MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME QUESTIONS IN THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE GROUND TROOPS, BY COLONEL-GENERAL OF THE TANK TROOPS P. POLUBOYAROV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400740001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Some Questions in the Further Development
and
Improvement of the Ground Troops
by
Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov
The rapid development of nuclear/missile weapons and
their broad introduction into the armed forces predetermin-
ed the necessity for a review of previously formed views
on the nature, methods, and forms of conducting modern
operations and on the role and significance in them of
various means of armed combat and also of views on the
means of further development of types of armed forces and
arms of troops. However, in this natural process sometimes,
under the guise of being something new, positions are
expressed which are poorly founded, or entirely unfounded
and already repudiated by reality itself.
Recently in our periodical press and in certain speeches,
.the opinion has been expressed concerning the advisability
of repudiating tank armies and the necessity for creating,
in place of tank and motorized rifle large units, unified
divisions capable of performing varied missions under the
complex conditions of a nuclear/missile war.
Taken by itself, this viewpoint is not new. It was
even put into practice in the structure of our ground troops
and the armies of a number of capitalist countries. Thus,
for example, in the French Army which, on the eve of the
invasion of German-Fascist troops into France had a
significant number of tanks, there was not a single tank
.division or tank corps. At the beginning of the war, there
were only two mechanized divisions in France and a third
was in the state of formation. A large portion of the
tanks of the French Army were dispersed by small subunits
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in infantry units and designated for joint. operations with
the infantry. This could not help but have--4n effect on
the combat effectiveness of the French Army';'and to a large
degree facilitated its rapid destruction by the German-
Fascist troops.
. In the structure of our ground troops prior to the
Second World War there was a similar repudiation of
major large units of armored troops. An attempt was made
to rectify this serious error but not in time, due to the
commencement of war with Fascist Germany. Until the end
of 1942 this error continued to have an effect on the
operations of our troops, even though we strove to equip
combined arms armies with as many tank regiments and
brigades as possible. But such an action did not produce
the needed effect, and during the course of the war we
were forced to create tank corps and tank armies which did
play an important role in the successful conduct of all the
successive operations of the Second World War.
After the war mechanized armies were created instead
of tank armies. Subsequently, it was necessary to abandon
these and once more return to tank armies.
Thus, as was proved by our experience and numerous
examples from the armies of other nations, measures for
the unification of tank and rifle (motorized rifle) large
units have thus far not justified themselves. Are there
sufficient bases to affirm that under the system which
has arisen, of arming ground troops, these measures will be
correct? In our opinion such bases do not yet exist.
It is well known that the decisive role in attaining
the aims of war and of individual operations, belongs to
nuclear/missile weapons. The efforts of ground troops are
directed toward the most complete and effective exploitation
of the results of the application of these weapons with the
aim of final defeat of basic enemy groupings and the
seizure of his vitally important centers and areas for
basing weapons of armed combat, primarily nuclear/missile
weapons. Ground troops complete the defeat of armed forces
on ground fronts, seize and hold enemy territory and the
most important installations.
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"One of the most basic missions of ground troops, one
of primary concern to the command and staffs", indicated
Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union-A. Ya.
Malinovskiy, "must be the skilful exploitation'df the
results of strikes by missile troops for the rapid advance
of armies and fronts".
On the basis of the nature of modern operations, it is
possible to say that in the composition of ground troops
the most important role will be played by that arm of
troops which by its combat characteristics is able,to the
maximum degree, to exploit the results of the effects of
nuclear weapons on the enemy, which loses its combat
effectiveness to the least extent from nuclear strikes by
the enemy, which can successfully conduct active, highly
mobile combat operations at high tempos, rapidly overcome
broad zones of radioactive contamination, and rout enemy
groupings in meeting engagements and battles precipitately.
At the present time such an arm of troops is the tank
troops. This is explained by the specific characteristics
and combat capabilities of tanks. Tanks are more stable
than other weapons under the effects of nuclear weapons
against them, possess powerful armament, high mobility, and
armor protection, and can operate immediately after nuclear
strikes; at the same time their crews are quite dependably
protected from the destructive factors of a nuclear burst.
The high combat qualities of tanks allow tank troops to
exploit effectively the results of nuclear strikes and
conduct highly mobile combat operations, to deliver, in
coordination with nuclear weapons and air drops, powerful
and deep strikes on the enemy during an offensive, and to
guarantee the activity and stability of troops in defense.
The high combat qualities of tank troops have pre-
determined the sharp proportional increase of them in the
composition of ground troops and the significant
equipping of combined arms large units and formations with
tanks. The organizational inclusion of tanks in the composition
of combined arms units, large units, and formations, as
well as their full motorization, have significantly raised
the maneuverability, striking force, stability of ground
troops during enemy nuclear strikes, and their ability to
conduct combat operations under conditions of the mass
utilization of nuclear weapons.
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The equipping of ground troops with nuclear/missile
weapons and the broad introduction of tanks and other.
armored equipment into their composition have had at
decisive influence on raising the combat capabilities of
combined arms large units and formations. A modern.
combined arms army is able not only to penetrate success-
fully the tactical defense of the enemy but also to direct
its efforts rapidly to an operational depth and develop
an offensive at high speeds.
Thus, the combat and maneuvering capabilities of
combined arms large.units and formations have increased
significantly. However, is it possible, on the basis of
this, to equate motorized rifle to tank divisions or
combined arms armies to tank armies, to assert that the
former can replace the latter, and on the basis of this
to conclude that tank armies are not needed? In our
opinion, this cannot be done because the large units and
formations named differ from one another not only in
quantity of tanks but also in basic combat characteristics
and operational-tactical capabilities.
The modern tank army is an entirely new operational
formation and by its combat qualities and capabilities is
significantly superior not only to the tank army of the
Second World War period but also to the postwar mechanized
.army. It also differs in many aspects from the modern
combined arms army. Having in its composition four
tank divisions, the tank army is a powerful striking and
highly maneuverable tank formation, capable of exploiting
the results of the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons in
the best manner. The organizational structure and combat
characteristics of tanks contain great capabilities for
delivering rapid and powerful tank strikes to a great
depth, for executing a rapid and broad maneuver on the
battlefield, for preserving a significant degree of
stability during enemy nuclear strikes and for surmounting
wide zones of radioactive contamination with high levels
of radiation. By its composition the tank army is homo-
geneous and much more mobile than the combined arms army.
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The combat capabilities of a tank army allow' it to
overcome the enemy defense after mass nuclear strikes more
quickly than a combined arms army, to reach an operational
expanse rapidly, and there to develop bold, decisive, and
highly mobile combat operations, directed in conjunction
with missile units, airborne landing forces, and aircraft
toward the destruction of the enemy's deep reserves and
the achievement of operational aims at the highest possible
speeds.
The high maneuverability of large units of a tank army,
their great antiatomic stability, and strike-penetration
force allow the army to conduct combat operations
successfully at a significant distance from the remaining
forces of the front and to perform in conjunction with .
other forces and means the most important missions in the
defeat of enemy troops. The role and significance of tank
armies in modern operations was defined very exactly by
the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, R.
Ya. Malinovskiy, who stated that tank armies were bundles
of arrows released from a tightly bound bow string for the
swift achievement of the final goals of an operation.
Certain comrades do not see the fundamental difference
between tank and combined arms armies and propose doing
away with tank armies. In our opinion, this proposal
stems from an incorrect understanding of the significance
of tank troops in general and tank armies specifically in
a nuclear/missile war and from an underestimation of their
combat capabilities.
Recognizing the important role of tank armies, we are
in no measure trying to belittle the significance and combat
capabilities of combined arms armies. Yielding to tank
armies in antiatomic stability, mobility, and ability to
conduct highly maneuverable combat operations, at the same
time combined arms armies possess a number of advantages
which allow them to perform many combat missions success-
fully. The same may be said of tank and motorized rifle
divisions.
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We consider that under modern conditions the necessity
for tank armies and tank divisions has in no way diminished
in comparison with the Second World War but, on the contrary,
it has increased. Speaking of the superfluousness of tank.
armies, some comrades refer to the complexity of committing
them to battle, and the difficulty of securing their flanks
and supplying them with various materiel. But these
deductions, in our opinion, are not sufficiently confirmed.
With the existence of massive,_multi-million man armies,
the huge spatial scope of a future war and the large variety
of missions which ground troops will perform, tank troops
and motorized infantry will, for the time being, remain
independent arms of troops, and the negation of one or the
other of them is premature. A repetition of mistakes
committed in the past may now lead to even worse results.
We hold the opinion that even with the presence among ground
troops of nuclear/missile weapons permitting the destruction
of enemy groupings of any composition, the necessity
continues to exist for a strike force, for tank troops and
their basic large units and formations which are tank
divisions and tank armies, and their long-range development
and improvement should be given due attention also in the
future.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the
presence of tank troops which are more advanced in technical
equipment, organizational structure, and methods of operations,
also, to a significant degree, in turn stimulates the
development of the infantry which must carry out highly
maneuverable combat operations in conjunction with tanks.
The attempt of certain comrades to reverse the direction
of this process is in obvious contradiction with the real
course of development of the means and methods of armed
conflict, as well as with the position that preferential
development must be given to the most modern arms of troops.
The currently accepted organizational structure of
large units and formations of ground troops basically
corresponds to the modern conditions of conducting combat
operations. However, the constant development of weapons
of armed combat and methods for their use governs the
necessity for its further improvement.
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The improvement of the organizational structure of
tank and motorized rifle large units must proceed, in our
opinion, along the line of an even greater decrease in
personnel, unprotected by armor, increase in antiatomic
stability and viability, strike-penetration force and
maneuverability of large units, and also an increase in
their ease of control and capability for conducting
independent combat operations to a great depth and at high
speeds.
In our opinion it is advisable to have tank divisions
and tank armies of the same composition. A tank army could
consist of 4 to 5 tank divisions, and a tank division of
4 tank regiments of medium tanks. In a tank army as well
as in tank divisions it is necessary to have organic
nuclear/missile weapons. Instead of a motorized rifle
regiment in a tank division it is advisable to have a
motorized rifle battalion in each of its tank regiments.
It is more advisable to have heavy tank regiments and
divisions under army or front subordination and to turn
them over in case of necessity to large units and formations
during the course of an operation.
Together with improving the organizational forms of
troops, great significance is acquired by the question of
the means of long-range development of tanks and other
armored equipment.
In the armament of our ground troops there are T-55
medium tanks and T-10M heavy tanks which more than other
combat vehicles guarantee protection of the crew from the
influence of the destructive factors of a nuclear burst
and are best suited for operations under conditions of the
mass utilization of nuclear weapons and by their basic
combat characteristics are significantly superior to foreign
tanks of corresponding types and years of manufacture. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to suppose that these tanks do
not need improvement. New conditions of conducting combat
operations make radical improvements in the combat qualities
of tanks essential and force the working out of new directions
in their development, because the possibilities of further
improvement of tanks by old methods are, in practice, almost
completely exhausted. In this connection, the question
arises as to along which directions our tank construction
must develop, and which types of tanks is it more advisable
to have in the armament of ground troops?
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In recent years the question of the future of tanks
has been broadly discussed in our military press, on
the pages of which are expressed the most varied proposals
and opinions, some of which even cast doubt generally on
the possibility of successful tank operations on the field
of combat with modern antitank weapons.
It is well known that the appearance of tanks brought
forth the need for weapons to combat them. Such a ,weapon
was first of all artillery: initially conventional, field;
later antitank, special. All subsequent development of
tanks was carried out in a competition between the
protective characteristics of their armor and the
destructive capabilities of armor-piercing shells. Toward
the end of the last war it had already become evident
that the superiority in this competition was with shells.
By this time, capabilities for increasing the thickness
of tank armor and its antishell stability had approached
their limits, but the destructive capabilities of shells
radically increased in connection with the use of high-
explosive charges.
The increase in the proportion of tank troops and their
role in performing combat missions under conditions of the
utilization of nuclear weapons has given new impetus to
searches for more effective antitank weapons. In recent
years for arming the armies of NATO countries recoilless
weapons and antitank guided missiles have been adopted,
the destructive capabilities of which almost doubly
exceed the protective characteristics of tank armor.
Work to improve these weapons continues. At the same time
attempts to create a qualitatively new armor have not as
yet reached any appreciable results in practice.
Thus, at the present time, as in the period of the
Second World War, a significant gap exists between the
protective capabilities of tank armor and the destructive
capabilities of antitank weapons. Basing their reasoning
on this fact, a number of foreign authors arrive at the
conclusion that tanks are weapons of the past and not of
a modern war, and they propose doing away with the heavy
armor of tanks because the armor is pierced by antitank
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weapons anyway , and changing to lightly armored i but
more mobile and maneuverable, vehicles. This viewpoint
finds support among a certain segment of our generals and
officers, who propose the creation of a light tank and
having it in the armament of ground tropswashthe thisbasic
and only combat vehicle. We cannot agree a number of reasons.
In the first place, a ofatheirodetanks with struction nothonlymby
increases the possibility
other weapons.
antitank but also by
Secondly, the chief weapon of destruction under
modern conditions is not antitank, but nuclear weapons,
and for this reason it is first ofltheclatter.toDuringed
from a consideration of
the conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations most
conditions of the broad use of nuclear weapons, them ond
the
effective means, capable of protecting a person
effects of the destrue factors
still the armor of tanks.
one of their most important qualities.
Thirdly, with a change to light, thinly armored
vehicles, the qualitative superiority in tanks will
immediately shift to the side of our probable enemies,
in whose armies medium tanks continue to be basic.
Fourthly, data concerning the destructive capabilities
of modern antitank weapons reflect
that present e absence ofltheheffects
results of firing range trials without
of firing against these weapons, and consequently, ditions.on considering adand rence between
combat. Underlequalnconditions of
the range
the effects ts of nuclear weapons andother means
beoindasmoretlon
on tanks and on antitank weapons, tanks will out
combat
favorable situation and will carry of effective
operations successfully, even
antitank weapons.
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Based on the nature of modernn operatiunsrandrith in the
conditions of tank constructwenconsider that unties=new
major capitalist countries, E-tew
models are developed for the armament of ourandarmyp,,S 77thr
types of tanks must remain: heavy, medium,
thathigher
amphibious. When tanks with
we willodo awaycwithria
are created, it is possible
heavy tanks and have in our armament, in addition to light
tanks, one basic type of tank.''., but with various armament
doesreconnaissancemake sense
systems. It seems to us
light tanks for airborne and subunits.
In our opinion, tanks of the future must, as in the
high mobility,
past, combine in themselves firepower,
and armor protection and
thetdeguarantee structivemfactorspofsable
protection to crews from
nuclear burst. atethepreferential
ofdotherpcharacteristics
another quality
of tanks might lead to the drastic decrease of their
.overall combat effectiveness. In connection with thist be:
the basic guides in the work of building new tanks of th -a further significant litreoferif ledeandrsmoothbore
tanks by improving the quay
guns, and subsequently by installation in tanks of more
modern guided missile armament, providing the capability
to destroy enemy tanks with certainty at such ranges and
with such accuracy as to exceed the capabilities of enemy
tanks;
-a sharp improvement in the protection of crews from
penetrating rada~sofrom high-explosive
tanks
protection of
-a further decrease in the weight of tanks by new
arrangements of P
and other new materials;
-an increase in the maneuverability of tanks and
raising their maximum speeds to 60 to 70 km per hour
and average speeds to 40 to 45 km per hour;
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weapons.
-a significant increase in the cruising range
of tanks, an increase in the depenamount of dability sew :icing
operation, and a decrease in the
:during the course of combat operations;
-a decrease in tank crews to 2 or 3 persons as a
result of complete automation of the combat operations
and servicing of tan ;
a usinstruments
-the equipping of tanks with more modern
ee-
for firing, sighting and navigational app
ing the conduct'of combat operations at night as well as
during the day;
-the maximum standardization of units and assemblies
for tanks;
-the creation of an improved system of driving tanks
under water;
-the creation of conditions for transport of tanks
by air.
All these measures must guarantee in the future the
superiority of our tanks over tanks of the armies of ith new capitalist countries. equtoicarrypped
combatnks
will be able even more
operations under conditions of the mass use of nuclear
in
o
g
f
l
the
g
The interests of increas
increas-
r
f
means
seek
troops also govern the necessity
ing the combat and maneuvering capabilities of infantry.
Our infantry in actuality is not only unprotected
rsts but also
from the destructivetactlts nuclear
from modern small arms. in comparison with
on the field of combat is also very
tanks. Tank units and subuits are of attacking the
enemy at combat speeds equal
of developing an offensive at a speede of 220 edtof25 kmmper mov
hour and more. On the other hand,
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50X1-HUM
of dismounted infantry thethe field of comb~ ani.'I oes~noted organism by the capabilities of
exceed 3 to 4 km per hour. The armored carriersarantting
in the armament of ground troops do not fully uatability
protection of the infantry and its necessary ragar
on the field of combat.
Thus, the infantry at present is the most vulnerable
of the
and least mobile eoef raeround the
attacking echelon 6 hampers
in the combat capabilities of tanks and infantry
the effective exploitation of the results of using nuclear
weapons and conducting offensives at high speeds.
With the aim of raising the is advisable,
capabilities of the infantry
opinion, to create as inexpensively. as-possible ach would
special mass combat vehicle for the infantry, whi to ould
permit it to follow the tanks without lagging
combat jointly with them from mithese vehicles, dismounting
only in the most exceptional We cannot agree with the raising the combat capabilities
who propose, with the aim of increasing the number of
of the motorized rifle division,
tanks in its composiidivisionOwilltnot compalmotoretely
that in this case the
rifle but a tank hdivision.
ncrease inrtheopinion,
numbertofrtanksnin
necessity for suc
a motorized sie oof raising important
the e moment nt is the matter
of the infantry. One of the possible ways of solving this
problem is the creation of an infantry combat vehicle.
An infantry combat vehicle must be, in our opinion,
fully armored, tracked or half-tracked, capable of over-
coming obstructions on the field of combat and difficult
ious,
sectors of terrain wa ithrhighhvitanks, abilitymandbantiatomic
transportable by
protection for the crew and troops traannspotedesant).
The maximum speed of the vehicle may be 4on twdee50 s per
70 to 80 km per hour, on tracks - up to km
hour.
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50X1-HUM
but compact::afld light
The vehicle must have powerful,
weight missile weapons, permitting the conduct ,of=-effective
combat not only against personnel and various f'4 e. weapons
but also against armored enemy targets.
The crew of the vehicle may consist of two persons.
The construction
The passenger complement is a rifle squad.
provide o troops to, conduct
of the vehicle must permit the transported
combat without dismounting, as dvdforor the the
convenient accommodation, boarding, and
transported troops under various
vehicleimustsbef ashlittleat
situation. The weight of
.as possible.
With the adoption of such a combat vehicle, the
necessity might arise for certain changes in-the rganization-
al TO&E structure of tank and motorizedtinfantryel in this
units and units. We tare hat not
can be decided only after the
article, considering like to
vehicle is created. At esuch shouldvehiconlyle might
indicate very briefly what
do for g'ound troops.
An infantry combat vehicle will provide first of all
the. for significantly increasing the mobility
and ma man eeuuberveraabbyility of motorized rifle units and subunits,
and n
which will er theamost complexsconditionsaoflcombat
behind tanks s under
situations and terrain. Operating from these vehicles,
the infantry will not lag behind tanks togetheriwith
be able to perform various
them.
The high cross-country ability and complete armoury
o
of the combat of infantry
and conduct
out broad maneuver changing
combat opera
ions nditionsrbothptogetherrwith rapidly tanks and
co
l
situational itu
independently.
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In equipping the infantry with the new combat vehicle,
the viability and stability of motorized rifle un.and
subunits during enemy nuclear attacks and their caj .bility
to exploit the results of our nuclear stbikesiand,dross
zones of radioactive contamination
The presence on the combat vehicle of cewguns
i
in combat mihahply
and missile mounts capable of engaging
armored and openly positioned enemy targets
combat
raise the firepower of the infantry. ronducwttinilg be able
operations on these vehicles,
the infantry and to combat successfully heffective supportatontanks on
personnel and offer more
the field of combat.
All the 'properties which the infantry will acquire
with the adoption of the combat
of motorizedarif le only
bilities vehicle
to raising the combat caps the dobilley
units and subunits but also to increasing
of tank and motorized largofetankunitsandasmotora rifleks
to this, the combat qualit
divisions will correspond more closely to the requirements
of a nuclear/missile war.
The high mobility, great strike force, and armor
protection of all personnel of comoatmoubunitsctfvtank
and motorized rifle divisions
results of
moref rapidestrikesons
exploitation of the
and the delivery of
against the enemy. The capabilities of troops for carrying from the
as
zone
of int out broad and rapid tgeeimmediate field of combat will
well as directly on
increase significantly.
The presence in the composition of anknand motorized
d
rifle divisions of easily controlled tank will
rifle units with equal mobility and maneuverability
for rapidly creating such combat
provide the capability
formations for combat as .to satisfy-the siivarious conditions
and requirements,-.of a sharply changing
qualities of tank and motorized rifle units will permit,
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in addition, the avoidance of a prior dangerous concentra-
tion of considerable forces and and weapons d area
on the axis of a major strik
iple of
into the practice of combat
to the nature of modern
dispersal of troops and axes. This principle corresponds
degree.
operations to the greatest The advance of large units and units in dispersed
formations on a broad front
frand along axes om enemy nucleardstrikesy
will decrease troop losses lize will make it more difficult
at the to permitsour
of mass destruction, and
troops to carry out a broader and more flexible maneuver
of forces and weapons the
deep rear area and destroying his
periods of time.
In conducting combat operations in dispersed formations
and along separate axes, tank and motorized rifle large the units will accomplish the ansconjunction withemissnemy
in mobile forms of comb for a
airborne forces, and aviation. The necessity
after defenses
kes
methodical breakthrough
be the
overcome enemy's
nuclear strikes
arises. The latter
along axes, providing rapid penetration to an operational
depth and development of an offensive at maximum possible
speed. At the same time, the advance of infantry
hia sregular
dikes also must Only become
vehicles following nuclear st
occurrence in ,overcoming the icreased ply and teon can speed of an
strikes against therenemy be
and the results
exploited to the maximum.
In overcoming the defense~o the
attack motorized
units and units will be able
march, not dismounting at a line of deployment as has been
done up to now. Moving out from the zone of interior after
tank subunits, as they approach the main line of resistance,
they will carry out necessary reformations while on the
march and in conjunctionttl
enemy's approach march
edefense on vehicles in combat or
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formations. Operating on combat vehicles, motorized rifle
units and subunits will be able to meuverrmore ureondf the
field of combat, more quickly change-the combat formations.and rchange
or from
march formations necessary
f the reverse.
formations ons to to approach
Of course, under varied situational conditions the
possibility of the infantry operating in dismounted
combat formations ss a~asinfantryexcluded
combatnvehiclesnare
operations of tank
e sma reason will However, in these
the infantry oil the combat
now. After the infantry has dismounted,
vehicles will not be removed torover, combat
done witinfantry
armored carriers, but will suppo
with their fire, advanci~hisftthetcombatbvehiclestwill be
their subunits. During this,
kept in constant readiness to afternthettanksa provide
it with a rapid means
The fullest high maneuvering capabilities of tanks
and motorized rifle large units will come about after
overcoming the enemy's defenses. Tank units ande
units, in reaching an operational expanse, will l break of the
through more boldly and deeply into combat
enemy's defenses, knowing; that the infantry on
coordinated andunite
vehicles will not lag befo~ddethem and liveringwhen
their efforts with them All this will increase
sudden strikes against the enemy.
even more the capabilities of atnspeedsg
combat
independent highly maneuverable
of 100 or more kilometers in a 24-hour period.
Equipping the infantry with the combat vehicle creates
new conditions, differing in principle from the past, for
troop forcing of water barriers.
First of all, after the infantry combat vehicle has
troops
become part of our armament, the requirements of
decreased
for various landing and ferrying
considerably and the in th havingg
of water barriers will
these means.
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Motorized rifle units and subunits, operating on
combat vehicles, will be bliteralosenseaofrterwords
while on the march, in the
Possessing high cross-country and amphibious qualities,
the combat ensure ensureatheir
water barrier rapidly on a of the barrier in
rapid deployment and quick forcing in the majority
combat or approach march formations. Thus,
of cases, motorized rifle subunits and units will be able
to surmount water barriers from
the entirerforcinglsectorswith-
out with amphibious gooouttpreparatory engineering work for preparing
ou
crossings (except for mine clearing).
Having infantry combat vehicles will increase the
possibilities for carrying out maneuver with forces and
weapons while forcing water barriers and for transferring
the efforts of advancing troops one direction
an of water
another. The execution of a subsequent forcing
iseing made significantly
barriers from the march will likewise
easier. Not being tied down by
movementwundermwaterous
motorized rifle units aequipped dlfortogether
tanks as well as tanks
after forcing one waterbit from the arrier will race toward the next
water barrier and force The equipping of motorized rifle units and subunits
condgtionsloluence
with an infantry combat vehicle
underhave
ratio swill
on the nature of trop op
strong radioactive contamination onscombatg
high mobility, motorized bypass- zones of
vehicles will be able not only to rapidly
contamination, but also to cross them successfully in
hislevel
directions with the lowest
higherddegree.ofTprotection
vehicles will provide
for personnel from penetrating radiation
dust than armored carriers, much ic.
Under modern condntdionTea~?significancetis maneuvering
of troops on the ground, great
by troop maneuver in the air. On the basis of this,
troops,together with their weapons andycoibat equipment,
must be capable of being transported
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50X1-HUM
air, asp _-is well known,
The mass movement of troops by
is impeded because of the absence
largerhloadacapacityle
a
combat equipment and means
for transporting airborne forces. Withvtheclreationmof aant
relatively lightweight infantry
step toward solving this mptthe wcombatill
made. The transportability of air of motorized rifle
by air will permit the transfer by
units and large units in future operations
pei mass formation
over considerable distances and of .
Naturally, in the future the question will arise of
whether all motorized rifle units of tank and motorized at
rifle divisions should be equipped with the infantry edmbdependent
vehicle. The solutierationalsmissionsnofstherlarge units
on the designated op to
and the economic capabilities of the country. It seems sh
us that first of all it would mbe whichumake up
these vehicles those
the complement of tank aimiesand tank dunitsolocated combined
arms armies. Subsequently, other large o tatlo a eduin be
the most important theaters of military p
so equipped.
It should be noted that in equipping the infantry
with the combat vehicle, the question of raising the mobility
hesrstill omposnoittion ppletely
of tank and motorized rifle divisions
solved because there will remain of ot relatively large numnot of havehlessrms
of troops which are p
maneuverability.
Under modern conditions, in the composition of all tank
divisions including those in tank armies, it would be
_
advisable to have nottrailer
whbut ich are capableeofmmores,
mainly with atomic armament,
effectively executing various fire missions duriastng the
conduct by tank troops of highly f
combat operations.
of l tank arms of tros which
Subunits and units of special
motorized rifleare
included in the composi edhron must
large units and conduct combat as an attacking
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50X1-HUM
brings
tion also possess increased lof nuclear weapons.
from the destructive factors means of
out the necessity of also developing appropriate armament and movement for them.
In the near future, apparently, vehicles can be created
for ground troops utilizing for movement the so-called
principle of the "air cushion". The adoption of such
vehicles will permit a sharper increase invthecmobility of
infantry and their maneuverability to a
to modern requirements. The hs withstheucapabilitytto of such
vehicles will provide trp
execute rapid maneuver, expanses ,including
significant zones of radioactive contamination and wide
water barriers in short periods ofrtime, and to daliverar.
sudden strikes against the enemy
Units and subunits equipped with these vehicles will
find the most widespread use as reconnaissance units iand
forward detachments of attacking troops. By exploit
breaks and unoccupied sectors in the enemy's defense, very
onlyhmissionseassignedetonforward
quickly will be able onotreach
dettaaclychmenntts and execute
also a portion of the missions which are
de
carried out by tactical airborne landing forces.
For ground troops it is advisable, in our opinion, to
build vehicles which have speed00f k100wioh
120 km per hour and a cr sg ranga
not less than 30 to 40 per cent of this by air. not the i The question arises as to whetaen~r rwill reachntheapoint
the combat capabilities of the inf Y comb where it will be capably tanksrfoltlseemslto usathatsthis~
with the same success a ood the
will not occur for this reason. No matter how g
be, on the basis of its
chrac cs vehles
comparable to our basic
chaaracte teriststicics it it tank large. units and units
tank. And because this is so,
potentialmotorly have le
under other equal conditions will
combat capabilities a
large units and units on these vehicles.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246A029400740001-4
theother
The basic advantages oftanks ofover
crew fromanuclearles
will remain: the best protection
destruction, more powerful armament, and greater penetrating
strike force. The influence f efthe fects by anytof thelenemy's
that under conditions of equal
weapons of destruction losses in tanks will berless whin
losses in other combat vehic orsexecuting combat missions.
better retain a capability
During operations along separate axes or isolated from the
main forces, this will have a decisive significance.
More powerful armament will permit the inslibtiotyofogreat
losses on the enemy and facilitate the p
completing his destruction by a powerful strike by the tanks l themselves. All these advantageakntogether willt a
provide tank troops with the opportunity advance
higher speed and to a great depth. It shonldhalso be kept
in mind that the development
proceeds relatively
encounters certain difficulties, yhetime the infantry receives
rapidly in our country.
the combat vehicle in itsarmament, tank can receive
and
a new and even more improved
It should be noted that the development of thince
in the postwar period proceeded along n?' properties more
its strike force and maneuverability, l?
characteristic of tank troops. c Our present rifheselcharactere (wombined ithout arms
armies, on the basis approach
taking nuclear/missile unitsnandnformationsrofiarmoi^ed and
the level of the large
mechanized troops the edeal during this periodrinps
also have advanced a great
technical equipment and organizational forms andnhave become
different. They are constantly
of combat equipment and armament, have a more improved
organization, and are capable of carrying
period eat of toi100
maneuverable combat opr241hour at
and more kilometers per antver,
of tank (army
thesence from the basic forces
have) not yet been
these high h combat qualities
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400740001-4
fully realized during several training exercises, sometimes
efforts are in evidence to
armies on a par with motorized
arms armies, and often they are drawn into long and fruit-
less combat instead of being utilized for carrying out
active and rapid offensive operations to a great depth.
For this reason, together with the further improvement of
combat equipment, armament, and the organizational structure
of troops, it is essential to search for and master in,
practice such methods of their use as to fully correspond
to the changing conditions of conducting combat operations
heexploitation of the results of
and to permit the maximum
nuclear strikes against
I50X1-HUM
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