GETTING TO THE BOTTOM OF THE CIA COVER-UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020029-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: September 28, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020029-2
2 8 SEP 1074
Getting to the Bottom
Of the CIA Cover-up
some assistance- I-wanted you to know that he was in
fact-,doing- somethings for the President. He is a long.
time acquaintance with the people here. He may want
some help on computer runs and other things. You
Tad Szulc, in his article that follows, writes about Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency subversion in Chile and the
hiding of it from congressional scrutiny. The judg-
ments that led to secret intervention in Chilean politics
deserve to be criticized, but at least the CIA was with-
.in its legal authority under its charter. That is not the
case with CIA's complicity in Watergate "extra-agency
activities." The law barring the agency from under-
taking domestic operations was dearly violated. More-
over, when former CIA Director Richard Helms gave
misleading and inaccurate answers to questions posed
by senators about past CIA assistance to Watergate
conspirator E. Howard Hunt, who worked for the
Nixon White House, he was covering up possible
criminal activity.
Cushman did not know that Ehrlichman's call had
been prompted by Hunt's then-White House boss
Charles Colson. And at the time Cushman could not
know that the reason for the call was to pave the way
for Hunt to get disguises, false identity cards, a clan-
destine camera and tape recording equipment from
the CIA which were to be used for domestic political
purposes-
In, making this July 1971 request to the agency for
"carte blanche" aid to Hunt and wrapping it in vague-
ness about "security problems," Ehrlichman and
-
mould encounter no.
Colson seemed to be sure they
CIA demand for proof that Hunt. was not violating the
agency's charter-and the law-prohibiting domestic
operations. Would Cushman have cared? Why were
these White House aides either. unaware of the law or
not fearful such an: illegal request, if identified, would
be turned down, or worse, exposed to the public?
Again, another flashback - this time to 1969. Ac-
cording to the- House Judiciary Committee's final re-
port on the impeachment articles against Richard
Nixon: "In 1969, Haldeman and Ehrlichman asked the
Central Intelligence Agency to conduct physical sur-
veillance of Donald Nixon, the President's brother,
who was moving to Las Vegas. Haldeman was re-
ported to have feared that Donald Nixon would come
into contact with criminal elements." Thereafter is
cited a report by the CIA inspector general and Deputy
Director Cushman dated June 29, 1973. The House
report goes on to say that the CIA refused to under-
take that mission because it had "no jurisdiction to
engage in domestic law enforcement or internal se-
curity activities ..." So some line was drawn.
Sometime after the July 7 Ehrlichman call to Cush-
man, which was dutifully reported to the CIA staff
meeting the next morning, and before July 27, 1971,
CIA was asked to prepare a psychological profile of
Daniel Ellsberg. The request came from White House
aide David Young, who along with Hunt and others
were investigating Ellsberg. Young reportedly said
that both Henry Kissinger, then running the National
Security Council, and Ehrlichman wanted CIA to help.
Helms' director of security, Howard Osborne, to whom
the request was first made, has stated he initially
told Young it would have to be cleared by Helms, since
Ellsberg was "a United States citizen who was pre-
sently involved in a legal sense with the United States
government." Helms approved the project after talk-
ing to Young. He told Osborne that nothing was to
he sent to the White House "without his personal
prior approval-" It is interesting that Helms, in later
testimony on the matter, said he complained to Young,
On May 21, 1973 Helms was recalled from his post
as ambassador to Iran and questioned under oath by
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychi-
atrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, by then had been uncovered,
along with information that CIA had given equipment
and aid to Hunt who had directed the illegal entry.
Helms said he had never heard of Dr. Fielding until
the psychiatrist's name appeared in the newspapers.
When asked about photographs that had been taken
by Hunt with a CIA camera and developed by the
agency, Helms swore, "I do not know what the con- j
tents of the film were in the latter part of August
[1971]." One senator asked if anyone at the agencywho
.reviewed the film thought Hunt might be contemplat-
ing a break-in. "I never heard anybody at the agency
mention such a theory," Helms replied and later ad-
ded, "nobody had. given us the slightest indication
.that anything underhanded was afoot."
Helms was asked why CIA had cut off its assistance
to Hunt on August 27, 1971. Twice the former director
said it was solely because Hunt's requests had be-
come "too extenisive." To support that, he recollected
that Hunt asked to have a secretary brought back from
Pans and a covert New York telephone and address
established for him. Helms never mentioned the
photographs and what they appeared to show as the
reason for the agency's stopping its aid to Hunt.
A review of the House Judiciary Committee material
on the Ellsberg break-in and CIA's role indicate Helms'
Senate testimony. was not the true agency -story. On
July 7, 1971 White House aide John Ehrlichman called
then CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman, and ac-
cording to Cushman's secretary's notes, said: "I want'
to alert you that an old acquaintance [of Cushman's],
Howard Hunt, has been asked by the President to do
some special consultant work on security problems.
He may be contacting you sometime in the future for
UUU continued
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that for the agency to write a profile _a an American'
citizen was "an imposition," since CIA knew nothing
about Ellsberg. Nowhere did Helms complain that the
task involved. CIA in a domestic matter. Later Helms
was to weasel out some language in the law that per-
mitted the agency to study problems associated with
the security of CIA classified documents.
With the profile project approved, FBI documents on
Ellsberg and published materials were sent to the CIA
employee who handled the job, Dr. Bernard Malloy.
Meanwhile Hunt followed up on the July 7 Ehrlich-
man call and visited CIA Deputy Director Cushman
on July 22. A tape of that meeting relates that Hunt
said the equipment was needed because of "a highly
sensitive mission by the White House to visit and
elicit information from an individual whose ideology
we aren't entirely sure of...." That "individual" was
CliftonDeMotte,a man who supposedly had informa-
tion on the Kennedys. Hunt also said it would be a'
"one time op(eration) ... in and out." Cushman did
not ask if this was a domestic activity, instead he
said: "I don't see why we can't" provide the equip-
ment. The next day Hunt got what he wanted. One
week later Hunt called the CIA technician who sup-
plied the first material and asked for a tape recorder
and additional. help, including credit cards, a second
speech alteration device and a New York address and
telephone number.
On August 11 the CLA's first profile on Ellsberg was
delivered to the White House, after having been re-
viewed by Helms. Attached to it was a note from CIA
Security Director Osborne stipulating: "I know that
you appreciate that however this is used, the agency
should not become involved."
The report disappointed Young and his colleagues
at the White House. That same day, Young and Emil
Krogh proposed "a covert operation be undertaken
to examine" the files of Ellsberg's former psychiatrist,
Dr. Lewis Fielding. Thus plans were launched for
the subsequent break-in, and on the following day
Mr. Malloy of CIA met with Young, Hunt and G.
Gordon Liddy to discuss the agency report on Ellsberg.
Malloy has recalled that when he was told that Ellsberg
had been under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Field-
ing's name was also given to him. Though Hunt asked
Malloy to keep his name out of any report on the meet-
ing, Malloy responded he could not. The White House
aides asked Malloy what additional material he needed
to expand what had already been done. Malloy sug-
gested data from Ellsberg's early life, "from nurses
or close relatives...."
Conversations continued to take place over the next
weeks between Malloy and Hunt with the latter pres-
suring for a new profile. On August 25, 1971, Hunt
and Gordon Liddy requested and received additional
disguise material from CIA, along with a camera con-
cealed in a tobacco pouch. A day later the CIA tech-
nician who delivered the material was called long
distance by Hunt and asked to meet him at six am at
Dulles Airport to receive the camera and film and de-'
velop them. The film was taken for development but
the technicians began to question the use to which
Hunt was putting the equipment. The camera had
been used by Hunt and Liddy to clandestinely photo-
graph Dr. Fielding's office, inside and outside, in
order to prepare for the burglary. The photographs
were reviewed by CIA technical supervisory person-
nel before they were delivered to Hunt. They revealed
a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding"
clearly visible. They also disclosed shots of the office
and one CIA official speculated at the time they were
"casing" photographs. Deputy Director Cushman's
office was informed. A decision was made to tell Hunt
that no more requests for assistance would be honored.
According to Gen. Cushman's aide, the CIA technical
people thought the assistance given Hunt "appeared
to involve the agency in domestic clandestine opera-
tions," a finding confirmed by the CIA general coun-
sel's office. That same day, August 27, Cushman called
Ehrlichman at the White House and told him aid to
Hunt was being halted because of those concerns.
On September 3, 1971 the break-in at Dr. Fielding's
office took place. On October 14 or 15, 1971 the CIA
technician who had developed the pictures for Hunt
was told Gen. Cushman was lunching with Hunt the
next day and wanted a complete briefing on what
assistance Hunt had been given. The technician in-
cluded in the briefing material xerox copies of the
Hunt photographs. What happened at that meeting
(if it took place) between Hunt and Cushman, and
why did the CIA deputy director at that time want to"
be brought.up to date on Hunt's requests? Did the
agency figure out that there was a relationship between
the Ellsberg profile and the Hunt casing job of Field-
ing's office? Was any additional material supplied
by CIA on Ellsberg after the Fielding break-in? I've
asked that question several places and have no answer.
It is known that the final CIA profile went to the White
House on November 9, 1971 and carried with it a note
from Helms stating: "I do wish to underline the point
that our involvement in this matter should not be
revealed in any context, formal or informal." Though
Helms was later to testify he meant the work might
reflect adversely on the capabilities of the agency, the
men who put the study together have said that their
concern was that the "agency's involvement become
known and particularly that it might come to light
during any proceeding."
Walter Pincus
00652
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