TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100240001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Terrorism
Review
1 September 1983
Seeret
Seeret
GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983
Copy 488
Directorate of
Intelligence MASTER FILE COPY
00 HOT GIVE OUT
01 MARK ON
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Secret
Review
1 September 1983
1 Perspective-Turmoil in Central America: The Terrorist Fallout
? (OGI)
5 Peru's Sendero Luminoso:
Status of the Insurgent Threat
(ALA)
7 Group Profile:
The African National Congress
(OGI)
11 The African National Congress's
Communist Ties
(ALA)
Drug Trafficking Activities
of Insurgent and Terrorist Groups
(OGI)
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25 Chronology
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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Perspective Turmoil in Central America: The Terrorist Fallout
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Terrorism, once relatively rare in much of Central America, has increased
substantially since the installation of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and
the intensification of leftist subversion and insurgency in El Salvador. Despite
some counterterrorist successes in several countries in the region, we believe the
terrorist threat-especially against US interests-in all of Central America 25X1
probably will increase in the next year.
We are particularly concerned about the recent willingness of traditionally
nonviolent Central American Communist parties to join with more radical gror25X1
in emphasizing armed struggle:
? Since 1981 some officials of the generally nonviolent Costa Rican Communist
Party PVP have suggested an increasingly militant line;
Honduras has been an especially important focus of terrorist activity during the
past two years. In 1981 there were eight terrorist attacks in the country; last year
the number rose dramatically to 24. Terrorist attacks declined in the first half of
1983, probably because of tougher law enforcement and security measures. The
most important Honduran Government counterterrorist success this year was the
arrest of Efrain Duarte Salgado Secretary General of the Po ular Revolutionary
Forces-Lorenzo Zela a FPR .
Despite the arrest of Duarte, the terrorists' capabilities in Honduras remain 25X1
substantial. Indeed, there may be considerable cooperation among the various 25X1
groups operating in Honduras. For example, the four most important Honduran
terrorist groups have jointly declared "revolutionary war" on the government. One
of the organizations, the FPR, we regard as posing the greatest threat to
Americans in Honduras. The FPR has previously attacked US interests, including
the 1980 and 1981 strafings of the US Embassy; the 1981 ambush of a US mobile
training team in which two US sergeants were wounded; the 1982 bombings of
IBM, Air Florida, and the Datum Corporation; as well as attacks against the
Honduran subsidiaries of several other US companies. Cuba and Nicara ua have
provided the FPR funding, training, propaganda support, and arms
Secret
GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983
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A second member of the terrorist front, the Popular Liberation Movement/Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Union (MPL/URP), more widely known as the Cinchoneros,
also receive Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Soviet support. Although Cinchonero targets
have been primarily Honduran, we believe the group is likely to focus on the
American presence, probably at the urging of Sandinista and Salvadoran revolu-
tionaries. In late 1982, Cinchonero terrorists captured and held hostage for several
days prominent Honduran officials and businessmen in San Pedro Sula. The
terrorists demanded the Honduran Government sever security ties with the United
States as a condition for release of the hostages.
Costa Rica, until recently, had seen little of the terrorist activity that has affected
its neighboring states. In March 1981, however, terrorists attacked a US Embassy
jeep in San Jose, wounding three Marines and killing their Costa Rican driver. A
second, near-simultaneous attack severely damaged the Honduran Embassy.
During 1981 and 1982, Costa Rican terrorists with Salvadoran and Nicaraguan
assistance also carried out a series of kidnapings, robberies, and bombings. Many
of the terrorists were captured by the security forces; others were driven
underground or forced to flee the country
terrorist infrastructure remains in place capable of carrying
out operations against government or US targets.
Guatemala has experienced political violence and acts of terrorism by forces of
both the left and right for almost 20 years. Even segments of the normally docile
Indian population have been radicalized and are being recruited by guerrillas.
Cuba has provided training, arms, and ideological guidance to various insurgent
organizations, each of which conducts terrorist activities
We believe the terrorist threat in El Salvador, especially against US interests, will
intensify, partly in response to the increase in US involvement there. The guerrilla
faction responsible for the May assassination of a US military adviser also
mounted a grenade attack against the US Embassy in June. Additional attacks on
the Embassy and on US civilian and military personnel are likely. Salvadoran
insurgents appear intent on increasing urban terrorism to disrupt the country's
upcoming elections.
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Secret
Highlights
Significant Development Fatah Dissidents Splintering. Five members of one of the PLO groups supporting
the Fatah dissidents in the Bekaa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), have rebelled against their leader
Ahmad Jabril because they believe Jabril is becoming nothing more than a Libyan
puppet. The five leaders have formed a provisional committee to counter Jabril's
leadership. some supporters of the Fatah
dissidents are becoming isenc ante wit t e dominant role Libya and Syria are
playing in the rebellion.
3 Secret
GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983
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Peru's Sendero Luminoso:
Status of the Insurgent Threat
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In the past year, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining
Path) insurgent group has become-along with the
economy-one of the two major concerns of the
Belaunde administration. In our view, the SL-which
has been engaged in violent activity since 1980-will
remain a major security problem for the government
for the next year or so. We believe that the SL
probably has sufficient manpower reserves to main-
tain the number of hardcore militants at-or perhaps
slightly above-the present estimated total of 1,000 to
1,500 in this time frame.
Despite reported heavy SL casualties since the mili-
tary joined the counterinsurgency effort last Decem-
ber, we believe the group's political-military appara-
tus remains largely intact. We think that most of
those killed have been second-echelon cadre and
civilians and, in any event, that the SL has a sufficient
reserve of personnel to replace losses for some time to
come. Since this spring, the SL has increased its
urban terrorist operations in Lima and other cities.
The SL's urban operations have included bombing
attacks against police and military facilities, electrical
towers, government ministries, foreign embassies, and
various businesses. A terrorist attack on the head-
quarters of President Belaunde's Popular Action Par-
ty on 11 July barely missed several important govern-
ment and party figures.
Fundamental insurgent strengths-a unified and
committed leadership, mastery of guerrilla and terror-
ist tactics, and relatively effective intelligence and
counterintelligence-have allowed the Sendero
Luminoso to remain firmly entrenched in the isolated
and rugged Ayacucho Department. The SL further
benefits from several key deficiencies of the security
training, and a fragmented intelligence network.
forces, including inadequate equipment, inappropriate
In their effort to eradicate the Sendero Luminoso, we
expect that the security forces probably will use more
repressive tactics. Although the SL also has employed
brutality-and in our view alienated some potential
peasant supporters-we project that the government
stands to lose more in terms of domestic and foreign
backing and-perhapr-increased recruitment oppor-
tunities for the insurgents. In turn, the SL is likely to
initiate more strikes outside its traditional strongholds
to relieve pressure on its home bases and promote the
appearance of a spreading insurgency.
The guerrillas, however, face certain constraints, even
in the short term. The SL's appeal is still relatively
narrow because of its alien Maoist ideology and its
sometimes harsh tactics. Additionally, the group's
ideological incompatibility with most potential foreign
arms suppliers, and the Soviet Union's concern over
jeopardizing its ties with Lima, have left the SL
completely dependent on limited local sources for
arms and equipment. We believe these factors mean
that SL combatants probably will remain under-
equipped. Consequently, we anticipate a continuation
of the cyclical pattern of short periods of intensive
attacks on high-visibility targets followed by consoli-
dation, recuperation, and resupply.
President Belaunde's determination to combat the SL
is solidifying and is leading to changes in the govern-
ment's counterinsurgency strategy. In our view, he
has recognized the deficiencies of the police and will
allow the armed forces progressively greater latitude
in directing the counterinsurgency. Although Peru's
troubled economy limits funding for the military and
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GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983
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Belaunde's term in 1985.
police, efforts to purchase needed equipment reflect
some reordering of government priorities. We believe
that the counterinsurgency forces will gradually im-
prove their effectiveness over the next two to three
years. Already, for example, the Army appears to be
organizing small units specifically designed for coun-
terinsurgency operations, and the government is mov-
ing ahead with plans to purchase helicopters. Thus we
judge that, within this time period, they should be
able to contain the Sendero Luminoso and possibly
force it onto the defensive toward the end of President
The Sendero Luminoso could change this picture, in
our view, by adopting new tactics-such as kidnaping
for ransom, more sophisticated use of publicity, and a
less rigid approach to ideology-to acquire more arms
and win larger numbers of adherents. So far, the
group's dogmatic and long-term approach to revolu-
tion suggests it will not shift tactics easily or quick-
ly-at least as long as its present leadership remains
in control.
The picture also could change if the insurgents begin
to receive substantial foreign support-although this
seems unlikely at present.
Cuba's Castro may be becoming more inter-
ested in the group, but there is only an outside chance
he would offer direct support in view of:
both Moscow and Beijing as "revisionist."
? The high value the USSR places on its lucrative
arms supply relationship with Lima.
? Castro's desire to restore full diplomatic relations
with Peru.
? The insularity of SL leaders, who have denounced
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Group Profile:
The African National Congress
Long the most prominent South African black opposi-
tion group, the African National Congress (ANC) was
founded in January 1912. Its original aim was reform
rather than revolution, and for years it confined itself
to legal political action. The group went underground
only when it was proscribed in 1960 following the
Sharpeville incident in which police opened fire on a
large crowd of black demonstrators, killing 67 and
wounding 186. In 1961 the ANC formed a military
wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe or Spear of the Nation.
During the next few years it conducted a campaign of
low-level sabotage directed particularly against police
stations and economic targets.
The Soweto riots in 1976, together with an influx of
young people, breathed new life into the ANC and
forced the established leadership to take a more
militant stance. The reinvigorated Umkhonto We
Sizwe renewed operations in 1980, although until the
May 1983 bombing in Pretoria the damage from its
attacks was generally light, most of its bombs being
set to explode when the target area was not crowded.
External Links
The ANC's Communist ties are extensive.' It receives,
weapons, explosives, and training from the USSR,
East European countries, and Cuba. The Soviets
provide most of the military equipment, which con-
sists mainly of small arms and explosives, although on
one occasion the ANC employed 122-mm rockets in
South Africa.
7 Secret
G1 TR 83-018
1 September 1983
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With South Africa having demonstrated both the
capability and the readiness to operate outside its
borders, most of the neighboring states are loath to
risk becoming the targets of reprisals by the South
African Defense Forces (SADF). For example, al-
though the ANC has established its political head-
quarters in Lusaka, Zambia does not, as far as we
know, allow any ANC military training to take place
on its territory nor any ANC operations to be mount-
ed from there. For economic reasons, Zimbabwe also
requires tolerable relations with South Africa. There-
fore, Harare is not inclined to provide any overt
assistance to the ANC. The Zimbabwean Govern-
ment has, however, permitted the ANC to maintain
unofficial offices in Harare[
Only Angola permits the ANC to maintain a major
guerrilla presence. Until the past few years, Tanzania
was the main site of ANC military training as well as
political indoctrination and academic instruction
the political wing of the ANC recruits from among
university students and from upper economic classes,
including whites. Umkhonto We Sizwe recruits large-
ly from lower educational and economic classes. The
large number of guerrillas who do not return from
their first assignments due to arrests and desertions
has caused difficulties in morale, expertise, and re-
cruitment.
NC operations inside South
Africa are care u y p anned and designed to be
carried out in stages that maximize the'chances for
success and minimize the risk to the attackers. Typi-
cally, one ANC team enters South Africa to scout a
likely target while another group smuggles weapons
across the border and caches them. Finally, a third
team enters South Africa unarmed, retrieves the
weapons from the cache, proceeds to its objective, and
mounts the attack.' Most ANC teams try to leave
South Africa soon after completing their operations.
Staging Areas
Most ANC guerrillas infiltrate into South Africa via
Swaziland from Mozambique. Officially, the Mozam-
bique Government prohibits the ANC from using its
territory as a springboard for attacks against South
Africa, but in practice it has turned a blind eye
toward ANC personnel operating there,
members of the group from transiting its territory.
South Africa has long been aware that the ANC
maintains some safehouses in Gaborone and stages
some operations from Botswana. Most of these opera-
tions have consisted of reconnaissance by unarmed
teams; the deaths of three ANC members at a
pistol and a grenade, which gives them the option of trying to fight
their way through a road or checkpoint if stopped, even though it
eliminates any possibility they could talk their way out of trouble.
likely to be caught) does not know the target.
Such a procedure reduces the danger to the participants, since
only one team needs to carry incriminating material across the
border. It also reduces the chances that the mission will fail,
because the team bringing in the weapons (which is the one most
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Secret
African National Congress Terrorist Operations, 1981-10 August 1983
Transvaal
PRETORIA' - ? v rill
-fk -1
LOUT
~5 arpeville
Terrorist incident (number and location)
(Size and number indicates more
than one incident)
0 1981 (47 total)
Q 1982 (31 total)
? 1983 (19 total)
4M Black homeland
0 300
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Secret
roadblock shootout on 4 May 1983 marked the first
The ANC also occasionally uses Lesotho as a staging
area for operations. Alleging that the government had
been ignoring rather than trying to control ANC
activities there, South Africa put economic pressure
on Lesotho. In response, Lesotho recently announced
that it will expel South African refugees associated
Possible Shift in Strategy
The ANC bomb that exploded on 20 May in down-
town Pretoria may have signaled a sharp change in
the group's policy of avoiding civilian casualties. The
car bomb-designed to cause casualties rather than
damage property-was detonated during rush hour
outside the South African Air Force Headquarters.
More than half of the 217 injured and 19 killed were
civilians, many of them whites. In addition, the US
Embassy reports that on 9 May Durban police de-
fused a bomb-identical to the one used in Pretoria-
in a heavily traveled area near a public airport with
Air Force facilities.
We believe that the ANC's apparent shift in strategy
may have been the result of an internal "compro-
mise." There may have been a causal link between
this shift and the South African raid on Maseru last
December, in which about 30 ANC personnel were
killed.
following the raid, the ANC leadership came
under pressure-presumably from black militants in
the organization-to bite civilians
the leadership
Intelligence
refused to authorize attacks specifically directed
against civilians, but did instruct the military wing
that it no longer needed to be as concerned as before
with avoiding civilian casualties. In its communiques
on the car bombing, the ANC emphasized that the
target of the attack was military: South African Air
Force Headquarters and the Directorate of Military
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Secret
The African National Congress's
Communist Ties
The African National Congress, the principal anti-
South-African insurgent group, has a long history of
ties to the Pro-Soviet Communist Party in South
Africa. Communists today are well represented in the
ANC's leadership and exert considerable influence on
it, especially with regard to military strategy. The
ANC's heavy dependence on Soviet Bloc military aid
is an important source of leverage for the South
African Communist Party (SACP).
Origins of the Relationship Between the ANC
and the Communist Party in South Africa
The Communist Party in South Africa and the ANC
have been intertwined during most of the last 60
years. The ANC was formed in 1912 as a black
reformist group composed mainly of tribal chiefs and
educated elite. The Communist Party of South Africa
(CPSA), which was founded in 1921 and joined the
Comintern the same year, began recruiting black
members and infiltrating the ANC in the mid-1920s
after the government enacted a series of discrimina-
tory laws.
Following the outlawing of the CPSA in 1950, black
Communists who had not previously done so now
joined the ANC, while Communists of other races
infiltrated existing political and labor groups and
established new ones. Former CPSA members secret-
ly reorganized the party in 1953 and renamed it the
South African Communist Party (SACP).
The South African Government banned the ANC
shortly after the Sharpeville riots of 1960. Forced
underground, the ANC lost its ability to generate
income inside South Africa and began to turn more
directly to the SACP.
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In our view, the aid came at a critical time for
the ANC and was instrumental in tying the ANC to
A high command-comprised of leading ANC and
SACP members-directed the miltary wing, which
launched a campaign of sabotage bombings in 1961.
The campaign fizzled out after police arrested a
number of ANC and SACP leaders in 1963-65. Those
members of the ANC and SACP hierarchies who
escaped the dragnet went into exile to rebuild their25X1
organizations. The SACP was able to expand its 25X1
influence on the ANC during this period largely
because the SACP had more international contacts
than the ANC and was more ex erienced in operating
underground. by 1968
most figures in the ship were Commu-
nists.
Moscow, probably believing that the Soweto riots in
1976 signaled an extended phase of violent unrest in
South Africa, increased its military aid to the ANC
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GI TR 83-018 25X1
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blacks and to focus international attention on the
grievances of South African blacks. The ANC has
Bolstered by the new aid and recruits, the ANC
launched another campaign of bombings and attacks
in 1980 to increase its support among South African
conducted some 106 attacks in the last four years.
Overlapping Organizations
Today, the SACP and the ANC maintain separate
organizational structures. This helps to play down the
image of a Communist/Soviet-controlled ANC, but
the two organizations openly describe their relation-
ship as an "alliance."
The SACP-a semisecret party based in London with
a strong pro-Soviet line-remains well represented in
the ANC's leadership. More than half of the ANC's
policymaking National Executive Committee mem-
bers are Communists, as are all of the members of the
key Revolutionary Council,
The latter body is responsible for all ANC
activities in South Africa, including conducting mili-
tary operations, establishing underground cells, and
forming links to trade unions. In addition, the SACP
District Committee in Lusaka, Zambia, acts as a
"watchdog," monitoring the ANC's responses to par-
ty policies and interests,
The SACP-which claims that 90 percent of its
members are blacks-is solidly entrenched in the
ranks of the ANC itself.
Communist Assistance to the ANC
The ANC's heavy dependence on the Soviet Bloc for 25X1
military aid is an important source of leverage for the
SACP. The Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba
are virtually the only suppliers of military training
and arms to the ANC today. Most of the ANC's
military training is conducted by Cuban and East
German military advisers at several camps in Angola.
The Soviet Union and various East European states
also provide some 200 scholarships a year to the ANC
for nonmilitary courses in the Soviet Bloc,
Promising ANC members can
study general academics in the USSR for up to five
years, or trade unionism for up to three years.
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the SACP is quite
selective in its recruitment. Moreover, we believe that
the majority of the ANC's rank and file is comprised
of three categories of blacks: nonideologues, anti-
Communist nationalists, and moderate socialists who
are comfortable working with Communists but do not
fully embrace Marxism-Leninism-especially its doc-
trine of atheism.
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Prospects
Despite the tensions, the ANC and the SACP will
undoubtedly continue their symbiotic relationship if
only because the alliance facilitates the ANC's access
to Communist assistance.
the ANC also gets many new members through
SACP recruiting efforts. These recruits usually are
more dedicated than the typical recruits; the most
energetic and capable ANC officials reportedly are
Communists. The SACP, for its part, recognizes the
value of-its ties to the ANC-the most popular
opposition group among South African blacks
We expect non-Communist ANC leaders to continue
to seek alternative sources of military aid to offset the
influence of the pro-Soviet faction. Tambo met with
Chinese Premier Zhao in Tanzania in January and
traveled in May to Beijing. China, which has provided
material support to a rival guerrilla group-the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC)-but not to the ANC -in
recent years, is considering supplying arms to the
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Drug Trafficking Activities of
Insurgent and Terrorist Groups
Rural-based insurgent/terrorist groups often play a
major role in the cultivation and initial processing-
though not in the smuggling and distribution-of
illicit drugs. Urban terrorist groups, on the other
hand, rarely become directly or extensively involved in
drug trafficking. The greater involvement of insurgent
groups results from two principal factors. First, insur-
gent groups are often active in the same rural areas
where marijuana, coca, or opium are or can easily be
grown. The remote locations and rough terrain char-
acteristic of such areas limit the influence of central
governments and hinder efforts to eradicate illicit
crops or drug trafficking. Second, drug trafficking
can be a lucrative and practical method for a rural
insurgent group to obtain funds. The level of involve-
ment of insurgent groups ranges from the extortion of
protection money from known traffickers to direct
involvement in the cultivation and transportation of
drugs.
Insurgent Groups
A number of so-called insurgent groups-notably in
Southeast Asia-are so heavily engaged in drug
trafficking that they are more like criminal enter-
prises than true insurgent groups.
The Shan United Army (SUA) is a smuggling and
trafficking organization of 3,000 to 4,000 armed
members that receives, by our estimate, some 80
percent of its funds from drug trafficking. Although
generally not involved in the cultivation of opium, the
SUA until recently controlled about two-thirds of the
opium processing and trafficking in the Thailand-
Burma border area.
Although Thai Govern-
ment military operations since early 1982 have dis-
rupted SUA operations, we believe that the SUA will
continue to play an important role in Golden Triangle
drug trafficking.
The Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) have the longest
history of involvement in drugs in the Golden Trian-
gle, although they have always officially denied it.
the CIF began drug
trafficking in the early 1950s, and today the remain-
ing 1,500 to 2,500 members are primarily involved in
the production and trafficking of refined heroin for
Thai, Burmese, and international markets. There is
evidence of CIF connections to Chinese criminal
syndicates, but not to organized criminal elements in
Europe and the United States.
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The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), es-
tablished in 1969, is a smuggling and trafficking
group of 800 to 1,000 armed members active in the
southern part of Burma's Shan State. It masks its
nature and activities by claiming to seek autonomy for
the Shan State. The SURA, with the cooperation of
corrupt officials, extorts money from local farmers,
taxes opium producers, and operates several border
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Other insurgent organizations directly involved in 25X1
drug trafficking devote only a part of their effort to
drug-related activities and use the funds derived from
these activities to further their political goals
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 25X1
(FARC), the largest and most formidable insurgent
group in Colombia, entered the drug business around
1977, according to US Embassy reporting. As coca
cultivation has expanded into traditional FARC 25X1
strongholds, their involvement has increased. FARC
units in these areas began by taxing coca production
and exacting fees from traffickers for use and transit
of FARC-controlled terroritory. According to a US
Embassy report, the FARC even established produc-
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tion quotas and set wage guidelines for workers and
growers. There is evidence that one of the FARC's
fronts in southeast Colombia was organized expressly
for the control of coca production with the aim of
using the profits from the trade to support other
fronts. Embassy reports also indicate that the FARC
is involved with organized smuggling networks in a
brisk trade of drugs for guns.
The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) involvement in
drug trafficking prior to 1978 was on a minor scale
and appears to have been the work of individuals
without explicit approval of the party leadership. In
1978, however, the BCP apparently began compensat-
ing for a sharp reduction in Chinese assistance by
sponsoring and even supervising opium poppy cultiva-
tion and trafficking. Today the BCP controls large
areas of Burma's opium-growing regions and is the
principal purchaser of raw opium from farmers. Ac-
cording to US Embassy assessments, the BCP refines
a small percentage of its opium into heroin at refiner-
ies inside Burma but transports most of its opium to
the border with Thailand where it is refined into
heroin by other narcotics trafficking organizations.
The Shan State Army (SSA) is an ethnically based
insurgent group established in 1960. Its 2,000 to
4,000 armed members are active throughout Burma's
Shan State. The SSA encourages opium poppy culti-
vation and taxes local producers and dealers as well as
caravans. The profits'are used to bribe officials and
purchase weapons and supplies.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), also founded
in 1960, is an ethnically based insurgent group of
more than 4,500 armed members that operates
throughout the Kachin State and in the northern part
of the Shan State in' Burma. The KIA taxes opium
producers, traffickers, and caravans and acts as a
broker between growers and trafficking organizations.
Some insurgent groups are only marginally involved
in the drug trade, with trafficking-related activities
ranging from extortion of producers and processors to
limited participation in domestic distribution.
The National Liberation Army (ELN), a Castroite
Marxist-Leninist organization, was established in
1963 and, although small, operates throughout
Colombia. According to unconfirmed US Embassy
reporting, ELN members have been involved in ex-
torting money from coca growers and in cultivating
marijuana.
The Popular Liberation Army (EPL), founded in
1967, is associated with the pro-Beijing Colombian
Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML). The
EPL is active in northern Colombia in Cordoba
Department and the Gulf of Uraba region. Colombian
authorities have told the US Embassy that they
suspect the EPL obtains some of its weapons from
drug traffickers operating in the Gulf of Uraba and
that some EPL members may be engaged in marijua-
na cultivation and trafficking.
25X1
Sendero Luminoso (SL), or Shining Path, is a Maoist
insurgent-terrorist group based primarily in the
Ayacucho region of Peru. According to Embassy
reporting, it has extorted money from traffickers 25X1
operating in its territory. Charges by Peruvian offi-
have not been substantiated.
cials that the SL is itself involved in'drug trafficking
Various groups in Southwest Asia, particularlylin
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, have long been'
involved in smuggling operations, some of which
involve narcotics. The Kurds, in particular, have an
experienced cadre of narcotics traffickers, couriers,
and processors who operate relatively freely through-
out western Iran and eastern Turkey. There are
conflicting reports regarding the involvement of the
Afghan insur ents. According to a September 1981
statement the
insurgents were at one time earning more ;than
$300,000 a month from the sale of drugs and gems.
Most evidence suggests, however, that insurgent orga- 25X1
nizations are not directly involved in the opium traffic
but are financed in part by taxes and contributions
from growers and smugglers.
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25X1
25X1
Philippine insurgent groups, including the New Peo-
ple's Army (NPA), cultivate marijuana and sell it
locally to help finance their operations
Urban Terrorist Groups
Compared with our information about the involve-
ment of rurally based insurgent groups in drug traf-
ficking, our information about the involvement of
urban terrorist groups is sparse and equivocal. What
information we have points to a minor role for
terrorists, compared with that of the organized crimi-
nal elements that dominate the business, and toward
individual opportunism rather than group complicity.
The most credible example of terrorist involvement
with drug traffickers involves the Colombian 19th of
April Movement (M- 19). In October 1981, M- 19 used
the drug-smuggling apparatus of Jaime Guillot Lara
to bring a large shipment of weapons into Colombia.
According to US Embassy reporting, M-19 has ex-
torted money from traffickers and growers and has
kidnaped wealthy traffickers and members of their
Following are some other examples of drug-related
activity involving terrorists:
According to the US Embassy, ETA has
employed known drug smugglers as low-level opera-
tives and couriers, and some individual ETA mem-
bers use and occasionally traffic in drugs.
? Rightist groups such as the Armed Revolutionary
Nuclei (NAR) in Italy and the Turkish Nationalist
Action Party (NAP) in Turkey have been linked to
trafficking by local press accounts that did not, 25X1
however, provide any specific details.
? The Palestinian terrorist group 15 May, like the 25X1
ETA, has been known to use drug smugglers as low-_
level operatives and couriers, but we doubt it is
involved itself in drug trafficking.
Why the Difference?
25X1
The manifold reasons why urban terrorist groups are
less involved in drug trafficking than insurgent groups
are practical rather than ideological.
Lack of Opportunity. The involvement of insurgent25X1
groups is generally limited to the areas that they
physically control or dominate; urban terrorists do not
control territory. Furthermore, the involvement of 25X1
insurgent groups is generally associated with cultiva-
tion, refining, or transport-not with distribution, 25X1
which is predominately an urban affair. In other 25X1
words, neither insurgent groups nor terrorist groups
are much involved with the distribution of illicit drugs
choice.
Availability ofAlternatives. Urban terrorist groups
have a wider variety of ways to make money than do
insurgent groups. Traditionally, urban terrorists fi-
nance their operations through bank robberies, kid-
napings, or extortion ("revolutionary taxes"), or they
depend for their funds upon some external source such
as a patron state or rich supporter. Insurgent groups
operating in remote areas often do not have such a
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ties.
Stiffer Competition. The distribution of illicit narcot-
ics in urban areas is dominated by tough and well-
organized criminal elements prepared to defend their
business ruthlessly and without regard for any of the
legal or civil rights that terrorists or insurgents might
be exploiting in their battle with government authori-
Operational Difficulties. Many urban terrorists are
so well known to the authorities or to the population
at large that they must live outside their own coun-
tries, which limits them essentially to periodic terror-
ist raids and prevents them from establishing, much
less maintaining, drug distribution networks. Other
terrorists depend for their viability 'in their own
countries on maintaining a circumspgct lifestyle that
does not arouse police suspicion. Associating with
elements of the drug trade is not compatible with such
a lifestyle; a clandestine urban terrorist also involved
getting caught and put out of business.
in drug trafficking has multiplied his chances of
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Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, November 1982-August 1983 a
2 2 6 3 4 5 7 10 10 2
6 12 11 2 11 13 8 4 10 3
!Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, November 1982-August 1983 a
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Total
47
50
57
59
77
82
59
66
North America
0
4
3
5
5
6
11
2
Latin America
12
9
13
10
18
20
12
19
Western Europe
25
23
20
26
33
20
18
20
USSR/Eastern Europe
3
0
1
1
3
0
1
0
Sub-Saharan Africa
1
1
0
3
4
5
4.
8
Middle East and North Africa
2
4
14
6
12
23
8
16
Asia/other
4
9
6
8
2
8
5
1
a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received.
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks
Figures for the most recent months are subject to change
as additional data are received.
J
Jul Aug
70 29
6 3
20 3
15 11
2 0
2 2
20 9
5 1
Car bomb in Baghdad
killed 2, wounded 130;
Ankara airport attack
killed 9, wounded 70.
Car bomb in Pretoria, S.A.
killed 18. wounded 217.
Bombing of US Embassy
in Lebanon killed 57,
wounded 120.
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July 1983
26 July 1983
Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
unless new information has been received.
continuing.
Cyprus: Explosives Cache Discovered
In Nicosia, 15 to 18 explosive devices-each comprised of four to six sticks of
TNT with timing and detonator devices-were discovered in the water at the
Polemidhia Dam. Cypriot security officials advised that examination of the devices
has revealed they are of US origin and are identical with the device utilized in a
bomb explosion against the Iraqi Airline office in spring 1983. Several attache
cases filled with hand grenades were also discovered in the cache. Investigation is
quently attributed the incident to squatters.
West Germany: Insurance Company Attacked
We originally attributed the bombing of the Alliance Life Insurance Company in
Stuttgart to the Revolutionary Cells. West German police, however, have subse-
12 August 1983 France: Explosion Precedes Papal Visit
grenades, as well as explosives-related material and 22 pounds of explosives.
after seizing a cache of arms believed destined for the outlawed Irish Republican
Army (IRA). The cache-contained in a false fuel tank of a tractor-trailer-
included 28 pistols and revolvers, 12,000 cartridges, 100 rifle magazines, two hand
In Lourdes, an anti-Church group calling itself "Stop the Priests" claimed
responsibility for an explosion that destroyed a statue behind the basilica where
Pope John Paul II was scheduled to make a pilgrimage 21-22 August. In a
telephone call to a French news agency, the group claimed the attack was
anticlerical, aimed at the "Vatican multinational" and threatened more attacks.
penetrations of weapons storage sites.
West Germany: Penetration of Conventional Weapons Storage Area
US Air Force sentries challenged three unidentified intruders at Morbach in
Rhineland-Palatinate. Guards fired a warning shot before the intruders fled. US
military officials have suggested that this was'a training exercise for future
14 August 1983 France: Arrests of Weapons Smugglers
In Paris, French police arrested three people-an Irishman and two Frenchmen-
25 Secret
GI TR 83-018
1 September 1983
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15 August 1983 France: Car Bomb Attack
In Paris, a car bomb killed the chauffeur of the South Yemen Ambassador to
France.
18 August 1983 US-Cuba: Delta Flight Hijacked
A Delta Airlines flight en route from Miami to Tampa with 80 persons aboard was
hijacked to Cuba by a man who sprayed a flammable liquid in the first-class
section of the plane and threatened to set the plane on fire. After the plane landed
in Havana the hijacker was taken into custody and the plane and passengers
continued on to Tampa. The incident was the 12th attempted and 10th successful
hijacking of an American carrier to Cuba since May.
25X1
19 August 1983 United Kingdom: London Letter Bomb
In London, the Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA) claimed responsibility
for a letter bomb sent to a coal mine official to protest the closing of a coal mine.
The device was intercepted and did not explode. The SNLA-a Scottish separatist
group-has sent letter bombs and firebombs to four government ministers in the
past year, although none has caused any serious injury.
at the post. We suspect the Military Wing of ETA was responsible for this
attack-the latest in its campaign against a special security plan for the Basque
20 August 1983 Spain: Bomb Attack Injures Five in Basque Country
In Laredo, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorists claimed responsibility
for two bombs that exploded. at a Civil Guard post. No warning call was given be-
fore the attack, which injured five people, including two daughters of a guardsman
country introduced by the Spanish Government-earlier this year.
United Kingdom: Bombing of US Firm
In London, the Angry Brigade-a British radical group of the 1970s-claimed
responsibility for a bomb attack on an office of American Express. A confessor let-
ter sent to Britain's national news agency claimed-but gave no explanation for-
the attack. The group had been inactive since the early 1970s until it claimed re-
sponsibility for an explosion at a prison officers' training college in late 1982.
South Africa: Explosion Outside Pretoria
The South African police claim that an electric pylon was exploded with plastique
by the African National Congress. The blast interrupted electricity to several
eastern Pretoria suburbs.
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21 August 1983 Philippines: Aquino's Assassination ,
Opposition leader Benigno Aquino was shot at Manila's airport as he returned
from three years of self-imposed. exile in the United. States. The unidentified
assassin was killed,by security police. Authorities are investigating.
22 August 1983
December, was meant to reaffirm the group's continued viability.
leftist terrorist organization. The Embassy believes the attack, the first since last
newspaper claimed credit for the attack in the name of the Cinchonero group, a
Pedro Sula causing minimal damage and no injuries. An anonymous call to a local
A bomb exploded in an empty building on the corner of the central square in San
Honduras: Bomb Explodes in San Pedro Sula
23 August 1983 Spain: Bank Bombing in Basque Country
In Orio, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty/Military Wing (ETA/M) is believed
responsible for an attack on a bank that refused to pay "revolutionary taxes." An
anonymous telephone call gave a 45-minute warning before the explosion.
There
25X1
25 August 1983 West Berlin: Bombing of French Consulate
25X1
rest of 51 Armenians following the 15 July bombing at Orly Airport.
blast, believed to be a retaliatory attack against the French Government for
the ar-
building holding the French Consulate. One man was killed and 23 injured
in the
(ASALA) has claimed responsibility for an explosion that nearly destroyed
a
In West Berlin, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
French interests.
can be confirmed Tehran has sunnorted groups in the past that have targe
ted
number of Lebanese prisoners in French prisons. Although no Iranian invol
vement
military and political support for Chad, Lebanon, and Iraq and the release
of a
Tehran. Tehran radio reported that the hijackers demanded a change in Fr
ance's
and Middle Eastern stops, the Arabic-speaking hijackers diverted the aircr
aft to
on board during a flight from Vienna to Paris. Following a number of Eur
opean
Four unidentified individuals hijacked an Air France 727 with several Am
ericans
Austria: Air France Hijacking
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28 August 1983 France: Bombings Protest French in Chad
Action Directe claimed responsibility for the explosion of two bombs outside the
Socialist Party's Headquarters and the Defense Ministry in Paris. Action Directe
wants France to withdraw its troops from Chad immediately. There were no
casualties.
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