CHILE AND THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020046-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: September 22, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020046-3
CHILE AND THE CIA 2 2 SEP 1974
Our Central Intelligence Agency suddenly finds itself
the focus of the kind of limelight-public attention that no
outfit engaged in the espionage business. seeks or wel-
comes.
President Gerald R. Ford.
did a lot to put the CIA in this
uncomfortable spot. In a moment
of excessive candor, ' he admitted
that it had given money to demo-
cratic `parties and media outlets
in Chile. At the time, they were
threatened with extinction by
Chile's late "Marxist president,.
Salvador Allende.. Mr. Ford went
on to defend such "intervention"
where it served our national in-
terest-Those remarks 'stirred up
of it
quite a commotion; some _
~en_ Church
prompted . by genuine concer;r
over letting the CIA mix in the internal politics of other
nations. But there was a considerable amount of sheer
hypocrisy in the outcry,'too.
Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) indulged' in - a hand-
vrina ng, garment-renting, pity-our-poor-country orgy of
denunciation.'
But Sen. Church has been around long enough to
know that the CIA has been involved in what it delicately
calls "covert operations" since its establishment.
Such phony grandstanding aside, the dust raised by
the Chile affair caused President Ford to call in nine Con-
gressional leaders to discuss whether--
LANDESTIN E ACTIVITIES
-snou;d be continued and, if so, under what ground rules.
All n_ arties were mum about how the talks went.
In our view, the United States would be most unwise
to renounce entirely the use of undercover political tactics.
It is admittedly an unsavory business that runs contrary
to much in our heritage and traditions.
We must face the reality that in thesemes aggres-
sion is not always heralded by clanking tanks and march-
ing armies; it advances on the little cat feet of subversion.
Lacking a capacity to counter this type of stealthy
conquest. we would have to choose between two equaily
unappealing alternatives: permit it to press ahead un-
checked, or meet it with open force.
Covert operations should not be undertaken, how-
ever, unless it is imperative to do so, and then only under
strictest supervision.
There is some merit to claims by lawmakers that
they are entitled to know more than they are now being
told about the details of CIA projects.
Better advance briefing may be called for. But if
Con-res.a a.~ks and expects fuller information and greater
trust frori security agencies, it will have to demonstrate
its ability to deal responsibly with.. confidential matters.
Intelligence is vital to our security. and secrecy is
essential to effective intelligence work. The more people
who have to be told about plans and operations, the
greater U e risk of leaks.
It world be tragic if the flap over Chile resulted in
rules that forced the CIA to work in a fishbowl, so exposed
to public view that it could not possibly carry out its
a122?mil 'lli~SiOf.
Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020046-3
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