MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PREEMPTION IN A MEETING ENGAGEMENT OF A TANK ARMY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP10-00105R000100860001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 16, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 9, 1974
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP10-00105R000100860001-1.pdf681.91 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100860001-1 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100860001-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100860001-1 Page 4 of 15 Pages 50X1-HUM Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Pree tive Strikes in a Meeting EnRagement 7-a Tank Army by Colonel N. Popov, Doctor of Military Sciences, Lecturer and Lieutenant Colonel V. Krysanov The article by Marshal of Armored Troops A. Babadzhanyan "A Meeting Engagement of a Tank Army in an Offensive Operation of a Front",* raises the very important question of preparing and conducting a mo ern meeting engagement with tank formations. This article closely examined and set forth the conditions under which a meeting engagement arises, the scope of such an engagement, and the methods of using nuclear weapons and other means of destruction. Particularly worthy of mention are the concepts regarding the determination of the stages of a meeting engagement and the organization and implementation of preemption of the enemy as the most important condition for the success of such an engagement. Considering the urgency of this problem, we would like to examine and develop certain concepts and, above all, express our views on the evaluation of the effectiveness of preemptive nuclear and fire strikes. Obtaining quantitative evaluations regarding preemption is extremely important for making well-grounded decisions, for using forces and means efficiently, and for choosing expedient methods to defeat the enemy with strikes by nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons, and by actions of tank groupings. The basic quantitative characteristics of preemptive strikes are the preemption time and the expected result of a nuclear (fire) strike; the effectiveness of the strike is indicated by the extent of damage inflicted on the enemy, and is dependent on the number of missiles expended (artillery ammunition and aircraft bombs). Indeed, it is one thing when the main mass of the means of destruction (for example, 70 to 80 percent) allotted for defeating the enemy is used in preemptive strikes, and quite another when only part of them (for example, 20 to 30 percent) are used. All of this determines the extent of the damage inflicted on the opposing enemy grouping and influences the choice of methods for routing the enemy in a meeting engagement and the use of tank large units. 50X1-HUM *Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought", 1968, No. 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100860001-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100860001-1 of 15 Pages On the one hand, a preemptive strike represents a unique race by two groupings advancing toward each other to deliver nuclear and fire strikes; on the other hand, a preemptive strike must be regarded not only as an event of short duration but also as a definite period whose duration will be deternnnedb th f y e time o preemption of the enemy in the delivery of strikes The first step in evaluating effectiveness is to d p g determine the pr eemption time when the troops have to deliver strikes against the enemy. , if a tank army is conducting a meeting engagement with an advancing Thus large enemy reserve grouping, the preemption time will be determined by the conditions under which this engagement arose, particularly by the distance between the two sides; by the tactical-technical characteristics and specifications o the rocket troops, artillery, and aviation; approaching by the range of launch (fire); by the rate at which the troops are other; by the degree of readiness; by the time needed to deploy the means of destruction from the march. These basic characteristics may be tied together b the following mathematical 1 y ma ematica re ationship: (1) to = D - d + tp where to = the time of preemption of the enemy in the delivery of strikes; I the range of launi. ch(f' ) f f destruction; re o our means o d the range of launch (fire) of enemy means; , vn = the speed of advance of our troops; vu = the speed of advance of enemy troops; 5 = the time of deployment of the enemy means of destruction. In this relationship we assume that we will preempt when t.. > 0 (the enemy will preempt when tu