MILITARY THOUGHT: PERFECTING THE METHODS OF OPERATIONAL TRAINING OF GENERALS, SENIOR OFFICERS, AND STAFFS, BY MAJOR-GENERAL M. IVANOV AND LT.-GEN. P. CHIRKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400500001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 20, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior
Officers and Staffs
With the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, especially
nuclear/missile weapons, in the technical equipment of modern
armies, vast changes have taken place which have, of course, intro-
duced much that is new into the methods of conduct of operations
and of warfare as a whole. In searching for the new in military
affairs, numerous comrades have recently expressed in publica-
tions a number of valuable theses directed toward more rapid
exposition of the basic changes that are taking place and the theo-
retical interpretation and substantiation of the probable nature of
armed conflict. The statements by authors of articles in the first
issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal"Military
Thought" and certain other articles are of considerable interest in
this regard.
We fully share the opinions of those comrades who speak out
for a fundamental review of the existing basic tenets of the theory
of military art, and we think that one of the most important factors
assuring successful resolution of this complicated problem is the
further improvement of the methods of operational training of
generals, senior officers, and staffs. This question acquires
special acuity in connection with the numerical reduction of the armed
forces and the increase in demands on the officer corps to master the
practical skills in troop command. In his address at the All Army
Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations in May
1960, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya.
Malinovskiy, among other tasks of increasing the combat readiness
of the armed forces, pointed out the necessity, "'... to continue to
improve the organization and the methods of operational, combat,
and political training and to carry out, in a positive fashion, the strug-
gle against the phenomena of oversimplification and weakness in troop
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It is greatly regretted that not enough attention is devoted in practice
to the problems of the methods of training troops and command cadres.
There is evidence of .this in the fact that the forms and methods of opera-
tional training during the postwar period have, in essence, undergone
no serious changes. The presently existing methods of operational
training of commanders and staffs consist mainly of carrying out command-
staff and refresh training. courses and group exercises with the com-
-rrfanT complement of district and army troops.
All of these methods of operational training, proven in the past,
cannot, in present conditions and in full measure guarantee the
qualitative training of command cadres since they are far from com-
prehensive and perfect. Among the deficiencies we include the following.
In the general system of operational training, the mastery by
generals and senior officers of new combat equipment, and particularly
of missiles of various designations, has been weak to date. Formally
acknowledging the decisive role of nuclear weapons in the destruction
of the enemy, and realizing that modern war will be waged with powerful
long-range means of combat which in no way compare with the weapons
of past wars, generals and senior officers are actually planning and
organizing operations as of old, principally on the basis of World War II
experience. It is a revelation to no one that methods for reaching
decisions, all plans for operations, and other documents that are
developed in staffs in the operational training system, differ very little
in form and content from what existed during the period of World War II.
The methods of training and execution of operations as they are stated
in the articles of Comrades Gastilovich and Baskakov, have basically
remained as before, 1
We ask why it is that we conduct the training of troops and com-
mand cadres without regard to the basic changes which have occurred in
armaments due to nuclear/missile weapons?
1 Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 1960,
First Issue.
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In our opinion, this occurs because the military-technical training
of generals and senior officers is still inferior. It is precisely be-
cause of..ignorance of the technical characteristics of nuclear/missile
weapons and . the ,means of their delivery to a target that many comrades
are unable to evaluate properly the role of these weapons in modern
warfare, to utilize them in a battle and operation in a qualified manner,
and to assign tasks wisely to the troops utilizing these weapons. By
the apt statement of Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy,
not all of us clearly realize what changes have been wrought in
military affairs by the adoption of new means of combat and particularly
of nuclear and missile weapons. One of the vital deficiencies, as is
pointed out by the Minister of Defense, is the inadequate knowledge of
the combat potentialities of nuclear weapons and missiles, on the part
of generals and officers.
Inferior military-technical training of command cadres is explained
by a number of circumstances.
Firstly, within the system of operational training to the present
time, the practical study of weapons of mass destruction, and es-
pecially of the means of delivery of nuclear warheads to a target, is
not being planned for or carried out. Military-technical information
on these weapons has been gleaned by generals and officers from
various manuals, textbooks, military journals, etc. It is quite
understandable that this information has been superficial and contra-
dictory. The first four-day refresher training course, for the study
of weapons of mass destruction, and principally of missiles of various
designations, was held in 1960 in the Baltic Military District on its
own initiative. Almost 150 generals and senior officers of the district
troops participated in this refresher course. Many of them saw there
for the first time those weapons which they "ably utilized" earlier. in
a battle and an operation.
Secondly, even today there are no textbooks on missile weapons
in the military districts. The so-called handbook materials on the
organization and tactical-technical data of missile troops that were
distributed to military units at various times are very confusing,
contradictory, incomplete, and can in no way serve as training aids
in the military-technical training of generals and senior officers con-
cerned with the planning for and the use of these weapons. 50X1-HUM
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Thirdly, inadequate reflection on the limitations in the study of even
the training data on missile weapons also affects the training of generals
and officers adversely. At the present time missile weapons are avail-
able to only a few. The majority of comrades who are directly con-
nected with the planning and utilization of these weapons are familiar
with these weapons only from the periodical press. It is apparent that
in order to have our command cadres really master the art of conducting
modern operations, it is necessary to review and broaden the limits of
study of missile weapons.
All of these circumstances have undoubtedly played a negative role
in the military-technical training of generals and senior officers which
cannot but reflect upon their practical activities.
The second defioey existing in the mks of operational train-
ing during refresher training courses and commanders exercises with---
the-com-mand-c.omple-ment o the district (army), is the tendency to study
the training problems and the conduct of operations by the methods of
group exercises.
In our opinion, the method of group exercises for studying the problems
of operational art in the system of commanders' training of the command
echelon of a district (army) is unacceptable because it does not conform
to the categories of the persons studying and it does not assure incul-
cation of the qualities necessary for battle, such as rapid formulation
of decisions, boldness, and resoluteness in operations.
On the basis of many years of experience, it is known that training
of command echelons of districts and armies is usually carried out in
two study groups (the commander and the chief of staff) in which all
commanders of arms of troops, chiefs of directorates, and departments
are included. And within these groups, numbering 20 to 25 persons,
consisting mainly of general and officer-specialists (artillerymen,
engineers, chemical specialists, rear services troops)and one or
two generals (officers) of combined-arms speciality, the training problems
of the operation are worked out (determination of the task, evaluation of
the circumstances, working out of the decision), which are chiefly the
concern of the command echelon. During the exercises, only the
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combined-arms generals and officers are fully and beneficially occupied.
As concerns the specialists, they participate only briefly within the
framework of their specialities, and for the remainder of the time
they are obliged. to be .inactive. ..In turn, the generals (officers) of
combined-arms speciality also gain very.little benefit from these
exercises, since. the command -complement of directorates of the
district and armies has sufficient experience for the resolution of such
problems as clarification of the task, evaluation of the circumstances,
and making the decisions.
. As a consequence, the method of group exercises so necessary
for a number of reasons in higher educational institutions is not
warranted in the training of staffs. Instead of training the command
complement of a district (army) in their functional responsibilities
and specialities and their skill in the organization of a battle and an
operation, because of the existing method of operational training, we
unwittingly expend valuable time in the resolution of secondary
problems and engender in the subsequent practical activity of generals
and senior officers unnecessary verbosity, an inclination toward all
sorts of meetings and to hear all types of information and reports.
Proceeding from these considerations, we believe that the method
of group exercises utilized in the system of command exercises of the.,,,
command echelon of the district and army ought to be eliminated and
Depending
ffiep.
replaced by the method o military-command map ga
upon the composition of the military districts and armies and the
established training goals, the military-command map games can be
single-or two-stage, one- or two-sided. These games, especially
the two-stage and two-sided, permit the whole command complement
of a district and army to realize conditions more nearly approximate
to the combat situation in comparison with group exercises and to
load all participants to the maximum with creative activity and to
elaborate more fully the training problems and the conduct of the
operations.
In 1959 the headquarters of the Baltic Military District carried out
a two-stage, two-sided military-command game to which were invited
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the command complement of the.... directorates of the. district, of the com-
bined-arms and air ar.mies_of. the army corps, of large units of PVO of
the Country, the fleet operational. group and also certain chiefs of mili-
tary departments of civilian higher educational institutions and retired
generals. During the game the commanders of armies (corps), arms of
troops, and chiefs of directorates acted as the appropriate commanders
and chiefs in the composition of a front according to Soviet Army organi-
zation, and their deputies - as the corresponding commanders and chiefs
within the composition of a group of "Western" armies. The remaining
participants in the game performed the duties which coincided with their
own responsibilities and specialties. In order to preclude contact be-
tween the two sides and to create the most favorable conditions for the
game, the sides were located separately--in the district headquarters
building and in the officers club. In content and method of execution,
the game received the approval of the participants. For some reason,
however, they were not used in subsequent military-command games of
staffs of districts and armies.
operational training which are carried out in accordance with the plan of
the Center. For example, not one operational exercise was carried out
by the headquarters of the Baltic Military District during the past six
A third and no less serious deficiency in the method of opera-
tional training of the command echelon is, in our view, the fact that
staffs of districts participate too infrequently in the arrangements for
years. The district troop commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of
the' operations directorate have not participated in the activities of opera-
tional training on a strategic scale for many years now, if we exclude
their participation as umpires in the exercises of the Southern Group of
Forces.
Such a situation cannot be called normal. The headquarters of
districts must themselves participate in the role of trainees periodically
and prepare themselves as troop control organs under the immediate di-
rection of the Center. This will permit a significant increase in the ef-
fectiveness of the work of staffs, the study of new developments in
military affairs, the adoption of experience in the organization of large
exercises, and the observation of one's own errors and deficiencies
which go unnoticed under normal conditions. 50X1-HUM
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. We.realize_that,the._measures carried out by the Center in operational
training with the districts. involve. definite.material expenditures. However,
it is possible to find methods which would not require large monetary
expenditures.
It is also necessary to find methods for improving the special train-
ing of army commanders, chiefs of staffs, chiefs of operations director-
ates (deparments), i. e., those commander-comrades who have direct
responsibility for operational and special training of large numbers of
generals and senior officers. While the chiefs of arms of troops and
services (artillery, PVO, etc. ). ; have increased their knowledge to some
degree at special refresher courses during the past years, the above-
mentioned category of persons have, for incomprehensible reasons, re-
mained out of the field of vision for many years. Do not commanders
and chiefs of staffs have need to study the missile weapons and the
resultant revolutionary changes they have wrought in the operational art?
Absolutely, And, it seems to us, they also need special refresher courses
for the study of the latest equipment and the urgent problems in the field
of strategy, operational art, and tactics.
Noting the deficiencies in the existing methods of operational train-
ing, we propose a change in the system of conducting the training of.
generals, senior officers, and staffs since it is obviously antiquated.
Our proposals for improving the methods of operational training consist
of the following:
For practical study of nuclear weapons and methods of their delivery
to a target, military-technical refresher courses for the district command
complement, including commanding officers of large units, should be held
at the beginning of the training year. During these refresher training
courses, lasting 4 to 5 days, there should be study of the new equipment
received by the district troops, and chiefly of missiles of various designa-
tions. The refresher training courses should conclude with formulation of
operational-tactical leaflets on problems of the use of this equipment in a
battle and an operation.
Upon completion of the military-technical refresher training courses,
and within the time limit fixed by the operational training plan, a two-
stage military-command map game should be conducted with the partici-
pation of the command complement of the district, of the armies an 50X1-HUM
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large units subordinate to the district, and also of the command comple-
ment of the other types of armed forces and military-educational insti-
tutions that are located in the district territory, and with the generals of
the reserve.
As far as possible, military-command games should be two-sided.
In this case, one of the sides (main command echelon) must operate in ac-
cordance with the organization and tactics of the Soviet Army, the opposing
side--in accordance with enemy organization and tactics. This will per-
mit a study iri depth of the troop organization and :the methods for con-
ducting operations of our probable enemies and, by comparative analysis,
the detection of the strong and weak points of both sides.
It is expedient for both sides in war games to be located in different
places (buildings) in order that participants do not have the opportunity
for personal contact and so that each side carries out its internal control
by technical communications means with observance of all rules of crypto-
graphic security (skrytoye upravleniye voiskami-SUV).
The decisions of each side will be presented to the director of the
games according to an established schedule and, in keeping with these de-
cisions, combat operations will be developed and new situations will be
introduced in accordance with the operational schedule.
methodically, without sharp changes in the situation. The staffs being edu-
cated usually create easy conditions for themselves: the initial situation
is presented beforehand at their points of permanent assignment, the de-
made. on the basis of the initial situation are put into practice with- I
cisions
out substantive changes during the entire course of the exercise; changes
of location of control points do not take place, the entire activity of the
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In their content, the operational command-staff exercises presently
being conducted do not satisfy the requirements for the conduct of modern
operations. The majority of these exercises are being conducted too
In addition to these undertakings, a district and its armies should
conduct one operation command-staff exercise of 6 to 7 days on the spot
with the participation of the staffs of combined-arms large units and the
staffs of missile units (large units).
The duration of military-command games of a district is 4 to 5 days.
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staffs amounts basically to the collection of data on the situation and the
development of various types of combat documents. Naturally, such
exercises are not beneficial to the command complement and they only
create incorrect impressions for generals and officers a bout the nature
of modern warfare.
In our practical activities we proceed from the guiding postulate
that war can start suddenly. The so-called threatening period will a-
mount to several hours or will be entirely absent. Consequently, the
system of staff training must proceed from a more complicated situa-
tion in which staffs will be brought to readiness in a limited time and
will be dispatched to the reserve command post from which they will
assume troop control. Therefore, such undertakings as operational
command-staff and staff exercises should begin. with calling the staff
trainees to alert and imparting tot hem the initial situation when they
arrive at the designated areas from their points of permanent assign-
ment. Prior to the sounding of the alert, it is necessary to take all
measures to achieve its surprise effect. Then we will have the oppor-
tunity to reveal, although not completely, az accurate picture of the
readiness of the staffs for troop control in a complicated situation, and
the exercises themselves will approximate combat conditions.
Guided by these considerations, in May 1960, the command com-
plement of the Baltic Military District arrived at the 11th Guards Army
without warning and issued a directive to the commander which required
the army troops to go on COMM alert, to be brought up to combat readi-
ness, and to be regrouped by the combined method on another axis within
a limited time for fulfillment of the combat task. All of these measures
were to be carried out under the conditions of combat operations that
had already been initiated, by the enemy. Simultaneously, groups of of-
ficers were dispatched to the large units of the army with authority to
control the conditions of the bringing to alert of each large unit. During
this particular exercise, in addition to the directorates of the army, one
division at full complement and only the staffs of divisions and one mo-
torized (tank) regiment each in the remaining large units were alerted.
The commander and the staff of the army had to notify the sub-
ordinate troops to bring them to the areas of concentration, plan the
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regrouping over a large. distance, brief the troops on the task, and
prepare them for march a few hours after the alert was sounded.
These requirements were also ,laid on the troop staffs. Due to the
surprise alert,.. the command complement of the army and the unit
staffs were placed in a.complex situation and they gained practical
work ,experience in the control of troops under such conditions. Both
the directors of the exercise and the participants had the opportunity
to observe. their own weak spots and gaps in training in general, and
in combat readiness in particular. ._
In our view, operational command-staff exercises to improve the
staffs as organs of control should be conducted in complex and sharply
changing situations at the front and in the rear, demanding of partici-
pants the adoption of new decisions in short periods of time. In the
background of this situation, there should be practice in shifting
control points by air transport, and also in effecting continuity in
troop control among the various command echelons. With these aims,
it is obviously advisable to reduce to a minimum the dependence upon
the rear services units and establishments which are included in the
command-staff exercises so that control points will be highly mobile
and efficient.
As an example of how these exercises should be conducted, we
can refer to the experience of the front operational-rear services
exercise with designated troops which was carried out with partici-
pation of Marshal of the Soviet Union. A. A. Grechko in the Baltic'
Military District in June 1959.
In accordance with the directive of General Headquarters
(STAVKA), the staff of the front (distract) planned an offensive opera-
tion and received instructions for its execution. By initial decision,
the tank army, which was to enter into the composition of the front
during the progress of the operation, made up the second operational
echelon and was to be brought into combat on the 3rd or 4th day of
the operation. When the ope ration was already planned, it became
known that General Headquarters had the opportunity to transfer the
tank army into the composition of the front earlier than the previously
designated time and offered the use of it in the first operational echelon
on the main axis. The command and staff of the front were placed in
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a difficult situation and had to replan.the operation anew in a limited
period of time, pass on the ..decision to the troops, and to carry out
their regrouping. In. this episode the staffs obtained considerable work
.experience under complex conditions.
In the course of the operation, by direction of Marshal of the
Soviet Union A. A..Grechko, there was repeated introduction of
elements of sharp change in the situation, which resulted in the
need for sharp changes in the tasks of formations and large units
and there was also practice in alerting the troops and committing
them to combat from the march from their permanent billets.
In the final phase of the exercise, a proposal was made to the
district staff that it develop and execute -an "army exercise within
a limited period. During the course of the army exercise, by
direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, a situatio
was created wherein the advancing army was forced to change its
direction of advance by 900 which, of course, required intensive
work on the part of the troops and staffs.
These exercises were a good training school for generals,
senior officers, staffs, and troops. It appears to us that o ra 'pnal
command-staff exercises should be carried out in just this fashion.
In the arrangement of preparations for command-staff exercises
it is expedient for the staffs of a district and of armies to carry out
two to three calendar days' staff training on the spot, utilizing com-
munications means to train, principally generals, officers, depart-
ments, directorates, and staffs as a whole in rapid development of
operational documents in accordance with a given situation and in
the ability to carry on communications on technical equipment and
with cryptographic security documents SUV; during the movement
and deployment of control points.
Therefore, during the course of the training. year, it is neces-
sary, in our view, to conduct in a district, as operational training,
1) military-technical refresher training courses, 2) a military-command
game, and 3) operational command-staff exercises on the spot. In
all,15 to 20 calendar days are required for this training. 50X1-HUM
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We also .consider it.necessary and feasible to .have the staff of
a district participate no less than once in two to three years in an
operational training exercise carried out by the Center on a strategic
scale. They can be strategic command-staff exercises on the spot
with means of communications or strategic military-command map
games involving several military districts. When a district participates
in a strategic command-staff exercise or game, district measures for
operational training inevitably relate to measures carried out by the
Center, and the second exercise planned by the district is not carried
out.
As concerns military- co command naps-games-on a strategic scale,
they can be conducTed w t the staffs of districts stationed at their
points of permanent assignment, and it appears to us that the method
for conducting them should be as follows. Having determined the
group.of military districts that are to participate in the game and
the complement of participants from each district, the Main Staff
develops the initial situation (tasks) and disseminates it to the
participants. The staffs participatirig-in the game are suddenly
alerted and proceed to their reserve control points. To supervise
the work of the exercise, groups of generals or officers--repre-
sentatives of the Main Staff and the central directorates, may be dis-
patched to the staffs of the districts.
In the course of a strategic military commandgate, in order
to present the plan of the operation and to get agreement on coordi-
nation with other districts participating in the game, the commander
or the chief of staff of the district along with commanders of arms of
troops will go by air at a definite time to the Center and to neighboring
district headquarters.
The basic content of a strategic military-command game, it
appears to us, must be the resolution of such practical questions
as bringing troops up to increased combat readiness during the threat-
ening period, the removal of these troops from a possible :.enemy
strike, the immediate execution of retaliatory nuclear strikes, the
elimination of the results of a nuclear attack, and joint operation
with the armies of the other Socialist States.
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The method proposed for .a strategic__military-command game does
not require large expenditures of material...means.and will undoubtedly
.have great benefit in the training of the command complement of the
.districts and their staffs, The duration of conduct of such exercises
should be no more than 6 to 7 days.
Therefore, a total of 20 to 25 days will be required for the opera-
tional training of generals, senior officers, and staffs of a district,
including the exercises which are carried out on a strategic scale.
It. is quite obvious that . execution of the measures indicated does
not end the operational training of generals and senior officers. The
principaLmetho_d of studying the theory of operational art remains
their independent efforts to synthesize and master the developments
which are continually appearing in the military affairs.
However,. the volume of military literature being published at
the present time is so large that one person has practically no oppor-
tunity to comprehend, nor even to read, all that is published on
various aspects of military affairs. Therefore it would be ex-
pedient, in our view, to plan and carry out so-called operational
rallies (aktiv) at least once every six months in the headquarters of
districts, with the participation of generals and officers of the prin-
cipal directorates and departments of the district and its armies.
mentally new tendencies.
The basic aim of such rallies is to convey to generals and officers
of the command complement, in a comprehensive form, the new
changes which have occurred during a certain period of time in opera-
tional art, tactics, and organization of our troops and those of the
enemy. At these rallies it would be possible, within a short time,
to familiarize the generals and officers with the basic contents of
the most important exercises, carried out in the Soviet Army and
abroad, to bring changes in troop organization to their attention, and
also to review the questions and postulates raised in the order of
their presentation in the periodical press. Of course, for these
undertakings it is advisable to make preparation and to pass to the
audience only those problems in which the solutions disclose funda-
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With approximately this same aim, but with a view to special
problems, and at .more frequent intervals (no less than once in
1 to 2 months), it would be beneficial to plan and to have operational
information (operationaya.informatsiya).1h..directorates and depart-
ments in the staffs of. districts and armies .in order that the generals
and officers be continually aware of new trends in operational art.
In connection with further improvement of the methods of
operational training and .the raising of. the level .of military know-
ledge of generals and senior officers, .there....is a need to improve
the quality of the trai ping aids being published, especially those
on nuclear/missile weapons.
At the present time, there is available to the troops a large
quantity of various forms of tables, lines, and graphs for the deter-
mination of the basic.-data for the use of destruction weapons and
for the protection of troops against them. But all of these aids were
prepared in primitive fashion and by amateurish methods, are
inconvenient to handle, and are far from perfect. Atremendous
amount of money is expended for the preparation of these aids in
the districts. Is it not time to formulate a single, more
sophisticated training aid for the whole army by a centralized
method and financed by those funds which are being wasted in
districts? It seems to us that an affirmative answer to this
question will economize on financial expenditures and will provide
the staffs with more sophisticated aids for which they have such
great need.
The proposals suggested by us for the improvement of the
methods of operational training of generals, senior officers,and
staffs claims in no-measure to be an, exhaustive exposition of the
-,problem posed.. Therefore it would be desirable to exchange
opinions in the pages of the--military press in order to discover
more sophisticated forms of operational training of generals,
officers, and staffs, and then use them to fulfill more qualitatively
the requirement of the Minister of Defense contained in the directive
on operational trairujng_No.. 0060.
Major-General M. Ivanov
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The general task of any command-staff or staff training exercise
on the spot is the training of omman wand staffs for operations
in complex conditions of modern combat reality. Whatever the
specific arms established by the command for each exercise and
whatever the methods used to carry out the exercise, the final aim
boils down principally--to training the command complement,
preparing the staffs , and continually raising the level of their combat
readiness.
It is understandable that the quality and results of an exercise
depend to a great extent on the nature of its preparation and organi-
zation. In the exercises carried out during the past years, there
can be noted a number of negative points common to all of them
which, in the interest of the subject, we feel it advisable not to ignore
in the future.
The desire to commit the headquarters, not with their existing,
but with considerably increased, personnel composition, communica-
tions means, and organizational transport is striking. This results
in the withdrawal of transport equipment and personnel from sub-
ordinate troops, which in turn disrupts the everyday life of units
and subunits. Using the personnel and motor vehicles, attached to
the headquarters for the period of the exercise, there is hasty
formation of temporary, disorganized subunits for carrying out
such functions as commendant's service and assistance to the
'Military Store" (Voyentorg); their personnel are not usually utilized
in accordance with their specialties. Commanders and staff officers
are placed in a false position because the staffs are brought out for
the exercise not as they actually are, but 'reinforced" at the expense
of weakening other troops. The most harmful thing here is the fact
that commanders and staffs become accustomed to participating in
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training exercises, only after definite organizational measures, but the
enemy really will not often permit this, especially in the initial period
of a war.
The best solution would be to have the staff s g-the exercise
with whatever composition they happen to have at the moment and to
give them some "reinforcements" during the course of the exercise;
to teach the commanders and staffs to command and direct with their
available, though limited means, and not to place them in an easier
and more favorable situation in advance. The example should be
set by higher headquarters, chiefly of districts.
The presence at a command-staff exercise of large numbers of
umpires is not always expedient, and occasionally is downright
harmful, at times not promoting the successful progress of the
exercise as much as distracting and tieing up the participants.
We are not even. speaking about the fact that a significant number of
umpires, and especially of their vehicles, at control points very
often interferes with the camouflaging of the latter.
These deficiencies are plainly noted when, for example,, the
commander summons to his field control point (PKP) vehicle or
tent one or two subordinate officers but instead, three or four
persons arrive, since each person summoned is trailed by one or
two umpires. They usually attempt to justify the assignment of so
many umpires with the excuse that it is done in the interests of
training. But these -aims should be achieved by classroom study,
by group exercises, and war games. And in reality, a commander
will never organize this type of meeting, which in actual conditions
would take extra materiel equipment (large tents, transport for their
movement, personnel to service them). Frequently the commander
and the staff, in preparing to go on an exercise, concern themselves
principally with where to billet and how to provide lights and food
for the umpires, and in what vehicles to transport them. But after
all, this is not the important thing.
The main thing is how to make one's headquarters combat ready
and, mobile, to set up the headquarters and ensure that its activities
are inconspicuous to the enemy, thus guaranteeing uninterrupted con-
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trol of the troops. Therefore, in preparing for the exercise, its
director is obligated to adopt the.measures which are necessary
to..eliminate the concern of the commander and staff conducting
the exercise about umpires. One should include only the minimum
.number of umpires. For the headquarters of a large unit, there
..should be..no..more than 5 to 7, and not 25 to 30 persons, as usually
...happens. In order to observe properly the work of contiguous
.departments and specific. .. individuals. it .is .advisable to combine
the work .of umpires and to assign one person for 2 or 3 depart-
ments, e.. g. , for the operational and._intelligence departments,
the rear services, special services, artillery, and aviation.
In ,.case of extreme._necessity...it is.-possible to assign an assitant
to certain .umpires. In this situation, it will be less crowded and
.the participants will work.more independently with more interest.
..During ,the course of the exercise, the secondary personnel will
be under the... management of the commander, the chief of staff, and
.the chief of the. department. Therefore, 5 to 7 qualified officers
of.the senior staff will be enough to instruct and to check a sub-
ordinate commander and the staff of, let us say, a division or
corps.
It is particularly desirable to note the role of terminal umpires
(kontsevyy posrednik), if they are.present at the exercise. First
of all, it is necessary that they be located in operating areas and
that the commander and.his.staff participating in the games should
have communications with both the -umpires and their subordinates
by. the actual...means that are possible in the given situation. An
exercise ...does .not achieve the desired results when the terminal
umpires are located at reduced distances. It is necessary that the
terminal umpire fulfill the will and orders of the commander if
they are not incomprehensible. The. director of the exercise must
so.instruct.the umpire as regards, decisions adopted by a commander.
Itis not possible to acknowledge the following situation as pro-
ce.d r y correct. _Having assigned a subordinate (final umpire)
the of. an offensive ..in the mountains, the commander cate-
gorically required.him to make a broad enveloping maneuver,
utilizing the..many available routes. The terminal umpire acted in-
correctly, and against the commander's orders, hit the enemy
"head-on", met with no success, and during the critique the director
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50X1-HUM
of the exercise rebuked, not the terminal umpire, but the participating
commander.
. Neither is _it possible to tolerate the fact that with the wide
use.of.liaison aircraft and.he.licopters.in all -branches of .the national
economy,. through the fault of the command, they are used very. little
or..not at all in command-staff exercises. In .the event of a restriction
.in the operation of radio. communications, the participating commander
and.-his staff are obliged to utilize only vehicular transport, at a time
when the helicopter (airplane) would be an incomparable means of
liaison if you consider that the troops will usually be located at great
distances from one another.
The problem here is certainly not in the real economy of
resources: but 'in the fact that in "departing further from sin" and
from superfluous "extraordinary occurrences" (ChP),, we do not
train the commanders and staffs to fulfill important responsibilities
by mastering air transport (selection of landing areas, concern about
materiel support), Furthermore, we neither teach nor train com-
manders and staff officers in observation, reconnaissance, and
orientation from the air. This is a very serious gap in the conduct
of command-staff exercises. For corroboration of the above, we
shall cite an example from the experience of the command-staff
exercise of the Turkestan Military District which was carried out in
1959. The day before the start of combat operations the commander
of a large unit was summoned for clarification of his task to the
senior commander's headquarters, which -was located at a great
.distance from the large unit. The commander, taking the deputy
.chief of the operations directorate with him, proceeded by vehicle
to the airfield, expending four hours of the night going cross country.
Upon arrival at the airfield, it turned out that the commander did not
have to...make the flight. He returned to his command post (P) in
another 4.hours, just 30 minutes prior to the 'attack". The deputy
chief of the operations directorate returned by airplane from the
.higher -headquarters to the area of location of his own headquarters
on the second day of operations and, in his own words, found the
headquarters, but the pilot, not being trained for operations under
these conditions, was afraid to land. The officer returned to his
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..headquarters after .the end of the exercise. The above again -corroborates
the fact that at the tactical level (zveno), not to mention .the operational,
it .is necessary to utilize air transport more widely for the control of
troops and to train officers and staffs as a whole to use air transport
.more sensibly.
.Two-sided command-staff exercises are carried.out_.in an inter-
esting.fashion, but they_..demand. great flexibility of -the command echelon
in the course of the exercise and also adequate communications with
the umpires of both sides, in order to permit correct reaction in
good..time to the.decisions adopted by the sides. For example, if
the "northern" troops .depart at 1700 hours from their areas of con-
centrations to new areas, it is not possible to evaluate positively the
results of a strike by the "southerners", carried out against these
areas after the departure from them of the "northern" troops.
Another example. The results of the action taken by the
"northern" side created favorable conditions for the landing of a
tactical airborne force in the rear of the "southerners'; which was
carried out after the necessary substantiations and calculations.
The senior umpire of the "northern" side noted all of this. However,
when this matter reached the director of the exercise, he changed the
conditions radically, "annihilated" the "northern" airborne force,
and "threw back" their left flank for a considerable distance, to the
benefit of the "southerners". Such lack of understanding between the
director and the senior umpires cannot pass unnoticed by the parti-
cipants, as well as the fact that at exercise critiques, quite correct
actions by one or the other side are declared incompetent and in-
correct without any basis.
In two-sided exercises, the sides must receive particularly
precise results of reconnaissance of targets. in the.. depth'..which cannot
be observed from the ground, especially if there are no actual means
of reconnaissance available to the participating staffs. In order that
the exercise proceed with great interest and in order that the assign-
ment of tasks to reconnaissance and the receipt of its results be
made more concrete and substantial, it is expedient in command-staff
exercises to use realistically simulated means of reconnaissance,
particularly aerial reconnaissance.
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.,...Depending upon how and when the reconnaissance, communica-
tions, and control of intelligence organs is organized, the latter
are responsible. for furnishing pertinent information on.the enemy
which.must arrive at the-headquarters via actual.means of com-
munications; for example: by radio from an artillery fire-adjusting
..plane; from -a staff.officer observer.in a helicopter, reconnaissance
plane, or bomber; from a reconnaissance group dropped into the
.enemy rear; radio .intelligence. from a higher headquarters, etc.
But the content of this.. information and the nature of its arrival
must be as close as possible to those of a real situation.
Completeness of information on the enemy is frequently
dependent, not upon well-organized and well-directed reconnais-
sance, but upon how persistently an intelligence officer follows
"on the heels" of the umpire and peers at his map.
At command-staff exercises carried out on the spot, many
opportunities exist to organize and carry out reconnaissance with
realistically simulated means and even with actual reconnaissance
subunits. This is especially important in two-sided command-staff
exercises. Of course, there must be designated persons (umpires)
in helicopters, airplanes, and subunits of troop reconnaissance who,
depending on the nature of the operations of the crew (subunit), will
be responsible for furnishing the necessary information and relating
this information to the locale which a given crew is observing. In
the capacity of umpires, in airplanes (helicopters) and in subunits,
it is expedient to have the commanders of these subunits, who will
be able to instruct their subordinates in the conduct of reconnaissance
simultaneously. This means that the subunits included for this
purpose must be composed of their own standard complement and
not of a contrived one.
In recent years, units and large units of troops have begun to
participate more frequently in command-staff exercises where, as
the background of a given exercise, they develop a definite theme
in the program of combat training and examine some particular
problem. Undoubtedly the inclusion of these troops raises the in-
terest of the participants of the exercise and compels them to be
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more careful in considering the situation and in calculating time
realistically; it obliges. them to keep in mind the presence of troops;
to be attentive also when resolving problems of materiel supply,
which frequently are, simplified in the absence of actual troops. In
the course of the exercise the command echelon must not forget the
participating troops, but must train them also. The deputy com-
mander of troops, in particular, must be responsible for this.
At times, due to a number of reasons (hindrances due to
sowing of crops, which creates a lack of sufficient motor vehicle
transport, etc. ), it is expedient to have the troops participate only
in certain stages or phases of the exercise. It is always permitted
and is never advisable to decline, to simulate troops as subunits
of motorized infantry, tanks, artillery, other arms of troops, and
also of aviation. This is always justified and will make the exercise
more interesting and instructive. The execution of command-staff
exercises with simulated troops has special significance now for
skeletonized (skadrirovannyy) large units and units and for units
and large units maintained at reduced complement. However, even
with simulated units, the commanders and staffs must operate in
realistic areas and not in reduced areas.
In conclusion, it is advisable to note once again that any
command-staff or staff exercise will be more beneficial and instruc-.
tive only if the staffs participate in the exercise at the strength
which they actually have, at the strength in which they will be caught
in a real situation, without extra preparations calculated for show
and effect of equipment. It is necessary to give the staffs only a
strictly limited time period for preparation to go on an exercise or
to put them on the alert and place them in conditions close to actual
reality.
Lt. -Gen. P. Chirkov
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