PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EAST ASIA OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10X00001R000100010019-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 17, 1969
• Content Type: SNIE

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SEC
CONJRO11 D DISSEM
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 40/50-69
Prospects for Regional Security
Arrangements in East Asia Over the
Next Five Years
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
17 April 1969
Authenticated:
TIVE SECRETARY, USI
SE
OILED DISSEM
SNIE 40/50-69
17 April 1969,
N?
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SECRET
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Dr. Edward W. Proctor, for the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State
Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
It. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Abstaining:
Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr., the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-
mission and Mr. William 0. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM ..................................................... 1
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................ 3
I. BACKGROUND ................................................. 3
II. GENERAL FACTORS AFFECTING EAST ASIAN ATTITUDES
TOWARD REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ........... 5
A. Varying Perceptions of the Threat .............................. 5
B. Other Variations in National Perspective ......................... 6
The Divided Nations ........................................... 6
The Neutralists ................................................ 7
The Other Nations ............................................ 8
C. Military Considerations ........................................ 11
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M O N G O L I A
C H I N A
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BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
TERR. OF PAPUA
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NEW GUINEA
A U S T R A L I A
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Demarcation
line
SOUTH
VIETNAM
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(U.K.)
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PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS IN EAST ASIA OVER
THE NEXT FIVE YEARS
THE PROBLEM
To examine the factors which affect the attitudes of the non-Com-
munist countries of East Asia toward regional security arrangements.'
CONCLUSIONS
A. We see very little prospect of uniting the non-Communist states
of East Asia in a formal security organization at any time soon.
B. The East Asian countries most concerned with an immediate
Communist threat to their security-the Republic of China (GRC),
South Korea, and South Vietnam-rely primarily on their bilateral
defense pacts with the US. They regard regional security organizations
as a means of encouraging the US to maintain its security role in the
region rather than as an alternative to the US commitment.
C. The nine other countries of the region, whether allied to the
US or nonaligned, also regard American. military power as their only
real shield against Chinese Communist military attack. Their view
of the likelihood of such an attack varies, however, as does the degree
of their concern with the threat of Chinese or other externally-spon-
sored subversion. Although Thailand has made a substantial contribu-
tion to the defense of South Vietnam, none of the other countries is
prepared to tie its fortunes to the outcome of longstanding conflicts by
joining in collective defense arrangements involving South Korea, the
GRC, or the states of Indochina.
D. Many countries threatened by Communist insurgency are pre-
pared to cooperate with non-Communist neighbors in bilateral efforts
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to control insurgent activities along common borders. But there is
little faith that regional security arrangements would provide a useful
way to cope with this threat.
E. Japan, the only East Asian country potentially able to make a
substantial military contribution to the defense of the area as a whole,
is constitutionally and politically inhibited from undertaking the re-
quired arms buildup and, even more, from assuming military commit-
ments to its neighbors. Many of these countries, in turn, would be
uneasy about any Japanese attempt to assert a leading military role
in the region.
F. Despite the poor prospects for any early development of re-
gional security arrangements, it seems likely that interest in a regional
approach to common problems in East Asia will persist. Regional in-
stitutions established for particular purposes of economic cooperation
are not likely to emerge as building-blocks for a future security edifice.
Groupings concerned with broader sorts of political consultation might
in time concern themselves with specific security problems, although
premature efforts to turn them in this direction could lead to their
fragmentation. Whether or not these or similar organizations would
move beyond the consultative stage and become active in the military-
security field would depend heavily on circumstances, particularly the
nature and dimension of the Communist threat as perceived in the
post-Vietnam environment.
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DISCUSSION
1. BACKGROUND
1. Over the past 10 years or so, East Asian countries have increasingly ex-
pressed support for the concept of regional cooperation, and some new groupings
have emerged. Unlike earlier regional organizations-ECAFE, the Colombo Plan,
and SEATO-some of these new groupings have resulted essentially from East
Asian initiatives and have drawn their membership exclusively from the region.
2. The Association of Southeast Asia-ASA-was formed in 1961 at the ini-
tiative of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya. It was to be con-
cerned primarily with cooperation in various economic, social, and cultural fields,
and included Thailand and the Philippines, as well as Malaya. ASA foundered
in 1963 as a result of Philippine opposition to the incorporation of the Bornean
territory of Sabah in the new state of Malaysia, but was formally revived in 1966
when the dispute had cooled and diplomatic relations between Malaysia and
the Philippines were established. The desire of Suharto's Indonesia to join its
neighbors led to the establishment in 1967 of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations-ASEAN-which includes the three ASA members plus Singapore and,
of course, Indonesia. ASEAN has absorbed the varied projects of ASA, which
is now virtually defunct.
3. The Asian and Pacific Council-ASPAC-was formed in mid-1966 to pro-
mote consultations among its nine member nations on a broad range of regional
problems.2 It was organized at the initiative of a South Korean Foreign Minister
who had been pressing the concept of a Seoul-based, anti-Communist regional
alliance since 1964, mainly to enhance his personal prestige at home. Credit for
its widespread acceptance among the Asians, however, belongs primarily to
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman.
4. In part, this awakening interest in regional cooperation reflects the further
development of trends in evidence since World War II. One of these has been
the search for ways of asserting national identity and providing a more effective
Asian voice in international councils and in relations with friendly or allied
Western nations. The changing attitude of. the US has also been a factor. East
Asian leaders have noted the expressed US desire for the development of regional
associations and may believe that more US economic aid will be available for
such associations than for individual states. There is also concern over the will-
ingness of the US to maintain its role as a security shield. The course of the war
in Vietnam has introduced an element of doubt that the US has the will to turn
S ASPAC membership includes: South Korea, Japan, the GRC, South Vietnam, Thailand,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and from outside the region, Australia and New Zealand; Laos has
been an observer at ASPAC meetings. (See maps which show membership of ASPAC, ASEAN,
and two other regional arrangements.)
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NORTH
KOREA
I JAPAN
TAIWAN
TNAM (GRC)
T`F-CAI NLey {PHILIPPINES
{5 SOUTH -
CAMIH.Pt7IA; VIETNAM -
NEW
ZEALAND
NEW
ZEALAND;
ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
FIVE POWER COMMONWEALTH
SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
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ASPAC
(Asian and Pacific Council)
SOuTh
CKORit A,
NEW NEW
ZEALAND
TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES
(Vietnamese War Allies)
,SOUTH
\KOREA
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 15
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
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back any further Communist challenge in the region, or the capability to do so
except perhaps at an unacceptably high cost to the target nation. And in South-
east Asia, interest in regional organizations has been stimulated by the prospective
British withdrawal from "East of Suez" military commitments.
5. Despite this increased attention to regional association, accomplishments
in multilateral cooperation in East Asia remain limited. The most promising starts
have been in the economic field. Even in this sector, however, the most ambitious
organizations-the Asian Development Bank and ECAFE's Mekong Committee-
are products of local cooperation with advanced Western countries. On the other
hand, ASEAN and ASPAC, although undertaking joint projects only in the eco-
nomic and cultural fields, do serve as informal political forums. As yet, however,
joint consultation on security matters has not become the province of any wholly
Asian organization. Such new security groupings as have appeared-the informal
council of seven countries contributing troops to Vietnam and the five-power
defense arrangement developing among Malaysia, Singapore, the UK, Australia,
and New Zealand-are essentially carryovers from existing Western-dominated
alliances. In short, many complications stand in the way of progress toward
effective cooperation among the East Asian nations on security matters.
II. GENERAL FACTORS AFFECTING EAST ASIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
A. Varying Perceptions of the Threat
6. The East Asian countries lack a common perception of the threat to their
security. While all are concerned about China's ambitions and its long-range
power potential, only South Korea and the GRC see any early threat of overt
Communist military aggression. The nations on the mainland of Southeast Asia,
and Indonesia as well, are concerned in varying degrees with the threat of
Chinese-sponsored subversion and revolutionary activity, but Japan and the
Philippines see no immediate security threat, military or subversive, from China.
7. Concern over the Vietnamese Communists also varies greatly and, even where
it is high, there is no agreement on the proper response. Aside from the former
French Indochinese states, only Thailand sees Hanoi as a direct and immediate
threat to its own security. Indeed, some East Asian leaders tend to view the
North Vietnamese as basically hostile toward Peking, and hence as potentially
useful allies in any long-range effort to contain Chinese ambitions in Southeast
Asia. Moreover, most East Asians anticipate an uncertain settlement that could
permit an eventual Communist takeover of South Vietnam and Laos (and some
would add Cambodia). In Southeast Asia, at least, there is concern over the
long-term implications of such a takeover. But most countries in this area see
little that they can do to ensure the maintenance of non-Communist regimes
in Indochina and wish to avoid the risks of trying to do so.
8. The USSR is not presently regarded as an aggressive threat by any of the
East Asian nations, in part because of the deterrent effect of the US presence.
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While some are concerned with Soviet subversion, most East Asian governments
believe that. they possess sufficient knowledge and sophistication to counter it
and that, in any case, the opportunities for Russian agents to make significant
political gains among Asian leftists are inherently limited. Many, moreover.
tend to view the USSR as a useful counterweight to Peking.
9. Finally, many East Asian states are as concerned over threats from non-
Communist neighbors as over those from Communist states or Communist-
supported insurgencies. Cambodia, for example, feels its very existence threatened
by what it sees as a centuries-old campaign of Thai and Vietnamese expan-
sionism. Singapore is concerned that its future is jeopardized by racial tensions
with the Malays and suspects that a close association between Malaysia and
Indonesia might work to its disadvantage. Malaysia sees its territorial integrity
menaced by the Philippine claim to Sabah and, over the longer term, distrusts
the intentions of Indonesia. Anti-Japanese sentiments remain strong in South
Korea, while some other countries are generally uneasy about any Japanese
attempt to assert a leading role in the region.
B. Other Variations in National Perspective
10. The following discussion of the interests and attitudes of the non-Com-
munist East Asian states toward regional security arrangements treats the 12
states concerned in three categories: the divided nations, the neutralists, and the
others. These categories are convenient for purposes of presentation and analysis,
the countries in each category having certain problems in common. As will be
apparent, the categories themselves do not represent potential groupings of nations
for security purposes.
The Divided Nations
11. Most East Asian countries recognize that South Korea, though sheltered
by US military power, faces a continuing threat from its Communist opponent
and that security links with it could therefore prove somewhat risky. Neverthe-
less, there are countervailing considerations which have made Seoul a welcome
partner in several multilateral undertakings in the region and which would
make it a desirable ally in a regional security pact. South Korea's effective mili-
tary performance in South Vietnam has enhanced its standing in the eyes of
some East Asian nations. There is also general appreciation of South Korea's
demonstrated ability to manage its domestic affairs and to outdistance its Com-
munist rival in Pyongyang, and of the relative absence of public dissent to the
government's activist anti-Communist policies. Furthermore, except for the Japa-
nese, there are no significant national enmities which might block cooperation
with the South Koreans.
12. For its part, South Korea has long been an advocate of broad regional
security alliances on the SEATO pattern, provided the US thereby would be
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more surely involved in Korea's defense.3 The South Koreans are not interested,
however, in any purely Asian security coalition which might involve them in
antiguerrilla campaigns in Southeast Asia without the certainty of major US
support. The South Koreans would not want to rely on Japanese forces for their
defense, not only because of the ancient animosity against Japan, but because
they would fear that existing US guarantees might thereby be vitiated.
13. Over the years, the GRC has become more acceptable to its non-
Communist neighbors. But almost none wants to become involved in what
clearly appears to be the weaker side of China's civil war; to include the GRC
in any regional alliance would work against its widespread acceptance almost
from the start. Recognizing this, Taipei has not pressed for a new regional security
arrangement much as it might want one. The Nationalist Chinese have been
content to offer private support for ROK initiatives in this field, meanwhile pro-
moting a variety of low-keyed bilateral intelligence contacts with the South
Koreans, the South Vietnamese, and the Thai.
14. For South Vietnam and Laos, of course, the outcome of the Vietnamese
war will be crucial in determining future regional security interests and roles.
Saigon, so long as it is not under Communist control or bound to a neutral status
by the terms of a settlement, would welcome the participation of others in its
defense. But only South Korea and Thailand have shown any inclination to con-
tribute substantially to the defense of South Vietnam; and even their assistance
has had to be heavily subsidized by the US.
15. The Royal Lao Government has been constrained from overtly accepting
external military assistance by the terms of the 1962 Geneva Accords, although
it has in fact relied heavily upon US air and other support for its defense. So
long as the Lao leaders, particularly Souvanna and the King, see the RLG's
chances of survival as resting essentially on agreement among the big powers,
not on arrangements among much smaller and less powerful neighbors, they
will be disinclined to throw down the gauntlet to Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow
by any formal alignment with security organizations likely to be deemed hostile
by these powers. Thus, the Lao attitude toward regional arrangements is likely
to conform to the shape of any settlement with the Communists and to the
military and political realities of the post-Vietnam situation in Southeast Asia
generally.
The Neutralists
16. Cambodia and Burma are unlikely to join any multilateral security group-
ing so long as they retain hope of mollifying the Communist powers on their
borders. Both countries long ago adopted a policy of neutrality on world issues,
'In recent months, Seoul has been advocating the formation of a "PATO" (Pacific Area
Treaty Organization) to include South Korea, the GRC, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the US.
In theory, the Asian members would pledge ground forces to each other's defense while the
US would provide naval, air, and logistical support to these forces in the event of need; the
US military response would, in concept, be automatic.
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and both believe that events elsewhere in Southeast Asia have confirmed the
correctness of their choice.
17. In practice, Cambodian and Burmese neutrality are quite dissimilar. Cam-
bodia has sought to involve all the powers, Communist and non-Communist, in
a delicate balance designed to safeguard its independence from the neighboring
Thai and Vietnamese nations. Unless the Communist-sponsored insurgency
within Cambodia becomes a much more serious threat, Prince Sihanouk would
probably steer clear of any pact opposed by Moscow or Peking, or obviously
aimed against the Communist countries. Moreover, no matter how the Vietna-
mese war is settled, Cambodia would probably not join any regional security
grouping, except possibly one that associated the Indochinese states in neutrality
and nonaggression commitments, perhaps with international guarantees.
18. Burma has become almost pathologically isolationist, immersing itself in
its domestic affairs and adopting an unequivocally negative position on regional
cooperation in virtually all its aspects. As a UN member, Burma participates
in ECAFE and it has retained ties with the Colombo Plan; but it has shown
no interest in newer economic groupings, even the Asian Development Bank.
The Burmese recognize the potential security threat from across the border
and have objected vigorously to Peking's open support of Burma's Communist
and ethnic insurgents. There has also been some limited anti-insurgent cooperation
with India. But Burma will almost certainly continue to regard involvement in
any more formal security arrangement as provocative to Peking and, therefore,
contrary to Burmese national interests.
The Other Nations
19. The attitudes of the six other East Asian nations toward regional security
arrangements are less predictable and would be more dependent on the nature
of the particular arrangements proposed and on attendant circumstances. Thai-
land, Malaysia, and Singapore may well feel more need of a new security
arrangement at this time than do Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan.
20. Heretofore, Thailand has been a leader of almost every East Asian grouping
of whatever stripe, a role to which the exceptional talents of Foreign Minister
Thanat have made an important contribution. Though a member of SEATO
and further assured by the language of the Rusk-Thanat agreement of 1962,
Thailand has been unsettled by the apparent unwillingness of the US to seek
a clear-cut military victory in Vietnam. It is casting about for supplements to
the US commitment to its defense and for alternatives should this commitment
prove to be less than firm. Conversion of ASPAC and/or ASEAN into security
terms has been considered, but Thai reactions to recent South Korean proposals
for a formalized "PATO" have been mixed. Apparently, Bangkok would prefer
to get a better "fix" on US intentions in the region before committing itself to
any new multilateral proposal. It may hope for a formal bilateral security arrange-
ment with the US after the Vietnamese war.
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21. The Thai are also freer than South Korea or the GRC to explore such
alternatives as "accommodation"-a significant reduction of security and political
ties with the US and a concomitant warming toward the Communist powers,
particularly Peking. Thai leaders are at least able to conceive of a situation in
which their Communist neighbors would be disposed to abandon their threaten-
ing posture in favor of a conciliatory policy. Some responsible Thai elements
probably believe that after Mao dies, overtures from Bangkok might strike a
responsive chord in Peking, and that this possibility might be foreclosed by
further Thai involvement in US security policy in the region. We do not believe,
however, that this view will gain much support among present Thai leaders,
so long as they are confident of an effective US security role in Southeast Asia.
22. The five-power alliance which links Malaysia and Singapore with the UK,
Australia, and New Zealand is destined to lose most of its military muscle when
the British withdraw from the area in 1971. Meanwhile, the precise nature and
scope of the ANZAC commitment remains hazy, though both countries have
declared their intention to maintain forces in the area after 1971 for defense
against external attack and externally-supported Communist insurgency. There is
also concern over the extent to which the US is committed under the ANZUS
treaty to support ANZAC forces in the area. Beyond this, as noted earlier, there
is apprehension in Malaysia and Singapore over the latent ambitions of Indo-
nesia and the unpredictable Filipino course of action with regard to Sabah.
23. Both Malaysia and Singapore are considering other ways to bolster their
national security, including bilateral nonaggression pacts with neighboring nations
and big power neutralization of the area. Singapore, in particular, still has some
interest in preserving a posture of nonalignment. As for regional security arrange-
ments, neither Malaysia nor Singapore has a current and active interest in any
new organizations. If circumstance were to lead them in this direction, however,
both would probably wish an arrangement in which Indonesian participation
would be balanced by that of Australia and New Zealand, with a US presence
in the background.
24. For the near future, however, Malaysia and Singapore are building up
their military and police forces to strengthen their internal security, to repel
small-scale invasion attempts, and to contribute to their five-power defense effort.
Malaysia also has bilateral agreements with Thailand and Indonesia for coopera-
tive action against Malaysian Communist guerrillas in the Thai border area and
in Indonesian Borneo close to the East Malaysian border. Neither Malaysia nor
Singapore, however, would want foreign Asian troops stationed on its territory
to combat insurgent elements, though Singapore might be willing to deploy some
troops to Malaysia's defense. Neither nation sees any immediate likelihood that
ASEAN could usefully be converted into a security grouping; they would prob-
ably oppose any such proposal, particularly if it appeared to sanction the deploy-
ment of a substantial Indonesian force to their territory.
25. Indonesia's size, strategic location, and potential strength are such that,
unless it were a member, no wholly indigenous security arrangement in South-
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east Asia could be effective. Yet few Indonesian leaders see persuasive security
reasons for establishing a regional pact at this time. Moreover, they have many
inhibitions against joining in any such venture. Membership in an arrangement
of patently anti-Communist cast might alienate the USSR, the East European
countries, and many Arab and African states, and would also generate political
opposition within Indonesia. Foreign Minister Malik and other civilian officials
would be concerned lest such a pact lead to vast military outlays at the expense
of essential economic programs. Nor would Indonesia be inclined to join any
arrangement in which its role would be overshadowed by larger and more
influential nations such as India and Japan. For the present, therefore, Indonesia's
leaders are more interested in relatively limited forms of cooperation with their
neighbors to deal with specific insurgency problems along their common borders
on a bilateral basis.
26. Over the longer term, Indonesia may choose to do more to help meet
security threats in Southeast Asia. Suharto's concept of national defense, for
example, envisages deployment of Indonesian forces to countries as distant as
Thailand should they request Indonesian assistance against external aggression.
Arrangements along this line appeal to Indonesians as one way of asserting
themselves among their neighbors and improving prospects for gaining the
leading political position in Southeast Asia.
27. Despite its close ties with the US and a strongly anti-Communist foreign
policy, the attitude of the Philippines on the regional security issue might be
somewhat equivocal. Nationalism in the Philippines is expressed most often as
anti-Americanism; thus, any suggestion of US pressure on Manila in connection
with a new multilateral pact would generate opposition to it in certain govern-
ment, press, and intellectual circles. Another handicap would be the apparent
lack of concern among Filipinos for events overseas, even on the nearby South-
east Asian mainland. (The token Philippine troop commitment to South Vietnam,
for example, was extracted only painfully by the US; the Filipinos did not feel
directly threatened by events in Indochina.) If a number of other Asian nations
joined in a security pact, the Filipinos would probably join, seeking a more
Asian orientation and lessening dependence on the US. For the next five years
or so, however, Filipino efforts in the security field will probably be focussed on
securing alterations to existing bilateral arrangements with the US which will
make the relationship a more "equal" one.
28. Still another complicating factor is Sabah. The Philippine claim to this
Malaysian territory has greatly disturbed relations with Kuala Lumpur and
caused widespread disgust with Manila's inept diplomacy and concern about
Malaysia's response. The conflict also threatens to bring the work of ASEAN
to a complete standstill.
29. Japan operates under many more political constraints on security matters
than Indonesia or the Philippines. It has a strong leftist movement which opposes
even the continuation of the security pact with the US. Moreover, virtually all
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Japanese oppose any costly and potentially dangerous military commitment in
Southeast Asia. This view is bolstered by the Japanese constitution which, in
effect, forbids dispatch of troops overseas. Moreover, Japan generally wishes to
avoid actions which might unnecessarily jeopardize prospects for trade with China
or an eventual political settlement. The Japanese, at least at present, see their
regional role as primarily one of developing trade relations and providing eco-
nomic assistance to promote political stability, and, in the case of China, to
erode its doctrinaire hostility toward the non-Communist world. There is no
prospect, therefore, that Japan will move toward a formal regional security
grouping over the next five years or so.
30. On the other side of the coin, many East Asians fear that military align-
ment with Japan could lead to its domination of the region. Thus, it seems prob-
able that Japan would not be a welcome member of any regional security group-
ing unless the US were also present as a political and military counterweight.
C. Military Considerations
31. The military forces of the non-Communist states of East Asia vary greatly
in their capabilities. The ROK and the GRC could make significant contributions
to their own defense. But their forces and those of Japan could not move beyond
their own borders in any substantial strength without major and continuing
US logistical support. And even transported to Southeast Asia, they would almost
certainly be insufficient to repel direct attacks by Peking and Hanoi in this area.
Any regional security arrangement designed to cope realistically with a conven-
tional military threat to Southeast Asia, therefore, would require very heavy
increases in the military forces of many states in this area. We do not envisage
any such development over the next five years or so.
32. For the foreseeable future, the smaller nations of Southeast Asia could do
little more than supply token combat forces to one another and would be almost
wholly dependent on US logistical systems for their transport and upkeep in
the field. Such forces might be useful in demonstrating regional solidarity in any
prolonged counterinsurgency campaign, but their value in a conventional defen-
sive role would almost certainly be very slight.
33. It is at least conceivable that the Indonesian military establishment could
be increased and, more important, upgraded so as to provide significant ground
force contingents for duty outside Indonesia, though they too would require US
logistical support. Indonesia's air force and navy are large by Southeast Asian
standards, but they lack the capability to contribute much to regional defense
in the near future. Their equipment is mainly of Soviet origin and, in general,
has been poorly maintained. They could be developed into a formidable defensive
force only if substantial quantities of US or other Western aircraft and naval
vessels were provided, along with lengthy programs of orientation and training;
Indonesia could not afford to pay for even a small portion of any such arms
package.
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34. Japan is the only East Asian country capable of becoming a major nuclear
power, possibly within five years of reaching a decision to do so, and hence the
only one potentially capable of coping with the Chinese military threat without
US support. Moreover, excluding Communist China, it is presently the most
important air and sea power in East Asia, and it could supply much of the
equipment and technical assistance required to bring indigenous Southeast Asian
forces to higher standards. If Japan wanted to do so, there is no question that
it could become a major air and sea power in the 1970's.
35. Australia and New Zealand (along with the UK) are presently committed
to the defense of East Asian states-in this case, Malaysia and Singapore. The
ANZAC countries are pledged to maintain small ground, air and naval detach-
ments in these countries until 1971 and for an indefinite period thereafter. The
Australian force could probably be doubled or tripled comparatively quickly,
and detachments could be employed elsewhere in the region under existing
SEATO arrangements-e.g., in Thailand. But Canberra would be reluctant to
undertake such moves because of the economic costs and the political opposition
at home to any heavier commitment to Southeast Asian security, at least without
a parallel US involvement. In any case, Australia's military resources are inade-
quate to fill the defense role handled so effectively by the UK during the Malay-
sian "confrontation" with Indonesia in 1963-1966.
36. So far, India has shown no interest in involving itself in Southeast Asian
security problems, though it is beginning to think of economic and other limited
consultative arrangements with states in the area. India is concerned to defend
its own threatened frontiers with Pakistan and China, and has little strength
left over for employment elsewhere, even if it had the logistical capability to
support an expeditionary force. Moreover, East Asians tend to view India as
relatively impotent militarily, disorganized politically, and economically un-
promising. There would be little local sentiment for and considerable opposition
to its inclusion in regional security arrangements.
37. None of the East Asian nations is presently desirous of further European
involvement in the security of the region. Although Malaysia and Singapore
would have preferred the UK to remain, they no longer see any prospect that the
British decision to withdraw can be reversed. Further UK involvement after
1971-except in minor military exercises, or on a consultative basis in SEATO,
or under the terms of the Anglo-Malayan defense agreement of 1957 in the event
of a direct attack on Malaysia-seems highly unlikely. Although a small British
force will remain in Hong Kong, the Colony is not a tenable base for East Asian
operations.
38. France has been inactive in SEATO for several years. Moreover, its South-
east Asian policies no longer accord with those of most members and its presence
is vigorously opposed by at least one-Thailand. France would almost certainly
not accept any security role in the region except perhaps as a guarantor of a
neutralized Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. West German, Dutch, or other
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Western European security involvements are even less likely; none of these
nations perceives vital interests at stake in the region, nor would any wish to
antagonize China or the USSR unnecessarily.
39. For the next five years at least, US military strength and logistical capabili-
ties would be crucial to the development of any credible East Asian arrange-
ment intended to provide security against Communist military aggression. Most
members would look mainly toward the US for the training and equipment they
would feel necessary to raise the standards of their respective forces. Though
they would probably seek to avoid dependence on US ground forces as long
as possible, they would expect some sort of tacit or explicit commitment of US
air and naval forces (including nuclear weapons) to their defense in order to
deter the Chinese and nullify any efforts by Peking to employ nuclear blackmail.
They would prefer that such forces were positioned nearby to increase the
credibility of US deterrent power. They would also like the US to supply, at
low cost, sufficient air and naval equipment to indigenous forces to permit a
respectable defense against a wide range of enemy actions short of major war.
40. East Asians have mixed feelings about the role of the US in relation to any
regional security concept. Countries possessing bilateral security ties with the
US would not regard a regional security organization without US participation as
a satisfactory substitute. Other countries regard their security as ultimately de-
pendent on a US presence in the area, but have preferred for various reasons not
to seek a bilateral security relationship with the US. They would not necessarily
welcome a formal defense tie with the US even if it came under a multilateral
guise. For all of the countries moving toward closer regional ties of any kind,
moreover, the concept of Asian initiative and leadership has become of increas-
ing importance; a good deal of the impetus toward regional thinking derives
from the belief that only jointly can Asian countries equalize what is otherwise
too clearly a patron-client relationship. If and when a regional security arrange-
ment is contemplated in East Asia, the preferred arrangement from the overall
East Asian view would probably be the formation of an indigenous grouping
with low-keyed though firm assurances of political and military support by the US.
III. THE OUTLOOK
41. It seems likely that interest in a regional approach to common problems
in East Asia will persist. For one thing, most of the countries in the area have
specific national interests which impel them in this direction: Japan's wish to
exorcise the image of aggression and imperialism and promote its economic in-
terests; the desire of the GRC, South Korea, and South Vietnam to demonstrate
international acceptance in their competition with opposing Communist regimes;
and the urge in many countries to enhance national prestige by exercising re-
gional leadership. The belief that economic stabilization and betterment will
contribute to political stability and hence reduce the threat to national security
is another factor that will help maintain interest in regional economic and social
cooperation.
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42. The existing regional institutions inspired by these considerations are not
necessarily building-blocks for some future security edifice. Premature efforts to
turn them in this direction could lead to their fragmentation. It is evident, none-
theless, that such groups as ASPAC and ASEAN are developing into political
forums of some importance, and might in time concern themselves with specific
security problems. Whether or not these or similar organizations would move
beyond the consultative stage and become active in the military-security field
would depend heavily on circumstances, particularly the nature and dimension
of the Communist threat as perceived in the post-Vietnam environment.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a
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b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of
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2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with
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IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
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