NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300990001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
STAT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Near East and
South Asia Review
18 December 1987
Articles Egyptian Democracy: Liberalization and Its Limits
Page
Political liberalization is a priority of the Egyptian Government, and
President Mubarak's critics admit that the political climate in Egypt
is freer today than at any time since the revolution in 1952.
Nonetheless, multiple safetuards almost certainly will be retained to
protect executive power?T.1. . - a i . is 1.w far Mubarak
will go with political reform.
25X1
25X1
1 25X1
25X1
Islamic Fundamentalism in the Egyptian Military: Limits to 7
Accommodation?
Cairo has adopted a policy of accommodating religious devotion in
the armed forces and even promoted Islamic ideology to ensure the
military's loyalty and to compensate for a diminished sense of
mission. Nonetheless, the regime is concerned about the increasing
number of soldiers who VXM' i radical or violent Islamic political
activity.
Sudan's Southern Insurgency: The Importance of Ethiopian 13
Sanctuary
Ethiopian sanctuary is critical to the viability of the Sudanese
People's Liberation Army. Since the insurgency's emergence in
1983, Sudanese rebels have developed an extensive, secure
organization in Ethiopia to recruit, train, supply, and control rebel
forces. These rebels are infiltrated into southern Sudan to wage
guerrilla operations against government forces
Libyan Activities in the Western Pacific: An Update
Since the US airstrikes on Libya in April 1986, the Tripoli-based
Anti-Imperialism Center has coordinated an ambitious effort to
broaden ties to radical groups worldwide. As part of this initiative,
agents of the center in the Western Pacific this year have actively
worked to establish a diplomatic presence in Vanuatu and build a
regional network capable of supporting subversion.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
19 25X1
i
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
The Western Sahara War: How Long Can the Polisario 23
Keep Fighting?
The Polisario Front guerrillas have been fighting in ghg Western
Sahara to create an independent state since 1975. The goal of the
guerrillas is to force Rabat to negotiate a political settlement
through a war of attrition to sap Morocco and make the war a
liability for King Hassan. The guerrillas show no sign of giving up
the struggle.
Algeria: Little Chance for Economic Reform
President Bendjedid's economic reform proposals, now being
debated by the National Assembly, face opposition by groups within
the ruling party and public-sector enterprises that want to maintain
the status 4uo. Even if adopted, the reforms would leave many
sources of fficiency untouched. They do not deal with
hydrocarbons the most important sector of the Algerian economy.
Land Reform in Mauritania
27
The Mauritanian Government enacted a comprehensive land reform
in 1983 that, if fully implemented, would have a dramatic impact on
the economy and racial relations in the country. The government
hopes to encourage privatization of land, eliminate traditional
practices of land tenure, and end the control of land by the nomadic
tribes.
31
Secret ii
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Lebanon: Hizballah Spreading the Word
Since its emergence during 1982-83, the roup of Lebanese Shia
radicalsrcollectively known as Hizballah as rapidly become the
most dynamic Islamic fundamentalist movement outside Iran.
Inspired, nurtured, and trained by Iran, Hizballah is assisting
fledgling fundamentalist Shia groups and exporting its Lebanese
brand of Islamic radicalism
41 25X1
Pakistani Ground Attack Versus Indian
Air Defense Capabilities
Pakistan's Air Force has a limited ground attack capability that will
not overcome India's air defenses in the next few years. Pakistan
suffers from shortages of modern strike aircraft and sophisticated
bombing gear and from tenuous command and control links.
Although India is improving its ground-based air defenses, it
remains vulnerable to well-planned strikes by modern aircraft
49
Pakistan's Export Earnings: The Wave Is Cresting
53
Pakistan's robust export sector is responsible for much of the
country's economic success over the past decade. The narrow export
base, however, means that export earnings are vulnerable to a
decline in any one item. Because external factors subject to sudden
changes contributed to the export sector's success, Pakistani officials
cannot assume continued good export performance.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are
preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the view of a
single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a
noncoordinated view.
25X1
25X6
25X1
X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles
Egyptian Democracy:
Liberalization and
Its Limits
Political liberalization is a stated priority of the
Egyptian Government, and even President Mubarak's
critics admit that the political climate in Egypt is
freer today than at any time since the revolution in
1952. In the past six years Mubarak has gradually
introduced unprecedented judicial, political, and press
freedoms, which are largely alien to Egypt's long
tradition of authoritarian rule. Nonetheless, multiple
safeguards almost certainly will be retained to protect
executive power?raising questions about how far
Mubarak will go with political reform. Moreover, low
voter turnout for elections and political apathy?
particularly among Egyptian youth?may leave the
political system more vulnerable to politically
committed fringe groups and reinforce government
instincts to retain controls over election r sults and
opposition activity
Building Democracy: Mubarak's Accomplishments
In his drive to liberalize Egypt's political system,
Mubarak can point to several accomplishments since
coming to power six years ago in the aftermath of
Anwar Sadat's assassination.
Strengthened Judiciary. Under Mubarak the
judiciary has enjoyed unprecedented independence.
The courts have become increasingly willing to assert
their authority, even when it conflicts with the
executive?a trend that should strengthen the concept
of separation of powers in Egypt. Specific reforms
have included reinstating the High Judicial Council?
dissolved by Nasir?which is empowered to override
decisions by the Ministry of Justice regarding judicial
appointments, promotions, and other personnel
actions. In addition, members of the office responsible
for investigating and prosecuting police charges
against suspects now enjoy judicial immunity, which
effectively protects them from police pressures during
investigations.
1
Public respect for the judiciary appears to be
increasing. Judicial rulings are taken seriously from
the President on down, in contrast to earlier eras when
the national leadership routinely ignored them.
Mubarak's call for an early People's Assembly
election last February was intended to preempt an
expected ruling from the Supreme Constitutional
court rendering the election law invalid. The
anticipated court action prompted the drafting of a
law that reformed several electoral procedures,
including limited restoration of the right of
independents to stand for election and the
reinstitution of byelections to fill midterm vacancies.
More Representative People's Assembly. Mubarak
has welcomed an increased opposition presence in the
national legislature, and he encourages opposition
participation in debates on national issues?in part to
co-opt the opposition into sharing the burdens of
decisionmaking. The election in April 1986 produced
a People's Assembly that?with 100 of its 458
members in the opposition?is the most representative
in Egypt's recent history. In addition, knowledgeable
observers agree that the election was the fairest since
the revolution.
The increased presence of Islamic fundamentalist
Muslim Brotherhood members (about 36) in the
assembly marks an even greater departure from past
practice. Although Egyptian law forbids political
parties based on religion and the Brotherhood is
technically banned, Mubarak has stated his
willingness to tolerate their involvement in organized
politics as long as they pose no threat to national
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Egypt: People's Assembly Election Results 1979 ? 1987
Ruling Party
National
Democratic
Party
Opposition
Socialist
Labor Party
Liberal Party
National
Progressive
Unionist Grouping
Independents
New Wafd Party
Total
1979
1984
1987
Elected
Seats
% in
Assembly
Elected
Seats
% in
Assembly
Elected
Seats
% in
Assembly
330
88.7
390
87
308
68.8
29
7.7
0
0.0
56*
12.5
3
0.9
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
40(NDP)
8.93 (NDP)
10
2.7
0
0.0
8 (Opp)
1.78(0pp)
0
0.0
58
13
36
8.04
372
100
448
100
448
100
* Labor ? Liberal Alliance: Includes approximately 36 Muslim Brotherhood members.
security or foster sectarian tension. According to the
US Embassy, Mubarak would prefer that the
Brotherhood be permitted to operate openly both to
give the public an opportunity to hear?and reject?
its agenda and to avoid driving the group
underground where its activities would be more
difficult to monitor. The Brotherhood, for its part,
appears willing to try working within the system and
thus far has avoided disruptive tactics within the
assembly.
Increased Press Freedom. Under Mubarak, Egypt's
press has enjoyed unprecedented freedom, and it has
become by far the most vibrant press establishment in
the Arab world. No newspapers have bee seized since
Mubarak became president, and at leasst one attempt
to seize copies of a single edition to squelch a story
was overturned in the courts. Overt censorship?the
Secret
rule under Nasir?no longer exists, and the regular
"guidance" sessions Sadat held for loyalist editors are
far less frequent. Editors seem to know how far they
can go. The opposition press regularly publishes sharp
criticism of the government with impunity, although
direct attacks on the President are more limited and
far less intense.
Limits to Democracy?
Despite these achievements, questions remain about
how far Mubarak will go toward greater liberalization
and what further steps he will take. Giving the
opposition a consultative role in major decisions, for
example, has become an essential ingredient in
Mubarak's crisis management style in recent years.
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
According to US Embassy reporting, Mubarak has
earned praise from opposition leaders for meeting
with them for frank discussions about government
policy, and we believe he is generally respected by the
Egyptian public for seeking to broaden political
participation through elections. Nonetheless,
Mubarak is unlikely to tamper with safeguards in the
system that heavily protect those in power from
political challenges.
Examples of safeguards built into Egyptian political
system abound. The president, for example, is not
directly elected by the people?a key opposition
demand?but is nominated by the People's Assembly
and confirmed by popular referendum. As long as the
president's party?the National Democratic Party?
enjoys at least a two-thirds majority in the assembly,
his renomination is assured. The possibility of an
opposition figure unseating an incumbent president is
almost nil.
Prospects for an opposition party gaining a majority
in the People's Assembly are no better. The current
election law favors the ruling party by requiring that a
party gain at least 8 percent of the national vote to be
seated in the assembly, regardless of the number of
seats it wins. This effectively deprives Egypt's smaller
parties of representation. Independent candidates
have been admitted once again to the assembly?one
for each of Egypt's 48 constituencies?but most of
these independents" came from the National
Democratic Party. The US Embassy reports that
Mubarak wants to amend the election law?once
again under pressure from the judiciary and the
opposition parties?to cancel the 8-percent rule and
return to a single candidate system. If he succeeds, we
expect the government to seek other means of
safeguarding its majority.
Government forces are not averse to using illegal
methods to preserve National Democratic Party
hegemony. Although last April's election was widely
regarded as the fairest since 1952, evidence suggests
that substantial voting fraud took place.
the voting results were
dal erent from what was announced. The leftist
National Progressive Unionist Grouping, for example,
won over 9 percent of the national vote?enough to
3
clear the 8-percent hurdle?yet the "official" results
put it well below that percentage, disqualifying it for
re resentation.
JI nterior Minister Zaki Badr personally
influenced the election outcome by arranging for
certain candidates to lose through manipulation of the
central ministry computer that tabulated the national
results. the
ruling party misused its influence and control of
government facilities and personnel to ensure
favorable election results. Other measures included
police pressure on Egyptian businesses to donate to
National Democratic Party coffers.
The government moved quickly to thwart a court
challenge to the election results brought by opposition
forces. When on 21 April the State Council
Administrative Court ruled that the National
Democratic Party should give up 17 contested seats to
the opposition?a major slap in the face for the
Ministry of Interior?the government immediately
filed two separate appeals to delay the decision. The
issue could take years to decide and may require the
attention of the Supreme Constitutional Co
Meanwhile, the ruling party keeps its seats
Internal Security Controls
Mubarak has retained considerable power to maintain
public order. The emergency law invoked after
Sadat's assassination has been upheld through
repeated extensions?most recently in April 1986 for
a two-year period?decreed by Mubarak and
approved by the National Democratic Party majority
in the People's Assembly. The law grants the
executive extraordinary powers to supercede normal
arrest and detention procedures normally provided by
Egyptian law. Under the emergency law, the
President and his delegate, the Minister of Interior,
can suspend certain constitutional and legal
safeguards normally associated with the protection of
civil and political liberties when they believe security
and public order are in peril. During the past year the
government has restricted use of this law to
countering Islamic fundamentalists and leftist
radicals. Nonetheless, it remains on the books and is a
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
source of considerable controversy. Opposition parties
both of the left and the right argue with some
justification that the law's survival is inconsistent with
Mubarak's liberalization agenda.
Mubarak's retention of Egypt's tough and unpopular
Interior Minister, Zaki Badr, is another hedge against
trouble. Badr's recently demonstrated successes
against terrorist groups have underscored his value to
the regime, but we believe his often heavyhanded
tactics?mass arrests and interrogations?risk driving
increasing numbers of religious Egyptians into the
fundamentalist camp. Mubarak has even mentioned
the possibility of a further preemptive campaign
against hardcore fundamentalists, a strategy that
could prove counterproductive.
Despite the relative freedom accorded the press, Cairo
occasionally exercises influence in the government-
supported "national press" whose editors in chief are
appointed and can be dismissed by the Shura Council.
Although no papers have been shut down, the
government's ability to approve applications for new
publications has occasionally been used to delay or
reject outright petitions from independent or
opposition groups to start regular publication
Public Attitudes: Do Egyptians Want Democracy?
Egypt lacks credible public opinion polls, but
knowledgeable observers agree that, apart from a few
politically active intellectuals, the broad mass of
Egyptians is ambivalent toward, and even skeptical of,
participatory government. Stimulating voter interest
in the political process will be one of Mubarak's most
daunting challenges. Poor Egyptians traditionally
look to the government to provide them with basic
necessities and help solve their problems, but US
Embassy reporting suggests they have no serious
expectation that it will.
Poor voter turnout in Egyptian elections is
symptomatic of the absence of a strong consensus
favoring greater political participation. According to a
recent survey, 75 percent of Egyptian voters do not
believe their participation in elections has any value.
Turnout figures for the Shura (Consultative) Council
election last year (82 percent) and for Mubarak's
reelection referendum in October 1987 (88 percent)
Secret
were almost certainly inflated for public consumption
by the Interior Ministry. Egyptians will vote in
greater numbers, however, when they are offered a
choice between competing candidates, as indicated by
the greater turnout for the more contested People's
Assembly election last spring.
The lack of interest in politics is particularly striking
among Egyptian youth. According to a recent survey,
92 percent of young Egyptians do not belong to any
political party. The reluctance of young people to
become involved is leading to what some researchers
call a "crisis of confidence" between the generations.
Only 30 percent of Cairo University students
participate in student union elections or any political
activity. The apathy of the majority could have
ominous implications for Egypt's political future if it
leaves a clear field for small but active Islamic groups,
which effectively mobilize their membership to vote
and which for several years have swept the national
student council elections.
Traditional styles of politics persist despite steady
progress on reforms. Power and influence
relationships are deeply personalized, from the
president's level to the peasant's. Leading members of
the government acquire power not because of their
positions in the ruling party, but because of their
contacts in the overall establishment and their
personal standing with the president. Advancement
depends not on local support, but on how well the
official impresses the president and members of his
immediate entourage. Respect for influence?and
cultivation of those who have it?is evident at all
levels of Egyptian society. The pursuit of influence
helps maintain the status quo by encouraging
Egyptians to back whatever authority or party is in
power because these alone have the patronage and
other tangible benefits to distribute.
Outlook
Mubarak is unlikely to abandon his efforts at
expanding democratic practice as a "safety valve" for
popular discontent. The lack of consensus throughout
society on exactly what kind of a system to build,
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2E25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
however, will slow progress and leave the cautious
Mubarak to take the initiative. Moreover, any
liberalized system would require the approval of the
Egyptian military, which, though largely hidden,
remains the final arbiter of power and is not subject to
civilian control.
Nonetheless, the longer Mubarak remains in power,
the better are the chances democracy will take root in
Egypt. According to a Mubarak confidant and
National Democratic Party leader, three national
elections in the past 13 months have focused the
attention of the President and his party on cultivating
and exploiting the constituent-based appeal of local
political talent. This has fueled debate over the
amount of decentralized control to be incorporated in
a new local government law. A parallel debate is
taking place within the ruling party over its basic
organization, specifically whether it will continue as a
Reverse Blank 5
Secret
disciplined top-down machine of central government
control or evolve into a more unruly, grassroots
organization for translating popular desires into
national policy.
Persuading Egyptians to become involved in politics
beyond the local level is likely to be Mubarak's
greatest challenge. Ironically, the President's
lackluster leadership style?and his inability to play
the pharaoh in the grand style of Nasir and Sadat?
may help this process. When asked what the Egyptian
people really wanted, one intellectual replied, " . . . an
easier life, more democracy, and strong leadership.
But, if they came face to face with a strong
charismatic leader, they would be willing to forget
about democracy."
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Islamic Fundamentalism in the
Egyptian Military: Limits
to Accommodation
Cairo has adopted a policy of accommodating
religious devotion in the armed forces and has even
promoted Islamic ideology?including some types of
fundamentalism?to ensure the military's loyalty and
to counter a diminished sense of mission. Nonetheless,
the regime is concerned about an increasing number
of soldiers who choose radical or violent Islamic
political activity.
The Ministry of Defense and Military Production is
attempting quietly to free itself of suspected
extremists, but we believe it is causing them to alter
their tactics, including resorting to underground
networks and subterfuge. Meanwhile, we suspect
greater numbers of soldiers will be susceptible to the
radicals' promises of a more just Islamic society as the
regime moves slowly to institute political and
economic reforms.
Cairo undoubtedly regards the expansion of
fundamentalism in the military as more damaging to
its survival than challenges from Islamic groups in
civilian society. Cairo probably worries that even
small groups in the military?with access to supplies
of heavy as well as small arms and ammunition?
could attack regime officials. A serious challenge to
the Egyptian Government, however, would have to
have at least the tacit support of large segments of the
armed forces to succeed over the long term
The Ministry of Defense probably will increase its
efforts to control Islam and tighten security in the
military during the coming months. Such a policy
probably will detract from the military's morale and
may eventually reduce military support for the
regime.
' Information about fundamentalism in the Egyptian military is
sparse, and most offer impressionistic reporting
rather than facts. For this article we draw heavily on academic
literature, which is subject to large information gaps, and on a
study prepared by a contractor with expertise in Middle Eastern
affairs
7
Secret
Growing Interest in Islam
We believe Egyptian military personnel in recent
years have been looking more frequently to their faith
than to secular ideologies for identity, motivation, and
unity. The military's interest in Islam probably in part
reflects an increasing trend in civilian society toward
Islamic revivalism and more public displays of
devotion.
needs:
25X1
25X1
Islam helps fill several of the military's 25X1
Islam offers a clear sense of purpose.
Islam also supplies a powerful
rite of incorporation because it emphasizes the idea
of community. The decline of Nasirism, Egypt's
peace treaty with Israel, and reduced concern about
other near-term regional threats to Egyptian
national security have left the military without a
clear sense of mission.' Regime efforts to maintain
the peacetime morale of the military through
training, fostering professionalism, and broadening
its charge to include involvement in the economy
probably are insufficient to sustain esprit de corps.
? Even though the military has generally fared better
than civilians because of perquisites offered by the
regime to ensure its loyalty, many soldiers and
officers have become disillusioned with the scarcity
of opportunities to better their lot and, according to
US Embassy sources, have turned to Islam as a way
of rationalizing their desire for a lifestyle they can
never hope to attain.
? Islam, through clerical leaders, probably helps to fill
the gap left by Egypt's uncharismatic leadership.
The military is generally loyal to Mubarak, but it
'The defeat of 1967 in particular caused many Egyptian soldiers to
reassess their commitment to Nasirism and to look to Islam as a
superior ideology. The general perception among Egypt's soldiers
was that Israeli troops had triumphed because they were fighting
for their God, not for secular goals
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
LOA1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
sees his performance as mediocre, noting his failure
to institute rapid government reforms to increase
justice and provide for a more equitable distribution
of wealth. Defense Minister Abu Ghazala, even
though well liked for his ability to provide goods
and services, may appear tainted by
his interest in politics.
We believe this new devotion to Islam symbolizes for
most military personnel a return to traditional values
and personal commitment to practicing their faith
rather than to political activism. Manifestations of an
increase in piety have taken various forms, including
such practices as greater attendance at mosques and
observance of prayer, according to US Embassy
sources. As in Egyptian society, the Islamic revival in
the military takes several forms, ranging from
conventional or mainstream Muslims to militant
fundamentalists. Even true fundamentalists?those
who want to return to a more Islamic way of life and
stress the need for renewing their faith according to
their interpretations of the teachings of the Koran?
vary in their understanding of the demands of their
religion.
A contractor with wide experience in the region
believes fundamentalist sentiment in the Egyptian
military can be divided into two main categories. The
first and probably the largest consists of
fundamentalists whose main concern is the strict
observance of Islam in its social and spiritual
dimensions. The second includes those who take Islam
a step farther to advocate political activism, their
ultimate objective being the establishment of an
Islamic government either through gradual change or
revolution.
Officially Sanctioned Revival
Cairo has emphasized Islamic rather than strictly
nationalist themes to motivate the military since
before the war in 1973. A survey made as part of the
contractor's study indicates that most officers believe
the success of the army in October 1973 was due
largely to the feeling of solidarity engendered by the
new focus on Islam. More recently, Cairo has
tolerated nonpolitical, religious sentiment in the
military and has even promoted the outward trappings
of Islam to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces and
Secret
control the spread of politically harmful
fundamentalism. The contractor believes the Ministry
of Defense is especially reluctant to discourage
devotional practices because such a policy probably
would result in charges of infidelity to Islam.'
Military commanders in particular do not want to be
identified as anti- or un-Islamic because they could
not lead troops that are "true believers." US Embassy
sources report that, following the purges and trials of
militant fundamentalists in the armed forces after
President Sadat's assassination, Cairo permitted an
increased number of mosques on military bases. Many
commanders have diverted needed funds, probably
from operational budgets or their own pockets, to
build mosaues for their units]
The regime's advocacy of a religious ideological
program in the military is limited to the
"establishment" Islam that preaches against political
involvement or subversion of the established order.
The program appears vague and flexible?probably
because the regime wants to gain approval from the
widest possible range of believers?and seems to rely
strongly on Islamic symbolism to maintain the loyalty
of military personnel. The contractor notes that the
regime's approved ideology stresses unity and includes
at least two major themes that often represent
fundamentalist views. One is the continuance of Israel
as Egypt's primary enemy, and the other is the need
for eventual liberation of Islamic lands in Palestine
and Jerusalem.'
The Ministry of Defense also has developed a
structure to enforce its ideological program. Religious
affairs in the armed forces are entrusted to the
' The punishment for infidelity in some Islamic fundamentalist
belief systems is excommunication and then death, according to an
academic expert.
? The rhetoric does not appear to be promoting another war with
Israel, but rather the need to maintain defenses in the expectation
of future conflict. Even though the liberation of Arab lands is
addressed, it does not appear to be an immediate concern or cause
for breaking the peace.
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X6
25X6
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Graduating ceremony for officers who will undertal,e preaching in
the Egsptian Armed Forces
Department of Moral Orientation. According to
contractor sources, this organization is commanded by
a major general and staffed by officers knowledgeable
in Islam and regime-approved shaykhs attached to the
military. The department's Office of Religious Affairs
provides Islamic direction for the military, primarily
through religious guidance officers. These "fighting
clerics- are educated in theological schools, given
military training, and serve in military units as
commissioned officers. The Department of Moral
Orientation also publishes religious literature that
presents regime-sanctioned Islamic views.
Ferreting Out the Radicals
Despite the military's eagerness to show its support
for Islam, it is unwilling to tolerate religious
revivalism or radical beliefs that would interfere with
normal operations, and it has been attempting to
ferret out offenders. The Department of Moral
9
Orientation serves double duty, not only directing
Islamic affairs but also helping to monitor religious
activity for signs of extremism.
Military Intelligence defines excessive religious
behavior to include such actions as praying more than
five times a day, urging others to veil their wives,
proselytizing on the job, bragging about personal
piety, spending an excessive amount of time in
mosques, and fraternizing with antigovernment
hout authorization.
Military Intelligence routinely conducts
intensive surveillance of selected officers as a security
measure. The Ministry of Defense for the past three
years has been checking the social backgrounds of
existing personnel and new recruits and has even
Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Who Is a Radical?
A contractor with expertise in Middle Eastern
Affairs believes Islamic fundamentalism and
radicalism appeal most to soldiers and officers in the
lower and middle ranks. He contends that these
soldiers and officers are more susceptible to
fundamentalist teachings because they have been
least influenced by the military's Nasirist past, most
affected by economic austerity, and often come from
rural and urban lower and middle classes?groups in
civilian society that are especially strong in their
support for Islamic revivalism. The contractor also
believes, and we generally agree, that fundamentalist
sentiment will grow among young military officers
and conscripts because they will continue to be the
hardest hit by diminishing economic opportunities
and will look for an ideology that will provide some
relief.
begun monitoring the social background of applicants
to the Armed Forces Academy to discover
involvement in radical fundamentalist activities,
request Military Intelligence to conduct surveillance
to determine the extent of the soldier's transgressions.
If Military Intelligence finds insufficient evidence of
extremist activity, it will recommend discharges
without prejudice for the suspects and will sometimes
force the soldiers to write letters of resignation to
protect the military from charges of discrimination.
in the case of officers, those
suspected of radical tendencies?providing that they
are in unimportant positions?are phased out when
their performance is reviewed for promotion. If
suspects are in positions where they could do serious
harm to the government or if they have good records,
Military Intelligence arranges to have them moved to
inconsequential jobs. For example, the Defense
Ministry has sent some high-ranking officers believed
to have been involved in radical activities to foreign
countries to serve as military attaches.
Military Intelligence has a special group that prepares
monthly morale reports and makes estimates about
the political reliability of the armed forces.
Information about possible radical fundamentalist
sympathizers presumably is forwarded to the group
from battalion security officers. Promotions are
increasingly based on evidence of officers' loyalty,
integrity, and lack of political and religious activism
rather than on nerformance
To protect morale, the military proceeds cautiously
against personnel it believes are radicals and rarely
announces the actions it takes.
suspects usually are monitored by their
superiors for signs of excessively religious behavior.
Senior officers counsel "offending" soldiers to stop
their extremist actions, and, if the soldiers persist in
demonstrating unacceptable behavior, the officers will
Secret
Usually, the Defense Ministry will provide discharged
suspects with standard termination bonuses to prevent
bitterness that could foster more fundamentalist
problems in the military. On the other hand,
Military Intelligence recommends
expulsion for individuals arrested for committing
illegal acts. Once ousted, the former military
personnel may be tried in a civilian court for their
offenses and given harsh punishments.
Possible Threat to the Regime?
We have little information on the number of radical
fundamentalists in the armed forces and doubt that
even Cairo is aware of the extent of radical
penetrations of the military.
most of the Muslims in
the armed forces are loyal to Cairo and that only a
few personnel can be classified as extremists who
would be dangerous to the regime. We are concerned,
however, that the increased number of recent
incidents and the involvement of military personnel of
all ranks may point to more support in the military for
extremist views. For example:
Interior Ministry forces in
September 1987 arrested 20 active-duty military
personnel who were members and leaders of a pro-
Iranian fundamentalist group called the "Islamic
Pioneers."
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
The military police arrested 50 to 60 active-duty
military personnel near Tanta, north of Cairo, in
May 1987. The group's members confessed to
belonging to Al-Jihad and had been planning to raid
the military's arms denot in the area
? Authorities last spring arrested an Air Force colonel
who had been assisting radicals to assemble pistol
silencers, possibly in preparation for assassination
attempts.
Data are extremely limited, but the Defense Ministry
also appears to be discharging an increasing number
of military personnel suspected of radical sympathies.
at least 10
officers are retired monthly for suspected
fundamentalist sympathies, about double the rate of
two years ago.'
Senior military commanders continue to minimize the
seriousness of radical fundamentalism in the military,
but we believe the recent incidents involving military
personnel?including some high-ranking officers in
sensitive positions?have raised their concerns.
during a speech
to senior officers in October 1987, Egypt's new
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Abu Shanaf
stressed the importance of improving security in the
armed forces and said it probably is the military's
The increase in suspects may stem from increased regime
vigilence, as well as a rise in personnel with fundamentalist
sympathies.
11
Secret
most important mission, given the possibility of new
internal threats to the regime. The Defense Ministry
is especially worried about successful Al-Jihad
penetrations of the military. In summer 1987 the
military made collection of information on Al-Jihad a
priority,
some senior
commanders are alarmed that more junior officers are
speaking openly about their religious views and saying
that some current military practices should be
changed to conform to Islam.
Outlook
We believe the military will be more susceptible to
radical fundamentalist penetrations in the next few
years. Economic grievances?resulting from
reductions in the military's budget and the release of
larger numbers of soldiers from duty with reduced
benefits?are critical elements in the increasing
military disaffection with the regime and the growth
of extremist views. Other factors that contribute to a
growing interest in Islam in the military?an
unconvincing and fuzzy understanding of mission,
mediocre to weak leadership, and growing civilian
revivalist sentiment?are also likely to provide a rich
medium in which radicalism can grow.
As radical Islamic groups in Egypt become more
sophisticated, they probably will make penetration of
the military a priority. Even small factions in the
military could gain access to arms and command
civilian support that could increase the success of
radical activities.
Al-Jihad groups are stressing the
need and value of recruiting military personnel. These
groups are convinced they cannot build enough
civilian support in the short term to overthrow the
government by popular revolution but believe they can
gain control in Egypt by influencing enough military
personnel to stage a coup. Members of Al-Jihad may
believe they could step into power during a period of
unrest that might accompany such a coup.
Egyptian officials are aware that at least
one Al-Jihad group has formed a military wing for the
development of specialists to recruit military
personnel.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
20A1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25)(1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
We believe the Defense Ministry's task of
accommodating Islamic devotion while stopping
radical infiltration of the military will become more
challenging during the coming months. Recent arrests
of military personnel suspected of extremist activities
and regime efforts to tighten security probably will
cause radicals to become more circumspect. This will
make it more difficult for Military Intelligence to
distinguish radicals from nonpolitical, devout
Muslims. The military must confront the prospect of
either tightening security and regulating religious
observances or, less likely in our view, resigning itself
to uncertainty about the extent of extremist sentiment
in its ranks.
Regime efforts to increase control over Islam in the
military and to tighten security could lead to a "witch
hunt" sentiment that would severely diminish morale.
Even though the Ministry of Defense is taking special
care in dealing with suspected extremists to avoid
claims of prejudice and to reduce bitterness, this
approach probably will be difficult to maintain with
an increasing number of arrests and discharges.
Soldiers, in our view, will become increasingly
apprehensive about regime methods, which almost
certainly will include requests to report to the
authorities suspicions about their comrades.
Fundamentalist soldiers?whether or not they are
radicals?will be more careful about their devotional
practices to avoid Ministry of Defense surveillance
and possible punishment, and fears of discovery may
lead to distrust of their comrades.
Implications
Growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the military
and declining morale might lead to the development
of political factionalism in the armed forces that
would hurt military loyalty to the regime. In
particular, increasing fundamentalist disaffection
Secret
with the government's inability to introduce positive
economic and social changes, combined with widening
and prolonged civilian unrest and sympathy for
Islamic goals, probably would diminish willingness of
at least some officers to aid the regime in the event of
civil disturbances. In the extreme case, military
personnel with fundamentalist sympathies might
either ignore government calls for assistance or step in
on the side of the protesters. In any event, the growth
of small cells of radicals in the military increases the
likelihood of assassination attempts against regime
leaders.
Sensitivity among some senior officers to Islamic
sentiment among the ranks probably reinforces an
inclination to balance military cooperation with the
United States and the West by developing closer
defense ties to other Arab countries. Such sentiment
is likely to support military efforts to continue
building Egypt's armaments industries. The scarcity
of suppliers of military equipment willing to grant
Egypt favorable payment terms, however, is likely to
prevent a substantial slackening of military bonds to
the United States. The military probably would follow
a policy of reducing public acknowledgement of
cooperation with the United States and limiting joint
exercises and curtailing US access to military
facilities.
12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Sudan's Southern Insurgency:
The Importance of Ethiopian
Sanctuary
Ethiopian sanctuary is critical to the viability of the
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Since
the insurgency's emergence in 1983, Sudanese rebels
have developed an extensive, secure organization in
Ethiopia to recruit, train, supply, and control rebel
forces, which number
25,000 to 40,000 men. SPLA forces, generally
battalion-size units formed in Ethiopia, are infiltrated
into southern Sudan to wage guerrilla operations
against government forces. After expenditure of
ammunition and supplies, combat losses, and soldier
fatigue, most of the rebel units probably return to
Ethiopia to be resupplied, rested, and reorganized for
reinfiltration into southern Sudan
Addis Ababa has relinquished some of its authority to
the SPLA in the Gambela region of Ethiopia, giving
greater leeway to the insurgents for their support
operations, since mid-
1986 the SPLA has increased its political and military
control in Gambela with little Ethiopian intervention.
he Ethiopian Army has
delegated some of its enforcement powers to the
SPLA in the Gambela region, including patrolling the
border, and the rebels have the authority to arrest and
punish "lawbreakers."
The SPLA exploits international relief operations for
Sudanese refugees in Gambela. The SPLA recruits
many members from the large refugee populations
located at camps run by relief organizations. The
SPLA also diverts food and supplies intended for
refugees to rebel stores. This food supply frees the
insurgents to allocate men for combat who might
otherwise be required to grow food to support the
movement
In our judgment, the SPLA's use of Ethiopian
sanctuary is significantly contributing to the
insurgency's growth and to the rebels' capability to
expand their operations. Analysis of other
insurgencies reveals that the existence of sanctuaries
in adjacent countries or remote domestic areas where
13
25X1
insurgents can organize is a key element for effective
rural insurgencies.' In seven of eight successful rural
insurgencies examined, the insurgents had foreign
sanctuaries or domestic areas outside government
control where they could train and find refuge. The
rebel organization in Ethiopia probably will continue 25X1
to contribute to the rebels' effectiveness, increasing
costs to Khartoum in men and materiel, decreasing
Army morale, and further weakening the government.
Recruitment
The SPLA exploits international relief operations on
behalf of Sudanese refugees in the Gambela region to
greatly boost recruitment. Sudanese refugees entering
Ethiopia are screened by an SPLA front, the Refugee
Coordination Committee, before registration with the
official Ethiopian Government Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission,
If requested by the officials, refugees must
join the rebel movement, The
draftees are threatened with violence and reprisals
against their families if they do not comply.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
The largest and most heavily exploited refugee camp 25X1
is at Itang, Ethiopia. Itang is
essentially a large refugee camp controlled by the
SPLA. The SPLA runs a continuous program of
enlistments and a yearly mass recruitment, usually in
September or October,
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
SituationMilitary in the South, October 1987
Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA) area of
operations, August 1987
SPLA base
rt Sudanese Army regional
headquarters
Egypt
Port Su a.
Arabia:
KHARTOUM*
Sudan
Al Ubayyiri.rt
Historic
north-south
',WI on Nobah
(Nuba Mountains)KOLAR
Aohyei
Bentiu.
Raga. 8atl,r Gkaza1
Central
African
Republic
?Wake!
'tango*.
Jokau
Alti an rkiir
(Upper NfleYAkuh?
Army garrison captured
by rebels, 31 May
ADDIS*
Birhane Selam
Mongolia
Army garrison captured
by rebels, early March
Zaire
Secret
yl
e
0 l4ilotneters,
200 Miles
14
711420 (A05662110,87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Government Attack Against the Rebels in Ethiopia
Limited ground force projection capabilities prevent
the Sudanese armed forces from mounting operations
to interdict or destroy the SPLA infrastructure inside
Ethiopia. Sudanese military operations against the
SPLA are severely hampered by poor logistics and
shortages of weapons, ammunition, and supplies. The
Sudanese military would be hard pressed to counter
Ethiopian ground force operations in Sudan,
executed in retaliation for Sudanese Army
penetrations into Ethiopia to attack the SPLA
The Sudanese military probably could covertly
infiltrate into Ethiopia special forces, consisting of
either soldiers or tribal militiamen aligned with
Khartoum, into Ethiopia to conduct sabotage,
demolition, or assassination against the SPLA, but
these forces would be operating in rebel-controlled
areas with tight security around key facilities and
would be vastly outnumbered. They could also
encounter regular Ethiopian Army units, severely
limiting the propects of survival for these units. Such
high-risk operations would probably have to be
repeated to have a significant impact on SPLA
operations. This in turn would erode plausible denial
and spark Ethiopian retaliation.
The Sudanese armed forces' ability to launch
airstrikes against SPLA bases in Ethiopia is also
poor. Low pilot proficiencies coupled with poor
maintenance, spare parts, and logistic capabilities,
which would reduce aircraft sorties, probably would
render the strikes ineffective. Such strikes would
almost certainly invite Ethiopian retaliatory air raids
against targets inside Sudan. Many key Sudanese
installations are vulnerable to Ethiopian air attack,
given the lack of effective Sudanese air defenses.
The Sudanese military, lacking more viable options,
probably will continue to support Ethiopian
insurgents and use these groups as proxies to fight
Sudanese rebels in Ethiopia. In November 1987, for
example, Sudan transferred a truckload of
ammunition and small arms to the Oromo Liberation
Front, a rebel organization that operates in western
Ethiopia, The
Sudanese military probably hopes the arms will
bolster the group's capability to challenge both
Ethiopian and SPLA forces located in its area of
operations. Sudan, however, suffers from chronic
shortages of arms and ammunition and has little to
transfer to the Ethiopian insurgents. Such support,
moreover, provides Addis Ababa with more incentive
to support the SPLA.
The SPLA operates within the UN-sponsored camp
for Sudanese refugees at Gambela,
The SPLA has conducted several
large-scale forced recruitments in the camp. During
1985 the SPLA conducted recruitment campaigns
there about every three months,
many new SPLA
recruits from Equatoria Province in Sudan are being
processed through the refugee camp near Dima,
Ethiopia. The bulk of the Dima population of 13,000
are young Sudanese males, and the camp refugee
15
committee is dominated by SPLA officers
although Dima is nominally
under the control of the Ethiopian Red Cross, the
SPLA wields ultimate power there.
Training
Almost all recruits from Itang and other areas,
including those recruited in Sudan, attend basic
military instruction at Bonga, Ethiopia,
The SPLA gives limited
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Rebel Conimander in Chief John Garang walking
through a gathering of recruits at a base in the
Gamhela region of Ethiopia
preliminary training in Itang, such as parade drills
and organized physical exercise, but the Bonga camp
serves as the SPLA's primary training facility,
As many as
10,000 recruits can be accommodated at the camp at
one time, but up to half of these are usually
discharged before completing their training.
the SPLA and the Ethiopian
Army in October 1986 closed 84 kilometers of road
between !tang and Bonga to facilitate the transfer of
10,000 inductees---netted in a mass recruitment
drive--to the training base.
SPLA recruits at Bonga receive a three-month course
in general drilling, weapons familiarization, and
guerrilla warfare,
Physical exercise, parade ground maneuvers
accompanied by singing, and basic weapons
familiarization, often with wooden-guns, are routine
daily practice,
At a site several kilometers southwest of Gambela
town in a heavily wooded area, abandoned dummy
weapons, foxholes, and other signs of training are
evident,
Although most of the training in Gambela is military,
political indoctrination are offered to selected rebels
in Ethiopia SPLA
Secret
members receive political indoctrination usually
between the ages of 12 and 30.
although the exact nature of the political
training is unclear, it almost certainly has a Marxist
orientation. The director of Rang Refugee
Coordination Committee, an SPLA official,
maintains a large library devoted almost exclusively
to Marxist literature, and he openly expounds a
vigorous Marxist philosophy,
Another camp, located at Zink, Ethiopia, has
the political training center for instruction in Marxist-
Leninism, which is provided only to higher echelon
SPLA members,
Combat Support
Food. Information provided by a former SPLA
member indicates that the SPLA is critically
dependent on the food it manages to skim from the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
operating in Ethiopia. Apart from the food the SPLA
obtains by looting the native population, both in
Ethiopia and Sudan, and some small-scale corn
cultivation by prisoners at various locations in
Ethiopia, the SPLA's only source of food is the
UNHCR, according to the SPLA defector.
as of late February 1987
the SPLA has been systematically diverting massive
amounts of international relief aid in the Gambela
region for its own use.
the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
control over food distribution at Rang is tenuous or
nonexistent, and most food is diverted to the SPLA.
SPLA officials sell international aid items to
Ethiopian merchants.
senior SPLA officers make a great deal of money
selling internationally donated oil, cereal, and other
food items on the local market and to neighboring
towns, but lower ranking SPLA officials are strictly
prohibited from this black-marketeering.
The SPLA through the Refugee Coordination
Committee inflates the number of refugees in
Gambela to increase international aid to the camps
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
and thus gains more supplies for the SPLA,
In addition to food, the SPLA obtains medical
supplies from the International Red Cross, which
provides more than $1 million per year to a hospital in
Gambela, Four
SPLA members who work as physicians steal drugs
from the hospital for the SPLA and regularly over-
prescribe medicine to selected patients who forward
the medicine to the rebels. They also secretly treat
wounded SPLA soldiers
Command, Control, and Intelligence Headquarters.
The SPLA's military headquarters is located at
Bilfam, Ethiopia,
the SPLA relies on
military and political officers at Bilfam to coordinate
and transmit policy decisions to other camps in
western Ethiopia and to commanders inside Sudan.
Access to Bilfam is restricted because of its
importance.
Staging Areas and Ammunition Depots. Asosa,
located north of Gambela, serves as an SPLA staging
base for operations inside Sudan. SPLA forces were
deployed there, before
their capture of the Sudanese border town of Kurmuk
in November 1987.
supplies are stored at Asosa. Adura, Manjok, and
Talut also function as staging areas into Sudan,
especially for the nearby border town of Jokau,
These staging areas
probably were instrumental to the rebel capture of
Reverse Blank
17
Jokau, Sudan, in May 1987. The population of these
staging bases fluctuates dramatically, depending on
the military operations inside Sudan,
These bases also contain administrative
offices, small ammunition depots, and stockades,
the SPLA uses Gambela as a
transit center and as a staging area to provide
administrative and logistic administrative support.
The camp at Bilfam is used primarily as a transit
center, although detainees, defectors, and suspected
Sudanese Government collaborators are also held
there,
Outlook
We believe the SPLA, in the near term, will depend
heavily on Ethiopian sanctuary for recruiting new
members, training and combat support functions, and
as a depot for supplies. Addis Ababa appears resolved 25X1
to supporting the insurgents' efforts to threaten the 25X1
government in Khartoum. Meanwhile, Khartoum
cannot militarily disrupt the SPLA's organization
inside Ethiopian territory.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Despite the utility of Ethiopian sanctuary, we believe
the rebels will expand their organization inside
Sudan.
the rebels are building up their main operations base
at Boma, Sudan. The expansion of the base at Boma
and the development of other bases inside Sudan will
reduce the need for rebel units, which largely move on
foot, to return to Ethiopia for supplies and
reorganization?reducing transit times and increasing
the insurgency's capability to sustain a higher level of
operations against government forces.
Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Libyan Activities in the
Weste7 Pacific: An
Update
Since the US airstrikes on Libya in April 1986, the
Tripoli-based World Center for Resistance to
Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reactionism, and
Fascism?the Mathaba or Anti-Imperialism
Center?has coordinated an ambitious effort to
broaden ties to radical groups worldwide. As part of
this initiativej
this year actively worked to establish a diplomatic
presence in Vanuatu and build a regional network
capable of supporting subversion. The firm response
by the Australian Government to this meddling last
April and May has dealt a serious?but not fatal?
blow to Libyan efforts in the region. As a result,
Tripoli has adopted a lower profile in the Western
Pacific in recent months, but it has not abandoned its
program to expand Libyan influence in the area.
Thrown Out of Canberra
Australia's closure of the Libyan People's Bureau in
Canberra was an important setback to Libyan plans.
Australian example?as well as the arrogance of
Libya's envoys and the unwelcome glare of the news
media?almost certainly was a factor in the decision
of the Government of Vanuatu to defer the opening of
a Libyan People's Bureau there.
Libya hoped to make Vanuatu a base for Anti-
Imperialism Center operations in the South Pacific.
These reversals left Libya without a permanent
presence in the area.
Libya Perseveres
Despite these events, Tripoli appears undeterred from
its goal of penetrating the South Pacific.
Libya's priorities in the
region are establishing a diplomatic presence in
Vanuatu and securing contacts with independence
movements in the French Pacific possessions of New
Caledonia and Tahiti. the Libyans
19
also will work to establish diplomatic relations?
presumably including a resident mission?with New
Zealand to compensate for the break in relations with
Australia.
Meanwhile, Libya has fallen back on its People's
Bureau in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as a base of
operations for both the South Pacific and Southeast
Asia. the Anti-
Imperialism Center intends to assign additional
people to Kuala Lumpur in December 1987 or
January 1988 to support a stranger subversive effort
in East Asia and the Pacific. One of these officials
may bring weapons and explosives into the Libyan
Cultural Center in Malaysia via diplomatic pouch,
The Islamic Call Society in Kuala Lumpur is another
avenue of Libyan influence in the area. Originally
founded as a missionary organization, the Islamic
Call Society has been co-opted by the Libyan Anti-
Imperialism Center and used to support its operations.
In Kuala Lumpur the Islamic Call office has given
logistic support to Anti-Imperialism projects.
From their People's Bureau in Kuala Lumpur, the
Libyans are in contact with leftist elements in
Vanuatu. Tripoli's main agent is the secretary general
of the ruling party, Barak Sope. Libya has provided
"security training"?which almost certainly includes
political indoctrination?for a ruling party security
squad that answers to Sope.
members of this squad have engaged in pro-Libyan
propaganda activities, although they have met with
little sympathy from most citizens of Vanuatu.
Vanuatu may merge
the party security unit with the Vanuatu police
protective security section. Port Vila has requested
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25)(1
25X11
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
additional Libyan training for both party members
and police trainees, according to the US Embassy in
Port Moresby.
Elsewhere in the Pacific
Although the establishment of a diplomatic or other
Libyan presence in Vanuatu is a high Libyan priority
in the Western Pacific, the Libyans are exploring
other avenues to expand their influence. In most
cases, the Libyan Anti-Imperialism Center and its
members in Kuala Lumpur play a leading role in
Libyan operations.
The Philippines, in particular, appears to be of
growing interest to Tripoli. The Libyans have a
longstanding relationship with Muslim Moro
insurgents in Mindanao and continue to offer political
and material support to them. In the past year,
however, the Libyans have been expanding their
contacts in the Philippines to include leftists and non-
Muslim groups. Although Libya remains a minor
actor in the Philippines, it almost certainly views the
troubled political situation there, as well as the large
US military presence, as targets of opportunity worth
exploiting.
Libyan activity in the Philippines generally consists of
political action and other active measures.
he Libyans have been working
with leftwmg intellectuals and Philippine college
professors and students, primarily to promote
Qadhafi's Green Book. Officials of the Anti-
Imperialism Center and the Islamic Call Society
visited Manila last fall, and the Anti-Imperialism
Center is having Libyan propaganda prepared in
Tagalog
The Libyans are active in other Pacific locations:
? Anti-Imperialism
Center officers in Kuala Lumpur recruited 150
radical Muslim Indonesians for military training in
Libya. the Indonesians
departed for a three- to four-month course in
October. Upon completion they are to return to
Indonesia to train others.
? In New Caledonia,
the Libyans are funding a locally prominent
Muslim preacher. In addition, Libya almost
certainly supports Melanesian separatists in New
Caledonia.
? Tripoli has provided funds to the Free Papua
Movement
for several years. 1 he Libyans may have brought
some members of the group to Libya this past
summer, but we cannot confirm that any Libyan
arms have reached the insurgents in Indonesia's
Irian Jaya Province.
? In Tonga the main Libyan contact is the
Tongan Muslim League, which proba y numbers
no more than two dozen members. The League is in
touch with the Libyan Islamic Call Society, which
has sponsored league members for instruction in
Tripoli's contacts in the Muslim community are
racIntially more dangerous.
agents of the Anti-Imperialism Lenter and
Islamic Call Society in Kuala Lumpur arranged in
late October 1987 for 30 Philippine Muslims to
receive military training in Libya.
last July Qadhafi urged a visiting Moro
delegation to overthrow the Aquino government and
to strike at US targets, such as Clark Air Force Base.
Secret
Malaysia and Libya
Libyan Prospects in the Western Pacific
In our judgment, Tripoli will continue to insinuate
itself into regional problems in the Pacific, trying to
build influence and undermine Western interests, but
its progress will be slow. Generally, Libyan arms and
money have been more effective in aggravating
existing conflicts than in generating new instability.
The traditional pro-Western outlook of the West
Pacific state, and, in the South Pacific, the influence
of Christianity are additional obstacles to Libyan
inroads.
Libya's relations with the ruling party in Vanuatu
bear watching, however, as its security training of
party members may give Libya's allies in Vanuatu a
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
useful instrument for intimidating political opponents.
Moreover,the opening of a People's Bureau in
Vanuatu would ease Libyan operational difficulties in
the South Pacific.
The provision of military training to Islamic radicals
from Indonesia and the Philippines is another
worrisome development. It is possible.
some of these Muslim
trainees will serve as cannon fodder for the Libyan
war effort with Chad. Nonetheless, Libyan efforts to
instigate anti-Western violence in Sub-Saharan
Africa and in the Caribbean suggest that some of the
Libyan operations in the Pacific are aimed at Western
interests.
We have no information that Libya is planning to
support terrorism in the Pacific area, nor does it seem
likely in the near term. Most of Tripoli's reliable
21
terrorist surrogates operate in the Middle East and
Western Europe. We are concerned, however, that
Qadhafi may be attracted by the instability in the
Philippines and seek to recruit surrogates for anti-US 25X1
action among dissident Filipinos. Tripoli also is likely
to watch for signs of increased violence by Melanesian
separatists in Indonesia and New Caledonia in hopes
of inflaming the problem with Libyan arms, training,
and money. 25X1
25X1
Libya's ability to sustain serious operations in the
Pacific will be limited by the absence of an extensive
support network. Although this remains a significant
weakness for Libya in the region, it is a vulnerability
Tripoli will seek to remedy.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Canary Islands
(Sp,)
Portugal
RABAT*
Casablanca.
Spain
Gibraltar
Ceuta
(Sp.)
*Fez
Morocco
Marrakech.
.El Aainn
rvjorocan
defensive
berm
Western
Sahara
Ad Dakhla.
NOUAKCHOTT
*Bir Moghrein
Melilla
? (Sp.)
?Tindouf
Algeria
Mauritania
Mali
0 150 Kilometers
I'
0 150 Miles
secret
22
7 070 8-87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
The Western Sahara War:
How Long Can the Polisario Keep
Fighting?
The Polisario Front guerrillas have been fighting in
the Western Sahara to create an independent state
since 1975. Aware that a decisive military victory is
unattainable, the guerrillas' goal is to force Rabat to
negotiate a political settlement through a war of
attrition to sap Morocco's resolve and make the war a
liability for King Hassan. The guerrillas may be
experiencing morale problems, but they show no sign
of giving up the struggle.
The Polisario's devotion to its cause is not the only
reason it has survived 12 years of fighting against a
larger and better equipped Moroccan force. The
guerrillas are well equipped, highly mobile, and take
advantage of their knowledge of the terrain. They are
faced with manpower and logistic constraints,
however, that limit their combat capabilities. The
guerrillas depend on Algeria for material support and
sanctuary without which they could not exist.
Moreover, Algiers can restrain the guerrillas from
exercising military options?such as direct attacks
from Algeria or terrorist attacks behind the berm or
in Morocco proper?which could increase pressure on
Hassan to negotiate but also risk direct hostilities
between Algeria and Morocco.
Evolution of the Fighting
During the war the Polisario's battlefield fortunes
have worsened as Morocco abandoned its initial
strategy of defending garrisoned towns and adopted
the berm strategy to counter early Polisario successes.
During the first phase of the war-1975-81?the
guerrillas operated freely in the sparsely populated
Sahara. They attacked isolated Moroccan garrisons
and ambushed patrols. By 1979 the guerrillas had
improved their capabilities and tactics enough to
attack targets in southern Morocco.
The Polisario achieved its most spectacular victory at
Guelta Zemmur in Western Sahara in October 1981,
but it proved costly in the long run. The Moroccans
suffered their biggest loss of men and materiel?some
300 casualties and at least a battalion's worth of
23
equipment?since the beginning of the war. Rabat
responded by withdrawing its troops from isolated
garrisons and began building the berm. In addition,
the King used the defeat to request increased US
assistance. The Polisario unsuccessfully tried to
disrupt the construction of the initial berm, as well as
each subsequent extension. Eventually the guerrillas
were forced to abandon their permanent bases in
Western Sahara and withdraw to Algeria. Since then
the guerrillas have been limited to conducting daily,
low-level harassments punctuated by occasional large-
scale attacks against the berm.
Polisario military activity reached an alltime low in
1986. The guerrillas did not launch a single major
attack, compared with the previous several years
when they conducted two or three such attacks a year.
The guerrillas, however, have increased their military
operations in 1987. They have launched eight major
attacks since February. The apparent success of this
offensive almost certainly has boosted Polisario
morale. The manpower and materiel cost of these
attacks, not yet known, probably will prevent the
guerrillas from matching this activity during the
coming year
How Much Longer Are They Willing To Fight?
During 12 years of fighting the Polisario has seen
Morocco gradually expand its control over nearly 80
percent of Western Sahara. If the Polisario hopes to
force Rabat to the negotiating table, the guerrillas
will have to sustain their resolve and carry on the war
more effectively. A Polisario official told the US
Embassy last May that the guerrillas are prepared for
a long war and will fight as long as Algerian support
continues. The attacks this year indicate that the
guerrillas are committed to their cause.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Several factors, including a lack of progress in the
war, extended combat duty, logistic shortages, and
tribal divisions, may be negatively affecting Polisario
morale,
The US Embassy in Nouakchott reported last May
that, according to credible sources, morale within the
Polisario was declining. Over 100 guerrillas had
deserted to Mauritania since the beginning of the
year, probably as a result of Morocco's latest berm
extension and the renewal of fighting in response to it.
In addition, tribal divisions have created morale
problems between the Reguibat?the largest tribe in
the Polisario Front?and secondary tribes and within
the Reguibat,
The Polisario admits there have been desertions since
it initiated its attacks this year, but it claims a net
increase in morale resulting from its successes,
according to the US Embassy in Algiers.
Can They Continue To Fight?
With only 3,000 to 5,000 combat personnel and a
limited manpower pool, the Polisario's ability to
sustain a high level of military operations is
constrained. The guerrillas have a limited ability to
expand their forces and replace combat losses by
drawing from the refugee camps in Tindouf and
recruiting from tribes in northern Mauritania.' They
almost certainly cannot afford to take even moderate
numbers of casualties over an extended period even if
they inflict greater casualties than they receive.
Polisario combat casualties for 1987 probably have
exceeded 15 percent and could restrict the frequency
and level of operations over the next year. The
guerrillas can fight the Moroccans indefinitely,
however, if they reduce their combat activity to pre-
1987 levels and continue to receive assistance from
Algeria.
' Estimates of the number of refugees living in Tindouf range from
as low as 15,000?according to Rabat?to the Polisario claim of
165,000. We estimate the figure to be 17,000 to 35,000
Secret
Major Polisario Equipment Holdings a
25X1
25X1
Ground order of battle
Tank
T-62
30
T-54/5571
71
Armored personnel carriers
BMP
90
BTR-60
22
Armored cars
Cascavel
26
BRDM
14
Artillery
122-mm
26
howitzer
25X1
160-mm
mortar
12
25X1
120-mm
mortar
6
Multiple-rocket launchers
BM-21
22
RM-70
2
25X1
Landrovers
120
25X1
Trucks
420
Air defense assets
Surface-to-air missiles
SA-6 TEL
8
SA-9 TEL
16
Self-propelled antiaircraft guns
ZSU-23/4
8
Antiaircraft heavy machineguns
ZU-23
50
ZPU-4
21
Dependence on Foreign Assistance
The Polisario could not exist as a military force
without external assistance. Algeria is the guerrillas'
primary benefactor. Algiers has given the guerrillas
equipment and materiel and also provides safehaven
for the fighters. Although the guerrillas benefit from
Algeria's support, their dependence means that
Algiers can and does exercise a large degree of control
over major Polisario military operations.
Furthermore, Algiers prevents the Polisario from
exercising military options that could cause the war to
escalate into an Algerian-Moroccan confrontation.
24
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
The Polisario has received assistance from other
countries, including Libya and Cuba. Tripoli provided
equipment and materiel to the guerrillas during the
first years of the war but reduced and eventually cut
off aid following the signing of the Oujda accord by
Colonel Qadhafi and King Hassan in August 1984.
Despite allegations from Rabat over the past year, we
have no evidence that Tripoli has resumed its support
following Hassan's unilateral abrogation of the treaty
in August 1986. Even if Qadhafi decided to renew
support, his preoccupation with Chad would make
him an unreliable backer at best.
Cuban assistance to the guerrillas long has been
limited to medical support personnel, but this appears
to have changed.
Ambassador admitted early this year that there is an
18- to 20-man Cuban military training mission
working with the Polisario. A second Cuban official
recently reported that Havana was planning to send a
small group of military advisers to assist the Polisario
early next year
We believe Cuba's impact on Polisario
capabilities has been and is likely to remain minimal.
Algeria will continue to provide the bulk of training
and assistance to the Polisario and will almost
certainly keep a tight rein on the Cubans' activities.
Morocco has charged that the Polisario is receiving
support from Iran, but we cannot confirm this.
Outlook
The Polisario can fight in Western Sahara almost
indefinitely as long as Algeria provides military
support and safehaven. In view of Rabat's
Reverse Blank
25
commitment to the war and ever increasing control of
the territory, however, this probably will not bring
King Hassan to the negotiating table. Although the
guerrillas will retain the advantage of choosing the
time and place of attack, they are not in a position to
sustain increased combat operations. Furthermore, we
believe Algiers at least in the near term will refrain
from approving escalation that could put enough
pressure on Rabat to force the King to negotiate.
The Polisario's resolve?which is essential to its
struggle?will be tested if the character of the war
does not change. We do not anticipate that the
guerrillas' manpower problem will improve, and
logistic constraints will persist unless Algerian support
increases or Libya resumes its assistance?both of
which appear unlikely. Furthermore, dependence on
Algeria could become a problem if Algiers grows
weary of the war, withdraws its support, and makes a
deal with Rabat. Algiers could encourage and support
increased attacks to hasten negotiations, but Polisario
victories so far have not accomplished this.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25x-i
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Algeria: Little Chlicelff
Economic Reformar-1
President Bendjedid's economic reform proposals,
now being debated by the National Assembly, face
intense opposition by groups within the ruling party
and public-sector enterprises that want to maintain
the status quo. Even if adopted, the reforms would
leave many sources of inefficiency untouched. They
do not, for example, deal with hydrocarbons, the most
important sector of the Algerian economy.
Algerian Socialism
After gaining independence 25 years ago, Algeria
adopted a Soviet-style command economy more
completely than any other Maghreb country. The
government nationalized all but the smallest
enterprises and farms. Ministerial bureaucrats and
central planners began sending down orders on almost
every aspect of production. Like their Soviet
counterparts, Algerian planners advocated investing
in large-scale projects in heavy industry, while
sacrificing agriculture. Most of these projects failed
because of a lack of the requisite natural resources
and technology and because of the organizational
problems inherent in central planning.
The agricultural sector has failed to provide for
Algeria's rapidly growing population. Algeria has
shifted from being a net food exporter at
independence to importing about 70 percent of its
food this year. During the oil boom years Algeria
might have afforded inefficient production, but now,
with greatly reduced revenues, Bendjedid believes
reforms are necessary.
The Reform Proposals
The proposals would modify state ownership of
enterprises to foster greater productivity and local
initiative. Enterprises would begin selling shares of
stock, and the state would become a major
shareholder rather than the sole owner. As a
shareholder the state would enjoy limited liability?to
be introduced for the first time?and, in principle,
would no longer have to bail out money-losing firms.
The state would intervene only through duly
authorized agents that manage its stockholdings, but
the conditions of intervention have not been spelled
out
27
Algeria: The Economy at a Glance
Algeria's economy depends heavily on the oil and gas
sector, which provides 97 percent of foreign exchange
earnings. Unlike most other OPEC countries, Algeria
derives more revenue from natural gas than from oil.
Hydrocarbon earnings have fallen more than 40
percent since early 1986. Algeria is a hardliner within
OPEC because it hopes that higher prices for oil will
lead to higher prices for natural gas.
Real economic growth in 1986 fell to about 2
percent?half the 1985 level. Real growth in 1987
will probably be at most 1 percent. With the
population expanding at 3.1 percent per year,
Algeria's ver capita rif growth has been negative.
Algeria needs about 300,000 new housing units each
year, mostly apartments, but the government is
providing only about 170,000 units. As a result, the
average unit contains about seven people.
Demographic problems will worsen because almost
half the 23 million population is under 15. Surplus
rural people move to the cities, and about two-thirds
of the population already lives in urban areas. The
urban growth rate of 5.2 percent per year has further
taxed already overburdened services and amenities.
City water systems, for example, frequently break
down for several days at a time.
The official unemployment rate of 16 percent is
probably understated by at least 8 percentage points.
We believe unemployment will increase for the rest of
the decade. The government hopes to create 110,000
jobs a year until 1990 but acknowledges that about
180,000 persons will enter the job market each year.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Enterprise managers would be given more authority
and responsibility for handling company affairs.
Under the proposals, workers in each plant would
elect a board of directors that would make medium-
and long-term investment and product decisions. For
example, if a firm had ample funds to pay for desired
machinery, the board could authorize a purchase
without reference to central planners and ministerial
officials. Furthermore, the board would prepare the
company's annual budget?also without consulting
Algiers.
The board in turn would elect a general manager who
would have authority over day-to-day production. He
would hire and fire workers according to their
productivity and change product prices in response to
shortrun market changes. He would also have the
responsibility of seeing that the firm is profitable,
profit being a key indicator of performance
Algiers would still prepare a five-year plan, but it
would be an "indicative plan" outlining broad social
and economic goals and a framework in which
enterprises would operate. Enterprises would have to
make their investment plans in harmony with the
national plan and would be required to report
annually on their conformance with plan guidelines.
State farms would be reorganized as producer
cooperatives to raise lagging productivity. All state
farmworkers would be required to join, despite the
fact that Algiers calls them "voluntary cooperatives."
The government would transfer all equipment to the
cooperatives and would grant leases in perpetuity on
land.' Algiers would allow private farming on land not
in state farms. Mandatory delivery quotas would be
abolished for both collective and private farms. The
state, however, would continue to subsidize
production of some desired crops.
The government would grant banks authority to make
investment decisions independently of central
planners. Banks would make investment decisions
primarily on the profitability of the project.
' Private ownership of land is prohibited under the Algerian
Constitution. Long-term leases would circumvent the restriction.
Secret
Analysis of the Proposals
Even if Bendjedid's proposals were fully enacted, they
would not substantially improve the efficiency of the
economy. Many impediments to reform would still be
in place. For example, Algiers will retain restrictions
on the entry of firms into markets. Although the
proposals call for joint ventures involving foreign
companies and the state, Algerian citizens will not be
allowed to form joint ventures with foreigners. As a
result, valuable opportunities to acquire
entrepreneurial experience and to train future
managers will be lost.
Furthermore, the government probably would allow
inefficient firms to stay in business rather than risk
alienating entrenched special interests. Before
relinquishing state ownership, Algiers plans to make a
one-time funds transfer to money-losing firms to
make them solvent. Although Algiers hopes firms will
remain solvent, there are provisions for further
subsidies to firms that cannot stay in the black. Only
in rare cases?not precisely defined?would firms be
forced to close. The government's prohibition on
calling firms bankrupt illustrates how sensitive the
leadership is to inefficiency and to the shutdown of
firms
We believe that in Algeria's highly politicized
environment the elections of board members would be
rigged so that current central planners and ministry
bureaucrats would win. Their lack of entrepreneurial
and technical skill, already a source of problems,
would only perpetuate inefficiency.
Although agriculture probably will be reformed more
than other sectors, we do not expect a substantial
increase in output. Farmers?whether collective or
private?would still face severe constraints and have
little incentive to work hard. For example, farmers
would be required to purchase all their supplies from
the state and, unlike enterprise managers, to sell their
products at prices set by the state to prevent
"profiteering."
28
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Algiers has stated that the oil and natural gas sector
will remain a socialist domain not subject to the
proposed reforms. This sector contributes most to the
gross domestic product and provides all of Algeria's
foreign exchange. The exclusion of the petroleum
sector restricts the reforms to the smaller industries,
which will severely limit their overall impact.
The government is retaining its near monopoly on
imports, further limiting the reforms proposed for
industry and agriculture. Since Algeria imports most
of its resources, the price-distorting effect of the
monopoly is spread throughout the economy. Further,
Algiers's refusal to devalue the dinar?currently
valued at five times its real worth?means that prices
of traded items will remain distorted.
Outlook
The National Assembly will debate the reform
proposals until the end of 1987. If they are passed,
implementation will begin in January 1988. They are
to be tried in a small?as yet unspecified?group of
firms and in a small number of banks. Bendjedid
hopes that, if this succeeds, the banks will extend the
reforms to other industries.
Reverse Blank
29
We believe the reforms will face opposition from
hardline socialists and public-sector enterprises with a
stake in the status quo. These interest groups probably
will dilute the reform proposals or will prevent their
passage, as was the fate of similar proposals in 1979
and 1986. Bendjedid cannot impose the reforms
unilaterally, because he does not have a large group of
supporters that stand to gain materially from the
reforms. After 130 years of colonialism and 25 years
of rigid central planning, Algeria lacks a tradition of
entrepreneurship at the national level.
25X1
25X1
As a result, we expect to see more of the minor,
sporadic reforms that have characterized Algeria's
"muddling through" in recent years, which will not
have a real impact on Algeria's badly mismanaged
economy. At the same time, Algeria's population is
growing at a high rate, increasing the nation's
economic difficulties each year.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Land Reform in Mauritania
Goals of Land Reform
The Mauritanian Government enacted a
comprehensive land reform in 1983 that, if fully
implemented, would have a dramatic impact on the
economy and racial relations within the country. With
little public discussion, the government adopted the
land reform with three long-term goals. According to
the US Embassy in Nouakchott, the government
hopes to encourage privatization of land by granting
holdings to individuals who will use them more
productively, eliminate the traditional practices of
land tenure by replacing the tribal system of group
tillage with a formal procedure of written land
entitlements issued by the state, and end the control
of access to land held by the nomadic tribes, allowing
for greater population dispersal.
Articles of the Reform
The land reform law clearly states the government
will recognize and guarantee private property that is
used in conformity with Islamic tenure law. This law
holds that the action should contribute to the
economic and social development of the community.
Under the land reform law, the government has the
authority to award land titles to individuals who
productively use or improve parcels of land.
Productive usage includes crop production, building,
or digging a water well.
Land that has no visible signs of improvement or
usage, other than sporadic grazing, is considered state
domain and can be allotted to those who propose a
development project. In accordance with the
requirements of the land reform, the state must post a
public notice and allow residents of the area two
months to provide documentation of ownership to
state authorities.
The land reform system stands in stark contrast to the
traditional tenure system, which primarily affected
the scarce arable land along the Senegalese border.
Under the traditional system, the tribal chief and
members of the village council would distribute land
31
among members of the community in varying
proportions?depending on the amount of land
inundated by water. Pastureland, which, by its nature,
shows no visible signs of physical improvement, was
often not subject to individual ownership but
designated instead for use by the entire village.
Problems Involving the Reform
According to the US embassy, the government's
adoption of land reform has become a contentious
political issue because it has increased tension among
the three primary groups competing for political and
economic influence. The government is dominated by
white Maurs of nomadic Arab ancestry. There are
also black Africans (Haratins) who are culturally
assimilated and descendants of slaves. The third
group consists of black ethnic groups?the
Toucouleur, Wolof, Soninke, and Bambara?who live
along the Senegal River in the south.
During the Nonaligned Movement summit meeting in
Harare in 1986, Toucouleur dissidents circulated an
antigovernment manifesto claiming the ruling Arabs
were oppressing black Mauritanians. The document
advocated violent opposition to the settlement of
Arabs on traditional black agricultural and
pastureland along the southern border with Senegal.
This land has traditionally been used to raise sorghum
and millet. The nomadic whites and assimilated
blacks, largely concentrated in the northern and
eastern sections of the country, have traditionally
been herdsmen of camels, cattle, sheep, and goats. In
addition, these groups have been involved with grain,
date, and animal feed production. Tension between
the government and the Toucouleur-led opposition
generated a coup attempt last fall. The government
announced on 22 October that it had foiled a coup
plot involving 51 persons?most of them members of
the Toucouleur. All of the coup plotters were tried,
with three Toucouleur military officers receiving
death sentences.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
The problem of competition over arable land in the
southern region of the country has been worsened by
the migration taking place within Mauritania. When
the second phase of the Sahelian drought commenced
in 1981-82, hundreds of thousands of Arabs and black
nomads fled the desert, settling in shantytowns
sprawling around Nouakchott and along the
Toucouleur-dominated southern border area. This
migration has been a major factor in increasing racial
tension in the country. The land reform movement is
perceived by the Toucouleur opposition as a means of
seizing land occupied by them and transferring
ownership to the white and assimilated black groups.
The government's previous policy of limiting land
distribution to discourage urban migration and the
lack of credit institutions that could provide low-cost
loans to the poor caused rampant land speculation.
The principal beneficiaries of this restrictive policy
over the last decade were speculators and slumlords,
many of whom are government officials and
prominent businessmen.
According to the US Embassy, pressures on the usage
of arable land are increasing. Swarms of locusts are
affecting large portions of North Africa. Creating
extensive crop damage, the locusts are playing a
direct role in encouraging migration from the remote
desert oases to Nouakchott and the arable land in the
south. The effect of the locust swarms will put
additional pressure on the usable land, forcing the
government to extend implementation of land reform.
Another serious problem is corruption within the land
registration process. The Toucouleur opposition fears
that the white-dominated government will
deliberately grant arable land to members of their
own ethnic community at the expense of the
Toucouleur minority. The fears of the Toucouleur
community were realized in a case involving the
coastal area called Keur Macine. Although the area
had little agricultural value because of its poor soil
quality, it was used by Toucouleur herdsmen and
fishermen. The controversy began when the former
governor, an Arab, distributed and registered without
authorization 60 parcels of land, including some to
important government figures. The governor's
Secret
transaction resulted in his removal from office, but
suspicions of land reform persist among the holders of
these lands.
Outlook
The issue of land reform and the abolition of the
traditional system of land tenure will remain
troubling issues for the Mauritanian Government. We
believe that, unless solutions can be found for the
problems of the continuing drought and destructive
locust swarms, population flight from the outlying
areas to Nouakchott and the Senegalese border area
will continue. As those areas become more crowded,
the government will face conflicting pressures
concerning implementing land reform as a means of
encouraging investment and economic expansion.
The problems involving land reform pose serious
questions regarding the stability of the government.
We believe that, if a solution to the concerns of the
Toucouleur community is not found, social unrest will
mount, perhaps resulting in another serious coup
attempt. The coup attempt last October was not a
direct result of a particular government policy.
Rather, it was a side effect of a growing number of
problems facing the government.
The economic difficulties of the Mauritanian
Government probably make land reform a necessary
policy for the country. If the government intends to
maintain political stability and promote economic
expansion, the key issues involving land distribution,
ethnic tension, the continuing drought, the destructive
locust swarms, and internal government corruption
must be addressed fairly. Government efforts to
alleviate these problems are hampered by a lack of
administrative and economic resources to imDlement
effectively land reform.
32
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
R
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Lebanon: Hizballah Spreading
the Word
Since its emergence during the period 1982-83, the
group of Lebanese Shia radicals collectively known as
Hizballah has rapidly become the most dynamic
Islamic fundamentalist movement outside Iran.
Inspired, nurtured, and trained by Iran, Hizballah
appears to be developing its own efforts to assist
fledgling fundamentalist Shia movements and ex sort
its Lebanese brand of Islamic radicalism.
Hizballah's radical Shia leadership is driven by a
fundamentalist ideology that is inspired by the
Iranian revolution and aims to establish an Islamic
republic in Lebanon. Like their Iranian brethren,
Hizballah expounds the belief that the Islamic
revolution must be a worldwide phenomenon that
cannot be confined within the boundaries of a single
country. We believe Hizballah has begun to
encourage fundamentalism throughout the Arab
world and may be assuming the same mentor role that
Iran played in Lebanon
Iran has played an integral role in the development
and training of radical Shias in Lebanon. Several
hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guard members in
Lebanon provide both military training and logistic
support to Hizballah.
the Revolutionary Guard provides
iz a a training in weapons, explosives, military
tactics, and communications. We do not believe that
Hizballah's contact with other fundamentalist groups
has approached the proportions of the Iranian link to
Hizballah but is rather in the initial stage of testing
the waters.
Hizballah is
passing its knowledge in military tactics and
recruitment techniques to fundamentalist groups
through contacts and training both in and outside
Lebanon.
41
25X1
Most Muslims worldwide are Sunni, but in Lebanon
and Iran Shias predominate. Longstanding ideological
differences will hinder Hizballah's activities in Sunni-
dominated countries (as it has Iran's), but growing
fundamentalist tendencies in both Shia and Sunni
communities worldwide are at least superficially
helping overcome the obstacles to cooperation.
Fundamentalist groups can identify with each other 25X1
as oppositionist political groups who advocate
nonsecular alternatives. 25X1
Hizballah Ties to North Africa
Although the fundamentalist movements in
predominantly Sunni North Africa are distinct from
that of Lebanon, they appear to have loose affiliations
with the Lebanese group. Tunisian fundamentalists,
in particular, appear linked to Lebanon's radical
Shias. Last September a Tunisian court sentenced the
leader of the largest Islamic fundamentalist group in
Tunisia?the Islamic Tendency Movement?to life 25X1
imprisonment for terrorist activities. Almost
immediately, Lebanon's Hizballah responded with a
communique, authenticated with a photograph of US
hostage Terry Anderson, threatening retaliation
against government leaders if death sentences were
carried out. 25X1
25X1
In addition, French police arrested several Tunisian
youths in March 1987 as part of a support group for
Hizballah activities in Europe.
the group was working with Hizballah at the
behest of Iran to transport and store liquid explosives
for future acts by Lebanese terrorists
In the past few months, we have received reports of
Hizballah contacts with Algerian fundamentalists. In
mid-July 1987 a senior Algerian security official
claimed that the Algerians had discovered several
Hizballah cells,
The cells consist of Algerians trained in Iran
and Lebanon.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X11
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Relations between Hizballah and Egyptian Sunni
fundamentalists appear to be developing as well.
Knowledgeable observers note growing sympathy
among Egyptian fundamentalists for the radical Shia
agenda?a sharp departure from the past. Early this
year a series of articles and interviews by Shaykh
Umar Abd al-Rahman, a militant Egyptian cleric
linked to the assassins of President Anwar Sadat,
appeared in the Hizballah press. Ideologically close to
Hizballah, Abd al-Rahman advocates an Islamic
nation and opposition to the moderate Egyptian
Government, Israel, and the West. Abd al-Rahman's
Sunni affiliation and his belief that Egypt, not Iran,
should lead the future Islamic nation almost certainly
will hinder cooperation, but public ties to radical
Sunni groups provide valuable propaganda and
underscore Hizballah's commitment to Islamic unity.
Tutor to the Gulf Shias
Islamic fundamentalism in the smaller Gulf Arab
states is slowly changing from a social phenomenon to
a political situation. It has not, however, become a
mass movement opposing the present governments.
The majority of Gulf Shias support the Sunni ruling
families in the Persian Gulf. For example, the
subversive prosetuptalist group, the Islamic Front for
the Liberation of Bahrain, suffered serious setbacks in
recent years, and its leaders are forced to overate
outside Bahrain with Iranian assistance.
Hizballah's involvement with the Gulf Shias appears
to be focused primarily on training and may be
somewhat older than in the Maghreb because of the
intense Iranian interest in the Gulf.
in late 1985 a large training
camp was discovered in northern Lebanon, near the
village of Janta, in the vicinity of Bala'bakk, part of
which is controlled by Hizballah. More than 2,000
Shias were reported to be training there, including
about 60 from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. After their
training, these Shias were to perform terrorist
operations in the Gulf states. In addition
Hizballah military trainers are
organizing and training Shia activists in Saudi
Arabia's Eastern Province.
Taking the.Show to Syria
An increasingly key target for Hizballah activity may
be neighboring Syria. Hizballah-Syrian relations are
a barometer for the larger Iranian-Syrian
Secret
relationship. In recent months the relationship has
been tense as Syria tries to contain Iranian influence
in Lebanon. Syria's goal to impose its security plan on
large sectors of Lebanon often places it at odds with
Hizballah activities. The kidnaping of US journalist
Charles Glass demonstrated the fragile equilibrium of
the relationship. Embarrassed by the breach of
security, Syrian troops cracked down on Hizballah
movement and supply shipments while Glass was
imprisoned but were careful not to push restrictions to
the point of open hostility.
Hizballah has longstanding ties to the anti-Syrian
Sunni fundamentalist Islamic Unification Movement
in northern Lebanon. The Islamic Unification
Movement in turn has ties to Syrian oppositionist
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Many
Syrian fundamentalists found safehaven with the
Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli, Lebanon,
after the Syrian Government's crackdown on the
Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982. Iran may
encourage these relationships to circumvent Syria's
border controls in case Iranian-Syrian relations sour
and Iran decides to embark on a campaign of
subversionl ,
Outlook
Hizballah will seek
to expand its ties to
fundamentalist groups to protect its growing
revolutionary reputation. The group will work closely
with Iran. It may increase joint training with
Revolutionary Guard advisers in the Bekaa and send
arms clandestinely to its new friends. In time,
42
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Hizballah's ties to other fundamentalists may be
sufficiently developed to enlist their aid in terrorist
operations against mutual enemies
Much of Hizballah's success will depend on the status
of Syrian-Hizballah relations. A severe crackdown on
Hizballah's freedom of movement or supplies could
frustrate Hizballah's efforts to train other
fundamentalists. Syrian tolerance, or even a
continuance of the present occasional Syrian
harassment, will give Hizballah the room to maneuver
and develop its aspirations to become a sponsor of
worldwide Islamic fundamentalism.
Reverse Blank
43
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
R
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Pakistani Ground Attack Versus
Indian Air Defense
Capabilities
Pakistan's Air Force has a limited ground attack
capability that, in our judgment, will not overcome
India's air defenses over the next few years. Pakistan
suffers from shortages of modern strike aircraft and
sophisticated bombing gear and from tenuous
command and control links. India's air defense
capability has improved dramatically in the last few
years with the addition of sophisticated multirole
aircraft to its inventory. Although India is improving
its ground-based air defenses, it remains vulnerable to
well-planned strikes by modern aircraft. We believe,
however, that in a future conflict Pakistan will not
have enough aircraft to fully exploit India's
weaknesses.
Pakistani Ground Attack Capabilities
Islamabad is implementing various measures to
improve the Air Force's ground attack capabilities.
Over the last few years, the Air Force has received
small quantities of modern aircraft, munitions, and
avionics and sought to improve ground-to-air
coordination. We believe these measures give
Pakistan a credible, but limited, close air support and
deep strike force.' Progress has been slow, largely
because of a lack of funds to procure significant
numbers of modern ground attack aircraft. Barring a
sudden infusion of foreign exchange, we expect
Pakistan to continue trying, without much success, to
compete with India's growing air defense capabilities.
Aircraft. The backbone of Pakistan's close air support
force is its 52 Chinese-built A-5s, which are
configured for close air support missions but are
obsolescent in design and avionics. The A-5s are
difficult to maintain. The US Embassy reports their
engines must be overhauled every 100 flying hours.
The Air Force's most capable multirole aircraft are its
' Modern combat aircraft can attack a variety of ground targets.
We use the term "close air support" to mean attacks on enemy
troops at or just behind the forward edge of battle. The term
"strike" denotes attacks on troops, logistic networks, cities, or
industrial targets well behind the battlefield
49
Secret
F-16s, which are supported by older, less capable
French-built Mirage Ills and 5s. The Air Force,
however, has too few of these aircraft. In a conflict
most of Pakistan's 38 F-16s would be relegated to air
defense duties, and its 66 Mirages would be spread
among air defense, ground attack, and reconnaissance
missions. In addition, the Air Force has 143 Chinese-
built F-6 fighters and 6 US-made B-57 bombers. Both
of these aircraft are old designs with little capability
to conduct attacks against modern air defenses
Pakistan appears ready to make a decision on the
purchase of a new aircraft. We believe the Air Force
wants to use the new aircraft primarily as an air
defense fighter but also wants it to have a ground
attack capability. After Islamabad considered
developing an improved version of the Chinese-made
F-7 fighter?called the Sabre-II?problems with this
project compelled the Pakistanis to decide to buy
more
Islamabad hopes that these aircraft can be
coproduced, with as much of the work as possible
done in Pakistan. Although the F-16's ground attack
capability is superior to that of the proposed Sabre II,
we believe the Air Force would deploy most of the
new F-16s as air defense aircraft, with some in reserve
for attack missions.
Meanwhile, Pakistan is increasing its inventory of
A-5s. US diplomats report that Pakistan is buying
A-5s from China at $3.5 million apiece?a substantial
savings over the roughly $13 million for a new F-16.
We do not know how many A-5s Islamabad plans to
purchase
The Army's ground attack capability resides in its 37
Saab MFI-17s and 20 AH-1 Cobra helicopters. The
Saabs are small, propeller-driven aircraft useful for
scouting tasks. They can also carry light loads of
bombs or rockets. The recently acquired Cobras are
equipped with TOW antitank missiles, and US
pilots are well trained and proficient.
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
I R noramhor 1017
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25A11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Pakistan's Ministry of Defense is seeking more attack
helicopters. Last summer McDonnell Douglas was
invited to bid on a sale of 50 to 60 MD-530F light
helicopters, which would be used mostly as scouts but
would also carry TOW missiles. The Army is
considering the US Bell-406, the French Gazelle, and
the German B0-105 helicopters to perform antiarmor
missions
Munitions. The Air Force has a variety of modern
attack munitions. It has US-made laser-guided
bombs, American Rockeye and British BL-755
cluster bomb units, and French Durandel runway
cratering bombs. These munitions can probably be
carried?although not always accurately delivered?
by all of the Air Force's attack aircraft. In addition,
the Air Force has Maverick air-to-surface missiles?a
US-made weapon designed to destroy tanks and
small, hardened targets and launched from F-16
fighters.
A shortage of laser designators to direct guided bombs
limits the Air Force's capability to hit point targets,
such as bridges or buildings, that may be heavily
defended in wartime.
only 12 French-made Atlis-2 laser
designators. These have been modified by the Air
Force so that they can be carried by either Mirages or
F-16s. The Army will buy 200 US-made ground-
based laser designators that can also be used to direct
guided bombs,
Command, Control, and Communications. In
previous wars with India, Pakistan's Air Force had
some success in ground attack missions but failed to
surprise the Indian Air Force at its bases or to have a
decisive impact on the ground fighting. We believe
that Islamabad would try to conduct a similar air
campaign in a future conflict, seeking to derive the
most benefits from its limited resources by
maximizing Indian losses of men and materiel
through strikes on Indian airfields, supply bases, and
units in transit behind the lines.
In a command exercise conducted in 1986, Air Force
staff officers practiced this doctrine. The exercise
involved Indian armored assaults on Pakistan's Sind
desert and southern Punjab Province. The Air Force
Secret
responded by providing close air support to break up
"Indian assaults" and by conducting repeated strikes
at logistic centers in the rear of the battle area.
The Air Force's combat coordination with the Army
is poor. during the
recent Highmark 87 collective training exercises, only
47 of 80 simulated close air support sorties were
judged successful, this problem on
the poor training of Army personnel, who
demonstrated a consistent inability to use their maps
and radios in calling for air support. In response to
this problem, the Air Force plans to rely on its own
forward air controllers whenever possible. We believe
this lack of interservice coordination would seriously
degrade Pakistan's attempts to make the most of its
limited attack capabilities and resources
The Army has not established a firm tactical doctrine
for employing its
Antitank training is done
cautiously because the Pakistanis are afraid to lose
helicopers, and uncertainty remains over whether the
Cobras should be primarily used against armor or
personnel.
Indian Air Defenses
India's ability to defend against Pakistani air attacks
is generally good, in our judgment. The Air Force has
close to 100 modern Mirage 2000s and MIG-29s,
about 350 older MIG-21s and MIG-23MFs, and 250
SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile launchers
(about 20 launchers are newly acquired and await
deployment). The Army has about 60 mobile missile
launchers (Tigercats, SA-6s, and SA-8s), 620
shoulder-fired missile launchers (SA-7s), and 70 self-
propelled and 1,500 towed antiaircraft guns. The
fighter aircraft squadrons lack modern command and
control systems, and the missiles are concentrated at
airfields or with the armored strike units, leaving
other targets vulnerable to concerted, well-planned
Pakistani air attacks.
Aircraft. We believe the Indian Air Force will allocate
about half of its older fighter aircraft?MIG-21s and
MIG-23MFs?to fly the bulk of its air defense
missions. Air Force exercises indicate the Indians will
50
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
keep a small portion of their air defense fighter
aircraft in the air and rotate the rest between ground
alert and maintenance. Each squadron probably will
attempt to intercept incoming aircraft outside the
protective envelope of surface-to-air missiles that
provide point defenses for airfields and a small
number of strategic targets
A key decision for the Indians will be how many of
their more advanced aircraft?Mirage 2000 and
MIG-29 multirole aircraft?to allocate to air defense
missions. We believe New Delhi will reassign these
aircraft from strike and strike escort missions as the
older MIG-21 force dwindles from combat losses.
pare parts
shortages and maintenance problems are severe for
India's older aircraft and may become extreme after a
short period of combat. In our judgment, the MIG-
29s will be reassigned first because their operational
range is shorter than the Mirage 2000s', and they will
be assigned air defense duties over the most important
potential targets, such as Bombay, nearby nuclear
facilities, and, eventually, New Delhi.
Ground-Based Air Defenses. Indian ground-based air
defenses are weak, even by Third World standards,
except near airfields. The Indians have deployed most
of their Soviet-supplied SA-2 high-altitude and SA-2
low-to-medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles to
protect their airfields
leaving other targets of Pakistani
airstrikes vulnerable.
We believe the Indians cannot rely on their ground-
based air defenses alone to disrupt Pakistani aircraft
attacks on logistic centers and other rear area targets.
By using most of their surface-to-air missiles to
protect airfields, the Indians have failed to create an
interlocking network of missile sites that would
provide effective area coverage. The Indians allocate
only a handful of missiles and radar-controlled
antiaircraft guns to protect key railyards?
insufficient, in our view, to defend against well-
planned attacks.
51
Secret
Indian Army tactical air defenses also are light.
Indian infantry and mountain divisions are not
equipped with heavy antiaircraft weapons, and the
two armored and single mechanized infantry divisions
have only about 70 modern ZSU 23-4 self-propelled
and 140 older ZU 23 towed antiaircraft guns spread
among them. The shoulder-fired SA-7s are spread
throughout several units. The Army's small number
of mobile tactical missiles?Tigercats, SA-6s, and
SA-8s?are organized into independent air defense
brigades,
Command, Control, and Communications. Indian
ability to detect Pakistani air attacks is improving.
have
made good progress in the last two years in deploying
a modern air defense warning system. They have built
a series of medium-range radar sites equipped with
underground bunkers, backup electrical power
generators, and buried communications lines from
Kashmir to Gujarat. Although these sites provide
overlapping coverage, they have not been integrated
under a command network that would provide
headquarters with a complete picture of the air battle.
The Indians are working on an airborne early
warning/airborne warning and control system
(AEW/AWACS) program for operation by 1992 at
the earliest,
We doubt, however, that they will be able to produce
an AEW/AWACS aircraft in that time without
extensive foreign assistance. India is also interested in
a quicker acquisition of the Soviet Mainstay
AWACS, which we believe would increase their
ability both to detect enemy aircraft and direct
intercept missions.
Outlook
Indian air defense capabilities probably will outstrip
the modest improvements in the Pakistani Air Force's
ground attack capabilities over the next few years.
Islamabad is hampered in its modernization efforts by
a lack of funds for new aircraft. Even if it begins
Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
9Y1
25X1
225X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 ?
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Pakistan's Export Earnin s:
The Wave Is Cresting
Pakistan's robust export sector has been responsible
for much of the country's economic success over the
past decade. The narrow export base, however, means
that export earnings are vulnerable to a decline in any
one item. Because external factors subject to sudden
changes, such as good weather, favorable world
commodity prices, and rising international demand,
have contributed to the export sector's success,
Pakistani officials cannot assume continued good
export performance. Moreover, Islamabad's export
policies are often inconsistent and result in
bureaucratic delays that often hamper firms in the
export business. A recently announced three-year
trade policy is an attempt to strengthen business
confidence, to continue to deregulate the export
sector, and to narrow Pakistan's large trade deficit.
Export-Led Growth
Exports have done well since President Zia took
power in 1977. The value of exported goods has grown
at a 12.5-percent average annual rate since 1977?
outpacing the 9.9-percent annual growth during the
Bhutto era?and has increased as a share of imports
from 48 percent to roughly 70 percent. According to a
contractor's study, Bhutto's focus on domestic politics
caused exporters to operate in an uncertain
environment in which there was considerable ad hoc
and inconsistent decisionmaking. Zia's government,
on the other hand, has adopted several measures to
improve export performance:
? Export promotion policies have been simplified, and
greater incentives are provided to exporters.
? Rebates of customs duties and sales taxes are more
generous, and export subsidies have been increased.
? A more flexible exchange rate policy has made
Pakistan's exports more competitive abroad
Weather conditions largely have been favorable
during Zia's administration, leading to several years
of bumper crops. Pakistan's principal exports?cotton,
textiles, and rice?are selling well in international
markets because of price competitiveness and ample
53
domestic supply. Pakistan has not been?until this
year?subject to stringent textile quotas, allowing
garment exports to expand rapidly.
Major Exports
Cotton is Islamabad's most important cash crop.
Pakistan is the second largest exporter of cotton in the
world and probably will export 640,000 metric tons of
cotton in fiscal year 1988?ending 30 June. This is a
slight increase from 1987. Cotton's vulnerability to
changing weather and insect infestation, however,
make it subject to factors beyond Islamabad's control.
The 1984 cotton crop was reduced by 30 percent
because of pest attacks, straining Pakistan's foreign
payments in 1985 and 1986, according to the US
Consulate in Karachi. For fiscal year 1988, the cotton
crop is expected to be lower than last year's crop
because of drought, according to agricultural attache
reporting. To boost exports, we believe Islamabad will
draw down domestic stocks of cotton.
The rice crop suffers from the same drought
conditions. This year's rice production and exports are
expected to drop 12 percent, as compared with the
previous year, according to agricultural attache
reporting. Rice exports make up 11 percent of total
exports, and rice is an important trading commodity
with Middle Eastern nations. A trade agreement was
recently reached with Iran whereby Pakistan will ship
100,000 tons of rice in exchange for Iranian crude oil.
Leather products probably are the most promising of
Pakistan's exports. They have increased as a share of
exports from 5 percent in fiscal year 1977 to 9 percent
in fiscal year 1987. Export earnings in leather goods
increased 32 percent in fiscal year 1987, as compared
with fiscal year 1986. According to US Embassy
reporting, they are expected to continue to increase in
the next few years because the leather goods market is
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-028
18 December 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
PAKISTANI EXPORTS
Million US$
(In Constant Prices)
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
1977 78 79 80 81
82 83 84 85 86 87*
*Estimated
relatively unsaturated, as compared with the cotton
and garment export markets. The slaughter of
animals in Afghanistan?a result of the war?has
created a new supply of hides easily smuggled into
Pakistan, contributing to low domestic prices of raw
leather, according to US Embassy reporting
Other key exports include:
? Readymade garments, which account for 7 percent
of exports and depend on markets in industrialized
nations that set strict quotas on garment imports.
? Carpet and rug exports?roughly 5 percent of
exports?have not appreciably increased in value
since fiscal year 1980.
? Fish and fish preparations, although only 3 percent
of total exports this year, have increased 300
percent in value since 1977.
Secret
Boosting Exports
Pakistan's trade policy announced in June is to last
for three years to ensure consistency and to bolster
exporters' confidence in the government's export
policy. Mehbub-ul Hach Minister of Commerce and
Planning, has been the driving force behind the new
policy. The basic tenet is linking Pakistan's imports
from a country to that country's purchase of Pakistani
goods. Islamabad also will refund more of the indirect
taxes and fees paid by exporters and limit income tax
to the value-added portion of export earnings rather
than to total export value. Mehbub's goal is to have
1-
expor s cover RS nercent of imnort expenditures by
1990.
54
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Million US$
(In Nominal Prices)
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
-
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
^
PAKISTANI EXPORTS
0
1977 78 79 80 81
*Estimated
82 83 84 85 86 87*
Mehbub's export strategy involves:
? Quality improvement and, therefore, higher prices
for Pakistani goods.
? Preferential credits for export-oriented businesses.
? Export houses, similar to those in South Korea and
Hong Kong, to standardize the quality of goods and
to consolidate marketing and advertising for more
than 130,000 exporters.
? Reducing tariffs on imported raw materials that are
used in export industries and increasing tariffs on
imported finished goods to give Pakistani
manufacturers a larger share of the domestic
market.
55
We do not believe, that Islamabad's efforts to
promote exports by linking them to imports will have
a substantial impact and could be counterproductive.
Pakistan cut tea imports from Kenya by 75 percent
earlier this year?Pakistan purchased 30 percent of
Kenya's total tea exports?because Nairobi had a
large trade surplus with Islamabad. In this instance
Islamabad had the advantage because many countries
provided tea to Pakistan, and its economic growth
does not depend on tea imports. Kenya has not
increased its purchases of Pakistani goods. Goods
such as machinery?roughly 20 percent of total
imports?are vital to Pakistan's economic health, and
Islamabad will have considerably less leverage with
its suppliers of machinery?industrialized nations
that can get along without Pakistani goods?to
enforce export linkages.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
225X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
MARKETS FOR PAKISTANI GOODS, 1986
United States-10.8%
Other Developed Countries--45.2%
Middle East-16.8%
Countertrade is seen by some Pakistani officials as a
shortcut to building export markets, balancing total
trade, and achieving Mebub-ul Haq's objective of
linking exports to imports. Many socialist countries
are good markets for Pakistani products but cannot
pay cash for them. Countertrade may expand
Pakistan's share of these markets. Pakistan's limits on
the kinds of products permissible to export under
countertrade-70 percent must be nontraditional,
hard-to-sell exports?and the necessity to get case-by-
case approval are obstacles to expanding
countertrade. According to the US Consulate in
Karachi, countertraders complain that the lack of an
official list of allowable imports under countertrade
has hindered contract negotiations. The Trading
Corporation of Pakistan believes that defense items,
such as arms and explosives, should be added to the
list of items exportable under countertrade
agreements to increase the nation's exports. The
Secret
Latin America-1.1%
Africa-5.1%
Communist--4.6%
(Includes China & North Korea
South Asia--4%
(Includes Burma)
Far East-12.4%
corporation wants to pay for imports of plant and
equipment with commodities produced in those
factories.
Outlook
We believe that Pakistan can sustain its healthy
export performance over the next several years only if
its luck holds. Traditional exports?such as cotton
and rice?probably will not sustain their growth of
the past decade. Islamabad cannot count on good
weather indefinitely. Unless Pakistan can increase its
manufacturing efficiency, textile producers in
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea could
overcome Pakistan's advantage in cost of production
and displace Pakistani textiles in international
markets. Although increasing exports of leather goods
seem promising, the industry is benefiting from a
56
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Pakistani Ordnance Factory?Potential for Exports
The Pakistani Ordnance Factory could become a
significant participant in Pakistan's export sector. It
specializes in the production of ammunition, metal
material, explosives, propellants, and filling and is
capable of supplying ammunition for US, Chinese,
Soviet, Swedish, and British weapons. Current
exports are running at 15 to 20 percent of the
factory's total production of several hundred million
dollars, according to press reports. The chairman of
the Pakistani Ordance Factory claims that between
1990 and 1992 his company should export 40 percent
of its production. Although scheduled to become a
limited liability company by 1988, the factory will
remain under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
57
large supply of hides?partly due to slaughtered
animals in Afghanistan?that could be reduced by a
settlement of the war.
International protectionism, large agricultural
subsidies on industrial nations, and falling world
commodity prices limit Pakistan's ability to sustain
increased export earnings over the next several years.
Islamabad's exports to its major partners?the United
States, Japan, Saudi Arabia, West Germany, and the
United Kingdom?probably will not significantly
improve, because Pakistan's exports are concentrated
in agricultural-based items for which easy substitutes
are found in international markets. The US Consulate
in Karachi projects, and we agree, that countertrade
will not account for more than 5 percent of Pakistani
exports in the next few years.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
25X1
25)(1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP05502029R000300990001-5