POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER: ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160033-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: March 26, 1943
• Content Type: REPORT

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ILLEGIB
Sec e
;POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER:
ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES
T 290
March 26, 1943.
I. DESCRIPTION
OF ALTERNATIVE
BOUNDARIES*
The following ten lines, which cover most of the
possible compromises between the frontier of 1938 and
the Soviet-German partition line of September 28, 1939,
will be discussed in terms of 1) their strategic
implications for the two states and for general security
in Europe; 2) the way in which they divide the various
ethnic groups inhabiting the disputed area; 3) their
probable economic advantages and disadvantages to the
two states; 4) their bearing upon communications and
transportation.
A. The Soviet-German
Partition Line of 1939
This line followed the former Polish-Lithuanian
boundary southwestward from the frontier of Latvia to
the southernmost tip of Lithuania, then out across the
base of the Suwalki salient (leaving the Fowiat of
Suwalki and part of that of Augustow to Germany) then
followed the boundary between Poland and East Prussia
and the Pisa and the Narew Rivers to the city of Ostrolgka,
then ran in a southwesterly direction to meet the Bug
River near the town of Malkinia; it followed the Bug
upstream as far as the town of Krystynopol, in Eastern
Galicia, turned west and ran in a nearly straight line to
a point on the San River near Sieniawa, then followed the
San River upstream to the old border between Poland and
Czechoslovakia.
In the consideration of this line as a possible Polish-
Soviet boundary the point where the Pisa River crosses
the boundary of East P)nssia will be taken as the northern
terminus; the Suwalki district thus falls on the Soviet
side of the line.
B. The
* See Map 13, Polish Series (Eastern Poland: Distribution
of Population).
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 C.
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B. T? Curzon Line
Of IM And l u
Continuation Tai ou :h
Eastern Galicia
On December 8, 1919, the Supremei Council of the
Allied and Associated Powers recognized the right of
Poland "to proceed with the organization of a regular
administration" in the territory west of a line which
followed the Bug downstream from the northern border
of Eastern Galicia to the administrative boundary between
the districts of Lelsk and Brest--Litovsk, then ran in
a general northeasterly direction to pass east of the
town of Hainowka and reach the Lososna River near its
source; it followed the Lososna River, with some deviations,
to its confluence with the Niemen River, then followed
the latter past Grodno to the district of Suwalki, the
eastern and northern boundary of which it followed, with
slight deviations, to the border of East Prussia.
The line which the Supreme Council accepted, in 1919,
as the western boundary of Eastern Galicia, for which a
special statue was under consideration, was a continuation
of the Curzon Line. It followed the southern boundary
of the province of Lublin as far as Belzec, then turned
south to follow the western boundaries of the districts
of Rawa Ruska, Jaworow, Moseiska, Sambor, Stary Sambor
and Turka.
L brie "C"
This line follows the eastern boundary of the province
(woiewodztwo) of Bialystok from the former Polish-Lithuanian
border to the Bug River, and the Soviet-German partition
line of 1939 thereafter.
D. Line "D"
This line is identical with line "C" as far as
the northern boundary of Eastern Galicia; from that point
it continues along the Bug River upstream to the city of
Kamionka Strumilowa, whence it runs due south and follows
the eastern boundary of the province of Lw&w to the point
where
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where it meets the Bobrka-Przemyslany road; it then turns
west to run south of the city of B6brka to the point
common to the three districts (t w a ) of Lwow, Bobrka
and Zydacz?w, and follows, with slight deviations, the
eastern boundary of the province of Lwow to the former
Polish-Czechoslovak frontier. This line follows an
alternative western boundary of Eastern Galicia proposed
by the British Delegation to the Peace Conference in 1919.
E.4lg W -
This line follows the eastern boundaries of the
following districts leaving them all within Poland:
Swiceiany, Wilno-Troki, Oszmiana, Lida, Szezuczyn,
Wolkowyak, Bielsk; it then follows the Soviet-German
partition line of 1939 from Niemirow (the point where
the administrative boundary between the districts of
Bielsk and Brzesc-nad-Bugiem meets the Bug River) to
the former frontier between Poland and Czechoslovakia.
F. Lane "F"
This line is identical with Line "E" as far as
the point common to the three districts of Bielsk,
Brzesc-nad-Bugiem and. Pruzana; it then follows the
eastern boundaries of the.following districts, leaving
them all within Poland: Brzesc-nad-Bugiem, Lubom]4,
Wlodzimierz, Sokal, Zolkiew, Lwow, Bobrka, Zydacz w
and Kalusz.
G. Line "G"
This line followe'the eastern boundaries of the
provinces of Bialystok and Lublin, then the southern
boundary of Wolyn and the eastern boundary of Tarnopol
thus leaving to the soviet Union the four eastern provinces
of Wiino,Nowogrodek, Poleeie and Woly1.
H. Line f
This line is.identical with Line "G", except for the
attribution to Poland of the three districts of Brzesc-nad-
Bugiem, Luboml and Wlodzimierz.
I. Line
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I. Line "I"
This line is identical with Line "F" from the
border of Lithuania to the border of Eastern Galicia,
whose northern and eastern boundary it follows to the
point common to the pre-1939 frontiers of Poland, Rumania
and the Soviet Union.
J. Line I'_JII
This line is identical with Line "B" (Curzon Line)
as far as the northern border of Eastern Galicia, then
continuing along the Bug River upstream to the city
of Kamionka Strumilowa, and running south along the
boundary between the provinces'of Tarnopol and Lwow,
then along the boundary between Tarnopol and Stanislawow,
to terminate at the former Polish-Rumanian frontier near
Zaleszizyki.
II. STRATEGIC
CONSIDERATIONS
1. Soviet
Strategic Aims
The territory between Line "A" and the former
Polish-Soviet frontier provided a cushion for absorbing
the German attack in 1941; the time which the Soviet armies
won by fighting delaying actions in former Polish territory
may have been a crucial factor in saving Moscow and Leningrad
from capture in 1941. On the other hand, it is sometimes
maintained that the severe losses suffered by the Red
Army in battles of encirclement west of the main line
of fortifications along the old Soviet-Polish frontier
were too high a price to pay for the time gained. What-
ever the military value of this territory to the Soviet
.Union in 1941, the Soviet Government will probably see
strategic advantages in recovering it. Following rivers
for most of its length and anchored on the Carpathian
Mountains at its southern end, the line of 1939 (Line "A")
could be fortified and made more defensible than the
frontier of 1920-1939. From the Soviet viewpoint, all
the alternative boundaries to the east of this line
would be less satisfactory, since they reduce the width
of the protective area which could be used for defensive
fighting.
Should
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Should the Soviet Union desire to play an active
role in Central Europe,it would prefer Line "A# to the
other suggested boundaries.. Central and Western European
nations may look with some apprehension on the extension
of Soviet so far to the west.
2. Relish
Strategic Aims
Poland will be in a difficult military position, no
matter where the boundary is drawn,and will have to
depend for security upon allies among the Great Powers
or upon a collective security. system, Insofar as
Poland's strategic interests are served by keeping the
eastern boundary as far as possible from Warsaw and the
heart of Poland, Line "A" is the least favorable, and
the former Polish-Soviet boundary the most favorable.
3.. lg Northern
Sector
The strategic problems in the northern sector are
connected with the questions of the future disposition
of Lithuania. If Lithuania again becomes a Soviet
Republic, the Wilno region would probably go tb the
Soviet Union; otherwise it would be a thin and highly
epesosed E$o13"FO and wouldethus beinteliminatedo Soviet + Lin
consideration.
Line *A", which at one point runs within one
hundred. kilometers of Warsaw, would put Poland in a
difficult strategic positioh.. The "Curzon" line
(Lines "B" and "J") would be less objectionable to the
Poles on this score, and those which follow the eastern
border of the province of Bialystok (Lines "C","D", "G"
and "R") are even better,
If Lithuania becomes independent and enters into
close association with Poland, lines "E", "F" and "I",
which leave the city of Wilno and five additional die!
tricte to Poland, would give Poland a larger bloc of
territory in the north but no special strategic advantages.
Wilno,
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Wilno, though an important point in any Polish-Lithuanian
plan of defense, would be in a very vulnerable location.
4? 1 Central
Sector
There are only two alternative boundaries in the
central sector, where seven of the lines ("AM, "B", "C",
"DNS *IM , "G"I NO) follow the course of the Bug River,
and the other three ("F", "H", "Z") follow a line
parallel to the Bug about forty kilometers to the east.
The Bug makes a fairly good geographic boundary, although
it is not a formidable barrier to military operations.
The Poles consider the line of the Bug to be uncomfortably,
close to central Poland. They would probably feel a
;greater sense of security if they held Brest-Litovsk,
on the eastern bank, and an additional forty-kilometer-
wide strip of territory. The Pripet marshes would not
,serve Poland as a defensive barrier if the Soviet Union
held Brest-Litovsk, which lies immediately to the west
of the marsh area and is connected by double-tracked
strategic railways with Minsk and'Kiev.
.5. Tbd Southern
The strategic significance of the alternative
boundaries in Eastern Galicia lies in their location
with respect to the Carpathian Mountains. Those lines
which terminate at the former Polish-Czechoelovak border
near the source of the San River (lines "A", $B", "C",
"E") bring the Soviet Union to the crest of the Carpathians
..along the whole northern border of Ruthenia. The most
.easily traversible passes through the northern Carpathians
lie along this border. Three minor railways running
through these passes connect the forager Polish and
Czechoslovak railway systems.
Possession of this Carpathian frontier would
probably assure the Soviet Union of a 1. ge voice in the
affairs of Central Europe. Bordering on the disputed
territory of Ruthenia, which is inhabited by a Ukrainian-
speaking
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-speaking population, it could make its influence felt
in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary. Poland and Rumania
would be deprived of the common frontier they possessed
'between 1920 and 1939. The strategic position of the
Soviet Union in the face of a potentially hostile
Polish.Rumantan bloc or larger East European grouping
would be very strong. The possibility that any of the
nations of Eastern Europe, singly or in combination,
could defend themselves against the Soviet Union, would
be small.
Lines ?DII and 'F" partition Eastern Galicia from
.north to south; they are slightly more favorable to
Poland than the San River line. The Soviet Union would
.still have a Carpathian frontier, but it would be shorter,
and the wedge of Soviet territory between Poland and
Rumania would be narrower. Under Line "D" the Soviet
Union would have access to two Carpathian passes; under
line OF* to but one, the Jabioniea Pass.
Lines OGO, "H? and 'I" leave the whole of Eastern
Galicia to Poland. The Soviet frontier would be about
one hundred miles distant from the Carpathians, as before
1939. If Rumania should retain Bukovina, Poland and
Rumania would have a common frontier, and the Soviet
pressure upon Central Europe would be somewhat less than
.if Soviet territory extended to the Carpathians. Poland
.an4 Rumania would be directly connected by the strategic
Lwow-Cern uti railway.
Line "JII is a compromise line running through Eastern
,Galicia roughly along the administrative boundary between
.the provinces of Lwow and Stanislawow, on the one hand,
and Tarnopol on the other. This line leaves to Poland
the crest of the Carpathians all the way to the border
of Bukovina. Again, in the supposition of Rumania's
retaining Bukovina it would give Poland and Rumania a
common frontier and a belt of territory about one hundred
kilosaeters in width east of the Carpathians. The Lwow.
Cernau i railway, which would run within Polish territory
at a distance of a few miles from the frontier, would
probably be of little use to Poland in a defensive military
campaign against the Soviet Union.
III. ETHNIC
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III. ETHNIC
FACTORS
Ethnic Groups
1.
i. Eastern Poland j /
The territory lying east of the Soviet-German line
of September 28, 1939,(including the district of Suwalki,
which was then annexed to East Prussia) had about twelve
.million inhabitants in 1931, according to the Polish
census of that year. Forty percent were listed as Polish-
speaking, 34 percent as Ukrainian-speaking, 8.2 as White
Russian-speaking, and 1.1 percent as Russian-speaking.
The Soviet Union could lay claim, on ethnic grounds, to
49 percent of the population of this area; this figure
includes the White Russians, who are concentrated in the
northern provinces, the Ukrainians, who inhabit the southern
provinces, the Russians, who are scattered throughout the
.whole area, and the "local" inhabitants of the province
of Polesie. The ",local" languages of this last-named
group are variations and dialects of White Russian and
Ukrainian, which the census-takers chose not to classify
with those two main language groups.
The Poliehtspeaking population in the area east of
the line of 1939 (Line"A") numbered 4,833,918 in 1931
.and over five millionO.in 1939, according to official
Polish figures. The Poles are the majority nationality
in the Bialystok, Wiino and LwoP areas, and they represent
a-substantial element. in the population elsewhere,
Although the upper and middle class Poles, who made up
the greater part of the landlord and professional classes
before 1939, will be greatly reduced in number at the
close of the war, the Polish peasantry will probably
remain as a numerically important minority in both the
White Russian and Ukrainian-populated regions../
2. Eolit-laal.
See T Document 218, "Eastern Poland: Ethnic Composi-
tion of the Population".
See Tables I and II for statistics on the ethnic
groups on each side of the ten alternative boundaries.
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2. a Aspirations
of the __ifferent Ethnic
Groups
The language statistics, even if assumed to be one-
hundred percent accurate, cannot be accepted as an
infallible index of the aspirations of the various ethnic
groups inhabiting Eastern Poland, particularly when they
are limited to a choice between Polish and soviet rule.
It is probably safe to assume that the overwhelming
majority of those whose mother-tongue is Polish would
favor the restoration of Polish sovereignty. The aspirations
of the non-Polish-speaking inhabitants are not so clear,
a. TM White Russians.--The White Russian-speaking
people of the northern provinces are a culturally backward
peasant population, with no coherent political groupings
or programs. They had both national and social grievances
against the pre-1939 Polish regime; them was some sympathy
with the Soviet Union and with Communism. Generally speak-
ing, the White Russians seem to have welcomed the soviet
occupation in 1939, for it meant liberation from their
Polish landlords and the distribution of land to the
peasantry. Under Polish rule their living standards were
so low that there could hardly be any strong objection,
on economic grounds, to incorporation in the Soviet Union,
despite the adjustments involved in the process of
"Sovietization'. In the cultural sphere the White Russians
of former Poland would probably have greater opportunities
for development in association with Soviet White Russia
than as citizens of a reconstituted Poland.
b. DA Ukrainians.--The case of the Ukrainians is
somewhat different. They are more advanced, culturally
and politically, than the White Russians. Especially
in Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainians had developed both
economic and political organizations intended to further
the welfare and aspirations of the national community.
he prevalence of individual peasant farms in this area
has contributed to the growth of a strong feeling of
Ukrainian nationalism directed against both Poland and
the Soviet Union. Although the Ukrainians of Eastern
Poland are divided by religion (some are Orthodox
some Uniate), by differing historical experience some
under
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under ustria, some under Russia), and by varying shades
of political opinion, they have been more or less united
in their opposition to the Polish state. Very few, in
the 1918-1939 period, favored incorporation in the Soviet
Ukraine. Given a choice, the majority would probably
favor an independent Western Ukrainian Republic which
might include Carpathian Ruthenia and northern bukovina
as well as Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. This solution
seems politically impossible now, as it was in 1919.
The year and a half of Soviet occupation of Eastern
Poland was not a happy experience for many of the former
leading elements among the Ukrainian and White Russian
population. The nationalist political parties were
liquidated. The intelligentsia and "kulak" elements,
and even some Communists, were persecuted. The collecti-
vization of agriculture, gradually introduced in 1940
and 1941, can hardly have been welcomed by the peasants.
Generally speaking, however, the elimination of the
Polish ruling class and the fact that a distribution of
land to the peasants preceded collectivization (which
could then be introduced slowly and without the use of
force), compensated for the "invasion" of Communist Party
men and G. P. U. agents, the absence of political freedom,
and the campaign against religion./
The Ukrainians of this area, for the most part,
consider the choice between Polish and Soviet rule as a
choice between two evils. Union with the Soviet Ukraine
would seem to be a more natural association for them than
a return to Polish rule, which has a long record of bitter-
ness and failure.
3. Northern Sector
While in the central and southern sectors Line "A"
roughly follows the line of ethnic division between the
predominantly Polish area and the area of mixed population,
in the north it runs far to the west of any plausible
ethnic
3 See T Document 228, "Soviet Rule in Eastern Poland,
1939-1941"
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ethnic line. It leaves outside Poland all but a
fraction of the province of Bialystok and also the Wilno
region (the five districts of Swigciany, Wilno-Troki,
Oszmiana, Lida and Szozuezyn); in both these areas the
Poles had a 70 percent majority in the census of 1931.
Thie ethnically Polish territory, which contains one and
one-half million of the nearly five million Poles living
east of Line "A", is contiguous to the purely Polish
territory west of Line "A".
The "Curzon" Line (Lines "B" and "J") more nearly
approaches the line of division between strongly Polish
and mixed territory, although in the absence of statistics
on individual communes, it is impossible to tell how
nearly they coincide. That part of the province of
Bialystok which lies to the west of Lines "B" and "J"
(including the Suwalki district) is overwhelmingly Polish.
The only districts which have a substantial White Russian
population are Grodno, Biel.sk and Wolkowysk, which lie,
wholly or in part, on the eastern or Soviet side.
Lines "C", "D", "G" and "H", following the eastern
boundary of the province of Bialystok, are slightly more
favorable to Poland. They leave to Poland an area with
a large Polish majority and with a White Russian minority
of about 200,000 living in the area adjacent to Soviet
territory. A large Polish population, living in the
provinces of Wilno and Nowogrodek, would be left within
the Soviet Union. The Poles in these two provinces
outnumber the White Russians by a margin of nearly two
to one (1,315,500 to 703,000) according to the Polish
census statistics.
Lines "E", "F" and "I" leave to-Poland five additional
districts, including the strongly Polish city of Wilno.
Although this region is not likely to fall to Poland
unless Lithuania again becomes an independent state,
Poland's claim to it on ethnic grounds is good. The
census of 1931 listed 698,000 Poles, 78,000 White Russians,
and 65,000 Lithuanians in these five districts. In the
remaining parts of the provinces of Wilno and Nowogrodek,
which would fall to the Soviet Union, the Poles make up
nearly half the population, 618,000 out of a total of
1,392,000. There are Polish majorities in some of the
easternmost
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easternmost districts bordering on the former Polish-
Soviet frontier.
4. C ntr Sector
The line of the Bug River was the eastern boundary
of "Congress Poland" and makes a fairly clear division
between Polish-speaking and non-Polish-speaking populations,
although there are some 63,000 Ukrainians in the districts
bordering the western bank of the river, and some 1029000
Polish-speaking persons in the three districts of Brze9c',
Luboml and Wlodzimierz, which border on the eastern bank.
These three districts form the additional belt of territory
left to Poland by Lines "F", "H", and "I"; all the other
lines follow the course of the river. Their total popu-
lation in 1931 was 452,000 of whom only 23 percent were
Poles. There are no valid ethnic grounds for the inclusion
of this area within Poland, except as compensation for the
cessibnrtbithe Soviet Union of predominantly Polish-speaking
territory elsewhere.
In the remaining area of the provinces of Polesie
and Wolyn', which falls to the Soviet Union under all
alternative lines, there are only 408,000 Poles (14.? percent)
in a total population of 2,766,000.
5. Southern Sector
It is impossible to draw a line through Eastern
Galicia which does not leave large number of Poles or
Ukrainians under alien rule. Lines "A", KC' and "E"
follow the line of the San River. This line is the
least favorable to Poland; while the population to the
west of it is almost purely Polish, nearly two million
Poles, about two-fifths of the total population, inhabit
the area east of the San River and would come under Soviet
rule.
Line "B", which represents the continuation of the
"Curzon" line in Eastern Galicia, runs somewhat to the
north of line "A" in the Rawa Ruska region, and to the
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east of it in the Przemysl region. It leaves to Poland
a slightly greater area of mixed population, in which
Poles and Ukrainians are fairly evenly balanced; this
area includes the city of Przemysl, which is strongly
Polish.
Line "DN was suggested by the British Delegation
at the Peace Conference of 1919 as a possible boundary
between Poland and an autbnomous state of Eastern Galicia.
It follows roughly the eastern boundary of the province
of Lwow. The total population of the Eastern Galician
territory lying between Line "D" and Line "A" was
1,795,000 in 1931, of whom 831,000 (46 percent) were Poles,
and 777,000 (43 percent) were Ukrainians. Line "D"
leaves the strongly Polish city of Lwow to Poland.
Line "F" leaves to Poland a somewhat larger share
of the territory of Eastern Galicia, including the western
half of the province of Stanislawow. This added area,
which has a population of almost half a million, is
predominantly Ukrainian; the Polish element comprises
less than one-fifth of the total. The principal arguments
in favor of the assignment of this area to Poland Ore
economic rather than ethnic.
Line "F" divides Eastern Galicia into two parts of
nearly equal size. The western part, the area between
Line . W and Line "F", ethich would fall to Poland, had
a total population, in 1931, of 2,301,000, of whom
927,000 (40 percent) were Polish and 1,155,000 (50 percent)
were Ukrainian.
Line "Jw runs through Eastern Galicia roughly along
the western boundary of the province of Tarnopol, leaving
that province to the Soviet Union, and leaving the provinces
of Lwow and Stanislawow to Poland. This line is a poor
boundary from the ethnic standpoint, since the province
of Stanislawow, which would be left to Poland, has a
three-to-one Ukrainian majority, whereas in the province
of Tarnopol, which would be left to the Soviet Union, the
Poles
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Poles have a slight numerical advantage over the Ukrainians.
Under Line "J", the larger part of Eastern Galicia
would fall'to Poland. Its total population, in 1931, was
3,324,000 of whom 1,826,000 (55 percent) were Ukrainians
and 1,178,000 (35 percent) were Poles. The Soviet share
of Eastern Galicia, which would include the province
of Tarnopol and a part of the district of Sokal in the
province of Lwdw, had a population of 1,643,000, of whom
801;000 (48 percent) were Poles, and 758,000 (46 percent)
were Ukrainians.
Lines "G", "H" and IN leave the whole of Eastern
Galicia to Poland. Poland would acquire a Ukrainian
population of over two-and one-half millions. The Polish
element numbers Just under two million. Thus Poland
has no good ethnic claim to the whole of Eastern Galicia.
However, since some of the easternmost districts, on the
former Polish-Soviet frontier, have Polish majorities, it
is impossible to draw a line of partition which would not
leave a considerable number of Poles outside Poland.
Similarly, any line drawn far enough to the east to
include within Poland the Poles of the Lwow and Tarnopol
regions must include also a large number of Ukrainians.
IV. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
1. Aicttire
Eastern-Poland is essentially an agricultural region.
In the four provinces of Wilno, Nowogrodek, Polesie and
Wolyn,-86 percent of the population is rural; in Eastern
Galicia the proportion is 78 percent. Throughout Eastern
Poland the main crops are rye and potatoes, both of which
are produced in abundance in other parts of'Poland.
The soil of the northern provinces is poor, production
per hectare is low, and the rate of increase of the
rural population is high. The region of the Pripet marshes,
comprising the province of Polesia and the northern part
of Wolyii, is largely useless ,swampland; its agriculture
is at a primitive level, which the Polish state did almost
nothing to raise. In the Wilno area some flax was grown
for the Polish textile industries, but otherwise the
agricultural products of the eastern provinces were
consumed
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consumed locally and contributed little to the economic
life of other parts of Poland. From the agricultural
standpoint, the region would probably be a liability
either to Poland or to.the Soviet Union, although there
are possibilities for a greater development of fruit
culture, industrial fibre plants, and cattle-raising.
Eastern Galicia has more fertile soil than the
northern provinces; it produced, besides rye and potatoes,
a large part of the wheat, maize, barley and hemp grown
in pre-1939 Poland. It is very thickly settled and is
faced with an acute problem of f'ural over-population.
The economy of the Soviet Union could probably absorb
the surplus population more easily than could the economy
of Poland.
2. Forests.
The area east of the Soviet-German line of 1939
(Line "A") has about 63 percent of the forest area of
former Poland. All the eastern provinces, except Tarnopol,
are more than 20 percent wooded. Polesie has the largest
wooded area, 1,222,000 hectares, while the Carpathian
region in the provinces of Lwow and Stanislaw6w is
endowed with extensive pine and hardwood forests. Poland's
forest wealth was rather recklessly exploited in the last
twenty years but always remained an important item in
the national economy.
About one-half of the Polish timber productionv was
consumed locally as fuel, some went to Polish factories,
and the remainder was exported. Timber alternated with
coal as Poland's chief export product, averaging 1? percent
of total exports in the period from 1924 to 1938. The
lose of all the timber land in the eastern provinces would
be felt severely by Poland. Any compromise- line, however,
which left at least the province of Bialystok and a part
of Eastern Galicia to Poland, would give to Poland a
substantial share of the forest area.
3. Mineral Resources
Poland's principal oil-fields were situated in
Eastern Galicia. The total crude oil output of these
fields reached two million tons in 1909, but then. gradually
declined
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declined to ?07,000 tons in 1938, a consequence of the
exhaustion of the existing wells. The fields of the
8rosno-Jaslo region, west of Line "Au, registered steady
gains,' but those of the Drohobycz-Boryslaw and Stanislawow
regions, east of Line $A", produced less each year. How-
ever, the eastern region remained the principal producing
area; in 1938 it accounted for two-thirds of Polandls
total production.
The opinion is generally held by geologists and
technicians that the decline in production will continue,
and that the Galician oil industry will not be of any
great importance in the future either to Poland or to
the Soviet Union. However, both Polish and Soviet sources
can be quoted in support of the thesis that an increase
in production can be effected by extensive exploration
and drilling, the use of new equipment, and the wider
application of new techniques. The Soviet authorities
.drew up ambitious plans for the expansion of the industry
in 1939, but the period of Soviet control was not long
enough to test them.
Without the oil wells of the disputed Drohobyoz and
Stanislawow regions, Poland would have to import most of
its oil. In the late 1930's Poland exported only a
fraction of its petroleum products; almost all were
consumed domestically. The oil wells of Eastern Galicia
sent nearly. 8O. percent of their oil products to central
and western Poland. Poland was free from dependence on
foreign sources of oil, but economically it gained little
by possessing its own oil-fields. Galician oil, crude or
refined, was not able to compete on an equal basis, even
in Poland, with American or Rumanian oil. Its value to
Poland lay in its favorable influence on the country's
foreign exchange position and its possible use in time
of war or economic isolation. From that standpoint it
would be more essential to Poland than to the oil-rich
Soviet Union, although the latter country could make use
of the Galician oil for mechanized farming operations in
White Russia and Western Ukraine.
The other mineral resources of Eastern Poland are
located almost entirely in Eastern Galicia. Natural
gas, production of which has increased while that of
petroleum has been falling, comes mainly from the
Drohobycz
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Drohobycz and Daszawa regions; it has been used for the
manufacture of gasoline, for heat and light in nearby
cities, and as an industrial fuel. The reserves are not
great and are not expected to be of great economic
importance in the future. Ozkerite is also produced in
the Drohobycz region; this is the world's only significant
commer d al source of ozokerite.
Important deposits of potassium salts, valuable for
agriculture and for the chemical industry, are located
near Kalusz, in the province of Stanislawowo smaller
deposits are found near Stryj and near Drohobycz. he
total production from all these sources was only 54,000
tons in 1923 but rose rapidly to 560,000 tons in 1938.
The.Carpathian region also contains large quantities of
rock salt, which enabled Poland to meet all domestic
demands and to have a surplus for export.
There are little-worked deposits of phosphates and
gypsum in the provinces of Stan islawow and Tarnopol, in
the valley of the Dniester River. Pyrites are mined near
Rudki in the procinve of Lw$w. There is some lignite in
the province of Tarnopol. Altogether, the mineral resources
of Eastern Galicia are varied, and they are of some
economic importance to Poland; a more intense exploitation
of them would probably be a definite part of any plant for
the Improvement of agriculture and for the development of
industry in the central and eastern parts of Poland.
The other eastern provinces have practically no
mineral wealth, except for the granite and basalt in the
province of Wolyn, the kaolin on the border between Wolyn
and Poleste, which supplied raw material for the whole
Polish porcelain industry, and scattered deposits of
lignite and peat over the whole area.
4. Industries
The principal manufacturing industries are 1) the
textile industries of Bialystok, which produced between
five and ten percent of all Polish textile goods; 2)
various finishing industries in the two largest cities,
Wilno
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Wilno and Lwow; 3) the industries connected with the
exploitation of the forest and mineral resources.
In 1938 there were twenty-three oil refineries in
Eastern Poland, with only one cracking-plant. Almost all
of them are located near the Drohobycz oil-fields or at
Lwow. Saw-mills are located in the main forest areas,,
especially in the Carpathian region of Eastern Galicia.
In the 1930's the saw-mills of the eastern provinces
accounted for about one-half of Poland's production of
lumber. Important cellulose, paper, and cardboard
factories are loc ted in the province of Wilno and in
Eastern Galicia.
5. Econom c As ee s
91 Alternative
Boundaries
Although no one economic factor, or combination of
factors, seems to deserve decisive weight in the determina-
tion of a permanent boundary, the loss of the whole area
east of Line "A" might be a serious blow to Poland's
economy, since the Polish-Soviet frontier will probably
be a real barrier to the exchange of goods. A compromise
boundary which left atileast some of the mineral resources
of Eastern Galicia to Poland might soften the blow with-
out greatly affecting the economic position of the Soviet
Union, which has little need of the meager resources of
Eastern Poland.
In the northern sector no economic factors are
sufficiently important to affect boundary considerations,
except perhaps the textile industries of Bialystok which
lie to the west of all the alternative lines save Line "A".
When Bialystok was under Soviet occupation, in 1940, it
was announced that it would be developed into one of the
largest textile centers of the Soviet Union. Both Poland
and the Soviet Union have other textile centers of much
greater importance.
In Eastern Galicia, the San River line (Lines "A",
"C" and "E") is the least favorable economically to
Poland, depriving it of two-thirds of its oil and natural
gas.wells, most of its oil refineries, and all its
deposits of ozokerite, potash, phosphates, and gypsum.
Line "B"
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Line "B" would also deprive Poland of all those economic
resources. Line "D", on the other hand, leaves to
Poland the Drohobycz-Boryelaw oil fields,, the natural gas
wells in the same region, the ozokerite mines, and some
of the larger Carpathian salt deposits. The phosphates,
gypsum, granite, basalt, kaolin, and the major share of
the potassium salts would be left within the Soviet Union.
The city of Lwow, with its refineries and other industrial
establishments, would fall to Poland.
Line "F" is somewhat more favorable to Poland than
Line "D", since it runs to the east of the main potash
deposits near Kalusz and Stryj; it also gives Poland a
greater share of the petroleum and natural gas area and
of the Carpathian forests. Poland would also regain the
paper and cellulose factories located near Zydaczo'w.
Lines "G", "H" and "I" leave the whole of Eastern
Galicia to Poland, giving that country the maximum
opportunities for economic development and thus for
absorbing the surplus rural population. Line "J" would
have about the same consequences; it leaves only the
province of Tarnopol, which has the fewest economic
resources, to the Soviet Union. From an economic stand-
point, Poland could afford to renounce its claim to all
territory east of Line "J",
The territory which falls to the Soviet Union under
all the alternative lines includes the greater part
of the provinces of Wilno, Nowogrodek, Polesie and Wolyi.
It has considerable forest land, a low level of agricultural
production, no important industries, and no minerals except
stone, granite, basalt, kaolin, and some lignite and peat.
IV. COMMUNICATIONS
1. Railway ,and
Canal S s ems
The railways of Eastern Poland form a western extension
og the Soviet railway system, most of the lines having
been built by the Imperial Russian regime. Although
practically
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practically no new lines were constructed during the
period of Polish administration, these railways are
also closely linked to the network of Central Poland by
the trunk lines to Warsaw, Lublin and Krakow.
The density of the railway network is 3.9 kilometers
per hundred square kilometers, considerably less than
in the other parts of pre-1939 Poland, although the
density in relation to the population is about the same.
The main east-west lines were little used in the 1919-
1939 period because of the insignificant volume of
Polish trade with the Soviet Union. The secondary lines
are of some importance to the local economic life of the
eastern provinces; their inadequacy and worn-out condi-
tion, however, have retarded the exploitation of the
economic resources of the region.
The roads are also quite inadequate. The Polish
government built some 200 miles of new highways in the
eastern provinces, and the official statistics give the
total length of the "public highways" as 19,000 kilometers;
almost none of the roads have a paved surface or a stone
substructure of any kind.
The rivers and canals, particularly in the region
of the Pripet marshes, form the basis for an excellent
waterway system, but they have suffered a marked decline
in traffic, largely because they have been out by political
frontiers. The Dvina, Niemen, Pripet, Bug and Dniester
Rivers are navigable by small boats and by timber rafts.
Three important canals the August6w, the Ogineki, and
the Royal {Dnieper-Bug$ Canals connect the Baltic with
the Black Sea by Joining the tributaries of the Dnieper
with those of the Vistula and the Niemen. This system
is capable of developing an expanded traffic.
2. Line "A"
Line "A" would give the Soviet Union two north-south
railways connecting the main points on the east-west lines;
one connects Wilno with Baranowioze, Luniniec, Sarny,
Rowne and Lwow; the other connects Wilno with Grodno,
Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, Kowel and Lwow. From all
important frontier cities on the Soviet side of the line
there are railway communications to the other main points
of the region by north-south lines as well as by those
running to the east. The most direct lines from Brest-
Litovsk
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Litovsk to Lwow and Przemysl are out by Line "A", but
the available alternative routes are not much longer.
On the Polish side of the line, railway communica-
tions are less adequate, since there would be no north-
south trunk railway nearer to the frontier than the
Warsaw-Lublin-Przemysl line. The lines in the eastern
part of the province of Lublin would be out off from the
important junctions of Brest-Litovsk and Rawa Ruska.
Soviet possession of Eastern Galicia would out the
direct railway connection between Poland and Rumaam,,ia, the
line running through Lwow and Stanislawow to Cernau~i, in
Bukovina. is line, one of the main routes between
Central Europe and the Black Sea, would be of great economic
importance to an East European federation.
The Soviet Union might put to fuller use the canals
which link the Pripet, Bug and Niemen river systems. The
timber traffic which flourished on the Niemen before
1914 might be revived. _A/
3 LL, aB"
Line "B" and Line "J" would deprive the Soviet rail-
way system of the important junction of Bialystok, Between
Grodno and Brest-Litovsk there would be no direct connection
within Soviet territory except the roundabout route via
Baranowioze. A more direct connection could be provided
by shifting the boundary a few kilometers to the west In
the region north of Brest-Litovsk, so as to leave the
whole length of the Brest-Hainowka-Wolkowysk railway on
the Soviet side of the line.
Under line "B". Polish communications in Galicia
would be improved by the inclusion within Poland of the
railway junctions of Przemsyl and Chyr6w, but would still
be handicapped by the loss of Rawa Ruska, which provides
the connection between the lines it Lwow province and
those in the eastern part of Lublin. The Soviet Union
would hold the most important communications center in
See T 221: "The Niemen River u.
Eastern
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Eastern Galicia, Lwow, whence raiiway.lines run south
to the oil-fields and to the Carpathian passes, southeast
to Rumania, and east and northeast toward Kiev and
Moscow.
Under Line "B" and Line "J", the Niemen River would
form the Polish-Soviet frontier in the Grodno area and would
not be likely to carry much traffic unless an international
regime including all the riparian states were established.
4. Lines NO and HE"
Lines "C" and "E" are identical with line "A" in
the central and southern sectors. In the north, line
"C" follows the eastern boundary of the providence of
Bialystok.-.O he cities of Grodno, Wolkowysk and Bialystok
would be tied into the Polish system of railway and canal
communications. The Soviet Union would :hold the frontier
points of Wilno, Baranowicze and Brest-Litovsk, and the
railways running eastward and southward from those points.
Line "E" leaves to Poland the Wilno region, which
would be connected with the Polish railway network by
lines running to Central Poland by way of Bialystok and
by way of Lida and Wolkowysk. Both these lines would
remain in Poland.
The Wilno area is an essential link in Poland's com-
munications with Lithuania. If these two countries are
expected to work in close economic co8peration, this area
should be attached either to the one or the other. The
principal lines of transportation between them are the
Niemen River and the three railway lines which connect
central Lithuania with the main Warsaw-Leningrad railway,
which they join in the Wilno region.
5. Line "D"
Line "D" Is identical with Line "C" in-the northern
and central sectors. In the south it leaves a larger
share of Eastern Galicia, including the city of Lwow,
to Poland. Lwow is the Junction of the trunk lines from
Warsaw
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Warsaw and from Krakow, and of the secondary lines from
the oil-fields region and other points to. the south and
west. The principal line from the Drohobycz?-Boryslaw
oil region, however, runs by way of Stryj, which would
lie on the Soviet side of the boundary. .
Inclusion of Lwow in Poland would deprive the Soviet
railways in the provinces of Tarnopol and Stanislawow
of their key junction.
Poland would have direct contlct by rail with Ruthenia
by way of the Lwow-Ulhorod line* he other two lines
connecting Eastern Galicia with Ruthenia would be in
Soviet hands. Soviet territory would form a wedge separat-
ing Poland from Rumania and cutting the main Lwow-Cernu~i
railway.
6. Line "F"
Line "F" leaves to Poland the Wilno area and good
river and rail communications with Lithuania. In the
central sector, it leaves to Poland the cities of Brest..
Litovsk, Wlodzimierz and Sokal, which are located east
of the Bug River. Although the main railway.connecting
these three points runs through Kowel, which would be
in Soviet territory, their possession by Poland would
greatly Improve the Polish railway network.
The-railway between Lwow,and.the Drohobycz oil-fields,
by way of Stryj, would run entirely within Polish territory.
Poland would have an additional direct rail link with
Ruthenia, the Lwow:Mukacevo line. The Soviet Union would
have access to only one line to Ruthenia, the line which
runs through the Jablonica Pass. Since the Soviet Union.,
would hold the eastern part of the province of Stanislaww
all the way to the Carpathians, the Lwow-Cernauti railway
would still run across Soviet territory.
7. Lines "G". U uI, and "IN
In the northern sector, Lines "G" and "H" follow the
eastern boundary of the province of Bialystok, leaving to
Poland the railway junctions of Bialystok and Wolkowyek,
and waterway communication with Lithuania and the Baltic
Sea by way of the Augustow Canal and the Niemen River.
Line 11I" leaves to Poland, in addition, the city of Wilno
and three railway connections with Lithuania.
In the
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In the central sector, Line "G" follows the Bug,
while Lines "H" and 01" run further to the east, leaving
to Poland the cities of Brest-Litovsk, Wlodzimierz and
Sokal, thus facilitating. Polish communications. Communi-
cation between Poland's share of Eastern Galicia and the
Bialystok region would be difficult without use of
railway lines crossing Soviet territory. The main route
by the Polish railways, yj Lublin and Warsaw, would
involve a wide deto to the west. However, if there
were a real economic demand for a Bialystok-Lwow railway,
there would be no important physical obstacles to its
construction.
These three lines leave the whole of Eastern Galicia
to Poland. Poland would have three direct lines of rail
communication with Ruthenia and two with Bukovina.
Be Line "J"
Line "J" is identical with Line "B" in the northern
and central sectors, where, from the standpoint of communi-
cations, it is more favorable to the Soviet Union than to
Poland, particularly if a slight rectification should be
made, so as to leave the Brest-Hainowka-Wolkowyek railway
in Soviet hands. In the south it cute across Eastern
Galicia, leaving the province of Tarnopol to the Soviet
Union; it terminates at the border of Bukovina rear
Zaleszcgyki. The whole length of the Lwow-Cernauti rail-
way as far as the border of Bukovina, and the lines branch-
ing off from it and running to the Carpathian passes,
would be in Polish hands. The loss of the province of
Tarnopol would not adversely affect Polish communications
in the rest of Eastern Galicia.
PS:JCCampbell:mhp
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0
percent
1,11no 4j"
percent
74 .,
a
061
1
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TABLE I (continued)
Russian
Lithuanian
Jewish
Line "A"
Line "B"
25,154
6,815
156,437
percent
1.8
0.5
11.2
Line "C"
35,106
13,256
177,340
percent
2.4
0.9
12.1
Line "D"
35,752
13,256
347,361
percent
1.1
0.4
10.7
Line "E"
49,493
77,150
219,484
percent
2.2
3.5
9.9
Line "F"
54,892
77,160
485,656
percent
1.1
1.5
9.7
Line "G"
36,159
13,271
541,298
percent
0.6
0.2
8.4
Line "H"
401,753
13,279
597,441
percent
0.6
0.2
8.7
Line 111"
559240
77,173
639,585
percent
0.7
1
8.4
Line "J"
25,979
6,828
410,332
percent
0.6
-
9.3
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Total
"0 * 44R
34*2
4:106
0
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convo, Of 7,
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L 8,9?79 442 0,54*
h GGenau
t184,605 (26, SO)
70 293 (48,3%)
(37.a%)
.~
?i)
(4.4)
3 .171,990
99;703, S
(62-0)
, 1,926
(43,6$)
X3,9 , 4
* %)
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