SOVIET ESPIONAGE: A BIG EFFORT - AND IT PAYS OFF BIG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807580067-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 67
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/15: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807580067-4
Soviet Espionage: "A Big
EtIort-anr.t It Pays Off Big"
From America's intelligence chief comes
an insider's assessment of KGB strategy in
the U.S. against the background of the Walker
family's alleged spy ring.
Q Mr. Casey, what does the Walker case-the arrest of three
members of one American family and a fourth suspect for spy-
ing-say about Soviet espionage operations in this country?
A Well, it says that they have had a big success. It also
confirms what we have known right along-that the Soviet
KGB has a very large and well-organized program operat-
ing on a worldwide basis. They get a lot of intelligence.
We have had success in thwarting the KGB ranks, and
over the last couple of years, they've had a lot of failures.
But they have their successes. too-and
this particular case seems to be a big
success.
Q A big success?
A Yes, it went on a long time. and it
seemed to be well organized. These
folks who have been arrested seemed
to have made a cottage industry out of
spying.
C. Now damaging was it to American
interests?
A I'm afraid it's quite damaging. I
can't fully assess it vet. But these peo-
ple were in a position to acquire and
put together a great deal of informa-
tion which we very much want to keep
away from the Soviets-information
which they could find very useful.
Q What kind of information could the
Soviets have gotten?
A Well. I haven't seen any damage
assessment, and I'm just speculating. I
think it's pretty clear that these peo-
ple, in a communications role. were in
a position to get a great deal of infor-
mation about codes, which could open
up a lot of things.
And they were probably in a position
to learn a lot about placement and
movements of our ships and perhaps
allied vessels.
Q What do you think this says in terms
of the American military's ability to guard against this sort of
spying?
A Well, nobody ever said we were able to completely
protect ourselves against this kind of activity. We do know
the KGB has had a number of successes over the last 10
years-rather major ones, mostly gathering technical infor-
mation about our weapons, our technology and our method
of collecting intelligence.
This is a big. wide-open country. and the KGB has large
numbers of people at work. I think the FBI works very
effectively in getting a picture of what they're doing here,
and CIA does worldwide. But they've got a big intelligence-
gathering apparatus. Each operation is done clandestinely,
and it's tough to get all of them.
Q Some years back. most Amer-
icans and Europeans who spied for
the Soviet Union did so for ioeoloo-
ical reasons. What is the motivation
today?
A I think it - mostl' mone\
More people or the other side
are getting disihusioned with the
Soviet system acid are defectins and ww antine to heir us but
on our side its inostl\ money that leads Americans to \\ ork
for the KGB.
Q The Walker case is the latest in a considerable number of al-
leged spy cases in the U.S. over the past year or so. Does this re-
flect a major increase in Soviet spymo activities in this country or
just more success in apprehending Soviet agents?
A That's very hard to say. We don't know how many are
out there.
I think we're probably getting better at counterespio-
nage. We have put more resources into it. We've signifi-
cantly increased the number of FBI agents watching and
following them, so it's harder for them. If we put more
people on it. we're going to catch more. At the same time,
the Soviets are working harder, too. We've had better luck
Interview With
William Casey, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency
in catching them. particularly in the
area of technological espionage.
Q How do you assess the Soviet effort
in this area?
A Gaining access to our advanced
technology continues to be. we think.
their top priority. We know they have
a very well-organized. far-flung effort
to determine what it is they want. to
target and find out where the work is
being done, to send people out with
names and addresses to go after the
technology they seek. This is done on a
worldwide basis.
They started some 15 years ago to
recruit 100 people a year out of their
technical and scientific schools, bring
them into the KGB, train them to tar-
get. assess and go out and chase down
secrets and steal them.
We've identified some 300 dummy
firms worldwide that are small technol-
ogy-smuggling shops. These entrepre-
neurs in technical piracy go out on the
world market. They say they want to
buy this and buy that, and people hus-
tle to get it for them.
The Soviets operate a great big appa-
ratus back there in Moscow that keeps
track of who has what in the way of
advanced technology and what weap-
ons it goes into. We figure that about a
thousand people are working in this organization.
C. Exactly what do these people do?
A Some of them in the headquarters do the analytical
and targeting work, and the others go out and operate in
foreign capitals and around the world to get next to people
who have this technology or who run these dummy firms.
They do this on a very organized, systematic basis. They
have an annual report on the needs of the various govern-
ment ministries-energy, aviation, heavy industries. These
ministries determine what they want in the way of technol-
ogy-production equipment, guidance, electronics. micro-
electrtdnics. computers, whatever. They put out a wish list,
a directory every year of what they want.
Q Do the Soviets get advanced technology from the West
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mainly by espionage. or through commercial channels by clr-
cumventing restrictions?
A \\e think nt' KCP produce the larL,t'st proportion of
it tnrollgh t ptonuce but otncr SoA lets get it also by attclid-
Ing scientific conference and h\ conibntc through litera-
ture, our trade magazines and goyernnie nt files that are
open to them
Their spies try to buy and steal blueprint, About a v ear
ago. the FBI grabbed somebody who had the drasvmcs for
our NIX.
They get it lot of it through legitimate trade channels.
Some of these dummy firms set up by the Soviets will bus
things from here in the United States and ship them to
some other country from which they can pass them on to
the Soviet Union.
Q Can the West shut off this flow of technology, or is It
inevitable, given the open nature of our societies?
A I think we do slow the flow by sensitizing people who
have the information to the dangers of being targeted by
the KGB and also by tightening up our controls over trade
and by tightening up our surveillance of their espionage.
Four years ago we didn't realize the degree to which the
precision, power and accuracy of their weapons depended
upon our technolog' . We now, understand that. And we are
making progress in slowing down the flow of this technolo-
gy. I don't suppose you can ever stop it altogether. But you
can make it a lot harder for them to get.
Q How successful have they been in using U.S. technology
to develop their weapons?
A Their space shuttle is pretty much modeled on ours.
Their guidance system in their strategic nuclear missiles is
pretty much a copy of what we have. We frequently know
enough about their weapons so that we can identify it when
they turn up with a feature we had for a couple of years. It's
a big effort. and it pays off for them. It pays off big.
Q Can you put a money figure on how valuable this has been
in terms of cutting down Soviet defense expenditures?
A Oh. it's certainly worth billions of dollars. It's hard to
put it all together and quantify it. But it's not only what it
saves them. I'd put a higher value on what it costs us when
we discover that we have to develop a countermeasure to
something they've acquired from us.
Q Mr. Casey, if we can turn to another critical issue: Is this
administration shifting toward more-active CIA support for anti-
Communist insurgents around the world?
A well. we don't talk about that. although the subject
gets talked about in the press and in the Congress. But it's
Key Points Made by Casey
The Walker spy case. "A big success" for the Soviets;
"quite damaging" to American interests.
Soviet espionage target. "Gaining access to our ad-
vanced technology" is the top priority.
Support for insurgents. "Every President since Frank-
lin Roosevelt has authorized support of rebels opposing
an oppressive government."
Impact of contras. They've "kept the Sandinistas from
consolidating a totalitarian regime."
U.S. military intervention in Latin America. It would
be a "tough decision" if the Sandinistas became en-
trenched in Nicaragua.
Retaliating against terrorists. "It's not inconceivable"
that the U.S. would attack a government that promoted
assaults against American targets.
CR',Ir t11,11 ttit'r, 1' al. In('rt'dst If: t: t 11Un11)t': 0: tlt'oplt
around the wo: Id \\ it( are rising t id of dntmg tt resist
ommuiiio-imp,v,ed c,,\ crnment,
\\c v c ,iisvav s ;ad a puiicv of hcipnii? lriendly countries
protect and deiced themselves Tht President made it
clear that he believes w e should help people opposing
oppressive governments
Q How can you reconcile U.S. support. say, for contras in
Nicaragua or for the Moslem rebels in Afghanistan with the
administrations condemnation of what the Soviets and Cubans
themselves are doing. for example, in El Salvador?
A If it nation supports rebels against it government, it
takes the position that that government is not it valid go\ -
eriiment. The regime in Afghanistan vvas clearly imposed
by force.
The government in Nicaragua is clearly oppressive and
maintained by force. and it's supported from the outside.
It's out to overthrow the government in El Salvador and in
Honduras, and we think in Costa Rica and so on.
Cambodia is being occupied by 170.000 Vietnamese
troops.
So these are not legitimate governments. You have to
make that distinction. Every U.S. President since Franklin
Roosevelt has authorized support of rebels opposing an
oppressive or illegitimate government.
Q In practical terms, is this policy producing results?
A There have been significant successes in either delay-
ing or frustrating and even avoiding the imposition of a
totalitarian government.
Q In Nicaragua. do you think that the contras have a chance
either to overthrow the Sandinista government or to force it to
accommodate political opponents?
A The rebels have kept the Sandinistas from consolidat-
ing a totalitarian regime and establishing a base from which
their neighbors could be threatened militarily. Now,
whether that's going to succeed. how long that's going to
prevent consolidation or whether it will change the govern-
ment, we don't know. We know that a comparable insur-
gency in Angola has been going for 10 years and is an
important force.
Q Isn't there a danger that U.S. support for an enterprise like
this can get out of control?
A It doesn't have to. It can be turned of; when circum-
stances require it. Nobody's plunking in their troops except
the Soviets in Afghanistan and Vietnamese in Cambodia.
That's quite different from providing supply, advice, that
sort of thing.
Q If doing something about the Sandinista government is in
this country's interest, doesn't it follow logically that U.S. mili-
tary intervention in some form becomes a clear possibility If the
contras are unable to do the job themselves?
A I would only refer you to what Secretary of State
George Shultz said on that. He said that if we fail to
induce the Sandinistas to reform by backing the rebels. we
may face a question of whether we could have to do it
militarily.
Look, if indeed what you have here is a second Cuba,
this time on the American mainland. and we don't want to
accept that permanent impairment of our security, the
easiest way to do it is helping the people who want to
resist it on the ground. If that fails and the Sandinistas
consolidate, then it's a tough decision.
Q In the absence of any more American aid, are the contras
going to evaporate, or can they hang on?
A It's amazing how people can continue to resist.
They've held on very well. Congress terminated support
effectively more than a year ago, and they're still there.
They're as active as they've ever been. They've had prob-
lems-some things they had to learn to do for themselves,
%tlnued
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but the' v. iw arned it ~~Diu can : dl~i inmt hat tIftse
I>t ople C:u~ Col
Q When we go in with suDDort for a group like the con-
tras. don't we. in effect. assume a moral responsibility for
their ultimate Late?
A \\ell. I tiiml. you do assume some responsibility.
hut, you know. life isn't ease If you want to do things,
Oil've got to assume responsi billh
Q What are the consequences of cutting them loose?
A \ ery bad for our reputation. for the willingness of
other countries who rely on our commitments. It's very
bad in terms of our reliability.
Q Does our action imply similar responsibility to Hondu-
ras. which provides an active base of support to the contras?
A Thats a matter of geography. The consequences of
letting it go are the impairment of our security, probably
n of our attention. We have to worry about our
i
di
o
vers
a
immediate back yard. Rebels in Nicaragua. "The easiest way" to prevent "permanent im-
Experience tells us that when the Communists take pairment of our security is helping the people who want to resist it."
over one of these countries, people, leave the country by
the millions. Lartc numbers of refugees will almost certain- ons away or establishing stronger security and defense so he
ly come here if the perception is that Communists are is deterred from doing it.
going to take over Central America. Q There were published reports several weeks ago that the
Q Turning to the administration's antiterrorism effort: How CIA trained a Lebanese antiterrorist squad, which then hired
effective is the policy of trying to pre-empt or retaliate against some people who went out and car-bombed a building in Beirut,
anti-U.S. terrorists? resulting in 80 fatalities. What happened in that case?
A Well, I think its a mistake to focus only on taking A That's a complicated story. The CIA and other intelli-
retaliatory or pre-emptive action. There's more to it. If gence services have worked with local intelligence services
you're resisting international terrorism and trying to pro- for many years to help them do their job. We have helped
tect your installations and your citizens from terrorism, train the Lebanese in how to deal with terrorism.
you've got to provide security and fortify your buildings. All Americans are at risk in Lebanon. We have lost better
You need intelligence to provide knowledge of what the than 300 people there in terrorist attacks. We told the
threat is and how the forces that practice terrorism func- Lebanese it's up to them to protect our people and our
tion and what their style is. You then have to try to get installations, but we offered to help them. We've worked to
intelligence about their intentions. strengthen their capabilities, train them, give them techni-
Q But top administration officials talk about taking pre-emp- cal support. But they do any operations themselves. We
tive action against terrorists. Where does that come in? were not involved, and no one we had trained was involved
A If you get prior intelligence about an operation, then in the Lebanese car-bombing operation.
you nave a chance to stop it. One way is by pre-emption, by Q Did the attack lead to a change of policy, as was reported?
taking their weapons away or arresting them or attacking A Well, we didn't like the way that situation was han-
them some other sway. That has to be done by local died. So we pulled back from any involvement in the plan-
secu- orces. We can't run around doing this in other ning or preparation of operations.
coin But we can work with the security forces and Q You mean no more collaboration with Lebanese intelli-
supp..r- them. We can train them. and we can give them pence in counterterrorism?
technical assistance and intelligence. A We still share intelligence and still train them. But
Q What about retaliation against terrorists who attack Ameri- they had come and asked us to help plan pre-emptive
can targets? action. Before the bombing. we were ready to consider
A That's pretty tough going because. first, we can't do it helping them with planning that sort of action if they did it
directly unless its grave enough to warrant military action. in a surgical, careful. well-targeted way-if they really
Of course, you have state terrorism, where governments knew what they were doing.
engage in terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy, Q How could you participate in planning for something like
using their embassies and communications for that purpose. that If it were likely that people were going to be killed? Isn't that
It's not inconceivable that we would attack a government if Illegal under U.S. law?
we were sure it had conducted an attack of this kind against A I don't want to get into a legal discussion here. I don't
Americans. think so. Let's say Congress voted funds to support the
The Israelis do it all the time. It's clear that we're not Afghan resistance, and we were asked to help and advise
afraid or unwilling to do it if the circumstances were right. them. Would we be engaged in assassination every time an
But you've got to be very careful. There are a lot of things Afghan soldier killed a Soviet soldier?
you've got to consider. You don't know how effective a That's not the intention. If the Lebanese discharge their
retaliatory action is going to be. It's not something you do duty to protect the lives and property of their citizens as
lightly. well as other nationals. and if in the course of doing that
Q You seem to minimize the utility of a pre-emptive U.S. someone gets killed, are we assassinating that guy? No.
strike or even a retaliatory strike- We're helping the Lebanese perform a security function.
A It depends upon the circumstances. I'm not going to If someone gets killed or hurt, well, it's a rough game. 1'
say that its not a feasible thing to do. You have to be very You don't resist and take protective action against terrorists
careful about it. There have been successful pre-emptions. because you worry that there's going to be somebody who
They haven't taken the form of going out and killing the might say, "Ah, that's assassination." then terrorists can
man who you think is going to make an attack. But they own the world, because nobody`s going to do anything
have taken the form of apprehending him. taking his weap- against them.
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