBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, DENMARK
E. FLENSBURG 54 DEG 49 MIN N 9 DEG 23 MIN E;
KIEL 54 DEG 19 MIN N 10 DEC 9 MIN E; HAMBURG 53 DEG
36 MIN N 10 DEG 3 MIN E
F. 4 DAYS
G. 12,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, ENGINEERS, AIR SUPPORT
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. NOVEMBER 1984
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 2 DAYS
G. 7,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,
ARMOURED INFANTRY
11. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, SECOND
QUARTER 1985 (COMMENT: NO FIRST QUARTER 1985.)
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. APRIL 1985
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 50 MIN N
9 DEG 58 MIN E
F. 12 DAYS
G. 8,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY
A. COMMAND POST EXERCISE AT CORPS LEVEL "FRANKISCHE
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REISE"
B. PREPARATION FOR ARMY EXERCISE 1986
C. MAY 1985
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, UNITED STATES,
FRANCE
E. HEIDELBERG 48 DEG 58 MIN N 8 DEG 40 MIN E;
GERSFELD 50 DEG 27 MIN N 9 DEG 56 MIN E; SCHWEINFURT
50 DEG 2 MIN N 10 DEG 15 MIN E; STUTTGART 48 DEG
47 MIN N 9 DEG 11 MIN E; KARLSRUHE 48 DEG 58 MIN N
8 DEG 23 MIN E
F. 6 DAYS
G. 9,000 TROOPS
H. GROUND FORCES
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. JUNE 1985
D FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 50 MIN N 9 DEG
58 MIN E
F. 13 DAYS
G. 8,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY
A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
C. JUNE 1985
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN/MUNSTER SUD 52 DEG 59 MIN N
10 DEG 7 MIN E
F. 14 DAYS
G. 8,000 TROOPS
H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARMOURED
INFANTRY, ARTILLERY
END
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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP B, MAY 30, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3756, B) STOCKHOLM 3869
1. CDE VI - 056
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: THE GDR AND THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTED
HIGHLY INTRUSIVE SCENARIOS FOR OBSERVATION OF MAJOR AIR
AND NAVAL EXERCISES, CALLING FOR OBSERVERS TO WATCH
ACTIVITIES FROM SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, SHORE, AIR AND NAVAL
BASES, AND AIR COMMAND POSTS. THE EAST'S EMPHASIS ON
AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES IS PART OF AN OVERALL STRATEGY
TO RENEGOTIATE THE MANDATE TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR
AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, WE SUSPECT THAT THE
WARSAW PACT IS AWARE OF WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF
CERTAIN NNA'S TO REPLACE ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH AN
EXPANDED OBSERVATION REGIME. THE SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS
ALSO MADE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT OBSERVATION REGIME. FRANCE STRESSED
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION.
THE NETHERLANDS DISCUSSED THE DUAL PURPOSE OF
OBSERVATION: TO JUDGE WHETHER AN ACTIVITY IS
NON-THREATENING; AND TO CHECK WHETHER NOTIFICATION DATA
CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL ACTIVITY. END SUMMARY.
4. SWEDISH MILREP (JOHANSSON) DELIVERED A SOMEWHAT
DEFENSIVE SPEECH, NOTING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S INVITA-
TION OF OBSERVERS TO ITS FEBRUARY VASTGRANS EXERCISE HAD
BEEN INTENDED TO SHOW HOW SWEDEN BELIEVED OBSERVATION
COULD BE CARRIED OUT ACCORDING TO THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT; IT HAD NOT BEEN PLANNED AS A SHOWPIECE OR AS A
MUDEL FOR FUTURE OBSERVATION REGIMES. HE SAID THAT THE
EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
CSBM'S AND COULD SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT INSTRUMENT OF
VERIFICATION (OF THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATIONS); IT MUST
BE FURTHER DEVELOPED FOR THE LATTER PURPOSE WITHOUT
JEOPARDIZING THE TRADITIONAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING EFFECTS
OF OBSERVATION. THIS CAN ONLY PARTLY BE ACHIEVED BY THE
INVITATION AND PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS, HE SAID; IT IS
ALSO NECESSARY TO HAVE ADEQUATE, IMPROVED, STANDARDIZED
CONDITIONS FOR OBSERVERS. FOR EXAMPLE:
-- ALL PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD RECEIVE
INVITATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH NOTIFICATION OF AN
ACTIVITY;
-- INVITED STATES SHOULD RESPOND WITHIN A FAIRLY
SHORT TIME; HOWEVER, WHEN ALERTS ARE CONDUCTED, OBSERVA-
TION PROCEDURES MUST BE DIFFERENT: THE U.S. STATEMENT
OF LAST WEEK (REF A) WAS OF INTEREST TO THE SWEDISH
DELEGATION;
-- INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE HOST COUNTRY SHOULD
NOT BE LIMITED TO THE OBSERVERS' PROGRAM; TO FACILITATE
THE OBSERVERS' PREPARATION, BASIC INFORMATION SHOULD BE
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PROVIDED WITH THE INVITATION REGARDING THE WHOLE
ACTIVITY, E.G., MAPS, SKETCHES OF THE MOVEMENTS OF MAJOR
UNITS;
-- SUCH EARLY INFO MUST BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER
DAILY DETAILED BRIEFINGS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND
THAT FORESEEN BY THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS OR DIRECTING
STAFF.
5. THE SWEDISH REP POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTERN
PROPOSAL CALLS FOR TWO OBSERVERS FROM EACH PARTICIPATING
STATE AND SAID THAT, WHILE HIS DELEGATION DOESN'T OPPOSE
IT, THIS MIGHT POSE PROBLEMS FOR SMALL COUNTRIES. HE
SUGGESTED MAKING THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS DEPENDENT ON
THE SIZE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY: TWO OBSERVERS COULD
BE SENT TO A NORMAL-SIZED ACTIVITY (UNDER THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT, THIS WOULD INVOLVE AT LEAST 25,000 TROOPS);
FOR A SMALLER, DIVISION-SIZED ACTIVITY, ONE OBSERVER MAY
BE SUFFICIENT, WHILE LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES MAY REQUIRE
MORE THAN TWO OBSERVERS. (BEGIN COMMENT: JOHANSSON MAY
BE HINTING HERE OF SWEDISH FOCUS ON OBSERVATION AS A
VERIFICATION MEASURE AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF
NOTIFICATION AT DIVISION LEVEL. END COMMENT.)
6. OTHER AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENT IS NEEDED, ACCORDING
TO THE SWEDISH REP:
-- THE FREEDOM OF OBSERVERS TO CHOOSE THE AREA AND
OBJECT OF OBSERVATION;
-- THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET COMMANDERS, STAFF
OFFICERS AND TROOPS;
-- THE TIME SPAN OF THE OBSERVATION: A SHORT
OBSERVATION PERIOD, COVERING ONLY ONE PHASE OF THE
ACTIVITY, IS INSUFFICIENT WHEN A LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITY IS
BEING CONDUCTED.
7. THE GDR (GRACZYNSKI) THEN INTRODUCED DETAILED
MODALITIES FOR THE OBSERVATION OF MAJOR AIR EXERCISES
(EASTERN WORKING GROUP DOCUMENT 2). OBSERVATION OF AIR
EXERCISES COULD BE ORGANIZED ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENT
OBSERVATION MEASURES, E.G.:
-- ON AIRFIELDS/AIR BASES;
-- IN A VISUAL MANNER IN THE AREA OF THE EXERCISE;
-- IN AIR COMMAND POSTS, ON SCREENS OF RADAR
MONITORING STATIONS;
-- THROUGH BRIEFINGS BY EXERCISE LEADERS.
8. ACCORDING TO GRACZYNSKI, OBSERVATION OF AIR
EXERCISES WOULD BE CONDUCTED AS FOLLOWS:
-- THE HOST COUNTRY INVITES OBSERVERS TO THE AIR-
BASE, AIRFIELD OR ANOTHER MILITARY FACILITY;
-- BEFORE THE START OF THE EXERCISE, THE EXERCISE
COMMANDERS BRIEF OBSERVERS AND ANSWER THEIR QUESTIONS ON
THE GOALS, THE CONTENT OF THE PLANNED ACTIVITY, THE
CONCEPT AND PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY, THE TYPE OF TRAINING
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ACTIVITIES, AND THE WORKING REGIME OF THE OBSERVERS;
-- AT THE AIRBASE/AIRFIELD, OBSERVERS CAN
FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE MAIN TYPES OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT EMPLOYED IN THE MANEUVER;
-- AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MANEUVER, THE OBSERVATION
OF AIR EXERCISES COULD TAKE PLACE FROM LAND, E.G., THE
VISUAL OBSERVATION OF TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS, ATTACKS ON
GROUND TARGETS ON THE TARGET RANGE, AND ACTIONS OF
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN OVERCOMING THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES;
-- AIR ACTIVITIES DON'T NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE
OBSERVED AT AIR COMMANDS; THEY CAN BE OBSERVED ON
SCREENS OF RADAR STATIONS NEAR THE AIR COMMAND AND BY
STUDYING MAPS ON THE AIR SITUATION;
-- OBSERVERS COULD MEET PERSONNEL OF TROOP ELEMENTS
PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE;
-- OBSERVATION OF THE RETURN OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE
ORGANIZED ON THE BASE/FIELD TO VERIFY THAT THE AIRCRAFT
HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MISSIONS;
-- TRANSPORT BY SEA OR RAIL OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
FROM PERMANENT BASES COULD BE OBSERVED AT THE LOADING OR
UNLOADING POINTS;
-- DIRECTORS OF THE MANEUVER COULD GIVE BRIEFINGS
ON THE RESULTS.
-- RELATIVELY BROAD OBSERVATION POSSIBILITIES COULD
BE USED SO THAT OBSERVERS COULD JUDGE THE SCALE AND
GOALS OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES.
-- THESE OBSERVATION OPPORTUNITIES MUST NOT HURT
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE HOST COUNTRY. (COMMENT:
THIS LAST CONDITION WAS NOT PART OF THE WRITTEN TEXT
GIVEN TO THE USDEL; HOWEVER, THE BROAD INTERPRETATION
THE WARSAW PACT COULD GIVE IT WHEN WARSAW PACT EXERCISES
WERE INVOLVED PROVIDES THE EAST WITH AN EASY EXCUSE FOR
NOT LIVING UP TO THE BROAD OBSERVATION MODALITIES
SEEMINGLY PROPOSED IN THIS MEASURE. END COMMENT.)
9. TATARNIKOV (USSR) PRAISED THE GDR STATEMENT FOR
DISCUSSING OBSERVATION NOT IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT IN
TERMS OF SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. HE NOTED THE DIFFICULTIES
OF OBSERVING ANY KIND OF EXERCISE AND POINTED OUT THAT
WHILE THE OBSERVERS TO THE SWEDISH EXERCISE VASTGRANS
HAD BEEN IN A POSITION TO OBSERVE MANY KINDS OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, "CONDITIONS BEYOND OUR CONTROL," I.E., BAD
WEATHER, HAD INTERFERED WITH OBSERVATION. TATARNIKOV
THEN SPELLED OUT "SPECIFIC SCENARIOS" FOR OBSERVATION OF
MAJOR NAVAL EXERCISES:
-- OBSERVERS COULD BE RECEIVED BY THE COMMANDER OF
A MAJOR NAVAL EXERCISE AT A NAVAL BASE OR A SPECIFIC
POINT; HE COULD BRIEF THEM ON THE PURPOSE, THE KINDS OF
ACTIVITIES AT VARIOUS STAGES, THE PARTICIPATING STATES,
THE SHIPS, THE SHIP CLASSES, THE AIRCRAFT AND
HELICOPTERS, THE AREA AND COORDINATES OF THE EXERCISE,
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THE OBSERVERS' WORK REGIME AND FACILITIES AT THE
OBSERVERS' DISPOSAL, THE VANTAGE POINT FROM WHICH THEY
COULD OBSERVE;
-- AT THE NAVAL BASE, THE OBSERVERS COULD FAMILIA-
RIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE SHIPS, THE OFFICERS AND MEN ON
BOARD; THEY COULD OBSERVE VARIOUS SHIPS, MILITARY EQUIP-
MENT, THE EMBARCATION OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, THE LOADING
OF AMMUNITION, CARGO, ETC.;
-- THEREAFTER, OBSERVATION OF NAVAL FORMATIONS COULD
TAKE PLACE FROM THE FLAG SHIP OR FROM A VESSEL DESIGNATED
SPECIFICALLY FOR OBSERVERS; INFORMATION WOULD HAVE TO BE
RECEIVED PERIODICALLY AT SEA;
-- AT SEA THE OBSERVERS COULD OBSERVE THE ACTIVITIES
OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT, AIRCRAFT FROM HELICOPTER CARRIERS
AND PATROLLING AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE AREA OF THE EXERCISE;
-- FROM AIRCRAFT SPECIALLY DESIGNATED FOR OBSERVERS,
THEY COULD OBSERVE THE FORMATION OF THE SHIPS INVOLVED
IN THE EXERCISES; IN THE EXERCISE AREA THEY ALSO COULD
OBSERVE THE MOVEMENTS OF SHIPS AND AIR ACTIVITIES; THUS,
THEY WOULD HAVE AN.IDEA OF THE PATTERN OF FORMATIONS OF
SHIPS, AND COULD ESTABLISH THEIR STRENGTH, THEIR CLASS,
WHETHER THE FORMATIONS ARE IN THE EXERCISE AREA; THEY
ALSO COULD CHECK COMPLIANCE OF THE EXERCISE WITH THE
NOTIFICATION;
-- AT THE NEXT STAGE, IF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ARE TO
BE LANDED, THE OBSERVERS COULD OBSERVE THIS FROM SHORE,
CHECKING WHETHER THE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE
EXERCISE CORRESPOND TO THE NUMBERS IN THE NOTIFICATION;
-- AT THE END OF THE EXERCISE, OBSERVERS HAVE TO BE
CONVINCED THAT THE SHIPS HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR PORT;
THEREFORE, THE OBSERVERS COULD RETURN TO THE BASE AND THE
COMMANDING OFFICER COULD GIVE THEM A BRIEFING REGARDING
WHETHER THE PURPOSES OF THE EXERCISE HAVE BEEN FULFILLED;
-- OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TRAINED;
-- THIS IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR OBSERVA-
TION OF NAVAL EXERCISES; THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF DOGMA,
BUT AN INVITATION TO DIALOGUE.
10. ITALY (SFARA) TOOK ISSUE WITH A RECENT COMPLAINT
THAT THE WARSAW PACT'S FORTHCOMINGNESS REGARDING DETAILS
ON OBSERVATIONS HAD NOT BEEN RECIPROCATED. SFARA SAID
THAT BOTH NATO AND THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED (NNA) HAVE
FRUM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CSCE, PARM, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP B, MAY 30, 1985
STRESSED THE NEED TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO ALL NOTIFIABLE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED TO EXTEND INVITATIONS
TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. HE NOTED THAT NATO HAS
INCLUDED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES WHICH
CORRESPOND TO THE MANDATE (THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH) AND
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ARE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. THE ITALIAN REP POINTED OUT
THAT UBSERVATION BACKED UP WITH ADEQUATE INFORMATION
WOULD ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE.
11. AUSTRIA (LIKO) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR COUNTRIES
WITHOUT ACCESS TO "HIGH MILITARY TECHNOLOGY" OF ELEMENTS
OF VERIFICATION WHICH COULD EXIST IN THE CONTEXT OF
OBSERVATION. WELL-ORGANIZED OBSERVATION MIGHT EVEN
REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF VERIFICATION, HE SAID, WHILE
AN OBSERVATION REGIME WITH INADEQUATE CONDITIONS COULD
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES. HE CALLED FOR
STANDARDIZED CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD:
-- SET THE INVITATION PROCESS AS WELL AS INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS BEFORE, AT THE START OF AND DURING A MILI-
TARY ACTIVITY;
-- PROVIDE THAT INVITATIONS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY
ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION AND GOOD LAND MAPS;
-- EXTEND THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION.
12. FRANCE (MERIC) STRESSED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION. HE SAID THAT AN INSPECTION
CALLS FOR SURVEYING, MONITORING AND CHECKING, WHILE THE
ROLE OF AN OBSERVER IS TO WATCH ATTENTIVELY, TO EVALUATE
WHETHER A MILITARY ACTIVITY IS THREATENING OR NOT AND TO
MAKE A STATEMENT OF HIS CONCLUSIONS. HE ARGUED THAT THE
INTENTIONS OF STATES WOULD BE EASIER TO JUDGE IF OBSER-
VERS WERE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE DESIGNATION OF THE
DIVISIONS ENGAGED IN MANEUVERS AND AN EXACT DEFINITION
(GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES) OF THE MANEUVER ZONE.
13. THE NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) ALSO ADDRESSED THE
ISSUE OF THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION, NOTING THAT IT IS
TWOFOLD:
-- TO SEE WHETHER A MILITARY ACTIVITY IS NON-
THREATENING;
-- TO CHECK WHETHER NOTIFICATION DATA CORRESPOND TO
THE ACTUAL ACTIVITY.
14. THE DUTCH MILREP INSISTED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT
FACTOR AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OBSERVATION IS THE
RIGHT TO OBSERVE THE WHOLE ACTIVITY.
15. COMMENT: WHILE IT IS GOOD TO SEE DETAILED DISCUS-
SIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP ON OBSERVATION, WE CANNOT
ACCEPT SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF STATEMENTS BY THE
EAST (EXPANDING THE ZONE), AND EVEN BY THE UNA (REPLAC-
ING ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH AN IMPROVED OBSERVATION
REGIME). WE ARE HEARTENED TO SEE THE EAST AND NNA SUP-
PORTING THE DUAL TASKS OF OBSERVATION WHICH THE DUTCH
MILREP (AND A POLISH STATEMENT LAST WEEK - REF B)
DESCRIBED. WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE EAST IS NOT
UNAWARE OF THE WILLINGNESS OF CERTAIN NNA DELEGATIONS TO
REPLACE ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH AN EXPANDED OBSERVATION
REGIME. MOREOVER, THE WARSAW PACT, WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON
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AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, CLEARLY IS TRYING TO EXPAND THE
MADRID MANDATE'S DEFINITION OF THE ZONE OUT INTO THE
ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. WE NOTE THAT THEY
RESERVE THEIR MOST DARING "SCENARIOS" OF OBSERVATION
MODALITIES FOR THEIR AIR AND NAVAL MEASURES. IF OUR
EARLY CONCLUSIONS ARE CORRECT, THE THRESHOLDS SUGGESTED
IN THE EAST'S WORKING DOCUMENTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO
OBVIATE THE NEED FOR EASTERN NOTIFICATIONS, THUS ALLOWING
THEM TO APPEAR QUITE GENEROUS. THIS SEEMS TO BE A RATHER
CLEVER TACTICAL PLOY VIS-A-VIS ATTITUDES IN THE WORKING
GROUPS. NEVERTHELESS, THEY AFFORD THE WEST SOME OPPOR-
TUNITIES TO TURN MUCH OF THIS NEW EASTERN OPENNESS TO
OUR ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND
ISSUES OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. END COMMENT.
130
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SECRET English interpretation
Tatarnikov statement Netherlands delegation
0bservatie
30 May 1985
Mr. Chai rman,
It is with great attention that I listened to the statement made by the
representative of the German Democratic Republic on specific questions
of the work and tasks of observers at major military manoeuvres.
I think the statement made by him is a very interesting one and I do
think that we should repeat this matter because observation
is a specific matter applied to a very specific form of activity.
`v- are not talking about observation in general we are talking about
observation of specific activities and since among the distinghuised
representatives here there have been questions and there were doubts
expressed as to the difficulties of observing airforce activities, naval
activities and there were questions raised by the distinghuised
representative of Austria, General Liko and I for my part I would like
to dwell on some of these specific questions and specific scenario's
which call for certain action and observation part of the observer in
connection with major naval manoeuvres. This is the kind of activity
which would be a step into something new because the observers
on the naval fleets have not been resorted to or ever used before.
But there is a certain practice established in friendly entry into
foreign ports of naval ships in friendly countries.
The Swedish population is often admitted on to the naval
ships and they talk to the sayiors,to the officers. This is an element
of observation after all I'd lil.e to say. This is the green that is sov.n.
in the field -that may come up with broader matters. But I thins; that
there :sight be difficulties and difficulties not only occuring with
i th
regard to observation of naval manoeuvresor airforce manoeuvres but I
--n-ink al_:, landf'or L')~'? " after the Vastgrans exercise wt-"J ch
we have observed which was excellently organised by the Swedish military
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SECRET
-2-
where we were in a position to observe many kinds of military activities
but conditiorswhich were beyond our control sometimes caused considerable
difficulties. I think that we all cane to this conclusion. Therefore I
don't need to dwell at length on this and therefore let us consider
the kind of scenario involving naval manoeuvres. Here the observer
can be received by the command or the person in command of a major naval
manoeuvre at a naval base or at some specific point a-d that would be the
first stage and therafter the work of the observers can be carried out
at sea to observe the action of the flj t, of the ships and
of course
aviation or let us sey airforce. This could be carried out also on
board or from an aircraft or on board of a ship. Then also 're
could have observers on land, along the coast and where we have a-phibious
forces landing with the action of aircraft in connection with air troopers
and the observation can be carried out at bases to which naval
shies return after manoeLr.vres. Well, the kind of scenarios that I was havinz
in mind would appear most particularr_y like this on greater detail and on
an appointed place the invited observers would be convened and the
co rnanding officer, well acquairted with the situation and the manoeLrvvres
would have to speak to these observers. He would then as a cc*.rmanding
officer carry out a briefing in the course of which he would acquaint
the invited observers with the purpose of the manoeuvres and its major
concept and he would describe the kind of military activities at the
a-.?
various stages in such activities and also would describe or mention
numerate the participating states, the ships, classes of ships, the air--rat
and C1~__:~pter. He would then specify the area and coot;ina-es of the ^3rceu
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SECRET j
and he would also declare to the observers in which way theywill be expected to
work and what means they will have at their disposal for observation, from where
they will observe and he could answer any questions that may arise and be
asked by the observers. At the naval base. the observers could
acquaint themselves and have personal contacts with the ships, officers and men.
Here the observers would be able to observe various ships,
the military hardware involved in the naval manoeuvres. Here they could also
observe the embarkation of armhibious forces, also loading of a,snunition,
cargo etc. This could,of course,be carried out at the first stage of the obser.'-
ation at the base. Thereafter the observers could also observe the naval
formations from the flagship or from some vessel specially appointed for this
and infer-:ation would have to be periodically receivedl.e and received while
at sea the observers could observe the activities of ships, aircraft and
also aircraft frcrn the aircarriers of helicopters and also patrolling aircraft
Nithin the area of manoeuvres. With ,aircraft especially designated for or
allocated for this the observers could observe the formation of the ships
involved in the manoeuvres.Zn the area of manoeuvres they also could observe
the movements of ships, air activities and would have a certain idea of the
pattern, of formation of ship_.They could establish their strength, their
class and they could therefore cheek o?'against the infcr-ration in the
notification. Trey could also decide ,.hether such naval formations are within
the a_ _a of rr1a_noeu?:res. At the next stage, if atmhibious forces are to oe
landed. the oh -.,ears could observe this from.. land, from the coast. 7-,e
c. uid also note that the snip. and aircraft involved in he rant ^,e=
to the ri.~:.Gc d=-laced in the notificatior..
of the
_ .J
a_ a ?rou of cbser.'erz ha= to be convinced that the ships r?t1_rnec to their o: .
tn,? per_or_?-L. returns to base a n d a briefing has to be carried out in conclusio-
:.`~e t-:= ccrr..andinr officer give_ a _cf a kind of infor?.a.ion with .
V_
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the purposes of the manoeuvres having been fulfilled.
This is of cours_,INL^. Chairman, only one of the scenarios as possible with
regard to observation of naval forces in manca1vres. Naturally, we are ready
to consider some details and further details with regard to this measure
together with the other representatives present here.Tnis approach considers
the realities of major manoeuvres on sea and of course the observers have to
have a specific preparation for this, would have to be trained but this is not
a matter of dogma, but this is an invitation to a dialogue.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
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SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET DEPUTIES/MILREPS WORKING LUNCH,
- MAY 30, 1985
1. CDE VI - 062
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. AT THE U.S.' INVITATION, THE DEPUTIES AND
MILREPS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET FOR THE
FIRST TIME SINCE AMBASSADORS GRINEVSKY AND GOODBY AGREED
THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE DETAILED,
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF ISSUES THAN IS POSSIBLE IN THE
WORKING GROUPS. WHILE THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY GENERAL
TATARNIKOV, WERE VERY WARY OF THIS FIRST INTENSIVE
DISCUSSION WITH THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THEY RESPONDED
NONETHELESS TO U.S. DELS' QUESTIONS, PROVIDING SOME
DETAILS ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE,
VERIFICATION AND ON THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS
FOR AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES. THEY ALSO AGREED IN
PRINCIPLE TO HOST THE NEXT MEETING AND GENERAL
TATARNIKOV OFFERED TO PASS TO US AN INFORMAL LIST OF
ISSUES WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS AT THE
NEXT BILATERAL MEETING. END SUMMARY.
4. AT THE U.S.' INVITATION, THE DEPUTIES AND MILREPS OF
THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET FOR THE FIRST TIME
SINCE AMBASSADORS GRINEVSKY AND GOODBY AGREED THAT SUCH
CONTACTS WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE DETAILED, SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES THAN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WORKING
GROUPS. PRESENT AT THE LUNCH WERE:
- U.S. - USSR
LYNN HANSEN - IVAN ROZANOV
MAJ.GEN. JONAS BLANK - GEN.MAJ. VICTOR TATARNIKOV
HARLAN STRAUSS - COL. IVAN BOGDANOV
PRISCILLA GALASSI - YEVGENIY VOLK
5. DISCUSSION FIRST FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON
INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. ROZANOV NOTED THAT MANY
QUESTIONS ARISE IN WORKING GROUP A ON WEDNESDAY
(INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION) WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED
IN THAT GROUP BECAUSE THEY PERTAIN TO VERIFICATION OF
MEASURES BEING DISCUSSED IN WORKING GROUP B. HE
SUGGESTED STUDYING WHAT COULD BE SELECTED FROM SC.1
MEASURES 1 AND 5 (INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION) TO BE
INTEGRATED IN THE DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ISSUES IN
WORKING GROUP B.
6. HANSEN NOTED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED IN THE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENT ON NOTIFICATION
OF MAJOR LAND EXERCISES IS ALMOST ENTIRELY COVERED IN
HELSINKI FINAL ACT OBLIGATIONS. HE THEN ASKED FOR AN
EXPLANATION OF THE FINAL SENTENCE IN THE EAST'S WORKING
DOCUMENT ON NOTIFICATION WHICH, BY CALLING FOR
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY ON COMPOSITION OF
FORCES INVOLVED, SEEMED TO INDICATE EASTERN FLEXIBILITY
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ON PROVIDING MORE INFORMATION. TATARNIKOV EXPLAINED
THAT INFORMATION EXCHANGED DURING NOTIFICATION WILL
CONFORM TO THE LIST PROVIDED IN THE WORKING DOCUMENT;
HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON THE CHARACTER OF THE EXERCISE,
E.G., IF THERE ARE AMPHIBIOUS COMPONENTS, OR IF
PARATROOPERS ARE TRANSFERRED, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
WOULD ACCOMPANY THE REGULAR LIST.
7. HANSEN THEN ASKED TATARNIKOV WHETHER, IF AGREEMENT
ON NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS WERE REACHED, THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD CONSIDER PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE
STRUCTURE OF TROOPS AND ON WHERE THEY COME FROM.
TATARNIKOV DANCED ALL AROUND THIS QUESTION WITHOUT EVER
ANSWERING IT. FIRST, HE SAID THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS TALK
ABOUT INFORMATION EXCHANGE, THEY MEAN INFORMATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. HE PROVIDED EXAMPLES: WHEN
NOTIFYING LARGE-SCALE GROUND FORCE EXERCISES, ONE TYPE
OF INFORMATION WOULD ACCOMPANY IT; IN THE CASE OF AIR
EXERCISES THE INFORMATION EXCHANGED WOULD BE DIFFERENT;
AND IT WOULD DIFFER AGAIN IN THE CASE OF NOTIFICATION OF
AIR EXERCISES. WHEN PRESSED, HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS
WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON WHERE FORCES ARE FROM (THE
REGION) AS WELL AS THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE. WHEN
HANSEN'S QUESTIONS BECAME MORE SPECIFIC ON DIVISION
DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF SOVIET EXERCISES IN THE
BALTIC MILITARY DISTRICT, ROZANOV CAME TO TATARNIKOV'S
RESCUE, QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR THE 35 PARTICIPANTS OF
THE CDE TO KNOW DIVISION DESIGNATIONS AND LOCATIONS.
HANSEN ARGUED THAT WHEN DISCUSSING VERIFICATION WHICH
CORRESPONDS TO THE CONTENT OF CSBM'S, ALL COUNTRIES
SHOULD PARTICIPATE.
8. TATARNIKOV THEN DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HELSINKI
MEASURES AND THE "NEW" APPROACH SET FORTH IN THE EASTERN
WORKING DOCUMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE USSR UNDER THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT CBM'S ALREADY PROVIDES NOTIFICATION
INFORMATION ON THE TROOPS OF THE BALTIC MILITARY
DISTRICT, THE AVIATION AND NAVAL FORCES WHICH
PARTICIPATE AND SHOWS THE COMPOSITION OF GROUND, AIR,
AND NAVAL FORCES. THE NEW EASTERN MEASURES WOULD APPLY
IN CASES WHEN UNITS AND SUB-UNITS WHICH EXCEED THE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD ARE MOVED FROM OTHER AREAS. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET GENERAL ADDED, IF A DIVISION WERE
TRANSFERRED FROM THE SOVIET FAR EAST OR FROM THE
CONTINENTAL U.S. TO THE AREA OF THE EXERCISE, THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD NOTIFY OR REQUIRE NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING
INFORMATION ON WHERE IT WAS TRANSFERRED TO AND FROM.
9. TATARNIKOV INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS IN
ITS POCKET A SET OF VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH IS
ADEQUATE FOR EACH MEASURE AND WHICH IT WILL TABLE AT THE
APPROPRIATE TIME. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE CONFERENCE
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DETERMINES THE RANGE OF CSBM'S, E.G., NOTIFICATION OF
GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL EXERCISES, IT WILL DETERMINE WHAT
ADEQUATE VERIFICATION SHOULD BE.
10. GENERAL BLANK POINTED OUT THAT THE MADRID MANDATE
REQUIRES VERIFICATION OF ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HAVE PRACTICAL
VERIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE. THE ONLY
OBJECTIVE AND REALISTIC VERIFICATION REGIME WE COULD
ENVISAGE WOULD REQUIRE OBSERVERS IN COMBAT CONTROL
CENTERS DURING THE WHOLE EXERCISE. HE ALSO POINTED OUT
THAT AIR FORCE EXERCISES DO NOT TAKE PLACE IN LIMITED
AREAS, BUT OVER THOUSANDS OF MILES AND INVOLVE MANY
RADAR STATIONS AND COMBAT CONTROL CENTERS.
11. TATARNIKOV ARGUED THAT VERIFICATION, WHICH WAS
APPLIED EQUALLY TO SOVIET AND U.S. TROOPS IN THE ZONE
WOULD BE "UNBALANCED" DUE TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE
NUMBER OF DIVISIONS STATIONED IN EUROPE BY THE TWO
COUNTRIES, I.E., FOUR U.S. DIVISIONS AND A SIGNIFICANTLY
LARGER, UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SOVIET DIVISIONS. HANSEN
COUNTERED THAT THE FOUR U.S. DIVISIONS IN EUROPE WERE
NOT THE ISSUE, BUT RATHER THE EAST-WEST BALANCE IN THE
LARGER EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THIS
FRAMEWORK IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO INSIST THERE IS ROUGH
BALANCE.
12. HANSEN THEN TURNED TO THE EASTERN PARAMETERS FOR
AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, ASKING HOW AND WHY THOSE
SPECIFIC NUMBERS (200 AIRCRAFT FOR AIR EXERCISES AND 30
SHIPS AND 100 AIRCRAFT FOR NAVAL EXERCISES) HAD BEEN
CHOSEN. TATARNIKOV STRESSED THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR
NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR AIR EXERCISES CALLS FOR 200
AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR SIMULTANEOUSLY. ADMITTING THAT AIR
EXERCISES LARGE ENOUGH TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION RARELY
OCCUR, NONETHELESS, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO
NOTIFY MASSIVE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF AND FLYING
IN THE DIRECTION OF EUROPE. THE SOVIET GENERAL SAID
THAT MODERN NAVAL ACTIVITIES DO NOT INVOLVE JUST SHIPS,
BUT ALSO AIRCRAFT; WITHOUT THE LATTER, THE FORMER WOULD
BE VERY VULNERABLE. HE INDICATED THAT BY AIRCRAFT, THE
SOVIETS MEAN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AVIATION, SEA-BASED
AVIATION, SHORE-BASED AVIATION, AND SHIPBOARD AVIATION.
HE ADDED THAT IF NAVAL EXERCISES WERE TO TAKE PLACE IN
THE BALTIC, LAND-BASED ARMY AVIATION ALSO WOULD BE
COUNTED. NAVAL FORCES WOULD INCLUDE AVIATION ON
HELICOPTER CARRIERS PLUS SHORE-BASED AVIATION AND PATROL
PLANES. THE SOVIET GENERAL INDICATED THAT WHILE
HELICOPTERS WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE AIRCRAFT
THRESHOLD FOR NAVAL EXERCISES, INFORMATION ON HELICOPTERS
WOULD BE EXCHANGED DURING NOTIFICATION. HE CONCLUDED BY
ASSERTING THAT 100 AIRCRAFT OCCASIONALLY DO PARTICIPATE
IN NAVAL EXERCISES.
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13. COMMENT: REPEATED SOVIET EVASIONS OF DIRECT U.S.
QUESTIONS ON WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE
INFORMATION ON THE DESIGNATIONS AND LOCATIONS OF SOVIET
DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES
INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTEREST IN, OR
FLEXIBILITY ON, THE EXCHANGE OF SUCH INFORMATION.
WHILE THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY GENERAL TATARNIKOV, WERE
VERY WARY OF THIS FIRST INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH THEIR
U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THEY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO HOST THE
NEXT MEETING. TATARNIKOV APPROACHED THE U.S. DEPUTY
AFTER THE LUNCH AND VOLUNTEERED TO PASS TO US AN
INFORMAL LIST OF ISSUES WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO
ADDRESS AT THE NEXT MEETING.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MAY 30, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3908 B) STOCKHOLM 3942 C) STATE 164036
1. CDE VI - 049
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: THE FRG REPORTED THAT IT WOULD TABLE ITS
MEASURE 2 PROTOTYPE AT THE MAY 30 MEETING OF WORKING
GROUP A. U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN, ON INSTRUCTIONS (REF C),
STATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD PREFER THAT NO ILLUSTRATIVE
PAPERS BE TABLED NOW AND COULD NOT IN ANY CASE ENDORSE
THE PRESENTATION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS, OTHER THAN THE
FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER, UNLESS IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT
MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5 OF THE NATO PACKAGE WERE COVERED
AND THAT TACTICS FOR TABLING SUCH PAPERS WERE AGREED
UPON. DELEGATIONS REPORTED ON THE STATUS OF PAPERS
COVERING MEASURES 3, 4, AND 5. GREECE DEBATED THE
EFFICACY OF TABLING ANY PAPERS, SINCE THE WEST HAS NOT
SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED NUF OR THE THREE EASTERN
NOTIFICATION PROPOSALS WHICH THE EAST REGARDS AS A QUID
PRO QUO FOR DIRECTING THEIR COMMENT ON CONCRETE CSBM'S.
VARIOUS DELEGATIONS STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH THIS
CHARACTERIZATION. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO DISCUSS NEXT
TIME THE TWO ISSUES RAISED BY THE FRENCH IN PLENARY ON
INFORMAL WORKING GROUP STRUCTURES AS WELL AS ADJOURNMENT
DATES IN MID-1986 FOR THE STOCKHOLM PORTION OF CDE. END
SUMMARY.
4. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS--U.S. AND FRG: DREHER (FRG)
REPORTED THAT THE FRG WOULD TABLE ITS MEASURE 2
(FORECASTS) PROTOTYPE PAPER AT THE AFTERNOON WORKING
GROUP A MEETING OF MAY 30 (SEE SEPTEL). HE NOTED THAT
THE FRG PAPER NOW CONFORMS TO THE U.S. DRAFT MEASURE 2
PROTOTYPE AND CONTAINS NO IDENTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE
UNITS. U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN STATED, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM
WASHINGTON (REF C), THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT ENDORSE THE
PRESENTATION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS ON THE NATO
PACKAGE'S MEASURES, OTHER THAN THE FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER,
UNLESS IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT PAPERS WILL BE AVAILABLE ON
MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. HANSEN NOTED
THAT PAPERS ON MEASURES 1 AND 5 (INFORMATION/
VERIFICATION) HAVE PROVEN TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT. IN
VIEW OF CAUCUS DECISIONS ON THE FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER (REF
B), THE U.S. WOULD NOT WITHDRAW CONSENSUS ON
PRESENTATION OF THE FRG PAPER ON A NATIONAL BASIS.
HOWEVER, THE U.S. POSITION IS NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY
ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS UNTIL DISCUSSION AND
AGREEMENT ON TACTICS FOR TABLING THEM IS COMPLETED.
HANSEN NOTED THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE
NOTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS TO MAINTAIN THE
CONFERENCE'S FOCUS ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED. HOWEVER, IT COULD
BE A MISTAKE TACTICALLY TO TABLE ONLY TWO OR THREE
PAPERS AND NOT THE REST. HANSEN CONCLUDED BY INSISTING
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THAT THE CAUCUS ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN GREATER DETAIL AT
SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS, AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED BY
AMBASSADORS GOODBY AND EDES (UK) (REFS A AND B), BEFORE
DELEGATIONS PROCEED WITH TABLING NEW NATIONAL PAPERS
BEYOND THE FRG PROTOTYPE. (COMMENT: STATEMENTS MADE ON
MAY 23 AND MAY 28 BY AMBASSADORS GOODBY AND EDES
RECOMMEND THAT THE CAUCUS DELAY TABLING ITS PAPERS UNTIL
A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE TACTICAL APPROACH WITH
ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS CAN BE MADE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF
THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH PROTOTYPES ALREADY
UNDER REVIEW AND THOSE STILL BEING DEVELOPED. THE
CAUCUS CONSENSUS AT THESE MEETINGS WAS TO ALLOW THE FRG
TO PROCEED WITH TABLING ITS MEASURE 2 PAPER AND TO
ASSESS CAREFULLY ALL SUBSEQUENT ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS.
END COMMENT.)
5. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS--OTHER MEASURES: MACKLEY (UK)
STATED THAT THE BRITISH MEASURE 3 (NOTIFICATION) PAPER
IS BEING CHANGED TO INCORPORATE COMMENTS FROM THE
MILITARY ADVISERS' GROUP (TEXT SENT SEPTEL). HE MADE NO
MENTION OF THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH MEASURE 1
(INFORMATION) PAPER. DELWORTH (CANADA) AGREED WITH U.S.
DEPUTY HANSEN'S STATEMENT ON DELAYING THE REMAINDER OF
THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS AND NOTED THAT HIS DELEGATION
WAS HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN PRODUCING A USEFUL
MEASURE 5 (VERIFICATION) PAPER. HE SAID A PAPER MAY BE
READY IN A MATTER OF DAYS FOR CAUCUS DISCUSSION.
GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REPORTED THAT HIS DELEGATION'S
MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION) PAPER WOULD BE READY SHORTLY.
ROSENTHAL (DENMARK) STATED THAT THE DANISH PAPER ON
AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES WAS UNDER REVIEW IN COPENHAGEN.
HE NOTED THAT A NEW DANISH PAPER WOULD STILL COVER MORE
THAN ONE MEASURE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND THUS MAY NOT BE
ACCEPTABLE TO THE CAUCUS AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE PAPER.
BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) FIRMLY AGREED WITH THE U.S.
POSITION. HE RESTATED HIS LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE
WHOLE PROCESS OF PREPARING ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS WHILE
NOTING THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE FRG TABLING OF ITS
MEASURE 2 PAPER. HOWEVER, BUWALDA STRONGLY URGED THAT
THE UTILITY OF TABLING THE REST OF THE PAPERS BE
ADDRESSED AND THE TACTICS BE REVIEWED BEFORE PROCEEDING
FURTHER. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, ALLENDESALAZAR
(SPAIN), SUMMARIZED CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO DELAY TABLING
NEW PAPERS UNTIL THE ISSUE OF TACTICS HAS BEEN
RESOLVED.
6. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS AND THE EAST: PAPADAKIS
(GREECE) ASKED WHY THE CAUCUS WAS PROCEEDING WITH
TABLING ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS WHEN THE EAST HAS STATED
THAT IT WILL NOT DISCUSS THEM UNLESS THE WEST ADDRESSES
THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION MEASURES (ON MAJOR
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GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES) AS WELL AS THE FORM AND
CONTENT OF A NUF PRINCIPLE. MEVIK (NORWAY), DREHER
(FRG), GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS)
STRONGLY DIFFERED WITH THE GREEK VIEW. THEY NOTED THAT
NUF HAS BEEN ADDRESSED THROUGHOUT THE LAST SESSION AS
WELL AS IN THIS ONE. MOREOVER, AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S
PLENARY STATEMENT OF MAY 24 WAS CITED AS THE DEFINITIVE
WORD ON THE CONTENT, FORM AND BASIS FOR REAFFIRMING THE
NUF PRINCIPLE; THE BALL IS NOW IN THE EASTERN COURT.
WITH RESPECT TO THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION MEASURES,
THE FRG PLENARY STATEMENT OF MAY 24 PROVIDED AN INITIAL
WESTERN RESPONSE, THEY SAID. IN ADDITION, THE CAUCUS
MUST AWAIT THE ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS BY THE
MILITARY ADVISERS' GROUP BEFORE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS
COULD BE MADE. FINALLY, THEY NOTED, ANY CAUCUS
DECISIONS ON ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS SHOULD BE TAKEN
INDEPENDENT OF EASTERN ACTIONS. PAPADAKIS MAINTAINED
HIS VIEW THAT THE WEST HAS PRODUCED NO SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS ON NUF BEYOND A REAFFIRMATION. BUWALDA CLOSED
THE DEBATE BY REFERRING AGAIN TO THE GOODBY PLENARY
STATEMENT AND NOTING THAT FINAL DETAILS REGARDING
WESTERN RECUNFIRMATION OF NUF ARE AN END-GAME EXERCISE.
7. CONTACTS: PAPADAKIS (GREECE) REPORTED THAT
GRINEVSKY SEES THE WEST IN A WAITING MODE UNTIL THE
RESULTS FROM OTTAWA BECOME APPARENT. ACCORDING TO
PAPADAKIS, GRINEVSKY BELIEVES POSITIVE RESULTS IN OTTAWA
WILL LEAD TO A PUSH FOR MOVING WORK AHEAD IN STOCKHOLM;
NEGATIVE RESULTS IN OTTAWA WILL PROVOKE THE WEST TO
CREATE OBSTACLES AT CDE. (COMMENT: AT THE MENTION OF
GRINEVSKY'S REFERENCE TO OTTAWA, DELWORTH OF CANADA
BROKE IN WITH A COMPLAINT THAT "THIS PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT
LINKAGE IS BEING USED AGAINST US." U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN
POINTED OUT THAT "THE EAST WILL USE ANY TACTIC THEY CAN
AGAINST US," AND REITERATED THE U.S. POSITION THAT WHILE
WE DO NOT CLAIM FORMAL LINKAGE BETWEEN THE MEETINGS, THE
INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL FACETS OF CSCE IS A
REALITY THAT THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO UPHOLD. END
COMMENT.) PAPADAKIS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE HUNGARIAN
AMBASSADOR, SZIGETI, REGARDED THE GOODBY PLENARY
STATEMENT ON MAJOR NICHOLSON AS WELL AS THE GUNDERSEN
WORKING GROUP A STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS (SEPTEL) AS A CHANGE IN WESTERN BEHAVIOR FOR THE
WORSE. THE RESULT, SZIGETI TOLD PAPADAKIS, COULD BE
MORE EASTERN POLEMICS. HANSEN NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS
BEGAN THE EXCHANGE IN THE MAY 24 PLENARY WITH EROFEEV'S
STATEMENT ON THE ALLEGED U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT.
HANSEN ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED EROFEEV WAS NOW WILLING TO
LET THE ISSUE REST AND NOT BE RAISED AGAIN IN PLENARY.
8. OTHER BUSINESS: MEVIK (NORWAY) ASKED AGAIN THAT THE
NEXT CAUCUS CONSIDER THE TWO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE
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FRENCH IN THEIR MAY 24 PLENARY STATEMENT ON INFORMAL
WORKING GROUP STRUCTURES AND ADJOURNMENT DATES FOR THE
STOCKHOLM PORTION OF CDE IN MID-1986 (REFTEL B). THERE
WAS CONSENSUS TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS AT THE NEXT
MEETING ON TUESDAY, JUNE 4. (COMMENT: THE FRENCH HAVE
INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT THEY MAY RAISE THESE ISSUES IN
BRUSSELS AS WELL. END COMMENT.)
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: MEASURE ONE
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 3908, B. STOCKHOLM 3942,
C. STOCKHOLM 3808, D. USNATO 7048 (1984), E. STATE 164036,
F. USNATO 5918 (1984), G. USNATO 6688 (1984),
H. USNATO 6975 (1984)
1. CDE VI - 52.
2. C- ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. IN RESPONSE TO INSTRUCTIONS REF E,
DELEGATION WILL WITHHOLD CONSENSUS WITHIN CAUCUS
REGARDING TABLING OF ADDITIONAL NATIONAL PAPERS
UNTIL THERE IS ASSURANCE THAT PAPERS ON MEASURES
1 THROUGH 5 CAN BE TABLED. REGARDING MEASURE 1,
WE UNDERSTAND FROM REF E THAT WASHINGTON'S UNDER-
STANDING OF THE NATO COMPROMISE DIFFERS FROM THAT OF
THE TURKS (AND OTHER ALLIES IN THE CAUCUS HERE).
SOME OF THE BACKGROUND IS REVIEWED BELOW IN ORDER TO
INDICATE WHY THE TURKS HAVE THEIR INTERPRETATION.
A MORE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING
RECORD WILL BE SENT SEPTEL. IN ANY EVENT, THE NATO
UNDERSTANDING DOES REQUIRE CAUCUS CONSENSUS BEFORE
NATIONAL PREFERENCES CAN BE OFFERED AND THE TURKS
HAVE REJECTED THE US MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE. MOST
OTHER ALLIES WOULD SUPPORT THE TURKS. WE THEREFORE
FACE THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER TO TABLE THE PROTOTYPE
OVER TURKISH AND ALLIED OBJECTIONS, RISKING A
US-TURKISH BILATERAL PROBLEM. PENDING FURTHER
WASHINGTON GUIDANCE, WE WILL DELAY INTRODUCING THE
PROTOTYPE INTO THE CAUCUS. END SUMMARY.
4. AS REPORTED IN REF A, US DELEGATION SUPPORTED
FRG DECISION TO PRESENT MEASURE 2 PAPER (TEXT
SEPTEL) AS A NATIONAL PRESENTATION. THIS WAS DONE
IN WORKING GROUP A ON MAY 30. REFS A AND B REPORT
EXHORTATIONS BY AMBASSADORS GOODBY AND EDES (UK)
TO AGAIN EVALUATE COMMON NATO APPROACH TO THE TABLING
OF WHAT ARE ESSENTIALLY NATIONAL PAPERS.
USDEL STATEMENT IN MAY 30 CAUCUS ENSURES THAT NO
ADDITIONAL PAPERS WILL BE PRESENTED UNLESS WE ARE
ABLE TO DEVISE SUITABLE PAPERS FOR ALL MEASURES.
AS REPORTED SEPTEL, ENTHUSIASM IN THE CAUCUS IS
WANING FOR THIS EXERCISE IN ITS CURRENT FORM.
5. THE TURKISH INTERPRETATION OF THE MEASURE 1
COMPROMISE REACHED IN NATO DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY
FROM THAT REPORTED IN REF E. BACK IN AUGUST 1984,
THROUGH THE AUSPICES OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION
HERE (BOLUKBASI) WORKING WITH THE US DELEGATION,
ANKARA HAD AGREED TO THE US FORMULATION PRESENTED
TO THE CSBM WG IN REF F. BELGIAN AND DUTCH OBJECTIONS
TO WHAT THEY BELIEVE WAS AN UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISE
CONVINCED ANKARA THAT
THE COMPROMISE WORKED OUT BY THE US AND TURKISH
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DELEGATIONS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE ALLIANCE
AND APPEARS TO HAVE OFFENDED TURKISH SENSITIVITIES
VIS-A-VIS THEIR LOYALTY TO A COMMON ALLIANCE
POSITION. THIS REOPENED THE ISSUE IN ANKARA,
LEADING TO US/BELGIAN/TURKISH DISCUSSIONS AT
EVERE DURING WHICH THE TURKS INDICATED THEY
NO LONGER SUPPORTED THE ORIGINAL US COMPROMISE,
AND RESULTING IN A NEW COMPROMISE TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE US COULD, IN BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS
OUTSIDE THE PLENARY, MAKE KNOWN ITS NATIONAL
POSITION ON BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, IF QUESTIONED BY THE EAST.
THESE DISCUSSIONS AREREPORTED IN NATO OFFICIAL/INFORMAL
TO USDEL STOCKHOLM AND IN REF G. ACCORDING
TO PARA 4, REF G IT IS THIS APPROACH WHICH HAS
BEEN RECORDED IN THE FINAL PACKAGE. SUBSEQUENTLY,
ANKARA REJECTED PART OF THIS COMPROMISE, AND
ANOTHER FORMULATION WAS DEVISED AT EVERE (REPORTED
IN REF H). THE EVERE FORMULATION WAS FURTHER
CHANGED BY ANKARA AND BECAME THE FINAL AGREEMENT
(PARA 3, REF D). THIS NEGOTIATING HISTORY IS
THE BASIS FOR THE TURKISH UNDERSTANDING OF THE
NATO COMPROMISE FINALLY REACHED IN OCTOBER 1984,
I.E., THAT DELEGATIONS COULD STATE THEIR NATIONAL
PREFERENCE IN BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS ON AN
INFORMAL BASIS, NOT IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.
THE KEY WORDS ARE "INFORMAL BASIS" WHICH WAS UNDER-
STOOD TO MEAN OUTSIDE THE PLENARY WHICH WAS THE
ONLY CONFERENCE MEETING AT THE TIME. MOREOVER,
THE FINAL AGREEMENT REFLECTED IN CM(84)2 4TH
REVISION STIPULATES THAT THE NATIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS
SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD ONLY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
BY THE EAST OR NNA. AT LEAST IN TURKISH EYES,
THIS ALSO HAS ITS ORIGIN IN THE INFORMAL US/BELGIAN/
TURK COMPROMISE MENTIONED ABOVE IN REF G.
THIS IS ALSO SEEN BY THE TURKS AS PRECLUDING
THE SUBMISSION OF NATIONAL POSITIONS IN THE
FORUM OF WORKING PAPERS.
6. AS REPORTED IN REF C, AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONDUCTED
CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKISH AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM
CONCERNING US MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE. TURKISH
AMBASSADOR SENT THE PAPER TO ANKARA FOR COMMENT AND
RECEIVED STRONG NEGATIVE REPLY. MEMBER OF TURKISH
DELEGATION (BOLUKBASI) EXPRESSED IRRITATION AND
INDIGNATION THAT US WOULD AGAIN RAISE MEASURE 1
ISSUE IN LIGHT OF ANKARA'S INTERPRETATION OF AGREE-
MENT REACHED IN NATO LAST YEAR, REPORTED IN REF G.
(AS A RESULT OF TURKISH AMBASSADOR OZGUL'S RECENT
HEART ATTACK, BOLUKBASI IS ACTING HEAD OF TURKISH
DELEGATION.)
7. GIVEN NATO AGREEMENT AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY
DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM AND STRONG TURKISH
144
SECRET
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OBJECTIONS, DELEGATION NOTED IN REF C ITS VIEW
THAT TO CONSIDER THE MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE A PURELY
NATIONAL PAPER AND TABLE IT DESPITE TURKISH
OBJECTIONS WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST OVERALL
INTERESTS OF THE US. BASED UPON ANKARA'S
RESPONSE TO US MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE PAPER,
WE COULD EXPECT TURKISH DELEGATION (BOLUKBASI)
AT THE MINIMUM TO WITHHOLD CONSENSUS,
WHICH THE OTHER ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT QUESTION
AND THUS CREATING A US-TURKISH STANDOFF IN THE
CAUCUS -- WHICH WOULD QUICKLY LEAK TO THE
CONFERENCE. BASED ON TURKISH DELEGATION COMMENTS,
ONE OUGHT TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT ON ANKARA,
ESPECIALLY ON THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF, WHICH
MIGHT SEE THIS AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL CONCERNING US-
TURKISH BILATERAL RELATIONS.
8. RECOMMENDATION. IN LIGHT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED,
RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON REVIEW MEASURE ONE ISSUE
IN VIEW OF INFORMATION REVIEWED ABOVE. WE WILL
DELAY SUBMISSION OF US MEASURE ONE PROTOTYPE TO
THE NATO CAUCUS PENDING FURTHER WASHINGTON GUIDANCE.
END
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SUBJECT: TURKISH RESERVATIONS REGARDING TABLING OF
MEASURE ONE PROTOTYPE
REF: STATE 164036
1. CDE VI-060 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN THIS MESSAGE I SUGGEST THAT WE RAISE IN
ANKARA THE "INFORMATION" ISSUE. END SUMMARY.
3. I SHARE WASHINGTON'S DESIRE, REFLECTED AGAIN IN THE
REFERENCED INSTRUCTION, TO HAVE PROTOTYPE MEASURE ONE
TABLED, PARTICULARLY SINCE I REGARD THE TABLING OF ALL
THE PLANNED PAPERS IN THE SERIES AS AN IMPORTANT, AND
STILL USEFUL DEVICE FOR HOLDING THE SPOTLIGHT ON NATO'S
PROPOSALS. SINCE THE PROTOTYPE IS AN INFORMAL NATIONAL
PAPER, I HAD HOPED THAT THE TURKS WOULD DISASSOCIATE
THEMSELVES FROM THE PAPER IN THE NATO CAUCUS BUT, IN THE
END, ACCEPT THAT THE U.S. COULD TRY TO AGGRESSIVELY SELL
MEASURE ONE. PERHAPS THIS MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE. THE
OBJECTION CONVEYED TO ME BY THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR.
HOWEVER, WAS ABSOLUTE AND OBVIOUSLY THE RESULT OF A
CATEGORICAL REFUSAL BY ANKARA TO INTERPRET THE TABLING
OF ANY U.S. NATIONAL PAPER IN THE CDE AS AN "INFORMAL"
OR "NON-COMMITTAL" ACT. THE TURKISH DELEGATION HERE HAS
NO FLEXIBILITY IN THE MATTER. I ADVISED THE TURKISH
AMBASSADOR THAT I WOULD REPORT THE SITUATION TO WASH-
INGTON AND, IN THE MEANTIME, TAKE NO ACTIONS WHICH
WOULD PUBLICLY EXPOSE THE SPLIT. I WANT TO STRESS
THAT IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR (WHO
IS NOW HOSPITALIZED WITH A HEART ATTACK), HE HAS MADE
REFERENCE ONLY TO THE FOOTNOTE TO MEASURE ONE CONTAINED
IN CM 84 (2) (FOURTH REVISION) AND SIMPLY ARGUED THAT
INTRODUCING A PAPER SUCH AS I RECOMMENDED COULD NOT
POSSIBLY BE NON-COMMITTAL AND INFORMAL.
4. SINCE "COORDINATION", AS REQUIRED BY THE AGREED
FOOTNOTE, AND AS I UNDERSTAND THE TERM IN THE NATO
CONTEXT, WAS CLEARLY OUT OF THE QUESTION, I CONCLUDED
THAT WE COULD NOT INTRODUCE THE TEXT OF PROTOTYPE MEASURE
ONE INTO THE NATO CAUCUS WITHOUT CREATING A FRUITLESS, AND
PROBABLY BITTER DISPUTE, AMONG THE ALLIES. NOR DID MY
PREVIOUS EXCHANGES WITH WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT ENCOURAG
ME TO THINK THAT THIS IS THE WAY I SHOULD DEAL WITH THE
TURKS.
5. MY REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN STOCKHOLM 3808
SUGGESTED THREE BASIC OPTIONS WITH PROS AND CONS.
WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE (REFTEL) ACCEPTED ONE OF THE CONS
I LISTED, NAMELY THAT FAILURE TO INTRODUCE PROTOTYPE
MEASURE ONE, AS IS, COULD WEAKEN MY CASE FOR SECURING
INFORMATION ON BRIGADE-LEVEL FORCES. THE INSTRUCTION
RESOLVED THE DILEMMA WITH THE TURKS BY ASKING THAT I
INTRODUCE PROTOTYPE MEASURE ONE IN THE CAUCUS AND REPORT
BACK. SINCE THE OUTCOME OF THAT COURSE OF ACTION WAS
ALREADY APPARENT, WE TOOK THE ALTERNATIVE OFFERED IN THE
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INSTRUCTION AND SPOKE IN THE NATO CAUCUS OF MAY 30 AGAINST
TABLING ANY FURTHER PROTOTYPE PAPERS.
6. AT THIS POINT, AN OBVIOUS COURSE OF ACTION IS TO
ACCEPT WITH REGRET THAT THE TABLING OF PROTOTYPE PAPERS
WILL HAVE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES AND THAT THE MATTER
SHOULD BE DROPPED AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE. WE STARTED
DOWN THAT ROAD IN THE NATO CAUCUS OF MAY 30. PERHAPS
THIS IS ALSO THE WISEST COURSE OF ACTION SINCE POSTPONED
PROBLEMS SOMETIMES SOLVE THEMSELVES, BUT I DO NOT THINK
THIS IS TRUE IN THIS INSTANCE.
7. I RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDE THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD ASK
AMBASSADOR STRAUSZ-HUPE TO TAKE UP THIS MATTER IN ANKARA.
THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN FESTERING FOR SOME TIME AND POSTPON-
ING THE ISSUE HAS BROUGHT US EVER CLOSER TO AN OPEN AND
ACRIMONIOUS SPLIT WITH THE TURKS. THE TIME IS NEVER RIGHT
FOR HAVING IT OUT WITH A KEY ALLY, AND NOW IS PROBABLY AS
BAD A TIME AS ANY. I REGRET ADDING ANOTHER ITEM TO
EMBASSY ANKARA'S AGENDA BUT I THINK IT IS TIME TO ASSESS
OUR PRIORITIES. WE CAN CONTINUE TO DUCK THE ISSUE OF
BRIGADE-LEVEL FORCES FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE IN THE
ALLIANCE, BUT I AM CONCERNED THAT EQUIVOCATING ON THE
ISSUE IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO ARGUE EFFEC-
STATE FOR EUR/BURT; PM/CHAIN
TIVELY FOR OTHER ELEMENTS IN OUR PACKAGE. I HAVE NO DOUBT
THAT THE SOVIETS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE SITUATION,
INCIDENTALLY, SINCE THE GENERAL ISSUE HAS BEEN PUBLIC KNOW-
LEDGE FOR THE PAST YEAR. THE POINTS TO BE REGISTERED WITH
THE TURKS WILL BE AS APPARENT IN WASHINGTON AND ANKARA AS
THEY ARE HERE BUT, IF DESIRED, I WILL BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE
THEM.
8. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN EARLY REACTION TO THIS
MESSAGE.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY, MAY 31, 1985
1. CDE VI - 057
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. WHAT BEGAN AS A FAIRLY HARMONIOUS PLENARY
SESSION WAS ENDED WITH ACRIMONIOUS CHARGES FROM THE
SOVIET DELEGATION THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION, IN PARTICU-
LAR, IS SANDBAGGING DISCUSSION ON NUF. PORTUGAL UNDER-
LINED THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE NATO PACK-
AGE; HUNGARY ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY WARSAW PACT EXPANSION
OF THE MANDATE ZONE OF APPLICABILITY TO INDEPENDENT AIR
AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) OPENED THE PLENARY
BY DEFINING CONFIDENCE, IN CSCE TERMS, AS TELLING OTHERS
"WHAT WE LOOK LIKE, WHAT WE INTEND TO DO, AND ALLOWING
OTHERS TO ASSESS OUR INTENTIONS." HE MAINTAINED THAT THE
RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE EMANATES PRIMARILY FROM THE WRONG
ASSESSMENT BY ONE STATE OF ANOTHER'S INTENTIONS DUE TO A
LACK OF RELIABLE INFORMATION. HE DECLARED THAT THE
MEASURES IN THE NATO PACKAGE PROVIDE THE MOST VIABLE PRO-
CEDURE FOR PRODUCING THIS INFORMATION, ACHIEVING PROPER
ASSESSMENT, AND ULTIMATELY "ENHANCING TRUST AMONG US".
5. IN A THOUGHTFUL, BUT TROUBLING, STATEMENT WHICH MAY
PRESAGE THE EAST'S APPROACH ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES,
AMBASSADOR SZIGETI OF HUNGARY ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY THE
EAST'S PROPOSALS ON NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND
NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE BASIS THAT "EUROPE SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED IN SIMPLE GEOGRAPHIC TERMS, BUT AS A POTENTIAL
AREA OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHERE . . . TWO ALLIANCES
FACE EACH OTHER. HE CONTENDED THAT TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCES IN NAVAL AND AIR CAPABILITIES HAVE MADE THEM
INSEPARABLE FROM THE REST OF THE MILITARY BALANCE (SIC)
IN EUROPE AND THE "SECURITY PERCEPTIONS OF THE PARTICI-
PATING STATES." AFTER DEFENDING THE EAST'S PROPOSALS ON
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS AS A REASONABLE MIDDLE GROUND,
SZIGETI TURNED TO CONSTRAINTS, CALLING FOR "SOPHISTICA-
TION AND FLEXIBILITY" IN DEALING WITH ASYMMETRY, RATHER
THAN SEEKING "PRECISELY EQUAL NUMBERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES"
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. (BEGIN COMMENT: IN HIS OPENING
PARAGRAPH, SZIGETI CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL,
MILITARY, AND "CONSTRAINT-TYPE MEASURES ON AN EQUAL
FOOTING AND IN A BALANCED MANNER," SUGGESTING FUTURE
EASTERN MISCHIEF ON THE "EQUAL TREATMENT" FRONT. END
COMMENT.) SZIGETI CLOSED WITH A CALL FOR A BUSINESSLIKE
AND CALM ATMOSPHERE AT CDE, "ABSTAINING FROM RAISING CON-
TROVERSIAL ISSUES WHICH DO NOT BELONG ON THE AGENDA."
(BEGIN COMMENT: THIS WAS PROBABLY A REFERENCE TO
AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S STATEMENT ON THE NICHOLSON KILLING
IN THE MAY 24 PLENARY, AND/OR THE U.S. STATEMENT ON CW
ON MAY 28. END COMMENT.)
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6. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY FOLLOWED WITH AN ATTACK
DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S. DELEGATION FOR ALLEGEDLY
REFUSING TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE IN RETURN FOR
EASTERN CONSIDERATION OF "CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES"
(SEPTEL). STRIPPED OF THE VERBIAGE, GRINEVSKY'S CLAIM
WAS THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STANCE AT CDE DOES NOT
REFLECT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATED WILLINGNESS (STRASBOURG
ADDRESS, AND STATEMENT PRIOR TO OPENING OF SIXTH ROUND)
TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN
THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-
BUILDING MEASURES. GRINEVSKY REFERRED TO STATEMENTS BY
AMBASSADOR GOODBY ON MAY 20 AND MAY 24 AS EXAMPLES OF
U.S. UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS NUF, SINCE THEY DID NOT
ADDRESS THE CONTENT AND FORM OF NUF, AND CHARGED THAT
THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESS STATEMENT IN BRUSSELS (USIS, MAY
1U) ON THE APPLICABILITY OF NUF TO ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS
REPRESENTED A DOUBLE STANDARD, "ONE FOR THE PUBLIC AND
THE OTHER FOR THIS CONFERENCE".
7. U.S. DEP HANSEN REPLIED TO GRINEVSKY BY REMINDING
HIM THAT THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVED 35 SOVEREIGN AND
INDEPENDENT STATES, THIS IS NOT A BILATERAL FORUM, AND
THAT CHARGES AGAINST ONE DELEGATION WERE OUT OF PLACE.
WITH REGARD TO THE SUBSTANCE OF GRINEVSKY'S COMPLAINT,
HANSEN REJECTED THE ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. WAS REFUSING
TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE AND QUOTED SEVERAL INSTANCES
TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. HAD PRESENTED ITS POSITION
ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NUF ISSUES BOTH IN PLENARY AND IN WG
A. HE THEN QUOTED PORTIONS OF AMBASSADOR G00DBY'S MAY 24
INTERVENTION, WHERE THE AMBASSADOR HAD QUOTED IRISH
AMBASSADOR O'BROIN'S STATEMENT: "THE ISSUE IS NOT
WHETHER TO REINFORCE THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE,
BUT HOW BEST TO DO IT . . . ."
8. GRINEVSKY RETURNED WITH A RIGHT-OF-REPLY CALLING THE
US POSITION ON NUF "THEATER OF THE ABSURD" AND REITERATING
HIS CHARGE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS
THE SOVIET NUF PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN US
DELEGATION STATEMENTS IN THE CONFERENCE.
9. COMMENT: GRINEVSKY'S SPEECH AND RIGHT-OF-REPLY
REPRESENT THE MAIN LINE OF SOVIET TACTICS FOR THE CURRENT
SESSION,I.E. BLAMING THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE US, FOR
HOLDING UP PROGRESS BY REFUSING TO PRESENT DETAILED IDEAS
ON NUF IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN TABLING OF IDEAS ON "MILI-
TARY-TECHNICAL" CSBM'S. AS STATED IN HANSEN REMARKS IN
PARA 7, USDEL HAS PRESENTED VIEWS ON NUF AS FAR AS WE
CONSIDER APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME. WE WILL CONTINUE TO
INSIST THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION MUST FOCUS ON THE
CONTENT OF CONCRETE CSBM'S. AS FOR THE POINTED (AND
MISLEADING) REFERENCES TO AMBASSADOR GOODBY, WE BELIEVE
SUCH PERSONAL ATTACKS UNDERCUT GRINEVSKY'S OWN POSITION
WITHOUT DAMAGING THE US POSITION ON NUF OR OTHER ISSUES.
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OTHER DELEGATIONS KNOW THE RECORD OF US STATEMENTS, IN
THE CONFERENCE AND IN OTHER FORUMS, AND REALIZE
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT WE SAY IN ONE PLACE
COMPARED TO WHAT WE SAY IN ANOTHER. END COMMENT.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: TEXT OF STATEMENT GIVEN BY OLEG A.
GRINEVSKY, MAY 31, 1985
1. CDE VI - 053.
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY OLEG A. GRINEVSKY,
USSR AMBASSADOR AT LARGE IN TODAY'S PLENARY. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN, IN THE STATEMENTS MADE BY MANY DELEGATIONS
HERE AT THE CONFERENCE IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED ON MORE THAN
ONE OCCASION THAT THE WORLD IS GOING THROUGH DIFFICULT
TIMES. FOR REASONS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THE
EXPECTATIONS THAT THE PEOPLES JUSTLY HAD FOR THE PROCESS
OF POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
STARTED IN THE 70S DUE TO THE EFFORTS MADE BY MANY
COUNTRIES, HAVE NEVER BEEN REALIZED. THIS PROCESS HAS
BEEN REPLACED BY CONFRONTATION WHOSE PHILOSOPHY IS
SPURRING THE ALREADY TOO-FAR-GONE ARMS RACE. FOR ITS
PART, THE ARMS BUILD-UP AIMED AT UPSETTING THE EXISTING
MILITARY AND STRATEGIC PARITY GIVES, IN CERTAIN
QUARTERS, DANGEROUS RISE TO INCLINATION TO RESORT TO
AGGRESSIVE METHODS AND DEVICES IN FOREIGN POLICY. THIS
VICIOUS CIRCLE - CONFRONTATION - ARMS RACE -
CONFRONTATION CAN AND MUST BE BROKEN. HUMAN
CIVILIZATION SIMPLY HAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE.
. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AMONG THOSE INTERNATIONAL
FORUMS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE BREAKING OF THIS
DANGEROUS CIRCLE OF EVENTS. THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY
ON THE NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
PEACEFUL RELATIONS AS PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS RESPECT.
ITS CONCLUSION WOULD SYMBOLIZE THE CONCENTRATED WILL OF
THE EUROPEAN STATES, USA AND CANADA TO PURSUE THE COURSE
AIMED AT CONSOLIDATING THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEFUL
COOPERATION AMONG OUR COUNTRIES.
. WHAT IS NEEDED IN NUCLEAR AGE, WITH ALL ITS DANGERS,
IS A POLITICAL THINKING WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE
REALITIES OF THAT AGE. SUCH CONCEPTS AS "POWER
POLITICS", "DETERRENCE" AND "ACHIEVEMENT OF MILITARY
SUPERIORITY" MUST GIVE WAY TO NON-USE OF FORCE,
CONFIDENCE, MUTUAL REGARD FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS.
THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW TREATY
COUNTRIES ARE AIMED AT ATTAINING PRECISELY THESE
OBJECTIVES.
. THE ELABORATION OF POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
GUARANTEES OF THE SECURITY OF STATES, WHICH WOULD
PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH REACHING AGREEMENT ON
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD,
WOULD LAY DOWN THE BASIS FOUNDATIONS FOR RESOLVING THE
MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AS WELL AS
CREATE CONDITIONS FOR FURTHERING THE PROCESS INITIATED
BY THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THUS PROMOTING THE EFFORTS
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OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.
. AS WE SEE IT, THE CONFERENCE HAS IN GENERAL SUPPORTED
THE CONCEPT THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY HAVE TO BE MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY,
THAT STEPS OF A POLITICAL NATURE HAVE TO BE COMBINED
WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY
FIELD. THIS HAS BEEN CLEARLY STATED IN THE DOCUMENT
PRESENTED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND
IN THEIR INTERVENTIONS. THIS WAS ALSO POINTED OUT IN
PARTICULAR BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE KINGDOM OF
THE NETHERLANDS, MR. DE RUITER WHO NOTED THAT ONE
COMPONENT OF CONFERENCE'S RESULTS SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON
NON-USE OF FORCE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PREVIOUS SESSIONS
OF CONFERENCE DID NOT SEE ANY FURTHER CONCRETE
ELABORATION OF THESE AND OTHER SIMILAR STATEMENTS MADE
BY NATO COUNTRIES.
. WE EXPECTED, AS DID MANY NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED
DELEGATIONS, THAT THE PRESENT SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE
WOULD BECOME A TURNING-POINT AND THAT NATO COUNTRIES
WOULD PROCEED TO A BUSINESS-LIKE AND SUBSTANTIVE
EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE. A
MONTH HAS ALMOST PASSED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE
SESSION. BUT HAS THIS BEEN THE CASE? LET US TURN TO
FACTS.
. AT THE JOINT MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUPS HELD ON
MAY 20 THE DISTINGUISHED U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR
GOODBY MADE A STATEMENT. IT HAS TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
HIS REMARKS SOUNDED BUSINESSLIKE AND CONTAINED NO
ATTEMPTS TO BRUSH ASIDE A NUMBER OF SERIOUS MILITARY
PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE TO BE RESOLVED. HE DID NOT GLOSS
OVER THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES WHICH HAVE TO BE WORKED ON
IN ORDER TO BE OVERCOME, HE DID NOT PRESENT THE
SITUATION AS IF THE WHOLE CONFERENCE APPLAUDED TO THE
NATO COUNTRIES' PROPOSALS AS IT WAS DONE, FOR EXAMPLE,
BY THE DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE UK DELEGATION WHO SPOKE
AT THE SAME MEETING.
. THE STATEMENT OF THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, HOWEVER,
CONTAINED A STRIKING PECULIARITY. THOUGH, AS HE SAID,
HIS REMARKS DEALT WITH QUESTIONS REGARDED BY THE U.S.
DELEGATION AS "KEY" QUESTIONS, HE COMPLETELY BY-PASSED
THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES,
INCLUDING THOSE RELATING TO NON-USE OF FORCE.
. A ONE-SIDED APPROACH LIKE THAT IS PUZZLING. IT IS
EVEN MORE SO, FOR THIS STATEMENT WAS PRONOUNCED
LITERALLY IN THE WAKE OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT
REAGAN IN STRASBOURG WHERE HE SAID - LEST THERE BE IDLE
TALK - I QUOTE HIM VERBATIM: "THE UNITED STATES IS
PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF
FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONCRETE
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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES". THIS SAME STATEMENT WAS
REITERATED IN THE ADDRESS BY THE U.S. PRESIDENT TO THE
U.S. DELEGATION BEFORE ITS DEPARTURE MAY 13 LAST.
. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED NOT ONLY TO NEGOTIATE BUT ALSO TO
ELABORATE CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES WHICH, COMBINED
WITH RELEVANT POLITICAL-PROPOSALS, WOULD LEAD TO THE
STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. OUR
PROPOSAL TO THIS EFFECT IS SET FORTH IN THE DOCUMENT,
KNOWN AS SC.4, SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE AS FAR BACK
AS ON MAY 8, L984. DISPLAYING FLEXIBILITY AND
ACCOMMODATING THE WISHES OF OUR PARTNERS BOTH FROM THE
NON-ALIGNED AND NATO COUNTRIES, WE HAVE SUBMITTED MORE
DETAILED PROPOSALS INCLUDING THOSE ON MILITARY
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.
. OF COURSE, THE U.S. DELEGATION MAY LIKE OUR PROPOSALS
OR NOT. IT MAY CONSIDER THE LIMITATION AND NOTIFICATION
THRESHOLDS OF MILITARY MANEUVRES AS EXCESSIVELY HIGH OR,
ON THE CONTRARY, EXCESSIVELY LOW. FINALLY, IT HAS THE
RIGHT TO CONSIDER OTHER CONCRETE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN
THOSE DOCUMENTS AS SUFFICIENT OR INSUFFICIENT. THIS IS
ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT AS WELL AS THE RIGHT OF ALL OTHER
DELEGATIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. STILL, THESE PROPOSALS
ARE QUITE CONCRETE AND THEY ARE ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.
. WHY THEN DOES THE U.S. DELEGATION KEEP SILENCE AS
REGARDS THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE? FRANKLY
SPEAKING, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HELD CONSULTATIONS AND
DECIDED TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION WOULD FURTHER DEVELOP.
MAY BE STILL IN ITS WORK THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL
DISPLAY WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS.
. THE NEXT STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT LATE IN COMING. IT WAS DELIVERED
ON MAY 24. SO WHAT?
. HONESTLY, IT HAS DISAPPOINTED US. ALTHOUGH IT
CONTAINED OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AND "THE
BASIC BUIDING BLOCKS" WHICH COULD BECOME A SUBJECT FOR
NEGOTIATION, YET, THE RENOUNCATION OF THE USE OF FORCE
WAS MENTIONED CASUALLY, IN PASSING.
. FIRST, IT WAS REITERATED FOR THE HUNDREDTH TIME THAT
THE U.S. DELEGATION IS IN FAVOUR OF REINFORCING THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE "THROUGH ADDITIONAL
PRACTICAL OBLIGATIONS". WHICH MEANS, IN OTHER WORDS,
THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION VIEWS THE MERE ADOPTION OF THE
MILITARY MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AS THE
REINFORCEMENT OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.
. SECOND, WE WERE INFORMED THAT THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD
NOT DEPART FROM THE PRINCIPLE AS EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. AS TO
SPELLING IT OUT FOR SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS, THEY
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SAY, IS REDUNDANT.
WHAT HAVE WE LEFT TO DO AFTER ALL THAT WAS SAID BY THE
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE? ARE WE SUPPOSED TO REPEAT ALL THAT
WAS ALREADY WIRTTEN DOWN IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND CONGRATULATE EACH OTHER ON THE
VICTORY SCORED IN THE DOMAIN OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING? IS
THAT THE WAY WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THE U.S.POSITION?
. BUT WHAT CAN A MERE REPETITION LIKE THAT GIVE IN REAL
TERMS? WHO NEEDS IT AND WHAT FOR? RARE ARE THE
OCCASIONS WHEN IT BEFALLS ME TO AGREE WITH MY FRIEND
CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR DELWORTH, BUT IN THIS
CASE I CANNOT BUT SHARE HIS VIEWPOINT: "IF THE OBJECT
WERE SIMPLY TO REPEAT THE PRINCIPLE, THE EFFORT WOULD BE
POINTLESS".
. FINALLY, NOW ALL THIS SHOULD BE HARMONIZED WITH
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT ON THE U.S. PREPAREDNESS TO
DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE. IN
FACT, OUR PROPOSALS SPEAK NOT OF REAFFIRMING THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE BUT OF DEVELOPING AND
SPECIFYING IT AND MAKING IT BINDING TO A MAXIMUM
DEGREE. WHY THEN DOES THE U.S. DELEGATION - IN SPITE OF
WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID - EVADE DISCUSSING THESE
PROPOSALS?
. MAY I REMIND: THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
PROPOSED - AS ONE OF THE KEY PROVISIONS - AN OBLIGATION
NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE EITHER NUCLEAR OR
CONVENTIONAL ARMS, NOT TO USE MILITARY FORCE AT ALL. IS
THE UNITED STATES NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS
PROPOSAL? IF THE ANSWER IS "YES", THEN WHY DON'T THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. DELEGATION WANT EVEN TO HEAR
ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL IN THE WORKING GROUP?
. WE HAVE NOTICED THAT MR. GOODBY - THOUGH IT WAS DONE
OUTSIDE THIS CONFERENCE - SAID TO JOURNALISTS IN
BRUSSELS - AND I QUOTE THE USIS BULLETIN OF MAY LO LAST:
"IF WE GO INTO THIS NON-USE OF FORCE, NON-USE OF FORCE
APPLIES TO ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR.
WE DON'T EXCLUDE ANY TYPES OF ARMS WHEN WE TALK ABOUT
NON-USE OF FORCE". WELL, THE STATEMENT IS CLEAR ENOUGH.
. WE HAVE A SERIOUS QUESTION IN THIS CONNECTION: IS THE
U.S. DELEGATION PREPARED TO CONFIRM THOSE WORDS HERE, AT
THIS CONFERENCE, OR PRESENT THAT STATEMENT AS A FORMULA
FOR CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS ON NON-USE OF FORCE? OR DOES
THE U.S. SIDE HAVE A DOUBLE STANDARD: ONE FOR THE PUBLIC
AND THE OTHER FOR THIS CONFERENCE?
. WE ARE SAYING THIS, MR. CHAIRMAN, NOT FOR THE SAKE OF
POLEMICS BUT IN ORDER TO FIND OUT HOW THINGS STAND. WE
HAVE ARRIVED HERE TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND
NOT TO PLAY NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS WHY WE WOULD LIKE TO
HAVE A CLEAR ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED. CAN YOU
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THINK OF ANY BETTER PLACE THAN THIS CONFERENCE WHERE THE
U.S. DELEGATION IS PROVIDED WITH THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPLAIN WHAT EXACTLY THE UNITED STATES HAS IN MIND IN
TERMS OF FORM AND CONTENT WHEN IT TALKS ABOUT NON-USE OF
FORCE. THIS WILL DEFINITELY FACILITATE THE PRODUCTIVE
WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.
. THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE FIRM WILL TO WORK FOR PEACE,
DETENTE AND STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN
EUROPE. THE USSR TRANSLATES THIS WILL INTO CONSTRUCTIVE
INITIATIVES AND CLEAR PROPOSALS WHICH LEAVE NO ROOM FOR
CONTRADICTORY INTERPRETATIONS. IT IS PRECISELY IN THIS
SPIRIT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ACTING AT ALL THE
NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY - IN GENEVA, STOCKHOLM AND
VIENNA. THIS HAS BEEN STATED CRYSTAL CLEAR THE OTHER
DAY BY MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU.
. I WOULD LIKE TO ESPECIALLY DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE
CONFERENCE TO WHAT HE STATED IN HIS SPEECH ON MAY 29
LAST. THE SOVIET UNION, HE SAID, IS IN FAVOUR OF AN
EARLY BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM
AND ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS THERE.
"APPARENTLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO BE MORE BOLD IN THE
SEARCH FOR THE KIND OF AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COMBINE
MAJOR MEASURES OF POLITICAL NATURE AND MUTALLY
ACCEPTABLE CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE
MILITARY AREA."
. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT WE CALL UPON THE CONFERENCE TO DO.
END TEXT.
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CHIC AGAINST Da= !
S T A T E M E N T
by
Ambassador KAroly Szigeti
Head of the Hungarian Delegation
to the
Conference on Confidence- and Security-building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe
Stockholm, May 31, 1985
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Mr. Chairman,
In my statement today I should like to make some
observations about the proposals submitted on the notification of
z
ground, air and naval force activities. Before doing so, let me
recall that the position of Hungary is, as stated at preceding
sessions, that the priority given by us to political type of
confidence-building measures in no way implies that we are not
interested in the elaboration of meaningful military measures,
including constraints. We hold that all the different kinds of
measures have their proper place and significance in the combina-
tion of agreements to be reached at this. Conference. This dele-
gation continues to be ready to promote the neaotiationson poli-
tical, military and constraint type measures on an equal footing
and in a balanced manner.
Mr. Chairman,
As I noted on an earlier occasion the Western proposals
before us focus on conventional ground forces. Their sponsors
expressed the view that the most likely risks of military
confrontation in the zone of application come from the potential
clash of ground forces.
Whether or not we felt it justified or legitimate,
the Western preoccupation with conventional
recognized as a part of Western ground forces has been
perception's of security and that
of their approach to confidence-building. We have been ready to
address it at the Stockholm Conference and elsewhere. We are willing
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to alleviate or dispel it by agreeing on substantial and balanced
confidence- and security-building measures.
The proposal submitted by Czechoslovakia on the noti-
fication of major manoeuvres of ground forces which is supported
by this delegation as well is an additional proof of this willing-
ness. What we are asking for, in turn, is more openness and
responsiveness to our security concerns and our proposals designed
to pursue them. The need for equal respect for the security interests
of all participating states is stipulated in the,mandate. In the
context of a conference on military security, Europe. should not be
considered in simple geographic terms, but rather as a potential
area of military confrontation where the bulk of forces of the two
alliances face each other, an area which should be defined according
to its coherence in terms of its military conditions and the
corresponding security perceptions of the participating states.
Accordingly, a meaningful system or set of military type CSBMs
to be elaborated by this Conference must not fail to cover major
elements of the military balance and, at the level of perceptions,
it should respond to the security concerns of all participating
states, both neutral and allied.
We support the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union
on the notification of major naval manoeuvres. As experts stated,
naval power has become an increasingly important component of the
military balance. Technological developments and recent deployment
plans suggest that the expected number, range and accuracy of
weapons carried by naval vessels will, in the next few years,
substantially increase their ability to attack targets on land.
The naval component in general and large-scale independent naval
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activities in particular cannot be separated from rest of the
military balance in Europe.
The same applies to air forces and major independent
aerial manoeuvres. Being one of the sponsors of the proposal on
the notification of major air force manoeuvres, submitted by the
German Democratic Republic first I should like to thank to those
previous speakers who have taken note of it for recognizing our
intention to facilitate our negotiations on military issues as
well. We feel discouraged, however, by listening to the first
reactions by Western delegationsi to the substance of the proposal.
The common argument advanced against it is, similarly
to the notification of naval manoeuvres, that in the western view
it is not compatible with the mandate. There is an important dis-
agreement between us regarding how the measures to be agreed upon
should apply to the adjoining sea and ocean areas and the air space
over it. I do not want to take up this issue now, in the context
of notification of aerial activities, since I do not feel it
relevant to our proposal.
Independent air force manoeuvres we seek to include
in the notification regime used to be conducted from air bases
located within the whole of Europe on the territory of the European
participating states. They are conducted, partly or entirely, in
the air space of those participating states. Thus, considerations
related to the adjoining sea area and air space do not apply to the
core of the proposal whether or not some of these manoeuvres
extend to the adjoining air space beyond national jurisdiction.
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As for air forces themselves, nothing in the mandate
supports the interpretation that those military activities taking
place within the whole of Europe the participating states will
agree to notify at this Conference can only be ground force
activities, while other activities are covered only if conducted
jointly with ground troop manoeuvres. The term ground or land
forces does not appear in the text of the mandate.
As for military significance, our experts in Working
Group B provided ample explanation of the capabilities of modern
air forces in initiating and supporting military operations.
At this point we need some sense of proportion. Those who argue
that out-of garrison activities of several thousands ground troops
could be relevant to the security of other states will certainly
not deny the military significance of the coordinated activities
of 200 airplanes which occur sometimes several minutes' flight-time
from the territory of other participating states.
Some of the western military experts believe that air
force manoeuvres may cause difficulties in terms of adequate
verification. This is an important issue which should, in due course,
be considered. carefully on the basis of the content of agreement.
All the more so, because we will face it in the context of combined
ground and air force manoeuvres as well. It would be perhaps early
to discuss it here and now, since the agreement on the substance
of the proposal has not yet begin to take shape.
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5 - I
Mr. Chairman,
In assessing the expected confidence-building effect
of the different proposals on notification we need again a sense
of proportion. It is the entire range of international political
and military conduct of states which shapes or undermines confi-
dence rather than notification of small-scale military training
activities. In a military environment decisively shaped by the
nuclear confrontation in Europe measures confined essentially to
conventional land forces, in and by themselves, would not be of
much help in generating mutual confidence and creating an atmosphere
more conducive to meaningful arms limitation talks.
As for the activities to be notified, we have to con-
centrate our attention to those activities of ground, air and naval
forces which, by their nature and size affect security in Europe
and may cause concern for other participating states regarding
their objectives. The widely shared view is that the purpose of
notification and observation is to demonstrate, and to give
evidence of, the non-agressive intention behind the activity in
question.
The thresholds triggering notification proposed by us
are, in our view, low enough to include all those activities that
may appear ambigous regarding their purpose. On the other hand,
the claim to notify and observe small-scale activities that are
irrelevant to security considerations would impose meaningless
burden on the participating states without sensible impact on the
risks of military confrontation and interstate relations.
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Mr. Chairman,
This delegation shares the view that the agreements
to emerge from this stage of the Conference should have an impact
on the established pattern of military activities and build opera-
tional barriers against the use of force. Constraint type measures
are particularly suitable for this purpose since the limitation
of the size of major manoeuvres would inhibit large concentration
of forces sufficient for surprise attack under the guise of a
routin peacetime manoeuvre. I do not believe that a set of CSBMs
which would allow the further growth of the size of military
manoeuvres within and around the whole of Europe could meet the
objectives set by our mandate.
Western delegations stressed that constraint measures
should have an equal impact on both alliances and emphasized the
need for taking into account differences in geography, force
postures, etc. What made us thinking is the fact that the requirement
of a carefully balanced effect of CSBMs has been emphasized in
the context of constraints only. But this is not my point. The
impact of constraint on major manoeuvres cannot be assessed by
simply comparing their respective number. Large-scale exercises
conducted, though less frequently, by our alliance, has been an
important means of training of our forces as well. The underlying
issue,I believe, is the notion of balance to be applied to our
negotiations.
Disarmament diplomacy, with its inclination to examine
microscopically the balance of agreement under consideration, has
often had difficulties in accomodating the quest for-precisely
equal numbers, rights and duties with asymmetries in force postures,
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geography and other relevant factors. In the case of CSBMs in
Europe, nevertheless, the search for a perfect and at least partly
quantifiable balance at each and every measure is, first, un-
justified, second, it could make our work here hopelessly complicated.
Our asymmetries can only be managed with a somewhat
more sophisticated and flexible perception of the balance of our
agreements than the one applied to constraint measures by the West.
The relevant part of the mandate states that the CSBMs should be
elaborated "On the basis of equality of rights, balance and
reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of the parti-
cipating states and of their respective obligation concerning
confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in
Europe...".
This definition of the balance provides us a sufficiently
precise and comprehensive standard for assessing whether or not
individual measures and, more importantly, the combination of
agreements to emerge from the Stockholm Conference would be balanced
enough.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me make a brief remark about
the climate surrounding our activities. Meaningful negotiations
can only be.conducted in a businesslike and calm atmosphere, free
of confrontation, rhetoric exchanges, abstaining from raising
controversial issues which do not belong to the agenda. During our
deliberations so far we have managed to preserve the businesslike
climate of the conference, by having been able to handle the apparent
differences in our approaches and proposals in a relaxed manner,
with due respect for each others' position. This atmosphere belongs
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to those common assets of ours we can rely upon while continuing
our search for areas of potential consensus.
This delegation hopes that the sense of responsibility
for the successful outcome of the conference and sustained self-
restraint in handling controversial issues will continue to
prevail and heated exchanges will not hinder early progress in
our negotiations.
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SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP, MAY 28-31, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3827, B) STOCKHOLM 4045,
- C) STOCKHOLM 4053, D) STOCKHOLM 4043,
- E) STOCKHOLM 3988. F) STOCKHOLM 4046,
- G) STOCKHOLM 4038, H) STOCKHOLM 3942,
- I) STOCKHOLM 3915
1. CDE VI - 059
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: THE EAST CAME OUT IN FORCE THIS WEEK,
USING AN EFFECTIVE GOOD GUY -- AND NOT SO EFFECTIVE BAD
GUY -- ROUTINE TO SOFTEN UP THE NEUTRALS AND EVEN SOME
OF OUR ALLIES. IN WORKING GROUP B MEETINGS ON NOTIFICA-
TION AND OBSERVATION, THE EAST SHOWED ITS "FORTHCOMING-
NESS IN AREAS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO THE WEST" BY LAYING
OUT DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS OF HOW OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND
AIR EXERCISES COULD BE CONDUCTED. A HUNGARIAN PLENARY
STATEMENT PROVIDED USEFUL HINTS OF FUTURE EASTERN LINES
OF ATTACK. IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT, THE SOVIET
AMBASSADOR LAMBASTED THE U.S. DELEGATION FOR NOT
ADDRESSING NUF IN A WAY HE CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE IN
LIGHT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DUBLIN SPEECH ON NON-USE OF
FORCE (NUF) AND IN VIEW OF EASTERN WORKING PAPERS ON
CSBM'S. THE U.S. REPLIED IN WORKING GROUP A TO THE
SOVIET UNION'S TENDENTIOUS PLENARY STATEMENT LAST WEEK
ATTACKING U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICY BY SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. CW POLICY AND POINTING TO THE
EXTENSIVE SOVIET CW PROGRAM. THE MADRID MANDATE AND THE
DEFINITION OF THE ZONE CAME UNDER CONCERTED ATTACK FROM
THE EAST -- AND FROM THE MALTESE, WHO INTERPRETED THE
MANDATE AS COVERING ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN. VIRTUALLY SILENT AGAIN THIS WEEK, THE
NNA APPARENTLY ARE STILL EMBROILED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO
AGREE ON A MORE DETAILED COMMON POSITION -- NNA LEGAL
EXPERTS WILL VISIT STOCKHOLM JUNE 3-7 TO DISCUSS NON-USE
OF FORCE. NATO'S ENERGIES, MEANWHILE, WERE EXPENDED ON
A SERIES OF INTERNAL DEBATES WHICH HAS DETRACTED FROM
THE EFFORT PUT INTO WORKING GROUPS. END SUMMARY.
4. THE EAST: AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND, AFTER
HUDDLING AMONG THEMSELVES, THE EAST INTRODUCED SOME
DETAILS FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION CSBM'S IN AN
APPARENT ATTEMPT TO APPEAR FORTHCOMING AND CONSTRUCTIVE
IN ITS APPROACH HERE, WHILE BLAMING THE WEST, THE U.S.,
AND AMBASSADOR GOODBY BY NAME, FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN
THE CONFERENCE. EASTERN DELEGATES THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN
SPREADING THIS NEW WARSAW PACT PARTY LINE: THE EAST HAS
HELD UP ITS HALF OF THE NEGOTIATING BARGAIN BY ADDRESSING
THE "AREAS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO THE WEST" (I.E.,
CONCRETE CSBM'S); NOW IT IS UP TO THE WEST TO BE EQUALLY
"FORTHCOMING" ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND CONSTRAINTS. FOR
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EXAMPLE, ONE WEEK AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THREE EASTERN
NOTIFICATION WORKING PAPERS ON MAY 21 (REF A), THE USSR
AND THE GDR PRESENTED DETAILED SCENARIOS DESCRIBING HOW
OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES COULD BE CONDUCTED
(SEPTEL). AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE EAST'S OPENING SALVO,
THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT MAY 31 (REF B), DELIVERED
IN VINTAGE GRINEVSKY STYLE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW,
CALLED THE U.S. DELEGATION'S NON-USE OF FORCE POSITION
"THEATRE OF THE ABSURD." GRINEVSKY CHARGED, MOREOVER,
THAT THE U.S. POSITION IN THE CONFERENCE DID NOT REFLECT
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATED DESIRE IN DUBLIN, IN STRASBOURG
AND IN HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE OPENING OF THIS ROUND,
TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON-NON-USE OF FORCE IN
THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-
BUILDING MEASURES.
5. WESTERN JOURNALISTS HAVE TOLD US THAT GRINEVSKY
COMPLAINED AFTER THE PLENARY THAT THE "CAPITALIST PRESS"
WAS IGNORING THE SOVIET POSITIONS IN THE CDE. WHEN A
SWEDISH CORRESPONDENT SAID GRINEVSKY HAD BEEN
"MISINFORMED," GRINEVSKY SAID ("IRRITABLY", ACCORDING TO
THE SWEDE), "PROVE IT." GRINEVSKY'S CRITICISM OF THE
WESTERN MEDIA PROBABLY REFLECTS BOTH SOVIET IRRITATION
THAT THEIR EARLIER PROPAGANDA APPROACH DID NOT CATCH ON
WITH WESTERN MEDIA (OR PUBLIC OPINION) AND A SOVIET
ATTEMPT TO STIMULATE THE PRESS TO REPORT ON THE "NEW
SOVIET IMAGE" AS FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATORS SEEKING SERIOUS
PROGRESS AT THE CDE.
6. WHILE THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT MADE MORE WAVES,
HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR SZIGETI'S STATEMENT MAY WELL PROVE
TO BE MORE IMPORTANT, BY PROVIDING SOME USEFUL HINTS OF
FUTURE EASTERN LINES OF ATTACK (SEPTEL), TO WIT:
-- WHILE UP UNTIL NOW THE EAST HAS INSISTED FIRST
ON EQUAL TREATMENT AND THEN ON PARALLEL PROGRESS IN THE
TWO WORKING GROUPS, I.E., ON "POLITICAL" AND "MILITARY-
TECHNICAL" MEASURES, THE HUNGARIANS CALLED FOR
"NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL, MILITARY AND CONSTRAINT TYPE
MEASURES ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND IN A BALANCED MANNER."
WHILE THE EAST DOES NOT HAVE A SERIOUS CONSTRAINT ON
THEIR OWN, THEY HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE CONCEPT FOR
TACTICAL REASONS -- TO GARNER NNA SUPPORT AND ISOLATE
THE WEST.
-- SZIGETI'S TWO REFERENCES TO "A COMBINATION OF
AGREEMENTS" SIGNALED THAT THE EAST HAS NOT SIGNED ON TO
THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR A SINGLE AGREEMENT.
-- HE ATTACKED NATO'S EMPHASIS ON GROUND FORCE
ACTIVITIES ON TWO FRONTS: FIRST, HE SAID IT WAS A PART
OF WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY WHICH WAS NOT SHARED
BY OTHERS; AND, SECOND, HE SAID THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS
NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE MANDATE WHICH, HE CLAIMED, DOES
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NOT MENTION GROUND FORCES EXPLICITLY.
-- THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATE ALSO SAID THAT EUROPE
SHOULD NOT BE DEFINED IN GEOGRAPHIC TERMS, BUT RATHER
STRATEGICALLY, AND THAT CSBM'S MUST NOT FAIL TO COVER
MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE, I.E.,
INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.
-- HE AVOIDED DISCUSSING HOW THE EASTERN NOTIFICA-
TION MEASURES WOULD BE VERIFIED "SINCE THE AGREEMENT ON
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL HAS NOT YET BEGUN TO TAKE
SHAPE." THIS FOLLOWS THE SEQUENTIAL APPROACH TAKEN BY
THE EAST OF LATE TO NEGOTIATE CSBM'S FIRST AND THEN TO
ADD ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.
-- FINALLY, REFERRING TO CONSTRAINTS, HE HINTED
THAT THE SEARCH FOR A "PERFECTLY" BALANCED MEASURE WAS
UNJUSTIFIED AND WOULD COMPLICATE WORK AT THE CDE.
7. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION AND
OBSERVATION POSITIONS ARE AIMED AT EXTENDING THE CDE
ZONE OF APPLICATION TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR
EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THE
SOVIETS ARE ALSO USING EXPANDED OBSERVATION TO APPEAR TO
BE FORTHCOMING ON VERIFICATION. OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
INDICATES THAT THE THRESHOLDS ARE SO HIGH THAT FEW, IF
ANY, EASTERN EXERCISES WOULD BE CAPTURED AND THE OBSERVA-
TION MODALITIES ARE SO INTRUSIVE -- CALLING FOR
OBSERVERS AT AIR AND NAVAL BASES, ON SHIPS, IN AIRCRAFT,
AT AIR COMMAND POSTS, AND AT RADAR MONITORING STATIONS
-- THAT THE EAST WOULD BE THE FIRST TO REJECT THEM IF IT
LOOKED AS IF THEY MIGHT BECOME PART OF A FINAL AGREEMENT
(REF C). WE SUSPECT THAT THEIR MOTIVES FOR INTRODUCING
DETAILED OBSERVATION MODALITIES ON NAVAL AND AIR
EXERCISES (AND FOR IGNORING GROUND FORCE EXERCISES) ARE
TWOFOLD: 1) TO EXTEND THE MANDATE'S ZONE, AND 2) TO SET
UP A NEGOTIATING SITUATION WHICH IS MORE FAVORABLE FOR
THEM, I.E., WHERE THEY CAN COUNTERBALANCE GROUND FORCES
MEASURES WHICH THE WEST WANTS WITH MEASURES (ON INDEPEN-
DENT NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA
AND AIR SPACE) WHICH THEY KNOW NATO WILL REJECT. THUS,
THEIR AIR AND NAVAL MEASURES BOTH SERVE AS BARGAINING
CHIPS AND ENABLE THE SOVIETS TO SAY THEY ARE WILLING TO
TALK TECHNICALLY ABOUT CONCRETE MEASURES.
8. IN ANY CASE, THE GDR DECLARATION THAT OBSERVATION
MUST NOT HARM THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE HOST COUNTRY
PROVIDES A CONVENIENT ESCAPE CLAUSE WHICH NEUTRALIZES
ALL OF THE POTENTIALLY FAVORABLE "POSSIBILITIES" THE GDR
SUGGESTED FOR OBSERVATION. WE EXPECT THE EAST TO APPLY
THIS CLAUSE LIBERALLY, GIVEN THE EAST'S PENCHANT FOR
SECRECY AND ITS ALL-INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF SECURITY. A
MEASURE OF THE TRUE EASTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEIR OWN
OBSERVATION MEASURES LIES IN THEIR FAILURE, SO FAR,
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EITHER TO SPELL OUT AN OBSERVATION REGIME FOR THEIR
GROUND FORCES EXERCISES OR TO DISTRIBUTE THE SOVIET
PAPER ON OBSERVATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES. NONETHELESS,
APPARENT EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE DETAILED
INFORMATION ON NOTIFICATION AND EXPANDED OBSERVATION
APPEALS TO A NUMBER OF NNA. EVEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE
LOSING SIGHT OF THE WESTERN PACKAGE WHICH SHOULD BE THE
FOCUS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS THIS SESSION. THE SOVIETS, OF
COURSE, ARE SEEKING TO SHIFT THE DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE
MEASURES FROM THE WESTERN PACKAGE TO THE SKEWED EASTERN
DEFINITION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S. THE WARSAW PACT HAS NOT
MOVED AN INCH TOWARD THE WEST'S POSITION; THIS HAS NOT
PREVENTED THEM FROM TAKING CREDIT FOR THEIR
"FLEXIBILITY," HOWEVER, AND FROM PRESSURING THE WEST TO
BE EQUALLY FORTHCOMING ON NUF. THIS PRESSURE HAS HAD
SOME EFFECT AMONG THE NNA AND EVEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES.
9. U.S.-SOVIET CONTACTS: AT U.S. INVITATION, THE
DEPUTIES AND MILREPS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS
MET FOR THE FIRST TIME (REPORTED SEPTEL) SINCE
AMBASSADORS GRINEVSKY AND GOODBY AGREED THAT SUCH
CONTACTS WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE DETAILED, SUBSTANTIVE
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES THAN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WORKING
GROUPS. AT THE LUNCH REPEATED SOVIET EVASIONS OF DIRECT
U.S. QUESTIONS ON WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO
PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE DESIGNATIONS AND LOCATIONS OF
SOVIET DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES
INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTEREST IN OR
FLEXIBILITY ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, INDEPENDENT
OF NOTIFICATION, ON THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF GROUND
FORCES AND LAND-BASED AIR FORCES. GENERAL TATARNIKOV,
WHEN PRESSED, SAID THAT INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION,
I.E., GENERAL AREA, OF FORCES INVOLVED IN A NOTIFIED
EXERCISE MIGHT ACCOMPANY NOTIFICATION. ACKNOWLEDGING
FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT EACH OF THE THREE EASTERN
NOTIFICATION PAPERS HAS "A SET OF VERIFICATION MEASURES
WHICH IS ADEQUATE FOR EACH MEASURE," THE SOVIET GENERAL
SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD NOT SPOKEN ON VERIFICATION
SINCE "ADEQUATE VERIFICATION" WOULD BE DETERMINED WHEN
THE CONFERENCE DETERMINES THE RANGE OF THE CSBM'S.
WHILE THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY THE GENERAL, WERE ON
THEIR GUARD DURING THIS FIRST INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH
THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THEY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO
HOST THE NEXT MEETING AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV OFFERED TO
PASS TO US AN INFORMAL LIST OF ISSUES THE SOVIETS WOULD
LIKE TO ADDRESS AT THE NEXT MEETING.
10. IN PRIVATE, U.S.-SOVIET WORKING RELATIONS WERE
BUSINESSLIKE, IF NOT OVERLY PRODUCTIVE. IN PUBLIC, THE
U.S. AND SOVIETS SQUARED OFF ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS.
IN WORKING GROUP A THE U.S. RESPONDED TO A TENDENTIOUS
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SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. CW POLICY ON MAY 24 (REF F) BY
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. CW POLICY AND BY
ELABORATING ON THE IMPORTANT ROLE CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLAY
IN SOVIET MILITARY PLANNING AND TRAINING. THE SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVE REPLIED IN KIND. AS USUAL, THE
U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE MADE A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS
NERVOUS, EVEN PROMPTING THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR IN HIS
MAY 31 PLENARY STATEMENT TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT "HEATED
EXCHANGES WILL NOT HINDER EARLY PROGRESS IN OUR
NEGOTIATIONS" (SEPTEL).
11. THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED: VIRTUALLY SILENT AGAIN
THIS WEEK, THE NNA APPARENTLY ARE STILL EMBROILED IN
THEIR INTERNAL NEGOTIATIONS OF MORE DETAILED COMMON
POSITIONS -- NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE NEAR COMPLETION
WHEN THE SWEDES DERAILED THE PROCESS BY INTRODUCING NEW
PAPERS AT THE MILREPS' MEETING IN VIENNA DURING THE LAST
RECESS. THE NNA, NONETHELESS, ARE PRESSING FORWARD.
THE FINNS HAVE TOLD US THAT NNA LEGAL EXPERTS WILL VISIT
STOCKHOLM (JUNE 3-7) TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE. THE
CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR, AUTHOR OF THE ONLY COMPREHENSIVE NNA
TREATMENT OF NUF, IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN NNA NUF POSITION. WE CONTINUE TO STAY
IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM. INDICATIONS ARE HE WILL NOT
RPT NOT INTRODUCE ANY DECLARATION THIS SESSION.
12. THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR TOOK ADVANTAGE OF NNA
INDECISIVENESS TO LAY DOWN YET ANOTHER MARKER OF HIS
DELEGATION'S NETTLESOME PREOCCUPATION WITH MEDITERRANEAN
SECURITY (REF E). IMPLICITLY REJECTING THE FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH, HE INTERPRETED THE MANDATE TO COVER ALL NAVAL
ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND CALLED FOR AN
EXTENSION OF NATO'S "OUT-OF-GARRISON" APPROACH TO
INCLUDE "OUT-OF-BASE" ACTIVITIES OF NAVAL FORCES. WHILE
THESE DEMANDS ARE SEEN AS EXTREME STARTING POSITIONS NOT
TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, THEY NONETHELESS FOLLOW THE
PATTERN OF MALTESE BEHAVIOR AT MADRID AND REMIND US OF
THE DISRUPTIVE ROLE THE MALTESE MAY CHOOSE TO PLAY
DURING THE END GAME.
13. ONLY THE SWEDES AND THE AUSTRIANS DELIVERED
DETAILED WORKING GROUP STATEMENTS, AND THEY CHOSE THE
PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE: OBSERVATION (SEPTEL). BOTH
SUPPORTED AN IMPROVED, STANDARDIZED REGIME WHICH WOULD
COVER THE WHOLE PERIOD OF AN EXERCISE. WHILE THE SWEDES
SEEM TO SUPPORT AN EXPANDED OBSERVATION REGIME AS A
MEANS OF DEALING WITH MOST VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THE AUSTRIANS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EVEN A WELL-ORGANIZED
OBSERVATION SYSTEM WILL HAVE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.
14. NATO: NATO'S ENERGIES, MEANWHILE, WERE EXPENDED ON
A SERIES OF'INTERNAL DEBATES WHICH HAS DETRACTED FROM
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THE EFFORT PUT INTO WORKING GROUPS. AFTER A LONG AND,
AT TIMES, ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE, THE FRG INSISTED ON
INTRODUCING ITS WORKING PAPER ON ANNUAL FORECASTS IN
WORKING GROUP A (REF F). THE U.S. ARGUED STRONGLY THAT
TABLING PAPERS ON SOME BUT NOT ALL FIVE OF THE MEASURES
WOULD FLAG ATTENTION TO OUR INTERNAL DISPUTE, A DILEMMA
WHICH THE EAST COULD WELL EXPLOIT. THEREFORE, CONSENSUS
FINALLY WAS ACHIEVED ON THE NEED TO DEVELOP OVERALL
TACTICS BEFORE TABLING ANY ADDITIONAL PAPERS (REF G).
WHILE WE HAVE SUCCEEDED SO FAR IN FOCUSSING ON SUBSTANCE
AND AVOIDING THE PROCEDURAL QUAGMIRE, PERSISTENT FRENCH
REQUESTS THAT THE CAUCUS ADDRESS BOTH THE ADJOURNMENT
DATE FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND NATO'S POSITION ON
THE INFORMAL WORK STRUCTURE, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED THIS
SESSION, HAVE PLACED THESE TWO CONTENTIOUS ISSUES ON THE
CAUCUS'S AGENDA (REF H).
15. AS REPORTED EARLIER, LEAKS IN THE NATO CAUCUS HAVE
BECOME A REAL PROBLEM, E.G., REF I; THIS WEEK THE
PROBLEM WENT ONE STEP FURTHER, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR
EDES, WHO TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT A UK NATIONAL PAPER ON
CONSTRAINTS, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY TABLED IN THE
CAUCUS OR REVIEWED BY THE MILAD GROUP, HAD BEEN HANDED
OVER TO THE NNA. ANOTHER TROUBLESOME NOTE WAS STRUCK BY
THE GREEK AMBASSADOR IN THE MAY 30 CAUCUS (REF G) WHEN
HE ASKED WHY NATO PLANNED TO TABLE MORE ILLUSTRATIVE
PAPERS WHEN THE EAST HAS TOLD US THAT IT WILL NOT
DISCUSS THEM UNLESS WE ADDRESS THEIR MEASURES (NUF,
THREE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS). PAPADAKIS WAS NOT
DISSUADED FROM THIS WORRISOME APPROACH BY STRONG CAUCUS
REACTION THAT WE INDEED HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE EAST'S
PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY NUF, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT
PREDICATE OUR OWN ACTIONS ON WARSAW PACT THREATS.
16. OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS MEETING: THE SOVIETS
AND THEIR WARSAW PACT SOUL BROTHERS, THE BULGARIANS, ARE
TAKING THE LEAD IN SPREADING THE WORD THAT THE WEST IS
IN A WAITING MODE PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE OTTAWA
MEETING. WE HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID FORMALLY LINKING
PROGRESS IN OTTAWA WITH PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM, WHILE
POINTING OUT THAT BOTH ARE INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE OVERALL
CSCE PROCESS AND THAT A POSITIVE OUTCOME AT ONE FORUM
CAN ONLY HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE OTHER.
END
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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, JUNE 3, 1985
1. CDE VI - 061
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. AT THE JUNE 3 WORKING GROUP A B
MEETING, THE EAST (POLAND, GDR) CONTINUED ITS ATTACK ON
NATO TREATMENT OF NUF AND CONSTRAINTS, ARGUING THAT NATO
-- AND THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR -- HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY
CLARIFIED ITS POSITION ON THESE ISSUES. DELWORTH
RESPONDED TO GRINEVSKY'S (USSR) MAY 31 "MISUNDERSTANDING"
OF CANADA'S POSITION ON NUF. CITRON (FRG), NOTING GDR
REFERENCES TO HIS MAY 24 SPEECH, POINTED OUT THE
CONTRAST BETWEEN THE EARLY TABLING OF THE COMPLETE NATO
PACKAGE AND THE EAST'S PIECEMEAL ELABORATION OF ITS
PROPOSALS. RESPONDING TO KONARSKI'S (POLAND) NUF
COMMENTS, PORTUGAL ASKED WHETHER THE EAST HAS MODIFIED
ITS POSITION ON NUF FOLLOWING THE TABLING OF SC.6;
KONARSKI REPLIED THAT THE EAST HAS INDEED GIVEN SEVERAL
INDICATIONS FOLLOWING THE TABLING OF SC.6 VIS-A-VIS ITS
FLEXIBILITY ON A NUF AGREEMENT. ONCE AGAIN TAKING UP
ITS "SEARCH FOR A COMMON PACKAGE" THEME, ROMANIA
SUGGESTED A ROAD TO SYSTEMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. THE NETHER-
LANDS JUSTIFIED MEASURE 1 AND 5 OF SC.1 AS SEPARATE
MEASURES. THE LONE NNA SPEAKER, LOIBL (AUSTRIA),
SUGGESTED AS FOOD FOR THOUGHT TWO POSSIBLE CHANGES TO
THE WORKING STRUCTURE. END SUMMARY
4. AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) LED AN AGGRESSIVE
EASTERN ATTACK ON NATO THROUGH HIS ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS
ON NUF, "TECHNICAL-MILITARY" MEASURES, AND ADAPTATION OF
THE WORKING STRUCTURE:
A. NUF: HE CHARACTERIZED NATO'S POSITION ON NUF AS
HAVING EVOLVED FROM ONE OF "AMBIGUOUS NEGATION," TO
"AMBIGUOUS HESITATION," TO "AMBIGUOUS APPROVAL." NOTING
THE "IRRATIONALLY TOO SLOW" WESTERN EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT
VIS-A-VIS NUF, HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLARITY AT THIS
STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. KONARSKI SPECIFIED THAT SIMPLE
REAFFIRMATION OF NUF, OR ITS "EXPRESSION THROUGH
MEASURES," WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. FINALLY, HE
CHALLENGED THE WEST TO "GET RID OF AMBIGUITIES" BY
PRESENTING EXPLICITLY ITS POSITION ON NUF.
B. "TECHNICAL-MILITARY MEASURES": KONARSKI PRAISED THE
EAST FOR TABLING ITS THREE NOTIFICATION WORKING
DOCUMENTS, WHICH HE CLAIMS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EAST IS
WILLING TO ACCOMMODATE WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS.
SC.1, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE CRITICIZED AS THE "DEVELOPED
FORM OF THE WEST'S SECURITY INTERESTS" -- A PACKAGE
WHICH DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL
PARTICIPANTS.
C. WORKING STRUCTURE: KONARSKI CLAIMED THAT POLAND HAS
"ONE OR TWO PROPOSALS" IT COULD SUBMIT IN THE-PROCESS OF
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REVIEWING THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, HE
SAID, POLAND HAS CONCLUDED THAT WE DO NOT NEED NEW
PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE. HE OUTLINED TWO PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS: 1) THE EXISTING STRUCTURE IS NO DOUBT
USEFUL AND WILL AGAIN BE NEEDED IN THE FUTURE, AND 2)
INFORMAL SOLUTIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRE INFORMAL
DECISIONS.
5. AMBASSADOR BURRING (GDR) CONTINUED THE EAST'S
HAMMERING ON THE NATO POSITIONS ON CONSTRAINTS AND NUF.
HE SOUNDED THE-EAST'S WARNING THAT WE ARE "NOW IN THE
STAGE WHERE WE HAVE TO BE CLEAR ON WHAT IS NEGOTIABLE."
THUS, HE ASKED, WHAT IS THE NATO POSITION ON CONSTRATINS?
AND, "IS THE U.S. READY TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRAINTS?
TURNING TO NUF, HE CLAIMED IT IS "HIGH TIME" NATO
EXPLAIN WHAT IS MEANS ON THIS ISSUE. SPECIFICALLY, HE
ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF CITRON'S (FRG) MAY 24 CALL
FOR AN "ALL-ENCOMPASSING REAFFIRMATION" OF NUF, AND HE
ALSO CHALLENGED CITRON TO EXPLAIN HIS VIEWS ON POLITICAL
MEASURES AND CONSTRAINTS. THE GDR AMBASSADOR ALSO
CRITICIZED THE "FALSE IMPRESSION" HE SAID WAS REGISTERED
BY USDEP IN THE MAY 24 ISSUE OF "FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE,"
WHICH QUOTED USDEP AS HAVING SAID THAT THE EAST HAS
ENDEAVORED TO LIMIT THE CONFERENCE EXCLUSIVELY TO
POLITICAL DECLARATIONS.
(BEGIN COMMENT: FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE SET BY GRINEVSKY'S
MAY 31 PLENARY STATEMENT, THE EAST APPEARS DETERMINED TO
APPLY PRESSURE ON NATO -- AND SPECIFICALLY THE U.S. --
TO TABLE NATO "PAPERS" ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS. IN SO
DOING, THEY PRESUMABLY ARE HOPING TO EXPLOIT ANY WEAK
LINKS IN NATO'S ARMOR AND TURN ATTENTION TO THEIR
"REASONABLE" APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE. THE RECENT
SERIES OF POINTED ATTACKS ON THE U.S. DELEGATION IS
EVIDENCE OF THIS TACTICAL GAME PLAN. ANOTHER INDICATION
OF THIS PLAN IS AN INTENSIFICATION OF EASTERN INFORMAL
CONTACTS WITH NNA AND OTHER NATO PARTICIPANTS. FINALLY,
THE EAST'S GRATUITOUS PRAISE OF ITS OWN NOTIFICATION
DOCUMENTS SEEMS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT NATO IS
THE OBSTRUCTIONIST TO PROGRESS IN CDE. END COMMENT)
6. AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) RESPONDED TO BUHRING'S
REFERENCE TO HIS STATEMENT. HE CONTRASTED THE EAST'S
PIECEMEAL -- AND LONG AWAITED -- TABLING OF ITS
PROPOSALS WITH NATO'S EARLY INTRODUCTION AND FULLY
DEVELOPED ELABORATION OF ITS PACKAGE.
7. CITING GRINEVSKY'S MAY 31 "SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING"
OF CANADA'S POSITION ON NUF, AMBASSADOR DELWORTH
CLARIFIED HIS DELEGATION'S THINKING BY REVIEWING THREE
REQUIREMENTS VIS-A-VIS NUF: 1) A TREATY IS NOT THE
APPROPRIATE FORM, 2) ANY LANGUAGE ADOPTED FOR NUF MUST
NOT UNDERMINE THE UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND
3) REAFFIRMATION OF NUF MUST BE COMBINED WITH CONCRETE
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CSBM'S, I.E., AN "ORGANIC FUSION."
8. AMBASSADOR CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) DIRECTED A QUESTION
TO KONARSKI BASED ON EASTERN EVOLUTION OF ITS NUF
POSITION: IS THE EAST'S EVOLUTION ON NUF EXPRESSED BY
SC.4 AND SC.6, OR IS THERE MORE? KONARSKI REPLIED THAT,
FOLLOWING THE TABLING OF sc.6, A "NUMBER OF POINTS HAVE
BEEN RAISED" WHICH INDICATE THE EAST'S WILLINGNESS TO
"REPLACE THE FORMULA BY ANOTHER" IF NECESSARY, A FORMULA
WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL
PARTICIPANTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: KONARSKI "SEEMED TO"
IMPLY THAT THE EAST IS WILLING TO DROP DISCUSSION OF THE
FORM OF A NUF COMMITMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR NATO
WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON
NUF. END COMMENT)
9. AMBASSADOR BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) JUSTIFIED THE
INFORMATION (MEASURE 1) AND VERIFICATION (MEASURE 5)
MEASURES OF SC.1 AS SEPARATE MEASURES. HE ARGUED THAT
THEY CANNOT BE SEEN IN ISOLATION FROM THE OTHER MEASURES
OF SC.1. BUWALDA REJECTED THE EAST'S ARGUMENT THAT
INFORMATION MUST BE GIVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION,
STRESSING THAT MEASURE 1 HAS IN MIND A "GENERAL PICTURE"
FROM WHICH THE PIECES OF INFORMATION PROVIDED IN OTHER
MEASURES CAN BE EVALUATED. REGARDING VERIFICATION, THE
DUTCH AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT VERIFICATION AND INSPEC-
TION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN PRINCIPLE -- NOT A PURPOSE IN
ITSELF -- BUT AS AN INTEGRATED ELEMENT OF THE PACKAGE.
THUS, HE SAID, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION SHOULD
INCLUDE GROUND INSPECTION AS WELL AS NON-INTERFERENCE IN
NATIUNAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HE ADDED THAT NTM IS "WIDER
THAN SATELLITES" -- THAT ALL STATES HAVE SOME FORM OF NTM,
HOWEVER INADEQUATE, TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE.
10. AMBASSADOR CETERCHI (ROMANIA) ADDED YET ANOTHER
STATEMENT TO THE ROMANIAN SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND. HE
CALLED ON THE CONFERENCE TO ADOPT A BALANCED,
SUBSTANTIVE "COMMON PACKAGE" IN CONFORMITY TO THE MADRID
MANDATE. THIS PACKAGE, HE STRESSED, SHOULD CONSIST OF
MEASURES OF PRIORITY TO ALL AND SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE
APPRECIATED AS A "WHOLE." HE IMPLIED THAT PARTICIPANTS
SHOULD LOOK BEYOND THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE
PACKAGE IN ORDER TO AGREE ON SOMETHING WHICH MEETS THE
SECURITY CONCERNS OF EACH PARTICIPANT. TO FACILITATE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "SINGLE SET OF INTERDEPENDENT
MEASURES" WITH A POSSIBILITY OF CONSENSUS, CETERCHI
PROPOSED THAT WE: 1) DRAW UP ELEMENTS AND THE FRAMEWORK
OF AN AGREEMENT, 2) CONCENTRATE EFFORTS ON THE CONTENT
OF MEASURES WHICH WILL HELP REACH CONSENSUS, 3) PROCEED
TO NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A TEXT FOR A FINAL AGREEMENT,
WHILE KEEPING ALL PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE, AND 4) GUIDE
THE WORKING GROUPS TO BRING POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER.
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SUBORDINATE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION TO THE TASK OF WIDENING
CONSENSUS. THE ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO NOTED THAT
THERE WERE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE ROMANIAN AIDE-
MEMOIRE AND THE PROPOSALS OF SC.2, AND EXPLAINED THAT
THE AIDE-MEMOIRE REPRESENTS A SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS,
WHEREAS SC.2 IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL
POSITION.
11. NOTING THAT THE CONTENTS OF A COMMON PACKAGE ARE
NOT YET SO READILY RECOGNIZABLE, AMBASSADOR LOIBL
(AUSTRIA) OFFERED "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" ON POSSIBLE
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE WORKING STRUCTURE TO BE CONSIDERED
DURING ITS REVIEW: 1) DELEGATIONS WISHING TO TAKE THE
FLOOR DURING WORKING GROUP MEETINGS SHOULD SPECIFY
BEFORE HAND WHAT THEY WILL SPEAK ABOUT; THIS WILL ENABLE
OTHERS TO PREPARE; AND 2) WE SHOULD AGREE ON WHICH
CONCRETE POINTS COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION SHOULD BE
DEALT WITH DURING THE NEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING.
(BEGIN COMMENT: LOIBL'S SUGGESTIONS MAY HAVE SOME MERIT
ALTHOUGH PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATIONMAY BE DIFFICULT.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: U.S.-MALTA BILATERAL
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3987, B) STOCKHOLM 1237
1. CDE VI - 090
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR GOODBY AND U.S. CDE DELOFF
(STOFFER) MET WITH MALTESE AMBASSADOR VICTOR CAMILLERI
AND HIS AIDE, MARIO BUTTIGIEG, ON MONDAY, JUNE 3, TO
REVIEW CONSTRAINTS, NUF, AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES.
4. MALTA ON CONSTRAINTS: CAMILLERI NOTED THAT
CONSTRAINTS, IN PRINCIPLE, NEED NOT BE INCLUDED IN A
FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE NNA GOAL, AND
MALTA'S, IS TO FIND A CONSTRAINTS WHICH WOULD LESSEN THE
DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK. HE ADMITTED THAT NATO'S
MEASURE 2 (FORECASIS) HELPS SOMEWHAT IN THE THREAT
ASSESSMENT OF A POTENTIAL SURPRISE ATTACK; HOWEVER, THE
EGYPTIAN MANEUVERS IN THE SINAI PENINSULA PRIOR TO THE
1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR CAST DOUBT ON THE CONSTRAINING
EFFECTS OF MEASURES REQUIRING PRENOTIFICATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. CAMILLERI SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS A
CONSTRAINT COULD BE FOUND THAT LIMITS THE DEPLOYMENT OF
CERTAIN EQUIPMENT, ON THE SIZE AND TYPE OF MANEUVERS IN
SENSITIVE AREAS, SUCH AS BORDER REGIONS.
5. U.S. ON CONSTRAINTS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY NOTED THAT
NATO HAS NEVER RULED OUT A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE IF A
BALANCED ONE COULD BE FOUND THAT FAVORED THE DEFENSE OVER
THE OFFENSE AND THAT APPLIED IN ITS EFFECTS TO ALL 35
NATIONS EQUALLY. NATO, HE NOTED, HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE
TO FIND ONE. ADVOCATES VARIOUSLY DESCRIBE THE OBJECTIVE
OF CONSTRAINTS AS A MEANS TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF
SURPRISE ATTACK AND POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, AND TO
FUNCTION AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN STABILIZING CONCRETE CSBM'S
AND DISARMAMENT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND A MEASURE THAT
MEETS ALL THESE CRITERIA. FOR EXAMPLE, GOODBY SAID,
RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS ARE NEEDED FOR
SURPRISE ATTACK, WHILE FAIRLY SMALL NUMBERS ARE ABLE TO
ENGAGE IN POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. THE PRIMARY NEED NOW,
HE EMPHASIZED, IS TO BE CLEARER ON THE PURPOSE OF
CONSTRAINTS. GOODBY EXPLAINED WHY SOME OF THE CAMILLERI
IDEAS ON EQUIPMENT AND MANEUVER CONSTRAINTS IN CERTAIN
AREAS WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT AND VERIFY,
BE UNEQUAL IN ITS APPLICATION TO NATO, AND BE INCONSIS-
TENT WITH THE MANDATE'S REQUIREMENT TO APPLY TO THE WHOLE
OF EUROPE. G00DBY CONCLUDED THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE COMPLEX
AND DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND NEED MORE TIME THAN THE
YEAR LEFT IN THE CONFERENCE JUST TO HANDLE ALL THE
DETAILED ISSUES ALREADY ON THE TABLE. CONSEQUENTLY,
CONSTRAINTS MAY HAVE TO BE SHELVED.
6. MALTA SEEKS CONSTRAINT PRINCIPLE: CAMILLERI NOTED
THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
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GOODBY HAD RAISED WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRAINTS.
NEVERTHELESS, MALTA'S INTEREST IS IN LOWERING THE
INTENSITY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND LESSENING THE
EXTENT OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. CAMILLERI STATED THAT
HIS AIM IS TO INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT AT THIS STAGE OF THE
WORK IN ORDER TO SECURE AS A FINAL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS FOR FUTURE
WORK.
7. MALTA ON NUF: CAMILLERI STATED THAT NUF IS A
POLITICAL ISSUE AND THAT MORE IS NEEDED FROM THE WEST
THAN A SIMPLE REAFFIRMATION. THE EAST WANTS DETAILED
COMMITMENTS CONSISTENT WITH, BUT STRONGER THAN, THE
LANGUAGE FOUND IN THE UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI FINAL
ACT. CAMILLERI INDICATED THAT THE EAST STILL INCLUDES
NFU IN ITS NUF PRINCIPLE. GOODBY INTERRUPTED AT THIS
POINT TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WOULD BE
ABSOLUTELY NO LATITUDE FROM THE U.S. OR NATO ON THAT
ISSUE. CAMILLERI RECOGNIZED THAT LONG-HELD POSITION,
BUT NOTED THAT NFU IS A MAJOR EASTERN ISSUE. CAMILLERI
CONCLUDED AMBIGUOUSLY BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT CLEAR
HOW MALTA COULD HELP ON THE NUF ISSUE.
8. U.S. ON NUF: GOODBY BEGAN WITH THE NFU ISSUE AND
EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD TOLD GRINEVSKY AND OTHERS IN
MOSCOW IN APRIL, 1984, THAT THERE WAS NO LATITUDE ON
THIS ISSUE WHATEVER FROM THE U.S. ON NUF, GOODBY SAID,
THE PRINCIPLE APPLIES TO ALL KINDS OF WEAPONS. IF ONE
WERE TO BEGIN LISTING WEAPONS AND LEAVE SOME OUT, IT
WOULD IMPLY THE USE OF THAT TYPE OF FORCE IS SANCTIONED.
GOODBY NOTED THAT GRINEVSKY IS FULLY AWARE OF THE
POSITION. THE SOVIETS, GOODBY SAID, ARE ATTEMPTING TO
APPLY NUF TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. THE U.S. LEGAL VIEW
IS THAT NUF ALREADY APPLIES TO THOSE AREAS UNDER THE UN
CHARTER AND NUMEROUS OIHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS. THUS,
GOODBY SUMMED UP, IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY AND LEGALLY
UNSOUND TO UNDERSCORE THE APPLICATIONS OF NUF WITH
RESPECT TO EITHER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES OR SPECIFIC
WEAPONS SYSTEMS. CONSEQUENTLY, NATO COULD ONLY SUPPORT
THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF USING LANGUAGE FROM THE UN CHARTER
AND HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
9. U.S. ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS: ON ADJOURNMENT, GOODBY
FELT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE
BY MID-1986. HE COULD NOT SEE THE CONFERENCE CONTINUING
THROUGH VIENNA, SINCE CDE IS A SUBORDINATE BODY. ON
WORKING PROCEDURES, GOODBY NOTED THAT IT WAS NOT AN
ARBITRARY MATTER OF THE CALENDAR. IF SIGNIFICANT
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION TAKES PLACE WHICH MERITS MOVING
TO DRAFTING, THEN DRAFTING GROUPS COULD BE ESTABLISHED
AT THAT TIME, PERHAPS THE FALL. HOWEVER, THE CONFERENCE
SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO DRAFTING IF IT IS NOT WARRANTED.
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CURRENTLY, THE POSITIONS OF PARTICIPANTS ARE STILL FAR
APART, EVEN ON THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION, WHICH NEARLY
ALL THE 35 STATES AGREE SHOULD BECOME PART OF A FINAL
AGREEMENT. A FRAMEWORK ON PRINCIPLES IS NEEDED BEFORE
DRAFTING COULD BEGIN, HE CONCLUDED. CAMILLERI FIRMLY
AGREED AND HOPED TO MEET AGAIN TO DISCUSS MALTA'S
AMPLIFICATION OF ITS SC.5 PROPOSAL.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE - REPORT OF WORKING GROUP A MEETING,
- JUNE 4, 1985
1. CDE VI - 70.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EASTERN REPS OFFERED A VAGUE DEFENSE
OF THE MERITS OF THE PROVISION IN 5C.6 FOR EMERGENCY
CONSULTATIONS IN CRISES (CZECHOSLOVAKIA); THEY RESPONDED
TO EARLIER WESTERN CRITICISM OF THE EAST'S NUCLEAR
WEAPONS-FREE ZONES (NWFZ'S) PROPOSALS (BULGARIA); THEY
ATTEMPTED TO SPLIT THE FRG FROM ITS WESTERN ALLIES ON
NUF (USSR); AND THEY CONTENDED THAT ARTICLE 13 OF THE UN
CHARTER SUPPORTS A REGIONAL CODIFICATION OF NUF AT THE
CDE. THE ERG SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON ITS NUF
POSITION, AND THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR, WHO REFERS TO
HIMSELF AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, AUTHORITATIVELY
DISPUTED THE CLAIM THAT ARTICLE 13 IS RELEVANT TO THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE BY NOTING THAT ONLY THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY COULD AUTHORIZE AND BRING INTO EFFECT A
REGIONAL CODIFICATION OF NUF. THE SOVIET DELEGATE WAS
CLEARLY TAKEN ABACK AND COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO
THE CYPRIOT. ON THE WHOLE, THE EAST AVOIDED THE
POLEMICS AND PERSONALIZED REMARKS CHARACTERISTIC OF ITS
RECENT INTERVENTIONS. END SUMMARY..
4. CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATE (SKOBA) ARGUED THAT PARA 8
(CONSULTATIONS IN CRISES) OF SC.6 WOULD REDUCE THE
POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION THROUGH
MISCALCULATION AND WOULD GUARANTEE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PRINCIPLE OF NUF. HE CLAIMED THAT MANY STATES,
INCLUDING NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES, NOW HAVE
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR, AND INDEED SUPPORT,
COMMITMENTS TO RESORT TO SUCH CONSULTATIONS.
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 8 OF SC.6, HE CONCLUDED, WOULD
REQUIRE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM AND
THE REQUISITE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES COULD BE ADAPTED
FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE CSCE PROCESS. (BEGIN
COMMENT: THE VAGUENESS OF THE CZECH STATEMENT RAISES
THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF CRISIS
COMMUNICATION IS NOT WELL DEVELOPED. END COMMENT.)
5. FRG DELEGATE (DREHER) RESPONDED TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF
MAY 21 THAT ONLY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THUS FAR HAD
EXPRESSED INTEREST IN NUF. HE ARGUED THAT THE FRG
DELEGATION HAD COME TO STOCKHOLM PREPARED TO STRENGTHEN
THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF WITH CONCRETE AND VERIFIABLE
MEASURES. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE ERG DELEGATION
HAD SPOKEN EXTENSIVELY ON NUF; HE CITED UNIVERSAL
RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF AS A BASIS FOR
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AVERRED THAT ALL CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS ARE READY TO REINFORCE THIS PRINCIPLE. THE
BASIC QUESTION, HE ADDED, WAS: SHOULD NUF BE REINFORCED
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BY WORDS OR BY DEEDS I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S? HE URGED
THAT IT BE DONE THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION OF CONCRETE
MEASURES AND ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION.
6. BULGARIAN REP (GOTEV) ADDRESSED FRG QUESTIONS OF
LAST WEEK REGARDING GUARANTEES AND VERIFIABILITY OF
NWFZ'S. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE INVOLVED NUCLEAR STATES
UNDERTAKE TO DEVELOP APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS AND
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. HE APPLAUDED THE USSR AS THE
ONLY NUCLEAR POWER THAT HAS DECLARED ITS READINESS TO
MAKE THE REQUISITE COMMITMENT. GOTEV CLAIMED THAT A KEY
WAY TO ENSURE AGAINST NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS IN
DESIGNATED NUCLEAR-FREE AREAS COULD BE TO KEEP NUCLEAR
WEAPONS OUT OF THESE AREAS SINCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD
ATTRACT STRIKES. GOTEV ALLUDED TO THE 1968 NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AS
USEFUL VEHICLES FOR CREATING NWFZ'S. UK REP (FREEMAN)
INTERVENED BRIEFLY TO STATE THAT CREATION OF NWFZ'S WAS
NOT WITHIN THE CONFERENCE MANDATE, BUT WENT ON TO
WELCOME THE BULGARIAN'S REMARKS CONCERNING
VERIFICATION; FREEMAN EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR A
FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION.
7. SOVIET SPOKESMAN (RAKHMANINOV) ATTEMPTED TO
ESTABLISH EVIDENCE OF FRG SUPPORT FOR THE SEPARATE
NATURE OF A NUF COMMITMENT, I.E., A COMMITMENT NOT
ORGANICALLY LINKED WITH CSBM'S. HE QUOTED A 1984
STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER HANS GENSCHER. ACCORDING
TO RAKHMANINOV, GENSCHER ALLOWED THAT A REAFFIRMATION OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF SHOULD NOT BE ORGANICALLY FUSED
WITH THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S. HE CLAIMED
AMBASSADOR CITRON, IN CONTRAST, HAD MOVED AWAY FROM THIS
LINE BY ARGUING THAT A NEW REAFFIRMATION OF NUF SHOULD
BE LINKED TO CONCRETE CSBM'S. RAKHMANINOV WENT ON TO
ARGUE THAT ARTICLE 13 OF THE UN CHARTER PROVIDED THE
BASIS FOR A LEGAL CODIFICATION OF A NUF COMMITMENT AND
THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ALLOWED FOR TREATIES WITHIN
THE CSCE PROCESS.
8. FRG DELEGATE DREHER PUT THE GENSCHER QUOTATION IN
ITS PROPER CONTEXT AND STATED HIS DELEGATION'S POSITION
CLEARLY: A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF, EVEN A FORMAL ONE,
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT CONCRETE VERIFIABLE CSBM'S, WOULD NOT
BE JUSTIFIED.
9. IN A POLITE, BUT TOUGH PUT-DOWN OF DISTORTED SOVIET
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE HFA, CYPRIOT
AMBASSADOR (PAPADOPOULOS) POINTED OUT THAT THE
CONFERENCE HAD NOT BEEN CONVENED BY THE UN AND THAT WE
ARE NOT HERE TO CODIFY A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW.
MOREOVER, HE CONTENDED THAT ARTICLE 13 IS NOT RELEVANT
TO THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND THAT ARTICLE 13 ALLOWS ONLY
THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CODIFY REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL EXPRESSIONS OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. HE ADDED THAT
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THE HFA AND MADRID MANDATE DO NOT PROVIDE FOR TREATIES
ARISING FROM THE CSCE PROCESS.
10. A SOMEWHAT CHAGRINED RAKHMANINOV THANKED THE FRG
DELEGATE FOR HIS RESPONSE AND, ADDRESSING THE CYPRIOT'S
REMARKS, ASSERTED LAMELY THAT ARTICLE 13 WAS INDEED OF
DIRECT RELEVANCE TO OUR WORK HERE. HE SAID,
NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE FRG AND CYPRIOT COMMENTS HAD
GIVEN THE WORKING GROUP "FOOD FOR THOUGHT."
END
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, JUNE 4
1. CDE VI - 069.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP B MEETING ON
NOTIFICATION WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF
NOTIFICATION OF "MOVEMENTS" AS OPPOSED TO "MANEUVERS".
FOLLOWING A U.S. INTERVENTION ARGUING THE ADVANTAGES OF
THE WEST'S OUT-OF-GARRISION (OOG) CONCEPT, SOVIET REP
ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING THE HELSINKI DISTINCTION
BY ARGUING THAT MOVEMENTS, SUCH AS MOVEMENTS OF RAPID
DEPLOYMENT FORCES, HAVE A SPECIAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
AND ARE A SIGNAL OF DANGER. SOVIET REP ALSO AGAIN
REJECTED THE WEST'S OOG CONCEPT. (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 4
BELOW). OTHER EASTERN AND WESTERN INTERVENTIONS WERE
ROUTINE. (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 5 BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. U.S. REP (HANSEN) DISTRIBUTED THE RUSSIAN TEXT OF
THE DEFINITION FOR "GARRISON" WHICH U.S. HAD PRESENTED A
WEEK PREVIOUSLY. HE USED THE OCCASION TO NOTE
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF "MANEUVER" VERSUS
"MOVEMENT". HE QUOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEFINITION OF
"MANEUVER" FROM JCS PUB 1 WHICH GAVE THREE DIFFERENT
DEFINITIONS. SOVIET REP ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN "MANEUVER" AND "MOVEMENT",
ARGUING THAT THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS HAS A MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE, IN TERMS OF PURPOSE AND NUMBER OF TROOPS,
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF MANEUVERS. HE ARGUED THAT TROOP
MOVEMENTS WERE MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INCREASING FORCE
CONCENTRATIONS IN SPECIFIC AREAS (AND PRESUMABLY, THOUGH
THE SOVIET REP DID NOT EXPLICITLY ?SAY IT', FOR SPECIFIC
REASONS). HE CLAIMED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN RECENT
YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN A TREND TO USE RAPID DEPLOYMENT
FORCES, WHICH ARE HIGHLY-MOBILE, FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT TO
VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD "TO SOLVE CERTAIN
POLITICAL/MILITARY PROBLEMS". SOVIET REP ARGUED THAT
SUCH MOVEMENTS WERE A "SIGNAL OF DANGER" AND SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO SEPARATE NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND
VERIFICATION. SOVIET REP REJECTED THE WEST'S CONCEPT OF
OOG ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH
NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, UNLESS IT IS
CHANGED TO AN "OUT-OF-BASE" CONCEPT.
5. IN OTHER INTERVENTIONS AND DISCUSSION, HUNGARIAN AND
BULGARIAN REPS GAVE ROUTINE STATEMENTS IN DEFENSE OF
NOTIFYING ALL AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS ABOVE THE PROPOSED
THRESHOLDS. THE ITALIAN REP GAVE A CRITICAL REVIEW OF
THE EASTERN PAPER ON NOTIFICATION OF LAND MANEUVERS,
CALLING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE LOOPHOLE PROVIDED BY
THE EAST'S PROVISION FOR NOTIFICATION OF SOME MANEUVERS
"AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME". U.S. REP (HANSEN)
DIRECTED CRITICAL QUESTIONS AT EASTERN REPS: HOW MANY
MORE EASTERN GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS WOULD BE NOTIFIED
UNDER THE 20,000 THRESHOLD; HOW MANY EASTERN AIR OR
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NAVAL MANEUVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED IN LAST 5 YEARS
UNDER THEIR PROPOSALS? RESPONDING TO THE FIRST
QUESTION, HUNGARIAN REP STATED THAT THE PROPOSED
THRESHOLD FOR AIR FORCE MANEUVERS WAS BASED ON AN
ANALYSIS OF NATO PRACTICES. HE SAID IT WAS FOR NATO
AUTHORITIES TO ANALYZE WTO PRACTICES. THE FRENCH REP
ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS NOW ACCEPTED OBLIGATORY
NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES; SOVIET REP
RESPONDED THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT AGREE TO OBLIGATORY
NOTIFICATION UNTIL THERE WAS AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE,
THAT AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO
NOTIFICATION.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE/NATO CAUCUS, JUNE 4, 1985
REF: A) STUCKHOLM 4136, B) STOCKHOLM 4135,
C) STOCKHOLM 4038, D) STOCKHOLM 3832,
- E) STOCKHOLM 4137
1. CDE VI - 065
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: THE CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE WEST'S POSITION
FOLLOWING EASTERN INTRODUCTION OF ITS THREE NOTIFICATION
PAPERS AND OBSERVATION MODALITIES. MOST FELT THAT NATO
WAS IN A SOUND TACTICAL POSITION EVEN THOUGH THE EAST HAD
TAKEN THE INITIATIVE ON CSBMS. INTEREST IN PRESSING
AHEAD WITH NATO NATIONAL "PROTOTYPE" PAPERS CONTINUED,
WITH THE BRITISH SAYING THEY HOPED TO GIVE THE CAUCUS A
DRAFT NEXT WEEK. AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPEATED
WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS MUST
COVER MEASURES 1 TO 5, AND AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT THE
WHOLE EXERCISE BE CAREFULLY RECONSIDERED. THE CAUCUS
CHASTISED THE FRENCH DEL FOR RAISING PROCEDURAL ISSUES
PREMATURELY. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) REPORTED ON A MAY 22
LUNCH WITH GRINEVSKY, WHO STATED HIS INTEREST FIRST IN
SEEING THE NNA BREAK THE STAGNATION AT THE CONFERENCE BY
CHAIRING "COFFEE GROUPS" AND SECOND IN HAVING THE WEST
RESPOND ON NUF WITH GREATER PRECISION. THE BONN
BRAINSTORMING SESSION WILL BE HELD SEPTEMBER 4-5. END
SUMMARY.
4. WARSAW PACT TACTICS AND IMPLICATIONS: TO INITIATE
THE DISCUSSION, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, EDES (UK), NOTED
THAT THE WEST MAY NOT NOW BE IN AS GOOD A POSITION AS IN
THE LAST ROUND, SINCE THE WARSAW PACT HAS PLAYED ITS HAND
SO WELL OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS. EDES POINTED TO THE
EAST'S THREE NOTIFICATION PAPERS AND THEIR APPARENT
FORTHCOMING POSITIONS ON OBSERVATION MODALITIES (REF A)
AS EXAMPLES. CITRON (FRG), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), MEVIK
(NORWAY), AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC
THAT THE NATO PACKAGE WOULD REMAIN THE FOCUS OF SUBSTAN-
TIVE DEBATE. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE EAST'S "BLUFF" ON
OBSERVATION PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WEST TO
EXPLOIT AND THAT EASTERN TACTICS COULD BE EXPOSED BY
APPLYING THE PARAMETERS OF THEIR OWN NOTIFICATION
MEASURES TO PAST EASTERN EXERCISES. BUWALDA WARNED
AGAINST ACTING HASTILY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET MOVES AND
OPINED THAT THE REAL SOVIET TACTIC MAY BE TO DRIVE WEDGES
IN THE ALLIANCE AND TO PROMPT UNPLANNED AND UNCOORDINATED
SUBSTANTIVE REACTIONS. GASCHIGNARD AGREED, POINTING TO
GRINEVSKY'S REMARKS IN THE MAY 31 PLENARY (REF B) WHICH
APPEARED TO BE DESIGNED TO SEPARATE THE U.S. FROM EUROPE
AND THE U.S. DELEGATION FROM WASHINGTON.
.. AMBASSADOR GOODBY AGREED WITH CITRON AND THE OTHERS
THAT THE WEST'S POSITION IS STILL GOOD AND SUBSTANTIVELY
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NOT DEPENDENT ON THE TABLING OF MORE PAPERS. GOODBY
NOTED THAT ASPECTS OF THE EAST'S POSITION ON OBSERVATION
MIGHT BE POCKETED, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS MUST NOT BE
ALLOWED TO OBTAIN MUCH CREDIT. ESSENTIALLY, THE SOVIETS
WERE ONLY EXPLAINING THEIR OWN SC.4 PROPOSALS, THEN
DEMANDING A REWARD FROM THE WEST IN THE FORM OF NUF. HE
SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN CONSPICUOUSLY DEVOID
OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, AND HAVE
AVOIDED ANY REAL ADVANCES IN NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION
OF LAND ACTIVITIES. GOODBY RECOMMENDED THESE ARGUMENTS
SHOULD BE USED TO EXPOSE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE PLENARY
AND AB MEETINGS. EDES SUMMED UP CAUCUS SENTIMENT BY
RECOMMENDING AGGRESSIVE PROBING OF THE EAST'S NEW
PROPOSALS AND STANDING FIRM ON THE SUBSTANCE OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
6. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS: GASCHIGNARD PROMISED AGAIN TO
CIRCULATE A PAPER NEXT WEEK ON MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION)
WHILE DELWORTH (CANADA) REPORTED GREAT DIFFICULTIES WITH
THE MEASURE 5 (VERIFICATION) PAPER. EDES (UK) STATED
THAT THE MEASURE 3 (NOTIFICATION) PAPER WAS READY TO BE
SENT AROUND, BUT THE MEASURE 1 (INFORMATION) PAPER STILL
HAS UNIQUE PROBLEMS. (COMMENT: WE HAVE URGED UK DEL
PRIVATELY TO DEFER THIS. THEIR INITIAL VIEW IS THAT
THEIR MEASURE 1 PAPER WOULD ONLY ILLUSTRATE A NATO
POSITION ALREADY ON THE TABLE.) EDES, AS CHAIRMAN,
REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT CONSENSUS WOULD BE NEEDED TO
MOVE FORWARD. MEVIK (NORWAY) URGED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN
ON A MEASURE 1 PAPER. CITRUN, LESS SENSITIVE THAN USUAL,
STATED OUTRIGHT THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM IN THE ALLIANCE
ON MEASURE 1. AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPEATED WHAT U.S.
DEPUTY HANSEN HAD SAID AT THE MAY 30 CAUCUS (REF C), THAT
WASHINGTON COULD NOT ENDORSE THE TABLING OF JUST ONE OR
TWO PAPERS BUT ONLY A SET OF PRESENTATIONS COVERING
MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5. MOREOVER, GOODBY ADDED, HE HAD
INCREASING PERSONAL DOUBTS WHETHER SUCH PAPERS ARE A
USEFUL ROAD TO FOLLOW, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE
DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN AS WE EXAMINE HOW TO
PRESENT SOME ASPECTS OF THE NATO PACKAGE IN ILLUSTRATIVE
PAPERS. GOODBY CONCLUDED THAT MORE EXTENSIVE THINKING
WOULD BE NEEDED ON THE PACKAGE. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL)
SECONDED GOODBY'S REMARKS. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE
ISSUE WAS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK.
7. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS: MEVIK (NORWAY), WHO TWICE HAD
REQUESTED CAUCUS CONSIDERATION OF FRENCH VIEWS EXPRESSED
AT THE MAY 24 PLENARY (REF D) ON WORKING PROCEDURES AND
ADJOURNMENT DATES, NOTED HIS INTEREST IN SECURING
HARMONIZATION OF ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON THE TWO SUBJECTS.
WITH RESPECT TO ADJOURNMENT DATES, MEVIK STATED THAT THE
TRADEMARK OF THE CSCE PROCESS HAS BEEN TO MISS TARGET
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DATES. THEREFORE, A MID-1986 DATE AS SUGGESTED BY FRANCE
COULD BECOME A SOURCE FOR RECRIMINATIONS WITHIN THE
CONFERENCE AND BY THE MEDIA, UNDERSCORING DIVISIONS IN
THE ALLIANCE. THE REAL DEADLINE, HE SAID, WAS NOVEMBER
It, WHEN VIENNA BEGINS. MOREOVER, THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION
OF DATES IS PREMATURE, SINCE THE 1986 CALENDAR OF WORK
WILL BE BASED ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS MADE IN 1985,
WHICH, IN TURN, WILL DETERMINE A LIKELY TARGET DATE.
WITH RESPECT TO WORKING PROCEDURES, MEVIK ALSO FELT
DISCUSSION WAS PREMATURE. NONETHELESS, HE BELIEVED
INFORMAL GROUPS COULD START MEETING IN THE NEXT ROUND,
BEGINNING WITH ONE OR EVEN FIVE GROUPS WITH NEUTRAL
COORDINATORS. DELWORTH (CANADA) ENDORSED MEVIK'S REMARKS
AND ADDED THAT TACTICALLY IT IS NOT HELPFUL TO ANNOUNCE
BEFOREHAND WHAT KIND OF INFORMAL WORKING GROUP STRUCTURE
IS DESIRED, PARTICULARLY IF ENOUGH SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS
HAS NOT BEEN MADE TO JUSTIFY NEW WORKING PROCEDURES.
SIMILARLY, HE NOTED, IF A SPECIFIC TARGET DATE IS DESIRED
OR EVEN SET, IT COULD CREATE NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS.
DELWORTH STATED THAT OTTAWA FEELS STRONGLY AS A MATTER
OF PRINCIPLE THAT NO DEADLINE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED;
RATHER, THE KEY IS TO GET RESULTS EVEN IF THAT MEANT
CONTINUING INTO OCTOBER OF 1986. CITRON (FRG) SUPPORTED
MEVIK AND DELWORTH WITH REGARD TO ADJOURNMENT DATES, BUT
PROPOSED CONSIDERING THE RETENTION OF THE PRESENT WORKING
GROUP STRUCTURE TO THE END OF THE NEXT ROUND, MEETING
INFORMALLY WITH COORDINATORS IN THE FALL IF PROGRESS HAS
BEEN ACHIEVED. CITRON ALSO ENDORSED IDEAS RAISED BY
LOIBL (AUSTRIA) IN THE JUNE 3 AB MEETING (REF E) THAT
INFORMAL GROUPS COULD CONCENTRATE ON AGREED UPON SUBJECTS
FOR SEVERAL SESSIONS.
8. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS (II): BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS)
JOINED HIS BRETHREN IN CRITICIZING THE UNILATERAL FRENCH
PLENARY STATEMENT ON WORKING PROCEDURES AND ADJOURNMENT
DATES, NOTING THAT JULY WAS UNREALISTIC, WHILE SEPTEMBER/
OCTOBER WOULD BE BETTER FOR ADJOURNING. CUTILEIRO
(PORTUGAL) CONDEMNED THE WHOLE DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES,
WHEREAS CIARRAPICO,(ITALY) STATED A FIRM PREFERENCE FOR
JUST TWO INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS. STANDAERT (BELGIUM),
AGREEING WITH BUWALDA, OPINED THAT THE SWEDES AND FINNS
ARE INTERESTED IN COORDINATOR ROLES. GASCHIGNARD
(FRANCE) ROUNDED OUT DEBATE BY FUNDAMENTALLY DISAGREEING
WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. HE NOTED THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUP
IDEA HAS BEEN IN THE AIR FOR A LONG TIME; IT WAS NOT
PREMATURE TO DISCUSS WORKING PROCEDURES, SINCE THE
DECEMBER AGREEMENT ON WORKING GROUPS CALLS FOR A REVIEW
OF STRUCTURE AT THE END OF THIS SESSION. ON ADJOURNMENT,
THOUGH HE USED "SUMMER" IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT AND
"JULY" IN CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS LAST ROUND, GASCHIGNARD
NOTED "SUMMER" LASTS UNTIL LATE SEPTEMBER. THE FRENCH
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IDEA IS TO STOP CDE BEFORE THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE
FOR VIENNA GETS UNDERWAY. THE SOVIETS, HE NOTED, WANT
TO UNBALANCE THE CSCE PROCESS AND CONTINUE CDE THROUGH
VIENNA. THEIR AIM IS TO PUSH THE SECURITY BASKET BY
MOVING TO STAGE 2 AT VIENNA AND THEREBY ACCORD SECURITY
MORE IMPORTANCE THAN IT DESERVES. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
DAY, EDES (UK), WARNED THAT FURTHER THINKING AND REVIEW
IS NEEDED VERY SOON ON THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN
ALLIED COHESION AND AVOID PRESENTING DIFFERING NATIONAL
POSITIONS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO REFRAIN FROM
DISCUSSION OUTSIDE THE CAUCUS ON THESE TWO SUBJECTS UNTIL
AN ALLIANCE POSITION IS AGREED UPON.
9. CONTACTS: STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTED ON THE
QUAKER-SPONSORED CDE SEMINAR HELD MAY 31-JUNE 2, WHICH
BROUGHT TOGETHER CDE AMBASSADORS AND REPRESENTATIVES WITH
ACADEMICS. STANDAERT NOTED THE REMARKS MADE BY SOVIET
ACADEMIC, MIHAIL GUERASSEV, FROM THE INSTITUTE ON USA
AND CANADA IN MOSCOW, WERE EXTREMELY POLEMICAL,
UNBALANCED, AND ULTIMATELY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. GUERASSEV,
STANDAERT SAID, CRUDELY BLAMED THE U.S. FOR UNILATERALLY
SPURRING THE ARMS RACE, WHILE HE CREDITED THE USSR WITH
WORKING ASSIDUOUSLY FOR PEACE. STANDAERT FELT THE NNA
WERE ESPECIALLY DISDAINFUL OF THE SOVIET'S PRESENTATION.
JONATHAN ALFORD OF THE LONDON IISS MADE AN INTERESTING
CONTRIBUTION; ALFORD'S MESSAGE WAS CLEAR -- NATO'S
OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE SIMPLE AND LIMITED, SEEKING THE
MINIMUM NEEDED TO BUILD CONFIDENCE RATHER THAN THE
MAXIMUM, WHICH HE ASCRIBES TO THE CURRENT NATO APPROACH.
STANDAERT CONCLUDED THAT THE ACCENT OF DISCUSSION WAS ON
NUF AND CONCRETE CSBM'S. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) REPORTED ON
A MAY 22 LUNCH WITH GRINEVSKY WHICH THE LATTER INITIATED.
(COMMENT: CIARRAPICO HAD BEEN IN ROME FOR NEARLY A WEEK
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH GRINEVSKY. END COMMENT.)
GRINEVSKY SAW NO REAL PROGRESS COMING AND SAID HE WAS
WAITING FOR THE NNA, ACTING AS MEDIATORS IN "COFFEE
GROUPS," TO MOVE THE CONFERENCE OUT OF WHAT HE CALLED
"ITS PRESENT STAGNATION." CIARRAPICO ADDED THAT
GRINEVSKY BELIEVED GROWING DIFFICULTIES IN GENEVA WOULD
CREATE POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS WHICH AN
AGREEMENT AT CDE COULD AMELIORATE BY IMPROVING THE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL CLIMATE. GRINEVSKY NOTED THAT THE
WEST HAD TO BE FORTHCOMING IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST'S
DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD WILL WITH ITS THREE NOTIFICATION
PROPOSALS. MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO CIARRAPICO, GRINEVSKY
TOLD HIM THAT A SIMPLE REAFFIRMATION OF NUF USING UN
CHARTER AND HELSINKI LANGUAGE WAS INADEQUATE TO SATISFY
SOVIET DEMANDS ON THE ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, GRINEVSKY
SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST COULD DEVELOP LANGUAGE ON A
COMMITMENT NOT TO USE WEAPONS OF ANY KIND, EXCEPT IN
SELF-DEFENSE, AS A MORE DETAILED EXPRESSION OF THE NUF
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PRINCIPLE.
10. OTHER BUSINESS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY FOLLOWED UP ON
CITRON'S (FRG) MENTIONING OF THE IDEA RAISED BY LOIBL
(AUSTRIA) (REF E) TO IDENTIFY IN ADVANCE THE TOPICS TO
BE ADDRESSED IN WORKING GROUPS. GOODBY NOTED THIS
APPROACH SHOULD BE GIVEN CLOSE ATTENTION. CITRON
AFFIRMED THAT THE BONN BRAINSTORMING SESSION WOULD BE
HELD SEPTEMBER 4-5 AND BE FOLLOWED BY THE NAC CONSULTA-
TION IN BRUSSELS ON SEPTEMBER 6. EDES (UK) SUGGESTED
THAT FUTURE BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS MAY BE MORE PRODUCTIVE
IF HELD AT THE END OF A ROUND RATHER THAN AT THE END OF
AN INTERSESSION PERIOD.
11. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY SET THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING
FOR THURSDAY, JUNE 6, WITH THE U.S. CHAIRING.
END
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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A, JUNE 6, 1985
1. CDE VI - 084
2. C - ENTIRE CONTENT
3. SUMMARY: THE NETHERLANDS REP REJECTED AN EARLIER
SOVIET STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO GEOGRAPHIC ASYMMETRY
BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT AND THEN CRITICALLY
ADDRESSED THE ROMANIAN "GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS" MEASURE
AND THE NNA MEASURE LIMITING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. THE
GDR ASKED POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE U.S. AND NATO POSI-
TION ON CONSTRAINTS. HUNGARY NOTED THAT FOUR OF THE FIVE
FORMAL CONFERENCE PROPOSALS SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF CON-
STRAINTS. AUSTRIA AND SWEDEN WELCOMED THE DISCUSSION OF
CONSTRAINTS, BUT NOTED THAT THE ISSUES WERE DELICATE,
DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX. ACCUSING NATO OF HAVING AN OFFEN-
SIVE DOCTRINE WHILE CLAIMING THAT SOVIET MILITARY
DOCTRINE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE, THE USSR CONCLUDED THAT IT
IS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.
4. VAN DER GRAAF (NETHERLANDS) CHALLENGED TATARNIKOV'S
PREVIOUS ASSERTION THAT THERE WERE NO ASYMMETRIES,
GEOGRAPHIC OR OTHERWISE, BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW
PACT. IN RESPONSE TO YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN COMPLAINTS
LAST WEEK THAT THE WEST HAD FAILED TO ADDRESS THE
CONSTRAINTS IN SC.2 AND SC.3, THE DUTCH MILREP SAID THAT
THE ROMANIAN "GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS" MEASURE DID NOT
APPLY EQUALLY TO THE TWO ALLIANCES. HE POINTED OUT THAT
SOVIET TACTICAL THINKING. IS DOMINATED BY SURPRISE AND
RAPID ATTACK WHEREAS NATO TACTICS ARE BASED ON "FORWARD
DEFENSE." THEREFORE, THE GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINT PROPOSED
IN SC.2 IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD PRECLUDE THE USE
OF NATO TERRITORY IN THE CENTRAL REGION FOR EXERCISES AND
WOULD UNDERMINE THE TACTIC OF "FORWARD DEFENSE." VAN DER
GRAAF REJECTED CONSTRAINTS ON TROOPS AS WELL AS AREAS FOR
THE CONDUCT OF SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AS SUGGESTED BY THE
NNA'S IN SC.3 FOR THE SAME REASON. IN ADDITION, HE SAID,
IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DESIGNATE CERTAIN MILITARY
EQUIPMENT AS PURELY OFFENSIVE, SINCE IN MANY CASES IT
ALSO IS VITAL FOR DEFENSE. MOREOVER, A CONSTRAINT
MEASURE ON OFFENSIVE EQUIPMENT WOULD REQUIRE FAR MORE
INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION MEANS THAN HAS UP TO NOW BEEN
SUGGESTED.
5. GRACZYNSKI (GDR) ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
- HOW CAN THE U.S. SUGGEST THAT CONSTRAINTS DO
- NOT CORRESPOND TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
- MANDATE?
- WHY DOES THE ALLIANCE NOT SUGGEST PARAMETERS OF
- ITS OWN?
- HAS THE U.S. GIVEN UP ON FINDING A SATISFACTORY
- CONSTRAINT?
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6. KOVACS (HUNGARY) PUSHED FOR A LIMIT ON THE SCALE OF
A MILITARY ACTIVITY, ARGUING THAT THE GREATER THE SCALE
OF A MANEUVER, THE LOWER THE LIKELIHOOD OF DETERMINING
ITS REAL INTENT OR PURPOSE. SINCE FOUR OF FIVE
PROPOSALS SUPPORT A CONSTRAINT WHICH COULD REDUCE THE
LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE, A CEILING OF 40,000
TROOPS, INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR FORCES, TAKES ON
INCREASED SIGNIFICANCE, HE CONCLUDED.
7. LIKO (AUSTRIA), PLEASED THAT ALL CONSTRAINT
PROPOSALS ARE BEING ADDRESSED, ACKNOWLEDGED,
NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE CONSTRAINT ISSUE IS NOT ONLY
DELICATE, BUT DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX. HE DESCRIBED VAN
DER GRAAF AS TAKING A "DEVIL'S ADVOCATE" APPROACH TO
CONSTRAINTS. THE SWEDISH REP ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH
GENERAL LIKO'S REMARKS, WELCOMING THE DIALOGUE ON
CONSTRAINTS AND THANKING THE DUTCH REP FOR ADDRESSING
SC.2 AND SC.3 MEASURES.
8. TATARNIKOV (USSR), "UNCONVINCED" BY VAN DER GRAAF'S
ARGUMENTS, STATED THAT THE WARSAW PACT ALSO IS REQUIRED
TO ASSUME A DEFENSIVE POSTURE ALONG THE SAME BORDERS AND
ARGUED THAT NATO HAS ADVANTAGES IN HUMAN AND ECONOMIC
RESOURCES. IN ADDITION, HE NOTED, THE WARSAW PACT IS
SURROUNDED BY MILITARY BASES. THE SOVIET GENERAL
REFERRED TO GENERAL ROGERS' FOLLOW-ON FORCES ATTACK
(FOFA) CONCEPT AS AN OFFENSIVE CONCEPT REQUIRING "DEFENSE
IN THE DEEP HINTERLAND OF COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT."
TATARNIKOV CLAIMED THAT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS
PURELY DEFENSIVE BUT, IF THE SOVIET UNION IS SUBJECT TO
ATTACK, SOVIET DOCTRINE DICTATES THAT SOVIET REACTION BE
SWIFT AND DECISIVE. HE CONCLUDED, THEREFORE, THAT IT WAS
IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES.
10. POUDADE (FRANCE) CRITICIZED THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS
ON CONSTRAINTS, POINTING OUT THAT THE CDE IS NOT AN
ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE CONFERENCE. FURTHERMORE, HE ASKED
RHETORICALLY, IF WE ARE TO TREAT IT AS SUCH, WHY
CONTINUE WITH THE CSCE PROCESS?
END
25X1
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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, JUNE 6
1. CDE VI - 89.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP B MEETING ON
OBSERVATION WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY IRISH STATEMENT WHICH
DISCUSSED THE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO ALLOW OBSERVERS TO
JUDGE WHETHER AN ACTIVITY WAS CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE NOTIFICATION, AND INDICATED THE NEED FOR
OBSERVERS TO VIEW THE ACTIVITY FROM BEGINNING TO END
(SUMMARIZED IN PARA 4 BELOW). POLISH REP ARGUED THAT
OBSERVERS NEED ONLY BE INVITED TO OBSERVE THE "MAIN
EPISODES" OF AN ACTIVITY (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 5 BELOW).
THE FRG CRITICIZED THE INADEQUATE CZECH NOTIFICATION OF
DRUZHBA 85 AND PARTICULARLY THE LACK OF INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS, AND CALLED FOR THE MANDATORY INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS. DENMARK NOTED THE DIFFERENT TRAINING
PATTERNS OF NATO AND THE WTO AS REGARDS AIR AND NAVAL
FORCES, AND QUESTIONED THE FEASIBILITY OF OBSERVING
LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS SUCH AS ARE CONDUCTED BY NATO.
THE U.S. QUESTIONED APPARENT EASTERN "FORTHCOMINGNESS"
REGARDING THE OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES,
GIVEN EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THE MORE LIMITED MEASURES OF
SC.1 AMOUNT TO ESPIONAGE. THE SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT
OBSERVATION OF SUCH MANEUVERS WAS FEASIBLE WITHOUT BEING
INTRUSIVE (U.S. AND SOVIET REMARKS ARE SUMMARIZED IN
PARA 6 BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. IRISH REP MADE ANOTHER HELPFUL AND COMPREHENSIVE
INTERVENTION ON OBSERVATION, DECLARING THERE WAS NO
REASON WHY DISCUSSION OF THE CONDITIONS OF WHAT
ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, THAT OBSERVATION SHOULD
BE MANDATORY FOR ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, AND THAT
INVITATIONS SHOULD BE ISSUED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES
WITHOUT EXCEPTION. IRISH REP NOTED THAT CERTAIN
INFORMATION MUST BE. AVAILABLE TO OBSERVERS IN SUFFICIENT
TIME TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR THE OBSERVATION
ACTIVITY. SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD, AT A MINIMUM,
INCLUDE: THE STRUCTURE OF THE FORCES PARTICIPATING IN
THE ACTIVITY; WHETHER OR NOT AIR/NAVAL SUPPORT IS
INVOLVED; THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY; WHETHER OR NOT
AMMUNITION IS CARRIED; LOCATION OF THE ACTIVITY; AND
TIMEFRAME. HE AGREED THAT THERE ARE TWO TASKS FOR
OBSERVERS: TO CONFIRM THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE
NOTIFICATION, AND TO ENSURE THEMSELVES OF THE
NON-THREATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY. SINCE THERE IS
NO EASY WAY TO CONFIRM THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF FORCES
PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY, OBSERVERS SHOULD BE
PERMITTED TO SEE THE ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS IN ASSEMBLY
AREAS, RECEIVE BRIEFINGS BY SENIOR OFFICIERS, AND VISIT
MAJOR FIRE-SUPPORT ELEMENTS INVOLVED, IN ORDER TO GAIN A
REASONABLY ACCURATE VIEW OF THE ACTIVITY. IRISH REP
EMPHASIZED THAT TO MEET THESE TWO TASKS, OBSERVERS
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SHOULD SEE THE ACTIVITY FROM BEGINNING TO END AND SHOULD
LIVE IN FIELD CONDITIONS IN ORDER TO OBSERVE THE
ACTIVITY 24 HOURS A DAY.
5. POLISH REP ATTEMPTED TO ANSWER A PREVIOUS SWISS
QUESTION REGARDING THE CRITERIA.OBSERVERS SHOULD USE FOR
DETERMINING THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF AN ACTIVITY.
THE POLISH REP SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT OF NOTIFICATION
AND THE FACT OF THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WOULD BE TWO
IMMEDIATE INDICATORS OF PEACEFUL INTENT. BEYOND THAT,
IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR OBSERVERS TO BE PERMITTED TO
SEE THE "MAIN EPISODES" OF AN ACTIVITY, AS DETERMINED BY
THE HOST STATE. HE SAID THAT THE IDEA THAT OBSERVERS
SHOULD BE PRESENT FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF AN
ACTIVITY REQUIRED FURTHER CLARIFICATION. HE NOTED, FOR
EXAMPLE, THAT SOMETIMES THE TRANSFER OR MOVEMENT OF
TROOPS FROM OUTSIDE TO THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE OFFICIAL TIMEFRAME OF THE MANEUVER
(COMMENT: HE IMPLYED THAT SUCH PRIOR TRANSFER OF TROOPS
MUST ALSO BE OBSERVED. END COMMENT) HE CONCLUDED THAT
WHILE THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES, THERE
WAS CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF OBSERVATION
AND CALLED FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF OBSERVATION AND
AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. SWISS REP DISAGREED WITH THE
POLISH POSITION, ARGUING THAT NOT ANY TYPE NOTIFICATION
WOULD GIVE ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL INTENT, BUT ONLY A
NOTIFICATION WHICH WAS SUBSTANTIVE IN CONTENT. HE DID
NOT DISAGREE WITH THE POLISH VIEW THAT "MAIN EPISODES"
OF AN ACTIVITY SHOULD BE OBSERVED, BUT ARGUED THAT THIS
DEPENDED ON THE DEFINITION OF "MAIN EPISODES" AND, IN
ANY CASE, COULD NOT AMOUNT TO MERELY PRE-ARRANGED
DEMONSTRATIONS.
6. U.S. REP (GEN. BLANK) EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE
"FORTHCOMINGNESS" OF THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS REGARDING
OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, PARTICULARLY IN
LIGHT OF EASTERN CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE SC.1 MEASURES
AS AMOUNTING TO ESPIONAGE. HE NOTED THAT THE EAST WAS
SUGGESTING THAT OBSERVERS BE PERMITTED TO VISIT AIR
BASES AND CONTROL CENTERS, AND ASKED WHY THE EAST WAS AT
THE SAME TIME UNWILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE
LOCATION OF AIR BASES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE GDR SHOULD
FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF SWEDEN WITH THE VASTGRANS
EXERCISE, AND INVITE THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS TO
OBSERVE AN AIR MANEUVER. THE SOVIET REP, IN RESPONSE,
SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST "SHOULD NOT LOOK A GIFT HORSE IN
THE MOUTH." HE CLARIFIED THAT THE EAST WAS NOT
SUGGESTING OBSERVERS AT COMMAND POSTS OR UNDERGROUND
BUNKERS OR OTHER VITAL NERVE CENTERS. RATHER, THEY
SHOULD BE PERMITTED AT MILITARY BASES, THE TOWNS WHERE
THE BASES ARE LOCATED, AND AT RADAR STATIONS WHERE THEY
COULD FOLLOW THE ACTIVITY ON DISPLAY SCREENS. REGARDING
LARGE-SCALE NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE SOVIET REP AGREED THAT
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OBSERVERS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO VIEW THE ENTIRE ACTIVITY.
BUT, HE ARGUED, OBSERVERS COULD COVER THE ENTIRE AREA OF
A NAVAL MANEUVER IF, FOR EXAMPLE, A SHIP WERE ALLOCATED
TO THEM FOR THAT PURPOSE AND THAT SHIP WERE PART OF THE
MILITARY FORMATION. WHILE OBSERVERS COULD NOT SEE
EVERYTHING THAT WENT ON, THEY COULD SEE ENOUGH TO REACH
JUDGMENT AS TO THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF THE
ACTIVITY, JUST AS IN THE EXAMPLE OF VASTGRANS, WHERE IT
WAS EVIDENT THAT OBSERVERS COULD NOT SEE EVERYTHING THAT
WENT ON IN THE GROUND FORCE MANEUVER.
END
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SUBJECT: CDE - NATO CAUCUS OF JUNE 6, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 4198, B) STOCKHOLM 4038
1. CDE VI - 073
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: FRANCE DISTRIBUTED ITS MEASURE 4
(OBSERVATION) PROTOTYPE PAPER AND EXPRESSED A STRONG'
DESIRE TO TABLE IT NEXT WEEK. THE U.S. AND NETHERLANDS
REASSERTED THAT THEY COULD NOT ENDORSE THE TABLING OF
JUST ONE OR TWO PAPERS, BUT ONLY A SET OF PRESENTATIONS
COVERING MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5, AND ONLY IF THE CAUCUS
REACHES AN UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO TABLE THEM.
U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN PROVIDED A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF
THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS AND RECOMMENDED DEVELOP-
ING A SYNOPTIC COMPARISON OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
LANGUAGE, MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND THE EASTERN
PROPOSALS. THE CAUCUS' INITIAL REACTION SEEMED FAVORABLE
TO USING SUCH COMPARISONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH APPLYING
THE EAST'S OBSERVATION MODALITIES TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVI-
TIES IN ORDER TO EXPOSE THE EAST'S POSITION AND TO
REFOCUS CONFERENCE ATTENTION ON THE NATO PACKAGE.
HOWEVER, SOME DELEGATIONS REQUESTED TIME TO CONSIDER THIS
APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS: GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE)
DISTRIBUTED THE FRENCH MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION) PROTOTYPE
PAPER (IN FRENCH) AND EXPRESSED A STRONG DESIRE TO TABLE
IT AT THE JUNE 13 WORKING GROUP B MEETING AS A NATIONAL
PRESENTATION (TEXT SENT SEPARATELY). BUWALDA
(NETHERLANDS) LAID DOWN A FIRM REMINDER THAT BOTH THE
U.S. AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID (REFS A
AND B) THAT THEY COULD NOT ENDORSE THE TABLING OF JUST
ONE OR TWO PAPERS BUT ONLY A SET OF PRESENTATIONS
COVERING MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5 AND ONLY IF THE CAUCUS
REACHES AN UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO TABLE THEM. BUWALDA
URGED THAT THE FRENCH PAPER BE GIVEN TO THE MILITARY
ADVISERS' GROUP FOR EXPEDITIOUS REVIEW AND SUBSEQUENTLY
BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE CAUCUS FOR CONSIDERATION. EDES
(UK) NOTED THAT MILREP WORK ON THE THREE EASTERN
NOTIFICATION PAPERS WOULD RETAIN PRIORITY ATTENTION.
(COMMENT: GASCHIGNARD GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE
AGREED ONLY RELUCTANTLY TO THE PROPOSED HANDLING OF THE
FRENCH MEASURE 4 PAPER. HE WAS NONCOMMITTAL ON U.S. AND
DUTCH VIEWS CONCERNING THE NEED TO HAVE PAPERS READY ON
MEASURES 1 TO 5 OF SC.1,AMPLIFIED BEFORE TABLING ANY
ADDITIONAL PROTOTYPE PAPERS. END COMMENT.)
5. WARSAW PACT TACTICS: U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN OFFERED
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS OF THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION
PAPERS. WITH RESPECT TO THE EASTERN GROUND NOTIFICATION
PAPERS, HE NOTED THAT IT REPEATS ALMOST VERBATIM LANGUAGE
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FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND DIFFERS ONLY IN THE
THRESHOLD LEVEL (20,000 MEN) AND THE NOTIFICATION PERIOD
(30 DAYS). THE AIR NOTIFICATION PAPER CONTAINS
PARAMETERS (200 PLANES) THAT EVEN TATARNIKOV (USSR)
AFFIRMED PRIVATELY WOULD ALMOST NEVER APPLY TO WARSAW
PACT MANEUVERS. ON NAVAL NOTIFICATIONS, THE AIR/NAVAL
THRESHOLD (100 PLANES, 30 SHIPS) IS PRACTICALLY NEVER
MET BY THE EAST, ALTHOUGH'TATARNIKOV CLAIMED A WARSAW
PACT EXERCISE WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED LAST APRIL.
HANSEN ARGUED THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE TO COMPEL THE
WEST TO DISCUSS THEIR SUBJECTS BY ARGUING THAT THE EAST
CLAIMS IT HAS NOW FULFILLED ITS PART OF THE BARGAIN AS
SUGGESTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DUBLIN AND STRASBOURG.
MOREOVER, HANSEN STATED, THE EAST IS ATTEMPTING TO
ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF A STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF
EUROPE, WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF EXTENDING THE ZONE,
RATHER THAN ACCEPT THE MANDATE'S GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITION.
HE NOTED THE NEED TO EXPOSE SOVIET MOTIVES AS WELL AS
THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS.
ONE WAY, HE SUGGESTED, MIGHT BE TO PREPARE A COMPARATIVE
MATRIX WITH COLUMNS SHOWING FINAL ACT LANGUAGE, MEASURE
3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND LANGUAGE FROM THE EASTERN GROUND
NOTIFICATION MEASURE. THE SAME MIGHT BE DONE WITH THE
EASTERN AIR AND NAVAL PAPERS. IN ADDITION, HE CONCLUDED,
A COMPARATIVE MATRIX COULD BE MADE SHOWING INFORMATION
EXCHANGED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, MEASURE 1 OF
SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND THE THREE EASTERN PROPOSALS.
6. WARSAW PACT TACTICS (II): EDES (UK), ANSTIS
(CANADA), AND CITRON (FRG) ENDORSED BOTH HANSEN'S
ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED TACTICAL RESPONSE TO THE EAST.
CITRON NOTED THAT SYNOPTICAL PAPERS MAY ONLY BE ONE
ASPECT OF DEALING WITH THE EASTERN PAPERS; POINTS COULD
ALSO BE MADE THROUGH INTERVENTIONS IN WORKING GROUPS AS
WELL, HE SAID. HANSEN AGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT THE
EAST HAS DISCUSSED INTRUSIVE OBSERVATION MODALITIES WITH
IMPUNITY IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUPS BECAUSE THEY
KNOW THEIR NOTIFICATION MEASURES WOULD NEVER APPLY TO
THEM. THE WEST, HE RECOMMENDED, NEEDS TO DEVELOP A WAY
TO EXTEND THE INTRUSIVE MODALITIES, SUGGESTED BY THE
EAST FOR AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, TO OBSERVATION OF
GROUND ACTIVITIES. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) WARNED AGAINST
FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF APPEARING RECEPTIVE TO THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION
MEASURES OR IMPLYING THAT THE WEST IS WILLING TO
AMALGAMATE MEASURES 1 AND 3 OF THE NATO PACKAGE. HE AND
OTHERS SUGGESTED TAKING TIME TO CONSIDER THE IDEAS
RAISED. EDES CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT TATARNIKOV
MENTIONED A FUTURE EASTERN PAPER ON TRANSITS. EDES
WONDERED WHETHER ANY NATO PREPLANNING COULD BE DONE.
SEVERAL DELEGATIONS RECOMMENDED THAT THE U.S. TAKE THE
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LEAD, WHILE CITRON AND HANSEN REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT A
U.S. PROBLEM, BUT AN ALLIANCE ONE.
7. CONTACTS: CITRON (FRG), EDES (UK), AND GASCHIGNARD
(FRANCE) REPORTED ON MEETINGS WITH BUHRING (GDR), WHO
FELT IT WAS PREMATURE TO CONSIDER CHANGING THE WORKING
GROUP STRUCTURE. BURRING NOTED THAT HE WAS ALSO OPPOSED
TO ACCEPTING THE DECEMBER AGREEMENT WHICH ESTABLISHED
WORKING GROUPS AND NOTED THE ISSUE WAS DECIDED OVER HIS
HEAD, I.E., BY GRINEVSKY. THE U.S. DEPUTY REPORTED THAT
BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) FEELS THE "MINIMUM" HE COULD ACCEPT
ON CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE AN OBLIGATION TO DISCUSS THEM
AFTER VIENNA.
8. OTHER BUSINESS: CITRON (FRG), REFERRING TO THE WORK
UNDERWAY IN THE COMBINED MILITARY ADVISERS/DEPUTIES
GROUPS ON ANOMALIES IN THE NATO PACKAGE, RECOMMENDED
THAT ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF ITEMS (TWO OR THREE) BE
SENT TO BRUSSELS FOR RESOLUTION; THE REST, HE SAID,
COULD BE HANDLED IN STOCKHOLM.
9. THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING WAS SET FOR TUESDAY, JUNE 11.
END
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SUBJECT: TEXT OF FRENCH MEASURE 4 PAPER
1. CDE VI - 088
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE FRENCH ILLUSTRATIVE
PAPER ON MEASURE 4. THE PAPER IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION
BY CDE MILREPS. THE QUESTION OF TABLING WILL BE DIS-
CUSSED IN FUTURE CAUCUSES.
4. BEGIN TEXT.
THE SIXTEEN PARTICIPATING STATES SPONSORING DOCUMENT
SC.1 PROPOSED INTER ALIA THAT ANY PARTICIPATING STATE
CONDUCTING A MILITARY ACTIVITY (HOST STATE) SHOULD BE
REQUIRED TO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM THE OTHER PARTICI-
PATING STATES NOT TAKING PART IN THAT ACTIVITY.
OBSERVATION OF NOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD BE THE
RULE. ALERT ACTIVITIES WOULD BE OBSERVED IF THEY HAD A
DURATION OF MORE THAN 48 HOURS, BUT ONLY 36 HOURS AFTER
THEIR COMMENCEMENT AND PROVIDING, OF COURSE, THAT THEY
SATISFIED THE OTHER CRITERIA (THRESHOLDS, OUT-OF-
GARRISON ACTIVITY).
OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE A STATUS THAT REMAINS TO BE DEFINED
(THE DELEGATION WILL REVERT TO THIS POINT IN DUE COURSE).
THE "HOST" COUNTRY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SUIT-
ABLE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENABLE THE OBSERVERS TO FOLLOW THE
EXECUTION OF THE ACTIVITY AND, THROUGH THE INDICATIONS
PROVIDED BY THE OBSERVATION OF ITS DIFFERENT PHASES,
SATISFY THEMSELVES OF ITS CONFORMITY WITH THE NOTI-
FICATION AND OF ITS NON-THREATENING CHARACTER.
THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT ATTEMPTS TO GIVE A CONCRETE
ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THESE NEW PROV-
ISIONS, WHICH ARE "EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE" AND "DESIGNED
TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY..." IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE ADOPTED AT
MADRID BY THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES.
ILLUSTRATION OF MEASURE 4, "OBSERVATION"
CASE OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL MANOEUVRE "DOUBS 84"
(THE NUMBERING OF THE PARAGRAPHS REFERS TO DOCUMENT
SC.1/AMPLIFIED)
1. NOT APPLICABLE: ONLY FRENCH FORCES PARTICIPATED IN
DOUBS 84.
2. THE OTHER 34 STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE WOULD
HAVE BEEN INVITED TO SEND OBSERVERS.
3. THE DOUBS 84 MANOEUVRE WAS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON 8
SEPTEMBER (START OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON DEPLOYMENT OF
THE TROOPS CONCERNED) AND TO END ON 14 SEPTEMBER
(COMPLETION OF THE RETURN TO GARRISONS). OBSERVATION
WOULD HAVE BEEN ARRANGED THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD.
4. NO ALERT PHASE WAS SCHEDULED.
5. A MAXIMUM OF 68 OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED.
6. (NO DATA AT THIS STAGE)
7. (NO DATA AT THIS STAGE)
8. (NOT APPLICABLE: CF. PARA 1)
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9. THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMMODATED IN THE
MESSES OF GARRISONS LOCATED WITHIN THE PERIMETER OF THE
MANOEUVRE (EPINAL, BESANCON, DIJON...).
1U. THE DISTANCES BETWEEN GARRISON AND MANOEUVRE
PERIMETER DID NOT EXCEED 150 KM.
- THE AREA OF MANOEUVRE MEASURED APPROXIMATELY 150 KM
AT ITS GREATEST EXTENSION.
- TRANSPORTATION WOULD THEREFORE HAVE BEEN BY COACH.
ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN MADE FOR A HELICOPTER
FLIGHT LASTING ROUGHLY ONE HOUR AND AFFORDING A VIEW OF
THE ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT WITHIN THE MANOEUVRE PERIMETER.
THE INITIAL RENDEZVOUS FOR OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN:
- REIMS, FOR HALF THE OBSERVERS, WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN
INVITED TO WITNESS THE EMBARKATION OF THE 10TH ARMOURED
DIVISION TOWARDS THE MANOEUVRE PERIMETER (BY RAIL);
- NANCY, FOR THE OTHER HALF OF THE OBSERVERS, INVITED
TO WITNESS THE DEPARTURE, ALSO BY RAIL, OF THE 4TH
ARMOURED DIVISION.
- (THE 7TH ARMOURED DIVISION, THE THIRD MAJOR
FORMATION PARTICIPATING IN THE MANOEUVRE, WAS ALREADY
STATIONED WITHIN THE MANOEUVRE PERIMETER.)
11. THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE HAD THE USE OF TELEPHONES,
ACCESSIBLE EVERY EVENING (AT THE "DIRECTION-ANIMATION"
COMMAND POST OF THE EXERCISE AND AT THEIR BILLETS).
12. A) I) THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY
ACCOMPANYING OFFICERS WITH SOLE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE
ITINERARIES.
II) THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE HAD THE USE OF
INDIVIDUAL FIELD GLASSES, FRENCH ARMY ISSUE
(MAGNIFICATION 8/50), TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY PERSONAL
EQUIPMENT (OTHER FIELD GLASSES, CAMERAS ...) AND OF ANY
ANNOTATED MAP.
III) A GENERAL BRIEFING ON THE EXERCISE WOULD HAVE
BEEN PROVIDED FOR THE OBSERVERS ON THE MORNING OF 10
SEPTEMBER, THE FIRST DAY OF THE TACTICAL PART OF THE
EXERCISE, AT THE "DIRECTION-ANIMATION" COMMAND POST.
IV) CONTINUITY IN FOLLOWING THE ACTIVITY AND
DIRECT OBSERVATION OF ALL THE FORMATIONS TAKING PART IN
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENSURED AS FOLLOWS:
-ON EACH DAY OF THE TACTICAL PHASE OF THE
EXERCISE (10, 11 AND 12 SEPTEMBER): PRESENTATION OF
TWO SPECIFIC OPERATIONS (FOR EXAMPLE A CROSSING, A
TANK COUNTER-ATTACK, AN ANTI-TANK AMBUSH BY A
COMPANY, AN ARTILLERY BARRAGE, AN AERIAL SUPPORT
ACTION, AN EMPLOYMENT OF LOGISTIC RESOURCES ...) AND,
AT THE END OF THE DAY, A BRIEFING AT THE
"DIRECTION-ANIMATION" COMMAND POST.
- AT MIDDAY ON 10 AND 11 SEPTEMBER, VISIT TO A
REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST (LUNCHEON).
- A HELICOPTER FLIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY ONE
HOUR, TO IDENTIFY THE PRINCIPAL FORMATIONS TAKING
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PART.
(NIGHT OPERATIONS, REDUCED IN ORDER TO LIMIT
INCONVENIENCE TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, WOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN OBSERVED.)
- V) DURING VISITS TO THE "DIRECTION-ANIMATION" OR
REGIMENTAL COMMAND POSTS, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN
FACILITIES FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN OBSERVERS AND
MILITARY PERSONNEL TAKING PART IN THE MANOEUVRE.
B) I) DURING THE "LAUNCHING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS"
PHASE OF THE EXERCISE (8 AND 9 SEPTEMBER), THE TWO
GROUPS OF OBSERVERS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 10 WOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE
EMBARKATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE TWO DIVISIONS
STATIONED ROUND REIMS AND NANCY (4 TO 5 RAILWAY
STATIONS PER DIVISION) AND TO BE PRESENT AT THE
VARIOUS PRESS CONFERENCES AND OTHER PUBLIC RELATIONS
ACTIVITIES.
THEY WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN CONVEYED TO THE
MANOEUVRE ZONE BY COACH OR RAIL. COMPARABLE
FACILITIES WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR THEM ON 13
AND 14 SEPTEMBER, DURING THE PHASE INVOLVING THE
RETURN TO GARRISON OF THE FORMATIONS CONCERNED. THE
OBSERVATION WOULD HAVE ENDED WITH THE DISEMBARKATION
OF THOSE FORMATIONS AT THE RAILWAY STATIONS NEAREST
THEIR GARRISONS.
- II)
- III) NOT APPLICABLE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE CONCERNED
- IV)
THESE PROVISIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED
ARE DISTINCTLY MORE FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE WHICH WERE
IN FACT APPLIED ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS.
THE OBSERVERS INVITED - DRAWN IN FACT NOT FROM ALL
THE 35 COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE CDE BUT ONLY
FROM A PORTION OF THEM - DID NOT HAVE THE ADVANTAGE
OF A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF THE MANOEUVRES AND WERE
TRANSPORTED DIRECTLY FROM PARIS, WITH A CORRESPONDING
REDUCTION IN THE DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION ON THE
DAY THAT HAD BEEN SET ASIDE FOR THEM.
WE WISH TO STRESS THROUGH THIS EXAMPLE HOW MUCH
OBSERVATION WOULD GAIN BY COMPARISON WITH THE
EXISTING "DE FACTO" PRACTICE. END TEXT.
19$
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SUBJECT: FRENCH MOTIVATIONS FOR NEW CDE PAPER
REF: STOCKHOLM 03317
1. CDE VI - 81.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: FRENCH DELEGATION MEMBERS POUDADE (DEPUTY
HEAD) AND SMESSOW DISCUSSED FRENCH PAPER PRESENTED TO
SELECTED DELEGATIONS AT NATO AND IN STOCKHOLM WITH US
DEPUTY HANSEN. THEY ASSERTED THAT THE 16 MUST DEVELOP A
CONSTRAINTS MEASURE TO SATISFY THE TACTICAL NEED IN THE
CDE; OTHERWISE, THE NNA WOULD TEAM WITH THE EAST TO
SUPPORT A MEASURE TO LIMIT NATO EXERCISES IN SOME
MANNER. FRENCH APPEAR LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT
INVITING OBSERVERS TO ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES AND SEEM
MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN OTHER ALLIES ON WHAT OBSERVERS
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO. FRENCH ALSO SEE MERIT IN
REPACKAGING SC-1/AMPLIFIED BY ASSIGNING THE SUBSTANCE OF
MEASURE 1 TO MEASURES 2 AND 3, BUT VOICED THE VIEW THAT
THIS MIGHT BE BETTER LEFT TO THE END GAME. END SUMMARY
4. POUDADE EXPLAINED THAT PARIS HAS SUBMITTED ITS IDEAS
ON A DYNAMIC READING OF THE PACKAGE TO THE FRG, U.K.,
AND U.S. BOTH IN BRUSSELS AND IN STOCKHOLM IN ORDER TO
ASCERTAIN THE VIEWS OF THE THREE ON THE ADVISABILITY OF
"TUNING THE PACKAGE" FOR CDE. THESE VIEWS WILL
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE PAPER WILL BE PRESENTED TO
THE 16 IN BRUSSELS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT
WEDDED TO THE IDEAS EXPLAINED IN THEIR PAPER AND
SUGGESTED THAT THE PAPER MIGHT BE FURTHER COMBINED WITH
BRITISH IDEAS (REFTEL).
5. PARIS BELIEVES THAT, IN LIGHT OF THEIR PERCEPTION OF
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IT WOULD BE WISE
TO CONSIDER ABANDONING MEASURE 1 (INFORMATION) AS A
SEPARATE MEASURE AND SPLITTING ITS SUBSTANCE BETWEEN
MEASURES 2 (ANNUAL CALENDAR) AND 3 (NOTIFICATION). THEY
WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THEIR IDEAS TO THE 16 SOMETIME
IN THE AUTUMN WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING A DECISION
BY END OF THE YEAR. PRELIMINARY REACTIONS BY OTHERS,
NOTABLY THE BRITISH, IS THAT THIS EFFORT IS PREMATURE.
HANSEN WAS POINTEDLY NEGATIVE REGARDING BOTH TIMING AND
SUBSTANCE. POUDADE OPINED THAT ABANDONING MEASURE 1 AS
A SEPARATE MEASURE MIGHT BE AN IDEA BEST LEFT TO THE
ENDGAME.
6. ACCORDING TO POUDADE, A SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE
APPROACH TAKEN BY PARIS IS TO DO AWAY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT FOR OBSERVERS AT SMALLER SCALE EXERCISES.
THE FRENCH MILITARY, HE EXPLAINED, HAS A FAIRLY
RELATIVELY RESTRICTIVE VIEW REGARDING THE WHOLE OBSERVER
PRACTICE. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE DRAFT WORKING
PAPER ON MEASURE 4, INTRODUCED INTO THE NATO CAUCUS BY
THE FRENCH ON 6 JUNE IN STOCKHOLM. IN FACT, THE FRENCH
DELEGATION HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO TURN ITS MEASURE 4
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PAPER OVER TO THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP FOR REVIEW
BECAUSE THE GROUP WOULD SEE IT AS A MINIMALIST PAPER AND
URGE IMPROVEMENTS TO MAKE IT MORE FORTHCOMING, AN
OUTCOME WHICH THE FRENCH MILITARY WOULD FIND
UNACCEPTABLE.
7. READING BETWEEN THE LINES OF WHAT POUDADE SAID, IT
APPEARS THAT FRANCE WANTS TO REINTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS AND DOWNPLAY THE CONCEPT THAT
INSPECTION COULD BE THE ROUTINE RIGHT OF ANY STATE BASED
ON A QUOTA SYSTEM. THIS IS EXPRESSED IN FRENCH PAPER
THROUGH THE NOTION OF CREATING THE POSSIBILITY FOR
INSPECTION OUTSIDE THE QUOTA.
8. IN CONTRAST TO THE SOMETIMES CONFUSING NATURE OF
POUDADE'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE PAPER THEY HAVE
PRESENTED TO THREE ALLIES (PARTIALLY BECAUSE WE WERE
WORKING FROM A FRENCH LANGUAGE VERSION), HIS EXPLANATION
OF PARIS THINKING ON THE CDE CUTOFF DATE WAS CLEAR.
PARIS BELIEVES THE STOCKHOLM MEETING MUST END BEFORE THE
START OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING IN SEPTEMBER 1986 FOR
VIENNA IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CDE DOES NOT
HAVE A LIFE OF ITS OWN, BUT IS A SUBSIDIARY MEETING OF
THE CSCE. CONTINUING STOCKHOLM AFTER ANY PART OF THE
VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING HAS BEGUN WOULD, IN THE FRENCH
VIEW, GIVE THE INDEPENDENT STATUS TO THE CDE WHICH THE
SOVIETS DESIRE. END
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SUBJECT: UK PAPER ON MEASURE 4
1. CDE VI - 076
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF UK PAPER ON SC-1/AMPLIFIED
MEASURE 3. THE BRITISH CONSIDER IT TO BE IN FINAL FORM
BUT NATO CAUCUS HAS NOT GIVEN FINAL OK FOR TABLING.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT ILLUSTRATES A NOTIFICATION OF A
MILITARY ACTIVITY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF MEASURE 3 OF
CSCE/SC.1 (AMPLIFIED) WHICH, UNDER THE TERMS OF THAT
MEASURE, WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED 45 DAYS BEFORE THE
START OF THE EXERCISE.
THE UNITED KINGDOM COMMITMENT TO NATO REQUIRES IT TO
HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE TROOPS IN EUROPE FROM
THE UNITED KINGDOM. THIS CAPABILITY IS TESTED EVERY 4-5
YEARS. THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT NOTIFIED EXERCISE
LIONHEART '84 (COMPROMISING EXERCISES FULL FLOW AND
SPEARPOINT '84). THE PRECEDING SIMILAR EXERCISE WAS
CRUSADER IN 1980. THE NEXT IS SCHEDULED FOR 1989.
(A) DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE, INCLUDING,
IF APPLICABLE, THE NAME OF THE EXERCISE.
EXERCISE LIONHEART IS A REINFORCEMENT AND FIELD TRAINING
EXERCISE CONSISTING OF EXERCISE FULL FLOW (REINFORCEMENT
PHASE) AND EXERCISE SPEARPOINT '84 (FIELD TRAINING
PHASE).
(B) THE NAME OF THE HEADQUARTERS CONDUCTING THE
ACTIVITY.
HQ BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE.
(C) THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY, INCLUDING THE
RELATION OF THE ACTIVITY TO THAT OF ANY OTHER MILITARY
ACTIVITY FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS GIVEN UNDER THIS
MEASURE.
TO EXERCISE AND DEMONSTRATE THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ABILITY
TO REINFORCE TROOPS IN EUROPE. REGULAR TROOPS,
TERRITORIAL ARMY AND RESERVISTS WILL MOVE TO THE
CONTINENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY JOIN BRITISH ARMY OF THE
RHINE FOR FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES. LIONHEART WILL BE
ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANNUAL SERIES OF AUTUMN EXERCISES
(WHICH WOULD BE SEPARATELY NOTIFIED) AND TROOPS FROM
SEVERAL ALLIED NATIONS WILL BE JOINING THE FIELD
TRAINING EXERCISES. THE EXERCISE WILL DEMONSTRATE THE
UNITED KINGDOM'S COMMITMENT TO NATO'S FORWARD DEFENCE
AND DETERRENT POLICY GENERALLY.
(D) THE DATES AND DURATION OF THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF
THE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE, INCLUDING THE BEGINNING OF
OUT-OF GARRISON DEPLOYMENT, THE ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE IF
APPLICABLE, AND THE RECOVERY PHASE DURING WHICH TROOPS
ARE RETURNED TO NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, IF THE
RECOVERY PHASE IS TO OCCUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
ACTIVITY.
LIONHEART - 3 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER
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FULL FLOW - 3 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER
SPEARPOINT - 17-29 SEPTEMBER
REGULAR FORCES WILL BEGIN OUT-OF-GARRISON DEPLOYMENT ON
3 SEPTEMBER.
TERRITORIAL ARMY UNITS WILL BEGIN REINFORCEMENT ON 14
SEPTEMBER.
RESERVISTS WILL PARTICIPATE BETWEEN 15 AND 23 SEPTEMBER.
ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE 14-27 SEPTEMBER.
RECOVERY PHASE 27 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER. TERRITORIAL
ARMY UNITS WILL RETURN TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY 28
SEPTEMBER. REGULAR FORCES RETURN TO GARRISON BY 5
OCTOBER.
(E) THE NAMES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES ENGAGED IN
THE ACTIVITY.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, UNITED STATES, NETHERLANDS,
UNITED KINGDOM.
(F) BOUNDARIES OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA IN THE ZONE
WHERE THE ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE, INCLUDING A MAP
TRACE OR GEOGRAPHIC CO-ORDINATES.
NORTH RHINE/WESTPHALIA AND LOWER SAXONY. AREA OF
MUNSTER MC0557, OSNABRUCK MC3592, HANNOVER ND5004,
HELMSTEDT PC3788, BRAUNLAGE PC1132, SCHLOSS NEUHAUS
MC8032, UNNA MCU612. UTM GRID REFERENCES. MAP ATTACHED.
(G) THE NUMBER OF TROOPS TO INCLUDE AMPHIBIOUS AND
AIRBORNE TROOPS, DIRECTING STAFF AND UMPIRES ENGAGED.
IF MORE THAN ONE PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGES IN THE
ACTIVITY THEN THE NUMBER OF TROOPS STAFF AND UMPIRES FOR
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE SPECIFIED.
ELEMENTS OF 1 (BRITISH) CORPS INCLUDING TWO ARMOURED AND
ONE INFANTRY DIVISION, TOGETHER WITH ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL
GERMAN, NETHERLANDS AND UNITED STATES ARMOURED DIVISIONS.
BREAKDOWN
EXERCISE CONTROL, UMPIRES AND
PERSONNEL DAMAGE CONTROL PERSONNEL
UK 103,000 15,800
FRG 6,300 -
NL 3,500 -
USA 3,400 -
116,200 15,800
TOTAL STRENGTH 132,000
(H) THE DESIGNATION OF THE GROUND FORCE DIVISIONS
ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY.
1 (BRITISH) CORPS - 2 INFANTRY DIVISION,
3 ARMOURED DIVISION, 4 ARMOURED DIVISION.
(I) THE TYPE OF OTHER FORCES INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY,
INCLUDING GROUND-BASED TACTICAL AIR FORCES AND NAVAL
SHIP-TO-SHORE COMBAT FORCES, IE., THOSE EXECUTING
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS OR
SHIP-TO-SHORE GUNNERY, IF PART OF A MILITARY-ACTIVITY IN
THE ZONE.
GROUND BASED TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY 2ND ALLIED
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TACTICAL AIR FORCE.
(J) CLARIFYING INFORMATION IF THE ACTIVITY IS ONE WHICH
NO FORECAST WAS MADE PURSUANT TO MEASURE 2 OF THIS
DOCUMENT OR IF THE ACTIVITY IS ONE FOR WHICH A FORECAST
WAS MADE BUT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE FORECAST
HAS BEEN CHANGED.
THIS ACTIVITY WOULD HAVE BEEN FORECAST ON 15 NOVEMBER
THE PRECEDING YEAR IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST REQUIRED
UNDER MEASURE 2 OF CSCE/SC.1/AMPLIFIED). END TEXT.
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Secret
Secret
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