NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 24 MARCH 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010083-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: March 24, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
CO NIDC 82-069C
24 Mar7982
COPY 4 0 2
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Guatemala: Military Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Central America:
Cuba: Defensive Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
International: Proposal on Aid to Turkey . . . . . . . . 6
Bangladesh: Armed Forces Takeover. . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Israel: Coalition Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Japan : Disarmament Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
South Africa - Zimbabwe: Trade Agreement Extended. . . . 9
China: Slow Wage Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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GUATEMALA: Military Coup 25X1
//The military junta that took power after an almost bloodless
coup yesterday has dissolved congress and abolished the constitution
and plans new elections
in about a year.//
//Efrain Rios Montt, a retired general who was the
Christian Democratic presidential candidate in 1974,
is the leader. The junta has announced its intention to
pursue free elections, an end to official corruption, and
an easing of Guatemala's international isolation; no
formal programs have been mentioned.//
o Staff General Hector Mario Lopez, w o was removed from
a command position last month because of his close ties
to rightwing leader Mario Sandoval, and other senior
officers participated. In addition, Sandoval's vice-
presidential running mate surfaced as the rebel's spokes-
man once the action was under way.//
Deputy Chief
The uprising took the government completely by
surprise
Practically all major units in the capital took part, and
minor resistance in a few cities and garrisons apparently
was quickly squelched. President Lucas, his brother Army
Chief of Staff Benedicto Lucas, President-elect Guevara,
and other officials evidently have been detained.
Comment: The coup is largely the result of mounting
disgust on the part of junior officers with the govern-
ment's corruption and inept leadership. The determination
of the plotters to make significant changes, however, can-
not yet be judged.
Honest elections and a peaceful transition to civilian
rule would at least partially refurbish Guatemala's tar-
nished international image and lay the foundation for some
measure of reconciliation at home. Rios Montt, a widely
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respected moderate, appears an excellent choice to give
respectability to the interim government, although his
first public address last night was shrill and uncompromis-
ing, not only toward the left but also toward the political
parties.
The involvement of Sandoval's close associates
in the coup, moreover, may indicate substantially in-
creased influence for the extreme right, and political
tensions are likely to grow during the yearlong wait for
elections. This probably would hamper the junta's efforts
to broaden its base at home and restore Guatemala's stand-
ing abroad.
In the meantime, leftist guerrillas may take advan-
tage of the preoccupation by the armed forces with poli-
tics to step up terrorist activities.
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Leaders of the rightist National Conciliation Party,
meanwhile, have indicated to US officials that they will
continue political attacks against the cogoverning Chris-
tian Democrats while avoiding open criticism of Roberto
D'Aubuisson's ultraconservative National Republican
Alliance. They also implied that they would charge fraud
if the Christian Democrats prevail in the election.
Despite the hard line taken by the National Concil-
iation Party leaders, some of the more moderate party
members previously have indicated that they would con-
sider a postelection alliance with the Christian Demo-
crats. The moderates may suspect complicity by D'Aubuisson
in the death of one of their leaders in January. They
also probably realize that an ultraconservative govern-
ment would cost El Salvador important foreign support,
which would ultimately benefit the insurgents.
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CUBA: Defensive Preparations
//Cuba's armed forces for the past month have been engaged in
countrywide preparations for the possibility of a US attack, and
the program probably will continue through next month.//
//Trenches, bunkers, revetments, and antiaircraft
artillery emplacements have been constructed at many
military installations throughout the island. Armored
vehicles, artillery, and air defense equipment have been
dispersed from garrisons to nearby defensive positions.
Guided-missile patrol boats and a few MIG-21 aircraft
also have been dispersed since late February.//
//The preparations have not disrupted military train-
ing or the sugar harvest, which is at its peak. Moreover,
there has been no accompanying campaign of public warnings
and diplomatic demarches similar to the one conducted
last November when an alleged invasion threat caused the
regime to declare a military alert.//
Comment: The measures increase Cuba's ability to
survive an air attack but otherwise add little to the
island's defensive capabilities. They probably reflect
general directives to military commanders to be ready
for an attack by the US.
//The extensive preparations also may be aimed at
convincing skeptics in Cuba that a showdown with the
US is coming. During the alert in November, many Cubans,
apparently numbed by two decades of manufactured crises
and alerts, refused to believe that an invasion was im-
minent. At the same time, the preparations suggest that
the regime is willing to risk an air attack as the price
of maintaining its aggressive policy in Central America.//
Although the initiation of these defensive measures
preceded the NATO naval maneuvers held earlier this
month in the Gulf of Mexico, the preparations continued
after the conclusion of the exercise. Havana probably
is worried by even larger US naval maneuvers, scheduled
to begin next month, that will include two US aircraft
carriers and a Marine amphibious landing at the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base.
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INTERNATIONAL: Proposal on Aid to Turkey
//Most West European governments probably would favor an OECD
proposal that seeks to avoid a formal pledging session this year
on aid to Turkey, a move that would receive grudging acceptance
from Ankara.//
//Rolf Geberth, head of the OECD's Turkish aid con-
sortium, fears that holding a pledging session this year
could increase criticism of Ankara in West European media
and legislatures and make it more difficult for govern-
ments to grant aid. He instead suggests a less formal
meeting in late spring or early summer.//
//Geberth expects that this meeting would conclude
that Turkey now requires less balance-of-payments assist-
ance but would propose continued project aid. It wou1d
not require governments to specify any aid amounts.
Comment: //Most West European governments probably
would endorse Geberth's proposal because they face ma-
jor political and economic obstacles to Turkish aid.
Dropping the multilateral pledge requirement would reduce
OECD pressure on participating governments to aid Turkey.//
//On the other hand, a formal pledging session might
not be effective until the political situation in Turkey
changes significantly. Domestic opinion probably would
deter many governments from either making pledges
carrying through on such commitments.//
//Ankara would be concerned that the proposal would
lead to a reduction in project assistance. The military
government may resent the suggestion because it believes
it has done much to accommodate West European political
concerns.//
//Ankara, nevertheless, would be relieved if there
were no formal OECD discussion of Turkey's political
situation. It would be likely to accept the proposal,
while increasing its efforts to secure bilateral aid
commitments.//
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Prone j1ronically unstable country.
//The ouster yesterday of the five-month-old civilian govern-
ment by the armed forces in a well-planned coup probably will not
change the country's pro-Western orientation.//
//General Ershad declared himself Chief Martial Law
Administrator and dismissed the government; President
Sattar's fate is unknown. The military had become in-
creasingly dissatisfied with the elderly Sattar, whose
poor health added to his apparent reluctance to tackle
Bangladesh's severe economic problems.//
Both previous Presidents of Bangladesh were as-
sassinated in military coups. President Zia Rahman, a
former general who overthrew the country's founder in
1975, was himself slain by disgruntled Army officers
last May.
Ershad has the Army's backing for now, but he has
no popular support outside the Army and is regarded
suspiciously by some factions within it because he did
not fight in Ban lades 's war of independence from
Pakistan.
Comment: The conservative military is unlikely to
change the country's pro-Western orientation, but
probably can do little to improve the economic situation.
The new leaders will move quickly to reassure the Western
nations, upon which Bangladesh depends for its vitally
needed food aid, that economic management in the country
will be improved. Ershad lacks the leadership, however--
as the military lacks the expertise--to reverse a con-
tinuing economic decline.
framework is unlikely to bring stability to this coup-
The military will back Ershad for the short term,
but is itself deeply divided, and the current governing
Top Secret
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ISRAEL: Coalition Prospects
Under Israel's parliamentary procedures, the tie
vote in the Knesset yesterday on Prime Minister Begin's
rule was the equivalent of a victory for him.
Comment: The opposition Labor Party is heartened
by the vote, however, and is likely to step up its con-
tacts with other opposition groups to bring down the
government. Knesset hardliners also will increase their
efforts to discredit the government in hopes of compli-
cating the final pullout from the Sinai. Begin probably
considers that his threat to resign will reinforce coali-
tion discipline; he may resume negotiations with the
two-member Telem Party of the late Moshe Dayan to
strengthen his chances of defeating future challenges--
almost certain to occur before the Sinai withdrawal late
next month.
//Public pressure on the government to take some offi-
cial initiative on disarmament is growing rapidly. The
leftist opposition sponsored a massive pro--disarmament
rally on Sunday and has initiated a petition drive. To
preempt the opposition, Prime Minister Suzuki plans to
propose a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities
being used for peaceful purposes when he addresses the
UN General Assembly's special session in June. Tokyo
is now seeking advance approval from Washington for such
an initiative.//
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entire post-Mao period.//
SOUTH AFRICA - ZIMBABWE: Trade Agreement Extended
South Africa's extension of the preferential trade
agreement with Zimbabwe has given new encouragement to
the Zimbabwean business community. The agreement, which
would have expired today, allows Zimbabwe to export
10 percent of its manufactured goods to South Africa
under highly favorable terms. The decision to continue
the existing arrangement as an interim measure was made
despite opposition from the South African business com-
munity.
Comment: The talks may yet stall as a result of
Salisbury's refusal to meet political conditions demanded
by Pretoria. A lapse in the current agreement would
have been a blow to Zimbabwe's economy, which has been
hurt by South Africa's announcement last year that the
accord would be terminated. The Botha government, how-
ever, evidently is interested in maintaining working
relations with--and continued leverage over--a politically
hostile neighbor.
CHINA: Slow Wage Growth
//The leadership has begun to publicize post-Mao
improvements in living standards and to seek support for
policies that tie wage increases to productivity in
order to reduce consumer expectations and prepare an
already discontented workforce for slower income growth.
The widely acclaimed consumer policies of the government
raised real incomes dramatically in 1978 and 1979, ending
the decline that accompanied more than a decade of left-
ist economic policies. Since 1980, however, inflation
has eroded those gains, but a new State Statistical
Bureau release focuses on consumer gains made over the
likely to prompt additional worker protest.
by opponents to attack Deng Xiaoping's policies and is
Comment: A slowdown in the growth of consumer
income, which outpaced both productivity and overall
economic growth during the post-Mao era, could be used
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