THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: CONSTRAINTS TO MARINE REGIONLISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 2, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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East-West Environment and Policy Institute
Reprint No. 16
The South China Sea:
Constraints to. Marine
Regionalism
by Mark J. Valencia
First published in ,
The Indonesian Quarterly,
vol. VIII, no. 2, April 1980, and
reprinted with permission of the
managing editor.
East-West Center
Honolulu, HI 96848
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The author is a Research Associate with the Environment and Policy Institute,
1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96848.
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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
CONSTRAINTS TO MARINE
REGIONALISM
Mark J. VALENCIA
If all littoral nations of the South China Sea' extend their marine
jurisdiction, the entire sea would become a mosaic of national control.
For exclusive economic zones (EEZs) reaching to 200nm from national
base lines, this control would comprise sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources
whether living or non-living, of the seabed and subsoil and the superja-
cent waters, and jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research and
the preservation of the marine environment.' The rights of other states in
a coastal state's EEZ will generally be limited to freedom of navigation
and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines.'
However, extended national jurisdiction will not alter the facts that:
1) marine resources are often transnational in -distribution; 2) the ocean,
as a continuous fluid system, transmits environmental pollutants and im-
pacts, and 3) maritime activities transcend the projected national marine
jurisdictional boundaries.
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (Revision 1) of the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea provides that states bordering
I For the purposes of this paper, the South China Sea is considered to extend from a
southwestern boundary along the 3?OOS parallel between Kalimantan and Sumatra,
northeast to an imaginary line connecting the northern tip of Taiwan to the coast of
Fukien, China.
2 United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Eighth Session, Geneva, 19
March to 27 April 1979, Informal Composite Negotiating Text (Revision 1), (ICNT, Rev.
I), Article 56 (Rights, jurisdiction and Duties of the Coastal States in the Exclusive
Economic Zone)
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semi-enclosed seas should co-operate with each other in the exercise of
their rights and duties under the Convention. Specifically, they shall
endeavour directly or through an appropriate regional organization to
co-ordinate 1) the management, conservation, exploration and exploita-
tion of the living resources of the sea; 2) the preservation of the marine
environment; and 3) their scientific research policies and programs.'
For the South China Sea region, issue categories which may require a
multilateral, possibly regional, approach, include dispute avoidance or
settlement, compensation for geographically disadvantaged entities, con-
tent of jurisdiction in relation to extraregional users, management of
fisheries and the resource, the prevention of, and remedial action for,
transnational pollution, and coordination of foreign access, technical
assistance and indigenous efforts for marine scientific research.
However, there are numerous general and specific constraints which
must he overcome to move toward functional marine regionalism or sub-
regionalism. Diverse national interests based on development priorities
and resource sovereignty and security concerns will affect and be affected
by intraregional politics and extraregional influences. Constraint posed
by diverse national interests will be exacerbated by: 1) marine areal and
resource inequities; 2) boundary disputes; e.g., continental shelf, ex-
clusive economic zones, islands, Chinese historical claims; 3) variation in
type and content of jurisdictional regimes; 4) lack of mutual under-
standing by policy makers of transnational marine environment, and re-
source interdependencies and the consequences of diverse national
marine policies regarding resource exploitation and environmental
management; and 5) insufficient indigenous technical and managerial ex-
pertise with a marine focus.
- The South China Sea is a northeast-southwest elongated, semi-
enclosed sea of 3.5 x 10" km2 area situated between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans.' It separates the Asian mainland in the northwest from an archi-
pelagic rim to the southeast; 90 percent of its circumference is occupied
by land.' There are two deep embayments on its north-western margin,
4 United Nations, supra it. 2, Article 123 (Cooperation of States Bordering Enclosed or
Senti-enclosed Seas)
5 Inlet C. Mart. "Fishers- and Resource Management in Southeast Asia", Resources for the
Future, Paper No. 7 in it series prepared for the Program of' International Studies of
Fishers- Arrangements (February. 1976), p. 4
li Lewis M. Alexander, "Regional Arrangements in the Oceans", American Journal of inter-
national Laru, y. 71. 1). 91
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the Gulf of Tonkin and the Gulf of Siam. The Sea is directly connected
with the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean to the southwest through
the Singapore-Malacca Straits bordered by Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore. The direct connection with the Pacific Ocean into the north-
east is through the Straits of Formosa between China and Taiwan, Bashi
Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines, and several channels in the
Batan and Babuyan Islands of the Philippines. Numerous indirect inter-
oceanic connections exist via the archipelagic rim. The Philippines, Indo-
nesia, Singapore, Taiwan and the heavily populated area of Hong Kong
are island entities. Malaysia consists of a peninsula and a portion of a
large island, separated from each other by the South China Sea. Thai-
land consists partially of a long isthmus truncated by the international
border with Malaysia. Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and part of Thailand
together comprise a peninsula.
The South China Sea can be bathymetrically divided into the deep
China Sea Basin in the northeastern portion, extending over 1,775 x 106
km2 or 52 percent of the total area, and extensive continental shelf areas
comprising 1,745 x 106 km2 or 48 percent of the total area.' The China
Sea Basin reaches a maximum depth of 5016 m off Palawan and contains
a central abyssal plain of about 4300 m average water depth.8 Numerous
bathymetric highs and island groups are situated on the continental
slope, e.g., Macclesfield (Chunsha) Bank, Pratas Reef, and the Paracels
(Hsisha). The Dangerous Ground, a collection of reefs, banks and islands,
including Spratly (Nansha) Island, in the southwest and Reed Bank in the
northeast, is situated in the eastern center of the South China Sea. Shoals,
e.g., Scarborough and Truro, are also found to the north within the deep
basin.
The continental shelf areas include the Mainland Shelf extending
from the Formosa Strait through the Gulf of Tonkin, the Sunda Shelf un-
derlying the southwestern South China Sea including the Gulf of
Thailand, and the narrow shelves of western Palawan and Luzon.
Numerous island groups and shoals are also situated on the shelves. Two
major series of petroliferous Tertiary basins underlie a portion of the Gulf
of Thailand and the northeastern edge of the Sunda Shelf; the latter series
possibly extends from the Asian mainland to the archipelagic rim. Small
petroliferous basins are also scattered through the coastal and marine
areas of the archipelagoes.'
7 Mark J. Valencia, "The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism". Marine
Policy (April, 1978), p. 87
8 Mark. J. Valencia, "South China Sea: Present and Potential Coastal Area Resource Use
Conflicts", Ocean Management, v. 5 (1978), p. 1-37
9 Ibid., p. 4
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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The South China Sea region is situated almost entirely between the
Tropic of Cancer and the Equator and is under the influence of a tropical
monsoonal climatic regime. North of the Equator, the dry monsoon with
northeasterly winds extends from October to April and the wet monsoon
with southwesterly winds lasts from May to September."' The coastal and
maritime climates and hence the coastal landforms and coastal and
marine biological systems, as well as the way of life of the inhabitants, are
similarly tropical monsoonal throughout much of the region.
Surface currents in the South China Sea are also greatly influenced by
the monsoon regime. During the southwest monsoon, northeasterly
currents, intensified in the western portion of the sea, dominate the sur-
face flow. However, a weaker southwesterly return flow develops in the
central eastern portion off Borneo, producing an anticyclonic circulation
pattern. These conditions are reversed during the northeast monsoon
with intense southwesterly surface flow along the western border
countered by a weaker northeasterly flow in the central eastern portion
forming a cyclonic circulation pattern." Since the surface flow reverses
direction twice each year and there is a counter current producing a cir-
culatory gyre even at the peak of each monsoon, flushing rates of surface
layer pollutants may be quite low. Certainly in the Gulf of Thailand,
water movements at all depths, and thus flushing rates, are weak through-
out the year.
Primary productivity is relatively high (1.0 g C/ms/day) over the Sunda
Shelf, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand, along the east coast of the
Malay Peninsula and between Sumatra and Borneo, and low (less than
0.5 g C/ms/day) over the deep areas.12 Production of fish, crustaceans and
mollusks is thus highest in the shelf areas. Tropical marine ecosystems,
such as those in the South China Sea, generally consist of large numbers
of species with individuals of shorter life cycles as compared to higher
latitude ecosystems. Thus, in the South China Sea, coastal fisheries are
based on large numbers of short-lived species." Some resources, e.g.,
various species of sardines, mackerel and tuna, will be shared by a
number of nations.
10 Mark J. Valencia, "The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism", supra n. 7,
p. 88-89
I I Mark J. Valencia, "South China Sea: Present and Potential Coastal Area Resource Use
Conflicts", supra n. 8, p. 7
12 Ibid., p. 7-9
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THE CONTEXT OF CONSTRAINTS TO MARINE REGIONALISM:
DIVERSE NATIONAL INTERESTS
There are no fundamental cohesive ocean management policies per se
in the entities of Southeast Asia. Components. of ocean management
policy are derived from more fundamental -considerations, e.g.,
historical/cultural perspectives, the current political setting, develop-
ment priorities, internal and external security concerns, and inter-
national relations. Therefore, such ocean management policies as do or
will exist have evolved or will evolve from economic and political trade-
offs within and between these domestic and international priorities.
Historical/Cultural Perspectives
There are several aspects of historical/cultural perspectives that may
be of relevance to the evolving policy positions of countries concerned
with transnational marine management issues in Southe4st Asian Seas.
These include: (1) intrinsic historical/cultural perspectives regarding the
sea and its uses, i.e., maritime traditions; (2) marine and extramarine
historical/cultural relationships among countries in the region; (3)
colonial history of the region, including the role of the sea, as it affects
perspectives on intra- and interregional relationships; and (4) post World
War II history, and the realpolitih of today.
Almost all countries in Southeast Asia have frontage on a
Mediterranean-like sea. Man's relation to the sea in Southeast Asia is
historic and human maritime activities, particularly trade, fishing and
war, have historically ranged well beyond the proposed extended
maritime boundaries. Also, the historically-determined distribution of
cultural-linguistic groups in Southeast Asia, as well as their activities,
overlap current territorial and project maritime boundaries.
Gradually over the past two millennia, foreigners, both eastern and
western, became aware of the natural wealth that Southeast Asia had to
offer. They initially obtained the goods of the region from indigenous in-
ternmediaries who controlled the sources of the goods. Eventually, how-
ever, the foreigners began to desire a direct contact of their own with
these sources and following the shattering of the Srivijaya domain in the
eleventh century, the Javanese system in the sixteenth, and the hold of the
mainland capitals in the nineteenth, they were able to make good their
wish. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the penetration and
opening of Southeast Asia had reached a point where foreigners had
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come to dominate politically and/or economically vast portions of the
region.14
World War II had a tremendous and lingering socio-cultural,
economic, and political impact on the region. Most of the region's en-
tities were under Japanese occupation, a fact which led to western
development of alternative sources and substitutes for their raw materials,
and thus extraregional economic competition which continues today.15
Current Political Setting
The political entities surrounding the South China Sea include the
capitalist, Western-oriented ASEAN block comprising the eastern and
southern rim - - the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thai-
land; the socialist states comprising the northwestern and northern
rim - - Cambodia, land-locked Laos, Vietnam and China; politically-
isolated Taiwan; the British dependencies of Brunei and Hong Kong; and
the Portuguese colony of Macao.
With the exception of Thailand, all the politically independent states
in the region have achieved that status or have experienced society
transforming movements within the last quarter century. Many of these
states are still struggling with basic problems such as the creation of a
sense of national identity among the populace, territorial integrity, or es-
tablishment of a viable economic and social system. Attempts to forge
national unity and to sharpen territorial boundaries have led to external
and internal disputes and conflict. These factors tend to introduce a
nationalistic fervor into intraregional affairs.
This scene serves as a backdrop for the realpolitih of today - the Indo-
chinese revolution and Vietnamese domination of Indochina, the con-
comitant Chinese-Soviet/Vietnamese tension, ASEAN co-operation and
competition, and the strong political and economic interests and involve-
ment of the United States and Japan in the region.
Within ASEAN itself, political-economic relations are cordial but
competitive and perhaps unstable in the long-term. For example,
Thailand must maintain a precarious balance between her own political-
economic system and those of her socialist neighbors. The Muslim
14 J.K. Whitmore, 1977 "The Opening of Southeast Asia: Trading Patterns Through the
Centuries"; in Karl T. Hutterer, ed., Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast
Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History, and Ethnography (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The Uni-
versitv of Michigan, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1977) pp. 139-154
15 Donald W. Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia, George Philip, London (1979, 2nd edition,
forthcoming), p. 6
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THE INDONESIAN QUARTERLY
irredentist movement in the south may eventually irritate relations with
Malaysia. Indonesia, by virtue of her size, population, GNP, oil and.
military posture, is clearly the leader of the ASEAN block, although this
jealously-guarded role has in the past been ignored by other ASEAN
members. Indonesia attacked Singapore. and Malaysia during Soekarno's
Konfrontasi,16 and her long-term potential for expansion must be con-
sidered in the light of past expansion in West Irian and Timor." Brunei
will reluctantly be given independence in 1983 and Malaysia and other
nations may try to influence her political destiny." As a sovereign enclave
of successful Chinese entrepreneurship in a less developed Malay world,
Singapore often projects a seige mentality and may be in a tenuous posi-
tion for the long-term. Malaysia and the Philippines have not yet resolved
the Sabah issue to Malaysia's satisfaction," and the successionist Muslim
movement in the Philippines probably creates tensions between the
Philippines and her Muslim neighbors.21' Economically, several of the
ASEAN countries produce the same raw materials for their national live-
lihood and the resulting direct competition for credits, investment,
assistance and markets will increase concomitant with development.
Other more-far-fetched or longer term indigenous political changes
could create instability within ASEAN, e.g., succession of Sabah or
Sarawak from the Federation of Malaysia, coups or political revolutions
in Thailand or the Philippines, or racial disorder in Malaysia.
In the wake of the successful Indochinese revolution, the United
States, the Soviet Union and China are vying for spheres of influence
within the region, thus creating or fostering instability. Indeed, the Kam-
puchean-Vietnamese conflict could be viewed as a proxy war of China
and the Soviet Union. China, fearing encirclement by Soviet allied states
on her southern flank had encouraged Kampuchea to provoke and to
resist Vietnam while simultaneously bringing direct pressure to bear on
Vietnam along their common border. At this juncture, Laos and Viet-
nam are firm allies within the Soviet sphere of influence,' and Vietnam's
16 Donald W. Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia, supra n. 15, p. 29
17 Ibid.
18 Anonymous, "The First 21 Years Show Some Success", Far Eastern Economic Review
(September I, 1978), p. 51-52; 'Anonymous', "Intelligence: Brunei's Bargain Offer",
Far Eastern Economic Review (March 11, 1977), p. 5
19 Anonymous, "The First 21 Years Show Some Success", supra, n. 8
20 Rodney Tasker, "Rebels Shift to New Targets", Far Eastern Economic Review, (December
1, 1978), p. 22-24
21 David A. Andelman, "Indochina is Adjusting to Peace". New York Times (December 19,
1976), p. 4E
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purported goal of a Federation of Indochina has moved nearer with their
conquest of the China-backed Kampuchean regime.22 Open hostilities
can probably continue to exist between China and Vietnam, reflecting the
"cold war" situation between China and the Soviet Union. The next arena
for surrogate conflict may be Thailand through various means including
violent acts by rival insurgent groups.13
The ASEAN members and Brunei, can be considered economically
and politically within the sphere of influence of the West, particularly the
United States. The ASEAN group is wary and vigilant regarding China's
intentions, particularly vis-a-vis the overseas Chinese within their respec-
tive socio-economic systems. The presence in almost all of the non-
,Communist entities of insurgencies ideologically aligned with, and sup-
ported by, the Communist Party of China reinforces this fear. However,
normalization of U.S. - China relations is generally viewed positively in
ASEAN capitals as it may, in their perception, provide the counter-
balance to Soviet intentions to fill the power vacuum .14
The abrupt normalization of relations between China and the United
States may have partially been a response to the recent gains in the region
of a perceived common enemy, the Soviet Union, particularly the mutual
defense agreement with Vietnam.25.On the contrary, Vietnam's involve-
ment in Kampuchea, apparently backed by the Soviet Union, has created
alarm in ASEAN capitals26 and may precipitate movement towards an
ASEAN defense pact or at least closer military co-operation. Vietnam and
China are both wooing ASEAN members in order to stave off further
arenas of conflict on their southern marine flanks. However, ASEAN
capitals have received these overtures coolly in a remarkable un-
precedented display of-high-level political co-ordination.21
22 Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN Unites in Anger", Far Eastern Economic Review, (January 19,
1979), p. 12-14; Tai Tong, "Phnom Penh's Fall", Far Eastern Economic Review, (January
26, 1979), p. 8; Rodney Tasker, "Condemnation But No Confrontation", Ibid. (January
26, 1979), p. 24-26
23 John McBeth, "Communists at the Crossroads", Far Eastern Economic Review, (July 27,
1979), p. 30-31.
24 Melinda Liu, "The Long March to Realism", Far Eastern Economic Review, (December 29,
1978), p. 10-12
25 Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN Unites in Anger", supra n. 22
27 Rodney Tasker, "A Courteous Rebuff", Far Eastern Economic Review, (September 29,
197,8), p. 8; Barry Wain, "ASEAN-Vietnam Rift Carries Risks of Political Polarization",
Asian. Wall Street Journal, (January 26, 1979), p. 9
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Marine Components of National Interest
Development Priorities
A number of factors are influencing evolving national perceptions of
the ocean. Among these are: 1) technological advances in marine use and
resource exploitation capabilities; 2) increased national awareness of, and
expectations for, potential ocean resources; and 3) indications that a
"common property" approach to ocean resources may be inefficient, and
advantageous to developed countries.
The political entities of the South China Sea marine region are, in
general, developing countries with a low per capita GNP and high rates of
population growth. Although only three political entities produce off-
shore hydrocarbons, almost all have high expectations for its discovery
and exploitation in their jurisdictional areas. The South China Sea coun-
tries are generally only moderately reliant on seaborne trade and
petroleum compared to the rest of the world. However, this degree of
reliance reflects their undeveloped economies rather than their high
dependence on sea transport for export of their primary agricultural and
mineral commodities and their importation of manufactured goods and,
for some, petroleum products. This dependence will increase in conjunc-
tion with the development process.
As for investment in the marine sector, their merchant and tanker
fleets are of moderate size. Their capability to patrol or deter unwanted
entry into their potential marine areas is generally inadequate. Research
expenditures, expertise, education in marine science, and technology and
capital are generally insufficient for indigenous development of their
potential marine resources. Thus, knowledge and technology transfer are
prime marine interests of these coastal nations.1%
Although anticipated economic benefits may be a prime motivation
for jurisdictional extensions, such extension will produce unanticipated
economic and political side effects. The zones of extended jurisdiction will
bring more area and more types of activity under the control of coastal
states. Coastal states will have to develop policies and efficient manage-
ment designs for the space, resources and the increasing varieties of activi-
ty within these zones. However, in many nations the administrative, scien-
tific and technical infrastructure is presently inadequate for efficient
management. Therefore, management policies may be formulated
without critical information or the capacity to implement them.
29 Mark J. Valencia. "Southeast Asia: National Marine Interests and Marine
Rcgionalist n", Ocean Development and International Law Journal v. 5 (1978), p. 422-476
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The recent trend toward extended maritime jurisdictions is building
interest in the maritime environment and its potential for serving the
future development needs of the region's nations: For some nations, there
is a wide quality of life gap between the rich and the poor, between the ur-
ban centers and rural areas. It is perhaps a political imperative that these
nations bridge that gap by providing a modest way of life for all the peo-
ple. Within the constraints of internal and external national security con-
siderations and international political-economic relations, the major in-
fluence on state ocean policy positions is thus likely to be the "value"
perception of ocean resources; i.e., how ocean resources can "best" con-
tribute to "development" and to narrowing the gap between "have" and
"have-nots"
Diverse development priorities may present pragmatic obstacles to
regional or subregional functional marine co-ordination or co-
operation. For example, the time frame for issue development is an im-
portant factor in the dynamics of national marine interest. This time
frame will vary with the issue and with the perspective of each of the con-
cerned actors. There may be a lack of synchroneity in the state of evolu-
tion of marine.- relevant sectors, and thus fixed-term development plans.
This diversity could inhibit co-operation/co-ordination of scientific
research and of consent to specific transnational projects proposed by ex-
traregional states. A range of perspective and conditions among coastal
states in the region for granting of consent for access for scientific re-
search by extraregional entities may foster an increase in the diversity of
quantity, quality and focus of scientific research in national zones. Diver-
sity of knowledge may lead to transnational misunderstanding and dis-
agreement regarding national management of portions of transnational
systems. Also, co-ordination of marine environmental regulations and
their enforcement may not he feasible due to lack of synchroneity in per-
spective on environment- development trade-offs, the perceived variances
of environmental vulnerability of different regions, and the concomitant
variation on restrictiveness and sophistication of national regulations and
their enforcement in various zones of jurisdiction.
The oft-mentioned possibility of co-operation in fisheries manage-
ment is itself fraught with constraints. National objectives for fisheries
management include employment, protein, profit, maintenance of
cultural traditions and national pride in a modern fishing fleet. The tim-
ing of relative emphasis among these objectives may also differ from na-
tion to nation and within nations. It is possible that for migratory or
shared stocks, the same stocks may be the basis for fisheries development
plans or supply strategy of more than one country within or outside the
region. Also, a problem with effort on migratory species is that increased
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catch in one national zone may reduce available stocks in other national
zones along the path of stock migration.
It has been suggested that a co-ordinated policy position and ex-
change of information vis-a-vis access for distant-water fishing states
could lead to improved coastal state bargaining positions, increased
technology transfer, and provision of information necessary for fisheries
management. However, a co-ordinated policy position vis-a-vis distant-
water fishing entities is unlikely because: (1) there are only a few buyers of
access, (2)-the, resource varies in nature and value geographically, and
(3) terms of agreements will vary with the nature and value of the resource
and the incentives required for attracting distant-water exploiters. In any
case, the potential for a united front is being rapidly reduced as time
passes and separate arrangements with coastal states by distant-water
fishing entities become fait accompli.
Security Concerns
The maintenance of newly acquired national sovereignty over ocean
resources and jurisdiction over ocean space has underlying national
security connotations and any co-ordination or co-operation cannot be
perceived as jeopardizing this basic principle. Creeping sovereignty may
create further tension.
Extended jurisdiction poses external security problems for the
region's countries. For example, countries which are politically and/or
ideologically opposed, e.g., Vietnam and Indonesia, Vietnam and the
Philippines, and Vietnam and China, will be brought into jurisdictional
contact or overlap with each other in the South China Sea. Nations may
attempt to extend their sea borders as far as possible to give them
"breathing room" with regard to their new neighbors, and for insulation
from conflicts involving navies of major powers. A wider jurisdictional
zone may also be perceived as enhancing the prospect of defense and of
arresting foreign violators of national regulations.
Initial regimes may be very strict and the undeveloped surveillance
and enforcement capabilities of these nations may dictate abrupt and
forceful "exemplary" measures to underline national control over ocean
space and resources. On the other hand, unsophisticated navigational
aids and lack of control over unorganized groups traditionally operating
across the new maritime borders may create transnational tension. For
example, throughout the region, fishermen of one nation who have fish-
ed in particular areas for generations will find these fishing grounds sub-
sumed by a neighboring nation's EEZ. It is unlikely in the short-term,
that these fishermen will recognize the resource sovereignty of the
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neighboring nation. On the other hand, the resource owner will attempt
to exert control over its claimed resources. Conflict between fishermen
and the enforcement agency will produce disputes between neighboring
nations.
Southeast Asian governments have regularly faced minority political
revolts, some aided materially by other nations from within and outside
of the region. The archipelagic nations, i.e., the Philippines and Indo-
nesia view the archipelagic concept as a political framework for creating
real national unity among widely scattered islands and subcultures.
Others, e.g., Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, may view this extension
of jurisdiction and "its strict. enforcement as the potential first step in a
creeping sovereignty which will eventually transform ocean space to
national territory. For Thailand and Malaysia, such action could become
a perceptual wedge between national units by potentially threatening sea
communication among dissimilar parts of the same country.
Similar conflicting perceptions may be particularly relevant to. nations
which claim various islands and their attached 200nm EEZs in the South
China Sea. Other nations which have, or may become, politically isolated
in the region may view extended jurisdiction in a similar fashion vis-a-uis
material support from outside the region. Also germane is the perceived
primary security interest in islands themselves along borders and in the
South China Sea. This is due to their strategic location and to the present
perception that land is of more national human concern than sea space.
The security concerns of extraregional maritime powers both coincide
with, and diverge from regional concerns. The maritime powers are
directly concerned with keeping the sea lines of communication open
through, and within, the region for communication with "friendly"
nations. Thus, any move that might be considered a potential threat to
"freedom of navigation" would bring the usual pressures to bear perhaps
including a "showing of the flag". An outbreak of regional hostilities
would also be considered a potential threat to open sealanes.
The South China Sea islands are strategically situated in regards to
these sealanes and for submarine bases. It may appear that the present
and future maritime users, China, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United
States, have a common interest in keeping the sealanes open. However,
they have and will continue to operate behind the scenes through friendly
regional countries, to inhibit one another's proxies from undue control
of islands or sealanes while attempting to obtain such proxy control
themselves. Such maneuvers, directly concerning either territory or ocean
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space, or resource-related activities in areas of potential conflict, may
only irritate relations in the region by strongly influencing the security
perspectives and actions of the region's nations.
Resource, Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Resource - Related Ac-
tivities
Resources and resource-related activities are to be managed. Impor-
tant resources include oil and gas, fish, space, and environmental quality.
Activities related to these resources include oil and gas ex-
ploration/exploitation, fishing, transportation/navigation, scientific
research and waste disposal.
a. Boundary Disputes (Figure 1)
Extended jurisdiction, boundary delimitation and resolution of
boundary disputes will determine who will manage the resources and ac-
tivities. The content of each national jurisdictional regime and the im-
plications for other nations will flow from these developments. Settle-
ment of jurisdictional boundaries may thus be a prerequisite for co-
operation on most other issues. There are four general types of marine
boundary disputes which must be resolved: continental shelves, EEZs
legal status and ownership of mid-ocean islands, and Chinese historical
claims to much of the South China Sea. Elements of these disputes and
the categories of the disputes themselves are interrelated.
The baseline of a coastal state's territorial sea is a foundation for the
other claims. There is general agreement on the l2nm limit for the
territorial sea among the coastal states and entities of the region, although
Brunei, Singapore and Taiwan still retain a 3nm territorial sea for
historical reasons. Nevertheless, the coastal states may disagree on the
adoption of normal, or straight baselines from which the territorial sea is
measured. Some, e.g., China and Vietnam, have not yet specified their
baselines. Also, the boundaries of the archipelagic claims of the Philip-
pines and Indonesia, international issues in themselves, will be used as
baselines for EEZ, continental shelf, and, for Indonesia, territorial sea
claims. The Philippines claims her treaty boundaries as the limits of her
territorial waters.
Most of the region's entities have declared jurisdiction over their con-
tinental shelves and ownership of the resources thereon and thereunder.
Nine bilateral and trilateral continental shelf boundary agreements have
been signed by the coastal states in the region. All of these agreements in-
volve Indonesia and mostly concern less controversial areas outside the
South China Sea proper. Over a dozen continental shelf agreements
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RONG'
W MW
arMCrous
GrourM .,~ ~~
AREAS IN DISPUTE
..; 200 METER ISOBATH
CHINA'S HISTORICAL CLAIMS
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between the various coastal states are still required.29 Significant disputes
with no immediate resolution in sight include those between Thailand
and Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia and Cambodia and Vietnam in the
eastern Gulf of Thailand, that between Vietnam and China in the Gulf of
Tonkin, and that between Indonesia and Vietnam north of the Natuna
Islands (See Map).30
Continental shelf boundary settlement is no longer a high priority to
Indonesia primarily because agreement has already been reached on most
boundaries.31 Indonesia has apparently taken the view that the need to
have agreement is more important than the need to maintain a position
which may be more costly in the long run. Indonesia's strategy appears to
be to negotiate bilaterally with each bordering country; on the basis of
these separate agreements, Indonesia and the several countries concerned
will logically proceed to a multilateral common point.
Vietnam and Indonesia might have been content to undertake an
economic race for regional supremacy separated by hundreds of miles of
the South China Sea. With extention of jurisdiction to their respective
continental shelves. Indonesia and Vietnam have not only become
neighbors but actually have overlapping continental shelf claims north of
the Natuna Islands.
The area of overlap may have hydrocarbon potential; in fact, both
Vietnam and Indonesia have let contracts for exploratory drilling in areas
immediately north and south of the disputed area. These nations are
ideologically and politically opposed and the dispute thus has potential
national security implications. Both nations need any oil to be dis-
covered - Vietnam for development and independence in energy re-
sources and for Indonesia, to contribute to the continuation of her level
of lucrative exports while satisfying domestic energy demand."
29 Hasjim Djalal, Conflicting Territorial and Jurisdictional Claims in South China Sea: In-
donesian Quarterly, v. III, no. 3, July, 1979
30 Stephen W. Ritterbush, "Marine Resources and the Potential for Conflict in the South
China Sea", The Fletcher Forum, v. 2 (January, 1978); Gulf of Tonkin dispute from
Anonymous; Estimated Philippines EEZ from Philippines Bureau of Coast and
Geodetic Survey, personal communication.
Anonymous, "The Truth about the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Question", Bejing
Review, (May 25, 1979), p. 14-19; Anonymous, "How Did the Sino-Vietnamese Border
Dispute Corne About?" Beijing Review, (Mav 25, 1979), p. 19-23
31 Mark J. Valencia, "Southeast Asian Seas: National Marine Interests Transnational
Issues and Marine Regionalism". in Chia Lin Sien and Colin McAndrews, eds., Southeast
Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development (Pergamon Press) in press
32 Guv Sacerdoti, "Wijarso Faces Up to the Oil Ghost", Far Eastern Economic Review, (June
10, 1977), p. 43
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These countries must rely largely on multinational capital, technical
expertise and equipment for-offshore hydrocarbon development. How-
ever, multinationals or extra-regional governments are unlikely to invest
in hydrocarbon development in disputed areas, particularly if the dispute
is serious enough to threaten the security of their investment. Also, the
conditions for exploitation and export of any oil found may differ
markedly depending on which nation controls the resource. Thus, resolu-
tion or muting of boundary disputes may be a prerequisite for develop-
ment of any hydrocarbon resources in this area.
Agreement in these disputes may be particularly difficult if, as in-
dicated in the ICNT Rev. 1, any such disputes are to be resolved on the
basis of equity and in the. light of all relevant circumstances." These
boundaries will also be more difficult to resolve due to conflicting claims
of ownership of coastal and offshore islands and the application of
different principles to continental shelf boundary claims and delimita-
tion - adjacency, exploitability, median line, prolongation of the con-
tinental margin and equity.
In the region, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia have
declared EEZs;'4 Malaysia and Indonesia will do so soon. The South
China Sea is a semi-enclosed, largely shallow sea with a projected pattern
of complex jurisdictional adjacencies which are dependent on, and in part
extensions of territorial boundaries between independent nations. Lit-
toral state extension of resource sovereignty and jurisdictional limits to
200nm will create or exacerbate existing boundary disputes implicitly in-
volving large areas of the South China Sea. Including disputed claims to
South China Sea islands, many claimants are situated within 400nm of
one another, so that the extended jurisdictions of opposite claimants to
200nm will overlap in many sectors. In some instances; e.g., between
Indonesia and Vietnam, the EEZ boundary may not be the same as that
on the continental shelf because of the application of different principals
such as equidistance vs. prolongation of the continental margin.
The disputed ownership of numerous obscure islands in the South
China Sea is another source of serious disagreement in delimiting sea
boundaries in the region. Vietnam and China both continue to claim
33 United Nations supra n. 2, Article 83 (Delimitation of the Continental shelf between ad-
jacent or opposite States)
34 Raymond Yao, "Gun Law of the Sea", Far Eastern Economic Review, (17 June 1977) p. 25;
Diane Ying, "Taiwan Declares 200nm EEZ", Asian Wall Street journal, (8 September,
1979) p. 3; Nayan Chanda, "All at Sea over the Deeper Issue", Far Eastern Economic
Rerliew, (3 February, 1978), p. 23; See Presidential Decree No. 1599 (Establishing an Ex-
clusive Economic Zone and for other Purposes), signed by President Ferdinand E. Mar-
cos on 11 June, 1978
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THE INDONESIAN QUARTERLY
ownership of the Paracel Islands, although China is now the sole occu-
pant, having forcibly removed South Vietnamese forces in January
1974.65 China also claims the Spratly Islands including Reed Bank at the
northern extremity of the Dangerous Ground where Philippine-
sanctioned exploration and drilling operations have brought strong
Chinese and Vietnamese protests. 16 Parts of the Spratlys and the Reed
Bank area are also claimed and/or occupied by forces of Taiwan and Viet-
nam." Because of their negligible size, the legal status of many of these
uninhabited mid-ocean islands in regards to extended jurisdictional
zones would also be open to controversy.
. Finally, China's historical claim to much of the South China sea poses
a major constraint tor regional marine activities which exclude China.
With both Vietnam and China maintaining a relatively low profile regar-
ding their claims, settlement may be some time in coming, particularly, if
these unspecified claims are to be used as political leverage vis-a-vis
ASEAN. Also, knowledge of resources may be a prerequisite to
negotiations on the basis of equity, presenting, together with restrictive
positions of some of the claimants on access for scientific research, a
"Catch 22" situation. Finally, a country must be perceived as politically
stable to negotiate a lasting agreement and this attribute is not
widespread in Southeast Asia.
b. Diversity ofJurisdictional Regimes and Content
The variety of jurisdictional regimes and their specific content as
determined by national interests will determine how the resources and
resource-related activities are to be managed. Jurisdiction over ocean
space is divided three ways--by function, by distance from shore, and
vertically. Jurisdictional regime types in Southeast Asian Seas will include
internal waters (including archipelagic waters), territorial seas, various
types of straits, historic waters, sealanes, continental shelves, exclusive
35 Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratley islands",
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, v. 3, No. 1 (1975) p. 1-28; Choon-Ho
Park, supra n..29, p. 27-59; Hungdah Chiu, "South China Sea Islands; Implications for
Delimiting the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes", The, China Quarterly, (December,
1977) p. 743-765; Russel Spurr, "Peking's inshore Navy", Far Eastern Economic Review,
(June 3, 1977), p 30-31
36 Bernard Wideman, "Manila, Hanoi at Odds Over Isle Oil", The Sunday Star-Bulletin and
Advertiser, (June 18, 1977), p. A-14.
37 Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park, supra n. 34; Choon-Ho Park supra n. 29 p. 29;
Corazon M. Siddayao, The Offshore Petroleum Resources of Southeast Asia, Potential
Conflict Situations and Related Economic Considerations, Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur (1978), p. 88-90
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economic zones, security zones and airspace. Conditions of access to
resources and the use of any or each of these jurisdictional zones will be
determined by their specific content. The specific content of national
jurisdiction, and the implementation of management and enforcement
policies, as well as their transnational diversity, will be determined by
national marine interests.
However, the form, substance, effectiveness and net benefit of
national management designs will both influence and be influenced by
the interests, activities and policies of the maritime powers and nations
with adjacent jurisdictional zones. Political-economic trade-offs in
national management and development of ocean space and resources are
inevitable, given the reality of intra- and interregional inter-
dependencies, extra-regional influence and interest in the region, and the
indigenous gap between development hopes and capabilities. National
policies for marine jurisdictional zones- and their resources may thus
become bargaining chips within the larger political context. Such trade-
offs may involve spheres ostensibly unrelated to oceans, such as "resource
diplomacy", or they may involve package bargains within the ocean
policy sphere.
Diversity of management regimes for transnational resources or
resource-related activities may lead to intra- and interregional com-
promise, or to conflict. Even if UNCLOS does not yield to multinational
diversity, and in spite of treaties, legal precedents and LOS provisions,
there will remain the problems of national and regional implementation
of management designs. Even implementation of internationally accepted
standards for activity in extended jurisdictional zones will create trans-
national issues because there is a wide range of national capability and
will to enforce such standards.
Maritime nations within or from outside the region will have to
negotiate conditions of access to coastal state resources and for use of
space. Conditions of resource access and space use may, in practice, be
preferentially applied, dependent on political or economic considera-
tions in the marine or other spheres. Such preferential treatment could
exacerbate coastal state relations with third countries which have been
denied access. Maritime powers may choose to exploit policy diversities
by shifting their activity toward areas of least resistance. Thus, diverse
national policies for zones of extended jurisdiction will have interdepen-
dent implications for the protection and management of the transna-
tional marine env- ronment and its resources.
There is thus a need for increased bilateral and multilateral con-
sultations, as well as a new degree of coordination to meet the challenge
of these impending changes in marine use patterns and concepts. How-
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ever, states are only now beginning to perceive clearly their own national
marine interests and how these differ from those of neighboring states or
maritime powers. Commonalities are neglected and differences emphasiz-
ed.
c. Marine Areal and Resource Inequities
With extension of jurisdiction in the South China Sea, geography dic-
tates that there will be inequities and imbalances imposed upon an
already economically and politically competitive milieu. The marine areal
and attendant resource base of Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei
will be negligible compared to. the great gains of China, Indonesia, the
Philippines. and Vietnam. This abrupt increase in inequities of area and
potential wealth may endanger ASEAN's progress in co-operation in
other spheres if compensation and accommodation for these geo-
graphically-determined disadvantages are not provided.
For example, Singapore hopes to enhance her status as the maritime
center of ASEAN and the region, serving to consolidate and disperse the
Europe to Southeast Asia trade and as a center for warehousing and pre-
and post-marine exploitation services. In the long-term Singapore may
actually benefit from the extension of jurisdiction of her neighbors and
their concomitant increased marine activities.
Singapore is zone-locked and her principal marine interest and in-
deed her economic base is thus unrestricted transport of goods and oil in
the region. Ironically, the very geographic situation of Singapore which
has contributed so much to her economic well-being, may, in the new
political. geography of oceans, be a. disadvantage. For example, the recent
trilateral agreement for traffic safety standards in the Malacca Strait im-
plies that some larger tankers will use the Lombok diversion and may
have put Singapore on guard against any future schemes that would affect
her entreport and transshipment status.
Another major marine interest of Singapore is compensation for her
GDS status. She is shelf-locked and has the least potential offshore area in
the region accruing in the event of a 200nm limit.
Singapore is a distant-water fishing nation as there are insufficient fish
for her fleet in her territorial seas and the negligible area available for
further jurisdictional extension .31 Access to Malaysian and Indonesian
88 Chia Lin Sien, "Coastal Changes, Marine Pollution and the Fishing Industry in
Singapore", paper presented at the Second Biennial Meeting of the Agricultural
Economic Society of South East Asia (AESSEA) November 3- 7, 1977, Iloilo, Philippines,
p. 28
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THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
territorial seas and Indonesian archipelagic waters will, with the ex-
ception of traditional fishing, probably be denied. Singapore has con-
sistently opposed extended jurisdiction but may attempt to bargain re-
cognition of the inevitable for compensatory measures. Such compensa-
tion might take the form of unhindered marine transit for her trading
partners, and air transit over neighbor's territorial seas which surround
Singapore, or even "regionalization" of fisheries.
Laos is land-locked and desires guaranteed marine access as well as
compensatory access to neighboring countries' marine resources. From
1954 until the Indochinese revolution, Laos depended predominantly on
Thailand for both imports (56%) and exports. (65%). However, during this
period and since, Thailand has used transit as a political-economic means
to influence Laotian internal politics and control incursions along their
long common border.39 Laos has requested access to the "surplus" of liv-
ing resources in the Gulf of Thailand from Thailand, but the request was
denied on the basis that there was no "surplus".
Cambodia is shelf-locked and Brunei is nearly shelf-locked; both are
zone-locked and have marine access only on a semi-enclosed sea. Thai-
land is both shelf-locked and zone-locked in the South China Sea. More-
over, the Thai distant-water fishing grounds in the South China Sea have,
or will come under Malaysian, Cambodian, Vietnamese and Indonesian
jurisdiction.
Indonesia's situation is a marked example in contrast. Except for
China, Indonesia has the largest population and the largest land area in
the region. Extension of jurisdiction, i.e., archipelagic waters, continental
shelf and EEZ, will provide Indonesia with marine resource sovereignty in
a huge area. Indonesia will probably follow the ICNT Rev. 1 provisions
for activities in her EEZ, viz., a consent regime for scientific research,
sovereign rights over protection of the marine environment, and access to
any fish surplus on the basis of preferential treatment for regional GDS
and other regional entities.
However, Indonesia's provisions for access to archipelagic (internal)
waters and territorial sea are likely to be restrictive. Acceptance of the
archipelagic concept and its attendant regime by neighbors and maritime
powers alike is the core of Indonesian national marine interests. Aside
from forging a sense of national unity, the concept is of prime security
concern to Indonesia. Control over these waters would inhibit external
material support to the frequent separatist movements in the archipelago,
39 David A. Andelman, "Indochina is Adjusting to Peace", New York Times, (December 19,
1976), p. 4E
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and facilitate interception of violators of the various jurisdictional
regimes.
This concept may also underlie Indonesia's position on the Malacca
Straits since these Straits can be seen as providing a route into the "inter-
nal waters" of the archipelago.40 However, if Japanese tankers over 220 x
103 dwt use the Lombok-Makassar route, Indonesia may gain the
economic benefits of a superport on Indonesian territory, or at least tap
this mobile "oil pipeline" to enhance development projects and thus
political integration of rural border areas. Indonesia may also have a
long-term interest in restricting the strategic mobility of the maritime
powers, thus insulating themselves from maritime power conflicts.41
Indonesia already requires advance notice and permission of foreign
military vessels to enter her territorial waters. Nevertheless, transit
passage in designated sealanes.will apparently be accepted.
Indonesia reserves all fisheries 'resources for herself in archipelagic
waters as there is a perceived dependence on food from the sea particular-
ly for rural folk, and there are plans to develop unexploited areas.. Also,
the Java Sea, the Malacca Straits and the Indonesian South China Sea are
overfished and no new trawlers can be built or licensed for use there until
the resource, gear-conflict and foreign fishing situation is evaluated and
policy and detailed regulations developed. The present policy for under-
exploited areas is to allow indigenous people to fish in order to determine
the resource base through monitoring of the catch. Thailand has been
seeking access for her trawlers in the same areas where additional Indo-
nesian effort has been prohibited, thus prospects for Thai access appear
low.
For sometime and for most transnational marine issues, bilateral
agreements and co-operation will be the rule. However, a carefully con-
structed web of bilateral agreements of a similar nature may eventually
form the basis for multilateral negotiations and adjustments towards a
common policy. For example, a particular country in the region with
many common marine borders; e.g., Indonesia, may take the lead in es-
tablishing bilateral agreements on EEZ jurisdictional content as she has
done with her marine neighbors for her continental shelf boundaries. In
40 Lee Yong Leng, Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea, Some Preliminary -Observations on the
Political Geography of Southeast Asian Seas, (Singapore University Press, 1978), p. 22
41 Ibid.
36
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this way, she might eventually lead those neighbors which also share com-
mon marine borders among themselves to co-ordinate the content of
their EEZ regimes. Co-ordination of policies, jurisdictional content and
enforcement procedures will probably precede functional co-operation.
There are two extreme categories of marine regionalism which might
short-circuit this evolutionary process: that which is relatively innocuous
and does not impinge on national sovereignty, and that where there is a
demonstrated urgent need, fear or commonality. The former category
would include data exchange and compilation for, e.g., fisheries, in-
cluding biological information and possibly information on various types
of co-operative ventures, limited information on hydrocarbons, and in-
formation on environmental quality and techniques of monitoring, pre-
vention and control.
Specific national marine policies could be coordinated provided such
co-ordination does not impinge on national sovereignty; this is a basic
dilemma between national and international interests, with the former
usually and understandably having priority in the short-term. There are
several issues that contain elements of a regional - extraregional polarity
that might create a common sense of urgency sufficient for regional ac-
tion, while maintaining or even strengthening national sovereignty: For
.the extraregional nations, the interest in unimpeded 'transit in general or
for specific vessel types in specific waters, e.g., warships in "inter-
national" straits, may be a unifying factor in a maritime power approach
to the region. For the region's coastal states, the concept of a zone of
"peace, freedom and neutrality" might eventually lead to the perhaps un-
enforceable denial of passage of all foreign warships in the South China
Sea.
Such issues might also include common, perhaps dual standards for
transportation of potential pollutants, i.e., stricter standards for vessels
transiting through the region than for cross and internal traffic by coastal
state lines. Since technology transfer is high on the list of "Third World"
demands, regional or subregional co-operation could be envisioned in
the development and transfer of marine technology via, among other
means, the establishment of regional marine scientific and technological
research centers as described in the ICNT Rev. 1.12 Finally, mechanisms
for dispute avoidance/settlement may be regionalized or subregionalized
to conform more closely with indigenous cultural systems for dealing with
international disagreements. The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-
operation in Southeast Asia of 24 February 1976, provides that the con-
42 United Nations, supra n. 2, Part XIV (Development and Transfer of Marine
Technology )
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tracting parties shall be guided by the principle of settlement of
differences or disputes by peaceful means, and thus may serve as a foun-
dation for. subregional marine dispute settlement.
In between these two extremes of innocuousness and urgency/
regional-extraregional polarization lie most of the transnational issues.
Most "regional issues" are general, analogous bilateral issues in the
region and not truly regional in scope. Functional marine regionalism
or subregionalism in incipient at best and perhaps a hopelessly idealistic
goal at worst. Necessity may be the mother of co-operation. UNCLOS is
really an attempt at World Government for the majority of the area of the
globe and is fraught with the same imbalances, inequities and instability
that have plagued such attempts in the past. It is premature to hope for its
successful practical application in a region comprising increasingly
nationalistic developing states, some ravaged by conflicts instigated and
supported by extraregional powers. Indeed, extraregional powers with
maritime interests in the region may continue attempts to influence the
marine policy of developing coastal states. Coastal state control and terms
of resource and sealane access may create big power tensions which could
be played out through surrogate coastal state conflicts.
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9
No. 15, "Net Energy Analysis and the Theory of Value: Is it a New Paradigm for a Planned
Economic System?"- by Eric L. Hyman. From Journal of Environmental Systems, 9, no.
4(1979-80): 313-324.
No. 14, "Bows, Blowpipes and Blunderbusses: Ecological Implications of Weapons Change
Among the Malaysian Negritos," by A. Terry Rambo. From The Malayan Nature Journal 32,
no. 2(1978):209-216.
No. 13, "Interactions Between People and Forests in East Kalimantan," by Andrew P. Vayda,
Carol J. Pierce Colfer, and Mohamad Brotokusumo. From Impact of Science on Society 30,
no. 3(1980):179-190.
No. 12, "Fish, Fishing, and Sea Boundaries: Tuna Stocks and Fishing Policies in Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific," by John Bardach and Yoshiaki Matsuda. From Geojournal
4.5(1980): 467-478.
No. 11, "Using Ecological Knowledge for Development Planning," by Richard A. Carpenter.
From Environmental Management 4, no. 1(1980):13-20.
No. 10, "Environmental Considerations in Energy Policies," by Toufiq A. Siddiqi. From
Ecology and Development, edited by Desh Bandhu and Veena Bhardwaj, pp. 169-181. Darya
Ganj, New Delhi: Indian Environmental Society, 1979.
No. 9, "Human Ecology of the Orang ASLI: A Review of Research on the Environmental Re-
lations of the Aborigines of Peninsular Malaysia," by A. Terry Rambo. From Federation Mu-
seums journal 24, new series (1979): 41-71.
No. 8, "Primitive Man's Impact on Genetic Resources of the Malaysian Tropical Rain For-
est," by A. Terry Rambo. From Malaysian Applied Biology 8, no. 1(1979): 59-65.
No. 7, "Environmental Analysis and Policy Planning," by William H. Matthews. From
Bioscience 29, no. 1(1979): 23-25.
No. 6, "The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism," by Mark J. Valencia. From
Marine Policy, April 1978, pp. 87-104.
No. 5, "Southeast Asia: National Marine Interests and Marine Regionalism," by Mark J. Va-
lencia. From Ocean Development and International Law Journal 5, no. 4(1978): 421-476.
No. 4, "Energy Resources of the Developing Countries and Some Priority Markets for the
Use of Solar Energy," by Toufiq A. Siddigi and Gerald F. Hein. From The journal of Energy
and Development 3, no. 1(autumn 1977):164-189.
No. 3, "Criteria for Selecting Appropriate Methods for Environmental Assessment," by
William H. Matthews. From the journal of the Japan Society of Air Pollution 15, no. 1(1980):
9-12.
No. 2, "Renewable Energy Prospects," edited by Wilfrid Bach, Walther Manshard, William
H. Matthews, and Harrison Brown._A Special Issue of Energy, The International journal 4, no.
5(1979): 711-1021.
No. 1, "Exploring Alternative Energy Strategies," by Wilfrid Bach and William H. Matthews.
From Energy, The International Journal4, no. 5(1979): 711-722.
The East-West Environment and Policy Institute Reprint Series presents selected articles by
research staff and participants that have been published elsewhere and are likely to be of in-
terest to EWEAPI audiences. Before reprinting an article, the Institute obtains permission
from the publisher. Available at no charge (single copies only) while supplies last.
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THE EAST-WEST CENTER - officially known as the Center for Cultural and Techni-
cal Interchange Between East and West- is a national educational institution estab-
lished in Hawaii by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to promote better relations and under-
standing between the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific through
cooperative study, training, and research. The Center is administered by a public,
nonprofit corporation whose international Board of Governors consists of distin-
guished scholars, business leaders, and public servants.
Each year more than 1,500 men and women from many nations and cultures par-
ticipate in Center programs that seek cooperative solutions to problems of mutual
consequence to East and West. Working with the Center's multidisciplinary and
multicultural staff, participants include visiting scholars and researchers; leaders
and professionals from the academic, government, and business communities; and
graduate degree students, most of whom are enrolled at the University of Hawaii.
For each Center participant from the United States, two participants are sought
from the Asian and the Pacific area.
Center programs are conducted by institutes addressing problems of communica-
tion, culture learning, environment and policy, population, and resource systems. A
limited number of "open" grants are available to degree scholars and research
fellows whose academic interests are not encompassed by institute programs.
The U.S. Congress provides basic funding for Center programs and a variety of
awards to participants. Because of the cooperative nature of Center programs,
financial support-and cost-sharing are also provided by Asian and Pacific govern-
ments, regional agencies, private enterprise and foundations. The Center is on land
adjacent to and provided by the University of Hawaii.
THE EAST-WEST ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY INSTITUTE was established in
October 1977 to increase understanding of the interrelationships among policies
designed to meet a broad range of human and societal needs over time and the
natural systems and resources on which these policies depend or impact Through
interdisciplinary and multinational programs of research, study, and training, the
Institute seeks to develop and apply concepts and approaches useful in identifying
alternatives available to decision makers and in assessing the implications of such
choices. Progress and results of Institute programs are disseminated in the East-
West Center region through research reports, books, workshop reports, working
papers, newsletters, and other educational and informational materials.
William H. Matthews, Director
East-West Environment and Policy Institute
East-West Center
1777 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/15 :
CIA-RDP08001297R000300180006-6