FOREIGNERS IN WEST GERMANY: SOURCE OF GROWING FRICTION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of
Intelligence
Foreigners in West
Germany: Source of
Growing Friction
EUR 83-10017
February 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Growing Friction
Foreigners in West
Germany: Source of
Western Europe Division,
welcome and may be directed to the Chief
This paper was prepared by (Office
of European Analysis. Comments and queries are
Secret
EUR 83-10017
February 1983
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as ct/'3/ December 1982
was used in this report.
Growing Friction
Foreigners in West
Germany: Source of
West Germany as one of four key issues facing the new government.
Hostility toward foreign workers (gastarbeiter) has become an increasingly
important political issue in West Germany-one that could affect the
fortunes of Bonn's major political parties. Recent polls indicate a growing
antipathy among West Germans toward foreign residents, who now
comprise about 7 percent of the West German population. Although some
intolerance has always been present, the sharp increase in recent years has
concerned West German leaders. In fact, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's initial
speech to the Bundestag on 13 October listed the problem of foreigners in
intensified West German concern
The rise in hostility is attributable primarily to the recession (particularly
the rise in unemployment) and to the burden placed on the social welfare
system by the growing number of foreign families. Paradoxically, West
Germans blame the foreign workers for taking away jobs while admitting
that many of these jobs are undesirable. The surge in applications for
political asylum from Third World countries in the late 1970s has
tility, will probably remain.
Many foreigners, meanwhile, show a marked inclination to retain a
separate cultural identity, thereby aggravating frictions with the native
population. As a result, the gulf between the two groups, as well as the hos-
will in our view remain limited to small fringe groups.
We believe the rise in antiforeign sentiment will continue to generate some
violence, heightening social tensions and damaging West Germany's image
abroad. Neo-Nazi groups are attempting to exploit these feelings, and
some rightwingers have even advocated violence to stem the flow of
immigrants and force others to leave; there have been beatings, bombings,
and some deaths. Domestic violence on any scale will be regarded as a seri-
ous political problem by the West Germans, even though such extremism
The pervasiveness of antiforeign attitudes limits the ability of the major
political parties to take constructive steps. Measures to facilitate integra-
tion or to finance voluntary departures have been discussed within the
iii Secret
EUR 83-10017
February 1983
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government, but there has been little action so far. The new Christian
Democratic/Free Democratic government ostensibly supports the dual
policy of integration and repatriation for foreigners. Its emphasis, however,
will almost certainly be on restricting new immigration and providing
expanded financial aid for those willing to return home, and a CDU-led
government after the election this March will probably establish a progam
along these lines
Although the problems posed by resident foreigners have yet to become
explicit election issues, the widespread antiforeign sentiment among West
German voters means that the gastarbeiter issue will probably become one
of the themes in the campaign debate before the national election in
March. The Christian Democrats are the most likely beneficiaries, became
they are more in tune with. public opinion than the other major parties
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Foreigners in West
Germany: Source of
Growing Friction
A Growing Problem
A poll conducted by the Godesberg Institute for
Applied Social Sciences in December 1981 indicates
that approximately one-half of West Germany's popu-
lation resents foreign residents. Two-thirds recom-
mend acomplete halt to all immigration and want to
repatriate those foreigners already present. Although
the use of foreign labor in German industry has
historical precedents, the high population density,
growing unemployment, and general economic uncer-
tainty~ombined with a new wave of refugees from
Africa and Asia-have created a resentment toward
foreigners unprecedented in the postwar period.
Confusion and ambiguity mark the efforts to resolve
the dilemma presented by this sizable and increasing-
ly unwelcome foreign population. In the past govern-
ment policy has supported rotations of workers be-
tween home and host countries, but it also has
recognized the need for at least limited integration of
long-term residents. Early statements indicate that
the new administration of Helmut Kohl will continue
to support integration formally while giving a higher
priority to the repatriation of foreigners. Still, this
government, like its predecessor, remains bedeviled by
the lack of practical alternatives West Berlin's gov-
erning mayor Richard von Weizaecker remarked
recently that the problem was a complex one that
might necessitate full integration or repatriation.
Historical Background
The precedents for importation of foreigners to pro-
vide manpower for Germany's economy stretch back
to the late 19th century, when approximately 1 mil-
lion workers, mostly Poles, migrated to and settled in
the Ruhr's mining and industrial centers. In addition,
thousands of temporary workers came for seasonal
labor on Germany's large agricultural estates. During
both world wars Germany relied on forced foreign
labor to maintain industrial production.
After 1945, West Germany initially had no need for
additional foreign workers. It took nearly a decade to
rebuild the shattered economy, and the manpower lost
during the war was replaced by German refugees
from Eastern Europe. By 1955, however, West Ger-
man farmers were requesting permission to import
Italian workers for harvesting, and a bilateral agree-
ment was concluded later that year.
West Germany began to look even more to the
Mediterranean countries after the erection of the
Berlin Wall in 1961 slowed markedly the flow of labor
from East Germany. The Rome Treaty of 1957 that
created the European Community (EC) established
the basis for the free flow of labor among member
countries. Bilateral treaties with Greece (1960), Spain
(1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal
(1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) gov-
erned the entry of workers from other countries
The foreigners originally were considered temporary
"guests" who were to relieve the labor shortage and
then leave, but many are becoming permanent resi-
dents. The economic advantages that attracted them
remain; many have acquired permament work over
the years and now occupy an integral role in the West
German economy. A number have brought their
families north. In fact, a new generation of foreigners.
born and bred in West Germany, is entering the labor
market.
The West German Labor Ministry established re-
cruiting centers in several countries, advertising posi-
tions, recruiting workers, and testing and examining
them. The Ministry paid for the transportation of
workers to West Germany; the employers provided
housing. By the late 1960s, .5,000 guestworkers were
arriving daily. In 1973 nearly every eighth worker was
a foreign citizen.
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The free movement of labor within the EC was
introduced in stages between October 1961 and July
1968. EC workers are allowed three months to secure
a job in the host country; if they succeed, they
automatically gain work and residence permits. They
hold the same rights as citizens regarding job security
and trade union membership, have the right to be
joined by dependents, and are entitled to social securi-
ty benefits.
The legal status for non-EC workers is much less
secure. Visas must be acquired at home. Work per-
mits are usually issued for one or two years and are
renewable at the discretion of local authorities. These
permits can be limited to a specific town or even an
individual factory. After extended residence, however,
the guestworkers from non-EC nations often obtain
more durable residence and work permits, and pres-
sure from the trade unions and churches has helped
them gain many of the rights enjoyed by EC nation-
als. Most importantly, families can now join the
worker when he has lived in West Germany for one
year and has found suitable housing.
Theoretically, labor migration Can represent a blend
of self-help and quasi-foreign aid. Laborers were
invited for temporary visits of a few years, after which
they were to return home with new skills and savings,
thereby contributing to the industrial development of
their native countries. At first, rotation governed by
the free market appeared to work. A year after the
recession of 1966/67, 100,000 guestworkers left for
home. But in fact, increasing numbers are staying
behind; as of last year, almost half the foreign workers
in West Germany had been there 10 years or more.
Many simply wait through periods of recession, sub-
sisting on social security allowances. Others have lived
in West Germany long enough to obtain extended
residence and work permits. This has gradually de-
stroyed the notion that these "guests" are temporary
residents.
Demographics of the Guestworker Population
Today West Germany has a foreign population of
approximately 4.7 million-about 7 percent of the
country's population. Turks represent the largest con-
tingent with over 1.5 million, followed by the Yugo-_
slays with 640,000.
Table 1
West Germany: Foreign Population
Total
Turks
Yugoslavs
Italians
Greeks
4.6
l.s
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.2
1.4
Not only have the numbers grown, but the composi-
tion has changed as well. Dependents now comprise
the vast majority of those migrating to West Germa-
ny. In 1973 approximately two-thirds of the 4 million
resident foreigners were workers; workers now repre-
sent only about two-fifths of the total. The shift began
in 1973 when the government, concerned over the
growing number of foreign workers and fearful that
unemployment among West Germans would rise fol-
lowing the Middle East war and the oil embargo,
banned all further recruitment of foreign workers.
That ban remains in effect today. It destroyed the
notion of rotation, convincing many workers that they
had no choice but to stay since their prospects for a
return to West Germany were so uncertain.
Since foreign workers could bring their families north
after one year's residence, the flow of dependents
increased. Eight years ago 35 percent of the foreigners
in West Germany were women; by 1981 the propor-
tion had risen to just over 41 percent. In 1961 only
4 percent of the foreigners were under 15, whereas by
1981, 24 percent were in that age group.
Family units now comprise the majority of West
Germany's foreign population, and social issues such
as housing and education have replaced work-related
questions as the major problems among foreigners.
Moreover, the birth rate among guestworkers now
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Table 2
Fixtures and Furniture in Foreign
Workers' Apartments
Fixtures
Percent of
Apartments
Furniture
Percent of
Apartments
Toilet inside apartment
42
Clothes closet
66
Toilet on same floor
29
Bed
63
Toilet outside the house
29
Table and chair
63
Cold water
60
Sofa
32
Hot and cold water
28
Additional chairs
10
Electric lights
92
Source: M. Borris, Auslaendischer Arbeiter in einer Grossstadt
(Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1974), p. 150.
exceeds that of West Germans. Thirteen percent of all
live births in 1980 were to foreign families; in Frank-
furt half of the births were to foreign parents.
Many West German publications express concern
over the emergence of foreign ghettos in West Ger-
man cities. One study of West Berlin in 1975 noted
that Turkish residents in particular tended to stay
among themselves, searching for compatriots on
successive moves.
Housing in these ghettos is often substandard, in part
because foreigners accept a lower living standard but
also because they try to save money to send home.
These factors, plus discrimination by West German
landlords, have produced overcrowded dwellings that
are often poorly furnished and unsanitary.
One new and pressing problem involves the emerging
.generation of foreign youth, now estimated at
1 million. These young people were born and bred in
West Germany, have only rarely seen their "home-
land," and are caught between two cultures. Sur-
rounded by affluence, they have expectations like .
those of their West German counterparts. Their op-
portunities for fulfilling these expectations are far
more limited, however, and many social scientists fear
the growth of crime and street violence. Government
statistics show teenage foreigners already are respon-
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A special reason for concern. regarding second-genera-
tion foreigners is their lack of education and training.
Approximately 60 percent of all foreign children in
West Germany drop out of school by the age of 15. A
study by the Labor Ministry in March 1981 noted
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are without vocational training. Approximately one-
third of those between the ages of 15 and 20 are
neither employed nor in vocational training.
This educational vacuum is attributable partly to the
inability of the West German school system to absorb
the growing number of foreign children, who now 25X1
comprise 10 percent of West German students, com-
pared with only 2.2 percent as recently as 1971. This
inability, in part, results from the indecision of both
the government and the parents as to whether these
children will remain in West Germany. In addition,
because the Federal Republic's decentralized school
system grants full autonomy to the states, there is no
uniform approach to the problem.
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At present, all states attempt to introduce foreign
youth to the German language and culture. The
governments hope to end the alienation many foreign-
ers feel toward West German society and to prepare
them for future vocational training. Few of the chil-
dren learn German at home, and transitional lan-
guage instruction is available for preschool children
and for the older recent arrivals, who suffer the
greatest language handicap. The classes are often
overcrowded, however, and the time for instruction
insufficient.
Foreign children also attend classes on the language
and culture of their native countries. The rationale of
the German states, explicit or implicit, is that the
foreign children may return home, a point supported
by many parents. Some states, such as Bavaria,
emphasize such instruction in hopes of encouraging
the foreigners to return to their native countries. West
Berlin, on the other hand, has incorporated the for-
eign youth into German classes, recognizing that
much of the foreign population will remain. Unfortu-
nately the foreign children usually finish their educa-
tion fully competent in neither German nor their
parents' language, and they remain unprepared for
life in either culture. One author called it an "educa-
tion in bilingual illiteracy."
Nationality appears to be the most significant factor
influencing the decision to remain in West Germany.
Between 1961 and 1976, 68 percent of all
guestworkers returned home. Yet this figure differs
drastically from group to group. A majority of the
Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks willingly return to
their native countries, whereas the two most numer-
ous groups, the Turks and Yugoslavs, display a
marked inclination to remain
Integration is complicated by the attitudes of the
foreigners themselves. The presence of entire families,
the existence of ethnic enclaves, and the instruction in
native languages and cultures all allow the
guestworkers to retain enough cultural identity to
remain separate. Many foreign workers appear to
prefer it this way.
The urge to remain separate is strongest among the
Turks; "Little Istanbuls" exist in West Berlin, Frank-
furt, Stuttgart, and other cities. Often from rural
areas, the Turks find the transition to West Germa-
ny's industrial; affluent, and secular society especially
difficult. Mosques and Islamic centers function as
cultural homes for some; State Department sources
indicate some religious leaders in the Turkish commu-
nity have cautioned their followers against contacts
with the Germans to avoid adopting Western ways.
Turkey's prospective entry into the Common Market
before the end of the decade poses special problems.
In 1964 Turkey signed an economic aid agreement
with the EC, and in 1968 both sides agreed that this
relationship should expand gradually into .full mem-
bership. This prospect helped encourage the migration
of Turkish workers. By 1986 the transitional stage is
supposed to be complete, inaugurating the free move-
ment of Turkish labor within the Community.
We believe that, at the moment, the West German
Government plans to support Turkish membership
only if labor migration is restricted. Of the Turkish
workers throughout Europe, over 80 percent have
gone to West Germany, and estimates of the number
of Turks waiting to emigrate to West Germany vary
from 1.5 to 2.5 million.
Political Asylum
Another element influencing West German attitudes
is the growing presence of refugees ostensibly fleeing
political persecution. After the Second World War,
West Germany's leaders hoped to erase some memo-
ries of their recent past by providing a haven for the
politically oppressed, particularly those fleeing the
East European regimes. Article 16 of the West Ger-
man Basic Law guarantees the right of asylum to all
those escaping political oppression as long as they
arrive in West Germany without the aid of the West
German Government. Article 19 ensures a fair and
full judicial hearing
In the last few years this guarantee has been exploited
by those seeking better economic opportunities in the
West. In the past, once a refugee applied for political
asylum, he immediately became eligible for residence
and work permits as well as welfare payments.- Since
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each case is decided individually, the applicant and
his lawyer could use a variety of appeals to prolong
the hearing as long as eight years
West German generosity has been costly. Since 1953
around 395,000 exiles have arrived, more than half of
them in the last five years. In 1977, 16,000 applied for
asylum, and the figures continued to rise until the
number reached 108,000 in 1980. The trend appar-
ently has been reversed-in 1981 less than half that
number requested asylum. Still, the government spent
DM 500 million (about $200 million) in 1981 on
refugees; similar amounts have been estimated by
knowledgeable observers for 1982 and 1983
The majority of these applicants come from the less
developed nations in Africa and Asia, and for most of
them the primary motivation is economic. A few are
legitimate political exiles-since 1979 approximately
9,000 Afghans have applied for asylum. Yet large
numbers of Pakistanis, Indians, Sri Lankans, and
North Africans, among others, have come in recent
years. East Europeans comprised only 6.4 percent of
the asylum seekers in 1980, although their proportion
rose to 28.9 percent in 1981 because of the situation in
Poland. In 1973, 52 percent of the applications were
successful; approximately 90 percent were denied in
1981.
In the same period, West Germany contended with
the arrival of Vietnamese refugees. West German
leaders initially hestitated to accept Vietnamese boat
people, believing that other countries should bear the
responsibility for developments in Southeast Asia.
Nonetheless, the federal and state governments in
1979 agreed to accept 26,000 Vietnamese if rescued
by West German vessels. In 1981 three states agreed
to accept another 600, mostly relatives of earlier
arrivals.
The upsurge in non-European immigrants forced the
West German Government to revise asylum proce-
dures. During the summer of 1981, the Bundesrat, the
upper house of the legislature, passed measures to
discourage those seeking economic opportunities
alone. No work permits are now issued during the first
year of residence, and child-support payments are
withheld pending successful completion of the judicial
review. These measures almost certainly were a major
Table 3
West Germany: Applicants for Political Asylum
1980
107,800
1981
49,400
January 1982
4,300
February 1982
3,400
factor behind the decline in applications in 1981. The
Kohl government has stated that it will extend this
policy by not issuing work permits during the entire
period of application, unless the applicant comes from
Eastern Europe.
None of the political parties is seeking to rescind the
constitutional guarantee of political asylum, however,
and the Bundesrat recently passed legislation to expe-
dite the judicial process and to break bureaucratic
bottlenecks. The federal office responsible for asylum
is to open regional offices to facilitate the review of
applications, and the Bundesrat has limited the ap-
peals process in the hopes of restricting the length of
the judicial review to no more than one year. The
Bundesrat has also discussed replacing the review
panel with a single judge.
Foreign Poetical Activism
Refugees have brought many of their political dis-
putes with them, sometimes producing violence. In-
deed, the Kohl government sees this as a major
problem arising from the presence of foreign colonies
in West Germany. A May 1981 attack on a Yugoslav
exile of Albanian extraction by agents of the Yugoslav
security service and a battle between Iranian factions
last April in Mainz are prominent examples
Yugoslavs and Iranians are among the most political-
ly active in West Germany.
about 2,350 Iranians are active,
all but 600 of them anti-Khomeini. Iranian activity is
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particularly evident in Hamburg, which has more
Iranian exiles than any European city except Paris.
Among the Yugoslavs, the Croats are the most active
group, but recent disturbances in Yugoslavia's Kosovo
Province have heightened activism among ethnic Al-
banians in West Germany.
perhaps 1,000 politically active Yugo-
slavs belong to various organizations in the Federal
Republic; the largest is the Croatian National Council
with about 700 members. Only a small minority of the
Yugoslavs and Iranians resident in West Germany
favor violence, but the involvement of their home
.governments increases the potential for violence and
could present the West German Government with
diplomatic problems.
Other refugee groups are active as well, including
Afghans, Kurds, and Palestinians. Among Palestin-
ians the Palestine Liberation Organization is the chief
political force. The mainline PL'O generally avoids
violence;
Extremist non-PLO Palestinian groups, such as Black
June, represent much greater threats.
Guestworkers, especially Turks, have brought their
political divisions to West Germany as well. Political-
ly motivated crimes among West Germany's Turks
rose from 69 in 1979 to 457 in 1980; assassinations
alone increased from one in 1977 to seven in 1980.
Since the military takeover in Ankara in 1980, vio-
Antiforeign Attitudes Among the West German Public
Intolerance by some Germans toward foreigners is not
new, but the extent of hostility revealed in the Decem-
ber 1981 survey was surprising. About half admitted
their antipathy, but the more significant finding was
the desire of over two-thirds of the West Germans to
see the guestworkers leave. Seven months earlier only
slightly over one-half had held that opinion, and in
November 1978 about one-third were so disposed.
West Germans also tend to blame foreigners for
growing social ills. For example, nearly half of those
in the most recent survey blame foreign residents for
the rising crime rate and unsanitary living conditions.
Two-thirds blame them for the drug traffic, and
approximately one-third attribute rising rents and
assaults on German women to foreigners. Many also
see the foreign residents as simple welfare cheats.
In fact foreigners, who comprise 7 percent of the
population as a whole, make up only about 8 percent
of West German welfare recipients, according to
West German figures for 1981. German prejudices
about foreigners' involvement in crime are somewhat
better grounded: current government statistics show
that 16 percent of suspects are foreigners. The group
represented most heavily in the criminal statistics is
young males between the ages of 14 and 21; in this
group the percentage involved in violent crimes is far
higher for foreigners than for Germans.
Of the various nationalities, West Germans dislike
Turks the most-a result of the size of the Turkish
community and the great cultural and religious gap
between Turks and West Germans. A study by the
Emnid Institute in 1981 showed that 36 percent of the
West German public thought negatively of the Turks.
North Africans were next at 18 percent, whereas
Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Portuguese, seen as Europe-
ans, generated negative ratings of only 4 to 5 percent.
Xenophobia reaches all levels of West German soci-
ety, but the younger and better educated the audi-
ence, the lower the level of hostility. According to the
December 1981 survey, 34 percent of those between
18 and 24 were hostile; the proportion rose to more
than half for those over 50. Only 28 percent of those
holding the equivalent of a high school diploma were
antiforeigner, half the level of those with only an
elementary level education.
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Foreigners in West Germany: Sources of Growing Friction
General Public Support
Percent
Support According to Educational Level
Percent
a Der Speigel, X18, 1982 ,
bThe German Tribune, May 30, 1982
Resident Aliens, 1961-1981
Millions
Resident Aliens According to Length of Stay, 1981
Longer
Than 10
Years``-
43% /
Less Than
4 Years
25%
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West Germany's current economic difficulties provide
much of the explanation for this growing hostility.
During both the 1974/75 recession and the current
one, the hospitality extended to the foreign guests
declined. Unskilled and semiskilled workers, lower
class families, low-ranking employees, and pensioners
are most affected by an economic recession and
compete most directly with guestworkers for jobs, less
expensive housing, and social services. Indeed, an
Emnid poll in March 1982 showed the presence of
guestworkers to be the most common reason given by
the public at large for West Germany's high unem-
ployment rate.
In addition to economics, the sudden influx of Asian
and African refugees has contributed to the intensifi-
cation of antiforeign sentiments. The West German
public makes little distinction between refugees and
guestworkers and resents the extra burden on West
Germany's already strapped social welfare system.
In addition, the refugees represent additional non-
European arrivals in a densel opulated ethnocentric
country.
Guestworkers and the Economy
Popular perceptions to the contrary, guestworkers do
play an integral and beneficial role in the West
German economy, a point supported by government
statistics. By 1973 foreign workers comprised approxi-
mately 12 percent of the West German labor force, up
`from less than 1 percent in 1960. Today the figure
stands at around 8 percent. In the Ruhr coal mines, as
well as in segments of the automotive and metal
industries, guestworkers fill 25 percent of the work
force. About 12 percent of the work force in the
construction industry is foreign. In some states the
proportion is even higher; foreign workers comprise
13.5 percent of the work force in Baden-Wuerttem-
berg and 10.9 percent in Hessen.
The guestworkers help hold down wage costs and
occupy the unskilled and semiskilled positions that
few West Germans want. This permits the native
population to take more skilled, higher paying posi-
tions.
Unemployment among foreign workers tends to out-
pace that of West Germans. In May 1982 government
statistics showed unemployment among guestworkers
DEUTrS(t,(H~E
[f ~~~yllll~
`Foreigners Out':? Three Views
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at 11.1 percent, as opposed to 6.9 percent for all of
West Germany. Nevertheless, guestworkers seem to
West Germans an unnecessary burden during the
recession. By coincidence, more than 2 million West
Germans are out of work, nearly equal to the number
of guestworkers in the West German economy.
Demographic trends make the guestworkers seem
expendable, as large numbers of young Germans are
entering the job market-around 80,000 a year be-
tween 1975 and 1985. After the mid-1980s, however,
the demographic surge will begin to recede and in the
1990s the native work force could decline by 1 mil-
lion. Some West German observers assert that the
West German economy will need between 1.5 and 2
million foreign workers by the 1990.
Rightwing Extremism
Antiforeign propaganda by rightwfng groups has in-
creased over the last year. Parallels with Nazi
ideology are obvious. Above all, these propagandists
consider the foreign community a threat to German
culture and racial purity. Some groups even advocate
terrorism to halt the flow of refugees and
guestworkers.
Such appeals to antiforeign sentiment have led to
occasional violence, but only a few deaths. Generally,
the violence has involved attacks on foreign shops or
individual beatings. The bombing of two refugee
camps by neo-Nazis in August 1981, however, has
raised the prospect of terrorism. The first occurred at
an Eritrean camp in Baden-Wuerttemberg; the sec-
ond came in Hamburg, where a 22-year-old Vietnam-
ese lost his life. While violence attributable to fringe
groups probably will continue and possibly increase
slightly, we believe such violence will remain isolated
with very little popular support.
Even if the extreme right benefited at the polls from
antiforeign sentiment, we would expect only limited
gains. The rightwing National Democratic Party
(NPD) hopes to exploit the sentiment against foreign-
ers to improve its poor electoral prospects, while neo-
Nazis hope to generate popular support for national
socialist ideals. Numerous "citizens' initiatives," usu-
ally sponsored by the NPD, have emerged to call for a
halt in the admission of foreigners to West Germany.
These groups have had some minor successes-the
best showing occurred in Kiel, where a "citizens'
initiative" captured 3.8 percent of the vote. Still, the
extreme right remains discredited in West German
eyes and resident foreigners do not present an issue
strong enough to lift them beyond the marginal level.
Influence on Major Parties
The antiforeign sentiment will obstruct the efforts of
the parties to resolve the issue constructively. Sup-
porters of the Christian Democrats display the least
tolerance. Recent polls indicate that 54 percent of
those voters are antiforeign, and nearly three-fourths
endorse the departure of all guestworkers. These
attitudes will reinforce CDU policies, which already
endorse the restrictions of new immigration and fi-
nancial aid for those wishing to return.
Of the. other two major parties, Free Democratic
voters display the most openness toward foreigners;
even in that group, however, the hostile outnumber
the tolerant by 37 to 30 percent and fully two-thirds
of FDP voters would like to see the guestworkers
leave.
In the party that is officially the strongest proponent
of integration-the SPD-antiforeign sentiment out-
weighs friendlier attitudes by 47 to 29 percent; two-
thirds of those surveyed favor the guestworkers' de-
parture. It is among the SPD's blue-collar constituen-
cy that resistance to integration is greatest. Antifor-
eign platforms have won their greatest support in
working-class districts, such as Gaarden-Ost in Kiel,
where the "citizens' initiative" won 6.2 percent of the
vote. It is in just those districts possessing a high
concentration of both foreign and German workers
where the SPD could lose votes either to rightwin~
extremists or to the Christian Democrats
This working-class hostility has so far not affected the
proforeigner policies of the German Trade Union
Federation (DGB), which generally supports the SPD.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the DGB opposed
discrimination against foreign workers, campaigning
for equal pay, better housing, and a graduated system
of residence permits based on length of stay. In 1972-
73 the DGB encouraged Turkish workers to join its
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ranks and the unions improved foreign representation
after a wave of wildcat strikes in 1973. The unions
have performed valuable educational and orientation
services, publishing brochures and providing legal
services for guestworkers. As of 1980, over a third of
foreign workers belonged to unions, and foreigners
have also experienced some of their greatest integra-
tion at the factory level, where they are represented in
works councils and union boards.
The record has not been perfect, however. Foreign
workers often object to a lack of representation at
higher levels of the union hierarchies, and some
unions bar non-EC nationals from holding office.
During recessions DGB leaders have expressed con-
cern over the free movement of EC workers, yet when
former DGB Executive Board member Karl Schwab
spoke along these lines in 1978, he was criticized by
union officials for deviating from DGB policy. Given
the current leadership within the DGB, the unions are
unlikely to alter their policy of support for limited
integration and aid for the foreign worker.
Current Policies
The guestworkers occupy positions on the margins of
West Germany's social and political life, and this
situation is not likely to change in the near future.
Extensive moves to alter this are also unlikely before
the next election. All political parties agree that the
ban on the further entry of foreign labor must be
maintained, and the last government took measures to
limit the flow of dependents as well. Wives and youths
must now wait two years for a work permit, and the
maximum age of dependents allowed to enter West
Germany has been cut to 16. Although strong resist-
ance from the Foreign and Interior Ministries blocked
the Schmidt government from lowerin this a e to 6,
ister of the Interior,
has revived the proposal. Nonetheless,
child support payments (370 DM for up to three
children, and an additional 240 DM for every extra
child) continue to encourage the immigration of for-
eign dependent children. The current coalition plans
to restrict such reunions, but has offered no specific
proposals as yet.
The government also attempts to control the distribu-
tion of foreign residents. About 80 percent of West
Germany's foreigners live in four states-North
Rhine-Westfalia, Bavaria, Hessen, and Baden-
Wuerttemberg. Individual cities also suffer from over-
concentration. West Berlin's mayor, Richard von
Weizsaecker, recently stated that the foreign resi-
dents (12 percent of the population, over half of whom
are Turks) represent his city's greatest dilemma.
When the proportion of aliens reaches 6 percent, West
German cities can ask the federal government for the
authority to deny residence permits to new arrivals. If
the percentage reaches 12, a city automatically can
declare itself closed to all new immigrants. The
rationale is that beyond this point the social and
economic infrastructure (housing, employment, wel-
fare payments) can no longer support the burden of
new aliens. So far, West Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt,
Hannover, and Munich have applied for or imposed
such bans. Cities may also apply the ban to individual
districts when they pass the 6-percent mark, and West
Berlin has done so in three districts, in one of which
the population is 25 percent foreign born.
The West German political parties differ, however, on
how to handle foreigners already resident. The Chris-
tian Democrats maintain that West Germany should
not become a land of immigration and that
guestworkers should not have the option of naturaliza-
tion.' They also favor some time limit on a foreign
worker's stay in West Germany. Ostensibly, the
Christian Democrats reject the notion of forcible
rotation, but they also publicly endorse a program of
financial incentives and educational programs to en-
courage foreigners to return home.
The idea of encouraging repatriation through finan-
cial incentives is not new, and it has found support
among Social Democrats and Free Democrats as well.
The issue arose as early as 1976, when then Minister
President Hans Filbinger of Baden-Wuerttemberg
introduced it to the state's electoral campaign. The
idea was endorsed by the Christian Democrats and
Free Democrats in their coalition agreement.
' Naturalization for any non-German is an extremely difficult
process, requiring a minimum of 10 years' residence, competence in
German language and history, and no criminal record. Even then,
an alien may receive citizenship only "if it is in the interests of the
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The program would allow unemployed guestworkers
to convert portions of their social security income-
primarily pension savings, unemployment compensa-
tion, and child-support payments-into cash to fi-
nance their return home. The coalition's program also
spoke of a time limit, which would probably corre-
spond to the former government's proposal. The long-
er the guestworker waited after becomin? unem-
ployed, the less he would receive.
West Germany has also attempted to encourage
workers to invest in their native countries in the hope
of making repatriation more attractive. One model of
worker investment has been a large cement plant in
central Turkey. In 1976, moreover, the federal gov-
ernment established a savings account for Turkish
workers who wished to invest in Turkey. The Kohl
government has also spoken of the need to channel
some foreign aid into developmental programs, there-
by reducing the need of foreigners. to emigrate. Al-
though anumber of firms have been established with
these funds-the Center for International Immigra-
tion in Frankfurt claims that over 250,000 Turks have
invested more than half a million dollars in such
prospects-to date they have had little effect on the
immigration of foreign workers.
For their part, the Social Democrats support the
gradual integration of the foreign residents into West
German society, although the previous coalition failed
to implement specific means to promote it. According
to statements by party leaders, the SPD does not wish
to limit a foreign worker's time in the Federal Repub-
lic; it supports the idea of permanent residence after a
stay of five or eight years. Representatives also have
suggested making the acquisition of citizenship an
option for foreign children born in West Germany
when they become 18. The SPD platform also has
recommended measures to further integration, such
as more job training and educational opportunities for
foreign youth, more subsidized housing, greater dis-
persion of foreigners to combat isolation, and greater
political rights.
The position of the Free Democrats generally corre-
sponds to that of the Social Democrats. FDP policy
supports greater political rights, extended residence
permits for foreign workers, and the acquisition of
citizenship after the age of 18. It is not yet clear how
much influence the FDP holds over government poli-
cy, but the reference in the coalition agreement with
the CDU/CSU to the promotion of integration and
the maintenance of the foreigners' cultural identity
was probably the result of the FDP presence. If the
FDP retains its position in the government after the
March election, the party could continue to exert a
moderating influence.
The SPD and FDP muted their support for the
integration of foreigners during the last few years of
the social-liberal coalition once this policy became a
political liability. The deep-seated belief in the need to
foster integration, as well as doubts regarding its
feasibility, almost certainly prevented the government
from directly addressing the growing concern in West
Germany over foreign residents. During the current
election campaign, both parties will probably try to
avoid the issue unless the Christian Democrats sug-
gest solutions that would infringe upon civil liberties.
Political rights for foreign residents remains perhaps
the most contentious issue. Guestworkers do not pos-
sess the right to engage in political activity in the
Federal Republic; political activism can provide
grounds for expulsion even though the West German
constitution guarantees the freedoms of speech, as-
sembly, and organization for all residents. Participa-
tion in political organizations, and even in some trade
union activities such as strikes, thus remains precari-
ous for foreign residents.
Resistance to the extension of voting rights, especially
in federal elections, is strong within all parties. Oppo-
nents argue that such a move would contravene the
provisions of the constitution that prohibit voting by
noncitizens. The right to vote in local elections is
nonetheless winning gradual acceptance. Last year
Kassel joined cities such as Nuremburg and Munich
in allowing aliens at least to form an advisory council
and voice their views to city parliaments and district
committees. The national platform of the FDP advo-
cates letting foreigners vote in local elections, whereas
the SPD currently advocates extension of voting
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rights only to nationals of EC countries. The current
coalition will almost certainly avoid this issue for the
near future, however
Even limited voting rights for foreign residents would
represent a major step toward integration. The logic
behind the extension of communal voting rights-that
foreigners should be able to vote locally because that
is where most decisions affecting their lives are
taken-can be extended, as one journalist noted, to
state and federal elections as well. With voting privi-
leges come social and political responsibilities, such as
military service, that would incorporate the foreigners
further into West Germany's social and political
fabric. This very logic assures resistance to the exten-
sion of communal voting rights among segments of
the West German population. But we think the
growing support for this idea among the major politi-
cal parties points to the adoption of this proposal
within the next few years, if only on a geographically
limited basis
Outlook
We believe antiforeign sentiment will remain a politi-
cal and social dilemma in West Germany for years.
The foreigners are likely to be a source of social
conflict and a catalyst for rightwing sentiment when-
ever West German economic prosperity or political
stability appear threatened. Resident foreigners, for
their part, are also likely to show increasing signs of
frustration; the self-immolation of a young Turkish
woman in Hamburg last summer is just one reflection
of the hopelessness affecting many foreign youths.
Despite such incidents, we doubt that foreigners will
respond in kind to rightist violence, even though they
are likely to stage demonstrations to protest their
treatment.
Reflecting the seriousness with which West Germans
view the problem, some journalists and politicians are
now speculating that the growth in hostility to for-
eigners could spur a resurgence of rightwing extre-
mism. They base this view on the increasing alien-
ation on many West German youth and their
penchant for violence that often victimizes West
Germany's foreign population. Such violent incidents
have so far included beatings, bombings, and a few
deaths. In addition, nationalistic groups, such as the
neo-Nazi National Democratic Party, have achieved
some minor successes running on platforms that pro-
mote the expulsion of foreigners.
Although such antiforeign violence may increase, we
believe on balance that such activities will remain
confined to the fringes of West German society-
primarily extreme rightists or groups of aimless and
frustrated youths. Even disturbances of that magni-
tude, however, will have significant political repercus-
sions in West Germany, where dealing with problems
of public order remains an especially sensitive issue. It
would be an exaggeration to suggest that antiforeign
attitudes threaten West Germany's democratic insti-
tutions-the vast majority of West Germans will seek
to solve the problem through traditional political
means-but we do expect the controversy to affect the
fortunes of the major political parties.
The issue is now a daily press topic, and Kohl's
decision to include the problem on his high-priority
agenda is the clearest sign that politicians now think
Despite Kohl's emphasis on the issue, we think he will
be reluctant to go beyond a stopgap approach before
the election on 6 March. Kohl or any other chancellor
almost certainly would rule out simple solutions such
as expulsion, not only because of humanitarian con-
victions, but also out of concern for West Germany's
image abroad, and possible diplomatic repercussions.
Instead, the current coalition probably hopes to re-
duce the number of foreign residents through finan-
cial incentives to return home and restrictions on
family reunification and recruitment. If the Christian
Democrats or the present coalition wins a secure
majority in the national election, we expect a more
extensive program to alleviate the problem.
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This would probably be an extension of proposals
discussed earlier, in particular those encouraging the
repatriation of foreign workers. For example, West
German contributions to the current OECD aid pack-
age for Turkey include 19 million DM for the resettle-
ment of Turkish guestworkers. If this program proves
successful, we think the government would consider
channeling more West German aid toward develop-
mental projects that encourage the return of foreign
workers to their homelands. In addition, any new
government in Bonn will almost certainly retain re-
strictions on the immigration of new foreign workers
and consider restricting further opportunities for fam-
ily reunifications in the Federal Republic.
These measures, however, would be intended primari-
ly to mollify the West German public. Bonn's ability
to control the number of foreigners is limited princi-
pally to those seeking political asylum and non-EC
workers and their dependents, and any impact on the
labor force will be minimal. EC nationals are free to
seek employment in any member country, and many
non-EC foreigners have lived in West Germany long
enough to obtain extended residence permits. In addi-
tion, both business and labor recognize that foreign
workers have become an integral part of the West
German economy, precluding any immediate and
extensive reduction in the number of gastarbeiter. At
best, the government probably will hope that incen-
tives to return home will reduce the number of
foreigners enough to alleviate public pressure for
government action.
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